USE OF THESES

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"Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts......We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received."

Aristotle.
This thesis is my own original work, except as indicated in the footnotes.

B.S. Jardine.
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I. INTENTION & PRACTICAL REASONING

What is he doing? In any given case there are many possible answers to this question. There are many possible descriptions of any action and none is "the" simple or obvious answer.

Did he do it intentionally? The answer to this question will depend on which description is substituted for x. Someone may intentionally do something which is something else, and yet not do that other thing intentionally (though it is something he does).

External indications may help us answer the question in practice but do not explain why the answer should be what it is. There must be something which can tell us not only whether an action is intentional, but also under what description it is so.

Knowing what one is doing: Knowledge seems likely to be involved in what performs this role.

Practical Reasoning: Practical reasoning is not a special argument form but a particular use of reasoning - to make the world conform to a "picture" rather than the reverse.

Practical Reasoning and Intention: Action done as a result of practical reasoning is intentional, practical reasoning meets the requirement formulated above. Objections to saying all intentional actions are done as a result of practical reasoning are based on two narrow a viewpoint of reasoning or an oversimplified view of certain types of action.

Limitations of this account: This account does not attempt to solve problems concerning responsibility or "freewill".
II. **REASON & PASSION**

The Intentionality of Reason: Some reasonings are intentional in the usual sense. From other points of view reasonings are not intentional, but not for the same reason as accidental or reflex actions.

Motives: A "dispositional" account is not really about motives but character traits and is quite inconsistent with the role for which motive words are used.

Emotion: Feelings (disturbances) may be the cause or the occasion of people doing things. In the former case these are not intentional actions, in the latter the feelings have no special role. Disturbances are part of what we refer to by emotion terms but an essential element is a certain construction of the situation in which the person finds himself.

Reason and Passion: Hume provides several arguments against his views on this subject, the basic weakness being a too limited view of passion. Many of his criticisms of the rationalist accounts of action are wellfounded - their view of reason was narrow and unrealistic.

III **WANTING, CONCLUDING & WILLING**

Any theory of intention must account for the failure to carry out intentions.

The Will: Common expressions such as "weak-willed" are not evidence for this doctrine. It is unnecessary unless we fail to account for unfulfilled intention. (In a loose sense it might be usable in ethical discussions).

The Elements of Practical Reasoning: There are three elements - wanting, beliefs about means and conclusion. This last may be an action or an expression of intention (decision).

Wanting: Strictly speaking one wants some proposition
to be true, rather than wants some object. It is possible to want unattainable objects.

Rejecting Conclusions: In both theoretical and practical reasoning it is impossible to see how someone can reject the conclusion of their reasoning if it is considered in isolation. Once other factors are admitted it is easy. There are senses in which a person may have incompatible wants - it depends on how wide is the field of consideration referred to.

There are concrete and abstract uses of "want" the former is that in practical reasoning and in this someone cannot want incompatible things simultaneously.

When a person's viewpoint is widened or narrowed, e.g. by a conflict between his wants, what he wants or some other element in practical reasoning must change. In one sense this means that in each case of unfulfilled intention the person changes his mind, but in an important sense this is not true.

Akrasia: Aristotle's solution compared with that given here.

Conclusion: "The end of an action is relative to the occasion"; "it is particular acts that have to be done."
Introduction

In setting out to examine what it is to act intentionally I begin from the distinctions, classifications and relations made in common usage. While I believe that the ultimate test of the value of the account I put forward is the light it throws on those features of the world which concern us in ordinary discussion of human action the usages of such discussion cannot strictly dictate the limits of the account. Ordinary usage may be inconsistent or confused, failing to distinguish between different but similar things or using a variety of expressions for the same type of phenomena. There is a special difficulty in relation to several subjects which arise in the course of this enquiry - the once-technical usages of moral, political, philosophical, theological and juristic theories have often become embedded in the language by way of popular writings on these subjects, the pulpit and the courts.

We may find that some theory once grouped together a number of phenomena and gave a common explanation of them. After the theoretical context of the explanation has lost popularity or been forgotten the terms used in the explanation may survive as a convenient phrase under which to classify those phenomena.

Other problems of method arise in relation to the writings of some of the philosophers whose views I discuss. In the case of Miss Anscombe much of her writing is elliptical and suggestive and sometimes simply obscure. In the case of Aristotle the difficulties are numerous, not the least being that of translation. Obviously to present an accurate picture of his arguments it is necessary not only to have a linguistic ability but a grasp of his philosophy. Although my highschool
Greek scarcely qualifies me to speak on this matter. I cannot help feeling that most translators have tended to interpret Aristotle very much in the light of their own views. I know that I have done this too, because I began to see what I think are the points of several passages only after I had begun to formulate opinions on the subjects dealt with or related ones. I may well have misunderstood these authors, but I do not claim that the views I attribute to them are necessarily correct interpretations, but only that they are the points which their writings suggested to me and which seemed fruitful or interesting.
INTENTION & PRACTICAL REASONING

"What is he doing?"

In many cases it is a simple matter to answer the questions "What is he doing?" and "Is he doing it intentionally?". Were someone to ask these questions concerning my present actions the obvious answer to the first would be "writing a thesis". It would be most surprising if the questioner were then to ask "Is he writing it intentionally?" but if he did no one, except perhaps a philosopher in search of an example, would doubt that I was, there being no reason to suppose that I am asleep, drugged or hypnotised. The situations in which these questions might be asked are so frequently like this that we can be led to make one assumption and overlook another which can confuse the whole question of intention.

The assumption we may make is that although there may be practical difficulties in determining what someone is doing, or in describing it, there is really one complete and correct answer to the question "What is he doing?". (This would not exclude the possibility of partial but correct answers such as "writing about intentions".) If this assumption is made it will probably seem that the question "is he doing it intentionally" is a separate question in answering which we require some further facts beyond those necessary for answering "What is he doing?", for example, that the action was preceded by an "act of will", or performed in a certain way.

What we may overlook is that when the subject of
"is doing", or indeed of any verb in the active voice, is a person, the action described by the verb is normally assumed to be intentional. The normal exceptions are verbs indicating an accident or a performance which is usually involuntary - "falling", "tripping" or "sneezing". When we ask "what is he doing?" we normally expect the answer to describe some intentional action.

It is frequently the case, therefore, that there is only one correct answer to "what is he doing?", the answer which describes what the person is intentionally doing (though sometimes, of course, someone may be intentionally doing several things). This would be the only correct answer in the sense that it alone gives the information sought, although there would be other true answers if "is doing" were understood in the sense in which it can stand for any verb, regardless of whether it describes an intentional action or not.

If "what is he doing?" is understood in the intentional sense there is no room for a further question "is it intentional?". If it is understood in its general sense there may be many correct answers and though one of these may describe an action which is intentional the others may not. Any account of what makes an action intentional must therefore explain why some of the things someone is doing are intentional, but others not. In Chapter 3 I will consider such alleged occurrences as "acts of will" more fully, but it should be clear from the start that it would be most unsatisfactory to maintain
that actions were intentional merely because they were preceded by "acts of will" or any similar phenomena. Such a view could only be plausible if it were assumed that people only did one thing at a time.

The point might not be so important if the several things which someone may be doing at once were actions such as reading a book, smoking a cigarette and travelling in a train. There may be a number of true but different descriptions, which do not differ merely in the words they use, nor in their completeness or accuracy, which are not synonymous, which from one point of view we might regard as descriptions of different actions but which yet refer to the same performance by a person. An example may illustrate this point.

A man is plying his trade in the market place, while being observed by a variety of people - a market inspector, a noise-control expert, a lawyer, a physiologist and an ordinary tourist. Each of these writing in his notebook descriptions of what the man is doing and in these notebooks we find a variety of descriptions - "He is contravening regulation 49(b)", "He is raising the noise level by x decibels", "He is making a contractual offer", "He is vibrating his vocal chords", "He is selling cabbages". All these are true and accurate descriptions, yet the man is not like the one man band who plays the trumpet with his mouth, drums with his feet, triangle with one hand and cymbals with another. Raising
the noise level, for example, is not merely something which the 

cabbage salesman just happens to be doing at the same time as he shouts the merits of his goods nor is contravening the regulation, as it might be if he was at the same time contravening the regulation against smoking in the markets.

There are at least two reasons why all these descriptions might be said to be descriptions of the same thing. Firstly for each description the event can be located by the same spatial and temporal references, even though we would normally give these with greater precision in some cases than others. (The vibration of vocal chords would normally be given a more precise spatial location than selling cabbages). They are not spatially differentiated in the same way as are the trumpet blowing and drumbeating of the one man band.

Secondly, given knowledge of the appropriate contexts, the various descriptions are generally interreferable. If we know the market regulations we can infer that he is contravening regulation 49(b) from the fact that he is selling cabbages outside the market gates at 2 p.m. If we know the regulations and the Law of Contract the lawyer's description can be inferred from the inspector's. If we have sufficient knowledge of physiology, physics, phonetics and the relevant language, and if the physiologist's description is detailed enough, we can even infer from it that the man is offering his cabbages for sale. In doing this we would not be inferring one description as that of a second event which would
be caused by another event. It is rather the case that the event under one description is constituted by the event under another description, for example, the contravention of the regulation is constituted by the selling of the cabbages. The variety of descriptions is due not to the variety of the man's activities, but to the varying points of view from which his behaviour is considered. For this reason each description may be complete and correct in its appropriate context.

It might seem that there would be one simple or natural answer to the question "what is he doing?" which would be neutral and assume no particular context.

But what answer is natural will depend on the circumstances in which the question is asked. The natural answer for the noise control expert when he is investigating the noise level at the markets is one in terms of how the man affects this. Similarly, the answers of the lawyer, physiologist and inspector are natural for men in their position. Perhaps the natural reply is that of the "man in the street" with no specialist interest in the question? There are three difficulties with this view. If two "men in the street" are both in an equally good position to observe what is going on in the marketplace and one asks the other "what is he doing?" it is not obvious what the natural answer would be. It is possible that the questioner has failed to observe some feature of the man's behaviour, or he might believe for some
reason that the appearances are deceptive, for example, because there is no one in the market place to buy cabbages, and that something else is going on with the apparent cabbage selling as a pretext. He suspects for example that the man is actually a cockatoo for a gambling school. Unless the man questioned knows why the question has been asked, what his questioner is especially interested in, no answer will be "obvious" or natural.

Secondly, even when the answer "selling cabbages" does seem obvious, because e.g., the questioner cannot see the seller, it still assumes a complicated context. It assumes not only a knowledge of the language but of the structure of economic and financial practices which make "selling" a meaningful activity.

Thirdly, one may ask why men in the street should have some special logical, philosophical or practical status for their remarks. If things are "really" as the man in the street describes them then the sun "really" revolves around the world, for the man in the street constantly speaks of it as so doing.

Another candidate for the essential or obvious description is one in purely physical terms. Such a description would, however, fail to describe the situation adequately from a number of important points of view. It would, e.g. ignore the use of language involved, ignore it at least as language, though it might describe a pattern of disturbances in the air. (With the necessary knowledge it would, as mentioned above, be possible to infer from such a description what words were spoken, but the fact
that extra knowledge is needed shows that the meaning of the two descriptions is not the same.) A physical description of the surroundings would also be no substitute for the description of them as a market place, which involves much more than a physical description, and does not even assume a very detailed one.

"Did he do it intentionally?"

The possibility of so many different descriptions gives rise to the difficulties referred to above. It is clear that the answer to the question "Is he doing that intentionally?" will depend on which description we substitute for "that". The cabbage seller, for example, may have intentionally sold cabbages, but he may not have broken regulation 49(b). He may, on the contrary, have been anxious to avoid trouble with the inspector. Nevertheless his selling cabbages did constitute the contravention of the regulations. This is, of course, a point of considerable importance in the law. Although it is frequently part of the definition of a crime that it is an intentional act, it is not required that the criminal should have intended to commit a crime, or to break the law. It would be no defence to say "I did not intend to commit a crime, I did not even know that what I did was a crime", since it is only necessary that the person intentionally did something which was in fact a crime, whether he knew it or not. Someone might, of course, intend "to commit a crime", because he wanted to provoke a test-case, or find out what it felt like to be in the dock.

This points to an important feature of the logic of intention. We can argue: He strangled his
grandmother, strangling one's grandmother is a serious crime, therefore he committed a serious crime. Suppose, however, we argue: he intentionally strangled his grandmother, strangling one's grandmother is a serious crime, therefore he intentionally committed a serious crime.

This conclusion may be most misleading. There is a sense in which it is correct and the judge might sensibly say, "he deliberately (or intentionally) committed this serious crime" but it is not the same sense as is found in the first premise. The criminal may have intended no more than to dispose of his grandmother, he is not necessarily like the Baronets of Ruddigore, who deliberately set out to commit crimes.

This situation may be described in two ways. We may say that intentionality is attributed to actions, and that two actions are not necessarily the same, even though their descriptions may be interreferable in the way I have discussed. There certainly is an important sense in which we might say, for example, that robbing a bank would be something different when committed by a bank robber or a Baronet of Ruddigore even though the difference resides only in the intention of the agent. Something considered as an action in this sense cannot be considered independently of the agent. To take this line of approach would amount to postulating a language-game concerning actions which proceeds according to certain special logical rules, even though it has connections with other language games.

The second possible treatment is to allow the equivalence of actions which are the same in the sense
discussed above, but to point out the special way in which "intentional" functions as a predicate, and "intend" as a verb; i.e. to distinguish between the grammar and "logical grammar" of this family of words.

An action can be the object of intention in two senses. In the first (direct) it is such an object only under a certain description or descriptions, namely, those which could truly have been substituted for x in a statement of the form "I intend x" or "I will x (am xing) intentionally". In the second (indirect) sense it is such an object under any description which is a description of the same action in the sense previously considered. "He intended x" - this use may be regarded as a conjunction of "He intended something (Ø) and that thing Ø was (is) x". Clearly if anything is a direct object of intention it is also an indirect object. It can validly be argued, therefore,

He intended (directly) to strangle his grandmother.
Therefore he intended (indirectly) to strangle his grandmother.
To strangle one's grandmother is to commit a serious crime.
Therefore he intended (indirectly) to commit a serious crime.

Ex hypothesi something which is an indirect object of an intention is not necessarily a direct object of that intention. It is therefore invalid to argue:
He intended (directly) to strangle his grandmother.
To strangle one's grandmother is to commit a serious crime.
Therefore he intended (directly) to commit a serious Crime.
The same distinction can be made in regard to "intentionally", "intentional" and other grammatical forms.

Clearly the direct sense is primary and of greater importance. It is also the sense which both first and third person usages have in common (I suppose it is possible for someone to say "I intentionally committed a serious crime" in the indirect sense, but there seems something slightly paradoxical in such a remark unless the context explains it). It is in this sense that it is clearly of the greatest importance what description we substitute for \( x \) in statements such as "He did \( x \) intentionally".

If we ask merely "Did he do that intentionally?" it may be possible to give an answer without bringing in a specific description. The agent's behaviour may display many characteristics typical of planned, intelligent behaviour. He may, for example, select various tools, discard and replace them by others and adopt new lines of approach and different methods contributing to one result. If he appears awake and alert there are reasonable grounds for saying he is acting intentionally. But what is he doing intentionally? Under what description may it be called intentional? The external characteristics may indeed give us many clues. We may reject the suggestion that all he is doing intentionally is testing his tools, because he undertakes more difficult performances than would be necessary for that purpose. Since these appear to be planned we may naturally assume there is some further intention in doing so. (We might, of course, be wrong, the
extra difficulties arising from absentmindedness and the appearance of deliberation merely from interest in the tool testing.)

This approach becomes more difficult, however, when the same methods could be being used to two ends, i.e. when the same means are necessary to two "actions" whose descriptions will apply to the same external act. If we wish to know whether he is intentionally locating a drain, or undermining the wall, or both we may be able to get some help from his reactions when these conclusions are reached — whether he shows surprise, satisfaction or dismay. But these are not necessarily reliable — even though he was intentionally undermining the wall he may not express satisfaction if a brick lands on his head as this end is achieved. Even though he was not seeking to uncover the drain he may express satisfaction when he does so — e.g. "What luck, that must be the drain that floods the basement."

Nor can we always expect any visible reaction.

Whether the agent continues working after something happens may also help, but will not necessarily do so. If he stops when the wall collapses but before the drain is uncovered it may be because he now has to think of some way of repairing the damage he has inadvertently caused. If he continues it may be because it has just occurred to him that by going on he may discover the drain.

In a case such as this it might be thought that the difficulties in determining what is done intentionally are merely practical ones arising
from the paucity of the evidence in some cases. When, however, the case is one of different descriptions of the same action such evidence may indeed tell us that something is being done intentionally, but under what description? (There may sometimes be some evidence - e.g. from the agent's subsequent reactions when he obtains further information about his action.) In general the nearer the situation approaches that which I have described as one of different descriptions of the same action, the less hope there is of such evidence being useful.

When we come to a theoretical account of intention this kind of difficulty, in a generalised form, can be seen to be a considerable obstacle to various types of theory. It arises, for example, if it is claimed that intentional actions are those in the performance of which certain features are present. Even if it is true that such features are found in many intentional actions, or even all, and that their presence frequently or always is a good ground for saying that the performance is intentional, it does not follow that their presence is what makes the action intentional. Such indications are blind, they in themselves do not point to one description rather than another (though at times circumstances may enable us in practice to dispense with further information). That such things cannot be what makes an action intentional is suggested by the very role they play in consideration of actions. We may look to them for relevant evidence, but in enquiring whether an action is intentional we are not merely asking after the manner in which it is performed.
Another, perhaps a more important, type of theory of intention, is faced with the difficulty we are considering — that in which it is claimed that intentional actions are those which are the product of some inner faculty or mechanism, such as the will. There is a sense which I will consider later in which I think one can meaningfully use the notion of the will, but it is not the sense in which the will is conceived of as the cause of actions. If there were such a cause, and it was what made actions intentional, then they would be equally intentional under every true description, for it would be equally their cause under each such description. This point may be obscured by expressions such as "a drive to make money" which suggest a mechanism which both causes actions and is "directed" to them under a certain description. It is this "direction" which is crucial, and (if the theory is to be satisfactory) this cannot be held to reside merely in the fact that the actions the mechanism produce in fact fall under that description. They would fall under many other descriptions as well, so that however useful such notions might be in giving an account of the causes of action they would not provide a satisfactory theory of intention. They fail to account for the actions being intentional under one description rather than another.

Whatever makes an action intentional must have some feature which is directly related to the description under which the action is intentional. Or, to put the same point in a different way, there must be something which can tell us not only whether an action is intentional, but also under what
description it is so.

**Knowing what one is doing**

There is one relationship which must exist between an agent and his intentional actions, indeed between him and those descriptions under which they are intentional, for a man cannot be said to have done intentionally something of which he was unaware at the time. The sentence "I didn't know what I was doing" is in fact used to deny that an action was done intentionally. Even when an intentional action is being performed the agent may be unaware either of some consequences of the action or of some descriptions of it. A man may be intentionally walking along a path, but may be unaware that he is treading on ants and the like as he walks along, and if so he cannot be said to be doing so intentionally. The cabbage seller may be unaware that he is contravening the regulations, and if so is not contravening them intentionally.

If we are looking for some factor which will distinguish descriptions under which an action is intentional from those under which it is not, then one involving knowledge seems a promising candidate. Whether the distinctions between descriptions are regarded as "real" or merely "intellectual" (if such a distinction can be made) they are related to the intellectual activities concerned with describing, and their possibility arises from the existence of varying points of view from which an action may be considered. The agent's knowledge of his actions under different descriptions clearly may vary, and so does their intentionality. Knowing what one is doing is clearly connected with intentionality.
We may therefore tentatively conclude that for an action to be intentional under a certain description it is necessary that the agent is aware of it under that description at the time he does it. This is not a sufficient condition. Firstly, someone may be aware of something which he "does" as a result of accident or misadventure, and without any intention on his part, for example, sliding down a slope, falling off a log or jerking his knee in the patella reflex.

Then there are causes where the agent knows his intentional action under various descriptions, not all of which seem to be descriptions under which it is intentional. If, for example, I were reading these remarks aloud I would be aware (because I have been thinking about such questions) that I was raising the noise level of the room, affecting its acoustic properties, vibrating my vocal chords etc. It would however be strange to say that I was therefore doing these things intentionally. If someone complained that I was making an already noisy world noisier, I could reasonably reply "I don't intend to, but I can't help it if I'm to read this out."

The situation is, I admit, more complicated than this, and I do not wish to deny that actions may be intentional under such descriptions, but only that their being known by the agent is by itself a sufficient ground for attributing intentionality to them.

**Practical Reasoning**

I now wish to introduce the notion of practical reasoning. Firstly I would again point out that I
do not claim that I am correctly interpreting Aristotle or any other writer on the subject, though I will refer to their remarks to illustrate various points, and I do in fact believe that my views are very close to Aristotle's.

Anscombe says (1) that it was clear to Aristotle that "he had found a completely different form of reasoning from theoretical reasoning" and this, she thinks, is related to "something that modern philosophy has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge?" (2) Now although I will contrast theoretical and practical reasonings, I do not wish to suggest that they involve different logical rules or processes, but rather that they are similar processes directed to different ends. When we reason theoretically we are seeking to discover the truth about something. When we reason practically we are seeking to achieve some end. Both these operations may be thought of as endeavours to bring about agreement between the world and a picture of it

1. "Intention" p. 59
2. ibid. p. 57
which we have. (3) In each case a discrepancy between world and picture is a failure, but in theoretical reasoning it is the picture which needs altering for we begin from the world and aim to build up or correct a picture of it. In practical reasoning it is the picture with which we begin, endeavouring to make the world conform to it, if there is a discrepancy then the world needs altering. Anscombe gives a concrete example (4): a man going out with a shopping list followed by a detective recording his purchases. If there is a discrepancy between

3. **Note:** This image was suggested by Prof. K. Baier. I do not necessarily mean by "picture" any actual image in someone's head; (map, plan, schema or any such term would do as well. It is the role of such things in theoretical and practical activities with which I am concerned, not the psychological forms in which they may be manifested in particular cases.) Still less do I wish to imply that both world and picture are each made up of a number of elements between which there is, should or can be a one for one correspondence. By "picture" I do however, mean something complex, which is like knowledge in that it can be more or less "accurate", clear or comprehensive rather than like a proposition which is either true or false.

4. *op, cit.* p. 57
either list and the actual purchases then there is a failure (5) but if it is the shopper's list which disagrees then the purchases are wrong, if the detective's, then the list is at fault. In both cases, however, the same methods of reasoning may be used - induction, deduction etc. - even though the starting points are different.

The difference between practical and theoretical reasoning is not that between practical and theoretical activity in a broad sense. In his theoretical investigations the mathematician or physicist will reason practically about the methods he uses to solve problems. In his practical activity the carpenter will reason theoretically to discover and elucidate the facts relevant to the situation in which he works. Similarly the "picture" may be part of the "world"; its construction may be the object of practical endeavour, and it may itself be the subject of

5. Note: Anscombe unnecessarily confuses this point by speaking of "mistakes". If the shopping list includes some unattainable article the shopper may not be said to have made a mistake in not purchasing it, but there is still a failure to carry out the plan set out in the list. We might, as Anscombe suggests, speak then of "a mistake in (an error of judgment) in constructing the list" but this is because the list does not exhaust all the shopper's aims. The pursuit of the unattainable is wasteful of time and energy which might be devoted to other, attainable purposes, and so may be considered as a mistake, but then the construction of the list is being considered as part of the world, not the picture. A mistaken belief that an unattainable object is attainable is of course an error of theory.
theoretical investigation.

The distinction between world and picture in relation to the point of view of the particular people involved, and the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning is based not in logic or metaphysics but in different types of human activity.

I have said that in practical reasoning we seek to achieve some end. Perhaps the most common case is where it is desired to work out a course of action which will produce a desired state of affairs, where the means adopted are the cause of the end — but this is not the only case. The means may constitute, rather than cause the end. The man in the market place, for example, wishing to challenge the validity of the market regulations in the courts may conclude that he must break the regulations in order to be able to do so. Thus for him his means are a necessary condition of the realisation of his end. Having decided this he now thinks of a way of breaking the regulations, which is for the moment his immediate end. On consulting the regulations he discovers that selling cabbages after hours is a breach of the regulations and adopts this means to his immediate end. But "selling cabbages after hours" is not the cause of some further happening — "breaking the regulations" — it constitutes that happening, i.e. it is that happening under another description. In either case, of course, the performance of the course of action resolved upon can be said to result in the achievement of the end.

It is important to distinguish between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning which merely happens to be about practical matters. Practical
reasoning involves consideration of facts relevant to the situation, and any such facts may be the subject of theoretical investigation. For example the reasonings of an engineer about the structural properties of various materials may lead to conclusions which would be of use in practical reasoning concerning a particular project. Practical reasoning, however, is directed towards the achievement of a particular aim by a particular person in a particular situation. If a solution is suggested which in general will produce the desired situation but which is not available in the particular circumstances the advice is likely to be deprecated as impractical. Even if it is in fact available that is simply a fortunate circumstance independent of general reasoning. Without a determination of the appropriateness of the means to an actually desired end in a particular situation the reasoning cannot be practical. The exact character of practical reasoning will be brought out in further discussion.

**Practical reasoning and Intention**

When an action is done as a result of practical reasoning it is clearly intentional, for it is something which the agent has planned, deliberated upon and aimed at. Since he has been reasoning about it, it is something of which he must be aware(6). Moreover, the descriptions under which it is intentional will be those under which he has considered it in his practical reasoning.

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6. **Note:** It would, I suppose, be possible for someone to accidentally perform some action, e.g. in his sleep, which he had previously deliberated about, but then it would not be done as a result of the reasoning. This phrase needs further investigation, but it should be sufficiently clear to pass for the moment.
reasoning, these being descriptions under which he knows it and has sought and planned it. Language witnesses to the connection between deliberation and intention, "deliberate" and "deliberately" being, in most occasions of their use, virtually synonymous with "intentional" and "intentionally".

Can we say that all intentional actions are the result of practical reasoning? There seem two kinds of obvious objections to this view. The first is that there are many intentional actions which are not even preceded by any conscious calculation or deliberation.

A particular piece of reasoning may be considered both as an activity of the person reasoning and as a logical argument - a certain sequence of connected propositions. When a logician derives the "logical form" of an argument from an expression of it in more ordinary language he does not misrepresent it, rather he correctly depicts the relevant features of the argument abstracted from the particular words used on a given occasion. When someone gives an account of how he reasoned on some matter he too may present it in some schematic form and thus correctly describe his reasoning without attempting to describe all his mental processes which occurred at the time, nor to reproduce exactly any words he may have "said to himself". In many cases a report of some mental process or occurrence of the form "I said that y" does not imply that the person recited to himself the words which "y" represents or any words at all. "I saw that there was a book on the table" or "I thought the cup was further from the edge than it was" do not imply that I recited in my head "There is a book on the
table" or "the cup is six inches (a long way) from the edge". This may also be true when the mental process is something like inferring. Someone sees smoke, seizes a fire extinguisher and directs it at the base of the fire. When asked how he knew the fire was there he may reply, though the language is somewhat stilted, "I inferred its presence from the smoke". This claim may be correct even if he did not recite to himself, "Where there's smoke there's fire, there's smoke, so there's fire".

There may be people who never think or reason without "speaking to themselves" but it does not seem necessary or true that thinking and reasoning be always accompanied by mental verbalisation. What seems necessary is that any process of reasoning should be capable of verbal expression. If someone cannot give a verbal account of some alleged reasoning his claim to have reasoned may be puzzling (unless his inability is due to forgetfulness, injury or some such cause). "A strange, indescribable thought" is not in the same class as "a strange, indescribable feeling", for when someone thinks or reasons, he must in some way understand what he does, and if he is able to express himself in language then he can normally express his thoughts and reasonings. It does not follow from this, however, that thoughts and reasonings must be always expressed in words, though all references to them in discussion must of course use verbal expressions.

If we reject the view that statements of the form "I saw (judged, inferred) that x" are necessarily oratio obliqua in which "x" represents some verbal but mental utterance then we will not require for
the presence of reasoning that there take place some explicit or elaborate calculation. It will suffice that the appropriate mental processes take place, e.g. that the person sees the smoke and because of past experience with this phenomenon imagines the fire beneath.

I do not wish to deny the differences between such simple reasonings and more elaborate, verbal calculations. In the case of practical reasoning these differences correspond to the differences between actions which we would simply describe as voluntary and those we would refer to as deliberate or premeditated.

The second objection to the view that intentional actions are the result of practical reasoning is that some cases are too simple to allow of anything we may sensibly call reasoning - cases where there seems no room for anything but the desire of the end and the obtaining of that end, (e.g. a man picking up and drinking a glass of beer placed in front of him). I must admit that it is largely a desire for a comprehensive theory which leads me to try to assimilate these cases to those where practical reasoning is more obviously involved, but whatever the substantial and practically important differences between deliberate actions and these "spontaneous" ones, from a formal point of view it is not only plausible but correct to do so. There are of course some actions which may be regarded as voluntary in some sense where reasoning does not seem to play a part - jerking one's hand away from a flame, for example. The grounds for
regarding this as voluntary are that it is not compelled by any outside agency (6) and that one can choose not to do it, so that it differs from processes such as digestion or perspiration. On the other hand it is only under certain conditions that choice or desire have any application - even Mucius Scaevola would have jerked his hand from the altar fire if they had come in contact accidentally and unexpectedly. To the extent that such actions may be considered as voluntary because they may be deliberately prevented they require no special attention.

Apart from such cases there are indeed actions where calculation (verbal or otherwise) has little or no place, but there are nonetheless other features than the desire of the end and its obtaining. If the desire is for the possession of some object, for example, then it must be perceived or imagined, i.e. it must in some way be believed or hoped to be within the agent's reach. If such belief or hope is not present then obtaining his end could be only a happy accident, (obviously it is not necessary that he believe he will obtain it, only that it is possible to do so). Moreover there must be belief, or hope, that the action performed will be an effective way of obtaining the end - the action must be recognised as appropriate.

6. This appears to be Aristotle's usage. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Book III 1109b - 1110b.
Anscombe comments that "it has an absurd appearance when practical reasonings, and particularly when the particular units called practical syllogisms by modern commentators, are set out in full". This seems particularly true in relation to "simple" cases where an analysis in terms of complex reasonings will often seem artificial. There are, however, two reasons for this. Firstly, any formal analysis is artificial from some points of view. The formal, theoretical reasonings discussed by logicians are often thoroughly artificial if considered as accounts of what people actually think. But, as remarked above, the production of descriptions of that kind is not the aim of the logician, and, the philosopher's task not being the same as that of the novelist, it is not a relevant objection to point out this kind of artificiality.

A second reason for this apparent difficulty is what Anscombe refers to as "an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge"(8). This conception has also been attacked by Ryle (9) though mainly in order to make room for a different kind of knowledge - "knowing how". His criticism of the view that "the primary exercise of minds consists in finding the answers to questions"(10) can be extended to the view that

7. "Intention" § 42 p. 78
8. ibid. §§ 32 p. 57
9. "Concept of Mind" Chapter II.
10. ibid. p. 26
"knowing that" is primarily concerned with answering questions (unless both question and answers are understood in a wider sense than Ryle and his hypothetical opponents appear to understand them). Once "knowing how" is seen to be a species of knowledge the distinction between knowing how and knowing that can itself be seen to be an oversimplification. Consider a piece of knowledge such as "knowing the way to the station". This may be construed either as a case of "knowing how" (the person can successfully get to the station) or a case of "knowing that" (the person can accurately describe the route). If the person who "knows how" can also remember the way he follows and has the required verbal abilities he too can describe the route. On the other hand the person who "knows that" can get to the station if he can recognise the streets etc mentioned in his description. In either case the transfer requires certain motor abilities, e.g. to speak or write or to walk. "Knowing how" seems the more appropriate description for the kind of abilities which can be put into practice without a verbal rehearsal of the rules or criteria involved - for example those used in finding one's way or picking up a glass and drinking from it, or those of someone who has learned to play chess without hearing or reading the rules. (11)

But if, to take this last case as an example, a player really does know how to play then he does to a considerable extent know what the rules of chess provide. He may not be able to give the correct verbal formula in

11. ibid. p. 41
answer to a question such as "What are the rules for moving a bishop?" because he may not know that the technical name for the piece with a slot and a nobble on top is "bishop" or that the word for that kind of move is "diagonally". Even if he cannot use those words, however, it is reasonable to say that he does know that the bishop can move diagonally backwards or forwards to the extent of the board and in no other manner.

"Knowing how" and "knowing that" both involve an appreciation of some aspect of the world whether it is expressed in "practical" manipulations of the world or in descriptions of it. "Knowing that" can be regarded as a combination of this common appreciation and abilities related to expression. To this extent one can agree with the "champions of the intellectualist legend" in reassimilating "knowing how to knowing that by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules, or the application of criteria." It does not, however, follow "that the operation which is characterised as intelligent must be preceded by an intellectual acknowledgement of these rules or criteria" if that means that "the agent must first go through the internal process of avowing to himself certain propositions about what is to be done".

The "absurd appearance" of setting out practical reasonings is not because it wrongly attempts "to describe actual mental processes" but because

12. I do not mean to suggest that this could be some capacity existentially distinct from either "knowing how" or "knowing that".
13. ibid. p. 29
14. Anscombe op. cit. § 42 p. 79
"an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge" and perhaps even the fact that the setting out is verbal, suggests that each step in the reasoning corresponds to some "internal process of avowing".

So far I have been speaking of knowledge, but the same considerations can be applied to belief. While we do not speak of "believing how"(15) there are things which bear the same relationship to "knowing how" as "believing that" does to "knowing that" — half formed skills, for example.

Again I do not wish to deny the differences between the reasonings or knowledge involved in "simple" or "spontaneous" actions and those involved where there is calculation and the application of some elaborated theory or principle. Actions exhibit a whole range of differences from calculated, premeditated actions through to those we might describe as "merely voluntary". Reasonings and knowledge exhibit a similar range of differences. The actions and reasonings of animals also illustrate this. Intention, reasoning and knowledge are most readily ascribed to the higher animals who have more complex and developed perceptions, desires and activities and a greater variety of adjustments to their environments. In the case of plants and the simplest animals we do not ascribe knowledge or speak of their "behaviour" as if it were intentional.

If, on other, presumably epistemological grounds,

15. Many uses of "knowing that" and "knowing how" expressions are necessarily not parallel. "He knows that x" commits the speaker to the truth of x, but "he knows how to y" involves a testimony to the subject's competence, not a claim that the speaker also knows how to y.
a sharp division were made in knowledge and reasoning and these terms perhaps reserved for explicit or verbal procedures then a similar and corresponding division could be made in the case of actions. The important point then would be the similarities and parallels on either side of the divisions. If the connection between practical reasoning and intentional action is established in one range of case it seems neither reasonable nor consistent to reject an account on this basis by using a narrow definition of reasoning and a broad definition of intentional action.

It is true, however, that while "intentional" and "intentionally" have a wide range of application "intend" and "intention" have a narrower one, which corresponds more closely to the "contemplative" view of "knowledge" and "reasoning". "Did you intend to do it?" suggests the questioner is looking for some explicit or verbal process preceeding the action in a way which is not suggested by "Did you do it intentionally?"

Limitations of this account

The theory for which I am arguing obviously provides only a very partial account of intentional action etc. It immediately raises many further problems. Some of these I will discuss in other chapters, others, such as those general problems concerning reasoning and knowledge, lead the enquiry into fields such as general epistemology.

It is also limited in its scope. Perhaps the most interesting questions with which an enquiry
into intention is connected are those dealing with responsibility but while we normally treat people as responsible for their intentional actions intentionality is by no means a necessary condition of responsibility. This is clearly illustrated in legal notions of responsibility. The law will hold someone responsible for omitting to do something though the omission may not have been intentional. It is enough that the "reasonable" man would have done the act omitted. Moreover the law will hold someone responsible for something which was not only unintentional but which they fully intended not to do. If I shoot at A intending to murder him but kill B by mistake I will be held responsible for murdering B even if I did not intend to harm him and even if my intention in shooting at A was to prevent some harm to B.

On the other hand the scholastic "principle of double effect", in some forms at least, implies that someone may not intend a consequence of an action which they fully foresee and for which we would normally say the action was responsible - for example the death of an unborn child as a consequence of an operation on its mother.

The concepts of law and casuistry are technical ones but they affect and are affected by the related concepts of other kinds of discourse.

In moral and political judgments we do not necessarily tie responsibility to intention. Someone may be considered morally responsible for the consequences of some omission and politicians are often held responsible
honest mistakes.

Questions of responsibility usually arise in connection with reward and punishment, praise and blame, within some special context, and intentionality as interpreted within that context is only one of the relevant factors.

This also affects the relevance of this enquiry to "free will". Doctrines of free will may raise at least three different kinds of issues. They may propound an account of actions to which our present enquiry is relevant. They may raise considerations relevant to an examination of causality. They may be a crucial element in a moral theory. A doctrine of free will may be asserted against the kind of view which places responsibility for actions primarily on heredity or environment and thus tends to divorce responsibility from intentionality. Other considerations may be brought into such a dispute to strengthen or weaken either side but the advocate of "free will" could, for example, abandon any doctrine of a special faculty of volition or a special kind of causality and still maintain that certain kinds of actions could be meaningfully described as being done of someone's "own free will" and that people should be held responsible for them.

On the other hand, while theories of action and intention alone cannot solve such disputes, in many fields of discourse responsibility and intentionality are in fact connected at least to the extent that it would be odd to describe as intentional an action for which we would not say the agent was responsible.
"You did that intentionally!" (or "deliberately!") can be a protest and accusation rather than a classification or description of an action. "He picked up that glass intentionally" suggests that something wrong or suspicious is going on. A theory of intention which seeks to be morally neutral cannot do justice to such shades of meaning, though it may throw some light on the structure of moral concepts into which they lead.
II

REASON AND PASSION

Having just put forward practical reasoning as the source and determining factor of intentional actions I now wish to examine the claims which may be made for reason and passion in regard to action, particularly intentional action, considering both for the moment in a general sense apart from particular theories.

The Intentionality of Reason

It could be questioned from the start whether reasonings can be regarded as the basis for intentional action. They are themselves human activities and one can presumably ask whether they are intentional or not. If they were held to be intentional and it was also claimed that intentional actions were always preceded or produced by reasoning of some kind, then it would appear that intentional action was impossible. No one could act intentionally without having reasoned, and reasoning being regarded as intentional, no one could reason without having reasoned. On the other hand if someone could reason without having reasoned, and reasoning was regarded as intentional, it would not be the case that all intentional actions were preceded by reasoning.

The problems produced by denying the intentionality of reasoning are of a different kind. There is on the face of it nothing strange in saying either that intentional actions are produced by something which is not itself intentional, or that they are intentional by virtue of their relationship to some such factor.
On the contrary, since a requirement that such factors should be intentional would produce the kind of absurdity just referred to, it seems that they cannot be intentional, or at least that in tracing back an intentional action we must come to some such factor which is not intentional in every case. The difficulties arise when such a view is presented as part of a theory of responsibility, whether it is reasonings or some other type of action (such as acts of will) that we put forward as the source of intentional actions.

It arises if someone maintains that (a) people are responsible for their intentional actions (including omissions), (b) people are not responsible for things which are unintentional or over which they have no control, (c) the sources of intentional actions are not intentional. While these three points are not themselves incompatible they lead to a position which is unacceptable from the point of view of some otherwise plausible moral theories. Thus people are led to criticise the whole notion of responsibility or else that of intentional action. If all three views are maintained it follows that people are responsible for things which are in some way produced by other things for which they are not responsible. If heredity, society, God or indeterminable acts of will are the sources of intentional actions then, it may seem, they, not the agent, are the proper objects of praise, blame, and if necessary and possible, of corrective measures. They should be held responsible.

In itself this would not lead us to retract a theory of intention which involved point (c) but
it does suggest that intentional action has been given a place more central than can be supported both in informal discourse and in more formal theories in fields such as morality, law and etiquette. It might seem that the first thing for a philosopher to do in regard to intention would be to criticise the importance given in such fields to the distinction between intentional and unintentional events.

There are several courses which could be followed. One could relegate the problem to another enquiry and simply concentrate on an account of intention, or one could reject all or part of the notion of responsibility used. To some extent I would wish to follow both these courses but I also wish to do justice to the vague but common view that a person's intentional actions are in some way peculiarly his and so should not be founded in something "beyond his control", without falling into the absurd regress which may arise.

The first question to be answered is whether reasonings are intentional or not. In many cases we can say that reasonings are intentional, and are so for the reason given in the account so far presented. I can intend to work out a geometrical problem, or to analyse and criticise a philosophical argument. Practical reasoning too may be intentional. I can in one piece of practical reasoning conclude that I should deliberate about some other course of action, rather than, for example, trust to luck or take things as they come. I may argue that as I want to finish several tasks by tonight but am not likely to if my day follows its normal course etc. then I should
plan my day carefully. Similarly one can intentionally omit to reason about something—perhaps because they would prefer not to know the truth about something, or because they believe that things go better when they trust to instinct, or because they believe it is impious or disloyal to enquire into some subjects.

There are other cases, however, where reasonings do not seem intentional. Even after having intended not to reason about some matter a person may be unable to avoid "putting two and two together". Someone may suddenly see the deduction to be drawn from various facts which he has not previously thought of as connected. Moreover from some aspects all reasonings cannot be intentional. While we may intend to come to a conclusion about some matter we cannot intend to come to a particular conclusion. If someone says "I intend to come to the conclusion that x" then his subsequent performance in accordance with that intention cannot then be described as "coming to a conclusion". A judge or investigator who had decided before considering evidence or hearing argument what his verdict or report would be, might formally say "I come to the conclusion that x" but this would not be in the sense in which one comes to a conclusion as the result of an argument. Someone who had formed such an intention might proceed to work out arguments for x and in the course of intentionally doing this might work out a proof for x. If he did not already believe x but intended to say that or act as if he did, then he might be said to have really come to the conclusion that x in the course of his reasoning,
but then that would not have been his intention (16). Someone could say "If possible I intend to come to the conclusion that x". This might mean either (a) "I intend to maintain x unless it is disproved" or (b) "I will come to the conclusion that x if the argument leads me to do so", where the expression is really one of hope rather than intention.

In general these cases fall into two categories. In the first the person intends to maintain x whatever the evidence or argument shows - i.e. he does not really intend to come to a conclusion in the course of an argument. In the second the person already believes that x is true and can be proved, i.e. what he does intentionally is set out the arguments in some explicit way. Indeed from the very nature of reasoning it is impossible to intentionally come to a particular conclusion, for if we intend to reason we must intend to "follow the argument where it leads".

This can also be seen in the case of belief. If someone says "I intend to believe y" he must mean either that he intends to act as though he believes it, pretend that he believes y etc or that he does believe it (and perhaps will shut his ears to arguments to the contrary) or refuse to think about his own doubts). While human capacity for self deception seems

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16. If someone "comes to the conclusion that x" because he has intentionally rejected all propositions which might be incompatible with x then x is really his premise, not his conclusion.
almost unlimited and such self deception may be the result of intentional actions it cannot be intentional for if someone knows that he deceives himself then he is not deceived.

Someone may then intentionally come to a conclusion about something just as someone can intentionally form a belief about something, but although there must be a description of the form "concluding that x" or "believing that x" which is a correct description of such a conclusion or belief such a description cannot be one under which it is intentional. Either x is established in the process of forming the intention, in which case it cannot be its consequence, or else the intention cannot involve concluding or believing x, though it may involve doing something which happens to lead to that. (The apparent exceptions are cases where "coming to a conclusion" etc are used to describe some formal process such as handing down a verdict or setting out a syllogism).

Should we say then that reasonings under such descriptions, or reasonings of the "spontaneous" kind (e.g. where the person cannot help "putting two and two together") are unintentional? They are not involuntary in the sense of being compelled by some outside force, for although external forces may compel someone to say that he believes or has concluded something or may prevent him carrying out an enquiry or meeting with evidence which would alter his belief or conclusion they cannot compel beliefs or conclusions themselves. (This is not to deny that it may be because of, for example, social pressures that someone believes certain things, but
the operation must be indirect, e.g. by restricting
the evidence presented. Beliefs and the like cannot
be directly coerced in the way in which the bailiff
can eject someone from a house.)

Should such reasonings be regarded as something
rather like digestion - a process going on in the
person of which it makes little sense to ask "is
he doing it intentionally or not?" But there are
cases where we can reason intentionally. It seems
rather more like breathing. It would be strange
to ask of someone's normal breathing "is he doing
it intentionally?" but we can intentionally inhale
something, breathe deeply or hold our breath. In
these cases there is some particular description -
"inhaling", "breathing deeply" - which is the object
of intention. In respect of these descriptions we can
ask "did he do it intentionally?" but in the case
of simply breathing there is no room for the
contrast between intentional and unintentional action.
Except for very short periods one cannot give up
breathing in the way in which one can give up smoking
or driving cars, though one can intentionally bring
about a situation in which the breathing stops,
as does the digestion, by committing suicide.
In the case of reasoning too there are particular
descriptions to which questions of intentionality
seem appropriate - e.g. "solving a problem" - and
some where the description itself seems to imply that
the reasoning is intentional - e.g. "planning". In
other cases questions of intentionality seem
inappropriate, i.e. we cannot say that in these
someone reasoned intentionally or unintentionally
(accidentally). Someone may accidentally discover
the truth but he cannot accidentally derive a
syllogism's conclusion from its premises for if
he arrives by accident at the proposition he cannot
have derived it from the premises.

Does this mean that such reasonings are processes
over which the person has no control? When we talk
of whether a person can control a car, an election
or the rising of the tides it is clear enough what
would be exercising the control and how. A person
is a living thing and processes of various kinds
are necessary before we can speak of its existence.
There must be processes which constitute the person
and we cannot ask concerning these whether they are
controlled by the person. We do speak of people
controlling themselves and it is possible to speak
of controlling things we might otherwise think of as
part of the person, e.g. base passions. At most
such expressions suggest that some processes are more
central in the person than others, a view which can
be extended to the conclusion that these along
constitute the "true self". I would argue that such
expressions point to the different degrees and types
of relationships between the various personal
processes. Digesting, for example, has only limited
relationships with other processes, such as reasoning,
and we are more inclined to treat digesting as something
which happens rather than something which a person
does.

Whatever view one takes on this issue reasonings
seem clearly to belong among the processes which
constitute a person. Certainly a person cannot
reason without in some way knowing what he is doing.
It is not surprising that processes such as believing
and reasoning should occupy a central place in our
concept of person, both generally and in moral and
political theories. It is through these processes that we communicate with and seek to influence other people.

Working along these lines we can distinguish between (a) actions which are intentional by virtue of their relationship to such central processes, (b) actions or events which are involuntary, unintentional or accidental and do not have that relationship and (c) the processes themselves, which may or may not have that relationship to other processes of the same type. In this way we can say that someone's intentional actions are peculiarly his by virtue of their relationship to something which is peculiarly him and that reasonings are not "beyond his control" but rather "him controlling". This is not of course intended to be a refutation of criticisms of theories of responsibility but to show that the type of theory of intention for which I have been arguing is neither inconsistent with common notions of responsibility nor produces obvious dilemmas in moral theory when joined with them. On the contrary, as far as it concerns that subject it tends to support the place given to intentionality.

Motives

Reasonings are not the only processes which appear central in the composition of persons nor the only ones associated with intentional action. Their main rivals for consideration as the source and determining factor of action may be considered under the traditional title of "passions" but immediately the difficulty arises that this is a much looser notion than that of reasoning. We speak of passions, feelings and emotions without making very clear distinctions between them.
There is also the question of the relationship of these things to motives. While we do not speak of a motive in all or even most cases of intentional action when we do speak of an action as done from or with a motive it seems certain that they must be intentional. There are several considerations which might lead us to connect motives with passions. The very words "motive" and "emotion" are etymologically connected, though this may simply be a linguistic deposit of the usages of past theories. More importantly there is an extensive group of words which we apply both to motives and to passions. We speak of feelings, emotions and passions of anger, envy, jealousy and love and we speak of the motive of an action as being anger, envy, jealousy or love. If we ask Anscombe's question "Why?" it is quite possible that one of these terms will be used in the reply.

Ryle puts forward an account which sharply distinguishes between motives and feelings, and which also involves distinguishing motives from intentions (though he does not discuss this directly). Ryle's discussion is also of interest because his account of motives could be developed to provide an alternative solution to the questions or to what makes an action intentional under one description rather than another.

17. Even the law does not require evidence of motive to establish that an action was intentional, despite the importance of motive hunting in detective stories.
18. op. cit. p. 9-10
19. op. cit. Chapter I.
Ryle argues that (20) statements attributing motives should be construed in terms of "law-like general hypothetical propositions". He gives, as an example, an analysis of "he boasted from vanity" as "he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfied the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of securing the admiration and envy of others, do does whatever he thinks will produce this admiration and envy". 21. In this form the analysis is obviously wrong. The second part could be expressed as "(p.q). ([p.q] satisfies L)" where:

p = this was a chance of securing the admiration and envy of others
q = he did what he thought would produce this admiration and envy
L = whenever he finds a chance of securing the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will produce this admiration and envy.

If this is what the analysis means, and it appears to be required by what Ryle actually wrote, it is difficult to see what the latter part has to do with the attribution of motives. On the face of things, it is concerned with the logical relationships between two compound propositions, not about an action or motive at all. Although it could be truthfully asserted when discussing the action under consideration it cannot possibly be an analysis of "he boasted from vanity".

Suppose on the other hand that the second part of Ryle's analysis is interpreted as "L.p.q."

20. ibid. pp 88-93
21. ibid. p. 89
(with or without the superfluous assertion that \((p \land q)\) satisfies \(L\)), an interpretation suggested by the whole tenor of Ryle's remarks, if not his actual analysis. Then if \(L\) is false the whole compound proposition is false, and if it is a correct analysis then "he boasted from vanity" is false. If on some occasions the person makes moderate, truthful statements and on others he does "what he thinks will produce this admiration and envy" then \(L\) is false and we cannot truthfully assert that "he boasted from vanity".

But inconsistencies in behaviour are among the cases in which people are most interested in motives. If Jones having always behaved in a very courteous manner and having rarely displayed any animosity to his acquaintances or borne grudges, blackballs an applicant for membership of his club, then Jones' fellow members are quite likely to ask "What on earth could Jones' motive have been?". If they come to the conclusion that it was revenge for an insult it would be no objection to say "But he hasn't acted like that before" because some law-like proposition was false. Indeed on Ryle's analysis it would be self-contradictory to say that someone acted out of character in acting from a certain motive. If we said, "He boasted from vanity" although he is not usually a vain man" then in the first clause we would be asserting a law-like proposition which we denied in the second clause.

In short the consequence of accepting Ryle's analysis is that where a person's behaviour is not wholly consistent in respect of each possible motive no true propositions about his motives are possible, since no "law-like general hypothetical proposition" can be true.
There are two ways in which an attempt can be made to avoid this fatal flaw. Firstly, further conditions could be built into the protasis of the law-like proposition, giving propositions like "whenever someone insults his dog when Jones has indigestion, then Jones----". In addition to the tendency to reduce the theory to triviality, this more takes it further away from motives. Such propositions would deal with conditions much more particular than the general characterisations of motive words such as vanity, jealousy or revenge.

The second possibility would be to make the apodosis more general but this would lead away from motives in the other direction as we approached apodoses such as "then he does whatever he thinks is appropriate".

There are two further serious weaknesses in Ryle's general approach apart from these problems arising from the form in which he presents it. His analysis gives no way of distinguishing propositions about motives from any other law-like propositions. The plausibility of his account is much increased by his use in the sample analysis of terms which could be used in giving a reason for an action - e.g. "I did it to secure the admiration and envy of others". The general theory of his account, however, gives no reason for choosing these terms for the law-like proposition rather than ones about, for example, disturbing the air. The following would fit Ryle's account: "he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies the law-like proposition that whenever he finds the
chance of securing the admiration and envy of others, he disturbs the air in his immediate vicinity". This proposition might even be true if the subject consistently acted from vanity and did so by verbally boasting. Why then should it, or any other law-like proposition which can be applied to an action, be ineligible as an analysis of some proposition about motives? It is possible to show why some propositions should be preferred to others if they are to be plausibly fitted into a discussion concerning motives, but to do so we must refer to factors such as the causes or objects of actions. Any other distinction which left motive propositions simply as describing one type of feature of actions would leave them unfitted to play the role which they do in our discourse about actions.

Several of these criticisms can be brought together in considering the kind of explanation which Ryle attributes to propositions about motives, indeed to all propositions concerning dispositions (22). The example he gives is an explanation that the glass broke "because it was brittle". To describe the glass as brittle is, he claims, "to assert a general hypothetical proposition about the glass". If this is so then when Smith asks "Why did the glass shatter when the stone struck it" and Brown replies "Because it was brittle" the Brown's reply is really equivalent to "Because glass always does". This appears to say nothing more about the occurrence in questions, and still leaves

22. ibid. pp88-9
it open for Smith to ask "But why does it?". Such a reply is not, however, pointless. It indicates that there is nothing unusual or surprising about this particular event, no peculiar feature which must be looked for in explanation. It distinguishes this case from one where, for example, a block of granite was shattered and the required explanation would be something like "That block had a flaw exactly where the stone struck it". It denies the need for further explanation of this particular incident and shifts further enquiries to a different level - not why did this piece of glass shatter when struck? but why does glass shatter when struck? If this is what Smith wants to know then it is as absurd to offer the brittleness of glass as an answer as it would be to invoke the dormitive power of opium or to explain why it puts people to sleep or the nature of sharpness possessed by a razor blade to explain why it cuts. Smith's second question could after all be put as "But why is glass brittle?"

Now in explaining actions law-like propositions could be used to deny the existence of peculiar features in an event. For example "Why did he kick the dog?" might be answered by "Because he is bad-tempered", i.e. we do not need to assume some special feature such as the dog biting him or tripping him up. "It is",

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23. Geach "Mental Acts" p. 5
24. Propositions attributing "dispositional" properties might be construed not as law-like statements but as propositions about e.g. the molecular structure of glass or steel, or the chemical properties of opium. They could then function as direct explanations.
Ryle says \( ^{25} \) "to say 'he would do that'". In other words Ryle's view is, as the paths up which his analyses tend to lead might make us expect, that to say that someone has acted from a particular motive is to say that he has acted in character. In relation to explanations this view of statements about motives completely robs them of the particularity which is essential to their use.

What Ryle's account might fit are character traits. The analysis he gives of "he boasted from vanity" could more plausibly be construed as an analysis of "His boasting was the sort of thing a vain man would do" (if we take the given form of the analysis) or of "He is a vain man and on this occasion he acted in character" (if we take the law-like proposition to be actually asserted). In order to distinguish character traits from other regularities some reference in the \textit{apodosis} to what the agent intends would be needed. It would at least be necessary to refer to what the agent thinks the consequences of his actions would be but neither this nor an explicit reference to what he intends would go far enough. Someone might consistently seek the same things as the vain man does and yet not be vain nor be acting from vanity. He might be a politician who believes that admiration, envy etc will increase his votes, and thus be displaying a trait of power hunger. \( ^{26} \)

This point is even more clear when we consider

25. ibid. p. 93
26. The reverse is also possible. Someone might seek positions of power from vanity.
particular motives. Those which Anscombe calls "backward-looking motives" (27) - revenge, gratitude, remorse and pity - clearly involve reference to something prior to what is intended in the action so motivated. Motives such as love and friendship seem also to refer to something, perhaps more elusive, in addition to the intention. It is not, unfortunately, possible to absorb motives in intentions, nor in character traits if they are derived from intentions.

(This is not to deny that the consideration of a person's previous actions and regularities discerned therein is relevant in deciding what his motive is on a particular occasion. If Green is noted for his selfishness and avarice, and has previously acted only to advance his own interests and finances, then we may naturally be reluctant to agree that a particular action of his is motivated by altruistic generosity. Nevertheless it is possible for someone to act out of character or undergo a change of heart. If it is clear that the action involves Green in financial loss and brings him no compensatory advantage and that Green was aware of this then his previous conduct would not preclude us from saying "he acted from generosity".)

Emotion

Let us now consider the possibility of identifying motives and passions and generally the claims for passion as the initiator and origin of action. (28)

27. op. cit. § 13 p. 20
28. I should say from the start that I intend to "speak more sedately of desires, impulses or promptings" (Ryle, op. cit. p. 88) rather than of qualms, pangs, flutters, trobs and itches since I see no reason
As well as the coincidence of feeling and motive words there are many other factors which make feelings an attractive candidate for this role. Once admitted that feelings can cause actions in any case it seems difficult to deny them the domination of the field, for it seems difficult to explain how our strongest feeling could be thwarted, unless an even stronger feeling arose to displace it. So strongly has this been felt that new types of feelings have been postulated to explain difficult ones - e.g. the "cool passions" of eighteenth century philosophers - and even the staunchest protagonists of reason have sought to underpin their theories by introducing quasi-passions, such as Kant's respect for duty appears to be.

Many of the disputes between reason and morality, particularly in their heyday in the eighteenth century, have been carried on in a context of moral theory. Hume declares that his endeavour (29) is in order to show the fallacy of the philosophy which "gives the preference to reason, and asserts that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates". (30) This is not, of course, the position for which I am arguing since I claim that all intentional action, whether virtuous or vicious, "conform themselves" to the "dictates" of reason. Nor am I confining reasoning to the a priori.

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29, "to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III p125
30. ibid. p. 125
role in which Hume's antagonists conceived it - it is not theoretical reasoning of an analytic, geometrical type which I put forward as the origin of intentional action.

Feelings, even of the itch and pang type, do sometimes cause people to do things. Someone in a state of anxiety, for example, may experience sinking feelings, tremblings, twinges etc and these may cause him to drop his cup, stumble over his sentences and so on. Feelings may also provide the occasion for action, as when the twinges and pangs lead someone to say "I can't bear this waiting, I'm going for a walk" and do so. (There are intermediate cases too, for example when someone in a rage kicks the cat or the furniture.) The difference may be illustrated by the possible responses to ordinary itching. On the one hand someone with an itch may automatically scratch and may be surprised and embarrassed to discover that he is doing so; he may even scratch in his sleep. On the other hand someone with an itch may scratch intentionally to get rid of it. He may even deliberate about whether to do so - "if I start scratching the speaker may be distracted or offended, but if I don't I won't be able to concentrate on what he's saying....". In either case the itch plays the same role as some external event, e.g. a jab from a pin in the first case, a distracting and buzzing insect in the second. The important difference is that when the itch causes the scratching in the first manner the scratching is not intentional as it is when the itch is its occasion.

Feelings, emotions or passions are normally thought of as some kind of disturbance, physical.

31. Someone in a state of anxiety or anticipation
mental or both. When we speak of someone as being "in an emotional state" we mean that he is suffering such disturbances — throbs, twinges, chills and other phenomena of greater or less intensity — not that he is vain, full of pity or jealous, though he may be any of these. Such disturbances may cause or include changes in the person's appearances and movements, e.g. flushes, tics, trembling and tenseness, as well as producing automatic or reflex actions like those referred to above. Affecting as they do the central portion of the person's environment they considerably affect his actions and preparations for action.

These phenomena are at least part of what we refer to when we speak of feelings of hatred, jealousy, fear etc. Someone may be literally choked with rage, trembling with fear or sick with anxiety. The distinction between different feelings is not, however, a distinction between different types of disturbances. Whiteness of face and trembling hands may be good evidence for diagnosing fear rather than joy or gratitude but they may also be symptoms of hatred or jealousy. Such features might also be caused by some non-emotional factor such as disease or drugs. Moreover, an emotion may have different expressions in different people. (32)

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may suffer from trembling hands and butterflies in the stomach while his mind remains clear and even active.

32. The researches of psychologists have not, I gather, had great success in discovering patterns common to and characteristic of particular motives. (Munn, Psychology, The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment, pp 117-120, Morgan, Introduction to Psychology, pp 92-94).

It is significant that the psychologist begins with
Nor are such features as may be common to different cases of some particular emotion sufficient to account for the appropriateness of the responses we expect. The production of adrenalin, for example, is perhaps the most common and most important physical concomitant of emotion and produces various effects in a wide range of situations. It plays an important part in the carrying out of actions and the presence of it and its effects may be sufficient to be either the cause or the occasion of actions. The fact that these or other disturbances caused or occasioned an action would not, however, be sufficient to characterise the action as done from any particular emotion.

The inadequacy of treating emotions purely in terms of disturbances, if their connection with motives and intentional actions is to be sustained, becomes clearer when we recall one of the requirements for a theory of intention put forward in the first chapter— that there must be something which can tell us not only whether an action is intentional, but also under what description it is so. Disturbances, however, are blind, i.e. even if they did cause actions they would not provide the grounds for distinguishing one description. What is more they would not in themselves be sufficient grounds for characterising an action as done from jealousy, anger, gratitude etc. The distinctive feature of each emotion is a certain construction of the situation in which the person finds himself, and without the existence of the appropriate construction we cannot sensibly speak of a situation in which "he can predict that the stimuli used will produce an emotional response" and then seek for common reactions in different classes of such situations.
of the presence of the emotion. These constructions vary in several ways: gratitude, revenge and remorse refer to some past event, anxiety, fear, ambition and anticipation to some future event (they may well refer to other events as well, e.g. some present factor may give rise to fear of some future event or situation). Revenge, remorse, fear, anger and hatred involve seeing some event or person as bad or harmful; in gratitude, joy, and love it is seen as good or beneficial. Some emotions are relatively specific, jealousy, greed or avarice for example; others such as anger or fear have more diffuse application. These constructions are those which the person puts on the situation, whether they are correct or not. An observer may be able to tell from the situation, including the person's reactions and conduct, what that person's emotion is but without knowing the person's construction of the situation he may be mistaken. The person may be displaying considerable animosity towards someone talking to his fiancee but his emotion may not be jealousy - he may simply hate the man without considering him as a rival in love. While it may be possible to obtain further knowledge simply from the person's behaviour in other situations this will not always be the case as emotions may arise in response to one particular situation.

While it is sufficient for my purposes to establish that the person's construction of his situation is an essential part of emotion it is worth further examining the relation between construction and disturbance in emotion. There are good grounds for saying that the disturbance arises because the person sees the situation in a certain
way, but there is also some reason to regard his outlook as the result of the disturbance, or at least as the result of the emotion in some more general sense. It is notorious that people's judgments are affected by their emotions, and we may say things such as "He only thinks that because he's jealous".

There are two different types of situation to which this may refer. In the first the person's judgments are affected by an emotional state, for example a person already disturbed by jealousy may see all sorts of hidden meanings and significances in casual words and gestures. This may be so whether the person is jealous of someone in particular or simply has a chronic condition of jealousy towards other people in general. This sort of thing is not peculiar to emotions for it is a quite general phenomenon that people tend to construe situations in accordance with their established beliefs of whatever kind they may be. While it may be true that emotions are self-reinforcing in this way it does not show that the emotion precedes the judgment. It is because the person already has the emotion — e.g. is jealous — including a certain construction of the situation, that he goes on to construe new features in the situation in a certain way.

In the second type of case the person may be said to see the situation in a certain way "because he has a jealous nature" or disposition. To this may be applied what has already been said about explanations by dispositions. Such a remark is used both to say that the judgment is typical of those he makes about such things and to suggest

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that there is no particular feature in the situation which explains the judgment. It is an alternative to explanations such as "Because Shirley said yesterday that she preferred Fred's hair to his" or "because he's been in a jealous fit since Ethel admired Harry's tie". While we naturally suspect that there are some features of a person which account for his tendency, these cannot be the judgments or disturbances which it is a tendency to have. (In actual practice "he has a jealous nature" probably means simply "He's often jealous", "that's typical" being implied in the context.)

Moods can be regarded as emotions with very general application in which the person sees "the whole world as menacing, congenial or grey". (33)

Reason and Passion

Hume states that reason "can never oppose passion in the direction of the will", that "nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse" and that reason lacking this "it is impossible it can withstand any principle which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspense a moment". (34) Despite these sweeping claims Hume proceeds to give a number of cases where reason can oppose or retard the impulse of passion and indeed provides the framework for the rejection of those claims. "As nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it,

33. Ryle op. cit. p. 100
34. op. cit. Book II Part III Section III (pp 125-127)
The quotations following are all from this section.
and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference it must follow that passions can be contrary to reason only, so far as they are accompanied with some judgment or opinion."(35) He then gives two kinds of cases when passion is accompanied with some judgment or opinion: "First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose means insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects". The first case he later extends to include opinions about the properties of an object. "I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases".

The first example he gives of a passion which cannot be said to be contrary to reason in fact provides a third kind of case. Even if someone did have a most extraordinary regard for his finger it certainly seems contrary to reason for him "to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of (his) finger", for his finger is part of the world.

There are some moves that can be made in an attempt to weaken the force of these admissions. To take the last case first it might be argued that in such a case reason simply shows that it is impossible to choose a certain end. While it may show that it is impossible to achieve some end it does not follow that it is impossible for people to desire and pursue it. Logic has little effect on many people and it seems a weak weapon to use against the man with

35. ibid. pp. 127-128
his finger on the nuclear button. Yet it is true that showing such a contradiction may induce someone to abandon his goal. Reason can therefore influence, indeed extinguish, passion but that influence is not the same as proving a point though that may be the basis of the influence. Someone's view of what is logically possible may affect their view of what is practically possible but it is not the same thing.

In relation to the cases he cites Hume makes a similar attempt to argue that what reason affects is not the passion but some intellectual attachment of it - "even then it is not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment". Even if this was as far as it went reason would still have been conceded very great influence over the passions. Hume "gives the preference to reason" with a vengeance when he says that "the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means, our passions yield to our reason without any opposition".

This influence of reason cannot be confined to cases when the judgment is false. Any judgment will be subject to review by reason and the fact that reason does not pronounce against it does not mean it is irrelevant. It must also be granted a positive influence as well as an inhibiting one for it can produce judgments as to the existence of objects and the properties they possess and the possibility of obtaining them just as it can be used to refute such judgments. Indeed it would seem that without such judgments passion would be quite powerless. It might produce reflex or involuntary actions, though
even there depending on perceptions, subject to reason's criticism, but could have nothing to do with intentional actions.

This is not the view which I wish to maintain, for in the last section I have argued against the view which Hume expresses thus: "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high." Now emotions clearly do have reference to other objects or events, even if these be vague ones as in the case of ill-defined fears or anxieties. In fact it is essential to emotions that they are not merely accompanied by, but include judgments or opinions.

While it may not reflect the usage of our ordinary language it would be possible to treat the passions as complex judgments or constructions of situations of a certain type, so long as it was borne in mind that they usually give rise to disturbances of various kinds which could affect the person's behaviour and judgment. This approximates fairly closely to our notion of motive but "emotion" and passion do have wider application and commonly include the disturbances as well. This perhaps is the root of many of the difficulties for both aspects have an important role in action and their operations are connected. Before considering this it is as well to note three important points arising
Firstly, he is correct in saying that "we speak not strictly and philosophically, when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason". If the above account is accepted the views of the rationalist moralists must be rejected as based on a false distinction.

Secondly his challenge to the rationalists of his day is well founded for they had a strong tendency to treat reason as an independent, almost self-sufficient faculty. In the way in which they saw reason operating it appears insufficient not only as a source of action but as a source of truth, except perhaps in very limited fields. To treat the matter in full would involve excursions into such difficult and controversial matters as the status of analytic propositions but the weaknesses of the rationalist view can be illustrated in relation to the discovery of "synthetic" truths about the world, even in relation to syllogistic reasoning.

It is not the argument, in the sense of the logical order or form which establishes the truth of the conclusion, nor the premises alone — someone may know two propositions without seeing the conclusion to be drawn from them. Nor can it be regarded as the premises plus the logical form (or "inference licence") as if there were three elements in the reasoning, for this leads to the infinite regress pointed out by Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson). It is rather the premises ordered in a certain manner in relation to the conclusion — i.e., the whole reasoning as represented by the whole syllogism. This involves the assertion of
the premises,\(^{36}\) for if they are simply referred to, as by a lecturer illustrating a point of logic, the conclusion is not established, we merely have a syllogism which could establish it.

The same is true of practical reasoning. The mere performance of logical operations is obviously insufficient to be the source of action. Some positive assertion is necessary and this can be found, in part at least, in the judgments involved in the constructions of the situation which are an essential feature of the passions.

Thirdly, Hume's position attacks the over intellectualised view of human beings held by his opponents, or rather, to do them justice, the view that it was possible for human beings to suppress the passions and live by intellect alone. In addition to rejecting what are (though not on their view) parts of reasoning essential to action they tended to ignore the essential role of the disturbances of emotions in human action.

Human actions require a complex set of physical conditions for their accomplishment.\(^{37}\) Many if not all of the disturbances found in emotions or the causes

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36. This is also the case if the premises are hypothetical in form, "If p then q" being a proposition and capable of assertion or denial.

37. It has of course been claimed particularly in arguments for the immortality of the soul, that some actions are not physical and do not depend on physical operations, even "brain processes". If this view is accepted it seems plausible to describe some of the
of these disturbances play an important role in carrying out actions. Increased heart beat, rapid breathing, general bodily tenseness etc. all lead to greater bodily efficiency. They may have other effects. They may affect the "mental" processes, e.g. a person in a state of nervous alertness is likely to notice slight sounds or movements which in other circumstances he might overlook. Thus fear in moderation is a considerable asset for a soldier.

They may however be a hindrance, as when someone is paralysed with fear and unable to flee or incoherent with rage and unable to utter his insults. The situation is like pumping too much petrol into the carburettor of an internal combustion engine.

When a relevant course of action is impossible the tensions built up may cause the person to do things — walk up and down or kick the furniture — or he may intentionally do such things to relieve his discomfort.

They may also cause quite marked effects when action becomes impossible not because of some obstacle but because the end has been achieved. Among the common expressions we use for such joyous phenomena is "letting off steam" which precisely compares them to the release of the now unnecessary pressure when a steam-train completes its journey.

From many points of view, therefore, a conditions and disturbances discussed as mental or non-physical also.
mechanical view of the relationship between emotion and action has much to commend it if it is applied to the disturbance aspect.

The role of the other element - the person's construction of his situation - is a different one. It forms an essential part of practical reasoning, for it is the way in which the person construes his situation. It highlights certain features - the wrong suffered or expected, the benefit received or sought. From this point of view it provides the motive of the action, asserting certain crucial relationships. We do not always speak of motives because there are not always relationships of such peculiar and central importance as to deserve such mention.

This also shows one difference between motives and intentions. Motives and emotions refer to general and central features which may not always be present in cases of intentional action.

Most of the terms we use for motives or emotions are unlikely to enter into a person's calculations nor do they describe what he aims to do or achieve. (38) Intending to be jealous is not the same as intentionally doing something from jealousy. (There are exceptions - e.g. when "revenge" is used to describe some action as in "getting his revenge".) Motive and emotion words are rather used to characterise the person's construction of the situation, parts of the practical reasoning which issued in the action. They are, speaking loosely, characterisations of sets of premises rather than of conclusions.

38. Ryle op. cit. p. 100
WANTING, CONCLUDING AND WILLING

A problem any theory of intention must face is that of unfulfilled intentions. Some cases do not present any difficulty — those where the intention is not carried out because some external obstacle arises to prevent it, or where the agent fails though lack of skill or knowledge. Nor is there any difficulty when the agent changes his mind before the time comes for the intention to be carried out; for example he intends to catch the 9.30 train but before the time arises for setting out for the station he is offered a lift in a car and so changes his mind.

The real problem arises from cases where there is no apparent reason for the failure to carry out the intention, but it is not carried out — the problem of "weakness of will". For some theories this is not a great difficulty. If the carrying out of intentions is attributed to an executive faculty of the will it may seem plausible to attribute its successes and failures to waning or waning strength, much as we might explain the successes for failures of a weightlifter. For the theory for which I have been arguing, the problem appears much more serious. If practical reasoning produces the action just as theoretical reasoning produces the conclusion how can it fail? If some intermediate operator is supposed then either it operate independently, as the will is supposed to do, or it is set in motion by the reasoning. In the latter case the problem is only pushed one step further back — why does practical reasoning fail to set them in motion on
The Will

As there are other considerations which may appear to support the theory of the will it is as well to examine this possible solution before proceeding further. The usages of ordinary languages are not of great significance as faculty theories have been considerably in vogue in the past and their terminology has filtered into common usage through media such as popular essays on morality and the pulpit. Indeed from my experience the latter, when occupied by one type of clergyman, is still a source of their dissemination. The important question is therefore whether the phenomena to which they refer necessarily involve the operations of some such faculty.

We speak of people as strong- or weak-willed and as possessing various degrees of willpower. When someone is characterised as being "weak-willed" it is because, either generally or on a particular occasion, he vacillates, fails to carry out his intentions, is easily distracted or deterred from his proposed course of action. The "strong-willed" person on the other hand is not distracted or deterred even by serious obstacles and difficulties and does not vacillate once he has resolved on his course. These terms are not applied because of observations of the operations of a faculty, this is put forward by theorists to explain the differences in conduct to which they are applied.

39. There are some things which might be regarded as intermediaries - the bodily functions necessary for action discussed in the last chapter.
When we speak of "acts of will" however, we do refer to particular actions. They are, however, of two different types. An example of one type is found in statements such as "by a heroic act of will he put on a final burst of speed to win the race". The action performed in this case is increasing speed and the important feature to which the statement draws attention is that it was very difficult and more than might have been expected and showed the athlete's courage and determination. This is similar to what is referred to by calling someone strongwilled but the suddenness and intensity of the action make "acts of will" a more appropriate expression. It does not necessarily imply that some special faculty was in operation any more than a description of his effort as "superhuman" would imply that the athlete possessed a divine or angelic nature.

The second type of "act of will" does involve the choice of an action. It occurs in conditions of vacillation. When unable to reach a preference for one course or another a person may arbitrarily decide on one course simply to avoid delay. The curious thing about the problem of the ass stranded between two equally desirable bales of hay is that because of its failure to decide between either bale it is supposed to stand and stare, a much less desirable course than either. An ass would presumably just go to the bale which it saw first, but a person might find himself vacillating between two equally desirable objects. In such circumstances he would most probably decide "If I don't take one I will have neither" and proceed to take whichever one he happened to be looking at when he decided this, or perhaps resolve the problem by tossing a coin. He does not need a
arbitrary faculty to do this, he decides in the normal way on a course of action - choosing one object by an arbitrary means.

Some ethical theories which exalt the will appear to be recommending the frequent adoption of such courses of action. There is a basis for this in the fact that reasoning may be a hindrance to the successful achievements of our aims. In some circumstances rapid action is essential and it is better to act than wait until all facts which may be relevant have been considered. Such theories in fact seem to be proposing a rule of prudence.

The will cannot be sufficient to account for intentional action since like other "blind" forces it gives no way of distinguishing the descriptions under which actions are intentional. In the case of theoretical reasoning we do not need to suppose some assenting faculty to explain why someone accepts the conclusions of his reasoning, though we do need an explanation, when they fail to do so. The general problem we are considering in the case of practical reasoning also arises because of failures and we do not find it puzzling or surprising that people do what they intend to do. As the linguistic usages apparently referring to the will can be satisfactorily explained without postulating the existence of a special faculty or type of operation the case for such supposition must rest on the

40. vide pp 11-12. In cruder versions of the theory this problem does not arise because the will is treated as if it were a person equipped with knowledge (and presumably reasoning). The same general questions could be asked about the activities of this sub-person.
possibility of failing to execute intentions. If this can be accounted for without that supposition it becomes superfluous.

It could still be possible to talk meaningfully of "the will" and to contrast it with "the intellect" using the terms to refer on the one hand to the person engaging in practical activity and on the other to the person engaging in theoretical activity. This distinction has been important in many disputes in ethics. Aristotle might be said to be treating ethics in terms of the will in opposition to Plato's treatment of it in terms of the intellect, for example when he criticises Plato's doctrines on the grounds that speculative enquiries into the form of the good are of little relevance to the actions of everyday life. (41) This sort of rough distinction is quite compatible with the view which I have been advocating, although it may produce confusions by obscuring the facts that "theoretical" activities such as scientific or philosophic enquiries involve practical reasoning like other human activities, (e.g. about how to conduct an experiment) and that "practical" activities, such as carpentry or ditchdigging, involve theoretical reasoning (e.g. mathematical calculations).

The Elements of Practical Reasoning

There are three essential elements involved in practical reasoning. The first element is a construction of the situation, such as is involved in the passions though not always as complex and general, which refers to something as wanted or not wanted. This may be regarded as a picture of the world to which

the world is to be made to conform. (42) (The picture might correspond to the world as it is when what the person wants is to preserve some existing situation.) For convenience I will refer to this element by expressions of the form "I want x".

Anscombe argues that "it is misleading to put 'I want' into a premise if we are giving a formal account of practical reasoning" but her argument on this point is illogical. From the fact that "not everything that I have described as coming in the range of 'reasons for acting' can have a place as a premise in a practical syllogism" (43) it does not follow that no such thing can be such a premise. Her argument comes to the strange conclusion that "They have Jersey cows in the Hereford market, so I'll go there" (44) is a piece of practical reasoning. It is not sufficient that "whatever is described in the proposition that is the starting-point of the argument must be wanted in order for the reasoning to lead to any action". Someone might want to buy good dairy cows but unless he knows that Jersey cows are good dairy cows the belief about their presence in the Hereford market would appear to him irrelevant to what he wants. As what conclusion follows from the practical reason depends on whether or not the person wants what is mentioned in it, it is very difficult to see why Anscombe objects to treating the element of wanting as a premise.

The second element relates to the means of achieving

42. vide pp 15-17
43. op. cit. § 35 p. 64
44. ibid. p. 65
the state wanted. In practice many factors other than the efficiency of the means arise at this point some of which will be discussed below. For the sake of simplicity I will for the moment assume that the only problem is that of discovering a means of achieving the state wanted and that there will be only one such means in each case. This element I represent by "Doing Y is the means to X".

The third element is the conclusion. Aristotle appears to regard the conclusion as an action(45) though he also speaks of it as an opinion. In some cases the conclusion will not involve immediate action, i.e. those where the action is to be taken at some future time, and in these cases the person may actually say to himself something like "so I'll catch the first train tomorrow". We would regard this a public announcement to this effect as an expression of his intention.

Now as there must be a description under which the agent knows his action, whether or not he employs this in some actual utterance, it is possible to invent "a form of words by which he accompanies this action, which we may call the conclusion in a verbalised form".(46) In doing so the cases where what follows immediately is an action and those where it is the formation of an intention are assimilated.

45. op. cit. Book VII ch. 3, 1147a 28. "When a single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with production it must immediately act."

46. Anscombe op. cit. 8 33 p. 60
I represent this element by "I should do Y" using "should" because it is "a rather light word with unlimited contexts of application" (47). This usage of "should" should not be understood to have any special moral meaning, if there is such a thing. If the distinction between "will" and "shall" were preserved in current usage "I will do Y" might be a better expression, but as it is likely to suffer from the same ambiguity as "I am going to..." "I want to do Y" might seem the right form for a conclusion drawn from the premises in the form given, but for the time being I wish to avoid possible confusion about which I am referring to when I discuss wanting. If English was properly equipped with gerundives they would be the best solution.

It is possible, of course, for practical reasoning to result in a conclusion not to do something. This can be represented as: "I want x, Doing Y will prevent x, Therefore I should not do Y", or as "I do not want x, Doing Y is the means to x, Therefore I should not do Y".

Wanting

"Want" itself is a word with a very wide range of uses, and the range becomes even wider when we consider the whole family of related terms of which it is a member - e.g. desire, longing, wish and hope. Some of the distinctions between what may be referred to in general as different types of wanting have some interest in relation to the problem under consideration.

47. ibid. § 35 p. 63
but there is one which I shall maintain is of crucial importance. I shall argue that the difference between those cases where intentions are carried out and those where they are not (excluding of course those where an external obstacle or mistake is the cause of failure) depends on a difference between different kinds or senses of wanting – i.e. that the solution to the problem of unfulfilled intentions is to be found within the field of practical reasoning itself.

It is necessary first to consider two possible complications concerning wanting. One arises in the course of Anscombe's discussion of whether any describable object or state of affairs can be substituted for \( x \) in "A wants \( x \)." (48) In the course of discussing this question she examines the possibility of wanting a saucer of mud, a twig of mountain ash or a pin, and comes to the conclusion that something can be said to be wanted only if some "desirability characterisation" of it could be given by the person who is said to want it. (49)

Now later she points out that her "remarks about 'wanting' an object or a state of affairs at § 37 do not necessarily apply to wanting to do something" and that "I want, that's all" can be applied to doing. (50) With this in mind the considerations concerning a saucer of mud etc lead to a different conclusion, and Anscombe herself points out things other than the giving of desirability characterisations. Suppose the person obtains the saucer of mud etc. keeps them near him and vigourously protests them from removal. "But

48. ibid. § 36, p. 66
49. § 37
50. § 51 pp 90-91
then, this is already beginning to make sense: these are his possessions, he wanted to own them; he may be idiotic, but his 'wanting' is recognisable as such.
Perhaps "he is careful always to carry the pin in his hand thereafter, or at least for a time, we may perhaps say: it seems he really wanted that pin. Then, perhaps, the answer to 'What did you want it for?' may be 'to carry it about with me' as a man may want a stick." "If he insists on 'having' the thing, we want to know what 'having amounts to.'" (51)

The oddity of saying someone wants some thing of this sort appears then to arise from the ambiguity of "I want x" where "x" is a noun or equivalent phrase. "I want a pin" may mean "I want to own a pin", "I want to have a pin with me", "I want to see a pin", "I want to use a pin", "I want a pin placed there" etc. The baffling situation is one where we cannot find a proposition which would be true if things were as the person wants, but otherwise false.

When the object of wanting is given in the infinitive form the required proposition is easily arrived at - e.g. "Smith owns a pin". In nearly all cases there is no real difficulty - if a noun is given as the object of wanting. If a dressmaker says "I want a pin" or a child playing says "I want a saucer of mud" we can easily see how the world will be different if it is as they want - the dressmaker will be holding a pin and poking it through material, the child will be dabbling in the mud, or the saucer and its contents

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51. ibid. S 37 pl 70-71 My emphases.
will be stored with other treasured possessions. In other circumstances there may be a doubt. We may not be sure whether the person wants to acquire an unusual possession or wants to use it to achieve something else.

We may therefore say that any meaningful statement of the form "I want x" can be construed as asserting "I want (some proposition) to be true".

The second possible complication arises from a distinction between wanting and "idle wishing". Now it is not true that a person cannot want unattainable objects or even that wanting must be "restricted to present or future objects or future states of affairs" (52). Someone may want root 2 to be commensurable, Helen to be still alive, the sun to blow up, Troy not to have fallen or to hold the moon in the palm of his hand. He may think that he is a genius able to revolutionise mathematics, an expert necromancer, the inventor of a new super weapon which can disrupt the sun's internal processes or of a time machine and the means of helping Hector. He may believe that the moon is very near the earth and only a foot or so wide.

If he does not have any illusion of this kind is the character of his wanting affected? The difference between the realist and the deluded man who wants such things is that the latter believes that there are means to bring about the desired state of affairs while the former does not, and perhaps also believes that there can be no such means. The difference relates to the second element of practical reasoning not the first and the failure to act due to the impossibility of

52. ibid § 36 p. 66
of acting, not the weakness of the wanting. (53)

To restrict from the outset "the wanting that interests us" i.e. which is relevant to practical reasoning, to something which "cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants" (54) might appear to solve the problem of unfulfilled intentions, but without some relevant account of the difference between the kinds of wanting would simply beg the question.

Rejecting Conclusions

We might be just as puzzled by the fact that it is possible for someone to reject the conclusion of their theoretical reasoning as we may be by the possibility of failing to fulfil intentions. Suppose someone believes that "All A are B" and that "all B are C", has no doubts about the validity of Barbara syllogisms, sees that those propositions can be the premises of such a syllogism and yet rejects the conclusion "all A are C". If we look no further than that syllogism we may be at a loss to explain his rejection once other factors are admitted to the picture the possible explanations are obvious. He may already simply believe that some A are not C, or believe that no C are D and that some A are D and have drawn the conclusion that some A are not C or couple all A are C with all C are E which he already believes and draw

53. There is such a thing as "idle wishing", e.g. in daydreams but it is not the same as wanting some unattainable object state. "Idle wishing" and "fancying" are ways of pretending.

54. ibid. p. 67
the conclusion all A are E which he does not believe. In any of these situations a number of possibilities are open to him. To take the simplest case (when the conclusion is something he does not believe) he may reject either premise, reject the validity of his reasoning or may abandon his former belief that some A are not C. In the more complicated cases the possibilities are multiplied accordingly. Any of the possibilities may lead him to reexamine a number of other beliefs. He may simply suspend judgment. Sometimes the resolution of such a problem is very complicated - e.g. in philosophical paradoxes.

Taking into account only the original syllogism the acceptance of the conclusion is necessary; but this is not so when the implications for all his other beliefs and reasonings are considered. These may include not only explicit beliefs but vague doubts and prejudices and a person may not be able to give the reason for his rejection except in vague terms such as "It just doesn't seem right somehow" or "I find that hard to swallow".

The elements of such a conflict may all be present and yet the person's beliefs may not be affected since it is possible for a person to have incompatible beliefs, even when both beliefs are explicit ones. We believe that the sun rises in the east every morning and sets in the west every evening, moving across the sky in the meantime. Yet when we consider astronomical or astronautical phenomena we believe that the sun remains stationary while the world revolves on its axis and travels round the sun. It is quite implausible to explain this away by saying that when we say "the sun has risen" we really mean
"the earth has rotated so that we can see the sun". Astronomical considerations simply do not enter our thoughts in normal discussion of such everyday matters and indeed for the purposes of those discussions there is no need to change the usages and assumptions which have persisted from pre-Copernican times. Which set of beliefs we will use depends on which set of circumstances we are dealing with.

In this case the Ptolemaic beliefs of some people may be said to be qualified if they retain vague memories of their school science on some occasions when speaking in Ptolemaic terms. It is possible however, for two incompatible sets of beliefs to be accepted and followed through without reservations, each in its appropriate context. This is shown in the resilience of prejudices. Someone may conduct his dealings with an individual member of a particular race on the assumption that he is an intelligent and competent worker and may say as much when commenting on his work. When discussing the extension of civil rights to or the cultural assimilation of the members of that race in general he may firmly maintain that they are all stupid, lazy and incompetent. In each case he may be quite untroubled by the incompatibility of his belief with the belief he holds to in other circumstances.

Whether doubts arise because of the incompatibility of different beliefs depends not just on whether the beliefs are related to one another but on whether they are brought together in the person's mind in such a way that he recognises the contradiction. Furthermore the doubt may only exist while they are brought together. When faced with a contradiction the person may suspend judgment, then, having forgotten the
problem, go on following each of the incompatible beliefs. This may happen even though when faced with the problem he rejected one belief.

Similar possibilities arise with practical as with theoretical reasoning. Someone may reason as follows: "I want x, Doing Y is the means to x, therefore I should do Y" but on coming to the consideration of Y he is faced with a previous intention not to do it - "I want z, Doing Y will prevent z, therefore I should not do Y" or "I do not want A, Doing Y is the means to A, therefore I should not do Y". Doing Y itself might be something the person does not want.

In the case of theoretical reasoning we could describe the person's problem thus: while he considered only a limited part of the world a certain element in his picture of the world was in agreement with it, i.e. his limited picture was true of the limited part of the world it was intended to portray. A contradiction arises when two such limited pictures are brought together because he is considering a wider segment of the world. (In the situation supposed the widening is brought about because his reasoning has connected two things which he had not previously thought of as connected). Previously it was possible for him to believe A and to believe B because he did so in different contexts. Now there is one context and he cannot believe (A and B) because the compound belief is selfcontradictory.

In the case of practical reasoning the problem is as follows: while he considered only part of the world he had a certain element in the picture to which he wanted that part of the world to conform.
Now two such limited pictures are brought together because he is considering a wider segment of the world (for the same reason as above). Now it becomes clear that the world cannot be made to conform to both pictures because they contain incompatible elements.

In each case the world cannot conform to the composite picture because the picture contains a contradiction.

Similar possibilities are open in the case of practical as in theoretical reasoning. The person can reject the validity of the reasoning, he can reject either minor premise or either major premise (including the simple - "I do not want Y"). Apart from the possibilities of mistakes of logic or of fact concerning the minor premise the choice is between wanting two different and incompatible situations. The person now sees that a world containing x and z is impossible (leaving out of consideration the other possible reasonings mentioned). He can make the world conform either to a picture containing x and not z or to one containing z and not x.

It is at this point that I want to introduce a distinction between different senses in which someone can be said to want something. I have already argued that wanting is part of a certain construction of the world, or more accurately of part of the world. A person can be said to want something when it is part of his construction of the part of the world which he is actually considering, whether it is part of the picture to which that part of the world may be made to conform. (I shall call this the concrete
sense of wanting). He can also be said to want something if it would be part of such construction and picture if he were considering a part of the world more limited than that which he is actually considering.

An example of Aristotle's illustrates the difference. (55) A boat is caught in a storm and can only be saved by throwing the cargo overboard. Now in one sense the captain certainly wants to throw over the cargo, but in another "in the abstract" he does not! If asked "why did you want to throw over the cargo?" he might reply "I didn't want to, but it was the only way to save the ship," but he might accept the question and its assumption and answer "because it was the only way to save the ship." We can imagine him telling an enquiry "I only wanted to throw it over because there was no other way to save the ship."

There are two corresponding uses of the expression "really want". Someone might say "I really want to travel, but my aged mother needs constant care so I'm staying home", but when his mother says "I want you to do what you want to do" he may reply "Well, all things considered what I really want to do is stay home and look after you". His position is that if he were considering a more limited part of the world than he is considering (i.e. a part of the world that did not include the situation of his mother) then he would want to travel in the same sense as he does want to stay home and look after his mother, "all things

55. Nicomachean Ethics Book III, Ch. 1, 1110a, 8-20
considered".

There are therefore three ways in which someone can be said to want incompatible things and one in which he cannot. The first way in which he can is illustrated in the examples just considered, when he wants the two things in different senses. The second is when each thing is wanted in the abstract sense - e.g. someone might in this sense want to travel and to look after his aged mother but "all things considered" want to look after his wife and family instead of either or perhaps not know what he wants "all things considered".

The third is when he wants each thing in the concrete sense but wants them at different times, in a similar way to that in which it is possible to hold incompatible beliefs. In this case "wants" is in the habitual present tense. Thus someone might want to secure world peace and to bring out the universal acceptance of a particular ideology or social system, even though these aims were in fact incompatible. At one time he might work enthusiastically for peace, at another strive energetically for the spread of his viewpoint, even though his actions at one time tended to frustrate those at another. Even after the conflict has been pointed out to him he may continue to want both things and seek to achieve them, being so absorbed at any given time by the task in hand that he forgets about its relation to his other activities.

The way in which a person cannot be said to want incompatible things is the concrete sense when the wanting of the two things is supposed to be
simultaneous. In that sense he cannot want (x and z) when x and z are incompatible. (56) That is the sense in which "want" is used in the first element of practical reasoning and so a person faced with a conflict of the kind we have been considering cannot maintain both major premises unless he rejects one of the minor premises or the validity of his reasoning. He may of course continue to want the rejected goal in the abstract sense.

What are the consequences for action of each of the courses open to resolve the conflict? If the person suspends judgment then there will be no wanting in the concrete sense -- nothing he wants "all things considered" for he has not yet considered all things which he now believes to be relevant. If he decides his reasoning is invalid then he will change his conclusion. If he rejects one of the minor premises the practical reasoning is no longer complete so the conclusion does not now follow. This is the most common resolution, for we have been supposing that there is only one way to achieve what is wanted whereas the means will in most cases have been chosen because it is the most efficient available. Normally when considering what means to adopt we anticipate the possibility of such conflicts, and choose a means which will avoid them. Thus we may choose the easiest means to avert conflict between the desire of achieving our aim and the desire to avoid

56. In neither case need the incompatibility be a direct contradiction between the two things believed or situations wanted. It is enough that combined with other beliefs a contradiction can be drawn from them.
unnecessary effort. If the major premise is rejected then the first element of practical reasoning is absent.

So far I have spoken as if the steps in the reasoning, the conflict and its resolution followed one another in a temporal sequence and if this were so one might expect the person to commence acting and then pause as he saw the conflict. But we do not think there must be a moment when we believe the conclusion of a theoretical reasoning before such a conflict makes us doubt or reject it. The sequence is a logical not a temporal one. (Someone might investigate the consequences of doing Y, discover that X, a possible situation which he had not previously envisaged was one of them and then came to want x.) The conflict could arise at any stage – as soon as we see where our reasoning is likely to lead us.

The obvious objection to this whole line of argument is that it amounts to saying that in every failure to carry out an intention (other than those where an external obstacle prevents it) the agent changes his mind, i.e. that no one ever really has an intention while failing to act on it. I am prepared to stand by this conclusion while showing that it is possible for a person to abandon his intention without "changing his mind" in an important sense.

An examination of examples may show the application of this position. So far we have been considering a type of case in which the person's picture changes because it is widened but the same sort of considerations obviously must apply when it changes by narrowing or altering. Perhaps the most common example of failing to carry out
an intention is staying in bed on a cold morning despite all sorts of good intentions to rise early. In this situation we may experience in a striking way the apparent powerlessness of intention. We may lie there saying "I must get up" and reciting all the things which made us intend to do so, but still remain between the sheets. Our picture of the world from this position divides into two limited and sharply distinguished parts - the warm, comfortable bed and the chilly air around us. As we emerge from sleep these properties of the world are most striking and dominate our somewhat muddled thoughts. The seminar which promised to be so interesting when contemplated last night now seems unreal - a mere shadow compared with the comfort of bed. Now we have not changed our mind in one sense - we have not rejected the views we held about the seminar, the features of it which we previously considered have been partially forgotten and pushed to the side of our mind in the new outlook it has acquired. We will get up when this outlook changes, perhaps because we remember being late for last week's seminar and the annoyance we felt then returns. Until something like this happens, however, what we want, all things considered, is different from what we wanted last night because the range of things being considered has altered.

Another example is the soldier marching off to war full of patriotic thoughts and intending to do great and courageous deeds to win the war, but spending his time on the battlefield shaking with terror in his foxhole. The actual horrors of war now dominate his picture of the world. "Winning the war" no longer means the performance of romantic feats against a terrified enemy, it means ploughing through mud past
the bodies of his comrades while enemy bullets whistle past him, no longer crushing a wicked aggressive monster, but shooting other human beings in an equally pitiable condition. He has not changed his mind about the "winning the war" of which he previously thought, but the "winning the war" with which he is faced is just not the same thing and has driven the other from his view of the world.

These situations may puzzle the people involved. They cannot remember changing their minds, in the abstract sense they still want to get up early or to win the war. Nor will it be obvious in what way their view of the world has changed. While they have the view of the moment their former outlook is not present to their mind, when they recover it the particular view will be displaced and become blurred in their memories. They may by reflecting on their experience discern the difference and its cause but it may be difficult to do so.

Just as it is possible to cease applying some once known truth without rejecting it because it or its relevance to the subject in hand has been forgotten so it is possible to abandon an intention without rejecting it or the premises which led to it because circumstances have changed our outlook on the world.

This does not mean that the failure to carry out the intention may not be the person's fault. In the first example he could have set his alarm clock and placed it where he would have to get up to turn it off, as he knows that the ring of a loud alarm clock is likely to fill the whole universe as seen by someone newly awakened. In the second example he could set out to exchange lighthearted conversation with his comrades to keep his mind off the horrors around him.
Either person could be held responsible for his failure because he omitted to take the necessary precautions.

**Akrasia**

Aristotle's discussion of akrasia\(^\text{57}\) being perhaps the best known treatment of "weakness of will" it is interesting to compare it with the above account. Although he sometimes speaks of wanting in a general sense (orexis) he distinguishes three kinds of wanting - epithumia, thumos and boulesis.\(^\text{58}\) These do not appear to be defined anywhere but from the discussion, it seems that epithumia is impulse directed towards particular things - the kind of desire I might experience when a glass of beer is placed in front of me, expressed by a spontaneous exclamation like "Oh, good! Beer!". Thumos is passion, such as indignation, fear or shame. Boulesis is the most difficult of the three, and seems to me to be what we might call "considered desire" - the desire we have for something when we have considered all its aspects and consequences. It is failure to act on practical reasoning based on boulesis which mainly concerns Aristotle, since boulesis plays a central role in his general ethical theory. Treating all premises of practical reasoning as falling within the field of knowledge he considers four types of case. In the first the person has knowledge but is not exercising it. An example of the position he seems to be considering is someone who does not want to die, knows that the

\(^{57}\) Nichomachean Ethics, Book VII, Chapter 3

\(^{58}\) Eudéman Ethics, Book II, Chapters 7,3.

De Motu, Chapter VI.
train will arrive at the crossing in thirty seconds, knows that driving onto the crossing when the train arrives will prove fatal yet does drive his car onto the crossing. The solution is that he knows that the train will arrive in thirty seconds in the same sense in which a schoolboy does who is reproached for giving a wrong answer when he knows the correct one. He could have given the answer if he had tried without having to look it up but he did not think of it.

In this case there was no practical reasoning in the sense in which I have described it, though there could have been if the man exercised his knowledge.

In the second case the person uses "only the particular premises and not the universal", i.e. he fails to recognise the relevant feature of the particular situation. The car driver might thus fail to recognise that "this is the crossing" either because he does not know it or because he is not exercising his knowledge, e.g. because he is not paying attention to his surroundings. Here Aristotle appears to be recognising as an element in practical reasoning that recognition of particulars which was one of the grounds on which I argued that practical reasoning existed even in the simplest case of intentional action. (59)

The third case appears like the first, except that the failure to exercise the knowledge is due to sleep, madness or drunkenness. The only complication is that people in these conditions may appear to have knowledge because they can use language and perhaps accidentally utter relevant propositions. The

59. pp. 22-23
utterances of the drunkard may be like the "I must get up" of the person lying in bed on a winter's morning.

In the fourth case there is a conflict between a universal opinion and one concerned with the particular facts, which is later treated as a form of particular desire. The passage is rather obscure but the essential point seems to be that the particular opinion obscures the universal, or to put it in the terms which I have used, a more limited picture of the world dominated by immediate circumstances replaces a wider picture.

The main differences between Aristotle's approach and that which I have advocated are that Aristotle begins by asking how someone can act in a manner contrary to his considered opinion or desire, whereas I began by asking how someone could fail to execute an intention whatever kind of wanting it was based on. Aristotle thus considers together cases which I would divide into two groups - those in which there was no intention because some element of practical reasoning was lacking and those where there was an intention which is not rejected but dissolved by a change in the person's viewpoint. Of the latter Aristotle considers only cases where the picture is narrowed whereas I have applied the same principles whether the change was a widening or contraction.

The essential similarity is in the view that when the premises of practical reasoning - concrete wanting and actual belief concerning means - are present in the person then he must act, but if one
aspect is missing the reasoning is incomplete and so does not lead to the conclusion.

Conclusion

Two points remain to be made. Concerning the first premise of practical reasoning Anscombe complains that if it is to entail the conclusion it must be so general that it would be insane, e.g. "It is necessary for all men over 60 to eat any food containing Vitamin X that they ever come across" (60). But "the end of an action is relative to the occasion" (61) and it is not necessary for the premise to be general in respect of the universe but only of that part which the person is considering. When we speak of wanting something, or for that matter believing something, "all things considered", we do not mean that we have considered every thing about the world, but only that we want or believe it after considering everything we see to be relevant.

Secondly it should now be apparent why I was reluctant at first to represent the conclusion of practical reasoning in the form "I want Y". Considered within the viewpoint expressed in the practical reasoning the conclusion is wanted in a concrete sense. But when not considered as a means but by itself it may not be wanted, though if all elements of practical reasoning remain present this will be only in the abstract sense of wanting.

60. op. cit. S 33 p. 60
61. Nicomachean Ethics Book III, Ch. 1, 1110a, 13.
The conclusion is the point at which the reasoning leads to the incorporation of a particular action into the picture to which we seek to make the world conform, and thus make possible the bringing about of that desired state of affairs "for it is particular acts that have to be done." (62)

62. Nicomachean Ethics Book VII Ch. 3, 1147a, 3
Principal Works referred to:


Also referred to:


