USE OF THESES

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LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

BY

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"I am a little world made cunningly
Of Elements, and an Angelike spright."
Donne.
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INTRODUCTION

Locke's Essay was an "inquiry into the nature of the understanding." The Inquiry was an epistemological one. Locke was concerned to discover how the understanding became stocked with ideas, how it used them to know, and how it worked differently with them when it merely believed. He was also concerned to show that his singularly empirical account of how the understanding acquired its ideas and operated with them, did not rule out as somehow illicit, notions like those of space and time which seem far removed from sense.

Now this thesis is an inquiry into the nature of the understanding as it is described by Locke. But the inquiry here will be only partly epistemological and will be in the main metaphysical. It will be epistemological to the extent that it is concerned with how, according to Locke, the mind comes to know itself. It will be metaphysical, or better, ontological, in that it is concerned with what the understanding is in Locke, i.e., how he characterizes it as a self-contained unit. An analogy may help to bring out the distinction here. A mirror may be characterized from two points of view:

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Introduction. Sect. 4.
firstly, we may be content merely to describe the thing before us, taking in its shape, weight, the fact that it is made of glass and that the glass is silvered behind etc., or we may wish to describe how it performs a certain function viz., that of reflecting light, and our description then will be very different. Locke's main purpose in the Essay is to describe the understanding from the second point of view, but he does say something about it from the first, and the aim of this thesis is to find out what he does say here.

When this has been done an attempt will be made to see how Locke fitted the understanding into one of his own categories, viz., that of substance, and to see what sense can be made of his assertion that material substances might think.¹

As a preliminary to this it will be necessary to determine just what Locke means when he says that something is a substance, and in view of his assertion that the quality of thinking might inhere in a material object, it will be necessary to look into his classification of qualities.

¹ 4.3.6.
Finally, I shall challenge Locke's assertion that thinking (or more properly consciousness) can be a quality.

This thesis, then, will be an Essay about Lockean metaphysics and in view of the fact that John Locke the philosopher was first and foremost an epistemologist, it may be worthwhile making a few remarks about how he came to hold a metaphysical doctrine like that of substance, and why he made his famous classification of qualities. Locke was concerned to explain, with his own empirical model, how we acquire certain of our ideas, and after explaining how we acquire that of power, he came to that of substance. We arrive at that simply by postulating a support for sensible qualities, since "we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor in one another."¹ This support which enables qualities to exist is what a substance is. And this is a metaphysical doctrine.

Locke expounded the primary/secondary distinction for two reasons. He wished to throw into as strong relief as possible the distinction between our ideas and the qualities that they are ideas of, and he wished to show

¹ 2.23.4.
that some ideas are copies of qualities outside the mind and that some are not. In what sense the primary/secondary distinction is a metaphysical one, is a question I will discuss in the course of this thesis.

It is noticeable that in both these cases the metaphysics grew out of the epistemological programme. To some extent this was inevitable: it is impossible to say how we acquire our idea of solidity or space or whatever, without saying what these ideas are. This involves conceptual analysis, which is a typical metaphysical activity. In this thesis I will prescind from the epistemological programme and will examine some of the metaphysics that it required and produced.


"C.S." in the references stands for "Correspondence with Stillingfleet". The references are to pages. The

"E of M" in the references stands for "An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God". In the same series as the Correspondence, Vol. 8. The references are to sections.

"Remarks" in the references stands for "Remarks Upon Some of Mr Norris's Books, Wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of Our Seeing All Things in God." In the same series as the Correspondence, Vol. 9. The references are to sections.
2. **A MATERIAL OBJECT AND ITS QUALITIES**

Locke does not consider extension to be definitive of body. He thinks of extension simply as a distance between two points, and this being the case, he can think of an extension in empty space. Indeed, empty space can be thought of as infinitely extended and in some places in his writings Locke uses "extension" as a synonym for "pure space" or "simple space".

He distinguishes our concepts of the extension of body and the extension of space thus:

The extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, movable parts, and the extension of space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and inmovable parts.

"Bodies", he writes elsewhere, can make distinct surfaces in a "uniform simple extension" and this is something that pure space cannot do. Again, when we consider extension in relation to "matter itself" it is "the distance of its coherent solid parts". So the difference between

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1 2.13.27., 2.13.10., 2.13.3., 2.4.4., C.S.p.419.
3 2.4.4.
4 E of M 45.
5 2.13.27.
the extension of a body, and an extension between two points in empty space, is cashed by saying that in the first instance the extension is the distance between solid parts or better between the termination or boundaries of a system of solid parts, and in the latter case, if we have, say, a cube of empty space, then we can think of extension as any of the distances between its eight points, the distance being in the featureless continuum that Locke (usually in the Essay) considers empty space to be.

Locke writes that the idea of solidity is "most intimately connected with, and essential to body." However, he explicates this notion in two different ways, and this leads to confusion. The explication goes in two directions because Locke wants to make two points about this notion, but he never properly distinguishes them. The first point concerns our notion of solidity, the second is that the Cartesian view that extension is the essence of body is false. To demonstrate this, Locke tries to establish that solidity and extension together comprise the essence of body, but the notion of solidity

1 2.4.1.
that he uses in this connection is not the same as "our" notion of it.

To consider first "our" notion of solidity:

The idea of solidity we receive by our touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.¹

Our idea of solidity, Locke says, arises from our feeling of resistance. However, it becomes clear that the idea we have of resistance is our idea of solidity. "That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved one towards another, I call solidity." Locke considers it a "sufficient explication of solidity, what it is, or wherein it consists"² to put an inflated football, or a flint, between a man's hands and then getting him to try to move his hands together.

Now resistance admits of degrees. The flint resists an applied force more than a heavily inflated football does, and the latter more than a loaf of bread does. Therefore the one is more solid than the other.

However, Locke also says that solidity "is the idea which belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill space."³

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¹ 2.4.1.
² 2.4.4.
³ 2.4.2.
So where we have a solid we have a space "replete",¹ as opposed to a space empty:

The idea of which filling of space is, that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other substances, and will forever hinder any other two bodies, that move towards one another in a straight line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them in a line not parallel to that which they move in.²

Now Locke is insistent that "solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses".³ And this being the case, what was solid on his first definition is not solid by the second. A loaf of bread encloses a certain volume of space, but it can be compressed into a smaller space. Thus the original loaf was not solid since it did not "utterly exclude" other bodies from the space it occupied. Obviously, very few things we ordinarily call "solids" will be solid on this definition which, let it be noted, equates solidity with both incompressibility and impenetrability. If a body can be compressed into a smaller space, then that body is

¹ C.S.p.392.
² 2.4.2.
³ 2.4.4. (my emphasis).
not a solid, and even if a body cannot be compressed into a smaller space, yet if another body can be driven into it, then that body is not a solid either. I will call this idea of solidity the "anti-Cartesian" one, since it is in evidence when Locke is attacking the Cartesian idea of space,¹ and the other idea, the "ordinary" one.

Locke distinguishes "solidity" from "hardness", the latter meaning "a firm cohesion of the parts of matter so that it does not easily change its figure".² Take, for example, a volume of water enclosed in an unbreakable membrane. By "unbreakable" I mean it is such that no force exerted on it when it is filled with water is sufficient to break it, and let us suppose that no force can compress the membrane of water into a smaller volume. It is therefore solid, but it is not hard because its shape can be changed merely by squeezing it.³ Conversely, something can be hard but not solid e.g., an ordinary piece of timber. (This is on the "anti-Cartesian" idea. On the "ordinary" idea anything hard would be solid, since anything hard would not easily change its shape. This implied resistance.)

¹ Vide 2.4.2-4., C.S.p.312., p.419. 2.13.11.
² 2.4.2.
³ Just for the record: if the shape changed, the volume would change slightly too. But I ignore this subtlety.
Now "solidity" in both the "ordinary" and "anti-Cartesian" sense is a technical term, since under the definition of the first, liquids and gases are both solid, and under the definition of the second, liquids are solids if they are suitably contained. This is a paradox, but it is not a serious one, since the point of introducing the term "solidity" is to pick out a characteristic that is essential to body, and the "ordinary" notion does this with respect to gases and liquids as well as objects with more stable shapes, and the anti-Cartesian one does with some bodies and suitably contained liquids. Gasses and liquids are bodies or material objects. The distinction that is marked in general discourse by saying that liquids and gases are not solids and wood and steel are, is marked in Lockean terminology by saying that the latter "do not easily change their figure"\(^1\) (i.e., are hard) while the former are soft.

The other idea that is essential to body is the idea of shape. This idea is a construct of our idea of extension or pure distance:

The mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction... or else

\(^1\) 2.4.4.
join another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of angle it pleases. So also the lines that are its sides, of what length it pleases, which joining again to other lines of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly enclosed any space, it is evident that it can multiply figures, both in their shape and capacity, in infinitum. ¹

Our idea of a shape is of a group of lines enclosing a space. Of existent things, their shapes can be thought of as "the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves".² If solidity is to exist anywhere, it must exist in the form of a shaped thing, says Locke. "Solidity requires shape"³ for its conception, but these are nevertheless distinct ideas, since we can think of shape without also thinking of solidity.

Now Locke certainly thinks that the qualities of solidity and extension (or shape) are necessary for an object to have if it is to be a body, but does he take them to be together sufficient? In the Stillingfleet Correspondence he writes that the complex idea of solidity and extension should be "called body"⁴ and in the

¹ 2.13.6.
² 2.13.5.
³ 2.13.11.
⁴ P.419.
Examination of Malebranche that together they "make body"\(^1\) and this does look as though his claim is that they are sufficient for body. However this would be a risky conclusion. It is always rather dangerous to force into the categories of necessary and sufficient conditions the distinctions of people not aware of them. And in these two cases Locke is arguing against the Cartesian view that extension is the distinctive mark of body and his claim seems to be merely that the Cartesians are mistaken, and should take both extension and solidity to be the distinguishing features.

But in the Essay there is conclusive evidence that Locke's view is that these two qualities are sufficient:

The essence of body is not bare extension, but an extended solid thing; and to say, an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to say, body moves or impels.\(^2\)

In this passage Locke is talking about the nominal essence, the idea we have by which we rank things into sorts. So if something is an extended, solid thing, it is of the kind "body".

In what has gone before, I have extracted from Locke's

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\(^1\) S.45.

\(^2\) 3.6.21.
writings an explication of the notion of "body" or "material object". He writes that:

Definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined.¹

And he would define body as a solid shaped thing, since to say the former is "all one" to saying the latter. This would be a way of saying what he meant by the term, or by giving an account of the nature of body. Now only if "solidity" is understood in its "ordinary" sense is this definition to be accepted. Otherwise things like chairs, loafs of bread and possibly lumps of metal would fail to be bodies or material objects, since they do not occupy their spaces to the total exclusion of other things. If something is a shape and a solid in the "anti-Cartesian" sense it is certainly a material object, but it is not necessary that something satisfy these conditions in order to be one.

* * * * *

Now Locke cannot be satisfied with just a definition

¹ 3.3.10.
of body. The position which may be put "If anything is a body it is solid and shaped" is not strong enough for him. In the Essay Locke is not merely engaged in laying down necessary and sufficient conditions which an entity must satisfy if it is to be called "body". As the exposition proceeds it will be shown that Locke thinks that solidity and shape are the only qualities that bodies have. Locke is prepared to recognize that there are other qualities in bodies, but these are "secondary". They are dependent on and derive from the primary qualities of solidity and shape. These are the basic, underivative qualities of a body. It is possible that there exist situations in which the qualities we normally find in bodies do not arise, but in all situations bodies are characterized by solidity and shape. Thus bodies are composed of atoms which all have weight. But in a universe in which only one atom existed, this atom would be weightless, but it would be solid and shaped nevertheless.

Locke thinks that to say that a body is solid and shaped is to give an exhaustive description of what it is. Hence he has a problem. "Solidity" has been analyzed out in a relational way. Something is a solid shape if it resists the entry of a thing into the space it encloses. What can be said of solids when they are not actually
else trying to enter its space. The question as to what it is that does the resisting obviously admits of an answer. There seems to be no way in which Locke's intention viz., to say that solidity and shape give a complete account of the notion of body, can be fulfilled.

The obvious thing to do is to look for another account of "solidity". Perhaps something can be done with the "anti-Cartesian" idea. "Something that fills" space does seem to be Locke's central notion of solidity. In the Stillingfleet Correspondence he writes that the difference between the complex idea of solidity and extension together, and extension alone, is evident to anyone "who ever thought of emptiness or fullness". But the whole story about something cannot be that it fills space. Filling space is a mode, just as falling is, and to use Lockean language, "needs something to inhere in". Something must fill space, and this must be characterizable in ways other than "it just fills space". The same can be said of a solid if a solid is defined as what is incompressible and impenetrable.

These arguments seem to be inescapable. There seems to be no way of giving sense to the suggestion that

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1 P.419.
2 P.419.
"solidity and shape" describe the complete nature of an entity. It seems to me that the best Locke can do in these circumstances is to take the notion of stuff as primitive and unanalyzable and to say that it fills space in the sense that a volume of it resists the entry of another volume into its space. Thus one of his atoms is a bit of resistant stuff.

These points made in this section will be substantiated in what immediately follows.

* * *

Generally in his writings when he is talking about "the nature of body" Locke is talking about the primary qualities that a body has. These being listed as "solidity, extension, figure and mobility"¹ the question arises as to whether, when Locke is listing these, he is doing any more than stating the definition of "body". In general, as far as the primary/secondary distinction is concerned, one thing

¹ He includes number but I omit it as being evidently a different sort of property. 2.8.9.
is clear and one is obscure. What is clear is that Locke used the distinction as a scientific distinction, and what is obscure is what the basis of the distinction is.

To take the first point. Locke thinks that the primary qualities of bodies are the only ones that they have:

All the rest whereby we take notice of bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing but several powers in them, depending on those primary qualities.\(^1\)

Colours and tastes are powers that bodies have, in virtue of the primary qualities of their minute parts, to cause sensations in us. The powers that bodies have to cause (say) chemical changes in others are likewise due to the peculiar primary qualities that their constituent particles have. Both these are straightforward empirical claims. The first is probably false and the second is certainly false. Bodies have charges as well as the primary qualities and these are operative in chemical changes.

The primary/secondary distinction comes hand in hand with the corpuscular theory which Locke inherited from Boyle. This theory takes one of its most important forms in The Essay as the doctrine of the real essence, the "real

\(^1\) 2.8.26.
constitution of a body's insensible parts". It is claimed in the Essay that the "discoverable qualities" of bodies depend on the structure of "the minute insensible parts" characterized only by the primary qualities. Once more, this thesis as to what the molar characteristics of bodies depends on, is doubtful science. Locke's confidence that an exhaustive knowledge of the real essence of a body would yield all there is to know about it, is almost boundless:

These insensible corpuscles, being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, size, texture and motion of the constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without trial their several operations one upon another; as we do now know the properties of a square or a triangle.

Only once does Locke suggest that he thinks that there might be some other qualities attributable to bodies besides the ones he habitually acknowledges:

1 3.3.17.
2 3.3.15.
3 4.6.25.
...the secondary qualities depending upon the primary qualities of their minute insensible parts; or if not upon them, upon something even more remote from our comprehension...¹

but he does nothing to develop this suggestion and goes on to affirm that the secondary qualities are dependent on the primary, and we must assume, them alone.

At the end of Book II Chapter 8 in which Locke introduces the primary/secondary distinction he acknowledges:

I have in what just goes before been engaged in physical enquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended.²

In view of this admission and the evidently scientific use Locke made of the distinction, it is natural to assume that he took it over from the experimental scientists of his day. And since it was their distinction, drawn from their theories, there was no need for Locke the philosopher, to justify it. This idea gains in plausibility when we have a close look at Chapter 8. On the basis of the distinction we are told that the ideas of the primary qualities are copies of them, while the ideas of the secondary are not, since there is nothing for them to copy. But although the distinction

¹ 4.3.11.
² 2.8.22.
is expounded at length, there is little argument for it, not much of a deliberate attempt to establish the distinction. In view of this it is natural to conclude that Locke thought it had already been established by the scientists of his day, and there was no need for him to establish it.

However, the question at once arises as to whose primary/secondary distinction Locke had taken over. The most likely candidates are Newton and Boyle, and Locke is not speaking with their voice on this matter because they included mass (inertial mass) among the primary qualities and Locke did not. Newton's primary qualities are extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia, and these are declared to be primary, or the real qualities of all bodies, because they are the only characteristics common to all bodies that have been experienced. Obviously some comments on "hardness" will be needed then, but there is no point in pursuing this here. I gather from Mandelbaum that for Boyle the primary qualities are those that have always to be taken into account in explaining the action that one body has on another. This being so weight should be one of the primary qualities. For this

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1 M. Mandelbaum. Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception, p.82.
2 op cit. pp.88-112.
reason it is incredible that Locke does not include
weight as a primary quality in the long passage quoted
on page 12. But in Locke weight is quite clearly a
power dependent on the primary qualities.

Before substantiating this last point discussion
is required of Locke's use of "bulk". Lists of the
primary qualities vary in Locke. Sometimes they are
"solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest,"\(^1\) sometimes
"bulk, figure, texture and motion".\(^2\) Perhaps "bulk"
includes "mass" in its meaning. However I don't think
it does. If it did, when Locke said that we could "know
without trial" the operations of one body on another, he
would surely have included bulk in the properties we need
to know in order to be able to do this. But he doesn't.
He mentions "figure, size, texture and motion of parts".\(^3\)
In the conclusion of his chapter on "Power" Locke says
that all our ideas might be reduced to

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Extension,} \\
\text{Solidity,} \\
\text{Mobility, or the power of being moved;}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^1\) 2.8.9., 2.8.22., E of M 52.
\(^2\) 2.3.10., 2.8.13., 2.8.15.
\(^3\) 4.6.25.
which from our senses we receive from body:
Perceptivity, or the power of perception, or thinking;
Motivity, or the power of moving:
which by reflection we receive from our minds.
To which if we add
Existence,
Duration,
Number,
which belong both to the one and the other, we
have perhaps, all the original ideas on which the rest depend. For by these, I imagine, might be explained the nature of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and all other ideas we have.¹

At the end of the section where he lists the primary qualities he does include "bulk" but omits "solidity", suggesting that one can be substituted for the other.²

Locke continually uses "bulk" in some lists of the primary qualities and "solidity" in others. He never explains the difference in terminology so we are left to suppose that he considers them different ways of saying the same thing. And the above quotation shows quite plainly that inertial or gravitational mass are not included by Locke in the primary qualities.

¹ 2.21.75. See also 2.31.2.
² See also 2.23.8., 2.23.9., 2.23.26.
However I think there is a reason why Locke sometimes includes "bulk" rather than "solidity" in the primary qualities. "Bulk, figure, texture and motion or rest" plainly has advantages over "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest" when it comes to explaining changes in terms of "the minute insensible parts". Take sensation for example. Variations in sensation can be accounted for in terms of the impact with which particles of different bulk and texture strike on our sense organs. It is clear that there can be particles of different bulk, less clear that there can be particles of different solidity. "Bulk" seems to mean something like "density" and could be understood in terms of compactness of particles. A body is bulky if there is little empty space between its constituents. However when it comes to the constituent particles themselves "bulk" would seem to be no different in meaning from "solidity". And it is worthwhile noticing that "solidity" is not predicated univocally by Locke of macroscopic bodies and their corpuscles. The latter appear to be solid in the "anti-Cartesian" sense and the former in the "ordinary" sense. Ultimately there seems to be no difference in the lists of the primary qualities. The texture of a body is nothing other than the minute variations in shape of its surface. To talk about
texture is just a way of drawing attention to features of a body's shape. When this has been said it appears that the primary qualities of a body are just the features that go to defining "body", since the primary qualities are "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest".

This is confirmed by what Locke says about weight or gravitational mass. This is mentioned as a power, just as colours are. Of course this power is not related to us as colour is. It is the power (say) a piece of gold has to attract other material objects, and is said to "depend on the real and primary qualities of its internal constitution". It is "not really in the gold, considered barely in itself", says Locke. If all that existed were one atom of gold it would have no weight, although it would have the primary qualities. But if another atom existed they would attract one another. Thus weight is a dispositional property.

The same can be said of inertial mass. To say of our sole atom that it has inertial mass is to say that so much force would be required to set it in motion. It is not to speak of any actual resistance to movement or change.

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1 2.23.2., 2.23.10., 2.23.37.
2 2.23.37.
of movement. This makes it a different sort of property from the primary ones. And the difference is that we can think of a body lacking mass, but not the primary qualities. Hence these qualities are not those that all bodies in fact have, but those that all bodies must have.

When he was introducing primary qualities\(^1\) Locke said that they were "utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be". They are those that "sense constantly finds in every particle of matter." If Locke were serious about this he would have made inertial mass a primary quality since that is constantly found in every part of matter. But he goes on to say that the primary qualities are those that "the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter". Thus the primary qualities are these that define "matter". Locke then goes on to say that the minute particles of matter must be characterized by these qualities. This is false. There is no necessity that ultimate particles be solid shapes. Of course if they are to be material, as Locke has defined this term, they must be. Locke has not assumed (as Newton did) that those characteristics universally shared by the objects of experience (the primary ones) are shared by the ultimate

\(^1\) 2.8.9.
constituents of those objects. He has assumed that the ultimate particles possess the defining characteristics of macroscopic bodies, and that these are all they possess. These are the assumptions lying behind the scientific use that Locke makes on behalf of the primary/secondary distinction.

Before concluding this section an epistemological point about the real essence ought to be made. If this is unknown to us, as Locke often asserts that it is, this is only a contingent matter. If we had the proper instruments we could perceive it. Locke occasionally writes that the real essence "cannot be known"¹ and sometimes the "cannot" seems to be stronger than "cannot in fact":

The active and passive powers of bodies and their ways of operating, consisting in a texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover.²

But other passages make it clear that our ignorance here is due merely to the insensitivity of our perceptual powers.³ Thus all qualities that a body has are, according to Locke,

¹ 3.9.12.
² 4.13.6. See also 4.6.5.
in principle observable by us.

By "material object", then, Locke means "shaped solid at motion or rest". Furthermore, these are the only qualities that he thinks bodies actually possess. The rest are "powers" arising from these. I am going to assume that this way of thinking about bodies is at least coherent. Considerable controversy has arisen in the history of philosophy subsequent to Locke over the question whether or not a body can have the primary and not the secondary qualities. I don't want to go into this here. My reasons for discussing bodies and their qualities are as follows:

(1) Having catalogued all the material qualities that there are (according to Locke) we are in a better position to see what are not material qualities.

(2) Having seen what the qualities are that constitute a material object we may be in a better position to see or fail to see how he can attribute non-material qualities to them. Further, there is one conclusion pertinent to the theme of this thesis that immediately follows from the primary/secondary distinction: Locke cannot now assert a straightout materialist view of mind. The secondary qualities are phenomenalistically explained as appearances to minds. The appearances cannot be material objects and given Locke's theory of these its pretty difficult to see how what they appear to could be a material object or a system of them.
3. THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE

Locke's theory of the substratum is offered as an explanation. In order to understand it, one must see what it is an explanation of. The alleged necessity of the substratum is argued for thus:

When we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone etc., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of these several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.¹

Throughout this chapter and in the Stillingfleet Correspondence it is clear that what requires explanation is the existence of qualities, since they are the sort of thing that cannot exist alone. This last point is otherwise put by Locke: qualities are "inconsistent with existence".² It is not the fact of the mere existence of qualities that requires explanation. The explanation of that is typically found in the various Cosmological arguments for the existence of God. In the present case we see that qualities exist and we see further that they are not the sort of thing that can exist alone, so what requires explanation is how they do exist.

¹ 2.23.4.
² C.S.p.21.
Locke's explanation is disarmingly simple: they are supported by something, or inhere in something. This may not be very helpful, but it is unexceptionable enough. But then Locke goes on to say that all we know about this something is that it is a "support" of qualities. 1 We have no "clear and distinct" idea of it. 2 When we speak of it we speak as children who talk of a "something, they know not what": 3 "substance" signifies "only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i.e., of something whereof we have no [particular distinct positive] idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know." 4 The type of thinking that drove Locke to this position, will, I hope, become clearer as the exposition proceeds.

Locke derives support for this theory from our "fashions of speaking". 5 We refer extension, shape and capacity for motion to a subject, to something. A magnet is said to be a thing having qualities. This way of talking intimates

1 2.23.2.
2 Ibid., and 2.23.4.
3 2.23.2.
4 1.3.19.
5 2.23.3.
that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.¹

It is important to note that Locke appeals to this as confirming what he says about the substratum. His reason for introducing the theory stems from the alleged nature of qualities.² The problem he sets himself is an ontological one, not a logical one.

The adequacy of the substratum qua explanation can be seriously challenged. What is the relation of supporting here? "Supporting" must be a metaphorical term. Locke appeals to the analogue of a support for a building.³ We have a clear enough idea of what that is, but the support required for qualities must be so singular that this analoque is of at best doubtful assistance. What's more, we can't even say whether it is an analogue since the relation in question is wholly unique. We dont know whether "supporting" is apt or not.

It is difficult to know what to do here. Stillingfleet,

¹ J.J.J.C.S. p.45.
² J.C.S. p.21., p.29., p.32., p.446.
³ C.S. p.453.
in effect, puts this question to Locke: "How does it follow that qualities have some sort of support from the fact that you cannot conceive them to exist alone?\footnote{C.S. p.445.} Now if Locke is correct in perceiving that qualities cannot exist alone, then some sort of explanation of their existence is required, since it is evident that they do exist. And since the ontological problem posed is of a unique sort, so will the answer be. Hence we have no right to expect an analogue to the relation here. But this doesn't help Locke, since it provides a reason for thinking that we will never know what the relation is.

Also, what it is that supports must forever remain unknown to us. Locke acknowledges this: "Of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused, obscure one of what it does".\footnote{2.13.9.} Now we can never have any idea of what the substratum is, since if we did, we would be fastening on to some characteristic, and this itself would require something to inhere in. So it is no accident that we tend to think of the substratum as a featureless entity. If we could discern in it some feature, that too would require a substratum.
there must be something that does, our premisses make plain to us. I therefore conclude that the arguments against Locke via the "unintelligibility" of "substratum" has no force.

Before drawing some consequences from Locke's position I will examine an argument of Bennett \(^1\) which claims to demonstrate a flaw in the argument to the substratum. This will be instructive since it will clarify the sort of explanation that the substratum involves. He calls it a theory of property instantiation \(^2\) and holds that in this theory an item counts as a substance if and only if it has a certain property \(S\) which is definitive of substantiality. But then the "account of what it is for a property to be instantiated, viz., that \(P\) is instantiated if and only if some substance bears \(P\), would say merely that \(P\) is instantiated if and only if some item is both \(S\) and \(P\). His (Locke's) analysis of a statement about the instantiation of one property would thus yield, uselessly, a statement about the joint instantiation of two properties".

Now Locke's is the doctrine that a property is

\(^1\) American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol.2. No.1 (Jan.'65).

\(^2\) Thus misleadingly making it appear that Locke's problem is a logical one.
instantiated if and only if something enables it to exist. And perhaps this is "useless" since it goes such a little distance in making clear what does the enabling or how it does it. According to Bennett however it is useless because Locke's account is in terms of another property S. The charge seems to be that Locke is involved in some sort of circularity. But is he? Why is it circular to say that a property is instantiated if there is something that enables it to exist, or as Locke unwisely says, something to "support" it? What Locke claims to have done is discern in qualities something for which there must be an explanation. And he recognizes that the explanans, if it is to explain, must be of a character other than the character to be explained. Thus what it is that enables qualities to exist must itself be of the sort that is able to exist alone. This kind of explanation is not uncommon in the history of philosophy (it has close cousins in various Cosmological arguments) and is not in the least circular.

Since Locke knew so little about the substratum he had no right to suppose that the qualities of e.g., a horse were supported by some "common subject"\(^1\) since for all he

\(^1\) 2.23.4.
knew each quality might have a substratum of its own. Nor could he say "all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, coexisting in such, though unknown, cause of their union"\(^1\) since he doesn't know enough about the substratum to say that it does account for the union of a thing's qualities. Locke cannot even discount the possibility that there is only one substratum in which all qualities inhere. Least of all can he say that the qualities "result"\(^2\) from the substratum. However, it seems probable that he was getting confused with the real essence here.

In his writings, when he is using "substance" Locke almost always means "substratum". This being unknowable, there at once arises the possibility that the desk on which I now write and a steer grazing somewhere in the Argentine might be the same substance, and surely this is absurd. However, Locke can meet this objection. The idea of the substratum is the common element in all our ideas of substances. He calls it "the idea of substance in general"

\(^1\) 2.23.6.
\(^2\) 2.23.1.
in contrast with the "idea of particular sorts of substances"¹ which is the idea of a combination of various qualities and their support. So my desk and the steer are instances of different ideas of "particular sorts of substances". Substances are differentiated by their qualities.

At one place in the Stillingfleet Correspondence Locke claims that the relation between a quality and the substratum is seen to hold in the same sort of way that all relations are seen to hold:

> The ideas of the qualities and actions or powers are perceived by the mind to be by themselves inconsistent with existence. Hence the mind perceives their necessary connexion with inherence or being supported; which being a relative idea super-added to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a support. For I never denied that the mind could frame to itself ideas of relation, but have showed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation.²

The idea of a support is doubtless in some sense relational but in this case we don't come by it in the way Locke claims in the Essay that we come by such ideas. He there writes that "the nature of relation consists in the referring two

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¹ 2.23.3.
² C.S. p.21.
things one to another". ¹ Now if this statement is taken at its full literal value, Locke's doctrine of substance becomes strictly unintelligible, because if he does want to say that what obtains between a quality and the substratum is a relation, and if relations obtain only between things, then qualities are things. But on reading the succeeding sections it becomes clear that "thing" is just a blanket term covering any entity whatever. "There is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode... which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other things." ² Nevertheless, we cannot come by the idea of a support in the way Locke claims we come by our ideas of relation. Because we come by these by comparing two or more "things" and the substratum is never given to us to compare. Obviously, we must already have the idea of a substratum if it is to supply us with any idea of relation. Equally obviously, the idea of the substratum and the idea of the support come to us together, if they come at all, since the notion of a substratum is the notion of a "that which supports". And if this does come to us, it would come intuitively, one would think, on having seen that

¹ 2.25.5.
² 2.25.7.
qualities are by themselves inconsistent with existence. Any attempt to show that this idea comes to us as he claimed ideas of relation ordinarily come to us, merely obscures the issue.

But then why does Locke say that properties are of such a kind as to be inconsistent with existence? As Stillingfleet neatly put it: "How came we to know that these accidents were such feeble things?" \(^1\) Locke nowhere answers this question. He writes: "They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real being that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find the word substance to support them." \(^2\) Locke seems to take this as an accepted philosophic doctrine, and he takes it as true. But although he does accept it he is profoundly uneasy about it, and he writes about it with the outrage of a man whose intelligence has been tricked. His first lengthy passage on the doctrine is characterized by an almost savage irony \(^3\) and he concludes it thus:

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\(^1\) Youlton, p.138.
\(^2\) 2.19.19.
\(^3\) A fact first pointed out to me by Professor C.B. Martin.
And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told that all learned books consisted of papers and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper. But were the Latin words, inhaerentia and substantio, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called sticking on and under propping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what use they are in deciding questions of philosophy.  

Similar irony and perplexity characterize his full treatment of the subject in 2.23.

Locke's bafflement in this connection is not hard to appreciate. The premisses that led him to postulate the substratum seem to be true, yet the conclusion they lead to is so very doubtful. That qualities exist need not be argued. Nor is there any need to argue that roundness, smoothnesses, smiles, to-the-north-ofs, underneaths, are by themselves "inconsistent with existence". If they are to exist, something must enable them to exist. But what enables them to exist are the billiard-balls, faces, buildings and bookshelves that they are the qualities of. There is no need to postulate something that is and must

1 2.13.20.
be, an "I know not what". These are the somethings that enable qualities to exist - ordinary common things. They exist because they are the qualities of things.¹

I conclude then that is no reason to accept Locke's doctrine of the substratum, even though when suitable stated it is an intelligible one. I shall assume, in view of this, that there is no need to accept any theory in which the substratum is an essential component.

¹ At the end of chapter 9 I shall try and indicate what I think the relation is between a thing and its qualities.
4. Locke's "Skepticism" about Substance

Locke's way of thinking about the substratum is such that he can never know anything about it. If he could discern anything positive in it, I have argued, he would be grasping some characteristic, and then that would need a substratum as a support. Indeed, Locke claims to have some knowledge of the substratum: it is what stands in the relation of "support" to qualities. But I have argued that he doesn't know enough about this relation to so characterize it. So what the substratum is must forever be outside his reach. Such lack of knowledge should not have caused him much concern. Forms of skepticism which one wants to resist are those which rule out as knowledge what we claim that we can legitimately know. It is not clear that the substratum theory does this. When we know something about a thing we know some aspect of it, or we know a relation it stands in to something else. The substratum is outside our reach on both counts. This is not because the substratum theory in some way cripples our knowing powers. It has nothing to do with them. Rather, given the ways in which things are known by us, the substratum is put forever beyond our reach.

This is clear enough. But the matter is obscured by the way Locke and some of the commentators write about it:
By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body, as if we know nothing at all.¹

It looks as though our ignorance of the substratum infects our knowledge of body. On Locke's account, this or that body consists of qualities and their substratum, so in a sense he is just being consistent, but all that is distinct and peculiar to them, and what they are as bodies, can be known. If it isn't, this is not for the same sort of reason that the substratum is unknown.

We have ideas of a material substance and a thinking substance. Now Locke maintains that we have no idea of how the solid parts of a body cohere, together² or how the parts communicate motion by impulse, and also that we have no idea of how a man thinks.³ But Locke writes as though our ignorance here is somehow related to our ignorance of the substratum:

¹ 2.13.6.
² 2.23.23.
³ 2.23.24. This last claim is made elsewhere in the Essay. It is not easy to see what Locke means by it. Just how a man thinks or knows, is what the Essay is all about. In the C.S. he says that his philosophical achievement is that "he gave an account of the mind in thinking". P.138. See also p.143.
There is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should, by thought, set body into motion, than how a substance we know not should, by impulse, set body into motion.1

Locke emphasizes just those words he uses when talking about the substratum. But surely our ignorance in the one case is just a deficiency in our knowledge of physics, and in the other (perhaps) a deficiency in our knowledge of the laws relating to the action of mind on body, neither having anything to do with our necessary ignorance of the substratum.

This sort of confusion is shared to some extent by Aeron2 and Gibson3, more particularly the latter:

Since the only idea of substance which we can form in either case is that of "a supposed I know not what", which underlies the qualities revealed to us in experience, it is impossible for us to know the innermost nature of matter or mind.

This last assertion only becomes true if we admit the substratum into "the innermost nature of mind or matter", and there seems to be no pressure on us to do that.

The worst offender here is Youlton who alleges that

1 J.29.
2 P.177.
3 P.97.
the real essence of matter "is to some extent at least hidden away in the unknowable but necessary substratum". ¹

The real essence being "the primary qualities of the minute insensible parts"² it is quite distinct from the substratum, even though, according to Locke, these qualities inhere in it, and being defined in terms of qualities, it is not at all hidden in the substratum.

What I wish to emphasize here is simply the unique character of our ignorance of the substratum. If we lack knowledge of other items of reality it will be for different reasons.

¹ P. 139.
² 4.3.11.
5. LOCKE'S ATTITUDE TO METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS

Etienne Gilson has remarked that Locke had a great tendency to shelve metaphysical problems when he came to them.¹ This comment is certainly understandable.

For example, in The Examination of Malebranche Locke says he has "no conception of anything if it is not a substance, mode or relation".² Yet ideas, the most important items in Locke's philosophy, seem to be none of these. And in The Examination he refers scathingly to "the good word modification"³ and this is in line with his ironical treatment of the subject in the Essay⁴ where he questions the clearness in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and "their use in deciding questions in philosophy".⁵ Indeed, he scarcely seems to understand the doctrine. He writes as though the assertion that God, spirits and body are substances entails some view as to identity of stuff between them.⁶

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¹ Elements of a Christian Philosophy, p.242.
² S.18.
³ S.39.
⁴ 2.13.17-20.
⁵ 2.13.20.
⁶ 2.13.18. This impression is reinforced by a good deal of what he says in The Examination. Vide Sects.39, 47.
Moreover, throughout the Essay he espouses a corpuscular theory of bodies, the corpuscles being characterized by the primary qualities. These corpuscles are atoms, independent existents.¹ Yet in one place in the Essay he gives an admirable sketch of a Spinoza-type theory of substance.² He declares that things are "retainers to other parts of nature," they are not "absolute and entire in themselves," and that "we are quite out of the way, when we think that things contain within themselves the qualities that appear to us in them."

This theory is nowhere discussed, just mentioned in passing. And this gives the clue to what is wrong with Gilson's remark. Locke did not consider it his job to discuss such theories. He was an epistemologist and he wanted to get on with the task of finding out what knowledge is. Just as a metaphysician might make an epistemological remark in the course of his work, so Locke made occasional metaphysical ones.

Yet in another sense Locke obviously did a good deal of metaphysics. His sections on solidity, space and time

¹ J.6.6.
² 4.7.11.
contain a good deal of "what we mean" by these ideas, even though his purpose in going into them was to show how we could acquire these ideas on his empirical premisses. On these subjects he writes with a good deal of competence and assurance. But once he moves into the categories of substance and accident (or quality) he loses his grip and seems to be generally baffled. Even so, the errors he makes are made because of a genuine problem. His fundamental insight, that qualities are by themselves inconsistent with existence, is a valid one, and so is his conclusion that there must be something enabling them to exist. He went wrong in thinking that this was the substratum, instead of ordinary things.
6. THE RELATION OF IDEAS TO THE MIND

An idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."\(^1\) It is also whatever it is that is given in perception. This last statement leaves it open that what is given in perception may be the surface of a material object. But this is not Locke's intention. From the very beginning of the Essay he presupposes a representative theory of perception, just as he does of thinking. He gives, so far as I have been able to find, only one reason why he thinks this theory necessary. Curiously enough, it comes at the very end of the Essay and it is not argued for. It is this:

\[\text{Since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas.}\(^2\)

I can only suggest a reason why Locke thought that material objects are not present to the understanding: he adopted the corpuscular theory, according to which the bodies we see are composed of discrete entities characterized only by the

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1 Introduction, Sect. 8.
2 4.21.4.
in the Introduction that "our first inquiry shall be - how they come into the mind". Very early in the Essay Locke says what he means by "in the mind":

If these words "to be in the understanding" have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood, to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the understanding.¹

This shows that at least part of what being "in the mind" means is "being perceived". And this is all that it means:

Imprinting (on the mind), if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived.²

Locke's position, so far, as to what ideas are and what their status in the mind is, at least has the virtue of simplicity. But it is undermined by the content that "idea" gradually acquires in the Essay. From the outset ideas are declared to be "objects".³ They are later said to be "particular existences".⁴ They are also "appearances".⁵

¹ 1.1.5.
² Ibid. Stress mine.
³ Epistle to the Reader. P.22.
⁴ 2.3.11., 4.17.8.
⁵ P.22., 2.19.4., 2.11.9., 2.2.1., 2.32.1., 2.32.14., 2.32.16.
Finally, they emerge as mental images. The point of the chapter in which the primary/secondary is introduced is that some ideas copy, and some do not, qualities really in bodies.\(^1\) True, there he does not use "copy" but "likeness", but it is images that have this likeness.\(^2\) However he does say that ideas "copy" qualities outside the mind.\(^3\) They are also said to be "pictures and representations in the mind of things that do exist".\(^4\)

Once Locke has said this much about ideas, it is not difficult to think of them existing unperceived by the mind. And Locke himself gives three instances in which is described just this case:

(1) When we see a coloured globe "it is certain that the idea imprinted on our mind is of a flat circle variously shadowed". But we do not "notice" this.\(^5\)

(2) When a man reads or hears "with attention and understanding" he does not notice the changes in his auditory or visual field.\(^6\)

\(^1\) 2.8.7.
\(^2\) See also 4.13.9., 2.9.9., 2.31.12.
\(^3\) 2.31.3., 2.31.8., 2.31.12.
\(^4\) 2.31.6.
\(^5\) 2.9.8.
\(^6\) 2.9.9.
(3) This is best left in Locke's own words. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark.¹

Now Locke does not produce these three instances because he thinks that they are counter-instances to any theory of his. He does not realize that they are. He mentions them in his chapter on perception to show, in the first case, that our acquired knowledge of the properties of things leads us, "by a judgement", to substitute the causes of an appearance for the appearance itself. This is a "settled habit"² of ours and is done so constantly and quickly that we "scarcely notice" the original appearance before substituting another for it. Of course the damaging feature of this case is that the original appearance was admitted not to be noticed at all. The second case is meant to illustrate that there are habits of this type, and the third is meant to show that when there are such habits, and when they characterize actions as quick as those of the mind, the objects of these acts go unnoticed.

¹ 2.9.10.
² 2.9.9.
Locke could have made all these points without admitting that the mind had unnoticed objects. He might have said of the "imprinted circle", that the laws of optics might lead us to expect that a circle would be imprinted on the mind, but that what we perceive is also conditioned by our acquired knowledge of objects, so this does not actually happen. In the second case he can make two moves. He can say that there is a division of attention, that we do notice the print or sounds, but do not concentrate on them but on the ideas they excite. Or he can emphasize the quickness of mental acts, and say that we see the characters and then advert to the ideas they cause. As for the final case, Locke has already argued that the normal causal machinery is not sufficient for the production of ideas. A thunderstorm may be raging outside, but if we are engrossed in a book we may not notice it. Just as the causal machinery is not sufficient for the production of an idea, a break in it may not be sufficient for the disappearance of ideas from the mind. However, even if this way of presenting the selected facts about perception is true, and what Locke says is false, the mere fact that we could understand what he said shows that it is possible
that ideas may exist in the mind unnoticed by it. We are able to do this because "idea" has ceased to mean only "whatever it is the mind perceives" and has come to mean "image". Hence it is not just "a that which...." but a characterizable entity with determinate properties e.g., distributed through two spatial dimensions, internally differentiated. So now we have something to think of even given that it is not perceived by a mind. Now we may only think we can do this because we do not fully understand the nature of mental images. Locke will have to show either that this is the case or revise what he has said about the incorrigible knowledge the mind has of its own ideas and provide a new sense for "in the mind".

Now even if what has so far been said is true, it is certainly not true that a Lockean abstract idea can exist when it is "not noticed". But this is because an abstract idea is not simply a particular existence, but an idea put to a certain use by the mind. An idea is an abstract one when either of the following conditions have been satisfied: the mind may form objects into a class on the basis of certain resemblances. The mind takes any one of the objects of this class, and attends to the features of it that made it a class member. When the mind is using an idea in this way, the idea is general or abstract because the mind is attending to a characteristic common to a range
of objects. Or the mind may simply attend to certain features of an idea, and if it later recognizes that other ideas resemble this one with respect to the features attended to, it can, on the basis of this, rank them into sorts, and think of the sort simply by selecting an idea of any class member and attending to its "class-making" features. Hence Locke says:

Universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When therefore we quit particulars; the generals that rest are only the creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of man, is added to them. Hence abstract ideas cannot be thought of as existing unnoticed by the mind, since a certain mental activity directed towards them is essential to them. An abstract idea is really something the mind does with an idea.

Judgments, of course, are in a similar position. These are "affirmations" or "negations" that the mind makes about its ideas. Presumably this is to say that a

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1 For the second model see 2.11.9. For the first 2.32.6. Both models, as one might expect, are present in the exposition of abstract ideas. 3.3.6.-20.

2 3.3.11.

3 2.32.2.
judgment is a claim to the effect that the world is as our ideas represent it to be, or is a projection by the mind of its ideas on to the world. Locke seems to suggest that ideas of substances are always thus referred to actual things, and often falsely, to the real essence. However it must not be inferred from this that there is something unique about ideas of substances, that, perhaps, they have some sort of referential role "built in", as it were. They are "nothing but bare appearances, or perceptions in the mind". The claim that they are patterns of what is actual is a judgment, which is, naturally enough, essentially mind-dependent.

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In a sense Locke discusses many other ways in which ideas are related to the mind. For example, he discusses the relation of remembering and the relation of abstracting. But such relations are determined by what the mind does with its ideas in its different acts, and I am not interested in such relations here. What I am interested in is what

1 2.30.5., 2.31.6., 2.31.13.
2 2.32.1.
Locke describes as "the nature and manner of the ideas in the understanding".\textsuperscript{1} It was his desire to have his "unaffected ignorance"\textsuperscript{2} on this point removed, that led him to examine Malebranche's philosophy and to study Norris's books.\textsuperscript{3}

Nevertheless, as both these enquiries proceed, it becomes clear that Locke's description of what he hoped to find in these philosophers is misleading. He is not reading them to discover what may be called the "ontological status" of ideas: whether they are self-subsistent entities, and if so whether they are material or spiritual, or whether they are qualities of a material or a spiritual thing. By the "nature of ideas" he means, curiously enough, "their causes and manner of production in the mind,"\textsuperscript{4} and he is reading these writers to see if they have any light to throw on the problem of interaction. He breaks down this problem thus:

Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I understand; and motions from these

\textsuperscript{1} E of M S.1.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{3} Remarks S.1.
\textsuperscript{4} Remarks 1.
continued to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our minds I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible.¹

That is, there is the problem of how purely physical causes can have a non-physical effect at all. But then Locke locates a further problem. Given that there is an idea before the mind, and the mind is seeing it, it needs to be explained how the mind sees it:

Let the picture (i.e. idea) be ever so clear; yet how we see it, is to me inconceivable.²

I am not sure whether Locke considers this to be a general problem, or whether it was merely one generated by Malebranche's system. However, given that Locke must admit that ideas can exist unperceived, it is a problem for him too. This point is associated with another that Locke makes. When a new idea comes before the mind, Locke thinks that the mind must "do" something or "suffer" something:³

For what difference a man finds in himself, when he sees a marygold, and sees not a marygold, has no difficulty, and needs not be enquired after: he has the idea now, which he had not before. The difficulty is, what alteration he has in his mind; what changes that has in itself, when it sees what it did not see before.⁴

¹ E of M S.10.
² E of M S.18.
³ E of M 39.
⁴ Remarks 2.
Locke himself thinks that there can be no answer to a request for a characterization of this alteration, because the only sorts of changes we can describe are those in which a change of parts takes place, and the mind is a simple substance without any parts. It is interesting that Locke should think that when a new idea comes before the mind, the mind itself should change. He must believe that they are somehow connected with the stuff of the mind. I gather from the Examination that Locke thinks this must be the case if the mind is to "operate" with ideas, but he does nothing to develop this point.

Locke received no enlightenment from either Malebranche or Norris on the problems of interactionism. But in the course of his criticisms of them, Locke does make some explicit statements about the ontological status of ideas. He considers the proposition that ideas are "spiritual beings" i.e. substances. He rejects this because he finds "it inconceivable that a spiritual, i.e. an unextended substance, should represent to the mind an extended figure

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1 Remarks 2.
2 See S.16.
e.g. a triangle of unequal sides or two triangles of different magnitudes". So if an idea is to represent an extended object, it must itself be extended. Very well. It seems that Lockean ideas are mental images. It also seems that these are two-dimensional, as Locke's argument here requires. But if something were two-dimensional and a substance, it would not be a material substance. But since it is extended it would not be a spiritual substance either, according to the way Locke uses "spiritual" here. And what of those ideas that do not even purport to be representations of extended objects e.g. the idea of goodness? It seems that this idea would at least have a chance of being spiritual. This objection proceeds against Malebranche's position via an attack on the immateriality of ideas, not their substantiality.

Locke then considers a second idea of Malebranche that the different ideas are different modifications of the mind. Locke replies thus:

The mind or soul that perceives, is one immaterial indivisible substance. Now I see

1 E of M S. 18.
the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste an apple I am eating. Now I ask, take "modification" for what you please, can the same unextended indivisible substance have different, nay inconsistent and opposite (as those of white and black must be) modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas, and so for the rest of those infinite sensations which we have in sorts and degrees.¹

Now "indivisible" here does not mean "simple". All that means is uncompounded. As such, one of Locke's atoms is a simple substance and it has different modifications. No weight is to be attached to Locke's claim that white and black are "inconsistent and opposite" modifications. We will only think this if we believe they cover surfaces, and Locke has argued this to be false. Even so, can they and tastes and hearings together modify an indivisible substance? If they do, there is no need to postulate different parts to bear them. A Lockean atom is both spatial and solid, but there is not one part of it that is spatial and one part that is solid. The only question that Locke can put to his opponent is this: Can an indivisible substance be modified, or have properties? Since the force of

¹ E of M S. 39.
"indivisible" seems only to be "unextended", I don't see why it should not.

To return to the first argument. Locke argued that if ideas were immaterial they could not do the job they were supposed to do. But in Locke ideas must be non-material. If material objects were present to the mind there would have been no point in introducing ideas at all. And ideas have properties e.g. of being coloured, that no physical objects, according to Locke, have.

But for all this, it is clear that Locke does not believe that ideas are spiritual things or modifications of a spiritual thing, and in the Examination he declares that he has no conception of anything, if it is not a substance, a mode of a substance, or a relation. It is difficult to know how seriously to take this. Locke refused to put "space" into these categories on the ground that it is unclear what these categories are. But if we do take Locke seriously on this point, then it seems that of the possibilities open to him the two most plausible are

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1 E of M S.18 and 26.
2 2.13.17-20.
(1) "Idea" is the name of a relation obtaining between the mind and what it is thinking about.

(2) Ideas are non-material qualities of physical objects. Locke does not want to assert (1). Presumably, anyone maintaining that ideas just consisted in the directedness of the mind to objects, would be holding this position. If anything, this approximates to a Lockean judgment about ideas, but these latter are "objects", "particular existences".

This leaves Locke with (2) and he will have to face his own problem of how a non-material modification (or quality) can represent extended things. (2) is still in some ways theoretically superior to the notion that ideas are spiritual substances. When an idea is "in the memory" for Locke, it is not something actual. When an idea is recalled "from memory" a new idea is produced with the realization that a similar one has been seen before. If ideas were substances, it seems that in cases like this we would be faced with the annihilation of substances and their production out of nothing. But if they are the modifications of a material thing or a system of material things, then Locke could say that in situations of this kind a new modification arose owing to a change in the material system. Since the mind is operative in the
production of ideas it seems that the stuff of the mind will have to be somehow connected with the material system that ideas are the modifications of. This seems to be the analysis that Locke has the most sympathy for:

Ideas may be real beings, though not substances; as motion is a real being, though not a substance; and it seems probable that, in us, ideas depend on, and are in some way or other the effect of motion: since they are so fleeting.¹

When Locke discussed the qualities of material objects he certainly did not think that any physical objects have any idea or ideas as a quality. But there seems to be no reason why some (e.g. brains and nervous systems) should not. He did not there face the question whether one of his atoms or a system of them could be modified by a non-material characteristic. However I can see nothing that rules this possibility out. There must, nevertheless, be some tension between the position that ideas are qualities and that they are "particular existences". And Locke does not affirm that ideas are "real beings, though not substances". This is merely entertained as a possibility. He says that his destructive criticisms of Norris

May be a sufficient excuse of the ignorance

¹ Remarks S.17.
I have owned of what our ideas are, any further than as they are perceptions we experiment in ourselves.¹

Beyond this philosophically most unsatisfactory position, Locke feels no safety at all.

As this thesis progresses I will ask whether, according to Locke, the mind itself can be a non-material quality of a material thing or organization of material things. I will also ask whether the mind can exist when there are no ideas before it. It seems that Locke has nothing to object to the claim that ideas might exist in a situation where there are no minds. After all, they can exist unnoticed by a mind and may be modifications of material systems. On the face of it, there is no reason why a mind should be present in the same system.

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¹ Remarks S.18.
and these ideas "could not be had from things without". Such ideas are those of perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing and "all the different actings of our minds".

More precisely, then, what does Locke mean by "introspection"? He defines the term early in the Essay:

By reflection...I would be understood to mean, that notice that the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of them in the understanding.

"Operations" here covers not only the actions of the mind but also "passions" like uneasiness or satisfaction, the distinction here presumably being between what the mind does and the things that happen to it. Thus the mind, which, while intuiting relations between ideas, or recalling an idea, can observe itself doing this. That this is Locke's meaning can be seen from his claim that the understanding can make itself its own object, and that it "can turn inwards upon itself". The mind is said to

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1 2.1.4.  
2 2.1.4.  
3 2.1.4.  
4 2.1.1.  
5 2.1.8., 2.19.1.
"notice"\(^1\) itself, "observe"\(^2\) itself, "perceive its own operations"\(^3\) to be "conscious"\(^4\) of itself, to "contemplate"\(^5\) itself.

The basic idea is clear: the very same entity that is conscious of ideas is conscious of itself being conscious of ideas. This would be a way of saying what self-consciousness is. However Locke does not keep to this idea. In his writings on personal identity, where he makes great capital of the idea of self-consciousness, his notion of what this is, is not the same as the notion I have just analyzed.

At the end of the Chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" Locke writes:

> Whatsoever be the composition whereof the complex idea is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same existence continued preserves it the same individual under that denomination.\(^6\)

A heap is the same at \(t\), as at \(t_2\), Locke alleges, if

\(^1\) 2.1.4., 2.1.1.
\(^2\) 2.1.2.
\(^3\) 2.1.4.
\(^4\) 2.1.4.
\(^5\) 2.1.7.
\(^6\) 2.27.29.
nothing is added to it or taken from it. We can say that the same vegetable or animal persists through time, if the same life persists, a diversity or increase in parts is not relevant to the identity of the organism, as long as they all contribute to the persistence of the same life. This existence continued is what preserves the identity of organisms. What secures the identity of persons through time, according to Locke, is sameness of consciousness, and by this he means "self-consciousness". [Locke does not take bodily identity to be relevant to personal identity. What makes the human body the same is what makes any organism the same.]

Locke's explication proceeds as follows: at the present moment what makes me a distinct entity, what separates me off from all other thinking things in the universe and thus secures my personal identity, is the fact that I am conscious of these thoughts and feelings and no other. More precisely, a self at a given time consists of those mental events that are the objects of an awareness:

Consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things.¹

¹ 2.27.11.
What the self is, is what this present consciousness extends over. And Locke is serious about this: "as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person". This consciousness that secures my personal distinctness now is what decides what past actions were performed by this present entity. Locke has provided us with a neat formula: What I am now is what this present consciousness extends over, and those actions in the past are mine that this consciousness can extend over:

For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self

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2.27.11. Emphasis mine. That this is the correct interpretation of Locke's principle of personal identity can be seen from 2.27.14-15, 2.27.19., 2.27.25. Thus I maintain that Flew in his article on Locke and Personal Identity (Philosophy 1951) misses what Locke was trying to bring off in this section. He says "It would be as well to point out here that 'consciousness' is not used by Locke in any clear or consistent way. Sometimes it seems to mean 'self-consciousness' in that queer and dubious sense not equivalent to embarrassed." (P.55) In the interests of "clarity and conciseness" Flew ignores this sense of "consciousness" and concentrates on that sense in which it is equivalent to "memory". The interests of clarity and conciseness are not identical with those of a sound exposition. Very often "consciousness" does involve "memory" but this is very seldom all that it means. If Locke had only meant "memory" in this connection it is a mystery that he did not use that word. Locke knew that we have memories. But out of 21 instances in which Locke discusses the principle of personal identity he uses "consciousness" in 19 and memory in 2. Even C.D. Broad misses the significance of this. See "Locke's Theory of Substantial Identity and Diversity." Theoria. Vol.17.
to itself now, and so will be the same self, so far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come.¹

This (reflex) consciousness has now been given a job to do. It can recognize that it was the consciousness of a past action. I can give no other sense to "extending backwards", or as he says elsewhere, "reaches backwards". It is already beginning to look like an entity separate from the mental act of which it is the consciousness.

As Locke's discussion proceeds this conclusion becomes inescapable. Locke considers the position that personal identity consists in identity of thinking substance. This he rejects. As far as we know, what it is that thinks in us may change, but as long as the consciousness of past actions persists we are the same person: "Different substances by the same consciousness... being united into one person."² Now when Locke was saying what he meant by "introspection", he said that that very thing which intuited the relations between ideas was conscious that it was doing so. Hence the consciousness of the act persisted for the duration of the act and ended with it.

¹ 2.27.10. In the Dover edition this is the second section in the discussion of Personal Identity. In this edition the sections are numbered 11, 10, 11, 12.
² 2.27.10.
The mind could remember its act, but this remembering would be a different act of the thinking thing, and would be conscious of itself. But now Locke looks on the consciousness of the act as something detachable from it and attachable to different thinking things: "That which we call the same consciousness not being the same individual act...." "If the same consciousness... can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person."\(^1\) On his first analysis of introspection Locke could not have thought this possible. And it is plain that Locke here thinks of (reflex) consciousness as the continuant that defines personal identity:

In all which account of self, the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self, but the same continued consciousness, in which several substances may have been united, and again separated from it...\(^2\)

His model of introspection is now this: the actions of the mind are reflected in another entity, which retains these reflections as representations,\(^3\) and this entity

\(^1\) 2.27.13.
\(^2\) 2.27.25.
\(^3\) 2.27.13.
persists, although the substance reflected in it may change numerically. What this entity reflects at a time is a person, and those representations it retains are representations of the actions of this person.

That this is a bizarre account of personal identity does not matter here. What does matter is that it is a different account of introspection from the one he gave at the beginning of Book II. No mere textual study would seem to provide sufficient grounds for choosing between them. It is true that when Locke says what introspection is he sets out the first model, and when he uses introspection he uses the second model, but the amount of discussion in which the second is used is a good deal greater than that used to expound the first.

In order to see which is the better account I will begin by seeing how they each stand up to criticism that can be levelled against introspection. Now Locke might have introduced introspection for either of two reasons:

(1) He thought it an obvious and interesting fact
(2) He needed it as an explanation.

For example, I may tell you that the Czarist secret police with its secret agents, agents provocateurs and double agents, was such a complex organization that on one occasion it found itself actively plotting the assassination of the Czar, because I thought that you might like to know, or

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2.1.1.
because I wanted to explain why (perhaps) the Americans ignored it when they were founding their own Secret Service. Now Locke introduces introspection for the second reason. He wants to explain how the mind "comes by" its ideas of thinking, willing, perceiving etc., "which could not be had from things without" and "the source of which every man has within himself". The explanation is that the mind is conscious or aware that it thinks. Since this is what Locke says, he must think that it is true. But how did he know that it is? The mind must be conscious of being conscious etc. And what reason does Locke have for thinking this true? It seems that once Locke says that we know that we think because we are conscious that we do, he involves himself in an infinite regress. Hence his account must be rejected. However there are quite a number of replies to this argument. It might be said that when I inspect an image I am aware of this (i.e. my inspecting it) and aware of this too, and so on ad infinitum, and that the process takes no time at all, or rather lasts for the duration of the act mentioned. It seems to me that even Locke's second model can meet this objection. On this account, the consciousness, a separate entity, is

1 2.1.4.
conscious or aware of the mental act. But what is there to be conscious of this process? That which inspects the image. And the separate entity can register this fact, and that which inspects, that fact, and so on ad infinitum, and the whole process may take no time at all. There is an analogy here with a pair of mirrors, parallel and face to face, reflecting each other without end.¹

To examine the first reply a little more closely. Locke can spell this reply out in at least two ways:

(1) He can say that a human mind is by nature a self-conscious mind.

(2) He can say that a human mind is not by nature self-conscious, but can become self-conscious if it so decides, i.e., being self-conscious would be a special mental act.

(1) might seem to have some advantages over (2). It might seem that on the second alternative, to meet the objection, a mind must perform an infinite number of acts in an instant. This may be theoretically possible but it is very doubtful whether it actually happens. The first alternative would avoid this difficulty. On this theory,

¹ I owe this idea to Cardinal Newman. The Grammar of Assent. P.162.
no mental acts would be required to explain how a mind knew its own actions. The mind is just the sort of thing that (eg) knows that it is thinking, and knows that too, and so on ad infinitum. Being a self-conscious entity in this sense is one of its ways of being an entity, just as being extended in three dimensions through space is one of a material object's ways of being an entity. This theory will come in for further discussion in this section. However, the second alternative does not necessarily commit Locke to an infinite number of acts. He can say that once we become conscious (say) that we are thinking, this act contains consciousness of this too, and of this, and so on. In other words, all the "consciousness" are contained in the one act.¹

Locke can also reply in a slightly different way. He might say that an act is required to become conscious of a perception of an idea, and a separate act is required to become conscious of that process, and another for that process etc. He might also admit that these acts take time. He might say that a mind can realize its ability to become self-conscious. Thus its ground for saying that it is conscious of a perception may be its knowledge that it could become conscious of this whole process. But it need not actually exercise the power.

¹ Another one of Newman's ideas. The Grammar of Assent, P.162.
Even if Locke could have been convinced that introspection was not needed to explain anything I think he would still have maintained that it exists. He seems to be as certain of it, and takes it as much for granted, as he does that William of Orange was a Protestant king.\footnote{Vide C.S. P. 143.} That is, any objection directed against the existence of introspection via the contention that it is inadequate \textit{qua explanation} would have left Locke unmoved. Yet others have denied, in any of the senses Locke ascribes to "introspection", that it exists. Against such people Locke can only argue by either directing their attention to the alleged phenomenon, or by asking them how they would explain something without the idea. Since Locke's opponents would presumably have done the former and failed, he must confine his defence to the latter. One of the questions he can ask is "How can you know when you think or doubt or assent, unless you are conscious of it?" A.J. Ayer is one who gives an analysis of a "sense in which it can properly be said that a person is directly aware of his own thoughts and feelings"\footnote{"Concept of a Person", P. 64.} without using Locke's idea of reflex consciousness. According to Ayer, a person is "directly aware" of being in a mental state if he is in
that state and he can give a true report of his being in it. But it is possible that a parrot experience an after-image, truly report that it is, and yet not be aware that it is in this state. In general it seems possible that there be minds in the universe that are aware of entities (e.g. mental images) can combine and compare them, yet not know that they are doing this. Of course Ayer does not analyze "awareness of thinking" merely in terms of "thinking", but "thinking and being able to give a true report of thinking". But this latter is not what self-consciousness is.

I will discuss one more argument that can be brought to bear against Locke's form of the doctrine of introspection. It is alleged by Sidney Shoemaker\textsuperscript{1} that I can (logically) be said to observe only those kinds of relations that are contingent. If I can perceive myself perceiving an image then this last relation must be a contingent one. Consequently, says Shoemaker, I must be able to perceive that it does not hold. I must be able to perceive myself and a present image and perceive that I am not perceiving that image. But this is impossible, for to do this I must perceive the image. So I can never observe that the

\textsuperscript{1} Self-knowledge and Self Identity, pp.92-9.
relation does not hold. Now once we admit that a  
relation, any relation, holds, we contradict ourselves  
if we then say that it does not. This seems to be  
exactly what Shoemaker requires of the introspectionist  
here. He wants him to agree that a relation holds and  
then asks him to observe that it does not. Needless to  
say, this cannot be done, but this need not alarm the  
introspectionist. Furthermore, it is false to say that  
we cannot observe necessary relations. Take three dots  
together in a straight line. I can observe that the  
second is between the other two even though from the  
nature of the case it must have been between the other  
two. Hence I see no force in Shoemaker's argument.  

It still remains to select one of the two models of  
introspection set up by Locke. I select the first, for  
the reason that the second invests a man with two minds.  
The consciousness must not only have reflected in it the  
actions of the "thinking thing", it must also be able to  
realize that it has. When discussing the argument turning  
in the infinitude of acts ascribable to the mind, I said  
that being conscious of the consciousness of mental acts  
could be ascribed to the "thinking thing". It would seem  
then that what recognizes that the consciousness has  
retained representations of past actions is "the thinking
thing", and if I were to subscribe to the second model I would have to maintain this. However Locke would not, for the whole point of the second model is that personal identity consists in the persistence of "consciousness" - a person now did those actions in the past that this consciousness can "reach" i.e., recognize that it was the consciousness of. Thus acts of thought are ascribed to this entity. On the first model there is only one entity that thinks and it is conscious that it does.

In the last section of this thesis I will argue that it is possible that there be two minds in a man. But I know of no reason for believing that this is ever actually the case. The facts of introspection do not demand this model; another is at hand to explain them. Consequently I accept that model that uses fewer entities.

I now proceed with the exposition of Locke's account of introspection. It is not clear whether he believes that the mind is directly given to itself in introspection. Sometimes he seems to be saying that the representative doctrine is in force here, just as it is in perception.¹ This is especially evident in the first chapter of Book II,

¹ O'Connor takes this as Locke's view. See p.99.
the contention of which is that all our knowledge
derives ultimately from experience. The tendency of this
chapter is to show that introspection and perception are
twin and parallel sources of knowledge:

The other fountain from which experience
furnisheth the understanding with ideas is, —
the perception of the operations of our own
minds within us, as it is employed about the
ideas it has got: — which operations, when
the soul comes to reflect on and consider,
do furnish the understanding with another set
of ideas, which could not be had from things
without.... This source of ideas every man has
wholly in himself; and though it be not
sense, as having nothing to do with external
objects, yet it is very like it, and might
properly enough be termed "internal sense". 1

Now representative theories aside, the characterization
of introspection given in the first section of the
Introduction, and the definition of "idea" given in the
last section there, is bound to confuse Locke on what is
given in introspection. He says that in introspection the
mind is its own object, and then defines "idea" as whatsoever
is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. "If
we are prepared to admit that an act of introspection is an
act of thinking (as Locke will have to, since thinking is
distinguished by a "degree of voluntary attention" 2 and

1 2.1.4.
2 2.9.1.
so is introspection) then we have the paradox that the mind is sometimes an idea.

However as the Essay proceeds the representative theory lapses as far as introspection goes, and at the very end of the Essay Locke says:

Since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas.¹

The argument here being that ideas are needed precisely because nothing the mind thinks about are as present to it as it itself is. In the long section on personal identity, Locke never even alludes to the complications that might be expected to develop if there were representations between the consciousness and the thinking thing. This is also true in those sections of the Essay where Locke is "tracing the progress"² of our minds or "reflecting on our ways of thinking".³ In the Correspondence with Stillingfleet the representative theory is also conspicuous by its absence when Locke treats

¹ 4.21.4. Stress mine.
² 2.12.18.
³ 4.2.1.
of introspection. ¹ Nowhere in his writings does Locke discuss the causes of our "ideas" of introspection as he does those of perception ², or give a sense in which these ideas can be said to copy or fail to copy their originals.

Locke can still maintain that we acquire our ideas of thinking and willing by introspection, even though ideas are not given in introspection. Once we have attended to these operations, he can say, we can recall what they are like. In this sense we have ideas of them, and in a sense these ideas were acquired in introspection. Locke would want to retain a representationist theory of thinking concerning the objects of introspection, even though he abandoned a representative theory of perception here. Presumably, the representations in question would be memory images of what the various mental acts are like.

Locke is also inconsistent on the point whether or not it is in the nature of the mind to be conscious of its own operations. He categorically asserts that it is, in several places:

I do say (a man) cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible

¹ P.138, P.143.
² 2.8.
of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts and to them it is.\(^1\)

Again:

It is altogether as unintelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it.\(^2\)

This position is reaffirmed at the opening of the account of personal identity.\(^3\) Yet Locke also states that:

The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object.\(^4\)

So it is not only "intelligible" that the mind should sometimes not be conscious of its own acts, it now appea that this is usually the case. It is only "in time"\(^5\) Locke says, that the mind comes to reflect on its own operations.

It seems that what Locke is most anxious to assert: all this is that the mind is never wholly without

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1 2.1.10.
2 2.1.19.
3 2.27.11. See also 2.1.11., 2.1.12.
4 Introduction, 1.
5 2.1.24.
consciousness of its own acts. But this consciousness admits of degrees of concentration:

Unless a man turns his attention that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of a landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it.¹

Locke admits that it is "pretty late" before children get ideas of the operations of their minds, yet he says that they are conscious of them nevertheless. But they do not attend to them, so they pass like "floating visions", and hence the objects of consciousness are too confused to the child to allow us to say of it that it has "ideas" of various mental acts. Children are conscious of their wonderings and assertings, but not sufficiently conscious of them to know they are different, much less to know the nature of the difference.

The problem now is to decide whether Locke is justified in holding that it is in the nature of mind to be self-conscious, in the sense of "being aware" but not "concentrating on", rather than merely that it is always

¹ 2.1.7.
self-conscious in this sense. Consider the case of a man's being lost in thought, or being held spell-bound by an object. In these cases is a man aware of being in these mental states? I am inclined to think, for the following reason, that he is. Unless he were, I do not see how he could say, immediately after having been in these states, that he was in them. And we can say this. But this is not conclusive. A man may be able to report truly that he was in such states because of other factors. So it seems possible that a man be in a mental state without knowing that he is and this is sufficient to refute the claim that the mind is by nature a self-conscious entity. The possibility remains that it is, in fact always such.

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Thus according to Locke we are in a better position to discover the operations of our own minds than the operations of external objects, since these are forever hidden from us by a veil of ideas. Now Locke does say that the mind "contemplates itself"¹ and can "make itself

¹ 4.9.4.
its own object"¹ but when he discusses introspection its objects are almost always termed "the operations"² of our mind. And Aaron claims that in The Examination Locke "categorically asserts that reflection does not give us knowledge of the mind itself but only of its operations".³ Although it is not very clear, the passage he refers to does seem to make this assertion:

And what reason can there be given, why God shows the idea of a triangle to us, and not the idea of our souls, but this, that God has given us external sensation to perceive the one, and none to perceive the other, but only internal sensation to perceive the operations from the latter.⁴

But how can this be true? How can we observe the mind operating without observing the mind? Perhaps there is a sense in which we can observe the operations of something without observing what it is that operates. We can observe measles "operating" on a child's body without observing the actual entities causing the spots. This sense of "operations" is the same as "effects" - we observe the effects that measles has on the child. But the

¹ Introduction, 1.
² 2.23.5*15.
³ John Locke, P.148.
⁴ E of M S.46.
operations of the mind are given to consciousness. We are conscious of an entity operating - hence we are conscious of an entity viz. the mind. The most that Locke can say is that we never observe the mind not operating with something. This may be true or false. Reasons will have to be adduced either way.

If the position Locke is committed to is correct - that the mind is sometimes its own object - then we ought to be able to say more about it than merely that it is "the thinking thing". We should be able to go some way towards saying what it is. But there are two tendencies in Locke. Sometimes he asserts the position that I argue in the last paragraph he must come to, sometimes he seems to want to assert that the mind is known "by description" as a "that which operates", "that which intuits relations between ideas" etc.

These two tendencies are manifest when Locke is saying what the mind is, i.e., explicating our "complex idea of an immaterial spirit". The simple ideas from which this is "framed" are got from the operations of the mind - they are thinking, perceiving, a power of moving themselves and other things "joined to substance". What it is that thinks

1 2.23.15.
or wills does not come into it. Yet in this very section he says that what thinks is given in every act of sensation:

It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature the corporeal and the spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing etc., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees or hears. ¹

Well then, what else can be said of this object of acquaintance? In two places in his later works he claims that it is a simple substance (i.e., not compound), ² but he offers no argument or explication of this.

It seems to me that a Lockean mind can be nothing other than consciousness. It is consciousness that intuits relations between ideas. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that ideas and their relations are given to consciousness. Acts of thought occurring at different times may or may not have different objects, but what is common to them is that they are the objects of a consciousness. This is observed to operate with ideas.

¹ 2.23.15.
² Remarks. 2., E of M S. 39.
How can it be characterized there? I do not know of any characterization that has even been given of it. As G.E. Moore remarked, when we attend to the act of intuiting a sense datum (e.g., a blue patch) all that seems to be given is the blue patch. He explains this by saying that consciousness is "diaphanous" i.e., as though transparent. Locke might well have said that "consciousness" is a simple idea of introspection, and can no more be further analyzed than "redness" can. C.D. Broad makes some illuminating distinctions here:

Suppose e.g., that the situation (i.e. the introspected situation) contained two constituents, one of which is sensed and can be selected, whilst the other is only sensed or felt and cannot be selected or inspected. Then, if we tried to introspect the situation, nothing would be presented to us except the former constituent. But, since the other constituent is sensed or felt by us, though it cannot be selected or inspected by us, we might quite well know with complete certainty that what we are inspecting is not the whole of the situation.

It must be admitted that there is no textual justification for my identification of consciousness with "the thinking thing". Locke does use the word "consciousness" a good deal but he applies it to the reflex

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1 Refutation of Idealism, Philosophical Studies, p.25.
act of awareness that the thinking thing has of its operations. However, some of the things Locke does want to say may appear to rule out my identification. Locke uses "soul", "thinking thing", "immaterial spirit" synonymously and in the first chapter of Book II, when arguing against the Cartesian view that the soul always thinks, he makes the following assertions

(a) Thinking (this being a generic term to cover all mental operations with ideas and hence includes perception) is a "condition of being awake".2

(b) It is not the essence of the soul to think any more than motion is the essence of body. Thinking is merely an "operation of the soul".3

(c) The soul exists during sleep.4

So Locke considers that thinking is a condition of the existence of consciousness in a man, but not of "the thinking thing" or "soul".

These statements come by way of prologue to his arguments against the Cartesian position. They are not

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1 See 2.27.
2 2.1.11.
3 2.1.10.
4 2.1.10.
themselves argued for, and the third proposition is a sort of a disclaimer. His view, Locke says, is that a man cannot think without being conscious of it, not that a man has no soul because he is not conscious of it in sleep. It seems that Locke was merely retreating from the heretical doctrine that there are times in a man's life when he has no soul. But what "soul" can mean in this context is most unclear. Are these statements, then, supported or needed by the arguments Locke brings to bear against the Cartesian position? Locke must attack Descartes because if thinking is the essence of mind, to enquire after the beginning of a man's ideas is to ask when his soul first existed, and not to ask "when did he first perceive?" Locke makes the following points:

(1) Often we do not remember having thoughts during sleep. If we nevertheless did have them, the sleeping man would be a different person from the waking man. There would be one man and two persons.

(2) He stresses the implausibility of the contention that men are thinking during sleep yet cannot remember any of their thoughts when they are woken in the middle of "them".

(3) What, he asks, would be the use of such thoughts of which no "footsteps" remain?

(4) Locke acknowledges that it is possible that the soul always thinks, but does not remember this. But it is also possible that it does not. There is no reason, he says, to accept the first proposition.
None of these points requires (a), (b), or (c).
I propose to ignore the third as being nothing more than a move Locke made to conciliate the orthodox. I propose to accept (b) and reject (a). The latter is not necessarily true and is perhaps even false. I can imagine a person who is conscious, yet who is not perceiving anything around him, nor is thinking of anything. It may be psychologically very difficult to do this, but it does not seem impossible.

Thus in reply to the question whether according to Locke the mind is anything actual when there are no ideas before it, I point to the possibility just mentioned. Locke does not maintain it himself, and would probably refuse to consider it as being too speculative, but it seems to follow from his general position. And what Locke says about there being an act of "taking notice" required before the mind can perceive ideas, implies that the mind exists anterior to its perceiving.

There seems to be another aspect of Locke's general epistemological position that will force Locke to say that the mind is actual before it does anything with symbols. [That is, before it "thinks", in Locke's sense of this word. Thinking, according to Locke, requires ideas, representative beings before the mind. These must be sensible tokens or symbols.] Now thinking is something we do, not something
that happens to us. This is a point which Locke is, in a general way, anxious to make:

Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active, where it, with any degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive.¹

However, Locke thinks of this voluntary activity only in terms of the degrees of attention which the mind affords to its ideas. If we are going to have any control over what we think about, Locke will have to recognize a different sort of voluntary activity concerned with ideas. If, for example, we wish to think of some of our past actions, we will have to select the appropriate ideas from memory. But before we can do this, we must know, in some sense of "know", what we want to think about. And we will have to know this before we have any symbols before our minds, in order to select the right ones. Now this pre-symbolic form of thinking is not something Locke anywhere recognizes, nor is it anything that he makes even the remotest theoretical provision for. But he will have to,

¹ 2.7.1. This last claim as to the passivity of the mind in perception is qualified two sections later. For more on the activity of the mind in thinking see 2.19.
nevertheless, if he wishes to put what we think about in our power.

The form of thinking required prior to the selection of symbols might be termed "thinking of" something as opposed to the "thinking about" something that we do with symbols. This distinction has some correspondence to the sense-reference distinction. "Thinking of" something seems to be just the directedness of the mind to an object. It seems to do nothing more than provide us with a subject to think about. If we wish to think about it to any extent, we seem to have to produce symbols, whether these take the form of mental images, an interior monologue, written words or diagrams. This is how we give a content (sense) to what we had first thought of (referred to). However, this is beside the point here. What matters is that if Locke wishes to make an important point, he will have to admit that the mind is actual and active when it has no tokens (ideas) before it.
A Lockean mind is pre-eminently an active being. From the time it first acquires ideas in sensation to the time it can truly be said to know, it has plenty of work to do: it must compound ideas, it must abstract them, it must compare them. All these are actions of the mind with ideas and some of them are voluntary e.g., consecutive to a decision to compare this idea with that. Locke argues that our idea of active power is derived from voluntary mental operations. Bodies yield only an idea of passive power, he says. A billiard ball at rest "affords us with no idea of any active power to move", ¹ nor does it when it is set in motion by another. Now the causal activity of this ball:

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gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in a body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not to produce any action.\]

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And the "active" power we ascribe to bodies is always of this sort: the power they have to change the state of a body is always derived from some other body. From reflection on the operations of our minds we get the idea

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¹ 2.21.4.
² 2.21.4.
of "the beginning of motion":

where we find by experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest.¹

This is our idea of action: "where the substance or agent puts itself into action by its own power"² and Locke gives as an instance of this the production of ideas "out of sight" at one's choice.

Willing, Locke emphasizes, is not something that is done by an entity separate from the mind. It is something that the mind does, just as thinking is.³ When we find ourselves exercising a power "to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by (a thought) or preference of the mind"⁴ we are willing. And what we must do to observe that these are actions, is observe that they are not determined by antecedent conditions, because if they are, they are not truly actions. They are the continuation of a pre-existing movement. (As the exposition proceeds it will be seen that we have to observe something more than this.)

¹ 2.21.4.
² 2.21.74.
⁴ 2.21.5.
Locke wrote his long treatise on the will to show that this is true, and at the end of it he reaffirms this position. But on the way he commits himself to a view that not only makes "acts" of the mind "passions", but makes it difficult to see how the "acts" of the mind are anything distinct from uneasinesses.

Before showing how this comes about, I wish to remark on what might seem to be the ontological ramifications of Locke's original position. If that position were true, it might seem to secure both the immateriality and substantiality of the mind in one move. The argument would go as follows. If a human mind can act e.g., stop or initiate a train of thought, even though everything else in the universe were inert, and material objects can be set in motion only by the prior motion of other bodies, then the mind could not be a body or an aspect of one. This does seem to show that the mind could not be a material aspect. But it could be a non-material aspect of a physical system which could act when the system and its parts were motionless. We will only think this impossible if we think that mental acts are analogous to changes of position, but once we remind ourselves that they are (or some of them are) decisions, the temptation to think of them in this fashion is removed.
There is one other point to be made. I argued in the last section that a Lockean mind is nothing other than consciousness. So it is consciousness that wills. This certainly sounds odd. However, this seems to be due to our habit of thinking of the will as an entity somehow separate from the mind, and our tendency to think of changes as changes of position. Once we remind ourselves that volitions are decisions to continue or change what we are doing, any real difficulty seems to disappear, although linguistic awkwardness remains.

For a man to be free, Locke says, it is not sufficient that, in a given case, he be doing what he has chosen to do. A man may be in a position that he cannot get out of e.g., in the stocks, and may choose to stay there. But in this situation he is not free, for should he choose to get out of the stocks he could not. A man, while asleep, may be carried into a room where there are friends whom he has not seen for years, and the door may be locked. He wakes up and is glad to be in the room. But although he chooses to be there he is there under necessity, for if he should choose to go out he could not.\footnote{2.21.10.} "Liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will,\"
says Locke, but he adds, "there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty". ¹ With the cases just mentioned in mind, he says

Liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring: but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct.²

It is not clear what Locke is holding to here. Would he be satisfied to say that a man is free only if he is doing what he has chosen, and that if he had chosen otherwise it must then be in his power to do what he chose to do, even though a man could never have chosen otherwise? Or would Locke want to hold that a man is free only if it is equally in his power to choose and not to choose to do something, and that in both cases he must be able to do what he has chosen? Locke must want to hold the second position. For if a man could not even choose otherwise than he did, there would be no point in insisting, as Locke does, that for a man to be free there must be nothing obstructing the performance of a given action (viz., one other than the man did). Volition is as much necessary to freedom as freedom to do what one wills.

However, as Locke develops his theory of the will it

¹ 2.21.8.
² 2.21.10.
what determines the will? the true and proper answer is, the mind. for that which determines the general power of directing, to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way. if this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, what determines the will? is this, what moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest? and to this i answer - the motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon a change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. although uneasiness is closely associated with desire, the nature of the association is not clear. in one place he says that uneasiness is desire. yet the tendency in locke is not to identify them but to make a looser connection:

but what immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good. and he says that he is "sure" that wherever uneasiness is, desire is. he says that desire is "a state of uneasiness".

1 2.21.29.
2 2.21.38.
3 2.21.33.
4 2.21.32.
Further, he says that "fear, anger, envy, shame etc., have their uneasiness too, and thereby influence the will". So only uneasiness determines the will. It is either part of what desire is, and part of any other passion that determines the will, or it is a state that is activated by desire or any other passion. Of these alternatives the second must be true. A man may desire to do something and not feel the least uneasiness pressing him into doing what he desires to do. He may desire to visit the new family that has just moved in next door, but this desire may not involve any uneasiness. This, we must suppose, implies in a man some degree of stress, not much perhaps, but some, a state of mental disequilibrium. I take it that this is what "uneasiness" means in Locke.

This being the case, Locke has committed himself to a highly specific thesis as to what it is that moves the will in each of its acts. But why on earth did he think this thesis true? Uneasiness is a felt state, and it is surely obvious that there are some occasions on which we make choices when we are in a state of perfect interior calm.

1 2.21.40.
Locke says that he will endeavour to show that it is uneasiness that determines the will to its successive acts "both from experience and the reason of the thing".¹ The appeal to experience consists largely in producing a number of cases, and asking us to agree that it is uneasiness that moves the man in each. His arguments from "the reason of the thing" consist mainly in his pointing out that if it is not uneasiness that determines the will it is impossible to see what does. In particular, he argues that the greater good in view is not sufficient to determine the will, for we may convince a man that it is better to act in a way different from that in which he habitually does, but he may still act as he always did. And if the greater good did determine the will, Locke fails to see how we could "get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven"², and conform our actions to a standard different from that required for the attainment of that goal.

Into the rights and wrongs of these positions I do not propose to enter. It is enough to show how Locke thinks mental acts are determined. Locke proceeds to

¹ 2.21.33.
² 2.21.38.
make what he takes to be an important modification of this theory:

There being in us a great many uneasiness, always soliciting and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action, and so it does, for the most part, but not always. For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.¹

And freedom consists in this power to suspend the execution of any uneasiness. But before Locke can say this, he must show that this suspension of action is not itself determined by an uneasiness, for on his general model it seems that it would be.² For example, I think of a friend of mine in Sydney whom I have not seen for years and who is shortly to go overseas. Should I go and see him? I am put in a state of uneasiness which will only be satisfied (let us say) if I do. But before I decide to go I pause and consider. If I do go, I will not be able to afford to return to Adelaide for Christmas and surely I am under a greater obligation to spend

¹ A fact drawn to my attention by Prof. C.B. Martin.

² 2.21.48.
Christmas with my family. Now wouldn't my pausing to consider be caused by the general uneasiness I have about doing anything precipitately? And after I have examined the possible courses of action, wouldn't my decision to act then be caused by the uneasiness one of them activated in me?

To be consistent, Locke must accept this. Hence he is a thorough-going determinist: all a man's choices are determined by antecedent uneasinesses. It may well be that when we attend to these uneasinesses with the question as to source in our minds, we find that they are antecedently unconditioned. Hence their moving the will is no case of a transfer of movement. But these uneasinesses could never give us any idea of power: "of something putting itself into action by its own power",\(^1\) or something beginning action of itself. They are merely things that happen to us, not things we do. This is why Locke is a determinist. And if we are to get the idea of power Locke is after, we must get it from decisions to do something or other e.g., to use his own example, to think of some absent thing\(^2\) or from efforts of will such as those

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\(^1\) 2.21.74 my stress.

\(^2\) 2.21.74.
we exercise on occasions when important moral choices are forced upon us. But if what Locke says is true, we cannot get the idea of active power from there either, since these are now determined by antecedent conditions. In short, we cannot get this idea at all. Locke has no right to conclude his chapter "Of Power" by saying that

Perceptivity, or the power of perception, or thinking; Motivity, or the power of moving

are the two great classes of ideas obtained from introspection.

It remains to be seen whether any room remains in Locke's theory of will for volitions i.e., decisions to do this or that. Now the distinction between the determining factor and the event determined is one which Locke wishes to maintain. Immediately after stating that in every particular instance it is uneasiness "that determines the mind to this or that particular motion or rest" he goes out of his way to distinguish volition from desire. He produces a case where choice and desire go counter to each other. Under severe coercion I may choose to do something that I may not desire to do. But

1 2.21.75.
2 2.21.29.
if Locke's general position is correct I make this choice only because I am more uneasy about what will happen to me if I fail to comply than if I do comply. Preceding the choice to do something is always the uneasiness for the want of that thing. The volition is always the pale echo of the uneasiness. Why should Locke retain it then? What point is there to it? Volition "is the power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind". ¹ Why doesn't Locke say this power is actualized when an uneasiness presses us to action? Uneasinesses, while certainly not "thoughts" in Locke's own sense (they do not require ideas before the mind) are concept-laden nevertheless; they are uneasinesses for the want of this, just as volitions are for this or that.²

It seems to me that Locke should have taken this position. In his own theory volitions play no part not played by uneasinesses. Perhaps Locke retained the distinction because there is an obvious introspectible

¹ 2.21.5.
² A fact which, if Locke had considered, might have led him to doubt that all thinking requires tokens before the mind.
difference between them. And the difference is just where Locke locates it. Efforts of will give us that idea of power that uneasiness themselves never could:

Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action.¹

From uneasiness or desire Locke could never have got the idea of something "putting itself" into action.²

So Locke retained the distinction because the facts seem to demand it, although there is no room for it in his theory.

Locke's settled position is that the various mental acts are determined by prior uneasinesses. They are self-determined in the sense that the uneasinesses in a given case are the self's, but they are not self-determined in the sense that the mind initiates its own actions. Something happens to it and this causes it to act.

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¹ 2.21.15. My emphasis.
² 2.21.74.
9. MIND AS SUBSTANCE AND MIND AS QUALITY

We obtain our ideas of particular substances by noting "that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together". These are "presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name". After having remarked that when we talk of any particular sort of corporeal substance like a horse or stone, we are really talking about a "compilation or collection" of qualities supported by a substratum, he says that "the same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind". The "ideas" that we observe to "go together" in this case are in fact the activities of thinking and moving bodies by thought, and the other activities given to introspection. Of course these do not go together in the sense that they co-exist in the same spatial region. It is not that thinking and willing are different qualities. They are different actions of the same thing. Saying that they

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1 2.23.1.
2 2.23.2.
3 2.23.4.
4 2.23.5.
"go together" can only mean that they, and others of their type, are found by introspection. "The idea of these actions or modes of thinking are inconsistent with the idea of self-subsistence, and therefore have a necessary connexion with a support or subject of inhesion."\(^1\)

What makes us say that there are particular material substances is that certain qualities are manifested in a spatial region. In these regions we have no evidence of thinking, and we find that bodies have no power to begin motion, but only to transfer it once it has been communicated to them. For this reason we do not include these ideas in our ideas of particular bodily substances. But we do find these "qualities" when we reflect, and thus we form the idea of a mind, or as Locke says, a "spiritual substance".\(^2\) Locke claims that, with a few exceptions [shape and extension, solidity and the communication of motion by impulse\(^3\)] there are no necessary relations obtaining between our ideas of qualities. Hence it is no contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity, "both being simple ideas,

\(^1\) C.S. p.32.
\(^2\) 2.23.5., 2.23.15-18.
\(^3\) 4.3.14.
independent one of another". ¹ Neither thinking nor solidity are simple in the sense of being unanalyzable, but they are certainly independent.

Hence Locke has established the possibility that a pure "spirit", i.e., a thinking, willing being exists even though no material being exists. However, this claim is not very exciting when we remember that all it means is that these activities with their substratum might exist when no substratum supports any material qualities. According to Locke, the reasons given above constitute a proof that there is a "spiritual substance in us".² But at the very same time he is prepared to admit that "upon my principles it cannot be proved (i.e., demonstratively proved) that there is an immaterial substance in us."³ For it may be that God has superadded to matter "a faculty of thinking."⁴ But even if he has, the material thing thus endowed is a spirit, for

the general idea of substance being the same everywhere, the modification of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a spirit without considering what other

¹ 2.23.32.
² C.S. p.32.
³ C.S. p.32. My emphasis.
⁴ Ibid.
modifications it has, as whether it has the modification of solidity or no.¹

But given the way Locke thinks of the substratum this conclusion immediately follows. Locke has no guarantee that there is not only one substratum in which all qualities inhere. Locke has to postulate the activity of God to account for the possibility of thought inhering in a material substance, only because he illicitly thinks of the substratum as explaining the co-existence of a group of qualities,² and hence he assumes that substrata separately underpin just those groups of qualities that appear separately to us.

Although for the above reason we cannot be sure that it is an immaterial substance that thinks in us, Locke regards it as highly probable that it is.³ His grounds for believing this are obscure. However he does make an explicit statement on this subject:

I presume, from what I have said about the supposition of a system of matter thinking (which there demonstrates that God is immaterial) will prove it in the highest degree probable, ⁴ that the thinking substance in us is immaterial.

¹ C.S. p.32.
² 2.23.4+6.
³ 4.3.6., C.S. p.32., C.S. p.482.
⁴ C.S. p.32.
He is referring here to his proof for the existence of God. What he attempts to show there is that matter, considered as modified only by the primary qualities, has no tendency to produce thought. But this would seem to give no weight to the claim that thinking and willing in us do not inhere in the same substratum as e.g., the material qualities of the brain.

Locke might then fall back to the position that bodies exhibit the primary qualities only, and that we do not find in any such group of qualities the power of producing motion by thought, the grouping of qualities being his original ground for the classification of substances. But then do the facts that when we observe bodies, and do not find the quality of thinking and its kindred co-existing with the material qualities, and our not finding the typically material qualities when we introspect, render it improbable that the two types of quality exist together in the same substratum? Our not noticing this in introspection would not seem to make it probable that this does not happen. If it does, we are licensed by Locke to call the substance a material spiritual

\[1\] 4.10.
one, although we are to take careful note that "spiritual" does not mean "immaterial". Given the activities of thinking and willing, it is analytic for Locke that there are spiritual substances.¹

However, there are indications that Locke wishes to maintain a more interesting thesis than this. When he introduces the possibility of thinking being an attribute of matter, he says that we have no reason to suppose that "Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think..."² This is otherwise put by saying that he sees "no contradiction in it that (God) should give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought."³ He is stressing here that given a certain organisation of bodies, God might be able to give it a power of being conscious of relations between ideas. There seems to be a departure from the model of attribution to a substratum. Given that model, there is no need to stress complexity of organization

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¹ C.S. p.32.
² 4.3.6.
³ 4.3.6.
to lend plausibility to the claim that a material substance might think. But if we abandon this model and think of atoms themselves as substances, it comes as a shock to be invited to consider that consciousness of ideas (thinking) might be a property of one of them. Here is further indication in the Essay that with regard to this point Locke is thinking of material substances solely in terms of atoms. He says:

Thinking, reasoning, fearing, which we conclude not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit.¹

Now if we think of bodies on the qualities - inherence model, nothing is easier than attributing the actions mentioned to the same subject of inhesion as the corporeal qualities. But if we think of bodies as particles, and think of these as substances, it at once becomes difficult to apprehend how "thinking" can "belong" to body. Hence I suggest there are grounds for believing that in discussing this problem, Locke abandons the substratum theory and invites us to conceive of thinking as a power of a system of parts, this thought of in a common-sense way. And in fact in a sustained passage in the Correspondence it is evident that he is thinking this way.²

¹ 2.23.5.
² P.460-471.
Now Locke does not believe that the power of thought is a natural power of matter, and in his proof for the existence of God he argues that matter can never of itself produce thought. All that matter can do is impel matter and be put in different arrangements. But this does not constitute thought. Hence his statement that if matter is to have the power of thought this must be superadded by God. In the Correspondence he claims both that it is possible for God to super-add to matter powers not contained in its essence, and that he has indeed done so. As an example of this he cites gravitation:

The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation, above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible instance, that he has done so.

As a further instance of this, Locke claims that unless God had "super-added" properties to the "dull, dead earth", he could not have made the irrational animals from it,

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1 4.10.10.
2 4.10.16.
3 4.3.6.
which he thinks God has done.¹

This abandons the idea that gravity is a power of bodies dependent on the primary qualities. This was the position in the Essay, and there Locke seems to think that all powers bodies have are dependent on these qualities. Hand in hand with this goes the thesis that all our ideas are somehow "made up" of the idea of the primary qualities, "perceptivity" and "motivity", and "existence", "duration" and "number".²

Whatever the relations of "depending on" and "being made up of" might be, Locke now plainly wants to assert that there is no necessary relation obtaining between our ideas of a body's qualities, and that there is no necessary connexion between the qualities themselves. But there was no necessity that Locke invoke the power of God to explain matter having qualities not contained in its essence. His point can be put by saying that matter has emergent properties, although this would not be consistent with what he says about it in his proof for the existence of God. The attraction of particle to particle is not something that can be deduced from their nature, given

¹ C.S. p.462.
² 2.21.75.
that this is defined by the primary qualities, nor could it be deduced from this and the bare relation of two particles existing together in space. This property could only be detected by observing the behaviour of different bits of matter in space. It might be said that a material particle has a "latent" property that is only manifested when it is in space with other particles. It may be that when particles are put into more complex arrangements other properties emerge.¹

That qualities can arise in this way is not here in dispute. What is in dispute is whether the mind, or consciousness, can be a quality or modification at all, given all that Locke has said about it. This will be the topic in the next section.

Locke does not raise the problem by asking whether the mind is a quality. He looks on thinking and willing, quite correctly, as modes. Therefore they must be supported by a substratum, just as shapes must be. The possibility that one and the same substratum supports both types of quality, at once becomes apparent.

When we say that thinking is a mode we mean that it is

¹ What I have said here derives from C.D. Broad. Mind and Its Place in Nature, Ch. 2.
an action of something. Evidently it is an action of the mind, and in the next section I shall ask whether that itself is a mode or modification. These can themselves be modified. A grin may be ear-to-ear, motions are fast or slow.

What can Locke be doing when he attributes thinking to a substratum? When we attribute thinking to something we mean that that thing thinks, that that thing is thinking. Locke cannot say that the substratum thinks. When we attribute solidity to a thing we mean that that thing is solid. Locke recognizes that solidity is a mode and must be referred to something. But what he refers it to is not solid. He can say indeed that it "has" solidity, or metaphorically that it "bears" solidity, or that what we refer it to enables solidity to exist, but not that it is solid.

This brings out the queerness in Locke's analysis of "thing" or "substance." A thing is thought of as having two types of component: the qualities and what enables them to exist. I suppose that the latter can exist without the former. A Lockean atom is a solid shape at motion or rest. Being solid and shaped is an atom's way of being a thing. A Lockean mind is consciousness. Being conscious is its way of being a thing. When we ascribe solidity and
shape to a discreet existent, we are giving its nature, saying what it is. When we ascribe solidity and shape to a substratum, we are not giving the nature of that, or saying what that is. Instead, we are saying that there are these qualities and that something supports them. What Locke, on this model, can never say, is that something is solid or that something is thinking. If he said that something did think, the question put to him is "what thinks" The answer is, "what we refer 'thinking' to". But Locke can only give this answer under pain of having a thinking substratum.

The point can be put in a paradox: Lockeian modes do not modify. If they did, we could ask what they modified. The only possible answer Locke can give to this question is "the substratum", and he can't give this. Otherwise we would be knowing the substratum through its modifications. Modes "inhere" in substrata or are supported by them, or the latter enable them to exist, but they do not modify anything.

Locke's insight into the ontological nature of modes was true as far as it went, but it did not go far enough. He saw that modes are "by themselves inconsistent with existence" and hence they had to be attributed to something. He did not see that they were attributes of what they are attributed to. If his insight had gone further, he would have noted that there are not modes and substrata, but modified things. And the modifications of a thing are that thing's ways of being a thing.
10. IS CONSCIOUSNESS A MODIFICATION?

In the last section I argued that Locke came at the problem of the ontological status of the mind in two ways: there was the substratum - inherence model, and the mind as the characteristic-of-a-complex model. On the first, the claim that the mind is a substance is uninteresting. Given that thinking and willing are modes, there must be something for them to inhere in. These qualities and their substratum make a spiritual substance. On the second model we are invited to consider that thinking might be a characteristic of a physical complex. We know what a Lockean thought is like: ideas and their relations are given to consciousness. For the sake of holding a definite view on the matter, let us say that in Locke ideas are non-material qualities of a physical system. It then seems possible that these can characterize a system when there is no consciousness to witness them. It is also possible that a consciousness exist when there are no ideas before it. What we must ask now is whether consciousness can be a modification.

Now if this question were put to Locke he would have thought that it is about the consciousness that goes to make up the self-consciousness that he used to define personal identity. If what I have said about that account
is true, he should not find the question strange, since he seems to think that in a situation in which a mind is conscious of its perception, the consciousness of this is a continuant that persists through varied acts of the thinking thing. I have argued that there is no reason for accepting this view, and that Locke's first model of self-consciousness, in which the mind that is conscious of ideas is itself conscious that it is doing this, is preferable. I have argued further that what it is that "operates with ideas" is consciousness. It is this that I am asking about when I ask whether consciousness can be a modification.

Not all that I will say here is relevant to a Lockean mind as it emerges from his writings. At one stage in the argument I will use the concept of a mental act that is unconditioned by antecedent events, but which is nevertheless an action of the mind, something that it does, not something that merely happens. It seems that this was a position that Locke hoped to argue to, but which was replaced by another as his argument developed. The upshot of this is that a possible way of differentiating minds in a bodyless universe is closed to him. Everything else I say here applies to a Lockean mind as it has been explicated in this thesis.
Before getting on with the job, it must be pointed out that "modification" here does not mean "mode" in the Lockean sense explicated at the end of the last section. When Locke says that thinking might be a quality of a physical complex he must think of this as composed of atoms, themselves modified by shape and solidity. On this model, consciousness would modify the system, or be an attribute of it.

Roundness is not the sort of thing that can exist alone, nor can fallings, nor to-the-left-ofs. They must modify, happen to, or be a relation of material objects. The problem here is this: Can consciousness exist alone or must it be the modification of an object?

When I say that "fallings cannot exist alone" I do not merely mean that we cannot think of them existing alone. As far as this goes, a Lockean atom cannot exist alone either. We cannot think of one of these existing, without also thinking of space, and perhaps also a certain minimum duration. But an atom is nevertheless not of the kind that happens to something, or is "of" something. Hence it is a substance, not a modification.

[On this view the Athenian State and the Australian Dollar would be substances. This is a paradox, but it is not relevant to the sort of point I am going to make in this section.]
If an entity were a bare modification, it would be impossible to think of it alone standing in relations to others of its own type, or to think of it alone as the source of activities, or to think of it as differentiated from others of its own type. If this could be thought of consciousness, it would follow that it is not a modification. If consciousness were just a modification, we could only think of it as differentiated and acting, in virtue of that of which it is the modification.

First of all, we might think of consciousnesses (hereafter referred to as "minds") existing at different points of space. If we are asked what we are to think of here, it is that which we are aware of in introspection. We can think of this as being merely conscious, or as "thinking of" something, or as deciding to "think of" something. It seems to me a plain phenomenological fact that most thinking requires a use of symbols of some sort or other. Locke seems to have thought that these are mental images. There is no doubt that sometimes we do use these. When engineers think about changing the gear ratio of a machine they very often (I would think) bring before their minds images of variously sized cogs in different relations. When philosophers think of matter and space they would often use images. I can only speak for myself here, and most of my thinking is done sub-vocally, in my throat, as a kind of interior monologue. If I had no throat, or no hands to write with, or no symbols to look
at, I would be restricted to using mental images. Perhaps these are body-dependent in the way outlined earlier. Nevertheless, any sort of thinking with symbols requires some sort of thinking anterior to their use, which does not itself require symbols, or we would never know what symbols to select in order to think about a thing.

This I call "thinking of", and since it is the sort of thinking I ascribe to minds in a bodyless universe, it will be helpful to rehearse the argument for it at this stage. Let us say, as Locke seems to have thought, that thinking just consists in the use of symbols, and to take Locke's own case, mental images. If this were the only type of thinking there were, I do not see how we could select a symbol in order to think about something with it. In order to be able to do this, we must know what we want to think about before we have any symbols before our minds. If, as Locke seems to have held, thinking is nothing but operating with symbols, then we would have no control over what we think about, since it seems that these symbols just come before our minds and with them we think of whatever they are symbols of. If what we are to think about is to be put within our power, then Locke will have to recognize another sort of thinking which I call "thinking-of" and which is a-symbolic. It may be asked that if this
sort of thinking occurs why do we ever have to use symbols in the first place? To this I freely admit that I do not know. It seems that the "thinking-of" mentioned here that is temporally prior to the use of symbols, is an undeveloped form of thinking. With it the mind finds an object or refers to one, but if it is to think very much about it - i.e., its properties, history and relations - it has to use symbols, whether they be mental images, words on paper, or words spoken silently in the throat. Why we have to do this does not come within the purview of philosophy to explain.

If it is thought highly implausible that there can be a form of thinking that does not consist in a use of symbols, then let the following facts be considered. There may be an image of a Cheshire cat before my mind, and this may be all that is before my mind. But I may nevertheless be thinking of my home in Adelaide. The same image may be before my mind and I may be attending to it closely, but I need not be thinking of Cheshire cats. I may just be trying to discern the properties of mental images, or contemplating the image because of its amusement value. I am only using the image to think of Cheshire cats if I am attending to those features of it that all cats possess and to those features that only Cheshire cats
possess, and I must realize that this is what I am doing. If I do not realize this I am just inspecting a jolly-looking image. Now my realizing this is not itself the inspection of an image or an action with symbols of any kind.

Perhaps we can think of a mind as occupying space too, as long as we make the proviso that a body might occupy the same space at the same time. However, the difficulty here is to give sense to "occupy", since this was defined in terms of a resistance to anything else trying to enter a space, and seems scarcely appropriate to a mind. Perhaps we can say that a mind occupies space in the sense that it is present at every point within a given volume (rather, that parts of it are present). This would be to say that a mind is extended, but as long as we will admit that the same volume might simultaneously be filled with resistant stuff, we have made no concessions that would embarrass claims as to the immateriality of mind.

This possibility is in some ways attractive. When we inspect an image it is not as though the image were concentrated in a point. Images seem to be two dimensional. And when we recall the activity of inspecting an image, it seems to have taken place in a kind of space. It was as though there were depth to it. H.H. Price has this to say of an image:
Its parts are related to each other by relations of location, and also by relations of larger and smaller. But as a whole it has no size though its parts have sizes in relation to each other. And as a whole it is nowhere; or if you prefer, it is in its own "where". It is a spatial world of its own, though a very poverty-stricken and short-lived one.... It is in a space of its own and has no spatial relations to anything in the physical world.¹

Surely it is an intolerable paradox to say that something is extended and yet has no size. It is better to say that different types of object occupy space in different ways, than that there are different types of space. Further, it is false to say, for example, that a pain has no spatial relations to anything in the physical world. A pain is where I locate it, in my arm, under my fingernail, or wherever. It would seem to be possible to locate pains with reference to a co-ordinate system, just as it is to locate bones. Mental images seem to be no different from pains in this respect. Mr M.C. Bradley, for example, locates his on the bridge of his nose.

These considerations are relevant to the spatiality of the objects of the mind, not the mind itself. I mentioned a fact about introspection that might lead us to think it true, as opposed to merely possible, that minds

¹ Thinking & Experience, p.250.
occupy space. I do not intend to press this point. It has often been maintained that "it just doesn't make sense" to apply spatial predicates to things mental, and with respect to some things mental I argue that this does make sense. I have not argued that consciousness itself, as opposed to its objects, is literally in space. I shall simply assume that it is, since I see no good reason to assume otherwise.\footnote{This is Locke's view of the matter. See 2.23.19-20.} More will be said on this point in the course of the discussion.

Minds, then, can be related to each other by measures of distance. But the interesting case is of two minds at one point of space, both (say) "thinking of" Westminster Cathedral and both conscious of themselves doing this. If there are two minds here, there must be something to differentiate the one from the other. But what could this be? It might be suggested that there are qualitatively differentiating properties for each mind. Perhaps each remembers having been the mind of a body that existed from $t_1$ to $t_2$ in places $P \ldots P_n$. There could have been only one such body. But it seems quite possible for a mind to forget the body in which it was, and it is also possible, on my premisses, that two minds might be in the one body.
In this paragraph I shall sketch a case in which we would think it possible that there were two minds in a man, then I shall elucidate the sketch, and extract from it a method for differentiating two minds at a point. Let us say that a philosopher is able to competently defend Cartesian dualism before an audience of highly capable materialists, and at the very same time to write an inventive and very technical paper on Church's theorem. This philosopher habitually writes books while simultaneously conducting post-graduate seminars. Furthermore, when this man looks at various surfaces, he often finds that they are covered by two colours at the one time. If we were dualists, we would at least entertain the possibility that there were two minds in the man. If this were true, he could tell us whether he was using both at a time to think of the same problem, or that he was only using one, and the other was blank. If he were using both to think of the same problem and were proceeding by the same steps in each, he would know that there were two minds acting because he would be conscious of two activities, that there were two continued, albeit parallel, sources of effort.

The referential force of "he" in this context needs clarification. When it is said that "he" could tell us whether he was using both at a time to think of the same
problem, or that he was using only one, and the other was blank", one of the two following models must be born in mind. Firstly, there are two minds here using the same body. We ask them whether they are thinking. One of them tells us what it is thinking by talking to us, and the other writes something out. In this way we find out whether they are thinking about the same subject. The one could only find out what the other was thinking in the same way. One might notice what the other was thinking by hearing him using words (talking out loud), and this one might notice what the other was thinking by noticing that one of the hands of its body was writing out notes. This model of two minds using the one body, aesthetically repellent though it is, seems to be intelligible. We could imagine these minds arguing with each other: one uses a hand of the body to make a statement, the other replies to it verbally. We could imagine one speculating as to whether the other saw the same colours when the eyes of the body were directed to a surface, and concluding that it did not by noticing the bodily discriminations that it made. On this model, one mind could know of the state of its bodily co-inhabitant only by noticing its bodily expressions. It would know that the expressions in question were not its own, because it itself would not have decided to speak or write on a given occasion.
If we adopted a different model that suggests itself here, namely that there is, let us say, a consciousness inspecting images of a system of cogs (a gear system), and another attending to and making deductions from mathematical symbols on a blackboard, and that the man is inwardly conscious of both these activities, perhaps we would say that there was one mind in the man, but that it was able to do two diverse and highly sophisticated things at once. What would "unify" these activities, and make us say that they were the activities of one mind, was that they were concomitantly the objects of an act of reflex awareness. Interestingly enough, it is precisely this fact that Locke used to define personal identity. In the case outlined first, we would be prepared to admit that there were two persons in the body.

I propose to try and use this fact seized on by Locke, to differentiate minds at a point. In the two-minds-in-a-man case we can imagine both minds "thinking of" Westminster Cathedral. This "thinking-of" does not require a use of symbols. One is conscious of its thinking, and so is the other conscious of its thinking. One is no more conscious of the other's thinking in this situation than it would be if one were making deductions from syllogisms on a blackboard, and the other were using the body's hand to
jot down notes to work out a problem. The one can only become conscious of the other's presence by noticing that it uses the body in some way. In the case of "thinking of" no use is made of the body, so one mind is not aware of the other's thinking, even though they be at the same point thinking of the same object. There are two minds here, it would be argued, because one is conscious of itself and not the other, and vice versa.

Now in the setting up of the model, the notion of a mind came to us under the following description: "mind operating on a body from $t$ to $t_2$ in ways $N$ to $N_2$ and inwardly conscious of these actions and no other", and "mind operating on the same body from $t$ to $t_2$ in ways $M$ to $M_2$ and inwardly conscious of these actions and no other". We know what minds are by introspecting our own. In the case of a mind acting on another body our concept of a mind is "entity like the one I introspect". Now this entity cannot be described, hence it cannot be defined, and so differentiating criteria for minds cannot be set up on the basis of a definition as they can for bodies. The possibility exists that all minds are qualitatively similar. Now in the present case we cannot differentiate minds via the different bodily actions they cause, since "thinking of" does not require any. Therefore the only way in which we
can think that there are different minds here is via the notion of "given to an inward consciousness". If there are two minds there must be two of these. In other words, the minds are different because they are the objects of a different consciousness. And this requires the model of self-consciousness in which what it is that is conscious of a thought is an entity separate from what it is that thinks the thought. This was the model Locke used in his discussion of personal identity. If what is conscious of "thinking of" Westminster Cathedral is the same entity as that which thinks, then there may be nothing separating the "two" minds here, since they may be qualitatively the same. It seems that the only way that we can think of there being two minds in this situation, is by thinking of them as the objects of different consciousnesses, and if this is really going to enable us to think of different minds, the consciousness must be thought of as distinct entities. But then what sort of entities can they be? Are they minds? As Locke uses them in his chapter on Personal Identity they seem to be. And if they are, parallel problems arise for individuating them. If they are not minds, I am at a loss to see what they can be.

This attempt at differentiation then, has not
succeeded. Perhaps there is another way of differentiating minds thinking the same thought at a point. Consider the case outlined where there was a considering of images of a system of cogs, and an attending to figures on a blackboard and an inward consciousness of both of these acts. For this last reason Locke would, I think, say that there was only one mind there. But perhaps in view of the fact that there are two centres of conscious activity, on the one hand a considering of one thing, and on the other a simultaneous attendance to and deducing from a column of figures, we would say that there were two minds here. On this view, what would distinguish a mind would be the fact that it was a centre of conscious activity, and there would be as many minds as there were these. If they existed at a point, perhaps there is no reason in theory why, when one of them became self-conscious, it should not also become self-conscious of the rest, but we would still have a method of differentiating minds here.

Even if the method suggested is not sufficient to differentiate minds "thinking of" the same object at the same place, there may be another way of doing this. At a point, let us say, there is a mind (or minds?) thinking of Westminster Cathedral. There is nothing also throughout space but this thinking of the Cathedral. What
we want to know is whether there is one mind at work or more than one. If at a later time there was at a different point of space another mind we would say, unless we were prepared to say that things could just come into existence (and I don't think we would say this), that this mind must previously have been at the same place as the other, and that they were both thinking the same thought. We would say that there were now at least two minds in the universe. At a given time we could never know how many minds there were, but since at later times there were more than previously there were, we would say that there must be something differentiating minds thinking the same thing at a point, although we do not know what it is.

But there is something else we might say here. At a time there was at least one mind in our universe, at a later time there were at least two. Perhaps there was only one to begin with, and it later separated into two, like an amoeba. If we think of minds as occupying volumes of space, this is theoretically possible, since they are then extended, and we can think of one half of a mind going in one direction and the other in another, and both halves functioning as minds. If we say that minds are not extended, it is not easy to see what "separation" can mean here. However, the term is dispensable. We can think
of one mind as issuing from another, or of one producing the other. Which alternative, then, should we adopt? I think we would adopt the first. Nothing we know about minds suggests that one can produce another, even though this may be possible. Even so, the first position leaves much to be desired. At a given time there would be no way of telling how many minds were thinking the same thought at a point. Since more minds appeared at a later time, we concluded that there must have been more than one mind at a given point, although we have no way of knowing what differentiated them then. If we did accept this, we would do so tentatively, waiting for further argument on the subject.

Let us suppose that we do not accept this either. What if there are no differentiating factors in the problem situation? Does this mean we have no right to talk of minds at all apart from bodies? This can only be so if it is essential to our concept of a mind that it makes sense to say that there are two or more minds, qualitatively the same, at a point in space. And is this essential to our concept of a mind? Now in some of the literature on this subject\(^1\) it seems to be thought that it is essential to our

concept of a mind that we cannot think this, and that if a scheme is proposed in which such a possibility arises, then that scheme must be discarded. According to this line of thought, we can make sense in this universe of the suggestion that there may be distinct, qualitatively similar minds. But they are here made distinct by the bodies they are in, or that they are properties of. Take away the bodies, and all bodies, and you have deprived yourself of any way of distinguishing qualitatively similar minds, and what was possible for minds in our universe becomes impossible in the bodyless one. Therefore, so the argument runs, we cannot talk of minds in such a universe. Now it is simply assumed by philosophers who argue in this way, that spatial positions cannot be used to separate minds. I see no reason to accept this assumption, or the further assumption that it is a category mistake to apply spatial predicates to minds. And there is something curious in the behaviour of philosophers who say that spatial predicates do not apply to minds, but who then differentiate them via the spatial properties of the bodies that have them. Presumably, where the bodies go the minds go. So the minds are in the same places as the bodies after all.

But if no sense can be made of the assertion that there is more than one similarly thinking mind at a point
must we give up talking of minds in a bodyless universe?
It seems that it could be equally well argued that since
we can think of minds at different points thinking of the
same object, and minds at the same point thinking of
different objects, we can talk of minds in this context.
It seems to be a matter of decision, what one says here.

Jerome Shaffer\(^1\) has recently suggested that similar
difficulties hold for the individuation of bodies. These
are individuated by the places they are in, but then what
individuates these? He says that it is "plausible to
think" that what individuates places are the bodies that
are in them or near them. But there is no need to take
this line. It might be said that what individuates bodies
is that they occupy different regions of space. Of course
what does the individuating here is not a region of space
\textit{qua} region of space. It is just that it is analytic to
say that if a body occupies space there is only one body
there.

The most damaging objection to all this lies in a
point made by C.B. Martin:\(^2\)

\(^1\) Philosophical Review. Persons and Their Bodies, Jan.1966.
P.74.
\(^2\) Religious Belief, p.112.
When I describe for myself my disembodied state, is this describing my mental life without my body? Not necessarily. There are many things that I can describe, without having to mention anything else, that cannot exist by themselves. I can describe a thing's shape without having to mention its size. From this it does not follow that I have described or can describe a thing that has shape but no size. Similarly, I can describe my mental life without mentioning anything about my body. It does not follow that I have described or can describe my mental life existing without a body.

What reason is there for thinking that I have not made this mistake? The answer lies in the doctrine of introspection. The difficulty in making sense of claims about the existence of something besides the body is to see what it is that is alleged to exist. I am maintaining, along Lockean lines, that this is given in introspection. We introspect, or as Locke says, reflect on, our thinkings, wonderings and assentings, and we can imagine our minds doing this even though no bodies at all existed. Nothing corporeal is given to introspection. Since we can understand what it would be for different minds to exist and to act even though no bodies existed, it follows that the mind is not a modification of body. We could not think of a roundness operating on something if there were no bodies, or fallings at such and such a rate of acceleration, or expansions in size. These can only be thought to happen if we think of a body moving or being
moved in the appropriate ways. But the actions of the mind are in a different category. In the cases just cited, we have nothing to think about if we are denied material objects, but even if we are denied these, we can still think of the actions of the mind - what acts here being the object given to introspection.

Consciousness, then, cannot be a modification of a body or a system of bodies. The possibility remains that it is itself a material substance. Now it cannot be a Lockean material substance since these are characterized only by the primary qualities, and consciousness can simply observe that it does not have these. But perhaps it is a body of a more complicated sort. There is no necessity that bodies have only the qualities that Locke ascribes to them. Whether there could be a body that was not at least solid and shaped, and under what conditions this could be identified with consciousness, is a very large problem and cannot be gone into here.

Since the view stated and defended above is one which almost all contemporary philosophers reject, I will conclude by considering two arguments that have been brought to bear against positions similar to it. The first of these is an argument by Strawson against Cartesianism, the second is an argument by Geach against introspection.
Strawson maintains that "the concept of the pure individual consciousness - the pure ego - is a concept that cannot exist". He immediately qualifies this by saying that it cannot exist as a "primary concept". It can exist as a "secondary" concept i.e., be explained in terms of another concept - the concept of a person. I propose to ignore this qualification, since it makes Strawson's whole account of "persons" incoherent. Throughout this, he insists that M- and P-predicates must be ascribed to the very same thing, yet in the section on disembodied existence, he ascribes P-predicates to an ego, and no M-predicates are ascribed to it. Once he ascribes P-predicates to an ego there is no further need to ascribe that to anything.

Plainly, Strawson would resist what I have to say about minds, because I argue that sense can be given to the idea of an individual consciousness without this having to be understood in terms of that to which both physical and mental predicates are ascribed. Strawson has two arguments against my position. One is that there is no way of differentiating these "pure entities", and I have done my best to meet that. The second rests on the claim that we can not self-ascribe the so-called P-predicates

1Individuals, p.102.
unless we can ascribe them to others. Now if what P-predicates name are characteristics of a consciousness, he says that it is impossible to see how we could ascribe them to others. We could never identify other consciousnesses. The obvious come-back to this is that we cannot identify them as such, but we can identify them if they are given a certain form of bodily expression. As Strawson puts it:

Can we not identify such a subject as, for example, "the subject that stands to that body in the same special relation that I stand in to this one".¹

Strawson rejects this because he can attach no sense to myself as a subject of experience if this is needed in order to understand that there are other subjects of experience. Crucial as this point is to Strawson, the argumentation for it is very slender. It is this. If the present Cartesian picture were true then

Of experiences on the one hand, and bodies on the other, the most I may be allowed to have noted is that experiences, all experiences, stand in a special relation to body M, that body M is unique in just this way, that this is what makes body M unique among bodies.²

Now first of all, it is quite harmless and true to say

¹ Individuals, p.101.
² Ibid.
that all the experiences I have noted stand in a special relation to a given body. Strawson's claim must be that this is the most I have noted. I see no reason to believe this. On the Lockean model, the mind decides, the mind thinks and is acquainted with these actions. It is a self-conscious agent. That is how it gets the idea of itself. It is interesting to see that in order to state the case against the Cartesians Strawson has something noting that all experiences stand in a causal relation to a given body. The only other way he could have put his case is by saying that there are merely self-conscious experiences contingent on a given body. If all this is true, then certain bodily states are only signs of mental states. Strawson thought that this position must be false. But he thought this because it presupposed as a condition of noting that some of your bodily states are signs, that I note that similar bodily states accompany my own feelings and thoughts. I have just examined the argument against this position and found it inadequate.¹

To come now to Geach:¹

If 'looking into the mind' has a genuine logical similarity to 'looking into the box', then it ought to make sense to talk about introspective mental images; lack of introspective imagery would be an idiosyncrasy like being unable to visualize, and might be expected to disable a man from some tasks. If McTaggart's idea is absurd, then it ought to make us suspect the comparison of introspection to real looking.²

McTaggart's idea was that I could have mental images of past mental states. This seems to be not in the least absurd to me. Last night I sat listening to the choral movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, sadly calling to mind the feeling of exhilaration it used to arouse in more receptive days. If the analogy between seeing and introspecting is to hold, says Geach, it ought to make sense to say that a man can fail to discriminate between the emotions (say) of anger and fear, just as it does to say that a man can fail to discriminate between red and green. Once again, I can make sense of this. What's more, inability to do this sort of thing on a suitably delicate scale would disable a man from some tasks, even though they be the despised ones of writing psychological novels.

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¹ Mental Acts. P.107-11.
² P.107-8.
and romantic poems. It is highly probable that Tolstoy was able to make more discriminations among emotional reactions to situations than Geach is. Geach says "of bona fides sense faculties it is impossible to say that they cannot be defective or inaccurate", but, he alleges, this cannot be said of introspection. It is doubtful whether anyone would want to hold that introspection is a "bona fides sense faculty". Nevertheless, the similarity is present here too. One of the ways in which my eyesight can be inaccurate is by failing to attend closely enough to an object, thus engendering a false belief about it. Now a physiologist may stimulate a region of my brain so that I have a perfect mental image of the interior of the professor's room, but by failing to attend to the image carefully or long enough, I may come to have false beliefs about what is in the room. Geach thinks that introspection ought also to be attended by illusions. Well, perhaps it is. Let us say I become possessed by a feeling of fear. I believe that I am afraid, yet in fact I am not afraid of anything. This would be an illusion. However, even if Geach would not allow this case, I have shown that the analogy holds

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1 P. 110.
between introspection and perception in a sufficient number of cases, although Geach never does show that the analogy is necessary to our making sense of "introspection".

To have concluded that consciousness is not a modification is to have reached a position as to its ontological status. Since it is not a modification, it is a substance. But then the Athenian State and the Australian Dollar are not modifications either. There is a difference between their ontological status and that of consciousness. In order to locate this difference one might use the notion of analysis. All that can be said about the Athenian State can be said about citizens, acting and disposed to act in certain ways. Talk about the Athenian State is just a convenient way of talking about other things. But exactly the same has been argued about minds. The questions "what is a substance?" and "Is the mind a substance?" are the questions naturally resulting from this thesis and they are not satisfactorily answered by the assertions that "substances are not modifications" and "minds are not modifications". However, to answer them would require another thesis.

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1 As W. Kneale suggests. The Notion of a Substance, P.A.S. 1940.

2 By Ryle, for example.
11. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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