USE OF THESES

This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author.
MEANING AND NECESSITY:

A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF C.I. LEWIS

by

Graham W. Kerrison

This thesis was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Australian National University

September, 1969
With the exception of the acknowledgements made within the text, this thesis is my own work.

Graham W. Kerrison
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

I  SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES  1
   §1  Introductory Remarks  2
   §2  Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)  3
   §3  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)  21
   §4  John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)  31

II  THE LOGICAL BEGINNINGS  41
   §5  Introductory Remarks  42
   §6  Implication in Principia Mathematica  44
   §7  The Paradoxes of Material Implication  52
   §8  The System of Strict Implication  61
   §9  Alternative Logics and the Foundation of Necessary Truth  77
III

THE A PRIORI IN "MIND AND
THE WORLD ORDER"

§10 Introductory Remarks 91

§11 The Doctrine of "The Given" 94

§12 The Incommunicability of the
Content of Experience 114

§13 The Legislative Character
of the A Priori 127

IV

THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 152

§14 Introductory Remarks 153

§15 The Modes of Meaning 155

§16 Some Further Terminological
Distinctions 176

§17 Linguistic Meaning -
Sense Meaning 193

§18 Analytic Meaning 206

§19 Propositions: A Kind of
Term 216

§20 Analytic Truth 234

§21 Definitions and the
Principles of Logic 252
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§22</td>
<td>Introductory Remarks</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§23</td>
<td>Lewis and Conventionalism</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§24</td>
<td>Some Objections by K.S. Donnellan</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§25</td>
<td>Quine, Lewis and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§26</td>
<td>Pap, Lewis and Synonymy</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§27</td>
<td>The Analytic and the A Priori</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY A</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BIBLIOGRAPHY B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Australian National University whose financial assistance in the form of a research scholarship made this work possible.

The following persons kindly provided me with manuscripts of their contributions to the long-awaited volume on C.I. Lewis edited by P.A. Schilpp: Professors E.M. Adams, R. Firth, W.H. Hay, A. Moore and B. Peach. Because of the circumstances surrounding this book I have decided not to comment directly on these papers. Professor Adams' bibliography was particularly useful to the extent that my Bibliography A bears a very close resemblance.

I am also indebted to Professor J.D. Gceeen of Stanford University where the Lewis Papers are now collected. I benefited from his knowledge of the papers. He also provided me with copies of the two unpublished papers listed in the bibliography.

My chief debt is to the members of the Philosophy Department in the Research School of Social Sciences. Professor J.A. Passmore and
Dr C.D. Rollins were particularly helpful in the early stages of defining the topic. Dr P.J. Sheehan read the entire manuscript through all its various drafts; every section of the thesis has been improved by his comments. Finally, I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr E.M. Curley. Without his constant stimulation, his criticism and his personal encouragement this thesis would have been much the poorer.
INTRODUCTION
To many students of philosophy, especially within the predominantly British tradition as we know it in Australia, Clarence Irving Lewis remains something of a mystery. His writings are conspicuously absent from the prescribed reading lists in Australian universities. Despite this remoteness, however, his name has always carried with it a respect which is customarily reserved for those who have been significantly influential in their own domain.

It was this seeming paradox between Lewis's stature and his remoteness that first attracted me - as much out of curiosity as anything else. This curiosity was further aroused by the obvious contrast between Australia and North America where interest in Lewis's work is so much greater. There was yet another factor which caught my interest. It was obvious that Lewis ranked among the more important philosophers of this century. There were signs of his influence in so many areas of philosophical discussion. Yet it puzzled me that in this age of prolific publications there was not a single volume devoted to the study of Lewis's work.
These were the factors which first prompted me to think in terms of searching for some well-defined area in Lewis's work which would lend itself to a study of this kind. On reading Lewis it became clear to me that these accidents of history which had first attracted me were, in a sense, by-products of the very nature of Lewis's philosophical work. One historical commentator has expressed this very succinctly:

C.I. Lewis was one of the most indomitable, intransigent, and gifted philosophers of our time, surely a pragmatist, perhaps the greatest, but one never really in the pocket of any school or technique. His life was given to our discipline, and his endowments and energies produced substantial contributions in several fields, notably logic, epistemology, and axiology. His work was placed squarely where he wanted it, regardless of the compelling millieu of our day, and I think we might say that he was one of those rare philosophers among us whose contemporaries included such men as Hume and Kant.¹

It is, I believe, this last fact which sets Lewis apart. He may well have been the last of the system-builders; in this regard he is certainly not a typical twentieth century philosopher. Lewis retained a kind of Kantian architectonic: ethics could not be viewed apart from epistemology; and epistemology could not be isolated from logic. For Lewis, the philosophical enterprise was a single whole.

An immediate consequence of this is that it is difficult to read any isolated portions of Lewis; the fragments presuppose a considerable understanding of the system as a whole. By this I mean that there are some fundamental philosophical issues which form the foundation for much of Lewis's thinking. These issues are reflected in a tightly knit vocabulary whose full significance is only available to those who are intimately familiar with his system. Consequently the effort involved in coming to grips with Lewis is qualitatively different from that which is typically required in the contemporary environment. These are the factors which have, in part, inhibited the discussion of Lewis's philosophy.
This dissertation presents a discussion of a cluster of philosophical doctrines which lie at the very heart of Lewis's philosophy. Throughout Lewis's philosophical career two questions presented themselves repeatedly: why do we regard some statements as necessarily true, and how do we determine what some term or statement means? In discussing Lewis's answer to these questions my purpose has been twofold. They are important philosophical questions. Consequently I have made some effort to place the discussion in a wider philosophical context. This is particularly the case in Chapters I, II and V. My major purpose, however, has been to penetrate to the roots of Lewis's philosophy. These roots, I believe, lie in his theory of meaning and in the doctrines that surround his views on the a priori and the analytic. To this extent this dissertation is only an introduction to Lewis. It does not extend to a general discussion of his epistemology though he has much of interest to say about empirical knowledge as well as a priori knowledge; nor does it extend to a discussion of his views on valuation although he sees direct links between all of these topics.
Lewis makes it quite clear that he regards the analysis of the a priori and the analytic as a prerequisite for any other philosophical endeavour. In the case of Lewis's own philosophical writings it is certainly true that these doctrines are fundamental, and if this study contributes to the understanding of Lewis my purpose will have been achieved.