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EMOTION AND EXPLANATION

by

Gillian K. Llinás

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This thesis is my own work and was written while I was a research scholar of the Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Gillian K. Llinás
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It is suggested that not only psychologists and physiologists, but also philosophers, have created confusion in their various approaches to the study of emotion by seeking to isolate and describe one feature of emotion and to label this as the 'essence' or 'basis' of emotion. Further, philosophers have concealed many important complexities by employing in their investigations of the concept the method of analysis 'by standard cases'. The main contention of this essay, on the other hand, is that emotion words are employed to signify phenomena so various that it is unrealistic to seek a description which would cover all cases of emotion and hence provide an answer to the question 'What is emotion?'. To show why this is so, our uses of emotion words to refer to 'feelings', emotional states, moods, impulse and dispositional motives and character traits are here examined, and the differences in their relationships to the concepts of wanting and of thinking are considered. Moreover, since it is held that emotion words serve not only as descriptive and evaluative terms, but are also frequently employed to provide
explanations of behaviour, the various ways in which the uses of these words serve to make behaviour intelligible to us are examined.

Basic to this investigation is the belief that in this area, as in all those generally specified as belonging to the Philosophy of Mind, philosophical analysis conducted in ignorance of, or disregard for, the empirical findings of psychology and physiology is frequently seriously misleading. For this reason, an attempt has here been made to ensure that the upholding of particular philosophical positions has not involved conflict with established empirical findings.
CHAPTER 1

The Nature of the Enquiry

In recent years it has become commonplace for psychologists, physiologists and philosophers to draw attention to the difficulties encountered by their respective disciplines in the investigation of emotion. Thus J.L. Austin in 'Other minds' refers to 'the complex and baffling field of the emotions';\textsuperscript{1} experimental psychologist Donald Lindsley states that 'emotion is one of the most complex phenomena known to psychology',\textsuperscript{2} while W. B. Cannon's influential 'hypothalamic theory', still the most comprehensive investigation of emotion at the physiological level,\textsuperscript{3} has long been under criticism. This lack of progress seems strange, to the investigators themselves no less than to mere observers, given the undoubted interest of the subject to scientists, philosophers and laymen alike. Many writers have deplored the absence of 'a reasonable and consistent theory of emotion'. Some of them have seen that any answer at present provided to the apparently straightforward question 'What is emotion?' is either obviously incomplete or blatantly


\textsuperscript{3}W.B. Cannon. Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage. 2nd ed. (1929), particularly p. 369.
tautologous. Thus, on the grounds of over-simplification, we are now quite justifiably sceptical of such views as that which took emotion words like 'fear', 'love' and 'jealousy' to refer to the occurrence of some highly specific event like a sensation or a feeling. Surely, it has been reasonably asked, a complex emotional experience such as that of jealousy amounts to more than just this? Again, the widespread tendency, particularly noticeable amongst psychologists, to answer the question 'What is emotion?' by means of such statements as 'Emotion refers to such states as joy, love, pride, jealousy, anger, grief and fear' must now be recognized as completely uninformative.

I am not, of course, asserting that psychologists and physiologists have failed to shed any light whatsoever on the subject of emotion. Yet we still speak of the 'problem of emotion'. Why, then, have their answers to the question 'What is emotion?' left us so dissatisfied?

As some critics have recently pointed out, the most stultifying error made by the experimental workers has been that of consistently identifying emotion with one or other of the phenomena which they have found to


be frequently associated with it. Thus the neurophysiologists, in observing the effects of electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus, have described one of the kinds of events in the brain which may be associated with an emotion, say fear or jealousy - but to talk of a person's fear or jealousy is not, surely, to talk only of these events in his brain. Similarly, the psychologists have investigated and described at length the behavioural manifestations which may occur as part of the emotional experience. Thus we know of the different kinds of facial expressions - smiling, scowling, wincing and so on - which may be associated with some emotions, and of the flushing, tearfulness, fist clenching or lashing out which may, but need not, occur on these occasions. Yet even when such manifestations do occur, the emotion is not merely these bodily reactions. This identification of emotion with the behaviour which is sometimes associated with it, however, still leads some psychologists to make such extraordinary references as a recent one to 'Some of the more tender emotions - such as sexual behaviour or smiling'. Or yet again, physiologists have described the more subtle bodily changes observable under laboratory conditions, such as alterations

1G. Mandler, 'Emotion' in New Directions in Psychology (1962), p. 309. (Italics are mine.)
in blood pressure, heart rate, metabolic rate, mobility of the stomach and intestines, any of which may occur when a person is, say, angry or afraid. But here also the person's anger or fear, love or jealousy, is not identifiable with such changes alone. Nor is the emotion simply the 'Feeling of the same changes as they occur' as William James' oft-quoted, oft-criticized theory postulated.¹ Thus the accounts of both psychologists and physiologists have shown a general tendency to isolate and describe one necessary or possible aspect of an emotional experience and then to label this as the 'basis' of emotion, to speak as though an emotion is 'simply' or 'nothing but' or 'essentially' this one aspect.

Further, although some philosophers have recently drawn attention to errors of this general kind in the work of the experimentalists, their own analyses of the concept have often been far from successful in avoiding what is in principle a similar type of mistake. Thus Errol Bedford, in his article 'Emotions',² concerned to refute the traditional notion that emotion words are simply the names of particular inner experiences or feelings, makes the general claim that the 'prime

function' of emotion words is judicial, not informative. For him, this amounts to the thesis that the main function of such words is not to convey information regarding the subject's inner state or condition but to imply an appraisal or criticism made by that subject of a particular situation. So Bedford holds that 'the verbs in the first person use' (e.g. 'I resent') 'serve to convey the speaker's assessment of some situation', while the third person use ('he resents') 'implies an assessment made by the person they refer to'.¹ 'Generalizing from this example', emotion words are held to 'form part of the vocabulary of appraisal and criticism'. Evaluation or assessment, not description, is the crucial function of emotion words.

Now much of what Bedford says on this point is both interesting and important. My objection here is levelled solely against his claim that the evaluative function frequently performed by emotion words is generally speaking the prime function of these terms. Such an approach, I believe, is as misleading philosophically as has been that of the experimentalists in terms of the 'essence' or 'basis' of an emotional experience. We may agree with Bedford, both in his rejection of the view

that emotion words serve simply to refer to particular sensations or feelings and in his claim that in the case of such statements as 'I was ashamed - embarrassed - contemptuous', there is implied primarily an assessment or evaluation of some situation by the speaker. Thus the statement 'I was embarrassed by his action' serves to convey my assessment of that action as 'awkward or inconvenient' rather than to describe my inner condition at that time.

But Bedford's thesis does not hold for all occurrences of emotion words in general. The person who exclaims, for example, that he is 'boiling with anger', though of course we inevitably assume him to be one who considers some incident or situation as displeasing to him, may on a particular occasion employ this form of words purely to acquaint us with his state of mental and physical perturbation at that time. Thus informed, we act accordingly, e.g. we keep out of his way! Such a person may later reassure us, 'I'm not angry any more, I've calmed down'. That is to say, he withdraws the term 'anger' when his mental and physical perturbation has subsided, though his assessment of some particular circumstance as displeasing may or may not still hold. Again, a person suffering from a generalized emotional condition such as depression or
euphoria is frequently only able to say that a particular pattern of thinking and reacting - called by us depressive or euphoric - is just 'how he is at present'. His claim 'I am euphoric' often serves chiefly to acquaint us with this pattern rather than to convey his assessment of any particular situation. Indeed, he may say 'I don't know why I'm laughing'. This is not to deny, of course, that there may be some unconscious evaluation which has given rise to his state, but this is a different question which will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this essay. The point for us here, however, is that a subject need not on a particular occasion use an emotion word primarily to convey his assessment of a situation.

Bedford's analysis ignores, too, the use of emotion words to signify motives for action. It is difficult to see how this particular function could be fitted into his account. So my claim is that it is important to see that the functions of emotion words are many and varied. On different occasions the same emotion term may be employed to perform quite distinct functions. Even the neurophysiologist who in his laboratory uses the term 'rage' primarily to denote a particular pattern of events in the brain is using the word in one possible sense. His fellow workers have no
difficulty in understanding his reference. For these reasons, to approach the philosophical analysis of the concept of emotion with preconceived ideas regarding the 'prime function' of such terms in all contexts must lead to a distorted view of the uses of that concept. It is misleading to fasten in this way upon one use as 'prime', 'basic' or 'essential'.

Another philosophical approach producing misleading conclusions has been the employment of the method of analysis 'by standard cases', with the consequent dismissal of recalcitrant cases as 'a-typical', 'deviant' or 'degenerate'. Thus R.S. Peters in his 'Emotion and the Category of Passivity' makes the not uncommon observation that 'Emotions always imply reference to an object'. More importantly, however, he goes on to defend this claim against objections based on the occurrence of emotions such as nameless fears, free-floating anxiety, generalized depression, apathy, or euphoria, by holding that these phenomena, which 'have no objects' in the sense that the victims are unable to give specific answers to the questions 'of whom? of what? with whom?', do not represent

2Ibid., p. 117.
'standard cases' of emotion. But considerably more analysis of what precisely is involved in an emotion 'having an object' is required before we can dismiss these cases as non-standard. What, then, is it for an emotion to 'have an object'? When an emotion 'has an object' need the subject 'know' that object? Can we escape the problem presented by some seemingly 'objectless' emotions by claiming that these phenomena are not emotions but moods? But what exactly is the distinction between an emotion and a mood? Can't moods 'have objects'? To speak of 'standard cases' in the analysis of a concept as complex as that of emotion tends to conceal rather than to clarify important philosophical puzzles. Restriction to 'standard cases', conveniently defined, glosses over many important uses of emotion words.

In the light of these criticisms, I shall be attempting to provide in this thesis a contribution towards a conceptual analysis of emotion, where I take such an analysis to involve an investigation of the roles which emotion words play in our description, evaluation and explanation of human behaviour. For the purposes of this analysis, I shall be returning to Ryle and thus indirectly to Wittgenstein, at least
in this respect: I shall be regarding 'emotion' as a term of family relationship, that is, a term embracing a large family of uses that are interrelated in a fairly complex manner. Thus the general background questions will be these: 'How extensive are the applications of emotion words in our language?', 'How do these applications differ from each other?', 'How are they interrelated so that we are justified in employing the major concept 'emotion' to cover such a variety of seemingly subordinate concepts?'. The answers to these questions will require an examination of emotion words as referring, for example, to impulses, feelings, moods, character traits and motives. For it has not always been seen that one and the same emotion word, say 'jealousy', may be employed in different contexts to signify any one of these various phenomena. We quite commonly speak of a jealous impulse, a feeling of jealousy, a jealous mood, a motive of jealousy, or of a person as by nature jealous. How, then, are all these different uses of the word related, if at all?

Again, it is sometimes held that a person to whom an emotion word such as 'jealous' is correctly applied must for that reason 'want' to do or achieve something and 'think' something to be the case. Is this so with all applications of emotion words? Can such general claims be made in relation to all our uses of these words?
11.

Such an analysis may also, I believe, be relevant to puzzles at the empirical level. Many scientists deplore the 'present confused state of the semantics of emotion'.¹ This confusion arises from their having first identified emotion with a particular kind of phenomena, e.g. physiological changes, events in the brain, or bodily expressions, and then having indiscriminately employed a variety of other terms, such as 'feeling', 'mood', 'affect', to cover associated phenomena which, by virtue of their own definitions, they are unable to use 'emotion' to denote. The following exchange between prominent scientists reflects this muddle.

Warren McCulloch: '...There are three terms which you have used again and again which have not sufficiently sharp definitions, namely, 'feeling', 'affect' and 'emotion'. These three have chased each other's tails round and round without my being able to get hold of them ... I am not sure whether you mean different things by them. I think you do.

Lawrence Kubie: Of course I do. These are multidimensional experiences, no dimensions of which should be excluded at this time by over-precise definitions.

F. Fremont-Smith: Then you are saying that for the purposes of this discussion, you don't mean very different things?

Lawrence Kubie: The meanings are overlapping. I shift from one term to the other so as not to be boring by repeating the same term over and over.

Warren McCulloch: Elegant variation.

Lawrence Kubie: Yes, that's right.¹

Dr. Kubie's claim that his different uses of these words represent purely stylistic changes appears to contradict his first reply that 'of course I do' mean different things by them. If their meanings are indeed 'overlapping', precisely in what respects do they overlap?

In attempting to clarify the uses of emotion words, I shall not be attempting to join the customary search for an answer to the question 'What is emotion?'. Indeed, one of the causes of our dissatisfaction may be that the quest for an answer is an ill-directed one. It seems possible that the concept of emotion is one which is employed by us to signify phenomena so various that a request for an answer is, in principle, simply naive. In this respect it resembles the neurophysiologists' recent claim that attempts to postulate a centre for emotion, say the hypothalamus, rather than a complex 'relational system'² of events in the brain.

occurring at various neural levels, are overly simple.

I am suggesting, then, that a useful task for the philosopher concerned with the problem of emotion may well be what Roland Hall has called 'concept reformation'.¹ He has said on this point:

'It is the concept-reformatory task of philosophy to help (or sometimes prevent) the process of concept exchange by adducing some sort of relevant considerations, something to show that the concept is not useful, is actively misleading, or even latently self-contradictory (or sometimes to rebut such suggestions). And of course if we seem to be objecting to the use of a word, this is after all the only way of expressing our repudiation of its associated concept'.²

What is required for the concept of emotion, it appears to me, is not concept repudiation, but concept reformation in the light of a clearer understanding of the complex of interrelated phenomena which the concept is at present employed to denote.

In Chapter 6 of this thesis, the discussion will be centred upon the role of emotion words in the explanation of human behaviour. There is little doubt that an explanation of a particular action given

²ibid., p. 171.
in terms of an emotion word, say 'anger' or 'jealousy', frequently serves to provide us with a considerable understanding of, and insight into, the action - and, perhaps, into the personality of the agent as well. But how does this use of emotion words help to make actions intelligible to us? Are the explanations provided in terms of emotion words always similar in kind? Or may different kinds of explanations be supplied by the same emotion words performing different functions? For example, is there any difference between accounting for a person's action, in terms of his jealousy, when we use the word to refer to his jealous impulse and when we use it to refer to his jealous disposition? When we use an emotion word to explain an action are we giving a causal explanation of that action? Or are we giving the reason for it?

It is clearly possible to pose many philosophical questions arising from the 'problem of emotion'; I shall try to provide the answers, at least in part, to some of these. Given the scope of the thesis, however, and the complexity of the subject matter, it is inevitable that many questions will be raised only to be passed over in what must appear too cavalier a fashion. In this respect I can only point out that the present discussion is merely an essay on the
concept of emotion, a concept which for adequate elucidation also requires parallel analysis of a number of related concepts. I refer, for example, to the concepts of thought and of action, which have frequently but, in my view, erroneously been held to be clearly separable from that of emotion. Further, it is doubtful that linguistic analysis alone will remove many of the puzzles which beset this field. It is my belief that an analysis of this kind is most effective when conducted in close contact with scientific research in the area. For this reason, though, for example, specific physiologic points will seldom be discussed in detail, I have attempted to ensure that the upholding of particular philosophical positions has not involved conflict with established physiological findings.
CHAPTER 2

Emotions as Impulses

When we discuss the relation of emotions to impulses, there are, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, two related definitions of 'impulse' which we must bear in mind. An impulse may be regarded, in one use, as 'a stimulus to action arising from some state of mind or feeling'. In another use, as in 'He did it on impulse', the word conveys that the agent acted in a manner that was sudden, unexpected and not on the basis of reflection or deliberation.

Concentrating initially upon the first use, we can most profitably introduce a consideration of some senses in which an emotion may be regarded as a 'state of mind or feeling' which 'stimulates action', by recapitulating what is familiar, but not for that reason unimportant, ground. Gilbert Ryle, in his analysis of the different senses of 'emotion' which might be said to explain behaviour, is concerned in The Concept of Mind,¹ to treat emotion words as referring to (1) 'motives or inclinations', (2) 'agitations' and (3) 'moods'. But in discussing the different senses in which emotion words may be used,

¹Chapter 4 (1949).
he is concerned, also, to make the general point that in none of these senses do we assert or imply that the behaviour is the effect of an impulse in the sense of a specific inner feeling or sensation which impels the agent to act. He is arguing here against the traditional theory which assumed that to each emotion word there corresponds a qualitatively distinct feeling that may find expression in outward behaviour.

It is not necessary to embark here upon a full discussion of this theory or the arguments against it. However, as I am concerned with the relation between talk about feelings and talk about emotions, it is important to see that much support has been given to the belief that emotion words refer to specific inner feelings, and much general confusion has been caused by the fact that we do frequently use the verb 'to feel' in reporting our emotions. We speak of 'feeling annoyed', 'feeling jealous', 'feeling afraid', and so on. The verb 'to feel' obviously has a number of different uses, e.g., as in 'I feel that you have a problem', where this means that the speaker is inclined to think that something is the case, or as in the perceptual use of 'I felt the scar on his hand'. But as Ryle
has pointed out,¹ the most common cause of confusion
has been the assimilation of the use of 'feel' in,
say, 'I feel annoyed' with that in 'I feel an itch,
tickle or ache'.

It has been supposed, and it is still frequently
implied in talk about emotions, that just as a par-
ticular kind of feeling or sensation is experienced
when one feels an itch (there cannot in this sense be
an unfelt itch), so there is a certain kind of feeling
or sensation experienced by a person who feels annoyed,
afraid, jealous and so on. But this will not do, for
reasons which are familiar. The most important of these
reasons is that for any specific feeling which may be
mentioned, it is always logically possible to say that
one feels, say, annoyed but does not have that specific
feeling. It may be that when I am annoyed I often have
a peculiar fluttering sensation in my stomach, but it is
not contradictory to say that I feel annoyed but do not
have that particular fluttering sensation. And converse-
ly, for any specific feeling, it is possible for a person
to have that feeling yet not feel annoyed on that
occasion. The fluttering in the stomach may also occur
when he is standing on his head or looking at a painting.
Thus unlike the person who has a pain, tickle or itch,

¹G. Ryle, 'Feelings', Philosophical Quarterly, 1
one who is afraid, jealous or annoyed need not feel afraid, jealous or annoyed in the sense of experiencing a particular sensation. Since this point is now also generally accepted by psychologists and physiologists on the basis of their empirical findings, it is unnecessary, I think, to pursue it further.

It is significant, however, that some philosophers have adopted a rather different position, not always clearly differentiated from the previous one, concerning the relation between bodily feelings or sensations and emotions. While rejecting the view that there is some specific feeling which is distinctive of each emotion, they nevertheless claim that some kind of bodily feeling is essentially involved in an emotional experience. Thus Moreland Perkins holds that 'Bodily feeling occupies a central place in emotional experience';¹ when we feel (experience) an emotion, our body is 'moved' and we feel (in the bodily sense) it moved'.² It is 'essential' that such feelings


²Ibid., p. 147. The additions in parentheses are mine.
be present. ¹ What is felt, he says, is a 'certain sort of bodily state or change of bodily state. This sort of change in our bodily state we feel by means of the sensory receptors of our somesthetic sensory system; we feel it by means of the sensory receptors located in the viscera, in the muscles of the heart, in the vestibular organs, and in the skeletal muscles and tendons; and we also feel this sort of change of bodily state by means of the receptors located in or near the skin - for example, it is by means of those sensory receptors located in the roots of the hair follicles that we feel our occasional goose-flesh'.²

I want to suggest, on the other hand, that a person who is angry, afraid, jealous or even desperate, need experience no bodily feelings at all, though of course, he frequently does so. Indeed, in cases of very strong emotion it is quite unlikely that the subject will

¹Perkins holds (op. cit., p. 151) that it is not 'inconceivable' that an emotion be experienced when no 'noteworthy feeling' is present. But much of what he says makes it sound like necessity, e.g. 'On my present hypothesis one would be inclined to agree with James in expecting that if a person's bodily senses were completely anaesthetized the person would not report that he felt, nor would he feel, any emotion whatever'. (p. 150). This claim by James was, of course, challenged strongly by Cannon, see M. Arnold, Emotion and Personality v. 2 (1960), p. 7.

²Ibid., p. 144.
experience the throbs, pangs, surges, chills, goose-flesh, or some combination of these, which are, as Perkins suggests, the feelings of the bodily changes as they occur.

As an example, let us take the case of the camper who is suddenly confronted by a huge grizzly bear. In a flash he is up the nearest tree, a feat which he would normally find difficult. When asked why he climbed the tree, he tells us that he was terrified of the grizzly. 'You were terrified? What did it feel like? What bodily feelings did you have?' we ask. He is nonplussed. 'Bodily feelings?' I had no time for those!' he answers. And there is some truth in this reply. For though a person in such a position is undoubtedly one whose body is being extensively 'moved' in the sense that drastic physiological changes - e.g. in rate of heart beat, respiration, visceral movement, blood circulation, sweat gland activity - are occurring, such changes are frequently not felt by the subject. This is because in a situation of this kind, the central nervous system often acts to inhibit information which is not directly relevant to the 'solution' of the problem - here the survival of the person by fight or flight. Thus though we do feel 'changes in our
bodily state by means of the sensory receptors of our somesthetic sensory system', if the central nervous system rejects the information conveyed to it by these means, then we do not feel the bodily changes as they occur. And it is, of course, well known that in emergency situations this inhibition of messages emanating from the sensory receptors frequently takes place. It is because this is so that if, for example, our camper also injures his leg severely in his headlong flight up the tree, it is unlikely that he will experience the relevant feelings at that time. He will do so later, of course, when the central nervous system is analyzing information from the sensory receptors in the normal fashion. Moreover, we cannot explain away cases of this kind, as many philosophers have attempted to do, by claiming that the subject simply 'forgets' that certain bodily feelings occurred. It is not that in reporting the general chaos the subject in these instances always forgets that he had such feelings. They need not have been part of his experience. But in any event, the introduction of memory into the analysis is misleading, for emotions need not be explicated only in the context of what has happened in the past. If we ask the person who is now claiming that he is 'boiling
with anger', whether he is experiencing bodily feelings of some kind, this question will not tax his memory.

It seems doubtful, too, that Perkins' philosophical thesis is strengthened by his references to the way in which novelists sometimes describe the emotional experiences of their characters. He quotes a novelist's account of a person in an emotional state, an account which includes the statement that the subject's 'skin coarsened'. From this Perkins concludes, 'I doubt that Mr. Lawton noticed his skin coarsening or noticed that he felt his skin coarsen or remembered an hour later that his skin had coarsened or that he had felt his skin coarsen. But surely his skin did coarsen and surely he did feel it coarsen and surely this was essential to Mr. Lawton's feeling the emotion he felt in relation to his daughter. The author has told us so'.¹ I do not see that it is 'surely' the case that the skin coarsening or the feeling of the skin coarsening was 'essential to Mr. Lawton's feeling the emotion', but in any case the author is not concerned with this kind of claim. Such descriptions are not intended to make philosophical points nor can they be

¹op. cit., p. 160.
used to support such a thesis. There are all kinds of philosophically irrelevant reasons why an author might describe an emotion in such a way that it 'begins and ends with a shiver and goose-flesh'.

Perhaps he himself frequently experiences such feelings when in the grip of an emotion, or perhaps he uses the phrases for stylistic or other purely literary reasons. The novelist knows, as do we all however, that it is a matter of fact that people often do experience some feelings of this kind as part of an emotional experience. But this is not challenged. The philosophical question is whether bodily feelings are in some sense essential for us to be able to speak of a person feeling an emotion. The novelist is not committing himself on this point.

Some philosophers, recognizing that emotion words are frequently employed without the implication that the person is experiencing bodily feelings, have suggested that what is crucial here is the distinction between a person's 'being afraid' and 'feeling afraid'. Thus, it is held, while a person may, in the absence of such feelings, be spoken of as 'being afraid', he cannot in their absence correctly be said to be

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1 op. cit., p. 158.
'feeling afraid'. But it is surely the case that the expressions 'is afraid' and 'feels afraid' are used quite synonymously. For example, if we ask our friend, 'How do you feel about your examination failure?', he may reply either 'I'm furious' or 'I feel furious' without thereby implying that his reaction either does or does not include bodily feelings. In either case we say we know 'how he feels'. It is quite arbitrary whether in reporting the occurrence of an emotion we employ the expression 'was afraid', or 'felt afraid', or 'experienced fear' - e.g. at the sight of the bear. It is not in ordinary usage assumed that only and necessarily in the case of 'felt afraid' is it to be taken that bodily feelings of some kind were in evidence.

Yet given that emotion words do not serve simply as the names of distinct bodily feelings, and that it is not necessary for a person to experience any such feelings as part of his emotional state, still when we speak of a person as angry, jealous, envious or afraid, 'feeling' in some sense of that word is very relevant. Can we say that a person who is angry or jealous or envious feels nothing? We speak not only of feeling angry or afraid but also of chills, pangs and surges in reporting our emotions - 'pangs of
jealousy', 'chills of terror', 'surges of love', and so on. What is involved in 'feeling' angry or afraid, then, and what place do these sensations - pangs, chills, surges, throbs - have in our talk about the emotions of ourselves and others?

When we speak of a person as angry or afraid, one of the things that we are usually saying is that he is agitated, disturbed, upset, that there is to a greater or lesser degree, some sort of turmoil going on. This tendency to speak of emotions as 'commotions', 'turmoils' or 'perturbations' has a long history. Seneca, for example, in the 'Dialogues', says that in speaking of an emotion we imply that 'the soul is uprooted from its foundations and begins, as it were, to toss on the sea!'¹ For us, what requires more investigation is the precise nature of the turmoil or perturbation to which such references have long been made.

Let us imagine that as I wait one day to give an important seminar I find my heart beating faster than usual, perspiration on my brow, a feeling of nausea in my stomach and a strange restlessness pervading my being. I am, it seems fair to say, in a

state of emotional agitation. Yet this is not necessarily so, for these reactions are all quite consistent with, for example, the onset of an attack of hepatitis which, it may be, is rife in my district at the moment. That is to say, these phenomena are the signs, the symptoms, of a state or condition, though I may not be able to say with certainty on a particular occasion whether they are the signs of an emotional or of a physical state. And this kind of question is not rare. Medical officers during World War I were considerably startled when a large number of soldiers in action independently complained of shortness of breath, heart palpitations, feelings of dizziness and precordial pain - in short, the textbook signs of heart disease. Of course, further evidence settled the problem; clinical examination of the heart showed no evidence of abnormality in these cases. These were the symptoms of an emotional, not of a physical, state. Similarly in the seminar case; if when I emerge from the seminar room these signs have disappeared and do not soon recur, I shall not be tempted to visit the nearest physician. I shall be inclined to say 'I was just emotionally agitated' or 'It was only emotional', as will any observers who
have had fears for my health. Because of the circumstances in which the agitation took place, I may be able to give a name to my state. I can say to my friends 'It was pure fright'. In thus identifying an emotional state as one of, say, fear or anger the circumstances in which the agitation occurs are important, since certain of our sensations, reactions, behaviour, will be common to a number of emotional states. A pang or flutter, therefore, is generally speaking not identifiable as a pang or flutter of fear outside the context of fearful circumstances, actual or putative.

It is important to realize that identification of our emotional states, as ones of anger, fear, or jealousy, is not always a simple process. For even if we are able on a particular occasion to rule out, say on medical grounds, that our agitation is physical in origin, it is sometimes difficult for us to say whether that state is one of anger or fear, love or hate, pity or remorse. We may often have to await further evidence from our own thoughts, feelings, behaviour and reactions, before we can solve the problem. We may then go wrong in attributing a particular emotion to ourselves. And, indeed, though
observers may go wrong, too, in attributing a specific emotion to us - they can misread the signs and emotions can be faked - nevertheless, they are often in a better position than we are. 'For heaven's sake', says A to B, 'you're obviously in love with the man'. 'Yes', replies B, 'I think you are right, but I thought at first that I just felt sorry for him. I think now that I was wrong'.

The fact that this problem of identifying an emotional state does frequently occur, brings out more clearly the distinction between emotions and pains, tickles or itches. Questions such as 'Am I really angry?' or 'Am I really in love?' do not appear to be as puzzling, for example, as 'Am I really in pain?'. There seems to be less room for doubt about the answer to the latter question; either, it is said, you have a pain or you don't. The question itself seems rather odd, so much so that many have claimed it to be a meaningless one. On the other hand, 'Am I really in love?' or 'Am I really angry?' are commonplace questions and there is no temptation to call them either odd or meaningless. We can be puzzled in these cases. However, the question 'Is the pain in my left foot the same as the one in my right foot?' is surely
as legitimate as 'Is this emotion the same as the one I experienced when I saw the blind beggar?'. But in the latter case we do not decide the issue, as in the pain case, by comparing the quality of our private sensations. In both situations, of course, we can go wrong. In the pain case we may be careless and answer too quickly, 'Yes, it is the same pain in both cases', then alter this to, 'No, sorry, the pain the left foot is more of a stabbing pain than the one in the right foot'. But our mistake in the case of love versus pity will not be the result of inadequate attention paid to the quality of the sensations involved, even granted that any such sensations are in evidence. Our own thoughts, our own behaviour, our own reactions, as well as any relevant sensations, will all come up for examination. We may well call upon a friend to help us decide the issue on the basis of his observations.

Concerning the relation between feeling and emotion, I have tried to make two main points. Firstly, the feelings or sensations which may, but need not, be associated with emotional states are related to them as symptoms to condition. Our pang or flutter or surge is a symptom of a state of
emotional agitation which, given certain further information, we can go on to characterize as one of fear or anger or jealousy. These sensations are manifestations of the emotional state. The physiological events which cause these sensations are part of what we refer to when we speak of a person as being in an emotional state.

Secondly, a person in an emotional state is in a disturbed condition, a condition of mental and physical agitation. The more intense his agitation, the stronger the emotion is held to be and the more likely it is that his condition will be displayed in his facial expressions, bodily movements and reactions. When we speak of a person as 'feeling' an emotion we are referring, not simply or necessarily to the common experience of bodily feelings, but to this general state of arousal. A person in the grip of an emotion, then, is not in his usual state, but neither is he vacant, incogitant, catatonic. For though the latter may occur as the aftermath of strong emotion, persons so afflicted are not in emotional states. They are not undergoing agitation of any kind; they have ceased to respond to any stimuli whatsoever. But the person who fails to report bodily feelings of some kind as part of his state is not one who does not feel
emotion as these people are. A man who is full of joy at his son's success may smile, pace the floor, be unable to concentrate on his work, be unable to think of anything but his son, may be unable to relax or speak coherently. He is in a general state of agitation; he feels disturbed, aroused, agitated, 'het up' in this general mental and physical sense.¹ We do not argue with his claim 'I feel great joy' if he also maintains that he does not experience pangs, chills, surges, throbs, flushes or goose-flesh.

I have been speaking, so far, of emotion words as signifying states of mental and physical agitation. In doing so, of course, I am arguing against the view of Ryle who holds that agitations are not states or incidents, but liabilities or propensities.² According to Ryle, to be angry for a period of time is to be liable to do such things as shout and throw dishes during that time. But as has been often pointed out, what Ryle is doing here is identifying the statement 'He is angry' with what would, in some conditions of

¹This general feeling of perturbation seems to be what some empirical workers have in mind when they speak of the emotional 'affect'.

²op. cit., p. 97.
use, be taken as sufficient evidence for it. That is, because statements about behaviour often represent our best evidence for statements about mental condition, he identifies the latter with hypothetical statements about behaviour. But because persons in a certain state are liable to behave in certain ways, it by no means follows that their being in that state is reducible to their having such liabilities. It may be that when a person is, say, distressed or desperate, he tends to be unable to concentrate on his work, crack jokes, or appreciate idle gossip, but these are generalizations about people who are distressed or desperate, and are not what we mean by saying that a person is now in such a state. It is not contradictory to say that a person is in one of these states, though he does not act or react in the usual way. Ryle himself has some difficulties in consistently upholding his analysis of emotional states in terms of the dispositions which characterize persons in those states. He says, for example, that 'Susceptibilities to specific agitations are on the same footing with inclinations or motives' in that both are general propensities. Allowing for the moment the doubtful point about motives, the analysis of agitations has here been replaced by the analysis of susceptibilities to agitations, which is an entirely different question.
I am not of course denying that emotion words do sometimes have dispositional meanings. I am concerned to say that this is not always or necessarily the case. Take such statements as 'He did it out of jealousy', or 'He did it because he was jealous' where these mean 'He did it because he was by temperament a jealous person', or 'because he was in a jealous mood'. To speak here of a dispositional meaning of 'jealous' has some point. But this is not to say that emotion words in all contexts are so used.

On the basis of the preceding discussion of emotional states, it is possible to provide some analysis of statements like 'Tom smashed the vase on an impulse of anger'. We have seen that a person in the grip of an emotion - in an emotional state - is physically and mentally agitated and that his agitation may be shown in his bodily expressions - wincing, scowling, smiling and so on - and in his behaviour. Because his state or condition is an unusual one, we can account for his behaviour by reference to that state. Thus when we say 'Tom smashed the vase on an impulse of anger', we are saying that Tom's behaviour on this occasion was the result of a forceful emotion
in the sense that the incident was the display or
direct expression of his emotional state, here
anger. His vase-smashing, unexpected given his
usual state and not performed on the basis of
deliberation or reflection, was the outcome, ex-
pression or manifestation of his mental and physical
state of agitation.

But this is not the only account which may be
given of a person acting on an 'impulse' of fear,
anger, jealousy or envy. For emotion words serve not
only to refer to states of agitation but also to
signify motives for action. This is sometimes ex-
pressed by saying that we act not only 'in anger'
but also 'out of anger'. When an emotion word refers
to a motive, we rule out that an action is simply the
manifestation or expression of an emotional state.
For in this case it is assumed that the agent has a
goal or end for his action. It should be emphasized
that from the fact that a person performs an action
on impulse, i.e. suddenly, unexpectedly and without
deliberation, it does not necessarily follow that the
action is not performed from a motive. The subject
of emotions as motives is complex, for there are
different kinds of motives and it is important that
these be distinguished from each other. Here, however, I shall be referring only to what have been called 'impulse motives'.

The notion of an impulse motive has been introduced to cover cases for which Ryle's analysis of motives does not allow. He claims that 'to say [that a man did something from a certain motive] is to say that this action, done in its particular circumstances, was just the sort of thing that that was an inclination to do. It is to say 'he would do that'. That is, in ascribing a specific motive to a person we are dealing with the sorts of things that he tends to try to do. It has often been objected that this account of motives is inadequate in that it fails to allow for the case of a person who acts on a single occasion on an impulse of, say, jealousy or envy - whose motive on this one occasion is certainly jealousy or envy however uncharacteristic this may be of him. For a person who performs an action from jealousy or envy might never perform

1See, for example, Robert Brown. Explanation in Social Science, (1963), pp. 84-87.

2op. cit., p. 93.
another action from that motive. The agent's behaviour on such an occasion, then, is different from what he usually does or from what our previous knowledge of him makes us expect that he would do.

Given that impulse motives cover cases of this kind, what is involved when we attribute such a motive to a person on a particular occasion? This is probably best shown by means of an example; let us take the statement 'Tom reported John's misdemeanour to his superior officer on an impulse of envy'. When we assign an impulse motive to a person, there are a number of things being said. Firstly, we know, by definition, that the action was sudden, unexpected, uncharacteristic - that is, in contrast with Tom's usual behaviour - and was not performed on the basis of reflection or deliberation. Again, because Tom's motive is characterized as one of envy - as opposed, say, to fear or revenge - we know the kind of goal which Tom was pursuing. For the kind of goal pursued by a person who acts out of envy is, by definition, the possession of something which someone else has. Thus in explaining an action by reference to an impulse motive of envy, we show that the action was directed to a goal of this kind. What is more, since
the motive is one of envy we know the kinds of beliefs, feelings and desires which possessed him, though we may not know specifically what these were. For example, in Tom's case we could say that he believed that John had the greater approval of his superior officer, that he considered this unfair and was distressed by it, and that he wanted for himself the position held by John in the eyes of his superior officer. In reporting John's misdemeanor he acted in a way which expressed these beliefs, feelings and desire. The mere statement 'Tom reported John's misdemeanor to his superior officer on an impulse of envy' does not, of course, give us all this specific information concerning why Tom envies John. I have supplied an imaginary background. The point is, however, that in using the word 'envy' to characterize Tom's motive, we are saying that his goal and the manner of its pursuit are of this kind; otherwise we would not call his action one of envy.

But we must now relate this account of impulse motives to what we have previously said on the subject of emotional states. There is an important connection here. For part of what must be included when we speak of a person as acting on an impulse motive of envy, jealousy, love, hate, is that the person feels envious,
jealous, vengeful, loving or hostile, feels in the sense that he is in a certain emotional state. In the absence of such agitation the person could not be said to be acting from an impulse motive, whatever the nature of his actions alone might lead us to believe. For example, if Tom suddenly presents Susie with a new Porsche because, although Susie's happiness does not particularly interest him, her happiness does influence her father whose good graces are professionally important to Tom, then Tom is not acting from an impulse motive of love on this occasion whatever his action might lead some to believe. For though this is indeed an action of the kind which a man might perform out of love, an impulse motive of love is ruled out if the agent does not feel love for the girl. Tom's action here, we would be inclined to say, was not performed from an impulse motive at all. Rather Tom is (perhaps) acting out of cold calculation, from a motive of gain. But whatever his motives may be, they do not include impulses of love if Tom doesn't feel love for Susie. A person acting from an impulse motive of love will have as his aim making Susie happy and he will believe that giving her the Porsche is a means of achieving this, but he must also be in the
appropriate state, must feel love, in order for impulses of love to be relevant in the explanation of his action.

This point raises, in turn, the problem of how we estimate the intensity of an emotion. We speak of anger as mild or violent, fears as strong or weak, one person's love as greater than another's, and so on. In the case of emotional states, we can estimate intensity by reference to the extent of the agitation involved. It has been suggested, however, that the intensity of emotions as motives must be estimated by another and quite different method. Thus Anthony Kenny has claimed that 'The intensity of an emotion as a motive is measured by the frequency and importance of the actions done out of it'.¹ We can, I think, question the usefulness of such measurement in terms of the importance of the actions, since it is not easy to see how this could be done in any non-arbitrary fashion. The criterion of importance could be meaningful only in extreme cases. For example, murder would no doubt be regarded as an 'important' action, and the intensity of the emotion as motive, therefore, judged to be great. But in

the case of more mundane actions, comparison in terms of importance could hardly be made at all precisely. The general question of strength of motive will be discussed in a later chapter,¹ but given our present consideration of impulse motives, it is clear that these will present a problem for Kenny's view.

Now impulse motives, we have seen, are appropriate in those cases where a person acts on a single occasion from a particular motive - jealousy, envy, revenge, love - but may never again so act. Thus the frequency of the actions so performed will not be relevant. Kenny does not recognize impulse motives in his discussion of emotions as motives but, even given this, it is strange that he does not consider agitation as constituting part of what will be relevant in measuring intensity of these motives. Our acts surely cannot be motivated by anger or fear or envy or jealousy if we never have any feelings of anger, fear, envy or jealousy connected with them. As in the case of the measurement of the intensity of emotional states, the severity of the agitation

¹Chapter 4, 'Emotion and Wanting'.
present seems to be an important criterion. The problem of 'motives intensely felt' is considerably more complex than Kenny allows.

In this chapter I have tried to say something about emotion words as signifying impulses to act. This led to a discussion of emotion words as referring to 'feelings', to emotional states, and to impulse motives. I have suggested that in none of these senses do emotion words stand for tendencies or liabilities to act in certain ways. In the following chapter, this point will emerge more clearly when we compare these cases with other primary uses of emotion words, uses which, I suggest, do require analysis in terms of dispositions.
CHAPTER 3

Emotions as Dispositions

So far our concern has been with the analysis of emotion words in some of their non-dispositional uses, but it has been claimed that there are important uses of these terms which do require analysis in terms of liabilities or tendencies. Some cases of this kind will now be discussed.

Broadly speaking, a disposition may be regarded as a tendency to behave in certain ways. When we explain a particular act by means of a dispositional explanation we do so by asserting that the act (or acts) in question is an instance of tendency, a disposition so to act. A reflex act, e.g. coughing upon irritation of the mucosa of the trachea, is usually regarded as the simplest case of an act explicable in terms of a disposition, there the tendency of the organism to react in a particular fixed fashion to a certain kind of stimulus. An habitual act is also the exercise of a disposition. Habits are tendencies to behave in fixed or stereotyped ways, not on the basis of deliberation or premeditation. To say that a person does something from
force of habit is incompatible with saying that he chose to do it. This is not to say, of course, that he may not originally have chosen to acquire the habit, but this is a different question. A person acting out of habit acts this way whether or not he is attending to what he is doing and, where the habit has become completely automatic, without even the awareness that the act has been performed.

A very wide range of human behaviour can, of course, become habitual; kindness, generosity, politeness can become habits just as smoking or nose-scratching can. Of a great deal of what one does or says or indeed thinks, it is possible to say that one has done or said or thought it automatically or mechanically, from force of habit. However, habits, like reflexes, are of little interest to us here since to say that a person performed an action which might be characterized as say, a kindly one, purely from force of habit is to exclude the possibility that kindness, as such, was in any sense an operative reason for his action. In particular, 'kindness' does not serve as the name of a motive in such cases, especially of a dispositional motive, i.e. a motive
seen as a recurrent feature of a person's character. This is a kind of motive with which a habit is sometimes confused.

For if we say that a person performs an action out of kindness, where 'kindness' serves to signify a dispositional motive, then we are committed to saying more than just that he regularly performs such an action. We are also saying, not only that the action is directed towards a goal of a particular kind and that the person frequently and consciously pursues that goal, but also that it involves certain kinds of beliefs, feelings and desires on the part of the agent. It may well be, of course, that a particular action - giving flowers to old ladies - once motivated by kindness has become in the course of time an habitual act, a stereotyped tendency to behave in a certain way, but then the explanation of that action as now performed purely from force of habit is of a vastly different kind. It does not involve us in talk of relevant feelings, desires, beliefs, nor of a particular kind of goal frequently and consciously pursued by that person in a variety of circumstances.
One of the central uses of emotion words in signifying dispositions is to refer to moods. Thus we speak of someone as being in a jealous, angry, jovial, melancholy, vain mood and we account for his behaviour on a particular occasion by reference to that mood. 'Why did Bill slap John on the back?' 'Oh, he's in a jovial mood'. It seems clear, too, that there is a difference between what is involved when we talk of a person as being overwhelmed, say, by a fit of anger as opposed to his being in an angry mood. This being so, it is, at first sight, strange that philosophers dealing with the subject of emotion have only rarely mentioned moods and even less frequently distinguished between a mood and an emotional state. A brief excursion into etymology, however, shows, partly, why this should be so. The word 'mood', as the Oxford English Dictionary indicates, has had a turbulent history indeed, as have its equivalents in other languages. Its contemporary meaning is given as 'a frame of mind or state of feelings, one's humour, temper or disposition at a particular time', and however inadequate for philosophical purposes this may be, it is at least clear enough to allow a contrast to be made with the
obsolete meanings listed. For 'mood' has, over the centuries, served not only to signify 'mind', 'heart', 'thought', 'feeling' but has been used also to name various specific emotions, e.g. pride, anger ('Mood without might is vain and bootless') and passionate grief ('She wept, she sobbed for great mood'). Vestiges of this sense of 'mood', as referring to a particular emotion, still linger on in some of our uses of 'moody' or 'moodily' with their possible connotation of sullenness, gloom or depression as in 'He stared moodily into the fire'. It is hardly surprising, therefore, if traditional philosophy reveals a neglect of the treatment of moods in our contemporary sense of that word.

Ryle seems to have been the first philosopher to seriously ask what we now mean when we speak of someone as being, at a particular time and for a 'shortish or longish period', in a specific mood. But Ryle is often confusing about moods because, for his own philosophical reasons, he does not distinguish between 'agitations' (here called 'emotional states') and moods. He claims, for example, that 'one of the most popular uses of 'emotion' is to describe the agitations or other moods in which people from time
As a result of this, some of the characteristics which he sees as distinctive of moods, e.g. their brevity and their monopolistic nature, often apply more clearly to emotional states. It also leads him to give some rather strange examples of moods, e.g. 'convulsed'. It is difficult to imagine a person for a week or a month 'in a convulsed mood' of any kind, yet the word 'mood', whatever else it may connote, is frequently employed to characterize a person over the period of a week or more. Many philosophers have, however, followed Ryle's analysis. Thus Bruce Aune, discussing depression in the sense of a depressed mood, claims that his dispositional account will hold for both 'Moods and emotions like anger, jealousy and so on', the latter it is understood, not only in their mood applications.

What, then, is the difference between saying that a person is overwhelmed by a fit of anger or jealousy and that he is in an angry or jealous mood? Modern psychologists avoid this issue, but the earlier

1G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), p. 95. The italics are mine.

psychologists at least saw that there was a distinction of some kind involved. 'Moods', claimed William McDougall, 'clearly are related in some way to emotions. We speak of angry, cautious, sociable, appreciative, despondent, submissive and many other moods. That is to say, in speaking of moods, we use the names by which we distinguish emotions. ... We can draw no sharp line between the emotion and the corresponding mood; we can only distinguish them by agreeing to call the affective-conative excitement an 'emotion' so long as we continue to think of the object which incites it, and to call it a mood if it still persists when we cease to think of the object'.

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But this, though it recognizes the problem at issue, merely takes over that commonplace of traditional philosophy that emotions always imply reference to an object. That this is not necessarily so seems to have been first intimated, though not enlarged upon, by Descartes in his 'Passions of the Soul'. He speaks there of feeling sad or joyful without being able to assign any object to one's sadness or joy. It is further clarified, though inadvertently, by Hume in the Treatise, Book II, 'Of the Passions',

when he distinguishes between the cause and the object of an emotion, thus paving the way for the realization that an emotion might have a cause but no specific object.

I have previously mentioned the complexities involved in speaking of emotions as 'objectless' and do not wish to pursue that vexed question in detail at this stage.¹ But it is perhaps worth noting here that cases of nameless fears, pointless depression, euphoria, and so on, cannot be argued away in the manner in which Wittgenstein and many others have attempted to do. Thus Wittgenstein holds, "There are certainly cases in which we say 'I feel a fear, but I'm not afraid of anything in particular'. Consider this case - we have a general undirected feeling of fear. Later on, we have an experience which makes us say, 'Now I know what I was afraid of. I was afraid of so-and-so happening".² Of course, cases of this kind, involving a temporary inability to identify the object of an emotion, do occur, but these are not the ones with which we are

¹See, however, Chapter 5, 'Emotion and Thinking'.
concerned. They are distinct from those cases where the emotion may have a cause of which the subject is unaware but in which the fear has become so generalized that the question 'What is it specifically that you are afraid of?' produces from the victim a helpless shrug, say, or a bewildered shake of the head; 'I just feel frightened' he says. We cannot use, therefore, the characteristic of object-directedness to distinguish an emotional state from a mood, since both may lack an object in the sense that the subject is unable to give a specific answer to questions of the 'of what?' 'of whom?' 'with whom?' 'with what?' 'about whom?' 'about what?' variety. Moods may also be object directed in a sense shown most clearly by our use of the phrase 'in the mood for' - love, solitude or an afternoon's tennis. Moods and emotional states are alike then, in that each may, but need not, be object-directed.

It appears, however, that the basic distinction between a mood and an emotional state lies in the fact that a mood is a 'liability condition' whereas an emotional state cannot be analyzed in terms of liabilities or tendencies. As Robert Brown has recently pointed out, when we say that a person is now, or has

for the period of an hour, a day, a week, a month, been in a jealous, irritable, jovial, anxious mood, then we are not saying, as in the case of a person overwhelmed by a fit of jealousy, anger, grief, etc., that the person is for that period completely possessed by his jealous or angry thoughts and feelings, that all his actions and reactions are then the outcome or expression of that state. A person possessed by anger in this sense does not tend to react when circumstances are appropriate - he is reacting for the entire period. It is no mere accident that we frequently refer to the subject of an emotional state in such terms as 'beside himself', 'possessed', 'consumed by', 'in the grip of', 'swept away', or 'engulfed by' grief or anger or jealousy or fear, for the person so overwhelmed is excluded by virtue of his agitated state from thinking, feeling, reacting in any other fashion. We do not find a person in a fit of anger or jealousy breaking off from his angry or jealous thoughts and reactions to indulge in a conversation upon philosophical matters.

But this is not so in the case of moods. We may justifiably speak of a mood as a 'short term tendency or liability condition' since a person who is
for the course of an afternoon, a day, a week, a month, in a jealous or irritable mood is one who for that period of time tends - is in a ready condition - to think, feel, act, react, in certain distinctive ways. Yet the irritable thoughts, feelings, and perhaps actions, of the subject are not continuous without pause; intermittently he will go about his usual business, talk philosophy, buy shares, sleep, eat, and so on. Still, for the course of that day, week, or month, we speak of the person, despite such intervening periods, as being in an irritable or jealous mood. Similarly, we speak of the weather being, despite intervals of better weather, stormy or showery. The irritability, like the shower, permits of interruption.

While McDougall correctly points out that 'in speaking of moods we use the names by which we distinguish emotions', he appears to overlook the fact that there are many more mood names than there are names of emotional states. Thus we quite correctly refer to people as being at a particular time in reading, writing, tennis-playing or lawn-mowing moods, as well as in placid or serene moods. But this serves only to clarify further the distinction
between moods and emotional states.\(^1\) We have previously spoken of emotional states as signifying kinds of agitation or perturbation, but though a person in a jealous or an angry mood will experience some such periods of agitation in the course of his mood, to speak of a person in a placid or serene mood is to draw attention to the lack of any such agitation. And there is a variety of other moods which may or may not involve emotional perturbation. The point is, then, that while the term 'emotional state' cannot be applied unless the person in that state is emotionally agitated or disturbed, the ascription of some mood words does not involve any periods of such disturbance.

We have seen that in a statement such as 'He did it because he was jealous', 'jealous' may denote an emotional state, an impulse motive, or a mood. I want to turn now to the rather complex topic of emotion words as they are employed to signify character traits. That is, to those cases where our example, 'He did it because he was jealous' serves to convey that the person performed the action because he is by nature or temperament a jealous person.

\(^1\)Brown, op. cit., p. 286.
Two comments, again by Ryle, will provide a convenient beginning for our discussion. He points out, firstly, that susceptibilities to specific moods are traits of character.\footnote{G. Ryle, op. cit., p. 96.} To see how this comes about we can return to our original example, 'Why did Bill slap John on the back?' 'Oh, he's in a jovial mood'. Let us suppose that the questioner remains unsatisfied and asks the further question, 'Why is he in such a mood?' and receives the reply, 'Well, he's inclined to get into these moods after any small success and this morning he finally passed his driving test'. Here we have a particular act accounted for by reference to a mood - a disposition to think, feel, act, react in certain distinctive ways over a limited period - and that disposition in turn accounted for by reference to a more complex disposition, a character trait seen as the tendency of the person to get into moods of a specific kind in certain circumstances.

Thus one of the things we may be saying when we speak of a person as by nature or temperament jovial, jealous, or irritable, is that he is one who has a tendency to get into jovial, jealous or
irritable moods - that he is prone to moods of such a kind. It is perhaps slightly misleading, however, to speak of character traits in this sense as always referring to moods of a specific kind. The word 'moody', which we have seen to have rather a shifting meaning, may also be used as the name of a character trait. Though, when so employed, it may mean that the subject is prone to moods of a particular kind - usually sullen or morose - it may also be used to convey that the person is prone to changing moods, usually of opposing kinds. Thus we say, 'He's incredibly moody - up one day and down the next'. That is, something like 'In a cheerful mood one day and in a morose one the next'. An 'emotional' person, on the other hand, is characterized as one who tends to 'get himself into an emotional state' of one kind or another on a variety of occasions. He shows a marked tendency to get into such agitated states, we complain, and at distressingly frequent intervals!

But when we speak of someone as jovial, jealous or irritable by nature, we are not always referring to a tendency on his part to get into jovial, irritable or jealous moods. 'It is necessary', Rees has
pointed out, 'to distinguish two different kinds of dispositions, namely dispositions in the sense of recurrent states and dispositions in the sense of recurrent events'. Rees calls the latter 'performance dispositions', and character traits may also be dispositions of this kind. Ryle obviously had this kind of point in mind when he made the second comment relevant to our present discussion: 'only when a mood is chronic do we use mood words as descriptions of character'. If a person in a jovial mood tends to think, feel, act, and react, in certain distinctive ways, then a person who is jovial by nature may not be one who is disposed to get into jovial moods, but one who is liable to think, feel, act, and react, most of the time in the ways distinctive of a person in such a mood. Ryle expresses this connection between a mood and a character trait rather oddly, however. Moods are by definition transitory conditions - they pass. Thus a mood cannot be 'chronic'; there must be intervals or the word 'mood' will simply not apply. It is perhaps clearer if we say that a mood, as opposed to

2 op.cit., p. 98.
a character trait of the 'common performance' type, is a phasic as opposed to a chronic liability condition, or a short term, as opposed to a long term, condition of this kind.

But the problem which has, in my view, caused the greatest confusion in the analysis of character traits has been the tendency of many philosophers to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, character traits and motives. Or more specifically, though this is not usually made clear, to identify character traits and dispositional motives, that is, motives seen as a recurrent feature of a person's character. I suggest that this identification can be rejected on at least three counts:

1. Though character traits are dispositions or tendencies, motives, as such, are not. The two have different logical characteristics.

2. Though many character trait words - jealousy, vanity, envy, patriotism, avarice, generosity, pride, for example - do serve to name dispositional motives, when we account for a person's action by reference to these traits, we do not always in doing so give a motive-explanation.

3. Some character trait words - cheerful, morose, sulky, for example - never serve as the names of dispositional motives.
Firstly, then, 'though character traits are dispositions or tendencies, motives are not. The two have different logical characteristics'. The tendency to characterize motives as dispositions has arisen largely from the fact that it is quite rightly noted that on many occasions the question 'What was his motive for performing that action?' is answered by reference to a character trait - jealousy, pride, envy, and so on. Thus, it is argued, since character traits refer to dispositions to act and to react in certain ways, and since the names of motives are the names of character traits, motives are dispositions. Thus one finds Ryle and many others\(^1\) making such observations as 'Motives are propensities, not acts or states'; they are 'traits of character or behaviour trends'. Now certainly it is sensible to seek out motives among traits of character. But what has happened in this case is that there has been an identification of motives with the kinds of things, character traits, which can be motives.\(^2\) Motives, however, are not the same kind of things as character traits.

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\(^2\)This point is made by A. R. White, 'The Language of Motives', *Mind*, LXVII (1958), p. 258.
traits; motives are kinds of explanations and not kinds of dispositions like moods or character traits. Motives do not have the same logical characteristics as the things that can be motives. We have previously seen, in our discussion of impulse motives, that when we explain an action as performed out of jealousy or pride or envy in the motive sense, we do so by indicating the kind of goal towards which the action was directed. But if, in addition, we go on to say that the type of goal here pursued is of a kind frequently pursued by that person, then 'jealousy', 'envy', 'pride' are the names of dispositional motives. The pursuit of goals of such a kind, we are then saying, is a common feature of the person's character.

In this way we can see that dispositional motives, as opposed to other kinds of motives, e.g. impulse motives, incorporate tendencies. But motives themselves, of whatever kind, are not tendencies. They are kinds of explanations, not just the kinds of things which may, but need not, feature in an explanation. Motives have the common characteristic that they explain a person's action by indicating the end or goal to which the action was directed.
Secondly, 'though many character trait words do serve to name dispositional motives, when we account for a person's action by reference to these traits we are not always doing so by giving a motive explanation'. I have said so far that character trait words such as jealousy, generosity, kindness, pride, envy, and patriotism, may be used as the names of dispositional motives, and that when so used they explain an action by indicating the type of goal consistently sought by the agent. It is important to see, however, that when we say of a person that he is jealous, proud, greedy, or vain, and account for his actions by reference to such traits, we are not always doing so by showing that it is an action performed in pursuit of the kind of goal frequently pursued by jealous, proud, greedy, or vain persons. Sometimes there is no question of a goal involved; the action is merely the expression or outcome of the person's disposition. For though a person who is proud or jealous or vain is one who tends to perform actions motivated by pride or jealousy or vanity, we are saying a number of other things about him when we characterize him as a proud, jealous, or vain person. Such a person is also one who is inclined to perform actions
which are expressions of, but not motivated by, 
pride, jealousy or vanity, as well as to think and 
to feel in certain distinctive ways.

Similarly, a person in a proud, jealous or 
vain mood is one who tends to think and to feel, and 
to act for the period of his mood, in certain dis- 
tinctive ways. But not all his actions will be 
motivated by pride, jealousy or vanity, though some 
of them may be. As Hume remarked concerning pride, 
'Even the very port and gait of a swan, turkey or 
peacock shows the high idea he has entertained of 
himself'.\textsuperscript{1} Much of the behaviour of a proud, jealous, 
or vain, person we account for as simply expressions 
of his pride, jealousy, or vanity. Some of his acts 
are outcomes of his disposition without being performed 
in pursuit of the kind of goals sought by persons who 
are proud, jealous, or vain. Psychiatrists and psy- 
chologists frequently make this sort of point. Our 
character traits, they say, are bound to manifest 
themselves in many spheres - 'in our way of working, 
in our gait, in our handwriting'.\textsuperscript{2} To take another

\textsuperscript{1}D. Hume, 'A Treatise of Human Nature', (ed. A.D. 

\textsuperscript{2}K. Horney, \textit{Our Inner Conflicts} (1949), p. 199.
kind of example: one of the things which may lead us to characterize a person as vain may be that he consistently looks delighted at the merest hint of praise and correspondingly forlorn at the slightest suggestion of criticism. Yet his looking delighted or forlorn are surely not acts performed in pursuit of any particular kind of goal. They are reactions characteristic of vain persons in such circumstances.

It is necessary to see, too, that persons who are by nature or temperament jealous, proud, envious, ambitious, patriotic, vain, are also disposed, by virtue of this fact, to get into certain emotional states or into moods of various kinds on appropriate occasions. Someone may be described as 'Bristling with the anger of outraged patriotism'. We frequently speak of people in this manner, for patriotic people do become angry; they bristle, fume, and utter cries of 'The country is in the hands of fools' in appropriate circumstances. When we account for such a person's anger we do so by saying that he is a patriotic man, and patriotic men tend to get into such states on relevant occasions. But neither his anger, nor his bristling, fuming, and shouting, which are the expressions of his angry state, are actions performed
by that person in pursuit of the kind of goal commonly pursued by patriotic people - the assisting of their country. We say, 'Well look, getting angry doesn't help', and this just makes him angrier, and quite rightly, for he has never supposed that it did help. He is just reacting to the situation in a manner in which a patriotic man might be expected to react. In a similar fashion, a person who is by nature jealous or envious may be disposed to get into moods of various kinds when conditions are appropriate. Thus the jealous person may be in a despondent mood for a week when his rival is successful or in a happy mood all day when the man meets with some setback. Here again, neither the mood nor the manifestations of that mood are actions performed in pursuit of any particular kind of goal.

To sum up this second point, character trait words such as jealous, proud, vain, patriotic, ambitious, do serve as the names of dispositional motives, and when they do so they explain an action in the manner I have endeavoured to indicate. But, when we account for a person's behaviour by reference to his characteristic jealousy, his pride, his vanity, his patriotism, his ambition, we are not always using these words in
that sense. For reference to such a trait may account for behaviour in various ways, only one of which is a dispositional motive explanation. As we have seen, a person who is by nature, say, jealous, is one who is disposed to perform acts which are expressions of, but not motivated by, his jealousy; he is disposed to think and to feel in certain distinctive ways, to get into certain emotional states and moods on appropriate occasions, as well as to perform actions motivated by jealousy.

Finally, 'some character trait words never serve as the names of dispositional motives'. Though some character trait words do function as the names of dispositional motives, there is a class of such words which do not so function. When we speak of a person as, for example, cheerful or morose by nature - 'He's a cheerful fellow' or 'a morose type' - then we certainly mean that he is one who tends to think, feel, act, react, in certain distinctive ways a great deal of the time, but there is, surely, no particular kind of goal characteristically and actively pursued by such a person. Rather, such a person tends to contemplate and to act in most situations in a manner open to the description 'cheerful', or 'morose'. These
words are the names of character traits in the same sense as are, say, 'optimistic' or 'sanguine'. We call a person 'optimistic' when he tends to 'look on the bright side' whatever the situation or circumstance. It is not that he tends to avoid or seek out certain situations as opposed to others, but rather that he tends to react in his characteristically optimistic fashion to whatever eventuates. These traits appear to fit most comfortably into the category of 'attitudes', at least in the sense in which some psychologists use that word. In this thesis I shall refer to them as 'character attitudes'.

Thus it appears that the identification of character traits with motives won't do, and indeed, that the result of such an identification is the concealment of many of the complexities involved when we account for a person's thinking, feeling, acting, reacting, in a particular manner by reference to a trait of character. When we do so on a particular occasion, for example, are we saying that the person is one who is subject to moods of a particular kind? That he tends to think, feel, act, react, in such a fashion most of the time? That his action or reaction on this occasion is an expression of a specific
character attitude? That he tends frequently to perform actions motivated by, say, envy or ambition? Is the act a manifestation of an emotional state, or of a mood, arising out of his characteristic mode of thought and action in a particular kind of situation? These are some of the questions which are not clearly distinguished by those who assimilate character traits and motives.

It would be convenient, but misleading, to leave this discussion of emotion words as signifying dispositions with the impression that such uses may be divided neatly into two categories - those referring to moods and those referring to character traits. A consideration of the words 'love' and 'hate' may help to show that this is not so.

Many philosophers make strange claims about love and hatred. Ewing, for example, in a paper on emotion, states without elucidation that 'It is certainly relevant to discuss love and hatred because, though they do not stand for emotions themselves, they are names for dispositions to have emotions'. ¹ Since it is surely correct to say that love and hatred are generally regarded as the most fundamental of emotions,

it is difficult to see what Ewing could mean in claiming that 'love' and hatred do not 'stand for emotions'. And, in fact, there seems little justification for his claim.

It is clear, for example, that both 'love' and hate may be used as the names of emotional states. We speak of ourselves and others as completely 'overwhelmed by' love or hate for another at a particular time, just as we do in the case of jealousy or anger. People also act 'out of' love or hate, that is, they act from these motives. In such cases there is a particular kind of end or goal for their action or actions - the welfare or detriment of another person or group of persons. If acting out of love (often for a particular person, say, mother) were a recurrent feature of a person's character, then this would be the name of a dispositional motive. We would not be surprised either, if such a person were disposed to get into certain emotional states or moods in appropriate circumstances - in a fury, for example, when mother was snubbed or in a lonely mood when she went on vacation. For such people - as in the case of those who are by nature ambitious, patriotic, envious, jealous - are disposed to think, feel, act, react, in
certain specific ways, to get into particular emotional states and moods in relevant circumstances, as well as to perform actions motivated by their love. It makes sense, too, to speak of someone as in a loving or in a hostile (rather than 'hating') mood. Such a person may, but need not, also be characteristically liable to get into moods of such a kind, or to think, feel, act, and react, in such a manner most of the time.

But what of the case where a friend informs us that for the course of two or three years he was 'in love'? 'Love' here clearly doesn't signify an emotional state; emotional states cannot continue without relief for periods such as this. They are, as we have seen, brief and all-embracing, permitting of no interruption. Rather, a person who is, for the course of a year or more, 'in love' is one who tends for that period to think, feel, act, react, in certain quite distinctive ways; but he does not do so without any respite whatever. Yet this liability condition is too lengthy to be called a mood and too short to be a character trait. Similarly, in statements such as 'I hate the milkman', 'hate' calls for analysis in terms of tendencies or liabilities to do, say, feel,
and think. Yet it does not necessarily imply that I am in a milkman-hating mood, nor that milkman-hating is a trait of my character. 'Hope' is frequently employed in this sense also, as in 'Tom hopes that Bill will succeed in his task'.

It seems likely, then, that a number of emotion words - 'jealous', and 'envious' are other examples - will on occasion be employed in this manner to refer to a disposition which cannot be characterized as either a mood or a character trait. There is no objection to our using a general term such as 'dispositional emotions' to cover all these cases of emotion words, at least in those contexts where the distinctions between them are not crucial. However, it has been my aim in this chapter to bring out the differences between the various dispositional uses of emotion terms, since in some instances, more particularly in relation to character traits, the failure to see these distinctions has obscured the nature of the explanations of human behaviour which can be provided by reference to these words.
CHAPTER 4

Emotion and Wanting

It is by now a philosophical cliche' that on many occasions when one wants something, to do or to become something, there is no particular itch, twitch, or tweak, no distinctive 'want' feeling, experienced. The traditional view that desire, in the sense of wanting, was to be included among the passions rested on the notion of desire as a feeling of yearning or longing. But it has long been seen that we often talk of 'wanting' something in contexts, e.g. as in 'I want to go to the library this afternoon', where no feelings of any kind need be involved and, moreover, where 'want' is far from conforming to that complex state of agitation, mental and physical, in which we have seen an emotion to consist. Yet an examination of some of the central uses of 'want' is important for my purposes, since I am concerned not only with emotions per se, but also with the part played by emotion words in the explanation of human behaviour. The concept of wanting, it is claimed, frequently provides an important link between emotion and behaviour. I hope that some of these links will be revealed here,
though in the course of this discussion I shall be raising issues not directly concerned with emotion as such.

Though contemporary philosophers have largely rejected traditional accounts which depict 'wanting' as the name of an introspectible feeling, it is necessary to see that those philosophers (Hobbes is one example) who saw wanting as representing a directed feeling, a movement of some kind towards an objective, did draw attention to the important point that the notion of an aim or goal is frequently involved in an account of 'wanting'. It is partly because this is so that the concept of wanting is held to be at the heart of a great number of our ordinary explanations of human behaviour. I shall try to make this clear by considering, first, the relation of wanting to the notions of intention and motive, both important concepts in such explanations. I shall then endeavour to relate some of our uses of 'want' to some uses of emotion words.

**Intending and wanting**

In this section I shall be concerned with the relation between wanting and intentional behaviour, i.e. that behaviour of which it is said that the
agent's intention has operated so as to produce it. Thus the framing of the intention results in the behaviour in the sense that it is the agent's intending it which brings it about. Furthermore, I distinguish between the action and the intention since it appears that though an intention is necessarily an intention to act\(^1\) - the idea of an intention implies the idea of an action intended - yet the action and the intention are separable since not all intentions result in actions, though many do. Thus I may fully intend to open the window before I start work, but I may not in fact open the window. Failure to make this distinction has had some strange repercussions in modern philosophy. An example of this is Strawson's\(^2\) categorization of predicates 'implying intention' such as 'writing a letter', 'coiling a rope', 'playing ball' as instances of predicates ascribed to oneself 'not on the basis of observation'. We can agree with Strawson that my action of, say, playing ball is an intentional one; this is what I intend to do and I do it. And it is also true that I

\(^1\)Here 'to act' is taken to include 'acts of omission', e.g. keeping very quiet and not saying a word while the burglar is in the room.

know without observation that I intend to do it. But in what sense do I know without observation, e.g. without seeing the ball and the wall against which I am to bounce it, and hearing it bounce, that I am playing ball? Surely observation is relevant here. Without such observation I could indeed know that I intended to play ball but without observation in any usual sense of that word, i.e. by the use of the senses, surely I do not know that I am actually playing ball. Indeed, psychological studies have shown that persons with impaired perception do not know what they are doing or, in some cases, whether they are actually doing anything at all - and this is quite irrespective of any intentions they may have. For us, the interesting point here is that the characteristic 'known without observation' applies to the intention but not to the action. Because the two are separable, it is to be expected that there will be characteristics of the one, e.g. known without observation, which will not necessarily be applicable to the other. It is when the two are erroneously conflated that we find ourselves faced with such strange claims as that predicates like 'playing ball' or 'coiling a rope' must be seen as ascribed to oneself not on the basis of observation.
To state a person's intention is frequently to explain his action. We account for John's action in catching the bus by saying that he intends to visit his old aunt. Such explanations function by providing the questioner with the aim or purpose of the action. Catching the bus, we learn, was performed as a means to the attainment of a particular end or goal, visiting the old aunt. An intention explanation may be given in answer to the question 'Why did he do that?' or more specifically, 'What was his intention in performing that action?'. Of course, another and more basic question, the answer to which is already assumed when we ask 'What was his intention in performing that action, in doing that?', is 'Did he do that (e.g. knock the waiter's arm) intentionally or unintentionally?'. Once we have received the reply 'It was intentional', we know that the action was not performed inadvertently, accidentally or by mistake. This likelihood removed, though the question ordinarily arises infrequently since on the whole we assume that most of a person's actions are intentional, the question 'What was his intention in doing that?' becomes the relevant one. And this question amounts to a request for the supplying of the goal or purpose
of the action - 'He did it with the intention of, or in order to, embarrass the man'. Thus an explanation in terms of an intention provides an answer to a question about a kind of goal-directed behaviour. The answer requires that the agent know what his aim or goal is, that he perform the action because he has that goal (and not, say, because at the last moment his arm is knocked so that he accidentally achieves his aim), and that he believe his action to be a means of achieving that aim.

Now it does seem that in such statements as 'He did it because he intended to ...' and 'He did it because he wanted to ...', 'intended' and 'wanted' are identical in meaning. Thus Anscombe points out that it has often been seen that 'Intention can be recast in the form 'because I wanted' and 'out of a desire that'. This does appear to be so. Indeed, in our example we can account for John's action in catching the bus by saying that he did so 'because he intended to visit his old aunt' or 'because he wanted to visit his old aunt'. In each case we provide an explanation by supplying the questioner with the goal or purpose of

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the action, i.e. we remove his perplexity regarding an action known to him by connecting it with a goal previously unknown to him.

From this apparently close connection between 'want' and 'intend', however, numerous confusions have arisen. It has been claimed that since we may say of any intentional action that we 'want' to do it, then the unfortunate conclusion must be drawn that all our intentional actions must be characterized as selfish or egocentric. For 'want to do' carries the suggestion that we are always acting to achieve what we at present happen to 'want', 'desire' or 'like'. Clearly this is not so, since we are all aware that we frequently intend to perform actions which in some sense we do not 'want' to perform, which may indeed be quite abhorrent to us; and we can also want to perform actions which we do not intend to perform. We can say with perfect propriety 'I intend to visit my old aunt, but I don't want to' In one sense, then, it appears that we 'want' to go, yet in another sense that we don't 'want' to go. This is puzzling.

Let us allow that there is a legitimate place for 'want' in the simple report of intention and that
this is made clear by the fact that in many cases 'want' may be used in place of 'intend' without remainder. Thus when I say 'I intend to visit my old aunt this afternoon', I am saying that this is what I am aiming at, this is what I am after, this is what I want to do this afternoon. What sense of 'want' is then involved when I say 'I intend to visit my old aunt this afternoon, but I don't really want to do so'? Or when a friend protests, 'I know that you intend to visit your aunt this afternoon, that this is what your aim is, that this is what you want to do this afternoon. But surely you don't really want to visit her. You are always saying that the chatter of old ladies makes you dizzy'. What is the difference between 'wanting' and 'really wanting' in these cases?

The source of confusion here appears to be the fact that 'want' is frequently employed to cover cases where what is wanted is wanted not as an end in itself but as a means to some further end. Thus I may say, 'I want to take my driving test next week. I dread it, but I need a license now that my husband is sick'. Or, 'I want to visit my old aunt this afternoon. Her chatter makes me dizzy but she is alone and shouldn't be neglected by her relations'. That is, 'wanting
to do x' sometimes covers those cases where what is wanted is not regarded by the agent as in itself desirable, but is regarded by him as necessary for the achievement of some further goal - e.g. acquiring a driver's license or preventing an old aunt's loneliness. My friend understandably asks, 'But surely you don't really want to go?' since it appears to him, on the basis of my past remarks, that visiting an old aunt is not something which in normal circumstances I would want to do. But he is satisfied when he learns that I want to go because I think that my aunt will feel lonely if I do not do so. It is, therefore, of the things which we want not as ends but as means, that it sometimes appears natural to say that we do not 'really want' them.

So the fact that it does seem appropriate to say of some of our intentional actions that we do not 'really want' to do them, should not lead us to deny that 'intending to do' implies 'wanting to do'. Nor does it follow from this that all our intentional actions must be regarded as selfish or egocentric. For many of the things which we intend to do, though indeed we want to do them, are not done because they
are regarded as in themselves desirable - we may hate visiting aunts or taking driving tests or punishing our children - but because we consider them as necessary for the achievement of some further aim. The 'want' of intention leaves open the question of whether what is wanted is wanted as a means or as an end. It is this question which is at issue when we are asked, following the report of our intention to do x, 'But do you really want to do it?'.

**Intention and motive**

Now if the notion of 'wanting' is involved whenever we provide an explanation of an action by reference to the agent's intention, this notion is also closely bound up with the concept of a motive. 'Out of a desire to ...', or 'Because he wanted to ...' is often as clear a way of stating a motive as 'Out of ambition', 'Out of envy' and so on. That this is so has led to some difficulties with regard to the relation between intention and motive as explanatory concepts and to the question as to whether the two can or should be clearly differentiated. I do not wish to enter here into a full account of these problems.
That the issue has proved problematical, particularly in relation to the subject of emotions as motives, is seen by reference to the kind of questions which have been raised in the course of discussion of this subject. Such questions as, 'Is the motive something different from the intention or is it part of the intention?'; 'Is the motive included in the intention?' 'Do motives make a difference to the intention?' and such statements as 'Passions make a difference to the intention'\(^1\) appear to reveal a fundamental lack of clarity regarding these concepts. Nor did attempts to clarify the issue in terms of backward looking reasons (motives) as opposed to forward looking reasons (intentions)\(^2\) prove fruitful, since the many different ways in which motives may be stated have made it unrealistic to attempt to force them into the one category of 'backward looking'.

Briefly, what is importantly common to explanations provided in terms of intentions and motive explanations, impulse or dispositional, is that in each case the explanation involves the enlightenment of the questioner regarding the goal or end sought

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\(^2\)e.g. G.E. Anscombe, Intention (1957), pp. 18-21.
or wanted by the agent in performing the action under consideration. It is important to see, however, that though these explanations have that fundamental characteristic in common, there are differences between explanations provided in terms of intentions and those provided in terms of motives. An example may help to clarify this. 'Why did John make that remark to Bill?' 'He wanted to make Bill look foolish in front of Professor Jones' 'Why?' 'Oh, it's envy', or 'Because he is envious of him'.

Now the first reply 'He wanted to make Bill look foolish in front of Professor Jones' provides us with an explanation of John's making the remark in terms of his intention in so doing. It simply gives the end to which the action in question was a means. The remark, we learn, was made by John as a means of achieving a particular goal - making Bill look foolish in front of Professor Jones. But the second reply 'It was envy' or 'He did it because he is envious of Bill' provides us with a great deal more information about this goal-directed action. It does so, most importantly, by classifying John's particular goal on this occasion - making Bill look foolish - as belonging to a set or class of goals typically pursued
by people who are envious. It is explained as being due to envy; a typical 'envious aim'. As we have previously seen, the attribution of such a motive refers in a general way to the type of goal pursued - in the case of envy, the possession of something which another has - and in a general way to the beliefs, feelings and desires of an agent who acts from that motive. Thus we may not know, following the attribution of the motive 'envy', precisely the beliefs, feeling, desires, goal, of the agent, but we do then know that they are of a certain kind. That is to say, when we explain John's action here as performed from a motive of envy, we are explaining that action by reference to an explanatory pattern of a particular kind. But this pattern of explanation, unlike an explanation in terms of intention, does not require that we provide the precise goal sought by the agent in performing the action. We may know this of course. We may know not merely that John's action was performed in pursuit of something which Bill has and which John himself wants, but that what he is precisely seeking is the approval of Professor Jones, which Bill now enjoys. But the point is that the motive explanation may be given in the absence of
such specific knowledge. This is not so in the case of an intention explanation, however. For such an explanation functions by specifying the particular goal to which the action in question was believed by the agent to be a means. In addition, even if, in the case of the motive explanation, we know the specific goal sought by the agent - Professor Jones' approval now enjoyed by Bill - we still may not know precisely the agent's beliefs, feelings and desires. All we are saying when we supply the motive 'envy' in explanation of John's action is that these, like his goal, are of a certain type - a type common to persons who act out of envy.

Of course disagreement may well arise regarding the motive involved on such an occasion, i.e. about which pattern of explanation is applicable. Thus, in our example, A may say 'It was envy', B 'revenge', C 'jealousy', D 'hate'. We are then not sure what particular kind of goal was sought by the agent, what kind of goal he takes his action as a means of achieving, what kind of feelings and desires are involved. It is frequently not easy to assign the correct motive and it may often require further investigation, further observation and enquiry, concerning
the agent's actions, reactions, manner and attitudes, to arrive at the appropriate pattern and, hence, the appropriate motive for the action in question.

Wanting and emotion as motive

Though it is generally agreed that 'wanting' is involved in the notion of a motive, that in assigning a motive to a person we are saying that there is a particular goal or kind of goal that he is after or wants to achieve, there is frequently considerable confusion regarding the wanting and the emotion involved in the special case of emotions as motives. Thus G. E. Myers has made the following statement: 'No philosopher surely wants to deny in assigning motives to people, that there is often though not always, implicit reference to wants possessing an emotional charge'.\(^1\) Since phrases such as 'implicit reference to wants possessing an emotional charge' are too vague to be of much assistance, it may prove helpful to try to untangle the wants and the emotions involved in the ascription of such a motive. I shall attempt to do this by considering the ways in which we go about estimating the strength of a motive.

We have seen that whenever we explain a particular action or a particular kind or set of actions as performed from a particular motive, there is implied a desire on the part of the agent to achieve a particular goal or kind of goal. This being so, when we come to the question of the estimation of the strength of any motive we find that what we are primarily seeking is an indication of how much the person wants to achieve his aim. And when we wish to ascertain how much a person really wants to achieve something, to be or become something, then we look most commonly at what he does. For it is obvious that the more a person wants to achieve an aim the more he will seek it, in the sense that the more actions he is likely to try to perform as a means of bringing about the desired situation. Thus the most common method of estimating strength of motive involves a consideration of how many of the agent's actions are explicable by reference to that motive. If we find that a wide variety of a particular person's actions are attributable to, say, his desire for fame, then we speak of his motive as a strong one in this case. Thus the frequency of the actions performed by a person from a particular motive is an important indicator of the strength of that motive.
Again, as we have previously seen, Kenny has suggested that another such indicator is the importance of the actions performed by the agent from the motive in question. I have pointed out that this particular means of estimating strength of motive will be useful only in special cases, since comparison in terms of importance will be difficult in the case of fairly mundane actions. Yet there will be instances where the importance of the action or actions will be relevant. Thus a person who, in performing a particular action for the sake of his country, thereby places himself in a position of great personal danger, can properly be said to have been 'strongly motivated' by patriotism, or the desire for fame. In some exceptional cases, therefore, the question of the importance of the action or actions performed from a particular motive will be crucial in estimating strength of motive.

Thirdly, we may try to obtain some idea of the strength of a particular motive by considering the agent's reactions to the frustrations which attend his efforts to achieve his aim. How does he respond to the disappointments which beset his efforts to

1Chapter 2.
achieve, say, social prominence? Do these merely serve to harden his resolve, or is he easily discouraged? A person who persists in the face of frustrations which lead another to forsake his goal is said to be the 'more strongly motivated'. Such a person, we say, has a strong motive in the sense that he allows no frustration, no obstacle, to block the way to the ultimate achievement of his aim.

Again, we may consider as evidence of strong motive the extent to which the person's thoughts, daydreams, fantasies and conversation centre around what he is seeking to attain. Thus the boy with a 'strong motive' to become a doctor may spend his free hours dreaming of himself as a great surgeon, talking about medicine, making plans for his future and so on. Of course thoughts, fantasies and talk are not in themselves necessarily indicative of strong motive. If the boy simply dreams and talks and never performs or tries to perform any actions as a means to achieving his aim, and if there is no cogent reason (e.g. lack of opportunity, conflicting duties) why he cannot do so, then we speak of mere 'wishful thinking' but not of 'strong motive' in that case.
One or more of these methods is employed in estimating the strength of any motive. That there is an additional factor to be considered in the case of emotions as motives, however, is shown by the tendency of many philosophers to refer uneasily to such motives as involving wants possessing an 'emotional charge' or even 'psychic energy'.¹ All that appears to be at issue here is the point we have previously mentioned - that a person who is motivated by fear, love or jealousy must some time also feel fear, love or jealousy in the sense that he must undergo some agitation, mental and physical, of the relevant kind. Of course, a person who is so motivated is not one who is continually undergoing such agitation. For as we have seen, an emotion as motive is a particular kind of explanation of action and is not simply the name of a state of agitation. Indeed, as Kenny has pointed out,² we frequently speak of, say, fear as a motive where the actions so motivated are not accompanied by any symptoms of

fear. Thus the complex precautions which I take to secure my financial security, buying shares, placing money in a variety of international banks and so on, may be motivated by my fear of the physical discomforts attendant upon poverty, yet the actions of mine so motivated may not be accompanied by trembling, sweating, and fearful thoughts. Yet even in these cases, if fear is in fact the motive, feelings of fear must surely be relevant. When all my plans go awry and I am confronted by poverty, if I do not then feel fear, experience some such agitation, then surely we have not been justified in explaining my previous actions as motivated by fear. In the absence of such feelings we should want to withdraw this explanation in favour of another - an intention perhaps, or a motive like pride or social ambition, but surely not fear. For these same actions may be performed from a variety of motives; if the person never feels fear then there is surely no reason to fasten upon

1It should be noted that the word 'fear' is sometimes used without the suggestion that the emotion, fear, is present at all, e.g. 'I fear that my child is annoying you', or 'He won't be able to come today, I'm afraid'. These express apologies or regrets rather than fears properly so called. Again, 'fear' is sometimes used where what is conveyed is the fact that the person thinks something may prove to be the case, and doesn't like this, e.g. 'He is afraid that that car may not be such a good bargain.'
fear as the motive. We then look for a different pattern, a different context into which to set these actions. Of course, a person can be afraid of the prospect of future poverty and act from this motive, yet when the situation eventuates may experience no fear. But then we contrast his fear at the prospect of poverty with his lack of fear in its presence. Thus the intensity of the agitation experienced will also be relevant in estimating the strength of an emotion as motive.

We have, then, five possible methods of assessing strength of motive in the case of emotions as motives. These are a) frequency of the actions performed from that motive, b) importance of the action or actions, c) the agent's reactions to frustration, d) the nature of his conversation, thoughts, daydreams, and e) the intensity of his emotional agitation. Of course not all these methods will be appropriate in every instance of an emotion as motive. This will depend upon the situation for which strength is being assessed. Thus we may be considering strength of motive in relation to a particular action already performed or for a particular action contemplated but not yet performed. It is in the latter case, for
example, that we consider particularly the nature of the person's conversation, thoughts and daydreams. The importance of the action will be a factor in both these cases. Sometimes, of course, we may be considering not a particular action but a particular set of actions, past or future. Or it may be a particular kind of action which is at issue, or a set of actions of a particular kind. The frequency of the actions performed will be relevant in the case of estimation of strength of motive for actions of a particular kind but not in the case of one particular action, and so on.

A further important, though unusual, sense of 'strong motive' should also be considered. We do occasionally speak of a person having a 'strong motive' for performing a given action, say a murder, when we do not in fact know whether that person was the agent in this case. Thus we say, 'John had a strong motive for killing Bill. He was in love with Susie, Bill's wife'. Yet we don't know whether or not John did commit the murder. Given that a motive is a kind of explanation of an action or series of actions, what occurs in these cases is that we see that a motive explanation of the action in question is close at hand in John's case. Knowing that John is in love with Susie, we look to him as the agent, since husband-killing is just the sort of action
which a man very much in love might perform as a means of securing the object of his love. That is, we can easily fit the action into this particular pattern, although we don't know in fact whether it is the correct one. But it is only in cases where we are considering possible explanations of an action that we ever speak of a person as having a motive for performing an action which, it may be, he did not in fact perform, or even think of performing.

Emotion and other senses of 'want'

We have seen that wanting in the sense of a desire for an end is involved whenever we assign a motive, and hence whenever we assign an emotion as a motive. It is often held, however, that 'wants' are also implied in other uses of emotion words. For example, where words such as 'fear', 'anger', 'joy', serve as the names of emotional states, wanting also enters into the analysis, it is claimed. For to be angry is, among other things, to want to lash out; to be afraid is to want to run away; to be joyful is to want to laugh aloud. Thus 'want', it is said, provides a link between emotion and behaviour. What is important here is to see which sense of 'want' is being employed.
Of great relevance to this discussion is White's point that 'want' is often misleadingly identified with 'inclination' in cases where the latter is in fact being used as synonymous with 'tendency' or 'proneness'. Thus when we say, 'John is inclined to be irritable on Mondays', we are saying that on Mondays John is disposed or liable or prone to think and react in this particular fashion. But we are not committing ourselves on the very different question of whether or not John wants so to react each Monday. For his wanting so to behave, or his very much wanting not to be such a bore at the beginning of every week, is not involved in our claim 'John is inclined to be irritable on Mondays'. We are merely saying that he exhibits this tendency. But it is this misidentification of wanting and being inclined, in the sense of being liable; or prone, to think and react, which is frequently the basis of the claim that the analysis of emotional states involves a wanting to behave. Having first analyzed emotional states in terms of inclinations or tendencies to behave, such philosophers then misidentify inclinations of this kind with wanting

1A.R. White, Attention (1964), p. 89.
to behave. They then conclude that wanting, e.g. wanting to lash out or wanting to laugh aloud, is a necessary factor in the analysis of such states.

There are two mistakes here. Firstly, as we have seen, being inclined, in the sense of being liable to think and act, is not the same thing as wanting so to think and act. Secondly, as has been previously pointed out, emotion words naming emotional states do not serve to signify tendencies or pronenesses to behave. Rather a person who is in, say, a fit of rage, is in a particular emotional state or condition. For the course of it he is reacting in thought, feeling, deed, in certain ways. He does not merely tend to think, act, react, when conditions are appropriate. In the case of mood words, which are the names of inclinations in the sense of dispositions or tendencies to think, act, react, the point regarding the confusion between such inclinations and wanting still holds. Thus while a person who is in a despondent mood is one who, for the period of that mood, is inclined to think gloomy thoughts, speak little, and walk with head down, from this it does not necessarily follow that he wants so to think and act.
A standard sense of 'want', one which is frequently held to be implied in talk about emotional states, is the 'feel inclined' or 'feel like' sense as opposed to the 'be inclined', 'be prone or liable' sense. Or, the 'feeling sense' as opposed to the 'frequency sense' of inclination, as White puts it. Thus, to be angry or afraid implies, on this analysis, not that the person is liable to lash out or run away, but that he is one who 'wants', in the sense of 'feels like', 'feels inclined', to so react. So White holds, 'In the feeling sense, inclination goes with such 'general condition' feelings as indignation, fear, hope or anxiety. To feel indignant is to feel inclined to protest, to feel afraid is to feel like running away'.

Yet surely this is not always so. For when we are interested in the estimation of the intensity of any emotional state, one of the factors to be considered is precisely whether 'feeling like' or 'feeling inclined' to react is relevant in that particular case. In the case of the milder emotions, say annoyance, we do often speak of ourselves or others as 'feeling inclined' to make a cutting remark or to bang the

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1A.R. White, op. cit., p. 91.
table. For when the emotion is not a completely overmastering one we are frequently able to restrict its observable manifestations. In this sense, it is true that an emotional state may involve first 'feeling like' reacting, and then either reacting or not reacting. But as Kenny has remarked, 'A man cannot be in a violent rage or extreme anguish if his countenance is serene and he talks composedly about indifferent topics. One of the criteria of intensity of such emotions is that they should be incapable of being concealed; as we talk of overmastering anger and overpowering grief'.¹ That is, in those cases where a person is 'overcome by', 'in the grip of', 'overpowered by', 'overwhelmed by', an emotion, we do not speak of, nor account for, his behaviour in terms of 'feeling like' or 'feeling inclined'. He just reacts in these ways; his screaming and his vase-smashing are direct expressions of his severe emotional state. It is therefore misleading to say, as White does, that emotions 'typically contain a felt inclination to expand or even explode into some form of behaviour'.² It is true that the milder emotions may include 'felt

¹Anthony Kenny, op. cit., p. 63.
²A.R. White, op. cit., p. 93.
inclinations to behave' amongst their manifestations and so, in this sense, a 'wanting' to behave. But in the more extreme cases there is just behaviour, and this behaviour is not accounted for in terms of 'felt inclinations' - and thus 'wanting' - so to behave.

Again, the general claim is frequently made that the analysis of character traits always involves the concept of wanting.¹ The same senses of 'want' now discussed must be distinguished in these cases. Some character trait words, as we saw in the last chapter, may serve as the names of dispositional motives, e.g. jealousy, envy, generosity and so on. When these terms are employed in that capacity, the 'want' involved will be the desire for an end or goal. However, in the case of character attitudes, e.g. cheerful, sulky, morose, the person so characterized is not one who wants something in that sense. Such words, we said, signify dispositions, tendencies, pronenesses to think, feel, act, react, in certain distinctive ways a great deal of the time, but there is no particular goal sought or wanted by them. Those who see 'wants' as entering into the analysis of this

class of character traits, therefore, are frequently employing 'want', in a misleading fashion, as synonymous with 'inclination', the sense being that of proneness or tendency or liability to behave in certain ways. It is true, of course, that a person who is disposed or liable to, say, scowl and snap at others will also on occasions 'feel inclined', 'feel like', behaving in such a manner, and thus the 'feeling like' sense of wanting will have a place in the case of character attitudes. But, of course, we dub a man as irritable or morose on the basis of the ways in which he does tend to act and react, and not merely on the basis of any of his feeling inclinations so to react.

It is obvious that I have not been concerned in this chapter to explore all the many and varied uses of the word 'want'. Rather, my task has been to look at some of the uses of that concept which have been held to play some part in the analysis of emotion words, particularly in connection with the uses of those words in the explanation of human behaviour. We shall find that the subject of wants will arise again in the following chapter, when we consider the nature of the 'evaluations' which give rise to many of our emotional states.
Philosophers and psychologists frequently suggest that 'emotions involve some kind of cognition', but the problems regarding the precise nature of the cognitive elements and their 'involvement' in emotions remain, I believe, among the most puzzling in this complex field. We shall begin our attempt to gain some understanding of these difficulties by a consideration of a straightforward emotion situation. Unless otherwise indicated, 'an emotion' will here signify 'an emotional state'.

Let us imagine that as I walk beside a river in Darwin, I suddenly become aware of crocodile slither marks in the mud at the water's edge. I am afraid; my knees tremble, my stomach lurches, I break out in a cold sweat. 'Crocodiles!' I think, and seize the nearest person for protection. Now in deciding in what ways 'some kind of cognition' enters into such a situation, it is helpful to distinguish two possible questions within the one query 'Why is she frightened?'. These are a) What is she frightened of? and b) Why is she frightened of that?
Suppose that in answer to a) 'What is she frightened of?,' the reply is given 'She is frightened of crocodiles, of whose presence those slither marks are undoubtedly a sign'. What 'cognitive processes' have been undergone by the person about whom such a statement is correctly made? It is usually held that there is a perception by the agent - a seeing or more vaguely, an 'awareness' - of an object, a person, a situation, or some sign of one of these. The person simply perceives and then reacts: sees the crocodile marks and runs; sees Smith and lashes out. However, even on those occasions when the fear or anger manifest themselves very quickly, it is surely misleading to speak of just seeing or just becoming aware or even just noticing an object or situation. Rather, it is more accurate to say that there is a seeing of the object or situation as something in particular, an awareness of it as that, a noticing of this as an object or situation of a certain kind. That is, the agent evaluates the situation as constituting, in the case of fear, a threat or the sign of a threat to the physical or mental well-being of himself or of somebody close to him. The intellectual nature of this evaluation
should not be concealed by speaking, as some philosophers and psychologists are wont to do, of such evaluations as being 'simple', 'direct', 'immediate', 'non-intellectual', or 'intuitive'.

There is a significant difference between just noticing or becoming aware and apprehending **that** an object is **of a particular kind.** Of course, this is not at all to say that the agent acts on the basis of deliberation here. Thus Ryle has said of this kind of mental activity, 'The child who can resent an undeserved scolding need not be able to formulate his protests let alone be able to defend them against objections. Still he apprehends **that he has been scolded for something he did not do,** and this apprehension must be classified as belonging to thinking. For it could be misapprehension and misapprehension is thinking that something is the case which is not the case'.

In our fear situation, then, I do not just see or notice or become aware of the slither marks as I pass, but see them as, notice them as, am aware of them as, constituting the sign of a threat to myself.

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I evaluate them in this way. I am aware of a difference in terms of my own well-being between the presence of these marks and those, say, of the local waterfowl. Similarly, if John is angry with Bill, it is not simply that he sees Bill, or sees and takes him to exist\(^1\) but that he sees this man, Bill, as the man who performed act x or made remark y. It is on the basis of this evaluation, however rapidly it is made, that John lashes out in anger.

I have spoken so far of the person who is frightened or angry as 'evaluating' a particular situation as dangerous or disagreeable to him. We must now attempt to be more precise about the nature of this evaluation, since as yet we have established only that it 'belongs to thinking'.

Commencing with the strongest claim: must this form of thought be knowledge? That is, must the person know that the situation is of a certain kind? This is obviously too strong a requirement, for clearly we are often just as frightened or just as angered by what we merely believe to be the case, though it is not, as by what we know to be so. I shall speak of the person in our situation as one

\(^1\)As appears to be suggested, for example, by G. Pitcher, 'Emotion', Mind, LXXIV (1965), p. 332.
who believes that a particular situation constitutes a threat to him - but with an important proviso. That is, in speaking of beliefs, I shall be using the term in that sense which allows that beliefs admit of 'degrees of assent'. Of these degrees of assent H.H. Price, following Locke, has said: 'The lowest degree is traditionally called surmising or suspecting, and the highest degree is called conviction. Between these two are the various degrees of opinion most commonly expressed by saying 'I think that ....'. I do think that it will be a fine afternoon though I am by no means sure about it. Or again, I am nearly sure that it will be fine but am not quite sure'.¹ Thus when I speak of a person as believing something to be the case, I shall take it that that person has thoughts about the situation which he is prepared to endorse, to some degree, as true. But it is not required that in every case he be convinced of their truth; he may well be just surmising. Of course, on a particular occasion we may say that we consider it 'inappropriate' or 'unreasonable' for a person to have become, say, afraid on the basis of a mere conjecture or suspicion that the situation

is threatening. But this is a different question. The point is that there is no logical inconsistency in such cases. Special cases of belief, e.g. 'half belief', will be considered later.

That it is the agent's own belief about the situation which is crucial for the occurrence of his emotion is shown by the fact that persons who are in, say, dangerous situations may not feel fear, while those who are not in fact threatened may do so. Thus someone confronted by the crocodile marks may feel no fear, experience no turmoil. This may be because he fails to appreciate the significance of the marks, and so does not evaluate the situation as representing imminent danger to himself. 'Why weren't you afraid?' we ask. 'I didn't realize they were crocodile marks'. Or again, the crocodile hunter armed with his rifle, while recognizing the marks for what they are, does not evaluate the situation as frightening to him though he may well understand why it should be so to others. 'Crocodiles can be nasty, but I can handle them'. Of course his belief and thus his emotional state may very quickly change.

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1For a discussion of this point, see I. Thalberg, 'Emotion and Thought', American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964), pp. 53-54.
in the event of his rifle becoming jammed as the beast lunges towards him. In this fashion our emotional states are changed in the light of alterations in our beliefs about particular objects, persons or situations.

Again, it should be noted that in the absence of the subject's evaluation of the situation as in some way threatening to him, any physical or mental perturbation which he experiences when faced by it, any trembling, sweating, or chaos of thought, will not be the manifestations of fear. They may be the manifestations of some other emotion or they may be the symptoms of a sudden attack of malaria. But not fear. Further investigation of the agent's beliefs about the situation or of his physical state will then be required to settle the problem.

Thus we are saying that the agent's belief about a particular situation is a necessary condition for the occurrence of his emotion in that situation, whether it be fear, anger, jealousy, resentment or embarrassment. Such a belief is not a sufficient condition however. For it may be that while recognizing the threat of the crocodiles, I do not on a particular occasion experience fear; or while seeing the insulting
force of a remark I yet do not become angry. For whether such a reaction occurs on a given occasion will frequently depend upon the mental and physical state of the person at that time. Thus if my capacity to react is inhibited by drugs, or if I am in great pain, or if I am simply preoccupied by some problem - I have this 'on my mind' - then even in the face of my belief that a remark is insulting I may not react by becoming angry. Again, some persons, by virtue of their particular temperament, do not get into such a state even in situations where most people would do so. Thus, 'It doesn't matter what you say, you can't make him angry'. This is not to say that the subject does not make the appropriate evaluation or that he merely conceals the manifestations of his anger efficiently, but that it is characteristic of him that he seldom becomes perturbed even in the face of quite serious provocation. Similarly, a person in, say, a happy mood may not so react, though he might normally do so.

We have seen so far that a belief about the situation is a necessary condition for the occurrence of the agent's emotion in that situation. This belief must, of course, be of the relevant kind for us to dub
the state one of fear rather than, say, of anger or resentment. Broadly speaking, the person who is afraid believes that he is threatened; he who is angry believes that he has been done some wrong or injury; he who is resentful believes that he has been treated unjustly; and so on. 'I am furious, Bill is being so kind to me' would be an extremely puzzling remark, and unless Bill's pleasantness was revealed to be regarded by the subject as somehow in itself insulting, we would conclude that the speaker was simply ignorant of the way in which the word 'anger' is used. But on the whole we assume that most people have learned the terminology of emotion and how to apply it.

But there is a further characteristic of emotion situations which is closely allied to the person's ability to discriminate between what is, say, dangerous and what is not. For it is important to see that a person's beliefs about a situation are framed against a background of his wants, preferences, and plans. That is, it is in terms of this background that situations are appraised as affecting us in particular ways. So when a person is afraid, he believes something to be a source of danger, the effects of which
he wants to avoid. Again, the scientist's joy at the success of his experiment presupposes the existence of certain plans and wants - for example, to be recognized by his colleagues, to attract students, to run his own laboratory - which he has learned are either aided or abetted by the object of his emotion, here the successful experiment. The occurrence of our emotions depends upon what is frequently a highly complex structure of wants in terms of which a situation is appraised. Here again, however, it is important to note that the introduction of the concept of wants does not carry with it the implication that the agent's actions and reactions on such an occasion occur as the result of a process of deliberation. The point is that, generally speaking, a person's emotion on a particular occasion is understandable in the light of the assumption that he has learned about the kind of situations which are relevant to the achievement or non-achievement of his wants, whether these be related to his physical well-being or to his position in society. On the other hand, of course, our emotions notoriously influence our plans and wants. One manifestation of our love for, or hatred of, a person - particularly
where these are the dispositional conditions discussed in Chapter 3 - will frequently be, for example, a desire to see that person happy or unhappy, successful or unsuccessful. Many of our plans and projects will then be revised, or new ones will be initiated, to allow for this new factor. These 'wants' are, of course, distinct from the 'wantings to behave' discussed in Chapter 4. There we saw that a person in the grip of an emotion may 'want' in the sense of 'feel like' acting or reacting in particular ways: for example, blowing kisses to, or clasping to his bosom, the object of his emotion in the case of love. Such 'feeling inclinations' to behave are possible components of an emotional state.

So far we have considered only what may be called a 'central' case of an emotion situation. It is 'central' in the sense that it encompasses all the characteristic features of such a situation. These are: a belief by the agent that the situation is of a particular kind; a desire to avoid or to embrace that situation; mental and physical perturbation; and either behaviour actually produced or a 'feeling like' producing such behaviour. Now
the fact that emotion words may on occasion be used to cover cases which do not exhibit all these features is crucial for an understanding of the 'problem of emotion'. We shall postpone consideration of this important question, however,\textsuperscript{1} and here concentrate specifically upon the problem of whether a belief by the agent that a particular situation is of a certain kind is a necessary feature in all cases of emotion.

Firstly, there are cases which puzzle us because, although a person is obviously, say, anxious in the presence of black cats, he yet denies that he believes that these creatures in any way present a threat to him. But many such cases are simply instances of the agent being reluctant to admit that he holds such a belief. 'Surely you don't believe that black cats are unlucky!' pronounced in a scathing tone, is likely to lead anyone hastily to deny that he does so believe. But these are not cases of emotions lacking the relevant belief. For the person is well aware that he does hold such a belief irrespective of whether or not he is always prepared

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{See} Chapter 7.
publicly to acknowledge it. And though, as in this particular case, the belief may sometimes be obviously open to criticism, this is not to deny that it is a belief at all.

Again, there are cases where a person holds a belief which he has not consciously formulated even to himself. Thus, though he may initially brusquely deny that he does hold a certain belief, we may on the basis of our own observations of his actions and reactions in a particular kind of situation, bring him to recognize that belief. So we may point out that we have observed him looking startled and drawing back whenever he visits the snake-house at the zoo, or finds a snake in his garden, or whenever a child produces a pet snake, and that he appears surprised when others do not withdraw also. Surely, we say, he does consider snakes dangerous. And he may well agree, though saying that he has 'never really thought about it' before.

It must be recognized, too, that people do hold beliefs, sometimes characterized as 'half-beliefs', which apply only in a particular set of circumstances but which are abandoned when those circumstances alter. Our emotions may be founded on beliefs of
this kind. Thus it is misleading to maintain, for example, that those who sob and cry 'The cad!' as they read a novel do not 'really believe' that a nice girl is being ill-treated by her lover. For as they read the novel or attend the theatre such persons are 'carried away' to the extent that for that period they do so believe, and thus genuinely grieve and rejoice with the characters. Yet such a person's beliefs about the situation are unlike ordinary beliefs in that they apply only within a particular context. On laying down the book or leaving the theatre they do not exclaim, 'I'm frightened, someone has just been murdered', though moments before they have been rooted to their seats in terror. Many people have beliefs of this kind which they lay aside when circumstances change. Religious beliefs are good examples of these inasmuch as they frequently apply only on Sundays. But such beliefs, and the emotions to which they give rise, are real enough while the circumstances are appropriate.

Still more puzzling are those cases of excessive fear or dread called 'phobias'. Fears of enclosed spaces, open spaces, crowds, cows, noise, fur, water, the dark and even sunsets are all examples of these. Some philosophers speak as though what is strange in
these cases is that the agents, while not in fact 'really believing' that the particular object or situation is threatening, nevertheless 'act as if they believe it is.' But surely such fears are called 'irrational' because in the face of all evidence to the contrary, the subject does have a very real belief in an imminent and great threat even though he is unable to say precisely in what the threat consists. The person will admit, of course, that the cow won't charge, the fur bite or the sunset burn, but he still evaluates the situation as a threatening one.

A typical account of an irrational fear is the following: 'A phobia is an exaggerated fear of something which most adults find innocuous. Let us use as an illustration the case of a married woman who developed a fear of going on the street alone. This kind of fear may be appropriate to a child. He perceives the street as a strange place, full of dangers where he should go only if accompanied by an adult. But for this grown woman such a perception is not appropriate. It becomes understandable when we learn that she is sexually dissatisfied and fears that she may be tempted to do something immoral if

\[1\text{e.g. G. Pitcher, op. cit., p. 336.}\]
she went to the night-club area alone.\textsuperscript{1} The fear, then, is called 'irrational', not because the woman doesn't 'really believe' that going on the street alone presents a threat, but because, while not allowing evidence for its innocuousness to effect her belief that it is dangerous, she is yet unable to specify any reasonable grounds for that belief. What is in question here is not the agent's belief about the situation, but the actual reasons for that belief and thus the reasons for her seemingly inexplicable reaction to it.

So far we have considered the role of beliefs in those cases where the question 'What is he frightened of?' is answered by reference to a specific object or situation. And we have seen that a particular kind of belief about that situation is an essential feature in the occurrence of the emotion. But as we have previously indicated, some emotion words are frequently used to signify states known as 'generalized' or 'free-floating' emotions. These are generalized in the sense that they are not 'about' any particular object or situation. That is, in these cases, the questions 'What is it (specifically) that

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you are frightend of, or angry or happy about? are simply not appropriate. If asked, they will not be answered by reference to any particular object or situation but in such terms as 'Nothing in particular' or 'Everything it seems' or, with a shrug, 'That's just how I feel'. We must now consider the role of beliefs in these instances.

Firstly, it is necessary to clarify the issue somewhat by pointing out that in speaking of emotions as 'objectless' in this sense, I do not include in that category those cases where, though the emotion is object-directed, the subject is temporarily unable to say what the object is. Thus a person may feel threatened and experience the associated perturbation, yet be unable to say to which of a number of possible circumstances his fear is directed. What is his fear about? His child's health? His deteriorating relations with his wife? In these instances - as illustrated, for example, by Wittgenstein's case quoted in Chapter 3 - the subject later realizes what that object is. 'Of course, my examination is at 3 o'clock'. Or he may be assisted in its identification by an observer; 'Isn't your examination at 3 o'clock?'. Again, a person may go wrong in his specification of the object.
'It's my examination', he says. But we may disagree. 'You know that you'll pass, and anyway I've never seen you in this state about an examination. On the other hand, you were in this condition a month ago after the doctor called on young Bill'. But these are not cases of objectless emotions in the required sense, though they do show that identifying the precise object of an emotion is not always simple, and that there is room for error in so doing.

On the other hand, I include in the category of objectless emotions those cases where the subject aware that, generally speaking, our emotions are directed to particular objects or situations, seeks out a series of possible objects. But in such cases we are frequently able to show him that his state is in fact a generalized one by pointing out that, say, discussion of no one particular circumstance perturbs him more than any other and thus that his state is, in this, different from other instances of emotion.

In discussing generalized emotions it is, I believe, important to see that it is misleading to say, as many philosophers do, that there is a particular 'class' of emotions which are of this type.
Thus it is often maintained that while depression and elation, for example, belong to the class of emotions which are never directed to any particular situation, emotions such as anger, joy, resentment, and love belong to a class of emotions which are always so directed. But it is extremely doubtful that emotions can be thus neatly categorized without exceptions to such class divisions becoming evident. Firstly, it is surely quite obvious that depression and elation may be object-directed. A person is quite frequently depressed or elated about some particular circumstance as opposed to others, e.g. depressed about his lack of money or elated about his examination success. But more importantly, it is distinctive of generalized emotions that, though they do not have objects, they do have causes of which the subject may, though he need not, be aware. And these causes may, though again they need not, be physiological in origin.¹ Thus such emotions may occur as the result of cerebral lesions, congenital brain malfunction, or they may be induced by the action of drugs ranging in strength from alcohol to the psychotomimetics such as LSD.

¹I am not here denying, of course, that object-directed emotions may also have causes of this kind, e.g. what I am depressed about may be my greying hair, but the cause of my depression may be an overdose of aspirin.
For our purpose, what is interesting about this latter fact is that it is now seen that a variety of emotions may be so induced. Thus persons under the influence of these drugs experience emotions which both they and their observers characterize as generalized states of fear, anger, melancholy, joy and even love and hate. Nor need these conditions be dispositional in nature. They frequently exhibit the characteristic all-encompassing feature of emotional states. Thus such persons think, act and react in a particular fashion to an extent which prohibits their thinking, acting and reacting for the course of that state in any other fashion. We may, of course, dismiss such instances of emotional states as 'non-standard'. However, since it no longer requires great imagination to suppose that these states may yet come to be just as commonplace, and hence presumably just as 'standard', as object directed states of these kinds, it appears arbitrary to do so.\footnote{Philosophers should be particularly wary of classifying certain emotional states as 'pathological'. For there is a sense in which all such states can be so described. Note the 19th century sense of 'pathology', i.e. 'Pertaining to the passions or emotions' - Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.}

With generalized emotions then, there is no one situation which the subject considers to be threatening,
unjust, dreary or sunny. Whether the cause be physical or psychological (e.g. some past experience frequently forgotten or repressed), the person in a state of, say, generalized fear is one who for the course of that state believes all objects, persons and situations to be potentially threatening, and he reacts accordingly. His state is then characterized as one of fear by virtue of his distinctive pattern of thinking, acting and reacting throughout that period. This point is important insofar as it shows that though, as has often been pointed out, identification of the object of an emotion is frequently the chief indicator in the identification of an emotional state, characterization of such a state as one of fear, anger, joy and so on may occur in the absence of a specific object.

Leaving aside cases of generalized emotions, we shall now return to the consideration of our original fear situation. We have seen that once the question a) 'What is she frightened of?' has been answered, we know that this particular object is the one the person sees as threatening to him. Then, if further elucidation is required the question b) 'Why is she frightened of that?' becomes the relevant
one.\textsuperscript{1} It asks for some account of how the agent has come to evaluate the object in this way. Thus, 'Why is she frightened of crocodiles?' 'Her brother was attacked by one last week'. Similar questions will apply, of course, if the original question concerns one of the manifestations of the emotion. For example, 'Why did she scream?' 'She's frightened of crocodiles' 'Why?' 'Her brother was attacked by one last week'. Thus knowledge of the agent's belief in danger and its grounds together help us to understand the occurrence of the emotion and also account for its manifestations.

Now since a person is generally able to give his reasons (grounds) for believing something to be the case, it is frequently on the basis of the adequacy or inadequacy of those reasons that we speak of his emotion in such terms as 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable', 'warranted' or 'unwarranted'. Thus

\textsuperscript{1}There are cases, however, where the answer to a) 'What is she frightened of?' also appears to answer b) 'Why is she frightened of that?'. For example, Dr. Robert Brown has suggested to me the case where what the agent is frightened of is entering into a particular state, e.g. madness. Here the question 'Why is she frightened of that?' seems redundant since madness is in itself frightening and not because it leads to something else that is frightening. If b) is to have a place in such instances, it would at least have to be re-interpreted as meaning 'Why is she frightened of that happening (as opposed to its not happening)'.

we say, for example, that a person's fear is 'unreasonable' when the reasons he gives for his belief in danger are patently false, e.g. his reason for fearing wombats is that they eat people. If this were true, his fear would be quite reasonable, but it's clearly false given the strength of the evidence to the contrary. Or again, we speak of unreasonable fear when the person's reason, though expressed in a true statement, constitutes an extremely bad reason for being afraid. Thus we say that it is unreasonable for a person to be afraid of going out this morning because he spilt the salt at breakfast. This is mere superstition, we claim, there is no evidence that such an event is connected with misfortunes occurring during the day.

But in speaking of a person's reasons for his emotion it is important to see that sometimes the subject is simply unable to give any reasons for his state. Or, more frequently, his reasons fail to convince us. Thus, in the latter case, a woman may say that she is afraid to leave the house because her baby may come to some harm in her absence. But this seems odd to us when we notice that she is still afraid to go out when there is a trained nurse present to care
for the child. We doubt, then, that the reason she gives is the actual reason for her fear. In such cases, as in the case of the person who fails to provide any reasons for his state, we seek first for her concealed reason, that is, a reason to which she is not prepared to admit. Failing this, we look for unconscious reasons or for physical causes sufficient to explain her fear. Thus the person's reasons and the actual reasons for an emotion do not always coincide. When they do not, we frequently speak of the agent's reasons as 'rationalizations' as we may also do in the case of those irrelevant reasons which people sometimes give for their physically induced states.

However, when we speak of a person's emotion as 'unreasonable', we do not always have in mind only the status of his reasons for that state. Thus the question at issue may be, 'Did he have good reasons for his emotion and if so, for what degree of it?'. So we may say that though a person had good reason to be angry, nevertheless the degree of his anger was excessive and thus his emotion 'unreasonable' in that sense. For example, the reaction of the man who flies into a frenzy when he misplaces a sock is deemed
unreasonable by virtue of its violence, though it may well be granted that annoyance would have been quite reasonable in the circumstances. Related to these cases are those where an emotion is called 'unreasonable' in a sense close to 'abnormal'. For example, it is quite reasonable, 'normal', to be afraid of snakes - after all, many are poisonous - but it is unreasonable, 'abnormal', to scream at the very sight of one even if pickled in a bottle.

We shall not attempt here, however, to investigate the many different ways in which an emotion may be criticized. Such an analysis requires a study of its own. This is obviously so, since even a cursory examination of the subject shows that terms such as 'unreasonable', 'unjustifiable', 'unwarranted', 'unnatural' are not only frequently employed synonymously in their reference to emotions, but in many cases presuppose standards concerning the kinds and degrees of behaviour expected in particular kinds of situations. And these standards, though sometimes dependent upon the empirical fact that persons do tend to react in a characteristic fashion to situations which they regard as agreeable or disagreeable, frequently also depend upon moral or social convention.
Thus we say, for example, 'He should have been sorry about his friend's failure', or 'He ought to have been happier at his wedding'. These considerations clearly raise problems beyond the scope of our present enquiry.¹

Of more direct relevance to the problem of emotion and cognition is the question of emotion in animals, concerning which I have so far been silent. Yet we have been speaking of the subjects of emotion as believing such and such to be the case and as having and giving reasons for those beliefs. Does this account present difficulties in the case of emotion in animals, i.e. where the subjects are non-language users?

Firstly, then, can we say that the fearful animal 'thinks' or 'believes' that a particular situation is dangerous? These concepts are sometimes held to be inapplicable to animals on the grounds that thinking of something under a particular description necessarily implies applying that description to it. And this, of course, non-language users cannot do.

On the other hand, on the basis of psychological

studies of learning in animals, it has been far more plausibly suggested that, by virtue of the animal’s distinctive pattern of behaviour in a particular kind of situation, we are often justified in attributing to them the capacity to make judgments. Thus it appears arbitrary to deny that the dog which leaps up, barks and rushes to the door when it sees its owner pick up the leash, thinks that it is about to be taken for a walk, or that the rat which squeaks and cowers in the laboratory maze thinks that it will be shocked. However, such an attribution becomes more difficult in relation to creatures at the lower end of the phylogenetic scale. Thus there is little temptation to hold that the grasshopper withdrawing from the prodding stick 'thinks' that this represents a danger.

In attributing to animals the capacity to make judgments, there appear to me to be two criteria involved. These are a) that the animal exhibits a distinctive pattern of behaviour in situations of a particular kind, and b) that the animal has the capacity to learn to modify that behaviour when no longer appropriate to the achievement of its goals. With the higher animals b) the ability to learn to
modify behaviour when it is inappropriate, is present. Thus the cat, which normally spits, claws and flees when confronted by a snake, sleeps peacefully beside that snake which is the family pet. Or the dog which rushes joyfully to the door when its owner picks up the leash, lies immobile when the 2 year old child does so. However, in the case of the grasshopper no such learning is possible. So the grasshopper's 'danger reactions' take place monotonously in any situation which involves, for example, the stimulation of its antennae. For with such creatures the withdrawal pattern is dependent upon a physiological mechanism similar to that of reflex actions in the higher animals. This being so, we speak of 'danger reactions' but not of 'fear' in these cases. Our two criteria, then, represent necessary, though of course not sufficient, conditions for the attribution of emotion to animals.

Given the relevance of the animal's goals to the occurrence of its emotions, of course, it is only to be expected that as the level of intelligence rises, and thus the number and complexity of its objectives increases, so will increase the variety of emotions aroused when the achievement of those objectives is aided or abetted. Thus though a cat may be afraid,
it is never embarrassed. For since it lacks the intellectual capacity to learn to discriminate between awkward and non-awkward situations, it cannot have avoidance of the latter as one of its goals.

But these considerations assume that it makes sense to speak of 'wants' in the case of animals. Whether or not this is so is as yet far from clear. Even more problematical is the question of whether animals, granted that they cannot 'give' reasons for their judgments, can in some sense be said to 'have their own reasons' for them. It is perhaps possible that the concept of 'having a reason' can also be explicated in terms of patterns of behaviour and modifications of such patterns. Here, however, we shall content ourselves with the observation that herein may lie an important distinction between man and animal.¹

¹For a preliminary analysis of these problems, see J. Bennett, Rationality (1964). Detailed philosophical analysis of the questions raised here seems overdue when we consider the manner in which physiologists have been speaking for many years, e.g. C.J. Herrick, The Neurological Foundations of Animal Behaviour (1924), p. 272-3: 'But the dog is not restricted to this narrow range of (reflex) reactions to immediate sense excitations; he can at times forecast the probable future movement of the fox in terms of his remembrance of the topography of parts of the course not now within the range of his senses... The dog can fabricate associations in terms of single experiences and utilize these past reactions by working their mnemonic vestiges into the present sensory complex during the anticipatory phase of a prolonged reaction... This is is a strictly cortical type of behaviour... In this situation vestigial traces of previous similar experiences, and all sorts of acquired automatisms, reinforce the sensory data of the moment.'
Thinking and other referents of emotion words.

So far we have concentrated upon the role of cognition in emotional states. We shall now consider the relation of cognition to other referents of emotion words, e.g. motives and dispositional states.

When emotion words are employed as the names of motives, we have seen, they serve to provide a kind of explanation of action. They are not then the names of states or conditions. Thus, as we found in Chapter 2, if Tom performs action $x$ out of envy of John, then Tom holds such beliefs as that John has the greater approval of his superior officer and he wants himself to gain John's position. In the light of such beliefs and desires, Tom acts in a manner aimed at bringing about the desired end. The performance of such an action presupposes a sophisticated intellectual procedure - the appraisal of the means to an end. That is, the action is performed as a means to the attainment of a particular end or goal desired by the agent. This is not to say, however, that acting from some motive like jealousy or envy necessarily involves the performance of a process of cogitation regarding the most suitable means to the
attainment of the desired end. It may do so, of course. But when a person acts on an impulse of jealousy, where 'jealousy' signifies an impulse motive, he will not stop to deliberate about what to do. At the same time, his action is not simply one manifestation of an emotional state, as in the case of the person who lashes out in anger. In the case of the motivated action, the agent is indeed acting to achieve a particular end in the light of particular beliefs and desires. But agents do not continually weigh evidence and draw conclusions when performing actions, even in the full sense of that word. All that is necessary is that the person should act on the basis of knowledge - obtained by past experience or observation - that events of a particular kind must take place if consequences of a certain kind are to follow and hence particular aims to be achieved.

Again, it is necessary to consider those character attitudes referred to by such terms as 'cheerful', 'sulky', 'morose', 'melancholy', 'depressive'. These, as we have seen, do not serve to name a recurrent motive for a person's actions. Rather they dub him as one who tends to think and react most
of the time in a manner open to such a description. That is, we say that such a person is one who has a particular 'view of life' which is displayed in almost everything he thinks and does. Generally speaking, then, the person who is by nature depressive is one who sees as 'weary and unprofitable' all the uses of this world, while he who is by nature cheerful takes quite the opposite view of affairs. Sometimes, of course, he may not have consciously formulated that view. Thus he may be quite surprised to hear that he is so characterized by his acquaintances. 'You are a happy soul', we say, 'you are inevitably smiling, even in the face of situations which would depress other people'. 'Good heavens, am I? I'd never really thought about it; but then, life's always interesting, don't you agree?'. Or, 'You're the typical angry young man, aren't you?' 'I don't know anything about that. What I do know is that you and your whole rotten generation have made a complete mess of the world. It makes me boil'. 'Yes, that's what I meant'.

Such a person may, though he need not, be able to give his reasons - good or bad - for his attitude. If not, there may be unconscious reasons which account
for it. 'It all stems from early paternal domination', claims the psychiatrist. Or the explanation may be of a different kind. Thus, 'He has never been the same since his childhood accident', or, 'It's an inherited trait; look at his grandfather'. The same considerations will, of course, apply in the case of the person whose trait takes the form of a tendency to get into moods of a particular kind.

It is significant that short terms dispositions such as moods share some of the characteristics of both emotional states and of long term dispositions like character attitudes. Thus the person in a cheerful or irritable mood, like the person in an emotional state may, though he need not, be cheerful or irritable about some particular situation. That is, the question 'What is she cheerful about?' may, but need not, be answered in the case of moods by mention of one particular circumstance. But the person by nature cheerful or irritable is never cheerful or irritable about only one particular incident or situation. On the other hand, as in the case of the person by nature melancholy, a person in a melancholy or cheerful or irritable mood may not even realize
that he is in such a mood let alone be able to
give his reasons for that mood. But persons
overwhelmed by anger or fear or depression or joy,
in the sense of being in an emotional state of one
of these kinds, rarely fail to realize that they are
in a state of agitation whether or not they can
always immediately give a name to that state. What
are the important variables? The unremitting nature
of emotional states is one; another is duration.
Thus moods, which last longer than emotional states
but which are shorter than character traits, are, by
virtue of that fact, less likely than emotional states
but more likely than traits to be directed to one par­
ticular object or situation. For the longer duration
of dispositional conditions means that there is
greater opportunity for additional objects of anger
or depression to be 'collected' as the condition
progresses. It is surely partly because this is so,
that emotional states are more likely than moods or
long-term dispositions to be individuated by reference
to a particular object. In the case of character
attitudes the condition has become so settled, its
occasions so numerous, that we cease to consider
relevant the question 'What is it (specifically) that
she is cheerful, depressed about?'. Again, it is often the difference in duration which makes it more likely that a person will go wrong in identifying the object of his mood than that he will do so in the case of the object of his emotional state. For the longer the duration of the condition, the more possible candidates for object will be present and thus the more scope for misidentification there will be.

I am suggesting, therefore, that some of the distinctions which we find among different referents of emotion words arise from the fact that they serve to name conditions which occupy different positions along a continuum with respect to duration. This is not to claim, however, that there are never cases of, say, brief, all-embracing states which share some characteristic more commonly attributed to long-term dispositions. Thus, as we have found, there are instances of emotional states which, as in the case of character attitudes, are not directed to any one particular object or situation. On the other hand, there are also instances of long-term dispositions, e.g. love for mother, which are so directed. My suggestion is simply that duration is one important

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1This question is distinguished, of course, from 'What made her a depressed person?'. This may be answered by reference to one specific causal circumstance, e.g. her physical ugliness, her car accident.
variable in emotional conditions, a variable which, in changing, frequently brings about alterations in other characteristics of those conditions. Thus moods, which occupy an intermediate position between emotional states and character traits with respect to duration, share some characteristics of each.

**Cause and object of emotion**

Since Hume it has been customary for philosophers to insist that a clear distinction be made between the cause and the object of an emotion. For, it is claimed, though this distinction is sometimes blurred by the fact that cause and object may coincide, nevertheless there are cases where the two are clearly separable. Thus, so the argument runs, though in the case of my fear of the crocodile or of the shadow in the hallway, the crocodile and the shadow are both the cause and the object of my fear, still there are cases where the cause of, say, my depression - an overindulgence in alcohol - is clearly not what I am depressed about. What I am depressed about is, let us say, my greying hair.

Here I want to suggest that though such causal statements do not imply object statements, nevertheless it is the case that object statements always imply
causal statements in the sense that, where emotions are object-directed, a thought or belief about that object is always a cause of the emotion. Whether or not it is also selected as the cause will then depend upon whether it is regarded as the most significant causal factor on that occasion.

By way of illustration, let us return to our first emotion situation and pose the question, 'What was the cause of her fright?'. It is immediately apparent that this question has a number of possible answers. Thus it may be answered by reference to a) the slither marks, b) the crocodile, c) the crocodile attack on my brother last week and its possible attack on me. In a) giving the cause of my fear is giving something which I noticed and regard as indicative of the presence of danger. In b) giving the cause is specifying the actual object considered by me to be dangerous. Here, though not always, what I am frightened of (the crocodile) and what frightened me (the slither marks) are distinct. When they are so, either may be cited in reply to the question, 'What was the cause of her fright?'. c) gives the cause in a different way. As we have seen, it explains my fear by specifying the reason for my
being afraid of this. Thus c) is not the cause of my fright in the same sense as are a) and b) for specification of what I regard as indicative of danger (what frightened me) or of what I consider to be dangerous (what I am frightened of) generally does not also serve to explain why I am frightened of it. Yet each may be cited as the cause of my fright. This is so because a), b) and c) explain my fear in different ways, since each answers a different question. That is to say, the question 'Why is she afraid?' is an ambiguous one, as amongst 'What frightened her?' 'What is she frightened of?' and 'Why is she frightened of that?'. Each reply specifies a cause in the sense that each factor named will figure as one element in the complete causal explanation of my fear in terms of all the conditions severally necessary and jointly sufficient for its occurrence.

Thus when the object of an emotion is selected as the cause on a particular occasion, this is not because there is only one kind of cause involved and the object is that cause, but because, of the various causal factors involved, this is regarded as the most significant on that occasion. On the other hand, where the object is not selected as the cause, as in
the case of my depression about my greying hair, this is not because the object is not a cause of my emotion, but because another factor is regarded as a more significant part of its cause, and thus is specified as the cause.

However, I suspect that, in the case of object-directed emotions, the object is frequently also specified as the cause not because it is the causal factor decided, after thought, to be the most significant in the occurrence of the emotion, but because it is the most obvious. For why, in the case of my fear of the shadow in the hallway, should the shadow be specified as the cause of my fear rather than, say, the fact that I have been reading horror stories all night? After all, it is this that has made me ready to take fright at the slightest provocation, just as it is my overindulgence in alcohol which has put me in a ready condition to become depressed about trivialities. But here again, what is frequently crucial in the specification of one factor as the cause, is the precise nature of the question asked. Thus if the question is 'Why did she take fright just then?' (rather than two hours earlier when she was also reading horror stories), then the shadow is
specified as the cause since this is the factor which 'made the difference' between what happened at 9 p.m. (she did not scream) and what happened at 11 p.m. (she screamed). But if the question is 'Why did she take fright at such a trivial thing?' then the reading of horror stories will be cited as the cause, since it is this that has prepared the subject to so react to shadows, noises and the like. Thus though both causes are present, both explain the person's fright in different ways, and the selection of one as opposed to the other as the cause will depend upon exactly what question is being posed. The question may, but need not, be answered by reference to the object of the emotion, but if it is not it does not follow from this that the object is not a causal factor in the occurrence of the emotion.
CHAPTER 6

Explanation in Terms of Emotions

The subject of explanation has already arisen frequently in the course of our discussion. Indeed, one answer to the specific question at issue in this chapter, 'How do emotion words function as explanations of behaviour?' has been considered in our treatment of emotion words as signifying motives. For, it has been claimed, the concept of a motive does not have a true place outside the realm of the explanation of an action, a series of actions or a kind of action or actions, past, present or future. Here, however, more attention will be given to the ways in which other uses of emotion words may serve to provide explanations of behaviour.

We shall assume that to explain something is to make it intelligible to someone, perhaps even to oneself. Here we shall be concerned with the explanation of what might loosely be called 'items of behaviour', but of course anything, e.g. a state of affairs, a rule, a mathematical theorem, that is regarded by the
questioner as obscure, vague, odd, curious, unusual or surprising, is a candidate for explanation. What succeeds in making anything intelligible or clear on any given occasion will depend upon the kind of phenomenon, and the precise aspect of it, which the questioner finds puzzling and upon the context in which the explanation is sought. Here again, the question of justification will not be our concern though it is granted that explanations of behaviour may also on occasion serve as justifications or vindications of that behaviour. But to explain is not necessarily to justify. Thus, for example, while a person's behaviour may be explained on a particular occasion by reference to his actual reason for so behaving, it is another and different question as to whether his reason is to be regarded as in some sense, e.g., morally or scientifically, a good reason for so acting.

It has been one of our main contentions that it is misleading to make general statements concerning the functions of emotion words in the absence of specification as to whether these words are to be re-
garded in any particular instance as referring to emotional states, moods, motives or character traits. Thus in considering the question, 'In what ways may the use of an emotion word make behaviour intelligible to us?', these different referents of emotion words will be discussed separately. It should be noted that the explanations here considered may be offered in answer to a variety of apparently different general questions, e.g. 'Why did he do that?', 'What made him do that?', 'What was the reason for his doing that?', 'What caused him to do that?'. That is to say, these questions in themselves do not make clear what kind of explanation will be relevant.

We have seen that one of the main uses of emotion words is to refer to and to characterize states of mental and physical perturbation. But we have noted, too, that a person may be in an emotional state without either he or an observer being able to identify it as one of fear, anger, love, pity and so on. Because this is so, we sometimes account for a person's behaviour on a particular occasion simply by referring
to his perturbed condition. For example, we may say 'John stuttered because he was emotionally agitated' or 'His trembling was due to his state of emotional agitation'. But whether such a state be identified or unidentified, that is, whether we say 'He stuttered because he was angry, afraid, embarrassed' or 'He stuttered because he was emotionally agitated', reference to that state will explain the stuttering to someone who does not understand how, given normal conditions, John should have stuttered just then. Now it is because a person who is in an emotional state is not therefore in his usual state or condition that reference to that condition serves to explain his behaviour on a particular occasion. That is, it is because a person in the grip of an emotion is not unruffled, unperturbed, calm, in his usual state, that we can account for his thoughts, feelings, reactions (or failures to react) by reference to his unusual condition. For since people are not continuously in states of emotional agitation, we do learn something when we are told that this morning John is in
such a state. But though reference to a person's emotional state may serve to explain his seemingly odd behaviour on a particular occasion, the explanation so provided is, of course, a very primitive one, for it has a place only when the questioner is not already aware of the state of the agent. In that case, however, it does enlighten him by showing that, correct as he is in his assumption that given normal conditions this behaviour was strange or unusual, on this occasion conditions were not in fact normal - the agent was in a state of emotional perturbation. Given this knowledge any further request for elucidation, should this be required, will centre upon the presence of that state. That is, the question at issue will then be not 'Why did he stutter?' but 'Why is he in such a state?'.

The distinctive kinds of thoughts, feelings and acts of a person in an emotional state of a certain kind are often spoken of as the 'symptoms' of that state. We must now attempt, however, to be rather more precise about the relation between such a state and its various symptoms. This relation is
certainly not made clear by the different ways we may speak in ordinary discourse. We may say, for example, 'He wept because he was grief-stricken', 'He stuttered with indignation', 'His trembling was the result of anxiety', 'He laughed with joy'. But what is the relation between the grief, indignation, anxiety or joy and its characteristic symptoms?

A return to our analogy of Chapter 2 between an emotional and a physical condition, e.g. hepatitis, should help to elucidate what is involved here. For there is a parallel between our accounting for a particular phenomenon by reference to a person's physical state and in our doing so by reference to his emotional state. Thus we say, 'His cold sweats and irritability were due to hepatitis' just as we say 'His blushing and stammering were due to embarrassment'. Reference to the person's unusual physical condition, hepatitis, accounts for the person's sweating, jaundice and irritability because these are recognized as common symptoms - characteristic signs - of that condition. And the blushing and the stammering of the person who is embarrassed are explicable by reference to his state
since these are recognized as characteristic signs of that condition. The important question is whether the hepatitis and the emotional state, unusual conditions that they are, can be called the causes of their common signs or symptoms.

Now 'hepatitis' is the name we give to an unusual physical condition - a condition which includes as elements not only (observable) occurrences like sweating and trembling but also those physiological events which cause the sweating and the trembling. That is, the occurrence of the unusual physiological events which cause the sweating and the trembling are part of what we refer to when we speak of a person as 'having hepatitis'. Similarly in the case of an emotional state, those unusual physiological events which cause the trembling and the blushing are part of what we refer to when we speak of a person as 'being in an emotional state', say embarrassment. Thus the conditions 'hepatitis' or 'embarrassment' may be called the 'causes' of their characteristic signs in the sense that these are conditions which incorporate within themselves those events which do
cause these phenomena. But the hepatitis or the emotional state _per se_, unusual conditions that they are, do not cause their common symptoms. What causes the condition hepatitis, the presence of virus III or SH, also causes (directly or indirectly) those phenomena which are the various elements in that condition. Similarly what causes the emotional state also causes (directly or indirectly) those phenomena which are the various elements in that state. Thus when we say that fear 'caused' the trembling or that hepatitis 'caused' the jaundice we are saying that these phenomena were caused by events which were themselves elements in the person's unusual physical or emotional condition. It is because this is so that we sometimes speak of these states as 'causal conditions', for they carry causal events within them without themselves being one.

A person who is in an emotional state, we have said, is one who is aroused in feeling and thought, certain of his physiological processes are undergoing quite drastic changes and his general perturbation may be revealed to us in his facial expressions, bodily movements, vocal utterances and behavioural
acts. When so revealed, we frequently speak of these phenomena as the natural expressions or manifestations of his emotional state and, we say, their occurrence is in need of no special explanation since they are recognized as characteristic of persons in such states.

Now of those phenomena which we collectively call the expressions of an emotional state some, it should be noted, cannot normally be voluntarily prevented or controlled - 'normally' is important here since some physiologists, for example, who understand the mechanisms involved can control them to some degree. These include bodily changes such as gooseflesh, blushing, sweating, trembling, dilation of the pupils. Others can often be inhibited or controlled given that the emotion is not a completely overwhelming one and that the agent is adept at such inhibition. These include facial expressions such as wincing and scowling, bodily movements or reactions such as cringing, starting and fist clenching as well as those more fully-fledged behavioural acts such as lashing out or throwing things. But whether behaviour of this kind occurs
completely involuntarily and spontaneously in emotion or whether it occurs in spite of attempts at control, it is not intentional. That is, though such an emotional reaction can sometimes be inhibited by a contrary intention, given that it does occur, the intention does not enter into the account of its occurrence. That it occurs because of a particular kind of antecedent physiological event holds independently of the agent's intention, since the intention was not operative in its occurrence.

It is perhaps worth mentioning, therefore, that since in our society we are frequently open to criticism for failing to inhibit or control the observable signs of our emotional states, it follows that criticism of an item of behaviour is not necessarily ruled out when the occurrence of that behaviour is explicable purely in terms of a preceding physiological event. The fist-clenching, scowling and lashing out of the angry man may clearly each be so explained yet he is still sometimes open to criticism for his failure to control or inhibit that behaviour. That is, to say
that an item of behaviour may be given 'a mere physiological explanation' is not necessarily to say that it must have happened, that it was inevitable, that the agent could not have altered what he did. It is the notion of self control, and not of cause which would seem to be at issue when we criticize persons for so behaving.

Of course, as we have seen, not all the behaviour of a man in, say, an angry state need be explicable simply as an expression of that state. For a person who is in an angry, jealous or fearful state may, while in that state, perform an action motivated by anger, jealousy or fear. Thus a man, angry with his wife, may deliberately break an ornament treasured by her because he wants to hurt her. But his action may then be correctly explained as having been motivated by anger, as being an action performed in pursuit of the kind of goal sought by those who act out of anger. The fact that behaviour occurs while a person is in an angry, jealous or fearful state does not necessarily mean that a motive explanation of that behaviour is ruled out.
Again, a person in an emotional state may on occasion perform one or more of a variety of possible kinds of actions in order to indicate to someone else that he is in an emotional state, in an emotional state of a particular kind or, perhaps, to make quite clear just how strong his emotion is. That is, he may behave in certain ways with the intention of 'communicating' his emotion to another person. He may do this by means of a linguistic utterance such as 'I am very upset', or 'I am absolutely furious'. Or he may do so by means of an utterance such as 'You really are a beastly cad' which, while employing no explicit emotion term, does make clear that his emotion is of a particular kind without precisely classifying it. Not all emotions, of course, have common terms by means of which they may be conveniently described or classified, so that to convey to another the precise nature of one's state sometimes requires quite an elaborate process of description. In the case of the more sophisticated emotions, for example those of the contempt, disgust, scorn variety, the activity of communicating one's emotion may require virtually a redescription of what
we called in Chapter 5, the entire 'emotion situation'. That is, it will involve mention of the goal or goals in terms of which a particular situation has been evaluated, the nature of the evaluation, one's state of mental and physical perturbation and one's behaviour or 'feeling like' behaving.

But the intentional activity of making clear one's emotions to others is not restricted to linguistic behaviour alone. Another way of so doing is to produce intentionally behavior of that kind which frequently occurs spontaneously and involuntarily in emotion. Thus a person who is angry may intentionally bang the table, a nervous man drum his fingers, a frightened man cringe, a sad man rest his head in his hands; that is, he may do these things in order to communicate to someone that he is angry, nervous, frightened, sad at a particular time. Such methods are effective since behaviour of these kinds, commonly occurring as involuntary expressions of these emotions, is readily interpretable as indicative of them.

But our 'vocabulary' for conveying or communicating emotion has also been extended by our adoption
of a number of exclamations and bodily movements which have, by our conventional use of them, come to be accepted as indications of particular emotions. These include hollow groans, eyebrow-raising, shoulder-shrugging, cheers or exclamations like 'Bah!' or 'Blast'. We must hasten to add, however, that these 'artificial' indications of emotion may also occur as involuntary expressions of emotion. Thus to say that a particular item of behaviour is 'learned' is not necessarily to say that it cannot occur involuntarily in emotion. One of the reasons why empirical workers find the phenomenon of emotion so complex is that they are simply not always able to differentiate clearly between what might be called the 'primitive reactions' and the 'learned reactions' which may occur as expressions of emotion.

It should be noted that I have been speaking here of the ways in which a person in a particular emotional state may act in order to convey his feelings to others. Persons not in such states may also, of course, act in such fashions in order to lead people erroneously to believe that they are in particular emotional states.
But to say that a person intentionally acts in these ways is not necessarily to say that he is simulating emotion, though he may be. In relation to simulation, it should be pointed out that though on any given social occasion we may not be sure, simply by virtue of his observable behaviour, whether or not a person is simulating emotion, it can hardly be said to follow from this, given our present use of lie-detectors (commonly known as 'emotion detectors' since they reveal the characteristic physiological changes present in emotion), E.E.G. machines (which measure peaks in electrical activity in the various parts of the brain), and the like, that emotions are therefore in principle private experiences.

Now my general purpose in discussing the different ways in which a person, in an emotional state, may behave in order to communicate to others that he is in a state, is this. That to say that a person behaved in a particular fashion while in an emotional state is not necessarily to say that an intention explanation of his behaviour may not have a place; that is, that
the question 'Why did he do that (e.g., wince or scowl)?' may not be correctly answered in such terms as 'In order to let his wife know that he was angry'.

At the same time it is important to see that in cases where an emotional state is severe - is an overwhelming one - it is precisely this ability to formulate intentions and to act upon those intentions which is among those higher cognitive abilities impaired. This point is important in relation to the question of estimating the intensity of an emotional state.

Philosophers and many psychologists customarily speak as though all that is involved in such estimation is, as Kenny says, 'the violence of the bodily changes, of facial expression, tone of voice, posture, gesture'.

1

Inasmuch as the presence of the person's emotional state is, in such a case, a circumstance regarded by him as sufficient for undertaking a particular course of action, his state may then be called 'his reason' for so acting. In order to give a complete explanation of his action in terms of his reason which, like an intention explanation, can be employed only in those cases where the agent believes that his action is a means to a known end, we must of course spell out the argument claimed by the agent to have determined his action, e.g. 'I was angry, I wanted to let my wife (but nobody else) know this, I believed doing x to be a means of letting her know this, therefore I did x'.

2

op.cit., p. 35.
But this is only part of the problem of estimating intensity in these cases. One of the frequent characteristic features of a severe emotional state is the disruption or inhibition of the sophisticated cognitive procedures involved in, for example, making reliable ('unclouded', 'undistorted') judgements, and of that very complex intellectual ability - the appraisal of a means to an end. Thus in estimating intensity, we give attention not only to the extent to which 'emergency' bodily changes and reactions are facilitated but also to the extent to which the higher cognitive abilities are disrupted or inhibited. That such disruption and inhibition frequently takes place in strong emotion is quite crucial to the understanding of the complexity of these general states of mental and physical agitation, and to the estimation of their intensity in any given instance. Neurophysiologists often speak of the inhibition 'at the higher level of organized thought, speech and action' characteristic of intense emotional states.

Furthermore, it should be seen that the distinction which many contemporary philosophers make between an item of behaviour, e.g. wincing or scowling, insofar as it is describable as a simple 'bodily movement' or reaction, and insofar as it is describable as an 'action' (in the sense of 'intentional behaviour'), is as crucial for the neurophysiologist as it is for the philosopher. It is crucial for the neurophysiologist in the sense that this behaviour, when it occurs as a result of the intention of the agent, is, for him, behaviour which involves, as causal factor, the activity of 'higher' brain centres, e.g. the centrencephalic system, while simple bodily reactions do not. Thus though in the case of wincing or scowling, describable on one occasion as a 'bodily movement' and on another as an 'action', it may be the case that the activity of the peripheral neuromuscular mechanisms are in each instance identical, the neurophysiologist's interest is hardly restricted to these mechanisms alone. That is to say, the neurophysiologist

\[^{1}\text{W. Penfield and H. Jasper, Epilepsy and the Functional Anatomy of the Human Brain (1953), p. 60.}\]
retains the distinction between say, wincing, as a 'bodily movement' and as an 'action' by reference to the importantly distinct neurophysiological causal antecedents involved in the occurrence of each. There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that the neurophysiologist's explanations of behaviour in terms of antecedent neurophysiological events will upset our 'present distinction between action and non-action for it could no longer hang on whether or not it is the intention which brings about the behaviour.'

The neurophysiologist's account will, if anything, serve to reinforce this distinction; he has no reason to deny its importance.

We have characterized moods as short-term tendency or liability conditions. A person in a cheerful, morose, jealous, envious, proud, irritable, depressed mood, we have said, need not, as in the case of a person in an emotional state of one of these kinds, be agitated, need not feel cheerful or jealous for the whole of that period. Rather, he is one who

tends - is in a ready condition - to do, say, feel and think in certain distinctive ways and, sometimes, to get into particular emotional states, whenever conditions are appropriate. Mood explanations, then, are a type of dispositional explanation. When we explain a person's back-slapping, scowling, snapping, or laughter by reference to his jovial, irritable or happy mood, we do so by subsuming that behaviour under the behaviour tendency to which the mood term refers. Thus the reply 'Because he's in a jovial mood' explains Bill's back-slapping by showing that this behaviour is part of a pattern of behaviour which is to be expected of a person in such a mood. We explain it by classifying it as an instance of this type. Thus, as in the case of explanations in terms of emotional states, explanations in terms of moods tell us that the person is not in his usual condition (otherwise the term 'mood' would simply not apply) but that, in the case of a mood, he is in a condition in which he is liable to behave in such a fashion if and when circumstances should be appropriate. Like explanations
in terms of emotional states, too, mood explanations are quite primitive ones. But a mood explanation is effective particularly insofar as it does rule out other possible explanations, e.g. that Bill's backslapping here is the exercise of a habit, is a neurotic symptom or is the expression of an overwhelming emotional state. And explanations of this dispositional type are not rare in everyday affairs. Thus we say, 'Bill is lying down this morning because he has been lethargic for the last few days', or 'That perspex beaker cracked because it is particularly brittle at the moment'. Such replies are frequently quite adequate to satisfy someone who is puzzled as to why, given normal circumstances, Bill should lie down this morning or the beaker crack. The oddity of both these occurrences is removed by showing that each is a type to be expected given present unusual conditions. And each of these replies serves to shift the question, should further elucidation be required, to 'Why is Bill in such a mood just now?', 'Why is Bill so lethargic now?', 'Why is the beaker so brittle at present?'. 
These questions may, though they need not, also be given dispositional explanations - explanations in terms of second order dispositions. For example, the reply may be, 'Bill - like many others - tends to get into such moods whenever he has some success and this morning he heard that he had passed his examinations', or 'He - like many others - tends to become so whenever staying in cities located at high altitudes', or 'They tend to become so whenever the temperature drops below a certain level'.

Such explanations, also, it is obvious, enable us to predict further instances of a similar type of behaviour in the near future. That is, in knowing, for example, that Bill's back-slapping is an expression of a jovial mood, we can justifiably expect similar jovialities to occur at least for a short time to come, whenever a suitable occasion arises. It is then up to us to decide whether, this being so, we will quietly withdraw to temporarily pursue our serious business elsewhere.
Of course persons in some moods, e.g. jealous, envious, proud, vindictive moods, in addition to being liable to think, feel, react in certain distinctive ways, are also liable to perform, and sometimes do perform, actions motivated by jealousy, envy, pride or vindictiveness. And a person in a mood may also, like a person in an emotional state, say or do something in order to convey his feelings to others. Indeed, given the longer duration and less tumultuous nature of moods as opposed to emotional states, it is far more likely that a person who is simply in a mood will have both the opportunity and the wit to do so. When persons are spoken of as doing such things as painting pictures and writing poems in order to communicate their emotion, it is surely dispositional emotions and not emotional states which are at issue here. Again, a person in a mood may act in a particular fashion, e.g. shout or bang the wall, in order to relieve his tension. Such acts may then be correctly explained as having been performed by the person as a means to the attainment of a particular goal or kind of goal
and not simply as an expression of his mood. That is to say, the question 'Why did he do that?' or 'What made him do that?' asked in relation to an act performed in a, say, jealous mood, may be answered in such terms as 'Because he is jealous' (motivated by jealousy - in either the impulse or dispositional sense) or 'In order to relieve his feelings'. He was pursuing a particular goal, we then learn, and here has employed the means which he takes to be appropriate to its attainment. But when we give a mood explanation of a particular item of behaviour - 'He did it, said it, thought it, felt it, because he is in a jealous mood' - we are not explaining that behaviour by reference to the goal or to the cause of the behaviour, we are removing the questioner's puzzlement about a particular item of behaviour by saying that there is nothing odd or peculiar about this behaviour in itself, for it is in keeping with the present unusual state of the agent. It is an expression of his angry or jealous or cheerful mood; such behaviour is only to be expected given the
agent's present frame of mind. There is then no need - as the questioner has done - to fasten upon it alone as odd or unusual, for it is rather the presence of the mood which is in need of explanation here.

We have already noted, in Chapter 3, the close relationship between moods and character traits. Both, we found, may be analyzed in terms of tendencies or dispositions. There is, moreover, a character trait name corresponding to each mood name; that is, just as a person may be in a jealous, irritable, proud, cheerful, depressed mood, so we often speak of a person as by nature jealous, irritable, proud, vain, cheerful or depressed. Moods, we saw, may be related to the corresponding trait either as a first to a second order disposition or as a short term to a long term disposition. Thus a person who is by nature jealous or cheerful may be one who is disposed to get into recurrent moods of one of these types, or he may be one who tends to think, feel, act, react a great deal of the time in the ways characteristic of persons in such moods. In the latter case, we can say, he has a 'settled' disposition of the mood type. We have
noted too that it is not only, in the latter case, the thoughts, feelings, acts, utterances of a person which may on occasion be accounted for by reference to his characteristic liability, but also some of his emotional states and moods. Thus we may, in explaining a person's behaviour on a particular occasion, first relate that behaviour to his present emotional state or mood and then go on to account for the occurrence of the latter as a display of a character trait. So we may say, 'John is angry with Bill because he is a jealous person'. Reference to John's jealous nature explains his anger since jealous persons are liable to become angry in appropriate circumstances. That is to say, such states are common expressions of a jealous disposition. Such questions as 'Why does he walk like that, talk like that, write like that?' may also, as we noted, be answered by reference to a person's character traits - e.g. his pride, his contempt, or his snobbery.

Moreover, just as a person in some moods, e.g. jealous, envious or proud moods, is one who, in addition
to being liable for the course of that mood to do, say, feel, think certain distinctive kinds of things, is liable to perform and sometimes does perform, actions motivated by jealousy, envy, or pride, so a person who is by nature jealous, envious or proud is also one who, in addition to being liable to do, say, feel, think certain distinctive kinds of things a great deal of the time is also liable to perform, and sometimes does perform, actions motivated by jealousy, envy, or pride. This being so, when we account for an individual act by saying, for example, 'He did it because he is a jealous person', we may in so doing be giving a motive explanation of his behaviour on that occasion - here an explanation in terms of a dispositional motive. That is, we may be explaining his action as having been performed in pursuit of the kind of goal commonly sought by persons who are by nature jealous. As we have reiterated, however, to use the form of words 'He did it because he is a jealous person' is not necessarily to give a motive explanation, though it can be. It may be simply to explain his behaviour as one expression of his jealous nature.
Now there is a crucial difference between those explanations provided in terms of short term disposi-
tions, e.g. moods, and those provided in terms of long term dispositions, e.g. character traits. In both cases we remove the questioner's puzzlement about a particular item of behaviour by showing that it is a display of a tendency. But in the case of character trait explanations, we are pointing out that the person's conduct on this occasion is in no way surprising or unusual or odd, for it forms part of the pattern of things which this person commonly does or says or feels or thinks. That is, we are relating his behaviour to his usual, and not, as in the case of moods, to his present unusual condition; to his common behaviour tendency and not to his unusual behaviour tendency. Thus when we say, 'Bill slapped John on the back because he is a jovial person' we are explaining this behaviour as one instance of Bill's customary way of behaving; we are relating it to his usual condition. 'Well, that's just how he tends to go on most of the time', we are saying, 'he's the jovial kind'.
Here again, dispositional explanations of this kind are not rare in everyday affairs. Thus when we say, for example, 'John is lying down this morning because he is a lethargic person' or 'That piece of tubing bent because it is elastic', we are, in a similar fashion, removing the apparent oddity of the incident in question by relating it to a 'chronic' condition and thus to a common tendency to react in such ways. Given these explanations we can, too, safely predict further occurrences of a similar kind in appropriate circumstances, and thus adjust our own conduct and affairs accordingly. So in knowing that Bob is an irritable person, or that John is constitutionally lethargic, we will be careful not to cross the former, and we will not waste our time inviting John to join in the game of touch football. Again, such explanations, in removing the questioner's puzzlement about one particular incident by amalgamating it to a known pattern of behaviour, shift the question at issue to a different one, viz. 'Why is he a lethargic person?', 'Why is he jovial?', 'Why is that tubing elastic?'. But the questioner may well
not be interested in obtaining information of this kind. He may well be perfectly satisfied once our explanation of Bill's back-slapping, John's lying down, or the tube's bending, given in terms of Bill's jovial nature, John's constitutional lethargy and the inherent elasticity of the tubing, has ruled out, as he may well have feared, that Bill has suddenly gone mad, John caught Asian flu or the piece of tubing deteriorated.

We might say, then, that emotional state explanations, mood explanations and character trait explanations are all types of 'general condition explanations'. For they explain a particular item of behaviour, not by giving the cause or the goal of that behaviour, but by relating it to the usual or unusual condition of the agent, and by showing that, given that condition, behaviour of this particular type was only to be expected. There is, therefore, no need to fasten upon this one item as in need of special explanation, for it is akin to the rest of his behaviour over either a short term or a long term period. Such explanations, then, rule
out the questioner's original presupposition - that there is something queer or odd about this one item of behaviour in itself.

Now we have already had a considerable amount to say about motive explanations. When emotion words are employed to signify motives, we have said, they explain an action by indicating the kind of goal to which the action was directed. That is, the action is explained as having been performed by the agent as a means to the attainment of a particular kind of goal. If, in addition, we go on to say that the type of goal here pursued is of a kind frequently pursued by the person, then those words - 'jealousy', 'envy', 'pride', for example - are the names of dispositional motives. We have seen, too, that the notion of a want or desire is involved whenever we attribute a motive. For to give a motive explanation of an action is (fundamentally) to explain that action by reference to the person's desire to bring about a state of affairs of a particular kind. Moreover, the person's desire must be operative in the performance of his action,
otherwise the motive explanation ('He did it out of jealousy, out of anger', i.e. 'He did x because he wanted to hurt his rival, redress an injury') will not apply. This being so, it has been suggested that such explanations may be regarded as a sub-class of causal explanation, with the desires of the agent operating as causal factors.

Some contemporary philosophers have rejected this interpretation but since it is a view assumed not only in traditional philosophy, but also by present day psychologists and physiologists, some consideration of the arguments advanced against the thesis that desires may operate as causal antecedents of action is perhaps in order here. Since similar arguments are also advanced against the view that intentions may also so function, we can consider these arguments together.

Fundamentally, what is said against the possibility of wants and intentions functioning as antecedents of action, amounts to the claim that the want or intention is inseparable from, 'non-contingently linked with', what is intended or wanted. Since the two are
thus related, it is said, one cannot be a cause of
the other since causal relations demand distinct
events. Thus Taylor holds, 'It is part of what we
mean by 'intending x' that, in the absence of inter­
fering factors, it is followed by doing x. I could
not be said to intend x if, even with no obstacles
or other countervailing factors I still didn't do it.
Thus my intention is not a causal antecedent of my
behaviour'.

But the claim 'I could not be said to
intend x if, even with no obstacles .., I still didn't
do it' is surely a misleading one. Clearly it is
possible for a person to intend to do x, e.g. to get
his thesis in on time, but not manage to do it, and
this for any number of reasons. But equally clearly,
it is possible for a person to intend to do x, to try
to do it, and fail. Yet it is surely the case that in
neither of these instances are we committed to saying
that the person did not in fact intend to do x, though
in neither case does he in fact do x. But if 'intending
x' does not entail 'doing x', it is difficult to see
the force of the claim for a non-contingent link

1 op.cit., p. 33.
between the two and, therefore, why intentions cannot be regarded as causal antecedents of behaviour.

Again, the force of the claim that the intention is always in some sense 'part of the meaning' of the action it explains is not easy to see. If I ask for the mop because I intend to use it to clean the bathroom floor, why cannot my intention to clean the bathroom floor causally explain my asking for the mop? It is surely not because 'intending to clean the bathroom floor' is part of the meaning of 'asking for the mop'.

Similarly, the argument that wants cannot be causal antecedents of behaviour depends upon the claim that there is in some sense a non-contingent link between 'wanting do do x' and 'doing x'. Yet here again, even in the case of our most strongly held desires, we are not always able to act upon them, let alone always with success in that action. Most of us want to do many things which, for a thousand reasons, we do not in fact do, and sometimes we try to do what we want to do but are unsuccessful. But, again, since 'wanting to do x'
does not entail 'doing x', it is difficult to see the force of the claim for a non-contingent link between the two. Nor is it the case that, as Taylor holds, 'that the action follows the desire neither requires nor admits of explanation'.¹ Both the question 'Why didn't you do what you wanted?' (e.g. do well at your work) and the question 'Why did you do what you wanted?' (e.g. do harm to your rival), represent perfectly straightforward requests for explanation.

Sometimes what appears to be at issue regarding the claim for a non-contingent link between 'wanting do do x' and 'doing x' seems to rest upon the nature of such cases as 'I opened the door because I wanted to open the door'. My want cannot be the causal antecedent of my action in these cases, it is said, because 'opening the door' is part of the description of 'wanting to open the door'. That is to say, we cannot describe the action without using words which link it to the alleged cause. But if all that is at

¹ op.cit., p. 38.
175.

stake here is the nature of the description, then a trivial rewording of the example, e.g. 'I turned the knob because I wanted to open the door' will presumably convert a non-causal into a causal relationship. The answer to the question of whether A is to be regarded as a causal antecedent of B cannot be said to vary with the alternative forms of description which may be applied to them.

It is sometimes said as against the view that explanations in terms of the agent's wants and intentions are a sub-class of ordinary causal explanation, that we do not have well-confirmed laws which connect these factors with action and so we cannot accurately predict what all people will do in all circumstances. But of course we do have commonsense and psychological generalizations which allow us to predict what a person is likely to do or try to do in circumstances of a particular kind. Much of the ordinary conduct of our affairs depends upon the fact that we can, and often do, make such predictions and act on the basis of them - though, of course, we can go wrong here. But, in any
event, ignorance of competent predictive laws does not prevent valid causal explanation, or few causal explanations could be advanced in many areas. Thus a neurophysiologist may be sure that some electrical impulses cause some cells to respond under certain conditions; he has often observed the connection between such impulses and cell activity in the course of his experiments. Indeed, the discovery of the causal relation between such impulses and cell activity represented one of the major discoveries in that area of science. But the neurophysiologist is not able to formulate laws on the basis of which he can accurately predict what impulses will make what cells respond in what ways under which precise conditions, though he is sure that further investigation will enable him to formulate such laws. That is to say, lack of knowledge of competent predictive laws does not rule out causal explanation.

It must be seen, too, that the laws which will enable us to accurately predict human behaviour will almost certainly not incorporate our ordinary everyday concepts such as 'wants' and 'intentions'. If we
indeed mean 'accurate prediction', then what will be at issue here will be laws incorporating neuro­physiological and neurochemical categories and, more fundamentally, those of molecular biology. But from this it does not at all follow that we will abandon our explanations in terms of our ordinary everyday categories, nor that the explanations couched in these terms are not causal explanations.
In the course of this thesis I have endeavoured to make three general points regarding a philosophical approach to 'the problem of emotion'. These are:

1. that rather than concentrating upon the one vague and all-embracing concept of 'emotion', it is profitable for the philosopher to distinguish, and mark the relations between, emotion words as they are employed to signify such phenomena as emotional states, moods, character traits and motives. In this way the philosopher may avoid the tendency to make such general statements as 'Emotions are feelings', 'Emotions are impulses', 'Emotions are dispositions', which have served to conceal the complexities and ambiguities involved in our applications of the general concept.

2. that the uses of emotion statements in our language are many and varied and that it is therefore premature to fasten upon one such use as 'primary' or 'basic' before more complete analysis of their various functions has been attained.
In this respect it has here been seen that we may employ such statements, e.g. 'I am very angry', 'She is in an irritable mood', 'He is depressed', on a particular occasion chiefly to refer to and to characterize those short or long-term - 'tonic', 'phasic' or 'chronic' - states or conditions into which people may get. That is, those special mental and physical conditions for the course of which persons do, say, think, feel, certain distinctive kinds of things, or for the course of which they are liable to so do, say, think and feel.

Again, such statements may be employed to explain and predict behaviour - 'Why is she scowling at Bill like that?' 'She's in an irritable mood'. And, inasmuch as some emotion words may serve as the names of motives, to explain a person's behaviour on a particular occasion by means of an emotion statement may be to give a motive explanation of that behaviour. That is to say, it may be to explain an action by showing that it was performed by the agent as a means to the attainment of a particular kind of goal - 'Why did John report Bill's misdemeanour?' 'He is jealous'.
Further, such statements may be employed, again on a particular occasion, chiefly to convey the speaker's evaluation of or attitude towards a particular state of affairs (actual or possible), or to attribute such an evaluation to another person. Thus when we say, for example, 'I am very angry about your behaviour during my lecture', 'I was embarrassed by his action', 'He is afraid of Negro extremism', 'I resented his remark', we are often employing these forms of words primarily to convey that the subject considers a particular circumstance to be in some way offensive to him or as awkward or inconvenient, dangerous or unjust. Sometimes we use mood or character trait statements with this evaluative connotation in view too. Thus when we say 'She is in a melancholy mood', 'He is a cheerful person', 'I am depressive', we are sometimes meaning chiefly to convey that the subject is now taking, or customarily takes, a particular view of circumstances of a particular kind, or of life in general, e.g. that life is 'sunny' or hopeless. But this is not to say, of
course, that such statements are always used primarily in this evaluative sense. For many emotion words may perform any one or more of these functions on different occasions. It is therefore misleading, as is frequently done, to classify emotion words such as 'fear', 'anger', 'jealousy' or 'hate' as always signifying 'turbulent passions' and other like 'embarrassment', 'pride', 'shame', 'envy' as always signifying 'calm passions' on the grounds that the latter are commonly used in the evaluative sense. For a person may be overwhelmed by embarrassment, overcome by pride, gripped by envy, or enveloped by shame, just as he may be so over-mastered or overwhelmed by fear, anger, jealousy or hate and a statement containing these words may therefore be used in a particular instance primarily to convey that the person is in such a state of turbulence. The point is surely that the majority of emotion words may be used with the emphasis upon either the evaluative or the 'turbulent' sense. Thus the statement 'I am very angry with you' may on
one occasion be employed to convey that the subject is in a state of mental and physical perturbation of a particular kind, and on another chiefly to convey that his evaluation of a particular circumstance is of a certain kind. Of course, the problem is that on any given occasion we may not be sure precisely which function an emotion statement of this kind is meant to perform, where the emphasis should fall. Thus to the person who tells us 'I am very angry with you', we are not always sure whether the appropriate reply is 'Now calm down!' or rather something like 'I really didn't mean to be rude' (that is, for example, 'I didn't mean to be offensive, so please don't interpret my behaviour in that manner'). But when we are not sure whether a person in so saying is merely meaning to convey to us that he considers our behaviour offensive or that he is also in a state of perturbation, there are, of course, ways of finding out. We can, for example, ask him 'Are you really upset?' or we can look for the signs of agitation. We can mark, for example, his tone of voice, his facial expression, his gestures, the lucidity of his speech, his ability
to make rational judgements and so on. This difficulty in always knowing precisely what a person means when he employs an emotion statement is a common one given the variety of functions which such statements may perform. Thus, as we have seen, there is a similar kind of problem when a person explains behaviour in such terms as 'He did it because he was jealous'. What does this mean? Further questioning is frequently required in order to be sure just what is being said here. So we may ask, for example, 'Was he in a jealous mood?' 'Did he act on impulse?' 'Would you call him a jealous person?' 'Was he motivated by jealousy?' 'Does he often act from such a motive?' 'Does he often get into jealous moods?'. The serious ambiguity of many of our emotion statements is surely an important part of the 'problem of emotion' from the philosophical point of view.

Now the somewhat bewildering and seemingly haphazard array of tasks which emotion statements may on different occasions perform, does achieve at least some measure of intelligibility when we see that some
of these functions may be related to the characteristic features of an emotion situation such as that considered in Chapter 5 of this essay. We saw there that the characteristic features of that fear situation were: a desire to avoid situations of a particular kind, a belief that this situation was of that kind, mental and physical agitation, and behaviour of a certain kind either produced or a 'feeling like' producing such behaviour. In the light of an examination of such a situation it no longer seems so surprising that emotion words may on occasion be used to cover cases which do not exhibit all these features, but rather one or more of them. Thus since an evaluation of a particular kind is one element in an emotion situation, emotion statements have come to be used in some instances primarily to convey that an evaluation of that kind has been made by the subject, as in 'He is afraid of Negro extremism'. But on other occasions such statements may be used to refer to and to characterize the subject's state of mental and physical perturbation - 'He was very afraid' - or to explain
behaviour of a particular kind - 'He did it because he was afraid' - whether or not this is thereby explained as simply an expression of the person's fearful state or also, for example, as having been motivated by fear, that is, as having been performed by the agent as a means of avoiding the danger which he here takes to exist. We may, then, by an examination of particular emotion situations and their different necessary and possible elements, be helped to understand some of the seemingly disparate functions which emotion statements have come to perform in our language.

3. that just as the psychologist and the physiologist may be assisted by the philosopher in the resolution of the conceptual muddles which are at present impeding the useful employment of his empirical data in achieving understanding of 'what an emotion is', so the philosopher, in his attempts to give an account of the uses of the concept of emotion, should surely give consideration to cases of those kinds which the empirical workers regard as falling under that concept. For it is surely the case that philosophical enquiry
into the nature of our concepts should embrace the uses of those concepts not only in our ordinary everyday thinking and talking but also in our specialized and scientific thinking and talking. This point is now of some importance in the philosophy of mind, I believe, since psychologists and physiologists do complain, in recent years with some fervour, that many contemporary philosophers are restricting their analyses to the ways in which mental concepts are regularly - or 'standardly' - employed by the man in the street, and this is obviously too restrictive to be of assistance to him. Thus, for example, some contemporary psychologists object to the common philosophical view that 'Emotions (emotional states) are always object-directed' since this leaves them with a class of cases - 'free-floating' emotional states - which in accordance with that view are, presumably, not to be classed as 'emotions'. Nor does he want to class such states as 'moods' since the latter, as we have seen, differ in important respects from emotional states.
Moreover, this restrictive view of what is involved in a philosophical enquiry into the nature of our concepts already promises to create problems in relation to the complex and difficult question of the 'causation of emotion' to which the empirical workers are now turning with some interest. For here again, the complaint is that philosophers frequently restrict their accounts of what might be said to be involved when we speak of one process or event as 'causing' another, in such a fashion as simply to rule out, without adequate analysis, the scientist's difficult cases. In the area of causation of emotion, for example, it has become customary for contemporary philosophers to make such statements as - to quote Ryle on the causation of amusement\(^1\) - 'My thought or apprehension of the ridiculous incident was not the cause of my being amused. It was partly constitutive of it, somewhat as the heads-side of a penny is indeed part of what makes it the penny that it is, and yet is obviously not a separately existing agency that causes the penny to be the penny that it is'. Such

an analysis must surely raise a number of important questions. For example, is the relation between the heads-side of a penny and the penny really analogous, even 'somewhat' analogous, to that between a person's thought about an incident and his being amused? That is, if we agree that the heads-side of a penny cannot be regarded as a separately existing agency that causes the penny to be the penny that it is, does it follow from this that we must agree that the agent's thought about an incident cannot be regarded as 'a separately existing agency' that is causally related to his state of amusement? Moreover, given that the person's thought about the incident is a constitutive element in his amusement, does it necessarily follow from this that that thought cannot also have been a cause of his emotion? Why cannot we hold, and this in accordance with the neurophysiologist's view, that the thought is a separately identifiable, separately describable, antecedent event necessary, though not sufficient, for the occurrence of that diffuse mental and physical state and as such is a cause of that state? Is this latter account
ruled out by many contemporary philosophers because it is held by them that it is necessarily the case that if a phenomenon is one element in such a state, it cannot then, by virtue of this fact, have been a cause of that state? If this latter view is held then it must surely be argued for, for it is a view unacceptable to scientists in many areas, in neurophysiology, for example, and in cybernetics. These scientists would certainly allow that there are cases where an element in a diffuse state may also have been a cause of that state and they have several ways of explaining such cases. One of these ways is by reference to the feed-back principle. In accordance with the feed-back principle, it will be remembered, to say that A is at t₁ a cause of B is not necessarily to say that at t₂ (or perhaps, simultaneously), A may not, by means of a feed-back from B, become one element in B. In relation to emotional states, what the neurophysiologist wants to know is, for example, which of the necessary or possible elements in such a state (e.g. a belief or the desire for a particular goal)
may also be causally related to the occurrence of the diffuse state and why it is that though in every case of an emotional state a thought or belief of a particular kind is one element in that state, there are cases where he is reluctant to say that that thought is also a cause of the emotional state. Thus, though in the case of an emotional state such as generalized fear, produced by him in a human subject by direct stimulation of a certain area of the hypothalamus, there is as one element in that state a belief by the subject that he is threatened in some way, the neurophysiologist does not necessarily want to speak of the belief in these cases as a cause of the fear state of which it is a part. These are obviously very difficult questions which await further empirical research and, one would hope, further philosophical analysis of the nature of causation. But the general point to be made here is that if a particular philosophical position is rejected by the empirical worker, this is not necessarily because his understanding is impeded by 'epistemological blinkers' but
perhaps because our theories regarding the nature of human knowledge are now simply inadequate given the revolution in the biological sciences through which we are presently living.
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