USE OF THESES

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Emotion & Evolution

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This thesis is my own work, written while I was a Research Scholar in the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. To the best of my knowledge, all sources have been acknowledged.

P.E Griffiths,
10th June 1988.
"He who admits on general grounds that the structure and habits of all animals have been gradually evolved, will look at the whole subject of Expression in a new and interesting light."

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As well as formal supervision, I have benefited greatly from discussion with other members of the School. I might mention, amongst others, Dr Jerry Gauss, Mr David Braddon-Mitchell, and Mr John Fitzpatrick. The School's continual flow of distinguished visitors has also been of great assistance, and I am grateful for comments on portions of my work by several visitors. Names which spring immediately to mind are Prof. Isaac Levi and Prof. Michael Smith.

Earlier versions of chapter three, chapter seven and appendix III have been read at Australasian Association for Philosophy conferences in 1986, 1987 and 1988 respectively. A version of chapter three was read to a seminar of the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Various parts of the thesis have been read to "work in progress" seminars in the School, and to meetings of the Australian National University Philosophy Society. In all cases, my ideas have been clarified by the ensuing discussion.

Finally, I should thank my fiancée Ms Marie-Louise McBride, for putting up with three years of composition.
Abstract

In my introductory chapter I briefly outline the present state of philosophical emotion theory. I state my position on the status and future of "folk psychology", and the future of traditional propositional attitude psychology.

The next three chapters of the thesis expound and criticise some current theories of emotion. In chapter two I outline the prevalent "cognitivist" orthodoxy. I present a series of problems for this theory, and show how successive refinements to the theory have attempted to meet them. In the last section of the chapter I discuss the relationship between a cognitive taxonomy of emotions and the folk taxonomy.

In chapter three I give an account of the philosophically neglected psychoevolutionary theory of emotions. I describe Darwin's remarkable work in this field, and compare it to the present state of play. In sections four and five of the chapter I outline an "affect-program" model of emotions, and connect it with current work in other areas of the philosophy of mind.

In chapter four I discuss the constructionist theories of emotion which have been taken up in recent years by certain philosophers. I criticise many of the current accounts of constructionism, and produce my own, substantially revised version, which I claim has been purged of many muddles, conflations, and controversial commitments.

Chapter five defends the core contentions of the thesis. I argue that none of the three theories discussed are adequate accounts of the whole domain, and that each should only properly apply to certain subdomains of emotional phenomena. I call this a "multi-vocal" theory of emotion, in contrast to the traditional insistence on univocal theories. Univocal theories, I argue, are merely Procrustean.
In chapter six I provide a cognate account of emotion attribution, stressing the diversity of modes of attribution that corresponds to the diversity of "emotional" phenomena.

Chapter seven provides a theory of mood and trait phenomena. Although independently motivated, the theory turns out to dovetail neatly with my account of affect-program states.

The appendices deal with matters referred to in the thesis, but which would interrupt the flow of my argument if included in the main body of the text. Appendix I gives details of experiments referred to in chapter three. Appendix II defends the uses of sociobiology suggested in chapter five. Appendix three gives a theory of sensations referred to in chapter six and elsewhere.

Format of the Thesis

I have used three levels of headings. First, the thesis is divided into chapters, numbered with Arabic numerals 1—7. Next, each chapter is divided into subsections numbered decimally, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc. Finally, simple underlined heads, such as that used to introduce this paragraph, are inserted at various points to aid the exposition. These are not listed in the table of contents, or used for cross-referencing.

Appendices to the thesis are numbered with Roman numerals, I—III. They are divided into decimally numbered sub-sections, I.I, I.II, etc, in a manner analogous to the chapters. Each appendix is linked to the particular chapter where the questions it deals with are most frequently referred to.
Figures and tables are also numbered decimally. Figures in chapters are labeled Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, etc. Tables in Appendix I are labeled Table I.I, Table I.II, etc.