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THE JAPANESE ARMY IN NORTH CHINA: PROBLEMS OF
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL
JULY 1937 to DECEMBER 1941

by

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This thesis is my own original work.

Lincoln Li
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

This is a study of the problems of occupation. It is not intended as a chronological narrative of Japanese rule over occupied North China. It is, rather, an analysis of the problem of the consolidation of power and control by an occupation army. Although the study is centred on the Japanese military occupation of North China, it is not concerned with the military history of the Japanese Army in North China. Military occupation was simply the initial step of establishing Japanese military dominance in the area under study, while it is the problems of consolidation and control subsequent to military occupation that the present study is concerned with. I do not presume to deal with all the problems consequent upon the Japanese occupation, but aim rather at bringing out some of the major problems of occupation which confronted the Japanese Army in North China, how solutions were attempted, and how the nature of these problems changed with the development of events within and without the North China theatre of war. This study on the problems of political and economic control is therefore an attempt to illustrate the basic nature of the problems with which the Japanese
Army in North China had to deal.

This study is also relevant in the context of internal development in China during the same period. Much work has been done by eminent scholars on the rise of the Chinese Communist Party and its successful reunification of China soon after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The success story of the Chinese Communist Party, the dedication of its cadres, and its almost limitless potential for mass organization have already been amply dealt with. The same attention, however, has not been given to the Japanese 'contribution', that is the parts played by the mere fact of Japanese military presence in China and the effects of Japanese policies designed for consolidating their power and control over the Chinese masses. It is my belief that the Chinese Communist effort and the Japanese effort were interrelated in their effects on internal Chinese political development. It is hoped, therefore, that the present study may, in a very moderate way, compensate for the erstwhile neglect of the Japanese 'contribution', and show that what the Japanese did in occupied China was not less important than what the Chinese Communists did in mobilizing mass support for the Chinese Communist cause. The thesis, however, is confined to the study of the Japanese 'contribution'. Where descriptions of Chinese Communist efforts are given, they
are based on existing publications and are meant only as a means to correlate the experiences of the Chinese Communists with those of the Japanese Army.

The problems discussed are mainly of political import. Economic, administrative, institutional, and military aspects of the occupation are examined in the light of the extent to which each contributed towards the consolidation of overall Japanese political control. This built-in bias of the present study is intentional and should explain why exhaustive study on any one of the problems raised is not pursued. Further, Japanese activities in North China, manifestations of national policies in one form or another, started long before the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in July 1937; events before this date, therefore, are brought in to provide background and continuity. The Japanese occupation of North China, though studied in isolation, is a part of the history of Sino-Japanese relations and proper perspective can only be gained by bearing this constantly in mind.

As Japanese policies in North China were based on their military strength, it is necessary first to examine the extent of their military commitment and the limits consequent upon the extent of military commitment

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1 The work most relevant to this aspect of my studies is Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power by C.A. Johnson.
within the period under study. The extent of Japanese military commitment, the pattern of troop deployment, the problem of logistic support for an army on foreign soil, and the precedence of military considerations above all else were factors basic to Japanese policy formation. Any changes in the size and location of Japanese armed forces in North China would lead to policy changes, or at least policy shifts, while any changes in policy would make new demands on the Japanese Army and hence affected its size and location. Japanese ambitions in North China were limited only by their own military capability, they grew with every extra soldier that was committed to the North China theatre.

In July 1937 the Japanese Army, then known as the Tientsin Garrison, had no more than ten thousand men.2

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2 The Tientsin Garrison (Tenshin Shūtōngun 天津駐屯軍) was the name of the Japanese military establishment in North China up to the end of August 1937. It was stationed at Tientsin, with a small detachment at Peking, under the terms of the Boxer Protocol. Its actual strength in July 1937 is not known and the Japanese themselves gave conflicting estimates, varying between five to fifteen thousand men. See JFA, (Japanese Foreign Office Archives) SP161, Saionji-Harada Memoirs, p.1818; Horiba Katsuo, Shina Jihen Sensō Shidōshi, p.87; F.C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia, p.30, for Japanese figures. See also Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yüan, K'ang-Jih Chan-shih, p.23, and Chou K'ai-ching, K'ang-chan i-ch'ien chih Chung-Jih kuan-hsi, p.145, for Chinese estimates which varied between ten to twenty thousand men. I favour the moderate Japanese estimate of 7,000 as cited by Jones and the moderate Chinese estimate of 10,000 put forward by Chou and recogn
The ambitions of the Japanese Army in North China at that time had to match its troop commitment to the area. Its ambitions then definitely did not go to the extent of contemplating the occupation of North China, for it was beyond the military capability of ten thousand men to do so. The two major acts of the Tientsin Garrison, the Fengtai and Lukouchiao Incidents, should reflect the intentions of the Japanese Army in North China up to July 1937. The strategic importance of both Fengtai and Lukouchiao can be seen at a glance from the sketch map below.

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2 Cont'd..

that the actual strength of the Tientsin Garrison was somewhere between seven to ten thousand men. Harada Kumao, Saionji Kō to Seikyoku, vol. 4, p.268.

3 See Map 1 for the location and strategic importance of Fengtai and Lukouchiao. In August 1936 the Japanese occupied Fengtai following a minor incident between Chinese army stable boys and Japanese troops. (See Shina Jiho,
Possession of them would enable the Japanese to have a stranglehold over rail communication from Peking to the sea and to Central China. The two moves were therefore calculated to gain influence over Peking by gaining a stranglehold over its major communication links.

Peking was the seat of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, the political regime in control of the provinces of Hopei and Chahar. The attempts of the Tientsin Garrison to increase Japanese influence over Peking were obviously designed to pressure the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to become more amenable to Japanese

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3 Cont'd.
vol 25, No. 2, Aug. 1936, p.45). In July 1937 the Lukouchiao Incident occurred when the Japanese wanted to enter the district city of Wanping on the pretext of having lost one soldier during night manoeuvres in the Lukouchiao area. According to Fang Chiu-wei in her article "Lukouchiao shih-chien chih ch'ien-hou", the Japanese military in North China committed only 2,000 men to the Lukouchiao area before substantial reinforcements arrived from Manchuria, Korea and Japan, showing that the Lukouchiao skirmish was a limited military venture of the Tientsin Garrison. See also Shina Shūtōngun Hohei Dai-ichi Rentai, "Lukouchiao fukin sentō chōhō" in Misuzu Shobo, Nicchū Sensō, vol 4, pp.335-363.

dictates within the two provinces under its jurisdiction. The Fengtai and Lukouchiao Incidents, backed up by an armed force of no more than ten thousand men, were attempts to strengthen Japanese indirect control. They were initially threats of force, followed by very limited uses of force in order to strengthen future threats of force vis-a-vis the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. A crisis resulted only when the Chinese soldiers defending the Lukouchiao area refused to budge, exposing the inability of the Tientsin Garrison to push the Chinese soldiers away from Lukouchiao and such an exposure would cause the Imperial Japanese Army to lose face.

The ambitions of the Japanese Army in North China, however, magnified with substantial troop increases in July and August 1937. To forestall any semblance of a military defeat at Lukouchiao, the Japanese Army commands in Manchuria and Korea despatched one and a half divisions to reinforce the Tientsin Garrison for the occasion, bolstering the numerical strength of the latter to about 40,000 men. The Tokyo Government grudgingly matched this with a promise of three more divisions. The Tientsin Garrison was

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5 Gunreibu Sanbō Honbu, 11th July 1937, "Hokushi sakusen ni kansuru Kai-Rikugun kyōtei" in Misuzu Shobō, vol 2, pp.5-7, (see also pp.10-13 for naval and air support); JFA, SP161, Saionji-Harada Memoirs, p.1818 and p.1832;
thus about to be enlarged to five divisions, with an approximate total of 100,000 men. These reinforcements started to arrive on 19th July, and the Japanese Army in North China was no longer satisfied with any political compromise with the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The Tientsin Garrison started military operations along the Tientsin-Peking sector on 25th July 1937. The sector was then guarded by the Chinese 29th Army, estimated to be about 100,000 strong. Within two weeks the Tientsin-Peking sector was guarded by the Chinese 29th Army, estimated to be about 100,000 strong.7

5 Cont'd..
Wachi Takaji, "Shina no sensei to waga taishi seisaku no shinkichō", in Suzuki Toshisada, Könichi Shina no Kaibai, pp.4-15; F.C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia, p.34. Horiba Katsuo, op cit, pp.83-85, elaborated the issue by saying that the Central Military Authorities in Tokyo were split on the question of reinforcements to North China. Ishiwara Kanji 信原覺爾 was against sending reinforcements as he judged that it was likely to cause a long drawn out war in China and this was detrimental to Japan's preparation for an eventual war with Russia. The War Ministry advocated sending 15 divisions at a cost of 55 billion yen to conduct a limited war of six months in North China. Konoe, the Prime Minister, compromised by sending 3 divisions at a cost of 3 billion yen.

6 Bōeicho Bōeikyūshūjo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen, pp.18-20. A truce agreement was reached between the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the Tientsin Garrison on 11th July. However, the arrival of a new commander on 12th July, the promise of troops from Manchuria and Korea on the same day, and finally Prime Minister Konoe's decision to dispatch three divisions to North China, all helped to change the mind of the Tientsin Garrison from observing the truce agreement.

7 Chou K'ai-ching, op cit, p.5; Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yüan, op cit, p.21; Shina Shūtōngun Hohei Dai-ichi Rentai, "Lukouchiao fukin sentō chōhō"; Bōeicho, op cit, p.13; Horiba Katsuo, op cit, p.87.
sector fell into Japanese hands, indeed, it would have taken
less time had there not been an unexpected revolt of puppet
police units at Tungchow, the capital of the East Hopei
puppet regime.  

A full scale war between China and Japan resulted
when both the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese
Communist Party challenged the Japanese invasion. The
Nationalist Chinese Government at Nanking despatched troops
to the north to stiffen resistance at Paoting, while the
civil war with the Chinese Communists was suspended to make
way for an Anti-Japanese United Front. The Tientsin
Garrison wanted to stage a decisive battle to crush
Nationalist-Chinese-led resistance at Paoting so as to

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8 On 29th July 1937, puppet police units at Tungchow
rebelled and massacred their Japanese officers and local
Japanese residents. This was the Tungchow Incident.
See JFA, Report by Vice-Consul Shimazu  at Peking,
dated 5th August, 1937, "Tōshū (Tungchow) Jihen hassei
kei-i gaihō" in SP205-6, History of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Police, China, September 1870 to December,
1940, pp.2376-2380.

9 The Chinese Communist Party despatched a draft communiqué
of cooperation with the Nationalist Chinese to the
Nanking Government on 15th July 1937. The Nationalist
Chinese agreed to the proposed terms of cooperation on
22nd August 1937 and the Military Council of the Nanking
Government regrouped Communist troops into the Eighth
Route Army and New Fourth Army and nominally put them
under Nanking Government control. See Bōeichō, op cit,
p.30.
bring the war to a speedy conclusion. The three divisions earlier promised by Tokyo arrived in North China at the end of July, and four additional divisions were ordered to leave for North China at the end of August.\textsuperscript{10} Thus before September 1937, the Japanese Army in North China had about 200,000 combat troops and it was renamed the North China Army (Hokushina Hōmengun). The North China Army was divided into three army corps consisting of a central command and two army corps, they were later joined by the Mongolia Army Corps (Shūmōgun).\textsuperscript{11}

The bulk of Japanese forces in North China was engaged in ousting Nationalist Chinese troops which were moving northwards along the major railways of Peking-Wuhan and Tientsin-Pukow. To facilitate quick pursuits and bring supplies to the front, the pattern of Japanese troop deployment closely followed the railway pattern in China. (see Map 3). Major battles with Nationalist Chinese armies preoccupied the attention of the Japanese Army in China up to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. This was preceded by the Battle of Hsuchow in April 1938, and Japanese troop

\textsuperscript{10} Horiba Katsuo, \textit{op. cit.}, p.102; Bōeichō, \textit{op. cit.}, p.25.

\textsuperscript{11} Hokushina Hōmengun 北支那方面軍, Shūmōgun 駐蒙軍. See Map 3 for the war zones assigned to each army corps within the North China theatre. See also Bōeichō, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.25-26 and 80. The Mongolia Army Corps was put under North China Army Command in late February 1938.
movement immediately after the Battle of Hsuchow was impeded for four to five months, according to Nationalist Chinese estimates, after Chinese troops had breached the banks of the Yellow River to slow down the Japanese advance. A military stalemate resulted after the Battle of Wuhan, not because of Chinese military capabilities, but because of limited Japanese troop commitment to the China theatres of war.

Decision on Japanese troop commitment overseas were the responsibility of the Combined Headquarters (Daihon-ei), the Joint General Staff of the Army and Navy, at Tokyo. The Combined Headquarters set the troop ceiling for the North China Army at 250,000 men. Although the Combined Headquarters had little authority over Japanese overseas commands, yet its decisions on troop deployment affected every overseas command and put a limit to what commitments the individual commands could make on their own. The Combined Headquarters not only put a troop ceiling for North China, it also wanted to reduce the overall Japanese troop commitment in China when it was realized that a

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12 Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yüan, op cit, p.67; Fukada Yūzo, Shina Kyosangun no Gensei, pp.386-387.

13 Daihon-ei 大本營; Bōeichō, op cit, pp.451-452, citing an Army document dated July 1940 and known as "Kokai gumbi jujitsu keikaku" 更改軍備充实計画.
decisive and quick military settlement was not in sight. Reduction of Japanese troops, however, was to be accompanied by an increase in the total war effort. The Combined Headquarters was definitely not interested in scaling down the war. An increase in the war effort was to be achieved through intensifying political and economic control measures and a gradual build up of puppet armies so that the effect of troop withdrawal would not be felt. The principle was that of partial Sinification of the war and puppet troops were to be stationed in 'secure' areas so as to free Japanese troops for combat duties. The Combined Headquarters suggested the creation of a puppet army of 100,000 men in Central China, followed by a second one of comparable size in North China. This was, of course, a plan of the military authorities in Tokyo and its adoption in North China depended entirely on the decision of the North China Army high command.

Prospects for troop reduction in North China never materialized. When troop reductions began in Central China, two divisions were diverted to reinforce the North China Army to enable it to deal with Yen Hsi-shan's

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14 Daihon-ei Rikugunbu, 30th Jan 1941, "Shinagawa busō dantai seibi narabī shidō yōkō", in Boeichō, op cit, pp.455-456.
army in southwestern Shansi. Before this military objective could be attained, the Japanese Army was suddenly confronted with a viable military challenge to their presence in North China by the Chinese Communists. In August 1940 the Chinese Communists launched their first Hundred Regiment Offensive and its effectiveness showed the North China Army that the Chinese Communists had emerged as the most formidable military challenge to its presence in North China. The North China Army could not deal with both Yen Hsi-shan and the Communists at the same time and a truce with Yen was therefore arranged in September 1941.

When the invading army could increase its military pressure continuously, military strength was the deciding factor. When the limit for maximum military commitment had been reached and a decision had not been arrived at in the field of battle, politics and economics were to play complementary roles of increasing importance in the struggle for control over North China. When the

15 Boeicho, op. cit., pp.452-454; Yen Hsi-shan 關錫山.
invading army was no longer capable of sustaining the military effort single-handed and had to rely on the use of conquered human, as distinct from natural, resources to supplement its military effort, then a point was reached where the political effort was as important as the military effort. This point was reached in early 1941, and helps to explain the phenomenon where Chinese Communist military strength and the area and population under their control continued to grow, after only a brief period of recession, in spite of intensified Japanese military-based efforts directly aimed at Chinese Communist strongholds. This does not mean that politics had come to play the dominant role, for Japanese military might continued to be of primary importance in the struggle. The invading army had been frustrated in its objectives, but was not in danger of being annihilated.

Limited Japanese military commitment in North China contributed to the fragmentation of the political map of North China into four zones (see Map 4). The North China Army occupied chiefly railways and urban centres and could not spare troops for occupation of the countryside beyond. The Chinese Communists entered North China after July 1937 and established guerrilla base areas deep in the 'unoccupied' countryside. The two invasions by the Japanese and the Chinese Communists of different parts of
North China left a 'neutral' zone in between. The neutral zones were occupied by dispersed Chinese troops of varying shades of political affiliation and were open for absorption by either the Chinese Communists or the Japanese. They were tolerated because neither the Chinese Communists nor the Japanese Army had sufficient man-power to absorb the dispersed Chinese forces in the neutral zone. Japanese attempts to expand into rural areas on either side of occupied railways to secure their lines of supply resulted in a fourth zone of semi-occupation where it was near enough for Japanese troops to strike. The semi-occupation zone differed from the occupied zones in that the Japanese would enter the semi-occupied zones only in case of necessity, whereas occupied zones were areas where Japanese troops were either stationed or patrolling regularly; that is, they were areas of constant and regular Japanese military presence. Semi-occupied zones were those where Japanese military presence was periodic and irregular, and they were contiguous to occupied zones. Thus the political map of North China was distinguishable into roughly four zones: the occupied, the semi-occupied, the neutral, and the Communist. This concept of political zones in North China will be discussed further in chapters VI and VII, where variations in line with economic and political control measures are made.
The next issue to be clarified before entering into the main body of the thesis is that of periodization. This presents a certain amount of difficulty, especially when it is necessary to decide on a terminal date for the present study. As later discussions revolve around a number of significant events, an attempt is made here to describe these in connection with the problem of periodization.

The Lukouchiao Incident marked the end of limited Japanese incursion into North China. Chinese resistance made it impossible for the Tientsin Garrison to strengthen influence and tighten control over the Hopei-Chahar Political Council without additional Japanese troop commitment to the area. Additional troops despatched from Manchuria, Korea and Japan, however, increased the ambitions of the Japanese Army in North China accordingly and its intention was changed to one of effecting a direct military solution. Thus the despatch of troops from Japan, intended to forestall the possibility of a local Japanese defeat, led to the physical act of military occupation over Tientsin, Peking, and adjacent areas by the Tientsin Garrison. July 1937 was therefore the crucial period when the Japanese Army in North China shifted from the policy of the threat of force to the actual application of force.

The Japanese Army in North China realised that resort to a direct military solution would inevitably lead
to political, economic, and cultural involvements as indicated by the subsequent formation of the Provisional Government in Peking in December 1937 under Japanese sponsorship. This Japanese-sponsored state structure had authority only in Japanese occupied areas and, in its attempt to extend its influence over the whole of North China, was challenged from two directions: organized resistance led by the Nationalist Chinese and that led by the Chinese Communist Party. The Japanese military regarded the Nationalist Chinese challenge as the more important by far and, as Nationalist-Chinese-led resistance was more vulnerable to Japanese military force, the Japanese concentrated their military drives against Nationalist Chinese armed forces. This phase of active military drive against the Nationalist Chinese continued up to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, resulting in the rout of Nationalist-Chinese-led resistance in North China and the retreat of Nationalist Chinese influence to the upper reaches of the Yangtze. The Japanese termed the result of their military drive against the Nationalist Chinese as the reduction of the Nationalist-Chinese-dominated Nanking Government from a national government to a local provincial regime. 18 The Japanese military drive against

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18 Horiba Katsuo, op cit, pp.128-133. Japan dictated harsh terms to the Chinese Government during a German mediation and set a deadline for the Chinese to accept all terms.
the Nationalist Chinese drastically changed the internal balance of political forces in North China, weakened the most formidable political opponent of the Chinese Communists, and thus contributed significantly to the growth of Chinese Communist influence in North China.

The phase of active military drive against the Nationalist Chinese was succeeded by the phase of active political drive against the Nationalist Chinese. Contacts were started with a number of well-known Chinese politicians for effecting a political settlement of the war, the objective was not to arrive at any acceptable compromise but to corrode the will of the Nationalist-Chinese leadership to continue resistance. This phase led to the defection of Wang Ching-wei and his formation of a puppet Nationalist-Chinese Government at Nanking. This event, however, was not favourable to the interests of the North China Army for two reasons. Firstly, the presence of a

18 Cont'd.. The Chinese offered to negotiate the terms dictated on 13th Jan 1939. This was taken as Chinese insincerity and the Japanese made a declaration on 16th Jan 1939 that Japan would no longer accept the Chinese Government as a party in any negotiation for a political settlement in China on the ground that the Chinese Government had been reduced to a local provincial regime and therefore not representative of China as a whole.

19 Imai Takeo, Shina Jihen no Kaisō, Chapters 2 and 5 on secret contacts between China and Japan before and after the outbreak of the Pacific War.
puppet figure of national stature in Central China enhanced the political importance of occupied Central China vis-a-vis occupied North China. Secondly, the formation of a puppet Nationalist-Chinese party apparatus and government structure threatened to resurrect Chinese nationalism within Japanese occupied areas. The North China Army had only just succeeded in ousting Nationalist-Chinese influence from North China and did not relish a possible Nationalist-Chinese comeback to the area even if the move was ostensibly to serve Japanese interests. Thus the North China Army insisted on acquiring autonomous status for North China with the establishment of a North China Political Council to rule areas occupied by the North China Army. Only a nominal allegiance was accorded by the Political Council to the Nanking puppet regime.  

During this phase of active political drive against the Nationalist-Chinese Government at Chungking, the military strategy of the Japanese in China also changed. Failure to crush Nationalist-Chinese military resistance in battle led the Japanese to extend their military commitments first to South China and then to the Indo-China Peninsula, in an attempt to cut off supplies

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to the Chungking Government. This, in effect, marked a change in Japanese strategy from one of inflicting decisive defeats on Nationalist-Chinese troops to one of tightening a Japanese economic blockade to secure an eventual collapse from within. The extension of the area of military commitment necessitated the re-deployment of troops, including those in the China theatres of war, to areas outside or on the periphery of China.

The establishment of the Wang Ching-wei Government was in fact the first step towards reducing Japanese troop commitments in China. The Combined Headquarters envisaged reducing the approximate total of 770,000 men in China to about half a million between 1940-43. The troop reduction was moderate and was to span over a three year period. During this time Chinese military and police units were to be trained and organized to supplement the Japanese war effort, so that troop reduction on the part of the Japanese would not lessen the total war effort at all. It was envisaged that two

21 Japanese military operations in South China was restricted to severing rail and sea communications between Chungking and the outside world. Japanese troops occupied only areas around the mouth of the Pearl River and gained control over sections of the Canton-Hankow Railway. Japanese entry into Thailand was facilitated by treaty when the Thais decided to give in to Japanese pressure as the best way of avoiding a one-sided military conflict. See Hata Ikuhiko, Nicchu Sensōshi, pp.295-296.
puppet armies would be formed for peace maintenance duties in 'secure' areas, thus freeing Japanese troops for front line and mopping up duties. Major troop reduction was first to be effected in Central China, where the total of 300,000 was to be halved by 1942.²²

Before the Japanese had started planning troop reductions in North China, they were awakened by the first Hundred Regiment Offensive in August 1940 to the fact that the Chinese Communists had emerged as an effective military challenge. The Communist bogey which the Japanese had so long used as an excuse for expansion into North China had become a reality, and this led the Japanese and their collaborators into earnest efforts towards coordinated political, economic, and military rural pacification campaigns aimed at eradicating Communist strength.²³ The planned change in strategy could not be effected in North China and, instead of reducing troops in North China, additional divisions were diverted to the area. The North China Army had to evolve an independent strategy of its own;

²² Bōeichō, op cit, p.451 citing Army sources; also pp.455-456 for Daihonei Rikugunbu, 30th Jan 1941, "Shinagawa busō dantai seibi narabi shidō yōkō".

²³ These were labelled as Law and Order Strengthening Movements, Chih-an ch'iang-hua yun-tung 安全強化運動. See Bōeichō, op cit, pp.494, 537-538, and 573-577.
concentration of military strength against Communist base areas. As the North China Army was basically short of troops and could not effect occupation of all of North China, its new drive against Communist base areas employed a policy of calculated terrorism. Villages suspected of supporting the Communists were victimized by the infamous Three All Policy: take all, kill all, and burn all. Chinese Communist sources indicated that the Japanese had scored significant victories in their new strategy. So effective did it seem to them that the Chinese Communists revised their overall resistance strategy to accommodate the new challenge as indicated by the Cheng Feng Movement and the slogan of "cut troops and simplify administration" (ching-ping chien-cheng). The Japanese terrorist tactics

24 Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, K'ang-Jih Chan-cheng shih-ch'i te Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-fang Chün, pp.119-120.

25 In 1942 the Chinese Communists responded by initiating the Cheng Feng Movement, which was essentially a retrenchment movement, and sought to cut troops and simplify administration (ching-ping chien-cheng) so as to offset the effects of Japanese economic blockade. On the other hand the Communists had to intensify their war efforts while they were cutting back their regular troop strength. The answer was to rely more on irregular forces, i.e. village based guerrillas. See Lee Ngok, The Chinese Communist Bases in North China 1938-43: a Study of Their Growth and Anti-Japanese Activities, with Special Reference to Administration and Mass Mobilization on the Village Level, pp.88-93;
succeeded in reducing the known boundaries of Communist strongholds, but they also sowed the seeds of hatred among the victimized peasantry and thus hardened their will to resist. Japanese terrorist tactics were in fact mobilizing peasant nationalism against them and the Japanese were driven to rely more and more on brute force. The struggle for control over North China thus began in earnest with the first Hundred Regiment Offensive in August 1940, three years after the North China Army had resorted to military occupation.

In fairness to the Japanese Army, it must be realized that the struggle was never allowed to be pursued to its logical conclusion. What it entailed was an about turn in Japanese military strategy from one of troop reduction to one of continuous increase in military commitment in terms of logistic support and manpower. Although the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, the building up of a small puppet army, and the diversion of troops from Central China, all helped towards a significant increase of Japanese troop strength in North China, the increases were simply inadequate for the occupation of North China. Further, involvement in South East Asia and the Pacific, and the eventual outbreak of war between the United States and Japan had in fact condemned the occupying forces to a defensive position. The Japanese had reached
an impasse in their strategy in China with the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, they could not advance without additional troops nor would they retreat and give up the spoils of hard fought battles. Since Japanese policies in occupied China depended on their military strength, a frozen military commitment limited their freedom to implement policy changes in political, economic, and cultural matters. December 1941, therefore, is taken as the terminal date for this study. Discussions are carried on beyond this date, however, in order to gauge the effects of the war with the United States on Japanese occupation policies in North China.
CHAPTER I

Japan's China Policy and the Drift towards War

Expansionism, or rather the desire for regional hegemony, is part of Japan's historical heritage and, in the context of East Asian international relations, expansion is a legitimate practice. Before the arrival of the West, East Asia was a world unto itself where international politics were regulated by principles and aspirations basically different from their Western counterparts. The idea of a balance of power to enable a community of nations to live side by side in tenuous peace, to attain stability through interwoven tension, was not the norm among the community of nations in East Asia. Instead of a balance of power, the ideal international order was an imbalance where one power would dominate over the rest. The world order was interpreted as a unity and to shatter this unity was illegitimate. The tension inherent in a balance of power among contending states was regarded as a temporary irrational state of confusion that had to be ended in reunification.

This legitimacy bestowed on the search for regional hegemony, or expansionism, was the product of circumstances. China was so well-endowed in natural and human resources that no one nation in the region could
claim parity with her. The Chinese Empire was the natural dominant power in East Asia.

Chinese hegemony, however, was neither permanent nor complete as long periods of foreign rule in China can tell. The Mongols and the Manchus, to name but two of China's best known conquerors, not only ruled China itself, but also used conquered Chinese resources to sustain their influence in other parts of the continent. The logic was that whichever power was in control of Chinese resources also held the key to East Asiatic hegemony. Thus China was not only the natural dominant power, China was also the natural contending ground for regional hegemony. This helps to explain a comparatively disinterested attitude on the part of China towards territorial expansion, for domestic and foreign affairs alike revolved around the control of China Proper.\(^1\)

\[^1\] Owen Lattimore, *Studies in Frontier History, Collected Papers 1928-58*, pp.307-324, "Chinese colonization in Manchuria", p.310: "The 'reservoir' region, both during periods of barbarian ascendancy and periods of Chinese ascendancy, is to be regarded as the key to the sovereignty of North China --- often of all China. It therefore has a regional importance which transcends both its racial and its cultural importance. However triumphant the northward spread of Chinese power, any Chinese population flowing into the 'reservoir' region inevitably becomes even more conscious of the fact that it can now exercise a control over the affairs of China behind it than that it can press forward to fresh conquests of barbarian territories." The 'reservoir' region denoted lands just north of the Great Wall where Chinese hold over them had been periodic.
made agricultural expansion unfeasible and military conquest uneconomical to the Chinese, military threats posed by nomadic tribes north of China kept Chinese armies in the north. The predominant form of Chinese expansion had been physical population presence associated with the spread of Chinese agriculture. This type of expansion, as the colonization of Manchuria in the twentieth century showed, could take place even while China was militarily impotent. It also accounts for the phenomenon that whenever a new power rose in East Asia, China became a contending ground. The rise of Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was no exception.

China-based regional hegemony was never complete, as the island empire of Japan consistently remained outside the reach of any continental power. The sea that separates China and Japan prevented Chinese prowess from being effectively felt, while the Chinese pre-occupation with a possible nomadic combination in Central Asia precluded China from developing a strong naval force, without which the islands of Japan could not be brought under control. Japan, however, was in comparison so poor in natural resources that she could not effectively challenge a China-based dominant power unless she herself could gain control and use of Chinese resources.

With the coming of the West to East Asia,
however, the nature of regional international relations became much more complex, as new ideas, new forces, and new resources were brought into play. The British Empire supported by Indian resources, the Dutch power based on the East Indies, the Europe-based Russia with her vast Asiatic holdings bordering on China, and the North-America-based United States were all enabled by phenomenal developments in communication to bring their considerable strength to bear on the East Asian scene. The traditional regional power relationships were disturbed and new relationships had to be evolved before a readjusted stability could return to East Asia. This was complicated by a gradual decline in China and centuries of isolation in Japan which made the two leading East Asian powers ill fitted to compete against the Western Powers. In fact, China and Japan both fell prey to the newcomers from afar. The Western Powers, however, did not come with the intent of setting up any hegemony and were satisfied with accommodating each other with a fair share of the spoils and pursued parallel expansion among themselves at the expense of Asian countries.

The presence of Western Powers in East Asia led to the confusion of two systems of international politics. This was not apparent to contemporary Western observers who simply believed that the world horizon had expanded for the
West. In weakness, China and Japan had to accept the form and terminology of international contact thrust upon them by the Western Powers, but, under the fragile surface of the superimposed Western system of the balance of power, China and Japan continued in keen competition for the rebuilding of regional hegemony. Since a basic objective inherent in the competition was the control of adequate resources, and that such resources within a regional context was in China, a race between Chinese reunification and Japanese expansion in China resulted. This was the basic conflict between China and Japan and, in order to account for the outbreak of war between the two countries in 1937, it is necessary to trace the course of Japan's China Policy in the twentieth century.

The attempt to rebuild a regional hegemony entailed three distinct stages: first, the effort towards building up national strength comparable to leading European nations or modernization; second, to make other nations in the region recognize the emerging power as the dominant power, and third, to oust the competing Western Powers from East Asia. These stages operate in overlapping time scale and "Japanese imperialism in Asia had to face the dilemma of the need to unite with other Asian countries in defending themselves against Western domination and the need to control less powerful neighbours in competing against
Soon after Japan had proven successfully in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) that she was the leading East Asian military power and that her military power was comparable to that of any Western nation, Western military presence was bodily withdrawn from East Asia with the outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918). While the conflict rages in Europe, Japan was left as the de facto dominant military power in East Asia and she used the interval to make China recognize her as the new inheritor of regional hegemony and to extend her control over Chinese resources in anticipation of the eventual return of Western Powers to East Asia. China was presented with the Twenty-one Demands which, if accepted, would have reduced China to protectorate status. The harshness of the terms of the Demands aroused a sudden upsurge of popular nationalist feelings in China, providing just sufficient support for her leaders to stay the hand of Japan until the war in Europe was over.

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2 S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p.xv.

3 Li Yü-shu, Chung-Jih erh-shih-i-t'iao chiao-she (Sino-Japanese Negotiation over Twenty-one Demands), photo 1, original text of the Twenty-one Demands in Japanese.

4 The end of the War in Europe did not lead the victorious European Powers to restrain Japan in the Far East immediately. The Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 in fact decided in favour of Japan over the question of
Although with the end of the First World War the Western Powers could again bring their considerable military potential to bear on the East Asian scene, Japan was already so well entrenched that any such attempt by the Western Powers could not but risk a major conflict with her. After four years of exhausting war effort, the Western Powers were not prepared for new conflicts and sought, therefore, for a negotiated settlement with Japan instead. Japan also was not willing to risk her new gains on the mainland in a military conflict and agreed to negotiate for a settlement where Japanese interests were not to be diminished and where Western interests could be accommodated in China.

The settlement formula was that under Japanese military dominance, East Asia in general and China in particular should be opened for international trade and a status quo on territorial holdings should be maintained. The Japanese accepted this formula in the Washington

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4 Cont'd.

whether German concessions in Shantung should be returned to China or be retained by Japan. The May Fourth Movement was caused by both the Twenty-one Demands and the Shantung Resolution. The Movement was led by students and intellectuals and marked the beginning of student nationalism centred on Peking. See Chou Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, p.1; Hua Kang, *Wu-szu yün-tung shih*, pp.34-44, "Jih-pen ti-kuo chu-i tsai ti-i-tz'u shih-chieh ta-chan ch'i-chien tui hua ti te-shu ch'in lüeh" 帝國主義在第一次世界大戰期間封建的特殊侵略.
Conference, (1921-22) their acceptance was formalized in the Nine Powers Treaty of 1922. This Japanese policy of accommodation with the West came to be popularly known as the Shidehara line, as the Japanese Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara was its principal Japanese advocate.\(^5\)

The Shidehara line was basically a policy for cooperation with the Western Powers in advancing their respective interests at the expense of China. Its success was dependent not only on the agreement of Japan and the Western Powers, but also on the acceptance of China. The rising tide of Chinese nationalism, however, challenged the implementation of the Shidehara line and threatened to limit and oust foreign interests from China. Shidehara argued that it was in Japan's interest to allow Chinese politics to take its own course, to watch developments closely, and to negotiate a settlement if and when an effective Chinese Government should emerge.\(^6\) Shidehara was

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\(^5\) The Washington Conference and the Nine Powers Treaty resulted in definite setbacks for Japan: she was made to return former German concessions in Shantung to China and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated. See Shidehara Kijūro, Gaikō Gojyūgonen, pp.45-91, for a personal recollection of the Washington Conference by Baron Shidehara. See also Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan (Shidehara Peace Foundation), Shidehara Kijūro, pp.221-226; Akira Iriye, "The ideology of Japanese Imperialism; Imperial Japan and Asia", in G.K. Goodman, Imperial Japan and Asia, pp.32-45.

\(^6\) Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, op cit, pp.292-297, "Tai-Shi fukanshō seisaku no genshu" 対支不干渉政策の厳守.
prepared to countenance Chinese reunification if established Japanese interests were not impaired.

The phenomenal success of the Chinese Nationalists in their Northern Expedition (1926-27) for reunifying China by force of arms shook Japanese faith in Shidehara's approach. An alternative was put forward by Tanaka Giichi who believed that unqualified Chinese reunification could not but be adverse to Japanese interests. He asserted that a reunified China must not include Manchuria. He wanted not only a weak China, but also to define what particular Chinese territory and resources should remain under Japanese influence. He formed a Cabinet three times -

7 Inoue Kiyosuke, Danshaku Tanaka Giichi Shoden, pp.36-44, "Tanaka Sori to So Kai-seki no kaidan" (An exchange of views between Tanaka Giichi and Chiang K' ai-shek dated 5th November 1927) 田中総理 と蔣介石 の 会 議; League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations signed at Peiping, 4th September 1932, p.55. When it seemed possible that the Nationalist Chinese armies might carry the civil war north of the Great Wall, the Tanaka Government in Japan sent a communique to the Chinese combatants on 28th May 1928 as follows: "The Japanese Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and is prepared to do all it can to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order, or constitute the probable cause of such a disturbance.

In these circumstances, should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria."; Yoshihashi Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden, p.14.
in May 1927, and April and May 1928 - and each time he resorted to military intervention to secure the limits of Japanese influence by the dispatch of troops to Shantung province to prevent the victorious Nationalist Chinese armies from succeeding in a military reunification of China.\(^8\)

The Japanese military in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, regarded even Tanaka's policy as inadequate and wanted not only to limit the extent of Chinese reunification but to take physical possession of Manchuria for Japan as well.\(^9\) As long as either the policy advocated by Shidehara or that advanced by Tanaka remained practicable, there was little chance for the expressed opinion of the overseas command to be acted on. The Manchurian warlord, Chang Hsüeh-liang, however, saw fit to declare nominal allegiance to the Nationalist Government at Nanking.\(^10\) Chang Hsüeh-liang's move appeared to have made the Tanaka approach

\(^8\) Takakura Tetsuichi (ed), Tanaka Giichi Denki, pp.620-639. "Santō shutsuhei 山東出兵； Wellington Koo, T'san-yü kuo-chi lien-ho-hui t'iao-ch'a wei-yuan-kui Chung-kuo tai-piao chi-t'ieh, April to August 1932, p.146; S.N. Ogata, op cit, p.10; Yoshihashi Takehiko, op cit, pp.19-20, shows that Tanaka himself was pressured by an extremist supporter Mori Kaku, into military intervention in Shantung.

\(^9\) S.N. Ogata, op cit, pp.41-47.

meaningless, for Chang had helped, in effect, to reunify China under the Nationalist Chinese in spite of Japanese military intervention aimed at preventing such a reunification. Moreover, Chang's plans to build an alternative rail and harbour system in an open attempt to lessen the Japanese hold on Manchuria made the Shidehara line impracticable too.\(^\text{11}\)

While the Tokyo Government was unable to offer any new China policy alternatives, the Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria without reference to the Japanese Government.\(^\text{12}\) Military success in Manchuria and the lack of any policy alternatives made Tokyo accept the *fait accompli* created by the Kwantung Army. The Japanese military in Manchuria thus showed a new way towards wresting foreign policy decisions from the Tokyo Government. From then on the Kwantung Army and the Tokyo Government each strove to practise a China policy independent of the other, and this phenomenon persisted even when the two power centres agreed on policy essentials. The example of the Kwantung Army was emulated by the Japanese military in North China, making the practice of Japanese policy in North China a most complex and uncertain affair.

\(^{11}\) League of Nations, *op cit*, pp.57-66

After the Manchurian Incident (September 1931) the race between Chinese reunification and Japanese continental expansion was centred on North China. The Nanking Government had little control over the five northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Shantung, Shansi and Suiyuan even though the provincial authorities there had all declared their allegiance to the National Government at Nanking. Up to the outbreak of war between China and Japan in 1937, North China was ruled by a handful of warlords. Most of the warlords began their careers in the 'modern' armies of the late Ch'ing Dynasty and each of them had a personal army and a territorial base, forming de facto states of their own. These warlords were in grave danger of being liquidated when Chiang Kai-shek launched the successful Northern Expedition. While Chiang's phenomenal military success enabled the Nationalist Chinese to form a Central Government in Nanking whose military and political ascendancy no local warlord nor any opposition party dared to deny, the ultimate objective of reunification was not attained.

Two developments in particular prevented the troops under Chiang from achieving reunification by force:

13 For a list of the major warlords in North China, see Sanbō Honbu, "Hokushi Shiji Undō no sui-i", in Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, Vol 1, pp.128-136.
the split between the Nationalist Chinese and the Chinese Communists, and military intervention by the Japanese at Tsinan. The former resulted in a civil war between two revolutionary parties which competed for leadership in the nationalist cause, and the latter exposed the danger of a full scale Sino-Japanese conflict if Chiang and the Nationalists persisted in their original reunification plans. Nevertheless, the Nationalist Chinese did claim to have reunified China and this claim was confirmed by the warlords when they declared their allegiance to Nanking one by one. However, reunification was only nominal and the declarations of allegiance by the warlords were obvious attempts to halt the northern advance of Nationalist Chinese troops on the one hand and to introduce a certain amount of Nationalist influence to counter growing Japanese interests in their domains on the other.

Political manoeuvring by the warlords, however, stopped neither the Nationalist Chinese nor the Japanese from expanding their respective influences into North China. The warlords could neither refuse the setting up of Nationalist Chinese party branches and secret police networks nor could they reject increases in the number of Japanese advisors in their local armies, administrations, and economic enterprises. Thus, after the loss of Manchuria in 1931, the confrontation of Nationalist Chinese and
Japanese interests in North China became the new focal point of Sino-Japanese friction in mainland Asia. It was the struggle for political control over North China that led to the outbreak of full scale war in July 1937. The struggle may conveniently be divided into the individual efforts of the Kwantung Army, the Tokyo Government, the Nanking Government, and the Tientsin Garrison in trying to gain indirect control over North China by tightening their respective influence over the warlords concerned. As these efforts were exerted during the same period and often revolved around the same events, repetition of occurrences in a modified context cannot be avoided.

Two expeditionary Japanese commands on Chinese soil were involved in North China up to the commencement of the undeclared Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Kwantung Army and the Tientsin Garrison. The Kwantung Army's interest in North China was only of a secondary nature: to make Japanese military pressures effectively felt so as to influence political developments in the region. The logic was that such influence would prevent the growth of Chinese national feeling in North China, thus helping to prevent the spread of Chinese national feeling to Manchuria and to consolidate the Japanese position in Manchuria. North China was intended as a buffer zone between the Nationalist Chinese at Nanking and the Japanese
military at Hsinking (Changchun). The Tientsin Garrison was not in a position to have a policy of its own initially as the combat forces under its command were minimal. Its acknowledged position was to act in support of Kwantung Army attempts to exert military pressure on North China, especially when such pressure was aimed at the Peking-Tientsin area.

The first problem of the Kwantung Army in increasing the effectiveness of its military pressure on North China was how to corrode the defence capabilities of neighbouring Chinese warlords. Manchuria and Hopei were separated by mountainous terrain, and Shanhaikwan, the gate between the mountain and the sea, commanded the only direct land route to and from Manchuria and Hopei. The natural defensive position was in Chinese hands. An alternative route into North China was through the steppes of Inner Mongolia, of which the province of Jehol formed a part. Acting on the pretext that Chang Hsüeh-liang and his associates were plotting for a comeback in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army took a 'preventive measure' by invading Jehol and taking Shanhaikwan by frontal assault.¹⁴ The result of these preemptive strikes was that by 1933 the land route into North China was wide open.

¹⁴ Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良; Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yuan, K'ang-Jih Chan-shih, p.9
If the Kwantung Army had designs for military conquest over North China, there was nothing in its path to stop its advance except for the fear of overstretching its troop strength. That the Kwantung Army was satisfied for the moment in arranging a truce with the Nanking Government signified that the possibility of making its military pressure felt in North China was sufficient. The Tangku Truce of 1933 therefore marked the successful introduction of Kwantung Army military pressure into North China. The Truce provided for the setting up of a demilitarized zone encompassing twenty-one districts on the Chinese side of the Sino-Manchurian frontier, or the non-fortification of the Chinese frontier.\(^{15}\) This insured against any effective Chinese resistance in the future. Further, attempts to encourage Mongol revival signalled that Kwantung Army efforts were absorbed in another direction.\(^{16}\) Although the Kwantung Army did not contemplate further military expansion in the direction of North China, it did not mean


\(^{16}\) JFA, SP161, Saionji-Harada Memoirs, p.1254, quoting the opinion of Ishiwara Kanji: "...it is a very stupid plan to carry on small projects in North China and stick our fingers at the Mongolian pie." Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, Vol 1, p.443, Prince Teh contacted the Japanese in Peking as early as 1932 to solicit Japanese support for Mongol revival. Increasing Kwantung Army interest was shown by the East Chahar and Suiyuan Incidents. For details of these incidents, see pp.502-603 in the same volume.
that the Kwantung Army was not interested in expanding its influence in North China via other means.

The first opportunity for the Kwantung Army to test the effectiveness of its military pressure on North China came with a dispute on the problem of policing the demilitarized zone. The Tangku Truce provided for a Chinese constabulary to keep law and order in the area, two rival factions developed within this police force, one supported by the warlord in Hopei, Yü Hsueh-chung, and the other supported by the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army wanted Yü Hsueh-chung to withdraw his influence from the demilitarized zone and leave the entire area to the Kwantung-Army-supported faction.

The issue was magnified by radicals in the Tientsin Garrison who wanted a drastic increase in Japanese influence in North China. Just after the Tientsin Garrison Commander had left for Hsinking, capital of the puppet regime of Manchoukuo and headquarters of the Kwantung Army, presumably to receive instructions on how to provide support action for the Kwantung Army, Colonel Sakai, Chief of Staff of the Garrison force, served categorical demands on the

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Nanking Government to withdraw all Nationalist influences from Hopei and to have Yü Hsueh-chung and his troops transferred elsewhere.¹⁸ Troop movements in Manchuria in connection with the demilitarized zone issue appeared to be Kwantung Army support for the Tientsin Garrison demands.¹⁹ Tokyo was alarmed that once again the initiative in China policy was likely to be wrested by its overseas commands and hastened to despatch naval support units to Tientsin in a show of force to establish the claims of the Tokyo Government should any form of Japanese expansion resulted from the venture.²⁰

The speed with which the rival Japanese power centres acted presented a false picture of a well-coordinated Japanese advance and this alarmed the Nanking Government so much that it sent Ho Yin-ch'in to North China to negotiate with the Japanese on the spot. Ho gave way on


all points to the Japanese in the Ho-Umez Agreement.\footnote{21} The Tientsin radicals were satisfied with the withdrawal of all Nationalist Chinese troops and organizations from Hopei, the Kwantung Army benefited from the introduction of troops of the warlord in Chahar, Sung Che-yuan, into Hopei as this move, which increased his territorial holding without a corresponding increase in military complement, was designed to make Sung better disposed towards Japan on the one hand and less able to resist Japanese military pressure on the other.\footnote{22} In fact Sung was made to give new concessions to the Japanese very soon after, when the Kwantung Army deliberately engineered an incident in Chahar and forced Sung to accept the Ch'in-Doihara Agreement.\footnote{23}

The effectiveness of its military pressure on North China exceeded the expectations of the leaders of the Kwantung Army and led them to an attempt to separate North China from Nanking formally and to make North China a Kwantung Army protectorate. A well-known China expert in the Kwantung Army, Doihara Kenji, was entrusted with the task of organizing a North China Autonomous Movement.

\footnote{21} Ho Ying-ch'in 何應欽; Kantōgun Shireibu, June 1933, "Hokushi ni okeru teisen kōshō keika gaiyō", in Misuzu Shobo, Manshū Jihen, pp.511-528.

\footnote{22} Shuhsi Hsu, The North China Problem, p.30; Sung Che-yuan 宋哲元.

\footnote{23} Ch'in Te-ch'un, Ch'in Te-ch'un hui-i-lu, pp.30-40.
Doihara started by fanning peasant riots in Hsiang Hsien and was to culminate in a 'state founding conference' in Manchoukuo style, which all the warlords in North China were invited to attend for the purpose of declaring their independence from Nanking. Most observers in China, Chinese and foreign, voiced the conviction that the appearance of an Autonomous North China was almost a certainty.  

On the day scheduled for the 'state founding conference', however, Doihara found himself alone at the conference site and none of the warlords turned up. The Kwantung Army could not spare the troops for a full scale invasion of North China, the Tokyo Government remained silent, and the Tientsin Garrison protested to the Kwantung Army that it was trespassing; North China should be a private preserve of the Japanese military in North China. As a result Doihara was transferred to Tientsin, a convenient way for the Kwantung Army to dissociate itself with Doihara and the North China Autonomous Movement.

As a face-saving measure, the Kwantung Army hastily established an autonomous government in the

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25 Ibid.

26 Shigemitsu Mamoru, Shōwa no Dōran, Vol 1, p.117.
demilitarized zone, which had been under effective Kwantung
Army indirect control since the signing of the Ho-Umezu
Agreement. Even this Kwantung Army foothold in North
China was lost when, soon after the Lukouchiao Incident,
the Tungchow puppet troops revolted and massacred their
Japanese officers and local Japanese residents. The
Tientsin Consulate and the Tientsin Garrison became the new
centres of Japanese pressure in North China.

After the Mukden Incident of September 1931,
government leaders in Tokyo were at a loss as to how to
reimpose authority over the Kwantung Army and regain
control over policy decision. At the same time radical
elements in the Army struck again and again by assassinating
prominent political and military leaders who were not
sympathetic to their radical views. These young rebels
not only disagreed with civil and military leaders on
foreign and domestic policies, but were also dissatisfied
with the existing socio-political order in Japan. They

27 Chou K'ai-ching, K'ang-ch'an i-ch'ien chih Chung-Jih
kuan-hsi, pp.111-116; Misuzu Shobō, Nîchû Sensô, vol 1,
pp.144-146, "Kitô bôkyô shiji seifu sengen oyobi soshiki
daikô"(竟東防共自洽政府宣言及組織大綱).

28 JFA, Shimazu, Vice-consul at Peking, 5th August 1937,
"Tōshū (Tungchow) Jihen hassei kei-i gaихô", in SP205-6,
History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police, China,
Sept 1870 to December 1940, pp.2376-2380.

29 S.N. Ogata, op cit, pp.20-36, "Crisis in Japan and the
growth of the radical reform movement".
therefore aimed at toppling the established order and replacing it with a military government. The internal crisis in Japan was climaxed by an unsuccessful coup in May 1933.

The threat from below caused the rival civil and military wings of the Tokyo Government to close ranks in defence of the established order. Attempts were made to reduce grievances by the appointment of ministers sympathetic to the radicals and by pursuing a China policy bolder than that of the Kwantung Army.

In September 1933 Hirota Kōki became Foreign Minister and, except for a short period during the Hayashi Cabinet, remained near the centre of power and exerted strong influence on policy-making until the outbreak of war. Hirota was particularly concerned with reestablishing a central policy-making body in Japan and with using policy-executing bodies other than the overseas commands. His attempt to rebuild a policy-making body began with convening conferences among the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Army, and Navy under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.  

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30 Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, vol 1, pp.xxiii-xxviii, explanations on materials in the collection concerning Hirota's diplomacy and how he negotiated for support from the other ministries, mainly through a Five Ministers Conference, before acting; see also pp.102-108 of the same volume, Gaimushō Tōkyōyoku, July to October 1935, "Taishi seisaku Hirota San Gensoku kettei no kei-i".
In effect, he was trying to institutionalize an inner cabinet in which the service ministers would have no cause to feel outnumbered. The policy agreed on by this body was enunciated in the three principles of Hirota, which were concerned mainly with Japanese expansion in North China: 'friendly relations' meant recognition for Manchoukuo, 'economic cooperation' meant reserving North China for Japanese capital investment, and 'joint defence against Communism' meant Japanese military presence in North China at points as desired by Japan. \(^{31}\)

The essential difference between the policy of Tokyo and that of the Japanese military in China was in the means proposed for attaining the common ends. Tokyo wanted to by-pass the overseas commands and to negotiate with the Nanking Government for the desired settlement. Nanking readily welcomed the new Japanese move and talks on the ambassadorial level were started. \(^{32}\) The prospects for a Tokyo-Nanking rapprochement appeared bright and the crisis engineered by the Kwantung Army and the Tientsin Garrison in 1935 may be viewed as a deliberate attempt of the

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\(^{32}\) The Japanese gesture was limited to making public Hirota's Three Principles and the Nanking Government had to make the formal request for high level talks. Refer Chou K'ai-ching, \textit{op cit}, p.38
overseas commands at sabotaging the prospects for a possible Sino-Japanese reconciliation. 33

The meeting of minds between Nanking and Tokyo was more apparent than real. For as Tokyo's policy was to gain more through negotiation and as Nanking desired to concede less through negotiation, a mutual settlement could not be reached even on a temporary basis. Tokyo's offensive, however, was not restricted to words and diplomacy. Japanese extra-territorial rights were also to be used as an instrument of expansion: concurrent with the direct negotiations was a huge increase in the number of consular offices in China, and the establishment of each office was accompanied by the establishment of consular police stations and substations. The consular police were bands of armed Japanese scattered inside Chinese territory, performing spy and espionage work, organizing Japanese residents into volunteer corps, and putting political pressure on local authorities to allow the advance of Japanese interests. 34

33 JFA, SP161, Saionji-Harada Memoirs, p.1245.

34 Expansion of consular offices was not restricted to North China and was the cause of a number of incidents when local Chinese objected to the move. Most of the incidents involved anti-Japanese riots and the loss of Japanese lives. The best known incidents are the Chengtu, Peihai, Tientsin, and Swatow Incidents. For a brief description of these and other similar incidents, see Chou K'ai-ching, op cit, pp.211-248.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry had seen to it that direct action in China was no longer the monopoly of the military overseas.

Nevertheless, Tokyo's instrument for direct action in North China existed but in a very modest form. The consulates and consular police units had to be rebuilt, reorganized, and strengthened so as to make the whole system a viable alternative to the overseas military commands. When Hirota first took up the Foreign Ministry portfolio, the Tientsin consular police numbered no more than fifty men. The first expansion plan for the consular police was approved in August 1936 when the known allocation was increased to ¥150,000, and sixty-five experienced police officers were transferred from Manchuria to strengthen the expansion program of the Tientsin consular police. Consular Police Headquarters for North China was established at Tientsin and under it were over twenty stations and substations situated at major communication centres. 35

The rapid build-up of the consular police alarmed the Kwantung Army and it took steps to forestall any similar development in Manchuria. In 1936 extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo was abolished, a measure designed, not to strengthen the hands of the puppet

35 JFA, SP205-6, History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police, China, September 1870 to December 1940, pp.518-527
government there, but to deprive the Foreign Ministry of a potential instrument in Manchuria. This move undoubtedly affected Foreign Ministry interests in Manchuria, but it also contributed towards building up the consular police in North China, as former Manchurian consular police personnel could be transferred to North China to augment the expansion program.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry faced almost unsurmountable problems in personnel. It had no training facilities and took on any one who cared to join, resulting in the recruitment of undesirable elements from North China and Japan. In 1936, at the very beginning of the expansion program, about forty members of the consular police were found guilty of making false intelligence reports and engaging in gambling and smuggling activities. These were hastily discharged. There was also dissension between officers originally in Tientsin and those transferred from Manchuria. These difficulties were not overcome until the end of 1938, when elaborate examinations were held for new recruits and when Chinese and Koreans

36 Matsumoto Oto-o, Manshūkoku Gensei (1937), pp.14-18, effective as from 1st July 1936.
37 JFA, SP205-6, op cit, pp.537-538.
38 Ibid, pp.537-538.
were admitted into service. By then, control of Japanese affairs in North China had passed irrevocably to the North China Army.

By April 1937 the consular police had a force of about eight hundred men. With this instrument in hand, the Foreign Ministry, soon after the start of military operations by the North China Army, instructed its agents to try to take advantage of the military success of the North China Army by taking over political functions from the army. The instructions could not be acted upon since the Finance Ministry refused to procure the funds required for such an undertaking, and since the North China Army hastily expanded its own political arm, the Special Service, under General Kita Sei-ichi.

39 Ibid, pp.612, 113-1128. Recruitment examinations, to which Chinese and Koreans were eligible to sit, began in July 1938. The first series of examinations recruited only twenty-six out of a total entry of one hundred. Of the recruited, nine had actually failed the examination and no Japanese nationals were recruited at all. However, the Consular Police in China expanded to a total of 949 men in December 1938 and 1032 men in March 1939. This expansion reflected the success of recruitment through examinations.

40 JFA, "Hokushi keisatsubu sōsetsu no riyu oyobi sono kei ka", in SP205-6, op cit, pp.548-560.

41 Hokushi no Hōmengun Shireibu oyobi Sanbōchō, 4th and 6th September 1937. "Kita shōshō ni ataeru kunrei", in Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, vol 2, pp.41-42; Bōeicho Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen, pp.41-43.
Nevertheless, the two-pronged attack on Nanking from Tokyo was effective, in that Chinese diplomatic procrastination was of no avail. Where direct negotiations failed, the consular offices would take direct action to undermine Chinese administrative integrity. The offensive, however, also provided a strong opposition, a continuous increase in anti-Japanese feelings which led to popular anti-Japanese boycotts and riots. These were developments which neither the Chinese Government nor the Japanese consular authorities was in a position to suppress or control. In fact, instead of advancing Japanese interests, the Tokyo offensive brought about a new crisis which threatened the very existence of Japanese interests in many parts of China. It was this state of internal unrest in China that gave the Tientsin Garrison grounds for demanding reinforcements to protect Japanese interests, and cause for planning direct military action in North China once the Tientsin Garrison was given substantial increases in combat strength. Before examining the course of action taken by the Tientsin Garrison, however, it is necessary to relate Nanking's reaction to the development of events.

Nanking's primary concern was the reunification of China. As far as the Nationalist Chinese were concerned, this could be achieved after their main internal rival, the Chinese Communists, and their main external enemy Japan
had been liquidated as competing political and military forces within China. The priority decided by Chiang Kai-shek was to deal with the Chinese Communists first, and this entailed refraining from clashing with the Japanese for as long as possible. For this reason Nanking was anxious to maintain North China as a buffer zone between Japan and Nanking, and to establish political influence within the administration and military forces of the warlords in North China to forestall the possibility that any one of the warlords, or the warlords in combination, would develop into a military-political force capable of challenging Nationalist Chinese ascendancy. 42

Nanking's anxiety to accommodate the Japanese was revealed in its readiness to sign away far-reaching concessions in the Ho-Umezu and Ch'in-Doihara Agreements, specifically the withdrawal of all Nationalist Chinese troops and organizations from the provinces of Hopei and Chahar. The stimulus given to Chinese popular nationalist feeling by rapid Japanese advances in North China limited the freedom of the Nationalist Chinese, a party which purported to lead the nationalist movement, from yielding

too much to the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek and his associates, therefore, had to make a more active effort in checking Japanese expansion when the Kwantung Army planned to organize the North China Autonomous Movement. Chiang went personally to dissuade the warlord of Shansi, Yen Hsi-shan, from joining in the Japanese cause, and sent personal representatives to visit other interested warlords for the same purpose. Even the Japanese favorite warlord of the time, Sung Che-yuan, was won over when Chiang moved the troops of Shang Chen away from Hopei to Honan to allow Sung's troops to take over Hopei unopposed in exchange for a formal allegiance to Nanking of the two provinces under Sung, Hopei and Chahar.

Tokyo's diplomatic offensive provided Nanking

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43 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.4-5, refers to a growth in the number of popular anti-Japanese bodies after the Ho-Umezu Agreement and in typical Japanese official tone stated that it was the work of the Nationalist Chinese.


45 Ibid, p.133. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council started as a Japanese sponsored scheme: to install Sung Che-yuan in Hopei with Japanese backing. Chiang Kai-shek presumably had a deal with Sung Che-yuan as the troops of Shang Chen, then warlord of Hopei, were moved to Honan at Chiang's orders and Sung was formally invested in office by Nanking. Sung thus benefited from balancing Nanking and Japanese influence.
with the opportunity to launch a diplomatic counter-offensive. Nanking's readiness to negotiate with Tokyo was underlined by a basic desire of the Chinese Government to avoid formal contacts with the Japanese military commands in North China and Manchuria. It was hoped that negotiations with the civil authorities in Tokyo would lessen the likelihood of military skirmishes and that minor concessions to Tokyo might just be sufficient to induce the latter to stay the hands of its military in China.

Nanking's miscalculation was that it failed to understand Tokyo's inability to control its military overseas without succeeding in securing more concessions from China through negotiations than the military could through military actions.

In spite of repeated concessions made to the Japanese, Nanking's prestige as the only force capable of leading a national stand against further Japanese incursions remained. Nanking was aware of the possibility of using popular Chinese nationalist feeling as a counter to Japanese diplomatic and military pressure. It was also aware of the danger of losing political influence if Nanking should fail to be looked up to as the centre of Chinese nationalist aspirations and this awareness dictated a limit to concessions for Japan. It was when the concession limit of Nanking was reached and that this fell short of Japanese
desires that a conflict resulted.

The clash between China and Japan in North China in July 1937, which precipitated the undeclared Sino-Japanese War, was the work of the tiny Tientsin Garrison. To account for the outbreak of war, therefore, it is necessary to trace the gradual emergence of the Japanese military in North China to the point where it became the Japanese power centre responsible for Japanese actions and decisions in North China.

The Japanese military in North China became directly involved in Chinese politics after the Kwantung Army had occupied Manchuria. The Tientsin Garrison assisted Colonel Doihara Kenji in starting a number of local riots at Tientsin for diverting the attention of Chinese authorities there when Pu Yi, the deposed Manchu Emperor, left for Manchuria under Japanese protection. From then on the Tientsin Garrison was known to support Kwantung Army policies, particularly in connection with North China.

Staff officers at Tientsin did not necessarily agree on all points with the senior command across the border. Inter-command rivalry was inherent and the Tientsin Garrison sought to assert an independent posture when the opportunity offered itself. The main drawback was its weak

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numerical strength, a mere five hundred to a thousand men. The military knew only of entering politics through military pressure and the Tientsin Garrison could not bring any effective pressure to bear on politicians and warlords in North China single-handed. However, rivalry between the Kwantung Army and Tokyo on wresting the initiative on China policy decisions gave the Tientsin Garrison room to manoeuvre. The first opportunity came in mid-1936 when the Kwantung Army tried to pressure the Hopei warlord to relinquish his influence over part of the demilitarized zone in favour of the Kwantung-Army-supported faction in another part of the demilitarized zone.

Possibly as part of the Kwantung Army plan to pressure the Chinese into accepting its terms, the Tientsin Garrison Commander, Umezu, was called to Hsingking for consultation. The Chief of Staff of the Tientsin Garrison, Col. Sakai, requested permission from Umezu to issue a public statement concerning a separate issue: the assassination of two pro-Japanese newspaper editors at Tientsin just as Umezu boarded the train. The content of the statement was not known to Umezu and turned out to be a categorical demand for the withdrawal of all Nationalist Chinese influence from the province of Hopei. 47

As in the case of Manchuria, the success of Japanese militarism in mid-1936 was facilitated by the Chinese themselves. Nanking was then pressing on with an anti-Communist expedition in the wake of the Chinese Communist Party's famous Long March. Chiang Kai-shek was too confident of imminent success in eliminating the Chinese Communists to be willing to disengage his troops for a possible confrontation, if not outright conflict, with Japan. Ho Ying-ch'in was sent north to negotiate a settlement with the Japanese military in North China and Ho conceded to the Tientsin Garrison's demand for withdrawal of Nationalist Chinese troops and political organization from Hopei. Ho failed to distinguish between the demands presented by the Tientsin Garrison and those presented by the Kwantung Army. Neither the Kwantung Army nor Tokyo had given the Tientsin Garrison any direct support apart from verbal assurances and brandishing of arms at a distance. The Kwantung Army was acting to advance its influence in the demilitarized zone, and Tokyo was acting to avoid the charge of inaction. Nanking's concession to the Tientsin Garrison was a failure in judgement.

As the Nationalist Chinese withdrew from Hopei, the Tientsin Garrison demanded troop reinforcements from Japan, not to tackle any opposing Chinese, but to enable
the Garrison to fill the power vacuum left by the Nationalist Chinese. Tokyo did not want to provide the opportunity for the emergence of a second insubordinate command overseas similar to the Kwantung Army, nor did Tokyo relish the prospect of the Kwantung Army walking into the power vacuum in Hopei. The strength of the Tientsin Garrison was consequently increased to the minimum level required for keeping the Kwantung Army out of Hopei.\(^{48}\) Tokyo's attempt in expanding the consular police force in North China at this time was obviously a move towards restraining the newly reinforced Tientsin Garrison.\(^{49}\)

The Kwantung Army's last effort to dominate the Japanese expansionist effort in North China ended with the failure of the Autonomous Movement. It resigned itself to a share of influence with the Tientsin Garrison over the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The Tientsin Garrison, however, was not satisfied with a share of influence and schemed to increase its influence over that of the

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\(^{48}\) *Shina Jihō*, vol 25, No 1, July 1936, p.49. The rank of the commanding officer in North China was raised on 1st May 1936 and the War Ministry in Tokyo announced that forces in North China would be substantially increased. However, no definite figure was ever released. Refer footnote number 2 in Introduction.

\(^{49}\) *JFA*, SP205-6, *op cit*, p.536.
Kwantung Army by exerting military pressure on Peking, the seat of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. This was the context within which the Fengtai and Lukouchiao Incidents were conceived and executed as control of the two points along Peking's vital rail communication with Nanking and the sea would provide the Tientsin Garrison with a stranglehold over the local regime in Peking.  

Ironically, it was the failure of the Tientsin Garrison in taking possession of Lukouchiao that led to a sharp rise of its military strength, and this in turn led to a change of its intentions, resulting in the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.

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50 Fang Ch'iu-wei, "Lukouchiao shih-chien chih ch'ien-hou", in Shih-shih yueh-pao, August 1937, pp.73-84; Horiba Katsuo, Shina Jihen Sensō Shidōshi, vol 1, p.82.
CHAPTER II

Political Developments prior to the Establishment of the Provisional Government - July to December 1937

Growing Chinese national consciousness and continued Japanese expansion in China could not but lead to a headlong clash, but that this should be precipitated by the events of July 1937 was a surprise to all parties concerned. Not the least astonished were the radical elements in the Tientsin Garrison who had sparked off the Lukouchiao Incident. In scheming to take control of the strategically important bridge, and the equally important railway station bearing the same name nearby, the radicals of the Tientsin Garrison never anticipated meeting with staunch Chinese resistance. The weak Japanese forces which were deployed to take Lukouchiao but failed, could not possibly have been the vanguard of a well-planned invasion.¹

It must be borne in mind that the Japanese did not have a prepared blueprint for the subjugation of China. Japanese expansion in China followed the general trend towards the

¹ The Tientsin Garrison deployed only about one thousand men in the Lukouchiao area initially. This was increased to about two thousand men before reinforcements from outside of North China were promised. See Shina Shūtōgun Hohei Dai-ichi Rentai, 8th to 9th July 1937, "Lukouchiao fukin sento chōhō", in Misuzu Shobō, Nichū Sensō, vol 4, pp.335-352; Fang Chiu-wei, "Lukouchiao shih-chien chih ch'ien-hou", Shih-shih yüeh-pao, pp.73-84, pp.76-77.
search for East Asiatic hegemony and the scope of Japanese aspirations in China were not constants, they were rather variables which expanded with each successful move. When Colonel Wachi Takaji, the acknowledged leader of the Tientsin Garrison radicals, was recalled to Tokyo to account for what was happening in North China, he was still blissfully unaware of the magnitude of the critical situation which he and his colleagues had brought about. He asserted that the Tientsin Garrison could well handle the situation and even advised against the dispatch of military reinforcements to North China. He was obviously confident that the Chinese would give substantial concessions to settle the incident in North China and he did not want to share the laurels with the Tokyo Government.

Unexpected Chinese resistance at Lukouchiao precipitated a crisis on the Japanese side. The ill-equipped, ill-trained, and ill-disciplined troops of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army nevertheless represented a

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2 Wachi Takaji and 素芝二; JFA, SP161, Saionji-Harada Memoirs, p.1841: Hirota to Harada "...Wachi of the General Staff of the Tientsin Army returned to Japan and gave a report on the Tientsin Army. He objected strongly to the actions taken by the Government. The reason for this was that when the incident first arose, the Tientsin Army believed that it would be able to settle the incident...However, the Government became greatly alarmed and tried to pass a bill (resolution) in the cabinet to send three divisions there. When the Tientsin Army heard about this, they became very indignant over it...". Harada Kumao, op cit, vol 6, pp.50-51.
numerically formidable force of one hundred thousand men. The Tientsin Garrison was outnumbered ten to one and was therefore in no position to subdue the warlord regime of Sung Che-yuan in battle. Further, the possibility of Nanking military intervention in North China could not be ruled out. The danger was that the military in North China might suffer defeat at Chinese hands, actual or apparent, and such a defeat would damage the sacrosanct prestige of the Imperial Japanese Army, encourage the growth of anti-Japanese nationalist groups, and ruin the prospects for Japanese interests in the region. Neither the Government at Tokyo, nor the Kwantung Army at Hsinking, was willing to sit on the fence and watch developments. The two Japanese power centres outside of North China both decided to intervene, first to forestall any loss of prestige and second to forestall the Tientsin Garrison from monopolising Japanese influence in North China.

It was decided first by the Kwantung and Korean Commands, and soon after by the Tokyo Government, that substantial reinforcements should be sent to North China. The junior command at Tientsin was increased from an army

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3 For the numerical strength of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army, see Ch'in Te-ch'un, Ch'in Te-ch'un hui-i-lu, p.5, and Horiba Katsuo, Shina Jihen Sensō Shidōshi, p.87. For the numerical strength of the Tientsin Garrison, refer to footnote No. 2 of the Introduction.
of ten thousand to an imposing force of five full combat
divisions together with naval and air support and the
promise of more troops to come if need be. The initial
limited objective, that of making the Hopei-Chahar Political
Council more amenable to Tientsin Garrison dictates, thus
became outmoded. The increase in Japanese military
commitment made possible the conception of bolder objectives.

Events moved so fast that the reinforced
Tientsin Garrison had little time to reconsider its long
term objectives and the implications of a changed course
of action. Instead of increasing its influence over Sung
Che-yuan, the Tientsin Garrison decided on carrying out
a vendetta against the insolent Chinese Twenty-ninth Army
which had dared to make a stand at Lukouchiao and on
bringing about the ruin of Sung Che-yuan and his associates
as a political force for their failure in giving way to
Japanese pressure in time. With amazing speed the Japanese
Army occupied major railway centres and garrisoned important
strategic points. Military occupation, however, created
for the Japanese Army the problem of political control.
If the peasantry in the hinterland lying between the major

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4 For the dispatch of troops by the power centres outside
of North China, refer to footnote No. 5 in the
Introduction.

5 Shina Shūtōngun, 15th July 1937, "Shina Shūtōngun no
sakusen keikaku sakutei", in Misuzu Shōbō, Nicchû Sensō,
vol 2, pp.15-16.
railways had remained as passive onlookers, ready to accept any political structure that the Japanese conquerors cared to put up, the problem would have been comparatively simple. Basic troop shortage, however, ensured that Japanese military victories were never complete and were mainly limited to outflanking and dispersing opposing Chinese armies into the unoccupied hinterland. The peasantry could not avoid being involved in the war even if they had chosen to. The Japanese Army was thus faced with the problem of first setting up a political control system in occupied areas, second, extending this system to areas not under direct Japanese occupation but within striking distance of garrisoned strategic centres, and third, eventually bringing the entire land surface of North China under Japanese control.

At the same time as the Tientsin Garrison was tackling the problem of administration in occupied areas, the Garrison itself was being subjected to a thorough restructuring. At the end of August 1937 the Garrison was again reinforced and was renamed the North China Army (Hokushina Homengun). It was initially divided into three army corps, but this number was increased to four when the Mongolian Army Corps (Shūmōgun) was incorporated into the North China Army, (see Map 3) and the enlarged Japanese
Army in North China was flooded with new divisional commanders. Most of the divisional commanders brought with them only a skeleton force to supplement the full strength divisions dispatched by Tokyo. In military terms this was a move to prepare for the dispatch of more combat troops to North China at short notice should battle conditions dictate this. In structural terms, however, the new arrivals outnumbered and outranked the former Tientsin radicals in the decision-making body of the expeditionary army. In this way, a new military leadership was installed in North China by the Central Military authorities in Tokyo, presumably to forestall the erstwhile insubordinate radical elements at Tientsin from dragging Japan into another uncalled-for conflict in China.

The new leadership was not bound by any past objectives of the radicals of the Tientsin Garrison, and this in itself made policy changes in North China far less cumbersome than if the Tientsin radicals had retained a significant say in policy matters. Since the Tokyo Government had hoped for a more cautious attitude from the

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6 Hokushina Hōmengun 北支那方面軍 ; Shūmōgun 駐蒙軍 ; see Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, vol 2, p.22, for a list of the divisional commanders sent to North China by the end of July 1937. See pp.35-36 for the renaming and restructuring of the Japanese Army in North China; see also Bōeichō Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen, pp.25-26.
new leadership, it should have dispatched military leaders with a known moderate view on China policy. The Tokyo Government, however, wanted to create an impression that it was more forceful than the Tientsin radicals in the question of expanding Japanese interests in China and this led the Tokyo Government to dispatch military leaders with a known radical outlook, the new Commander-in-Chief, General Katsuki Kiyoshi, was appointed as a move to out-radical the radicals. It was simply pointless for Tokyo to expect that the new military leadership would practise restraint in North China.

The formation of a Japanese-controlled Chinese administration in North China was complicated by a simultaneous growth and reorganization of the Japanese Army in North China, and by the intrigues and struggle for control and influence in occupied North China among the Japanese themselves, not to mention the rivalries among Chinese collaborating groups and personalities. Since the Japanese Army was ill-prepared for political control over conquered territories, in general it was anxious to preserve the established socio-political order. Wherever possible, former officials and civil servants were reconfirmed in their posts, provided they were willing to take orders from

7 Katsuki Kiyoshi 香月清司; Hata Ikuhiko, Nicchu Sensōshi, pp.204-205.
the Japanese.

Sung Che-yuan did little to deny the invaders the use of the existing administrative structure, since, even after the Japanese Army had started full scale military operations, Sung still hoped for a negotiated settlement with the Japanese in which he and his associates could continue to play prominent roles. The speed with which the Twenty-ninth Army retreated from the Peking-Tientsin sector to Paoting showed that the move was premeditated and well planned. The Japanese started their offensive on 27th July; Sung withdrew his troops from Peking in less than two days. Presumably to prevent security leak, a body of troops stationed at the Southern suburbs of Peking was not informed about the withdrawal. Following a Japanese bombing raid on the barracks there, they fled in confusion. It is interesting to note that among them were over one thousand militant students who had recently joined the Twenty-ninth Army in its anti-Japanese defence. Heavy casualties among these students were reported. As militant

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9 Ch'in Te-ch'un, op cit, pp.11 and 180.
students had been a source of embarrassment to Sung in the
past, there is some question about Sung's motives in leaving
the students behind. The situation created by the lightning
withdrawal was more than the Japanese Army could handle and
it was not until ten days later that it succeeded in
muster ing three thousand troops to stage a triumphal entry
into the undefended city of Peking.\textsuperscript{10}

Troop withdrawal can easily be explained away
by strategic necessity, to concentrate forces at more
defensible positions in order to conduct a more effective
resistance. Such a line of reasoning, however, was not
supported by the political moves of Sung Che-yuan.
Administrative organs were not evacuated from Peking when
Sung pulled out his troops. Indeed, he saw to it that the
existing regional and municipal governing bodies should
remain in Peking to take charge of affairs pending Japanese
arrival. Accordingly he appointed General Chang Tzu-chung,
a trusted aide known to be on good terms with the former
Tientsin Garrison radicals, as Acting Chairman of the
Hopei-Chahar Political Council and Acting Mayor of Peking.\textsuperscript{11}
Sung realized that his power had been based on military
force and he left four regiments with Chang to strengthen

\textsuperscript{10} Chu Ching-hsin, \textit{op cit}, p.45; Lu Yueh-ming, \textit{op cit},
pp.58-59.

\textsuperscript{11} Ch'in Te-ch'un, \textit{op cit}, pp.20-21; Chu Ching-hsin, \textit{op cit},
p.42; Chang Tzu-chung 張自忠.
his hand in Peking. These troops were given only police functions and were given only militia status to make it clear to the Japanese that they would not be employed in battle. Chang's hand was strengthened further by the appointment of P'an Yü-kuei, an outspokenly pro-Japanese figure of long standing, as Chief of Police. Moreover, the loyalty of the police force, estimated at about six thousand strong, was reinforced by a personal gift of $30,000 from Chang and P'an. The alliance between Chang and P'an never materialised. The fact that P'an helped to establish a Committee for Public Safety in Peking (Peiching Ti-fang Chih-an Wei-chih-hui) to replace Chang's municipal government shows that P'an chose to oppose Chang instead.

The Nanking Government not only failed to condemn Sung Che-yuan for not conducting a more resolute resistance, but in fact welcomed the withdrawal of troops to Paoting by praising it as a necessary military move.

12 Chu Ching-hsin, op cit, p. 42. P'an Yü-kuei.
13 Pan Yü-kuei, Lukouchiao shih-pien-hou Peiching chih-an chi-yao, p. 5; Chu Ching-hsin, op cit, p. 45.
14 Ch'in Te-ch'un, op cit, p. 21, claims that the withdrawal to Paoting was directly ordered by Chiang Kai-shek. As this book is published in Taipei and this point has not been contested or censored by the Nationalist Chinese Government, there is no reason to doubt this claim. Further, Kuo-Fang yen-chiu-yuan, K'ang-Jih Chan-shih, p. 24, says that Chiang issued a statement at the time expressing his approval and asserted the move should have been taken earlier! As there was only an interval
Nor did the Nanking Government make a distinction between the military and political actions of Sung by making a separate objection to the continued existence of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council in Peking. Further, the fact that Chang Tzu-chung reported the failure of his peace efforts, not to Sung Che-yuan but to Chiang Kai-shek personally, seemed to indicate a certain degree of Nanking involvement in the affair. It is also significant that the warlord in Shantung, Han Fu-chu, should have been arrested and shot for failing to put up effective resistance, while Sung was allowed to retire quietly from public life.

The hope to use the Hopei-Chahar Political Council either as a channel for negotiation or as an administrative organ under Japanese occupation was not entirely unfounded. With no plans for organizing any occupation administration, the invading army did not disband.

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of two days between the commencement of full scale Japanese operations and the Chinese withdrawal from Peking, one cannot help wondering what Chiang was trying to say.

15 Ch'in Te-ch'un, op cit, pp.22-23, says that Chang Chih-chung was ordered by Sung Che-yuan to report directly to Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang received Chang and assumed personal responsibility for whatever Chang had done or had failed to do.

16 Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yuan, op cit, p.68; Ch'in Te-ch'un, op cit, pp.190-191; K'ang I-wei, K'ang-chan i-wen, pp.131-132; Chūō Kōron, Shina Mondai Jiten, appendix, p.42; Bōeichō..., op cit, p.41; Han Fu-chu 韓復渠.
the Council even after Peking had fallen into their hands.\(^{17}\)

The Council had been formed earlier under Japanese pressure and not a few of its members were in close contact with the Japanese military Special Service at Peking. If the Council could be fully controlled, there was no reason why its existence could not be continued under Japanese occupation. The Council, however, lost control in Peking to the Committee for Public Safety before Japanese troops entered the city. The new leadership of the Japanese Army in North China was possibly glad that a new body had emerged to replace the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, for the new leaders wanted a puppet regime of their own making and saw no need in reestablishing the authority of the defunct Council.

During the struggle between Chang and P'an for control in Peking, the latter seemed to have acquired tacit Japanese support, since, under Japanese pressure, Chang's military units were disarmed.\(^{18}\) This act strengthened the position of the police units under P'an vis-a-vis the

\(^{17}\) Bōeichō..., op cit, p.41. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council was dissolved on 20th August 1937 by Chang Tzu-chung, under Nanking Government authorization.

\(^{18}\) Chu Ching-hsin, op cit, p.42, says that Chang Tzu-chung was ordered by the Japanese to disarm his troops on 2nd August 1937. Chang stalled for as long as he dared, and finally complied with the order on 5th August 1937. That was also the day on which Chang fled Peking in disguise.
military units under Chang. Both Chang and P'an made
contacts with the Japanese Special Service chief in Peking,
Colonel Matsui, and requested the Japanese Army to spare
Peking, in return for declaring it an open city. Some sort
of agreement was arrived at as testified by the fact that
when Japanese military units appeared at the gates of
Peking on 5th August, Matsui complied with Chang and Pan's
request to have the troops withdrawn. 19

After his troops were disarmed, Chang Tzu-chung
lost his nerve and fled the city in disguise to avoid
detection. 20 Although his troops did not disintegrate, they
no longer counted as an effective political force in Peking,
and P'an was left in sole charge of security in Peking with
his police units. When Japanese troops eventually entered
the city on 8th August, they promptly disarmed Pan's
police units as well. However, robbery, arson, and the
many disturbances associated with a breakdown in normal
administration spread to Japanese residential areas and
this led the Japanese Army to re-issue the Chinese police
units with a portion of their former armament. Each police
station was issued fifty rifles, ten pistols, and ten bullets
for each weapon, but policemen had to account in detail for

19 P'an Yü-kuei, op. cit., p. 4; Chu Ching-hsin, op. cit., p. 42.
20 Ch'in Te-ch'un, op. cit., p. 22.
the use of every single bullet.\textsuperscript{21} The Japanese Army did not reward P'an for using his police units to secure Peking until Japanese troops arrived\textsuperscript{22} and P'an was astute enough to use his police units to surround and disarm the remnant military forces of Chang before the Japanese disarmed the police units.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, control over Peking fell from the hands of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council with the departure of Sung Che-yuan's main forces on 29th July. That same evening a group of merchants and municipal officials met to discuss ways and means of maintaining law and order in the city after the Chinese army had left. When the Hopei-Chahar Political Council sought to continue its rule in Peking the following day, the civic leaders who had come together did not see fit to allow the Council undisputed sway and proceeded to form a Committee for Public Safety to take over municipal functions. A formal inauguration ceremony was held on 30th July and was attended by over forty persons, including heads of departments in the municipal government, leaders of chambers of commerce, bankers, and members of the press. These showed where

\textsuperscript{21} Chu Ching-hsin, \textit{op cit}, p.45.
\textsuperscript{22} P'an Yü-kuei, \textit{op cit}, pp.6 and 10.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, p.15.
support for the new Committee were. It was headed by a
senile politician of Ch'ing vintage and included three
outspokenly pro-Japanese members of the Hopei-Chahar
Political Council.\textsuperscript{24} Chang Tzu-chung stayed on in Peking
until 5th August, watching power slipping away from his
hands.

As distinct from the Hopei-Chahar Political
Council, the Committee asked for no terms from the Japanese
Army and declared its sole interest to be that of maintain­
ing regular municipal functions and providing emergency
relief to refugees.\textsuperscript{25} It declared itself to be above
politics, which amounted to no more than a declaration of
no support for the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. That
this Committee was bent on pleasing the Japanese became
obvious from its hasty dismissal of one hundred and forty-
one municipal officials suspected of Nationalist Chinese
affiliations,\textsuperscript{26} and from its disarming of units of the
mutinous Tungchow police when they approached the walls of
Peking, expecting to join forces with the Twenty-ninth
Army.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.399.
\textsuperscript{25} Peiching Ti-fang Wei-chih-hui, Peiching Ti-fang Wei-chih-
hui Pao-kao-shu, inauguration declaration.
\textsuperscript{26} P'an Yü-kuei, \textit{op cit}, p.34.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid}, p.12
On 8th August 1937 the Committee opened the Peking city gates to welcome the entry of Japanese troops. As the Japanese had found the Committee very useful, they allowed it to continue in existence and expanded its functions by forming five sub-committees to provide a certain amount of administrative specialization. The sub-committees formed were: Social Welfare, Economy, Public Safety, Traffic and Culture, a list that reflects the major concern of the Japanese Army in Peking. The Committee thus became the self-appointed municipal government and had its position confirmed by the Japanese Army. It then proceeded to appoint its own mayor and renamed the city Peking. The new municipal authorities were supported mainly by the propertied classes and when they organized a "mass" demonstration in mid-August in support of the concept of an independent North China, the demonstrators drove around Peking in over one hundred private cars, in the fashion of a funeral procession.

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29 Peiching Ti-fang Wei-chih-hui, op cit, pp.1-2; Asahi Shimbun, August 1937, p.160.
30 JFA, S 1.1.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, pp.8584 and 8979; Asahi Shimbun, August 1937, p.301; Shina Jihō, vol 27, no. 5, November 1937, p.50. Before this date the city was called Peiping.
31 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.400.
Although the Japanese Army accepted the Peking Committee for Public Safety as the new administrative authority in the city in place of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, it did not extend the jurisdiction of the Peking Committee beyond the municipality. The Japanese Army also fostered similar local Committees for Public Safety elsewhere. These local Committees had little common interest between them, except that of competing against each other for the favour of the invading army. Before the North China Army had decided on the form of political structure it would give to its conquered territories the appearance of these local Committees were welcomed for two reasons: firstly, they helped to maintain local order, and, secondly, they represented rival Chinese groups which the Japanese Army could balance against one another. The most prominent rivals of the Peking Committee were the East Hopei Autonomous Government and the Tientsin Committee for Public Safety.

The 'spontaneous' appearance of puppet administrations in Peking and Tientsin was by no means coincidental. Prior to the Lukouchiao Incident the Japanese Army Special Service had three independent establishments in North China based at the cities of Tungchow, Peking, and Tientsin. These Special Service

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32 Boeichō..., op cit, p.41.
groups were responsible for organizing puppet administrations of their own choice in their respective sphere of influence. Each group hoped for a greater share of influence in an eventual administration for the whole of Japanese occupied areas, and the rivalry shown by the three Chinese puppet groups simply demonstrated the inherent rivalry of their Japanese manipulators behind the scenes.

Tientsin had been the Japanese headquarters in North China prior to the start of hostilities in July 1937. As Japanese troops entered the city, a Committee for Public Safety was formed under Kao Lin-wei to take over municipal functions. Kao's task was comparatively simple, as he encountered no rival faction in Tientsin and his Committee was formed after Japanese occupation and protected by Japanese military power from the start. The importance accorded to Kao's Tientsin Committee was seen in the formation of a Tientsin-Peking Liaison Committee in September as a first step towards establishing a local government for occupied Hopei.

Although Tungchow, capital city of the demilitarized zone, had a puppet government as early as


November 1936, its importance diminished after the puppet police units there staged a mutiny on 29th July 1937. The mutiny occurred when the puppet police units were ordered to assist the Japanese Army in disarming units of the Twenty-ninth Army stationed outside Tungchow. On hearing reports of Japanese reverses near Langfang, a railway junction between Peking and Tientsin, the Tungchow puppet police joined forces with the local Twenty-ninth Army units and attacked their Japanese officers instead. The mutiny was quelled within a day, but not before the Tungchow Special Service Chief, Colonel Hosoki, was killed and the puppet administrative structure wrecked.\textsuperscript{35} The Tungchow puppets had to start anew. They moved their base to Tangshan on the coast, and succeeded in reorganizing themselves by 10th August 1937.\textsuperscript{36} Even then the Tungchow group was sufficiently weakened by the experience for the Peking and Tientsin groups to give the Tungchow group lesser representation in the Liaison Committee.

The leaders of all three puppet groups were nonentities with no more than a very limited local appeal, and were not satisfactory puppets for heading either a provincial or a regional government. Further, they were

\textsuperscript{35} Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.46.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, pp.50-52; Tangshan 唐山.
too closely connected with the radical elements of the former Tientsin Garrison for the liking of the new Japanese military leadership of the North China Army. However, they were tolerated as de facto puppet administrators in occupied Hopei until the new Japanese leadership had secured the use of a new group of Chinese collaborators. Even then the Peking-Tientsin-Tungchow puppets were only jostled out of their strongholds and given minor positions.

The process of evolving a regional puppet administration in North China was further complicated by the efforts of the Kwantung Army and the Tokyo Government to gain influence over the eventual puppet structure. In a spirited statement made on 14th August 1937, the Kwantung Army made it known that it was in no mood for relinquishing its share of influence in North China either to the North China Army or to the Tokyo Government. The Kwantung Army reasserted its aspirations in North China and sought for an accommodation with the North China Army by proposing to set up a federated autonomous government in the five northern provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, Shantung, and Shansi. The proposed federation, however, was to have two political centres, one at Chiangchia-kou and the other at Peking, dominated by the Special Services of the Kwantung Army and the North China Army respectively.  

37 Kantōgun Shireibu, 14th August 1937, "Taijikyoku shōri yōkō", in Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, vol 2, pp.29-32.
statement was backed up by speedy action in the formation of autonomous governments in Chahar and northern Shansi, areas then occupied by units of the Kwantung Army.  

When the federation proposal was made, the Kwantung Army had control over two of the five provinces, Chahar and Suiyuan, while the North China Army had control only of Hopei. As the operational area of the North China Army expanded to the provinces of Shantung, Shansi and Honan, it was fast in establishing autonomous provincial governments in each province as well. The North China Army was probably insuring against the contingency that it might have to share power with the Kwantung Army over a federated regional government, as indicated by this attempt to create a greater number of North China Army controlled autonomous provincial governments. Or the process may reflect the splitting of North China into spheres of influence among the army corps of the North China Army itself. (See Map 3 for Army Corps zones)

38 Kantōgun Shireibu, 1st October 1937, "Mōkyō hōmen seiji kōsaku shidō yōkō", in Misuzu Shobo, Nicchū Sensō, vol 2, pp.120-126; Bōeichō..., op cit, p.47

39 Shantung had two Japanese power centres, Tsingtao and Tsinan. Tsingtao was a private preserve of the Navy and its puppets did not figure in the Provisional Government. Tsinan was the provincial capital and a Committee for Public Safety was formed on 29th December 1937. (see Asahi Shimbun, December 1937, p.462) Tsinan came under Provisional Government control officially in March 1938. (Shina Jihō, vol 28, no 4, April 1938, p.48) The Shansi
Meanwhile the Kwantung Army sought to extend its influence into occupied areas not directly under its own units. Early in August 1937 a number of experienced propaganda personnel from the South Manchurian Railway Company was transferred to North China to assist in the building of a political arm for the Japanese Army there. The Peace Pacification Corps (Sembu Han) was created mainly for securing roads and railways against enemy attacks by organizing Chinese civilian manpower in the countryside. It was part of the regular army with combined military, political, propagandist, and organizational functions. When members of the Corps encountered enemy forces they would fight, when they entered villages they would round up the local inhabitants to give them lectures and dramatic performances praising the cause of Sino-Japanese cooperation and heralding the invading army as saviours for an oppressed people. One of the most important tasks of the Corps was the establishment of Communication Protection Associations in country areas, laying the responsibility of railway

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autonomous government was formed at Taiyuan on 10th December 1937, but by April 1938 was still not officially under Provisional Government control. (Shina Jihō, vol 28 no. 1, Jan 1938, p.58; no. 6, June 1938, p.38) Honan autonomous government was formed on 27th November 1937, but only came under Provisional Government control in April 1938. (Shina Jihō, vol 28, no. 1, Jan 1938, p.57; no. 6, June 1938, p.38)

40 Fukada Yūzo, Shina Kyōsangun no Gensei, p.376; Bōeicho..., op cit, p.78.
protection on the shoulders of peasants living along the major rail lines. Kwantung Army influence within the Corps, however, diminished to minor proportions when the North China Army enlarged the Corps with its own personnel. Finally the Corps was disbanded altogether and elements loyal to the North China Army were incorporated into the political arm of the puppet administration, the Hsin-min Hui.

In contrast to the Kwantung Army, Tokyo's effort towards maximizing its influence in North China was extremely cautious. The War Ministry made a gesture to demonstrate that Tokyo was in control of affairs by issuing a directive

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41 Bōeichō..., op cit, pp.78-79. Senbu Han 宗武班.

42 Ibid, p.78. In January 1938 the Headquarters of the Peace Pacification Corps was moved to Peking where Kita could assert firmer control and new members were recruited from Japan Proper. Fukada Yūzo, op cit, p.376.

43 JFA, S 1.6.1.3-5, "Hokushi seikyō Shimmin-kai kankei", December 1939 to January 1944, pp. 7-19.

i) Consul-General Arino 蘇野 at Tsinan to Foreign Minister Nomura 野村, 11th January 1940, informing the Minister that officers of the Peace Pacification Corps opposed amalgamation with the Hsin-min Hui; 

ii) Tsuchda 土田, Secretary at Peking Legation, to Foreign Minister Arita 有田, 16th January 1940, saying that Wang Keh-min had assumed Chairmanship of the Hsin-min Hui;

iii) Consul-General Arino at Tsinan to Foreign Minister Arita, 3rd Feb 1940, informing the Minister that the Peace Pacification Corps would be amalgamated with the Hsin-min Hui on 1st March 1940.
on 12th August 1937 on the question of the formation of administration in North China. It instructed the overseas command not to assume the airs of a victor, to encourage local self-government, and to ensure maximum Chinese participation so that an independent North China which was friendly to Japan and Manchoukuo and which would help towards the realization of a Japan-Manchoukuo-China economic community would emerge. Because the contents were general guidelines, the military in North China could interpret the directive as it wished without challenging the authority of Tokyo. In short the directive did not provide a source of conflict.

Tokyo succeeded, however, in ousting the Tientsin radicals from control of affairs in North China by the introduction of a new military leadership over the Army in North China. Tokyo's caution was an uncertainty on its part as to whether the new leadership would take orders from Tokyo or adopt an independent stance of its own. The new leadership was unwilling to lean either on Tokyo support, or on the established Special Service groups at Peking-Tientsin-Tungchow, or on the borrowed political personnel from the South Manchurian Railway Company. Instead, the North China Army proceeded to form a new Special Service as its own political arm and General Kita Sei-ichi was appointed as the first Chief of the new

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establishment on 4th September 1937. \(^\text{45}\) The primary concern of the new Special Service was to establish a puppet administration for North China Army occupied territories and to ensure that this administration should be free from the influence of the former Tientsin radicals, the Kwantung Army, and Tokyo. Kita's immediate concern was to outmanoeuvre the Peking-Tientsin-Tungchow Special Service groups and their respective puppet groups, bring them under control, and introduce a new puppet group over their heads.

The choice of Wang K'e-min as the leading puppet figure is intriguing in itself. Wang was an able bureaucrat who had served in diplomatic and financial capacities in various Peking Governments and became a leading figure in North China soon after the Tangku Truce of 1933. A Political Council for North China was established in 1934 to devote full attention to negotiate with the Japanese military in Manchuria and North China. Wang K'e-min was the second man in this Council and was outspoken on the need for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. For a short time Wang acted as Chairman until the Council was replaced by the Hopei-Chahar Political Council late in 1935. Wang K'e-min sought to continue his political life, but was

\(^{45}\) Hokushina no Hōmengun Shireibu oyobi Sanbōchō, 4th and 6th September 1937, "Kita shōshō ni ataeru kunrei," in Misuzu Shōbō, Nicchū Sensō, vol 2, pp.41-42.
rejected by radicals in the Tientsin Garrison and was compelled to leave North China altogether. Kita contacted Wang K'e-min in Hong Kong and persuaded him to return to political life in North China. Kita's choice could only have been a deliberate attempt to show the radicals of the former Tientsin Garrison that he was not prepared to use the puppet figures of their choice. As opposition to Wang's nomination was expected, it was necessary for Kita and Wang to mobilize support before announcing that Wang was the leading man in the projected puppet administration in North China. Accordingly Wang paid courtesy calls on prospective supporters both in Peking and Tokyo. There is no record of the specific persons he called on, but his success indicated that the influence of the radicals in the former Tientsin Garrison had been swamped by the influx of new troops and new commanders since the China Incident, and that these new leaders supported Kita.

G.E. Taylor, in The Struggle for North China, has suggested that the North China Army was in a hurry to

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48 Ibid, p.19; W.V. Pennell, op. cit, pp.33-34.
establish the Provisional Government in Peking after Nanking had fallen into the hands of the Japanese Army in Central China, in order to establish the claims of Peking as the political centre for occupied China.\textsuperscript{49} North China Army political pretensions over occupied China are borne out by a North China Army Special Service feasibility report in October 1937, in which it was recommended that the new regime in North China should not be a local regime, but rather a national government to replace Nanking. It was argued that no prominent Chinese leader would agree to head a local regime, that establishing a local regime in North China would invite accusation of splitting up China, and that professing a reunification policy would help the new regime to compete successfully against the Nationalist Chinese Government on its own terms.\textsuperscript{50}

Wang K‘e-min arrived at Peking on 7th December 1937 and conferred secretly with Kita and other prospective members of the proposed puppet government already hand-picked by Kita.\textsuperscript{51} Within a couple of days agreements were

\textsuperscript{49} G.E. Taylor,\textit{ The Struggle for North China}, p.20.

\textsuperscript{50} Hokushina Hōmengun Tokumubu, 28th October 1937, "Hokushina seiken juritsu ni kansuru kenkyū", in Boeichō...\textit{, op cit}, p.44

reached among the puppet figures themselves on the spoils of office and the Provisional Government was formally established in Peking on 14th December 1937. Creation of the Provisional Government did not yet alter the established pattern of puppet administration in Peking-Tientsin-Tungchow and the Provisional Government under Wang K'e-min provided no more than a shadow cabinet whose functions and authority had yet to be acquired and defined. Indeed the Provisional Government had no operating offices until the beginning of January 1938. The immediate concern of the shadow government was to procure some financial resources and to exert control over the established puppet administrations in Peking-Tientsin-Tungchow.

Two days after the Provisional Government was established, it took control of the Customs Offices at Tientsin and Chinhuangtao. The annual returns from Tientsin were estimated at forty-two million Yuan and those of Chinhuangtao at one million and seven hundred thousand Yuan. Customs returns, however, had been undermined by Japanese protected illicit trade conducted openly through

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54 Asahi Shimbun, December 1937, p.246; Toa, vol 11, no. 3, March 1938, pp.34-38, "Chūka Minkoku Rinji Seifu no zaiseiteki kiso", p.34.
East Hopei ports. The East Hopei regime changed tariffs of about one quarter that charged at other North China ports and the Provisional Government cut its tariff rate to the 1931 level on 21st January 1938. This move pleased Japanese trading interests, made the separate existence of the East Hopei regime superfluous, and prevented further loss of Customs revenue to illicit trade practices. Customs returns were estimated to account for 46% of total government revenue in occupied North China.

Other major sources of revenue were the Salt and Consolidated taxes. North China is a major salt producer in China and the trade had long been organized under monopolies. The salt monopoly was initially taken over by the Kōchū Company, a Japanese company financed by the South Manchurian Railway Company started before the China Incident. In mid-1939 the salt monopoly was split into two in order to bring in fresh capital. This made tax collection simple and economical, but it also gave the

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57 Gaiji Keisatsu-hō, No. 189, April 1938, p.51.
58 Asahi Shimbun, January 1939, p.366, the Kōchū Company owned half of the salt monopoly, the other half was owned by Japanese salt merchants and Chinese financiers so as to bring in new capital.
59 Kuwano Hiroshi, Senji tsūka kōsaku shiron, p.68.
Japanese effective control over an important source of revenue during the occupation. The precise composition of the Consolidated Tax is unknown except that it included more than one tax item: income tax, tobacco tax, and wine tax are just a few of the items included.  

The Provisional Government, however, was not financed by taxation returns alone. The most important single source of 'income' was the indiscriminate printing of paper money. A Reserve Bank of China was formed with authority to issue notes, and these notes were given a value at par with Japanese Yen. Former legal tenders were to be collected by the Reserve Bank, and people in North China were given a period of one year to change their money into the new Reserve Bank currency. Given the fact that Japanese occupation was incomplete and that foreign banks at Tientsin did not recognize the Reserve Bank notes, it took a long time to establish the new currency as the main

60 Gaiji Keisatsu-hō, No. 189, April 1938, "Kōnichi dantai kikanshi ni keisai sareta 'tettei ka no Kahoku'", p.51.

61 Toa, vol 11, No. 3, March 1938, pp.64-69, "Chūkoku Rengō Jumbi Ginkō setsuritsu no igi", p.64.


medium of exchange in North China. Deficit financing and high prices encouraged an influx of Japanese imports into North China, and as a result Japan herself had to suffer much of the consequences of indiscriminate note issue in North China.

The Provisional Government had more money than it needed for dispensing with its low administrative costs. The 'surplus' was used to subsidize provincial governments and the costs of running the Hsin-min Hui. Subsidies given to provinces for police, relief, education and other activities helped to enhance the prestige of the Provisional Government, among local puppet administrative circles, as the central administration in North China. The Government could send its agents to check on provincial affairs and could put some mild form of financial pressure on local administrations. The tendency for the Provisional Government to centralize was later accelerated by the growth of anti-Japanese Chinese guerrilla resistance as this prompted the Japanese Army to rely more on its Chinese collaborators.

64 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, pp.35-59.
65 This point will be discussed further in Chapter V.
67 Asahi Shimbun, July 1938, p.392.
The immediate task for the Provisional Government leaders, after they had gained control over Customs revenue, was to oust the rival puppet figures in Peking-Tientsin-Tungchow and to take over their established administrative structures. This was done subtly by first confirming all key puppet figures in their present positions, and then manoeuvring the leading figure in each group out of position in turn. The police chief of Peking, P'an Yü-kuei, was promoted to become the Mayor of Tientsin. In accepting the appointment, however, P'an was made to give up his power base and relinquish effective control in Peking to the newly established Provisional Government. P'an attempted to rebuild a power base at Tientsin where he tried to effect a thorough personnel reshuffle designed to put as many of his personal nominees as possible into the Municipal Government. P'an was watched by the Special Service and his schemes were tolerated for four months before the Special Service stepped in and stopped P'an from making any more reshuffles. However, P'an was not required to dismiss the personal nominees he had put into office.

The Tientsin Municipal Government then was split into a pro-P'an and an anti-P'an faction, this balance gave the

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68 Asahi Shimbun, January 1938, p.63; P'an Yü-kuei, op. cit., p.275

69 JFA, SP205-6, History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police, China, September 1870 to December 1940, pp.8679-8681
Provisional Government opportunities to assert its authority over the Tientsin Municipal Government.

Kao Lin-wei, the erstwhile Chairman of the Committee for Public Safety at Tientsin, was promoted in similar fashion to become the Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government. In accepting this office he had to give up his control over affairs at Tientsin and he hoped to compensate this loss by appointing his supporters to high local administrative posts in the East Hopei area. East Hopei, however, had long had their puppet administration and the existing puppet figures would recognize Kao's authority only if he would confirm them in office. Kao agreed reluctantly, depriving himself of the power to make appointments within the provincial puppet administration. Without this power Kao was in no position to have a personal following. Soon he realized that he could not do much with his nominal position and submitted his resignation in March 1939.

The East Hopei regime was incorporated into the

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71 W.V. Pennel, "K'uei-lei chia-t'ing chung te hsing-hsing se-se", in Mei Jih I-pao, Hua-peî kuan-liao ch'un-hsiang, pp.54-58, pp.55-56.

72 Asahi Shimbun, March 1939, p.143, reports that Kao Lin-wei resigned as chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government on 10th March 1939. He was replaced by Wang I-tang 王偉唐.
Provisional Government after leaders of the two puppet groups had negotiated for a settlement and signed an agreement to that effect. Its former leader, Yin Yu-keng, was duly rewarded for his inability to prevent his own police units from massacring their Japanese officers by being moved from office and compelled to give a substantial voluntary donation to comfort the bereaved Japanese families. Chih Chung-mu acted as head of the East Hopei Regime, and was responsible for negotiating with the Provisional Government. After the East Hopei regime had lost its independent status, Chih was appointed chancellor of the Hsin-min Academy, an institution giving political reorientation courses to prospective Provisional Government civil servants. In effect Chih was being pensioned off.

The extension of Provisional Government influence to areas outside of Peking and the reestablishment of local district governments were carefully regulated by the North China Army. On 22nd December 1937 the North China Army


\[ W.V. Pennel, "K'uei-lei chia-t'ing ch'ung te hsing-hsing se-se", pp.57-58; Toa Dobunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.473. \]

\[ Asahi Shimbun, December 1937, p.298; G. Moresthe, "Ch'i-t'ung cheng-fu te shih-mo", in Mei Jih I-pao, Hua-pei kuan-liao ch'ūn-hsiang, pp.68-70, p.70. Chih Chung-mu \]
issued a document instructing its troops, the Special Service, and the Provisional Government on their respective roles in reestablishing local government. It was made clear that first priority had to be given to military operations and that the fighting units were to have the final say in all matters. The Special Service, however, was required to provide Japanese political guidance in the formation of local governments. The actual words used were 'internal control' (naimen shido). The actual administration, however, had to be Chinese and the Special Service was to encourage the growth of local Committees for Public Safety as a preliminary to reestablishing local government.

Whereas the North China Army had fighting units distributed all along major communication lines, the Special Service did not have an established political working force for organization work on the district level. The Special Service had to build this up from scratch, and its efforts consisted of individual appointments made by Kita at Peking for members of his staff to become Liaison Officers between Peking Headquarters and the individual districts concerned.

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76 Hokushina Homengun Shireibu, 22nd December 1937, "Gunshenkyō chi-iki chian iji jisshi yōrei", in Bōeichō..., op. cit., pp. 53-57, naimen shido 内面指導.

These Liaison Officers were responsible for the reestablishment of local government and as district governments were directly formed or brought under centralized control by the Japanese Special Service and not by the Provisional Government, Provisional Government authority did not extend downward in a vertical fashion. Instead, Provisional Government decrees could only be upheld by local administrations if they had been sanctioned by the Special Service in Peking and supported by district Liaison Officers on the scene. Local government personalities need not have any connection with the Provisional Government, but they must have support from the local Japanese Special Service agents. Thus the appearance of Japanese controlled local administration was not synonymous with the growth of Provisional Government power. The Chinese puppet administration was structurally highly decentralized.

The Special Service was instructed to disturb the established order as little as possible and not to form local Committees for Public Safety as a means to challenge the established local government needlessly. If the local administration was intact upon occupation, the Liaison Officer was to inform the Provisional Government to have the local officials reconfirmed in their posts and the Liaison Officer would stay on as advisor to the local government to ensure Japanese control. If local government
had disintegrated, then the Liaison Officer was responsible for finding a group of leading citizens willing to join the Japanese cause and to form a local Committee for Public Safety. If the local administrators were not subservient to Japanese wishes, the Liaison Officer would form a Committee for Public Safety to act as an opposition group to be established in power by the Japanese. The Provisional Government would then dismiss the local officials and appoint new ones from among members of the Committee for Public Safety to bestow a mantle of legitimacy on the new authorities. This was the pattern along which the Japanese Army intended to extend its control beyond the occupied areas to cover the whole of North China eventually.
CHAPTER III

Policy and Administrative Control

The efforts of the Japanese Army towards consolidating political control over North China were channelled through its Special Service and collaborating Chinese government and semi-government bodies. Japanese-sponsored administrative bodies were designed as instruments of Japanese political control. As the Japanese Army did not have control over all of North China, the collaborating bodies were also designed as instruments to assist in the spread and consolidation of Japanese control into 'unsecure' areas. Two of the basic objectives involved were the stabilization of internal conditions and the mobilization of conquered resources. This chapter deals with aspects of the Japanese effort in stabilizing internal conditions. Discussion is focussed on the policy-making process, formal and actual, and the administrative structure of the Japanese-sponsored indigenous regime. In other words, attention is focussed on the relations between Tokyo and the North China Army, and between the North China Army and its puppet regime in matters of policy and administrative control.

Basic manpower shortage dictated that the North China Army had to rely on its Chinese collaborators in
operating an indigenous administrative structure which would exert control over the populace at large. Continual efforts were made by the North China Army to minimize the degree of dependence upon its Chinese collaborators and, in doing this, certain principles and practices were observed. As a non-Japanese control structure, the Japanese-sponsored Provisional Government became in itself an object of control. As Japanese authority rested on military conquest, the first principle to be observed was the preservation of Japanese military dominance. This led to continual efforts at strengthening the prowess of the North China Army through troop increases, improvements in transport and communication facilities, and developing war industries in North China. As a corollary of maintaining Japanese military dominance, the Japanese-sponsored regime was initially denied the right to organize military forces of its own. However, this policy was modified later when internal security problems proved beyond the manpower resources of the North China Army to handle. Even then, puppet forces were limited in size and tightly controlled through Japanese military advisors and restrictions in arms supply. Secondly, 'divide and rule' was practised by fostering opposition cliques within the puppet leadership. Thirdly, the entire governmental structure was ridden with devices of check and balance. Fourthly, Japanese secret service personnel were installed
at every level of administration to provide Japanese supervision and control.

The structure of government in occupied North China inherited some of the traditional features of both the Chinese and the Japanese governmental system. The Japanese trait of a discrepancy between the form of government and the actual bodies wielding power, and the Chinese trait of a clear division between a formal government wielding power and a sub-government 'self-governing' stratum doing most of the administrative work involved in direct contact with the populace at large, were both reflected in the make-shift governmental structure arrived at between the occupation forces and their collaborators in North China. The Government in Tokyo held formal authority over the occupation forces, the North China Army wielded the substance of power in areas under its occupation. The Provisional Government, constantly shadowed by the Special Service of the North China Army, acted as the central government, while administrative details were carried out by a bureaucracy at the district level and the local gentry below the district level. The Japanese Army hoped to gain effective control over the populace through its control over a formal government in North China. The failure to govern was most prominent at the sub-district level where the Provisional Government, or its counterparts
at the provinces, had no effective police or military force to support the authority of the local gentry if and when opposition was encountered. Japanese troops were too heavily committed to garrison and battle duties to provide adequate support for internal security measures.

That part of the governmental structure most resembling the Japanese model was the machinery for policy-making, and this was to be expected in that the conquerors retained full control over policy decisions. In fact, policy-making in North China could not be divorced from the same process within the Japanese governmental structure; occupied North China was, after all, an extension of the Japanese Empire. In this context the highest formal policy-making body was the cabinet in Tokyo. The cabinet was divided into two main factions, representing military and civilian interests. The strong interest in politics shown by the Japanese military had deep historical roots. During the two hundred and fifty years of Tokugawa rule, the samurai class monopolized political power. The Meiji Emperor and his advisors therefore sought to forestall future meddling in politics by the military by depriving them of privileged social positions and their right to participate in political elections. After the inauguration of military conscription in 1873, the distinction between samurai and commoners ceased in theory to exist, though
most of the military leaders continued to come from the old samurai stock. But the feeling of separateness, based on class distinction before 1873, thereafter came to be based on function: members of the Army and Navy arrogated to themselves the moral and social superiority which the earlier samurai had claimed. The political pretensions of the military suffered a further rebuff in 1890 when an Imperial Ordinance granted the suffrage to all males over twenty-five years of age who paid a yearly national income or land tax of fifteen yen or more, but excluded servicemen along with priests, religious teachers, and the insane. ¹

As most cabinet posts were in civilian hands, in normal operation of the cabinet system civilian interests would have been expected to have the dominant say in policy matters. Moreover, this civilian dominance should have been reinforced by the fact that servicemen had no means of political expression through the electoral process. In practice, however, this was far from the case, as the military had found ways and means of redressing the imbalance through both constitutional and extra-constitutional means. Firstly, service ministers had to be appointed from

¹ Y.C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1930-1945 pp.17, 19, 21.
among generals and admirals on the active list. As they owed their position not to any election, they were not members of political parties and were free from party control. Although serving in a cabinet and forming only parts of a cabinet, service ministers could go over the head of the Prime Minister and report directly to the throne on technical matters. This constitutional provision, intended to retain military command for the Emperor, in practice meant that service ministers were responsible neither to the Prime Minister nor to the Legislature. Imperial approval, tacit or actual, made it impossible for the cabinet to reject proposals made by service ministers without challenging the principle of the divine right of the Emperor. However, cabinet approval of unpopular measures, presented to it as fait accompli by the service ministers, did not spare civilian cabinet ministers from censure by the political parties to which they belonged and by the Diet. The Japanese could not find a happy medium.

2 Ibid, p.25, "Before 1900 the War and Navy Ministers and Vice-ministers were not legally required to be generals and admirals on active duty. But the practice was made compulsory, at the instigation of Yamagata (Aritomo), in 1900, when these ministers were put under the authority of their respective chiefs of staff for operational purposes."; P.M.A. Linebarger, Far Eastern Governments and Politics, p.388; Shigemitsu Mamoru, Shōwa no Dōran, pp.106-107.

3 P.M.A. Linebarger, op cit, p.389; Shigemitsu Mamoru, op cit, pp.139-141.
between their professed conviction in the Divine Right of the Emperor and modern mass political representation in the Upper and Lower Houses of The Diet. The military had the opportunity to exploit the inherent contradiction in forcing the hands of their civilian colleagues in the cabinet by by-passing both the assemblies and the cabinet in gaining imperial sanction. Failing this, the services could engineer a political crisis at any time by advising their ministers to resign so as to force a new government into office, a government that was more amenable to pressure from the military than the one before. A proposed new government not acceptable to the military would find it impossible to fill the service ministries and thus unable to assume office. In the early 1930s Japan experienced political crisis after political crisis engineered in this fashion by the military.

If the cabinet system were to survive, civilian dominance within the cabinet system could not be insisted on. Attempts to reach a compromise solution were started

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4 Shigemitsu Mamoru, op cit, pp.144-145, the Army acquired a virtual veto on any cabinet as seen in General Ugaki's attempt to form a government. After Hirota's resignation subsequent to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Ugaki was asked to form a new government. The Army objected to Ugaki's moderate political view and refused to nominate an Army Minister for Ugaki, whereupon Ugaki failed to form a government; Y.C. Maxon, op cit, p.117.
by Hirota Kōki who arranged ministerial consultation among the key civilian and service ministers, namely the Foreign Minister, the Army Minister, the Navy Minister, the Finance Minister, and the Prime Minister. The form of consultation, however, varied each time and not all the five ministers listed were consulted on every occasion. Nevertheless, Hirota started in a modest way in the direction of building an inner cabinet. This ad hoc approach towards policy coordination between civilian and military interests served to maintain the cabinet system in comparatively smooth working order until after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.

The War brought the dialogue on modifying the cabinet system to the fore once again. The military pressed for a centralized agency taking charge of all affairs affecting China. They were asking firstly, for control over China policy formulation, and, secondly, for

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5 Hirota Kōki, 幸田弘毅; Misuzu Shobō, 毛利 愛, Sensō, vol. 1, pp.xxiii-xxviii, explanations on materials in the collection concerning Hirota's diplomacy and how he negotiated for support from the other ministries; Y.C. Maxon, op cit, pp.115-116.

6 JFA, S13.1.1.0-2, "Dai Tōa-shō setchi kankei ikken", Feb 1939-Aug 1945, p.7. The matter was brought up by the Cabinet Planning Board, a body under Army influence, in a formal submission to the Cabinet on 20th January 1938 for the establishment of a new ministry in charge of China affairs.
control over the various Japanese governmental agencies in China. The argument propounded was that the continued existence of separate Japanese governmental agencies in China, notably Foreign Office and overseas command establishments, served to make the execution of a common policy difficult, and that the proposed new agency should have control over the activities of all existing Japanese governmental agencies in China. As the proposal only included agencies dealing with cultural, political, and economic affairs in China, while military affairs were to continue to be under the charge of existing overseas commands, the proposal was no more than a thinly veiled attempt to take over the agencies of civil interests in China. Further, as the Foreign Ministry consular offices in China formed the bulk of these agencies under question, the move was strongly opposed by the Foreign Ministry, even when that portfolio was in the hands of figures outspokenly pro-military in other matters. The Foreign Ministry

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7 Shina Jiho, Vol 29, No. 5, November 1938, pp.2-3, an outline of the Army’s proposal, breaks down Army intentions into policy control in Tokyo and administrative control in China on matters concerned with politics, economics and culture.


countered with proposals for expanding existing consular establishments and increasing their budget provisions, on the ground that such expansion was necessary for enabling the consular offices to cope with the rapid increase of Japanese responsibilities on the China mainland. The Foreign Ministry desired to reap the political harvest of the Army's military successes and asserted that the military should concentrate their efforts in winning the war and leave the details on political, economic, and cultural reorganizations to the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry opposition to the establishment of a central agency in charge of China affairs benefited civilian interests in one significant way, it led the civil-military dispute to centre on the merits and demerits of putting existing Japanese governmental agencies in China under a new body and this resulted in lessening pressure from the military for a policy-control body on China affairs.

In this dispute for a greater share in controlling the increased Japanese interests in China, the Foreign Ministry eventually lost out. The civilian wing, however, was able to maintain its influence in policy-making within the cabinet by reaching a compromise solution with the military. Prince Kono, the Prime Minister,

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10 トータ道本裁, ダイニカイシンシンガセンセイヨラン, p.79.
simplified the cabinet policy-making structure by setting up an inner cabinet. The inner cabinet is generally known as the Five Ministers' Conference, as the Ministers of the Army, Navy, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and the Prime Minister participated in its deliberations. The balance was held by the Prime Minister, leading to a position where, if the services could have a military man serving as Prime Minister, the military would have preponderance in policy decisions within the inner cabinet. Rivalry between the Navy and the Army, however, enabled the civilian wing to exert more influence within this inner cabinet and as such it was not a satisfactory arrangement for the Army.

The Army, particularly the overseas commands, was not willing to share control over occupied territories in China with the civilian wing in the cabinet. Consequently, the military continued to press for the establishment of a new body in charge of China affairs. This led the civilian wing to make further concessions, culminating in the establishment of the China Affairs Board (Kōain) in December 1938. The Board was attached to the

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11 Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿; Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.6.

12 Kōain 興正院; Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.82, Agreement on principle on the establishment
Prime Minister's office, giving a semblance of civilian control. It was charged with the duty of implementing Japanese policies in occupied China concerned with politics, economics, and culture. All governmental agencies in China were placed under the Board with the exception of consular offices, which had much of their power and function reduced. The consular offices had to restrict their activities to "purely diplomatic" (jungaikō) matters and were forbidden to engage in political, economic, and cultural affairs in China. By sacrificing Foreign Ministry interests, the civilian wing managed to retain formal policy control.

That the service ministers tolerated such a compromise was not surprising, since the formal policy-making body was not in actual control of policy implementation. This was particularly true in policies concerning China, for military commands overseas, starting with the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, had become insubordinate and they had come to practise policies of their own in the regions under their command. These overseas commands

12 Cont'd
of the Kōain was reached on 1st October 1938. The matter was then left at the hands of the Legislative Bureau for drafting detailed organic legislative provisions; p.86, The Kōain was formally established on 16th December 1938.

13 Shina Jihō, Vol 30, No. 1, Jan 1939, p.81; Jungaikō.
asserted that as ministers in Japan were away from the scene of action, they were not in the best position for forming sensible policies. They also asserted that, being actually on the scene of action and being professionals practising their trade, the overseas commands should be the ones to give the best 'advice' to the cabinet on what should be done. They argued that the cabinet should follow such advice with alacrity to repay the sincerity and patriotism of its military forces overseas and to give these forces the maximum support from Japan. The overseas commands asserted their independence not only of the cabinet as a whole, but also refused to acknowledge commitments made by service ministers within the cabinet as binding on the overseas commands. Their independent stance was reflected by the political and economic policies of the North China Army. The creation of a national government in Peking theoretically independent of Japan established a legal position for the North China Army to veto Tokyo decrees in North China. The slogan "to sustain war with war" expressed the desire of the North China Army to become self-supporting, relying on the resources of occupied areas to sustain the war effort.

Service ministers, that is the central military authorities, were placed between civilian interests and overseas military commands. Central military authorities
were anxious both to exert a preponderant influence within the cabinet system and to reassert centralized control over Japanese troops overseas. Thus in every major policy dispute we find at least three opposing factions: the overseas commands, the central military authorities, and civilian interests. In the case of China policy formulation, the North China Army was successful in first precipitating a war and then in dragging the rest of the policy-making factions into the foray and bringing Japan as a nation into war with China. However, committing Japan to war with China did not mean a complete change in the policy-making process and future actions would continue to be hampered by the cumbersome and complicated power relations among the three factions. In war time the military wanted a drastic change in the policy-making structure so that military operations would not be unduly hindered; the logic was that the military should have undisputed control. Civilian interests were of course opposed to such a line of reasoning and wanted to avert any dialogue on the issue as long as possible till conditions warranted civilian claims for more effective policy control. Civilian evasion, however, had to fall short of endangering the very existence of the cabinet system.

Prior to the establishment of the China Affairs Board, the army secret service, or the Special Service
according to Japanese terminology, had actually taken over control in political, economic and cultural affairs in China. There was little point for the Foreign Ministry to continue a purely academic argument that it should have control over the same affairs in China. Consular offices were at best duplicating some of the functions of the Special Service. For this reason the Foreign Ministry found the other civilian ministries willing to sacrifice Foreign Ministry interests in China for a compromise with the military. Foreign Minister Ugaki Kazusuke, who realized that it was futile to protest against the proposed establishment of the China Affairs Board, remained silent during deliberations in the Five Ministers' Conference, and could do no more than resign so as to register Foreign Ministry dissent. The decision to establish the China Affairs Board was passed by the Five Ministers' Conference after Ugaki's resignation and before the next Foreign Minister came into office. In short, the Foreign Ministry was ignored. Nevertheless, strong Foreign Ministry opposition made it necessary to lower the status of the proposed agency from ministry to board. The nominal status of the new agency, however, did not reduce its real share in policy

14 Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.81-82
Ugaki Kazusuke, Ugaki Nikki, p.323.
decisions over China, for, as the Five Ministers' Conference continued to be the highest policy-making body, that body was joined by the Director of the China Affairs Board whenever policy matters concerning China were being discussed.  

The Five Ministers' Conference became the 'Six Ministers' Conference' as from December 1938 with the establishment of the China Affairs Board.

In this way the creation of the China Affairs Board effected fundamental changes in both the policy-making inner cabinet in Tokyo and the policy-execution governmental agencies overseas. The only part of the Board that was new, however, was its office in Tokyo. Board branches in Mongolia, North China, Central China, and South China were not new establishments at all; they were only the former army secret service in each locality renamed. That these offices were only nominally under the new Board in Tokyo was recognized by the new establishment itself as indicated by the fact that these offices were not called

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15 *Asahi Shimbun*, December 1938, p.231, quoting an interview with Itagaki Seishirō, Army Minister, during which Itagaki said that when matters concerning China policy came up, the Five Ministers would call the Kōain chief to join in discussions; *Shina Jihō*, Vol 30, No. 1, January 1939, pp.81-83.

16 *Tōa Dobunkai*, *Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran*, pp.89-92, these were not formally established until 1st March 1939 after special financial allocations had been made by the Cabinet. The heads of these branches were the Special Service chiefs and the Special Service was formally abolished.
branches, but simply titled Liaison Offices (Renrakubu). They were channels of contact between the China Affairs Board in Tokyo and the overseas commands in China. The China Affairs Board was therefore no more than a channel for the overseas commands to make their views known to the highest formal policy-making body in Tokyo. Thus the Tokyo Government had the satisfaction of retaining formal policy control and the overseas commands succeeded in voicing their views to the cabinet without going through the service ministries before formal policy decisions were made public. The arrangement thus facilitated the execution of policies arrived at by the overseas commands; they could be given formal approval by Tokyo to maintain a facade of centralized control so as to minimize friction between Tokyo and the overseas commands. Elevation of the China Affairs Board to ministry status by Tōjō Hideki in 1941 to become the Ministry of Greater East Asia (Dai Tōashō) affected little change except that the new Ministry could concern itself with all East Asian affairs instead of only in China affairs and became a channel for a greater number of overseas commands than before to express their views to the cabinet.

17 Renrakubu 连络部.
18 Mi Chien (translated), "Ta Tung Ja Sheng she-chih te i-i", in Hsin Tung Ja, Vol 1, No. 4, November 1942, pp.8-13.
Chart 1: Policy-making Structure

What is more important, as far as North China was concerned, was not how formal authority was bestowed on policies within the Japanese political structure but how were policies arrived at and executed within North China itself by the Japanese Army and its collaborators. That is to say how did the North China Army arrive at policy decisions on political, economic, and cultural affairs, and how were these policies put into practice, granting that the Army itself was mainly occupied with military details. As far as Tokyo was concerned, the problem was how to infiltrate these policy-executing bodies under the North China Army and how to influence policy decisions in North China.
The China Affairs Board, or rather its Liaison Offices in China, was basically a coordinating body, created for the purpose of coordinating policy decision and execution by the various Japanese organizations in China. These organizations were all put under the Liaison Office, but as far as possible their former staff and functions were retained. Centralization under the Liaison Office was designed to do away with duplication and internal conflict. Its main function was not to build up inter-regional liaison and thus bring about coordinated national policy throughout the Japanese occupied territories, but rather to build up intra-regional liaison. Coordination was effected at internal conferences convened by each individual Liaison Office, attended by members of its own staff. As its staff was drawn from the various Japanese organizations under the China Affairs Board, the conferences became a kind of de facto representative body on which all Japanese interests in the region could be represented.

In theory the China Affairs Board Liaison Office

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19 JFA, Sl3 1.1.0-1, "Zaishi Teikoku gyōsei kikan no seiri tōgō mondai ikken", August to October 1941, pp.62-63, Kōain and Cabinet decision, dated 12th August 1941.

20 Bōeichō Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen, pp.106-109, the North China Army could have its own officers participate directly in these conferences as well.
conferences decided on policies and instructed the relevant Japanese bodies in China to execute such decisions. In fact, however, the Army command of the region decided on policy, instructed its Special Service, which was in control of the Liaison Office, to communicate the policy decisions to the other members of the Liaison Office through the deliberative conferences. The conference then 'decided' on the policy decisions, and instructed the relevant body for execution. This meant that through the Liaison Office conferences the Army command gained control over the services of formerly independent Japanese governmental agencies in China. This included a substantial part of the consular offices as their personnel formerly working on political, economic and cultural affairs were absorbed by the Liaison Office and the depleted consular offices were restricted to pure diplomacy, meaning possibly only matters of protocol. It was for this reason that the Foreign Ministry objected to the establishment of the China Affairs Board. The creation of the China Affairs Board served to put a thin veil over the exertion of Army control over Japanese civil agencies in China, while reserving a certain amount of self-respect for non-Army organizations by encouraging them to believe that they shared in the policy-making process and that they were not acting under Army orders.
Army intelligence service personnel not only formed the main body of the China Affairs Board Liaison Offices, but were also in charge of establishing puppet administrations. The China Affairs Board Liaison Office was therefore the controlling agent for the North China Army over both Japanese governmental bodies in China and Chinese administrations sponsored by the Japanese. For this reason the Tokyo Government had tried to gain control over the Army's intelligence service in North China soon after the China Incident, but Tokyo's efforts met with little success. The North China Army which superceded the Tientsin Garrison in August 1937 did not have a Special Service establishment of its own. The existing Special Service establishment in North China had three independent centres, situated at Peking, Tientsin, and Tungchow. All three branches were closely associated with the radical elements of the superceded Tientsin Garrison whose power and influence the new leaders of the North China Army had inherited. This close association made the North China Army reluctant to base its Special Service on those facilities than existing in Peking, Tientsin, and Tungchow. However, the North China Army felt a compelling need for a Special Service to take care of the details of an occupation political settlement. Accordingly a new Special Service was established with the appointment of General Kita Sei-ichi as its first chief in September 1937.
He was specifically instructed by the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the North China Army to employ his new establishment for the creation of puppet administrations in occupied North China.\(^{21}\) The North China Army, however, did not give its own Special Service unlimited authority in arranging an occupation political settlement and the Special Service was required to obtain approval from every local commander when puppet administrations at the provincial and district levels were to be formed. The Special Service was told specifically that local commanders had the final say in any matter concerned with military operations.\(^{22}\) During war time everything was concerned with military operations in one way or another and this provision reserved the right of veto for the military leaders of the North China Army should the Special Service try to scheme for power.

The North China Army was not without a certain amount of internal division. Before the outbreak of war in July 1937 the military in North China was a well-knit self-contained policy-making unit. It had the benefit of being

\(^{21}\) *Ibid*, pp.41-42.

\(^{22}\) *Hokushina Hōmēgun Shireibu*, 22nd December 1937, "Gunsenkyō chi-iki chīan iji jisshi yōryō", in Bōekichō, *op cit*, pp.53-57. Section three, sub-heading three in particular, on relations between army units and the Special Service.
a small force concentrated in the two cities of Tientsin and Peking. This meant that Japanese officers in command of troops in North China stayed close together, maintaining frequent personal contact and constant exchange of views on current political problems in North China. In July 1937 Tokyo could identify the Tientsin radicals and their leader Wachi Takaji, and could be certain that they had engineered the Lukouchiao skirmish. Indeed, Tokyo hoped to forestall the situation from worsening simply by recalling Wachi for a few days as this would deprive the Tientsin radicals of their leader at the most critical juncture. Wachi foiled Tokyo's scheme by flying in and out of Tokyo instead of taking the expected slow sea voyage back to Japan.  

The increase in Japanese military commitment and the injection of a new military leadership in July and August 1937 radically altered the policy-making core of the military in North China. The Tientsin radicals were ousted and replaced by new men known for radical views, and the new leadership had the use of a far larger body of troops for putting their views into practice. The reinforced North China Army was more affirmative on the merits

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of forcing a quick solution in the field of battle than the Tientsin Garrison. The new leadership, however, was split into three groups by precautions taken by the civilian and military authorities in Tokyo. The North China Army was split into three army corps, each with its own troops and its own territory to guard. (see Map 3) As military and political problems of each war zone differed, the needs and aspirations of the three component army corps necessarily differed also. The nature and extent of such internal rivalries remain to be examined.

Further, the North China Army competed with the Central China Army and the Kwantung Army for influence in occupied China. Conflicts between Japanese overseas commands were most prominent at points where their armies met. A notable example was the conflict of interests between the North China Army, the Kwantung Army and railway guards of the South Manchurian Railway at Kupeikou, a railway junction between North China, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. In this particular case the extent of jurisdiction of the three Japanese authorities had to be determined in a negotiated settlement in which the duties and functions of the troops of each within the city were defined.²⁴ The differences

²⁴ JFA, "Kupeikou Eki torishige kyōtei", (effective from 1st Jan 1939), in SP205-6, History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police: China, September 1870-December 1940, pp.922-924
existing within the North China Army were of a lesser magnitude and this may be accounted for by the continued existence of a North China Army General Staff where field commanders of all its component army corps did meet to discuss military, political, and any other problems in occupied North China. The existence of rival commands in Manchuria and Central China, and the continued efforts of Tokyo to increase its influence over Japanese troops overseas, were factors that helped to hold the army corps in North China closer together. Common rivals and enemies helped to foster a sense of comradeship.

Although the Japanese retained policy control in North China, they had to depend on their Chinese collaborators to carry out administrative functions. The Provisional Government established in Peking and the provincial governments established in Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, and Honan were instruments of control through which Japanese dictates could be exerted on the populace in occupied territories. As instruments of control, the puppet administrations were also objects of control. Their creators, the North China Army and its Special Service establishment, had to be careful that the 'pro-Japanese' regime they had set up would not and could not repeat the performance of either the Hopei-Chahar Political Council or the East Hopei Autonomous Government. The former tried to play Nanking
against Japan so as to acquire some degree of freedom, the latter failed to exert effective control over its own police forces which rose in revolt and massacred local Japanese residents and military advisors. Control over the puppet administrations was provided in the structure of government, in the balance of rival political cliques, in the provision of a Japanese advisor system, in the retention of financial control, and, in the last analysis, in unchallenged military power.

The Japanese-sponsored Chinese central administration for North China established in December 1937 was meant to establish the claims of Peking as the political centre for the whole of occupied China, to dispel the hopes of Chinese monarchists for a Manchu restoration in China, and to make a clear distinction between the puppet government under Kwantung Army control and that under the North China Army. The Provisional Government of the Republic of China was established in Peking immediately after the fall of Nanking. It was set up as a national government to replace the Nationalist Chinese Government at Nanking even though the authority of the North China Army did not extend beyond the theatre of war assigned to its charge, that is, the general area north of the Yellow River and south of the Great Wall. The form of government for the new puppet regime was declared to be republican. Moreover, the formal establishment of the Provisional Government preceded the
start of administrative functions by the same government by more than a fortnight.\textsuperscript{25} The haste of establishment was evidently dictated by political considerations of the North China Army rather than by any imminent administrative needs of occupied areas.

After the fall of Peking, Chinese monarchists became hopeful of a Japanese-sponsored Manchu restoration. The former Manchu Emperor had gone to Manchuria in 1931 to collaborate with the Kwantung Army in anticipation of Japanese support for the restoration movement.\textsuperscript{26} The Kwantung Army, however, only made him Chief Executive of the Republic of Manchoukuo. This was presumably a move to quieten fears of Kwantung Army designs on Chinese territories south of the Great Wall and to lessen international censure. Manchoukuo, however, was renamed Manchoutikuo or the Manchu Empire in March 1934, at a time when the Kwantung Army had started expanding its influence in the direction of North China.\textsuperscript{27} The establishment of a republican form of government in Peking in 1937 ended any false hopes which Chinese monarchists might have been entertaining.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, December 1937, 30th December 1937, Peking: 
"...After careful considerations on finance, the Provisional Government started a few administrative offices on 1st Jan 1938".

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Aisin Gioro Pu Yi, Wo-ti Ch'ien-pan-sheng}, pp.252-295.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, pp.319-322.
The North China Army had grown under the shadow of the Kwantung Army and was therefore anxious to show that its occupation of North China was by no means an extension of the influence of the Japanese military in Manchuria. Subscribing to a Manchu restoration in North China would strengthen beliefs that the influence of the Kwantung Army was strong and that North China and Manchuria might be brought together under one common political control system as part of the grandiose Japanese dream for a Manchu-Mongolian revival under Japanese sponsorship. The establishment of a republic in Peking thus also helped to dispel Kwantung Army hopes for any measure of control in North China.

The assertion of independence from the Kwantung Army was accompanied by a desire to extend the influence of the North China Army to all occupied China south of the Great Wall. For this reason the Provisional Government was created to replace Nanking as the new national government of China. A rationale which had been put forward to justify the invasion was that the Nationalist Chinese were abusing political power by instituting a party dictatorship at Nanking. This dictatorship was said to be adverse to the interests of the masses of the Chinese people, in that the Nationalist Chinese were helping to foster Communist and Western Imperialist influences in China to the detriment
of the well-being of East Asian culture and Sino-Japanese friendship. The Japanese portrayed their military expedition as a modern crusade aimed at the salvation of both the Chinese people and East Asian cultural heritage from oppression and impending ruin under Nationalist Chinese rule. The war was therefore called a 'holy war' (seisen) and the establishment of the Provisional Government was explained as part of the promise of building a true democracy in China and was in itself intended as a demonstration of Japanese goodwill. The North China Army was in effect trying to distinguish between a legitimate and an illegitimate republican government, claiming legitimacy for its Peking creation. This line of reasoning led the North China Army to copy the essential features of the structure of government of the Nanking Government. The Japanese had come to eradicate party dictatorship; the Chinese governmental structure, in theory, was not under attack.

The principle of the separation of powers, so strongly advocated by Dr Sun Yat-sen as a safeguard against

28 Bøeichō, op cit, p.45.

29 Seisen or Holy War can also be interpreted as simply a war commanded by the Japanese Emperor. As the Emperor is of Divine Origin, his acts are also holy, hence the Emperor's war becomes synonymous with Holy War.
despotism, was adopted openly.\(^{30}\) The Provisional Government, under a head of state, was to have three separate and independent arms: the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. The position of head of state, however, was never filled and no one Chinese collaborator was allowed the chance to build up a personal reputation as the real or apparent leader of the entire puppet government. Indeed, the North China Army took great pains to institute actual collective leadership within the Provisional Government and, consequently, the three separate arms were each headed by a committee. The Provisional Government was therefore headed by the Executive Committee, the Legislative Committee, and the Judiciary Committee.\(^{31}\) The Executive Committee was then divided into departments, and the departments into bureaux. The administrative structure was labelled as a Committee-department-bureau system.\(^{32}\)

The three Committees not only provided positions for the puppet leadership installed by the North China Army, but also provided nominal posts for puppet figures of the Tungchow-Peking-Tientsin groups who had been ousted in favour of the new leadership group. Membership in the

\(^{30}\) Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.404.

\(^{31}\) Ibid, p.404.

\(^{32}\) Ibid, pp.408-423, "Gyōsei Iinkai Sōshiki Taikō" 行政委員會組織大綱.
Committees was divided into executive and ordinary members. The new puppet leaders were given executive membership, ousted figures were given ordinary membership. The distinction meant that ordinary members were not involved in the day-to-day affairs of government.

The Committees also served to distinguish three persons from among the puppet leadership as of equal status, namely the chairman of each of the Committees. This was a device to ensure that no one puppet figure could become the de facto head of the Chinese collaborators and that collective leadership would not be impaired.

The principle of the separation of powers was observed only in form. The three separate Committees were not of equal importance in terms of function and as most of their members held membership in all three Committees, the Committees could hardly be called separate. Checks and balances had to be found in the structure of the Executive Committee and in the presence of opposing cliques within the puppet leadership. In fact multiple membership enabled the Executive Committee to assume administrative, legislative and judicial functions.

The Executive Committee was split up into a number of independent departments: Administration, Security,

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33 Ibid, p.405.
34 Ibid, pp.404-405.
Each executive member of the Executive Committee headed one of the departments, forming the power base of each within the puppet leadership. Since the power of appointment to posts in the Executive Committee was not exercised by the puppet group, continuation in office for each individual member depended upon Japanese support. This meant that the department heads were responsible individually to the Japanese overlords and the Executive Committee was no more than a coordinating organ for the various departments. Individual responsibility to the Japanese was modified slightly by Wang K'e-min, the first chairman of the Executive Committee, who succeeded in gaining a loose personal ascendancy within the puppet leadership through cordial relations with his colleagues and a financial hold over the various departments. He retained for himself the headship of the Administrative Department, the department which was in control of Provisional Government finance.

Nonetheless, there was no way for the Committee to enforce its decisions on any one department should the department head choose to disagree with the majority decision. This inbuilt right of dissent meant that the puppet leaders

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would have to depend upon Japanese arbitration and support to make final decisions for them should any disagreement arise among themselves. Proposals with Japanese support could override the Executive Committee, as the Japanese retained the power of appointment to the Committee posts. The Committee and its departments were closely watched by Japanese advisors throughout.  

Included in the small puppet leadership group were politicians with a known anti-Nationalist Chinese past, and these people themselves belonged to two political cliques in particular: the Anfu and the Chihli cliques. Politicians of these two cliques did not distinguish clique lines very clearly and not a few of the puppet leaders had served in various capacities under governments of both cliques. Wang K'e-min was known to be associated with the Chihli clique and his moderate success in gaining a personal ascendency within the puppet leadership defeated Japanese attempts to prevent the emergence of any one

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37 Bōeichō, op cit, p.75. The North China Army and the Executive Committee of the Provisional Government signed a Treaty of Sino-Japanese Mutual Assistance in Political Affairs (Nichi-ka seiji josei kyōtei 日朝政治助成協定) on 27th April 1938, which allowed Japan to provide all necessary personnel as advisors to the Provisional Government on administrative, judicial, military, internal security, and police affairs. It was stipulated that Chinese officials will not carry out measures not previously approved by the Japanese advisors: see also Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.465.
person within the puppet leadership as the accepted leader of the group. Failing to balance the three Committee Chairmen against each other, the North China Army tried to balance the puppet leadership on clique lines. For this reason Wang I-T'ang, a known sycophant and a staunch Anfu man, was used to oppose Wang K'e-min. Wang K'e-min relinquished office subsequent to the formation of Wang Ching-wei's government in Nanking, for his sympathies were with Wang Ching-wei, and Wang I-t'ang succeeded him as the chairman of the North China Political Council. The Council was the body that replaced the Provisional Government after Wang Ching-wei's government was formed at Nanking.

The Provisional Government was only nominally the central government for the whole of occupied North China, for provincial, circuit, and district governments were, for the most part, formed without reference to the puppet leadership in Peking. On the local level, the authority of the Provisional Government went hardly any further than the walls of Peking. Even local governments in the environs of Peking and Tientsin, and in the East Hopei area, were possibly outside Provisional Government control, as district chiefs there had been appointed before

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the establishment of the Provisional Government. This was the result of circumstances rather than choice, for immediately after the fall of the Peking-Tientsin sector to Japanese troops, the Committees for Public Safety in Peking and Tientsin started appointing or confirming former district chiefs in their posts. However, the pattern was set, and district and provincial governments further away from the Peking-Tientsin sector were established by the Special Service by the use of local leadership groups unconnected with the puppet leadership in Peking. These local officials owed no loyalty to the Provisional Government and, as they collected their own taxes, were subjected to little control from Peking. They were responsible to their Japanese supporters and not to the Provisional Government, whose authority was only recognised nominally. However, orders sanctioned by the Japanese high

39 Peiching Ti-fang Wei-ch'ih-hui,, Peiching Ti-fang Wei-ch'ih-hui Pao-kao-shu, section on Local Government (Ti-fang sheng-cheng地方行政) for details of local government appointments and formation of local committees for public safety in Hopei province before establishment of the Provisional Government; W.V. Pennel, "K'uei-lei chia-t'ing ch'ung te hsing-hsing se-se", in Mei Jih I-pao, Hua-pei kuan-liao ch'un-hsiang, pp.53-58.

40 Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 20th April 1939, "Chian shukusei yōkō", in Bōeichō, op cit, pp.116-124, Section 1, article 10, "Provincial, circuit, and district officials are appointed at the advice and guidance of the Special Service Chief."; Tōa Dobunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.423-425, "Shōkōshō soshiki taikō省公署組織大綱, article 8."
command and passed out in the name of the Provisional Government had to be obeyed. But orders sanctioned by the Chinese leadership without reference to the Japanese Army had little chance of being implemented. This ensured that measures detrimental to Japanese interests were unlikely to be acted on by the puppet administration.

Local government also adopted a three-tiered structure: province, circuit, and district. The formation of local government subsequent to occupation started at the district level. Puppet district governments were formed either by confirming existing Chinese officials in their office, or, if the officials had either fled or were not acceptable to the Japanese, by establishing local committees for public safety in which willing collaborators were included. Provincial governments were formed without any reference to the puppet leadership in Peking. Indeed, provincial governments were declared to be autonomous individually and their allegiance to the Provisional Government was declared after the autonomous provincial governments had been in existence for some time even though the Provisional Government was then already in existence. The circuit as an administrative unit had

41 For examples, see Peiching Ti-fang Wei-ch'ih-hui, op cit, section on Local Government.

42 Toa Dobunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp. 474, 481-484,
been abolished by the Republic, but was revived by the Japanese Army in North China. This was possibly a move to lessen the influence of provincial governments on the district and sub-district levels: Both the provincial and circuit governments did not have any direct contact with the populace. The most important tier in the local government structure was therefore the district. The primary concern of district administration was rural control. The economic, police, and military aspects of rural control will be discussed in Chapters VI and VII. Discussion on this problem here is confined to the administrative aspect.

Eighty per cent or more of the population of North China were peasants living in villages. The Japanese strategy of first striking at urban centres and communication lines inevitably left the countryside and the peasantry at the fringe of their political, economic and military thinking. In fact manpower shortage compelled the Japanese Army to ignore the countryside except where immediate military considerations were involved.

Japanese occupation of urban centres and

42 Cont'd
on details of the establishment of provincial governments in Hopei, Shantung, Honan, and Shansi provinces.

43 Ibid, p.423.
communication lines logically led them to attempts at rural control. The cities needed food, railways had to be secured against guerrilla attacks, and the working economy of North China was in the countryside as North China was predominantly agricultural. If the Japanese Army was to consolidate its conquests, the countryside had to be controlled. If the Japanese Army was to sustain war with war, that is to pay for war costs with conquered resources in North China, then it had to gain control over the wealth of North China in the countryside. Much to the consternation of the North China Army, rural control became the key to their success or failure in occupying North China.

Initial Japanese efforts towards rural control were piecemeal and half-hearted. The Peace Pacification Corps was created with South Manchurian Railway Company assistance for the specific task of consolidating Japanese control in villages along railways connecting Peking to Manchuria.\(^4\) The aim was to secure a major supply route against enemy attack for the troops then operating in North China. To enable the Peace Pacification Corps and other rural political workers to form a clear concept of what they were to do in reviving the traditional administrative

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\(^4\) Fukada Yūzo, Shina Kyōsangun no Gensei, p.376; Bōeichō, op. cit, pp.78-80.
system or bringing the remnant of the system back into some form of centralized control, a training manual was drawn up in which a rough description of the village administrative system was given. The description in fact followed more what the Japanese wanted the village scene to become rather than what the actual rural administrative control system had been.

A distinction was made between a village as a rural community and a village as an administrative unit. An administrative village was an arbitrarily fixed unit to enable administrative functions to be performed and may be formed by a few villages, one village, or part of a village. The administrative village had the household as a basic unit and each administrative village had one hundred households. In actual practice, the number of households varied slightly from the standard of one hundred, but the departure was never great. The total number of households was then divided into Lü and Lin: every five households formed a Lin or Neighbourhood, and every five Lins formed a Lü. Where the number of households in a natural village was less than one hundred, a few neighbouring villages would be grouped together to form an administrative village.

45 JFA, Sonsei Kaizen Kō, in Sl.6.1.3-3, "Hokushi seikyo", pp.1376-1423.
Where the number of households exceeded one hundred, the natural village would be divided into more than one administrative village.  

Village administration had traditionally been performed by the villagers themselves on a voluntary basis. Village administration involved two distinct groups of functions: duties performed on behalf of the government and those performed on behalf of the local community. Absence of government control brought with it the boon of having no governmental duties to perform. But village administration at no time stopped, for the basic administrative needs within a village had to be fulfilled. The Japanese Army and its collaborators were faced with the task of reestablishing government control over village administration and making village administrations perform government duties assigned to them. The problem involved defining administrative boundaries, election of officers, and keeping records of these in the district government office. The process was necessarily slow and cumbersome, and the Japanese tried to disturb the established order in rural areas as little as possible. There was a need, however, to devise ways and means of ousting village officers who were not supporting the Japanese cause. This was done by

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46 Ibid, pp.1382-1383; Lü 阮, Lin 陸.
providing for an elaborate election system and by stipulating that elected officers had to be approved by the district government before taking office. The elected officers were requested to keep written records of their duties performed so that their activities could be checked by the district government from time to time. The existence of such a system on the books, however, did not necessarily mean that it was widely practised. Indeed it was more of a device in reserve should the occasion warrant its invocation.

As reimposing administrative control over rural areas was an effort centred on the district government, the effort started only after control had been established over district governments. The close identity between the reestablishment of district government and village administration meant that the effort towards reimposing rural control was limited to districts under Japanese occupation or in close proximity to Japanese garrison posts. The configuration of effectively controlled areas followed closely the configuration of Japanese troop distribution, and the extension of Japanese control into rural areas beyond occupied areas was in itself conditioned

48 Ibid, pp.1387-1389.
by Japanese troop distribution as well. (See Maps 3 and 4)

As a consequence, only rural areas lying on either side of major railways faced the prospect of being brought within Japanese control. The Japanese-sponsored administration could not escape the fact that it was a puppet administration whose authority could be effective only in areas where Japanese military power was used as support. The Japanese failed to provide the puppet government with any means of its own for enforcing authority beyond the bounds of Japanese occupied areas. The puppet administration was not an effective instrument on its own right for the spread of Japanese influence.

Two particular features of the puppet administrative structure deserve special mention: it was disarmed and decentralized. The revolt of puppet police units at Tungchow and the massacre of Japanese residents there was an experience the Japanese military in North China could not forget. The puppet administration formed subsequently was not only denied military forces of its own, but also required to keep its police units small and as lightly armed as possible. 49 The only exception

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49 Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 22nd December 1937, "Gunsenkyō chi-iki chian iji jisshi yōryō, in Bōeichō, op cit, pp.53-57. Each district was restricted to have a police or similar internal security force of under 200 strong, initially armed with pistols only. Improvements in armament given after the particular police
to the rule was the formation of a four hundred man strong bodyguard for puppet government leaders to protect themselves from assassination attempts. Initially Japanese bodyguards were provided, but this exposed Japanese military personnel individually to terrorist attacks and there was no way of ensuring their safety. After Wang K'e-min's Japanese bodyguard had died in the course of duty, they were withdrawn, and a Chinese bodyguard corps formed.

The policy of keeping an unarmed puppet regime in North China backfired on the Japanese. Japanese manpower shortage had left most of the countryside untouched by the occupation and the military vacuum was not filled by the puppet regime. This enabled Communist and other resistance groups to continue operating behind Japanese lines, building up anti-Japanese strength and hindering the spread of Japanese control. The provision of from one to two hundred policemen for each district was grossly inadequate as it meant no more than one or two policemen per village even if all the policemen were evenly distributed over the countryside. Guerrilla attacks made

49 Cont'd
units had proven its loyalty to the Japanese cause in action.

50 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.423.

51 JFA, SP205-6, History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police, China, September 1870 to December 1940, p.2478.
any decentralization of police personnel impossible. According to a report of the China Affairs Board on security conditions in suburban areas of seven cities made in March 1940, security within the cities were good day and night, but it was unsafe at night just a few miles away from urban areas. The policy of keeping the puppet regime unarmed had to be given up after the first Hundred Regiments Offensive, and a puppet army was formed to supplement the combat strength of the Japanese Army.

Decentralization was realized by depriving the puppet government of a chain of authority linking department with department, and subordinating local government to central government. Each administrative unit within the puppet government could act on its own accord without heeding problems of coordination and common objective. Although decentralization was built into the structure of government as exercised by the Chinese collaborators, yet the actual functioning of the administrative structure was highly centralized. This was possible because authority was retained by the Special Service of the North China Army, and the Special Service had a centralized structure. The

52 Bōeichō, op cit, 260-264.
Special Service Headquarters at Peking appointed advisors to every level of government and sent out Liaison Officers to every district government. These advisors and Liaison Officers provided the missing lines of communication between department and department, and between central and local administration. By ensuring that the governmental structure could work only under Japanese supervision, the Japanese Army deprived the puppet regime of any initiative to expand its influence and control independent of the Japanese Army.
Chart 2: Administrative Structure

North China Army
  ↓
Army Corps → Special Service
  ↓
Provisional Government
  ↓
Judicial Committee  Legislative Committee  Executive Committee
  ↓
Departments
  ↓
(Administration  Security  Education  Judicial  Relief)
  ↓
  bureaux  bureaux  bureaux  bureaux  bureaux
  ↓
  Provincial Government
  ↓
  Circuit Government
  ↓
  District Government
  ↓
  Sub-district police stations (Chü)
  ↓
  Administrative Village
  ↓
  Lü
  ↓
  Lin
  ↓
  Household
CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL

Ideological control, despite its modern sounding overtones, is not a new concept in China. Indeed, the very structure of Chinese society had been moulded to a significant extent by the continued practice of ideological control through formal education. Confucianist scholars divided Chinese society into the four classes of scholar, peasant, worker, and merchant in descending order. Scholars claimed the highest socio-political position, then substantiated and perpetuated this claim through the Civil Service Examination system. Theoretically, civil service examinations were conducted to enable the state to choose the best talents in the land for public service. However, through syllabus manipulations, whereby talent was not judged by ability to deal with concrete and varied problems connected with the day-to-day affairs of the nation and people, the scholar class maintained its social and political dominance through a virtual monopoly on formal education. Scholarship was concerned with studying the Confucian classics and learning a complicated writing system, mastery over which would demand years of patient effort. Only scholar families could provide the necessary facilities such as books and teachers, and only landed
families could finance their members to devote all their time on academic pursuits. The bulk of the peasantry had no opportunity to rise into the ruling scholar-gentry class, while merchants were deliberately excluded for fear that they might challenge the dominance of the landed-gentry.

Scholarship was not only the gateway to social and political eminence, it was also an instrument for the ruling dynasty and its supporters to perpetuate a particular socio-political philosophy. Education was in fact an indoctrination process, and motivation for the individual to submit himself willingly to this process through his own efforts was provided in the lure of public office and all the social prestige connected thereto. Sophisticated ideological control through the education process was therefore a deep-rooted Chinese tradition, which nevertheless appeared to be on the point of collapse towards the end of the Ch'ing period and at the beginning of the Republican era. The decay of centralized control was accompanied by influxes of new ideas and institutions from the West.

The continued dominance of the scholar-gentry class in China bred in them a tradition of pride and firm conviction that the educated were destined to rule. Together with this pride and conviction was a strong sense of responsibility for the well-being of Chinese society as a whole, a responsibility that was becoming heavier every
day with the gradual decay of the Ch'ing Government and the continued inroads into the Celestial Empire made by the Western Imperial Powers. A strong will to rebuild China ushered in reformist and revolutionary tendencies among the educated, engendered by the common desire to see China a strong nation again. The Self-strengthening Movement was an early expression of such 'intellectual' tendencies.\(^1\)

The Movement, however, was chiefly concerned with modernizing China's military complements to help protect the established order. Repeated defeats at the hands of Japan and the Powers in 1895 and 1900 revealed that fundamental changes in the traditional political, economic and social structure were inevitable if China was to be strong again. Education and ideological control, as a cornerstone of the established order, was among the first to come under close scrutiny. Even the defunct Ch'ing Court which had been so assiduous in suppressing K'ang Yu-wei's reform movement in 1898\(^2\) came around to advocate reform from above and went as far as abolishing the Civil Service Examination in 1905 and to replace traditional education with a modern school

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\(^1\) Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, pp.95-127.

\(^2\) Ibid, pp.158-163.
system modelled on those of the West. Ideological control through education, however, was not abandoned, it was only up-dated, and Confucianism continued to be the official ideology.

Nonetheless, education reforms struck at the root of the traditional ruling class. Although modern schools lessened the traditional landed-gentry dominance in education, they did not shake the established belief that the educated had both the right and the responsibility to rule. This helps to account for the active reactions portrayed by students in China towards every major political upheaval in the twentieth century. Student nationalism was such an important part of Chinese political life that both the Nationalist Chinese and the Chinese Communists endeavoured to lead and control the student nationalist movement. Their separate approaches towards leading and controlling the educated elite saw the tradition of ideological control through education re-emerge in triumph. Both political parties impressed upon school children, through teachers and text-books, their particular mode of ideological thinking. Ideological control through education was an official policy and it contributed positively towards

3 Francis L.H. Pott, "Modern Education" in China, edited by H.F. MacNair, p.430.
inculcating national consciousness, and hence to the cause of Chinese reunification. As Japanese expansionism was a major obstacle to Chinese reunification, the Japanese charge that the Chinese National Government was fostering anti-Japanese feelings was not altogether groundless.

Education as an instrument of ideological control prior to effective Chinese reunification in 1949 was not a monopoly of the Chinese Government. Japan and the Western Powers were not slow in realizing the need to cultivate popular goodwill in China, while the efforts of Christian missionaries to propagate the faith was but a varying form of the same process. Thus government and private funds were channelled to support cultural activities in China. Propaganda, research, goodwill activities such as providing subsidies to Chinese institutions of learning and organizing medical services were employed by foreign powers as ways and means of influencing Chinese public opinion in their country's favour.

Japan was a late starter in this cultural offensive. It was not until 1924 that the Japanese Government formulated a policy of direct government involvement in sponsoring cultural activities in China or concerning China. The pattern of Japanese cultural involvement prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 decisively influenced the attitude of the Japanese military in North China towards
education, propaganda, and ideological control. It is, therefore, necessary to describe in brief the main features of Japanese cultural activities in China since 1924 to assess their effect on occupation education, propaganda, and ideological control policy in North China.

In 1924 the Japanese Diet approved a financial bill which allocated funds to finance cultural activities concerning China or in China. The funds allocated were realized from Chinese Government payments to Japan on the Boxer Indemnity and the Shantung Compensations. These funds were channelled to organizations in China and Japan through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and amounted to an approximate total of fifty million Chinese dollars (yuan) per annum. The sources of income, however, would be dried up in fifteen years as the Chinese Government would have met all her obligations in regard to the Boxer Indemnity and the Shantung Compensations by then. Therefore, to forestall a sudden drying up of funds after fifteen years, most of the income was kept as reserve so that interest earnings from the reserve would continue to finance cultural

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4 Higuchi Hiroshi, Nihon no Taishi Toshi Kenkyū, p.452.

5 The Shantung Compensations were paid by the Chinese Government to the Japanese Government for the latter's return in 1922 of former German concessions in Shantung Province. The Compensations amounted to Ch$54 million.
activities started by the Japanese Government. This consideration meant that annual funds made available were very limited, varying from one to three million Chinese dollars. Further, the major portion of the funds made available was not spent on building a better Japanese image in China. The funds were not only divided among interested institutions in China (including Manchuria) and Japan, but also shared by Japanese-operated and Chinese-operated institutions in China. Of the estimated annual total of three million dollars, about sixty per cent or two million dollars were allocated to support institutions in China. The remaining forty per cent were spent in Japan, mainly to finance research programs on China. Of the funds allocated for spending in China, less than half were received by Chinese institutions. This, and the fact that the subsidized Japanese institutions in China were mainly directed for the benefit of Japanese residents in China, meant that less than one third of the three million dollars total was used to gain Chinese goodwill.

The moderate amount spent by Japan, or rather reinvested by Japan, for cultivating Chinese goodwill necessarily gained only moderate response. Japan's effort

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6 Higuchi Hiroshi, *op cit*, p.453.

appeared most inadequate when it was compared with those of Western countries such as the United States and France, both of which reinvested the entire proceeds of their portions of the Boxer Indemnities in financial aids to China. The United States and France both spent more than Japan in operating or subsidizing cultural institutions in China. Given the amount of Japanese invested interests in China, the sum ploughed back into China by Japan on 'public relations' work was most inadequate. This inadequacy was brought to more prominent relief when compared with similar efforts by Western countries. Nevertheless, because of the proximity between China and Japan and the comparatively low cost for Chinese students to study in Japan, as compared with the cost of studying in the more distant Western countries, most of China's overseas students were to be found in Japan. Therefore, Japan's monetary contribution towards cultural activities in China does not give us an accurate picture of the real influence Japan had on Chinese public opinion. It does suggest, however, that Japan could have done far more in this field. The

8 Shūgiin Chōsabu, Taishi Bunka Kōsaku ni Kansuru Ronchō, pp.160-170.

Western Powers, because of their distance from China, needed to spend more than Japan to attain the same results. It must also be pointed out, however, that Japanese cultural efforts in China, unlike similar efforts by Western countries, were not supplemented to any significant extent by private or missionary ventures. For example, there was little scope for Japanese Buddhist organizations to propagate the faith in China from whence they have imported the faith earlier.

The inadequacy of Japan's cultural effort in China was brought to the fore with the occupation of North China. The Foreign Ministry, the body administering Japan's cultural funds in China, promptly despatched an investigation team of academic experts to inquire into the conditions of education, particularly higher education, in occupied North China. Separate reports submitted by members of the team pointed out that universities, colleges and libraries had been forced to close their doors because of a gross shortage of funds and a large exodus of staff and students. The Foreign Ministry wanted to extend

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10 JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5, ..., "Pekin Taishikan tai bunka kōsaku iken", pp.1-14, being a telegram from Morijima in Peking to Foreign Minister Hirota, dated 22nd Oct 1937.

11 JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5, ..., "Pekin Taishikan tai bunka kōsaku iken", pp.52-60, Yoshikawa Kojirō 鞍木孝二郎, "Hokushi bunka kōsaku ni kansuru shisatsu hokoku narabi ni
financial aid to hard-pressed institutions as a means towards establishing its influence and control. The Foreign Ministry and the North China Army, however, were rivals in North China; the former had no control over conquered resources in China and had to ask for extra finance from Japan to defray the costs of expanding Foreign Ministry influence in occupied North China. Accordingly the Finance Ministry was approached for a special allocation and, failing that, the North China Army was approached for joint action.\(^\text{12}\) Existing Foreign Ministry finance was strained to the limit and cultural funds to China channelled through the Foreign Ministry was increased to ¥5.62 million in 1938, an increase of ¥1.8 million over the previous year.\(^\text{13}\) However, the Foreign Ministry could not supply all the financial needs of hard-pressed Chinese cultural institutions in occupied China and, short of massive Japanese Government involvement, such needs could only be met by the North China Army with its conquered resources.

\(^{11}\) Cont'd...

ikensho "北支文化工作に関する視察報告並に意見書"
pp.2-8, being a telegram from Morijima in Peking to Foreign Minister Hirota, dated 2nd Oct 1937.

\(^{12}\) JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5,... "Pekin Taishikan tai bunka kōsaku iken", pp.15-17 and pp.24-25, being telegrams from Morijima in Peking to Foreign Minister Hirota, dated 3rd November 1937 and 27th Jan 1938.

\(^{13}\) Shūgiin Chōsabu, op cit, pp.64-65.
The Foreign Ministry, in fact, faced the prospect of dwindling financial resources, for the occupation had also dried up the regular income from the Boxer Indemnity and the Shantung Compensation. The Chinese Government was not going to pay indemnity and compensation to a country with which it was having a life-and-death struggle on the battlefield. When the Finance Ministry turned down a Foreign Ministry request for a special allocation, the Foreign Ministry could no longer hope to pursue its own active cultural policy in North China. The cultural program administered by the Foreign Ministry started in 1924 with Japanese Government financial provisions, and was doomed in 1937 with Japanese Government refusal to give extra financial provisions. The field was left wide open for the North China Army.

Apart from the absence of massive Japanese financial commitment, another factor affecting occupation Japanese cultural policy in North China was Chinese student nationalism. Student nationalism had been a major obstacle to the ambitions of the Japanese military in North China, and Peking was a citadel of student nationalism. North China had the benefit of being the central seat of power

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14 JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5,... "Pekin Taishikan tai bunka kōsaku iken", pp.24-25, being telegram from Morijima in Peking to Foreign Minister Hirota, dated 27th Jan 1938.
during the Ch'ing period and was the recipient of initial education reforms started by the Ch'ing Government. Later, liberal education flourished in Peking because it was not the centre of power for either the Nationalist Chinese or the Chinese Communists. As such, teachers and students in the area were least susceptible to thought control efforts by Chinese authorities. Further, foreign cultural activities were particularly active in North China precisely because it was not the power centre of either the Nationalist Chinese or the Chinese Communists, and Western efforts further exposed the intellectuals in North China to new ideas and helped to inculcate a strong critical spirit.

Peking had a long and proud history as the cultural centre of China. In the 1930's the city housed most of China's modern universities. Students from all over China came to study in Peking, still expecting to lead China after graduation. But students in Peking were destined to be disillusioned as far as sharing political power was concerned, for both the Nationalist Chinese and the Chinese Communists ran their own universities and military academies to staff their respective political,
administrative, and military establishments. Both parties wanted to recruit persons who were politically reliable from the standpoint of party interest. Peking students were a frustrated lot of patriots and self-seekers who were compelled to seek their own form of expression to show support for or disapproval of specific political issues, thus hoping to influence political developments. They found an effective expression in student demonstrations and dominated student nationalist movements in China up to the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident. The flight of

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15 Chinese revolutionaries under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen failed again and again in their bids for power. A decisive factor was the lack of loyal and dedicated cadres fighting for a well-defined political belief. Sun tried to provide these by putting his political ideas into writing and by building a military academy with Russian help at Whampao. Later political cadres were trained at the Cheng-chih Ta-Hsueh 政治大學 and other government universities. The earliest cadre training facilities of the Chinese Communists are not known, but in the autumn of 1931 a Hung-chun Hsueh-hsiao 紅軍學校 was established at Juichin, Kiangsi Province, and this was elevated to university status in November 1933. The same establishment was later re-organized and renamed as the K'ang-Jih Chun-cheng Ta-hsueh 抗日軍政大學 at Yenan.

16 Peking students had a fore-taste of the effectiveness of public demonstration in 1915 when they succeeded in modifying the Japanese Twenty-one Demands. Historians generally, however, date the modern Chinese student movement from the demonstration of May 4th 1919, which was staged to protest the decision of the Versailles powers to sanctify Japan's occupation of Shantung. Similar demonstrations occurred after the Mukden Incident of September 1931 and on 9th December 1935, at the height of the Japanese-engineered North China Autonomous Movement. The Lukouchiao Incident, however, was not
students to Communist or Nationalist areas, and Japanese control over universities in occupied territories ended the role of North China intellectuals as an independent political force. Student demonstration was replaced by student participation in resistance during the Sino-Japanese war, while post-war student demonstrations were merely party-manipulated affairs.

Japanese incursions into North China before 1937 goaded students in Peking to become anti-Japanese. They tried to exert pressure on the various political groups in China to put up a more defiant attitude towards Japanese expansionist moves. The Chinese Communists gave them full vocal support and advocated the formation of a United Front whereby all contending politico-military groups in China would cease their internal wrangling to unite against the common national foe. The Nationalist Chinese could not but support student nationalism, but was afraid that nationalist outbursts by students would precipitate a war with Japan before China was ready. Further, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to liquidate the Communist

16 Cont'd.,
followed by demonstrations, but by active student participation in military resistance by either joining Sung Che-yuan's army, or taking flight to join forces with the Communists at Yenan or the Nationalists at Chungking and Kunming.

17 John Israel, Student Nationalism in China 1927-1937, p.157
Chinese first before turning his attention to Japan, and consequently found the anti-Japanese fervour of his student supporters embarrassing. The Chinese Communists wanted to exploit Chiang's embarrassment by encouraging the anti-Japanese fervour of the students, discredit Chiang as a nationalist, and put the Chinese Communist Party at the head of the Chinese nationalist movement instead. Chiang Kai-shek could do no more than quietly sanctioning the suppression of student movements and openly pleaded with student petitioners to be patient and to devote their full attention to studies.  

Student nationalism in Peking reached a climax on 9th December 1935 and succeeded in preventing the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over the five provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan in North China. Stern government suppression as part of a Sino-Japanese compromise for suspending the North China Autonomous Movement led to a gradual decline in the student movement. Even so, the Japanese military in North China apparently was careful enough to start the Lukouchiao Incident in July, when most students were away from Peking.

18 Ibid, pp.52, 61-63 and 70.
19 Jen-min ch' u-pan-she, I-erh-chiu Yün-tung.
during the long summer vacations. Student reaction to Japanese occupation was not lacking, and over a thousand students, out of an estimated total of fifteen thousand post-secondary students in Peking, are known to have enlisted hastily in the Twenty-ninth Army to assist in military resistance, the majority of students and teachers of the University of Peking fled the city upon Japanese occupation, and a group of militant students is reported to have attempted to stop Chang Tzu-chung at Tsinan during his flight away from North China. Unlike earlier expressions of student nationalism, it failed to stop Japanese expansion in North China in 1937.

The North China Army and the Japanese Foreign Ministry differed fundamentally in their approach towards tackling the problem of student nationalism. The temptation for the North China Army was to apply force to discipline the educated. The Foreign Ministry, however, advocated a policy of influencing the educated through control over and financial assistance to institutions of learning. The Foreign Ministry's inability to procure extra funds to carry on and expand its established cultural activities in China

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20 Summer vacations for schools in China started around end of June and terminated at the beginning of September.

21 Kōain Kahoku Renrakubu, Kahoku Nōson Kyōiku Chōsa Hōkoku, p.6; Ch'in Te-ch'un, Ch'in Te-ch'un hui-i-lu, pp.22-23 and 180; Chang Tzu-chung 張自忠.
enabled the North China Army's policy of suppression and control to operate unopposed. Immediately after the occupation of the Peking-Tientsin sector, the Japanese military started to suppress student activities and dramatized its stand by the destruction of education centres with a known anti-Japanese record. The Nankai University at Tientsin was reported to have been razed to the ground by air bombing prior to occupation, and set afire after occupation.²² At Paoting, text-books and laboratory equipments were burnt in public.²³ In Peking little active suppression was needed, for most universities there failed to start classes after the summer vacations of 1937 for lack of funds, and the North China Army made little effort towards putting the hard-pressed universities and colleges on an operational basis again.

Universities and post-secondary colleges in Peking were faced with imminent collapse even without the hostile attitude of the Japanese Army. In fact most private institutions had ceased operations as they were depleted of funds, staff, and students. Government institutions continued to function on reserve funds, but did little more than maintaining what remained of their
staff. Unless the new regime agreed to extend financial support, even government universities could not survive for long. The immediate test was whether classes could be resumed with the commencement of a new term in September 1937.

The new municipal authority succeeding the fall of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was the Committee for Public Safety of Peking. This ad hoc municipal body inherited power and control over government education institutions in Peking, it was also saddled with the responsibility of administering and financing these institutions. The task was an unwelcome one for two reasons. Firstly, the ad hoc municipal authorities did not have the financial resources to support these institutions which had formerly been supported by regional and not just municipal financial resources, and secondly, these institutions had been anti-Japanese centres in the past and the Committee was afraid of antagonizing the Japanese Army by any form of support rendered to the universities and colleges. In fact, the Committee was anxious to please its new masters by actively suppressing Anti-Japanese activities.

The only parties interested in the welfare of established educational institutions were the institutions themselves and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It was their
combined reserve funds that gave the hard-pressed institutions a breathing space, and it was the Japanese Foreign Ministry that convinced the North China Army of the importance of sustaining education in occupied North China. The approach by the Foreign Ministry was an admission of its inability to shoulder the problem alone and was evidently an attempt to interest the North China Army in joint action with the Foreign Ministry in educational and cultural affairs. The Japanese military in North China was ready to agree with the Foreign Ministry that something had to be done. The North China Army, however, realized only too well that the Foreign Ministry was powerless to do anything on its own and did not respond with any schemes for joint action. Instead, it took the education problem upon its own shoulders, assigned the task to its Special Service, and the Special Service had its Third Section devoted to handle education problems. The Foreign Ministry was simply ignored.

Once the North China Army had assumed responsibility, it was no longer possible for the Japanese-sponsored Committee for Public Safety of Peking to avoid

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24 JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5, ...., "Pekin Taishikan tai bunka kōsaku iken", pp.15-17, being telegram from Morijima in Peking to Foreign Minister Hirota, dated 3rd November 1937.

25 Ibid.
formal commitments to former government education institutions. The Special Service had to procure funds for these government institutions, and the Committee toed the Japanese line by reversing its former evasive attitude: the Committee accepted in principle the duty of providing funds for former government universities and colleges in October 1937. However, the Committee never went beyond this verbal commitment. Indeed, no further steps were taken until after the Committee had been replaced by the Provisional Government in December 1937. T'ang Er-ho, head of the Department of Education of the Executive Committee of the new government, met student leaders on 8th January 1938 and assured them that the Government had decided to resume classes in principle, but no actual date was announced. Further, in order to set the minds of university students and staff at ease, the Provisional Government let it be known that a sum of three hundred thousand dollars had been set aside for the universities

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26 *Shina Jihō*, Vol 28, No. 1, January 1938, p.65

27 *T'ang Er-ho* 湯爾和, a Japan returned medical graduate who first came into political prominence during Yuan Shih-kai's days, continued to be active in various Peking Government after Yuan's fall, and was one of the three leading puppet figures of the Provisional Government. He served as Chairman of the Legislative Committee and Head of the Department of Education.

and that classes could be resumed in April 1938. This meagre sum was regarded as sufficient because only a small percentage of former students and staff members remained. The expedient of regrouping the depleted staff and facilities into fewer institutions was taken. There was to be only one teaching university and one research institute.

Even then, it was not until 10th May 1938 that classes in the Faculties of Medicine and Agriculture were resumed. And even as late as 1942 there were only the four faculties of Agriculture, Medicine, Engineering and Science in operation.

The difficulties encountered by universities in reopening classes indicated the low priority given to higher education by the North China Army. The Japanese military was anxious to erase anti-Japanese student movements and to train a body of pro-Japanese civil servants to staff the puppet administration. As former centres of anti-Japanese student nationalism, universities were objects of

29 JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5, ..., "Pekin Taishikan tai bunka kōsaku iken", pp.18-23, being a telegram from Morijima in Peking to Foreign Minister Hirota, dated 27th January 1938.


31 Asahi Shimbun, May 1938, p.154.

of control and were not regarded as satisfactory institutions for the training of pro-Japanese officials. Chinese susceptibility was observed to the extent of reestablishing a university, but its function was confined to training professionals. The faculties of Medicine and Agriculture were favoured because their students were regarded as essentially apolitical as a result of their highly technical training. Even then, the North China Army saw to it that a majority of the university teachers were Japanese nationals. A special body was established to facilitate the recruitment of Japanese university teachers. The East Asian Cultural Exchange Association or the Tōa Bunka Kyōgikai was established in September 1938 to advise the Third Section of the Special Service on matters concerning staff and student exchange problems. The Association had sixty appointed members, composed equally of Chinese and Japanese nationals, and was financed jointly by the Provisional Government and the Tokyo Government. Student exchange was later assigned to a new body called the Tōa Shinkōkai, established by the China Affairs Board in February 1939. The Shinkōkai was in charge of sending

students from China to Japan, and the Foreign Ministry was to provide funds and allocate students to universities once they arrived in Japan.\(^{35}\)

The training of officials was not assigned to the university. A Hsin-min Academy (Hsin-min Hsueh-yuan) was established in January 1938, directly under the Executive Committee of the Provisional Government, to train prospective government officials. The Academy offered a political re-orientation course of three months and its sole task was to ensure the political reliability of prospective government officials. Students were initially recruited from among university graduates, but later graduates of junior and senior high schools were also admitted. The Academy could enrol sixty students at a time.\(^{36}\) In January 1939 the Hsin-min Academy was reorganized and three training courses, lasting for three months, one year, and two years, were offered. The three-month course was designed for serving officials, the one-year course was a qualifying course for admission into the two-year course, presumably designed for recruits with lower

\(^{35}\) JFA, S.8.7.2.0-5, ... "Kōain Miscellaneous", 8th Feb 1939, pp.416-418.

Whereas a short political reorientation course was deemed adequate for Chinese officials, it was soon realized that Japanese advisors needed extensive training in the Chinese language. Although the Japanese language was made into a compulsory subject in primary and middle schools, there were still far too few Chinese who could speak Japanese to make it practicable to use Japanese as the official language. Accordingly, the Kōa Gakuin was established in January 1940 to train Japanese nationals in the Chinese language. The annual enrolment of the Kōa Gakuin was one hundred, and, as the course would last for three years, total enrolment was three hundred.

Further, the Hsin-min Hui had separate training facilities for its political cadres. The first cadre training centre was set up in April 1938, offering a six-month political course to two hundred students, composed equally of Chinese and Japanese nationals. This was later broken up into three training centres: one for

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38 Ishikawa Ken, op cit, pp.158-160.
39 Kōa Gakuin 軍事学院; Shina Jiho, Vol 32, No. 2 Feb 1940; Asahi Shimbun, Jan 1940, p.91.
40 Bōeichō Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen,p.77
Chinese recruits, one for Japanese recruits, and one for personnel assigned to the Hsin-min Hui by the China Affairs Board. Training centres were also established at the Provincial, Circuit and District levels. In March 1941 there were three hundred and nineteen training centres at the district level in North China, boasting a graduate total of just over seventy thousand, with another three thousand undergoing training. The Provisional Government also established a separate Police Officer Training School and a Military Academy, started in March 1938 and June 1938 respectively, to provide reliable personnel for its police and military units.

The attitude of the North China Army towards established institutions of higher learning was one of distrust as reflected in its active attempt to by-pass them in recruiting government officials for the puppet regime. University education was countenanced only to the extent of retaining technical training facilities, as doctors, engineers and agricultural experts were sorely needed. The humanities were deliberately suppressed and only classical Chinese learning still retained a place in

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42 Asahi Shimbun, December 1938, p.209.
the reorganized university in Peking. Further, to fore­
stall the growth of national feeling in campus, it was
made sure that most university teachers were Japanese
nationals.

Whereas Chinese government and private univer­
sities were easily brought under control, institutions
financed by Third Powers or operated by foreign missionaries
continued to act as centres for political dissent. As
such these institutions became a political problem which
the North China Army would attempt to solve at the first
opportunity. Unlike Chinese institutions, foreign
institutions were comparatively free from financial and
staff problems, and they were never compelled by circum­
stances to suspend classes. Further, given the protection
of foreign interests, these institutions had comparatively
more academic freedom within campus. For this reason
their students and staff members were critical of Japanese
actions and the actions of the Japanese-sponsored regime.
It was natural that these institutions would be objects of
control for the Japanese and their Chinese collaborators.

The opportunity which the Provisional Government
had been waiting for came in the middle of June 1938. The
Hsin-min Hui organized an Anti-Communist and Anti-Party­
dictatorship Week from the 13th to the 19th, furnished
with the usual mass meetings, handbills, posters and public speeches. The activities were not supported by foreign-sponsored institutions. Moreover, students in these institutions staged a formal protest against the Japanese-organized propaganda campaign by not attending any classes during the same week. The defiant attitude of the students gave the Provisional Government an opportunity to serve notice on the authorities of the institutions concerned, reminding them that they too had to toe the government line if they were to be allowed to continue in operation. Further, the Provisional Government demanded that the institutions concerned permit government censors to check their library holdings and that the censors would confiscate all books deemed politically undesirable.

The institutions concerned protested against the proposed course of action, and a compromise was arrived at between the two parties in dispute. The institutions concerned agreed to observe government education policies and promised self-discipline in return for administrative independence. Foreign-supported institutions were thus inhibited from

44 Ibid, June 1938, p.306.
46 Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.815
countenancing activities deemed hostile to the ruling regime and its Japanese masters. Still, it was not until after the outbreak of the Pacific War that foreign-supported institutions were finally brought under full Provisional Government control.

The record on Japanese policies on education in North China during the occupation period was mainly a negative one, how to control and not how to develop. Whereas it was comparatively easy to neglect higher education, to by-pass universities as recruiting grounds for government officials, and to establish alternative political training facilities for cadres and cadets, the same practices could not be applied to primary and middle school education. The number of post-secondary establishments was small and they were on the point of collapse immediately after occupation, the policy of suppressing their activities could be put into effect simply by giving them the minimum assistance. The number of primary and middle schools was large, to demolish the established structure and to replace it with a new one would cost more manpower and finance than the North China Army and its collaborators were able to supply. The only practicable approach was to remodel the existing structure to the satisfaction of the North China Army.

The Japanese had complained before the China
Incident that student nationalism in China was incited by biased text-books, narrow-minded teachers, and subversive party propaganda. Education reform was centred on eradicating the basis for such complaints. The first action in this direction was taken by the Tientsin Committee for Public Safety: on 29th August 1937 the sub-committee on text-book revision decided to revise all school text-books and planned to have the new text-books ready for use when the new term started on 15th September 1937. Text-book revision would be explained to heads of schools on 3rd September 1937, and, two days later, 2,500 teachers would be called together to discuss the matter. The step was a hasty one and involved little more than deleting objectionable passages from existing text-books. The task of text-book revision was continued by the Provisional Government, however, and a Text-Book Revision Committee was established in March 1938. The Committee was headed by a Chinese official who had had extensive experience in similar text-book revisions in East Hopei, and he was

47 Kawai Shingo, "Minzokushūgiteki keikō o chūshin to shite mitaru Chūkoku Kokumintō no kyōiku seisaku no rinkaku", in Tōa Kenkyūjoho, No. 7, December 1940, pp.1-49; Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.796; John Israel, op cit, pp.21 and 49.

48 Asahi Shimbun, August 1937, p.480.
assisted by two high ranking Japanese officials from the
Japanese Ministry of Education. Apart from revising
existing text-books, Confucianist classics were reintroduced
into primary and middle school syllabuses. Text-book
revision was directed against 'biased accounts' and aimed
at introducing 'correct interpretations', mainly concerning
Japanese actions on the China mainland in the twentieth
century.

The Provisional Government also paid attention
to teacher training. The former teachers' training college
in Peking was revived to its pre-Incident condition, the
only exception among post-secondary colleges in Peking,
and it was staffed mainly by Chinese teachers. Further,
many junior teachers' training colleges were restored in
provincial and district capitals. Nevertheless, the
number of students, teachers and schools were far less than
pre-occupation days as the comparison figures on Table I
and Table II would show. This drop in the quantitative
measurement of education in occupied North China is to be

50 Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.815-817
51 Ishikawa Ken, op cit, p.154
52 Ibid, pp.153, 155, and 162 for figures on chien-i shih
fan簡易師範 , chien-i nung-ts'un shih-fan簡易農
村師範 , and shih-fan chiang-shih so師範講習所.
expected in that the Japanese Army only occupied parts of North China. But this drop does confirm Japanese failure in extending control.

Apart from this hurried effort towards text-book revision and a very modest effort towards teacher training, no steps were taken to examine the state of primary and secondary education until late in 1939. Existing schools, both modern and traditional, were left to operate as best they could without any consideration to how they had been affected by the occupation. Instead, there was only an attempt at window-dressing to show the populace that education was not being neglected.

In August 1938 the Provisional Government put forward a Ten-Year Education Development Plan. When details of the Plan were released, it turned out to be a very modest scheme indeed. The basic aim of the Plan was for the Provisional Government to finance the establishment of twenty model schools a year, or two hundred model schools in ten years. An initial allocation of only $98,000 per annum was set aside for the project and then the scheme was restricted to the Province of Hopei. Agreement between the Provisional Government and the Hopei Provincial Government stipulated that the Provisional Government would

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53 Asahi Shimbun, August 1938, p.142.
finance the establishment of twenty model primary schools in Hopei annually and that the Provisional Government would shoulder all running expenses in the first year. The Hopei Provincial Government was to provide for running expenses from the second year onward.\textsuperscript{54} It was hoped that the Plan would eventually be extended to other provinces in North China. However, there is no indication that the Plan was ever extended beyond the boundaries of Hopei, and even within Hopei itself the Plan was not much of a success. According to a Shina Jiho estimate, there were fewer schools in Peking in April 1941 than there were schools before the Lukouchiao Incident.\textsuperscript{55} A look at Table III would show that the same was true for Tientsin. A further look at Tables I and II would show that the situation was worse in rural areas.

By 1939 it was evident to the Japanese themselves that their authority did not extend beyond the occupied railways and cities. The North China Army began to look into socio-political factors in its desire to find alternative courses of action to supplement its military effort so that Japanese authority could be effectively felt in a wider area. Accordingly, a special investigation team

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, August 1938, p.142.

\textsuperscript{55} Shina Jiho, Vol 34, No. 4, April 1941, p.76.
was formed by the China Affairs Board Liaison Office in North China to inquire into the state of secondary and primary education in rural areas. The team carried out investigations between March and April 1939. Its report pointed out that backward as education was in North China before occupation, it had since deteriorated. The report assumed that literacy rate before occupation was between 15-20% and estimated that this had dropped to around 10% or less after occupation. The worst hit were rural areas, and in Cheng-ting Hsien, an average district in Hopei where detailed investigations were carried out by the team, it was found that out of the 250 schools there were before occupation, only 45% had been reopened, and that only 33% of their students and 32% of their teachers remained.

In spite of the bleak picture painted by the China Affairs Board report, no major effort was made to improve education facilities. The North China Army had clearly underestimated the potential of education as a means of ideological control.

Education was given very low priority generally. The main attempt was directed at rooting out anti-Japanese education, ideological control in a negative sense. The

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56 Koain Kahoku Renrakubu, Kahoku Nōson Kyōiku Chōsa Hōkoku, preface.
57 Ibid, pp.73-74 and 90; Cheng-ting hsien 正定縣.
Japanese and their collaborators could not and did not make full use of the educational system to indoctrinate the populace because firstly they had no comprehensive ideological arguments to present and secondly the Japanese military believed far more in the effectiveness of force than persuasion. While the Japanese were putting forward a rough set of ideas which they labelled as Hsin-min Chu-i or the New People's Ideology, trying hard to present a progressive and modern image, they were at the same time reintroducing Confucianism in an attempt to marshal conservative Chinese forces to their support. Further, the brutality of Japanese troops simply did not give strength to talks of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Military considerations usually overrode political considerations, there was little attempt to coordinate the two.

The half-hearted effort to employ traditional ideological control through education was best reflected in figures released by the Provisional Government on the restoration of primary and middle school education in North China. By June 1940 the number of schools and teachers were still far less than pre-incident days. The following tables on the state of education in North China are included to demonstrate the drastic decrease of education facilities, teachers, and students immediately upon Japanese occupation and the slow pace at which educational
facilities were being restored in occupied areas. Table III on Tientsin further reveals that urban centres suffered less in this respect and the decrease in student population was only about 10%. This is of course a reflection of Japanese strength in urban centres, but it also points to a Japanese neglect of ideological control through education in the countryside.

I. State of Education in Hopei, before and after the Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>Post-Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>29,030</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1938</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1939</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7,307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>-144</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>-21,723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of teachers</th>
<th>Pre-Incident</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>34,213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1938</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>9,348</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1939</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>15,253</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>-1,187</td>
<td>-1,179</td>
<td>-18,960</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Pre-Incident</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td>13,591</td>
<td>18,964</td>
<td>1,151,536</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1938</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>5,957</td>
<td>145,769</td>
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<td>12/1939</td>
<td>4,430</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>291,744</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>-9,161</td>
<td>-12,227</td>
<td>-859,762</td>
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(source: Ishikawa Ken, op. cit, p.153)

58 Ishikawa Ken, op. cit, pp.152-155. Figures in Table I does not include figures for Peking and Tientsin.
## II. State of Education in Shantung, before and after the Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Post-Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1940</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7,674</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
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<td>-60</td>
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<td>-27,402</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of teachers</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Post-Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>13,082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Post-Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>4,405</td>
<td>312,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Ishikawa Ken, *op cit*, p.155)

58 Cont'd...

"Post-secondary" included technical colleges and all types of teachers training schools, some of which may be only of post-primary standard.
### III. State of Education at Tientsin, before and after the Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Post Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/1937</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>314</td>
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<td>6/1940</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-124</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Teachers</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pre-Incident</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Incident</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>1,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/1937</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>1,378</td>
</tr>
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<td>Comparison</td>
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<td>-36</td>
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<td>Comparison</td>
<td>-190</td>
<td>-120</td>
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(source: Ishikawa ken, op. cit., p.154)
North China Army ideological control efforts cannot be dismissed without a discussion of its propaganda efforts. In marked contrast to its distrust of higher education and its lukewarm attitude towards secondary and primary education, the North China Army was very much alive to the possibilities of the application of modern propaganda techniques. Indeed, the Japanese military had started a propaganda effort of its own in North China before the invasion, mainly in sponsoring pro-Japanese newspapers. For example, the popular Chinese newspaper Yung Pao at Tientsin was purchased outright in 1935. Although its circulation was only 60,000, it was rated by the Tientsin Garrison as one of the two most popular newspapers in North China. In purchasing a formerly Chinese-operated popular newspaper the Japanese military in North China could have its ideas communicated to the Chinese populace without revealing that the ideas were of the Japanese military. This attempt to influence Chinese public opinion under camouflage so irritated the Nationalist Chinese that they made assassination attempts on pro-Japanese newspaper editors, to terrorize their colleagues into silence. The death of two newspaper editors at the hands of assassins in 1936 touched

off a political crisis, culminating in China's humiliation in accepting the Ho-Umezu and Ch'in-Doihara Agreements.  

After the outbreak of war, the North China Army established a Propaganda Department (Hokushigun Hōdōbu) to direct Japanese propaganda moves. As propaganda is in itself concerned with politics, a field assigned to the Special Service, the North China Army observed the form of this arrangement by appointing officers of the Propaganda Department to become members of the Special Service in charge of propaganda activities. The Propaganda Department thus served a twofold purpose: to conduct propaganda activities on its own and to control other propaganda-making bodies in North China. Its own propaganda activities were concerned with the release of news items through newspapers, radio broadcasts, and movies. The organizations under its control in matters of propaganda were the Peace Pacification Corps, the Hsin-min Hui, the Intelligence Bureau of the Provisional Government, and the censorship bodies of the Provisional Government.

The North China Army's concern was that news reporting should follow official communiques closely. In

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60 Gunreibu, 12th June 1935, "Hokushi ni okeru hanman kōnichi sakudō ni motozuku Nisshi-gun no kōshō", in Misuzu Shobō, Nicchū Sensō, Vol 1, pp.60-64.

61 Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 2nd December 1939, "Jōhō shūnin sanbō kaigi ni okeru Hōdōbu shūnin shōkō setsumei jikō", p.46.
order to promote 'correct' reporting and prevent the public from being 'misled', the North China Army designed measures to train and indoctrinate newspaper reporters and editors. Accordingly, the Intelligence Section of the Provisional Government was instructed to start a newspaper reporting seminar in November 1938 to which every Chinese newspaper had to send a reporter to attend. The seminar was to last two weeks, discussions were centred around ways and means of achieving 'correct' reporting. At the end of the seminar, the Intelligence Section was responsible for compiling a handbook on 'correct reporting' for distribution to all Chinese newspapers as a guideline on their activities. The seminars were to be repeated once every year.  

Further, a training centre was established in Peking to give newspaper editors a six-month re-orientation course, divided into three months of theoretical training and three months of practical work. As a result of tight Japanese control over newspapers, their views were but reflections of official statements and consequently attracted little public interest. The North China Army was providing financial subsidies to every single newspaper to keep them in operation. This expedient, however, proved

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63 Ibid, p.2.
too expensive and the North China Army decided to phase out all subsidies starting from December 1939. Further, the printing facilities of newspapers were to be made available to print propaganda handouts of both the North China Army and the Provisional Government, presumably as a means of cutting propaganda costs.

Apart from controlling private newspapers, the North China Army directly started Chinese newspapers of its own. The Wu Te Pao, for example, was a newspaper designed exclusively for the armed units of the Provisional Government and enjoyed a daily circulation of 20,000. Further, attempts were made to produce newspapers camouflaged as enemy newspapers. The camouflaged newspapers reported favourably on the Japanese, and copies of these were dropped behind enemy lines, an example of the practice of psychological warfare. Shortage of material in North China, however, inhibited Japanese propaganda efforts. There was not enough newsprint to satisfy demands in North China and the Japanese army had to resort to the expedient of fixing a ceiling for the use of newsprints, it was

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64 Ibid, p.2.
65 Ibid, p.2.
66 Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 1st December 1939, "Hokushigun Hōdō senden gaiyō", pp.3-6; Wu-te Pao 武德報.
arbitrarily decided that the amount of newsprint to be made available would not exceed the amount used during July 1938 to June 1939.67

Radio broadcast and moving pictures were also used to make known the North China Army's point of view. The Army took over control of the broadcasting station in Peking in January 1938, employed broadcasting professionals from Japan to operate the station, but kept the station under direct North China Army supervision. Further, mobile broadcasting units made Chinese broadcasts in the field as a psychological complement of Japanese armed units. The Japanese military simply could not refrain from the use of force even in propaganda. Its military units were issued with radio receivers, and they would round up local inhabitants to listen to official news broadcasts. 68

News control was more difficult in connection with Japanese newspapers and foreign correspondents. The North China Army did not want its political rivals in Japan to have their independent news reporting facilities and adopted the policy of having one Japanese language newspaper


for the whole of North China. Accordingly, the Tōa Shinhō was established and it was planned that other existing Japanese language newspapers in North China would be taken over by the Tōa Shinhō one by one. As for Japanese correspondents in North China, there were over a thousand Japanese war correspondents belonging to sixty different organizations, of which only correspondents from three organizations could carry wireless sets to the front and only Domei, the official news agency of the Japanese Government, could transmit news back to Japan through its transmitting station at Tientsin. Foreign correspondents were given a daily news release by the Japanese Legation in Peking, and the North China Army gave frequent guided tours so that foreign correspondents would report on matters desired to be reported overseas by the North China Army.

Propaganda literature, in the form of leaflets and pamphlets, were also printed. The following table shows

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69 Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 2nd December 1939, "Jōhō shūnin..... setsumeijikō", p.4. Tōa Shinhō 東北新聞.

70 Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 1st December 1939, "Hokushigun hōdō senden gaiyō", p.11.


72 Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 2nd December 1939, "Jōhō shūnin..... setsumeijikō", pp.5-7.
IV. Volume of Propaganda Literature, June - October 1939

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</tbody>
</table>

(source: Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 1st December 1939, "Hokushigun hōdō senden gaiyō", p.21)
the volume of such literature between June and October 1939.  

These propaganda literature were distributed by the various propaganda bodies under the North China Army, the most important of which was the Hsin-min Hui. It was established for the sole purpose of creating support for Japanese military presence and the Chinese puppet regime. As such the Hsin-min Hui was a copy of the Concordia Society, (Hsieh-Ho-Hui), the political arm of the Manchoukuo Government, but, in order to demonstrate that there was a difference between the Concordia Society and the Hsin-min Hui, as a gesture to show absolute independence from Kwantung Army influence, the Hsin-min Hui was declared to be not a political party, but purely an indoctrination body. This nominal distinction was meaningless otherwise. The Hsin-min Hui was divorced from the Provisional Government, although it was designed to support the Provisional Government. This practice was another expression of the principle of divide and rule. The Hsin-min Hui was a creation of the Special Service and preparations for its establishment started around October 1937. About a

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73 Hokushigun Hōdōbu, 1st December 1939, "Hokushigun hōdō senden gaiyō", p.21.

74 Hsieh-ho Hui 協和會; Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yoran, p.492; Shina Jihō, Vol 28, No. 2, Feb 1938, pp.59-61; Bōeichō Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, op cit, p.77
week after the formal inauguration of the Provisional Government, the Hsin-min Hui came into existence.\textsuperscript{75}

Although it was a party machine designed to mobilize popular support for a Chinese puppet regime, membership and executive positions were open to both Chinese and Japanese nationals under the pretext of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Membership was classified into full and associate status, and only full members could hold executive posts in the Hsin-min Hui.\textsuperscript{76} It had three separate training centres for cultivating cadres, each centre catering for a different element with the Hsin-min Hui leadership: Chinese recruits, Japanese recruits, and personnel assigned to the Hsin-min Hui by the China Affairs Board.\textsuperscript{77} The last element represented the Army Special Service, the body that had created the Hsin-min Hui, and it was the most powerful element within the Hsin-min Hui. These China-Affairs-Board-assigned personnel were given a longer training period, mainly in the Chinese language. The other two elements were included for the obvious reason of manpower shortage in the Special Service. Hsin-min Hui cadre training

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.492; Shina Jihō, Vol 28, No. 2, Feb 1938, pp.59-61.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.495.
\end{itemize}
facilities were also established at the provincial, circuit and district levels.

The Hsin-min Hui was responsible for propagating the official ideology, hastily drawn up and labelled as Hsin-min Chui-i or the New People's Ideology. 78 Although propaganda literature was based on pronouncements of Sino-Japanese cooperation, the enhancement of East Asian culture and the benevolence of Japanese occupation, the 'new' school text-books employed witnessed an undisguised return to Confucianist teachings. The works of Confucius, Mencius and their followers became standard texts in primary and middle schools. 79 There was thus an ideological cleavage within the puppet structure, the Provisional Government revived Confucianism in schools under its control, the Hsin-min Hui tried to project a progressive image by propagating the New People's Ideology. This cleavage was possibly another example of 'divide and rule', but was more likely to be a natural result of dividing the Provisional Government and the Hsin-min Hui structurally. The

78 For attempts to define Hsin-min Chu-i, see (a) Miao Pin, "Shimmin shugi no riron", in Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.502-518 and in Gaiji Keisatsu-hō, No 188, March 1938, pp.1-16; (b) Sung K'ai, "Shimmin-kai taikō no setsumei", and (c) Chang Yen-hsing, "Shimmin-kai no ninmu", in Gaiji Keisatsu-hō, No 188, March 1938, pp.17-28

79 Tōa Dōbunkai, Dainikai Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.815.
Provisional Government was anxious to gain the support of conservative elements through enhancing classical Chinese learning, the Hsin-min Hui was anxious to build up political support through party activities and in so doing it inherited the party organization concepts of the Chinese Communists and Nationalist Chinese. Not only was a new ideology necessary to present a reformist or even revolutionary image for the new order, it was also needed as a means to enable Nationalist and Communist defectors to cover up their defection in patriotic terms and without need to give up their reformist or revolutionary principles. The Hsin-min Hui director, Miao Pin, was himself a prominent member of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and one-time member of its Central Executive Committee. The attempt to adopt nationalism in the form of anti-British and Anti-Western feelings is another indication that the Hsui-min Hui was partly designed to take over renegade Nationalist

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80 For biographical details on Miao Pin, see Gaimusho Jōhōbu Hensan, Gendai Chūka Minkoku Manshūteikoku Jinmeikan, p.466, Imai Takeo, Shina Jihen no Kaisō, pp. 194-202, and Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.502; see also Jōhō, No. 8, 15th December 1939, pp. 71-86, where it was reported that two prominent Fu-hsing-she members were arrested by the Japanese. Miao Pin guaranteed their conduct and they were released. Fu-hsing-she was a branch of the Blue Shirts, a Nationalist Chinese secret police organization, in North China. This led to fifty Fu-hsing-she members defecting to the Japanese in September 1939.
Chinese or Chinese Communist organizations.  

The ambitious programmes that the Hsin-min Hui was designed for was not reflected in the mode of organization and expansion. The means of expansion was the establishment of branches all over North China. The basic unit of the Hsin-min Hui was a branch and they were to be formed on territorial, professional, occupational, and religious divisions. This pointed to the fact that the Hsin-min Hui was not so much attempting to create a new political infrastructure in support of the new regime as in trying to put political control over established communal and public bodies. Accordingly branches were formed in peasant associations, chambers of commerce, labour unions, teachers unions, civil servant unions, and religious groups. Even so, the Hsin-min Hui claimed no more than a total membership of around seventy thousand in December 1940, out of a population of well over eighty million. Its budget for 1940 was Ch$7.5 million, and that for 1941 was Ch$14 million, indicating firstly scanty financial investment in the Hsin-min Hui and secondly


82 Itoh Masahiko, op cit, p.106.

83 Ibid, p.106.
rapid expansion of its activities between the two years.\footnote{Ibid, p.107} The influence of the Hsin-min Hui, however, was not insignificant, particularly after taking into consideration that its propaganda campaigns were directed mainly on the urban populace.\footnote{Ibid, pp.108-109.} The Japanese military in North China realized that the traditional ruling class, the scholar-gentry, were mainly residing in administrative urban centres and the propaganda was for their consumption. The peasantry was purposely ignored in Japanese-directed indoctrination efforts on the ground that they were illiterate and that ideological arguments were too sophisticated for the peasantry. If the scholar-gentry could be influenced, it was hoped that they would in turn influence the peasantry. This is not to say that the Japanese military had no intention of securing peasant support. The Japanese military asserted that peasant support was not to be secured through empty words, but through actual results in improving their livelihood. Apart from decreeing a general reduction in taxes, which was either not practised or rendered meaningless by Japanese military procurements on the spot, the Japanese military did no more than assign the task of improving the lot of the peasantry.
to the Hsin-min Hui cadres and establish a few agricultural experiment stations. The expressed intention of improving the livelihood of the peasantry was farcical in that the Japanese military was concentrating as much capital as it could muster on economic activities deemed important to national defence, coal and iron for example. There was little or no place for agriculture in the economic development plans of the North China Army. The fact that Hsin-min Hui agents were told to reorganize rural economy as best they could, however, led to developments in rural economic control. For lack of funds and personnel the Japanese military in North China had been content to leave the rural sector alone. This aspect of the problem will be discussed fully in Chapter VI.

Nevertheless, a modest attempt was made to influence the educated in rural areas and a youth movement, aimed at primary school graduates, was organized. Training centres were set up at district capitals, each enrolling sixty young peasants at a time, and offered a two-month indoctrination course with lectures on subjects such as the obligation to pay taxes, village self-government, Hsin Min Chu-i, and Sino-Japanese solidarity. According to an

86 Shina Jihō, Vol 31, No. 6, December 1939, p.99
87 See Chapter V.
Asahi Shimbun report, there were forty-two such centres by December 1938, claiming over five thousand graduates, while another source claimed 319 such centres by 1940 with over 70,000 graduates. This was essentially a political indoctrination for primary school graduates, and as the primary school graduate total for June 1940 was over one million, the seventy thousand claimed was a very modest result indeed.

Japanese ideological-control efforts in occupied North China were inadequate. The most obvious shortcoming was their failure to make better use of educational facilities for ideological indoctrination purposes. As such a practice was a well-founded Chinese tradition, resort to such a practice by the Japanese would have been accepted by the populace in occupied areas. That the Japanese military should have allowed education to decline exposed them to the accusation of purposely undermining Chinese cultural institutions as a means of reducing China to secondary importance within the family of nations in East Asia. This may or may not have been true, but decline in

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88 Asahi Shimbun, December 1938, p.331.
89 Itoh Masahiko, op cit, p.107.
90 Ishikawa Ken, op cit, p.152, for total of primary school children in June 1940.
education certainly did reduce the impact of Japanese propaganda and the effectiveness of Japanese ideological control. Another major shortcoming of the Japanese ideological control effort in North China was their failure to direct propaganda at the illiterate peasant masses. They did realize that the Chinese Communists were giving top priority to influencing the peasantry, and the Japanese military should at least have countered with an equally strong propaganda campaign directed at the peasantry as a means of reducing peasant support for the Chinese Communists even if not as a means of building up peasant support for themselves.

The lack of ideological-control efforts reflects the psychological state of the North China Army also. Firstly, as a military body the North China Army could not accept that ideological control could in any way be compared with military action. 'Might is right' was its first dictum. Secondly, the Japanese in fact had no credible ideology to offer. The kind of ideological explanations put forward to justify their military actions in China were not expressions of firmly held convictions, they were, rather, ad hoc rationalisations. The Japanese themselves did not believe in the cause of Greater East Asia and East Asian Coprosperity, and what they practised exposed their readiness to put Japanese interests above everything else.
Whereas the Japanese could rationalise this inconsistency by equating Japanese interests with East Asian interests, the same rationalisation could not be accepted by other East Asian peoples. The Japanese could hardly expect to convince others with a haphazard set of ideological expressions of whose validity they themselves were not wholly convinced. Ideology was used only to sweeten the pill of military conquest.
CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC CONTROL

In contrast to the lack of attention for ideological control, economic questions received prominent attention from the North China Army. One of the professed Japanese objectives in launching an invasion was to secure economic gains, or, as expressed in Japanese propaganda parlance, to realize Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. The desire for economic gain in North China was expressed in different terms to different audiences: to the Japanese it was presented as the need to gain access to natural resources and control over market, to the Chinese it was stressed that Japanese-assisted economic development in North China was for the benefit of the Chinese and that the realization of such economic gains for the Chinese could not but gain popular Chinese support for Japanese presence in the area. Similar pretexts had been used earlier to justify Japanese expansion by apologists both in Japan and abroad. Japan, they argued, was an overcrowded land whose problems had been aggravated by tariff walls raised and immigration restrictions imposed by the Western Powers. In exercising her right to survive as an independent nation in the modern world, it was right and proper for Japan to seek an exclusive sphere of influence in adjacent territories.
so as to secure her sources of raw material supplies and
markets for her industrial products.\(^1\) This line of
reasoning contained in it elements of truth which made it
sound convincing and realistic at the time. Expansion was
presented as a matter of life or death for the nation.
The Japanese military modified the assertions of the
apologists with a distinct military slant: the economic
pretext for expansion was to be based on military necessity.
Japan must achieve self-sufficiency in national defence;\(^2\)
that is, her expansionist moves were to centre on the
control of sufficient mineral resources deemed indispen­sable to Japanese war industries. The North China Army

\(^1\) Hashimoto Kingoro, "The need for emigration and expansion" in Ivan Morris (ed), *Japan 1931-1945, Militarism, Fascism, Japanism?* pp.64-65.

\(^2\) Tsunoda Jun (ed), *Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo*, pp.422-432. Ishiwara Kanji puts forth the theory that war is inevitable and is a process through which human progress is attained. He therefore advocated war preparedness, against Russia in particular.
Rikugunshō Shimbunhan, "Kokubō no hongi to sono kyōka no teishō", in Takahashi Masaei (ed), *Kokka Shūgi Undō*, Vol 2 pp.266-282. Army radicals expanded on Ishiwara's theory to advocate self-sufficiency in national defence, Kokubō no Jishū 国 防 の 事 じ務 む . Self-reliance is not an alarming objective in itself, but the military made self-sufficiency in defence to mean capability to wage a war against Russia and/or the United States single-handed. This led Ishiwara and others to advocate a National Defence Economy, Kokubō Keizai 国 防 經 濟 業 . This involved (a) gearing Japanese economy to a war footing and building up heavy industries and (b) securing essential raw materials such as coal, iron, and oil from Manchuria and Mongolia. The inclusion of China and the South Seas was a later development based on essentially the same arguments.
adopted this hypothesis on the need for self-sufficiency in national defence and attempted to gear conquered resources in North China for war support without any adequate prior assessment as to how far the North China economy could be bent in the direction desired by the North China Army.

The desire of the Japanese military for self-sufficiency in national defence was genuine and they were highly motivated by patriotic considerations. The Japanese military, however, had no clear notions as to what constituted self-sufficiency in national defence. The acquisition of Manchuria, at one time denoted as the life-line of Japan, obviously did not satisfy the minimum requirements of self-sufficiency in national defence, for North China was immediately coveted for its rich deposits of coal and iron while its one hundred million inhabitants were viewed as potential customers for Japanese goods. The fact that North China was a food deficit region, that huge investments had to be made if exploitation of its coal and iron deposits on any scale was to be practised, and that urban centres were the most unproductive parts of the region were all overlooked until after the North China Army had resorted to military occupation. There was a great discrepancy between the rosy economic potential as painted by the Japanese expansionists and the actual scene in North China, which could not but continue to worsen under
war conditions. This error of judgement in itself created problems for the occupation forces.

Moreover, the pretexts for expansion expressed by the military and civilian interests revealed a fundamental difference in their respective economic objectives in occupied territories. In North China, the military wanted to develop the mining of coal and iron, and communication facilities for transporting ores to steel works in Japan and Manchuria. Private interests wanted to develop the area as an exclusive market for cheap Japanese consumer goods and for supply of raw materials to Japan, cotton in particular.

Basic lack of interest on the part of private Japanese capital in mining coal and iron, except in Shantung where coal was needed for generating power to operate Japanese textile mills at Tsingtao and where proximity to the sea facilitated both transportation and security, made it imperative for the North China Army to keep a firm control over economic policy and to adopt economic planning as a way to enforce development in the sectors desired. The Japanese military in North China was not averse to commercial exploitation of the region, and the fact that the Provisional Government was required to lower its tariff rates twice was designed for no other purpose than to increase the amount of Japanese imports and lower the cost.
of raw material exports. Indeed, this move pleased not only Japanese business interests, but Western business interests as well. After the Japanese-sponsored regimes in North and Central China had lowered their tariff rates, the Powers brought pressure to bear on the Nationalist Chinese Government to follow suit lest Western trading position in China be affected by the Japanese move. This attempt to facilitate commercial exploitation of occupied China served to induce invested foreign capital to remain in China, an exodus of foreign funds would have worsened the capital shortage problem immensely. Tariff cuts directly caused a rapid increase in Japanese private capital investment. However, it should be noted that the Japanese military in Manchuria had purposely kept private Japanese capital out of Manchuria, and the departure from this line of action in North China is significant. Nevertheless,

3 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.541-543; Asahi Shimbun, June 1938, p.1; Kuwano Hiroshi, Senji Tsūka Kōsaku Shiron, p.61.

4 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.543; N.R. Clifford Retreat from China, p.58.

5 Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha Sangyōbu, Hokushina Keizai Sōkan, pp.125-128. However, private investment was centred on textile industries.

6 Army radicals blamed social, economic, and political ills in Japan on unbridled capitalism. They proposed to rebuild the social, economic and political order in Japan by enhancing the patriotic motive to replace the
the North China Army accorded low priority to commercial exploitation. Only in that part of the economy where military considerations were either absent or of very little significance were private interests given a free hand.

The problem of economic control was confined initially to activities considered important to national defence and the North China economy was arbitrarily classified into a free and a controlled sector. The distinction was based purely on priorities of the North China Army and does not indicate that efforts towards control were not exerted in the so-called free sector. What the distinction signified was no more than the graduation of economic activities in terms of military priority. It does help to point out that whereas economic policies affected both sectors, economic planning was meant only for the controlled sector. The controlled sector, however, tended to embrace more and more economic activities in time as even

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profit-making motive. The Kwantung Army was experimenting with this concept in Manchuria and tried its best to keep the established financial cliques in Japan out of Manchuria. Investment capital had to be procured, however, and this was done by taking control over the resources of the South Manchurian Railway Company and by the introduction of 'patriotic capitalists' from Japan. 'Patriotic capital' was no more than admitting financial interests connected with heavy industries in Japan. See S.N.Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932, pp.23-25, and Kungtu C. Sun, The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, pp.75-76 and 80.
non-strategical goods such as foodstuff came to acquire strategic importance because both the Japanese Army and the Chinese resistance were living off the land.

As the North China Army had to busy itself with military operations and as its leaders had a military and not an economic or political background, the North China Army entrusted the details of political, economic and cultural control to its Special Service establishment while retaining final policy control. It is significant that the Special Service should have created economic-planning, policy-initiation, and policy-making bodies outside the Provisional Government. Economic affairs were regarded as so important a sector of Japanese interests that the puppet regime was to be denied all but a nominal control. Although economic-planning and policy-making functions were denied to the puppet regime, the Provisional Government was allowed to be represented in what was nominally the highest policy-making body on economic affairs: the Nichi-Ka Keizai Kyōgi Kai or the Sino-Japanese Bilateral Economic Conference. This practice served to maintain a facade of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation as the Bilateral Conference had half of its members appointed by the

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Provisional Government. The rest were Special Service appointees.  

The Bilateral Conference, established early in March 1938, was the embodiment of the principle of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. The partnership between Chinese labour/resources and Japanese capital/technical know-how was designed to entitle the latter to a formal equal share in economic policy-making power in North China. Chinese susceptibility was observed only in reserving the chairmanship of the Bilateral Conference to a Chinese national. Wang K'e-min, the leading figure of the puppet leadership in Peking, realized the importance of the Bilateral Conference and, being an experienced banker, appointed himself as chairman. However, the stipulation

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9 Asahi Shimbun, June 1938, p.202. Although the Bilateral Conference was established in March 1938, bilateral talks did not start until June 1938 after Hiranama Hechisaburō, Japanese vice-chairman to the Conference, had returned from leave in Japan to Peking. Shina Jihō, Vol 28, No. 5, May 1938, p.56.

10 Hōmengun Tokumubu, 1st Feb 1938, "Nichi-Ka Keizai Kyōgikai Sōshiki Yōryō", in JFA, S.1.1.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, pp. 1227-1229; Tōa, Vol 11, No. 4, April 1938, pp.54-63, "Hokushi keizai kaihatsusaku no saikentō", p.63
that the day-to-day affairs of the Bilateral Conference were to be under the charge of a Japanese national dispelled any illusion of Chinese control over this body.\textsuperscript{11} Japanese control was asserted to the extent that the first Bilateral Conference meeting was delayed for three months simply because the Japanese vice-chairman was taking a holiday in Japan.\textsuperscript{12}

Contrary to the announced function of the Bilateral Conference, it was not a policy-making body. With a total membership of ten, chosen from among Chinese and Japanese serving officials with technical backgrounds, the Bilateral Conference was concerned with drafting economic plans. It was divided into four departments: that of mining and industry, agriculture, finance, and trade. Within each department was a planning centre. Heads of departments were appointed from among the Bilateral Conference membership, but the planning centres were staffed by outside recruits.\textsuperscript{13} The planning centres were responsible for drafting development plans for initial discussions on

\textsuperscript{11} Hōmengun Tokomubu, 1st Feb 1938, "Nichi-Ka Keizai Kyōgikai Sōshiki Yōryō", in JFA, S.1.l.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, pp.1227-1229.

\textsuperscript{12} Asahi Shimbun, June 1938, p.308, and July 1938, p.42.

the departmental level. The North China Army maintained an 'observer' in all departmental deliberations and as this 'observer' had the right to speak as a representative of the North China Army, he was in effect the real directing force on drafting economic plans.\textsuperscript{14} Approved departmental draft plans were then presented to the Bilateral Conference for further deliberations aimed at coordinating the efforts of the four departments before Bilateral Conference sanction was given.\textsuperscript{15} The North China Army, however, negated Bilateral Conference policy control functions by establishing the Economic Committee.\textsuperscript{16}

The Economic Committee was an all-Japanese body responsible for advising the North China Army on economic matters. The size and composition of its membership was not fixed, but it included all Japanese members of the Bilateral Conference and they were required to report all

\textsuperscript{14} Homengun Tokumubu, "Nichi-Ka Keizai Kyōgikai ni taisuru gun no naimen shidō yōryō", in JFA, S.1.1.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, p.1230.

\textsuperscript{15} Homengun Tokumubu, 1st Feb 1938, "Nichi-Ka Keizai Kyōgikai Sōshiki Yōryō", in JFA, S.1.1.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, pp.1227-1229.

\textsuperscript{16} Asahi Shimbun, June 1938, p.308. The Economic Committee was established in March 1938. Its Chairman, Hiranama Hechisaburō, stayed in Japan until June 1938 and the first committee meeting was called on 20th June 1938.
Conference proceedings to the Economic Committee. This Committee emerged as the policy control agency because the North China Army participated directly in its deliberations and North China Army sanction on economic measures was obtained through this body. The Special Service was also represented directly and was entitled to appoint three members. The Economic Committee therefore included the Special Service, the Japanese members of the Bilateral Conference, and the North China Army. It was the body in which the Japanese themselves deliberated on policy matters, and final decisions made by the North China Army. Japanese economic experts were given a say equal to the Special Service in advising the North China Army and this made it possible for the North China Army to make its own decisions in economic matters instead of delegating the function entirely to its Special Service. The Bilateral Conference was reduced to an economic planning board. In fact matters were initiated at the Bilateral Conference only after the Japanese had discussed the matters beforehand in the

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17. Tokumubu Dainika, 10th Feb 1938, "Keizai Iinkai sōshiki an", in JFA, S.1.1.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, pp.1231-1233. The Economic Committee was a secret internal body of the North China Army whose existence was to be kept secret. Tōa, Vol 11, No. 4, April 1938, pp.54-63, "Hokushi keizai kaihatsusaku no saikentō", p.63.

Economic Committee. Bilateral Conference policy discussions were only formal processes to rubber stamp economic decisions with Sino-Japanese approval.  

The establishment of the China Affairs Board in December 1938 and the subsequent nominal disbanding of the Special Service to enable it to become the North China branch of the China Affairs Board brought with it no fundamental changes to the economic policy-making and planning structure as described except that rival Foreign Ministry personnel engaged in economic affairs in North China were absorbed by the China Affairs Board, thus falling under Special Service control.  

Nor did the establishment of the North China Development Company around the same time materially alter the structure in any way. Researchers of the Japanese Self-Defence Force hold the view that as a functional economic planning and policy-making body, the Bilateral Conference and the Economic Committee were superceded by the North China Development Company.  

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19 Ibid


21 Bōeicho Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen, pp.74-75.
Development Company was not a policy-making body, it was a purely financial concern designed for procuring investment capital to support the controlled sector of the North China economy. This distinction is important, since the Development Company was under effective Tokyo Government control and strong Zaibatsu influence. To say that the Development Company had control over economic policy-making is in effect to assert that Tokyo had succeeded in gaining policy control from the North China Army, and this is clearly untrue. The economic control structure is diagrammatically represented in Chart III, descriptions of the North China Development Company and its subsidiary monopoly companies are presented later in this chapter.

The fact that huge investments would be required for economic development in North China and that the North China Army could not raise sufficient funds within its occupied territories emboldened rival Japanese interests in Manchuria, North China, and Japan to advise the North China Army on tentative economic development plans. The aim was either to gain control from or share control with the military in North China, invariably by attempts to influence the thinking of the North China Army before it made up its mind. The most prominent rivals were the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Kōchū Company, and Zaibatsu groups in Japan.
The South Manchurian Railway Company was the first to come up with a draft development plan. It revolved around the control of railways in North China and extended to control over rail support activities such as bus service, coal mining, and harbour facilities. A total investment of eight billion yen spread over a five year period was proposed. Further, the Kōchū Company in North China was to be compensated by the South Manchurian Railway Company for allowing the latter to come into the economic field in North China. Compensation was to be in the form of South Manchurian Railway Company investment in the Kōchū Company, up to eighty-eight million yen for the first year, to enable the latter to take over control of existing industries in North China outside of the South Manchurian Railway Company development plan on the one condition that the Kōchū Company would refrain from ambitious expansion programmes. That is to say, South Manchurian Railway Company support for the Kōchū Company was limited to maintaining existing production levels in industries under Kōchū Company control.

The modest development plan put forward by the

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23 Ibid, p.29
South Manchurian Railway Company indicated that that Company was both unwilling and unable to provide all the capital wants in North China. Even the proposed eight billion yen development plan was brought down to size when it was made clear to the North China Army that only one and a half billion yen would actually be made available in the first year, and that a substantial portion of the capital had to be raised in Japan and not Manchuria. What the South Manchurian Railway Company succeeded in driving home to the North China Army was that sufficient capital could not be procured, at least not from Manchuria alone, and that under the circumstances the North China Army had to decide on priorities and concentrate its efforts on a selected sector of the economy. Developmental schemes on the Manchoukuo scale and financed in the Manchoukuo fashion could not be repeated in North China. The North China Army regarded the South Manchurian Railway Company proposal as too modest and had it shelved.

The Kōchū Company, set up in December 1936 and financed entirely by the South Manchurian Railway Company, was designed to repeat the success of the Japanese chartered company in Manchuria and to build a Japanese financial

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24 Ibid, p.29. The South Manchurian Railway Company proposed to raise three billion yen in Manchuria and five billion yen in Japan.
empire in North China. The Kōchū Company supported the basic concept of the South Manchurian Railway Company proposal, but objected to being given a secondary role. Therefore, it countered with an alternative plan centred on the establishment of a policy control company with full authority over all activities in the controlled sector. The Kōchū Company was contemplating expanding its present modest facilities to become the proposed policy control company. There was no chance for the Kōchū Company alternative plan to be adopted since the Kōchū Company could advance no promise on capital investment except the vague suggestion that capital should be procured from Japan, Manchuria, and North China and that such investors should submit willingly to Kōchū Company control. The Kōchū Company itself had only a declared capital of ten million yen and a paid-up capital of two and a half million. It was in no position to finance any development plan covering the whole of North China.

27 Ibid, pp.29-30
28 Chou K'ai-ching, op cit, pp.177-179; Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, p.63.
Financial interests in Japan were not happy with the overall North China Army concept of a controlled economy in North China and were reluctant to put investment capital into ventures based on the patriotic instead of the profit-making motive. They pointed out that North China was not an industrial region and that to enforce development in mining and industry was not only costly, but also promised no financial returns for a long time to come, a fact that would keep most investors at a safe distance. Representing mainly light industrial interests, they looked to North China as a potential market and a good source of supply for raw materials such as cotton. They therefore voiced their preference for a laissez-faire economic policy in North China to allow profit-making enterprises to develop according to natural demand and supply. Where departure from the laissez-faire approach was favoured, it was favoured only as a means to eliminate competition against established industrial interests. That is to say, they objected to any large scale investment in North China, resented North China Army control, and condemned investment on enterprises designed to strengthen the military and not Japan's economic power.

Since it was evident that some support from private capital was essential, the North China Army made concrete moves at attracting Japanese capital to North China. Before the occupation the Nationalist Chinese Government had been accused of raising tariff walls designed to keep Japanese goods out. The North China Army therefore strove to gain control over the customs establishment in North China prior to legislating tariff cuts. This move was necessary for a second reason in that returns from customs could be used to defray administrative costs of the Provisional Government.

Customs returns had been pledged for repayment of foreign loans and attempts to gain control over them brought diplomatic complications. The customs office at Tientsin was under the direction of a British national. Other customs offices were situated in ports under the East Hopei Autonomous Government. The mutiny of East Hopei police units and its occupation by troops of the North China Army simplified matters somewhat. The East

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31 JFA, Shimazu, Vice-consul at Peking, 5th August 1937, "Tōshū (Tungchow) Jihen hassei kei-i gaihō", in SP205-6 History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police, China, September 1870 to December 1940, pp. 2376-2380; Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp. 45-50.
Hopei regime, which had been orientated towards the Kwantung Army, was incorporated into the Provisional Government and became an area where the Provisional Government had effective administrative control. However, the customs returns of ports in East Hopei were insignificant as compared with the returns of the customs office at Tientsin. On 15th December 1937, just one day after the establishment of the Provisional Government, negotiations with the Director of Customs at Tientsin were carried out and on the following day the Tientsin Customs Office was taken over by the Provisional Government. The question

32 Tōa, Vol 11, No. 3, March 1938, pp.34-38, "Chūka Minkoku Rinji Seifu no zaiseiteki kisō". Tientsin customs returns were estimated at forty-two million Chinese dollars, while East Hopei customs returns were estimated at only one million and seven hundred thousand Chinese dollars.

33 Tōa Dobunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.540, claimed that the Tientsin Customs Office was formally taken over by the Provisional Government on 16th December 1937. This claim is refuted by F.C. Jones, in his Shanghai and Tientsin, p.160. Jones quoted a statement made on 15th Feb 1938 by Lord Plymouth, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Lords: "The present position is that Mr Myers, who is the Customs Commissioner at Tientsin, agreed last autumn, under the threat of seizure by the (Japanese) military authorities to bank all Customs revenues in the Yokohama Specie Bank. It was understood that in due course remittances would be made from that Bank to Shanghai to meet the service of the loan, but no remittance is likely to be made until the position at Shanghai (Customs Office) has been cleared up". In view of the fact that the Provisional Government did legislate tariff reduction in January 1938 and had the reduction implemented, there is no doubt that the Tientsin Customs was handed over
is why did the British acquiesce in a Japanese-supported Provisional Government takeover of the Tientsin Customs Office?

The Tientsin Customs Office had been an embarrassment to Britain ever since the Japanese took Manchuria and the twenty-two districts in East Hopei. Japanese goods were imported into North China either through Dairen or one of the East Hopei ports where they were charged a much lower tariff rate, usually at about a quarter of that charged by the customs office at Tientsin. The Japanese would not allow these goods to be taxed again by Chinese customs and were ready to use their military force on land and at sea to deal with any attempt on the part of the Chinese customs to tax them. Some Japanese goods were not

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to the Provisional Government. However, the arrangement between the Japanese and the British over customs was not made formal until May 1938. It was reported in Tōa, Vol 11, No. 6, June 1938, pp.31-40, in an article entitled "Shina Shinseiken no Kaikan sesshu no igi", that formal negotiation with the British ambassador opened on 2nd May 1938. The British agreed to hand over Customs on condition that foreign debts would be honoured. The Customs was handed over to puppet authorities on 6th June 1938. The Reformed Government (Central China) and the Provisional Government then made a joint statement that they would honour foreign debts. See also Asahi Shimbun, June 1938, p.172.

Arthur N. Young, China and the Helping Hand 1937-1945, pp.87-96, reveals a long period of negotiation between Britain and Japan in 1938. The British negotiated with the Tokyo Government in order to circumvent the Japanese military in North and Central China. N.R. Clifford, op cit, pp.57-58, claims that negotiations started in September 1937 and lasted until May 1938.
even taxed at all. This was the so-called Special Trade of North China.

British goods were consequently discriminated against as a result of Japanese unilateral action on the one hand, and on the other by the fact that the Tientsin Customs Office was administered by a British national and its returns pledged to repay foreign loans which were very often British as well. The dilemma was that collection of dues in effect gave preferential tariff treatment to the Japanese, while non-collection would hurt the interests of bond holders in Britain. It was obvious then that the British had to choose between maintaining a market in North China and protecting invested financial capital. Decision was delayed as long as possible and a Chinese customs office remained in action three months after Tientsin and most of North China had fallen into Japanese hands. But when the Japanese made up their minds to ask for control over the Tientsin Customs Office, the British

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tried to make the best bargain they could in relinquishing control. The Japanese made no more than a verbal pledge that foreign interests would be respected and that foreign loans would be honoured by the Provisional Government in proportion to the area under its control. 35 This was no more than a face-saving gesture.

Once the Tientsin Customs Office was in Japanese hands the question of tariff rates cropped up immediately. Different rates applied in Dairen, East Hopei, and Tientsin. This anomaly could not be allowed to continue, and rates were reduced to the East Hopei level. 36 This meant that the established income from this source would be reduced by half. The annual income of the Tientsin Customs Office had amounted to about forty-two million Chinese dollars. 37 Half of this would be just over twenty million dollars. The amount was urgently needed to finance the establishment of administration under the Provisional Government and also it was only an estimated

35 F.C. Jones, op cit, p.160.

36 Toa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.541. The first tariff reduction in January 1938 was based on eliminating tariff rate differences between East Hopei ports and Tientsin.

37 Toa, Vol 11, No. 3, March 1938, pp.34-38, "Chūka Minkoku Rinji Seifu no zaiseiteki kisō", p.34.
income for the future, not ready capital on hand.\textsuperscript{38} As such potential income from customs was unlikely to become a major source of investment capital and the North China Army was therefore willing to sacrifice part of this potential income in the hope of attracting substantial private capital investment.

The views expressed by rival Japanese interests made it clear to the North China Army that to procure sufficient capital investment was a major problem. In order to have a reliable picture of the economic potential of the occupied territories as a basis for policy-making and for estimating investment needs, expert advice was sought by the appointment of Hiranama Hechisaburō, associated with the Nissan Group in Manchuria, as Economic Advisor to the Provisional Government.\textsuperscript{39} Hiranama also became vice-chairman of the Bilateral Conference and was in effect the leading economic advisor to the North China

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Jōhō}, No. 10, 1st Jan 1940, pp.105-106. According to figures released by Wang Shih-ching, head of the Finance Department of the Provisional Government, customs returns for Jan to Sept 1938 amounted to Ch$52 million, and for Oct 1938 to Sept 1939 amounted to Ch$106 million. Each time accounted for more than half of total revenue returns of the Provisional Government. The increase in returns, however, must be discounted against inflation during the same period.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Tōa}, Vol 11, No. 5, May 1938, pp.26-34, "Hokushi keizai kaihatsu to gaishi yūnyū mondai", p.28; Nashimoto Yuhei, \textit{op cit}, p.170.
Army in the Economic Committee. Hiranama was quick to point out that North China was a food deficit region, liable to be more a burden than an asset to overall Japanese prowess in East Asia. He advised, therefore, that efforts at economic development be concentrated on the agricultural sector, aimed at making the region self-supporting in food production at least. This was opposed to the Army's desire to develop war industries, and the desire of light industrial interests to encourage the cultivation of cash crops such as cotton in North China. The advice was rejected as mere academic nonsense. As an alternative, the North China Army could subordinate development in the mining and industrial sector in North China to the raw material needs in Manchuria. This demanded lesser investment capital than if the North China economy were to stand alone, and exports of coal and iron to Manchuria could be used to pay for food imports from the same region. However, this approach entailed subordinating policy decisions to those of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Further, the problem of raising enough investment capital remained. It was estimated that a financial burden of at least thirty billion yen for development projects in North and Central China would be placed on Japan and that a minimum of eleven

40 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, p.63; Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, pp.626-627.
billion yen would be required by the controlled sector in North China. 41

The North China Army realized that an accommodation with Manchuria was imperative as indicated by its willingness to base economic plans in North China to those in Manchuria. Since Manchoukuo had started a Five-Year Plan in 1937, the North China Army followed with an initial Four-Year Plan and a subsequent Five-Year Plan so as to put developmental plans for the two adjacent occupation zones on the same time scale and running through a concurrent time period. 42 The so-called economic planning in North China, however, went no further than drawing up financial estimates. Actual development plans were not formulated until the question of finance had been solved. The first concrete steps were therefore the setting up of financing channels in the North China Development Company, monopoly companies, and the Reserve Bank of China. The Four-Year Plan nonetheless made a

41 Tōa, Vol 11, No. 5, May 1938, pp.26-34, "Hokushi keizai kaihatsu to gaishi yūnyū mondai". An estimate on the financial needs of a Nine Year Plan as put forward by Tokyo amounted to ¥11.05 billion. The amount was provisionally allocated as follows: Communication ¥4 (unit in billion), Tele-communication ¥0.35, Iron and Steel ¥1.3, Coal ¥4.5, Salt ¥0.2 and Electricity ¥0.7.

42 Nashimoto Yūhei, op cit, p.174; Tōa, Vol 11, No. 4, April 1938, pp.54-63, "Hokushi keizai kaihatsusaku no saikentō", p.60.
provisional investment allocation, indicating a divergence of views between Tokyo and the North China Army on the minimum required. The North China Army's provisional investment is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount (billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>¥ 4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Extraction</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition there was a separate Nine-Year Plan for doubling cotton production. The problems remaining were the procurement of capital, and the limiting of the influence of rival interests in Japan and Manchuria just short of discouraging them from investing in North China.

The North China Development Company was established by the Japanese Government to procure finance from Japan.

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43 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, p.62, quoting North China Army Special Service sources, claimed that the first Five Year Plan, later changed to a Four-Year Plan, would cost fourteen billion yen.
to support economic development plans of the North China Army, evidently an effort towards ensuring effective influence by Tokyo. Although labelled as a national policy company (kokusaku kaisha) it had practically nothing to do with policy-making. It was strictly a financial concern dedicated to the task of realizing capital for investment in the controlled sector of the North China economy as defined by the North China Army. The main interests incorporated into the North China Development Company were the Tokyo Government and Zaibatsu groups in Japan. It was organized, financed, and controlled by Tokyo interests and as such it was kept away from the operation of economic development projects by the military in North China.

As the Development Company was given a limited role to perform, it returned the favour with limited financial support. The declared capital of the Development Company was only three and a half billion yen, and this was far below even the minimum estimates of eleven billion required to finance the two projected economic plans. Tokyo financial interests were not even willing to shoulder this comparatively moderate sum, and the Tokyo Government

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had to contribute half of the Development Company's declared capital. The Tokyo Government contribution, however, was broken down into one and a half billion yen in supplies, mainly in the form of trucks, rolling stocks, and rail carriages required for making good recent war damages, and quarter of a billion yen in cash. The remaining one and three quarter billion yen was promised by Zaibatsu groups on condition that (a) they retain control over the investment and (b) the Tokyo Government would give them financial guarantees. The Tokyo Government agreed to these terms, and the North China Army accepted funds made available by the Development Company. As the Development Company was not under North China Army control, however, it was kept out of North China and out of any operational projects. The Development Company had its offices in Tokyo, with branches only in Peking and Changchiakou to act as liaison channels. The Tokyo Government promised financial subsidies to the Development Company to ensure an annual dividend of 6% irrespective of whether it was making a


The lengths to which the Tokyo Government went in establishing the North China Development Company in spite of the little influence the Company could exert in North China showed how anxious Tokyo was to increase its influence in North China. Tokyo control over the Development Company lessened at the beginning of 1940 when Company executives decided to make the Peking branch office the real centre of Development Company operations. This continued until 1943 when the head office was formally moved to Peking.

Apart from Government and Zaibatsu financial contributions, the North China Development Company was further made into a centre for procuring funds from other sources with the basic aim of securing double the minimum requirement of eleven billion yen. The sources of finance considered were native Chinese capital, foreign investment and Japanese interests other than the Zaibatsu groups.


48 Asahi Shimbun, December 1939, pp.128 and 256.

49 JFA, "Hokushi Kaihatsu Kaisha kinō ni kansuru ken", being a telegram from Shiotaku 薮到 the Minister for Greater East Asia, Aoki, 金井 dated 16th November 1943, found in S.5.2.2.1-10, "Hokushi Kaihatsu to Chūshi Shinkō Kabushiki Kaisha", pp.84-88.
The Development Company was authorized to issue bonds to a total value not exceeding five times its paid up capital or a maximum possible total of seventeen and a half billion yen. If the bonds were all sold and if the declared capital of the Development Company were all paid up, the total realized would be twenty-one billion yen. The bonds were also guaranteed by the Tokyo Government, ensuring full interest and capital returns whatever happened in North China.

No official figures were ever released on the actual amount of bonds sold, but response was expected to be poor and the projected figure of seventeen and a half billion yen was probably never realized. After two years, investment capital from all sources realized to support the controlled sector amounted to just over five and a half billion yen. Chinese capital in North China was lacking, and much of the little that there was had escaped to banks.


52 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, Hokushina Keizai no Shindōkō, pp.262-263
in foreign concessions at Tientsin and Shanghai. Foreign capital was likely to pull out since Japanese military occupation had deprived foreign interests of earlier privileges and adequate legal protection, the North China Army could aim at no more than retaining existing foreign-owned enterprises in North China, mainly belonging to British interests.  

Nevertheless, the North China Army took active steps to attract foreign capital and a Committee on Encouragement of Foreign Investment was established in July 1938, comprising elements from the Bilateral Conference, the Special Service, and the Foreign Ministry. The Committee was to examine the volume of foreign capital to be attracted, the type of investment foreign capital should engage in, and ways of retaining foreign capital already invested.  

Little progress was made beyond sponsoring German and Italian economic missions to visit North China. The Japanese were particularly anxious to attract German interests. In return for German recognition of Japan's special position in North China, Japan promised...

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54 Asahi Shimbun, July 1938, p.246, news item on Gaishi Yūnyū Tinkai 外資輸入委員會.

to reciprocate by giving special treatment to German trade in North China.  

Since financial support from the Tokyo Government and Zaibatsu groups was insufficient to satisfy the needs of the North China Army, support was sought from financial interests in Manchuria and North China. What the North China Army did was to offer monopoly rights over individual industry and mining enterprise within the controlled sector to an operating company. The operating company was nominally a subsidiary of the North China Development Company, which meant no more than the allocation of funds from the resources of the Development Company to that particular operating company. This formed only a portion of the operating capital of the subsidiary, the additional capital would be contributed by companies such as the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Kōchū Company, that is, Japanese financial interests overseas.

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56 Rikugunshō Dairokka, 10th July 1938, "Hokushi ni okeru Nichi-Doku keizai teikei ni kansuru kyōtei an", in JFA, S.1.1.1.0-27, Shina Jihen, pp.2284-2285.

57 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.635, has two tables on the amount of capital invested in each monopoly within the controlled sector. Figures are broken down into North China Development Company contribution, other Japanese contribution, and Chinese contribution.
Nominally under the Development Company, the subsidiary companies were in charge of carrying out actual development projects put forward by the North China Army. Had the Development Company been able and willing to supply all investment needs, it would at least have acquired a \textit{de facto} veto power over economic projects through withholding finance, serving as an effective counter to the North China Army and reducing the operating companies to mere technical organizations. As it was, the fact that Development Company financial support was limited meant that its influence was limited and this made it easier for the North China Army to retain control over the operating companies. This control was effected through the nominal observance of the principle of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation in that (a) the subsidiaries were registered in North China and their Company Laws drawn up in North China and (b) the Provisional Government, through contributing railways and other government property holdings, claimed a 50% share in each subsidiary and retained the power of approving the appointment of top executives.\footnote{Ibid, pp.634-635.} As the Provisional Government was effectively controlled by the North China Army, nominal Provisional Government control was inserted to allow actual North China Army
control over these subsidiaries of the Development Company. Further, the juxtaposition of rival Japanese financial interests within the same operating company served to balance one against the other, enabling North China Army dominance to be more effective even if not complete.

The release of monopoly rights in individual industries to operating companies had the effect of dividing the controlled sector into separate compartments. In order to coordinate the development plans of each monopoly, or rather in order to make each industry adhere closely to the Four-Year Plan of the North China Army, it was imperative that the Japanese military in North China should maintain a dominant say within each monopoly. This need made the North China Army anxious to raise native Chinese capital as a form of North China Army contribution to the capital investment requirements of each individual monopoly. Further, the Japanese Government was unwilling to foot the entire financial costs involved in war operations in North and Central China, and was anxious to have its burden alleviated by the use of conquered resources. Both the Tokyo Government and the North China Army agreed on one point, that banking facilities in occupied territories should be used to help finance war and investment needs.

At the start of hostilities, Japanese military
units in China used Yen - Bank of Chōsen notes in North China and Bank of Tokyo notes in Central China - to defray immediate costs inside occupied Chinese territories.\(^{59}\)

Heavy military expenditure and the world depression in the early thirties had brought about heavy pressure on the Yen. The Japanese Government had aimed at maintaining an exchange value of ¥1 to 1s.2d. and the Yen had fallen below this value twice.\(^{60}\) An increase in Yen circulation in China would stimulate inflationary trends in Japan and weaken further the Yen's international position. In short, the Japanese Government was unwilling to give its armies in China substantial amounts in Yen.

Tokyo therefore advanced a formula for solving this problem in September 1937. The North China Army was asked to form a special Banking Control Committee to exert direct control over the Bank of Hopei and its note issues were to be used to defray Japanese military costs and local procurements in North China. Major Chinese banks in North China were to be asked to give the necessary financial backing to the Bank of Hopei so as to enable it to maintain a parity in value between Bank of Hopei notes and legal tender issued by the Chinese Government at Nanking.


The Bank of Hopei would then advance any amount of cash requested by the North China Army. Further, the Yen and foreign currency holdings of the Bank of Hopei were to be deposited in Japanese banks, which in turn were responsible for meeting the foreign currency needs of North China. Foreign currency expenditure, however, was to be kept at a minimum. If accepted by the North China Army, Tokyo would be relieved of the irksome duty of supplying Yen notes overseas, would have acquired a modest addition to her foreign currency reserves, and would have gained exchange control in North China.

The Tokyo formula was not accepted by the North China Army, raising a fundamental question on policy and bringing to the fore the question of whether Tokyo or its Army in North China had more control over policy decisions in occupied areas. The Tokyo formula was essentially a plan to set up a Japanese-controlled currency issue in North China which was divorced from the Yen. Centralized exchange control in Tokyo would have given the Government a powerful instrument in exerting its influence over the North China Army. Further, should a monetary crisis result from the move, it would be confined to occupied territories.

The Yen would be immune from the effects of monetary crisis in occupied China. There was little consideration given to providing the North China Army with a viable banking structure for supporting the war effort and economic development projects.

Tokyo's reluctance to provide any more Yen for spending in occupied areas compelled its armies overseas either to follow formulae put forward by Tokyo, or to advance alternative plans of their own. The Central China Army resorted to issuing Military Notes, but these had no monetary value outside of military zones. Military notes were never issued in North China, possibly to avoid hardening Chinese resistance. The use of the Bank of Hopei notes, as suggested by Tokyo, sounded attractive at the start as the notes were already in circulation, and were an accepted currency in foreign trade. However, the circulation area of the Hopei notes within occupied areas was limited to the province of Hopei and the same problem would reemerge in North China provinces other than Hopei. What was the North China Army to do with the note issues of the Bank of Kitung (East Hopei) and the Bank of Shansi? Obviously, a more comprehensive approach was needed.

This led the North China Army to establish the China Reserve Bank in March 1938 as the sole note issue bank in occupied North China. The notes issued would be used not only to pay for military procurements and finance developmental projects, but also to be used in purchasing essential supplies from Japan. The Reserve Bank note was proclaimed at par with the Yen, and the North China Army planned to link the two currencies, hoping to have the Reserve Bank notes accepted in international dealings.

In order to gain confidence for the Reserve Bank note, the North China Army tried to raise capital for the Reserve Bank to give its note issues adequate backing in reserves.

Legislation for the establishment of the China Reserve Bank set the declared capital at fifty million yen. Only half of the capital was to be paid up, and this was shared between the Provisional Government and the leading Chinese banks in North China on a fifty-fifty basis. On paper, then, it was entirely financed by Chinese interests. The Provisional Government, however, had no capital to invest and had to issue bonds which were bought...

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63 Tōa Dōbunkai, Shinshina Gensei Yōran, p.600.
64 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, pp.21-22, quoting proclamation made by the Reserve Bank of China.
up by three leading Japanese banks and the Japanese Government. The Japanese banks provided nine million yen and the Japanese Government provided three and a half million yen's worth of silver stock from the holdings of the Bank of Chōsen. The yen reserves made available by the Japanese banks were only credits and were deposited in the Japanese banks concerned. Thus, the China Reserve Bank started only with the silver stock provided by the Japanese Government.  

The capital made available was obviously inadequate and efforts were therefore made to strengthen the financial position of the China Reserve Bank before it opened its doors in March 1938. First, an attempt was made to secure Chinese silver holdings stored in Peking and Tientsin. Japan had succeeded in preventing the shipment of over fifty million yen's worth of silver to Central China after the Nanking Government had enforced the Nationalization of Silver in 1935. These silver stocks were stored in French-owned warehouses in Peking and in Chinese bank branches at the British Concession at Tientsin. Both the French and British Governments recognized the

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Nationalist Chinese Government as the only legal government in China and refused to assist the Japanese in pressuring the Chinese to give up their silver holdings in North China to the North China Army or its Chinese agents. Bank executives in North China resorted to delaying tactics by first refusing to admit that they had any authority from their head office in Chungking to release the silver, and later by escaping to Hong Kong, leaving junior staff only in North China. Meanwhile the Japanese could do no more than keeping a watchful eye on the silver stocks lest they be smuggled out of North China. The silver stocks remained outside Japanese control until after the outbreak of the Pacific War when the Japanese finally invaded foreign concessions in China.

Failure to obtain substantial Chinese capital to support the China Reserve Bank and its note issue led the North China Army to turn to financial interests in Japan for help. A Japanese banking consortium agreed to provide one billion yen credit on condition that the Reserve Bank should submit its accounts to the consortium twice a year and that all appointments to the Supervisory Committee of the Reserve

68 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, p.19.
69 Ibid, p.20.
Bank had to be approved by the consortium. The North China Army could not but agree to these harsh conditions set by the consortium, and this agreement enabled the China Reserve Bank to open for business in March 1938. Financial weakness of the Reserve Bank was a fact that the military in North China could not gloss over, and a fact that did not help to give Reserve Bank notes a firm standing within or without North China.

The introduction of China Reserve Bank notes in North China opened up yet another front in the Sino-Japanese conflict: a currency war. Japan and China had to compete in making their respective currency issues in China acceptable by the populace inside and outside areas under their control. Confidence in these currency issues was tied to the exchange rates of these currencies in the open market in Shanghai and Tientsin. The North China Army tried to give the Reserve Bank note extra strength by tying it to the Yen, and declared the value of Yen and Reserve Bank dollar at par, the very prospect that Tokyo had been trying to avoid. This measure was made practicable by a secret agreement between the Reserve Bank, the Bank of

70 Ibid, p.20

Chōsen, and the Yokohama Specie Bank. The Reserve Bank was given unlimited drawing rights on Yen from the two banks at an annual interest of no more than 3.5%. 72

The aim of economic control over adjacent territories had originally been to make Japan into a self-sufficient defence state, that is to supplement Japan's economy with conquered resources with particular emphasis on the war industrial sector. In no time at all this professed aim had been reduced to the slogan of 'to sustain war with war' in North China. 73 The slogan reflected a realization that far from strengthening Japan's economic power, war in North China was more likely than not to sap on Japan's economic strength. Under the circumstances, everything possible to avert this had to be done and the economic objective was reduced to paying for war costs with conquered resources. In effect, economic gain was no longer the aim of expansion and economic control was meant to maintain continued military expansion for expansion's sake. Failure to attain the aim of sustaining war with war was reflected in the balance of trade between North China and Japan, import and export control measures imposed by Japan, and foreign exchange measures taken by the

72 Ibid, pp.116-117.

73 I-sen yō-sen 以戦養戦.
Provisional Government.

North China had been a trade deficit region since the beginning of the twentieth century, mainly due to food imports. The situation improved considerably in the mid-1930s when cotton exports to Japan were rising steadily and officially a trade surplus was attained in the years 1935, 1936 and 1937, amounting to Ch$9.5 million, Ch$50 million, and Ch$69 million respectively. This was more apparent than real as an increasing volume of imports into North China was unloaded at East Hopei ports where the Japanese-sponsored puppet regime charged only a quarter of the official tariff rates. East Hopei import figures had not been included in the official Chinese figures for North China.

Subsequent to Japanese occupation, the excess of imports over exports increased rapidly. The official trade deficits for 1938, 1939, and 1940 were, in terms of China Reserve Bank notes, $65 million, $373 million, and $657 million respectively. For a rough comparison of the figures in the years cited, the value of the Chinese dollar and the China Reserve Bank dollar may be taken as of equal value although the Chinese dollar was in fact at a slight

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74 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, p.53.
75 Ibid, p.53.
premium. The Provisional Government had removed tariff protection for native Chinese products and the tariff structure was maintained only because the Provisional Government derived about half of its revenue from this one source. War conditions in North China caused a rise in prices, thus the same article would fetch a much higher price in North China than before, while there was no corresponding rise in prices of the same magnitude in Japan. North China economic development projects required imports of machinery and other capital goods. All these helped to bring about a rapid decrease in imports. Price difference between Japan and North China resulted in an artificial profit margin because the two currencies were arbitrarily tied.

The North China Army tried to limit this artificial profit margin by attempting to control commodity prices in North China by resort to wage and price control. In July 1938 the Hsin-min Hui, the political arm of the Provisional Government, issued a table on fixed labour charges on a daily basis. 76 As commodity prices rose by 200% between July 1937 and November 1938, and by 430% by June 1941, 77 it was impossible to enforce the fixed wages

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76 Asahi Shimbun, July 1938, p.228.
77 Ibid, November 1939, p.388; Tōa, Vol 15, No. 12, December
in general as they were below the minimum subsistence wage. The fact that the wage table was issued by the Hsin-min Hui and not by the Provisional Government indicated that the Japanese and their collaborators had no confidence in enforcing fixed wages and the wage table was an official reference rather than law. However, when the Provisional Government and the Japanese military employed Chinese labour, efforts were made to compel labourers to accept these fixed wages, a practice that could not but breed discontent. Wage control had degenerated into corvee labour.

As wage control was unrealistic, the North China Army tried to control commodity prices. Rising prices were causing difficulties in exporting to Japan, aggravating the trade balance figures further. Accordingly a Price Control Committee was established in August 1938, and fixed prices were to be worked out for food and fuel. Later price control was extended to cotton exports.

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77 Cont'd...

78 Asahi Shimbun, August 1938, p.172, news item on the Kei-Shin Buushi Chōsei Iinkai 京都物資調整委員會.

Price control, however, caused a drop in imports and the North China Army suspended price control in January 1940 on the ground that North China was facing an acute shortage of material and that imports had to be encouraged.  

Japan's trade surplus against North China was a net financial loss. The Reserve Bank notes had no value on the international monetary market, and Reserve Bank note earnings could not be used by Japan to purchase goods except in North China. What was worse, the Reserve Bank note was used by the North China Army to procure local supplies and was printed indiscriminately. The value of Reserve Bank notes in North China itself was facing real inflation. The increase of note issue in North China was

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80 Ibid, January 1940, p.192; Tokunaga Seikō, *op cit*. The North China Army and its Chinese collaborators, however, redoubled their efforts on price control from June 1942. Price control was centred on essential consumer goods and essential military supplies. Rationing was adopted.

81 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, *op cit*, pp.11-12, for exact figure of Reserve Bank note circulation, broken down into annual and monthly figures; *Tōa*, Vol 15, No. 12, December 1942, pp.97-111, "Tairiku ni okeru bukka mondai" (2) Hokushi Mokyō hen, p.105. Amount of Reserve Bank note in circulation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (million)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>$162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>948 (up to June 1942);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tokunaga Seikō, *op cit*, p.42.
not accompanied by an increase in the Gross National Product. In fact the reverse might have been true due to war conditions and disruption in communication. The peasants were giving up cultivation of cotton and other cash crops, as transportation and sales were not certain, and reverted to food crops to ensure their food supplies locally. The official export figure, measured in monetary terms, did not drop after occupation. However, the true value of exports dropped as the value of the currency dropped.

The Provisional Government had in 1938 adopted foreign currency control laws, designed to limit any adverse effect on the Yen because of the new currency issue in North China. Remittances to Japan and Manchuria were to be controlled and limited, further foreign banks were to be denied the right to deal in such remittances. Japan and Manchuria were invited to take exchange control measures of their own. The laws were simply not enforced, for an import excess from Japan meant that the North China Army could use Reserve Bank notes, which cost no more than the

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82 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, p.53.
84 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, pp.29-30.
paper they were printed on, to buy essential supplies from Japan to augment its military efforts. Only half-hearted efforts at controlling inflation such as wage and price control were made. Towards the middle of 1940, the Provisional Government went as far as enforcing the foreign exchange control laws and enact deflationary measures such as restricting Japanese immigrants and bank loans. 85 Further, exporters were required to deposit and sell their foreign exchange earnings at the Reserve Bank at official rates in return for an import licence for goods of the same value. The series of half-hearted measures taken in North China fell far short of satisfying the Tokyo Government, forcing the latter to adopt remedies of its own in Japan. In September 1940 Japan enacted trade restriction laws of her own to regulate trade between Japan and her occupied territories. She would allow only as much export to North China as she had had imported from North China. 86

The expedient succeeded officially in reestablishing a trade balance between North China and Japan. In fact this was not so. The volume of trade was measured in terms of Yen and Reserve Bank dollar, arbitrarily declared at par. The Reserve Bank dollar had a lower value than

85 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, pp.15-16 and 23-25.
the Yen. Further, import licences in North China were sold by exporters to importers at a price, and the price was used to cover losses incurred by exporters when compelled to sell their foreign exchange earnings to the Reserve Bank. The money for buying these import licences were not included in the trade figures. A moderate estimate puts the error margin at between 10-20%. 87

In spite of a de facto import excess into North China after September 1940, the trade restriction measures hit the North China Army hard, and it had to redouble its efforts at requisitioning supplies locally, as reflected by the infamous "three all" policy of Okamura Yasuji: Kill All, Burn All and Take All. 88 Reported by Chinese Communist sources as an effective weapon in reducing Communist controlled area and population, 89 the "three all" policy might have been more of a desperate North China Army effort to survive by redirverting its drive for requisitioning conquered resources to the rural sector.

87 Ibid, pp.23-25.
89 Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, op cit, p.122, estimated that between 1941 and spring of 1942, the area of liberated zones lessened by one sixth, and the population under Chinese Party control lessened by one third.
than a new active policy directed against Communist-led resistance. The following chapter will deal with this shift of emphasis from the mining and industrial sector to the rural sector in North China.

Japan had to give up her trade restrictions against occupied territories after July 1940. In that month the United States and Britain retaliated against Japan's move to station troops in Indo-China, and froze all Japanese foreign assets in London and New York.\(^{90}\) Japanese foreign currency holdings were primarily in US Dollar and Pound Sterling. Thus, at one blow, Japan lost the facility to conduct trade with Western countries and her products had to find alternative markets. To keep her factories working, the effort to enforce a trade balance between Japan and her occupied territories was no longer deemed wise. The respite for the North China Army, however, was short-lived, for in December 1941 the Pacific War broke out. Japan's resources were committed to a struggle for survival with the United States. Little could be spared by Japan for the Japanese armies in China and the slogan 'to sustain war with war' had to be practised to the full as a policy.

CHAPTER VI

Rural Economic Control

North China is primarily an agricultural region and its economic problems, as distinct from Japanese economic problems in North China, were chiefly concerned with agriculture both before and during the Japanese occupation. Over-population and uneconomic small scale farming made the region into a food deficit area. It was estimated that between 1933 and 1936 North China produced about ninety per cent of its food requirements, and imported the remaining ten per cent.¹ The situation was aggravated by incessant civil strife, exorbitant taxes, recurrent natural disasters, high land rent, usurious rates for short term credit, and the Japanese occupation to boot. The traditional economic structure was in dire need of repairs and the most prominent single economic issue was how to solve the food problem.

Solution of the food deficit problem was simple, it was just a matter of increasing production. However,

¹ Murakami Sutemi, Hokushi Nōson Keizai Ron, pp.30-31; see also Kashiwa Sukekata, Hokushi no Nōson Keizai Shakai, pp.348-358, on the question of North China food deficit; Kuwano Hiroshi Senji Tsūka Kōsaku Shiron, p.192, asserts that food imports were well above one million tons per annum.
production could not be increased without the removal of at least some of the causes for low production, embedded in the established socio-politico-economic order. The dominant classes in rural areas, that is landlords and peasants of substance, were not averse to an increase in production and a lifting of the general standard of living, provided their social, economic and political authority was not impaired. In short, as changes in one field could not but lead to changes in other fields, even the mildest reforms were resisted by the established order. The government in power, whether it be indigenous or Japanese-sponsored, looked to the established order for support, consequently it was reluctant to usher in any drastic reforms. The ideal sought was a solution which would promise increased production without disturbing the established social and political order. This chapter attempts to analyse Japanese efforts to face up to the problem, or rather how the problem was forced upon the Japanese, and how the subordination of all considerations to military dictates by the North China Army helped to create a revolutionary situation in rural North China.

The intolerable economic situation in North China, heightened by an unequal distribution of wealth, was alleviated somewhat by economic developments in neighbouring lands: Manchuria and Japan in particular. Over-population
in North China entailed the presence of surplus labour
which the fast developing economy of Manchuria was both
ready and willing to absorb. Thus we find Japanese
companies offering assisted passages to North China peasants
often in the form of a one way ticket to Manchuria.² This
movement of labour helped the North China economy not only
in relieving it of considerable population pressure, but
also brought in a substantial amount of 'overseas'
remittances, a welcome source of foreign exchange earning

² Chinese migration into Manchuria took place long before
the twentieth century. The introduction of rail and
steam ship communication by Russia and Japan to this part
of the world changed the traditional seasonal migration
to and from Manchuria and North China. Railways not only
facilitated Chinese agricultural settlement deep into
the heartlands of Manchuria, they also outstripped the
speed of horses, thus ending the age old advantage of
mobile nomadic forces. Concession fares to and prohibitive
fares away from Manchuria further helped to encourage a
greater percentage of the migrants to settle in Manchuria.
Tōa Keizai Chōsakyoku, Manchuria Yearbook 1931, p. 6,
estimated the population in July 1930 at 29,198,000;
Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha Sangyōbu, Hokushina
Keizai Sōkan, p. 171, gives the percentage of permanent
settlers among migrants to Manchuria between 1925-30 at
59.7%, 73.1%, 64.5%, 42.5% and 34.7%, while the annual
number of migrants during the same period fluctuated
between half a million to a million people. The permanent
settlers' percentage dropped to 3.4% in 1931 and -20.5%
in 1932 as a result of Chinese refugees fleeing from the
Japanese occupation. But this trend was reversed again
the following year; Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha
Keizai Chōsakai, Manshū Rōdō Jijō Sōran, p. 292, estimated
that only 6.72% of migrants received assisted passages in
one form or another; see also Owen Lattimore, Studies in
Frontier History, pp. 307-324, "Chinese Colonization in
Manchuria".
for use in paying off food imports. This flight of savings away from Manchuria, however, created a new problem for the Japanese military in Manchuria where enforced industrial development needed every dollar available.

Industrial development in Japan also helped to brighten the economic scene in North China. Japanese textile interests were dependent on cotton imports from North America. They were anxious to find alternative sources of supply to lessen their dependence on the United States, the principal rival of the Japanese in the Pacific region. North China, being a sphere of Japanese influence, was a satisfactory region for increased cotton production to supply the increasing needs of Japanese textiles. Apart from cotton, peanut was also a major cash crop cultivated for export. Cash crops were cultivated to pay for food imports of low quality so as to overcome the food deficit problem. From 1935 to 1937 North China recorded an export surplus for three consecutive years. Although the surplus was fictitious in that the growing illicit trade in East Hopei had not been allowed for in the official trade figures, nevertheless it does serve to show the growing

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4 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op. cit, p.53.
importance of cash crops as vital components of North China exports. The cultivation of cash crops, however, created new problems in food production in that wheat and cotton competed directly for the limited available arable land. An increase in the acreage devoted to cotton cultivation necessarily meant a corresponding decrease in the acreage devoted to wheat farming.

A pioneering attempt at formulating a hypothesis for alleviating rural poverty without bringing about a social revoluation was advanced by Hsueh Hsien-chou, a professor attached to the Futan University at Shanghai. In the midst of the intellectual fervour characteristic of the May Fourth Movement, Hsueh started to advocate economic recovery through a return to agriculture and self-help among the peasantry in 1919. Hsueh attributed the cause of rural poverty to usurious practices and sought to introduce low interest modern finance onto the rural scene so as to alleviate the financial burdens of the peasantry and to rationalize the economic process in agricultural production. Hsueh and his supporters, mainly university teachers and

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6 Hsueh Hsien-chou

7 Futan
students, started a very modest savings bank within the campus of Futan University with an initial capital of only one thousand dollars. The move was followed up by the formation of a society in support of Hsueh's ideas and the society published a weekly journal to publicize the cause of rural self-help in China. Although Hsueh's ideas were well received among intellectual circles and acquired the support of some minor philanthropic groups, their influence would have remained minimal were it not for a severe drought in North China in 1919-1920.

The widespread suffering caused by the resulting famine, with estimated deaths at around the half million mark, stirred both Chinese and foreign philanthropic groups into action. Under the leadership of foreign missionaries, a Sino-Foreign Relief Society (hereafter cited as the Relief Society) was formed in November 1921. The Relief Society obtained Government permission to engage in relief work until the Government itself was in a position to take over the good work. The proviso was clearly designed to prevent a non-government body with strong foreign connections from taking root over a wide area of China and did not

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8 Fukada Masao, Kahoku Gassakusha Undōshi, p.1.
9 Ibid, p.4; Ka-Yō Gishinkai 東洋義賑會.
10 Ibid, p.4.
indicate any strenuous government effort at long term relief.

As a private body, the Relief Society had limited funds and had to make the best use of such funds to benefit the maximum number of people. It decided not to hand out food or money for temporary relief and sought to concentrate its efforts at preventing future disasters. The Relief Society started by sponsoring an investigation programme designed to probe into the basic causes of rural poverty and to formulate a course of action based on the findings of its investigations. The investigation covered two hundred and forty villages in five provinces of Central and North China and the programme was put under the charge of a sub-committee formed in April 1922.\(^{11}\)

After looking into the findings of the investigations, the sub-committee recommended to the Relief Society that the establishment of rural cooperatives was a good way of solving rural poverty and it started publishing a journal called *Relief Society Journal* in December 1923 to popularize the rural cooperative concept.\(^{12}\) In April the sub-committee took a further step forward in

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\(^{11}\) Ibid, p. 4; the sub-committee was called Nōri Bunka Iinkai.  

\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 4.
drafting a model article of incorporation for rural cooperatives as a guide line on how the legal aspects of the cooperatives could be dealt with. The Relief Society supported the activities of the sub-committee with a five thousand dollar grant, and the amount was used in setting up three experimental rural cooperatives at the district of Hsiang Ho, T'ang, and Ting, chosen because of their proximity to Peking. The response at Hsiang Ho district was presumably the most encouraging, for in June 1924 the Relief Society allocated a further grant of twenty-two thousand dollars for the establishment of a full scale rural cooperative movement in that particular district. Of the amount, two thousand dollars were earmarked for establishment costs, and the remaining twenty thousand dollars as working capital. Moreover, the Relief Society started another magazine called The Cooperative News in January 1926 to publicize the rural cooperative movement it was sponsoring. However, it was not until the early 1930s that the rural cooperative movement really started to gain

13 Ibid, p.5., p.4; Relief Society Journal, Chiu-tsai hui-k'an 救災會刊.
14 Ibid, p.5; Hsiang Ho 香河, T'ang 唐, T'ing 定.
16 Ibid, p.8; "Cooperative News", Ho-tso-hsun 合作訊.
momentum as the following figures on the capital outlay of the Relief Society would show:–

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>$ 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The amount was used to finance forty-four cooperative headquarters at the district level, and sixty-three cooperatives at the sub-district (chü) level, with over four thousand and five hundred rural cooperatives affiliated to them.  

The number of cooperatives was obviously too large for the meagre resources of the Relief Society to support. The Relief Society did not want to narrow its scope of operations, but at the same time it had to establish its own terms of reference for finance priorities. Accordingly, the expedient of classifying the cooperatives into 'recognized' and 'unrecognized' categories was taken, the former and their affiliated bodies were given financial support while the latter and their affiliated bodies were given only technical assistance and advice. The status of the latter could be advanced to the 'recognized' category provided their internal organization and operation procedures met the approval of the Relief Society, and

provided the Relief Society could find additional funds to support expanded activities.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p.8; Murakami Sutemi, \textit{op cit}, pp.317-318; "Recognized", cheng-jen 水 認, "Unrecognized", wei-cheng-jen 未 認.}

The moderate success of the Relief Society in promoting a rural cooperative movement attracted attention from Chinese political circles, particularly circles opposed to the Communist programme of social revolution and drastic land reforms. The Nanking Government which emerged after the successful Northern Expedition led by the Nationalist Chinese in 1926-1927 was particularly keen to find alternative rural reform programmes to compete with its erstwhile political partner, the Chinese Communist Party. The rural cooperative movement was readily adopted in Central China and the movement there was centred on political rather than economic considerations. The flight of Chinese Communist forces in the now famous Long March added strength to the Nationalist-Chinese-sponsored rural cooperative movement in Central China. Its success in Central China emboldened the Nationalist Chinese to extend the movement to North China as a means of increasing its political influence there.\footnote{\textit{North China War Zone Relief Committee, Hua-pei chan-chu chiu-chi wei-yuan-hui 华北戰區救濟委員會.}} Between July 1933 and July 1934, the North China War Zone Relief Committee,\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p.8; Murakami Sutemi, \textit{op cit}, pp.317-318; "Recognized", cheng-jen 水 認, "Unrecognized", wei-cheng-jen 未 認.} a Nationalist
Chinese dominated body, was instrumental for the establishment of 3,804 rural cooperatives in North China. After July 1934 the War Zone Relief Committee was replaced by a Rural Cooperative Committee for Hopei, which was in turn replaced by a Committee for the Direction of the Rural Cooperative Movement in North China in quick succession. It was estimated that by 1936 the number of rural cooperatives in North China associated with the Nationalist Chinese effort amounted to 4117, with a membership of just under 200,000.

The success of the Nationalist Chinese Government in promoting a rural cooperative movement in areas not under its political domination as a means of increasing its political influence there both alarmed and impressed the Japanese. Tachibana Shiraki, a leading China expert attached to the South Manchurian Railway Company, made a fact-finding tour in North China in May 1936, accompanied

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20 Nashimoto Yūhei, Hokushi no Nōgyō Keizai, pp.266-267.
21 Ibid, p.267; Rural Cooperative Committee for Hopei, Hopei ho-tso shih-yeh wei-yuan-hui 河北合作事業委員會.
22 Murakami Sutemi, op cit, p.321; Committee for the Direction of the Rural Cooperative Movement in North China, Hua-pei ho-tso shih-yeh wei-yuan-hui 副北合作事業委員會, was established in 1935.
23 Ibid, p.317
24 Tachibana Shiraki 橘 樹.
by an able disciple named Nashimoto Yuhei. Subsequently Tachibana wrote an article in the *Manshū Hyōron*, advocating that Japan should learn from the experience of the Nationalist Chinese Government in this field and promote a separate rural cooperative movement in North China all her own. Nashimoto Yuhei was a vocal supporter of his teacher's views and justified them in terms of Japanese political and economic objectives in North China. Nashimoto argued that Japan's political motive in North China was to make it into a pro-Japanese region so that the defence of Manchuria could be strengthened and that Russian-orientated Communist influence would have no chance of developing in North China, that Japan's economic objective was to secure and use North China resources to strengthen the economic structure of Japan and Manchuria, and that these objectives could be arrived at with far greater ease if Japan could secure support from the peasant masses in North China. The inference was that a Japanese-supported rural cooperative movement would serve to win the hearts and


27 Nashimoto Yuhei, *Shinsei Shina Keieiron*, pp.204-205.
minds of the North China peasantry for the Japanese cause. These ideas of Tachibana and Nashimoto were labelled as "Reemphasis on Agriculture" or Shinjūnō Shūgi, as a contrast to the emphasis of the military on war industries and resources essential for war industries.

Support for the "Reemphasis on Agriculture" approach was voiced by the Tientsin Garrison and it sought to practise these ideas before the occupation in Japanese-dominated East Hopei. The scope of the Japanese-sponsored rural cooperative movement in East Hopei was compromised by lukewarm support expressed by Japanese textile interests. The Tientsin Garrison had no capital of its own to sponsor any rural cooperative movement and it therefore sought commitment from Japanese textile interests in North China. Japanese textile interests, however, was keen only in promoting the cultivation of cotton and not in promoting a general cooperative movement in North China. Whereas the motive of the Tientsin Garrison in promoting a rural cooperative movement was to increase its political influence, the motive of the textile interests was to cultivate a source of cotton supply.

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28 Ibid, p.201; Shinjūnō Shūgi 新重農主義 ; Tachibana Shiraki, op cit, p.427.
29 Murakami Sutemi, op cit, p.314.
Their interest in encouraging cotton production had led them to establish a Japan-Manchuria Cotton Association before 1930 to promote cotton cultivation in Manchuria. This association was renamed the East Asian Cotton Association after September 1931, signifying their intention to extend the activities of the Association into North China after the Japanese military had occupied Manchuria. The East Asia Cotton Association was instrumental in establishing a Hopei Cotton Improvement Association in July 1936 in conjunction with Chinese warlord and financial interests in that province. The Hopei Cotton Improvement Association immediately embarked on a rural cooperative movement of its own, distinguished by its sole interest in promoting cotton cultivation. The Chinese warlords were also anxious to have their own rural cooperative movements to off-set the growth of Nationalist Chinese influence through the movement in North China. Before the Japanese occupation, the Hopei Cotton Improvement Association succeeded in establishing

31 Ibid, p.316; Toa Menka Kyōkai 東亞棉花協會.
32 Hopei Cotton Improvement Association, Hopei sheng mien-ch' an kai-chin-hui 河北省棉產改進會.
33 Murakami Sutemi, op cit, pp.316 and 321.
988 rural cooperatives, with a membership of almost twenty-six thousand.  

Thus in preoccupation North China there were three separate and independent rural cooperative movements: sponsored by the Sino-Foreign Relief Society, the Nationalist Chinese Government, and the Hopei Provincial Government in conjunction with Japanese interests respectively. The three separate movements together claimed over eight thousand three hundred rural cooperatives with an estimated total membership of over 280,000. The Japanese invasion, however, brought devastation to the entire rural cooperative movement as finance, communication and trade were severely disrupted. Worst of all, the movement no longer enjoyed the prominent attention from political combatants in North China, as the Hopei warlord regime had crumbled, the Nationalist Chinese had been chased out of North China, and the North China Army was not interested in the agricultural sector of the economy. The North China Army was already facing the problem of capital shortage for economic development projects in the controlled sector, and whatever funds it could lay its hands on were intended for the development of industries and mining

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34 Ibid, p.317
activities deemed vital to the war machine. The North China Army not only gave a low priority to the agricultural sector, it virtually ignored agriculture.

Although the North China Army was not interested in the agricultural sector, it needed the expertise knowledge of the advocates of "Reemphasis on Agriculture". They were installed in positions of authority by the North China Army principally to facilitate the takeover of erstwhile Nationalist-Chinese-dominated cooperatives. The main concern of the North China Army was simply to take the necessary precautions to prevent the growth of Nationalist Chinese influence in occupied North China. The takeover task was in fact assigned to the Hsin-min Hui and it appointed Ishii Shunsuke and Yamazaki Kentarō to direct and execute the trust. Ishii was a disciple of Tachibana, and the influence of the "Reemphasis on Agriculture" school was reinforced by the friendship between Tachibana and Kozawa Kaisaku, the top advisor to the North China Army on the establishment of the Hsin-min Hui.

These advocates of "Reemphasis on Agriculture"

37 Fukuda Masao, *op cit*, p.38; Kozawa Kaisaku 小澤開策. 
were initially given posts within the Health Department of
the Hsin-min Hui and they pressed for their cause from
within in seeking to establish a rural cooperative struct-
ure separate and independent from the Hsin-min Hui. Their
desire was partially fulfilled in June 1938 when the
Hsin-min Hui established a Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters
headed by Ishii Shunsuke. The North China Army supervised
the activities of the new body through Yoshida Shinshichirō
of the Special Service by appointing him to head the
research section of the new establishment. The Hsin-min
Cooperative Headquarters was still a part of the Hsin-min
Hui, nevertheless rural cooperative activities did acquire
a formal status as a distinct branch of Hsin-min Hui
activities.

The Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters took
control only of cooperatives formerly under the Nationalist-
Chinese-dominated Committee for the Direction of the Rural
Cooperative Movement in North China, and that only those
lying in areas actually under Japanese occupation. The

38 Murakami Sutemi, op cit, p.324; Hsin-min Cooperative
Headquarters, Hsin-min ho-tso chung-yang-hui 新民合作
中央會. Yoshida Shinshichirō 吉田新七郎; Fukada Masao,
op cit, p.59, points out that Yoshida Shinshichirō is
from the Special Service and therefore represents
Special Service supervision over matters of policy.
39 Murakami Sutemi, op cit, p.324.
rural cooperative sponsored by the Relief Society and the Hopei Provincial Government remained outside of the jurisdiction of the Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters. This may be explained in that Nationalist-Chinese-dominated cooperatives were intended for a political end and that the Hsin-min Hui was the new political body intended to supplant the political functions of the Chinese Nationalist Party in North China. The Hopei-Government-dominated cooperatives were involved with private Japanese capital support, as the North China Army wanted to encourage the inflow of private Japanese capital, as little as possible was done to antagonize Japanese textile industrial interests, hence the Hopei-Government-dominated rural cooperatives were left alone. This did not trouble the advocates of "Reemphasis on Agriculture" as the cooperatives specialising in cotton cultivation had been started at their instigation earlier. The advocates of "Reemphasis on Agriculture", therefore, dominated the cooperative movement in occupied China, with only cooperatives formerly under the Relief Society still outside of their influence. The Relief Society was mainly supported by overseas missionary funds and the Japanese had every reason not to disturb the status quo lest the flow of funds from abroad

40 Ibid, pp.323-324.
to support rural cooperatives in North China should stop
and therefore add to the problems of the North China Army.

The emergence of the "Reemphasis on Agriculture"
school within the rural cooperative movement in North
China was paralleled by a decline in the rural cooperative
movement in North China, mainly as a result of war
conditions. The cotton cultivation cooperatives were hit
by a general tendency among the peasantry to give up
cultivation of cash crops and to revert to cultivation of
food crops to ensure their food supplies locally. The
formerly Nationalist-Chinese-dominated cooperatives were
hit by a shortage of funds as responsible Chinese officials
fled south with cooperative funds and as the North China
Army was unwilling to divert significant sums of money
for the cooperative movement. It was estimated that the
existing cooperative structure had an operating capital
of about five million Chinese dollars before occupation,
but the North China Army was only willing to set aside
half a million dollars for the Hsin-min Cooperative
Headquarters in the first year to salvage whatever it could
of the rural cooperative movement. 41

In spite of the seemingly well-organized approach

41 Fukada Masao, op cit, pp.45-48; Nashimoto Yūhei,
Hokushi no Nōgyō Keizai, p.310.
towards taking over the erstwhile Nationalist-Chinese-dominated rural cooperative structure, the North China Army had little idea as to what it was to do with the structure. The Japanese Army did not have as many trained political cadres as the Nationalist Chinese in using the cooperatives as a platform for party propaganda. The cadre shortage was so severe that Ishii Shunsuke had to start a cadre training centre in February 1938 which gave only a one-month training course and which was capable only of producing ninety-three cadres a month to meet the urgent demand. Personnel and finance shortages limited the possible scope of activities, the Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters therefore went little further than building up a central administration and sponsoring rural cooperative experiments in Liang Hsiang district and the four suburbs of Peking. Reorganization at the district level and below was hardly attempted at all.

The food shortage problem, particularly in the Peking-Tientsin sector immediately following the occupation, compelled the North China Army to pay some attention to the agricultural sector. The establishment of Economy Restoration Committees in districts around Peking and

42 Fukuda Masao, *op cit*, p.43.

43 *Ibid*, p.43.
Tientsin was countenanced. The Committees were chaired by the local district magistrate, with representatives from the Japanese Army, the Peace Pacification Corps, Japanese advisors to the district government and the local Hsin-min Hui chief. As the rural cooperative movement was an economic activity, the Economy Restoration Committees had a hand in the movement. Apart from the incidental concern of the Economy Restoration Committees, the cooperative movement was allowed to drift apart at the local level, and centralized control was the exception rather than the rule. Failing to gain more support from the North China Army, Ishii Shunsuke and Yamazaki Kentarō both resigned their office in March 1939 and rejoined the South Manchurian Railway Company. With their departure the Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters virtually disintegrated, as over ninety staff members left the Hsin-min Headquarters to perform what they considered to be more meaningful service at the local level with individual district-centred rural cooperative efforts, and where the grip of the North China Army on economic policy matters might have been

46 Ibid, pp.49-50; Murakami Sutemi, op cit, p.312.
47 Fukuda Masao, op cit, pp.49-50.
less suffocating. Indeed, the rural cooperative movement in North China would have disintegrated altogether were it not for the dedication of a few Japanese agents working on the district level, the growth of Chinese Communist influence in rural North China, the export restrictions imposed by the Tokyo Government in enforcing a trade balance between Japan Proper and her overseas conquered territories and the continued interest shown by Tachibana and Nashimoto and their efforts to impress on the North China Army the importance of a rural cooperative movement. As the North China Army's lack of interest in the rural cooperative movement was a direct result of the fact that rural areas were on the fringe of Japanese military consideration, so the reemergence of the rural cooperative movement in the policy considerations of the North China Army was associated with the increased military significance of the countryside.

The North China Army occupied principally railways and urban centres and Japanese authority did not extend for more than a few miles on either side of major railway lines. The need to concentrate troops for major battles with Chinese defending armies precluded not only the thought of spreading Japanese troops to complete an effective occupation over the surface of North China, but also required Japanese commanders to give up recently
occupied cities and railways to facilitate troop movements. The political map of North China (Map 4) presents only a rough estimation of political territorial divisions in occupied North China as the lines of division were fluid. It was not until after the fall of Hankow that major battles were no longer the order of the day and it was only then that Japanese commanders could seriously think of how to deal with security problems in unoccupied rural areas behind Japanese front lines.

The countryside had been flooded with defeated troops, former government officials, and refugees of all kinds who had fled from the advancing Japanese columns. Japanese preoccupation with military operations elsewhere enabled these diverse elements to be regrouped and reorganized, to absorb the initial shocks of defeat and to reemerge as politico-military forces. When the North China Army was at last ready to liquidate remnant resistance in the countryside, rural-based Chinese resistance had emerged as an effective military-politico-economic challenge to Japanese military presence in North China. The problem of rural control therefore became the most vital question facing the Japanese invaders in military,

48 Bōeichō Bōeikyūshūjo Senshishitsu, Hokushi no Chiansen, pp.60-66.
political, or economic terms. The urgency of the problem made the North China Army aware of its neglect of the once popular rural cooperative movement. Reappraisal of the rural cooperative movement was hastily made, the scattered efforts of able Japanese agents in promoting the movement despite North China Army apathy were scrutinized, the ideas of Tacinaba and Nashimoto were reexamined, and a new rural cooperative programme was initiated in October 1939 with a series of North China Army directives. This renewed interest intensified around June 1939, and the period between July 1937 and April 1939 was one in which the North China Army paid little attention and showed scanty interest for organized efforts in establishing

49 Hokushigun Shireibu, 25th October 1939:
(1) "Gassakusha Fukyū Soki Kōsaku Yōryō", p.14;
(2) "Hokushi Minshū sōshiki shidō yōryō", p.4;
(3) "Shin Ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no jirei", p.25;
(4) "Ryō-gyō (Liang Hsiang) Ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no jirei", p.26;
(5) "Hokushi ni okeru Kōekijo sōshiki shidō yōryō", p.4;
(6) "Minshū sōshiki kōsaku no ichi rei (ken ni okeru keizai sōshiki kosei no shujun)", p.13;
(7) "Mohan chiku shidō yōryō", p.8;
(8) "Hokushi ni okeru seikatsu hitsujuhin kyūkyū sōshiki ni kansuru shidō yōryō", p.2;
(9) "Gassakusha shidō yōryō", p.18.

Japanese rural control. However, attention on the rural scene was forced on the North China Army by the force of circumstances.

Its inability to spare troops for rural pacification before the fall of Hankow in October 1938 and its heavy reliance on direct Japanese punitive expeditions into the unoccupied countryside led the North China Army to disregard rural control measures other than periodic military raids into suspected areas of enemy concentration. The traditional rural control structure was neglected, while economic control over the countryside was simply not contemplated. The Japanese military was content to think that the rural economy was dependent on major urban centres and railways for market, service, finance, and transport, and that Japanese control over railways and cities would put such a heavy strain on the countryside that the peasantry had no choice but to submit themselves to Japanese authority. The Japanese military had overlooked the fact that most villages in North China were self-sufficient. Backwardness in transport and other facilities encouraged the peasantry to continue to rely on their own production to meet their own basic needs. The disruption of communication facilities and temporary dislocation of marketing services subsequent to the Japanese occupation reinforced this desire for self-reliance and the Japanese
reported that peasants were giving up the cultivation of cash crops such as cotton and redirerting their efforts towards food production. 51

Isolated Japanese efforts at rural economic control before June 1939 were prompted by considerations such as securing food supplies for major urban centres, promoting cotton production, and the desire to spread Japanese political influence. The question of rural economic control did not receive prominent attention from the North China Army until the Tokyo Government was on the point of imposing export restrictions on her conquered territories overseas. 52 Not only was Japan unwilling to countenance a continued favourable balance of trade vis-a-vis North China, the Tokyo Government even intimated that most of the essential supplies exported to North China eventually found their way to enemy-held territories and therefore the export surplus both weakened Japan's economic power and strengthened enemy resistance at the same time. 53

The proposed trade restrictions were therefore in the nature of a partial economic blockade by Japan against its own conquered territories overseas. The North China Army

51 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, p.218.
53 Ibid, p.194.
tried to avoid this eventuality by hastily imposing an economic blockade against enemy-held territories in August 1940, only one month before the Tokyo Government legislated against any export surplus to North China, in a determined attempt to stop an outflow of strategic goods to the enemy and to retain as much of the decreased import as possible for use by the North China Army. The move was primarily based on military considerations.

Enforcing the economic blockade involved the demarcation of well defined frontier lines separating Japanese-held from Chinese-held territories, the very element lacking by the very nature of the guerrilla warfare which the Chinese resistance forces were pursuing. Where the Japanese failed to define exactly the area of Chinese-held territory, they attempted to define Japanese-held territory instead. This was done by engaging corvee labour to dig trenches around the perimeter of Japanese-held urban centres, put up watch towers at points along the trenches, have the trenches patrolled by Japanese troops, Chinese police units, Chinese militia units, and surprise patrols conducted by units of the Japanese Special Service to see to it that the self-erected security net

was not penetrated by enemy forces acting in collusion with puppet police and militia units.\footnote{Ibid, p.195; Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, p.196, quoted North China Army Chief of Staff statement in October 1942, claiming there were 7,700 watch towers and 11,860 kilometers of trenches in North China dug for this purpose.} It was in effect an attempt to tighten control over the occupied and semi-occupied zones, and to impede the movement of people and goods between these and the neutral zones immediately beyond. All persons entering or leaving this perimeter had to declare all the effects carried on their person so that strategic goods would not leak out to areas outside of this policed perimeter.\footnote{Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, p.195.} Further, corvee labour was used in building connecting roads between defined areas of Japanese occupation to facilitate rapid troop movements in case of emergencies.\footnote{Hokushigun Shireibu, 25th October 1939, "Shin Ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no girei", p.1.}

These measures only defined the most effective points of Japanese occupation without extending Japanese control, served to disrupt further the economic ties between urban centres and the rural areas around them, and did not help to bring in agricultural produce to help in feeding the urban populace or in supplying the occupation
forces. As food supplies from rural areas were essential, the economic blockade had to be modified. What the North China Army wanted was a system which would help in bringing in food supplies to centres of Japanese strength on the one hand, and in restricting an outflow of strategic materials on the other. The countryside was dependent on Japanese-held areas for supplies of salt, matches, and other essentials of a similar nature. The Japanese therefore established a rationing system on such items to control their inflow from ports and their outflow from district capitals into the surrounding countryside. In August 1940 the North China Army established Committees on Material Supplies or Busshi Taisaku Iinkai in district capitals to help administer the rationing and economic blockade measures. These Committees included elements from the North China Army, the local militia, the district government, the Hsin-min Hui, and the District Rural Cooperative Headquarters. Members of these Committees were required to draw up detailed estimates on local needs for strategic goods. The district would then be supplied in accordance with such estimates. 58

The North China Army, however, did not attempt to stop all flow of strategic materials to the countryside.

58 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, pp.1956; Busshi Taisaku Iinkai 物資對策委员会.
what it tried to do was to tie political loyalty to the
Japanese with the availability of such supplies. Accord­
ingly the traditional Pao-chia System of rural police
control was revived, and each household registered with a
loyal Pao-chia unit was issued with rationing cards. The
possession of these cards would enable the loyal peasants
to purchase much needed materials from Japanese-held
district capitals and to take the same back to their
villages even if these were beyond the perimeter of Japanese
occupied and semi-occupied zones. Thus, apart from
drawing up a physical frontier between Japanese-held and
Chinese-held territories, the North China Army also tried to
extend a political shading on areas beyond the perimeter of
Japanese military strength, based on Pao-chia police
control and the lure of ready supplies of essential
materials by the Japanese. Professed political loyalty of
this kind was most unreliable and hence the economic
blockade could not have been a hundred percent effective.
Nevertheless, the system did provide the North China Army
with a criterion for distributing strategic supplies to areas
considered Japanese strongholds and to withhold such
supplies to areas considered Chinese strongholds.

Japanese strongholds, however, were mainly

densely populated urban centres which had traditionally been dependent upon the countryside for food supplies. It is estimated that before the occupation, rural areas exported about twenty to thirty per cent of their wheat production to urban centres and that this dropped to only about five to six per cent during the occupation. Even without a general fall in production, the decrease in the overall percentage of food supplies made available for urban consumers would have been alarming. However, the wheat production figures for 1939 and 1940 showed a drop of about twenty-seven per cent on comparing with pre-Incident average annual yields, making the food shortage problem in urban centres more acute than ever.\(^{60}\) The Japanese therefore had to devise ways and means of encouraging food production on the one hand, and to ensure that the harvested grains would find their way into Japanese-held urban centres on the other. The rural cooperative movement regained prominent attention from the Japanese for the possibility of using it as an instrument of encouraging food production and of ensuring the marketing of such produce in Japanese-held urban centres. It was in this way that the rural cooperative movements in the districts

\(^{60}\) Ibid, pp.211-212.
of Wu-ch'ing, Liang Hsiang, and Chin came under scrutiny.61

In June 1938 Ohashi Masao and Takazawa Shigeo,62 two experienced civilian organizers, were despatched to work at the Hsin-min Hui branch at Wu-ch'ing. Ohashi, who was interested in political indoctrination, was appointed director; Takazawa, who had had extensive experience in consumer cooperative work in Japan, was appointed as his assistant. Ohashi started with political indoctrination classes for peasant youths, only to find that his students were unwilling to return to their villages after receiving political training to spread the message of Japanese goodwill. Instead, they expected some kind of reward for their compliance in attending the political indoctrination classes and aspired to become government officials in urban centres. In order to attract these youths back to their villages, Ohashi realized that there was a definite need to create posts in the villages to accommodate his students.63 Takazawa's experience in consumer cooperative organization was therefore drawn upon.

62 Ohashi Masao, Takazawa Shigeo.
63 Fukuda Masao, op. cit, pp.90-92.
Of the half a million dollars allocated for promoting the rural cooperative movement in 1938, only sixty-one thousand dollars were earmarked for Hopei province. 64 This amount was allotted to three districts only, of which Wu-ch'ing was one. 65 With about twenty thousand dollars on hand, Ohashi and Takazawa began a combined political indoctrination and rural cooperative programme. For villages close to the district capital, Hsin-min Hui agents were sent out to help in organizing rural cooperatives; for villages further away, peasant youths were recruited for political indoctrination and then returned to their villages to organize rural cooperatives. These cooperatives were given the privilege of borrowing from the Wu-ch'ing Hsin-min Hui branch at six per cent per annum. By the end of 1938 there were already one hundred rural cooperatives at Wu-ch'ing, with a membership of 3,744. By May 1939, when both Ohashi and Takazawa were transferred, there were three hundred co-operatives at Wu-ch'ing. 66 The experiment was based on the use of financial assistance as a reward for political

64 Ibid, p. 91.
65 Ibid, p. 91; the three districts were Wu-ch'ing 武清, An-ch'i 安 池, and Tai-hsing 太興.
66 Ibid, pp. 91-93.
support expressed.

The Japanese experience in reviving the rural cooperative movement at Chin district was another outstanding example of local initiative and received prominent attention from the North China Army because the Chin district was a cotton producing district and Japanese experience there was relevant to future rural cooperative policies for cotton producing areas. The Yokoyama regiment entered the Chin district capital in January 1938 and found out that the city was glutted with cotton. Disruption of communication facilities made it impossible for the Chin district people to export and sell their produce. Japanese occupation reopened the export route for the district and the Yokoyama regiment actively promoted cotton export by establishing a cotton exchange. Apart from charging a transaction commission, all transactions were done in China Reserve Bank note, leading to a virtual disappearance of enemy currencies in the district. Further, the Yokoyama regiment mobilized peasant youths to build connecting roads and to organize self-defence militia units to help in protecting the cotton crops from enemy raids.67

Whereas the Wu-ch'ing and Chin experiences were

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the product of private initiative, the Liang Hsiang experience in reviving the rural cooperative movement was a well planned affair from the centre. Liang Hsiang was marked off as an experimental district in March 1938 by the Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters. Ishii Shunsuke and others of the "Reemphasis on Agriculture" school dominated the limited centralized efforts at reviving the rural cooperative movement until their resignation in March 1939.

In October 1939 the North China Army drafted an outline of the Liang Hsiang experience between March 1938 and May 1939 for the information of cadres responsible for reviving the rural cooperative movement.

After Liang Hsiang was occupied, the Hsin-min Hui branch there established an Economy Restoration Committee or Ching-chi Fu-hsing Hui at the district capital. This committee was supervised by a body made up of representatives of the North China Army, the Peace Pacification Corps, the District Liaison Officer, and the

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68 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Ryō-gyō (Liang Hsiang) ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no girei", pp.2-3.
69 Fukuda Masao, op cit, pp.49-50.
70 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Ryō-gyō (Liang Hsiang) ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no jirei", p.1, where the purpose of drafting the document was explained.
71 Ibid, p.13; Ching-chi Fu-hsing-hui 经济復興會.
director of the district Hsin-min Hui branch. The advisory body advanced policies, and the Restoration Committee executed policies. The Restoration Committee was the forerunner of the district cooperative centre and was engaged in four types of activities: purchase, transport, market, and finance. It would purchase essential supplies for distribution to the villages, provide transport for goods, establish an Agricultural Exchange for the marketing of rural produce, and extend low interest loans to rural cooperatives.

The Liang Hsiang Economy Restoration Committee erred in going forward too enthusiastically in encouraging villagers to form local rural cooperatives, seventy villages out of a total of ninety-two responded favourably to the call. Joining a village cooperative was voluntary, and each member was requested to subscribe one dollar as investment. As membership was based on household and not on individuals, and as destitute peasants were exempted from the one dollar contribution requirement, an average initial capital of only seventy dollars per cooperative

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72 Fukuda Masao, op cit, p.37.
73 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Ryō-gyō (Liang Hsiang) ken ni okeru nōson soshikika kōsaku no jirei", pp.3-9 and 13.
74 Ibid, p.3.
was realized. The widespread response proved embarrassing when the Liang Hsiang Restoration Committee found out to its dismay that the Provisional Government would provide only thirty-seven thousand dollars for its activities in the first financial year, of which twenty thousand dollars were intended as capital and seventeen thousand dollars for current expenditures. Moreover, only half of the capital was earmarked for short term loans to the peasantry.  

Bureaucratic practices were resorted to as expedients in lessening the number of loan applications. Peasants were required to form borrowing groups of six, whose members were mutually responsible for the total loan contracted by members of the group. The principle of giving unsecured loans was therefore undermined and, as if this was insufficient to deter potential applicants, all applications had to be processed and guaranteed by a village chief or his deputy as well. If the peasants failed to repay loans contracted, village chiefs were held responsible for their repayment. Poor peasants with an uncertain and low income were most unlikely to be given such support by their village chiefs. Further, loans were

extended only to forty villages which were comparatively close to the district capital. Capital shortage was improved in the following year when the working capital was increased to sixty thousand dollars.

Although the effort at providing low interest loans was hampered from attaining any formidable success, the Liang Hsiang experiment met with greater success in the running of an Agricultural Exchange. Established in June 1938, the Agricultural Exchange provided marketing facilities for affiliated rural cooperatives. Produce was entrusted to the Exchange for sale at a nominal commission of 0.5 per cent, paid jointly by the buyer and the seller. A prominent feature of the Agricultural Exchange was that produce was sold at fixed prices, thus providing some protection for small peasants against price manipulation by middlemen. Nor were the interests of traders ignored in that the Agricultural Exchange was in fact run by traders in Liang Hsiang under Hsin-min Hui supervision and prices were fixed to permit traders to make a profit on the

78 Ibid, p.12.
80 Ibid, p.5 and p.18; Agricultural Exchange or Nōsan Butsu Kōekijo, later renamed as Shinmin Gassakusha Kōekijo.
81 Ibid, p.8; Fukuda Masao, op cit, p.85.
assumption that the goods were to be transported to and sold at Peking or Tientsin. Prices were fixed on each market day and were based on current prices in Peking minus the cost of transport and a profit margin for dealers. This practice of fixing prices daily also guarded against laying too much of the burden of inflation on the shoulders of the peasantry.

The Liang Hsiang Agricultural Exchange was not a phenomenal success as it had a total transaction of only one million dollars in the first year. What it did demonstrate to be attractive was that income from commission charged made it financially self-supporting, that it sent into circulation China Reserve Bank notes which cost the Japanese no more than the paper they were printed on, and, most important of all, that it established a channel for mass purchase of agricultural produce from the countryside for consumption in Japanese-held urban centres. To strengthen the Japanese hold on agricultural produce, the Agricultural Exchange also built warehouses to keep a reserve within Japanese-held urban centres. The marketing

82 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Ryō-gyō (Liang Hsiang) ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no jirei", pp.7-8.
83 Ibid, pp.8-9.
84 Hokushigun Shireibu, 25th October 1939, "Minshū sōshiki kōsaku no ichi rei (ken ni okeru keizai sōshiki kōsei no shujun)", p.7.
and warehousing facilities thus provided also helped indirectly in increasing revenue and reducing administrative costs for the Provisional Government. A four per cent tax was levied on all agricultural produce, the concentration of a large volume of agricultural produce in district capitals helped to facilitate tax collection and lower administrative costs. Similar Agricultural Exchanges were established elsewhere in Hopei, Shantung, and Northern Kiangsu. In March 1941 there were seventy-four Agricultural Exchanges in twenty-four districts operating in Hopei. This was increased to about two hundred by the end of the year. Shantung only had eight Agricultural Exchanges by the end of 1940, by the end of 1941 this was increased to thirty-two spread over thirteen districts. Northern Kiangsu had twenty-three Agricultural Exchanges in March 1941, spread over seven districts. Figures for other provinces are not available.

The experience gained at Wu-ch'ing, Chin, Liang Hsiang, and similar successes elsewhere became the basis on which the North China Army evolved a new rural economic control structure on the district level. The rapid growth

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85 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Ryō-gyō (Liang-Hsiang) ken ni okeru nōson sōshikika kōsaku no jirei", p.9.

86 Fukuda Masao, op cit, p.86.
of Communist-led Chinese resistance had, by the autumn of 1939, made the North China Army realize the inadequacy of relying on its periodic punitive expeditions into the countryside, expeditions which made the Japanese presence felt and hated, but fell short of consolidating Japanese control. The Liang Hsiang practices promised ease in procuring food supplies, the Wu-ch'ing practices promised the spread of political influence, and the Chin practices set a model for rural economic control in cotton growing areas. The North China Army was therefore contemplating how these merits could be combined in a new system of rural economic control.

Just as the North China Army was reviewing its agricultural policy, the "Reemphasis on Agriculture" school came into prominence again when Nashimoto Yūhei presented the North China Army with a detailed plan on the establishment of a North China Development Company or Hokushi Nōji Kaihatsu Kaisha. Nashimoto proposed that the Company should be a joint Sino-Japanese operation, with the North China Development Company and Japanese textile interests contributing half of the paid-up capital, and the Provisional Government contributing the other half. As the Provisional Government might not have any capital to invest, its contribution was to be made up of capital
investment by Chinese banks and real estate or property of
the Provisional Government. The declared capital of the
proposed company was set at twenty million dollars and the
paid-up capital at five million dollars. The task of the
Company was to act as a central control agent of the rural
cooperative movement, with authority over all the erstwhile
independent rural cooperative movements. Its capital was
to be used to provide loan services and technical
assistance.

The new rural cooperative policy formed was a
mixture of the experiences gained at Wu-ch'ing, Liang Hsiang,
and Chin districts, and the proposal of Nashimoto.
Reorganization on the central level was based on Nashimoto's
ideas, and reorganization on the district level was based
on actual experience. In its new scheme the North China
Army was conscious of its limited financial resources,
sought to avoid overextending its resources, and adopted
the principle that financial assistance to rural cooperat­
ives was extended only for the initial period. Moreover,
any assistance rendered had to be repaid in full, and that
self-sufficiency in finance was the eventual goal. The

87 Nashimoto Yūhei, Hokushi no nōgyō keizai, pp.307-322,
"Hokushi Nōji Kaihatsu Kaisha Setsuritsu Keikaku An".
88 Ibid, pp.308-310.
district authorities were therefore instructed to concentrate their attention on the establishment of Mutual Aid Societies instead of rural cooperatives. 89

There is no significant difference in function between a Mutual Aid Society and a rural cooperative as they were both engaged in finance, production, purchasing, marketing, and simple processing of primary products into semi-finished forms. What distinguished the two was mainly the state of their finances. A Mutual Aid Society was recognized to be lacking in capital and personnel, and therefore could not fulfil its functions without government financial aid. A rural cooperative was regarded as financially independent and had no need for external financial aid. The emphasis on the formation of Mutual Aid Societies showed that finance was a major problem confronting the Japanese effort to revive the rural cooperative movement.

The North China Army, however, had one distinct advantage: the control of major communication lines. Essential supplies such as fertilizers, salt, matches and so on had to be transported to villages and the Japanese

could exact political allegiance by threatening to withhold transportation facilities. The financial weakness of the Japanese, however, was further revealed by the practice of not advancing any credit to villages for the purchase of such essential supplies. Only in very exceptional cases were insolvent but politically reliable villages given some supplies on credit. Even then, the supplies advanced were mainly materials indispensable for production and not consumer goods. The logic was that the peasantry could repay their debts only if they were enabled to produce and rural areas were useful to the Japanese only if its produce could be requisitioned to feed Japanese troops, and satisfy Japanese industrial needs.

The crucial point was the interval at which a Mutual Aid Society would become a rural cooperative. The Mutual Aid Society stage was a fostering period not only in terms of finance as efforts at building up village militia units, at giving indoctrination courses under the cover of youth and women organizations were made concurrently. When a rural community was self-reliant in finance, in defence, and was politically reliable, it was

90 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Gassakusha fukyū soki kōsaku yōryō" pp.5-6.

given cooperative status. At this point that village would lose government assistance, but this was compensated by its admission into a well-coordinated and centralized economic control structure.

The new rural cooperative control system established in 1939 consisted of two structures, central and local. The local structure was described by a series of directives issued by the North China Army in October 1939. The basic unit continued to be a village and the scope of the cooperative movement was initially restricted to Model Zones or rural areas under actual Japanese military occupation. A collaborator group was to be organized in each model district to act as the nerve centre for pushing the rural control effort on the local level. The collaborator group was mainly responsible for reestablishing police control, indicating that security in rural areas was given higher priority than economic control. Although the composition of the collaborator group was not fixed, the emphasis on law and order indicated that at this initial stage local business leaders had only minor

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92 Refer to items listed in footnote 49.

93 Hokushigun Shireibu, January 1941, "Gassakusha shidō yōryō", pp.2 and 4; 25th October 1939, "Hokushi minshū sōshiki shidō yōryō", p.3; "Minshu sōshiki kōsaku no ichi rei (ken ni okeru keizai sōshiki kōsei no shujun", p.2; collaborator group or chūshin jinbutsu.
influence. This was of course contrary to practices in the Liang Hsiang experience and was designed to minimize the tendency in laying too much emphasis on the economic functions of rural cooperatives before the political loyalty of the peasantry or the effectiveness of government police control had been assured in the locality. This was made clear by stipulations that the collaborator group was to keep a close coordination between the efforts at indoctrination, at establishing a Pao-chia police control structure, and at rural cooperative developments. The collaborator group, however, was responsible for the establishment of a District Cooperative Centre after a few cooperatives had been formed and to start its economic functions. There is also no indication as to whether the District Cooperative Centre would include local business interests or not, but the running of a central market or Agricultural Exchange definitely involved cooperation with local traders and it is most likely that business leaders were included in the District Cooperative Centre if the Liang Hsiang experience was to serve at all.94

94 Hokushigun Shireibu, "Gassakusha shidō yōryō", pp.6-7.

A fully-fledged rural cooperative, that is, one that had gone through the capital formation period and was self-reliant on finance, could be joined by any peasant
in the village on a household basis. Further capital was realized through the sale of shares to members and each member could purchase a maximum of fifty shares. The shares were set at two dollars each and the maximum purchase limitation was a safeguard against rich peasant domination. Each cooperative had a general manager, a business manager, and a few business staff, all elected by contributing cooperative members. There was no provision on how the elections were to be held, indicating that the District Cooperative Centre would possibly have the de facto power of appointment. The elected Executive was checked by three supervisors and a number of censors. Supervisors were to check the accounts and prevent malpractices, censors were no more than members given the right to air grievances and their presence seems to indicate that ordinary cooperative members could not express criticism on the operation of a rural cooperative directly. A cooperative would engage in activities concerned with finance, purchase, sales, agency, and simple manufacturing. Where one village was regarded as too small for efficient and economic production, a few neighbouring villages were

95 Santōshō mohan chiku kōsaku shidō iinkai, 10th January 1940, "Santōshō mohan chiku shidō kōsaku yōkō".

to be joined together to form one rural cooperative.\footnote{Hokushigun Shireibu, "Gassakusha shidō yōryō", p.2.}

The village-based rural cooperatives were controlled by a District Cooperative Centre. Each and every village cooperative had to become a member of the District Cooperative Centre, whose capital was realized from its members, the Hsin-min Hui and the Provisional Government. They in turn contributed capital for the establishment of a central rural bank, which was placed under the China Reserve Bank. The Cooperative system provided banking facilities for agricultural development.\footnote{Ibid, pp.22-23.} Deposits in a district capital also made the peasantry to have a vested interest in the regime and thus better disposed towards providing Japanese commanders with information on possible enemy attacks on the district capital. For centralizing the available resources of villages in the district capital, the Cooperative Centre was to establish warehouses to store crops entrusted to the Agricultural Exchange for sale.\footnote{Hokushigun Shireibu, "Minshū sōshiki kōsaku no ichi rei (ken ni okeru keizai sōshiki kōsei no shujun)", p.7.} This also strengthened the peasant's interest in defending the district capital.

There was a danger that District Cooperative
Centres would become too powerful and independent if some form of centralized control could not be imposed. Therefore Cooperative Centres at the Circuit and Provincial levels were established. There was no attempt, however, to complicate the functions of a District Cooperative Centre and those of the Province and Circuit Centres. The latter were restricted only to finance, that is receiving deposits and reallocating financial resources, and control activities. It reserved full authority over District Cooperative Centres through the power of appointment. Above all the Cooperative centres at different levels was to be a central rural bank where all deposits were to congregate and financial reallocation for the whole of North China made.

Although the North China Army had worked out a blueprint for reorganizing the rural cooperation movement by October 1939, it was not until the second half of 1940 that it began to put the plan into operation. The Economic Blockade against enemy-held territories was enforced in

100 Chisaka Iin, "Shōgassakusha Rengokai setsuritsu narabi ni sono unei ni kansuru kihon hōshin an", appended to Hokushigun Shireibu, "Minshū sōshiki kōsaku no ichi rei (ken ni okeru keizai sōshiki kōsei no shujun)"); see also Fukuda Masao, op. cit., pp.48-49; Hokushigun Shireibu, "Gassakusha shidō yōryō", pp.15-22.

August 1940, and export restrictions against North China was enacted by Japan in September 1940. In May 1941 the first District Cooperative Centre was established at Paoting Hsien, soon followed by similar moves in other districts and culminated in the establishment of a Hopei Provincial Cooperative Centre. The provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Shansi established the same structure after Hopei. The Provisional Government provided a common legal framework in December 1941 when the Temporary Legislations on Rural Cooperatives were issued and a North China Cooperative Enterprises Association was formed. Unlike the Hsin-min Cooperative Headquarters, the new Association had control over all three separate rural cooperative movements and it was provided with a working capital of five million dollars, subscribed by the Provisional Cooperative Headquarters and the Reserve Bank. The organization and

102 Matsuzaki Yūjirō, op cit, pp.194-195.
function of the North China Cooperative Enterprises Association shows that the suggestions of Nashimoto Yuhei had been heeded, with one notable exception in that the Association was not a Sino-Japanese joint venture. This indicated that the North China Army failed to gain private Japanese capital support for the new move.

Ancillary to this new effort towards promoting the rural cooperative movement, a Ten-Year Development Plan for increasing agricultural production was drawn up in July 1940 and scheduled for execution the following year.108 In 1942 an emergency production increase plan was acted on: to open 200,000 wells for irrigation within one year. The Government was to provide free of charge the amount of coal needed for burning bricks needed in building wells, and to provide a fifty dollars interest-free loan for the purchase of seeds. Further, insecticides enough for use over five million mous were provided free. The whole operation was estimated to cost thirty million dollars, while separate irrigations works were estimated to cost another twenty-one million dollars.109 This new interest in the agricultural sector shown by the North China Army during wartime can only mean that agricultural produce

108 Kuwano Hiroshi, op cit, p.192.
had acquired immense strategic importance.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, exports from North China to Japan increased sharply without any comparable increase in imports. Indeed, the volume of imports was sharply decreasing as well, as shown on Table V:

**Table V Trade Figures between North China and Manchuria/Japan, 1941 to October 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports Japan</th>
<th>Manchuria</th>
<th>Total (million yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943 (1-10)</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Manchuria</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943 (1-10)</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Kuwano Hiroshi, *op cit*, p.190)

N.B. Figures based on import/export licences issued by the China Reserve Bank. As import licences were sold at a premium, the actual disparity between import and export is greater than the figures shown here.

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110 Kuwano Hiroshi, *op cit*, p.190.
Whereas a decrease in import can be attributed to a shortage of material resources in Japan as she was totally committed to a war of survival against the United States, a sharp increase of exports from North China cannot be attributed to an increase in production or the presence of any surplus. In 1941 a bumper harvest helped to lessen the effects of intensified Japanese export drives, but locusts and bad harvests the following years hit North China hard. Two points need to be explained at this juncture, 1) why would the North China Army exhaust resources of North China to support the war efforts of Tokyo, and 2) how was it possible for the North China Army, which was in occupation of non-productive urban centres and communication lines, to succeed in gathering the produce of North China for export?

The Japanese military overseas had disagreed with Tokyo on the question of continental expansion. The Kwantung Army and the North China Army acted in succession against the wishes of the Tokyo Government in precipitating military conquest of different parts of China. This had helped to build up power enclaves within the Japanese state structure, and overseas commands such as the North China Army were not averse to practise policies of self-interest

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as distinct from the interest of the Central Government. A good example was the use of money printed in North China to augment North China Army purchases from Japan at the expense of Tokyo.\footnote{112} The military, however, was genuinely patriotic in the sense that they were dedicated to what they believed to be the national cause. The significance of the military outcome of the Pacific War was plain to the military in overseas commands, and they were far­sighted enough in military questions to subordinate the military considerations in North China to the overall Japanese military position in the war.

This question of motivation is of course open to dispute and I attempt at no more than suggesting a rationale for actions taken. The fact that the North China Army succeeded in gathering North China resources for export in the years 1940−45 in the face of gross shortage of material in North China indicated the strength of the Japanese rural economic control structure. The resources that were shipped out of North China could have been used by the North China Army to tighten its economic, political and military control or even extend its sphere of influence into "neutral" and "liberated" areas. The deciding factor then was the fact that the North China Army had

\footnote{112} cf Chapter V.
decided to go all out in supporting the war efforts in other theatres of war, resulting in a weakening of its economic, political and military position in North China. Enforced export resulted in semi-famine conditions in North China, particularly in areas where Japanese influence was strong. These conditions sustained the resistance morale of the Chinese peasantry and made them more susceptible to Chinese Communist Party leadership. The increased support given to the Chinese Communists necessarily strengthened their military capabilities and enabled the Chinese Communists to stand up to the Japanese on military terms. The irony of it all is that the North China Army had subordinated all its policies to military considerations and that its policies failed precisely in gaining military advantages.

The continued export drive, however, was more than the rural cooperative structure could sustain, and the Japanese eventually degenerated into practices of sheer plunder of land and produce. Troops on patrol or combat duties would send a food-requisition detachment to villages they passed through to collect the food supplies they needed en route.\(^{113}\) The export drive was intensified

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113 Yamaguchi Masao, "Chūkoku sensen ijo ari", in Hiroku Daitōa senshi (Tairiku Chōsen Hen), pp. 80-91; Chinese Communist K'ung-shih ching-yeh 空室清野 policy is meant to frustrate Japanese I-sen Yō-sen 以戰養戰 practices.
by the confiscation of rich arable lands to be placed at the disposal of Japanese companies for intensified large scale production. The rural cooperative structure, however, remained the core of the Japanese material requisition system in North China until their surrender in 1945.

Sustained export surplus in the absence of production increase, however, created a food shortage problem of increasing dimension which the Japanese were unable to cope with. Realizing this, the Japanese military in North China resorted to evasive tactics and left the burden of responsibility to the puppet government. In February 1943 the Japanese Legation in Peking announced that Japan would import food from adjacent areas to meet the needs of Japanese residents, security personnel, and workers engaged in key communication and industrial facilities such as rail, coal, and iron. The puppet government was simply told to arrange for local grain supplies to feed the urban population. The puppet government hastily worked out a quota system in March 1943 in which every district had to supply a fixed volume of grain to the

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114 Kuwano Hiroshi, *op cit*, p.75; Hsu Ti-hsin, *Chung-kuo ching-ch'i te tao-lu*, chapter I.
government at fixed prices. These arbitrary arrangements were imposed with no reference to the productive power or the consumption needs of the peasantry and could not but harden their will to resist. The peasantry living in occupied and semi-occupied areas were particularly affected by these measures, and their disaffection necessarily lessened Japanese control.

Problems of Internal Security

In spite of repeated victories over the defending Chinese forces, the North China Army found to its dismay that a military stalemate had resulted from its lack of troops. Whereas the Japanese had enough soldiers committed to the North China theatre to maintain their military invincibility in battle, they did not have enough troops for occupying and holding territories. This military stalemate was first expressed in the presence of a front line in Japanese military maps, stretching from North to South in inland China.¹ Defeated Chinese armies were either pushed inland to areas beyond the front line or they were dispersed into the surrounding countryside behind the front line. The Japanese Army could not spare the troops required for pursuing and destroying the remnants of enemy resistance behind their lines. The problem of dealing with the dispersed troops behind the front line in areas supposedly occupied by the Japanese, and the problem of strengthening control in areas actually occupied, constituted the problem of internal security (chian mondai)² for

¹ See Map on troop distribution. (Map 3)
² Chian Mondai 治安問題 or problems of law and order.
the North China Army. It was in fact a mixture of the problems of internal security and guerrilla warfare. For the sake of convenience, "internal security" hereafter refers to the Japanese concept of chian mondai.

The Chinese Red Army, which began moving into North China in September 1937 subsequent to the Chinese Nationalist Party's acceptance of the formation of an Anti-Japanese United Front, did not even go as far as engaging the Japanese in battles and opted for guerrilla tactics from the very beginning of the war. The Chinese defenders were doing their best in harassing actions at the rear, destroying railways, roads, bridges, and telegraph lines;

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3 Foreign Languages Press, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol 2, pp.52-53, Mao on Strategy and Tactics, being part of an interview with James Bertram on 25th October 1937: "We are doing what the other Chinese troops have not done, i.e., operating chiefly on the enemy's flanks and rear. This way of fighting is vastly different from purely frontal defence. We are not against employing part of the forces in frontal operations, for that is necessary. But the main forces must be used against the enemy's flanks, and it is essential to adopt encircling and outflanking tactics in order to attack the enemy independently and with the initiative in our hands, for that is the only way to destroy his forces and preserve our own. Furthermore, the use of some of our armed forces against the enemy's rear is particularly effective, because they can disrupt his supply lines and bases. Even the frontal forces should rely mainly on "counter assault" and not on purely defensive tactics. One important reason for the military setbacks in the last few months has been the use of unsuitable methods of fighting. The methods of fighting employed by the Eighth Route Army are what we call guerrilla and mobile warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands..." (my own underlining)
ambushing lightly protected Japanese supply convoys, and conducting surprise raids on Japanese-held installations of all kinds.\textsuperscript{4} The Shansi troops of Yen Hsi-shan, after an initial frontal clash with the Japanese in the defence of Taiyuan, withdrew to the hills in south western Shansi and adopted guerrilla tactics also.\textsuperscript{5} The existence of numerous pockets of resistance created by the presence of dispersed Chinese troops and the guerrilla tactics of the Chinese Red Army and Yen Hsi-shan were the most serious aspects of the problem of internal security in rural areas behind Japanese lines. It must be borne in mind, however, that initially guerrilla tactics were not carried out by partisans, but were simply tactics adopted by the regular Chinese armies as a means to redress their inferior fire power \textit{vis-a-vis} the Japanese. The development of a people's war and a partisan-based resistance followed at a later stage of the war and was essentially a Chinese response to internal security measures adopted by the Japanese Army.

\textsuperscript{4} Bōeichō Bōeikyūshujo Senshishitsu, \textit{Hokushi no Chiansen}, p.53.

\textsuperscript{5} C.A. Johnson, \textit{Peasant Nationalism and Communism Power}, p.95. As Yen avoided further frontal battle after he had retreated to southwestern Shansi, yet continuing a war of resistance against the Japanese, he was in fact adopting guerrilla warfare.
The guerrilla tactics of the Chinese defenders had one very significant consequence, the attacking Japanese Army was compelled to look to its rear and to deploy a substantial portion of its limited troop strength for the defence of major supply lines and important administrative centres. The initial strategy of attempting to win a lightning victory through the occupation of major communication lines had earlier determined the general configuration of Japanese troop deployment (see Map 3), hence also the general configuration of occupied zones, while Chinese guerrilla tactics contributed in accentuating this basic configuration. The existence of a well-defined Japanese-held zone and an ill-defined Chinese-held zone had important political ramifications, the political affiliation of the dispersed military units and the political allegiance of the peasantry would decide, in the absence of unlimited Japanese reinforcements, the political future of the countryside. The problem of internal security in rural areas behind Japanese lines was therefore essentially a question of securing loyalty from or imposing control over the peasantry and the dispersed military units, it was a complex political, military and administrative problem.

As the North China Army had not anticipated a problem of this nature upon launching the invasion, its initial attempts to face the problem was piecemeal and
represented but conditioned reactions. The initiative therefore rested with the Chinese defenders and there was no comprehensive scheme advanced by the Japanese for dealing with the problem. As the Chinese defenders were concentrating their efforts on harassing actions, the North China Army responded in kind with measures designed to protect its major supply lines and to ensure that such measures would not overstrain its limited troop strength. Japanese attempts to protect their supply lines created a new zone of semi-occupation where Japanese military patrol and the proximity of Japanese military presence enabled them to have control of the land and people lying within. Beyond the semi-occupation zone were territories under the control of dispersed Chinese troops, against which the Japanese did practically nothing until after the battle of Wuhan in October 1938.

In starting its attempts to protect major supply lines, the North China Army was fortunate in that the South Manchurian Railway Company had faced a similar problem in Manchuria after that region had fallen into Japanese hands. Sporadic attacks and sabotage by Chinese guerrillas led the South Manchurian Railway towards organizing Chinese manpower on either side of railways and communication lines to provide war-support activities. In June 1933 the Manchurian Railway Bureau drafted a plan for the propagation
of "Thoughts for the protection of communication lines" or Airo Shisō, aimed at mobilizing eight million peasants in Manchuria to assist in the protection of railways and other communication facilities.  

As the South Manchurian Railway Company had had some experience in organizing Chinese manpower to overcome Japanese troop shortage problems, its assistance was sought by the North China Army.

Early in August 1937, just a few days after full scale hostilities had broken out in North China, about fifty persons were transferred from the South Manchurian Railway Company to the North China Army to assist in organizing peasant manpower to provide increased protection for communication lines. The number of persons on loan from the South Manchurian Railway Company later increased to about eight hundred, which, together with recruits from the North China Army itself, boosted the total of personnel engaged in this communication protection work to well over two thousand and they were collectively known as the Tashiri Sueshiro, "Hokushi ni okeru Airō Undō", in Kōa, III, No. 7, July 1942, pp.115-129, p.116. June 1933 the Manchoukuo Railway Bureau drafted "An outline plan for the propagation of communication protection thoughts" or "Tetsudō aigo shisō fukyū keikaku taikō" 鐵路愛護思想普及計畫大綱.

Fukada Yūzo, Shina Kyōsangun no gensei, p.376.
Sembu Han or Peace Pacification Corps.\(^8\)

The Corps was part of the regular Japanese Army, initially stationed at seven points along the Peking-Shanhaikwan Line. Operating military units were able to request any one of the Corps offices for assignment of its specialized personnel to accompany the unit in military operations. The Corps members thus assigned to a unit were to carry out a number of tasks, propagandistic and organizational in nature. The area of operation of the Corps was extended beyond the Peking-Shanhaikwan Line to cover all Japanese-held railways in North China and Corps offices were established in various district capitals along major railways.\(^9\) The efforts of the Corps were the first Japanese attempts at rural control.

The initial functions of the Peace Pacification Corps can be described as counter propaganda. On entering a village with a military unit, members of the Corps were responsible for obliterating any anti-Japanese posters and confiscating all anti-Japanese literature. They whitewashed out anti-Japanese wall slogans and replaced them with pro-Japanese, anti-Communist, and anti-Nationalist

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\(^9\) Tashiri Sueshirō, *op cit*, p.117; Boeicho..., *op cit*, pp. 78-80.
Chinese ones. After these initial counter propaganda work had been completed, the Corps members would round up the local inhabitants for a mass meeting which included lectures on the righteousness of Japanese military action in North China, the need to cooperate with the Japanese Army, and exhortations for the peasants to oppose the Nationalist Chinese and Chinese Communist forces. Language problem must have watered down the results of these counter propaganda efforts as the Corps suffered from the fact that it was an all-Japanese body operating among a Chinese populace. The Corps tried to overcome this by working out a language text-book and organizing Japanese language classes. It is doubtful that the Corps succeeded to any significant extent in this field. The Corps also tried to build up Chinese goodwill by distributing free rations and providing roving medical services. Pictures of smiling Chinese peasants receiving free rations and medical attention were used in propaganda literature to demonstrate how the Chinese peasantry welcomed deliverance at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army:

10 Fukada Yūzo, op cit, pp.377-379.
Apart from counter propaganda, the Corps had to face the problem of consolidating Japanese authority in villages they have passed through. Whereas the peasants could easily be rounded up, at gun-point if need be, for attendance at mass meetings, their support for the Japanese could not be relied on after the Japanese military units had moved on. The propaganda efforts exerted by the Peace Pacification Corps during the brief period of effective military occupation certainly could not have been counted as having changed the hearts and minds of the peasantry to render their full support for the Japanese war effort. Counter propaganda work was an essential function performed by the Corps, but it was not the most important function for which the Corps had been established to perform.

The primary function of the Peace Pacification Corps was the organization of Chinese manpower in support of communication protection measures of the North China Army. Counter-propaganda was designed only to make the task of organizing the peasants easier. War-support activities included intelligence reports on enemy troop movements, round-the-clock watchmen service for all sections of railways and important communication lines, courier service for alerting Japanese military command posts against enemy raids, labour for repairing damaged facilities
labour for building new connecting roads, labour for digging trenches on either side of major communication lines designed to prevent enemy raids and to slow down enemy withdrawal after raids.\(^{13}\) Organization of such activities was a monumental task when the fact of the transitory nature of Japanese military control over the peasantry on either side of major communication lines is taken into account. The situation was that such activities had to be organized and that organizational efforts could not count on uninterrupted military support from the North China Army.

The lack of troops had necessitated the use of Chinese manpower in war-support activities, it also necessitated the channelling of organizational efforts through a village-based Chinese administration. Although it was difficult to call to account the actions of every peasant in a village individually, it was comparatively simple to place responsibilities on the shoulders of village chiefs and their deputies and to put the onus of organizing war-support activities on them. Village administrators were called upon to organize the peasants to provide war-support services demanded of them. The traditional Chinese society had been used to the practice

\(^{13}\) *Kōa*, IV, No. 2, February 1943, pp.90-102, "Kahoku Aigo Sonchō ni kiku", p.95.
of the principle of group responsibility and the invocation of this principle by the Japanese did not raise doubts of its practicability, nor did its application incur popular wrath. The fact that the Corps members moved with Japanese military units meant that direct Japanese organizational efforts were intermitent and a continuous organizational effort on the village level had to be indirect. It was not until 1943-44 that the North China Army resorted to recruiting Chinese labour gangs direct, introducing legislations enabling them to press able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and forty into a labour army with a three-year term of service. This, however, only reflected decreasing Japanese ability to organize corvee labour through the native village administration during this latter period and signified decreased, rather than increased, efforts in mobilizing Chinese manpower for war-support.

Administration in rural China had traditionally been performed by bodies outside of the formal government structure. Government control over the sub-government rural administrative structure was strong at the beginning of a dynasty, and would weaken towards the end of a dynasty. Before the Japanese occupation the rural administrative structure was only loosely controlled by the formal

14 C.A. Johnson, op cit, p.45.
government. As village administrative posts were not paid and carried with them heavy responsibilities such as tax collection and the enforcement of law and order, it was difficult to find persons to accept the posts and the delegated government responsibilities. This does not mean a break-down in local village administration, rural communities had little difficulty in finding administrators to take care of internal village administrative needs. These same village administrators, however, were unwilling to perform government functions, as distinct from local village functions. The Peace Pacification Corps was therefore faced with the task of making sure that there were identifiable persons in individual villages alongside major communication lines to whom government functions could be delegated and on whom responsibility could be laid. The task involved not only supervising the election of village administrative officers, but also time-consuming work in village boundary delineation and arbitration in communal disputes. In short, in its efforts to organize rural manpower for war-support, the Peace Pacification Corps had stumbled onto the task of rebuilding rural administrative control in areas adjacent to major communication lines.

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15 JFA, S.1.6.1.3-3, "Hokushi seikyō", pp.1376-1423, Sonsei Kaizenkō.
These areas became semi-occupied zones where Japanese military presence was periodic and where Japanese control over the village administrative structure was on the whole effective.

Villages in which administrative reorganization had been effected by the Peace Pacification Corps were called Communication Protection Villages, their chiefs as Communication Protection Village Chiefs, and the entire effort labelled as the Communication Protection Movement. The internal organizational structure of a Communication Protection Village did not differ from those of other villages, but its responsibility to the Japanese Army was particular in that it was expected to provide additional protection to supply lines. Enforcement was based on the threat of force, for Japanese military presence was near and not at these villages.

Although the efforts in organizing Chinese manpower by the Peace Pacification Corps led it into counter propaganda and rural administrative reorganization, these tasks were formally assigned by the North China Army to its Special Service section. The Special Service was established in early September 1937 with the appointment of General Kita Sei-ichi as its first chief. Kita's term

16 Bōeichō..., op cit, p.78; Tashiri Sueshirō, op cit.
As chief of the Special Service, you are required to direct your men to take charge of all political affairs and to take control of Chinese administrations in rear areas, including the East Hopei region, so as to strengthen the foundation of the co-prosperity and co-existence of Japan, Manchuria, and China. 17

Kita, however, had to build a Special Service establishment from scratch, and he had no means of preventing the Peace Pacification Corps from indulging in spheres of activities earmarked for his Special Service. The Special Service, however, came to maturity towards December 1937 as witnessed by its establishment of the Provisional Government and the Hsin-min Hui at Peking in that month. In late December (1937) the North China Army formally put the Peace Pacification Corps under the Special Service, 18 which hastily took control. This is indicated by the establishment of the Headquarters of the Peace Pacification Corps of the Special Service, Tokumubu Sembu Han Honbu, at Peking in January 1938. 19 The Corps, however, had already developed into a sizable organization in its own right and

17 Misuzu Shōbō, Nichū Sensō, Vol 2, p. 41. (My own translation) See also Bōeichō..., op cit, p. 42.

18 Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 22nd December 1937, "Gun senkyō chi-iki chien iji jisshō yōryō", in Bōeichō..., op cit, pp. 53-57. See p. 56 under heading Sembu 備篇.

19 Bōeichō..., op cit, p. 78. Tokumubu Sembu Han Honbu 特務部宣撫班本部.
the Special Service was unable to integrate the Corps immediately and the Corps therefore retained its structure and identity for some time to come.

The functions of the Corps were duplicated by organizations established by the Special Service. In occupied zones local committees for public safety were formed, culminating in the establishment of the Provisional Government. Theoretically the Provisional Government claimed jurisdiction over all North China, in fact its authority was effective only within occupied zones. The Provisional Government, however, was desirous of expanding its influence into the semi-occupied zones where the Peace Pacification Corps had been active. There was consequently a clash of interest between the Corps and the Provisional Government. The establishment of the Hsin-min Hui in the same month to act as the political arm of the Provisional Government also brought it into conflict with the Corps as both organizations were interested in propaganda and rural reorganization activities. Even the control of the Corps over the Communication Protection Movement was challenged following the establishment of the North China Railway Company early in April 1939.\(^{20}\) What might have decided the fate of the Corps was possibly the

\(^{20}\) Tashiri Sueshirō, *op cit*, p.118.
fact that it was heavily staffed by South Manchurian Railway Company personnel, and, as such, represented a branch of Kwantung Army influence in North China. It is evident that the North China Army wanted to curtail the influence of the Corps, otherwise the Special Service would not have been enabled to create rival organizations to duplicate its functions, making the Corps less and less indispensable. The coup de grace was effected in March 1940 when the Peace Pacification Corps was formally disbanded and forcibly incorporated into the Hsin-min Hui.\textsuperscript{21}

The Communication Protection Movement, however, was reassigned not to the Hsin-min Hui but to the North China Railway Company.\textsuperscript{22} This seems to indicate that a choice was open to former Corps members in joining either the Hsin-min Hui or the North China Railway Company, in

\textsuperscript{21} JFA, S.1.6.1.3-5, "Hokushi seikyō; Shimmin-kai kankei", December 1939 to January 1944,

i) Consul-general Arino 岩野 at Tsinan to Foreign Minister Nomura 野村, 11th January 1940, informing the Minister that officers of the Peace Pacification Corps opposed to amalgamation with the Hsin-min Hui;

ii) Tsuchida 土田, secretary of Peking Legation, to Foreign Minister Arita 有田, 16th January 1940, saying that Wang K'ē-min had assumed chairmanship of the Hsin-min Hui;

iii) Consul-general Arino at Tsinan to Foreign Minister Arita, 3rd February 1940, informing the Minister that the Peace Pacification Corps would be amalgamated with the Hsin-min Hui on 1st March 1940.

\textsuperscript{22} Tashiri Sueshirō, op cit, p.118.
either case they could still continue to perform their hitherto functions in the Communication Protection Movement. The North China Railway Company was closely associated with the South Manchurian Railway Company, while the Hsin-min Hui was controlled by the Special Service, the choice for former members of the Corps was therefore either to continue to serve the South Manchurian Railway Company by joining the North China Railway Company or to associate themselves openly with the Special Service by joining the Hsin-min Hui. As the Hsin-min Hui was involved in reorganizing local government, the area of operation of the Hsin-min Hui and the North China Railway Company necessarily overlapped each other. A distinction was made within the Communication Protection Movement where the North China Army had policy control, the Special Service had supervisory control, and the Railway Company was responsible for execution. This verbal distinction of the parts played by the North China Army, the Special Service, and the Railway Company was no more than a tactful way of describing that the North China Army dictated to the Railway Company through its Special Service. What was not made clear, however, was whether the Communication Protection Villages Chiefs were answerable to the Railway Company, or the Special Service. It is likely

\[23\] Ibid, p.122.
that they were answerable to both.

In spite of in-fighting among the Japanese, they were able to claim in 1942 that there were just under 9,000 Communication Protection Villages with an estimated population of just over eleven million. These figures included mainly people living within five kilometres on either side of railways and did not include similar villages along roads and rivers, which had an estimated length of 16,888 kilometres. But since Japanese efforts in organizing Communication Protection Villages along roads and rivers were minimal as dictated by their pattern of troop deployment, the population figure claimed for Communication Protection Villages was possibly representative of the number of rural inhabitants under Japanese control. If this were true the Japanese Army was in control of only about one-eighth of the rural population in North China.

The Japanese occupation of major urban centres and their efforts at control over rural areas alongside railways were not the only factors at work in redrawing the political map of war-torn North China. The political and military vacuum consequent upon the defeat of warlord troops at Japanese hands opened the way into North China

24 Ibid, p.126.
provinces for Chinese-Communist-Party troops and cadres. Earlier attempts of the Chinese Communist Party to enter North China via Shansi had been repulsed by the troops of Yen Hsi-shan. The Japanese occupation, however, not only weakened Yen's troop strength, but also made it imperative for him to cooperate with the Chinese Communists in resisting the Japanese. The Eighth Route Army entered Shansi early in September 1937 and was nominally under the command of Yen Hsi-shan. It was the age-old story of internal cohesion achieved under outside pressure.

The Chinese Communist Party's contribution in redrawing the political map of North China was its establishment of border governments as base areas for guerrilla resistance. On entering to operate in North China, the Chinese Communist Party, no less than the North China Army, was confronted by the problem of manpower shortage. The Eighth Route Army was estimated to be only 45,000 strong and subdivided into three divisions. The numerically weak and poorly armed Communist troops were nevertheless experienced in fighting for survival against a superior foe.

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27 *Bōeichō...*, *op cit*, p.30.
and this qualified the Chinese Communists for leadership in China's struggle for survival against the Japanese in North China. Taking advantage of the Japanese preoccupation with major battles in Central China, the Chinese Communists proceeded to rally the dispersed Chinese troops in North China as a means of increasing its manpower resources. In this way the Chinese Communists established eighteen border governments behind Japanese lines, of these the best known and best organized was the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Government or Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Government. 28

In October 1937 Taiyuan fell into Japanese hands, whereupon Yen Hsi-shan withdrew the main body of his forces to the hills in south-western Shansi. 29 Around the same time Communist forces were moving into Northern Shansi to organize a guerrilla base in the Wutai Mountain area. 30 Yen's officials there, led by Sung Shao-wen and Hu Jen-k'uei, advised Yen to cooperate with the Chinese Communists in the Wutai Mountain area and Yen complied. 31

28 Chin-Ch'a-Chi 萬察冀
29 C.A. Johnson, op cit, p.95.
30 Kōain Kahoku Renrakubu, "Shin-cha-ki henku no jōkyō", in Jōhō, No. 35, 1st February 1941, pp.1-72, p.2; Ch'en K'o-han, Chi-Ch'a-Chin pien-ch'ü mo-fan k'ang-jih ken-chū-ti, p.6; Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, K'ang-jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'uang, p.26
Without Yen's consent, Chinese Communist activities in the area would have been made very difficult, for they had only about two thousand troops to back up their presence in the area. Yen's consent also enabled Sung and Hu to work with the Chinese Communists in reorganizing the area into a guerrilla base for supporting sustained resistance. Thus the Japanese occupation not only softened the military capability, but also the political will of Yen in resisting Chinese Communist entry into Shansi. The Chinese Communist 'occupation' of Northern Shansi was therefore unopposed and was actually assisted by the local expertise of Sung Shao-wen and Hu Jen-k'uei.

The immediate task which the Chinese Communists embarked upon in the Wutai area was the consolidation of their military strength. Cadres were sent out to popularize the slogan "Resistance for National Salvation", to contact isolated Chinese military units and to bring them into the Eighth Route Army. The case of Lü Cheng-ts'ao is a classic example of Chinese Communist military expansion tactics. Lü was a regimental officer under Sung Che-yuan

32 Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, op cit, p.26; C.A. Johnson, op cit, p.97.

and had fled with his unit after the fall of Paoting in September 1937. Lü kept his unit intact, however, and expanded it with the addition of local militia units at Ankuo Hsien. Chinese Communist cadres contacted Lü and brought him and his unit under the Eighth Route Army. Similar efforts in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Area met with encouraging success so that by December 1937 the Chinese Communists were able to designate the border area as a new army zone. Fighting units in the area were placed under the command of Nieh Jung-chen.35

As the Chinese Communists were succeeding in consolidating their military strength, efforts were directed towards the establishment of a Border Government for the area. In January 1938 a representative assembly met at Fuping, 160 delegates from the army, the Chinese Communist Party, the Nationalist Chinese Party, and communal bodies such as youth, women, peasant, worker and cultural organizations attended the assembly. The assembly demonstrated that United Front principles were observed and it also gave strength to the claim that the establishment of the Border

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35 Böeichō..., op cit, p.86, claims that one of the Communist cadres who contacted Lü was a close relation of Lü; C.A. Johnson, op cit, pp.34-35; Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'aung, p.27; Köain Kahoku Renrakubu, "Shin-cha-ki henku no jokyō", in Jöhō, No. 35, 1st February 1941, pp.1-72, p.2; Nieh Jung-chen 聶崇臻.
Government was an act of the people. In a brief two-week sitting, the assembly passed the basic legislations with which the Border Government was to work. Finally, legitimacy was confirmed by Chungking's tacit recognition of the Border Government as legal. 36

The success story of the formation of guerrilla base areas and border governments, however, must not be exaggerated beyond their proper dimensions. Manpower shortage, trained cadres in particular, did not permit the Chinese Communists to absorb all the dispersed military units in the countryside and a large neutral zone, areas where both effective Japanese and Chinese Communist control was absent, continued to exist. The existence of the neutral zones also demonstrated that not all resistance fighters in North China accepted Chinese Communist leadership. In fact the North China Army was so conscious of active friction between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Chinese that it was naive enough to believe that troop concentrations by the Chinese Communists prior to the first Hundred Regiment Offensive in August 1940 were signs of a possible major clash between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Chinese. 37 The existence

36 Kōain Kahoku Renrakubu, "Shin-cha-ki henku no jōkyō", in Jōhō, No. 35, 1st February 1941, pp.1-72, pp.3-4 and 43.

37 Bōeichō..., op cit, p.338.
of the neutral zones also demonstrated that the peasantry in the neutral zones were not sufficiently national conscious to come forward to resist the Japanese on their own initiative. In fact, the Japanese still had a chance of winning their support if only the Japanese could identify their interests with those of the peasantry.

Japanese occupation of urban centres and communication lines, their efforts at rural control in areas alongside railways, Chinese Communist efforts in building guerrilla base areas, and the existence of neutral zones in between Japanese centres of power and Chinese Communist centres of power as a consequence of manpower and organizational problems on both sides, decided the main features of the political map of war-time North China. There were thus four zones, the Japanese occupied, the semi-occupied, the guerrilla bases, and the neutral zones. Although each was distinct from the rest in nature, there was no distinct boundary between any of them and each zone merged into the territory of its adjacent zones. Even if there were boundaries between them, these boundaries were mobile and fluid, moving with the tide of war. This zoning concept is important, however, for it helps to understand the nature of Japanese policy in rural pacification, of which the Communication Protection Movement was only a part. The discussion now turns to Japanese rural
pacification policies and practices vis-a-vis the guerrilla base areas and the neutral zones.

Basing upon this zoning concept, Japanese rural pacification efforts can be distinguished into four phases: a) to secure control over lands alongside railways, b) to expand from semi-occupied areas into neutral zones, c) to crush Chinese Communist guerrilla base areas, d) contraction of areas of Japanese control as a result of rapid expansion of Communist-controlled areas and Communist infiltration of Japanese-held areas. Phase one was centred on the Communication Protection Movement and the territorial limitation of Japanese rural control efforts was dictated by their strategy of defeating Chinese armies at major battles. This phase lasted until the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. Phase two roughly began with the fall of Wuhan which freed considerable Japanese troops and this enabled the Japanese Army to plan consolidation and expansion of its territorial hold in China. This phase was marked by the absence of any formidable Chinese resistance and Japanese expansion rate was conditioned principally by its manpower shortage, and the sheer size of the land and population of China. Phase three began with the Chinese Communist-led Hundred Regiment Offensive in August 1940, the Japanese found to their surprise and dismay that the Chinese Communist Party had emerged as an effective military
challenge to Japanese military presence in North China. This diverted Japanese attention from expanding into the neutral zones to concentrating their military strength at crushing the various Communist-led guerrilla base areas in North China. Phase four began roughly with the Pacific War when, instead of any identification of interests between the peasantry and the Japanese Army, there was an increasing clash of interest between the Japanese Army and the peasantry as a result of intensified Japanese efforts to export to Japan to support the total war effort against the United States. In terms of the rise of peasant nationalism, the last phase was by far the most significant.

The problems presented by the Communist guerrilla base areas and the neutral zones were, to say the least, of a different nature from those presented by the semi-occupied zones. In spite of the prominence given by the Japanese in their propaganda efforts to the threat of Communism to East Asia, Chinese Communist presence in North China was not given much attention to. The Japanese leaders in North China were military men, and, as the Chinese Communists presented not much of a military challenge, it was looked on only with marginal interest. Upon the relief on troop pressure subsequent to the Battle of Wuhan, it was the neutral zones that interested
the North China Army as they were territories open to Japanese entry if only the Japanese could find enough troops to march in and take possession. As manpower shortage was basic, the problem was how to make use of Chinese manpower and institutions to advance Japanese control into the neutral zones.

In this attempt to spread influence into the neutral zones, the Japanese and the Chinese Communists were competitors. Both the Chinese Communists and the Japanese were concerned with enlisting the support of dispersed Chinese military units in the neutral zones. The approaches of the Chinese Communists and the Japanese were, however, significantly different. Whereas the Chinese Communists were enlisting these military units to assist in military resistance, the Japanese were trying to disarm any unit that would declare its allegiance to the Japanese cause. This was significant because the dispersed units wanted to retain a certain amount of political influence and they could retain this influence only if they were allowed to continue as effective military units. Allegience to the Japanese was therefore a final act of self-denial which these minor military units led by officers of former warlord

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38 Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 22nd December 1937, "Gun Senkyō chi-iki chian iji jisshiki yōryō", in Bōeichō... , op cit, pp.53-57.
armies were most certainly unwilling to make. The Japanese policy of disbanding the dispersed Chinese military units and to return their men to work in fields and factories simply had no appeal for nationalists and self-seekers alike. This policy of disbanding former Chinese military units was consistently pursued even when the North China Army had decided to make use of a Chinese puppet army, for the new puppet army was made up of new recruits and not regroupings of surrendered troops. This was a major blunder in policy, Japanese preoccupation with the disarming of the Chinese populace was in itself a factor for driving minor military figures to throw in their lot with the Communist-led resistance effort. The intriguing question was not so much why these minor military figures threw in their lot with the Chinese Communists, but how the Chinese Communists were able to absorb these diverse elements without weakening their party organization, the revolutionary fervour of the Communist movement, and the cohesion of the Chinese-Communist-led resistance movement.

Indeed, the Chinese Communists were not able to absorb all the dispersed military units in the countryside not yet under Japanese control. The manpower problem,

39 Bōeichō..., op cit, pp.483-485 for details on the establishment of a puppet army in North China, see also pp.485-486 on the unreliability of surrendered troops.
particularly in trained cadres, plagued the Chinese Communists as much as the Japanese if not more so because of the faster rate of expansion of guerrilla base areas into the neutral zones and because of their heavy reliance on political support, not to mention the fact that the Chinese Communists started with a smaller body of men. Further, the growth of Chinese Communist military capability and the desire of the Japanese to hasten their own expansion rate into the neutral zones led the North China Army to revise its earlier policy of disarming the Chinese in North China to tolerate some of the dispersed military units to continue operation in the neutral zones. These units were weak in organization and fire power, and the fact that they had not joined with the Chinese Communists on their own initiative showed that they were anti-Communist and would remain anti-Communist as long as they

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40 Dai-Hon-ei Rikugunbu, 2nd December 1938, "Senkyō chi-ikinai Shinagawa busō dantai shidō yōkō", and Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 20th April 1939, "Chian shukusei yōkō", both found in Bōeichō..., op cit, pp.111-112 and 116-124. In the former, the Tokyo General Staff Headquarters instructed the North China Army to organize a puppet army and to make suitable use of defected Chinese troops. As the North China Army need not comply with Tokyo orders, the Tokyo directive was no more than an advice. However, the latter document, which was a North China Army directive, reveals that by April 1939 there was already a puppet army in North China and that defected Chinese troops were also made use of.
were not pushed to the wall by the Japanese. The reverse was also true, if the Chinese Communist forces were to force these dispersed units out of their territories, they would stage resistance and liable to throw in their lot with the Japanese. Thus in the midst of the growth of Chinese Communist and Japanese power in opposite directions, each eating into the neutral zones, there remained a substantial number of miscellaneous Chinese warlord enclaves of diminutive proportion in between. For survival purposes, it was not unusual for some of these units to feign allegiance to one side or the other as the need arose, thus increasing the mobile nature of the zone boundaries.

In comparing the relative success of the Chinese Communists and the Japanese in expanding into the neutral zone it must be borne in mind that the Chinese Communist effort was much more vigorous. The reason for this is obvious in that expansion into the neutral zone was a matter of life or death for the Chinese Communists in North China whereas it was only an incidental task for the Japanese invasion army. To the Japanese, expansion into the neutral zone was only a side issue that would help

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41 [Boeichô... op cit, Map No. 4, titled "Hokushi hōmen senkyō chi-ikinai teki heiryoku"] claims there were 250,000 regular Nationalist Chinese troops and 56,000 Nationalist Chinese affiliated guerrillas in occupied North China in July 1940.
marginally in determining the outcome of the war in China. It was part of the internal security question, a matter of imposing law and order, and lack of complete success did not alter the fact of Japanese military presence. They were concerned primarily with destroying the military capability of the Chungking Government and regarded the fall of that Government as synonymous with total Chinese defeat. The Chinese Communist presence in North China was regarded as important, but not as important as the survival of the Nationalist Chinese regime in Chungking. And even when the North China Army focused its attention on the Chinese Communists after the Hundred Regiment Offensive, it was more concerned with destroying the military capabilities of the armed forces of the Communists rather than with the minor effects of the allegiance or otherwise of individual dispersed Chinese military units in the neutral zones. The strategy adopted for dealing with the Chinese Communist military threat was that of conducting mopping-up campaigns directed against the guerrilla base areas themselves and not on the neutral zones lying in between. 42

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42 Jen-min chu-pan-she, K'ang-Ji chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'aung, p.2., says that since 1941 the Japanese concentrated their main forces onto "Liberated Areas or Chieh-fang-ch'ü 解放区" and not "Guerrilla areas" or yu-chi-ch'ü 游击区. The former term denoted Chinese Communist strongholds and the latter term denoted the neutral zones; Bōeichō..., op cit, pp.467-468
Japanese were not in possession of the neutral zones, their existence did not impede the movement of large bodies of Japanese troops to and from the guerrilla base areas.

The immediate concern of the Japanese after the Hundred Regiment Offensive was not the conquest of the neutral zones, but to ensure that the neutral zones should stay neutral, at least in military capability if not in political allegiance, so that Japanese military preponderance in North China stood no chance of being challenged by any forces emerging from the neutral zones. The North China Army directive on internal security dated 22nd December 1937 throws light on this when the document comes to the question of police and self-defence establishments. There were no distinctive practices for the occupied area, the semi-occupied area, and the neutral areas. This in itself is significant, for whereas occupied and semi-occupied zones could depend on Japanese military support at the ready, the neutral zones could not expect Japanese military support to any comparable extent. Had the Japanese not been preoccupied with maintaining the military impotency of the neutral zones, these were the areas in which pro-Japanese forces should have been armed.

43 Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 22nd December 1937, "Gun senkyō chi-iki chian iji jisshi yōryō", in Bōeichō..., pp.53-57.
to contribute to the total Japanese war effort. As it was, the directive stipulated that district capitals were to have a police complement of no more than two hundred men and that local village defence were to fall onto the shoulders of local militia units.\(^4\) There was no attempt to define what the local militia units were, but there were precautions against providing the militia with any arms at all save those captured in battle by the militia units themselves. In short, there was no attempt to help the peasants organize defence for their villages apart from tolerating existing militia units and there was no attempt to coordinate the militia activities with those of the Japanese Army. It was no more than a vague desire that these same militia units which would not oppose the passage of Japanese troop movements would somehow rise in arms against armies from the guerrilla base areas. The logic that the militia units which were not strong enough to stage self-defence against the Japanese would be just as helpless against Chinese armies did not seem to have struck home to the Japanese military planners in North China.

The Japanese strategy in phase two of their rural pacification effort was a repetition of their earlier efforts in the semi-occupied zones. Measures during this

\(^4\) Ibid,
phase were based on a directive of the North China Army dated 20th April 1939 and this was basically a restatement of the directive of December 1937. Rural pacification was defined as getting rid of pockets of resistance within occupied areas and that the effort was to be based primarily on Japanese military strength. The only significant differences were a new accent on youth training and the revitalization of the traditional Pao-chia police control system. In fact manpower shortage was compelling the Japanese military to increase the roles played by the puppet police structure and the revitalization of the Pao-chia structure was part of this general trend.

The Provisional Government had revived the Pao-chia system formally on a trial basis in late 1938 with a set of revised Pao-chia legislations for application in the four suburbs of Peking and seven surrounding districts beyond. These regulations were revised again in July 1939 before they were applied to all territories under Provisional Government jurisdiction. The Provisional Government had revived the Pao-chia system formally on a trial basis in late 1938 with a set of revised Pao-chia legislations for application in the four suburbs of Peking and seven surrounding districts beyond. These regulations were revised again in July 1939 before they were applied to all territories under Provisional Government jurisdiction.

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45 Hokushina Hōmengun Shireibu, 20th April 1939, "Chian shukusei yōkō", in Bōeichō..., op cit, pp.116-124.
46 Ibid, p.117.
Government, however, did not go far beyond drafting these new legislations and their implementation in any scale did not take place until the North China Political Council had replaced the Provisional Government as the ruling authority in North China. 49

The legislations as drawn up by the Provisional Government and adopted by the North China Political Council consisted of forty articles concerned with the twin problem of defining the structure and function of the Pao-chia system. The basic unit continued to be a household, each household was to have its own head. The unit above the household was Chia, which was made up of ten households and headed by a Chia-chang appointed by the government from among its component household heads. The unit above the Chia was Pao, which was made up of ten Chia and headed by a Pao-chang appointed by the government from among the component Chia-changs. The Pao-chang was assisted by a deputy. Neighbouring Pao units were required to come together to form a Ren-pao, which was no more than an administrative coordination organ for correlating the duties of neighbouring Pao units. All posts in the Pao-chia system

49 The North China Political Council was established on 30th March 1940 to replace the Provisional Government as part of the agreement between Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese when Wang agreed to form a central government in Japanese occupied China. See Asahi Shimbun, March 1940, p.334.
were honorary. 50

The Pao-chia units were put under government police control as Ren-pao heads were subordinated to branch police stations, which in turn were under the district police commissioner. The police commissioner was under the district magistrate and the district magistrate was subjected to control from both the local Japanese commander and the local Hsin-min Hui representatives. All posts, except that of household heads, were appointed by the government and its degree of centralization was not allowed to go beyond the district level as a check against the Pao-chia militia units from developing into a giant military establishment beyond the capacity of the Japanese Army to control. 51

Apart from legislation, the problems of recruitment of Pao-chia officers and the way in which they were to carry out their functions remained. These problems were hardly tackled at all until the North China Political Council had been established, showing that the Provisional Government had made little effort in translating its Pao-chia legislations into reality. One of the very first things which the North China Political Council did in putting the


51 Ibid, p.16; see also Bēichō... , op cit, pp.53-57 and pp. 116-124 for Japanese control over militia units.
Pao-chia system on an operating basis was to design a training system and to provide training facilities. This included the writing of training manuals, the establishment of short training courses on Pao-chia operation for police officers, and the establishment of similar short training courses run by police officers on the provincial and district levels. In every province a two-week Pao-chia training seminar was held in which police officers entrusted with the task of organizing the Pao-chia structure were enrolled. After the two weeks' training period, these police officers were dispatched to various districts to organize Pao-chia-head training courses which were also to last for two weeks. After going through what little training the government was providing, the Pao-chia heads were to go back to their villages to make the Pao-chia system work.

It was recognized that a prerequisite for making the system work on the village level was to gain cooperation from the local inhabitants. Pao-chia officers were therefore instructed to consult local inhabitants on how to carry out their assigned functions. The inhabitants had no choice in what functions they were called on to

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52 Hua-pei cheng-wu wei-yuan-hui chih-an tsung-shu, 23rd April 1942, "Pao-chia-chang hsün-lien chi-hua kang-yao".
perform, but were given a nominal say in how to carry out the assigned functions. Pao-chia heads drew up lists of duties to be performed, local inhabitants were invited to express their opinions on the manner of performance of these duties, they were then required to affix their signatures onto the document to make the duties contained therein binding on the local inhabitants. The local inhabitants had little choice in that the essential duties had been fixed by the government and they could only vary the form in which these duties were to be carried out. For example, sentry duties around strategic spots were required of villagers and they could only decide on the relative importance of each spot and to assign varying number of sentries accordingly. Even if they had disliked the idea of providing sentry duties, they could not object to it. Thus the signature from all local inhabitants was no more than a gesture to show the local inhabitants and to make them feel that somehow they have had a say in deciding their own duties.

The main functions expected of the Pao-chia system were the control of population movement through a detailed census system and contribution towards frustrating

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Communist guerrilla tactics through a Pao-chia militia. Census taking was used as a method of police control. Each household head was required to apply to the nearest Pao-chia head or police station for residence permits for every member of his household. All persons between the ages of twelve and sixty had to be registered. The household head applied on behalf of his family members and each person had to provide a guarantor apart from his household head. It was believed that criminals and political suspects would have difficulties in procuring guarantors as the Pao-chia system meted out punishment on a group responsibility basis where the guarantor would receive the same punishment as the offender himself. Persons who could not find a guarantor would therefore be denied a residence permit and be kept on guard so that he could not do any mischief. There was no provision, however, that persons without a residence permit could not stay in a locality and there were provisions through which such 'unregistered' persons could earn themselves the right to be registered through services rendered to the community such as informing the Japanese Army on enemy movements.  

Information provided in the application forms

54 Hua-pei cheng-wu wei-yuan-hui chih-an tsung-shu, Hu-kou t'iao-ch'a chieh-shuo, p.22
were the basis on which Pao-chia officers and police officers could work. They could apportion Pao-chia administrative costs, draft young men for local militia duties, draw up list of suspects when required. Therefore, it was important to keep the registers up to date and household heads were required to furnish information on any changes in their household due to birth, death, marriage or simply the movement of certain members from one place to another. Pao-chia heads were told to pay special attention to acquiring information on newcomers and to question them closely to see why they should have moved from their original abode to where they were and to make sure that they were not aiding the enemy war effort. Likewise any sudden change in the mode of life of regular inhabitants were to be noted and reported to the police and these included any changes in the standard of living or the mere appearance of acting suspiciously.55

Whereas the census system helped to keep the peasants from making mischief, it could not stop an outside force from intruding into a village and claiming control over it. The Pao-chia system was therefore also used in organizing local militia units. In organizing local militia units the Japanese were faced with the contradiction

inherent in the need to mobilize rural manpower on the one hand and the need to keep the rural countryside stable on the other. In other words, manpower mobilization had to be limited to an extent and precautions taken to an extent where organized rural military power would only serve to consolidate Japanese power and not to become active political units themselves in competing with the Japanese for political power. Thus the organization of militia units had to face a threefolded problem: organization, political control, and localization.

Each village had to organize its own Pao-chia militia units and each household was expected to provide at least one able-bodied man for militia service. However, the size of the militia was limited by law and the manpower of each militia unit should neither exceed nor be less than the required figure. All males between the ages of eighteen and forty were eligible for militia service, while able-bodied men below and above the eligible age group were eligible to be militia reserve. Militia men were organized into Chia, Pao, Sub-district, and District units. The militia men in a Chia came together to form a Chia unit, commanded by the Chia-chang; the militia men in a Pao unit came together to form a Pao unit, commanded by the Pao-chang; all Pao units were placed under the police branch stations in each sub-district, and these in turn came under
the command of the district magistrate. Thus in principle
the district magistrate had under his control a militia
force as numerous as the number of households in his
district. 56

Once a militia unit was formed, the government
had to devise ways and means of keeping the force under
control. Part of this was exerted through training. In
making the force into effective fighting units, its members
were given physical training in the art of self-defence
and in rifle shooting. As the Japanese had control over
arms supply, certain amount of loyalty could be enforced
through the withholding of supplies. Besides militia men
were taught to read and write and their text-books included
the Thousand Characters, Common Sense of Being a Law-
Abiding Citizen, and Pao-chia Concepts, all aimed at
providing a conservative and pro-Japanese outlook. 57
Communists were described as the natural enemy of all human
beings as they were bent on destroying life and property
everywhere. Militia units had the right and duty to assist

56 Hua-pei cheng-wu wei-yuan-hui chih-an tsung-shu, Tzu-
wei chen-ti, pp.7-10.

57 Ibid, pp.11-14; Thousand Characters, Ch'ien-tzu-k'o
千字課; Common Sense of Being a Law Abiding Citizen,
Kung-min ch'ang-shih 公民常識; Pao-chia Concepts,
Pao-chia ta-i 保甲大意.
the police and military in ridding the country of this pest.  

Arms and ideological control were not deemed sufficient and precautions were taken to prevent Pao-chia units from being a force in the struggle for political control itself. This was done through localizing Pao-chia units. As militia service was honorary and part-time, militia men had to support themselves through continuing their regular professions in a village and their farming duties would tie them to the land. A military force that was tied to the soil could not move around to claim influence outside of its own village. Further, Pao-chia units were defensive in character and only moved out of their operating territories for offensive purposes as supplementary forces of Japanese and puppet troops.  

Phase three began with the Hundred Regiment Offensive in August 1940. The success of the Chinese Communist offensive not only damaged Japanese installations, but demonstrated that i) the Chinese Communists had emerged as an effective military challenge and ii) the Pao-chia militia system had not been strong enough to impede the


freedom of movement of guerrilla units in the neutral zones. The Japanese were compelled to resort to drastic military measures against the Chinese Communist guerrilla base areas which in turn compelled them to divert men from operations in the neutral zones, which in turn compelled them to rely more heavily on Chinese manpower. The implications of these were far reaching and therefore deserve a fuller analysis.

The immediate Japanese military response was to concentrate their military effort on guerrilla base areas. As these areas were comparatively distant from Japanese power centres in urban centres and communication lines, control after conquest was an insoluble problem. Consequently, the Japanese practised a policy of calculated terrorism, their troops moving into guerrilla base areas would terrorize the populace by the infamous Three All policy: Take All, Burn All and Kill All, a kind of scotched earth policy in reverse. Indiscriminate devastation was designed to break the will of the populace from supporting the resistance cause, and to deprive the Chinese Communist military forces of sources of manpower and food supplies. The Three All policy succeeded in reducing the area and people under Chinese Communist control, but it also embittered the populace in former guerrilla base areas into hardened resistance. Japanese brutality motivated the
peasantry in the affected areas far beyond the propaganda and organizing ability of the Chinese Communists could. This in turn enabled the Chinese Communists to succeed in their revised guerrilla tactics. With their regular army hotly pursued by the Japanese, the Chinese Communists were compelled to rely more and more on the striking effectiveness of irregulars, namely the village-based partisan fighters. As a result, the Japanese found that their military power alone was insufficient in eliminating Chinese Communist military-political presence and the Japanese were compelled to coordinate their efforts with the puppet regime. This was witnessed by the building of a puppet army and the launching of the Law and Order Strengthening Movements by the puppet regime in support of Japanese punitive expeditions against the Communist Chinese strongholds.

In 1942 the Chinese Communists responded by initiating the Cheng Feng Movement, which was essentially a retrenchment movement, and sought to cut troops and simplify administration, ching-ping chien-cheng, so as to cut costs under severe Japanese economic blockade. On the other hand the Chinese Communists had to intensify their war efforts while they were cutting their regular troop strength. The answer was to rely more on irregular forces, i.e. village based guerrillas. See Lee Ngog, The Chinese Communist Bases in North China 1938-43; a study of Their Growth and Anti-Japanese Activities, with Special Reference to Administration and Mass Mobilization on the Village Level. (unpublished Ph D thesis, London 1968), pp.88-93.
The Provisional Government started with a miscellaneous police force of about 5,000 men in December 1937. The North China Army's policy of keeping its puppet regime lightly armed precluded any vigorous programme in building up a puppet army. A gesture was made in this direction, however, in May 1938, with the establishment of a military academy at Tungchow for training an officer corps. It was not until November 1939 that the first military recruitment was made in Northern Hopei for manning an army of 15,000. One year later, the new army was given police duties in twelve districts, ten in Hopei and two in Shantung. A second recruitment was made in November 1940 for an extra 26,000 men to be ready for service within a year. Apart from this new army of 41,000, there were another 4,000 men formerly belonging to the East Hopei puppet regime. This remained a separate armed force and was used in assisting patrol duties along the Peking-Shanhaikwan Railway. As for local police force, it was estimated that there were about 63,000 of them, amounting to a district average of only 130 men. There was a provincial army of 4,000 men in Shantung and another force known as the Internal Security Police of 72,000. It is not clear as to the differences between the police and the

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61 Boeichō..., op cit, pp.482-485.
Internal Security Police, my guess is that the latter was an officer corps paid by the puppet government to command the local militia units. There was an average of 200 Internal Security policemen in each district, resulting in an average of more than one but less than two men for each village. Thus apart from militia units, there was a total of 180,000 miscellaneous armed puppet forces of one kind or another in North China. Most of these were police units of a local nature, presumably concentrated in the semi-occupied areas. For supplementary roles in punitive operations, the Japanese Army could only rely on the regular puppet army of 41,000.

The Law and Order Strengthening Movements were joint Sino-Japanese operations in expanding influence into the neutral zone. The first of these started on 30th March 1941 and lasted for only four days, it was therefore a kind of dress rehearsal on what was to come. The emphasis was initially on propaganda, with Japanese troops moving in and puppet political workers to follow up with propaganda activities such as distributing pamphlets, giving lectures, and showing films. Attempts were also to be made in revitalizing the local Pao-chia structure.63

62Ibid, p.484.
63Ibid, pp.494-496.
A second Movement was launched in July 1941 and lasted for two months, evidently without much success for the Third Law and Order Strengthening Movement launched in September 1941 changed the emphasis from propaganda to tightening the economic blockade of suspected enemy-held territories and similar actions were repeated in 1942. 64

The Law and Order Strengthening Movements started when the Japanese were concentrating their military efforts against Chinese Communist guerrilla base areas and were evidently the Japanese solution to manpower shortage problems in their efforts to expand into the neutral zones. Concentration of troops against guerrilla bases increased troop pressure on the Japanese and they could not but choose to supplement their troop strength with the political and military establishments of its puppet regime in spite of an innate Japanese distrust for their Chinese collaborators. The combined effects of the Three All policy against guerrilla base areas and the Law and Order Strengthening Movements against neutral zones nevertheless marked the most vigorous period of Japanese expansion into both the neutral zones and the guerrilla base areas. As such the Chinese Communists marked the period 1940-42 as the most difficult period in their resistance effort. 65

64 Ibid, pp.538, 573-577.

65 Jen-min chu-pan-she, K'ang-Ji chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'u kai-k'uang, pp.2-3.
During the same period the Chinese Communists were also actively infiltrating Japanese power centres by the injection of a resistance leadership. According to reports of the North China Branch of the China Affairs Board, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a proposal by Hsiao K'e in December 1939 on the dispatch of three-men groups to infiltrate Japanese-held urban centres. In January 1940 the Chinese Communists picked three thousand men from among its troops for the purpose. The picked men were given a one-month special training then dispatched to infiltrate urban centres in three-men groups, each group acting independently of all other groups and with no knowledge of the activities of other groups so as to avoid Japanese detection of the overall activities of these groups through the arrest of individual members. Each member was given one hundred dollars in cash, half of which was meant for personal maintenance until settled in a job, and the other half was to be used in cultivating friendship with possible converts. The emphasis was to recruit persons of less than thirty-five years old who had little or no family ties and each member was to attempt to gain two converts only. The duty of these guerrilla leaders and their converts was sabotage.\footnote{Kōain Kahoku Renrakubu, "Tōshi yūgeki sannindan", in Jōhō, No. 18, 15th May 1940, pp.79-85; Hsiao K'e.} The presence of these
infiltrators was important in that they could intensify their recruitment activities later when Japanese policies created resentment in urban centres.

The fourth and final phase began in December 1941 with the outbreak of the Pacific War; it began even before phase three had run its course. This was the period of Communist Chinese expansion and the development of a popular people's war of resistance when the Chinese found out their military potential in sheer weight of numbers and the will to resist. The point at issue here is how did Japanese policies and practices contribute towards mobilizing the peasantry in anti-Japanese resistance. As the political map of North China was distinguishable into the four zones of occupied, semi-occupied, neutral and Communist-held, the respective response of the peasantry in each zone to Japanese actions has to be gauged individually.

Mention has been made in Chapter VI on how the North China Army was compelled by the export restrictions imposed by Tokyo to tighten its economic control over rural areas, to make North China self-sufficient in food supplies or to make the villages supply the cities with food. This was part of the efforts of phase three and resulted

67 See Chapter VI.
in a considerable expansion of Japanese control from the semi-occupied areas into the neutral zones. Success in rural economic control was based on the mutual need of the villages and the cities: the former supplied food, the latter supplied marketing facilities and simple manufactured products. The Pacific War, however, increased Japanese demands on the productivity of the villages beyond the need to feed the urban populace in North China. Instead of enforcing a balance of trade between North China and Manchuria/Japan, the North China Army went on to enforcing an export surplus so that Japan could have more material resources for conducting the war in the Pacific. This was a fatal move in that the Japanese naturally were able to extract rural produce in North China from the section of the peasantry under the most effective Japanese control. As Japanese demands were beyond the capacity of these peasants to meet, the sheer need to survive drove these formerly acquiescent peasants into open rebellion and thus opened the way for more effective Chinese Communist infiltration and expansion, not in the neutral zones separating Japanese-held and Communist-held areas, but in the very zones of Japanese strength. Growing guerrilla strength in former semi-occupied areas resulted in frequent attacks on communication lines, thus compelling the Japanese to return their troops from punitive expeditions against
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PATTERN OF JAPANESE TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN NORTH CHINA, SEPTEMBER 1938

Approximate frontline on 1st. June 1945

- Army Corps boundaries
- Areas with Japanese troops
1) North China Army Proper
2) The 12th Army Corps
3) The 1st Army Corps
4) The Mongolian Army Corps

APPROXIMATE POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN NORTH CHINA, 1937-45

Occupied zones
Semi-occupied zones
Neutral zones
Communist-held areas