USE OF THESES

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PLATO'S THEORY OF PLEASURE

Essays on Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus

by

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In a thesis of this kind, one's debts to others cannot but be very great. I have tried to acknowledge mine, though I would not claim to have been completely successful in doing so. These apart, the thesis is my own work.
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Abstract

The essays presented in this thesis are all concerned in some way with Plato's views on pleasure. However I have not hesitated to discuss both topics and particular arguments which, strictly speaking, are ancillary to this central theme.

The order followed is this. In Chapter I, I discuss first of all the influence of contemporary medical theory on fifth- and fourth-century Greek ethics. I then mention the views of Prodicus on the semantics of pleasure, and argue that his distinctions were not necessarily mere quibbles: Greek ethical writers needed, and lacked, an enjoyment-exhilaration distinction (of the sort drawn nowadays by authors like Ryle), and one might possibly have been founded on Prodicus's semantics. Next I discuss the family of akrasia idioms and their possible origin, together with the anti-hedonist bias of some of the pre-Platonists. I argue that the status of 'pleasure' in the 'overcome by pleasure' idiom is doubtful: that it is not clear whether 'pleasure' is supposed to function as an intentional or a non-intentional motive word - in other words, whether pleasure is taken to be a goal, or an impulse, or neither of these things. Finally I discuss the Socratic paradoxes, arguing
that the paradox S2 ('No one errs willingly') does not represent a corollary of the paradox S1 ('Virtue is knowledge'), and indeed that the two paradoxes are inconsistent if 'knowledge' is taken in its everyday sense of 'craft-expertise':

I suggest also that S1 may have been something of a commonplace in the intellectual circles of Socrates' day, while S2, with 'err' used in the sense of 'do evil' or 'do injustice' was distinctively Socratic. I have added three supplementary notes.

In Chapter II, I discuss the Protagoras. While not completely ruling out the possibility that the Protagoras is a hedonist dialogue, I suggest that it is more plausible to take the hedonism of the Protagoras as akin to that of the Laws, hedonism in both dialogues being regarded by Plato as a sort of moral deuteroc plous - as a second-best way of exhorting people who lack dialectical ability. I suggest also that some of the contributions to the discussion of both main speakers indicate that Plato is probing the basis of ordinary (as opposed to philosophic) morality. Other points made in Chapter II are these. Plato is not putting fallacious arguments into the mouth of Socrates. The hedonist thesis propounded by Socrates is convertible ('All pleasant things are good and all good things are pleasant'). Socrates is probably not sponsoring the hedonist thesis (though I despair of ever being certain about this).
Socrates could have disproved the theory of akrasia without invoking hedonism. It may be that Protagoras has a vested interest in opposing the theory of akrasia, insofar at least as the practice of rhetoric encourages ordinary people to hold it, since it attacks the worth of episteme or knowledge, and he is a pedlar of knowledge. Notes are appended on the minor arguments for the identity of the virtues, and on some other points.

Chapter III deals with the Gorgias and the Phaedo. I give a brief exposition of the argument of the Gorgias, and discuss the dialectical proofs of the non-identity of pleasure and goodness. I suggest that the hedonist thesis is shown no mercy in the Gorgias because, 'while in the hands of honourable men like Protagoras, it can even be a power for good, in the hands of moral morons like Callicles, it cannot but be a power for evil'. I suggest also that the dialectical proofs apply to pleasure generally, and not just to profligate pleasure. The extreme anti-hedonism of the Phaedo is noted.

Chapter IV opens with a statement of the hygienic theory of pleasure, put together from the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Philebus. I follow this statement with a brief criticism
of the theory. The theory (i) permits of no distinction
between the mere perception of a restorative process and
the enjoyment of it, and (ii) assuming a distinction between
bodily and mental pleasure, permits no uniform account to be
given of mental pleasure. This statement and criticism is
followed by a brief discussion of the account of pleasure in
the ninth book of the Republic. The Republic is to some extent
an antidote to the Phaedo: the Phaedo sponsors a two-level
view of morality (ordinary morality and philosophic morality)
and repudiates pleasure along with lower-level morality; the
Republic continues this sponsorship, but devises a true or
superior type of pleasure to accompany higher-level morality.

Chapter V deals with the Philebus to 31. I consider in
particular the statement of dialectical method in these pages.
I suggest that the dialectical method of the Divine Gift
(16c foll.) and the Kinds of Beings (23c foll.) represents an
try to apply the procedures of harmonics to collection and
division, and that Plato has in mind those cases in which kinds
may be said to 'overlap' and (possibly) those cases in which
difference in kind is constituted by difference of degree.
Plato's immediate purpose in introducing this material is to
provide a metaphysical basis for the theory of the mixed life.
In Chapter VI two aspects of the second half (31 foll.) of the Philebus are dealt with. I discuss first the treatment of mental concepts. This discussion is intended to indicate the rationale of the theory that anticipatory pleasures and pains can be true or false: they can be said to be true or false because their content is expressible as a set of judgements; and I add some remarks designed to suggest in what respect wicked anticipatory pleasures are false. I discuss secondly the important of the type of 'falsity' which arises when the natural state or phusis of a creature is wrongly dubbed 'pleasure'.

Chapter VII is devoted to pleasure in the Laws, and to the Conclusion of the thesis as a whole.

* A published abridgement of pages 297-314 of Chapter VI has been inserted in the back cover.
PLA§E A¥D KNOWLEDGE

a) The Hygienic Approach to Ethics

Plato was not the first Greek thinker to speculate about pleasure. For one thing, some of the natural philosophers had discussed it. They seem to have treated it as a physiological state or process. The most notable account from this point of view was probably that of Diogenes of Apollonia, who believed pleasure to be a matter of the right degree of aeration of the blood. Empedocles thought that the same general sort of account should be given of pleasure as of sense-perception, and also connected pleasure with the repair or replenishment of deficiency (presumably, of organic deficiency). Both Diogenes and Empedocles were deeply interested in medical theory. Greek scientific medicine began, and developed very considerably, during the fifth century before Christ. These developments took place, firstly, in the South-West of Asia Minor and, secondly, in Sicily and the South of Italy. Diogenes, who was a native of Phrygia in Asia Minor, had considerable influence on Hippocrates of Cos, the most prominent member of the Asian school, while Empedocles was

1 Aristotle's 'phusiologoi'.
2 Theophrastus, de Sensu, 43.
3 DK 31 A95.
perhaps the most famous member of the Western, or Italian-Sicilian school. 4

Not only did natural philosophy influence medicine; medicine, in turn, influenced ethical theory. The most important ethical theorists of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, Democritus and Plato, leaned heavily on medical doctrine. In particular, each developed an hygienic theory of pleasure. Most of Democritus's work has been lost. If, however, Professor Vlastos's careful reconstruction of his ethical position 5 is accepted, it would seem that he took the ideal state of the soul to be one of kresis or healthful balance, and no pleasure which did not agree with (sumpherein) this state to be acceptable. The concepts of healthful balance and agreeableness were fundamental in Hippocratic medical theory. 6 Moreover, since Democritus held a physicalist theory of mind (the mind, while having power to move the body, being, like the body, a cluster of atoms), he seems to have wanted to do something more than draw an analogy between bodily health and moral well-being. What he attempted to develop was a notion of well-being which would include, rather than pattern itself upon, the notion of bodily

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4 For the influence of Diogenes on Hippocrates, cf. Freeman CPP, 284. On Empedocles' medical interests, cf. Freeman, CPP, 177 and Chap. 31 passim.

5 'Ethics and Physics in Democritus', Philosophical Review, LIV (1945), 578 sqq. and LV (1946), 53 sqq.

health. He would show how 'the perfection of the soul puts right the faults of the body'; and how the perfected mind would integrate into harmonious patterns those bodily sensations called pleasures. It would be unprofitable to speculate further upon Democritus's theory here. The extent to which Democritus influenced Plato (who nowhere mentions him) is disputed, but it seems safe to say that Democritus can have had little or no early influence upon Plato. Plato's own hygienic theory, which will be discussed in detail in later chapters, leaned heavily on the Italian-Sicilian medical concepts of deficiency and replenishment.

So far as one can tell from surviving sources, hygienic ethics was, like scientific medicine, a fifth-century discovery. This, of course, is not to deny that medicine was practised successfully in Greece even from Homeric times, and that its practitioners looked to certain principles for guidance: it is only to emphasize that medical theory was not, in earlier times, rich or sophisticated enough to be of much use in formulating and disposing of problems within the rich and sophisticated range of human relationships. What may be somewhat loosely referred to as political discourse had, however, been previously developed to the point where it was capable of fertilising

7 DK 68 B187a.
moral discourse (and, indeed, medical discourse as well).

But before elaborating upon this, I shall consider briefly another sort of approach to the concept of pleasure, which, had it been taken up by able philosophers, might considerably have changed the course of fourth-century Greek ethics.

b) The Semantic Distinctions of Prodicus

There is (says Socrates in the Cratylus) an ancient saying that 'hard is the knowledge of the good'. And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language - these are his own words - and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore I do not know the truth about such matters. (384ab)

It is to be regretted that Socrates did not hear the fifty-drachma course and tell us about it. Prodicus of Ceos was a sophist.

He himself declared that the sophist was 'on the borderline between the philosopher and the statesman'. An important part of his work was the preparation of young men for political life. And the making of speeches was an important part of political life. Prodicus's reputation seems to have depended partly on his etymology and partly on his science (if such it is) of verbal distinctions. If the reader tries to find out from Plato what Prodicus was like, he obtains the

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8 DK 84 B3.

impression of a good-natured pedant, pre-occupied with verbal quibbles. But at the same time, he will be left in doubt about the nature of Prodicus's quibbling. Was Prodicus attempting, for instance, to discover nuances testified to by everyday Greek usage, or to stipulate desirable changes in linguistic conventions? It has been suggested that he thought that words were in some way part of the nature of things: if this is right, he might well have considered that his verbal distinctions indicated actual differences of meaning, which ordinary speech must be made to reflect. Whatever one is to make of Prodicus's theory, it must be remembered that, in practice, much of his time must have been devoted to the training of young men as public speakers, and that, upon his competence as an instructor, his livelihood would have depended. It would therefore be surprising if his semantics, however he rationalised it, did not owe a great deal to common sense. It is of immediate interest that Prodicus had something to say about the use of pleasure synonyms. Two passages, one in Plato and one in Aristotle, give us the terms

10 In addition to the Protagoras and the Cratylus, cf. Charmides, 163d; Laches, 197d; Euthydemus, 277e, 305c; Meno, 75c, 96d; Hippias Major, 282c; Symposium, 177b; Theaetetus, 151b.

11 cf. Untersteiner, S, 212 foll.
between which Prodicus drew distinctions. At Protagoras, 358a, Socrates says:

And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names (diairesis ton onomatōn); whether you use the word 'pleasant' (hēdu) or 'delightful' (terpnon) or 'joyful' (charton), .... I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer according to the sense of my words.

There is an echo of this passage in Aristotle's Topics (112b 21-25):

Moreover, look and see also if something has been stated to be an accident of itself, being taken for a different thing because it has a different name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasures (hedonai, pl.) into joy (chara) and delight (terpsis) and good cheer (euphrosune); for all these are names of the same thing, viz., pleasure. If then anyone says that being joyful is an accidental attribute of being cheerful, he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute of itself.

Unfortunately, there is little to tell us upon what basis Prodicus drew this distinction. All that we have is the conclusion of a short speech that Plato assigned to him in the Protagoras (337ac):

And thus we who are the hearers will be rather gratified than pleased; for gratification (euphrosune) is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure (hēdonē) is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight (hēdu),
Probably the distinction between ἁδόνη and εὐφροσύνη was not an idle one. At any rate, it seems to have occurred naturally enough to Plato on another occasion, when he was writing the Timaeus:

Hence the pleasure (ἁδόνη) they (i.e., musical harmonies) give to the unintelligent (ἀφρόνες), and the delight (εὐφροσύνη) they afford to the wise (εὐφρόνες), by the representation of the divine harmony in mortal movements. (80b, tr. Cornford).

But if Prodicus's basic distinction was drawn between ἁδόνη and εὐφροσύνη, what of Aristotle's claim that he used to divide ἁδῶνα (pleasures) into χαρά, τερψίς, and εὐφροσύνη? One possibility is that Prodicus changed his mind; but it is at least equally possible that Aristotle was doing what he seems often to have done in reporting the views of his predecessors, namely saying what those views (in his opinion) amounted to. That is, if (as seems to me plausible) Prodicus had distinguished in the first place between εὐφροσύνη and ἁδόνη, and added that ἁδόνη should be treated of under the headings 'χαρά' and 'τερψίς', Aristotle would have been quite capable of expounding this by means of the passage in the Topics. And whether or not Aristotle is right, Plato can hardly have been justified, in the

12 For Aristotle's tendency to trim the thought of others to suit his own designs, cf. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy.
first of the Protagoras passages quoted, in brushing aside any distinction between 'chara' and 'terpsis' as a quibble. For it must be allowed that the noun 'chara', and its verb 'chairein', were more apt in some contexts than the noun 'terpsis' and its verb 'terpein'. (This not to deny a considerable overlapping). 'Terpsis', that is, tended to be used where pleasure or enjoyment was full-blooded, 'chara' and 'chairein' where it was anaemic. 'Terpsis' tended to be used of pleasures that were, if not sensory (and perhaps sensual), at least in some sense physical: 'terpsis' went with feasting, carousing, and voluptuous youth. 'Chairein' tended to be used of non-bodily pleasures, of, e.g., the pleasure of envy or the pleasure of disputation. (Indeed, so attenuated does the pleasure or enjoyment associated with 'chairein' become, that sometimes the most apt English renderings are 'be wont to', 'be inclined to', and the like). 13

This is not to argue that Prodicus must have had a respectable philosophical point to make in attempting to distinguish between chara and terpsis; it is to suggest that he had some ground for a semantic distinction, and to suggest

13 Liddell and Scott, s.v.
that such a distinction might have proved of use in subsequent philosophical discussions of pleasure, perhaps in much the same way as a somewhat arbitrary distinction between pleasure and enjoyment has proved convenient in recent conceptual analysis. 14

At the beginning of the Philebus Plato wrote:

SOC. Well, Philebus holds that good, for all creatures, is enjoyment (to chairein), pleasure (hedone), or delight (terpsis), and any other experiences of that kind, with names of the same ring. (11b)

It might perhaps have been an advantage had Plato been in a position to observe at the beginning of his most important treatise on pleasure that the many different sorts of experience he was about to discuss, 'with names of the same ring', were not experiences of one kind, and that some were not experiences at all.

So far we have seen something of two branches of learning which were thought relevant to discussions of pleasure by different ancient philosophers. Of the two, scientific medicine had the more profound influence, though one would have thought it an unpromising tool for philosophical discussion. Prodicus, who seems to have been no mere quibbler, and to have had a

14 Most notably in the work of Professor Ryle. See Bibliography of Articles.
philosophically more promising approach with his science
of names, failed to get from his more famous contemporaries
the hearing he deserved.

c) The Akrasia Idioms

Pleasure was a topic which, for the most part, the
ancients were incapable of treating dispassionately. Sages
discoursed upon it in order either to commend it or to decry
it. Not that squabbles over the true worth of pleasure were
necessarily unsophisticated. Pleasure polemics possibly were
at their most sophisticated while Eudoxus and Speusippus
were members of the Academy. It has been plausibly suggested\textsuperscript{15}
that Plato wrote the Philebus in an attempt to resolve their
differences, which were still a live issue when Aristotle was
composing the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics.\textsuperscript{16} The debate
between Eudoxus and Speusippus was the culmination of at least
a century and a half of barracking by hedonist and anti-hedonist.
Indeed, the first literary appearance of the word 'hedone'
is in a eulogistic fragment composed at about the end of the
sixth century by Simonides:

\textsuperscript{15} A.E. Taylor, PPE, 23–26.
\textsuperscript{16} NE, X, 1172a 28.
For what human life, nay, what tyrant's power, is desirable without hēdōnē?
Without pleasure even a god's life is unenviable. 17

Among thinking men of Simonides' day, and of the generation after him, this piece of simple exuberance would hardly have won universal acclaim. Epicharmus, part-philosopher and contemporary of Simonides, warned that

Pleasures are for mortals impious pirates: for the man who is caught by pleasures is straightway cast into the sea. 18

Democritus was, as we have seen, much less naive; but he, too, could make puritanical noises on occasion:

Untimely pleasures beget unpleasantnesses. 19

All who derive their pleasures from the stomach, over-stepping due season in eating or drinking or sexual pleasure, have pleasures that are but brief and short-lived ... but pains that are many. 20

The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved to women. 21

The target here is well-defined: bodily pleasures, the pleasures

17 fr. 71. (Nothing compels us to take the fragment as Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry, 368, suggests).
18 DK 23 B44a.
19 DK 68 B71.
20 DK 68 B235.
21 DK 68 B214.
of eating and love, the enemy of well-being.

If well-being (Heraclitus had said) lay in bodily pleasures, we would call oxen 'well-off' when they find vetch to eat. 22

Mimnermus had wondered long ago what joy there would be in living without golden Aphrodite. 23 The greatest joy imaginable, thought the ageing Sophocles, 24 Diogenes the Cynic compared courtesans to honeyed poison; 25 'I should rather be mad!' his master Antisthenes had said, 'than feel pleasure'. 26 Eudoxus held the enigmatic belief that pleasure was the good, and Aristotle (perhaps following Plato) thought it worth while to stress Eudoxus' integrity. 27 Hardly surprising, in an age when easy-going wits like Aristippus 28 and Anaxarchus 29 were deemed to be living in licentious debauchery.

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22 DK 22 B4.
23 Elegies, I. i. (Bergk).
24 cf. Plato, Republic, 329b-d.
26 Diog. Laert. VI, 3.
27 NE, X, 1172b 15.
29 DK 72 A3, A9.
In the literature, as well as in the recorded utterances of wise men, a number of similar uncouth phrases keep recurring. They connect pleasure with such things as slavery and mastery, victory and defeat. They seem to have been part of everyday speech, and not just philosophers’ jargon. The topic on which they centre is akrasia (or akrateia) - - 30 the powerlessness of men to withstand the onslaught of pleasure. If the tradition of the doxographers is to be accepted, such idioms would seem to have originated with the Seven Sages. 31 The thoughts of Epicharmus and Democritus are anticipated in maxims attributed to Solon and Cleobulus:

Banish any pleasure that is a begetter of pain; 32 and

... overcome pleasure, 33

But the historicity of such doxa1 or opinions is extremely doubtful; it was common Greek practice to seek to hallow one

30 Plato uses the expressions 'akrateia hedones' (Laws I, 636c) and 'akrateia hedonon' (Timaeus, 86d; Laws X, 886a, 908c; Laws XI, 934a).
31 DK 10.
32 DK 10,3.
33 Ibid.
generation's opinions by attributing them to wise men who had lived three or four generations earlier. We can probably do no more than guess at the origin of such locutions.

The idiomatic phrases 'to be overcome by pleasure' and 'to be worsted by pleasure' are members of a fairly large family. One could be a slave to, or be overcome by, or be worsted by, *inter alia* wine, women, money, one's belly, anger, fear, lust, and pleasure. There is also a complementary family of idioms, framed in terms of superiority to, or victory over, such ills; and there is yet another group which speaks of victory or mastery over, and subjection or inferiority to, oneself. The word *akrasia* is a blanket term used to refer to the condition of an agent who is overcome by any of the ills just mentioned, or who is 'inferior to himself'. It means,


literally, 'powerlessness', and, in at least one medical context, 'paralysis'.

The list of ills by which one can be overcome is readily divisible into sub-lists of external and internal ills: wine, women, and money are external ills, while the belly, anger, fear, and lust are internal ills. The status of pleasure is somewhat problematic.

To begin with, we might distinguish between two sorts of akrasia statement, that is two sorts of statement of the form 'X is overcome by ~' ("~" being the name of some ill). The distinction is between external akrasia statements, where the ill specified is an external one, and internal akrasia statements, where the ill specified is an internal one. In general, it is possible to describe the same state of affairs by both external and internal akrasia statements.

37 I.7.4. IV.951.22 (The adjective 'akrasis' is used).
Antony was enslaved by Cleopatra.
The jurors were overcome by money.
The soldiers were vanquished by the appearance of the enemy.

Antony was enslaved to lust.
The jurors were overcome by greed.
The soldiers were vanquished by fear.

The grammatical objects of external akrasia statements denote things which are pursued or avoided, and have an obvious affinity with those motive statements in which motive is equivalent to intention. For instance, the affinity of a Greek sentence like 'The jurors were overcome by money' is with an English sentence like 'The jurors found for the guilty party in order to enrich themselves' or 'The motive of the jurors in finding for the guilty party was one of sordid gain'. On the other hand, the grammatical objects of internal akrasia

38 cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, section 12; A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, p. 84. Hereafter I write 'intentional motive' for 'motive which is equivalent to intention'. 
17.

statements denote not the objects of pursuit or avoidance, but rather non-intentional motives, that is the sorts of motives from which or out of which people are said to do things. The affinity of a Greek sentence like 'Antony was enslaved to lust' is with an English sentence of the type: 'Antony acted as he did out of lust'. It would seem that the description of conduct given by an external akrasia statement is a radically different sort of description from that given by an internal akrasia statement.

The language of the akrasia idioms has obvious military connotations. Moreover, it evolved at a time when the language of war was also very largely the language of politics.

Homerian society (that is, the society of roughly the ninth and eighth centuries) was loose-knit; allegiance was given for the most part on a basis of kinship; and the sort of violence which the clans of Homer's day were called upon to resist was in general violence from without. Between the Homeric period

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40 The typical 'war' of Homer's time was the booty-raid; one does not raid one's own clan for booty. cf. M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, p. 53.
and the time of Socrates (that is, during the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries) the polis or city-state developed, and this development made upon men moral demands that had been unknown in Homer's day. For the polis was liable to suffer just as much from internal as from external aggression. The strife or stasis of rival groups within the city was its endemic ill. Stasis, begotten of economic and political development, brought with it the need for strong and even despotic rule; and against this background the curious political phenomenon of tyranny appeared.

In Homeric society the language of morals was a language of outer conflict. The Homeric clan survived by uniting to defeat its external enemies. Homeric man saw his moral problems in much the same light as the problems of his own and his clan's survival.

Where a man or his household was beset by external aggressors, the issue would be settled quite simply by brute strength. When a powerful aggressor trounced his weaker victims, there was not much point in the survivors' bewailing their misfortune. If they lacked strong friends, there was little to be said for appeals to the justice, piety, and moderation of their
cause; for there would be no one to listen. It is hardly surprising that such men should have viewed their misfortunes fatalistically, and no more surprising that this fatalism should have infected their attitude to lapses from the accepted standards of behaviour.

If an Homeric man's stronger adversary beat him insensible, it was simply his moira, his portion, or, as we should say, his bad luck. But it was just as much bad luck if, in a fit of petulance, he made a fool of himself by usurping his subordinate's concubine. Moreover, the latter sort of case, no less than the former, could be, and often was, described in terms of the intervention of an external power. Psychic intervention (as Professor E. R. Dodds has called it) played, in descriptions of moral lapses, or indeed of any sort of behaviour that was out of character, a role analogous to that of physical intervention in descriptions of material adversity. So the folly of Glaucus the Lydian in taking bronze armour in exchange for gold is, like the folly of Agamemnon in commandeering Achilles' girl, attributed to the taking away of his wits by Zeus. Even a man's thumos (a word which has no exact English equivalent, but which is often

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41 The Greeks and the Irrational, ch. I.
42 Iliad VI, 234-236.
43 Iliad IX, 374-377.
translated by 'heart') is sometimes treated as an external counsellor:

A man's thumos tells him that he must now eat or drink or slay an enemy, it advises him on his course of action, it puts words into his mouth... He can converse with it... almost as man to man... Usually he takes its advice, but he may also reject it and act, as Zeus does on one occasion, 'without the consent of his thumos'.

Glaucus the Lydian behaved prodigally, Agamemnon petulantly, and Odysseus, when he had second thoughts about killing the Cyclops, prudently; but we look in vain for descriptions of their actions in terms of their motives. Glaucus and Agamemnon are dogged by the intervention of Zeus. Odysseus is counselled by 'a second thumos'.

To us, descriptions of conduct in the language of psychic intervention seem crude and stilted. We are more at home with the motive-descriptions of, say, Aristotle or Jane Austen. Nevertheless psychic intervention was remarkably durable. It turns up, for instance, about four centuries after Homer in the Encomium on Helen of the sophist Gorgias.

Helen, says Gorgias, must have gone off with Paris for one of four reasons: either (a) because it was so ordained by fate;

44 Dodds, op. cit., 16.
45 Odyssey IX, 299-305.
46 DK 82 B11.
(b) because she was abducted; (c) because she was persuaded; or (d) because of her passion for Paris, we should undoubtedly be willing to acquit Helen if Gorgias could establish (a) or (b); in either of these cases, Helen would not have been able to help what happened. But the point of the Encomium is not to establish (a) or (b), but to suggest that (c) and (d) are just as good grounds for acquittal as (a) and (b). For, says Gorgias, persuasion by speech is much the same as abduction by force, and the passion of love is to be accounted for either as the irresistible working of a god, or as a disease of the soul.

In the last resort, Gorgias attributes Helen's plight to 'magic and wizardry', of which, he says, there are two sorts.

47 DK 82 B11 (12).
48 DK 82 B11 (19).
49 This distinction is drawn at DK 82 B11 (10). Persuasion is considered under the aspect of doxes apatēmα at (11), and probably also at (13); it is considered under the aspect of psuchēs hamartēmα at (14), (12), which is surely misplaced in the text as we have it, gives the conclusion of the whole section on persuasion. Lust is considered under the aspect of doxes apatēmα at (16) to (18), and in the first half of (19) (i.e. down to 'amunasthai dunstos'); in the second half of (19) it is treated of under the aspect of psuchēs hamartēmα (= psuchēs agnoēmα or ignorance in the soul).
The first sort is 'the deceits of appearance' (*doxes* apatēmatēs). Now (c) suppose Helen to have been persuaded to abscond. Most men lack sure knowledge of past, present, and future alike; they therefore tender as advice to the soul doxa or appearance. But doxa is unreliable, and so involves those who take its advice in a correspondingly unreliable outcome. Again, (d) suppose that she was swayed by passion. It will readily be allowed that doxa plays an important role in emotional experiences:

For instance, in war, the sight of enemy forms wearing hostile array is so distressing to the soul that often men flee in terror as if the coming danger were already present. The powerful habit induced by custom (*nomos*) is displaced by the fear aroused by sight, which causes oblivion of what custom judges honourable (*kalon*) and of the advantage (*agathon*) derived from victory.

50 Gorgias uses three words: *mēme* (memory), *ennoia* (awareness), and *pronoia* (foreknowledge). All three are collectively contrasted at (11) with doxa. (It is at least curious in this connection that the Gorgias was the first dialogue in which Plato made philosophical capital of the doxa (or *pistis*) - episteme distinction).

51 DK 82 B11 (11).

52 DK 82 B11 (16).
Painters, ... when they create one shape from many colours, give pleasure to sight; and the pleasure afforded by sculpture to the eyes is divine; many objects engender in many people a love of many actions and forms, 53

But what is the artist is a god, and his handiwork the embellishment of a human form:

If therefore Helen's eye, delighted with Paris's form, engendered the passion of love in her soul, this is not remarkable; for if a god is at work with divine power, how can the weaker person resist him? 54

The closeness of these descriptions to Homeric psychic intervention is apparent. Helen's soul succumbed either to persuasion or to passion: in the former case Paris, or some other counsellor, intervened, and, in the latter case, Love himself. Just as the Homeric gods, when they intervened in human affairs, were wont to practise deceptive camouflage, so Paris and Love are accused of verbal and visual trickery respectively: Paris made it all sound as if ...; Love made things look as if ....

But now we part company with the Homeric way of viewing conduct: for there is a second sort of magic and wizardry,

53 DK 82 B11 (18).
54 DK 82 B11 (19).
to wit 'errors in the soul' (psuchēs hamartēmeta).

Suppose once more that Helen was beguiled by persuasion:
does not persuasion also affect the make-up (taxis) of the mind, just as drugs affect that of the body?

    Just as drugs by driving out different humours from the body can put an end either to the disease or to life, so with speech: different words can induce grief, pleasure, or fear; or again, by means of a harmful kind of persuasion, words can drug and bewitch the soul. 55

And suppose, second time round, that she acted out of lust and that no god was at work: her malady in that case must have been a human one, namely ignorance of soul, something not to be condemned as criminal, but rather to be pitied as a misfortune. 56

Gorgias himself declared that he wrote the Encomium for amusement. 57 It may be slight and light-hearted, but it has one serious point to make, namely that both internal and external circumstances are relevant in evaluating conduct.

Helen eloped because Paris made it all sound as if ...; but perhaps his proposal seemed so attractive just because his clever sales-talk infatuated her. She saw him as someone so

55 DK 82 B11 (14).
56 DK 82 B11 (19).
57 DK 82 B11 (21).
carnally desirable as to be worth the shame of adultery; but perhaps only a woman whose personality was sick with lust would have seen him in this light.

It might be urged that Gorgias does not necessarily hold that descriptions of Helen's misdemeanour in terms, on the one hand, of external circumstances ('Helen succumbed to Paris's brave speech', 'Helen was vanquished by Paris's beauty'), and, on the other, of internal circumstances ('Helen succumbed to her infatuation', 'Helen was overcome by lust'), are, so to speak, but obverse and reverse of the same coin. However, it would be so easy to drive him into this position, that it is hardly unreasonable to read it between the lines. For one has but to say something like this to him: 'No, Gorgias, it will not do just to say that Helen was captivated by the look of things, or by the sound of things. To be sure, we shall allow you to describe her behaviour in this way, but we shall not allow such descriptions to exculpate her: for it is doxa that people are supposed to take precautions against. In matters of conduct, we blame people for failing to see behind appearances, especially appearances contrived by gods and Trojan playboys'. To this his reply can only be: 'To be fair, you must consider not only what presented itself
to Helen's eyes or ears, but also what went on inside Helen, that is, in her soul; and her soul was either drugged by the power of speech, or sick with love. We should hardly blame someone for being sick, or for having been drugged by someone else, should we?'

So, then, by the time of Gorgias' descriptions of misbehaviour have become rather more elaborate than they were a few centuries before. Intervention ab extra is still important, though in mundane matters it is doxa, rather than Zeus, which pulls rabbits out of hats; but descriptions in terms of external factors have now been complemented by descriptions in terms of internal disorder.

The Greek idioms of internal disorder are, for the most part, foreign to our way of thinking. For, whereas our descriptions of inner stress and disturbance owe a great deal to classical mechanics, and perhaps to some of the other experimental sciences, the Greek idioms of internal disorder leaned heavily on political discourse, the main preoccupation of which came to be with stasis and how to prevent it. Just as the older idioms of psychic intervention borrowed from the language of external aggression, so the newer idioms of internal disorder borrowed from the language of internal dissension.

58 For an account of the political analogy, cf. Ryle, Dilemmas, pp. 64-65.
It was remarked earlier that the objects of external akrasia statements differ significantly from those of internal akrasia statements, the reference of the former being to intentional motives, and of the latter to non-intentional motives.

This means that, although it may be possible to give both an external and an internal akrasia description of the same piece of behaviour, it will not do to suppose that the internal akrasia description has the same point to make as the external akrasia description.

I do not wish to maintain that external akrasia statements are a type of psychic intervention statement; only that akrasia statements and psychic intervention statements are similar in one important respect, namely, in that both sorts of statement account for behaviour by mentioning the intrusion of external factors. The notion of psychic intervention would seem to involve, in addition, the taking over of the agent's personality by an 'invading personality'. (For the expression 'invading personality', cf. Taylor, CPT, 611). When Gorgias mentions the god Eros in his apology for Helen, he either talks, or comes very close to talking, the language of psychic intervention: when he mentions doxa, he is talking in terms of external akrasia. My guess, and I am not sure that one can do better than guess here, is that explanation in terms of external akrasia grew out of explanation in terms of psychic intervention: men gradually come to speak of being tripped up or overcome not so much by superhuman beings, but rather by mundane factors like appearances, or food, or other people. Internal akrasia statements, by contrast, seem to presuppose both a 'subliminal self', whose political analogue is the inept tyrant, and certain internal factors, whose political analogues are the factions of a strife-torn city. (For 'subliminal self', cf. Taylor, loc. cit.).
akrasia description. While an internal akrasia description may be compatible with an external akrasia description, the one will not be a mere reduction or analysis of the other.

Suppose that a panic-stricken military force retreats in the face of opposition. It might be said, using the jargon of external akrasia, that the force was overcome by the enemy's appearance; and it might also be said, using the jargon of internal akrasia, that the force was overcome by fear. But if 'The soldiers were overcome by fear' meant the same as 'The soldiers were overcome by the enemy's appearance', then it would seem that overcoming fear must be simply a matter of making allowance for appearances, of correcting for appearances, of seeing through appearances to an underlying reality. But this would surely be a very unplausible account to give of what it is to overcome one's fear: while allowing (for example) for tricks of light, colour, and perspective is a ratiocinative process, and while ratiocination may sometimes be an element in the conquest of fear, struggling against fear is, in the main, a non-ratiocinative business. So then, whatever the relation between external and internal akrasia statements, they are not merely different ways of making the same point.

What, then, is the status of 'pleasure' in akrasia

60 cf. Crombie, EPD, Vo. 1, p. 245.
statements of the form: 'X was overcome by pleasure'? Is 'pleasure' supposed to be an intentional or a non-intentional motive word? Are we to envisage pleasures as factors external to the agent, somewhat perhaps as food or women could be said to be external to the agent, or as internal factors, of the order perhaps of fear, anger, or lust? Or, finally, are we to accord pleasure some special status of its own, which puts descriptions of conduct in terms of succumbing to pleasure (akrasia hédones) out of step with both sorts of akrasia descriptions that have so far been considered?

It seems to me difficult, if not impossible, to answer these questions straightforwardly. The Greek words 'hédas' ('pleasant-things') and 'hédonai' ('pleasures') can denote, firstly, things or events external to the agent, secondly, the agent's bodily sensations, and, thirdly, certain

61 In Homer, the word 'hédus' seems to function in much the same way as 'gluku' ('sweet'). In some contexts, 'hédas' and 'hédonai' seem to have the force of 'sweets' or 'luxuries'. Epicharmus seems to be using 'hédonai' in this way at DK 23 B44a. Democritus at DK 68 B74 ('Accept (= take?) nothing hédus that is disagreeable') seems almost to be writing a medical prescription: Avoid sweet things or luxuries that disagree with you.

62 Probably the most unequivocal instance of this is at Anaxagoras, B4 (= DK 59 B4), where 'hédonai' means 'sweet tastes'.
somewhat obscure mental processes, certain occurrences in
the agent's soul which are in some way related to his bodily
sensations or to the external world. 63

Wines, musical performances, and feasts can all in some
sense be the goals of action: they are things or events
which one can want to possess, or be present at, or participate
in. Insofar, then, as 'pleasure' denotes such things or
events, 64 pleasure can obviously be classed as an intentional
motive. In such cases it would make sense to talk of acting
for the sake of, or with a view to, pleasure. The same will
hold of bodily sensations: one can act with a view to having
or experiencing a bodily sensation. Since therefore bodily
sensations can be intentional motives, those pleasures which
are nothing more than bodily sensations can be intentional
motives.

'Both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind
of motion, are they not?' asks Socrates at Republic 533e.
'Motion in the soul' 65 was undoubtedly part of the stock in
trade of the philosophical psychology of Plato's day, and covers

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63 I discuss Plato's treatment of these mental processes in
the chapters dealing with the Philebus.

64 As perhaps in Democritus B214 (= DK 68 B214).

a number of rather different things. It covers first of all the element of awareness in bodily sensation. Secondly, it covers certain emotional conditions, such as mirth, rapture, and grief. Thirdly, it enables some sort of explanation to be given of what it is to enjoy something.

We are of course to conceive of the soul as a separate entity from the body, the real person, as it were, of which the body is an external and dispensable husk. Part of the soul’s job is to monitor events taking place in the body. In this aspect of its working, the soul is in some way ancillary to the body. In one place Plato invites us to consider the soul as making written assessments of data transmitted by way of the body. \[66\] To employ a modern analogy, we might suppose ‘motions’ of the soul to be like the motions of a seismograph, which, by means of a moving needle, makes a graphic record correlatable with external earth tremors of above a certain intensity; and the analogy could be completed by supposing in addition a seismograph operator whose job it was to interpret and assess the scratchings of the needle on the graph paper.

In other aspects of its working, however, the soul does not merely record and assess goings-on which are external to it,

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\[66\] Philebus, 39 (which will be discussed in detail later).
but has a positive contribution of its own to make. It is not, or not merely, a recorder of bodily thrills, glows, and pangs, but itself experiences certain peculiarly mental thrills, glows, and pangs.° To make the same point by a medical analogy, the soul is not merely an apparatus for detecting imbalances of bodily humours, but is itself subject to an imbalance of mental humours: so, says Gorgias, are grief, pleasure, and fear produced in the soul.°

Finally, the soul can make assessments of both external and internal occurrences in terms of fulfilment of need, which might make it plausible to suggest as at least a necessary condition of enjoying something, the making of a judgement that it fulfils a need.

The purport of a moral diagnosis of the form 'Alcibiades was overcome by money' is at once apparent, since it is formed with direct reference to the agent's intentional motive: what Alcibiades wanted to get was money, and he would do anything to get it. But a diagnosis of the form 'Alcibiades was overcome by pleasure' is much more vague. How is it to be analyzed?

68 DK 82 B11 (14).
69 Or, in the language of the Hygienic Theory, that it is truly repletive. (The Hygienic Theory is discussed in some detail in Chapters III and following).
Has it, primarily, reference to things Alcibiades wanted to get, or to bodily sensations he wanted to have? Does it tell us, primarily, that (so to speak) Alcibiades' mental seismograph, or his interpretation of its deliverances, was in some way defective? Or does it mean, primarily, that Alcibiades' soul was subject to certain more or less violent, and peculiarly mental, turbulences or imbalances? Are we being referred to his intentional, or to his non-intentional, motives; to his aspirations, or to certain inner workings in terms of which his aspirations might be explained?

The best we can do, it seems to me, is to turn to a theory which, in the Protagoras, Socrates assigns to 'the majority of people'. I shall call it the theory of akrasia. The theory has, as its key concepts, the concepts of pleasure and knowledge: when people act contrary to their knowledge of what is right, it is because they are overcome by pleasure. But before we turn to the Protagoras, something had better be said about the part played in moral discourse by the concept

70 Plato, Protagoras, 352b-c.

71 In the Protagoras, the theory is also cast in terms of pleasure and belief: more will be said of this in Chapter II.

72 cf. Plato, Protagoras, 352d-e.
of knowledge.

d) The Socratic Paradoxes

The rest of this chapter I shall devote to a brief discussion of the so-called Socratic paradoxes that

S1. Arete is episteme 73

and

S2. No one errs willingly. 74

It is sometimes assumed that Plato held both S1 and S2.

Such an assumption would I think be warranted with respect to S2, but something of a distortion with respect to S1.

73 The locus classicus of the doctrine 'Arete is episteme' in Plato is Meno 87b-96c, where however the doctrine is 'hypothesized', i.e. made one of the components of the biconditional 'Arete is teachable only if arete is episteme', and then disproved (prima facie, at least) by showing that arete is not taught. Two attempts to define particular aretai - temperance (Charmides, 164c foll.) and courage (Laches, 199 foll.) - in terms of episteme break down in aporia. A variant of the doctrine is the so-called 'techne analogy' of the first book of the Republic, where some searching criticism of the doctrine is to be found.

74 This appears in Plato in a variety of guises: cf. Protagoras 345e1; Gorgias 509e5-6; Republic IX, 589c6; Timaeus 36d7-e1; Laws IX, 360d1; Laws V, 734b4; Republic II, 382a7-8; Sophist 228c7-8; Sophist 230a6; Protagoras 355c6-7; Republic III, 413a4-5; Laws V, 731c3-4. In contrast to S1, S2 is in general either asserted and not challenged, or established by argument (as in the Protagoras).
That the historical Socrates held S1 can hardly be doubted: Aristotle says that he did, and it is reasonable to suppose that Aristotle had Plato's word for this. Plato's own position here was one neither of straightforward acceptance nor of straightforward rejection. It would not perhaps be too wide of the mark to say that Plato treated S1 as a sort of prophetic insight into the nature of moral goodness. Certainly, he spent much time working out its implications.

It is unfortunate that, if we want in English to represent S1 by three words, we must set it down as 'Virtue is knowledge'. But to do this is at once to over-simplify and to mislead. For one thing, such an English formulation points to a deceptively simple argument for S2. The argument would run something like this. To say that virtue is knowledge is to say more or less that knowing what is right always guarantees doing what is right. Thus doing what is wrong necessarily involves ignorance of what is right. But if a man is really ignorant of what he ought to do whenever he does wrong, he can never be said to do wrong on purpose: doing wrong on purpose would involve the agent in knowing that the action was wrong, and such knowledge would

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75 NE VI, 1144b 18, 29; NE III, 1116b4; EE I, 1216b 2-20; EE III 1229a15, 1230a7; EE VII, 1246b34.
guarantee his not doing the action. 'No one errs willingly'.

So we might argue. But we should be warned off so facile a rendering of S1 by the mere fact that Plato did not attempt to derive S2 from S1 in this way. Indeed, S2 seems to be not so much a derivative from S1 as an objection to it. There was in Greek a close connexion between the notions of episteme ('knowledge') and technē ('craft', 'art', 'skill'). In general, if anything could be called a technē, it could also be called an episteme. 'Shoe-making is (an) episteme' and 'Medicine is (an) episteme' were quite respectable things to say in Greek, and, indeed, indicate the standard use of 'episteme'.

To maintain that moral excellence or arete was episteme was thus to class moral excellence along with such things as shoe-making, medicine, house-building, and geometry.

A caution must be entered here, though. Not quite everything involving expertise of some sort could be termed episteme.

Episteme is not just skill: it is skill which exists primarily for the serving of some good purpose. There is, for instance,

76 For 'episteme' in this sense, cf. Gorgias 511c (of swimming); Republic 438d (of building); Politicus 308c (of crafts which proceed by combining materials); Theaetetus 146d-e (of cobbling and carpentry).

77 This does not mean that episteme cannot be deliberately employed to bring about bad results instead of good, as will become apparent in subsequent discussion of the Hippias Minor.
an expertise or knack involved in pastry-cooking; yet in the Gorgias Socrates denies to pastry-cooking, as opposed to medicine, the dignified status of a techne - and so, by implication, of an episteme. Whereas the doctor, in exercising his skill, has an eye to the good of his patient, the pastry-cook takes no account of the well-being of his customer. We might say, to put it in another way, that what distinguishes the expert (technites, epistemon) from the mere journeyman is the element of discrimination by the expert between good and bad results, or good and bad states of things. The journeyman who turns out hundreds of exactly similar dowels to rigid specifications would hardly qualify for the august title of craftsman or expert; this would be reserved for the cabinet-maker, who in the exercise of his skill is all the while discriminating between better and worse arrangements of all sorts of pieces of wood. The journeyman is simply following a recipe, without even bothering to inquire whether there is any point to what he

78 Gorgias, 501a.

79 The following definition of 'episteme' in the sense of 'craft-expertise' would perhaps have been acceptable to Plato: 'Skill the exercise of which necessarily involves discrimination between good and bad results'. Patently, 'episteme' does not, in this sense, mean 'propositional knowledge', although in order to possess such episteme, it will be necessary to have some propositional knowledge. For the propositional knowledge involved, see Note 1 to this chapter.
is doing; the cabinet-maker does everything with a view to
the fashioning of comfortable beds, tables, and chairs.

'In technē', said Aristotle, 'he who errs willingly is
preferable'. Although what characterized the epistemē
was a discrimination in the exercise of skill, the discrimination
did not have to be one-way; it did not, that is, have to
issue in the choice of a course of action calculated to bring
about a good result. A doctor, for instance, would possess
certain skill that would be both requisite and sufficient for
producing in his patients particular changes of bodily
condition. In exercising his skill, he would discriminate
between better and worse bodily conditions. Usually, of course,
he would practise upon his patient so as to bring about a change
for the better in the patient's bodily condition; though this
need not always be the case. A legacy-hunting doctor might
very skilfully kill his patient, by administering just enough
of an overdose of a therapeutic drug. No doubt it would be
said that such a doctor acted iniquitously, but it could hardly
be said of him that he acted incompetently. Examples can be
multiplied. It will be the skilled accountant who is best able
to defraud by making the right errors in the right places;

80 NE 1140b 22-23,
it will be the skilled engraver of banknotes who is best able to counterfeit them, and so on. And it is at this 'capacity for producing opposite results', which characterizes techne, that Aristotle's remark is aimed. The man who 'errs unwillingly' (for instance, someone who, while claiming to treat a sick person, kills him without meaning to) is a poor craftsman, or better, perhaps, is no craftsman at all; the man who 'errs willingly' (for instance, the legacy-hunting doctor of our previous example) is, though perhaps a scoundrel, at least competent in his craft.

Now, if one classed moral excellence along with the various epistemai, one encountered the difficulty that it would appear possible for a certain sort of wicked man to count as morally excellent, by virtue of his very wickedness. For just as a contrast might be drawn between the bungling of a layman unproficient in medicine, and the skilled performance of the legacy-hunting medical poisoner, so a further contrast might be drawn between, for example, the ingenuity of a respectable, undetected racketeer, and the bungling of a convicted petty

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31 'Dunamis enantiōn'. For the technical application of this notion, see Hippias Minor 366c-368a. For its application to justice, see Republic I, 333e-334b, and the discussion of the Hippias Minor in this chapter.
theif: just as the doctor's success in poisoning his patient would be conclusive evidence of his medical skill, so the racketeer's deliberate and highly successful\textsuperscript{82} moral turpitude could be cited as evidence of his moral skill, and therefore of his moral excellence.

This point is discussed (somewhat obliquely, it \textit{must} be allowed) in the \textit{Hippias Minor}. Hippias maintains that, of Achilles and Odysseus, Achilles is the better man: Achilles is brave and open in his dealings, but Odysseus is wily and deceitful.\textsuperscript{83} Well, says Socrates, if Odysseus is wily and deceitful, must he not have skill (\textit{dunamis}) and knowledge (\textit{epist\emph{e}m\emph{e}}) which enable him to deceive others?\textsuperscript{84} Anyway, Socrates continues, Achilles himself misleads others by announcing his resolve to return home, and then doing nothing about it.\textsuperscript{85} Hippias replies that Achilles did not willingly

\textsuperscript{82} The criteria of success would be 'prosperity' criteria: if wrongdoing brought the agent such conventionally accepted goods as wealth and civic honour, it might then be held successful.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Hippias Minor} 365b.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{id.} 365d-e.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{id.} 369d-370e.
deceive others, since he was compelled by circumstances beyond his control to remain at Troy, while Odysseus practised deliberate deception. 86

This gives Socrates the opening he wants. Who, he asks, is the better runner, wrestler, doctor, or musician? Is it he who loses races, takes falls, fails to cure people, or goes out of tune unintentionally, or he who does such things on purpose? Hippias has to admit that in all of these cases the better man is the man who does things wrong on purpose. 87

And would not Hippias agree, further, that justice is skill and knowledge of the soul? He would. 88 This admission enables Socrates to draw his final conclusion:

Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, must be the good man. (376b)

At this Hippias is aghast. Socrates unhelpfully professes utter perplexity, and on this note the dialogue concludes.

Hippias makes no difficulty over the thesis (S1) that moral excellence is _epistēmē_, which turns up at 376d-e in the guise 'Justice is skill and knowledge of the soul'. Nor should

86 ibid.
87 _id_. 373c-375c.
88 _id_. 375d-e.
we expect him to, since this sort of position tends to be readily accepted by Socrates' interlocutors elsewhere. Indeed, what gets Hippias into difficulties is his ready and uncritical acceptance of this doctrine. To see how this is so, we need only consider Socrates' final profession of perplexity, which is surely something of a feint. He gives the game away by admitting that he cannot agree with himself (376b8). Of course he cannot, since he is forever maintaining that no one does wrong on purpose. The good man is not the man who 'voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things', since no one ever willingly does wrong and disgraceful things.

89 Any theory that S1 represents a radical departure by either the real or the Platonic Socrates from traditional Greek ethical thinking, at once encounters the objection that most of Plato's other characters are quite as at home with it as Socrates. One finds characters like Gorgias, Hippias, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus getting into muddles because they are ready to engage in ethical disputes in which the conceptual symmetry of epistēmē with aretē is assumed; but one does not find them protesting against the novelty or outlandishness of the assumption. Might we not infer from this that, at least in the circles in which Socrates moved, S1 was commonplace rather than paradoxical?

90 Socrates must of course mean that the wilful doing of bad deeds would be a sufficient, not a necessary, condition of moral excellence. In the arts, malpractice, though admissible evidence of expertise, is not the only admissible evidence.
However the curious conclusion about moral goodness at 376b is an inference from the thesis (= S1) at 375d that justice is an epistēma, an epistēma in the same sense, that is, as running, wrestling, and so forth are epistēmēs, so that it must be of S1, or at any rate of S1 taken in a certain sense, that the last part of the dialogue is designed as a reductio ad absurdum.

Two other things are noteworthy about Hippias. Firstly, it is Hippias's opinion that Odysseus tells lies on purpose; and Hippias's willingness to make this sort of moral judgement would no doubt have been shared by most intelligent fifth- and fourth-century Greeks (cf. 370d). Secondly, Hippias is ready to admit, under Socrates' interrogation, that men who are really wily need ability and knowledge in order to be sure of deceiving (365d sqq.).

The statement 'Odysseus told lies on purpose' seems straightforward enough to us; and no doubt it seemed so to

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91 Socrates does not exactly get Hippias to agree that there is a special expertise in deceiving; but he does the next best thing by mentioning a number of epistēmēs, beginning with a detailed arithmetical example, and getting Hippias to admit that, in all of these cases, it is the expert who is able to mislead others. Moreover, Hippias the polymath is prepared, in view of his proficiency in just about every art there is, to entertain the suggestion that this holds of all epistēmēs. (He fails to see at once the disastrous implication of this for S1).
Hippias, too. Socrates would, however, have rejected it. Why?

At the root of Socrates' rejection lay an old proverb, which is preserved by (among others) Aristotle:

No one is willingly *poneros*, or unwillingly *makarios*. 92

'Poneros' can mean both 'wretched' or 'hapless' (primitively), and 'wicked' (derivatively). (It is something like 'good for nothing'). *Makarios* means 'happy' or, better, '(materially) prosperous'. Aristotle thought the first half of the proverb patently false; but then he took 'poneros' to mean 'wicked' (the dominant meaning in his time). About two hundred years earlier, however, Epicharmus had incorporated the same words in a play about the labours and madness of Hercules:

But I do all these things under constraint (ananke):
No one, I think, is willingly *poneros*, or willingly accepts etc. 93

There is no paradox here: 'poneros' is patently used in its primitive sense. To be cleaner of the Augean stables is to be *poneros*, to be human trash, beset by the *ponoi* or toils of the riff-raff; and no one is in such a plight of his own accord.

92 NE 1113b 14-15.

93 DK 23 57. I see no compelling reason for doubting the genuineness of this fragment. See Note 2 to this chapter.
At *Meno* 78a, Socrates and Meno agree that 'no one wants to be *kakodaimon*', that is, to be hapless or ill-fated. What they say there has precisely the force that the proverb 'No one is willingly *poneros* had for Epicharmus.

For an educated Greek of Socrates' or Plato's time, lying would have counted as one of the main forms of injustice;⁹⁴ so that it would seem that Hippias, in the *Hippias Minor*, sees nothing wrong with the notion of deliberate injustice. At the same time, it is hardly likely that he would have disagreed with Socrates, Meno, or Epicharmus that 'no one is willingly hapless'. But one of the ways in which people become hapless or badly-off is by making bad bargains,⁹⁵ by acting disadvantageously. Thus the old proverb entails that no one willingly acts to his detriment; and this entailment Hippias would no doubt have accepted.

It would seem, then, that we can discern two sets of beliefs, the first involving such propositions as

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⁹⁴ cf. *Republic* I. 331b-d.

⁹⁵ Something more will be said of this in Chapter II.
(1) No one is willingly poneros (= wretched, hapless, badly-off)
and
(2) No one willingly acts to his detriment;
the second involving such propositions as
(3) No one is willingly poneros (= wicked)
and its derivative
(4) No one is willingly unjust.

It is obvious that (3) and (4) cannot be derived from (1) and (2), except by the mediation of propositions like
(5) Anyone who is poneros (= wicked) is poneros (= hapless)
and
(6) Anyone who acts unjustly acts to his detriment.

It is (5) and (6) that represent the Platonic (and, presumably, Socratic) point of departure from plain morality, that is, the sort of morality espoused by Greeks of Plato's time, and ably expounded by men like Hippias. Thus what, from the Platonic point of view, Hippias fails to take into account is that the unjust action of lying is detrimental to the liar. 96

96 He does not see that injustice is necessarily unprofitable to him who does it. Thrasymachus, more articulately, maintains that injustice is, if properly perpetrated, more profitable to the agent than justice (cf. Republic, I. 336 and foll.), and it is this sort of view which the Republic as a whole is designed to refute.
Footnote continued.

Professor G. Santas ('The Socratic Paradoxes', Philos. Rev. LXXIII (1964) pp. 147-164) distinguishes between 'prudential' and 'moral' forms of the paradoxes. The link between them is, he suggests, provided by argument 'that behaving justly always benefits the agent, and that behaving unjustly always harms the agent'. The position I am adopting seems to me fairly close to this: my (1) and (2) would express the 'prudential' side, and (3) and (4) the 'moral' side, while (5) and (6) would express the link between them. However, I have some reservations about the way in which he states the distinction. For one thing, I am not happy with the terms 'moral' and 'prudential', since these suggest a dichotomy quite foreign to Plato's way of thinking. For another, I do not think that one can make a classification of Platonic passages on the linguistic basis Santas recommends: here the Protagoras would be an insuperable obstacle. Finally, I take 'Virtue is knowledge' ( = S1) to differ significantly in its import from the other paradoxes,
This brings us to the second thing that is noteworthy about Hippias, namely his belief that wily men need ability and knowledge in order to be sure of deceiving. Now (it might be urged) if the Platonic point of view is right, and the deceitful man is, in deceiving others, acting against his own interests, how can he be said to be acting ably, or knowledgeably, or skilfully? For to say that someone has acted ably, or knowledgeably, or skilfully is to imply that he has made things turn out as he wanted them to; and the making of such an implication would, in the case of the liar, be unwarranted. Admittedly, the liar has made things go as he wanted them to up to a point; but in this respect he is no better off than, for example, the physician who in a case of fever reduces the patient's temperature, but neglects to keep him out of draughts, or prevent him from becoming fatigued. Just as medical skill is to be attributed on the basis of effecting cures rather than on the basis of relieving discomfort (that is, on the basis of long-term rather than of short-term success), so ability in the conduct of one's life is to be attributed on the basis of accomplishing that which is, in the long run, to one's greatest advantage.
It will perhaps be best if I pause here to restate briefly the lessons which I have suggested we can learn by reading between the lines of the *Hippias Minor*. Perhaps the most important lesson is that \( S_1 \) ('\textit{Arete} is \textit{episteme}') is, if taken at face value, false. It is false because it is inconsistent with \( S_2 \) ('No one errs willingly'), assuming of course that \( S_2 \) is taken not merely in its primitive sense of \((S_2,1)\) 'No one willingly acts to his detriment', but in its developed Platonic sense of 'No one willingly does wrong'.

A second lesson is this: Like Hippias, most people see nothing wrong with moral judgements of the form 'So-and-so lied deliberately', and this attitude commits them to the rejection of \( S_2 \) in its Platonic sense. But this does not mean that they reject the whole basis of \( S_2 \); for they accept readily enough the commonsense proposition \( S_2,1 \). What they balk at is the notion that \((S_2,2)\) anyone who does wrong acts to his detriment.

A third lesson is that the difference between \textit{arete} or moral excellence and \textit{kakia} or moral depravity cannot under any circumstances be characterized as a difference between technically correct performance and cleverly contrived technical
malfeasance: the so-called 'skilful liar' displays no skill at all, not even a skill analogous to the perverted medical skill of the competent abortionist. I do not raise these considerations in order to suggest that Plato was more or less in favour of scrapping S1. I shall now try to show in what way he considered it helpful and illuminating.

In several contexts, Plato contrasts desire (epithumia) or wish (boulesis) with art (techne) and ability (dunamis), and he obviously thinks the contrast relevant to both technical and moral matters. 97 Let us consider first its technical application. Let us suppose that a good runner and a bad runner are having a race, which they both want to win. 98 In such a case, one cannot differentiate them by reference to what they want, since they both want the same thing, namely to cross the line first. One can however differentiate them by reference to ability: the good runner has, and the bad runner lacks, the ability to cross the line first. The further comment might of course be made that there is nothing ineluctable

97 cf. Meno 77-78; Gorgias 509e-510a.

98 This example is based on one given at Hippias Minor 373d.
about the runners' wishing to win, either in this or in any other instance. Conceivably, both runners might have wanted to lose, the good runner to encourage his rival, and the bad runner from sheer despair. At the same time, this consideration does not affect the general point that good technicians or craftsman are to be distinguished from bad not by reference to ultimate aim or purpose, but by reference to ability: the good runner is the one who can win if he wants to; the bad runner is the one who cannot win if he wants to.

I would say (perhaps at the risk of oversimplifying) that in Plato's opinion this illustration would square with the facts of morality in one respect and one only: just as, in the illustration, the good and the bad runner have the same ultimate aim as a matter of fact, so in fact both good and bad men have, in behaving as they do, the same ultimate aim, namely that of living well or prospering. On the other hand, there would be two respects (at least) in which the

99 For a discussion of the ultimate aim common to both good and bad men, see Note 3 to this chapter. For the cardinal importance of such notions as 'eu zón' and 'eu pratein', cf. Protagoras 351b, Republic X, 621d,
illustration would not square with the facts of morality.
Firstly, while runners, both good and bad, need not, on
any given occasion, aim to win, men, both good and bad,
cannot but, in their every action, aim at prosperity. 100
Secondly, while the difference between the good and the
bad runner can be straightforwardly stated in terms of
possession and lack of ability, the difference between the
good and the bad man cannot be so straightforwardly stated,
even though it may have something in common with difference
in ability. 101

Some comment on this is called for. For one thing,
am I not indulging in malicious travesty in attributing to
Plato the belief that one cannot distinguish good from bad
men by reference to the sorts of things they want? For, it
might be said, this is one way, and perhaps the way, in which
we do distinguish good men from bad: while discriminating
between good and bad runners or carpenters involves appraisal

100 cf, *Meno* 78a.

101 I. M. Crombie (EPD 1, p. 80) puts the point as follows:
'There is therefore some "skill" in a loose sense which
'is possessed by just men and which enables them to make
'some "appropriate contribution". It is important to
'declare what this "skill" is in order that we may understand
'it more clearly and thus "contribute" more "appropriately".'
of skill, discriminating between good and bad men involves appraisal of purpose or intention, and in this, at least to some extent, lies the difference between moral and technical appraisal. And in any case, the import of 'prosperity' and 'living well' is so nebulous, that one could hardly advance living well and prosperity as specific goals, of the order say of breasting the tape, kept steadily in view by all men.

There is of course a good deal in this objection, but it might perhaps be met in this way. The Greek approach to moral matters was one of more or less enlightened self-interest: in general, if one wanted to argue that X was a better thing to do than Y, one argued in terms of the superior profitability of X to the agent, and not in terms of, for instance, X's involving selfless motives, X's being the course dictated by duty rather than self-interest, X's bringing greater benefits to others than Y, and so forth. When Plato talks about 'goods' he means 'things that are good for the person who has them'; and when he talks about 'evils' he means 'things that are bad for the person who has them'. When he makes Socrates say (as Gorgias 497e) that good men are essentially men who have good things present to them, he is merely reflecting popular attitudes: to be a good man is to be good at getting things
which are good for one. There was moreover general agreement about what things were good for one: they might be summed up (as at *Nero* 78c) as health, wealth, and political office. 102

So then, it is possible to give a fairly specific interpretation of the thesis that good and bad men cannot be distinguished on the basis of their aims. Both want, let us say, health, wealth, and the esteem of their fellow men. It is not then that bad men are so inarticulate that they cannot specify what they want, or for that matter that they are somehow unable to recognize health, wealth, or esteem when they encounter these things. It is rather that they are bad at getting them in any enduring form: put very crudely, the sort of thing they do not see is that being an honest town clerk is, in the last analysis, a more profitable way of living than being tyrant of a banana republic. 103 Perhaps what makes bad men so myopic is that the last analysis takes such a long time to make: the just man receives his dividend 'here, and in the journey of a thousand years'. 104

102 cf. *Gorgias* 467e.

103 This point is further developed in the chapters dealing with the *Republic* and the *Philebus*.

104 cf. *Republic* X. 621d.
Something has already been said about the proverb upon which the first point of dissimilarity between our technical example of the race and the facts of morality is based, the point that is that both good and bad men cannot but, in their every action, aim at prosperity, or at 'acquiring good things'. Although people often act to their disadvantage, they never do so willingly (cf. S2,1 above): what they want from their actions is some long-term benefit, and this they fail to get. The point is a truism, not a tautology: it is folk psychology, and not a metalinguistic thesis about the logic of the verb 'to want' or the verb 'to desire'.

Now, if all men have the same long-term aims, if it is psychologically impossible for them not to pursue these aims, and if good men in the long run secure these aims to a greater extent and in more enduring forms than do bad men, is it not reasonable to infer that the difference between good and bad men is straightforwardly one that can be stated in terms of ability or skill, of the sort which marks off the technical expert from the layman?

105 At Protagoras 358d1 it is explicitly stated that 'To pursue what one believes to be bad (sc. for one) rather what is good (sc. for one) is not in human nature.'
Plato sometimes gives the impression of thinking along these lines, but in the main he follows one or other of two lines of thought: we might refer to them as a positive and a negative line.

To take the negative line first: If moral and technical excellence were similar in that both involved the possession of skill, ability, or know-how, then we should expect morality to involve at some stage some form of apprenticeship: we should expect to find morally expert parents imparting a moral knack (as it were) to their children, just as we find cobblers imparting the knack of cobbling to their apprentices; and we should be able to point to specific sorts of tasks which were set these moral apprentices to develop moral skill in them. But it is notorious that fathers who are universally acknowledged to possess arete in the highest degree, not infrequently raise dissolute sons; and again it is difficult, if not impossible, to point to any specific media, analogous to the cobbler's leather and tools, upon or with which good men work so as to secure their aims. From such considerations as these,

106 Especially in the Protagoras,

107 cf. Protagoras 319b-320b; Meno 90b-94e.

108 This seems to me to be the sort of thing implied by Charmides 164-174.
it would appear that good men have not got moral knowledge or *episteme*, but, after the manner of 'prophets and diviners', have only right opinion (or *the doxa*) about the conduct of their lives: their *arete* is not *episteme*, but merely *orthe doxa*. 109

The positive line might be stated thus: One thing which the technical expert must possess is a thorough grasp of what he is aiming at. If he is a saddler making a bridle, he has a thorough grasp of the structure or form of the bridle; 110 if he is a carpenter making a shuttle, he keeps in view the structure or form of the shuttle. 111 While having such a grasp is not a sufficient condition for the possession of *episteme* in the technical sense, but a necessary condition, 112 it might still be possible in the light of this to give some sense to S1, while all men have the same overall aims in the conduct of their lives, might it not be possible to improve their vision of these aims; to give them a moral understanding akin to the vision of structure or form possessed by the saddler and the carpenter? If one could impart such a vision, not only might one provide

110 The example is taken from *Republic* X. 601c; cf. *Cratylus* 390b.
111 cf. *Cratylus* 389a.
112 cf. Footnote 79 and Note 1 to this chapter.
a rational basis for plain morality (morality of the ortho doxa variety): one would also have some hope of inculcating morality.  

If both these lines of thought are fairly attributed to Plato - and I think they are - then the sentence "Arete is episteme" now appears not as a thesis about the way in which right conduct is to be described, interpreted, or accounted for, but as a slogan giving at least part of the programme for a new type of morality. I shall amplify this.

I have deliberately used the vague expression 'new type of morality'. This however leaves us uncertain about what precisely Plato is presumed to want changed. Does he necessarily want men to lead changed lives? or is he, while content for them to go on behaving more or less as they have been, anxious that the basis of their approach to moral problems should change? To some extent, he wants both of these things, but the latter to a greater extent than the former.

We might distinguish between two groups of protagonists in the Dialogues. There are, on the one hand, men like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Glauccon, Adeimantus, and (I should think) Protagoras and Meno. All of these are men leading conventionally exemplary lives. They are conspicuously men of arete. There is certainly

113 A very different sort of inculcating from the 'trade training' that was the Sophists' speciality.
no point in trying to account for or describe their moral lives in terms of episteme, since (as has been seen) there is no indication that ordinary decent living involves the possession of episteme, and there are a number of indications that it does not. What is at issue in their case is mainly the metaphysic of their morality, that is those presuppositions upon which their articulate moral beliefs are based. For the metaphysic of their sort of morality (of plain morality, as I shall call it) is stocked with dangerous half-truths, such as the belief that things are good only qua pleasant: 114 let a 'plain man' ferret out the hedonist thesis, and in no time he will be found performing like Callicles. Replace their half-truths with vision of the structure of those good things they are aiming at (together with a corresponding vision of their own true nature), 115 and the danger of their going off the rails will be removed.

The second group of protagonists includes men like Callicles and possibly Thrasymachus, who are clever enough to discern some of the half-truths which conventional beliefs presuppose, but not to discern any more solid foundation for conventionally

114 This is discussed in Chapter II.

115 If one has vision of the structure of something that is good for one (e.g. of a chair), this necessarily involves having a proportionate grasp of one's own nature (e.g. of one's anatomy).
good living. Insofar as their speculations give rise to the corruption both of themselves and of others, the 'new type of morality' will call for a change not merely in their beliefs, but in the conduct of their lives.

The working out of Plato's programme for a new type of morality, and the part played in it by the concept of pleasure, will now be examined in more detail.
CHAPTER I - NOTE 1*

The Propositional Knowledge Involved in Episteme

At Gorgias 450c-d a distinction is drawn between two sorts of technai: most technai are concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking, while a few work wholly through the medium of language, and require little action, if any. Since 'technē' and 'epistēmē' are interchangeable terms, it is apparent that only in relatively few cases would it be even plausible to identify the possession of epistēmē with the possession of propositional knowledge.

Nevertheless, it would seem that, even in the case of those technai that require little or no speaking, one must possess certain propositional knowledge if one is to count as a technēs or epistēnēn.

At Gorgias 501a, Socrates says that the art of medicine investigates the natural condition (phusis) of the patient and the cause (aitia) of what it accomplishes, and is able to give an account (a logos) of both of these things. It is, he says, this ability to give an account which distinguishes medicine from cookery, which is a mere habitude (empeiria) or knack (tribē) not involving an account (alogos).

Socrates does not mean here that the medical expert must be able to give an account of the steps to be taken in curing a patient, or even of the physiological processes he induces in the patient's body. For, at Philebus 56a-b, medicine is classified as a craft that proceeds not 'by measurement' (that is, in steps that can be specified in

* cf. Footnote 79.
exact detail), but rather 'by the sort of shrewd guesswork that goes with constant practice' ('meletes stochasmol'); so that 'to give an account of the cause of what medicine accomplishes' cannot mean 'to specify the steps which the physician takes', or even, I think, 'to specify the physiological processes which the physician induces in the patient! If you assume that the physician is proceeding 'by shrewd guesses', you cannot expect him to specify either of these things in any detail.

It seems to me (especially in view of what is said about cause at Phaedo 96a-99c) that 'the cause of what medicine accomplishes' must mean 'the teleological principles that guide the physician' or 'those aims which the physician can express articulately, and tries to achieve when treating his patients'. Of course, these principles or aims are determined by the account the physician can give, if called upon, of the phusis of the human body, i.e., of the state which it is best for the human body to be in. For instances, the physician will know (propositionally) that healthy people have a particular temperature-range, a particular pulse rate, and the ability to read letters of certain sizes at certain distances, and so on. If his patient is defective in any of these respects, the physician will try to remedy the defect. The treating and curing of the patient will perhaps be a matter of hit-and-miss; but the specifying of the goal which the physician has before him will not.
It would seem then that, in general, the sort of propositional knowledge which is the theoretical component of episteme, and a necessary condition for the possession of episteme, is knowledge not of steps to be taken, but of ends to be secured. (Cf. also Xenophon, Memorabilia, III.x.9-15).
CHAPTER I - NOTE 2

The Proverb: 'Oudeis hekon poneros'

The Aristotelian proverb appears also in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue On Justice, where (at 347a) it is attributed to 'a minstrel'. This raises a presumption of its antiquity, and so of the antiquity of the saying 'oudeis hekon poneros'. Kathleen Freeman (CPP 134 n,1) holds the Epicharmus fragment suspect, on the ground that it was possibly a weapon forged by Alcimus, the Sicilian rhetorician (fl. 300 BC), for use against Plato. Alcimus, who would make an eminently suitable patron saint of bacshakians, apparently believed that Plato plagiarized from Epicharmus. Diogenes Laertius (III. 9-17) gives six 'Epicharmus' fragments (= DK 23 B1-6) on which Alcimus rested his case. These certainly seem too good to be true, and Freeman does well to reject them. But need the Hercules fragment (= DK 23 B7) be equally suspect? Diogenes does not mention it, and in fact it turns up in a scholion on the Aristotelian proverb (i.e. on NE 11:3b 14-15; and cf. DK 23 B7 and Stewart, NNE I, 275 on b14). If the learned (at least) of Alcimus's day assumed 'oudeis hekon poneros' to be an ancient proverb, what point would there have been in Alcimus's forging verses containing it in order to prove to them that Epicharmus thought of the formula before Plato? I do not think that Freeman is right in doubting the fragment.

* cf. Footnote 93.
CHAPTER I - NOTE 3 *

To the question whether it is possible to distinguish good men from bad on the basis on their aims, or of what they want, two arguments seem particularly relevant, one in the Meno and one in the Gorgias.

At Meno 77b, Meno offers as a definition of arete:

The desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.

He agrees with Socrates that to desire what is honourable is to desire what is good. Since the possession of arete is what distinguishes good men from bad, Meno has suggested a twofold basis upon which good men might be distinguished from bad: (1) Good men will be found to desire good things, and bad men bad things; and (2) Good men will have an ability, not possessed by bad men, for getting good things. I am concerned here only with (1).

There are, says Meno, two sorts of people who desire bad things. Firstly, some desire bad things without knowing them to be bad: they think that the bad things they desire are good things, and will benefit them. Secondly, others desire bad things knowing them to be bad, and realising that the bad things they desire will harm them. Socrates controverts both of these assertions at 77d-78b; Meno admits that nobody desires evil; and Socrates concludes (at 78b4-6) that:

The desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect.

* cf. Footnote 99.
Socrates gets rid of Meno's second category of people who desire bad things by proving (at 77e5 to 78b2) that there are no such people. (The proof is straightforward, and turns upon a version of S2.1, which is introduced at 78a4-5).

The elimination of the first category is far from straightforward. It takes place at 77d7-e4:

It is obvious then that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire bad things, but things which they think to be good, although they are really bad. Thus it is obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature and think them to be good things, desire good things. Socrates here is not, it would seem, ruling out the possibility of there being people who 'desire things which they think to be good, although they are really bad'. He is however ruling out the possibility of our describing such people as 'desiring bad things'.

But this raises a difficulty. Surely Meno can reply that a distinction can still be drawn between good and bad men, and an account of arete be given, in terms of men's desires. Will not good men be men who 'desire things which they think to be good, and which really are good', and bad men those who 'desire things which they think to be good, although they are really bad'? Moreover, provided that this distinction is kept sight of, what harm is done by describing those in the first category as 'wanting bad things' in the sense of 'desiring things which they think to be good, although they are really bad'? Is Socrates' point nothing more than a linguistic quibble?
It is worth noting that forms of two different words for 'desire', namely 'epithumia' and 'boulesis' appear in the argument. Despite Socrates' censure of Prodicus at Protagoras 340a-b for attempting to distinguish between them, it must be allowed that 'boulesis' and its derivatives are Platonic sacred cows. (For a note on the distinction, see Santas, The Socratic Paradoxes, Philosophical Review, LXXIII (1964), note 15). Briefly, one can epithumain things one only thinks good for one, but one can boulethat only things that are good for one. In the Meno argument, the discussion is carried on in terms of epithumia up to 78a, and thereafter in terms of boulesis.

Now the overall conclusion of the argument (at 78b4-6) is that both good and bad men have the same boulesis, namely boulesis for things that are good for them, and that neither type of man is better than the other in this respect. But this overall conclusion comes immediately after the elimination of Meno's second category of bad men, that is, of bad men who want bad things which they know to be bad. In the course of eliminating this second category, an appeal has been made to S2.1, in the form: Nobody has the boulesis to be wretched and ill-fated. That is, an appeal has been made to what are said to be men's long-term or 'whole-of-life' aims. So the overall conclusion would seem to be that, in respect of their long-term desires, good men are no better than bad: both have the same long-term aims, and the objects of these aims are
things that are in fact good for them.

But can this be made to square with 77d7-e4? For it is possible to infer from 77d7-e4 that perhaps good men are to be distinguished from bad by reference to short-term aims, that is by reference to the sorts of things they have epithumia rather than boulesis for: bad men, unlike good, have epithumia (though not boulesis) for short-term ends which they only think good. By contrast, the epithumia of good men would be for really good short-term ends.

I suggest, though with some hesitation, that 77d7-e4 might be brought into line with the overall conclusion in this way. Good and bad men have the same long-term aims, and so cannot be distinguished upon this basis. The short-term preferences of good men will be for really good things, while those of bad men will, as often as not, be for things that they only suppose to be good. Yet this affords no basis for distinguishing between the two sorts of men. For, conceivably, a good and a bad man might both have preferences for exactly similar things (e.g. for seats in parliament), and yet not both have their identical long-term aims furthered by the acquisition of these things. To put it in another way, you cannot say, just on the basis of even a large number of short-term preferences of two men, that one is better than the other: what counts is the overall pattern of their preferences, the way in which their preferences are arranged with a view to securing their long-term aims.

I think then that at Meno 77d7-e4 Plato possibly has two points in mind, but, in aiming at conciseness, manages to
make neither point very clearly. One point is that bad men who make mistakes about the conduciveness of their short-term preferences to their long-term aims, do in fact have the same long-term aims as good men (e.g. well-being and prosperity), and so cannot be distinguished from good men on the score of long-term aims. The second point is that, though it is in order to say: 'A wants (epithumei) that, and that is bad for him', one's grounds for making such a judgement must be not only a correct description of what that is, but also an appreciation of the extent to which that harmonizes or fails to harmonize with all of A's other preferences in such a way that A's long-term aims are achieved; so that the bare knowledge of what things A prefers (epithumei) is not of itself a sufficient ground for describing A as a bad man. Both points might be combined thus: A knowledge of what someone wants does not of itself entitle us to say whether he is good or bad; for, in the long term, all men want the same things, while, in the short term, it is not men's actual preferences that command them to us, but rather the extent to which they manage to combine in furtherance of their long-term aims the things they prefer.

The Gorgias argument is at 466-468. It is Polus's contention that rhetoricians have great political power, since they kill and despoil and exile anyone they please. Socrates replies that such people do not do what they want to do (the verb 'boulesthai' is used), but only what seems best ('ha dokei') to them. But, says Polus, surely someone who does what seems best to him is doing what he wants to do (467b).
Socrates in reply draws a distinction between three sorts of things: good things, bad things, and things which are in between (\textit{metaxu}). He cites wisdom, health, and wealth as examples of good things, and the taking of medicine, the making of sea-voyages, engaging in business, walking, and standing as examples of in-between things. Polus accepts this.

Now, says Socrates, are not killings, confiscations, and banishings in-between things? For men never want to do any of these things unconditionally (\textit{haplos}, 468c3), but only conditionally upon their being conducive to the agent's good. So then, if some rhetorician kills, exiles, or despoils another, thinking that this is to his advantage, when in fact it is not, what he does is not what he wants to do, but only what seems best to him (468c-d).

The point Socrates makes here can be put slightly differently. Suppose (what is not in fact so, but could conceivably be so) that whenever I wanted something I went about saying to myself: 'May I get so-and-so'. Now if Socrates is right, I should find myself on some occasions saying, unconditionally, 'May I get so-and-so', and, on others, inserting a proviso: 'May I get so-and-so, provided that...'

On occasions when I uttered the unconditioned optative, so-and-so would be a good thing, while on occasions when I uttered the conditioned optative, so-and-so would be an in-between thing. In the former case, I would realise instinctively that it would be senseless, or, perhaps, psychologically impossible (cf. \textit{Protagoras}, 358d1-2), for me not to pursue so-and-so, whatever the circumstances; while in the
latter case I would realise instinctively that so-and-so was one of those things which on some occasions it might be sensible, and on others senseless, to pursue.

It seems to me that Plato is thinking along such lines in the Gorgias passage. We all unconditionally-want (= have boulesis for) the same things ('wisdom, health and wealth'). And we all provisionally-want in-between things, things describable in themselves neither as good nor as bad.

Some of us however tend more than others to provisionally-want in-between things which, when we get them, turn out to be unconducive to our long-term aims, to the things we unconditionally-want. But this unconduciveness depends not on the in-between things individually considered, but rather on their disposal in our scheme of preferences. (For instance, A has, and realises, the following sequence of in-between aims: confiscating his enemy's property, building a fine house for himself with the proceeds, and holding splendid banquets in his house. B, on the other hand, has, and realises these in-between aims: confiscating his enemy's property, restoring the confiscated property to his enemy, and paying his enemy a handsome annuity thereafter. We should no doubt say that B was the better man, but on what grounds? Not by reason of his provisionally-wanting (and getting) X or Y or Z or even all three of these in-between things, but rather by reason of the way in which his moves have been ordered conducively to his long-term aims).

The Gorgias passage would seem then to support the thesis propounded at Meno 78b4-6 that:
The desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect.

For, according to the Gorgias argument, we all have boulesis for the same things (i.e., good things), and so cannot be distinguished on that basis; and we all provisionally want things that are neither good nor bad per se, which again affords no basis for distinguishing good from bad men.
CHAPTER II

THE PROTAGORAS:

AN EXAMINATION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF PLAIN MORALITY

a) Disagreement about the Theme of the Dialogue

There is no general agreement about Plato's purpose in the Protagoras. Perhaps the most serious difficulties arise when attempts are made either to reconcile what is said in the Protagoras about pleasure with what is said elsewhere, particularly in the Gorgias and the Phaedo, or alternatively to explain away the discrepancies.

Briefly, part of the argument of the Protagoras has seemed to some critics hedonistic, and even utilitarian, in tone, and so directly opposed to the vehement anti-hedonism of its near neighbours, the Gorgias and the Phaedo. There must of course be few scholars nowadays who expect anything that Plato wrote to square with everything else that he wrote; but, at the same time, there must be even

2 G. Grote, Plato, Ch. XXI.
3 Gorgias 495e-499b.
4 Phaedo 69.
fewer who would be prepared to accept an account of Plato's philosophy which did not posit an orderly process of development in the treatment of such important topics as knowledge and pleasure. The apparently violent transition from the Protagoras to the Gorgias and the Phaedo is thus something of an embarrassment.

This embarrassment is hard to justify. Perhaps, after all, Plato underwent some drastic conversion after writing the Protagoras, and before writing the Gorgias and the Phaedo. There would admittedly be no evidence, other than the three dialogues mentioned, for the conversion, but need this worry us? That Berkeley's position is much farther from Locke's in the Principles than in the New Theory can be divined by reading these two works: we need no additional retraction. Moreover, what further clues to a Platonic change of heart do we require? Plato lacked the Shavian virtue of writing prefaces for his dialogues, and so the only clue we might reasonably hope for would have to be some sort of half-way house between the Protagoras on the one hand and the Gorgias and the Phaedo on the other: some dialogue, for instance, in which it would be agreed only with considerable misgiving that the pleasant was the

5 The chronological ordering: Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo seems to be generally accepted. Wilmotiz thought the Protagoras very early, and probably composed before the
death of Socrates, E. R. Dodds (Gorgias, pp. 21-22) also thinks that the Protagoras precedes the Gorgias. Dodds bases his dating on four features of the Protagoras, the first three of which were pointed out by Vlastos (PP, xxv), and the fourth by Friedlander (i1, 2, 324): (1) the unidealised portrait of Socrates in the Protagoras; (2) Socrates' defeat in argument at Protagoras 350c ff.; (3) Socrates' derivation in the Protagoras from hedonist premises of the Socratic paradox; and (4) the greater depth and intensity, and better construction, of the Gorgias. (4) is surely rather a matter of taste than an objective criterion; and I cannot understand how (1), (2), and (3), even if correct, warrant Dodds's inference that 'philosophically, the Protagoras appears much less mature (sc. than the Gorgias)'. After all, Plato, not Socrates, is the author of the work; so that it might equally be said that such things as vivid portraiture and a contrived dialectical defeat of Socrates indicated greater artistic and philosophical maturity in the Protagoras. Apart from this, it seems to me that (1) and (4) are unreliable for the purpose of relative dating, that (2) is false, and that (3) is a gross oversimplification.

My own view of the Protagoras leaves open the question of its date relative to the Gorgias. However, if the Protagoras did represent a hedonist stage in Plato's thought, it would surely be earlier than the Phaedo, which would count as a renouncing of this aberration. (It would be curious indeed if Plato progressed from discovery and denunciation of the hedonic calculus in the Phaedo, to enthusiasm for it in the Protagoras). On that assumption, the Gorgias would fall most naturally in between the Protagoras and the Phaedo.
good. For better or for worse, there is no such dialogue. Why, assuming a complete change of heart, we should expect there to be, I am at a loss to say. 6

It seems to me that the hypothesis of a change of heart by Plato is on the face of it plausible. There are however a number of ways in which its plausibility might be impugned.

Firstly, it might be impugned a priori, on grounds of economy. Suppose, it might be said, that here we find Plato's position (as distinct from the position of one or other of his protagonists) apparently to be $X$, and further on apparently to be not-$X$. This immediately prompts the inference that Plato has either changed his mind without telling us, or else slipped up. While both of these things are possible, neither should be admitted, save perhaps as a desperate last resort. For, in general, one is more likely to make sense of the writings of a philosopher of Plato's calibre by seeking to reconcile apparently major discrepancies, than by gratuitously imputing to him mistakes and changes of mind.

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6 J.P. Sullivan ('The Hedonism in Plato's Protagors', Phronesis VI (1961), p.10) thinks the absence of any such clues an objection to the hypothesis of a change of heart.
This, it seems to me, is a salutary canon of interpretation so long as it is applied to individual dialogues; but to insist on its application as between dialogues is to sponsor the picture of a Plato who never had misgivings about his previously formulated positions, and whose 'philosophical arteries hardened regretfully soon'. That Plato's attitude to astronomy changed significantly between the Republic and the Laws need not worry us: it would worry us if we seemed to discern this change of attitude within the Republic itself. And the same holds, I would suggest, of his attitude to pleasure.

What, though, if Plato's reasons for writing the Protagoras were dramatic or biographical, rather than philosophical? Let me put this more precisely. There is, on any account, a good deal of philosophy done in the Protagoras, and some of it is done extremely well. But this need not mean that Plato necessarily wanted to associate himself either with any of the conclusion reached, or with any of the perplexities engendered, in the course of the discussion. Perhaps Plato wanted mainly to entertain


8 Republic 529c-e; Laws 822a-c.
his audience with a display of dialectical fireworks.⁹

On this sort of account, neither Plato nor the Socrates

of the dialogue need be helplessly committed to anything in the
dialogue.¹⁰ Admittedly, Socrates argues for some typically

'Socratic' positions, such as the thesis that wrongdoing

is involuntary,¹¹ and the thesis that arete is one;¹²

⁹ Jowett (TDP I, p. 125) rightly praised the dramatic

excellence of the Protagoras. But in going on to

say that Plato's 'mode of revealing the truth is by

lights and shadows', he seems to be condoning a cutting

of the Gordian knot: if we dislike the apparent hedonism

of the Protagoras, we can explain it away as one of the

lights (or shadows) in a fine son et lumiere performance.

¹⁰ Of course, it does not necessarily follow from the view

that dramatic considerations were uppermost in Plato's

mind when he wrote the Protagoras, that the apparent

hedonism of the dialogue cannot have been meant seriously.

Conceivably the Protagoras was a first-rate dramatic

piece and also a vehicle for Plato's youthful hedonism.

But the alternative view, that considerations of good

theatre for those interested in argument prevailed to

the exclusion of seriousness about the beliefs argued

for, is also possible.

¹¹ 358c-d.

¹² 329c sqq.
but he also argues (it might be said) for the typically 'un-Socratic' thesis that the pleasant is the good. 13

The point, then, is not his commitment, or lack of commitment, to such positions, but rather the use he makes of them in argument: superb Catherine-wheels and ugly squibs are alike given a part in the splendid display.

Again, Plato's purpose might have been to show us Socrates 'life-size, and with no crookedness of feature, no wart or wrinkle, smoothed out of the portrait', without necessarily wanting to commit himself to anything he made Socrates say. 14 Perhaps, after all, the historical Socrates

13 353c sqq.

14 cf. Vlastos, PP, xxv. Again (and compare note 10), it is conceivable that Plato was both writing the philosophical biography of a hedonist Socrates and himself thoroughly committed to the hedonism professed by Socrates. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that considerations of faithful biography triumphed even over Plato's own beliefs; and if this could be established, the hypothesis of Plato's conversion from hedonism would be excluded. (Vlastos, it should be noted, thinks that in the Protagoras, hedonism, though not full-blown hedonism (PP, xli), is seriously sponsored by Socrates. (See his note 50 at PP, xli). He gives no indication of whether he believes that Plato also sponsored it).
was like that: perhaps he had a utilitarian bent\textsuperscript{15} which Plato, personally, could not stomach; or perhaps, alternatively, he simply belaboured his opponents with anything (including hedonism) that came to hand.

So then, if we can assume that, when Plato composed the \textit{Protagoras}, he suppressed his own views in the interest of good drama, or faithful\textsuperscript{16} biography, or both, we can also dispense with the hypothesis of his undergoing an abrupt conversion from hedonism to antihedonism.

Unfortunately there is not a shred of evidence, other than internal evidence, to support such an assumption. It is true that a good deal of Plato's writing lacks the dramatic quality of the \textit{Protagoras}. In this respect, the \textit{Timaeus}, the \textit{Philebus}, and the \textit{Laws} (to name only three) are obviously in a different category. At the same time, the \textit{Protagoras} is hardly odd man out. What of the \textit{Symposium}? Whether the \textit{Protagoras} or the \textit{Symposium} is the more dramatic work is perhaps a nice question; but so far as I know, nobody has thought of dismissing Diotima's speech\textsuperscript{16} with

\textsuperscript{15} Socrates is thus depicted in Xenophon's \textit{Memorabilia} (and cf. Jowett, TDP I, p.130). There is, however, no evidence that Xenophon knew Socrates, and it is possible (though incapable of being proved or disproved) that Xenophon drew on Plato, among others, for his description of Socrates. (cf. Ryle, \textit{Plato's Progress}, pp.121-122).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Symposium}, 202-212.
the comment that Plato cannot have been too serious about it, since it appears in a highly dramatic context. If we are to suppose that lack of dramatic quality is in Plato a necessary condition of philosophical seriousness, we shall have to jettison a good deal more than the hedonism of the Protagoras.

What, again, entitles us to say of any given dialogue: "This is pure biography: the sentiments expressed are those of the historical Socrates, and the dialogue was composed to give us not Plato's philosophy, but rather a glimpse of how the real Socrates philosophized. This dialogue is therefore to be contrasted both with those which are more akin to historical romance than to biography, and in which Plato as it were manipulates the strings of a lifelike puppet, and also with those which are little but Platonic treatises recast in dialogue form, with some of the exposition assigned to a persona called "Socrates". 17 By what criteria can such a judgement be made? If, in a given dialogue, Socrates' irony seems heavy-handed, if he clowns about a poem of Simonides, and if his opponent is harried relentlessly, are we to infer

17 Under this sort of classification, the Phaedo, for example, would count as a dialogue akin rather to historical romance than to biography, and the Laws as little but a treatise recast in dialogue form.
from this that here we have the very son of Sophroniscus?\footnote{Vlastos, PP. xxiv.} These surely are slender threads from which to hang such an estimate. Socratic irony is in general heavy-handed; and in those dialogues in which he displays any vitality at all, he is prone to tease and to harry the opposition. If these quirks are more pronounced in the Protagoras (and I doubt whether they are), this hardly entitles us to say more than that Plato the dramatist was having a field day: it does not entitle us to say that the play he wrote was intended as a vehicle for philosophical biography, rather than for his own philosophy.

It will perhaps be said, however, that something more than just Socratic politeness or impoliteness is involved: there is also the consideration of Socrates' philosophical maturity. Suppose, it might be said, that we have two dialogues, \textit{A} and \textit{B}. In \textit{A}, we find Socrates to be not merely somewhat uncouth and ebullient, but even prone to serious philosophical error: the slips he makes are such that Plato cannot but have deliberately attributed them to him. In \textit{B}, on the other hand, we find Socrates both relatively well-mannered and philosophically correct: slips by Socrates are

\footnote{Vlastos, PP. xxiv.}
rare, and, where they do occur, are almost certainly to be attributed to Plato. Well then, is not the earthy and philosophically immature Socrates of A more likely than the courteous and philosophically mature Socrates of B to be the subject of a biographical sketch? and is not the Socrates of B either a mask or an idealised portrait, and so a likely vehicle for Plato's own doctrines? There is something to be said for this view in the abstract, but I do not believe that it throws any light upon the Protagoras. I do not believe, that is, that the Socrates of the Gorgias was endowed by Plato with a philosophical maturity that was denied to the Socrates of the Protagoras, and I have attempted to show this in my more detailed exposition of the arguments of the Protagoras. If I am right, then it cannot be argued that, because the Socrates of the Protagoras is philosophically immature, the Protagoras gives us the philosophical biography of Socrates, rather than the philosophy of Plato.

So far, then, the hypothesis of Plato's philosophical conversion from hedonism to anti-hedonism has not been

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19 As well as the text of this chapter, see Notes 1, 2, and 4 which follow it.
successfully impugned. But let us now consider a third way of attacking it.

At Laws 732e-734e, the Athenian states the way in which, 'on purely human considerations', the best sort of life is to be commended to men. It is to be commended by a demonstration of its superior pleasantness. The Athenian proceeds to make this demonstration, which he bases upon the following set of principles:

We wish for pleasure; pain we neither choose nor wish for. A neutral state, though not desired as an alternative to pleasure, is desired as a relief from pain. Less of pain with more of pleasure is desired; less of pleasure with more of pain is not desired. As for an equal balance of both, we can give no certain reason for desiring it. And all these objects affect our several choices or leave them unaffected, in virtue of their frequency, their magnitude, their intensity, their equality, and the conditions which are the opposites of these in their influence on desire. All this, then, being inevitably ordered so, a life which contains numerous, extensive, and intense feelings of both kinds is desired if there is an excess of pleasures, not desired if the excess is on the other side. Again, a life where both kinds of feeling are few, inconsiderable, and of low intensity is not desired if the pains predominate, but is desired in the opposite case. As for a life in which the balance is even, we must stand to our earlier pronouncement; we desire it so far as it contains a predominance of what attracts us, and yet do not desire it so far as it is predominant in what repels. So we must regard our lives as confined within these limits and must consider what kind of life it is natural to desire. But if we ever speak of ourselves as desiring an object other than those aforesaid, the statement is due to ignorance and defective experience of
actual lives. (733b-d, tr. A. E. Taylor).

He then argues that, applying these criteria, we must conclude that the lives of temperance, wisdom, courage, and health are superior in pleasantness to, and so more felicific than, the lives of folly, cowardice, profligacy, and disease.

Now at 733b-d, we have an amplified version of the pleasure calculus of the Protagoras, and the Laws version obviously has Plato's imprimatur: the Athenian introduces it as conducive to right conduct. It looks then as if Plato was in some sense a hedonist when he wrote the Laws. Assuming what I shall later argue, that the hedonism of the Laws is the same sort of hedonism as that of the Protagoras, how does the hypothesis now stand that Plato was converted to antihedonism after writing the Protagoras?

On this hypothesis, we now have the picture of a Plato who began by embracing hedonism, was converted to antihedonism, and then, presumably in old age, lapsed into his original heresy. This is just possible, but I believe that a more plausible theory can be constructed.

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20 Laws 734d-e.
21 Laws 732e-733a.
22 See Chapter VII.
It is significant that the pleasure calculus of the *Laws*, like that of the *Protagoras*, is something to be used primarily in convincing the ordinary sort of person, the 'plain man'. In the *Laws*, the hedonic calculus is definitely a *pis aller*: 'It is to men, not to gods, we are speaking'; and gods would be well content with the first section of the Great Preamble (716-732), which establishes on less mundane grounds the nobility and comeliness of the temperate life. In the *Protagoras*, the calculus is employed to disabuse the plain man of his belief 'that many people know the things which are best, but do not do them when they might...because they are overcome by pleasure'. Let us now turn for a moment to the *Phaedo*, where we are told that the temperance of the non-philosopher (that is, of the plain man) is a matter of pleasure-swapping: the temperate non-philosopher uses a sort of hedonic coinage, in terms of which he cashes, and then chooses between, possible courses of conduct. The Socrates of the *Phaedo*, close to death and surrounded by disciples, rejects this sort of moral attitude. The Socrates of the *Protagoras* and the Athenian of the *Laws*

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23 *Protagoras* 352-357; *Laws* 732e.
24 352d-e.
25 68e-69b.
give it some sort of backing; but their audiences are made up not of philosophers, but of sophists and civil servants.

It seems to me that a common thread runs through the three passages I have just mentioned. This is Plato's belief that, if one wants to make morality attractive to ordinary people untrained in philosophy, one must do so by preaching to them not the gospel of philosophy, which will be above their heads, but rather the gospel of pleasure (the doctrine, that is, that the pleasantest thing to do is always identical with the best thing to do), which, however shaky, will be both readily comprehensible to them, and readily accepted by them. The gospel of pleasure is of course not articulately held by most non-philosophers: it is rather something presupposed by conventional behaviour and conventional moral judgements. It is not so much one of everyman's moral beliefs, as part of the metaphysic of his morality.

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26 It is something of which the 'majority of the world' have to be convinced at Protagoras 353c-354e, the basis of the demonstration being the convention of describing certain sorts of things as 'goods', and other sorts of things as 'evils'.
It would seem, then, that an alternative hypothesis to that of an early conversion of Plato to antihedonism is possible, and even (as I shall argue in this and the following chapters) highly plausible. The alternative hypothesis would be roughly this. Plato always believed that hedonism was a latent, and very important, element in plain or conventional morality. He probably also believed that the cause of conventional morality might best be advanced by an appeal to the hedonism which conventional moral beliefs presupposed. Finally, he believed that conventional moral beliefs were confused and incoherent. I would think that these three beliefs were more or less constantly subscribed to by Plato.

In other respects, however, he seems to have vacillated. At times, I think, he believed that the claims of conventional morality were worth pushing. How, after all, might one exhort men like Polemarchus who, though living impeccably, yet lacked the capacity for critical discussion? Surely in the language either of their cherished shibboleths ('Justice is a matter of paying one's debts and telling the truth') or else of the hedonism presupposed by their moral beliefs.

27 Certainly in the Laws, and to some extent in the Protagoras, the Meno, and the Republic.

28 cf. Republic I 331 and foll.
code.²⁹ At other times (perhaps most of the time) he thought these claims hardly worthy of consideration, an attitude which produced either a harsh rejection of ordinary hedonism (as in the Gorgias³⁰ and the Phaedo³¹), or the formulation of a radically different type of hedonism (as in the Republic³² and the Philebus³³).

It seems to me that, on this hypothesis, the Protagoras is to be construed as neither for nor against the hedonism latent in conventional morality, but simply as a sort of excavation of the presuppositions of conventional morality, Plato leaving the reader to draw the inference that conventional moral beliefs are seriously confused and incoherent. Let us now see whether the text of the Protagoras bears out this alternative hypothesis.

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²⁹ Perhaps, as Crombie suggests (EPD 1, p.136), the discussion of pleasure in Republic IX was introduced to persuade those whose education ( unlike Glaucon's) had not 'conditioned them to choose order'. And the same is almost certainly true of the appeal to the hedonic calculus in the Laws.

³⁰ Discussed in Chapter III.

³¹ Discussed also in Chapter III.

³² See Chapter IV.

³³ See Chapter VI.
b) Summary of the Dialogue

(1) Hippocrates in Danger (310-314)

Hippocrates wants to become Protagoras’s pupil.

But Protagoras is a sophist. Does Hippocrates know what a sophist is? Of course: a sophist is one who knows wise things. Yes, says Socrates, but what, exactly, is it that a sophist knows and teaches his pupil? Hippocrates cannot say.

Well, says Socrates, is not a sophist a sort of merchant who purveys the food of the soul, which is knowledge? But now, a merchant who sells food for the body is no expert in whether the food he stocks is beneficial or harmful to the body. He praises his wares indiscriminately, and let the buyer beware. Sophists behave in much the same way. Does Hippocrates know, then, before buying of Protagoras, which of his wares are good, and which evil? Perhaps Protagoras himself does not know.

And there is another consideration. If one buys food of a merchant, one can take it away and inspect it at leisure, to see if it is tainted. But the risk in buying knowledge is far greater. For one cannot put it in a dish and inspect
it at leisure. On paying for it, one at once receives
it into the soul, and goes away either harmed or benefited.
So they had best ask Protagoras beforehand what will
befall Hippocrates if he becomes his pupil. This Socrates
does.

(ii) Protagoras's Apology (314-328)

Protagoras's claim is to teach men prudence or good
judgement (euboulia) in both private and public matters;
a pupil of his 'will learn (he says) to order his own house
in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act
most powerfully in the affairs of the state'. Unlike some
others, he does not waste his pupils' time with the arts: arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music; what he teaches
is the craft of politics (politike techne), and what he
undertakes is to make men good citizens (agathoi politai).
(318e-319a).

Socrates doubts whether Protagoras can have the profi-
ciency to which he lays claim, since it seems to him doubtful
whether the craft of politics can be taught at all. For
one thing, while the Athenian Assembly takes the advice only

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34 318d-e: an ostensible reference to Hippias, but it is
interesting (as Gruhe points out, Classical Quarterly XXVII,
pp. 203-204) that the four arts mentioned form part of the
philosopher's training in the Republic.
of experts (technitai) in cases where technical matters, such as details of shipbuilding, are under consideration, it is willing to listen to anyone at all, whatever his calling, in political deliberations, and will never refuse a hearing to such a speaker on the ground that he has not learned, or has never had a teacher in, politics.

The inference to be drawn from this is that the Athenian people does not think that the craft of politics can be taught; and the conduct of eminent Athenian individuals gives added weight to such a view: Pericles made no attempt to instruct his own sons in civic goodness (areté), though politically accomplished (sophos) himself, and Arinthro, the guardian of Pericles' son Cleinias, returned the boy to his father, 'at a loss what to do with him'. These, says Socrates, are but two examples of good men who have failed to make others good. 'Having these examples before me (he concludes) I am inclined to think that areté cannot be taught'. (319a-320c).

Protagoras offers to show that it can. He begins his proof with a myth.

The Myth of Protagoras. In the beginning there were gods only, but at the appointed time mortal creatures were fashioned. At the bidding of the gods, Prometheus ('Forethought')
and Epimetheus ('Afterthought') equipped them for life upon earth, Epimetheus distributing certain qualities among them, and Prometheus inspecting the distribution. Epimetheus, being foolish, distributed among the brutes all the qualities at his disposal. Prometheus, at his inspection, found man unprovided for, but the hour at hand when man should go forth upon earth. He therefore stole from Hephaestus and Athene the cleverness associated with their crafts, and gave it, together with fire, to man. He was unable to give man political wisdom, since it was in the keeping of Zeus, and too well guarded to be stolen. Man therefore had to go upon earth equipped only with the mechanical and calculative crafts.

At first men lived dispersed, but later they banded together in cities, both for protection from the brutes, and from a desire of living together. Since they had no political wisdom, they were constantly at strife in their cities, and Zeus, fearing that they would destroy one another, sent Hermes among them bearing reverence (aidôs) and justice (dikê). By Zeus's command, Hermes gave all men a share in reverence and justice, and made a law that anyone with no
According to Protagoras, the myth has two points to make. The first point is that any community requires all its citizens to have a share in political excellence (politikē aretē). (Here the mythical analogue is presumably Zeus's gift of reverence and justice to all men as an antidote against strife, with its accompanying sanction). The proof of this, says Protagoras, is that, whereas men who truthfully own to not possessing some technical proficiency are commended as sensible, those who own, on some occasion, to being unjust (i.e. to not having a share in political excellence) are accounted mad for making the admission. And the requirement that all should share in political excellence accounts, in turn, for the willingness of assemblies to listen to anyone at all in political matters. (322d5-323c2).

The second point which the myth has to make is that societies do not conceive of political excellence as being given by nature. (Here the mythical analogue is the bestowal


36 See G.B. Kerferd, op. cit.
of justice and reverence upon men by divine intervention, after they have come into the light of day; which contrasts with the bestowal of craft-aptitude (entechnos sophia) upon them in the course of their making, and before their going upon earth. Far from being thought of as a natural attribute, or even as a spontaneous growth, political excellence is looked on as 'a thing which is taught, and which comes to a man by taking pains'. And of this the proof is that men do consider political excellence to be taught, from the very fact that its opposites, impiety and injustice (i.e., the opposites of reverence and justice), are punished. The punishment of impiety and injustice by civil authority is never vindictive - that would be irrational -, but is administered with a view to deterring both wrongdoers and others from doing wrong in the future. But the attempt to deter would be pointless, if impiety and injustice were thought to be natural conditions, like bodily frailty; what underlies the attempt is the belief that political excellence can be inculcated. (323c3-324d1).

So ends Protagoras's commentary on his myth.

The 'Account' of Protagoras. Protagoras follows up the myth, and the commentary on it, with an account (a logos, 324d7) of why good men do nothing towards improving their sons'
areté, when areté is something in respect of which they themselves are distinguished. (As it turns out, the purpose of Protagoras in giving this account is not merely to clear up the difficulty raised by Socrates at 319e-320a, but to show as well that societies rightly hold the belief referred to at 323c-324d, the belief, that is, that political excellence is imparted by teaching). The account may be summarised as follows.

Areté is the one quality of which all men must be partakers if society is to exist at all. Societies acknowledge this by ordaining severe penalties, such as death and exile, for the failure of individuals to possess areté. Good men undoubtedly believe that areté can be taught. Strange it would be, then, if good men took pains to school their children in relatively trifling accomplishments, but made no attempt to educate them in more important matters, ignorance of which might well involve their death or ruin.

But, in fact, their children are taught these important things. Society - mother, nurse, father, teachers, and the authorities of the state - is the imparter of areté. Parents and nurses don't just teach children to speak: they are forever telling them that this is right and that is wrong, and backing up their admonitions with threats and punishments. Schoolmasters
do not just teach boys their letters: as part of their learning to comprehend what is written down, they are given tales and encomiums of the deeds of great men, and so come to emulate such men. And similar things might be said of the music master and the gymnastic trainer. The more affluent the parents, the longer this sort of thing goes on. Finally, when a young man finishes his formal education, the state compels him to learn its laws, and to live after their pattern, constantly correcting him by calling him to account for his transgressions.

As to the failure of some sons of good fathers to turn out well - that is easily accounted for. Imagine a situation in which some branch of formal instruction, such as flute-playing, became necessary for the existence of society. Everyone, to be sure, would learn flute-playing, and would have his children taught it. Some would be good at flute-playing, and others bad. But would one expect the children of good flautists necessarily to grow up better flautists than the children of bad flautists? Here, indeed, nature would come into play: some would be naturally more apt than others. Everyone would be found competent to some degree, however, and would seem good enough by contrast with non-flautists. So, too, if civilised
man were forced for a time to live among man-hating savages, he would yearn to see once more even the greatest ruffians found in civilised society, who would appear good by contrast.

All men in a society are teachers of political excellence, each according to his ability. Nor is this surprising; who, after all, are the teachers of Greek? And indeed, if one takes one or other of the crafts, who are the teachers of its apprentices, save the other practitioners of it (i.e. fathers and fellow-workmen) generally? This holds, moreover, of anything whatever that is taught. If you find anyone with a smattering of something imparting what he knows to someone who is wholly ignorant, there you can say unhesitatingly that the former is a teacher of the latter; but in cases where the latter knows something of the subject also, it becomes difficult to say whether or not one is teaching the other. All the same, if someone is better able than others to promote arete by ever so little, this is a gain. (Here, presumably, Protagoras is using 'arete' to cover both craft-proficiency and political excellence). The modest claim of Protagoras is that he is just such a teacher. (324d-328c).
This completes the summary of Protagoras's speech. The rest of the dialogue consists of a debate between Socrates and Protagoras on the oneness of aretē.

(iii) The Debate on the Oneness of Arete (328-362)

Let us look first in outline at the course of the debate, which I divide for convenience into seven parts (D.1 to D.7).

(D.1) Preamble to the Debate. (329c-330b) Protagoras, when questioned by Socrates, maintains that there is not just one aretē, but several aretai; that each is unlike the other; and that each has a different role or function (dunamis).

(D.2) The Relation of Justice to Piety (330c-332a) Socrates argues that 'justice is either the same with piety, or very nearly the same' and that 'justice is like piety and piety is like justice'. Protagoras allows that there is 'a resemblance' between justice and piety, but maintains that 'things (sc. such as justice and piety) which are alike in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike'. Does he think, then, says Socrates, 'that justice and piety have but a small degree of likeness?' No, says Protagoras,
no more than he agrees with what he takes to be Socrates' view of the matter. 37

(D.3) The Relation of Cleverness or Wisdom (Sophia) to Temperance (Sophrosunê) (332a-333b) Socrates next argues that 'temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and piety appeared to us to be nearly the same'. To this Protagoras assents, 'but with great reluctance'. 38

(D.4) The Relation of Temperance (Sophrosunê) to Justice (Dikaiosunê) (333b-334c) Socrates fails to establish a connexion between temperance and justice, because Protagoras breaks off the argument. Socrates develops the argument to the point where Protagoras admits that, if one supposes that an unjust man can display sophrosunê in his injustice (a supposition which Protagoras agrees to make only for argument's sake), he will only display it in those cases in which he does well out of his injustice. However, when Socrates attempts to complete the elenchus by getting Protagoras to admit that good things are things that are profitable for men, Protagoras

37 This argument is discussed in some detail in Note 1 to this chapter.

38 For a further discussion, see Note 2 to this chapter.
unobligingly refuses to make the admission. 39

(D.5) **Digression: the Scopas Poem of Simonides**

(334-349) After some conciliatory remarks by a number of the company (334c-338e), Protagoras questions Socrates about a celebrated poem by Simonides, dedicated to Scopas of Thessaly. (338e-348a) In his exposition of the poem, Socrates makes two important points. The first, for which an argument is offered, is that 'the only real doing ill is to be deprived of epistēmê' (345b). The second, which is proclaimed rather than proved, is that no one willingly does wrong (345de). 40

(D.6) **The Relation of Courage (Andreia) to Wisdom or Cleverness (Sophia) (348-360)** Two arguments are attempted here. The first (D.6a: 349d-351b) turns upon the relation of

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39 Probably Socrates would, if allowed, have completed the elenchus somewhat as follows: Good things are things that are profitable for men; To dispose others to harm one is an unprofitable thing to do; To do injustice to others disposes them to harm one; Therefore to do injustice to others is unprofitable (for men); Therefore to do injustice to others is not (ever) a good thing; But men do well only out of good things; Therefore men never do well out of injustice; Therefore no man can be sophrôn in his injustice.

40 See Note 3 to this chapter.
confidence (tharros) to courage, \(^{41}\) and the second (D.6b: in effect, from 351b to 360c) upon the refutation of the theory of akrasia. Protagoras claims that the first argument is vitiated by what we should call an illicit conversion, and, at the end of the second, gives assent only in order to 'gratify' Socrates.

(D.7) Final Aporia (360e-362a) Protagoras, says Socrates, had begun by affirming that aretē was teachable, and he himself by doubting whether it was; but it would now seem, on Protagoras’s argument, that aretē, being other than knowledge (sophia, epistēmē); is unteachable, and, on his own, that aretē is entirely knowledge, and so teachable. In fact, they have been tripped up by Afterthought: before enquiring whether aretē could be taught, they should first have asked what it was. \(^{42}\)

This, in brief outline, is the course of the debate on the oneness of aretē.

It will immediately be apparent that the Protagoras as a whole is far from being a discussion either of hedonism,

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\(^{41}\) See Note 4 to this chapter.

\(^{42}\) 361c, cf. Meno 36d.
or of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain make their appearance in the analysis of akrasia which takes place within D.6b, an argument which will presently be discussed in detail. First of all, however, some more general remarks will be made about the argument (D.6) for the oneness of courage and wisdom as a whole, and its place in the dialogue.

c) The Identity of Courage and Wisdom (D.6)

In D.6a (at 349d), Protagoras argues for the non-identity of courage and wisdom on the ground that 'many men are utterly... ignorant' yet 'nevertheless remarkable for their courage'. He believes too that courageous men are necessarily confident (350c), but denies that courage is the same thing as confidence:

Confidence may be given to men by art (technē), and also by madness and spirit (thumos), but courage comes to them from the nature (phusis) and good nurture (euthrophia) of the soul. (351a-b)

Now Protagoras has already allowed that 'madmen' (that is, the foolhardy) are confident, but denied that they have

44 Aristotle (NE 1115b 24 and foll.) distinguishes (i) the man who 'exceeds in fearlessness' ('a sort of madman or insensible person if he feared nothing, neither earthquakes nor the waves, as they say the Celts do not') from (ii) the man who 'exceeds in confidence' ('the rash man, ... thought to be boastful and only a pretender to courage'). Socrates does not specifically distinguish between (i) and (ii). In D.6a (= 349d-351b), Socrates and Protagoras would seem to be discussing (i) rather than (ii); while Socrates' later assimilation of 'base and evil confidence' to cowardice (360b-c, discussed below) is much more plausible if the man who displays base and evil confidence is taken to be (ii) rather than (i).
courage, since their confidence springs from madness (350b). This leaves two types of confident men, some or all of whom Protagoras might be ready to call 'brave', namely those who get their confidence from techne or art, and those who get it from thumos or spirit. As far as one can tell, his position would seem to be that anyone who is confident in either of these ways is brave. For at 349e he speaks of courageous men as 'the aggressive, ready to go at that which most people are afraid to approach', while a little later (at 352c-d) he avers that 'wisdom and knowledge are the mightiest of human

45 350b4-5. This tricky section of D.Go is also discussed in Note 4, appended to this chapter. Briefly, Socrates takes Protagoras to concede at this point that all confident men who are ignorant are mad (Vlastos, op. cit., p. xxxii, n. 33). All that Protagoras need concede is that all men who are confident about something of which they are ignorant are mad.

46 cf. Vlastos, op. cit., p. xxxvi, esp. n. 43: 'Another good clue to (the) meaning of "confidence" is that the Greek tharros is used as the opposite of "fear"... and is thought of as a "passion", i.e. an emotional state..., in a much more direct sense than is conveyed by the English "confidence".' (See too the references supplied by Vlastos in this note).

There is probably no one English equivalent of 'tharros' in this standard sense. To tharrein is in this sense necessarily to be exhilarated. Sometimes 'cheerful' and its synonyms will do, though a scrumful of blood-lusting football players, while undoubtedly displaying tharros, would not normally be described as cheerful.

The concepts of thumos and tharros are closely related,
Footnote continued.

in much the same way as the concepts of temper and anger.
(The relation is roughly that of disposition to emotional
state: thumos is a more or less permanent feature of
people, while tharros is something which breaks out in
them from time to time).

At 349e3, where Protagoras identifies tharros with
aggressiveness, he seems to be thinking of men who are
confident in this standard (Greek) sense, i.e. men whose
confidence is given them by thumos. (For the power of
thumos, as distinct from madness and art, to bestow tharros,
cf. 351a7-b1).

The almost complete absence of quantifiers in D.6a is
distressing, but I take Protagoras's admission at 349e1-3
to be this: All brave men are confident; and all confident
men (at least) whose confidence derives from thumos (or,
perhaps, a healthy, well-nurtured thumos) are brave.
This of course does not commit Protagoras to the view that
all confident men, without qualification, are brave.
things'. 47

We might perhaps summarise Protagoras's views on courage thus: Being brave is essentially a matter of possessing a natural endowment of the soul 48 which has been carefully nurtured from birth onwards. Courageous behaviour is always attended by confidence, though not by the confidence which springs from foolhardiness, 49

47 His admissions that epistēmē (350a5-b1) and techne (351a7) bestow confidence do not, I grant, commit him to the view that if anyone derives his tharros from techne or epistēmē, he thereby qualifies for the title of 'brave man'. However, if he holds that epistēmē is not a sufficient condition of courage (as well as of confidence), why does he jib at the common opinion that, inter alia, a man can possess epistēmē but act uncouragously (252e)?

For the power of epistēmē to confer confidence (eupsuchia), cf. Thucydides, I. 121.4.

For Aristotle's view that men are not, qua technical specialists, courageous, see NE 1115a 25-b 2; 1116b 6 and foll.

48 351b1-2. Probably this is why, for Protagoras, courage differs widely from the other parts of arête (349d): politike arête (= the 'justice and reverence' of the myth) is not a natural endowment, while courage is. For Plato's view of the relevance of phusis and trophe to arête generally, see Timaeus 36d-e.

49 = mania.
the confidence which attends courageous behaviour being that of either the expert (the technites) or the man of pluck (of thumes). Thus while the possession of expertise (episteme, technē) is a possible concomitant of courageous behaviour, it is not a necessary concomitant of courageous behaviour.

If Socrates is to establish the identity of courage and wisdom, he must show, at the very least, that the possession of wisdom or knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for the possession of courage: that men are brave if and only if they have knowledge. In D.6a, Protagoras, while allowing that confidence is a necessary condition of courage, does not allow that knowledge is a necessary condition of confidence. According to Protagoras, then, it is not necessary to have knowledge in order to be brave, so that courage and wisdom cannot be identical.

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51 349e1-2; 350c7-8.
52 Knowledge being merely one of three things, any one of which is a sufficient condition of confidence. (cf. 351a7-b2.)
It would seem, however, that this is as far as Protagoras is prepared to go in denying the oneness of courage and wisdom. For it is open to him to put his denial of Socrates' thesis in an even stronger form, and claim that the possession of knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for the possession of courage. This he declines to do, even when Socrates gives him the opportunity at the beginning of D.6b (at 352d), by putting before him the theory of akrasia, which states that 'many people know the things which are best, but do not do them when they might...'. Clearly, the theory of akrasia entails that the possession of knowledge is not a sufficient condition of the possession of courage: Protagoras, in spurning the theory, and affirming that 'wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful of human things', declines to make a stronger denial of the oneness of courage and wisdom than he made at the beginning of D.6a, where he denied merely that the possession of knowledge was a necessary condition of the possession of courage.

Socrates, however, chooses to dispute the stronger
form of the denial of the oneness of courage and wisdom.  
Lacking a live adversary, he sets up an Aunt Sally, the plain man.  
Protagoras's acquiescence in this move of Socrates proves his undoing; for Socrates is able to fight the plain man on ground which is not necessarily of Protagoras's choosing. This looks innocent enough, since the plain man and Protagoras seem to deny different things, the plain man that knowledge is sufficient, and Protagoras that knowledge is necessary, for courageous behaviour; but Socrates, by a skilful combination of premises to which the

54 At 351b, Protagoras still has to be convinced that wisdom is a necessary condition of courage. (That Socrates is well aware of this is obvious from his remarks at 359a-b). From 351b onwards, Socrates elects, in addition, to combat the view that wisdom is not a sufficient condition of courage.

55 I use 'the plain man' throughout for 'the majority of the world', and equivalent expressions.

56 He acquiesces at 353b. Socrates uses his position as questioner in the elenchus (cf. 343c, 353b) to obtain Protagoras's compliance.
plain man is either expressly\textsuperscript{57} or implicitly\textsuperscript{58} committed, forces the plain man to accept the identity of wrongdoing with ignorance.\textsuperscript{59} Thus the plain man, who is initially committed merely to the view that knowledge is not a sufficient condition of courageous behaviour, has in the end to accept that ignorance is both necessary and sufficient\textsuperscript{60}.

\textsuperscript{57} Such as the theory of akrasia (352c-e), and the classifying of certain painful processes, namely remedial processes, as goods (354a-c).

\textsuperscript{58} Such as the hedonist thesis (351c, 354c-d, 358a, 358b).

\textsuperscript{59} Strictly speaking, it is 'being overcome by pleasure' (357c-d) and 'inference to oneself' (358c) which are identified with 'ignorance'. But we must bear in mind that, on Socrates' analysis, akrasia (\textit{=} inferiority to oneself) is simply a matter of doing the worse when one might do the better: all instances of akrasia are instances of run-of-the-mill wrongdoing, i.e. of doing, under no compulsion, what is evil, believing it to be good. See also (d) below.

\textsuperscript{60} If Socrates shows that ignorance is a necessary condition of the occurrence of the sort of behaviour which in fact constitutes akrasia, he thereby disproves the plain man's theory that knowledge is sometimes not sufficient for right conduct. By identifying akrasia with ignorance, he goes much further than this.
for wrongdoing. Protagoras, who consents to be Socrates' ally against the plain man, realises too late that the conclusion of the argument against the plain man is potent also against his own position: once wrongdoing (and, by implication, uncourageous behaviour) is identified with ignorance, Socrates' task of identifying courage with wisdom becomes relatively simply and straightforward, and Protagoras's thesis that a man can be utterly ignorant, but nevertheless courageous, is overthrown.

Socrates' final victory over Protagoras is undoubtedly a triumph of legerdemain rather than of logic. But is this legerdemain reprehensible? It seems to me that this question can be asked on two levels. Firstly, we can ask whether Socrates is deliberately hoodwinking Protagoras, and, if he is, whether the deception he is practising can be justified. Secondly, we can ask whether Plato himself wants to hoodwink the reader.

By the beginning of B,6b (351), Socrates has good reason to complain of his treatment at the hands of Protagoras.

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61 Probably only at 360c-d.
62 This is discussed in (d) below.
63 The crux is at 358a-b, discussed below.
He has patiently heard out Protagoras's apology, only to have his own arguments, which are both concise and well-constructed, misunderstood, grudgingly assented to, and interrupted with lengthy speeches. Small wonder that, both in the discussion of the Scopas poem (D,5 = 334-349) and in the lengthy analysis of akrasia (D,3b, at 352-357), Protagoras receives a dose of his own medicine. If Protagoras, despite his protest to the contrary, is incapable of participating properly in elenctic discussion, then let him be harangued, now in jest, now in earnest, and heaven help him if he fails to catch Socrates' change of mood.

If he likes long set pieces, let him lump the consequences of swallowing them whole. This, I suggest, is Socrates' mood in D,6b, and he can hardly be blamed for his exasperation.

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64 See Notes 1, 2, and 4 appended to this chapter. It is of course Plato who puts these concise, well-constructed arguments into Socrates' mouth, and Plato, too, who makes Protagoras fail to grasp them. That this is not always brought out as clearly as it might be (especially in the case of D,6a = 349d-351b) I believe to be Plato's fault rather than Socrates'. (On this see Note 4).

65 As at 350e-d and (I believe) 331b-c.

66 As at 333b.

67 As at 334a-c.

68 Socrates' mood in discussing the Scopas poem is mainly flippant: cf. (among other things) the discussion with Prodicus at 341, and the description of the Lacedaemonians at 342.
The hoodwinking of Protagoras can, though, be taken at a second level. For, throughout the debate with Protagoras, Socrates is trying not merely to criticize destructively some definition proposed by Protagoras, but to prove his own positive thesis of the oneness of arete. His elenctic arguments must therefore result in something more than puzzlement. Admittedly, the earlier arguments for the oneness of arete do not seem to break down in aporia; but they do break up in confusion and bickering, which is much worse. Socrates manages to make headway with his thesis, in the long run, only by making his own lengthy analysis of akrasia, and foisting it upon Protagoras.

69 The contrast here is between the use of elenchus in the Protagoras, and its use in the Charmides, the Laches, the Meno (up to 80), and Republic I. It might be said that, while Socrates is not testing definitions in the Protagoras, he is nevertheless examining a thesis pronounced by Protagoras about what sort of thing arete is. Admittedly, Protagoras does maintain that politike arete is teachable, but this thesis is not directly scrutinised (and compare Meno 96 and foll.). What is scrutinised is the thesis that arete is disunitary (cf. 329c-e), but the formulation of this thesis (329d4-8) is the work of Socrates, not of Protagoras.

70 At 353a-b.
Plato's construction of the dialogue in this way seems to me to indicate his growing realisation of the limitations of the elenctic method - an excellent way, to be sure, of testing hypotheses by subjecting them to destructive criticism, but hardly the best method for obtaining positive results. Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that Plato is, as it were, conniving with Socrates to trick not merely Protagoras, but the reader as well: I want only to suggest that such connivance need not be a foregone conclusion.

d) A More Detailed Discussion of D.6b (= 351b-360c), and especially of the Analysis of Akrasia

Socrates does not comment on Protagoras's rejection of his first attempt to prove the identity of courage and wisdom. He at once asks whether, if one lives pleasantly, one lives well. Yes. So then, to live pleasantly is good, and to live painfully is evil? Protagoras doubts whether this is true without qualification: there are pleasant things that are evil, and unpleasant things that are good; and a man does well to pass his life pleasantly only if his pleasure is in things good (agatha) and noble (kala). Well, says Socrates, this is a view to which most people are committed: does Protagoras really stand committed to the
popular view, or does he believe rather

that things are good insofar as they are pleasant
if they have no consequences of another sort,
and insofar as they are painful they are bad? 71

Protagoras suggests that they discuss this more closely. (351)

Protagoras believes that some pleasant things are
bad; but how does this tally with his other beliefs? What,
asks Socrates, does he think about knowledge (episteme)?
Are its essential connotations 72 those of strength, of leading,
and of ruling; or rather those of weakness, of being led,
and of being mastered? The former, says Protagoras; and this
is something that he, of all men, must acknowledge. (352a-d)

Then in this, says Socrates, Protagoras differs from
the plain man, who does

not share your conviction and mine, but claims
that many people know the things which are best,
but do not do them when they might. And most
persons whom I have asked the reason of this
have said that when men act contrary to knowledge
they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some
of those things which I was just now mentioning. 73

71 351cd-6. This first statement of the hedonist thesis need
not represent Socrates' own view. For the construing of
the passage, see Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making,
p. 47, 2nd paragraph.

72 352b4, c4.

73 352d4-c2. (A reformulation of the theory of akrasia,
first mentioned at 352b-c).
Protagoras replies that the plain man says the first thing that comes into his head: in this case, as in others, to refute him is not worth the trouble. Socrates disagrees: it may be, he says, that this commonly held belief will help them to discover how courage is related to the other parts of arete. Protagoras agrees that they should examine it. (352d-353b)

Men, says Socrates, are sometimes got the better of by food, drink, and sex. The plain man would have it that men, even while recognizing such things as evil, nevertheless succumb to them because they are pleasant.

But ask the plain man why it is that such things are regarded as evil. Is it in respect of the immediate pleasure that they undoubtedly bring? Hardly, since if this alone was what they brought, men would regard them as good. Is it, then, in respect of unpleasant things, such as disease, that come in their train? The plain man will have to agree that they are evil only because they issue in pain, and rob men of other pleasures. On the other hand, when the plain man allows (as he will) that some painful things such as surgery are good things, he does so because these things produce such beneficial states as the
state of bodily health, and so end in pleasantness, and
get rid of and avert pain. The only criteria that people
have regard to, then, when they describe pleasures and
pains as 'good' or 'evil', are criteria of pleasantness
and painfulness. (353c-354d)

Despite all this, the plain man will insist on telling
you that sometimes, though men recognize evil things for
what they are, and though it is open to them to avoid doing
evil, they do evil just the same, being seduced and put
out of their wits by pleasure; and conversely that, despite
their recognizing good things, they are sometime overcome
by the pleasure of the moment, and fail to do good. What the
plain man says is, of course, absurd. For, since pleasantness
is the only criterion of what is good, and painfulness of
what is evil, it is obvious that 'good' and 'pleasant' are
no more than different words with the same range of application;
and likewise with 'bad' and 'painful'. One can thus interchange
'good' and 'pleasant' on the one hand, and 'bad' and 'painful'
on the other. Let it now be assumed that the plain man is
right, and that on some occasion an agent does something evil,
knowing it for evil, because pleasure overcomes him. This
commits the plain man to saying that the agent does evil,
knowing it for evil, because he is overcome by something
good; and, further, to saying that, since the agent did
wrong, the good (that 'overcame him') was not worthy to
conquer \(^74\) the evil that was done. But in what respect
was it not worthy? Only, surely, in respect of a dispro-
portion between evil and good: evil stood to good as
greater to less, or as more to fewer. Greater evils have
been chosen as the price of \(^75\) lesser goods. A similar
result follows if 'pleasant' is substituted everywhere for
'good', and 'painful' for 'evil' or 'bad'. Nor can anything

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\(^74\) 'not worthy to conquer': I translate the Greek ('\textit{ouk axi\-}\n\textit{\ion{a}n nikan}') quite literally. The basic connotations
of 'axion' ('worth', 'worthy') are of weight and
monetary value. It has sometimes been assumed (cf.
Guthrie's translation) that there is an allusion to
some sort of inner conflict (cf. 'nikan', 'conquer'),
perhaps of the sort envisaged at 352b-c. I doubt
whether such an allusion is intended (and cf. Gallop's
note at \textit{Phronesis} IX, 123). I think there is rather
a reference forward to 'anti' ('as the price of') (355e3)
and to the simile of the scales at 356b. Plato means,
I would suggest, that the good(s) in the situation is
not heavy enough to outweigh, or perhaps not valuable
enough to outprice, or cancel the debit balance brought
about by, the evil(s).

\(^75\) 'as the price of': ('\textit{anti}'), cf. Gallop, \textit{Phronesis} IX,
123. In English, 'lesser' is pleonastic: the evils
chosen are either larger, or more numerous, than the
goods chosen. It is like giving five pounds for something
worth two: the buyer chooses a 'greater evil' (being five
pounds worse off) as the price of a 'lesser good' (being
two pounds' worth of something better off).
be made to turn on alleged differences in kind between immediate pleasure or pain and future pleasure or pain: there can be no other measure of pleasure than pleasure itself, in terms of number of pleasures, or of intensity of pleasures; and so with pain also. The advice to be given to the plain man is, then, this: Let him, like an expert in weighing, put in the balance the pleasures and the pains involved in a given course of conduct, and also their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If he is weighing pleasures against pleasures, he should take the more and the greater. If he is weighing pains against pains, he should take the fewer and the less. If it is a weighing of pleasures against pains, then that course of action should be chosen in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and that in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful should be

76 'Weighing nearness and distance' was probably applicable also to the weighing of physical objects. See Note 5 appended to this chapter.
avoided. (354e-356b)

Objects of the same size appear larger when near, but smaller at a distance. The same holds for thicknesses, numbers, and sounds. With reference to such things as these, what if doing well in life consisted in doing or in choosing the greater, and not doing or in avoiding the less? Would men's salvation then lie in the craft of measurement or in the power of appearance? For is not the power of appearance a deceitful thing, which makes men take at one time that of which they repent at another, both in their actions and in the choice of things great and small? It is the craft of measuring which renders impotent (akurion) this spectre, and makes the soul abide

77 The problem confronting the 'skilful weigher' (356b1) is that of choosing between courses of action. Thus in each of the first two situations there would be only one 'weighing' involved (that is, pleasure against pleasure and pain against pain). In the third sort of case (which is the typical akrasia situation), it would seem that there must be at least two 'weighings', viz. the separate 'weighings' of pleasant and painful elements in either alternative.

78 Again there is a pleonasm. The meaning is: Of two objects of the same size, the nearer looks larger than the more distant, and the more distant looks smaller than the nearer. (Cf. the reference to 'equal sounds', at 356c7),
in truth. Again, if salvation were a matter of the choice of odd and even, and of knowing when one ought to choose the greater, and when the less (either in reference to the same quantity or to another, and whether near or at a distance), the thing that would save men's lives would be knowledge - the knowledge of how to measure. All this the plain man must accept. But it has been shown that the salvation of human life does consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains, in terms of 'more' and 'fewer', of 'greater' and 'less', and of 'nearer' and 'remoter'; so that it must be first and foremost a metric salvation, an investigation, that is, of relative excess, defect, and equality. And since it involves measure, it must be a craft and a branch of knowledge.  

This gives the minor premise of an argument in the modus ponens: (in effect) 'If salvation were a matter of the choice of greater and less, it would be \( \text{epistēmē} \) (356a-357b); 'Salvation is a matter of the choice of greater and less' (357a5-b3, cf. 356a-b, the analogy of the 'expert in weighing'); 'Therefore, salvation is \( \text{epistēmē} \)' (cf. 357b4-5).

The analogous forms of measurement specified have included weighing (356a-b), optics, computing, and harmonics (356c).
The argument with the plain man may now be summarised: Socrates and Protagoras are agreed (352b-d) that there is nothing more potent (more kurion) than knowledge (episteme). The plain man, for his part, contends that pleasure often prevails even over someone who has knowledge. Socrates and Protagoras reply, and the plain man admits, that men go wrong in their choice of pleasures and pains, or, in other words, in their choice of good and evil, through want of knowledge or expertise, and, specifically, through want of expertise in measuring. But any erring deed done without knowledge is done in ignorance. Thus to be 'overcome by pleasure' is nothing but gross ignorance.

And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things; you are concerned about your money and give them none; and the result is that you are the worse off both in public and in private life. Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general. And now I should like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true.
Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is good, and the painful evil...

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others. (357e-358b)

So concludes Socrates' analysis of akrasia. (357c-358b)

It is worth pointing out that the hedonist thesis, both as put to Protagoras and as put to the plain man, is a fullblown assertion of the co-extensiveness of the range of application of 'pleasant' with the range of application of 'good', and of the range of application of 'painful' with the range of application of 'evil'. It has, for instance, been suggested that, at least vis-a-vis Protagoras, Socrates insists only on the thesis that whatever is pleasant is good, and not, in addition, on the converse thesis that whatever is good is pleasant. However, it would be unwise, in my opinion, to construe 351c4-6 in this way. Sentences which use 'insofar as' or 'according as' (I mean sentences of the type 'Every X is, insofar as it is X, a Y') can, depending on the contexts in which they occur, be nothing more than flatulent formulations of A propositions ('Insofar as anyone is resident in the country, he is liable for military service' - uttered in a context in which, non-resident nationals were also liable), or can assert that two
terms have identical reference ('Insofar as patients are capable of walking, they are allowed up for a while each day'). There is, then, at least an ambiguity in 351c4-6: Socrates might mean only that 'pleasant' implies 'good'; but he might also mean that 'good' and 'pleasant' are co-extensive in their application.

Fortunately, there are several pointers to his meaning, both within and outside the argument with the plain man. Of those outside the argument, the first is at 351b3-4:

I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill? He assented.

The natural way of taking 'others' here is complementary to 'some', i.e. as meaning 'all others', so that Socrates' meaning is that any given man must either live well or live badly, and cannot do both at once. Socrates then goes on to say that if anyone lives pleasantly, he lives well, and that if anyone lives in pain, he lives badly. While there cannot be a valid formal inference here that living pleasantly is the same as living well, and living in pain the same as living badly, it would at least be curious if Socrates were not arguing on this assumption. If he were

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81 This holds also of the Greek 'kath' hoson' and 'kath' ho'.
not, we should have to suppose three sorts of living: pleasant, painful, and 'neutral' (a distinction which Plato admittedly makes elsewhere); and living 'neutrally' could hardly be taken as a criterion of good or bad living. It would then be necessary to get some criterion other than pleasure, such as would enable an exhaustive classification of all lives (including 'pleasure-neutral' lives) into good and bad to be carried out. But one cannot help feeling ('feeling' being the operative word here) that what Socrates is after is a criterion enabling a thorough classification of all lives into one or other of the two exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories of good living and bad living.

A stronger pointer in this direction is an interchange which follows the argument with the plain man:

True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and noble thing?

The cowards, he replied.

And what is good and noble, I said, is also pleasant?

It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied. (360a)

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82 See Chapter VI on the Philebus.
Where has it been acknowledged? One's first inclination is to take this as a reference back to 353b3-6:

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions noble of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? And all noble achievement is both good and useful? This was admitted.

This passage, then, will not do, as it stands, as the referent of 360a; for, whereas the train of inference here is from 'pleasant' to 'noble' to 'good', at 360a it is from 'good and noble' to 'pleasant'. There would seem, then, to be two possibilities at 360a: either Protagoras has muddled up the train of inference at 353b3-6, or he has all along taken Socrates' point (against both him and the plain man) to be that 'good' and 'pleasant' are co-extensive in their application. Now it seems to me that 353b3-6 refers forward in the text not to 360a, but to 359e5-8:

And is going to battle noble or disgraceful? Noble, he replied.

And if noble, then already admitted by us to be good; for all noble actions we have admitted to be good.

That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.

We need not, then, suppose that Protagoras misremembers
358b3-6; for it seems to me that the best and most economical way of linking up the three passages just quoted is this: Plato wrote in 358b3-6 as a base for the inference from 'noble' to 'good' at 359e5-8; as a base for the inference from 'noble and good' to 'pleasant' at 360a, he wanted the reader to use the hedonist thesis in its stronger form of "Pleasant" implies "good" and "good" implies "pleasant". (This would of course mean that the inference from 'pleasant' to 'noble' at 358b3-6 is a feint. But so it is: Socrates is squeezing the important inference from 'noble' to 'good' (358b3-6) in between the minor (358a5-b3) and major (358b6-c3) premises of a modus ponens syllogism, both of which begin with inferences from 'pleasant' to 'good', and to both of which the inference from 'noble' to 'good' is utterly irrelevant. The initial inference from 'pleasant' to 'noble' merely serves to disguise the ugly duckling by giving it a specious resemblance to the birds on either side of it). And it was perfectly reasonable of Plato to expect the reader to take the moves in this way, since it is open to the reader to take the very first statement of the hedonist thesis at
351c4-6 quite naturally as a statement of the thesis in its stronger form.

These, then, are two pointers from outside the argument with the plain man to a stronger rather than a weaker reading of the hedonist thesis. Within the argument between Socrates and the plain man, there is one quite obvious clue to the proper way of taking the thesis (at least as between Socrates and the plain man): this is the rejection, at 354c-d, of any notion that there might be, for the plain man, some criterion of the goodness or badness of pleasures and pains other than pleasure or pain themselves:

Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good; and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. For if you call enjoyment evil with reference to some other criterion, and with some other end in view, then you can tell us what that criterion or end is; but you cannot... And again, have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains-- then, if you have some end in view other than pleasure and pain when you call actual pain a good, you can tell us what that is; but you cannot. (354c5-e2)

This of course is to say that, for the plain man, anything is good only if it is pleasant, and evil only if it is painful;
without such an interpretation of the hedonist thesis, the double substitution in the akrasia theory of (on the one hand) 'good' for 'pleasant' and 'evil' for 'painful', and of (on the other hand) 'pleasant' for 'good' and 'painful' for 'evil' (355b-356b) could not be carried out, and, in particular, the account of moral belief ('It is better to do X than to do Y') in terms of the 'measuring' of pleasures and pains (356b sq.) would not be a comprehensive one. In the akrasia argument, then, the thesis appears in its stronger form. But, at the end of the akrasia argument, Socrates gets Protagoras and the rest of the company not merely to agree, as Protagoras has agreed all along, that this is how the plain man must be handled, but, in addition, to agree to the hedonist thesis (358a5-b3). If, however, they accept the hedonist thesis because of what Socrates has been saying to his hypothetical plain man (and I cannot see anything apart from this which might be a ground for their accepting it), it is only reasonable to suppose that they accept precisely the version of it that the plain man accepts, i.e. that they too accept it in its stronger form. I would therefore say that at 358a5-6

... the pleasant is good and the painful evil ...
is meant to convey the stronger form of the thesis. But the whole akrasia argument arose out of Protagoras's desire to have the thesis as stated at 351c4-6 and again at 351e1-3 investigated. If, as I have suggested, this original statement of the thesis is, on the face of it, ambiguous in that it can be taken to convey either the weaker or the stronger version, and if, at the end of the investigation, Protagoras is ready to accept the stronger version, it is a fair inference that the original statement at 351c4-6 and 351e1-3 is meant as a statement of the stronger version. I would therefore conclude that the hedonist thesis adopted in D.6b is throughout a full-blown one, warranting inferences both from 'pleasant' to 'good' and from 'good' to 'pleasant'.

So far a synopsis has been given of Socrates' analysis of akrasia, and it has been argued that in making this analysis Socrates employs a full-blown hedonist thesis.

Before discussing the remainder of D.6b (that is, 358b-360e), we might consider whether, from what we have seen so far, we can reasonably infer that Plato himself is committed to the hedonist thesis propounded by Socrates.

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83 Jowett, who translates: 'the pleasant is the good' seems to take it in this way. The Greek is ambiguous.
Consider for a moment pages 351 and 352. These contain a sort of preamble to Socrates' argument with the plain man. They are devoted to stating, and obtaining Protagoras's reactions to, the two cardinal propositions of that argument, namely (1) the hedonist thesis and (2) the theory of akrasia. Now it has been urged that, at 351-352, Socrates sponsors the hedonist thesis. If this view is right, we cannot of course automatically infer to Platonic sponsorship of the hedonist thesis; but, at the same time, it must be allowed that Socratic sponsorship would tell in favour of Platonic sponsorship rather than against it.

A preliminary point first. It will no doubt seem to readers of the original Jowett and similar translations that at 351c Socrates undoubtedly sponsors the hedonist thesis:

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85 In particular, it would be inconsistent to infer from Socratic to Platonic sponsorship of anti-hedonism in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo*, but to plead in the case of the *Protagoras* that Socratic sponsorship of hedonism need not imply Platonic sponsorship of it; unless of course one could show some compelling reason for treating the *Protagoras* in this way.
For I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant ... 86

In the Greek, however, Socrates does not say that anything: 'say' is followed by a question:

For I say: are not things good in as far as they are pleasant...?

And by 'for I say' ('ego gar lego') Socrates is most naturally taken to mean (as Guthrie puts it):

I mean to say, are not things, etc.

So then, it cannot be argued that, because Socrates prefaces his formulation of the hedonist thesis at 351c4-6 by the words 'For I say', he is therefore asserting the hedonist thesis.

86 This translation, which appears in the first three editions of Jowett, has been corrected in the fourth (TDP I, p. 178), the corrected translation being much the same as Guthrie's (in the Penguin translation, p. 87). Ostwald (in Vlastos's Plato's Protagoras, p. 56) follows the original Jowett translation, no doubt in view of what Vlastos says on p. xi (n. 50). Croiset in the Budé edition (III, i, p. 73) also represents Socrates as asserting the hedonist thesis ('Je dirais plutôt: ...'), though unlike Jowett he preserves the interrogative.

87 Plato: Protagoras and Meno, p. 87.

88 See also Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making, p. 47.
On the other hand, something might turn upon the fact that at 351c4-6, and again at 351e1-3, Socrates formulates the hedonist thesis in questions expecting affirmative answers:

Are not things good in as far as they are pleasant...?

My meaning then is that: whether they are not good insofar as they are pleasant...

In I.M. Crombie’s opinion, whether one takes Socrates to sponsor the hedonist thesis depends upon whether one takes a question expecting the answer 'Yes' to be the same thing as a statement. This surely is to oversimplify. For Socrates could have said: 'What do you say to this, Protagoras: Things are good in as far as they are pleasant...?' and the doubt would still remain. It is not really a matter of whether a question expecting the answer 'Yes' amounts to a statement; this can readily be granted. It is rather a matter of whether a grammatical statement (or its equivalent) made by Socrates necessarily involves Socrates' sponsorship of what the statement expresses. We can then allow that Socrates states the hedonist thesis at 351-352, but still query his sponsorship of it. Perhaps the fairest way of putting it is to say that

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89 EPD 1, p. 240.
his statement of the thesis raises a rebuttable presumption of his sponsorship.

I doubt whether any attempted rebuttal of the presumption can be entirely satisfactory; but the following considerations seem to me to be relevant.

On a number of occasions in his ethical writings, Aristotle mentions the ethical beliefs of Socrates. Since Aristotle was born some fifteen years after Socrates' death, his knowledge of Socratic beliefs was not firsthand. His most likely secondary source would be Plato. There is, moreover, as A.T. Taylor pointed out, a fairly close correspondence between what Aristotle thought were the ethical beliefs of the historical Socrates, and certain of the positions argued for by Socrates in the Protagoras. With the somewhat doubtful exception of the Laches and the Phaedo, the Protagoras seems to be the only one of Plato's dialogues with which this

90 See the list of references given by Taylor, PMW, p.235, n.1.
92 For the alleged correspondence between NE 1116b 4-5 and Laches 192d sqq. see Joachim, ANE, p.120. (Taylor, loc. cit., doubts whether Aristotle has the Laches in mind).
93 cf. NE 1144b 19-20 and Phaedo 68-69. (A correspondence also holds between this portion of the Ethics and the Protagoras).
correspondence holds. It therefore looks as if the
Protagoras was Aristotle's main, and possibly his only,
secondary authority for the ethical beliefs of Socrates.

Now the hedonist thesis is undoubtedly of crucial
importance in the Protagoras, whether Socrates is supposed
to sponsor it or not: it is quite as important a component
of the dialogue as, say, the theory of akrasia. If then
the Socrates of the Protagoras is supposed to sponsor the
hedonist thesis, might be not have expected to find some
indirect confirmation of this sponsorship in the ethical

94 Indirect, since what we should expect to find in Aristotle
is not 'In the Protagoras, Socrates sponsors the view
that p' (or the like), but simply 'Socrates thought that
p'. Assuming that the theory suggested by Taylor is
right, we have to infer from beliefs which, according to
Aristotle, the historical Socrates sponsored to beliefs
which, according to Aristotle, the Socrates of the
Protagoras sponsors.

It does not matter whether Aristotle had good reason for
treating the Protagoras as a reliable secondary source
for the beliefs of the historical Socrates: Plato might
have told him that it was, or he might have formed such
an opinion on less adequate grounds.

It is of course just possible that Aristotle mistakenly
supposed that the Socrates of the Protagoras does not
sponsor the hedonist thesis, a possibility which his
silence about Socratic hedonism leaves open. But assuming,
because of his contact with Plato, that he was more
probably right than wrong about the views of the Socrates
of the Protagoras, his silence points rather to the
conclusion that the Socrates of the Protagoras does not
sponsor the hedonist thesis,
writings of Aristotle? Might we not have expected to find somewhere in Aristotle a remark to the effect that Socrates was one of those who held that the pleasant and the good were the same? For Aristotle did think this belief important enough to tell us that Eudoxus held it, and to suggest that the grounds upon which he held it were inadequate. Socrates was a much more important moral philosopher than Eudoxus. It would therefore be surprising if Aristotle had inferred from the *Protagoras* Socrates' sponsorship of the hedonist thesis, but neglected to mention this sponsorship when discussing the thesis.

Another consideration is this. While Socrates does not force Protagoras to swallow the hedonist thesis at 351-352, he does taunt him with it. This is brought out at

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95 NE 1172b 9 sqq.

96 Not impossible, I allow, but still very surprising.

97 Hackforth (Classical Quarterly XXII, at p. 41) is surely wrong in saying that 'The hedonist thesis is forced on Protagoras in the first instance'. (From the references he gives, he obviously means by 'in the first instance': 'at 351-352'). By the end of 352 Protagoras has agreed to do no more than investigate the thesis (on which cf. 351e3-7).
Then to live pleasantly is good, and to live unpleasantly evil.

Yes, he said, if he lives so as to find pleasure in what is good and noble.

And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world (hoi polloi), call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?

What is wrong? Protagoras seems, for once, to be agreeing with hoi polloi, with men who have no understanding and only repeat what their leaders are pleased to tell them, who just say anything that comes to their head, and who hold beliefs that a sophist would be ashamed to entertain.

The reason why he agrees with them is subsequently brought home to the reader in the analysis of akrasia. It is because he has in this case failed to do the sort of thing which he did in the course of his lengthy Apology (314-328), namely to track down the implications of the professed beliefs of ordinary people, and so to discover more fundamental beliefs which their professed beliefs presuppose. It is just because

98 317a.
99 353a.
100 333c.
101 More precisely: (1) That the Athenians (a) accord to everyone the right to speak in the Assembly on matters of politike arete, and (b) deem mad anyone who owns to unjust behaviour, shows that they believe that all men
Footnote continued.

share in politike arete (322e-323c). (2) That men do not admonish or punish the victims of nature or accident, but do admonish and punish the unjust and impious, shows that they believe that arete is teachable (323c-324c). Admittedly, Protagoras does not speak of beliefs presupposing or implying other beliefs (though he comes very close to doing so at 324b5-6). Nevertheless, it is apparent that what is at issue between him and Socrates is the set of beliefs on which men's political behaviour is based. The beliefs at issue can hardly be supposed to be beliefs to which all men give conscious assent at some time in their lives. If they were, the issue between Protagoras and Socrates could be settled quite simply by counting heads: it would simply be a matter of (say) putting the question "Is arete teachable?" to every Athenian. Yet Protagoras does not suggest doing any such thing. He no doubt realises that there is a great difference between being committed to a belief, and perceiving that one is so committed. Though ordinary Athenians are perhaps committed to the belief that arete is teachable, it is doubtless unwise to ask them anything more penetrating than "Should temple-robbers be punished?"
the plain man openly avers that certain sorts of pleasures
are evil, and that certain sorts of painful processes are
good, that he can be brought to confess the hedonist thesis. 102
It is strange that Protagoras, who sees in the common belief
that criminals are in need of punishment an argument for a
common belief in the teachability of arete, 103 should not be
able to see one stage beyond the common belief in wicked
pleasures and remedial goods. If I am right in attributing
this frame of mind to Socrates, then at 351c2-3 Socrates is
taunting Protagoras not so much with holding common beliefs
as with holding them uncritically.

This becomes clearer with Socrates' question at 351d7-e1:

Do you not call 'pleasant' things which participate
in pleasure or bring it about?

Protagoras readily assents to this, as one would expect him
to. The point of the question is a commonplace one: we
customarily term 'pleasant' not only things which are of them-
selves pleasant ("sharing-in-pleasure", to use Socrates'
language), such as eating water-melon, but also things which
are 'pleasure-producing', such as growing or buying

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102 cf. 353c-354e.

103 324a.
Now, Socrates seems to imply, if Protagoras is ready to stand by this commonplace view of the use of 'pleasant', and so is agreeable to the notion that things which do not per se bestow pleasure can all the same be pleasant insofar as they are productive of pleasure, it will not do for him to maintain that some good things are merely painful, that some bad things are merely pleasant, and that indifferent things can be determinately pleasant or determinately painful. (The working out of this is of course left until the argument with the plain man: we have to wait until 353c-354d to be shown in detail that Protagoras, like the plain man, is guilty of uncritical and superficial

104 That is to say, felicific actions or processes are, qua felicific, pleasant. This of course need not imply that the pleasantness (in this sense) of such actions or processes cannot be offset to some extent by their immediate painfulness. Socrates can hardly be claiming, or attributing to the plain man the view, that such things as 'burning, cutting, drugging, and starving' are immediately pleasant ('share in pleasure'). While allowing that such things are immediately painful (354b1), he suggests that they are nonetheless also pleasant, qua pleasure-producing or felicific. (The verb 'poiein' is used again at 353d3 of what is brought about or produced in the future).

105 Socrates' suggestion that there are two sorts of criteria of a thing's pleasantness (351d7-e1) is made immediately after Protagoras's assertion at c7-d7; and Socrates at once follows up his suggestion by putting the hedonist thesis to Protagoras a second time (e1-3).
137.

thinking when he dissociates the pleasantness of things from their goodness).

But, it will be said, none of this need mean that Socrates does not sponsor the hedonist thesis. Perhaps he thinks both that Protagoras's views are superficial and uncritically held and also that the hedonist thesis, which a critical examination of these views discloses, is right. Is there any way of determining whether or not this is so?

Consider something else that Socrates has put to Protagoras quite early in the dialogue:

> Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think that areté cannot be taught. (320b)

Having what examples before him? Why, the parliamentary procedure of the Athenians ('a wise people')\(^{106}\) and the private lives of the 'best and wisest' of their citizens.\(^{107}\) This, Socrates says, is the way the Athenians handle their public and private affairs; and, on the basis of this, I, Socrates, consider that areté is unteachable. Is he serious about this? Hardly. For, as soon as Protagoras has delivered his lengthy reply to this contention, Socrates straightway begins the discussion of the oneness of areté,

\(^{106}\) 319b-d.

\(^{107}\) 319d-320b.
leaving no room for doubt whether he considers wisdom to be an aspect of arete:

You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of arete? (329e–330a)

But, if Socrates believes this, and, moreover, loses no time in attempting to identify the other parts of arete with wisdom, how can it be said that he ever seriously doubted that arete was teachable?

If arete is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, Socrates, then I cannot but suppose that it is capable of being taught. (361b)

is the rebuke which Socrates playfully administers to himself at the end of the dialogue; but it has not needed forty pages of argument to convince him of this: he could just as well have said it at the beginning of his reply to the Apology of Protagoras. He cannot, then, have been serious in maintaining the unteachability of arete.

If he is not serious about the unteachability of arete, why should he be serious about hedonism? The hedonist thesis, like the view that arete is unteachable, is not elicited dialectically from Protagoras (and this, surely, distinguishes

108 361a–b. (Socrates fancifully supposes the rebuke to be administered by the argument).
it from the thesis of the oneness of arete), but merely put to him as something implicit in common morality. The hedonist thesis derives from the inability of the plain man to nominate any criterion of goodness, other than that of pleasantness, with reference to which he pronounces the pleasures of self-indulgence evil, and the pains of self-denial good.

Here, however, another consideration arises. Socrates, it will be said, can well afford to disown the view that arete is unteachable, since he bases nothing upon it. But could he, even if he wanted to, disown the hedonist thesis? For it is surely an integral part of the second of his arguments for the oneness of courage and wisdom. More precisely, he derives one of the Socratic paradoxes from it, and it is in the light of this paradox that he concludes the argument. He is serious about the paradox: how can he fail to be serious about the foundation for the paradox? 109

109 cf. Vlastos, PP, p. x1, n. 50. Vlastos argues that for Socrates 'to make (the hedonist thesis) the premise for (the paradox) would have been extremely misleading, for it would have encouraged the listener to believe a falsehood'. I am not sure whether this is not too naive an approach: certainly the Socrates of Republic III 414 has no qualms about telling his putative listeners a whopper. This apart, we must remember that hedonism is
The proof of the paradox follows immediately upon the assent of the company to the hedonist thesis at 358b:

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions noble of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? And the noble work is also useful and good?

This was admitted.

Then, I said, if (A) the pleasant is the good, (B) nobody does anything either with the knowledge or in the belief that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And (C) this 'inferiority of a man to himself' is merely ignorance, as the 'superiority of a man to himself' is wisdom.

They all assented.

And (D) is not ignorance having a false belief and being deceived about important matters?

To this also they unanimously assented.

Then, I said, (E) no man willingly pursues evil, or what he thinks to be evil. (F) To pursue what one believes to be evil rather than what is good is not in human nature; and (G) when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.

All of them agreed to every word of this. (358b–d).

109 cont. something to which the plain man (the principal 'listener' at this point) is implicitly committed; this being so, might it not be thought expedient by Socrates to turn this inarticulate belief (with which he might or might not agree) to good account? The foundation may be shaky, but perhaps it is better to use a shaky foundation for limited purposes than to tear down the whole building.
(The letters A to G are used to label those propositions which either comprise the paradox, or constitute the proof of it).

I take $E$ to be the main statement of the paradox, and $F$ and $G$ to be elaborations upon this main statement. Now at $E$ we have, not just one proposition, but a conjunction of two propositions: Both ($E'$) no man willingly pursues evil and ($E''$) no man willingly pursues what he thinks to be evil. This means that we have to account separately for the derivation of each of the propositions $E'$ and $E''$.

The derivation of $E''$ is straightforward. For $B$, like $E$, has two members, the second being: ($B''$) Nobody does anything in the belief that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. $B''$ can be rewritten: Nobody does anything believing it to be the worse of two attainable things, unless he is physically compelled. We have only to substitute 'evil' for 'the worse of two attainable things', and 'willingly' for 'unless he is

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110 I write 'unless he is physically compelled' for 'when he might do the better'. It is reasonably clear that words like 'exon' connote physical rather than psychological ability, especially in view of 358d1.
physically compelled', and we have the equivalent of $E''$.

$E'$ is a little more tricky. Its derivation cannot be symmetrical with that of $E''$; that is, it does not follow analytically from: (E') Nobody does anything with the knowledge that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. For the proposition so derived from $E'$ is not $E'$ but: No man willingly pursues what he knows to be evil; and this is not what is in the text. The text reads: (E') No man willingly pursues evil; and this obviously applies whether or not the agent believes what he pursues to be evil. 112

If we leave aside for a moment the aspect of physical compulsion (i.e. if we assume that the agent can always 'do the better'), then we must hold, following $E''$, that

111 I do not of course want to say that 'willingly' means, for Plato, 'unless one is physically compelled'. Compulsion is the necessary and sufficient condition of involuntariness only in cases where the agent believes his action to be evil.

112 Mr. Gulley (writing in Phronesis X, pp. 82-105) seems to have overlooked this. For some discussion of this, see Note 6 appended to this chapter.
anyone who does (or pursues) evil believes what he
pursues to be good; because E"' asserts that (physical
compulsion apart) no one pursues or does anything that
he believes to be evil. But to believe that something
which is in fact evil is good is to 'have a false belief
and be deceived about important matters',\(^\text{113}\) and it seems
to have been a Socratic commonplace that such ignorance
is involuntary.\(^\text{114}\) It is this latter consideration which
supplies the link needed to establish E'.\(^\text{115}\)

So long then as we read into the argument the premise
that false belief about important matters is always held
unwillingly (and it seems to me quite reasonable to import
this premise), the derivation of E from B is plain sailing.
But according to Socrates B follows from A (i.e. from the
hedonist thesis), and A has already been agreed to, not only
by the hypothetical plain man,\(^\text{116}\) but by Protagoras and the
other sophists.\(^\text{117}\) It seems obvious, then, that the paradox
is not merely consistent with the hedonist thesis, but is

\(^{113}\) 358c4-5.

\(^{114}\) Republic II 382a7-8; cf. Sophist 230a6.

\(^{115}\) The argument (put into intensional form) would run:
All wrongdoing is ignorance about important matters;
All such ignorance is involuntary; . All wrongdoing
is involuntary.

\(^{116}\) 354d3, e2.

\(^{117}\) 358a5-b3.
derived from it. Why then need we have any reservation on this score about Socrates' sponsorship of the thesis?

Turn back for a moment to the argument with the plain man. What Protagoras does not deny, and the plain man does, is the power of knowledge. For the plain man, knowledge is not such as to rule (hoion archein), while other things, like anger, pleasure, pain, love, and fear are; for people can have knowledge of what is right, and yet be overcome by these things. Now it was suggested in Chapter I, in the discussion of the akrasia idioms, that internal akrasia statements have at least a close affinity with explanations of actions in terms of (non-intentional) motive. That is, the modern counterparts of such statements as 'The troops fled, because they were

118 352c8-d3.
119 352b3-4.
120 352c4.
121 352b7-8.
122 Chapter I (c).
overcome by fear of the enemy' and 'He gave her all his property, because he was overcome by love' would be statements like: 'The troops fled from fear of the enemy' and 'His infatuation for her made him give her all his property'. It may, in the light of this, be possible to state the point of disagreement between Socrates and the plain man in a different way.

One thing which the plain man is committed to denying is that, for any given action, an adequate explanation of the agent's behaviour can be furnished in terms of his moral beliefs. Suppose, for instance, that a soldier remains at his post, despite the fact that it has been attacked by an overwhelmingly superior force. The plain man wants to know why he stayed, and did not, like some of his comrades, run away. You say to the plain man: 'Why, I

123 Up to 358, the theory of akrasia is of course formulated in terms of knowledge only: thinking and believing are introduced only at 358 foll. I doubt however whether there is in the Protagoras, insofar as the grasp of truths is concerned, any significant difference between knowledge and belief of truths: the epistêma/orthê doxa distinction of the Meno has not yet begun to play its part. (In particular, the definition of ignorance given by Socrates at 358c3-5 suggests as a definition of propositional knowledge: Having a true belief, and not being deceived about important matters).
suppose that he stayed at his post because he thought it the right thing to do'. To this the plain man might well reply that it really tells him nothing: for, he will say, those cowards who deserted no doubt thought the same thing; so that both the man who stayed and those who ran away had the same moral belief. You then try another approach: those (you say) who ran away did so from fear; while the brave man mastered his fear, and was kept going by his confidence. With this sort of explanation the plain man will be happy. It is an explanation in terms, not or moral belief, but of motive; and it presupposes a demarcation between moral beliefs, which are powerless to account for actions, and motives, in terms of which explanations of behaviour are to be given. Beliefs, even true beliefs, cannot be adequate explanations of actions, because the holding of a moral belief does not guarantee that the agent will act as it prescribes: motives, on the other hand, do afford adequate explanations of conduct, simply because anger, fear, lust, and the like are internal forces which

124 Unless otherwise indicated, 'motive' is used to mean 'non-intentional motive'.

have the power to compel the agent to act in certain ways, that is, to 'overcome' or 'conquer' him.

This is the sort of theory which Socrates sets himself the task of demolishing. Socrates' first mention of the theory of akrasia (352b-c) gives a list of things which can 'overcome' people: anger, pleasure, pain, love, and fear. This looks like a mixed bag; and so it is not surprising that Socrates first substitutes for 'anger, love, and fear' the phrase 'some of those things which I was just now mentioning', and then drops them from the discussion altogether. He concentrates instead on pleasure and pain.

In a way it is curious that he should do this, since what he is discussing with Protagoras is the oneness of courage and wisdom. Concepts such as those of cowardice, rashness, fear, and confidence would seem more directly relevant to an argument about the nature of courage, than would the concept of pleasure. Why then does he concentrate on pleasure, to the exclusion of fear and anger? The answer is that he wants to give an analysis of choice, and to do this he needs something which can plausibly be advanced as a criterion of the goodness of action. Fear and anger will not serve his purpose here: for actions are good or bad according as they are or are not conducive to the agent's

125 352e1.
long-term happiness, while fear and anger are frames of mind in which actions are done.

Pleasure, Socrates contends, is the only 'end or standard'\textsuperscript{126} in relation to which pleasure and pain can be said by the man in the street to be good or evil. In other words, pleasure is, for the plain man, the sole criterion of the goodness or badness of pleasure and pain. This is an odd thing to say. It is one thing to say (however un-plausibly) that low petrol consumption is the sole criterion of the goodness of motor cars: it is another thing altogether to say that low petrol consumption is the sole criterion of the goodness of low petrol consumption. The first of these statements makes sense, while the second does not.

As we have seen, Socrates has suggested, and Protagoras agreed, that 'pleasant' means either 'sharing in pleasure' or 'producing pleasure'.\textsuperscript{127} In the light of this, we can perhaps explain the odd contention that (in effect) pleasure is the sole criterion of the goodness of pleasure. Overeating

\textsuperscript{126} 'telos', 354b7.

\textsuperscript{127} 351d7-e1.
'shares in pleasure', but produces future pain which outweighs the immediate pleasure in which it shares.\textsuperscript{128} It is thus on balance painful, and therefore bad. But pleasure (or the lack of it) is in this case the sole criterion not, surely, of the goodness of the immediate pleasure in which overeating 'shares', but of the goodness of overeating itself.\textsuperscript{129} This would suggest that, when Socrates says that pleasure is the sole criterion of the goodness or badness of pleasure and pain, he is using 'pleasure' to connote both (i) certain types of actions like overeating and getting drunk; and (ii) some ill-defined thing which these sorts of actions are supposed to 'share in' or produce; his meaning then would be that the sole criterion of the goodness of any pleasure, in the first sense, will always be pleasure, in the second sense.

What precisely this second sense of 'pleasure' might be is very difficult to say, and perhaps Plato himself, when he composed the Protagoras, was not very clear in his own

\textsuperscript{128} 353c-e.

\textsuperscript{129} 'Evil' at 353c7 and 9 obviously goes with 'eating', 'drinking' and 'lovemaking' (c6).
mind about it. Probably, though, it would not be too far wide of the mark to suppose that Socrates uses 'pleasure' more or less uncritically as a feeling-word, which means that, were he called upon to define pleasure, he would have to do so in terms either of bodily sensations or of the mental analogues of those sensations. For, firstly, Socrates is arguing the case for hedonism with the plain man, and accordingly has to give the plain man some simple criterion of goodness which will be readily intelligible to him; and, secondly, he makes it reasonably clear that 'pain' is being used in the sense of 'physical suffering', and that 'pleasure' and 'pain' are polar terms.

The proof of the hedonist thesis to the plain man is the first of three stages in the demolishing of the theory of akrasia. Let us now briefly consider the remaining two.

The second stage (354e-356a) is the analysis of the explanatory clause ('because they are overcome by pleasure') in the theory of akrasia. The analysis in effect reduces

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130 This could be done in English by employing words like 'exhilarate' and 'titillate', both of which have mental as well as bodily application.

131 The examples of pains cited are disease and poverty (353d-e), and gymnastic exercises, military service, burning, cutting, drugging, and starving (354a).
'being overcome by pleasure' to (1) 'choosing greater evils as the price of lesser goods' and its equivalent (ii) 'choosing greater pains as the price of lesser pleasures'.

This reductive analysis does not of itself disclose any absurdity in the theory of akrasia, except for a prima facie one, which it disposes of.

The hedonist thesis warrants the substitution of 'good' for 'pleasant' and 'evil' for 'painful', and vice versa. The substitution of 'good' for 'pleasant' and of 'evil' for 'painful' makes the theory of akrasia say that a man does evil things, knowing them to be evil, because he is overcome by good things.

This is prima facie absurd, but the absurdity vanishes when we realise that this can only mean that

132 On this point see Gallop's article 'The Socratic Paradox in the Protagoras' (Phronesis IX (1964), pp. 117-129, especially at p. 123). Compare also fn. 75 above.

133 At 355a-b, Socrates tells the plain man that the theory of akrasia (of which two formulations, both containing the 'because' clause, are given) is absurd. He offers to prove this by 'substitution of names' (355b), and gives his proof at 355c-357e. Since what he proves is that 'being overcome by pleasure' = 'ignorance' (cf. 357c-d), the absurdity spoken of at 355a-b must be self-contradiction. However the 'swaggering questioner' at 355c-d must be using 'absurd' somewhat differently. For what he calls 'absurd' is the first of a series of reformulations of the theory of akrasia ('that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good'); and by 'absurd' he seems to mean 'on the face of it either nonsensical or self-contradictory': once Socrates
a man does evil things, knowing them to be evil, because he is overcome by good things which are unworthy to overcome... evil things.

(The first 'overcome' here means something like 'prevailed upon to act', while the second 'overcome' means something like 'cancel out' or 'counterbalance'). Socrates' point is this: It is a feature of akrasia that the akrates (the 'morally weak' man) takes or chooses to have both good things and evil things. At the same time, everyone present (including the imaginary plain man) would agree that the akrates does wrong or errs (hamartanei).
The very fact that he errs entails that the good things which he takes or chooses are 'unworthy to conquer' (i.e. inadequate to counterbalance or outweigh)\textsuperscript{136} the evil things which he takes or chooses; and another way of putting this entailment is to say that the \textit{akrates} chooses greater evils as the price of lesser goods. \textit{Now, if the hedonist thesis is accepted, akrasia (doing evil knowing it to be evil) has to be explicable as 'being overcome by good things'; but such an explanation is un plausible, unless we amplify it to 'being overcome (= prevailed upon to act) by good things which are inadequate to counterbalance the evil things which are chosen along with them'; and this in turn warrants the reduction of the explanatory clause in the theory of \textit{akrasia} to: 'because he chooses greater evils as the price of lesser goods'.}\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{136} cf. fn. 74, above.

\textsuperscript{137} cf. fn. 75, above, on 'anti'.

\textsuperscript{138} Gallop rightly observes (op. cit., p. 124) that 'to say that advantages are unworthy to prevail over' (= \textit{anaxia nikan}) 'disadvantages is to say that the advantages are "not worth" (\textit{anaxia}) the disadvantages they entail'. This accords perfectly with the analysis of 'being overcome by pleasure' as 'choosing greater evils as the price of lesser goods'. \textit{I do not however follow Gallop's claim that there is an 'ought' lurking in 'axios' (and cf. Vlastos, PP, p. xlii, n. 53).}
Footnote continued.

It seems to me that Gallop (but not Socrates) is confusing two things: (i) the notion that people ought not to be overcome by pleasure; and (ii) the notion that the pleasures of akrasia are not worth the pains. While (ii) has a part to play in the two reductions of 'being overcome by pleasure', (i) has not.

Suppose, as Gallop does, that what the 'swaggering questioner' is asking at 355d3-4 is whether or not the advantages (pleasures) of akrasia ought to have prevailed with the agent over its disadvantages (pains), and that the answer given by Socrates at d5 is that they ought not. We must then suppose the questioner to ask (d6-8) on what score advantages ought not to prevail (with agents) over disadvantages (etc.), and the only conceivable (e1-2) answer to be that it is on the score of quantitative disproportion. This is far from being the only conceivable answer, so that at d6-8 and d3-4 the questioner must have meant something else.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the import of the question at d3-4 is whether, in akrasia situations, profits (or advantages or goods or pleasures) are adequate to offset (nikan) losses (or disadvantages or evils or pains); and that the import of the question at d6-8 is on what score profits are inadequate to offset losses; in that case 'on the score of quantitative disproportion' might well be said to be the only conceivable answer.

It is somewhat unobliging of Socrates not to say at 355c foll. that the advantages of akrasia do not of course conquer, outweigh, offset, or prevail over (nikan) its disadvantages in the long run. But this is surely what he means. In akrasia situations advantages are ouk axía nikan disadvantages, not in the sense that they do sometimes nikan but ought not to, but in the sense that, even if only the advantages of akrasia are immediately experienced, these advantages are such as to be ultimately outweighed by disadvantages.
Having completed this reduction, Socrates makes another reduction, which is along the same lines but more sketchy, by substituting 'pleasure' for 'good' in the theory of *akrasia* and 'pain' for 'evil'. (Even though Socrates does not explicitly say so, this second reduction warrants the rewriting of the explanatory clause in the theory as: 'because he chooses greater pains as the price of lesser pleasures'). This second reduction is rounded off with the remark that 'inadequacy' or 'unworthiness' as between pleasure and pain can only be a quantitative relationship of some sort, and that no further special consideration applies as between immediate pleasure and future pleasures and pains.

This brings us to the third and final stage of the demolition of the theory of *akrasia* (356b-357b). The first paragraph (356a8-c3) might not unreasonably be headed: 'How to Choose: Some Simple Ways'. It tells the plain man, in some detail, how not to 'choose greater pains as the price of lesser pleasures'. A mistake which has been made in

139 This looks back to the alternative formulation of the theory of *akrasia* at 355bi-3.
interpreting this paragraph has been to divide it at 356b3. Up to 356b3, Socrates is saying to the plain man: Put your pleasures and pains (etc.) on the scales, and say which is heavier. After 356b3, he is saying things like: 'If you are weighing pains against pains, you should take the fewer and the less'. One's first reaction is to say that up to 356b3 Socrates is telling the plain man how to formulate his moral beliefs, in the sense of telling him how to formulate propositions beginning: 'The best (or pleasantest) thing for me to do in these circumstances is to...'; while from 356b3 on he is telling the plain man not what to say, but what to do.

If one takes this view of the analogy of the weigher, Socrates' labour is vain, and what he says need not worry proponents of the theory of akrasia; for he has done nothing to bridge the gulf between moral belief and action. The champions of akrasia can agree that the analogy is apt; they can allow that moral beliefs are formed as the analogy supposes; but they can also insist that the analogy merely highlights the difference between good men and morally weak men. Good men, they will say, form their moral beliefs as

140 cf. Gallop, op. cit., p. 128.
the analogy supposes, and also obey the injunctions telling them what to do (e.g., when weighing pains against pains, they always take the fewer and the less intense), while the morally weak form moral beliefs identical with those of the good, but fail to obey the prescriptions governing choice and action. This (the champions of akrasia will say) is a pity, but there is no absurdity in it: the akrates unfortunately is the sort of person who does evil, rightly believing it to be evil, because he chooses greater evil as the price of lesser good; this merely reflects the gap between belief and action, a gap which the analogy of the weigher does nothing to bridge.

This view of the analogy envisages a weigher who merely records equalities and discrepancies, and whose interests are merely speculative. But it seems to me extremely doubtful whether Socrates has this sort of weighing in mind; rather that the weigher's job is to make choices between heavier and lighter, and nearer and more distant, objects. The weigher is not on this view

141 cf. fn. 123, above.
like the nurse in the doctor's surgery who disinterestedly records the patient's weight, but rather like a postal clerk who is employed to check parcels for deficient postage, and who performs his task by throwing each parcel first onto a scale, and then down one or other of two chutes, according as it is sufficiently or insufficiently stamped: for the clerk to throw a parcel from the scale into the chute marked 'insufficient postage' is for him to 'say' that the parcel is heavier than the weight against which it is being checked, in the sense that it would normally be reasonable to infer from his choice of chute to his believing the parcel to be heavier.

Two considerations seem to me to support this alternative interpretation of the analogy. Firstly the analogy is supposed to throw some light on what it is not to succumb to pleasure (or, as we should say, to temptation). It must be, then, that the morally weak or incontinent man does badly something which the continent man, 'like a skilful weigher', does well. Is Socrates' meaning therefore that continent men do well, and incontinent men badly, specific problems of mental arithmetic, and that both sorts of men act only after expressly formulating answers to these problems of the type: 'Disadvantage $D$ is twice as great as Advantage
A'?

This would surely be an unplausible line for Socrates to run. Brave men do not preface their actions with exercises in mental arithmetic; nor do they go into battle having first quite explicitly told themselves that what they are doing is $x$ times as something-or-other as running away; and similar considerations apply in the case of cowards. At the same time, the postal clerk in our example does not preface the sorting of each parcel with a sum, nor does he say to himself, *totidem verbis*, before consigning a parcel to one or other chute: 'This is heavier (lighter) than the counterweight on the scale'.

The second consideration is this. At 357a5-b3, we find Socrates saying:

Well then, my friends, I say to them; since the salvation (*soteria*) of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains - in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter - must not this salvation consist in measurement, since it involves a consideration (*skepsis*) of excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

Here, as David Gallop rightly observes, salvation is identified twice with something: in the 'since' clause,

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142 See *Phronesis* IX (1964) at pages 127-128.
it is identified with right choice; while in the principal clause, it is identified with measurement. This can mean two things. Firstly, it can mean, as Gallop implies, that Socrates is fudging, by giving 'the impression that the correct choice of pleasures and pains actually is the art of measurement' while fully realising that it is not. But, secondly, Socrates may not be fudging after all: perhaps he thinks (and Plato thought) that choosing rightly is an exercise of measuring skill, and the correct choice is a type of measurement. This latter is on the face of it the more reasonable interpretation. Socrates makes no bones about inferring subsequently143 that error in choice of pains and pleasures is ignorance, which makes it eminently reasonable to assume that at 357a5-b3 he wants to do something more than just give 'the impression' that correct choice is (the art of) measurement. This in turn leads one to suppose that in the simile of the weigher something more than a marriage of convenience between right choice and knowledge is contemplated.

143 cf. 357d1, where Socrates calls 'being overcome by pleasure' (= 'erring in the choice of pleasures and pains', d4-5) 'amathia'.
At 356a8-c3 Socrates in fact exploits the fundamental weakness of the theory of akrasia, namely the stipulation that the actions of the morally weak man represent choices between alternative courses of action: the akrates does the worse when he might do the better. 144 (Similarly, the continent man would, according to the theory, be one who does the better when he might do the worse).

Suppose that we have an akrasia situation in which two alternatives, A and B are open to the agent; and suppose that the agent does A. Since A and B are, ex hypothesi, genuine alternatives, we cannot without self-contradiction deny that the agent chooses A in preference to B. But if he chooses A in preference to B, he necessarily chooses it as satisfying particular criteria C to a greater extent than B; and his choosing according to these criteria entails his believing at the moment of choosing to do A, that A so satisfies the criteria C. Let us now give all of this a Platonic reformulation: The agent as it were puts A and B in a balance suitable for weighing the C-qualities of A and B; he weighs A and B, and says that A is more C-like than B; and he takes (or chooses or does) A and rejects B.

144 cf. 352d7.

145 That is, his reason(s) for preferring A to B will have to mention those criteria C which he believes A satisfies to a greater extent than B.
This sort of reformulation is something like the simile of the weigher (356a8-c3). I shall confine my remarks to an important similarity between the reformulation and the simile, and to two points at which they differ.

Both the reformulation and the simile of the weigher suggest that action is a matter of saying something and also choosing or doing something, so that an agent could conceivably 'say' without choosing (= acting), or again choose without 'saying'. If the reformulation and the simile are supposed to be making this sort of point, then patently (as we have seen) supporters of the theory of akrasia are not discomfited: for the whole point of their theory is that there is such a gap between 'saying' (i.e. believing A to be the preferable course of action) and choosing (i.e. actually preferring or doing A). Perhaps then this suggestion should be disregarded.

But now let us consider a point of difference between the reformulation and the simile of the weigher: whereas the reformulation is merely descriptive (i.e. it simply tells us what happens when an agent chooses between alternative courses of action), the simile of the weigher is prescriptive (i.e. it tells agents how to choose between alternative
courses of action). This is not just because the verbs in the reformulation are all indicatives ('puts', 'weighs', 'says', 'takes'); it is because the reformulation relates generally to the making of choices, while the simile of the weigher relates specifically to the making of right choices.

The simile of the weigher could indeed be expressed in the indicative mood, without loss of its prescriptive force. Socrates could put it this way: The good man is one who, like a skilful weigher, puts in the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weighs them, and says which outweighs the other: if he weighs pleasures against pleasures, he will of course take the more and greater ... and so on. The simile of the weigher is no more deprived of its prescriptive force by being rewritten in this way, than is 'Don't drop litter' by being rewritten 'The good citizen doesn't drop litter'.

Supposing that Socrates agrees to put the simile of the weigher as we have just suggested, what now is the difference between the reformulation and the simile? The reformulation tells us the sort of thing that happens when any man acts (in the full sense of 'acts'): he weighs alternatives ('puts them in the scales and says that A is
more C-like') and chooses. The 'and' here is deceptive: it is not the 'and' of 'I got up and had breakfast', but is much closer to the 'and' of 'I played the game and enjoyed it very much'. The point of the reformulation is that when any man acts, whether rightly or wrongly, he makes his choice by weighing alternatives. It is pointless to tell someone to make his choices by weighing alternatives, or (what amounts to the same thing) to tell him that the good man makes his choices by weighing alternatives, for the simple reason that any agent perforce functions in this way. All men are, up to a point, 'weighers': no purpose is therefore served by telling them to be.

Socrates' simile does however serve a purpose: for it warns the plain man to pay heed to a factor which 'weighers' are prone to overlook, namely the factor of nearness and distance. In situations covered by the theory of akrasia people always make some sort of weighing of alternatives, since the theory stipulates that alternatives are open to them, and therefore implies that they choose between alternatives; but much of the time they fail to weigh the alternatives properly. There is no point in telling a bad driver that a good driver turns the steering wheel to change the car's direction; but there is a great deal of
point in telling him that a good driver takes such-and-
such factors into account when steering out of a skid.

My understanding of the simile of the weigher is then this: It presupposes a descriptive analysis of
action in terms of weighing alternatives, saying which alternative is preferable according to definite criteria,
and following the course of action which is deemed preferable. (The connexion of these three components is of course a necessary and not a contingent connexion, since to choose or prefer a course of action is necessarily to deem it preferable, and to deem it preferable is necessarily to have weighed it against other alternatives according to criteria). This being so, it would be pointless to tell someone to choose (or act) by weighing alternatives, or to say (prescriptively) that the good man is one who chooses (or acts) by weighing alternatives; and this is not what Socrates does. What he does is to admonish his audience to take into account the factor of nearness and remoteness in time when acting; and he does this by saying (in effect): Weigh, taking into account nearness and remoteness ... say ... and choose ... — in other words: Take into account the factor of nearness and remoteness when you act. To give such advice is not pointless, since the factor of nearness
and remoteness is in fact often ignored.

This simile, and the analysis of action underlying it, is the crucial step of the third and final stage of the refutation of the theory of akrasia. The paragraph (356c4-e4) which follows the simile of the weigher seems to me to bear out the interpretation of it which I have given. The morally weak man is there depicted not as someone who chooses the inferior course in the realisation that it is inferior, but as someone who alternates between choice and repentance. He is dominated by the 'power of appearance', which is to say that his choice reflects his judgement that things are as they appear to be. The morally weak man's choice of an alternative indicates not his belief in the inferiority of that alternative, but his being duped by its apparent superiority.

Let me now briefly recapitulate. It was suggested that, because Socrates derives the paradox 'No one willingly does evil' from the hedonist thesis, he must therefore be serious about the hedonist thesis. We saw that, according to Socrates, the hedonist thesis entails that no one ever acts contrary to moral belief, when it is open to him to act in
accordance with it; and that this entailment, together with the hedonist thesis and the Socratic tenet that no one is willingly ignorant (i.e. morally ignorant), yields the paradox. We then investigated the three stages by which Socrates proves the hedonist thesis to the plain man, and moves from it to the proposition that no one acts contrary to moral belief.

Has the hedonist thesis a vital part to play in Socrates' analysis of choice and action, or is it in some way dispensable? To answer this, let us take a last look at the role of pleasure in the theory of akrasia.

Many people know the things which are best, but do not do them when they might, because they are overcome by pleasure.

A man may have knowledge (episteme), and yet the knowledge which is in him may be over-mastered by ... pleasure.

This has an air of paradox. Somebody says to Socrates, or Protagoras, or Hippocrates, or any other fifth-century Greek of speculative bent: 'What a strange fellow Damon is: he is, you know, an accomplished flute-player. The other day when I met him, seeing that he had his flute with

146 cf. 352d6-e1.
147 cf. 352b5-7.
him, I asked him to play an air which he knows quite well; for I have often heard him play it before. He replied that he would be delighted to play it for me. He put the flute to his lips, but no sound came from it. After he had stood for quite a while like this, I plucked up the courage to ask him whether there was something wrong with the instrument. He replied that there was nothing at all wrong with it. So I then told him not to bother - that he could play me the air another time. He assured me, however, that he wanted to play it there and then. After he had stood there, as before, for a long time, with the flute pressed to his lips, and no sound coming from it, he bade me good day, expressing the hope that I had enjoyed the tune, and then walked away. I think myself that, though there is perhaps nothing wrong with Damon's flute, there is certainly something wrong with Damon.

'If this is so' (comes the reply) 'I fear that Damon must be going mad, in which case we have lost one of our best musicians. But perhaps things are not quite as serious as they sound: perhaps, despite what he said, he didn't want to play for you, or perhaps there was something wrong with the flute; but in that case it was rude of him not to tell
you what was really the matter.

To put this more prosaically, there are three possibilities. It must be assumed either that some physical condition external to Damon (such as the state of his flute) prevented him from playing, or that he did not in fact want to play (despite his protest), or that he had gone mad and so lost his musical knowledge. External constraint, absence of desire, deprivation of knowledge: these represent all possible explanations of Damon's failure to perform.\footnote{148}

A proponent of the theory of \textit{akrasia} wants to say that in moral, as opposed to technical, matters, there is a fourth alternative. In \textit{akrasia} situations, there is no question of external constraint ('...but do not do them when they might'), or of deprivation of knowledge ('...the knowledge which is in him...'). Nor can it be said that the agent does not want to take what he believes to be the best course of action: for him to take the worse course, he has to be 'overcome', and the knowledge in him 'overmastered'.\footnote{149}

\footnote{148 For the distinction between the first and third of these factors, see Note 3 to this chapter.}

\footnote{149 352b-c.}
The theory of akrasia seems to be saying that the morally well-equipped man encounters, in trying to carry out his intentions, a hazard which the technically well-equipped man does not have to reckon with: the morally well-equipped man must reckon not only with external adversity (or physical constraint), but with internal psychological factors as well.

The theory of akrasia, as stated in the Protagoras, is easy enough to poke holes in. The point of the theory is, fairly obviously, that even the best of men are sometimes governed by impulse rather than by reason; and if this is the main point that the theory has to make, then it is harmless enough. Surely the honour of episteme can be appeased if we say that, where strong impulses or 'violent passions' (such as panic and fury) take over, the agent is rendered incapable of choice. That is, the agent is put in the position of one who might not do what episteme dictates. Admittedly, we might want to say that it is a toss-up whether occasional impulse-behaviour of this sort is to count on the one hand as compulsion or constraint, or again as temporary deprivation of episteme.
but either way the status of episteme does not seem to be called into question. Perhaps Damon the flautist suffered from petit mal; but it would be strange to say that this reflected adversely on the art of flute-playing.

Socrates does not however take the theory to task in quite this way. On his analysis, the akrates certainly lacks episteme, but there is all the same something disturbingly calm and rational about him: he is represented as a decision-maker, rather than as one who has lost the power to decide anything. He is unambiguously shown as a chooser, not as one who for good reasons is utterly incapable of doing other than what he does. Socrates or, better perhaps, Plato has been reproved for thus ignoring the distinction between 'cool passions' and 'violent passions', but perhaps there is an explanation for this apparent unperceptiveness.

Protagoras and Socrates seem to be on the same side as far as the theory of akrasia is concerned, and yet they differ on so many other things. This should make us ask how real their identity of interest on this topic can be.

150 Crombie, EPD 1, p. 245.
Socrates innocently introduces the theory as a belief held by hoi polloi. Protagoras bridles at the mention of it:

Yes, Socrates, and that is not the only point about which mankind is in error. 152

But why, Socrates, need we investigate the opinion of hoi polloi, who just say anything that comes to their head? 153

Now hoi polloi are undoubtedly vulgar fellows: sailors, navvies, and the like. The akrasia idioms ('overcome by fear', 'overcome by anger', and so forth) are undoubtedly part of their everyday speech: they no doubt talk uncritically in these terms. But the theory of akrasia, as Socrates presents it, is not likely to be part of such people's daily conversation: even intelligent hoi polloi surely have better things to do than speculate about the power of episteme in potential choice situations. Again, even if these people think these things, why should this irritate Protagoras? It cannot touch him - or can it?

It is at this point of the Protagoras that Banquo's ghost appears. And who is Banquo? The one person whom

151 352d5.
152 352e3-4.
153 353a7-8.
one might have expected to appear on Callias's distinguished guest-list, and who does not: Gorgias. But then, Gorgias is no sophist: he is a rhetor.

Then I am to call you a rhetor?

Socrates asks for Gorgias in the Gorgias. Later in the Gorgias Socrates says that sophists and rhetoricians are in different classes, though the distinction involved is too nice for either them or other people to grasp readily. Yet even if the distinction is not grasped, the difference is felt: sophists, says Gorgias's finished product, are good for nothing.

The thing I particularly admire about Gorgias (says Meno) is that you will never hear him claim to teach arete; indeed he laughs at the sophists when he hears them do so. In his view his job is to make clever speakers.

Helen was a well-bred, well-married girl who ran off with the lodger. It is the sort of thing well-bred, well-married girls are doing all the time. It is also the sort

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154 Gorgias 449a6.
155 id. 465c.
156 Callicles at Gorgias 520a1-2.
157 Meno 95c1-4.
of thing well-bred, well-married girls are supposed to know better than to do. If (per impossibile) Helen had attended the sophists' finishing-school, her arete would perhaps have been developed to the point where she would not have contemplated eloping. But, on the other hand, what matter that she heeded her animal instincts: all that she needs is a Gorgias to plead for her:

Persuasion by speech is equivalent to abduction by force. 158

The power of speech over the constitution of the soul can be compared with the effect of drugs on the bodily state. 159

If Love is at work with divine power, how can the weaker person resist him? 160

If the disease is human, due to the soul's ignorance, it must not be condemned as a crime, but pitied as a misfortune. 161

(Whatever) ... caused Helen's action, she is innocent. 162

158 DK 82 B11 (12).
159 id. (14).
160 id. (19).
161 ibid.
162 id. (20) (Gorgias systematically exhausts all possible accounts of his 'client's' misconduct. His strategy is similar in the Defence of Palamedes, DK 82 B11a).
Why waste time learning to be moral? Gorgias will get you acquitted, whatever the charge. And if you throw away your money to the sophists, what guarantee have you that the moral and political expertise they develop in you will be proof against the sorts of impulses that undid Helen?

Who, moreover, is likely to make the deeper impression on hoi polloi, the sophist or the rhetorician? Hippocrates, the pupil of Protagoras, schooled in the customs and conventions of the Athenian people, or Callicles, the pupil of Gorgias, schooled specifically in the manipulation of those customs and conventions? The sophists are worthless fellows because what they peddle is the know-how necessary for leading a conventionally good life. Rhetoric enables its practitioner and his clients to spurn the conventions, and lead a life of more or less sophisticated indulgence. The rhetorician, finally, operates through the one mass medium of communication: the sophist speaks to a small group.

163 318e-319a.
164 cf. Gorgias 482c-486c.
It seems to me significant that Socrates turns the tables on the theory of *akrasia* by invoking the very doctrine (the doctrine, that is, that 'pleasant' and 'good' have the same application) that he so bitterly disputes in the *Gorgias*. It is a doctrine of which Protagoras is wary, but which Callicles has no qualms about advocating. The hedonist thesis is a rhetorician's rather than a sophist's doctrine. What I mean is this. The sophist who, like Protagoras, considers his role in society to be the completion of the education which his charges have already been receiving at the hands of society, will naturally be anxious not to approve, or even to seem to approve, of indulgence in activities which society stigmatizes as base (*aischra*). On the other hand, the successful public orator and advocate who, for his own or his clients' gain, finds it necessary to challenge conventional attitudes, customs, and institutions at every turn,

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166 Particularly at *Gorgias* 495e-499b.
167 *351c*-d.
168 *Gorgias* 495d.
169 cf. *351c1*-2.
will be just as anxious to persuade men that those
for whom he speaks are doing nothing worse than
gratifying their natural instincts and appetites.

At the same time, it will not do for the rhetorician
(and those whom he trains) to unmask conventional morality
completely, since conventional morality can have its uses:
it may be a racket, but the advocate may well, more often
than not, be representing the racketeers. If ordinary
people were as astute as Thrasymachus, they would quickly
perceive that subservience to conventional morality was
getting them nowhere; if they had the audacity of Callicles,
they would dare to discard conventional morality altogether,
holding it to be merely the counterfeit of a superior
'morality of nature'. But (perhaps fortunately) they lack
this astuteness and audacity. You cannot bring them to
renounce conventional morality completely: at most you can
put into their heads the superficial and 'unscientific',\textsuperscript{170}
notion that conventional morality is to some extent ill-
suited to man's needs, since even those who have ostensibly

\textsuperscript{170} The belief that episteme can be 'dragged about like
a slave' is said at 352b8 to be held uncritically
(atechinos) by ordinary people.
had a good 'training' in it are often unable to withstand the promptings of passion.

Granted this frame of mind, ordinary people will hardly be willing to lavish time and money on anything purporting to be an education at advanced level in conventional morality. For them, acquiring the 'know-how' of conventional morality will be all very well up to a point; but no one (they will tell themselves) wastes his substance acquiring an expertise which is second-rate, in the sense of always being liable to fail him at crucial moments. Men pay good money to learn even the non-banausic arts like arithmetic: they would scarcely be willing to do this if the practice of such arts were constantly frustrated by the random operation of factors apparently within their scope, but at the same time curiously beyond their control - as if, per impossibile, two and two made four for much of the time, but sometimes quite unpredictably and capriciously made three, five, or anything else.

This attitude of ordinary people is of course confused and incoherent. You can say, as Gorgias seems

171 cf. 357e7-8.
to be saying of Helen, that there are occasions on
which people who act impulsively simply cannot help
themselves, and that their impulses determine what
they do. You can also say, as Callicles does in the
Gorgias, that it is always nobler to prefer that course
of action which involves the fullest possible compliance
with what are conventionally regarded as 'base' appetites
and impulses. There is room, that is, for both determinist
and libertarian impulsionism. But ordinary people want
to have both at once. The victim of akrasia does not
prefer compliance with a base impulse, since he believes
what he does to be the worse of two courses of action; yet
nor does the impulse to which he succumbs determine his
course of action, since all the time it is open to him
to pursue an alternative course of action. To clear up
this muddle, you can do one of two things. Firstly, you
can get the plain man to drop his claim that it is all
the time open to the victim of akrasia to do other than
what he does. 172 Alternatively, you can do what Socrates

172 In which case he will have to take 'overcome by' in
the akrasia formula to mean 'prevented from acting
otherwise by'.
does, and persuade the plain man that the akrates does at the time of acting really prefer (i.e. deem it better) to follow the promptings of whatever impulse is said to 'overcome' him. Getting the plain man to regard akrasia in this light is essentially a matter of convincing him that akrasia involves not (as he would have it) some sort of momentary paralysis of the power of choice, but rather the rapid alternation of choice and repentance. But if this alternative analysis is to carry weight, some attempt must be made either to eliminate or to explain away the determinist-looking formula 'because he was overcome by ...' Socrates explains it away by arbitrarily selecting the phrase 'because he was overcome by pleasure' for analysis, and by treating pleasure as the criterion which in moral matters informs choice and repentance. He could of course have branded the explanatory formula from the outset as vulgar nonsense, and refused to consider it seriously. However, by proceeding as he does, he at once charms Protagoras (both by suggesting

173 cf. 356d4-7. On this sort of analysis such expressions as 'he was overcome by fear' will have to be construed along the lines: 'Fear counted with him for more than ...'
to him precisely in what sense he is to be regarded as a 'physician of ignorance', and by convincing him that the product he sells to his pupils is proof against the knocks of rhetoricians), and exposes the basis upon which the morality of both Protagoras and the plain man rests: it rests ultimately on the same foundation as does that of Callicles.

The argument for the oneness of courage and wisdom is now concluded: Fear is the expectation of evil; so that no one will pursue what he fears when it is impossible for him to pursue what he does not fear. Therefore the popular view that cowards go where there is nothing to fear, and brave men where there is much to fear, is mistaken. Brave men and cowards pursue opposite ends: brave men go willingly to battle, cowards do not. This means that brave men willingly pursue what is nobler, better, and pleasanter, while cowards are unwilling to do so. But this unwillingness of cowards cannot be accompanied by knowledge: if cowards knew that what they avoid is in fact the nobler, better, and pleasanter course, they would not avoid it.
The brave man has neither base fear nor base confidence. By contrast, both the coward and the fool-hardy exhibit base fear and base confidence. Such fear and confidence are brought about by ignorance, so that cowardice (and also, presumably, rashness) must be the ignorance of what is and is not fearful, and courage must be the knowledge of what is and is not fearful (358e-360d).

e) Concluding Remarks

My conclusions about the Protagoras would be somewhat as follows. The dialogue represents an attempt to expose (in the fullest sense of the word) the metaphysic of plain morality, that is, those inarticulate presuppositions which in fact underlay the moral judgements of the average literate and articulate Athenian, the sort of man who was 'prudent in affairs private as well as public', who could 'order his own house in the best manner', and who was 'able to speak and act effectively in affairs of state' (cf. 318e-319a).

Part of the unearthing of the metaphysic is assigned to Protagoras, and part to Socrates. The debate between Socrates and Protagoras on the oneness of arete exposes the internal inconsistencies of the metaphysic. If Plato
succeeds in showing that the metaphysic of plain morality 
is inconsistent, then he succeeds in showing that plain 
morality is confused.

A caution here: we need not necessarily identify Plato's 
purpose with the purposes he assigns to Socrates and Protagoras. 
Protagoras wants to convince Socrates that he can teach arete, 
and Socrates wants to convince Protagoras of the oneness of 
arete; but Plato's purpose in structuring the dialogue as he does 
need be neither of these things, except incidentally.

Both Protagoras and Socrates talk sense. In the dialogue 
they are both, to some extent, reporters of received popular 
opinion; and both draw reasonable inferences from the opinions 
they report to the presuppositions which underly those opinions. 
'People will tell you that p: they must therefore believe that q' 
is a sort of leitmotif of the dialogue, though like all good 
leitmotifs, it sometimes takes one unawares.

The Athenians ordain that only experts may speak in the 
Assembly when matters of craft-expertise are being discussed, 
whereas they permit anyone at all to speak where arete is concerned: 
the inference to be drawn from this is that they believe that 
arete is not teachable. Again, if anyone were to own himself wicked 
before the Assembly, his fellow citizens would deem him mad: 
they therefore believe that all members of society have a share
in arete. They believe, too, that wickedness is corrigible by punishment: but the basis for such a belief must be a belief that arete is teachable.

Moreover, they tell you that even men of discrimination, who recognise that A is better for them than B, nevertheless do B when they might have done A; and they even draw from this the explicit inference that pleasure sometimes overcomes knowledge. They also make a variety of pronouncements on the goodness or badness of food, sex, gymnastic exercises, military service, surgical treatment, and so forth; and what underlies these is the inarticulate premise that things are good only qua pleasant on balance, and evil only qua painful on balance.

The inconsistencies here are patent. Ordinary people presuppose, on the one hand, that arete is not teachable, and, on the other, that it is; again, they presuppose on the one hand, that pleasure is some sort of rebellious impulse, incapable of being tamed and disciplined by knowledge, and that the pleasantness of a course of action as such gives no good reason for preferring it to other alternatives, and, on the other, that pleasure is the only measure of the goodness of a course of action.
At 329d-330b, Socrates suggests to Protagoras an analogy between aretē and the face. Protagoras accepts the analogy, which Socrates then (330c-332a) proceeds to demolish with an argument for the oneness of justice and piety. I summarise the analogy thus:

A. Justice, temperance, piety, courage, and wisdom are all parts of aretē. (329d3-4).

B. As any part of the face (i.e., either eyes or ears or mouth or nose) is to the face, so is any part of aretē to aretē. (329d4-e2).

C. As any part of the face is in itself unlike any other part of the face, so any part of aretē is in itself unlike any other part of aretē. (cf. 330b1).

D. As any part of the face has a different ability (dunamis) from any other part of the face, so any part of aretē has a different ability from any other part of aretē. (330a4-b3)

This completes the analogy. The main steps of Socrates' demolition of the analogy are:

C. Justice is a thing (a pragma). (330b6-c2)

D. The thing called 'justice' is either a just thing or an unjust thing. (I write in this proposition to convey the force of the question at 330c3-5).

E. The thing called 'justice' is not an unjust thing. (Implicit).

D. The thing called 'justice' is a just thing. (330c5-7).

E. Justice is the sort of thing that is just. (330c7-d1).

F. Piety is a thing (a pragma). (330d1-5).

G. Piety is the sort of thing that is pious. (330d5-e2).

If any part of aretē is unlike any other part of aretē (cf. Bb, Bc), then piety is not the sort of thing that is just, and justice is not the sort of thing that is pious. (331a6-9).

* cf. Footnotes 19, 37 and 64.
If piety is not the sort of thing that is just, then piety is unjust.

If justice is not the sort of thing that is pious, then justice is impious. (cf. 331a9-b1).

Justice is a pious thing.

Piety is a just thing. (331b1-3).

Either justice is identical with piety, or justice is very like piety.

Justice is like piety.

Piety is like justice. (331b3-6).

Socrates' argument from C to J is obviously meant to work somewhat as follows. Propositions C to F are intended as a foundation for G. G and I together give a syllogism in the modus tollens. The denial of the antecedent of G is (for reasons I shall give presently) rewritten as the disjunction Ja. Jb and Jc reformulate the second disjunct of Ja. Finally, because the antecedent of G is false, at least one of the propositions Jb and Jc is false, and the analogy breaks down.

If we assume that this account of the structure of the argument is substantially correct, it would seem that one proposition whose credentials warrant scrutiny is I, since I has the important task of denying the consequent of G. It is patent that Socrates feels safe in asserting I because the conditionals in H leave him no option: if he will not say that piety is something just, then he must be prepared to assert that piety is something unjust (and similarly with justice) - a prospect too horrible to contemplate. This brings us to H, and to the charge which has been levelled against Socrates, or Plato, or perhaps both, of inferring a contrary from a contradictory (i.e. of inferring from '... not just' to '... unjust', and from '... not pious' to '... impious').

I do not believe that this charge should be upheld against either Socrates or Plato. My reasons for saying this will, however, involve a discussion of some other aspects of the argument. Let us first look at the analogy.
The analogy has it that the parts of the face differ both 'in themselves' and 'in their abilities' (cf. Bb, Bo). What does Socrates mean by saying that the parts of the face are unlike one another 'in themselves'? Just that the nose (let us say) does not look like the mouth? I rather doubt whether this is the point (or, at any rate, the whole point) here. Noses do not look like mouths; but neither, in most cases, do they look like turnips. For the analogy Socrates selects not just a random collection of four different-looking sorts of thing (as an anatomist might make a random collection of different-looking pieces of corpses), but rather four different components (eyes, ears, nose, mouth) of a structural whole (the face). It seems, then, that Socrates wants to draw attention not merely to four different types of thing, but to four different components of something.

It is not hard to see how this might apply to political excellence or aretē. Aretē might be thought of (and presumably is thought of by Protagoras) as a structured whole whose components are reverence of the gods, fair dealing with men, self-restraint, bravery in battle, and prudent deliberation on private and public matters. Of a man lack any of these, it will not perhaps be said of him that he is an all-round man; but nor need he be a complete failure. If, for example, he possesses all the 'parts of aretē' except courage, his public life will be marred by a deformity analogous to the deformity produced in a face by the lack of an ear; but it will still be a recognizable public life, just as a face with an ear missing is still a recognizable face.

What should be regarded in any given case as a component of a structure must, to some extent, be an arbitrary matter. But the criteria for determining whether or not something is a separate component will generally be bound up with dissectability rather than with function. I mean something like this. If an anatomist wants to give an account of the face, he will do it by dividing the face up into parts such that a reasonably coherent and self-contained account can be given of each division. His procedure will be governed not so much by a priori assumptions about the role of various bits of the face, as by a need to give an orderly exposition of the dissection he is performing. When the dissection is made, and the components sorted out, he will next turn to questions of function, if possible using his dissection as a basis for his remarks on the functions of the various components.
(When he comes to discuss functions, a number of possibilities might arise. Of two given components, it might turn out that each performs a different function, that both perform the same sort of function, or that both have a share in performing the same function; again, each of the two components might be functionally independent of the other, one might be functionally dependent on the other, or each might be functionally dependent on the other).

Socrates' procedure, in treating of the face, is more or less along these lines; for he first sorts out his components, and then asserts that each component has a different function or ability. (If I am not mistaken, he means, when he says that each component of the face has a different ability, both that each component of the face accomplishes something different from the others and that what each component accomplishes, it accomplishes independently of the others. Thus he would be committed, inter alia, to the (empirically false) thesis that the distinctive ability possessed by the mouth is the ability to taste things, and that it exercises this ability unassisted by the nose; a thesis partly corrected by the account of pungent tastes at Timaeus, 65e).

It would seem that, by accepting the analogy between the face and arete, Protagoras commits himself to two things. Firstly, he commits himself to saying that a distinct, self-contained account is to be given of each 'part of arete' (the 'dissection' aspect). That is, just as the dissectionist gives distinct, self-contained accounts of the eye and of the ear, so the sophist gives distinct, self-contained accounts of justice (that aspect of social behaviour which has to do with right dealing between man and man) and piety (that aspect of social behaviour which has to do with right dealing between man and god). Secondly, he commits himself to saying that each 'part of arete' has an ability to accomplish something quite distinct from what the other parts accomplish; and probably also to saying that each part exercises its ability independently of all the others (the 'function' aspect). (It might perhaps follow from this aspect of his commitment that justice, unaided by piety, works peace in cities; and that piety, unaided by justice, works the prosperity of pious individuals, and so on).

Socrates holds no brief for either of these two positions. But the argument he produces to refute Protagoras is an argument against the second position only. This
This inference is to be drawn from the language which the refutation employs. Firstly, Socrates lays emphasis on justice's and piety's being pragmata ('things'). Of course, 'pragma', like 'thing', has a wide range of application, so that, but for the stressing of the term in C and E, one would not have been inclined to give special significance to its appearance. One standard use of 'pragma' is to refer to things qua apt for performing particular tasks. In Republic I, 352e-353c, the term is applied to horses, eyes, ears, and pruning-knives. (The eye is the pragma or instrument which is apt for the ergon or task of seeing; the pruning-knife is the pragma which is apt for the task of pruning, and so on). Let us assume, then, that the force of 'Justice/Piety is a pragma' (C, E) is 'Justice/Piety is an instrument', and see what follows.

Socrates gives no analogue of justice, but, had he given one, it would have been some part of the face. Let us take the eye as the analogue of justice. The eye, qua instrument, is the instrument of sight. Obviously we can make up a great many sentences containing 'eye' and 'sight' or 'see', but it seems to me that the most promising of such sentences (because the most abstract) is likely to be the one whose terms have as referents the instrument-type, the eye, and the type of activity peculiar to the eye, viz.

The eye sees.

Let us take this sentence as the analogue of 'Justice is just', and a similar sentence,

The ear hears,

as the analogue of 'Piety is pious'. I now pair off the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Virtue-word'</th>
<th>Analogue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>justice</td>
<td>the eye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>piety</td>
<td>the ear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is just</td>
<td>sees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is pious</td>
<td>hears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is not just</td>
<td>does not see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is not pious</td>
<td>does not hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unjust</td>
<td>blind (= unable to see)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impious</td>
<td>deaf (= unable to hear)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before I go further, it might be as well to point out that the Greek counterpart of 'is the sort of thing that' (toiouton hoion) often means, quite straightforwardly, 'is able to'. Now we are in a position to make up some propositions analogous to those in Socrates' refutation of Protagoras:

$Dc'$. The thing (instrument) which is called 'the eye' sees.

$Dd'$. The eye is the sort of thing that sees (= The eye is able to see).

$F'$. The ear is able to hear.

$C'$. If any part of the face is unlike any other part of the face, then the ear is unable to see, and the eye is unable to hear.

$Ha'$. If the ear is unable to see, then the ear is blind.

$Hb'$. If the eye is unable to hear, then the eye is deaf.

$Ia'$. The eye hears.

$Ib'$. The ear sees.

(There is no need to go further, since the components of $I'$ are false).

Now it was stipulated when the analogy was drawn that the parts of the face might be said to be unlike in two ways, 'in themselves' ($Bb$) and 'in their abilities' ($Bc$). (I have already explained the probable import of these expressions). Since the consequent of $G'$ is concerned solely with the inability of the eye to hear and the ear to see, and since the fictitious questioner in the text takes $G$ to be self-evident (i.e. as an entailment; he offers no argument for it), it would seem that the antecedent of $G'$ is a restatement of the first half of $Bc$, which is also cast in terms of ability. $G'$ can therefore be rephrased thus:

$G'$. If any part of the face has a different ability from any other part of the face, then the ear is unable to see, and the eye is unable to hear.

This gives a very neat argument between $D'$ and $H'$: $Dd'$ is deduced from $Dc'$ (ab esse ad posse); $G'$ is an entailment; $Ha'$ and $Hb'$ (assuming that 'blind' = 'unable to see', and is predicable of things other than eyes, and that 'deaf' = 'unable to hear', and is predicable of things other than ears) are analytic.
Socrates' refutation is to be read in this light. In effect, he does not argue that piety/justice is unjust/impious if it is not just/pious, but that it is unjust/impious if it is unable to be just/pious; and he does so because this is his understanding of 'unjust' and 'impious'. Such an understanding is dictated by the Socratic paradoxes: men act unjustly or impiously only qua incapable of acting justly or piously; for if someone is really able to act justly or piously, he will act justly or piously. 'No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course when he might choose the better'. (358b-c) For Socrates, the distinctive peculiarity of ethical discourse is that a posse ad esse valet consequentia.

We are now in a position to see the reason for the disjunction at $\mathcal{J}_2$:

Either justice is identical with piety, or justice is very like piety.

It has been shown that it is not the case that 'any part of aretē has a different ability from any other part of aretē'. In particular, it has been shown that justice does not have a different ability from piety, i.e., that neither justice nor piety is able to accomplish something which the other is unable to accomplish. This, however, does not make them one and the same 'part of aretē'. If, in addition to seeing, eyes could smell, and if, in addition to smelling, noses could see, it might be said that both possessed the same functions; but this would still not make the eye the same component of the face as the nose. In fact, Socrates holds the strong thesis that justice and piety are one and the same, but all that the argument entitles him to assert is the weak thesis 'Justice is very like piety'. Hence the disjunction of strong and weak thesis.

The argument between G and J is, conveniently for Socrates, carried on without Protagoras's help (apart from 331a4-5, which merely refers back to the analogy). When Protagoras finally gets a chance to comment on this part of the argument (331b8 sqq.), the proposition he attacks is $\mathcal{J}_1$ ('Justice is a pious thing and piety is a just thing').
But I has to be accepted because the consequents in \( H \) were found unacceptable. Assuming that Protagoras would not want to opt for these consequents ('Justice is impious', 'Piety is unjust'), he could still get rid of \( I \) by denying the (bi-) conditionals in \( H \), by denying for instance that 'impious' is to be construed as 'unable to be pious', or 'unjust' as 'unable to be just'. That he makes no such denial at 331d-e seems to me to indicate only that he has missed the force of the entailment in \( H \) (331a9-b1). It seems to me that he is unaware of just how thoroughly Socrates is exploiting the analogy.

**Concluding Remarks.** It will be apparent that I take the words 'all' \( \text{adikon ara} \) (331a9) to indicate the entailment of '\( \text{hoion me dikaion} \)' (ibid.) (and not just of '\( \text{me dikaion} \)'), and the words 'to de anhosion' (331b1) to indicate the entailment of '\( \text{hoion me hosion} \)' (331a9) (and not just of '\( \text{me hosion} \)' ). (This unfortunately puts the anonymous questioner out of step with his '\( \text{hoion anhosion einai} \)' at 330d6 (cf. 'able to be blind/deaf'), but I think that this might be discounted as a lapsus calami, arising from the compression of \( F \), i.e. of that part of the argument designed to show that piety is \( \text{hoion hosion einai} \).

I have not written into my schema any proposition to represent the inference from 'ouk ... \( \text{hoion dikaion} \) '(331a7-8) to '\( \text{hoion me dikaion} \)' (331a9) (i.e. from 'not the sort of thing that is just' to 'the sort of thing that is not-just'). Both expressions have the same ability significance ('unable to be just').

Two recent articles on this passage are to be found in *Phronesis*, 1961, pp. 86-93, and in *Phronesis*, 1964, pp. 130-135. The first of these, by David Gallop, does not give due weight to the analogy. The second, by David Savan, does. Savan, however, complicates matters unnecessarily by supposing that the parts of the face (and likewise the 'parts of arete') have to be treated first as things (pragmata) and then as powers (dunameis) (op. cit. p. 133). (He does so because he disagrees with Gallop's view that Socrates makes no headway at all against Protagoras (op. cit. p. 93). Savan maintains, as I do, that there is no inference in the
argument from contradiction to contrariety. But the reason he gives is that there are two different sorts of analogues involved. First there is the analogue of 'Justice is not holy'. For this Savan seems to think that sentences in terms of either pragmata or dunameis are suitable, such as 'The eye is not the ear' or 'Sight is not hearing'. Secondly there is the analogue of 'Justice is unholy'. For this a sentence with a dunameis or function as subject is needed: 'Sight is inaudible'. But non multiplicanda entia. Plato nowhere gives any hint of wanting to treat justice as other than a pragma or thing for the purposes of this argument.

And an asymmetry develops between the negative 'me hosion' ('not pious') and the privative 'anhosion' ('impious'): 'me hosion' has to be construed actively, with reference to the faculty of hearing, and 'anhosion' passively, with reference to inaudibility. Savan is right in construing 'anhosion' as an ability adjective, but he needs to construe it as an active ('deaf' = 'unable to hear') rather than as a passive ('inaudible' = 'unable to be heard') ability adjective.

The charge of 'self-predication' has been brought against this argument (cf. Vlastos, Philosophical Review, 1954, p. 337). If sentences like 'Justice is the sort of thing that is just' necessarily involve some logical fallacy, there is no point in discussing their implications. (If there is an error here in this respect, it is Plato's error, not Socrates'). But it is far from apparent that sentences in which virtue-adjectives are predicated of virtue-nouns are at all objectionable. I shall not discuss this further here, but would refer the reader to Professor R.J. Butler's article The Measure and Weight of the Third Man (MIND, 1963, at pp. 65-66). See also Crombie, EPD 2, 264-265.

Finally, it might be said that Socrates loads the dice from the start by implicitly stipulating (Da) that justice is either just or unjust. (Such a stipulation would not of itself involve an inference of contrariety from contradiction, but only the unwarranted exclusion of 'both not just and not unjust'). While there is some force in this, it must be
remembered that the two crucial members of D are De and Dd, and that Protagoras assents to De (at 330c7). Moreover, if my reading of the argument from De onwards is right, Socrates is arguing on the assumption that being able to be just entails being just, and being unjust is being unable to be just. This point of view, though unavowed, might well lead the imaginary questioner (i.e. Socrates) to use 'just' and 'unjust' exclusively from the outset.
CHAPTER II — NOTE 2

Protagoras, 332a-333b.

Vlastos (PP, xxix) gives the following as the frame of the argument:

S. Wisdom and Folly are Opposites. (332a4-6; re-affirmed at 332e5-7).

U. Temperance and Folly are Opposites. (332a6-c3; d3-e5).

V. Everything (which has an opposite) has only one opposite. (332c3-d3; re-affirmed at 332e7-333a1).

P. Wisdom is not different from Temperance. (333b4-5).

In this he is undoubtedly right.

Protagoras agrees to S straight off. Socrates sets up an argument for U, U, Vlastos says, is a 'miserably lame duck, deduced by the shadiest of logic'. He goes on:

The crucial inference is at 332b from 'Acting foolishly implies acting without sophrosyne (temperance)' to 'Acting foolishly is the opposite of acting with sophrosyne'. The fallacy will be obvious if one compares 'Being triangular implies being not square; therefore, being a triangular figure is the opposite of being a square figure', noting that by the same reasoning one can 'prove' that a triangular figure is the opposite of a round one, whence, in conjunction with V above, one may infer, 'a square figure is not different from around one'. Some of the commentators do strange things with this fallacy....

Here Vlastos is wrong: there is no fallacy. To see where he is wrong, we must look at the support (or rather at part of the support) for U. We may discern the following supporting argument at 332a6-b3:

Ua. Every Advantageous action is Temperate. (a6-8).

Ua'. No action which is not Temperate is Advantageous. (Conversion of Ua).

Ub. Every action which is not Advantageous is Foolish. (b1-2).

* cf. Footnotes 19, 38 and 64.
Every action which is not Temperate is Foolish. (Conclusion from \( Ua' \) and \( Ub \)).

No Foolish action is Temperate. (\( b2-3 \)).

Every action which is not Temperate, and no Temperate action, is Foolish. (Combination of \( Uc \) and \( Ud' \)).

(As for the construing of the passage, it will be apparent that I read \( ?\overline{mё orthос} \) ('not rightly') at \( b1 \) as an abbreviation for \( ?\overline{mё orthос_mё} оphelimоs' \) ('neither rightly nor advantageously', cf. \( a6-7 \)), and that 'Advantageous' in my schema does duty for both \( orthос' \) ('rightly') and \( оphelimоs' \) ('advantageously').)

By \( b3 \) Socrates has established enough to justify a thesis that every human action is classifiable as temperate or foolish. (This is a much stronger sort of thesis than that canvassed in Vlastos's geometrical parody: any parody in geometrical terms would have to be designed to support some such thesis as 'All geometrical figures are classifiable as squares or triangles'.) This being so, it is not unreasonable that 'temperate' and 'foolish' should, qua descriptive of human action, be claimed to be opposites; just as it would not be unreasonable, upon the assumption that human beings are classifiable as male and female, to term 'male' and 'female' opposites, qua descriptive of human beings.

Vlastos notes that at \( 333a \) Socrates wonders whether he and Protagoras should renounce \( P \) ('Wisdom is different from Temperance') or \( V \), a move to which Vlastos refers as a 'mistake'. For, he says, the choice confronting the disputants is not just between \( P \) and \( V \), but between \( P, S, U, \) and \( V \). There is indeed a formal mistake, but such mistakes, which are after all common enough in ordinary conversation, can be illuminating. What should bother us is not the fact that \( S \) and \( U \) get left out of the disjunction, but rather the reason why they get left out, and \( V \) goes in. Let us therefore look once more at the structure of the argument.

In demonstrating \( U \), Socrates also demonstrated that every action must be either temperate or foolish. \( S \), however, was not demonstrated, but was merely agreed to by the disputants \((332a4-6)\). Thus it was never shown that every
action must be either wise or foolish. Had this been done, it would have followed that every temperate action was wise, and every wise action temperate. (I think that Plato would have taken this to warrant the identification of temperance with wisdom; though whether rightly or not is another matter).

Socrates tries to bring 'wise' into line with 'temperate', not by showing that 'wise' and 'temperate' are co-extensive in application, but by means of a very dubious argument about 'opposites' (V, 332c3-d3). He mentions three things (the beautiful, the good, the high in tone) each of which, according to him, has only one opposite. From these three examples he infers that 'every opposite has one opposite only and no more' (332c3-9; Vlastos's V). The inference is unwarranted, as may be seen from a geometrical example, constructed after the manner of Vlastos's. Suppose a geometry with three sorts of figures: circles, triangles, and squares. It might perhaps be said intuitively that 'round' and 'square' (cf. 'foolish' and 'wise') are opposites. Next it might be asserted that all figures within the geometry must be either rectilinear or non-rectilinear (cf. 'temperate', 'not temperate'). It might then be shown that 'non-rectilinear' must, within this geometry, have the same significance as 'circular' or 'round' (cf. the equating of non-temperate with foolish actions); and it might reasonably be suggested, on the strength of this demonstration, that 'round' and 'rectilinear' should count as opposites (cf. the opposition of 'temperate' to 'foolish'). But obviously the imaginary geometrician could not here go on to equate 'square' with 'rectilinear': within his geometry the proposition 'Every square is a rectilinear figure' does not convert simpliciter. From the necessary truth that opposites go in pairs, it cannot then be inferred that two pairs of opposites with a term in common must have the same reference: the members of one pair might, when predicated of the same term, yield contrary propositions, and the members of the other, contradictory propositions. Thus the argument is not defective at U, but at V.

Socrates is not necessarily in precisely the same sort of position as our imaginary geometrician. Not only, that is, can Socrates claim to have established that all wise
actions are temperate (cf. 'All squares are rectilinear'): unlike the geometrical parody, it leaves open the possibility that all temperate actions are wise. By the end of the argument Socrates certainly talks as if he has shown this as well, but in fact it still remains no more than a possibility. In the last resort, we shall have to say that what Socrates does is tantamount to converting 'All wise actions are temperate' into 'All temperate actions are wise'. It is not, however, a blatant illicit conversion: Socrates thinks that he is entitled to regard wisdom and temperance as co-extensive because they have the same 'opposite'. But the concept of opposition here is too crude to be of use: as a technical notion, it awaits refining into the concepts of contrariety and contradiction.

I would suggest then that the explanation to be given of the final disjunction of $V$ and $P$ is something like this. Plato thought the argument a good one. He thought that $S$ was simply a matter of common sense. He also thought (mistakenly) that to be the opposite of something was to stand to that thing in a definite symmetrical relation whose terms would, in any given case of opposition, have only two possible referents; so that, if it were said that both $X$ and $Y$ were opposites of $Z$, $X$ and $Y$ must have the same referent. He therefore thought that opposition (a) could be demonstrated (as parenthood might be) (cf. $U$), and (b) that once the relation of opposition was established, inferences of identity and non-identity might be drawn from it (as it might be inferred from the parental relationship of $A$ to $B$ and $C$ that $B$ and $C$ are siblings). This conception of opposition he formulated in the dogma (perhaps held also by Socrates) that every opposite (i.e., everything which can stand to anything else in the relation of opposition) has only one opposite (cf. $V$). At the same time, we may suppose him to have been astute enough to realize that the most contentious premise in the argument, from a logical point of view, would be the dogma just mentioned: to this he gave recognition by mentioning $V$ alone in the final disjunction with $P$. 
Protagoras 334-349 (= D. 5).

This digression is in some ways very puzzling. Since Socrates is obviously doing a lot of leg-pulling (and enjoying it), there is no point in agonizing over his every pronouncement. But one or two things are worth looking at.

Protagoras claims to find an inconsistency in a court poem by Simonides dedicated to Scopas of Thessaly. A discussion of the poem follows. The theme of the poem itself is, roughly, that men should be esteemed by reference to what they do, rather than by reference to their material prosperity. Being truly good and noble is a matter not merely (as it was said of old) of winning battles and amassing wealth, but also of never willingly doing ignoble or base deeds. But it is impossible to find anyone who passes muster on both counts. This is because irredeemable misfortune (amechanos sumphora) dogs the prosperous man's footsteps: you can never be sure that his prosperity will endure. We must therefore make do with something less than true nobility: it will be enough if a man refrains from doing ignoble deeds deliberately, and has not suffered too many knocks of fortune. Above all, he must have justice, the salvation of cities, in his heart.

Simonides, of course, knew which side his bread was buttered on, and also who buttered it. He certainly does

* cf. Footnotes 40 and 148.
not want to give the impression that never deliberately doing wrong is all that matters. Tyrannies need the support not of men of straw, but of men of substance; but in evaluating such men you must put a lot of weight on their unwillingness to act unjustly (i.e., to get out of line politically), and no weight on their distinctively aristocratic credentials (owning half the county, and the like), since aristocrats are here today and liquidated tomorrow.

So much for the original poem. Socrates gives us a sort of re-edited version. He shifts grammatical connexions, and even the punctuation, to suit himself. So blatant are his emendations (which I will not discuss here) that one is forced to conclude that Socrates knows very well that Simonides' meaning is not the one Socrates attributes to him. At the same time, it is quite possible that he is using the poem as a vehicle for his own sentiments.

Presumably when Simonides spoke of 'irredeemable misfortune', he was thinking of the fall of the axe on aristocratic necks and fortunes. Socrates, however, gives the words a technical application. For the helmsman, a tempest represents irredeemable misfortune, for the farmer, a bad season, and for the doctor (I should say), an epidemic. (See 344c-d). These, interestingly, are all cases of external constraint, or cases of people being prevented by adverse external circumstances from acting as they want to.

However, this does not seem to be the only kind of misfortune that Socrates has in mind. He goes on to say that (in the words of the poem) men are good when they do
well and bad when they do ill. In the original poem, this seems to be a comment on the old, aristocratic standard of goodness: you are a good man if and only if your affairs prosper, a bad man if they do not.

Socrates gives this, too, a technical application (344e-345b): specialists in the arts (e.g. grammarians and doctors) become good at their professions by learning them, and bad by being deprived of their knowledge. As examples of 'deprivation of knowledge', he gives 'becoming bad, by lapse of time or fatigue or illness or some other accident' (345b). These are all examples of things going wrong within the specialist, not externally to him.

The difference between these and the earlier examples is at once apparent. The doctor whose medical knowledge is rusty for want of practice, or who is ill or tired, is a poor doctor in the sense of being one who cannot cope even in favourable circumstances: the lone doctor who is confronted with a raging cholera epidemic is 'bad' or 'poor' only in the sense of being helpless.

Socrates goes on to say (345c-346b) that Simonides cannot have meant to reserve his praise for those who 'do no base thing willingly', since (as we should expect to hear from Socrates) 'no one willingly does anything base'. He therefore shifts a comma, making Simonides say simply that his praise goes to those who do nothing base. This means, says Socrates, that for Simonides it is sufficient if a man attain a 'middle state' (346d-e) in which he does nothing evil; it is the man in this state who escapes censure.
One might have wished Socrates to be rather more lucid in his perverseness; but I take his meaning to be this. In the sense of 'do' in which a man is said to do even those things that are forced upon him from without, no man is good at doing what is best (for him) all the time, just as no specialist, however proficient, can reasonably bank on a continually benign environment for the practice of his speciality. In the sense of 'do' in which a man is said to do only those things which he is under no compulsion _ab extra_ to do, some men are good at doing the best (i.e., best-for-them) thing all the time, while others are not: those who are not have forgotten morality (i.e., forgotten the difference between right and wrong), much as a technical expert might forget his speciality. Forgetting morality implies learning it: men become good by learning _arete_, and good men become bad by forgetting what they have learnt, or (in other words) by being 'deprived of _episteme_'. We might therefore distinguish three classes of men: (1) a god-like (and in fact empty) class whose members do no evil, in both senses of 'do'; (2) a middle class, whose members do evil, in the first and weaker sense of 'do', but do nothing evil, in the second and stronger sense of 'do'; and (3) a third class, whose members do evil, in both senses of 'do'. To belong to the first class is not within man's power, but to belong to the second class is, and accordingly we praise those who belong to it. Belonging to the second class rather than to the first is a matter of living in an adverse and inhospitable environment which one is more or less unable to modify; belonging to the third class rather than the second is a matter
of being in an unhealthy and undesirable mental condition
(the condition namely of ignorance, or of 'lacking episteme')
which is for the most part remediable.

(Of course Socrates need not mean that it necessarily
makes sense on every occasion to correct by punishment or
censure those who do (in the second and stronger sense of
'do') evil: 'those are best for the longest time whom the
gods love' (345c3), and if the gods make someone mad in
order to destroy him, there may be little point in trying to
remedy his mental condition. Probably all that he wants to
do is to indicate that, generally speaking, it makes sense
to censure people only when their misdeeds are attributable
to defects in them, and not to defects in their physical
environment; for it is, in general, in men's power to act
otherwise, except where they are under physical constraint).

I would think that Socrates' discussion of the Scopas
poem to some extent looks forward to the subsequent account
he gives of akrasia (353-358). For the theory of akrasia
evisages that men can retain their (moral) episteme, yet
at the same time do evil without being physically compelled to
(cf. 'exon autois', 352d7 et al.). However the Scopas
discourse seems to imply that wrongdoing always involves either
physical compulsion of the agent, or the agent's (loss) of
episteme.
Protagoras, 349d–351b (= D.6a)

After a first reading of this short argument for the oneness of courage and wisdom, the reader is left in no doubt that Socrates has blundered, and that Protagoras (at 350c) has caught him out in illicitly converting 'All brave men are confident'. After a fourth or fifth reading, the reader is left rather with an uneasy feeling that probably someone, somewhere, has made a mistake; but his original certainty that there is a mistake, and that the mistake is an illicit conversion, has left him.

In interpreting the argument, we are concerned with the performances of three people: firstly, of Plato, who wrote it; and secondly and thirdly, of Socrates and Protagoras, who are Plato's creatures. Perhaps Plato wrote a good script, and perhaps he did not. In either case, he may have wanted to depict (1) an incorrect Socrates and a correct Protagoras, or (2) a correct Socrates and an incorrect Protagoras, or (3) an incorrect Socrates and an incorrect Protagoras, or (4) a correct Socrates and a correct Protagoras. The very fact that at least the first three of these four views of the relative merits of Socrates and Protagoras have been sponsored by able critics, would seem to suggest that Plato is at least partly to blame.

* cf. Footnotes 19, 41, 45, and 64.
The best and most thorough schematization of the argument is that done by Vlastos in the introduction to Plato's *Protagoras* (pp. xxxi-xxxvi). Reducing this to its bare essentials, and rewriting it in class calculus notation, we have:

\[ A. \quad b = 0 \quad (349e2-3; \ 350b6-7) \]
\[ B. \quad bn = 0 \quad (Implicit \ in \ 349e3-8) \]
\[ C. \quad wc = 0 \quad (349e8-350b1) \]
\[ D. \quad cwn = 0 \quad (350b1-6) \]
\[ E. \quad cwb = 0 \quad (350c1-2) \]
\[ F. \quad wcw = 0 \quad (350c2-4) \]
\[ G. \quad wb = 0 \quad (not \ stated) \]
\[ H. \quad wb = 0 \quad (not \ stated) \]
\[ I. \quad cb = 0 \quad (attributed \ to \ Socrates \ by \ Protagoras \ at \ 350c-d) \]
\[ J. \quad wb = 0 \quad (not \ stated) \]

According to Vlastos's analysis, Socrates behaves impeccably from \( A \) to \( F \) ('he has used no proposition except those admitted by *Protagoras*'), but commits a foul at \( G \), by introducing a proposition which Protagoras has had no chance to consider, as if it were already admitted. Socrates' foul is thus not a logical error (cf. p. xxxv, n. 40), but rather a breach of a rule of debating.

On this interpretation, Socrates is running two lines of argument. The first, through \( A, B, F \), and \( F \), gives \( J \). The second, through \( C \) and \( G \), gives \( H \). It is the second line of argument to which Protagoras objects. For he takes Socrates to be asserting, at 350c2-4, not \( G \), but \( C \) and \( I \).

* Key:  
  - \( b \): courageous  
  - \( c \): confident  
  - \( n \): noble (*kalos*)  
  - \( w \): wise
(C and I together entail H, I being the illicit conversion of A). Is Socrates caught out? Some commentators think that he is (cf. Sprague, Plato's Use of Fallacy, p. 96, and Crombie, EPD 1, p. 235), but this view does not allow for the fact that Socrates has no motive for making the illicit conversion attributed to him. (On this, see Vlastos's cogent argument, op. cit., pp. xxxiii-xxxiv). Briefly, Protagoras has contended (at 349d) that the ignorance which frequently accompanies bravery gives proof of the difference of courage from the other parts of arete; Socrates obtains his assent to three premises (A, Ba, E) which together entail that (J) ignorance never accompanies bravery, thus rebutting his argument. Protagoras, instead of objecting to this rebuttal, tries to counter Socrates' second line of argument (C-G-H), which is irrelevant to Protagoras's original contention.

From these considerations it would seem that Protagoras's difficulties are to be sought in Socrates' first line of argument (A-Ba-E-F-J). I can think of one objection to Socrates' first line of argument, but I am not sure whether Protagoras would want to avail himself of it. The objection would be that 'confident' is used in one sense in A, and in a different sense in F, so that the attempt to derive J from A and F must fail. For 'confident' in F obviously has the same sense as 'confident' in C, and the point of C is that anyone who is expert (or 'wise') in a technical matter is necessarily confident about his technical performances; while in A 'confident' seems to be used in a sense in which it would be impossible to specify any sort of thing about which
the brave man could be said to be confident. In other words, the expert's confidence is locatable in his conviction of mastery of a given type of performance, while the brave man's confidence is locatable in such traits of character as pluck and fortitude.

Protagoras, however, raises no objection when Socrates later pairs off 'confidence' and 'fear' (360b); nor does he object to Socrates' definition of fear as 'expectation of evil' (358d). This suggests that Protagoras would be willing to subscribe to 'expectation of good' as a definition of confidence. He seems moreover to think that good (things) can be discussed scientifically by compiling lists of things beneficial to a given thing (e.g. to man), and further sub-dividing these lists according to the respects in which the things listed are beneficial (334a-c). In view of this, we need not perhaps be too surprised that Protagoras does not raise the sort of objection just mentioned. That is to say, Protagoras probably envisages a much closer parallel between moral and technical confidence than we would be willing to allow.
How does one 'weigh in a balance' nearness and distance? In Plato's time balances were simple affairs, the sort in common use being a pole with a pan at either end, suspended at the centre by a cord. (Aristotle), *Mechanics* 849b 34 sqq. records that 'dealers in purple, in weighing it, use contrivances with intent to deceive, putting the cord out of centre...', and in the same work has a note on the so-called Danish steelyard, a simple pole with a number of notches, a movable rope fulcrum, and a small fixed weight at one end (853b 25 sqq.). It is then a reasonable assumption that Plato's and Socrates' contemporaries were familiar with the method of weighing small objects against large by shifting the suspension-rope off centre. The downfall of the akратêse seems, applying the analogy, to be this. He imagines that he is confronted with this sort of situation:

\[ H \triangleleft L \]

\[ \Delta \]

\[ 2 \]

\[ \Delta \]

\[ 3 \]

The pleasures seem to tip the scale (to be *axia nikan*) only because the fulcrum is far away, and the pains are almost at the fulcrum. There are thus two disproportions involved, (1) a disproportion in the masses being balanced; and (2) a disproportion in the lengths from pan to fulcrum, which over-compensates for (1). (1) is the analogue of the disproportion in size or number of the hedonic elements (pleasures and pains or pleasures) involved; (2) is the analogue of the disproportion between their respective distances in time from the agent. (The application of (2) cannot be any more rigorous than this, since in the model it is the 'pleasure-pan' that is farther from the fulcrum, and the 'pain-pan' that is nearer: the important point, however, is the need to correct the disproportion in length). Of course, the 'expert in weighing' need not go to the bother of re-adjusting the fulcrum; all he needs is a grasp of the mechanics involved. (For fourth-century 'experts', an understanding of harmonic progression would have sufficed).

* cf. Footnote 76.
CHAPTER II - NOTE 6

The Socratic Paradox at Protagoras 358c-d.

In his article 'The Interpretation of "No one does wrong willingly" in Plato's Dialogues' (Phronesis X (1965), pp. 82-105), Mr. Norman Gulley suggests that it is a doctrine of the Protagoras that any action chosen as a possible course of action and either known or believed to be good is at the same time a voluntary action. (p. 93)

This cannot be right. If it were, the statement of the paradox at 358c6 foll. would have to begin:

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues either what he knows or what he thinks to be evil ...

(The use of this sort of formula would not of itself establish Gulley's thesis; but perhaps this would not matter much. We could allow that it left open the possibility of Gulley's view being correct, and even that it was suggestive of such a view).

However, what Plato wrote is this:

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or what he thinks to be evil ...

To affirm this is, patently, to affirm both that no one voluntarily pursues evil and that no one voluntarily pursues what he thinks to be evil; whence it must follow that all pursuit of evil (whether or not the agent believes it to be good) is involuntary, and also that all pursuit of good which the agent (mistakenly) thinks evil is involuntary. This suggests that the Socrates of the Protagoras would hold that the only voluntary actions are good actions chosen as possible courses of action and either known or believed to be good - a doctrine which is certainly much closer to that of the Gorgias than the one attributed to the Protagoras by Gulley.

* cf. Footnote 112.
I doubt, indeed, whether there is any significant difference between the doctrine of involuntariness of the Protagoras and that of the Gorgias. Admittedly, the exposition of the doctrine of the Gorgias is more intricate: the notion of boulesis (on which see Chapter I, Note 3) is given a lot of attention, and it is clearly implied that the voluntary (hekôn) agent is the one who acts with boulesis (Gorgias 509e). It is true, too, as Gulley points out (p. 83), that

if what the agent thinks is good for him is 'really' bad for him, then it is not an object of boulesis.

But none of this entails that, for the agent to have boulesis for X, and so to act voluntarily with regard to X, he must know that X is good for him: perhaps a true belief about the goodness of X will do the trick (and cf. Meno 97 foll.). If it will, and if, as seems to be the case, the doctrine of the Protagoras is that those act voluntarily who do good rightly believing it to be good, then there is in this respect no discrepancy between the Protagoras and the Gorgias.
CHAPTER III

THE GORGIAS AND THE PHAEDO

Both of these dialogues were probably written during Plato's 'middle' period, perhaps between 390 and 385. We can be reasonably sure that the Gorgias was written first, though for our purposes the order does not matter much. It is of some interest that, while the dramatic date of the Phaedo can be quite precisely given as the day of Socrates' execution in 399, no precise dramatic date can be assigned to the Gorgias, which is set rather vaguely in the time of the Peloponnesian wars. This might be thought to argue in favour of an earlier date of composition for the Phaedo: if it has a precise historical setting, then it is probably nearer in date of composition to 399 than a dialogue with an imprecise setting, since Plato's memory of the circumstances seems to be fresher. Scholars nowadays are, however, rightly sceptical of any claim that the Phaedo must be substantially

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1 On the impossibility of assigning a precise dramatic date, see E.R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias, pp. 17-18.
a record of some discussion in which Socrates the son of Sophroniscus actually took part, mainly on the ground that what is philosophically important in the dialogue is for the most part post-Socratic; which would perhaps mean that Plato gave the dialogue a precise setting in order to dedicate a distinctively Platonic essay in a rather special way to Socrates' memory. But, as I say, this does not seem of crucial importance for what we are discussing.

a) The Gorgias

Thrasylus aptly labelled the Gorgias 'a refutative dialogue about Rhetoric'. Roughly, what is being refuted is the claim of rhetoric to be 'the finest of the arts'. It must be remembered that a fifth-century rhetorician was more than a teacher of the polite art of after-dinner speaking. Professor Dodds puts the position thus:

To the contemporaries of Socrates rhetoric meant the practical art of influencing men's will through the spoken word. And in an age when books were still few, and newspapers no more dreamt of than cinema or television, the spoken word was the one effective medium of mass-communication. Its mastery was in a democracy the royal road to power and also, in the last resort, the best guarantee of personal safety, since most Athenian politicians had sooner or later to defend themselves and their policy before a jury. ...Rhetoric was the Art of Success.

2 See, for instance, the references given by R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, p. 4, n.1.

3 448e5.

4 Dodds, op. cit., p. 4.
In the Gorgias three people speak up for the Art of Success: Gorgias the master, Polus the disciple, and Callicles, the budding professional practitioner. Socrates questions all three in turn, and the dialogue concludes with a long monologue delivered by Socrates. In briefly expounding the dialogue, we might thus conveniently divide it up into four sections.

Section 1 (449-461) (Socrates-Gorgias). This first section is devoted to an attempt to elicit from Gorgias a definition of rhetoric. What is rhetoric? It is, says Gorgias, the art (technē) which is 'concerned with words (peri logous)'.

This will not do, Socrates points out, since all arts are in some way 'about words', even such arts as medicine and music.

What does Gorgias say to this? He replies that rhetoric, unlike music and medicine, is practised by means of words, not of actions.

Socrates helpfully suggests that a distinction can be drawn between arts which can be carried on in silence, and those which cannot; but, assuming rhetoric to be one of the latter sort, how is it to be distinguished from, say, arithmetic, which also seems to be an art which acts through speech? Well, says Gorgias, rhetoric acts by speaking with regard to the most important of human things, which are political freedom and power: rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and these are the benefits which it confers.
But, Socrates retorts, you cannot just say that it is
the art of persuasion, in the same way as you cannot say
that Zeuxis is the figure-painter: there are other figure-
painters, so that, if you describe Zeuxis as 'the figure-painter',
you must add what sorts of figures he paints, and where they
are to be found. What sorts of 'figures' does rhetoric 'paint'?

Persuasion or conviction about what is just or unjust, says
Gorgias. Where are its 'figures' to be found? In assemblies
and juries.

So far Gorgias has been made to say about what rhetoric
produces conviction, and where it produces conviction. He has
not said what sort of conviction it produces. Of what, then,
does the art of rhetoric persuade - of what is true, or of
what may be true and may be false? Does the rhetorician impart
that sort of conviction which is knowledge, and cannot be false;
or does he impart only belief? Belief, says Gorgias. This then
completes the definition of rhetoric: it is the art of producing
belief about what is just or unjust, in juries and assemblies.

It would seem from this, says Socrates, that the rhetorician
can have no part to play in the giving of technical advice; and

10 453c  
11 454b (cf. 452e).

12 454c-455a (Gorgias's final definition of rhetoric may be
obtained by running together 454b and 455a).
this must extremely limit his usefulness: if in public affairs we want advice about public works or military operations, we call in the architect or the soldier.

Gorgias makes light of this: the position of the rhetor is rather that of a Pericles, who, while no builder, can yet persuade the people to embark on programmes of public works. Likewise, says Gorgias, you will find rhetoricians persuading reluctant patients to let their physicians treat them: so great, indeed, is the power of rhetoric that a rhetorician who competed against a physician for the position of state medical officer would be bound to be appointed. Gorgias hastens to add that of course such power should not be used improperly, just as a boxer should not use his skill to beat up his father. 13

But, says Socrates, if a rhetorician who is admittedly ignorant of medicine is more persuasive about it, at least to simple people, than a skilled physician, is it not also possible that he is equally ignorant of justice, even though he can perhaps easily persuade people in matters having to do with justice? Gorgias supposes that, were one of his pupils to be ignorant of justice, he would teach him that as well: that a man has learned rhetoric thus implies that he has at some time or other learned about justice. 14

Socrates then springs the trap. Gorgias has said, on the one hand, that the rhetorician can (though should not) use his

13 455b-457c. 14 459a-460a.
art for bad ends (like the boxer beating his father).

Thus the rhetorician can be an unjust man. But Gorgias also claims that one who has learnt rhetoric will also have learnt justice; and, as one who has learnt carpentry is a carpenter, so one who has learnt justice is a just man. Thus the rhetorician must be a just man; and so Gorgias's claims are inconsistent.

Section 2 (462-481) (Socrates-Palus). Polus, the disciple, now comes to the master's rescue: Socrates has treated Gorgias discourteously. Gorgias's claim to know justice and be able to teach it to others was, he says, prompted by a proper sense of shame. Anyone who was asked whether he knew and could impart justice would be ashamed to answer 'No', so that Socrates' victory has been secured by a cheap emotional trick. After an altercation on the subject of lengthy speeches, Polus agrees to question Socrates.

Socrates made Gorgias define rhetoric: now Polus will make Socrates define it. What is rhetoric? A knack. The knack of what? The knack of producing gratification. So that is Socrates'
definition? No, says Socrates, because you can define
cookery in that way too. What then is rhetoric? Like
cookery, it is a part of flattery; unlike cookery, it is
the sham or ghost of a part of politics. Laudable or base? 19

Gorgias interrupts to ask for enlightenment. There are,
says Socrates, four technai, two of which serve the soul, and
two the body. Of the four, there is a preventive art (gymnastic)
for the body, and a preventive art (legislation) for the soul;
again, there is a corrective art (medicine) for the body, and
a corrective art (justice) for the soul. Of these four there
are shams: cosmetics is the sham of gymnastic, sophistic of
legislation, cookery of medicine, and rhetoric of justice. The
four shams are varieties of flattery, and the distinguishing
mark of flattery is that it aims at what is pleasant, as distinct
from what is best. 20

So then, says Polus, the orator is highly regarded because
he flatters people? No, says Socrates, orators are not highly
regarded. What? says Polus, have they not great political power?
Surely they can do whatever they want to? They have no power,
and they do not what they want to, but only what they think they
want to (ha dokei, 'what seems good to them'). 20a

19 462b-463d.
20 463e-466a (It is said at 464d that 'present pleasure' is the
'bait' which flattery sets before men).
20a There has been some discussion of this in Note 3 to Chapter I,
avove.
Does not Socrates envy the man who can kill anyone he pleases? No, because one could if one wished take a dagger into the market-place and kill anyone one pleased: would one be enviable on that account? Of course not, says Polus, but only because one would be punished for it; but if one were like the tyrant Archelaus, who has committed the most monstrous crimes with impunity, one would indeed be enviable: even Socrates would gladly change places with Archelaus. He would not: if Archelaus is an evil-doer who has escaped punishment, then his lot is more wretched than if he had been apprehended and put to a horrible death.  

Polus laughs, but Socrates stands his ground: all evil-doers are unfortunate, but the evil-doer who escapes punishment is more hapless than the one who suffers it. Socrates offers a proof: Polus would agree that it is baser (more aischron) to do injustice than to suffer it? Yes. But the two criteria of what is noble or laudable (kalon) and what is base (aischron) are pleasure and benefit. Now to suffer injustice is nobler (more kalon) than to do it; therefore it must be either the more pleasant or the more beneficial of the two; but it is not more pleasant, and so it must be more beneficial: thus to do injustice is worse (or less beneficial) than to suffer it. Socrates goes on to argue (partly on the basis

21 466a-473e.  22 474c-475e (which is discussed below).
of what he has just said) that the unjust man who gets his deserts is more fortunate than the unjust man who does not, which indicates a possible use to which rhetoric might be put: rhetoric might perhaps come in handy when a wrongdoer wanted to indict himself for his crimes, and accept the beneficial punishment imposed. 23

Section 3 (481-506) (Socrates-Callicles). Callicles asks whether Socrates can be serious: if he is, then 'the whole of human life is turned upside down', and in everything people are doing the very opposite of what they ought to do. In fact, says Callicles, Socrates has shown to Polus the same gross discourtesy that he previously showed to Gorgias. Just as Gorgias was shamed into claiming to be just and to be able to impart justice, so Polus has been shamed into admitting that doing injustice is more ignoble (aischron) than suffering it. 24 Of course, Polus meant by 'ignoble', 'conventionally ignoble'. By convention (nomos) injustice is ignoble, but not by nature (phusis), so that, in the nature of things, suffering injustice is worse than doing it. Laws or conventions exist only to protect the weak from the strong; and they are conspicuously absent both in the animal world and in international affairs, where nature reigns supreme. But a superman, if there is one, will disregard 'formulas and spells and charms,

23 473e-481b.  24 482d-e.
and all laws which are against nature', and trample them underfoot, 'and the light of nature's justice will shine forth'. Socrates cannot see this because he has given over his life to philosophy - something which is all very well in its place (which is the schoolroom), but which makes a man who pursues it in later life a most pitiful spectacle. Let Socrates give over philosophy and learn how free men live, before some worthless person trumps up a charge against him, drags him off to court, and has him put to death. 25

Socrates takes Callicles to say that the better should rule the worse, the stronger the weaker, and that the better sort of person should have more than the riff-raff. That is so. 'Stronger' - stronger in what? In numbers? If this is what is meant, then Callicles is opting for mob rule. 26 By 'stronger' does he mean 'wiser'? Yes. Then, by an analogy, taking the physician to be wiser than all of us in the matter of food, the physician should get the lion's share when it comes to apportioning food; so too the tailor should have the

25 Callicles' great speech or rhesis is at 482c-486c.
26 488b-489d (Socrates also shows that, if Callicles means 'stronger in numbers' by 'better', then his phusis-nomos contrast backfires, since hoi polloi (who would have to be the 'better-by-nature') accept the convention that doing injustice is more base than suffering it).
most and best clothes, the cobbler the most shoes, and the farmer the most seed. Callicles rejects the analogy. 27

What then can be mean by 'stronger'? 'Men with the intelligence and courage to rule others'. 'And to rule themselves also?' What, says Callicles, does this mean? Only, says Socrates, that men should rule their pleasures and passions. 28 Socrates, then, identifies the know-how of living (sophrosune) with folly? It is the mark of a man to let one's appetites wax fat, and gratify them to the fullest extent: wisdom was given us not to put a curb on our desires, but rather to minister to their promptings. 29

Socrates counters with his own view: only those who want nothing are happy. 'Then only stones and the dead are happy'. 30 Socrates replies by appealing to two allegories. The profligate, firstly, are like the uninitiated in the Sicilian myth, who

27 489e-491a (It is of some interest that at 460b, Gorgias does not hesitate to accept a techne parallel (carpentry: justice), while at 491 a, Callicles scornfully repudiates one: 'Yes, Heaven knows, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument').

28 491d-e.

29 491e-492e.

30 492e.
are forever carrying water in a sieve to a pot full of holes, the sieve representing their souls. 31 Again, they are like men who are ever having to go to the trouble and expense of replenishing leaky jars with quantities of precious fluid, while their neighbours (i.e. the self-restrained), having sound jars, do not suffer this distress. But, says Callicles, those with the leaky jars, insofar as they are a figure of men experiencing pleasure, are to be envied: to keep having appetites and gratifying them is the greatest happiness. 32

For Callicles, then, the pleasant and the good are the same? Yes. They are not the same for Socrates, and he offers Callicles two proofs of their dissimilarity. 33 (These will be considered in detail in a moment). Callicles is sufficiently impressed by them to allow that there are good and bad pleasures. Good pleasures, then, are beneficial, and bad pleasures are hurtful; and we need the help of some art to enable us to distinguish between them. 34

Socrates now returns to the distinction he drew in the discussion with Polus between the four arts concerned with the care of body and soul, and their counterfeits. Music, tragedy,
poetry, and rhetoric all seem to merit a place in the same pigeon-hole, all being concerned with the pleasure rather than the good of their audiences. The rhetorician plays with his audience as someone might play with children, seeking only to gratify them, but never to improve them. Callicles admits that perhaps the orators of his own day behave in this way, but claims that the orators of former times - Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades, and more recently Pericles - were better men. They were not, says Socrates: for none of them set before himself the ideal of bringing harmony out of disorder, and of making those whom they ruled better and more virtuous. Callicles is now quite vexed, and suggests that Socrates finish the argument himself.

Section 4 (506-527) (Socrates). Socrates first restates some of the conclusions of the previous discussions: the pleasant and the good are not the same; pleasure is to be pursued only for the sake of what is good; and we become good by acquiring arete. Arete is never present in us or in anything by accident, but is a matter of order and harmony. The self-restrained soul is orderly and harmonious, and therefore perfectly good and happy, while the reverse holds of the licentious soul, which is utterly

35a Though Callicles has a speaking part in this section, it is a relatively minor one: after 505d he answers only for the purpose of concluding the argument.
wretched. Callicles counsels licentiousness because he would have men cultivate excess and disproportion: he does not care about geometry.

Rhetoric prides itself on being a saviour of life; yet the rhetorician would no doubt disdain the humbler arts which save life: swimming, navigation, and engine-making. Why? If the excellence of rhetoric consists in its saving power, why should the rhetorician despise any other skill with precisely the same power? But perhaps the rhetoricians mistake is to make length rather than quality of life his concern.

There are two types of process: one aims at pleasing men, the other at making them good. If someone is applying for the job of state physician, we examine him, and inquire about whom he has cured, and made better and healthier. Callicles is going to embark on a political career, and will perhaps be a holder of public offices: should we not then examine him in the same way? Which of the Athenians has he made better? He will need to have done better than those eminent men whose names were just mentioned, who gratified the appetite of the demos for docks and harbours, but failed to make them better citizens, and so were all turned out of office for their pains. To call such men statesmen is like calling a baker or a vintner a gymnastic trainer. Socrates sees himself as the only Athenian

36 506a-508a. 37 511c-513c.
who seeks the true art of politics; but, if he is brought unjustly to trial, he will fare no better than would a physician tried 'in a court of little boys at the indictment of the pastry-cook'.

No man however should be afraid of death, but only of wrong-doing:

For to go to the world below having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils.

Socrates concludes with an eschatological myth.

From this sketchy summary it will be seen that in fact the Gorgias deals with a good deal more than the nature and value of rhetoric. Rhetoric is one of a group of central concepts which are compared and contrasted: knowledge and belief, justice and rhetoric, goodness and pleasure. The first of these great contrasts is made by Socrates when eliciting a definition of rhetoric from Gorgias; the second and third are made when Socrates offers Polus an alternative definition of rhetoric, and are developed in the argument with Callicles, and in the concluding monologue. Pleasure thus appears in the Gorgias as the third member of an unholy trinity: belief, rhetoric, and pleasure. Goodness, by contrast, is the third member of the

38 513d-522c.  39 522c-e.
40 523-527  41 454c-d.
42 463e-466a.  43 500a-506e; 492e-500a.
44 517b-519d; 506c-d, 513c-e.
holy trinity comprising knowledge, justice, and goodness.

45 The disunity of pleasure and goodness is already assumed in the argument with Polus; however I will consider first the proofs which Socrates offers Callicles of this disunity. I will begin with the dialectical proofs (1) at 495e-497e and (2) at 497d-499b.

The first dialectical proof. This proof is in two stages. It is proved, firstly, that no one can have good and evil at the same time. 46 It is then shown that a man can have pleasure and pain at the same time; ergo pleasure and good cannot be the same. The first stage invokes an analogy between good and evil (i.e. moral good and evil) and certain bodily conditions. No one can have eyes which are simultaneously healthy and inflamed; nor can anyone be strong and weak, or swift and slow, simultaneously. 48 In the same way, says Socrates (and Callicles agrees) goodness and well-being or prosperity (eudaimonia) on the one hand, and evil and misery on the other, must alternate: no one can have both at once. 49 Now, says Socrates, look at pleasure and pain. All desires (e.g. hunger and thirst) are painful, while all gratifications of desire (e.g. eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty) are pleasant. The pain

45 'disunity' in the sense of 'non-identity'.
46 495e-496c.
47 496c-e.
48 495e-496b.
49 496b-c.
consists in the desire or appetite, while the pleasure consists in its gratification. Yet in cases where an appetite is gratified, the appetite and its gratification are present simultaneously; therefore pleasure and pain are present simultaneously; therefore pleasure and pain are not to be equated with good and evil. In like manner, appetites cease when their gratification ceases (one stops drinking when one stops being thirsty): good and evil do not cease simultaneously in this manner, but alternate, so that on this score pleasure and good cannot be identified.

This is a rather curious argument. Taking into account what Plato elsewhere (notably in the Republic) has to say about contrariety, it has been inferred that a point he wants to make is that pleasure and pain are not true contraries.

50 496d–e. 51 496e. 52 497c.

53 cf. Republic 436b8–9. (For some discussion of this 'law of contradiction' to anticipatory pleasure and pain, as accounted for in the Philebus, see Note appended to Chapter VI).

54 Indeed, the point of 495e in this argument seems to be that, if any two things are opposites, one cannot have both simultaneously; it is then shown (496c–e) that one cannot have pleasure and pain simultaneously. All this warrants the inference that pleasure and pain are not opposites, but Socrates leaves the inference undrawn. Perhaps Dodds (op. cit., p. 310) is right: Plato had just not got round to working out the logic of opposition in any detail.
If this is so, then it possibly throws some further light on Socrates' refusal to define rhetoric as the art of anything, since an art or techne is concerned with the production of one of two contrary conditions: the oculist produces healthy eyes, the gymnastic trainer produces strong men and swift runners, and so on. The rhetorician who produces pleasure or gratification in his audience would not, on this account, be producing one of two contrary conditions. But perhaps this is reading too much into the argument.

Nor can it be said, I would think, that Socrates is confining his attention in this (and also the following) argument to profligate pleasures. To be sure, he has just given Callicles the myths of the sieve and the leaky jars, which are undoubtedly intended as allegorical figures of the profligate pleasures. The levels in the jars, for instance, do not rise with replenishment, because the jars are being drained as fast as they are being filled, and the draining and the replenishment seem to constitute a single debilitating process. But the examples in the first

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55 The point that techne operates with a view to realising one (and normally the better) of two contrary ends has been discussed in Chapter I (d), above.

56 One might, that is, be tempted to say something like this: Since profligate pleasure-pain is just one single, continuous, enervating process, and since Callicles is defending profligate pleasure-pain, Socrates is making the point that the 'pleasure' and 'pain' halves of profligate pleasure-pain are not true opposites, and so cannot correspond to good and evil; but this observation of Socrates' has only a limited application to profligate pleasure.
dialectical argument are surely more innocent than this. After all, eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty are what even people like Socrates do every day of their lives; and at 497c Socrates specifically envisages a terminus of such processes. These examples are therefore to be connected with the first, or self-restrained, man in the allegory of the leaky jars, rather than with the second, or profligate, man: the self-restrained man, like the normal sort of person who eats when hungry, fills his jars and makes an end of it; it is only the profligate who leaves his jars uncaulked or, in other words, sets no bounds to his appetites and their gratification.

The second dialectical proof. Put into statement form, this runs as follows: Good men are called good by virtue of the presence to them of good things, just as noble men are deemed noble by virtue of the presence to them of noble things. Good men (e.g. men who are wise and brave) feel both pleasure and pain; but so also do bad men (e.g. men who are stupid and cowardly). Good and bad men experience pleasure (and pain) in a nearly equal degree, although bad men’s pleasures and pains are rather more intense. If we suppose that pleasures

57 493e.
58 497d–e.
59 497e–498c.
are goods and pains evils (as Callicles would have it), then we must also suppose that goods are present to those who feel pleasure, and evils to those who feel pain. This entails that those who feel pleasure are good, and that those who feel pain are evil; and that men are better or worse than others according as their pleasures or pains are more intense than those of others. Therefore good men (e.g. wise and brave men) who feel pleasure are good, and good men who feel pain are evil; and the like holds of bad men (e.g. fools and cowards). The bad man is therefore both as good and as bad as the good man, and perhaps even better than the good man, since his pleasures are more intense.

What Socrates is getting at in this argument is rather hard to see. It is however interesting that he should refer back to it at the beginning of Section 4 of the dialogue (precisely, at 506c-d):

And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good by the presence of which we are good.

He continues:

And we are good, and all good things whatever are good, when some arete is present in us or them.

It is thus fairly obvious that Socrates' meaning in the second dialectical proof must be that good men are good by reason of having arete present to them, in much the same way as good spades

60 498d.  61 498d-a.  62 499a.
(for example) are good by reason of having the areté of a spade present to them. If we say that good spades are good by reason of having the areté of a spade (i.e. the fitness for performing those tasks which spades are normally required to perform) present to them, then the point we are making is that a spade can be said to be a good spade if and only if it possesses those properties (such as flatness, toughness, sharpness, rectangularity, and so on) which together constitute its fitness for performing a well-defined set of tasks. On this analogy, if we say that good men are good by reason of having (human) areté present to them, the point being made is that man can be said to be a good man if and only if he possesses certain properties (character-traits such as courage, temperance, piety, and the like) which together constitute his fitness for living in human society.

It is not at all obvious that Callicles takes Socrates to mean this sort of thing. On the contrary, when Socrates says that good men have good things present to them, Callicles probably takes him to be saying that men are good according as they possess not moral qualities, but such in-between (i.e. potentially good) external things as money, high office,

63 467e-468a; and see Chapter I, Note 3, above.
and the like. Certainly, the pleasant things or pleasures at the presence of which men feel pleasure are agreed by Callicles to be external things or events, like the departure of an enemy in battle. This no doubt is why Callicles so readily agrees that those who feel pleasure are good because goods or pleasures are present to them: he equates goods with those external luxuries or pieces of good fortune which delight men.

I think it fairly likely then that Socrates is using the word 'presence' equivocally; as if in English one were to speak in the same breath of possessing property in the middle town and possessing the property of maleability. Callicles, for his part, is an unreflective sort of person, and is perhaps automatically subscribing to the old-fashioned standard of goodness, according to which a man's external wealth and good fortune were the marks of personal goodness. Now at 491b,

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64 498b.

65 A.E. Taylor (PMN, p. 121, n. 3) oversimplifies the position: I.M. Crombie (EPD 1, p. 231) seems to me to have got it right.

66 The unsatisfactoriness of the old-fashioned standard seems to me to be implied in the concluding myth of Divine Judgement. In former times, men were judged in the body, so that those who were sufficiently well-heeled escaped censure. Under the new dispensation, the soul is scrutinised naked, and all that matters is its possession or want of areté.
Callicles has identified his moral superman with the man possessed of wisdom and courage, so that it is no accident that in this proof of the non-identity of pleasure and goodness, Socrates takes as his example of good men, men who are wise and brave. Of course, the wise and brave man is hardly the same person for Callicles as he is for Socrates; Callicles' good man is the man who is shrewd and brave enough to fatten and gratify his appetites for luxury and political power, while Socrates' good man is the man who rules his pleasures and passions. This being so, Socrates could hardly hope to rout Callicles by contending, for instance, that bad men enjoy the pleasures of profligacy, while good men do not.

Socrates, however, cunningly appeals to the pleasures and pains of warfare: wise and brave men, fools and cowards, all alike feel pleasure at the enemy's departure. Callicles' earlier encomium of profligate pleasure has no bearing on this example, so that Callicles can only admit that, in this case, good and bad men feel pleasure to much the same extent.

Had Callicles been more astute, he could no doubt have protested at the equivocation on the word 'presence'. I have already suggested that he does not protest because he does not query implicit equations of human goodness with political and material well-being; and it is this sort of equation that
Socrates so eloquently questions in the closing pages of the Gorgias. 67 Trapped as he is, Callicles can only blurt out:

But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad? 68

Of course Callicles must now allow that some pleasures are good and others bad: if he did not, he would have to admit, if challenged, that the sort of pleasure felt by cowards (who would be among the number of the despised untermenschen) at the enemy's departure must not merely escape censure, but even be commended as good and honourable.

I will consider presently the immediate sequel of these two proofs; but before doing so, let us briefly go back to part of the argument with Polus that has already been mentioned in the summary of the dialogue. I refer to the passage 474b-475e. What sort of account would Polus give of anything's being kalon (beautiful, noble, or laudable)? Must it not be either beneficial (ophelimon) or pleasant or both? And likewise, if a thing is aischron (ugly, ignoble, base), must it not be either harmful or painful or both? Polus accepts these as the criteria of nobility and baseness, and Socrates goes on to demonstrate from these admissions that it is better to suffer than to do evil.

67 cf. footnote 66; also (e.g.) 518e-519a.

68 499b.
The hapless Polus applauds Socrates' defining beauty or nobility 'by reference to pleasure and good'. He does not however seem fully to realise that Socrates is proposing alternative necessary conditions for a thing's being describable as kalon. Socrates is thus deliberately driving a wedge between pleasure and goodness (or utility). Moreover, Socrates is almost certainly not committed to the view that utility and pleasantness are alternative sufficient conditions of a thing's being kalon: it does not follow from what he puts to Polus that the pleasantness of a thing necessarily renders it kalon; and in view of what is said about the value of pleasure elsewhere in the dialogue, it can hardly be that he would have wanted to suggest this. All that Socrates commits himself to is that if \( x \) is kalon but not beneficial, then \( x \) must be pleasant: it does not follow that if \( x \) is pleasant but not beneficial, then it must be kalon. Whether or not \( x \) is kalon is such a case must presumably depend upon the sort of pleasure involved; and any evaluation of the sort of pleasure involved will surely involve the application of criteria other than pleasure, such as criteria of order and harmony.

In the light then of the two dialectical proofs offered to Callicles, and of this argument with Polus, we see that Socrates

69 475a2-4.

70 Compare this with Protagoras 354d.
is advocating in the Gorgias a most thorough separation of pleasure from goodness. The seal is set on this separation in the passage which immediately follows the two dialectical proofs (499-501). Some pleasures are beneficial, others harmful: the beneficial are good, the harmful evil. When we seek pleasure, we should so with a view to what is good, but we should not seek what is good with a view to pleasure. Sham arts, such as rhetoric, know nothing of what is better and worse, but are concerned solely with the production of pleasure. 71

These sentiments are apparently a far cry from those of the Socrates of the Protagoras. But, as I have suggested in the last chapter, it seems unlikely that the Socrates of the Protagoras seriously holds his hedonist thesis. Again, I have suggested that, whether or not Socrates is supposed to be an apostle of hedonism in the Protagoras, Plato's purpose in that dialogue can very plausibly be taken to be an examination of the presuppositions of ordinary morality, one of which turns out to be the hedonist thesis. The hedonist thesis, as I have suggested, has its uses: it is a simple moral doctrine which ordinary people can, without much difficulty, be made to infer from their formulated moral beliefs. In the

71 500a-b.
hands of honourable men like Protagoras, it can even perhaps
be a power of good, since it can be used to impart to people
with no aptitude for ethical inquiry (i.e. most people) some
faint comprehension of the basis of morality. However, in
the hands of moral morons like Callicles, it is undoubtedly
a power for evil, since such people are only too ready to
learn from it, and preach, the lesson that gratification of
appetite is all that matters in life. To be sure, the appetites
of a Callicles are in a sense more sophisticated than those of
the ordinary run of people, involving as they do an insatiable
lust for political power; but this only makes men like Callicles
all the more dangerous, and their doctrines all the more damnable.

A final point on the Gorgias. We can discern in this
dialogue the first appearance of what we might term the hygienic
doctrine of pleasure. Admittedly the doctrine is not worked
out in any detail, and very probably Plato did not do this until
he came to write the Republic and the Timaeus. But the basis
of the doctrine is already present in the two allegorical passages
at 493: pleasure is essentially a repletive process. The two
allegories are said by Socrates to be Sicilian or Italian imports,
and (though we cannot be sure) it is quite possible that Plato
picked them up in Sicily, and with them the basis of the hygienic
theory of pleasure. 72 Of this more will be said presently.

72 For the attribution of the hygienic theory to Empedocles, cf.
Dodds, op. cit., p. 304.
We must now look briefly at the Phaedo.

b) The Phaedo

At Phaedo 67b-69e there is a contrast between ordinary and philosophic goodness. This arises out of the contrast Socrates draws between the death of lovers of wisdom (philosophers) and the death of lovers of the body or of honours and riches. The philosopher goes uncomplainingly to death, since his whole concern in life has been the release and separation of soul from body; the earthbound man, on the contrary, makes an undignified fuss about death. The reason for this, according to Socrates, is not hard to see, if only one contrasts the moral qualities of the two sorts of men.

Both philosophers and ordinary men can be described as courageous and temperate. But the courage and temperance of ordinary people is of a mercenary kind. For instance: ordinary men think of death as a great evil, yet often enough face it bravely; but they do this always through fear of some greater evil than death. Again, we find ordinary men mastering their baser passions, but this very mastery is a sort of profligacy: they are simply giving up certain pleasures (the baser ones) in order that they may indulge other pleasures (the nobler ones). But this virtue that we find in ordinary people amounts to no more than the trading of pleasure for pleasure, fear for fear, and so on. They employ the currency of pleasure and fear in their
moral transactions, where they should be employing intelligence alone. It is peculiar to the philosopher to shun all such bartering: his courage and temperance spring from wisdom alone; and the courage and temperance of ordinary men are but counterfeits of his.

The strong repudiation here of the hedonic calculus of the Protagoras is at once apparent. But the anti-hedonism of the Phaedo is even stronger than that of the Gorgias. One might want to say of the Gorgias that, even though it is intended as a warning against the possible disastrous consequences of ordering (or better, disordering) our lives according to the false doctrine of hedonism, its polemic is somewhat softened by the attitude manifested in the Protagoras, viz. that even hedonism has its uses. But the point of the Phaedo passage is not just that hedonism is to be handled with care: it is that hedonism can afford no basis whatever for the truly virtuous life. Of course, it is in the Phaedo that the distinction between ordinary and philosophic goodness is most pronounced: we shall find this distinction softened, and pleasure more gently treated, in the Republic.

74 69a-b.
CHAPTER IV

THE HYGIENIC THEORY OF PLEASURE

and

THE REPUBLIC


As we have now seen, this theory is adumbrated in the two allegorical passages of Section 3 of the Gorgias. It is, however, more or less fully stated in the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Philebus. Though it is not put in precisely the same way in each of these dialogues, the discrepancies one finds are of a fairly minor nature, so that little harm will be done by conflating at this point these three statements of the theory.

Fundamentally, the hygienic theory regards pleasure and pain as processes or motions going on in the soul, most of them being at least potentially unruly. Motion involves direction, and pleasure and pain are opposites: they must

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1 See Chapter III.
2 Republic 583 foll.
3 64 foll.
4 31d-32b.
5 Republic 583e; Philebus 27e.
6 Republic 583c.
therefore be motions in opposite directions. Since they are motions they cannot be states of rest, whence it is misguided to identify with pleasure or pain those states of tranquillity which are neither pleasant nor painful (e.g., the state of well-being of man who has recovered from a serious illness). Pains are destructive processes: if the motion of pain is not arrested it terminates in complete dissolution of the living thing in which it occurs, i.e., in death. When a pain-process is arrested a contrary process or motion is at once set in train, i.e., one of pleasure. Thus while pain is a process of destruction, pleasure is one of restoration. It is generally true to say that the organic processes which accompany pains are processes of emptying, while those which constitute pleasures are processes of replenishment. There is no such thing as an unperceived pleasure or an unperceived pain; we reserve the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' for those organic processes of restoration and destruction which we perceive, i.e., which penetrate

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7 Republic 583c; Philebus 27e.
8 Philebus 31d.
9 Pain being a type of phthora, and pleasure a type of genesis or katastasis.
10 cf. Phaedrus 258e; Phaedo 60b-c.
11 Philebus 31d.
12 'kenōsis' is the Greek word.
13 plērōsis or anaplērōsis.
14 Philebus 43c.
both the body and the soul, and set up a disturbance which is in one sense common to both, and in another sense peculiar to each. The fact that some processes are perceived signifies that they are of a considerable magnitude. Sometimes processes of destruction or emptying occur at a slow pace over long periods; when this occurs the destructive process, though unperceived, often has for compensation a swift and intense, and therefore perceived restorative process. This is the explanation of how some pleasures (e.g., those of smell) occur when there has been no antecedent pain. Indeed, if Heracleitus and his followers are right, living organisms are being subjected all the time to moderate processes of destruction and restoration, the one constantly compensating for the other. This would make any talk of an organism's being in a state of tranquility or at rest inaccurate, though it would not render the substance of an important previous judgement inaccurate, namely that it is misguided to identify with pleasure or pain the condition of a healthy organism which is being subjected to only moderate processes. From observations which have already been made,

15 Philebus 33d.
16 Philebus 43c.
17 Timaeus 64c-d; Philebus 51b; cf. Phaedrus 258e.
18 Philebus 43a.
19 Philebus 43c.
it is apparent that the magnitude of restorative processes is equal to, and hence determined by, the magnitude of the corresponding destructive processes; the sicker and more painful a given constitution, the more intense the pleasure of its recovery. Conversely, moderate and gradual disorderings beget less intense pleasures.

b) Criticism of the Hygienic Theory

For the moment, let us grant that the correct account of pain and pleasure is one along these lines. Now even if we confine ourselves to a discussion of processes like those of eating, drinking, and smelling, the theory as Plato holds it is too economical. For it does not permit of a distinction between the perception of a restorative process and the enjoyment of it. If I am hungry, and can abate my hunger only by eating some food which I do not like, the odds are that I shall perceive only too well every unpleasant mouthful. But my hunger will abate as surely as if I had eaten ambrosia. This false economy may be attributed in part to the assumption that pleasure is the opposite of pain, and hence that what takes

20 cf. Phaedrus 258e.

21 cf. Philebus 51b.
place when a person feels pleasure must be the reverse of what happens when he feels pain. But it is just too simple to treat even so-called bodily pleasures in general as the opposites of more or less locatable bodily pains. Hunger is a sensation fairly readily locatable in the pit of the stomach. But the enjoyment of a meal is not just the perception of the filling of the pit of one's stomach; nor indeed is it just a titillation of the taste buds, although both of these things may be reasons for saying that one enjoyed one's food. Bodily pains are in a different case. Pangs of hunger, toothaches, headaches and so on are generally locatable and generally disliked; if someone claims to like, or to be indifferent to these things, he is put down as psychologically abnormal. One may be hungry and eat exactly similar food on two occasions, but enjoy one meal and not the other. It is at least odd to say of severe recurrent leg cramps that one hated them yesterday but rather enjoyed them today.

The hygienic theory, then, is too economical to account for the sorts of pleasures I have mentioned. But it runs into even greater difficulties when used to examine 'mental' pleasures. For, supposing that 'bodily' pleasures are particular sorts of sensations namely sensations of restorative processes going on in the body, what are 'mental pleasures'? Are they memories and pre-cognitions of bodily restorations, or are they processes,
which somehow are the analogues of the perceived bodily processes, but which are confined wholly to the soul? To attempt to account for all 'mental pleasures' by memory and precognition would have been out of the question, for to what bodily emptyings and fillings could the pleasures of calculations possibly be so related? Moreover, an account in terms of analogous functioning of the soul would not be comprehensive wither; for anticipatory pleasures, i.e. those which sometimes arise when one desires something, involve our remembering that something exactly similar to the thing anticipated was efficacious on a previous occasion; where there have been no previous occasions, there is neither anticipation nor desire. But if anticipations and desires could be explained merely on a basis of 'analogous functioning', we should find people on the first occasion of a deprivation knowing exactly what they lacked. It seems, then, that some 'mental pleasures' would require explanation in terms of memory and precognition, and others in terms of 'analogous functioning'.

The hygienic theory thus gives an unrealistic account of the difference between commonplace pains and pleasures, and does not provide a basis for comparing mental pleasures generally with bodily pleasures.
c) Pleasure in the Republic

The treatment of the various types of pleasure discussed in Book IX of the Republic may be looked upon as the offspring of two parents: the first parent is the hygienic theory of pleasure and pain, and the second the metaphysics of the ektopes or digression formed by Books V, VI, and VII. Of the legitimacy of this offspring there is room for doubt.

The hygienic theory asserts that pleasure is a process involving replenishment, while pain is one involving depletion. Pleasure, that is, represents restoration to a desirable state, while pain represents a falling away from it. This means that pleasures are enjoyed with a view to something other than pleasure, and so cannot be goals of action: one does not do something for the sake of (getting) pleasure; rather, one experiences pleasures for the sake of those desirable states which ensue upon them. The profligate sort of person (like Callicles in the Gorgias) speaks of pleasure as if it were a goal of action. If you can get such a person to accept the hygienic theory, he will of course be driven to abandon his view of pleasure as being something for the sake of which other things are done; but at the same time this will not necessarily
persuade him of the wrongness of his way of life. Why (he will say), there is no harm as far as I am concerned in down-grading pleasure to the status of something ancillary to or productive of what is good; this still leaves it open to me to live in the most licentious manner possible if I wish: for if pleasure is a process culminating in some stable and healthy condition, why should I not try to get as much pleasure as possible, since only good can come of it?

There are probably a number of ways in which this sort of contention could be answered, and Plato in the Republic suggests one of them; but I do not think the suggestion altogether happy. The processes of depletion and replenishment can take place at two levels, or better, perhaps, in two regions. Between these two (the upper and lower regions), there is a middle region. Most people mistakenly take movement from the lower to the middle region for true ascent, and fancy that, having once reached the middle region, they are already in the upper. Now the middle region is the region of satiety and freedom from pain, and the meaning of the allegory is that most people are content to set themselves the goal of satiety and freedom from pain: indeed they even confuse this with pleasure itself. This is because they have no experience of the upper region, which is the realm
of 'true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue'.

This metaphysical stratification does not come as a surprise after the similes of the divided line and the cave, but at the same time it does not provide much of a cudgel with which to belabour the man who thinks only in terms of physical satiety and freedom from pain. Why should anyone bother about whether he is standing in the middle region or moving about in the upper, so long as he is content to stand in the middle? Socrates is provided with an answer. Hunger and thirst are conditions of bodily depletion, while ignorance and folly are conditions of depletion of the soul: the corresponding processes of replenishment are, in the case of the body, eating, and in the case of the soul, learning. Replenishment is always a more genuine replenishment in the case of that which has more of being. The soul has more of being and truth than the body, and the things on which the soul feeds (knowledge, true opinion, and the like) have more of being than the things on which the body feeds. The soul then is more real than the body, and is replenished with things that are more real than those which replenish the body; its replenishment must therefore be more genuine. This being so, the pleasures of the soul

22 584d-585a.
must be more genuine and trustworthy than those of the body. 23

This is not of course sheer sophistry. Plato is presumably wanting to say that the man who lusts after bodily pleasures is not getting true satisfaction for his reward, while the man who seeks after knowledge is. And Plato could suggest that, if you want proof of this, all that you must do is give either sort of life (the life of knowledge, that is, and the life of appetite) a fair trial: no one who has given either sort a fair trial would thereafter opt for the pursuit (beyond what is necessary) of bodily satiety.

At the same time, all of the metaphysical tricks worked by Socrates in terms of upper, lower, and middle, and of the more real filling of more real receptacles with more real contents are quite superfluous, once the argument has been advanced that the philosopher is in the best position to estimate comparative pleasantnesses because he has had the widest experience of possible lives.

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23 585a-e.

24 cf. 580d-583a. (The point is put in this way by I.M. Crombie).
CHAPTER V

THE PHILEBUS:

PERAS and APEIRON

The Philebus occupies fifty-seven pages in the second volume of Stephanus's edition. Thrasyllus labelled the dialogue 'On Pleasure', thereby telling less than half the story. The first third of the work is taken up with a rather complicated discussion in which the key notions are the Pythagorean ones of peras and apeiron. It would be uncharitable to suppose that Plato wished merely to lead his hearers a merry dance thereby, and we must therefore try to see what this opening discussion is about, and what relevance it has for the rest of the dialogue.

Socrates opens the discussion by propounding two rival theses. The thesis of Philebus is that enjoyment, pleasure, delight, and anything consonant with them is the good for all living things. The thesis of Socrates is that thought,

1 II. 11-67.
2 In full: 'or "On Pleasure"; Ethical'.
3 11-31.
4 Strictly speaking, Socrates does not claim it for his own; he says 'our rival thesis' (11b6). For the possible background to the dispute, cf. Taylor, PPE, pp. 12-26.
intelligence, memory and their correlates are better and more profitable than pleasure for all creatures capable of attaining them.

They must begin, says Socrates, with a serious enquiry into the nature of pleasure. If one just hears the word 'pleasure', one tends to assume some sort of unity (such as one assumes, I suppose, when one hears the word 'dog'). In reality, it assumes a variety of forms which are, in a sense, dissimilar. There are, for example, the pleasures of profligacy and of sobriety, 'fool's paradise' pleasures and intellectual pleasures. Is it not stupid to call these 'similar'? Why, no, says Protarchus; pleasures of profligacy and sobriety admittedly arise from opposite sources, though in themselves they cannot be termed 'opposites'. How, he wants to know, can pleasure be unlike pleasure? Socrates counters with examples of colour and figure. Black and white both count as colours; there is no difference between them qua colours; yet it is universally admitted that black and white are complete opposites. And the same goes for geometrical figures. Well, Protarchus wants to know, how will this hurt the argument?

5 Correct belief or judgement (ορθὴ δοξα) and true reasoning (αληθὴς λογισμος).
Because, Socrates replies, the hedonist camp persists in predicating of all pleasures, unlike as they are, the term 'good'. In fact, three propositions are relevant:

(1) 'All pleasures are pleasant', a proposition which, says Socrates, no one wants to dispute; (2) 'Any (type of) pleasure is unlike any other (type of) pleasure', a proposition which hedonists can be forced to admit; and (3) 'All pleasures are good', a proposition advanced by hedonists but disputed by non-hedonists, the latter maintaining that some pleasures only are good. If, says Socrates, hedonists want to maintain that all pleasures are good, then they must at least be able to show some one element present in both 'good' and 'bad' pleasures, which they are attributing to all pleasures when they call them good. No hedonist, says Protarchus, would let you call any pleasure bad. (This, of course, does not meet Socrates' substantial point, which is that any claim that all A's are X's needs to be backed with a demonstration that all A's possess some common property, in virtue of which it is proper to describe any given A as an X).

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6 'Bad' and 'good' at 13b4 obviously mean: 'Described by anti-hedonists as "bad" and "good".'
If, says Socrates, one does not allow the fact 'that pleasures are unlike, and in some cases opposed to one another' to have any weight, but merely harps on the similarity to one another of all pleasures qua pleasures, then (one might as well infer that) no pleasure differs from any other; a manner of proceeding that befits not philosophers, but the dimmest of first-year undergraduates. Besides, Protarchus must remember that, just as he is defending the cause of pleasure, so Socrates is defending that of knowledge: Socrates too, then, can be awkward, and deny any dissimilarity between branches of knowledge, in which case all will be up with the argument, and the only way out will be by a tour de force having nothing to do with philosophical discussion. Protarchus then agrees that they must face squarely the dissimilarities between sorts of pleasure on the one hand and sorts of knowledge on the other.

There are two things worth noting here. The first is the element of illogicality in what Protarchus is doing.

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7 This seems to me to be required by the sense.

8 13d.

9 'alogia' is the Greek term.
This has been pinned down (very successfully, it seems to me) by Mr. Crombie, who refers to it as 'the fallacy of Protarchus'. The schema of the fallacy is this:

(a) A and B are both P.
(b) Therefore they are alike.
(c) But A is Q (because it is xP)\(^{11}\)
(d) Therefore, since A and B are alike B must also be Q.

The fallacy could involve someone's contending, for instance, that the pleasure of profligacy and the pleasure of geometry are both pleasures; that therefore they are alike; that the pleasure of geometry is good (because it is a pleasure); and that, therefore, since the pleasures of profligacy and geometry are alike, the pleasure of profligacy must also be good. In its crudest possible form (i.e. when the parenthesis at (c) is omitted) the fallacy involves an inference from the similarity of two things to their exact similarity. Of course, such inferences do not, for the most part, fool anyone. Most people will recognize that there is no immediate inference from 'Jane and Mary are alike' and 'Jane has dimples' to 'Mary has dimples'.

\(^{10}\) EPD2, 359–368.

\(^{11}\) Crombie has 'But A is Q (because it is xP)'. He points out that the parenthesis is not essential to the schema.
Why, then, does Socrates suppose that people become unwontedly obtuse when they start to debate the goodness of pleasure?

The answer, it seems to me, is that the fallacy of Protarchus is something which most people are wary enough to avoid when discussing specimens (such as Jane and Mary), but not (or at least not all of the time) when discussing species. Whether Brown's cow ruminates and whether Smith's horse ruminates are questions that can be settled by observations of Brown's cow and of Smith's horse; and even (one hopes) in Protarchus's circle, anyone rash enough to suggest that, because the Greek equivalents of Brown's cow and Smith's horse were alike, that particular horse must, like that particular cow, ruminates, would not have been hailed as a profound thinker. Profundity would begin to appear when some fourth-century zoologist who knew nothing of the Channel Islands remarked, upon learning of the existence of Jersey cows: 'Ah, they too are herbivorous quadrupeds, so that they must be ruminants'.

12 Compare: 'Schadenfreude (= phthonos) is a pleasure of the soul too (= in addition to the pleasures of calculation), so that it must be good'. (For phthonos cf. Philebus 48-50).
Although this conclusion would have been right, it would have been right out accidentally, since it would have depended upon a misclassification such as 'The class of herbivorous quadrupeds is the same class as the class of ruminants', a misclassification which would have warranted the further inference that Barbary horses were ruminants.

This is not to suggest, of course, that Socrates comes forth in the *Philebus* equipped with the panoply of genus, species, and differentia; though it will I think emerge after further discussion that the weapons Plato was able to provide him with were about as good as the Aristotelian ones, and certainly adequate for his purpose.

A second consideration, which is to some degree bound up with all of this, is that Socrates and Protarchus are arguing about what is good (or, perhaps, 'the good') for

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13 $h_{QR} = 0$.

14 Crombie (EPD 2, 360) refers to the discussion of love at *Phaedrus* 265-266. The thesis there refuted is something like: '(Homo-sexual) platonic love must be base because, like (homosexual) carnal love, it is a sort of madness'. The thesis is untenable because it fails to classify madness correctly into divine madness and morbid madness.
living things. One aspect of this we have encountered before, so that we should not be surprised to find it recurring here. I mean the connexion at 11b-c of the notions of goodness and profitableness. Ostensibly, though of course only ostensibly, this gives the debate a mercenary flavour, rather as if the sort of topic being discussed was: 'What puts a man more in credit, having his money in gilt-edged, or having it out on first mortgage?' Whether Socrates' accounts of pleasure and knowledge are capable of coping with this aspect of the discussion, will be considered in the next chapter; for the rest, the approach is characteristically Platonic, and need not disturb us further here. What is more immediately relevant to the discussion is the difference between the objects of 'good for' in each of the rival theses stated at 11b-c. The view of Philebus, espoused by Protarchus, is that 'pleasure ... is (the) good ... for all living things'; the view of Socrates is that 'thought (etc.) ... (is) better for all creatures capable of attaining (it).’ In Socrates' thesis, the class of those who are supposed to derive greater benefit from knowledge 15 than from pleasure is a sub-class of Philebus's

15 I use 'knowledge' as a blanket term for the list at 11b7-8.
class of the beneficiaries of pleasure: Philebus and Protarchus talk in terms of 'good for all living things'; Socrates in terms of 'good for such living things as are capable of intellectual endeavour'. It seems to me that we are to infer from Socrates' careful emphasis of the restriction of the class of beneficiaries that in this respect too Protarchus is in error. Not only is he failing to discriminate between kinds of pleasure; he is confusing also different kinds of sensitive creature. For Protarchus would seem in effect to be arguing: 'Men and brutes are both living creatures; therefore they are alike; but brutes benefit from enjoying whatever pleasure presents itself; therefore men too benefit from enjoying whatever pleasure presents itself'. If this is the sort of thing the reader is supposed to infer, it will not be unreasonable of him to expect, in addition to any systematic discussion of knowledge and pleasure, some drawing of distinctions between types of living creature, on the basis of intelligence. As we shall see, such an expectation is not disappointed.

16 Twice given in the same line (11c1).

17 It is interesting to compare the refusal of Protagoras to argue along these lines at Protagoras, 334a-c.
Having said something of the fallacy of Protarchus, we must now consider Socrates' remedy for it. Protarchus's problem, says Socrates, is one that trips us all up. He gives it a name: the problem of One and Many. The name derives from certain paradoxical assertions, the assertions namely that many are one, and one many. These paradoxes, says Socrates, can be used to make points which are philosophically uninteresting. One such point is that Protarchus, who in fact is one, is yet many Protarchuses, each with an opposite: Protarchus the tall, Protarchus the short, Protarchus the heavy, Protarchus the light, and so on. This is one sort of point. Another sort of philosophically uninteresting case arises when somebody, having run through all the parts of something, and having got his opponent to admit that all

18 This illustration is contributed by Protarchus.

19 A.E. Taylor (PPE, 106) is surely wrong about this example. His gloss says: 'E.g. the 'one' of Protarchus as a child is short and light, the 'one' of the grown man tall and heavy'. The example is reminiscent of Phaedo 102, where Socrates solves the problem of how Simmias can be at once both tall and short. My guess would be that Plato here was wanting to exclude this sort of problem, which he almost certainly thought settled in his later years.
these parts together are the thing, accuses his opponent of claiming one to be many\textsuperscript{20} and many to be one.

The philosophically interesting sort of case arises, according to Socrates, when a one is posited outside the realms of becoming and perishing; and as examples of such 'ones', he gives 'man', 'ox', 'beauty', and 'good'.\textsuperscript{21} What makes for worthwhile philosophy is 'careful attention to such units involving division of them'. The problems raised by such a procedure are these: (1) Do such units really exist? and (2) How is one to conceive

that each of them, being always one and the same and subject neither to generation nor destruction, nevertheless is, to begin with, most assuredly this single unity and yet subsequently comes to be in the infinite number of things that come into being? \textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} The Greek says \textit{'polla kai apeira'} ('many and indefinite') (14e4).
\item \textsuperscript{21} The quotation marks are used only to indicate that these are precisely the units in which Socrates says he is interested. That is, they are used to quote, not to indicate that Socrates is talking about the terms 'man', 'ox', etc.
\item \textsuperscript{22} The exegetical problem connected with this passage is well known. If one accepts the MSS reading (given in OCT) one gets three problems, the additional problem being, more or less: 'Since each of these units is one particular unit, how can these units be said to be eternal and self-identical?' (For an indication of the rationale of this problem, see Taylor, PPE, 257-259, editors' note 9).
\end{itemize}
How then does one set about discussing such questions?

There is, says Socrates, a Divine Gift which, accompanied by a very bright flame, man received at the hands of some Prometheus, and which the ancients, who were closer to the gods than we are, handed on to us. The Divine Gift may be expressed thus:

The variants of Zeller (see OCT) and Bury (see Hackforth, PEP, 20) result in the elimination of the additional problem. I rule out the MSS reading because the additional problem seems irrelevant to the argument. To state (2) I have used the translation of Hackforth, who follows Bury. Zeller's emendation is neater, but both give substantially the same result. (Cf. Crombie, EPD 2, 362).

23 I suspect that a note by Plato on this passage might have read: "What the gods gave, and the ancients handed on, was, generally speaking, mathematics and, specifically, harmonics. Harmonics has the power to enlighten us about the structure of the world. The applications of harmonics to reality, both here and at 23-31, are of my own devising'. I hope that the aptness of this fictitious comment will become apparent in subsequent discussion.
Every thing that is said to exist eternally is of one and many, having by nature within itself limit (peras) and innumerability (apeiron, apeiria);

This being so, enquiry about any such thing must always be made in the following manner:

2.1 One must first posit in every case a single form (for it will always be possible to find a form);

2.2 One must next look for two forms, or, if it is impossible to find just two, for three, or some other number of forms;

2.3 Each of these further forms must in its turn be treated as recommended in 2.2; until the stage is reached where one sees not merely that the original unit is (a) one and (b) many and innumerable (pola kai apeira), but also how many it is;

2.4 The form of innumerability is not to be applied to the manifold (plethos) until the number (arithmos) between the unit and its innumerable aspect (to apeiron) is conclusively determined: only then may each unit be dismissed into innumerability (into to apeiron).

Socrates concludes his proclamation of the Gift by saying:

'But our wise men of today set up a unit at haphazard, much too soon or too late, and proceed immediately from the unit to an indefinite multiplicity. They miss out the intermediate terms (ta mesa), and it is these which make all the difference between the dialectical and the eristic style of argumentation'. (16e-17a) (Tr. Taylor).

Protarchus then asks Socrates to elucidate his statement.

Before discussing Socrates' elucidation, we should notice that Protarchus does not seem to consider wholly unintelligible
what Socrates has said so far:

I think I partly understand you, Socrates, but I need a clearer explanation of parts of your statement. (17a)

Here Protarchus would seem to have an advantage over the modern reader, to whom the Divine Gift must, at a first reading, seem so much double-Dutch.

Since the three illustrations at 17b-18d all have to do with classifications, and since Protarchus expresses his satisfaction with the illustrations, a *prima facie* possibility is that, while Protarchus is familiar with the technical terms that crop up in Socrates' original statement, he does not see that they have a ready application to sorts of things in the world. Now 'apeiron', 'plethos' ('multiplicity', 'manifold'), 'hen' ('one'), and 'arithmos' ('number') all look like arithmetical terms, so that we should not be surprised if it turns out that Protarchus's partial understanding is an understanding of arithmetic, or of something akin to arithmetic.

Arithmetic itself will hardly do. Finding how many an initial one is, looks as if it might involve some such arithmetical equation as 'One equals five fifths': but the arithmetic of Plato's day seems to have disdained operations
with fractions, treating only the series of positive integers, 1, 2, 3 ..., as numbers. Moreover, even if an arithmetic which admitted fractions were involved, such an arithmetic would not be able to convey an important part of the message of the Divine Gift, namely that any 'initial one' which comes under scrutiny has a definite number. But an indefinite number of equations of the type 'One equals \( \frac{1}{n} \)'s is possible: there is nothing ineluctable about any, or any set, of them, as far as the number one of arithmetic is concerned.

Geometry is at the same disadvantage. For if the mathematical interpretation of the expressions 'one' ('hen') and 'initial one' ('kat archas hen') is taken to be a given straight line \( AB \), and if the mathematical interpretation of the expression 'see how many an initial one is' is taken to be division of \( AB \), the difficulty is encountered that infinitely many divisions of \( AB \) are possible: you cannot tell 'how many' a line is divisible into, because there is no 'how many'. Platonic geometry however has an advantage which Platonic arithmetic does not, namely that it can cope with ratios of integers, or fractions. In Book VI of the \textit{Republic}, for instance, when Plato wished to state
the proportion $a:b:c:d::(a+b):(c+d)$, he did so in geometrical terms. 24

It seems then that we must look for something in mathematics with both arithmetical and geometrical features, and that neither arithmetic nor geometry will do of itself. Harmonics, it seems to me, is what we are looking for.

There is in the Timaeus (at 34-36) a curious and perplexing passage in which the forming of the world soul (the intelligible aspect par excellence of the world) is described. I shall not discuss this passage in any detail, but shall merely remark on some aspects of it. Firstly, it would seem that the psychic dough (or whatever) with which God is working, is laid out in a straight line. 25 Secondly, God marks off an interval on the line (35b4-5), and then marks off other intervals and sub-intervals, there being definite numerical proportions between the first interval and each subsequent interval or sub-interval.

24 Republic VI, 509d and foll.

25 The body of the world (31-34) has of course a rational structure: but, being compounded of material elements, it is, from a Platonic point of view, inferior to the soul. (Cf. Timaeus 34c).

26 Or perhaps a pair of lines, like a capital lambda (Taylor, CPT, 137).
Thirdly, with the marking off of the last sub-interval, the whole line of stuff is used up (36b5-6). Fourthly, the entire division and subdivision can be concisely expressed in the language of harmonics. Fifthly, the range of octaves involved is well beyond the compass of the human voice. It is difficult not to see in this the tentative formulation of a belief that the world, in its most intelligible aspect, can be completely accounted for in the language of harmonics, though no doubt of a considerably more complex and rarefied harmonics than that familiar to musicians.

It seems to me not too far-fetched to suppose that Plato had the same sort of thing in mind in the Philebus proclamation of the Divine Gift. In particular, it should be noted that in the Timaeus passage, God does not begin his

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27 The intervals are 'filled up' (i.e., subdivided into sub-intervals) with the portion of the mixture remaining after the first division (i.e. by 'applying' different segments of the remaining length). God is at once geometrician and celestial pastrycook.

28 As four octaves and a major sixth on the diatonic scale (cf. Taylor, CPT, 139-140).

29 For the sort of harmonics Plato would probably have in mind, cf. Republic VII, 530d-531c.
work on the length of soul-stuff by marking off a random length; he has just so much mixture; all intervals and sub-intervals marked off subsequently to the first length are harmoniously proportioned to it; and when the last harmonious sub-interval has been marked off, the mixture is all used up. It would therefore seem that the selection of the first length is in some way crucial: either the first notch has to go exactly where God puts it, or at very least it has to go in one of a determinate number of places at which it makes harmonic sense to put it. So, too, in the Philebus the first step one takes in using the Gift (2.1 above) is crucial: one must 'posit a single form' which will resolve into a whole number of further forms; the penalty for muffing this step is presumably failure to find an exact number of further forms to follow on the first one.  

A valuable suggestion about the exegesis of the Gift passage has been made by Professor A.C. Lloyd, who suggests

30 It may also be failure to find an 'harmonious number' (cf. Republic VII, 531c3-4) of further forms.

that it helps considerably to suppose the illustration
of a divided line, an illustration which Protarchus and
Philebus (and, by implication, Plato's own pupils) might
be supposed to take for granted. This suggestion of
Professor Lloyd's seems to me to tally with my own suggestion
that an harmonic model, with whose workings the protagonists
are familiar, is involved. For in Plato's day the scientific
discussion of harmonics proceeded not, as nowadays, in terms
of vibrations and waves, but in the languages of geometry
and of arithmetic, that is, in terms of ratios between lengths.
(This sort of treatment reflected Pythagorean preoccupation
with stringed instruments and bridges). A given straight line
AB, while geometrically divisible in indefinitely many ways,
would, if taken as an harmonic model, for instance as the
model of an octave, become divisible only in a definite manner,
according to fixed proportions. One might perhaps say, at
the risk of oversimplifying, that while in geometry lines
did not have numbers (of parts), in harmonics they did.

There seem to be two senses in which one might say in
harmonic theory that lines have numbers. Suppose that we use
the line AB to illustrate the Greek octave. We do this by
dividing AB in the proportion of 1:2,

\[
\begin{array}{c}
1 \\
A \\
\hline
2 \\
\hline
C \\
\hline
B
\end{array}
\]

Figure 1
both of its segments AC and CB representing octaves. (Whatever octave AC stood for, CB would represent the octave above it). We began, then, with one line, and divided that line into two parts. We might then say that any line which is used solely to illustrate the octave has the number 2. But we might also say that it has or exhibits the characteristic octave ratio of 1:2. It would be important to mention the ratio, since the other two basic intervals, the fifth and the tetrachord, could also be illustrated by lines divided into two parts, though in both of these latter cases the ratio determining the point of division would be different from the octave ratio.

Are both of these aspects, the aspect, that is, of dividing the line into \( n \) intervals, and the aspect of dividing it in a particular proportion, equally important here? The short answer to this is that while the first aspect, the number-of-parts aspect, is important in the Divine Gift passage, the second aspect, the ratio aspect, becomes the more important one when the mathematical language re-appears at 23c. But to show how this is so, some further discussion will be necessary.
So far I have not matched the methodological part of the Gift (paragraph 2, that is) with an analogy derived from harmonics, and it may be as well to do this before proceeding farther. Consider a specific example: a discussion in harmonics of the compass of the human voice. These, I think, might be steps in such a discussion.

A2.1 Let the line XY represent the compass of the human voice. (Cf. 2.1: 'posing a single form').

A2.2 The line XY must then be divided into three parts, representing two octaves and a tetrachord, according to such-and-such a ratio. (Cf. 2.2: 'looking for some number of forms to follow the first form').

A2.3 Each of these intervals must, in turn, be further divided into its sub-intervals (e.g. the octave divisions into fifths and tetrachords, the tetrachord division into tones); and each divisible sub-interval so produced must be re-subdivided according to the rules of harmonics. (Cf. 2.3: 'treating each further form as recommended in 2.2').

We must now decide upon an analogue for paragraph 2.4 of the Gift. This will have to be an harmonics analogue for 'dismissing a unit' (i.e. a form) 'into innumerability'. This is not difficult.

If we suppose the tone to be the lowest sort of interval recognised by harmonics, it is obvious that any segment of a line which represents an interval of one tone is, though capable of infinite further division geometrically speaking,
incapable of further division as a matter of harmonics. This must however be qualified slightly. The division of the line XY to represent octaves, fifths, tetrachords, and so on was based on the stopping of lyre strings, and in musical practice, as distinct from harmonic theory, lyre strings could be, and were, stopped in an infinite variety of places. What happened, of course, was not that some clever person invented harmonics, and thus enabled people to play musical instruments: people had been playing musical instruments long before the science of harmonics was thought of. The contribution of harmonics to music was the treating of certain stops and intervals as fundamental: it did not pretend that musicians played in exactly the manner which harmonic theorists prescribed. Harmonics benefited those learning music by giving them rules to break, as much as by giving them rules to learn. We must bear in mind, then, that the musically valuable science of harmonics got under way only by ignoring to some extent what actually happened when musical instruments were played. I shall have occasion presently to refer back to this qualification.

For present purposes, it will be enough to say that to 'apply the form of innumerability' to a line representing a set of harmonic intervals is to allow that a stage has been
reached at which the line has become incapable of further division according to the theory of harmonics. The line may, qua geometrical entity, be further divided; but if it is further divided, it is being treated as nothing more than an object of geometrical discourse. Paragraph A2.4 in our analogy will, then, read:

A2.4 Ultimately a stage will be reached in division of the line XY at which the theory of harmonics will have nothing to say about further division. Any further division of XY (and such division is admittedly possible) will therefore be non-harmonic. To recognise this is to 'dismiss into innumerability' the various subdivisions of XY.

I would not wish to be misunderstood about this suggested analogy. What we have in the Divine Gift passage itself is not harmonics, but dialectic. What is common to paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 of the Divine Gift, and to the harmonics analogy I have just constructed, is a group of formal mathematical terms: where the two differ is in the material component to which the formal terms have application. In the harmonics analogy, there is a directive to divide a straight line (the material component) into a definite number of intervals and sub-intervals whose lengths are in a certain ratio: in the Divine Gift passage, there is a directive to divide 'things that are said to exist eternally' or 'forms' (the material component)
into a definite number of sub-forms, further sub-forms, and so on, until the division is completed.

It was remarked upon above that Protarchus and Philebus seem to be only partly familiar with what Socrates says when he expounds the Divine Gift. What they are familiar with, I suggest, is the sort of harmonics exercise I have sketched in A2.1 to A2.4. They have, presumably, had the sort of pre-dialectical training described in the Republic,32 which would account for this familiarity. They are, then, more or less familiar with the mathematical terms used by Socrates, and with one sort of application of them. They are not familiar with the sort of use to which Socrates is now putting them.

Professor Lloyd thinks it plausible that dichotomous classification was illustrated diagrammatically in the Academy by means of straight lines which were bisected and re-bisected.33 This may well have been so; but at the same time I doubt whether dichotomous classification of the sort counselled in the Sophist and the Statesman is the sort

32 Republic VII.

33 See Lloyd's diagram, op. cit., p. 222.
Socrates has in mind when he proclaims the Divine Gift.

For Socrates' illustrations of the Gift at 17a-18d seem to preclude such an interpretation.

Socrates begins the first illustration (17a-b) by saying:

What I say is apparent in (the) letters... (17a8-9).

He is of course talking about grammar, though several translators fail to make this clear. (A. E. Taylor, for instance, writes; for 'letters', 'the sounds of our letters', 34 and Professor Hackforth 'the alphabet': 35 even though the alphabet is the subject of the third illustration). Phone or speech, Socrates continues,

... is one, and yet also indefinitely many ...

But we are not yet learned from knowing either of these facts, neither that it is so indefinitely many, nor yet that it is one: what makes one a literate is to know how many sorts of it there are, and what sorts. 36

(Socrates perhaps has in mind what Aristotle in the Poetics (1456b) calls 'modes of diction' ("schemata tēs lexēōs"): commands, prayers, statements, threats, questions, answers, and so forth). 37

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Obviously, one might classify speech into such modes, but it is hard to see how the process of classification could be dichotomous.

Socrates begins the second illustration (17b-e) by remarking that in music, just as in grammar, phone is one. What is being considered here, then, is voice-pitch, and perhaps also the pitch of musical instruments used to accompany singing. There are three kinds of voice-pitch: low (to baru), high (to oyu), and to homotonon. The word 'homotonon' (etymologically, 'having the same note(s)') has puzzled interpreters. Now 'low' and 'high' are undoubtedly the names not of notes (tonoi), but of registers or compasses of notes. They function in the same way as words like 'baritone' and 'counter-tenor' in modern music. With 'homotonon' there seem to be two possibilities: it is either the name of a note, or the name of a mid-register in between high and low, somewhat as 'baritone' is the name of register in between tenor and bass. In the absence of conclusive musical evidence, we can only try to settle the matter a priori.

It is surely reasonable to settle it in this way: if two of the kinds of musical phone are registers, the third
must also be a register. Just as it would be not merely incorrect but absurd to say: 'There are three sorts of male voice - bass, tenor, and middle C', so it would be absurd in the same way to give 'homotonon' as a species of phone, if 'homotonon' were merely the name of a note. (The homotonon was perhaps a register of relatively narrow compass, having about the same note-range as unsung speech. Perhaps too it was the register used in the chanting of trimeters, anapests, and the like in tragedy, as opposed to the more exquisite lyric registers; but all of this is speculative).  

Socrates' point seems to be, then, that to begin with we classify voice-pitch into three kinds or registers: low, homotonon, and high. But something more is needed to make one expert in the theory of music: one must know the number of intervals of high and low pitch, their termini (horoi), their descriptions, and the systems or scales which are produced from them. He adds that rhythm and metre are to

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38 This would suggest that the homotonon is the register common to the baru and oxu registers; in other words that it is that register in which to baru and to oxu have the same notes. If this is so, this illustration fits in well with the following parable of Theuth (discussed below).
be similarly treated.

Of this second illustration, Professor Hackforth has this to say:

It will be realised that this second example, although it illustrates one kind of rational treatment of the One-Many problem, does not illustrate dialectic, and is of no direct relevance to that classification of pleasures and kinds of knowledge from which the present digression took its departure. 39

Why? Because, he suggests, the terms 'high', 'low', and 'homotonon'

are not the names of species of sound, which can be further divided into sub-species: nor is sound here thought of as a genus. 40

But this is surely to beg the question. May it not be that the very point Socrates wants to make is that some at least of the things that are said to exist eternally are classifiable into kinds and sub-kinds on the basis of differences of degree? There are several kinds of musical register, and we differentiate between them on the basis of difference of pitch: we distinguish a soprano register from a bass register primarily on the basis of the soprano register's having a higher pitch. There are several kinds

39 PEP, p. 25.

40 id. pp. 24-25.
of climate, and we differentiate between them on the basis of difference in temperature-range, or again of differences in annual rainfall, or perhaps of both. There are several classes of taxpayer, and we differentiate between them on the basis of differences in range of income. Of course, differences of degree can be drawn almost ad infinitum. It is pointless to draw attention to most of these differences; just as it is sensible to let only relatively few of the differences one draws become the basis for distinguishing kinds. It might well be sensible to classify the register E-e' (roughly the bass register) and the register c-aa'' (roughly the soprano register) as different kinds of register: it would hardly be sensible to do this with the registers E-a and c-g.

Moreover, such a consideration is highly relevant to the classification of pleasures. If types of pleasure turn out to be distinguishable, at least to some extent, on the basis of difference of magnitude or intensity, then it is surely important to appreciate when it is, and when it is not, sensible to distinguish kinds of pleasure on this basis. More will be said of this subsequently.
Another consideration arises here, and is best introduced by means of two digrammatic examples. Suppose firstly that a taxation authority classifies income earners into three groups: (1) supertax-payers, who earn over £3000; (2) taxpayers at standard rate, who earn between £1000 and £3000; and (3) taxpayers at reduced rate, who earn under £1000. The three classes are obviously mutually exclusive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reduced</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Supertax-payer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£1000</td>
<td>£3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2

and this is represented in the diagram by the contiguity of AC and CD, and of CD and DB. But now consider a line diagram used to illustrate the difference between the bass and soprano registers:

Figure 3

Here the lines $Ee'$ and $c_{aa''}$ overlap, and the segment $ce'$ represents a register common to both bass and soprano voices or instruments.
Consider now the two arguments:

(a) Standard taxpayers and supertax-payers both earn more than £1000 a year;  
Therefore standard taxpayers and supertax-payers are alike;  
But supertax-payers earn over £3000 a year;  
Therefore standard taxpayers earn over £3000 a year.

(b) Basses and sopranos can both sing notes above c;  
Therefore basses and sopranos are alike;  
But sopranos can sing g';  
Therefore basses can sing g'.

Both of these invalid arguments exemplify the fallacy of Protarchus, which has been discussed above. But (b) has a specious plausibility which (a) has not, inasmuch as in (b) we are dealing with overlapping kinds, that is, with kinds differentiated by reference to different, but overlapping, stretches of a quality-range. Though the bass and soprano registers are different registers, there is a relatively large compass which they have in common: it very often happens to be the case that if a note is on the bass register, it is also on the soprano register.

Someone who thinks that Jersey cows must, qua herbivorous quadrupeds, ruminate, can be put right fairly straightforwardly, by being shown how ordinary dichotomous classification per genus et differentiam works. Someone who writes a piece to be sung in unison by basses and sopranos, and requires the
the hitting of notes in the range $e'-aa''$ needs to be

drilled not in dichotomous classification, but in distinguishing

between a number of quality ranges (in this case, stretches

of the pitch continuum) which overlap to a greater or lesser

extent.

Something which Socrates says a few pages further on, namely that the concept of pleasure is a quality-range concept, might well suggest that, in discussions of pleasure, the fallacy of Protarchus becomes particularly insidious. It may well turn out that, on Socrates' analysis, arguing about the goodness of this or that pleasure is more like arguing about types of musical register, or about types of climate, than like arguing about kinds of animal. We must wait and see whether this is so.

Socrates' third illustration (at 18a-d) is the celebrated, or perhaps notorious, myth of Theuth. The story of Theuth exemplifies dialectic in reverse, so to speak. It was

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41 This is not quite accurate, since Theuth begins in the middle, rather than at the other end, of the process. He begins neither with an 'initial one' nor with the ultimate subdivisions of an 'initial one': he takes three forms, further divides them, and goes from the subdivisions to the 'initial one'.
Theuth's achievement to notice that human speech (phone) is an indeterminate thing (an apeiron). Within this apeiron he discerned not one but a number of vowels; he then noticed a definite number of other features of speech which partook in a sense ofnoise, though not of voice; and finally he noticed a third kind, which in Socrates' own day are called voiceless letters. He next divided each of the three kinds in turn, until he came down to the individual letters. Having determined the number of these, he gave the name 'letter' to each of them.

And since he said that none of us could learn any one of them without all the rest, he further devised a single bond which makes them all in a way into one thing, and gave it the name of a single art, that of letters. (18c7-d2).

We might in passing note the precise classification made by Theuth. It is presumably the classification which Aristotle gives at Poetics 1456b. Letters are either vowels, semi-vowels or mutes: A is a vowel, S and R are semi-vowels, G and D are mutes. Vowels have an audible sound without the addition of another letter, while semi-vowels and mutes do not. Mutes combine with sonants (i.e. with both vowels and semi-vowels) to form syllables, but not with other mutes.
Philebus praises the clarity of this illustration, but adds that he still wonders what the point of it can be. Socrates' audience thus grasps the parable insofar as it concerns the classification of letters, but cannot relate it to the conflict of pleasure and knowledge.

Well, says Socrates, in this contest they are speaking of pleasure as of one thing, and of knowledge as of one thing; but perhaps they should rather be asking

in what sense is either of them one and many?
And in what sense is either of them no mere indefinite multiplicity, but has a determinate number before one reaches an indefinite multiplicity? 43

Protarchus takes this question to be

whether there are kinds of pleasure, and how many and what they are, and similarly with thought. 44

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42 Key: \(V = \) vowels \(s = \) sonant
\(S = \) semi-vowels \(ns = \) non-sonant (\(=\) mute)
\(M = \) mutes \(a = \) audible by itself
\(na = \) inaudible by itself (\(=\) consonant)

43 18e-19a

44 19b.
After some recapitulation of the previous discussion (presumably for the benefit of Philebus), Protarchus suggests to Socrates that it is up to him to decide whether to divide pleasure and knowledge into kinds, or whether to resolve the conflict by some other method. Protarchus indeed seems to be hoping that Socrates will now embark on something less tedious than dialectical analysis, and Socrates for his part seems willing to gratify this hope. He claims to recall 'a discourse about pleasure and thought, heard long ago, in a dream, or perhaps in waking life' to the effect that the good is some third thing, distinct from pleasure and knowledge. If this can be shown, then, for one thing, pleasure cannot claim victory, and, for another, the division of pleasure into kinds can be dispensed with. Protarchus welcomes this observation.

Socrates then suggests that, before the matter can be cleared up in this fashion, a preliminary point must be disposed of. This point concerns the conditions which anything must satisfy if it is to qualify for the august title of 'the good'. The conditions are these: the good must be (1) complete or perfect, (2) adequate and (3) sought after by all who perceive it. Protarchus agrees.
Now, says Socrates, let them scrutinise in turn the lives of pleasure and of thought, in the light of this observation; and let it be stipulated that there must be nothing of thought in the life of pleasure, and nothing of pleasure in the life of thought. Firstly, then, let Protarchus suppose himself to be living a life consisting exclusively of 'perpetual enjoyment of the intensest pleasures': would such a life stand in need of any supplement? No, says Protarchus. Surely, says Socrates, Protarchus cannot say that in having pleasure he would lack nothing: for, ex hypothesi, he lacks 'thought, intelligence, calculation of steps to be taken ... knowledge, true belief ... and memory'. In other words, his life would be no better than that of a jellyfish or a mollusc, since he would lack all awareness of pleasures being enjoyed, all memory of past pleasures, and all anticipation of pleasures to come; and such a life no one would pronounce worthy of choice. On the other hand, no one would be content with a life consisting of all those things the pleasure-glutted Protarchus was just said to lack, but in which all pleasure and pain was absent. Neither of the two lives considered is either

48 21b

49 21b-c.
sufficient or desirable: a man pursuing either of them would be acting in involuntary defiance of the nature of the truly desirable, through his ignorance or under some unhappy compulsion. Yet at the same time, everyone without exception would surely prefer a life combining both pleasure and thought. Protarchus agrees. This means, Socrates continues, that when it comes to bestowing the prize (i.e. to saying what is 'the good') neither the life of thought nor the life of pleasure can claim victory, since neither life possesses the three marks of goodness; it must be for the mixed life that the palm of victory is reserved. Nevertheless, one might ask whether pleasure should be awarded second prize, or knowledge. Here, says Socrates, he would maintain that, whatever it is that makes the mixed life good and desirable, knowledge is more likely to be its kinsman than pleasure. To put it in another way, knowledge is more likely than pleasure to be the cause of the mixed life.

This will be a convenient point at which to break off the exposition of the argument. It would seem that, in developing his doctrine of the goodness of the mixed life, Socrates has either discarded the Divine Gift completely, or at best put it into cold storage. The former alternative cannot be right since (as we shall presently see) a good deal of the second half of the dialogue (i.e., from 31 onwards) is taken up with the

50 22b. 51 22c-e.
distinguishing of kinds of pleasure and kinds of knowledge. In the light of this it would be reasonable to suppose that when at 20c Socrates claims to see 'no further need to discuss the subdivision of pleasure into kinds', he is not being altogether serious: he has after all to humour Protarchus, who is pulling faces about having to do too much dialectic. Perhaps then Socrates, having proclaimed the Divine Gift and given a few illustrations of its use, is giving Protarchus a short rest from dialectical analysis, to which he intends presently to return.

I doubt whether this is the whole story. For even while developing the doctrine of the mixed life, Socrates is proceeding to some extent as Theuth proceeded in the parable. Theuth in the parable began by positing three species of letters, while Socrates gets Protarchus to contemplate three sorts of lives. The fact that in both cases three kinds of things are involved need not of course be significant, but it is I think suggestive.

52 There are also three kinds (oxy, baru, homotonon) in the second (musical) illustration of the Divine Gift passage, at 17b-e. This is a classification made by harmonics, and I wonder whether perhaps it went like this:

\[
\begin{align*}
& B \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad H \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad O
\end{align*}
\]

\[B = \text{baru}; \quad O = \text{oxy}; \quad H = \text{homotonon}.\]
Perhaps the important similarity between the classification of speech-sounds and the classification of lives is not so much the number of main kinds involved in both cases, but rather the way in which these main kinds dovetail or interlock.

The parable of Theuth fails to enlighten us because, among other things, it does not tell us much about phonetics. But of course the parable is addressed not to us, but to Protarchus and Philebus (and their fellow Academicians), and they presumably know their phonetics. Aristotle in the Poetics gives us a bit more information, and while I do not think that we can make much sense of it in terms of the way in which we pronounce letters, we can at least discern in what he says a possible rationale of the classification of

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53 Perhaps Philebus (a dim young man, by the sound of it) welcomes the Theuth illustration (at 18d) because phonetics is an easier subject to master than harmonics or formal grammar.

54 Poetics XX. 1456b 20 foll.

55 For instance, he allows a syllable to be constituted only by a mute plus a sonant (and not by a semi-vowel plus a vowel), which leaves no room for, say, the syllable SA; and again, we should hardly regard DS as a syllable. (cf. Poet. 1456b 34 foll.).
letters, or better, perhaps, of phonemes. Two principles seem to be involved. Firstly, certain phonemes constitute the husk of syllables, so to speak, and others the kernel. This principle gives us the mute - (aphonon-) sonant (phonon echon) \(^\text{57}\) distinction. Secondly, certain phonemes are audible by themselves, while the rest are not. This principle gives us the vowel - (phoneen-) consonant \(^\text{59}\) distinction. These two dichotomies dovetail or interlock to give a three-part classification, in which the semi-vowel (hemiphonon) \(^\text{60}\) is the middle kind. (For a diagrammatic representation of this, see Figure 4, above). That is to say, the sonant (= vowel + semi-vowel) and consonant (= mute + semi-vowel) kinds of phoneme are not mutually exclusive: they overlap, and the region of their overlap is the semi-vowel kind or species.

Now Philebus and Socrates began by opposing pleasure and its cognates to thought and its cognates. Socrates proceeds from this original crude opposition to the doctrine of the three sorts of life, and the point of this doctrine is that it will not do to regard the lives of pleasure and thought as quite distinct sorts of life. You can, to be sure, envisage a life of pleasure without thought, and also a life of thought without

\(^{56}\) 18c3; Aristotle, loc.cit., 28.

\(^{57}\) Ar. Poet. 1456b 35-36.

\(^{58}\) 18b8; cf. Ar. Poet. 1456b 26.

\(^{59}\) Plato's 'ta aphthonga' (cf. 18c1 and 4).

\(^{60}\) 18c1 and 18c5 (= ta mesa); Ar. Poet. 1456b 27.
thought, and also a life of thought without pleasure, but these two lives are not (respectively) the life of pleasure and the life of thought or knowledge: they are merely sub-kinds of these two kinds of life. The lives of pleasure and thought overlap, and the region of their overlap is the mixed life:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Life of Pleasure} \\
P- & M & K- \\
\hline
\text{Life of Knowledge}
\end{array}
\]

Figure 5

Just as there is a kind of phoneme common to the sonant and consonant kinds, and just as there may be a musical register which is part of two other musical registers, so there is a kind of life which is common to the lives of pleasure and knowledge.

Socrates now proceeds to a more general classification, one which, he says, involves 'all things which now exist in the universe'. We might perhaps tag this 'the Analysis of Kinds of Beings', or, for short, 'the Analysis'. Socrates' statement of the Analysis is as follows: From the Divine Gift we know that there are in the universe peras and apeiron. These will constitute two of the classes of the Analysis. A third class will be constituted by the blending of these
two, and a fourth will be necessary to account for the cause of the blending (23c-d).

Socrates now discusses the four classes. As instances of the class of the Indeterminate (apeiron), he gives a string of comparatives: the hotter, the colder, the more intense, the less intense, the dryer, the wetter, the swifter, the slower, and so on. The members of this class are in a condition of perpetual advance, and never stay still, whereas with determinate number (to poson) goes a stay and arrest of the advance.

Socrates concludes that the mark of the Indefinite or Indeterminate is that it admits of more and less, or again of too much. (24d-e)

The class of Limit (peras) is, he continues, that which 'refuses these qualifications but admits their various opposites', and he cites as examples of these opposites the equal and the double. (25a-b)

Socrates now comes to the third class, that which results from mixing or blending the Indeterminate Kind with Limit. He first of all gives some examples of the Indeterminate, and then apologizes for not having 'collected the progeny of the Limit into one, as we did with the Indeterminate' (25d). This is strange, since he has already (at 25a-b) given examples of Limit (the equal, the double, and so on): what can he mean by
saying that he has not 'collected the progeny of the Limit'?
The answer will be found at 26c-d, where Socrates says of the
Indeterminate:

There were plenty of varieties of the Indeterminate
too, and yet its unity became apparent when we
stamped them all with the name of the class of
the 'more and less'.

It would seem, then, that in order to 'collect the progeny' of
a Kind, the Kind must be 'sealed' or 'stamped' with a name.
For some reason Socrates has not done this; that is, he has
suggested no one characteristic which distinguishes the class
of the Limit.

To return however to the Mixed Kind, Socrates says that
in a case of disease, for instance, the right combination of
Indeterminate and Limit gives rise to health, which exemplifies
this Kind; and as other examples of it he gives music and fair
weather (26a). He adds that this mixing of the Indeterminate with
Limit occurs within the moral order as well:

It was this goddess (i.e. Harmony) who perceived that
self-will and vice at large have no limit of pleasures
and repletions in them, and therefore she introduced
the limitation of law and order. (26b)

Law and order is thus the member of the class of Limit which is
'mixed' with 'pleasures and repletions' to give (presumably) self-
restraint and virtue. Socrates concludes his account of the
Mixed Kind by saying that he means by it 'process which termi-
nates in being (genesis eis ousian, 26d8)': in saying this
he is presumably 'collecting the progeny' of the Mixed Kind
by 'sealing' or 'stamping' it with a name.
Having completed his account of the Mixed Kind, Socrates now turns to the fourth and last of the Kinds, that namely of cause or \textit{aitia} (26e-27b). The first three Kinds, he says, have yielded all stable natures (\textit{gignomena}, 27a11) and everything (i.e. \textit{perata} and \textit{apeira}) from which they are produced; the fourth Kind is the one which causes or produces (\textit{poiei}, cf. 26e6) these stable natures from their constituents, and this Socrates subsequently identifies (29b foll.) with cosmic Intelligence or Nous.

It would seem that the classification made in the Analysis of Kinds is supposed to be basically the same sort of classification as that made at 20c-23a in the discussion of the three lives. That this is so can be seen from the way in which Socrates correlates the two classifications. It is admitted by Philebus at 27e-28a that pleasure and pain admit of more and less, and Socrates uses this admission to consign them to the Indeterminate Kind (28a). Meanwhile the life compounded of pleasure and thought has already (at 27d) been assigned a place in the third or Mixed Kind. And at 29d-30d it is alleged that wisdom and intelligence belong to the Kind of Universal Cause.

The odd man out here is the Kind of Limit, with which nothing in the doctrine of the three lives is specifically correlated. It seems to me possible that this has something
to do with the failure of Socrates to 'collect the progeny of Limit' (acknowledged at 25d).

I would suggest that the method of the Divine Gift and the Analysis of Kinds are related somewhat as follows. The Divine Gift was probably introduced into the dialogue to provide a classificatory basis for the doctrine of the three lives. Plato quite possibly felt that a division involving overlapping kinds (like the life of pleasure, the life of knowledge, and the mixed life) needed to be given a special metaphysical basis; and he gave it one by applying an harmonics analogy to the topic of classification. He used the Divine Gift principally to assert that a single kind can sometimes be supposed of n overlapping sub-kinds. In the Analysis of Kinds passage, on the other hand, he is concerned not so much with the number of overlapping kinds as with ratio of overlap: in the Analysis passage he wants to suggest to the reader the importance of realising not merely that human life is essentially a variety of the third or mixed life, but also that it is of the greatest importance for the mixed life that one necessarily leads que human being to have its intellectual and hedonic ingredients blended in the correct proportion.
Plato's discussion of mental concepts in the *Philebus* is very carefully elaborated and a correct understanding of this account is essential for an understanding of what Plato wants to say about pleasure. My method will be to deal in turn with the accounts given of various concepts: I shall try as I go to show how these fit into place.

a) Anaisthēsia and Sensation. When some bodily process dies away before being communicated to the soul, we have an instance of anaisthēsia, or failure to perceive. Such processes, says Socrates, are properly described as hidden from the soul, since it makes sense to speak of forgetting only where memory has departed: where a bodily process does not get through to the soul, there can be no memory of it. Sensation, on the other hand, occurs when a bodily process gets through to the soul; it involves a joint agitation of both body and soul, though the agitation of the soul during sensation is of a different order from the agitation undergone by the body. (33d-34a).

* It has been necessary to reproduce a portion of this Chapter photographically, and consequently to place all footnotes together at the end.
Sensation, then, is a process or motion partly of the body and partly of the mind. To some extent this is a misleading way of putting things, since we are not meant to understand that these two elements are homogeneous. Indeed, when Socrates says that the disturbance or impact (seismos) is common to both body and mind and peculiar to each of them he surely means (a) that the sensory process operates in similar ways in the body and "in" the mind, but (b) that what goes on in the body is here not of the same order or type as what goes on "in" the mind: the mental seismos is related to the bodily seismos analogically. If then the bodily and mental elements in sensation are analogous rather than homogeneous the question then arises of just what it is that is supposed to happen in the body and what in the mind. It is tempting to give an answer somewhat along these lines:—what goes on in the body is (eg) the physiological processes of seeing, while what goes on in the mind is the production and unification of sense-impressions or sense-data. For reasons which I hope will subsequently become apparent, I suggest that this is not the sort of thing that Plato is talking about.

Rather, what he means is something like this. The eye, for instance, sees a great many things; the mind picks some of these out and remarks upon them. This "picking-out-and-
"remarking-upon" is not, in the first instance, done verbally, though it may later be expressed verbally, eg, "That is a house". Once the process of picking-out-and-remarking-upon is complete there is in the mind a thought, judgement of (Humean?) impression (doxa); when expressed verbally, or, more accurately, when propositionalized, this thought becomes a statement (logos). For the sake of brevity, I shall call the process of picking-out-and-remarking-upon the judging process. (GR. to doxazein) The judging process, for Plato, is part sensation and part memory; where sensation leaves off and memory takes over would, on his account, be impossible to decide.

b) Memory, Forgetting, and Recollection. The purely mental counterparts of sensation and anaisthēsia are, on the one hand, memory and, on the other, forgetting. Memory is the preservation of sensation in the soul (presumably, a preservation of the distinctively mental agitation which is one component of the compound agitation of sensation). Forgetting is the departure of memory from the soul. Recollection is of two sorts. There is, firstly, the 'total recall' variety, when the soul resurrects vividly within itself some previous bodily experience; secondly, there is the revival of a departed memory, or of a forgotten piece of knowledge. (34a–c).
The two sorts of recollection are most important. The common element they share is that of internal, "spontaneous" mental activity, directed towards "re-creating" something or other. I suggest that recollecting, in the first sense, is vivid imagining of past experience, for instance, seeing the concert hall and the orchestra once more in the mind's eye, and hearing again in the mind's ear the work performed. What is remarkable here is that memory is not expressly excluded, whereas in the second sort of recollection it is expressly excluded. There is, surely, a good reason for this. The process of sensation, as we have seen, occurs in the body in one way and in the mind in another. Memory is peculiarly mental (on which see in particular 35b-c). Therefore the aspect of sensation which it preserves must be the peculiarly mental aspect. This sensory mental activity and its preservation constitute the judging process (39a). To revert to the first sort of recollection. I may remember, either actively or dispositionally, that I attended a particularly fine performance of the Beethoven Fifth at the Albert Hall last August. This I can do without seeing pictures in the mind's eye or hearing sounds in the mind's ear. But I may also at times recollect the actual performance by "seeing" the musicians, "hearing" the orchestra, and so on. This sort of thing is a resumption (analêpsis), as it were, of the total experience. In the second sort, however, memory
is supposed to have been utterly lost or destroyed, and has to be "dug up" (anapolein). This is done by the mind, without the body's help. The memory which is unearthed is that of "sensation or theoretical knowledge", the memory, that is, of judgements (doxai) or propositions (logoi). These are operations which can, as often as not, be carried out without the help of mental images.

* Since memory is the preservation of (the mental aspect of) sensation, "the memory of sensation" is pleonastic. Moreover, in view of the expression "the memory of a piece of knowledge" it would seem that the original definition of memory was incomplete.
I wish, firstly, to discuss three interpretations of this argument which seem to me erroneous, and, secondly, to offer, for what it is worth, my own paraphrase of it.

The crux, it seems to me, is at 35a6-10:

This passage has given rise to two lines of interpretation, namely, on the one hand, that all of the argument from 35a6 to 35c2 is about ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος, and, on the other, that only 35a6-10 deals with the first occasion of depletion. The first line has been taken by Apelt and, more recently, by Professors Klibansky and Hackforth. Since there is a close similarity between the views of Apelt and Klibansky, I shall consider their interpretations first.

Apelt and Klibansky hold that 35a6-c2 is an attempt to account for the desire felt by someone who is undergoing depletion for the first time. I am not sure why they want to involve Plato in such an attempt; but it is perhaps unnecessary to go into this, since their interpretations will not stand scrutiny for other reasons. In particular, their interpretations make 35a6-10 incompatible with 35b11-c2:
Both Apelt and Klibansky have seen this, and each has tried in his own way to show that the contradiction is apparent only. Apelt, in effect, requires the reader to understand after της μνημής at 35cl, something like της φύσεως or της ἀρμονίας:

"Also woran erinnert er sich? Nicht an die Füllung,
"wohl aber an jenen ursprünglichen Gleichgewichtzustand,
"den Platon als Ausgangspunkt aller sinnlichen Lust und
"Unlust annimmt und den er eben deshalb wiederholt mit
"so grossen Nachdruck betont."4

Hackforth's judgement on this seems to me conclusive:

"This I find difficult to accept. For if Plato meant
"it he is guilty of an incredible negligence of
"expression; how can the reader fail to take the almost
"immediately preceding genitive της πληρώσεως to be
"the genitive implied in της μνημής?"5

Klibansky's attempt at explaining away the incompatibility is rather more subtle; for, while allowing that της πληρώσεως is implied at 35cl, he finds an ambiguity in πληρώσεως, which, he says, can mean either "replenishment" (the act) or "repletion" (the state). "Socrates' argument", he says,
"presupposes that the two meanings are not linguistically
"distinguished." Thus at 35a1, 35a2 and 35b11–cl the word
would, according to him, mean "repletion", while at 35a7 it would mean "replenishment", whereupon the incompatibility would vanish. He attempts to fortify his position by appealing to Greek usage, arguing that the words πληρώσεως πώματος (35a1) mean not "replenishment by drinking" but "repletion with drink": "replenishment by drinking" would, he says, have to be πληρώσεως διὰ πώμα, "or the like".

This is not so. Greek verbs of filling employ partitive genitives, not instrumental constructions, to signify with what the filling is done, and with their corresponding nouns such genitives are legitimately retained in unambiguous contexts. Thus πληρώσεως πώματος is normal Greek for "replenishment with drink / by drinking", just as πληροῦν πώματος is normal Greek for "replenish with drink".

Klibansky may be right in thinking that "repletion with drink" is a permissible translation of πληρώσεως πώματος, but he is wrong in thinking that it is the only possible translation: hence he has failed to show that it is the translation needed here. Moreover, πληρώσεως is used predominantly to signify the processes of filling up and being filled up, and but rarely in the sense of "repletion". (Liddell and Scott give only two examples where it means "repletion", neither from Plato.) Again, the tenses of πληροῦσα and κενοῦσα are throughout continuous
presents, not perfects. Take, for instance, 34e9-11:

ΣΩ. Διψάμεν γέ πού λέγομεν ἐκάστοτέ τι;
ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δ' οὔ;
ΣΩ. Τούτο δὲ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦτα;

and compare it with 35b3-4:

ΣΩ. Οὖν ἄρα δ' ἐξεσχεῖ, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψή γάρ,
toúto de kénwoc' ὁ o' ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

If consistency is to be maintained, κένωσις, like κενοῦτα, can refer only to the process of depletion or evacuation, as distinct from the state of emptiness. Likewise, the thirsty man ἔρη πληρουθαί (35a4) and ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως (35b4), and I cannot see how πληρώσις could mean "the process of being replenished" at 35b4, and not mean the same thing at 35b6 and 35b11, unless Plato were being crudely disingenuous.

I believe, then, that the interpretations of Apelt and Klibansky can be accepted only on pain of attributing to Plato, in the one case, "an incredible negligence of expression" and, in the other, downright disingenuousness. While one must not assume a priori that Plato could never be guilty of such failings, nor even indeed that he could not possibly be guilty of the sort of inconsistency that both editors have tried to explain away, it is, nevertheless, a salutary canon of construction not to make nonsense, or
worse, of an argument where there is no need to do so, and I shall try presently to show that there is no such need here.

Hackforth's interpretation is interesting, but extremely perverse. The relevant part of his note is:

"I believe that the clue to the argument is what Socrates does not actually say, but only implies: viz.

that no desire (ἐπιθυμία) can occur on the first occasion of κάνωσις. There is a strong contrast between δὲ τὸ πρῶτον κανεύμενος (35a6) and ἄλλα μὴν ὤ γε ἐπιθυμῶν (35bl): and it is just this contrast that is intended to carry the implication in question. Accordingly I paraphrase the argument as follows:

It might be supposed that, since thirst (which is an ἐπιθυμία, 34e13) occurs when the physical organism is 'depleted', it is the body that ἐπιθυμεῖ. But if that were so, desire would occur at the first κάνωσις; yet it does not, for desire involves the notion or 'apprehension' (ἐφαπτεσθαι) of something opposite to the physical experience of κάνωσις, the notion namely of πλήρωσις; and this notion, just because it is an opposite notion to anything that the body can, at the first κάνωσις (i.e. before any πλήρωσις has been experienced), possibly possess, must belong to soul. In short, desire involves a preceding bodily πλήρωσις,
of which the soul conceives the notion by way of memory.

The words \( \kappa \nu \nu \omega \sigma \iota \kappa \gamma \acute{\alpha} \rho \pi \omicron \omicron \) at 35b9 do not mean that the reason why it is impossible for the body \( \delta \varphi \alpha \pi \tau \varepsilon \sigma \delta \alpha \varsigma \pi \lambda \eta \rho \varphi \varepsilon \sigma \omega \varsigma \varsigma \) is that the same thing cannot \( \delta \varphi \alpha \pi \tau \varepsilon \sigma \delta \alpha \varsigma \) two opposites simultaneously, as Taylor supposes; if they did, there would, so far as I can see, be no point in introducing the topic of the first \( \kappa \nu \nu \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) at all; rather they mean that, the only relevant experience of the body hitherto being that of \( \kappa \nu \nu \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (which it is at the moment in question experiencing), it cannot be conceived as apprehending \( \pi \lambda \eta \rho \omega \varsigma \varsigma \)."

Hackforth seems to me to be right about one thing, namely that it is to be inferred from the context that desire does not occur on the first occasion of depletion—an insight that he shares with Grote, and probably with Badham also. But his boiling down of the argument into a hypothetical syllogism is disastrous. More precisely, Hackforth's paraphrase has this skeleton:

(1) Since desire occurs when the body is (being) depleted, it might be supposed that it is the body that desires.
But (ii) If that were so [=if it were the body that desired], desire would occur at the first \( \kappa \nu \nu \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \).
However (iii) Desire does not occur at the first κένωσις.

(Implication carried by the contrast between ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος (35a6) and ἄλλα μὴν ὁ γε ἐπιθυμών (35b1).)

Whence (iv) It is the body that desires. (cf. 35c6-7)

Steps (ii), (iii) and (iv) make up the syllogism, which means that (ii) and (iii) together entail (iv). Thus, in order to establish (iv), Socrates would need to establish (ii) and (iii), either by proving them, or by getting Protarchus to accept them without argument.

Socrates does not explicitly assert (ii). Therefore, if Hackforth's version is right, Socrates must be implying (ii). However, Socrates neither adduces any argument of which (ii) could reasonably be taken to be the unexpressed conclusion, nor speaks in such a way that (ii) must be a tacit assumption in the light of which his express remarks are to be read.

While Socrates undoubtedly implies (iii), he surely does not, as Hackforth suggests, argue for it. It would have been curious if Plato, when constructing the piece, had made Socrates imply something, Protarchus agree with the remarks carrying the implication, and Socrates then argue in support of it. It is perfectly proper to construct an argument of which the conclusion is so obvious that the audience can safely be left to draw it; but it would be eccentric to have a speaker's audience agree with him about π, where both he and they cannot but realize that π implies
and the speaker then mount an elaborate defence of &. Lest Plato be taxed here with this form of eccentricity, of which he is plainly innocent, I discuss this part of Hackforth's paraphrase in somewhat more detail. According to Hackforth, Socrates argues for (iii) in the following way:

(iii/a) Desire involves the notion of πληρωσίς (cf. 35b1-8)

(iii/b) At the time of the first κένωσις (i.e. before any πληρωσίς has been experienced, cf. 35a6-9), the only relevant experience of the body of the person affected is that of κένωσις (κενοῦται γάρ ποι, b9); whence

(iii/c) The body cannot, at the first κένωσις, possibly possess the opposite notion of πληρωσίς (τὸ μὲν ὁδομένα δόνατον, b9) and so

(iii/d) The notion of πληρωσίς must belong to soul (35b11), AND (iii) The body does not (in view of (iii/a)) desire at the first κένωσις; i.e. (Bodily) desire does not occur at the first κένωσις.

This section of the paraphrase suffers from a double disorder: firstly, Hackforth has made a mistake about the significance of ἐφάπτεσθαι (cf. (iii/a), supra), as I shall show when giving my own interpretation; and, secondly, he has convinced himself that the whole argument somehow turns on (iii), so that everything between 35a6 and 35b11 is there in order to prove it. For the present I shall concern myself with the second of these consideration only.
Obviously, 35b9 cannot conceivably mean what Hackforth says it means (cf. (iii/b) and (iii/c) above, and the last paragraph of his note). For, to turn against him the argument which he uses against Apelt: If at 35b9 Plato meant: Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα τὸ τοῦ τὸ πρῶτον κανονισμοῦ ἀδύνατον, he is guilty of an incredible negligence of expression; how can the reader fail to take the almost immediately preceding genitive τοῦ δυσμένου to be the genitive implied in τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα? But if at b9 Plato is talking about the δυσμένος (i.e. someone really feeling desire, and not merely undergoing a first depletion), his remarks there are surely irrelevant to the implication that no one being depleted for the first time feels desire. (Taylor is of course right about b9: it is an application of the law of contradiction in an argument designed to prove that it is the soul of the ἐπιθυμωτὸς that ἐφάπαξει πληρώσεως. )

But, even if Hackforth were allowed the sort of move that he has denied Apelt; even, that is, if one were to grant him (iii/b) and (iii/c), as well as (iii/a), he still could not deduce (iii/d): he could show, at most, that if, on the first occasion of depletion, either the body or the soul possessed the notion of πληρωσις, then the notion of πληρωσις must, on that occasion, belong to the soul. He would then have to offer this conditional sentence, limited in its application to the first occasion of depletion, as a paraphrase of a categorical sentence of apparently unlimited applicability
to all cases of desire, namely: Τὴν ψυχὴν δρα τῆς πληρωσεως ἐφακτεσέαι λοιπῶν (35b11). Confronted with this, one can only abandon salvage operations. It was, of course, open to Hackforth to take (iii) in another, less artificial way, namely as something that Socrates was assuming, and not as something that he was trying to prove: why he did not so take it, I cannot understand.

I do not claim that my own interpretation is particularly novel or original—only that it is more likely to be right than any of those I have already discussed. From what I have said so far it seems tolerably safe to assume that, after 35a10, ὅ το πρῶτον κενομενος drops right out of the discussion; for it seems to me that Apelt, Klibansky and Hackforth have, between them, exhausted all the possible strategems for keeping him in it after that point. This granted, so much of the argument becomes quite straightforward:

Taking thirst as a paradigm case, it can be shown that:

(a) (34e9-12) Desire always involves depletion;

(b) (34e13-35a5) The object of desire is always the condition contrary (ἐναντιόν πάθημα) to depletion, i.e. replenishment (πληρωσις).
(6) (35bl-11) In all cases of desire it is the soul that \( \varepsilon \varphi \alpha \kappa \tau \varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \pi \lambda \eta \rho \omega \varsigma \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \); for, if we suppose that the body \( \varepsilon \varphi \alpha \kappa \tau \varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \pi \lambda \eta \rho \omega \varsigma \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \), we shall have to suppose further that it is undergoing two contrary processes simultaneously and with respect to the same thing,\(^{15}\) which is absurd.

(2) (35c3-8) It follows from all that has been said that there is no such thing as bodily desire.

There remain to be accounted for:

(γ) (35a6-10); and

(ε) (35c1-2).

The key words in (γ) are: \( \varepsilon \kappa \tau \iota \ \alpha \lambda \sigma \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \iota \) \( \pi \lambda \eta \rho \omega \varsigma \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \) \( \varepsilon \varphi \alpha \kappa \tau \varepsilon \tau \alpha \iota \). The emphasis is surely on \( \alpha \lambda \sigma \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \iota \) and \( \mu \nu \mu \mu \), since the point of (γ) is that (as Badham\(^{16}\) puts it) "all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory". The following considerations move me to argue for this interpretation of (γ).

(1) There is, as Hackforth has pointed out, an implication at 35a6-10 that \( \delta \ \tau \delta \ \kappa \rho \omega \tau \varsigma \kappa \nu \omega \mu \nu \omega \varsigma \) \( \chi \nu \varsigma \nu \mu \varepsilon \nu \varsigma \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \). The implication is carried by the contrast between \( \delta \ \tau \delta \ \kappa \rho \omega \tau \varsigma \kappa \nu \omega \mu \nu \omega \varsigma \) \( (a6) \), on the one hand, and \( \delta \kappa \nu \omega \mu \nu \omega \varsigma \) \( \eta \mu \nu \varsigma \omega \varsigma \) \( (a3) \) and \( \delta \ \nu \chi \varepsilon \kappa \iota \vartheta \mu \varepsilon \nu \varsigma \varepsilon \omega \varsigma \) \( (b1) \), on the other, the contrast being between the tiro, who feels only distress and uneasiness\(^{17}\)(e.g. Daphnis, when first confronted with the charms of Chloe\(^{18}\)) and the more experienced person, who knows what he wants, and so can properly be said to feel desire (e.g. Friar John, on seeing the
maidservants of Bishop Homenaz). The contrast, and the implication it carries, seem to me to be commonplace, and not in themselves of any great importance.

(2) This implication stands to what is in the text at 6-10 (ἀντὶ πρώτου κανονίσμου οὐτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεται οὔτε μνήμη) as conclusion to minor premiss, which means that there is also implied a major premiss to the effect that ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν οὐτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεται οὔτε μνήμη; and this implied major premiss has a much better claim than the implied conclusion to be taken as the point of (γ). I offer the following parallel, in which an explicit minor premiss carries with it, by implication, both a conclusion and a major premiss, the major premiss being the point the speaker wants to make. An alderman of impeccable background is haranguing his cronies:

"If we say that someone is eligible to be Lord Mayor, "we imply that he has a private income adequate for "upholding the dignity of his office: anyone of our sort "with such an income is certainly eligible. But now, "what about a wealthy bookmaker, for instance? Is it "possible for him to be well-connected, since he surely "won't have been to the right schools? However, the sort "of person who is eligible &c. &c."

Here the speaker begins with one of the necessary conditions of eligibility, namely the possession of an adequate private
income (and compare 34e9-12, where ἄναρχος is given as a necessary condition of ἐξελθομένος). Then comes a strong contrast between (on the one hand) "anyone of our sort" and "However, the sort of person who is eligible", and (on the other) "But now, what about a wealthy bookmaker"; and this contrast carries the obvious implication that no bookmaker, however wealthy, is eligible to be Lord Mayor. Assuming, though, that no bookmaker is in fact putting up for Lord Mayor, this implication can hardly be the point being made by the speaker. However, the rhetorical question in italics (which is equivalent to "No bookmaker, however wealthy, is well-connected") and the implication that no bookmaker is eligible, readily suggest the syllogism:

No one who is not well-connected is eligible to be Lord Mayor (major premiss);

No bookmaker, however wealthy, is well-connected (minor premiss);

∴ No bookmaker, however wealthy, is eligible to be Lord Mayor (conclusion).

The major premiss gives the speaker's point: granted that the ineligibility of bookmakers (conclusion) is an assumption shared by him and his friends, the speaker, by stressing that bookmakers invariably lack the right connexions (minor premiss), is merely pointing the moral that the right connexions are essential if one is to be in the running (major premiss).
To express oneself in this way is perhaps to be clumsy, but not to be unintelligible. 35a6-10 is to be similarly construed: Socrates' assumption that people undergoing depletion for the first time are incapable of desiring, is obviously common ground between him and Protarchus, since Protarchus does not question his clear implication of it; and, by stressing that ὃ τὸ πρῶτον κενοῦμενος οὖτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεται οὕτω μνήμη, Socrates points the moral that ὃ ἐπιθυμῶν οὔτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεται οὕτω μνήμη.

(3) What is vitally important in the implied major premiss is not just that ὃ ἐπιθυμῶν ἐφάπτεται πληρώσεως, but that he οὔτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεται οὕτω μνήμη. Ἐφάπτεσθαι, used metaphorically, has in Plato a very wide application: it can refer, for instance, to the connexion or relation between perceiver and thing perceived, knower and object of knowledge, prophet and truth prophetically grasped, and one who opines and what is opined: it has, then, a very general epistemological application, and Hackforth's "to have the notion or 'apprehension' of", at least insofar as it implies knowing how to use a word, is likely only to mislead. In most contexts where it is used metaphorically, ἐφάπτεσθαι can be rendered adequately, if inelegantly, by "to be directly connected with / related to". Moreover, the precise sort of connexion or relation that a
person has with something he ἔφακττατε depends on the nature of the thing: if it is an ἐπιστητόν, for instance, he knows (ἔφακττατε) it; if it is a sensible like πλήρωσις (which is an αἰσθητή κίνησις), he perceives or remembers it. It is the stressing, at (γ), of the precise sort of connexion between the ἐπιθεμένων and πλήρωσις that makes (ε) (35cl-2: τῇ μνήμῃ ὡλευ ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.) perspicuous: it is obvious that the ἐπιθεμένων is linked with πλήρωσις by memory because it has already (a6-10) been asserted that his only possible links with πλήρωσις are those of sensation and memory, and because sensation is ruled out by the law of contradiction. Leave out (γ), and it ceases to be obvious at (ε) why a memory-link should be involved.

I therefore paraphrase 34e9-35c2 thus:-

Taking thirst as a paradigm case, it can be shown that:

(a) (34e9-12) Desire always involves depletion;

(β) (34e13-35a5) The object of desire is always the condition contrary to depletion, i.e. replenishment;

(γ) (35a6-10) [Replenishment being a sensible process,] the link with replenishment of the person feeling desire must be one either of sensation or of memory;

(δ) (35b1-11) In all cases of desire it is the soul, not the body, of the person feeling desire that is linked or connected with replenishment;
(ε) (35c1-2) [Since, by (γ), the soul's connexion with replenishment must be through either sensation or memory, and since the soul, which is already connected through sensation with depletion, cannot simultaneously be connected in the same way with two opposites,] it is obvious that the soul's connexion with replenishment is through memory.

(ζ) (35c3-8) There is no such thing as bodily desire.

There are two things about the argument which seem to me to call for further comment. Firstly, why the emphasis at (ζ) (repeated at 35d5-7) on there being no such thing as bodily desire? For one thing, it is hard to see how (ζ) could be supposed to be the conclusion reached in the discussion of desire, since it is an inadequate answer to the question asked by Socrates at 34c3-4:

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τὴν ποτὲ ἐκεῖνα γένος βλέπαντες οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα τὰῦτα ἐνὶ προσαγορεύωμεν ὀνόματι;

Socrates is here looking for what is characteristic of desire, and being ψυχῆς σύμπασα is no more characteristic of desire than it is of (e.g.) knowledge or recollection. The reason for emphasizing (ζ) seems to me to be this: At 32bd Socrates has undertaken an investigation of the purely mental pleasures and pains of anticipation, in the hope of learning whether or not pleasure is invariably to be welcomed; whether, that is, it is desirable without reservation, or
only with such reservations as apply to other ἡπειρα, such as heat and cold. Again, at 35e-36b he suggests that desire and an attendant hope of gratification are two components of anticipatory pleasure. But if either of these two components is even partly bodily, it is unplausible to suggest that it is a component of something purely mental. While none would doubt that hope is purely mental, ordinary usage, which permits one to speak of carnal or bodily desire (σώματος ἐπιθυμία), seems to suggest that desire is at least partly bodily: hence the need to stress at (ζ) that the rest of the argument (34e9-35c2) has conclusively shown, inter alia, that desire is purely mental. (The characteristic of desire is of course given by (α)-(ε) (34e9-35c2): the common characteristic of all cases of desire is that the soul remembers (the appropriate) replenishment on an occasion of (bodily) depletion.)

Secondly, it is perhaps worth remarking that 35c9-d4 is not an exact re-statement of 34e9-35c8. The three steps of 35c9-d4 are:

(η) (c9-11) The object of a creature's striving (i.e. of desire) is always the opposite of its present experience (and cf. 34e13-35a5);

(θ) (c12-15) Which indicates that there must be a memory of that opposite (cf. a6-10 and c1-2);
Thus, since it is memory that leads us to what we desire, it follows that desire is exclusively within the province of the soul (cf. bl-11 and c3-8). (8) follows from (7) only if one supposes that the opposed παθήματα are both sensibles (i.e. capable of being grasped only through sensation or memory), and that (to quote Badham) "sensation is occupied [only] with the present state" (a premiss not relied on in the first version). Again, in the first version it is apparent by the end of (6) (i.e. by 35b11) that desire is non-bodily, the inference that memory is the faculty employed being drawn at (8); whereas in the second version the inference that desire is exclusively mental [(4)] is drawn from the assertion at (8) that memory is the faculty employed. Lastly, there is no mention in the second version of κένωσις and κλήρωσις, but only of the more general τὰ παθήματα and τὰ ἐκπλημμένα / τὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντία; and it seems to me plausible that in the second version Plato was insuring his critique of desire against attack on the score of a too heavy reliance on the nutritive paradigm of thirst.30
d) **Anticipation.** The arguments may be stated quite briefly. While undergoing the processes of emptying and replenishment (bodily-mental processes which are sensed), a man may also have purely mental experience of another type. For instance, while being emptied he may **remember** the pleasures which would end his discomfort were they to come his way. In such a case a man will sometimes have confident expectation that the remembered pleasures will be actualised; at other times he will despair of their being actualised. We might say, then, that when someone confidently expects that replenishment will occur he seems to experience a pleasure in remembering; on the other hand, when there is despair of actualisation there is pain in remembering. Pleasures and pains of these types are, like judgements or propositions, sometimes true and sometimes false.

The only comment I shall make here is that anticipatory pleasures and pains are remembered judgements or propositions (= memories) set in contexts of optimism or pessimism. Now a person's optimism or pessimism may be baseless, but it cannot be false. A **memory**, however, can be false. This I think is the sort of thing Plato means when he introduces the notions of pleasure-truth and pleasure-falsity. His point is surely a reasonable one. It is rounded off by the mention at 36e of the complementary and indeed basic type of true/false pleasure,
namely that which consists in a judgement in an "optimistic" context.

Has there never then been such a thing as a man, awake or asleep, crazed or delirious, who believes he is feeling pleasure, but actually feels none, or thinks he is feeling pain when he actually feels none?

(What Plato wants to bring out here is surely that, eg, a dream-pleasure of eating oysters consists in a false judgement that one is eating oysters in a context of being well-disposed towards oysters. To make the meaning quite explicit, we must read into this passage something like "believes he is 'feeling pleasure through the body by a sensory process, but actually feels none through the body". (35e-36b).

c) Judgements, Statements, Memories. (38b-40c). The argument here employs (i) a model (38c-e) and (ii) an analogy (38e-40c).

(i) The Model. Judgement and the attempt to reflect upon it originate in sensation and memory. The following is a model of how the judging process operates. A man sees indistinctly a distant object which arouses his curiosity. He may then be represented as questioning himself about what it is. Supposing the object to be a man, his (notional) answer will "hit the target" if it asserts the object to be a man; it will be "wide of the mark" if it asserts it to be an effigy. Normally, of course, the process will not be carried on verbally; if it is,
a proposition will result. (The theory of truth here is 
one of correspondence. Note that a judgement is not formulated 
in words: a statement is.) (38c-e).

(ii) The Analogy. The analogy must be read schematically. 
That is, the distinction between the analogues and what is 
being analogized must be kept in view. I set these out in 
columns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analogue</th>
<th>Analogized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papyrus roll</td>
<td>Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scribe</td>
<td>Sensation, Memory and their concomitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words written by scribe</td>
<td>Judgements/Propositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designer</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designs</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(38e-40c)

The sort of account which one is at first inclined to 
give of the analogy is this. Judgements (etc.) are analogous 
to sentences written by a scribe on a papyrus roll, the papyrus 
roll being the mind, and the scribe being sensation, memory, etc. 
When the state of affairs which was being judged ceases, 
imagination (the designer) supervenes and produces mental sense-
images (the pictures drawn on the roll). These mental pictures 
are the stuff of anticipatory pleasures, and may, like the "text" 
they illustrate be true or false. With the latter half of this 
account I disagree. Firstly, Plato has already dealt with 
"mental picturing" under the heading of recollection. Secondly, 
the status of anticipatory pleasures has already been given as
that of memories within a context of confident expectation.

The crucial passage here is at 39b3-c2. It reads as follows:

PRO.: How do we say the designer does his work and when?
SOC.: When a man abstracts from sight or some other sensation the judgements he then formed or the propositions he then uttered, and in a sense sees within himself the images of what he judged or stated.

Now he does not see the images of the things about which he formed judgements (houses, trees, etc.). What he sees are images of what he judged, i.e., of his former judgements (e.g., the judgement that that is a man, etc.). The designer in the analogy is not then illustrating the text of the scribe, but painting it (in somewhat the same way as the designer in Rep. X paints the bed made by the carpenter).

On my interpretation it does however become difficult to state expressly what the designer is the analogue of; but in this connexion it is interesting that Plato does not say so either. I should think that what the designer analogizes is some aspect of the processes of memory and perhaps recollection, and that the eikones of judgements are memory-judgements or memories. To be sure, memories are often accompanied by mental pictures; but this is quite a different thing from saying that the essence of anticipation is picture-imaging. Basically, what the designer part of the analogy tells us is that the records
or copies even of accurate judgements formed on occasions of sense-experience can turn out to be inaccurate. If it were simply a problem of a correct text being illustrated inaccurately, the analogy would permit correction of the pictures in the light of the text (i.e., correction of imagination by memory of what was the case). But Plato does not seem to envisage this: the work of the designer seems not to complement the text but to supersede it.

* * *

In the *Journal of Philosophy* for 1962, Professor Thalberg makes some remarks on the suggestion that it is legitimate to talk of false pleasures. Thalberg's version of 'the Platonic thesis' is as follows:

First, we use the expressions 'pleased that', etc., to characterize a man's pleasure, just as we say of a hypochondriac's anxiety, 'He fears that he has leprosy'. Secondly, we can say that the hypochondriac's fear or a person's belief or expectation is erroneous... Therefore, if someone, having lost, declares, 'I'm delighted that I won', why shouldn't we say that he was mistaken and that his pleasure was false? 32

Whatever the merits of such a thesis (and they are, I think, considerable), it is not to be attributed to Plato in the *Philebus*.

Since Thalberg's references to the *Philebus* all fall between 36c and 40d, I assume that he is interested in the sort of falsity discussed there, confine my remarks to it. One of the points Thalberg wants to make is that
whether or not one ought to be amused at some performance and whether or not one ought to believe something are evaluative issues—and quite distinct from the truth or falsity of a belief or a pleasure. 33

He then taxes Plato with having confused the falsity and the wickedness of pleasures. But to tell your readers, as does Plato, that 'bad men delight for the most part in false pleasures, and good men in true ones', 34 is monstrously to impose upon them, if the sort of thing you mean is either that most of the bad man's pleasures are reprehensible (in which case you are being trivial), or that bad men are, qua bad, more likely than good men to be mistaken in their beliefs about the occurrence of events which occasion (or are going to occasion) their pleasures (in which case you are pulling their legs). Here Plato deserves a better hearing.

At 36c-40d Plato is discussing, in the main, false anticipatory pleasures (cf. especially 39d-40a) and such pleasures are felt 'in the soul alone' (39d1-2). Why the emphasis on this type of pleasure? Because at 32c-d Socrates suggested that

by taking these two experiences (viz. anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain) pure and without any mixture of pain in the one case and pleasure in the other—I think that we shall get a clear answer to the question about pleasure, the question whether everything classed as pleasure is to be welcomed, or whether we ought to grant that to some other of those classes that we previously distinguished, while with pleasure and pain the case stands as with hot and cold and all things like that, namely that sometimes they are to be welcomed and sometimes are not:
the reason being that they are not in themselves good, though some of them sometimes and somehow acquire the character of good things.

As we have seen, Socrates' first move in answering this question was to demonstrate that anticipatory pleasures are all derived from memory (cf. 33c4-5). He made this move by establishing, firstly, that desires are workings of the soul, occurring when the body is undergoing a depletion, and the soul remembers the contrary process of replenishment (33d-35d), and especially 34d-35d), and, secondly that anticipatory pleasures are (or at least involve) (i) desire, and (ii) the expectation (elpis) that replenishment is about to take place (35e-36b). (To give an example: the pleasure of looking forward to a cool drink arises (i) because one is thirsty, i.e., because, while one's throat is parched, one's soul remembers that on similar occasions in the past having a drink relieved the parched feeling, and (ii) because one expects to get a drink in the near future).

At this point it would seem that one or both of two disorders might sometimes infect anticipatory pleasures. Firstly, one might be mistaken in confidently expecting future relief: the publican might be out of beer. To be sure, misplaced hopes have their morbid forms; some of us no doubt spend most
of our lives building castles in Spain, or living in fools' paradises. At the same time, we are often enough prepared, as with Mr. Micawber, to be lenient with such purblindness; and it is only in very exceptional cases that we regard it as heinous. Secondly, one might have warped or morbid desires. That is, one might wrongly consider something to the sort of replenishment appropriate to one's particular distress. (In this second case, I suppose, one might be mistaken about one's present malaise, or about the cure for it, or even about both). Such wrong estimates will of course involve the person who makes them in holding false beliefs about both past and future: 'When I felt low before, drink solved my problems, and it will solve them again now'. But these incorrect beliefs are mistaken (we would say) not in their estimate of what events have in the past taken place, or will in the future take place, but rather in their estimate of the pleasantness of what they look back or forward to. We should perhaps go on to say that in this case the incorrect beliefs are erroneous or misguided value-judgements: Plato would say that they are false beliefs about what is or is not replenishment.

It seems to me that 36c-40d must be read with these considerations in mind. Let us look at the passage 38a-40e. In forming judgements (and in expressing these judgements in
statements) both sensation and memory play a part.

Sensation, memory, and the feelings consequent upon them
are like a scribe writing words on our souls: when the scribe
writes what is true, the result is that true
opinion and true assertions spring up in us;
while when the...scribe...writes what is false
we get the opposite sort of opinions and assertions. 35

A painter (i.e. imagination) comes after the scribe and
illustrates his text: as the text is true or false, so are
the painter's illustrations of it true or false. All of this
applies equally to present, past, and future. Each one of us,
whether good or bad, has texts and their illustrations written
and painted in his soul. The texts and illustrations in the
souls of the good are true, while those in the souls of the
bad are false. The illustrations are pleasures painted in the
soul: bad men have false illustrations in their souls, and
therefore false pleasures:

Hence we reach the result that false pleasures
do exist in men's souls, being really a rather
ridiculous imitation of true pleasures; and the
same applies to pains. 36

It is tempting at first glance to make the scribe-painter
analogy answer to the dichotomy of expectation and desire at
35e-36b. For example, one might attribute to the scribe one's
expectation of a legacy, while the painter would be responsible
visions of securing great quantities of gold,
and pleasure upon pleasure in consequence. 37

But the analogy cannot be supposed to fit quite in this way,
since false pictures illustrate false texts (39b5-6), and
there need be nothing wrong with the bad man's belief that
he is going to come into money.

However two sorts of expectations are, as we have seen,
to be taken into account. The first sort of expectation is
categorical ('I expect to get through a gallon of beer in the
next hour'), while the second, which derives from desire, is
hypothetical ('Drink has always been the solution to my problems
in the past, so that if I drink now, my problems will be solved
again'). It is of course a great weakness in Plato's treatment
of falsity of pleasure that this fundamental distinction is
not clearly drawn.

There cannot, of course, be an anticipatory pleasure
without the first sort of expectation: indeed if a man expected
not to get a drink when thirsty, he would have an anticipatory
pain (cf. 36b12-15); but at the same time it is surely the
falsity of the second (or hypothetical) expectation which in
the case of the bad man is necessarily false, since bad men,
however shrewd they may be in anticipating what will happen,
are burdened with morbid desires. If the only sort of expectation involved is the categorical sort, then it is difficult to see both (a) why the expectation and its illustration should be false when a man is bad but true when he is good, and (b) how the illustration could be described as a 'painted pleasure': the mental picture of a lawyer handing me a cheque, or of my sitting down to a gallon of beer, hardly seem to qualify for the title 'painted pleasure'.

(B) TRUTH AND FALSITY OF PLEASURE AT PHILEBUS 42-45
(42c-45e)

The argument from 42c to 45e falls into two parts. The first part, from 42c to 44a, is about a particular type of falsity of pleasure, namely that which arises when pleasure is confused with what goes on in the 'third' or 'neutral' life (i.e. the 'life of thought' of 21d-e). The second part, from 44b to 45e, is devoted to the doctrine of the 'enemies of Philebus', who maintain that there is no such thing as pleasure, pleasure so-called being merely release from pain.

The steps of the first part are as follows:

1. 'Next, then, we shall consider whether by the following means we do not encounter both apparent and real pleasures and pains even more false in living creatures than the foregoing'. (42c5-8)

2.1 Pain arises as a result of the disruption of a creature's nature. (42c9-d3)
2.2 Pleasure is a re-establishment of nature. (42d5-7)

2.3 When there is neither disruption nor re-establishment, there is neither pain nor pleasure. (42d9-43a1)

2.4 (Heracleitean principles do not prevent our positing moderate, unperceived motions to and fro which are neither disruption nor re-establishment). (43a-c)

2.5 We may therefore distinguish pleasure, not-pain, and pain. These three are mutually exclusive. (43d-e)

3.1 Some people call not-pain pleasure. (44a1-2)

3.2 Pleasure, not-pain and pain are mutually exclusive. (= 2.5)

3.3 'A belief or statement in which the third life is held to be pleasant or painful is then incorrect, at any rate according to the correct account'. (43e8-10)

4.1 People who call not-pain pleasure think they are experiencing pleasure when they are experiencing not-pain. (44a4-8)

4.2 Because of (2.5) supra they thereby opine falsely about pleasure. (44a9-10)

I concur with Professor Dies (the translator of the Budé edition) in taking 'false' in (1) as attributive; I disagree with the renderings of both Hackforth and Taylor who take it predicatively, and regard the participles (phainomenas, ousas) as copulae. That is, the argument is concerned with a situation in which there is room for both real and apparent false pleasure. The 'te kai' linking the participles is to be read disjunctively (Dies translates '..soit imaginaires, soit réels...'). (2) is obviously the 'correct account' referred to in 3.3. It is implicit in 3.3 that those who call not-pain pleasure hold an incorrect account of pleasure and pain. Thus the dispute between Plato and those
mentioned in (3) and (4) is not just about words (as the example at 43e in terms of gold, silver, and that which is neither indicates). Finally, the upshot of this particular error is that it causes people to opine falsely about pleasure (not 'their pleasure', as Taylor translates). Apart from (1) 'false pleasure' are not mentioned in the passage under discussion.

The theory of propositional truth of the *Philebus* (38c-e) seems to be one of correspondence between the parts of a judgement and the parts of the situation to which the judgement refers. The whole content of a judgement might be put verbally: "'What is it by that rock?' "A statue".' The corresponding statement might be: 'There's a statue by that rock'. If in fact there is a man by the rock, one element of the statement has failed to correspond with an element of the situation. Plato's theory of truth of pleasure is similarly one of correspondence between a pleasure and the situation which is the object of enjoyment, a correspondence in which sensation, and memory are the intermediaries. In some cases, for instance, an anticipatory pleasure will be false because it can be correlated only with a situation which is not at all pleasant (cf. 40a), and in other cases because its correlate is not as pleasant as it appears (cf. 42b).

How does this consideration affect 42c-44a? Plato wants to suggest first of all that in this third category there can
be both apparent and real pleasures. The real variety will be anticipatory, as when a person sick or in pain 'enjoys' the prospect of relief. Of course, there is nothing strange in a man's looking forward to his recovery; what is strange is his saying: 'If only I were rid of this pain I'd want nothing else from life'. This leads him to expect, perhaps, that his mere recovery from illness will answer all his problems and cravings. But in fact, it will not answer any of them; it will not even in itself be enjoyable - all that it will do is put the sick man once more in a position to enjoy life. Thus the sick man's pleasurable anticipation, while really pleasant, is false, since there is no pleasure to which it corresponds.

The apparent variety is more difficult to account for. There is, I suppose, the relatively uninteresting case of the man who recovers from illness, discovers that mere recovery is not, after all, pleasant (although not painful, either), yet to save face, either with his friends or with himself, tells everyone that merely being well is the greatest of pleasures. We might say, I suppose, that his error is merely verbal. But there may be other cases where the error is not merely verbal. These arise where an incorrect account of pleasure and pain processes is believed. Two incorrect accounts might be suggested:
(i) The 'third life' (i.e. absence of perceived motion) alone is pleasant; all the rest is pain of varying intensity;
(ii) Tranquillity is the purest of pleasures, other pleasures representing an approach to it. The upshot of either of these beliefs will be that a man holding them will declare that life is pleasant, or most pleasant, at times of repose. Tranquillity and repose will then be his goal. Such beliefs may even affect his manner of life. When he is experiencing not-pain (tranquillity) he thinks, then, that he is feeling pleasure. This belief, based on an incorrect account, is false because the account from which it derives is false.

The most that we can say here is, I suppose, that people who believe such accounts give deceptive manifestations of enjoyment; or rather, perhaps, that when they appear to be enjoying $X$ they are really enjoying $Y$: for although they appear to enjoy something which does not warrant enjoyment (i.e., tranquillity) and so to have a false (in the sense of unwarranted or unjustified) pleasure, what they in fact enjoy is something else. In this sense, then, we may speak of the 'appearance of a false pleasure'.

My overall conclusion about Plato's view that pleasures and pains may be true or false is that when he speaks of truth and falsity he has in mind things like justifiability, entitlement
and warranty. In the Philebus both 'orthos' and 'alēthēs' are used of pleasures. 'Orthos' admittedly means 'correct' not 'right' (in the moral sense). 'Alēthēs can however have moral overtones ('honest', etc.). Plato believed, I think, that there ought in people's lives to be a fairly rigidly controlled economy of pleasures. That is, just as people should hold only justified beliefs, so they should enjoy only justified pleasures. In general, pleasures are justified by corresponding to situations which are truly pleasant (just as beliefs are justified by their correspondence with all the elements of a situation). Anticipatory pleasures are notoriously prone not to correspond at all, or to correspond only partially; and where a man's grasp of the metaphysics of pleasure is faulty, his actual present pleasures (justified ones, perhaps) will appear unjustified.

I shall now briefly examine 44a-45e in the light of what I have said. Those whose views are criticised in this passage are not fools - they are 'deinoi peri phusin'. Their views obviously derive from the belief that the third life alone is worth having, since it alone is pain-free, with the addition of the rather obvious point that in a system where there is only increasing or decreasing pain and tranquillity, the
introduction of a third term 'pleasure' is uneconomical and confusing. All so-called pleasures are merely decreasing pains or pain-releases; and it is unhelpful to call tranquility 'true pleasure', since nobody very much (except perhaps the 'naive sick man') used the word in this sense. Their belief then is grounded in their observation that the most intense pleasures (so-called) are escapes from intense pain.

(At the time when he wrote the Republic Plato was persuaded that there was in this theory a substantial measure of truth. Those whom he scourges in the Republic are those without experience of true pleasure, who confuse pleasure with pain release and the middle state (584c-585a). That is, he accepts the doctrine of the deinoi peri phusin that so-called pleasures are only ebbing pains; he agrees with them also in refusing to regard the middle state as pleasure. Where he disagrees with them in the Republic is in regarding the middle state not as the desiderandum but as a half-way house between pain and true or pure pleasure (a process of the upper region). It may well be that in the Republic 'middle state' is used in a double sense of which Plato was unaware; (1) satiety (in the sense of the state of euphoria a man finds himself in after gorging; (2) tranquillity. Even in the Philebus his metaphysics is not adequate to account for or recognise this distinction).
The false notions of the *deinocoi peri phusin* are thus at least part of what is implied at 43e10 by the words 'at any rate according to the correct account'. I think that Plato means that even though the ascetic because of his false beliefs may well find that even ascetic 'pleasures' can be just as much of an illusion as profligate pleasures (42c-44a), nevertheless we could do worse than to treat him (much as poets are treated) as a sort of prophet (cf.44c5). He serves a useful purpose in pointing out for our consideration certain sorts of intense pleasures, a loathing of which has brought him to his own position.

The connexion of this section with what has gone before it is, I think, this. Up to 45 (roughly) Plato is talking about a man's warrant or justification for his pleasures; the implications are of course moral, the criteria for applying the terms roughly psychological. For instance, a man need not look forward with excited anticipation to spending his uncle's legacy on wine, women, and song, or, for that matter, on procuring hermitic seclusion from the world about him: for none of these things is, in the event, pleasant. In taking his pleasures, a man must have his feet firmly on the ground; he must know the long-term hedonic worth of a situation before he begins, even in prospect, to enjoy it. To say that a pleasure, whether present or in prospect, is true is to say that it corresponds with the situation to which it refers.
FOOTNOTES

1. Line references are to the Oxford Classical Text.


4. Apelt, loc. cit.

5. Hackforth, op. cit., p. 66.

6. id. p. 67.


8. Badham, Plato's Philebus, 2nd ed. (1878), p. 8. (I cannot see how Badham could have construed the argument as he did, unless he were supposing Socrates and Protarchus to be agreed on the impossibility of desire at the first xéνωςις.)

9. In the modus tollens: [(p⇒q)⇒¬q]⇒¬p
Had (ii) been a lemma in Socrates' argument, one would have expected to find something like this in the text:

(ii/a) If it were the body that desired, desire would occur whenever \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) occurred; But

(ii/b) If desire occurred whenever \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) occurred, desire would occur at the first \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \); whence (ii) would follow. (In the wider context of an argument in which it was being provisionally assumed that desire was exclusively bodily, (ii/a) could have been justified on the ground that the necessity of anything besides bodily \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) for the occurrence of bodily desire would be inconceivable: so that \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) would be sufficient, as well as necessary, for the occurrence of bodily desire.) Admittedly, Plato might have constructed this sort of argument: that he did not is apparent from the text.

It seems to me significant that the word \( \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \) does not appear in the text until 35b9 (and compare Hackforth's paraphrase of what precedes 35b9, in which "physical organism" and "body" are freely introduced). All that appears in the text about the relation of \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) to \( \varepsilon \pi \iota \varepsilon \mu \iota \alpha \varepsilon \) is an assertion (at 34e9-12) that \( \varepsilon \pi \iota \varepsilon \mu \iota \alpha \varepsilon \) always involves \( \kappa \varepsilon \nu \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) (and not vice versa); to which added point is given by the use of \( \delta \kappa \nu \nu \nu \mu \mu \nu \varepsilon \nu \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsig
Plato, the Man and his Work, p.419. (On the other hand, Taylor's account of the argument is deficient in that, like Bury, he fails to attach any significance to 35a6-10.)

As formulated at Republic 436b8-9: Ἀκούω δὴ ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταῦτα γε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ὅσα ἐθελήσει ἡμᾶς; and cf. Phaedo 102e-103b and Sophist 230b. It might perhaps be argued against Taylor and in favour of Hackforth that Plato did not think that the law of contradiction covered the various types of ἔναντια παθήματα discussed in the Philebus, since at 46c6-8 we find Socrates saying: 'Ὅσον ἐν τῷ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῷ διαφορέω τάνατον ἢ μα πάθη πάσχει, ποτὲ διγνῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχηται, κ.τ.λ.

I should not think such an argument cogent, since while Socrates is discussing the mental elements in certain pleasure- or pain-situation between 32b and 42b, he is after 44a discussing compound situations (σύμμεικτα πάθη) in which pleasant or painful elements have joined together in a single blend (cf. 47b5: ὅστ' εἰς μᾶλα ἄμφοτέρα καθαύν ἕναι).
Since (iii/b) and (iii/c) are limited in their application to the first occasion of depletion. In terms of the text, if Hackforth takes το το πρώτον κενουμένου to be the genitive implied in το οὐμα (b9), he must also take it to be the genitive implied in τὴν ψυχήν (b11).

The body can δόξηθαι πληρόσεως only by means of αἰσθήσεως; but simultaneous αἰσθήσεως of both κένωσις and πληρωσις would mean that it was being both drained of and replenished with the same thing (in the case of thirst, fluid) simultaneously.

loc. cit.

Diea (in the Budé ed., p.40) refers to Condillac's contrasting (in the Traité des Sensations, Ch.III) of desire with "l'inquiétude ou malaise que nous nommons besoin".

Longus, I.32.

Rabelais, IV.54.

Phaedo, 79c, and cf. Phaedo, 65d.

Symposium, 212a3-5; Republic, 484b3-7, 490b1-7.

Timaeus, 71e; Laws, 662a1-5.

Republic, 534c5-6.

Lit. "to grasp". The verb is used in epistemological contexts in cases of acquaintance with its object: "directly" thus has the force of "not by description" or "non-inferentially."
cf. the formulation at Rep. 534c5-6: ... ἀλλ' εἴ πη ἐλάχιστον τινὸς ἐφάκτεται, δόξη, σοι ἐπιστήμη ἐφάκτεσθαι ...


Plato seems to me simply that they are the two components of anticipatory pleasure, i.e. that anticipatory pleasure = desire + hope, but I shall not discuss this here.

"Ελπίς is the general term for judgements about the future (δόξα μελλόντων, Laws, 644c9-10).

"Appropriate" is important: the thirsty dipsomaniac might well be prompted by memories of former debauches to souse himself once more in wine; of course, his memories are false: the wine made him ill and solved none of his problems. It seems to me that Plato took such pains with his analysis of desire because he believed warped desires to be the vicious element in false anticipatory pleasures: people go wrong most often, and most grievously, by misremembering their πληρώσεις. 'Ελπίδες, on the other hand, are relatively unimportant: a good few of our chicken do come home to roost, and most of us know castles in Spain for what they are.

Aristotle was critical of Plato's reliance on nutritive paradigms (cf. N.E. 1173b 7-20).

32 Thalberg, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

33 *id.*, p. 69.

34 40c1-2 (tr. Hackforth).

35 39a (tr. Hackforth).

36 40c (tr. Hackforth).

37 40a9-11 (tr. Hackforth).

38 For the first two categories, see 40a-d; 40e-42c.
CHAPTER VII

LAWS and CONCLUSION

a) The Laws

Something has already been said on the treatment of pleasure in the Laws at the beginning of Chapter II. With the Laws we are again back on familiar ground. The pleasure calculus of the Laws, like that of the Protagoras, is something to be used primarily in convincing the ordinary decent person of the claims of morality. In the Laws, the hedonic calculus is definitely a pis aller: 'It is to men, not to gods, we are speaking'; and gods would be well content with the first section of the Great Preamble (716-732), which establishes on less profane grounds the nobility and comeliness of the temperate life.

The principles which the Athenian commends at 732e-734e are these:

We wish for pleasure; pain we neither choose nor wish for. A neutral state, though not desired as an alternative to pleasure, is desired as a relief from pain. Less of pain with more of pleasure is desired; less of pleasure with more of pain is not desired. As for an equal balance of both, we can give no certain reason for desiring it. And all these objects affect our several choices or leave them unaffected, in virtue of their frequency, their magnitude, their intensity, their equality, and the conditions which are the opposites of these in their influence on desire. All this, then, being inevitably ordered so, a life which contains numerous, extensive,
and intense feelings of both kinds is desired if there is an excess of pleasures, not desired if the excess is on the other side. Again, a life where both kinds of feeling are few, incon­ siderable, and of low intensity is not desired if the pains predominate, but is desired in the opposite case. As for a life in which the balance is even, we must stand to our earlier pronouncement; we desire it so far as it contains a predominance of what attracts us, and yet do not desire it so far as it is predominant in what repels. So we must regard our lives as confined within these limits and must consider what kind of life it is natural to desire. But if we ever speak of ourselves as desiring an object other than those aforesaid, the statement is due to ignorance and defective experience of actual lives. (733b-d, tr. A.E. Taylor)
b) Conclusion

There is a simple-minded approach to Plato's treatment of pleasure, and it runs something like this: People who believe that pleasure is the only thing which is really good and called 'hedonists'. Plato began his philosophical life as a hedonist, soon repented of his hedonist leanings, and thereafter lived decently. And there is a variant of this view, which is roughly this: Plato was never really a hedonist. Where (as in the Protagoras) he seems to flirt with hedonism, he is merely using the hedonist's weapons to refute the hedonist, or people like him: his ethical position is consistently anti-hedonist.

Both approaches are unilluminating. Admittedly, 'Pleasure is the good' and 'Pleasure is not the good' were remarks which, however gauche they seem to us, flew easily from the pens of the ancients, Plato and Aristotle included; and Plato makes some of his characters debate about which of the two opinions is right. Yet such expressions have the air of catchcries or slogans, of 'contending banners', to use a phrase of Mill's. Contending banners are not always the best guide to what is at stake.

What is mainly at stake, it seems to me, is the status of plain morality, and by 'plain morality' I mean the code of moral beliefs that was more or less common ground among articulate fifth- and fourth-century Greeks.
Plato's writings exhibit no uniform or thoroughly consistent approach to plain morality; at times he seems to praise, and at times to condemn it. At the same time, he probably thought hedonism a useful philosopher's weapon for advancing the claims of plain morality. His apparent waverings about hedonism are probably due to his willingness on some occasions, and his extreme reluctance on others, to plead the cause of plain morality.
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Note: In reference to the Pre-Socratics, lines are numbered according to the 5th edition of Diels; in reference to Plato and Aristotle, they are numbered according to the Oxford Classical Text series. Translations are listed under the translator's name, with a cross-reference under the author's.

An asterisk placed beside a translator's name indicates that I have generally quoted from his or her translation, though I have occasionally made amendments in the interest of clarity.

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Some commentators have found difficulty in accommodating this passage to the general line of argument from 34e3 to 35d4, which is that desire, since it consists in the soul's remembering past replenishment, must be non-bodily. Why should Plato, already having indicated at 34e9-12 that desire is felt only when organic depletion is going on, clutter up the argument with an apparently irrelevant digression about the first occasion of depletion?

One possibility is that the first occasion of depletion is a special case of desire, upon which the argument from 35a6 to 35c2 is based. (The references at 35b1 to ο ἐπιθυμόνων and at b6 to ο δυσών would thus be references to ο τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος.) The difficulty then arises that, while Socrates and Protarchus are agreed at a6-10 that no one undergoing depletion for the first time can 'have hold of' replenishment by means of either sensation or memory, Socrates inconsistently asserts at b11-cl: ὑπὸ τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτομαι λοιπῶν, τῇ (sc. τῆς πληρώσεως) μνήμη δὴ λοιπόν ὅτι, Attempts have been made to explain away this inconsistency. Should we not read 'τῆς φύσεως' or 'τῆς ἀρμονίας' instead of 'τῆς πληρώσεως' as the genitive implied on 'τῇ μνήμῃ' at cl? Not, surely, without convicting Plato of 'an incredible negligence of expression', and disregarding the fact that 'there is no allusion in this context' to original organic equilibrium. A second

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1 Notably Apelt in his commentary on the Philebus (note 53), the editors of A.E. Taylor's translation of the Philebus (Nelson, 1956, pp. 261-262), and Professor Hackforth in Plato's Examination of Pleasure (pp. 66-67).
2 Canvassed by Apelt and by the editors of Taylor's translation.
3 Apelt's 'ursprünglicher Gleichgewichtszustand' (loc. cit.) (and cf. Philebus, 31d4-6).
4 Hackforth, loc. cit.
5 Editors' note to Taylor's translation, loc. cit.
explanation\textsuperscript{6} has it that there is, in ‘πλήρωσις’, an equivocation, the argument presupposing that the meanings ‘replenishment’ (the process) and ‘repletion’ (the state) ‘are not linguistically distinguished’, so that, while the meaning required at a7 is ‘replenishment’, that required at b11-c1 is ‘repletion’. This, too, is implausible, since the dominant meaning of the word is ‘replenishment’ (LSJ), and since ‘κενούμενος’ (34e11, 35b9), ‘κενούμενος’ (a3, a4, a6) and ‘πληροῦσθαι’ (a4) are continuous present tenses, which makes it improbable that ‘κένωσις’ and ‘πλήρωσις’ are being used otherwise than as names of processes.\textsuperscript{7}

Another possibility is that only a6-10 has to do with the first occasion of depletion, while the rest of the argument is about desire in general. (Thus ‘ὅ ἐπιθύμων’ (b1) and ‘τοῖς διψώντος’ (b6) would have the same reference as ‘ὅ κενούμενος ἡμῶν’ (a3), but a different reference from ‘ὅ το πρῶτον κενούμενος’ (a6).) If this approach is right, Plato can hardly be allowing the possibility of desire at the first depletion, because, if he were, a6-10 would merely state an unexplained, and therefore unilluminating exception to the general principle (established at b1-c1) that, whenever desire is felt, the soul ‘has hold of’ replenishment through memory.\textsuperscript{6} Rather, he must be assuming that desire

\textsuperscript{6} Offered by Taylor’s editors, loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{7} Nothing turns upon ‘πληρώσεως πώματος’ (35a1), as Taylor’s editors seem to think, since both verbs and nouns of filling regularly indicate the material with which the filling is done by partitive genitives. ‘Πλήρωσις πώματος’ can thus mean either ‘replenishment with drink’ (process) or, less commonly, ‘repletion with drink’ (state), depending upon the context. (The instrumental ‘πλήρωσις διὰ πώμα’ is an alternative to ‘πλήρωσις πώματος’ in both senses.)

\textsuperscript{8} b1-c1 is most naturally taken thus: (i) Anyone who feels desire desires not depletion, which he is undergoing, but [the contrary process of] replenishment (b1-5, with which cf. 34e13-35a5); (ii) Thus some part of the [person feeling desire] ‘has hold of’ replenishment (b6-8); (iii) This cannot be the body, because the body is undergoing depletion (b9-10); (iv) Therefore it must be the soul (b11), and (v) The soul must, obviously, ‘have hold of’ replenishment through memory (c1).

Hackforth (loc. cit.) accuses A.E. Taylor (Plato, p. 419) of taking ‘κενούμενος γὰρ ποι’ (b9) to mean ‘that the reason why it is impossible for the body ἐφάπτεσθαι πληρώσεως is that the same thing cannot ἐφάπτεσθαι two opposites simultaneously’. The accusation is unwarranted, since Taylor says nothing of the sort in his paraphrase. Hackforth, however, seems to me to be half right, inasmuch as Plato would probably not have wanted to imply that, in general, the same thing cannot ἐφάπτεσθαι two opposites simultaneously. Why should it not? ‘Ἐφάπτεσθαι’ has to do, not with doing and undergoing (and cf. note 12, infra), but with people’s ‘grasp’ on objects of cognition; and why, for instance, should one be unable κενούμενος καὶ πληρώσεως τῇ μνήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι διὰ (as where one simul-
cannot occur at the first depletion, and giving, at a6-10, a reason why it cannot, i.e. the inability of anyone undergoing depletion for the first time to 'have hold of' replenishment by means of either sensation or memory. But this inability is a reason for the non-occurrence of desire at the first depletion only if, when desire is felt, the person feeling it necessarily 'has hold of' replenishment by means of either sensation or memory. Now, it seems arguable that, at a6-10, Plato is writing compendiously: he wants to draw the reader's attention both to the impossibility of desire at the first depletion, and to the necessity of 'having hold of' replenishment by means of either sensation or memory on occasions when desire is felt; and he achieves this by stating the connexion between the two. Admittedly, if this account of a6-10 is to carry any weight, it must be possible to assign a place in the argument to each of the propositions thought to be compendiously asserted. Fortunately it is not difficult to do so.

Let us take first the assumption that no one undergoing depletion for the first time can feel desire. It seems to me that, had a6-10 been omitted, the reader might not unreasonably have inferred from 34e9-35a5 that desire was supposed always to attend on bodily depletion (or, at least, on bodily depletion of sufficient magnitude to be perceived). But, this inference drawn, the reader might well demur at 35c6-7 (ΣΩ. Σύμμετον ἐπίθυμεν ὃς φέρειν ἡμῶν οὕτως ὁ λόγος γιγανέσθαι): granted the sufficiency of bodily depletion for the occurrence of desire, would it not be tendentious of Plato to insist that desire was non-taneously remembers both the thirst and the quenching of it)? The point of 'κενοῦσιν γὰρ ποῖ' is that the same thing cannot πάσχειν two opposites simultaneously: for the body can 'grasp' (or, rather, co-operate with the soul in 'grasping') only one kind of objects of cognition (viz. sensibles), in only one way (viz. by sensation); so that, in the special case of sensation, to say that τὸ σῶμα [αἰσθήσει] κενόμενος ἑρέπτειν is to imply that the body is undergoing depletion.

Both Grote (Plato, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 569) and Hackforth (loc. cit.) read this assumption into the argument, though neither seems to me to give a satisfactory account of it. Hackforth, though taking the assumption to be relevant to the point that desire is non-bodily (c6-7), gets into unnecessary difficulties over b1-11, which he implausibly takes as a proof that desire does not occur at the first depletion. (For one thing, this sort of reading of b1-11 would require him to take τοῦ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενον instead of τοῦ διψώμενος as the genitive implied in 'τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα' (b9).) He thus fails to see that, while the assumption can plausibly be assigned the negative role of indicating that bodily depletion is not sufficient for the occurrence of desire, b1-c1 must be given the positive role of showing (a) that desire is a mental function, and (b) what sort of mental function it is.
bodily? As it is, the argument seems to indicate that, since desire never occurs at the first depletion, depletion is not invariably accompanied by desire, and so cannot be of the essence of desire. Now let us turn to the major premise that anyone feeling desire must 'have hold of' replenishment by means of either sensation or memory. I believe that 35c1 (τῇ μνήμῃ δὴλον ὅτι τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἐν ἔτ' ἀλλω ἐφάσκετο;) becomes perspicuous only when this is taken into account. Why should it be obvious that the soul 'has hold of' replenishment by means of memory? Surely only because 'all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory', and because sensation is ruled out by the body’s inability to undergo, and the soul’s consequent inability to sense, the contrary processes of depletion and replenishment simultaneously.

We can therefore conclude, at least provisionally, that the plight of ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενοῦμενος is the subject of discussion only at 46-10, which does double duty by indicating both that depletion does not invariably give rise to desire (since ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενοῦμενος οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ), and that sensation and memory are, prima facie, the only possible means by which anyone feeling desire can 'have hold of' replenishment.

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Surely a truism for Plato, since replenishment, being a sensible process (an ἀλεθὴν κάνησα), could be 'got hold of' only by means of sensation or memory. (The minor premise is, of course, given by the rhetorical question at 46-7.)

Cf. Badham, Plato's Philoebus, 2nd ed. (1878), p. 3.

Cf. Republic, 436b8-9: Δῇλον δὲ ταῦτα τάναντα ποιεῖν ἢ πάξχειν κατὰ ταῦτα γε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα οὐκ ἐθελήσαι δὲμ. The soul (in association with the body) can sense only what the body is undergoing (and cf. the account of sensation at 33d-34a); thus, for the soul to be sensing two contrary processes simultaneously, the body would have to be undergoing two contrary processes simultaneously.

'Ἐφάσκετον' raises problems which I cannot, for want of space, discuss here, except to say that it is safest to translate literally (and cf. Dies' note on p. 39 of the Budé ed.). Certainly Hackforth's 'possess the notion of' is inadequate.