USE OF THESES

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Submitted to the Australian National University
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by Edward F. Connelly
Canberra, May 1978
This thesis is the result of research entirely carried out by myself.

E.F. Connelly

E.F. Connelly
This thesis is dedicated to my wife:
Gayle Cecilia Ngit-ung Kam Connelly,
for her patience, perseverance, and
unfailing charm.
I wish to thank the Australian National University for generously supporting this thesis; my supervisor, Prof. Liu Ts'un-yan of the Department of Chinese, for generously giving of his time and erudition; and my assistant supervisor, Dr. Pierre Ryckmans of the Department of Chinese, for his suggestions and proofreading. Prof. J.W. de Jong of the Department of South Asian and Buddhist Studies kindly attended a seminar based on the second chapter and offered valuable suggestions and criticisms. Dr. Daniel Kane's encouragement was only surpassed by his contagious enthusiasm for things Chinese. Thanks are also due to Dr. R.R.C. de Crespigny for his proofreading and suggestions on format, and to Dr. Wong Yin-wai for suggestions on reference materials. I am deeply indebted to the late Prof. Tang Junyi of the New Asia Institute for providing invaluable source material and answering my many questions. Prof. Mou Zongsan, also of the New Asia Institute, allowed me an interview and no small amount of inspiration. Prof. Wing-tsit Chan generously provided information on bibliographical items. Prof. Dai Junren of National Taiwan University gave me an insight into Xiong's personality and an appreciation of Confucian thought. I owe many thanks to my friends Paul Harrison, Dennis Peitso, Greg Schopen, and Tso Sze-bong for their help in proofreading and finding sources. The Chinese characters in the text are from the graceful hand of Mrs. Wang Chen Ying-ying.

I alone am responsible for any mistakes or omissions.
This thesis consists of a presentation and explication of Xiong Shili's critique of Yogacāra Buddhist philosophy. Since Xiong's critique was shaped by his personal experiences, his friends and colleagues, and his own philosophy, the first chapter is a biography of Xiong. Born in 1885 into a poor family and orphaned by age ten, Xiong's early education was meagre and he became literate largely through his own efforts. At seventeen, Xiong enlisted in the army in order to act as liaison between the troops and the revolutionary party of Sun Yat-sen. After the 1911 Republican Revolution, Xiong unsuccesssfully pursued a political career. He later went to Nanking and studied Buddhism at the Institute for Inner Learning. In 1923, Xiong accepted a post in the Philosophy Department of Peking University. Some ten years later, he published his major work the *New Treatise on Consciousness-only*. Xiong retired from Peking University in 1955 and went to live with his son in Shanghai where he died in May of 1968.

Xiong's critique of Yogacāra Buddhist philosophy is aimed primarily at the theory of seeds. Thus in Chapter two, which presents Xiong's version of the rise of Yogacāra in India and its transmission to China, Xiong maintains that the two schools of Yogacāra introduced into China, the *Shelun* School of Paramārtha and the *Weishi* School of Xuan Zang, held widely divergent theories on the nature of seeds. In Chapter three, which is a presentation of Xiong's analysis of the Yogacāra concept of mind, Xiong scores the Yogacāra for analyzing
the mind into innumerable discrete parts and then positing seeds as the ultimate source of these parts. In order to maintain the principle of "consciousness-only," says Xiong, the eighth consciousness becomes essential to the Yogacara because without this eighth consciousness to act as a storehouse to store all seeds, the consciousness-only philosophy becomes a "seeds-only" philosophy. In the fourth chapter, which presents Xiong's views on the theory of causation, Xiong praises the Yogacara for establishing the concept of cause proper (i.e. a true cause, a cause capable of producing its own effect), but criticises the identification of cause proper with seeds. By positing seeds as causal agents, says Xiong, the Yogacara reduced the theory of causation to a theory of "construction-alism." In the fifth chapter, which presents Xiong's views on the principle of the unity of substance and function, Xiong criticises the Yogacara for failing to resolve the ontological dualism between the theory of seeds and the theory of "genuine thusness," and decries the ethical determinism implicit in the distinction between "good" and "bad" seeds.

Xiong's critique is based on his understanding of Buddhism which is derived solely from Chinese translations. (Xiong knew no foreign language.) Xiong's critique is also biased by his own philosophical ideas which are largely Confucian in inspiration. Xiong is considered by most authorities to be one of the two most outstanding philosophers of twentieth century China.¹ Those who read and value Xiong's works usually do so, not for his critique of Yogacara Buddhism, but for his reconstruction of neo-Confucianism.

¹. The other is Feng Youlan.
I decided to write this thesis on Xiong's critique of Yogācāra rather than his reconstruction of neo-Confucianism because I felt that, without an understanding of the former, the latter can be but poorly understood. What little there is about Xiong in English, moreover, deals with his reconstruction of neo-Confucianism while his critique of Yogācāra has been almost completely ignored. I hope that in some small way this thesis might help to overcome that deficiency.

The pinyin Romanization system has been used throughout except in the case of long established and well known place names (Peking rather than Beijing for example).
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Bibliography
Abbreviations used in the footnotes:

**BEFEO** 
*Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orient*

**Chuxu**

**Doctrine**
Wei Tat (trans.), *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun: Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness*, Hong Kong, 1973.

**Foming**

**JAOS**
*Journal of the American Oriental Society*

**PEW**
*Philosophy East and West*

**Popo Lun**

**Shiyao**

**Shuji**

**Siddhi**

**Taishō**
*Taishō Daizōkyō*, Tokyo, 1929-1934.

**Xinlun**

**Xinlun (classical)**

**Yuyao**
CHAPTER I: A BIOGRAPHY OF XIONG SHILI

A. Childhood and Early Education

Born in 1885\(^1\) in Huanggang (黄岡) county, Hubei (湖北) province, Xiong Shili (熊十力)\(^2\) was the third son in an impoverished family of six boys.\(^3\) Xiong's mother died when he was quite young.\(^4\) At seven years of age, he was herding cattle on a

\(^1\) Some authors incorrectly give 1882 as Xiong's year of birth. (Cf. Liu Shu-hsien, "Hsiung Shih-li's Theory of Causation," PEW, 19:4 (Oct. '69) 399.) Xiong states that he arrived at Peking University in 1922 when he was thirty-seven years old. (Xiong Shili, Shili yuyao chuxu [十八語要初續], Taipei, 1973, p. 17. [Hereafter cited as Chuxu.]) Xiong also states that he began the draft for his Dujing shiyao in 1944 when he was sixty sui. (Xiong Shili, Dujing shiyao [讀經要], Taipei, 1973, Introduction, p. 4. [Hereafter cited as Shiyao.]) These two sources indicate that Xiong was born in 1885.

\(^2\) Xiong's name was dingzhong (定中) and his style was zizhen (手真). (Cf. Xiong Shouhui (ed.), Xinhai wuchang shouyi shibian [辛亥武昌首義史編], Taipei, 1971, Vol. I, p. 189.) Xiong later took the name shili (十力, daśabala) a reference to the ten powers of a Buddha.


\(^4\) Shiyao, juan (卷) II, p. 91. [Hereafter cited as Shiyao II:91.]
nearby hillside.¹ At nine, his father, Xiong Qixiang (熊其相), fell ill with a lung ailment.² Xiong's father, a literate man fond of reading Song neo-Confucianism (理學), had evidently failed the imperial exams and earned a meagre living as a village tutor.³ Recognizing his son's brilliance - Xiong had memorized the Three Character Classic (三字經) in one day - the father forced himself to take on more students in order to have the means to teach his son to read and write. The father taught Xiong to write in the difficult "eight legged" (八股文) essay style which was still used in the imperial exams. When Xiong was ten, his father's illness worsened and he died. On his deathbed, his father told Xiong: "Fate has it that you must give up your studies. You are weak and often sick, and hence unsuited for agriculture. It would be best to study tailoring." Xiong swore to his father that he would continue his studies.⁴

Although he died when Xiong was still quite young, his father had a decided influence on Xiong's intellectual development. Recognizing Xiong's intelligence, the father taxed his already poor health to make his son literate. (Of Xiong's five other brothers, only the eldest received an education.) The father provided Xiong with a solid grounding in classical Confucian thought by teaching him the Three Character Classic and the Four Books (四書).⁵ His father encouraged Xiong to deliberate for himself on the meaning of certain

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¹ Xiong Shili, Mingxin pian [明心篇], Taipei, 1976, p. 183. [Hereafter cited as Mingxin pian, 183.]
⁴ Yuyao, op. cit.
⁵ Ibid.
passages. Xiong was asked, for example, to consider the vastly different views on hegemony (霸) expressed by Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (371-289 B.C.). But his father also cautioned that the ability to discern between profound and frivolous writing required insight which Xiong would have to gain for himself. His father aroused Xiong's intellectual curiosity by recounting the burning of books and burying of scholars carried out by the first emperor of the Qin (秦) dynasty. Xiong asked why only Confucian books were burned and only Confucian scholars were executed. His father, who held unorthodox opinions on Chinese history, only smiled in reply. Later, Xiong would argue that among the early Confucians there was a revolutionary group opposed to the imperial system. The first emperor of the Qin burned Confucian works and buried Confucian scholars in an attempt to destroy this group. Xiong became aware of and sympathetic to the need for revolution in his own time by listening to his father's allegorical tales of the sufferings and indignities China suffered at the hands of invading barbarians during the eastern Jin (晋) dynasty (317-420) and the Song (宋) dynasty (960-1279).

After his father's death, Xiong spent several years with his oldest brother as a fishmonger, until a relative recommended Xiong to a teacher named He (何) who had been a friend of Xiong's father.

1. Shiyao, III:200. The difference centers on the person of Guan Zhong through whose ministerial talents the Duke of Huan (683-642 BC) achieved hegemony over the other feudal princes. Confucius seems to admire Guan Zhong (Cf. Analects, XIV, 16 & 17) while Mencius is contemptuous (Cf. Mencius, IIA, 1; and IIB, 2).
2. Yuyao, III:80b.
3. Xiong Shili, Yuan ru(原儒),Taipei, 1972, juan shang(卷上), p. 27b. [Hereafter cited as Yuan ru, I:27b.]
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. I:45b.
Xiong was too poor to pay tuition but He permitted him to audit classes. He, like Xiong's father, was an adherent of the Cheng-Zhu school of neo-Confucianism but was also in favor of reform and advocated the construction of schools in the countryside and urged women not to bind their feet. Despite obvious poverty and the fact that he was the youngest pupil, Xiong's essays, much to the chagrin of his classmates, were consistently praised by He. This made the classmates, most of whom were the sons of well-to-do country gentry, jealous and they took to ridiculing Xiong. Although meek in appearance, Xiong had a temper and quickly retaliated against those who ridiculed him. These altercations, plus the fact that his brothers could no longer afford to send him rice, brought Xiong's schooling to a premature finish: after just six months, he returned home.

At home, Xiong helped his brothers till the fields. His oldest brother, Xiong Zhongfu (熊仲甫), had attended school until he was fifteen, when family poverty forced him to quit school and return home to help farm. Xiong Zhongfu took books into the fields and read when time allowed. Xiong's brother, like his father and his

1. Xu Fuguan, op. cit., p. 217. Xu had forgotten the name of Xiong's first teacher but thought it might be Bingli (炳理). He Bingli (styled Kunge [何焜閣]) was in fact the teacher of Xiong's two boyhood friends Wang Han and He Zixin and was Wang Han's brother-in-law. (Yuyao, I:76b.) Xiong mentions that he and his two friends met with He for study and discussion (cf. Yuyao, ibid.) but Xiong's first teacher was, however, He Cheng (何珵), styled Shengmu (聖木). (Cf. Shiyao, II:61a.)

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. and Yuyao, III:63a. See also Xu Fuguan, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

teacher, was also fond of neo-Confucianism, particularly the works of Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200). Zhongfu later became interested in Buddhism, studied the Diamond Sutra (金剛經), and became a vegetarian which, because his health was poor, weakened his constitution and hastened his death. Xiong, following his brother's example, became an omnivorous reader. He borrowed books on science from a retired official who lived nearby. Among these was Yan Fu's (嚴復, 1853-1921) translation of Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. He read the essays and memorials of the reform party headed by Kang Youwei (康有為, 1858-1927). He read the Ming loyalist scholars Wang Fuzhi (王夫之, 1619-1697) and Gu Yanwu (顧炎武, 1613-1682) and was impressed by their nationalist and democratic thought. Even as a youngster Xiong had speculated about the origins of the universe and the nature of man so he was naturally attracted to philosophic writings. He read Wang Yangming's (王陽明, 1472-1679) "Inquiry on the Great Learning" and commentary to the Doctrine of the Mean. He preferred Wang's idealist explanation of the latter to Zhu Xi's which he considered too religious. Xiong was also fond of reading the Taoist philosophical works the Laozi (老子) and the Zhuangzi (莊子) and his own works contain copious quotes from these.

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1. Yuan ru, II:3b.
3. Yuyao, III:69b. Xiong later denied that his concepts of "opening" and "closing" were influenced by Yan Fu's use of these terms. (Cf. Shiyao, III:75; and Mingxin pian, 215.)
5. Yuyao, I:59a, and II:57a.
6. Xiong Shili, Tiyong lun [體用論], Taipei, 1976, p. 241. (Hereafter cited as Tiyong lun, 241.)
7. Mingxin pian, 182.
8. Shiyao, III:86; and Mingxin pian, 151.
I read Mr. Chen's books when I was about sixteen or seventeen. The work which affected me the most at the time was an essay entitled 'On Beasts.' It went: 'A man is equipped with a body of seven chi (尺). Except for mind and reason there is nothing of value. The entire [body] is a sack of pus and blood, wrapped around a bunch of bones. When hungry, he can eat; when thirsty, he can drink. A man can wear clothes; he can also behave obscenely. When poor and humble, he thinks of riches and honor. When rich and honored, he covets power and authority. When angered, he fights; when worried, he is melancholy. When impoverished, he becomes reckless; when happy, he becomes lewd. In short, he indulges his passions, grows old, dies, and that is all. Hence, he can be called a beast.' When I first read this, I was greatly excited. . . . I became aware that this body and its passions are not the real me. Only mind and reason are the real me.1

Xiong's philosophic bent of mind shows clearly in his reaction to Chen's essay. His musing over certain passages in the Mencius also bear witness to his philosophical proclivities. He read in the Mencius:

Slight is the difference between man and beasts. The common man loses this distinguishing feature while the gentleman retains it.2

And again:

He who gets up with the crowing of the cock and never tires of doing good is the same kind of man as [the sage] Xun; he who gets up with the crowing of the cock and never tires of working for profit is the same kind of man as [the robber] Zhi.3

After reading these two passages, Xiong pondered the question of

whether or not an alternative to being a follower of Xun or Zhi was possible. He concluded that there was no alternative: a man was either moral or immoral, a sage or a robber; there is no amorality. Xiong's formulation, at such an early age, of this ethical law of excluded middle clearly shows his philosophical bent. Indeed, one of Xiong's later criticisms of the Yogacara was its insistence that some actions are neither good nor bad and can be classified as non-defined (無記).  

In his early teens, Xiong affected an unorthodox lifestyle. In summer he lived in an abandoned temple and, taking as his model Zi Sang Bo Zi (子桑伯子), a Taoist eccentric of the Warring States period (403-221 BC), walked around the temple in the nude and smashed statues of Bodhisattvas. Complaints were made to his oldest brother but he made no effort to stop Xiong's unruly behavior. Finally an old friend of his father's reproached Xiong and shamed him into changing his behavior. At this time, the imperial exams were still being held. Xiong, under the influence of the writings of Wang Fuzhi and Gu Yanwu, decided on principle not to take the exams. Instead, he and two boyhood friends, Wang Han and He Zixin, went to the provincial capital of Wuchang to join the anti-Manchu revolution.

1. Xiong Shili, Popo xin weishi lun (破破新唯識論), Taipei, 1975, p. 4. [Hereafter cited as Popo lun.]
3. The Han dynasty work Shuoyuan (說苑) by Liu Xiang (劉向) contains the story of a supposed visit by Confucius to Zi Sang Bo Zi. See also Analects, VI, 1.
4. Yuyao, III:63a; and Xu Fuguan, op. cit., p. 128.
5. Yuyao, op. cit.
B. The 1911 Revolution

1. He Zixin and Wang Han

Xiong's two boyhood friends were He Zixin (何自新) who like Xiong was also from Huanggang county, and Wang Han (王漢, 1882-1904) who was from nearby Qishui (圻水) county.¹ As young students, all three had been interested in the Book of Changes and Wang Han, who divined with the Changes, had been interested in 'magical calculations' (符了) until Xiong explained to him the underlying mathematical principles of the Changes. He Zixin studied Cheng Yi's (程頤, 1033-1107) interpretation of the Changes until he was introduced, by Xiong and Wang, to Wang Fuzhi's interpretation.

After reading Wang's commentaries on the Book of Changes, He exclaimed: "This is sufficient to complete what Cheng Yi lacks."² He asked Xiong and Wang to explain the passage in the Changes which said: "A group of dragons with no head."³ Wang replied: "'A group of dragons' refers to a country in which each man is independent and self-governing. 'With no head' means there is no need of a ruler."⁴ This retort caused all three to clap their hands and laugh. The three friends had all studied with He Bingli but only Wang and He were considered his students as Xiong could not afford the tuition which He Bingli, a juren (舉人) and returned student from Japan, probably commanded.⁵

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¹ For a biography of He Zixin, see Yuyao, I:80a-80b; For Wang's, Yuyao, I:76b-79a.
² Yuyao, I:77a.
³ Cf. Book of Changes (易經) under the gian (乾) hexagram.
⁴ Yuyao, I:77a.
⁵ This is undoubtedly the same He Bingli mentioned by Xu Fuguan, op. cit., p. 217. Xu gives He's style as kunge (昆閣) while Xiong gives it as kunge (琨閣). (Cf. Yuyao, I:80b.)
He Bingli supported Kang Youwei's reform efforts and instilled in his students the need for reform. Influenced by He's advocacy of reform, and motivated by Gu Yanwu's admonition that even the humblest man has a responsibility for the fate of his country, Xiong, Wang, and He Zixin determined to become revolutionaries.\(^1\) Xiong remarks of this decision:

> When I was close to twenty, I forsook the imperial exams and joined the army. I wanted to arouse democratic feeling in order to strengthen China.\(^2\)

Xiong had nurtured this ambition from an early age. He relates:

> When I was young, I was watching a play. Seeing the beauty of Han dynasty dress, I remarked: 'Why is it not so today?' An elderly man told me the reason [i.e. because the Manchus ruled China]. I then asked him: 'Who are more numerous, the Manchus or the Han [Chinese]?' The old man replied: 'The Han [Chinese].' Then I asked: 'How is it that a minority rules a majority?' The old man could make no reply.\(^3\)

In 1902, when Xiong was seventeen, he, Wang Han, and He Zixin travelled to Wuchang (武昌) the provincial capital, to join the revolution. Since the imperial exams had not yet been abolished, and since the three young men were literate, their neighbors considered them foolhardy. Xiong, who shortly after his arrival in Wuchang joined the army in order to promulgate the revolution among the troops, was considered especially rash because literate men just did not become soldiers.\(^4\) Nevertheless, Xiong was determined to

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1. Yuyao, I:77b.
4. Ibid.
advance the revolutionary cause.

2. The Science Study Group

After their arrival in Wuchang, Xiong joined the army while Wang Han and He Zixin both joined the Science Study Group (科學講習所), the first revolutionary organization established in Hupei.\(^1\) Several of the group's leading members were also members of the Society for the Revival of China (華興會). This society was established in 1903 by Huang Xing (黃興, 1874-1916)\(^2\) who, next to Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian,孫逸仙, 1866-1925)\(^3\), was the most influential revolutionary in China. Indeed, the covert purpose of the Science Study Group was to carry out Huang Xing's plans for revolution.\(^4\) When Huang arrived in Wuchang in 1904, the group held a welcoming party at which Huang explained his plans for revolution. Afterwards, Song Jiaoren (宋教仁, 1882-1913)\(^5\) was dispatched to Hunan to make contact with a clandestine revolutionary organization, while He Zixin and two others were dispatched to contact revolutionary groups in the western part of Hupei. A member of the Society for the Revival of China disclosed Huang's plans to Wang Xianqian (王先謙, 1842-1918), a scholar-official in Hunan province. Wang in turn notified the provincial governor, Lu Yuanding (陸元鼎) who had the offices of the Society surrounded and several

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members arrested. From captured documents, it was discovered that the Science Study Group was really a clandestine revolutionary organization. The governor-general of Hupei, Zhang Zhidong ( 張之洞, 1837-1909), was notified. Zhang sent the police to search the Group's offices but no incriminating evidence was found because Huang Xing had been able to forewarn the Group. Nevertheless, after an existence of just a few months, the Science Study Group came to an abrupt end.¹

3. Wang Han's Assassination Attempt on Tie Liang

In 1904, Tie Liang ( 鐵良, b. 1863), then vice-Minister of Finance in the Manchu government, planned an inspection tour of the south of China. Wang Han and Hu Ying ( 胡瑛) planned to assassinate him.² When Tie Liang arrived in Zhangde ( 彰德), Wang Han was waiting for him. As Tie alighted from his vehicle, Wang fired a pistol at him. Wang, who had received no military training, did not really know how to shoot a pistol and consequently, his shot missed. Rather than suffer the humiliation of capture, torture, and execution, Wang jumped into a well and drowned himself. When his body was recovered, a suicide note of several thousand words was found. In the note, Wang lauded democracy and criticised the Emperor's relatives who had created chaos in the government.³

² Yuyao, I:78a. Zhang Nanxian claims that Wang Han and Hu Ying first went to Wuhan to assassinate Tie only to find that he had come and gone. (Cf. Xiong Shouhui, op. cit., p. 167.)
³ Yuyoo, I:78a.
the time of his death, Wang was just twenty-two, had been married for only a month, and had no children.\footnote{For Zhang Nanxian's account of Wang Han's assassination attempt on Tie Liang, see: Zhang Nanxian, \textit{Hubei geming zhi zhi lu (湖北革命知之錄)}, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1944, pp. 60-62.}

Sometime later, Hu Ying published an account of Wang Han's assassination attempt and subsequent death in a Tokyo newspaper. A newspaper in Jiangsu (江蘇) reprinted the article and was subsequently closed down by the government. After the 1911 Revolution, the scholar and revolutionary, Zhang Taiyan (章太炎, 1868-1936) published a list of revolutionary martyrs and Wang Han's name headed the list. Toward the end of 1912, Wang Han's cousin visited Xiong Shili and obtained from him a letter to Li Yuanhong (黎元洪, 1864-1928) who had been vice-president of the Republic after the 1911 Revolution. The letter requested that Wang Han be honored as a martyr, that his dependents be supported, that his grave be sought out, and that either a memorial stone be erected or that his remains be removed to Wuchang for public burial. No action was taken on these requests. In 1906, Wang Han's cousin visited Hu Ying who gave him travel expenses to Zhangde to find Wang Han's grave but the grave could not be located.\footnote{Yuyao, I:78a.}

4. Society for the Daily Increase of Knowledge

When news of Wang Han's death reached his comrades in Wuchang, they became even more determined to carry out the revolution. To this end, Xiong Shili, He Zixin, and others established, in January...
of 1906, the Society for the Daily Increase of Knowledge (日知會). The Society operated out of the reading room of the American founded Episcopalian Church in Wuchang. Every Sunday a meeting was held in the Church during which lectures were given on the world situation and China's critical condition. Shortly after the Society was established, Xiong Shili recommended that a secret organization be set up as liaison between the Society and students and soldiers. The organization was called the Huanggang County Soldiers' and Students' Tutorial Society (黃岡軍學界講習社). The name Huanggang county was used to deceive the police into thinking the society was just one of many similar county organizations and membership was not restricted to people from Huanggang county. The society held meetings on Sundays during which lectures on nationalism, democracy, and local autonomy were given. These lectures were largely based on the works of Mencius, Wang Fuzhi, and Huang Zongxi (黃宗羲, 1610-1695). Revolutionary propaganda such as the People's Paper (民報) and the Revolutionary Army (革命軍) were distributed. The latter, written by Zou Rong

1. Mingxin pian, p. 107. The name of the society was probably inspired by Gu Yanwu's collected notes which are entitled Record of the Daily Increase of Knowledge (日知錄). In his preface to this work, Gu states that he took the title from Zi Xia's saying: "He, who from day to day recognises what he has not yet, and from month to month does not forget what he has attained to, may be said indeed to love to learn." (Legge [trans.], Analects, XIX, 5.)
4. Yuyao, I:81a; and Ju Juesheng, op. cit., p. 12.
5. Xiong Shouhui, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 188.
(鄭燮, 1885-1905) in 1903, advocated the violent overthrow of Manchu rule and the establishment of a republic with a constitution similar to that of the United States.¹ The society was so efficient in distributing this propaganda that every soldier had a copy of some revolutionary pamphlet.²

In 1906 the Manchu court ordered the southern Army to maneuver in Hunan province. Xiong suggested that the revolutionaries use this opportunity to revolt. His plan was to contact secret organizations, such as the Hongmen hui (洪門會) and the Gelao hui (哥老會), of Hupeih, Hunan, Hopei, and Szechwan provinces.³ These secret organizations would plan to revolt simultaneously in their respective provinces forcing the Manchu court to send troops to quell the revolts. Troops sympathetic to the revolution would join the rebels, and the central plain of China would be won over to the revolutionary side. This plan was never realized, however, because Xiong was forced to flee for his life from Wuchang. In 1905 Xiong had passed the entrance exam to the Army Special School where his espousal of the revolutionary cause was so fervent and public that he came to the attention of the School's superintendent, Liu Bangji (劉邦騏).⁴ Liu reported Xiong to the commander-in-chief, Zhang Biao (張彪) who in turn ordered Xiong's commander, Li Yuanhong, to have Xiong arrested. Fortunately, Ji Yulin (李雨霖), a colleague of Li's and a former member of the Science Study Group, informed Xiong of the danger. Xiong escaped but a bounty of five hundred cash was put on his life. Xiong, with the

². Xiong Shouhui, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 188.
⁴. For a description of the Army Special School, see: Ju Juesheng, op. cit., p. 12.
help of He Zixin, went into hiding. Shortly afterwards, the Society for the Daily Increase of Knowledge was surrounded by troops and police. Nine people, including He Zixin, were arrested and jailed. He later escaped, fell sick, and returned to Huanggang where, a short time later, he died.¹ The revolution had thus exacted a high price from the three boyhood friends: Wang Han and He Zixin lost their lives and Xiong Shili nearly lost his.

5. Xiong Shili on the 1911 Revolution

In a preface to Ju Zheng's (居正) memoirs of the 1911 Revolution, Xiong mentions four points about the revolution which he considered significant. First, the revolutionary party, the Tongmeng hui (同盟會), centered its activities in the border provinces and avoided the heartland areas because it considered these areas especially backwards. When the revolution actually occurred, however, it occurred in Wuchang, the very heartland itself. Xiong adds that He Zixin had maintained that the heartland areas were the most revolutionary and subsequent events proved him correct. Second, Sun Yat-sen was a brilliant leader because he did not rely solely on his own wisdom and strength but pooled the wisdom and strength of all the revolutionaries. Furthermore, he did not restrain the energies of his followers but allowed them initiative and freedom. Third, the southern part of China has always resisted tyranny and it is no historical accident that Hupei and Hunan produced the most fervent revolutionaries. And fourth, the 1911 Revolution was successful because of the excellent liaison between the Tongmeng hui and the army. This liaison was largely due to the efforts of the

¹ Mingxin pian, p. 107; and Yuyao, I:81a.
Hupei revolutionaries who, by propagating the theories of Wang Fuzhi and Du Jun (杜濬, 1610-1686), revolutionized the whole army.¹ Xiong, however, also criticized the 1911 Revolutionaries for being latent feudalists. Xiong held that their latent feudalism was due to the fact that the concepts of democracy which the revolutionaries imported from abroad were never given a proper Chinese grounding. Xiong held that non-Chinese concepts of democracy should have been associated with the Chinese concepts of democracy which Xiong believed were an integral part of early Confucianism. Just because this was not done, argues Xiong, the revolutionaries, although nominally democratic, were subconsciously still feudalists.²

6. **Xiong Shili After the 1911 Revolution**

In 1911, the year of the revolution, Xiong was a staff officer in the Hupei military government.³ In 1912 Yuan Shikai (袁世凱, 1859-1916) became provisional president of the Republic and proceeded to persecute the revolutionaries.⁴ Song Jiaoren who, along with Wang Han, He Zixin, and others, had founded the Science Study Group, was assassinated by an agent of Yuan Shikai.⁵ The military government was being reduced at this time to make way for the new civilian republican government and, for these reasons, Xiong accepted severance pay and bought land in De-an (德安) county, Jiangxi (江西) province. De-an had been newly opened and Xiong and his brothers were determined to become agricultural settlers. Although the hardships and privations were unexpectedly severe, Xiong and his

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2. Yuan ru, 1:49a.
4. Xiong Shili, Qiankun yan (乾坤衍), Taipei, 1976, p. 66. [Hereafter cited as Qiankun yan.]
5. Yuyao, 1:79b.
brothers farmed in De-an for several years. In 1916 Xiong joined 
Sun Yat-sen's Guangxi (广西) Army and participated in the ex-
pedition against Hunan. He quickly became disillusioned, however, 
by the pettiness and selfishness of the revolutionary party's members, 
considered many new members insipid men, and feared for the future 
of the revolution. Xiong also came to the realization that he 
did not have the necessary talents to pursue a political career. At about this time, Xiong's oldest and two younger brothers died 
in poverty. Xiong reacted to these events by vowing to quit politics 
and devote himself to study. On the recommendation of a friend, 
he obtained a teaching post at a middle school in Jiangsu (江苏). 
On the way there, he stopped in Nanjing (南京) where he heard Ouyang 
Jingwu (歐陽竟無, 1872-1944) lecture on Yogacara Buddhism. 
Xiong was so moved by what he heard that he resigned his teaching 
post in Jiangsu and resolved to stay in Nanjing and study Buddhism 
with Ouyang Jingwu.

C. The Buddhist Scholar

1. The Institute for Inner Learning

Xiong's participation in the 1911 Revolution marked the end

1. Yu Zi, "Xiong Shili yishi" (熊十力逸事), Nei ming (内明), Hong Kong, 44 (Nov. '75) 3-6.
2. Yuyao, IV:58b; and Shiyao, II:41-42, and 91.
3. Shiyao, II:42.
5. Xiong wrote a book entitled Zhenxin shu (真心書) about his 
change of heart at this time. I have been unable to locate a copy 
of this book which was published in 1918. (Cf. Appendix I.)
of the first important stage in his life; the next important stage
was his period of study at the Institute for Inner Learning (支那内学院). The Institute played a major role in the Buddhist
revival which occurred in China during the turn of the century. The father of this revival, Yang Wenhui (楊文會, 1837-1911),
became interested in Buddhism after reading the Awakening of Faith
in the Mahayana (大乘起信論). Around 1866, Yang and several
friends established the Jinling (金陵) Scriptural Press to reprint
Buddhist texts. In 1878 Yang made his first trip to England where
he served as a counselor to the Chinese envoy in London. At Oxford
Yang met the renowned Buddhist scholar Max Muller (1823-1900) who
introduced him to his student, the Japanese scholar Nanjiu Bunyiu
(南條文雄, 1849-1927). At the time, Nanjiu was preparing
a catalogue of the Chinese Tripitika and informed Yang that he had
discovered that some of the Buddhist texts lost in China were still
preserved in Japan. In 1890 Yang wrote to Nanjiu in Japan and asked
his help in collecting these lost Buddhist texts. Nanjiu presented
Yang's kinsman, who was with the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, with
several hundred volumes which, on the kinsman's return to China,
were delivered to Yang. Among these texts, Yang discovered a copy

2. For an English translation, see: Yoshito S. Hakeda, The Awakening
3. For an account of Nanjiu, see: Dong Chu, Zhongri fojiao jiaotong
4. Welch, op. cit., pp. 4-5. Wing-tsit Chan in his Religious Trends
in Modern China (Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1953), p. 60,
claims that Yang himself went to Japan. Yang's granddaughter,
Yang Buwei (楊步偉), however, does not mention her grand-
father going to Japan. (Cf. Welch, op. cit., and Yang Buwei,
Yige nuren de zizhuan (一個女人的自傳), Taipei, 1967.
of Kui Ji's Transmitted Notes on the Completion of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only (成唯識論述記, Taishō, 1830). Kui Ji's Transmitted Notes had been lost in China since the Buddhist persecution of 841-845. Without Kui Ji's Transmitted Notes, the major work of Yogācāra Buddhism in Chinese, the Completion of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only (成唯識論, Taishō 1585), is impossible to fully understand. The Completion of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only was translated into Chinese from the original Sanskrit of Vasubandhu's (c420-500) Treatise in Thirty Verses (trimsīka) by the famous Tang dynasty monk and pilgrim Xuan Zang (玄奘, 596-664). The translation incorporates the commentaries on Vasubandhu's Treatise in Thirty Verses by ten Indian scholars of Yogācāra but adheres most closely to the commentary of Dharmapāla (439-507). After the death of Vasubandhu, there were three lines

1. Cf. Wei Tat (trans.), The Doctrine of Mere-consciousness, Hong Kong, 1974, p. LIV. [Hereafter cited as Doctrine.]

2. D. Shimaji's (禽地大平等, died 1928) introduction to the Japanese translation of the Completion of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only (Kokuyaku daiśōkyō, 国譯大藏經, Vol. X, Tokyo, 1920) states that the Transmitted Notes and three other commentaries on Xuan Zang's work were lost in China during the proscription of 841-846. (For a French translation of Shimaji's introduction, see: Sylvain Levi, Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra, Paris, 1932, pp. 15-42.) Xiong also holds that the works were lost during the Tang proscription. (Cf. Chuxu, p. 172).


4. For a list of the ten Indian commentators, see: Sylvain Lévi, op. cit., pp. 18-22, and Foming, II:6a. Walter Liebenthal is of the opinion that Xuan Zang did not rely on the commentary of Dharmapāla. (Cf. Walter Liebenthal, "The Version of the Vīṃśatikā by I-ching and Its Relation to That by Hsuan-tsang," Yanjing Xuebao (燕京學報), 17 (June '35) 179-184.)
of transmission of the Yogācāra doctrines and Dharmapāla, whose center was Nalanda University, represented one line. Dharmapāla's most famous student, Śīlabhadra (529-645), taught Xuan Zang during the latter's sojourn in India. 1 Kui Ji assisted Xuan Zang with the translation of the Completion of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only and thus Kui Ji's Transmitted Notes constitutes a valuable recension without which Xuan Zang's translation cannot be fully understood. Kui Ji's work sheds much light on the schools of thought which are refuted in the translation, explains philosophical and technical terms, gives the names of sūtras and śāstras quoted in the text, and identifies those whose opinions are quoted. 2 Yang's reprinting of the Transmitted Notes, which had been lost in China for over a thousand years, stimulated a revival of interest in Yogācāra Buddhism.

After Yang's death in 1911, his student Ouyang Jingwu, took charge of the Jinling Scriptural Press. 3 For the next several years, Ouyang collated and reprinted Yogācāra texts. He also made a trip to Japan in search of lost texts. 4 In 1919, he established the Chinese Institute for Inner Learning (支那内学院) in Nanjing. (Inner learning is moral self-cultivation while outer learning is science.) Ouyang received financial help for the Institute from Zhang Binglin (章炳麟, 1868-1936), whom he had met in Japan, and from Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培, 1867-1940) who

arranged a grant from the Academia Sinica. Although not an original thinker, Ouyang was a forceful teacher and had as his students at one time or another many of the most influential intellectuals of modern China. Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀, 1879-1942), Zhang Junmai (張君勵, 1887-1969), Liang Qichao (梁啟超, 1873-1929), Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, born 1893), Tang Yongtong (湯用彤, 1892-1964), Xiong Shili - all either studied with or were associated with the great Master from Yihuang. (Ouyang was from Yihuang (宜黃) county, Jiangxi (江西) province and is thus often referred to in Xiong's writings as the great Master from Yihuang (宜黃大師).)

Because of his opposition to religion (he considered all religions superstitious) and to monks (he said that becoming a monk was essentially a selfish act), Ouyang led the revival of interest in philosophic, as opposed to devotional, Buddhism.  

2. Xiong's Early Interest in Buddhism

Xiong's interest in Buddhism was first aroused by his older brother, Xiong Zhongfu (熊仲甫), who studied the Diamond Sūtra and became a vegetarian. Xiong's interest in Buddhism increased when he read the works of Wang Fuzhi because Wang himself was well read in Buddhism and, according to Xiong, Wang displayed a deep understanding of Yogacāra. While serving in the Army to propagate the revolutionary cause, Xiong read the Sūranāgamasmādhisūtra

2. Welch, op. cit., p. 204. Tai Xu (太虛, 1889-1947) is considered to be the leader of the revival of devotional Buddhism.
One of Xiong's revolutionary friends, Man Xinyu, was well versed in Yogacara thought.

After the 1911 Revolution, Xiong met and was influenced by the monk Yue Xia. Yue Xia, like Xiong, was a native of Huanggang county, Hubei province. A scholarly monk, Yue Xia had played a leading role in monastic education by founding the Avatamsaka University. He was also well-traveled and had visited Japan, southeast Asia, India, and western Europe. Yue Xia advocated the Garland Sutra, and was adept at chan style meditation. Xiong visited Yue Xia on one of the latter's return trips to Huanggang. At this time, some people were arguing that the Indian monk Nadi, who visited China during the Tang dynasty, and not Xuan Zang, had translated the Yogacara texts into Chinese. Yue Xia vigorously refuted these opinions and defended Xuan Zang. Xiong was impressed with Yue Xia's arguments and scholarship and later wrote an article based on them.

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1. Cf. Etienne Lamotte (trans.), La Concentration de La Marche Héroïque, Institut belge des hautes études chinoises, Brussels, 1965. (This sutra is also known by the abbreviated name of Surangamasutra.) The Chinese Tripitika contains another sutra with this title (Taisho 945) but it is a forgery. (Cf. Yuyao, I:68b; Lamotte, op. cit., p. 106; and M. P. Demiéville, Concile de Lhasa, Paris, 1952, pp. 43-52.)


5. Xiong Shili, "Tangshi foxue jiupai fandui Xuan Zang zhi anchao," (唐世佛學舊派反對玄奘之暗潮), Zhongguo zhexueshi lunwen chuji (中國哲學史論文初集), Peking, 1959, pp. 97-103.
3. Xiong and the Institute for Inner Learning

Xiong studied at the Institute in 1920 and describes this period in his life thus:

When I was thirty-five, it was a time of great change in my life. It was just like being born again . . .

Soon after [I was thirty-five] almost all my brothers had died. Deeply anguished, I deplored the human condition.

I journeyed to Nanjing to study Buddhism with Mr. Ouyang Jingwu. I stayed for more than a year intently studying Buddhist शुत्रस and शास्त्रas (内典).\(^1\)

With his obvious poverty and lack of academic qualifications, Xiong was less than enthusiastically received at the Institute and consequently agreed to do janitorial tasks in exchange for board.

He was so poor that he had only one pair of trousers which he would wash in the evening and hang up to dry overnight. Often the trousers were still wet next morning so Xiong would wear only his long gown.

This amused his colleagues at the Institute and they teased him with a sobriquet.\(^2\) At first, Xiong did not attend Ouyang's lectures but studied on his own. After seeing an essay Xiong had written, however, Ouyang invited him to attend lectures.\(^3\)

Xiong thought highly of Ouyang and compared his achievements in propagating Yogacara with those of the Tang Masters Xuan Zang and Kui Ji.\(^4\) Xiong, for example credits Ouyang with discovering that the फात्रिंग (法相) and वैशी (唯識) are in fact two

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1. Yuyao, III:63b.
4. One account says that Xiong was never admitted into the inner circle of Ouyang's students. (Cf. Yu Zi, "Pojia mingxiang tongshi," Neiming, 44 (Nov. '75) 3-5)
different branches of the Yogacara school and not just alternate names for the Yogacara.¹ The weishi differs from the faxiang in that it does not deny the existence of a material world *per se* but denies that such a world can exist independently of consciousness.² It is not surprising that Xiong thought highly of Ouyang because in many respects the two were quite similar. Ouyang’s aversion to any form of religious practice reflected Xiong’s own views. Ouyang, like Xiong, was well versed in Confucian philosophy and taught it at the Institute. Intellectually, however, Xiong and Ouyang had widely divergent temperaments. Ouyang was a scholarly thinker who used the Qing (清) techniques of empirical research (考据) to detect false or corrupted texts. Ouyang’s long debate with the reform monk Tai Xu over the authenticity of the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana* is just one example. Xiong, on the other hand, was a “thinker’s thinker” and was fascinated by the development of ideas and their philosophical content.³ Ultimately, Xiong the philosopher and Ouyang the emendator differed in their views on Yogacara: Ouyang considered it sufficient in itself to stand as a philosophic system, but Xiong felt it contained several grievous errors. Among these were the bifurcation of substance (體) and function (用), and the metaphysical pluralism implicit in the theory of seeds (種子, bija). The break between the two came when Xiong destroyed the draft to his *Outline of Consciousness-only* (唯識學概論), which he had written under Ouyang’s guidance.

¹ Xiong Shili, *Xin weishi lun* (新唯識論), Letian Publishing Co., Taipei, 1972, appendix, p. 121b. [Hereafter cited as Xinlun, appendix:121b.]
² Foming, II:1b.
³ Xiong was described to me in these terms by Mou Zongsan (牟宗三).
and rewrote the work as a critique. This began a period in Xiong's life when he sought for truth within himself and not from Buddhist sutras or Confucian classics. Xiong describes this period and the philosophy which evolved from it thus:

Some people have stated that my philosophy is an attempt to adduce Confucianism as an evidence to support Buddhism. This statement might appear to be true, for my personal experience in this matter is absolutely incomprehensible to an outsider. There was a period when I was inclined toward Indian Buddhist thought. My pursuit of Buddhist studies was certainly not motivated by a mere desire to broaden my knowledge and to display my erudition. It was really driven by a great wish to search for truth as a ground for "peace of mind and a meaningful existence" (an-hsin li-ming). I studied the teachings of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu with Master Ou-yang and was thoroughly converted. Later on, I gradually rejected the theories of various schools. Totally putting aside Buddhism and other systems (including even Confucianism), I searched within myself with singleness of purpose. I thought that truth is not remote from us. We can never lay hold of truth by turning around under the spell of verbal and written words of others. Thereupon I completely trusted my own devotion and open-mindedness. I constantly maintained vigilance lest my selfish desires and prejudices deceive my (true) self. I was entirely engaged in what Ch'en Po-sha termed "placing the mind in non-being" (ts'o hsin yü wu). It means to make a clean sweep of all kinds of "cognitive perception" (chih-chien) derived from bigoted opinions and implanted superstitions. The purpose is to make the mind large and dynamic without any trace of stagnation. Only then can we "experientially recognize" (t'i-jen) the truth in all places. After a long time, I suddenly awoke to the realization that what I inwardly witnessed agreed entirely with the idea of "great change" (ta-i) in the Confucian transmission.

1. Yuan ru, II:33b. Only a part of this original draft was ever published. (Cf. Xiong Shili, "Ji̇ng xiang chang," Neixue niankan (內學年刊), Dingwen Publishing Co., Taipei, 1975, pp. 337-352.)
Thereupon I completely destroyed the draft of the Wei-shih doctrine which I had written on the basis of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and avowed to compose a new Wei-shih doctrine of my own in order to save myself from the defect of the old. Hence my understanding of Confucianism was not derived from book learning. Only after my inner experience had already embodied it did I feel that my understanding of it was in complete harmony with what was recorded in the books. This kind of experience is extremely difficult to explain to the general public.¹

In 1922, Cai Yuanpei, then the chancellor of Peking University, visited Ouyang in Nanking and asked him to recommend someone to teach Indian philosophy at Peking University. Cai interviewed several candidates, including Xiong, all of whom were recommended by Ouyang. Xiong showed Cai a draft copy of his Outline of Consciousness-only, which was an orthodox explanation of the Yogacāra philosophy based on the exegesis of the Indian monk Dharmapala. Cai was impressed with the work and invited Xiong to lecture in the philosophy department of Peking University.² Xiong accepted the offer and so ended his short but fruitful term of study at the Institute for Inner Learning.

D. Professor Of Philosophy
1. Peking University

When Xiong arrived at Peking University, it was the intellectual center of China. This was due largely to the reforms of Cai Yuanpei who had been appointed Chancellor of the University in 1917. Cai

¹ The original of this passage can be found in Xinlun, IV:82b-83a. The translation is that of Tu Wei-ming. (Cf. Tu Wei-ming, "Hsiung Shih-li's Quest for Authentic Existence," in Charlotte Furth (ed.), The Limits of Change, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 206-207.

² Xu Fuguan, op. cit., p. 219. One source claims Xiong was recommended to Cai by Lin Zaiping. (Cf. Wang Huatang, "Tan Xiong Shili,"op. cit.)
declared that the university was a place for scholarship and not a springboard to government position. Cai appointed many young teachers, most of whom had studied abroad, to the faculty, and he invited scholars of divergent views to the university. Xiong arrived at Peking University basically sympathetic to Cai's reforms but skeptical of the younger teachers who were mostly western trained and western oriented. Xiong disapproved entirely of their pedagogic approach to education and considered them mere "peddlers of skills."¹ Xiong discussed with Cai the university's lack of courses on the Confucian classics but the two had quite different opinions on what the classics were and how they should be taught. While discussing the three commentaries to the Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋), for example, Cai declared that all three commentaries were just historical criticisms while Xiong maintained that one of the three, the Gongyang (公羊) commentary, was a systematic political philosophy.²

Xiong was not a supporter of the May Fourth Movement which originated at Peking University. Student-led demonstrations and strikes opposing government acceptance of Japan's infamous "Twenty-one Demands" occurred in Peking on May fourth, 1919. The subsequent drive for modernization and social reform which these demonstrations generated became known as the May Fourth Movement.³ Xiong was

opposed to the anti-Confucian bias of the movement and blamed this bias on Qing dynasty empirical research, the same empirical research which Hu Shi (胡适, 1891-1962) praised for containing the seeds of modern scientific method. The May Fourth Movement's attacks on the Confucian classics were unwarranted, felt Xiong, because the spirit of the classics had long been dead, victim of the Qing scholars and their empirical research. The movement's slogan "Down with Confucius and Sons" was redundant, argued Xiong, because the true Confucius and the true Confucian spirit had already been laid low by Qing pedantry and scholasticism. Qing empirical research, according to Xiong, put too much emphasis on the correct reading of words, on the meaning of obscure terms and phrases, and on elaborate commentaries. The emphasis on words rather than meaning, on name rather than reality was exemplified, according to Xiong, by the Qing scholar Dai Zhen (戴震, 1723-1777). Dai had said:

The essence of the classics is the Way (道). The Way is elucidated by phrases, and phrases are comprised of words. [One] must start from words in order to comprehend phrases, and from phrases in order to comprehend the Way. Only thus can [the Way] be gained.

Xiong criticised this quote from Dai as representative of Qing pedantry. Borrowing a phrase from the dissident Qing scholar, Zhang Xuecheng (章學誠, 1738-1801), Xiong lambasted Dai for being concerned with "classical studying and not the study of the

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Hu Shu quotes this same passage from Dai but interprets it completely differently from Xiong. Hu says: "Dai Zhen's uniqueness among Qing Confucians is that he clearly saw that textual research
Xiong Shili, like Zang Xuecheng, opposed the Qing scholars who were concerned with the minutiae of textual criticism and the study of history for history's sake. Xiong agreed with Zhang that history should teach the moral principles which underlie events. In Xiong's opinion, Qing scholars like Dai lost sight of the fact that the classics are primarily wisdom books, guides to moral cultivation. The Qing scholars completely neglected Confucius' admonition that "books do not exhaust words, and words do not exhaust meanings." By over emphasizing textual research, said Xiong, they reduced the classics to histories, wisdom to scholia.

Peking University, because it was China's leading university, was often visited by foreign scholars. In 1919, John Dewey (1859-1952) lectured there on pragmatism, and in the following year Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) lectured on empirical rationalism. Xiong had read Russell's works in Chinese translation and heard him lecture. Xiong also corresponded with Zhang Shenfu (張申府, born 1893) who was Russell's interpreter when Russell toured China and who was the major advocate of Russell's philosophy in China.

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3. This quote is from the 'Ten Appendices' (十翼) to the Book of Changes which Xiong held were authored by Confucius. (Cf. Shiyao, III:48.)
2. Liang Shuming and Lin Zaiping

When Xiong arrived at Peking University in 1922, he found that his ideas and criticisms were shared by two of his colleagues in the philosophy department: Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, born 1894) and Lin Zaiping (林宰平, born 1875). Liang had just published a book, based on his lecture notes, entitled Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (東西文化及其哲學). This work constituted the first systematic defense of Confucianism since the challenge of the May Fourth Movement. Liang described western culture as materialistic, rationalistic, and progressive; Indian culture as quietist and introspective; and Chinese culture as the mean between these two extremes. By Chinese culture, Liang made it quite clear that he meant Confucianism which he described as an accommodating philosophy which stresses intuition over reason. Because of its middle position between the two extremes of western and Indian cultures, Liang concluded that Chinese culture would ultimately gain ascendancy over the other two. In this respect, Liang's ideas and Xiong's were extremely similar.

In 1923, the year after Liang's book was published, Lin Zaiping participated in the debate on science and metaphysics. The debate began when Zhang Junmai, lecturing at Qinghua University, attacked the idea prevalent among western trained intellectuals in China that science was the panacea for all of man's problems. The perennial problems of the human condition are best solved, argued Zhang,

1. Foming, II:68a; and Xinlun, appendix:22a.
by a philosophy of life which values intuition over reason. Zhang's attack on science was immediately rebutted in an article written by Ding Wenjiang (丁文江, 1887-1936), a British trained geologist.1 Ding's position was supported by Hu Shi, Wu Zhihui (吳稚暉, 1865-1963), and others while Zhang's position was supported by Zhang Dongsun (張東荪, born 1886), Lin Zaiping, and eventually Liang Qichao.2 Lin Zaiping contributed an article criticising Ding and pointing out that science was not germane to all areas of human endeavor and that art, poetry, and music, for example, were quite independent of science. To assume that science can solve all of man's problems, continued Lin, was an attitude similar to religious fanaticism. Lin concluded his article by mentioning that he had asked the opinion of his friend, Xiong Shili, on these matters and that Xiong had agreed with Lin's criticisms entirely.3 Thus, although Xiong took no active part in the debate on science and metaphysics, he quite clearly aligned himself with the metaphysicians in opposition to the scientists. In a letter to an American professor, Xiong indicated what his position was by remarking that the ancients had said that man's difficulties derive from three sources: the natural environment, other people, and one's own mind. Of these three sources, said Xiong, science could only alleviate the first and philosophy was needed to overcome the other two.4

1. For a biography of Ding, see: Hu Shi, Ding Wenjiang de zhuanji (丁文江的傳記), Hu Shi Memorial Museum, Taipei, 1973.
2. Kwok, op. cit., p. 149.
4. Chuxu, p. 11.
Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming, and Lin Zaiping came from quite different backgrounds. Xiong was a self-educated village boy from a poor family whose experiences as a soldier and revolutionary were alien to the intellectuals of his day. Liang, by contrast, was the son of a juren 學( ) scholar-official and had joined the faculty of Peking University when only twenty-three years old. Lin had been educated in Japan and had travelled in Germany and was thus the only one of the three who could read a foreign language or had travelled abroad. Despite their different backgrounds, however, the intellectual proclivities of the three were remarkably similar. Both Liang and Xiong had studied Yogacara Buddhism with Ouyang Jingwu and Lin was so well read in Yogacara that Liang Qichao sought his advice. All three went from advocating Buddhist idealism to advocating Confucian idealism and thus ultimately rejected Buddhist otherworldliness for Confucian involvement. In keeping with their beliefs, Lin founded the Progressive Party with his friend Liang Qichao, and also held several government positions. Liang was involved in village government and rural reconstruction and Xiong attributed this to the influence of the thought of Lu Xiangshan 陸象山, 1139-1193) and Wang Yangming 王陽明, 1472-1529). And Xiong of course had been involved in the 1911 Revolution and was deeply committed to teaching as a way of reforming the self and society.

While at Peking University, Xiong, Liang, and Lin became fast friends and met frequently. Xiong describes their meetings thus:

4. Yuyao, II:45a; and Van Slyke, op. cit., p. 466.
Each time we met, Zaiping would be brimming over with difficult questions to which I would freely respond. Often our voices carried outside our room. Shuming was quiet and seldom spoke. He would wrestle with the difficulties raised and in a few sentences grasp the essentials. I often talked about ancient and modern works, rigorously assessing their merits and faults. Zaiping would jest: "Old Xiong your eyes are on Heaven." And I would jokingly reply: "I have the dharma (法) eye, I know all." 

Lin Zaiping influenced Xiong more than Liang Shuming. Lin is mentioned in all of Xiong's major works and it was from Lin that Xiong gained an understanding of western philosophy. Lin's criticisms forced Xiong to reconsider many of his ideas and acted as the whet stone on which Xiong sharpened his philosophical knife.

3. Ma Yifu

While Xiong was at Peking University, Ma Yifu (馬一浮, born 1882) was regarded as an eminent scholar, praised not only for his learning but also for his poetry and calligraphy. Except for a time when he taught at Zhejiang University, Ma spent most of his life as a recluse. Because he was well versed in both neo-Confucianism and Buddhism, Xiong wanted to meet Ma and asked Shan Puan (單撲庵, died 1930), a colleague of Xiong's in the philosophy department and a friend of Ma's, to arrange an introduction. Shan replied that Ma was not eager to meet people and reminded Xiong that, when Cai Yuanpei had cabled Ma inviting him to teach at Peking University, Ma had sent an eight word reply

2. Yuyao, I:53a-54b.
which said: "Formerly I have heard of students coming to learn, but I have not heard of a teacher going to teach."¹ Xiong was undaunted and sent Ma the draft copy of the New Treatise on Consciousness-only (新唯識論) with a letter asking Ma to read and evaluate the work. For over a month there was no reply and Xiong fretted his draft might be lost in the mail. Shortly thereafter, Xiong received a visit from Ma himself. Ma had not only read the draft but also was so impressed that he had decided to visit Xiong in person. In this way began a long friendship between them.²

Ma Yifu and Xiong Shili were, in many ways, opposites. Ma, a noted poet and calligrapher, had a long, flowing beard, a grave demeanor, and was short and stout of build. Xiong, on the other hand, professed complete inability at poetry and was not noted for his calligraphy. Xiong, moreover, suffered from poor health and was consequently thin and haggard looking. Ma and Xiong had completely contrasting personalities and habits. Ma was a fastidious eater, for example, whereas Xiong relished good food and ate with zeal. Ma's strict daily regimen contrasted sharply with Xiong's casualness. For all their personal differences, however, they had similar intellectual convictions. Both were well read in Buddhism: Ma in Chan and Xiong in Yogacara. Both were Confucian philosophic idealists who derived their philosophies from the classics. Neither had been abroad, neither knew a foreign language.³

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¹. Quoted by Yuzi in "Xiong Shili yishi," op. cit., p. 4.
². For a short biography of Ma, see: Hashikawa Tokio, Chugoku bunkakai jimbutsu sokan, Peking, 1940, p. 328.
Xiong taught at Ma's Fuxing (復性) Academy in 1927 when it was located in Huangzhou, and again in 1939 when, because of the Japanese invasion, it was moved to Jiading in Sichuan. Ma wrote a preface for the 1932 classical (文言文本) edition of Xiong's New Treatise on Consciousness-only in which he stated that Xiong's treatise would cause:

Seng Zhao (僧肇, 374-414) to fold his hands and sigh, and Xuan Zang and Kui Ji to be speechless.

Ma compared Xiong's work to Wang Bi's (王弼, 226-249) explication of the Book of Changes and Nagarjuna's (circa 200) explanation of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. ¹ Ma also acted as Xiong's mentor: before Xiong decided to adopt the orphaned daughter of a teacher at Peking University, he discussed the adoption with Ma and sought his advice.²

4. A Student's View of Xiong

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, born 1909) first came into contact with Xiong in 1932 when Mou was a third year philosophy student at Peking University. Mou's classmate, Deng Gaojing (鄧高鏡), had loaned Mou a copy of the New Treatise on Consciousness-only and urged him to read it. Mou was so fascinated by the book that he read it in one night.³ Mou asked Gao to introduce him to Xiong and so several days later the two went to Peking's Central Park

¹. See Ma's preface to the classical edition of Xin weishi lun republished in Taipei by Heluo Publishing Co., 1975.
². Chuxu, p. 29.
³. Dai Junren (戴君仁, born 1900) of National Taiwan University remarked to me that Xiong's writings are characterized by their ability to captivate the reader.
in order to meet Xiong. They sat at a table with other members of the Peking University philosophy department including Lin Zai-ping and Tang Yongtong who was then the chairman of the philosophy department. Mou describes Xiong's arrival thus:

Before long, I saw a man walk in with whiskers blowing in the wind, a wan countenance, wearing a small, round skullcap, and looking like a vagrant quack, stiff and numb from the cold, who has just relieved himself - that was Mr. Xiong Shili. At the time, he was not well and often sick. The others sat and chatted while I ate melon seeds, not paying much attention to what they said. Suddenly, I heard the old gentleman [i.e. Xiong] slap the table and solemnly declare: "These days, I am the only one able to lecture on the philosophers of the late Zhou; all the rest talk nonsense." All the others smiled and laughed, but I was surprised and thought to myself, this man is special . . .

5. The Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy

Xiong had long cherished the idea of establishing a Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy. Xiong hoped that the Institute would allow students who were interested in philosophy to live in year round with their teachers and classmates. This would afford the students an opportunity for self-cultivation which Xiong considered the *sine qua non* of philosophic knowledge. Xiong alluded to the need for such an institute in a letter to Tang Yongtong. In the letter, Xiong remarked that anyone seriously interested in philosophic thought, besides reading traditional philosophic works, should also read Buddhist *sūtras* but due to the lack of commentaries and annotations, these works were difficult to comprehend. Xiong

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noted that existant commentaries were often ineffectual because they were compiled by monks who simply borrowed words and phrases from one part of the text to explain another.¹ Xiong suggested to Tang that the Peking University Research Institute take notice of talented students interested in philosophy, support them, train them, and afford them the opportunity to write a detailed explanation of a *sūtra* in modern, colloquial Chinese.²

After the Sino-Japanese war, Xiong returned to Peking University with the intention of discussing his plan for a Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy with the new Chancellor, Hu Shi. Xiong hoped to convince Hu that, since present day institutions all emphasized empirical research, there was a need for a Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy. The Institute would teach philosophy supplemented by courses in history, literature, political science, sociology, and the natural sciences. The philosophy courses would concentrate primarily on Chinese philosophy and secondarily on Indian and western philosophies. Equal emphasis, said Xiong, would be given to the discursive method (western philosophy) and the intuitive method (Chinese and Indian philosophies). The intuitive method, however, would require self-cultivation. History courses, like the philosophy courses, would center on Chinese history and be supplemented by the histories of foreign countries. The Institute, said Xiong, should stress nationalist and democratic thought but added that nationalist thought did not mean a narrow concept of race but rather referred to all people sharing a common culture. Courses in the social sciences would

¹. Yuyao, II:47a.
². Ibid.
would use western works as texts but these would be liberally supplemented by selections from the classics, the dynastic histories, and the collected writings of famous men.¹ Xiong never presented his plan for the Institute to Hu Shi, however, because he probably realized that Hu, who was heavily in favor of western-style education, simply would not support such an institute.

Much later, in 1944, Xiong did actually establish a Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy at Beipei (北碚) in Sichuan province. Xiong received help from Ju Zheng (居正, 1876-1951) who was then the President of the Judicial Yuan and a friend of Xiong’s since the 1911 Revolution when they were both members of the Society for the Daily Increase of Knowledge.² Xiong also received support from Chen Lifu (陈立夫, born 1900), who was then the Minister of Education. The Institute survived for only a year but during this year (1944-1945) Xiong wrote one of his major works the Essentials for Studying the Classics (读经示要).³ The conditions under which the book was written and Xiong’s daily regimen during his time at the Institute have been recorded by his student, Ju Zheng’s son, Ju Haoran (居浩然).

Ju writes:

In 1944, Lu Ziying (卢子英), the mayor of Beipei, donated a building to Xiong Shili in which Xiong established the Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy.

Before this, Xiong had lived at [Liang Shuming's] Mian-ren (勉仁) Academy. Because my father was chairman

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¹ Chuxu, pp. 148-152.
² See Xiong's preface in Ju Juesheng, op. cit.
of the Board of Directors, I became the first student and together with Xiong, who was the Director of the Institute, moved into the empty building. Except for a few simple tables, wooden stools, and bamboo beds, the building had nothing at all. Surprisingly enough, it had no books, not even one volume. Each morning, I would get up, start the fire, boil water, and make rice gruel; I would attend to Xiong's morning needs and then sprinkle water and sweep the courtyard and building. For breakfast, we had only thick rice gruel and salt cakes. After breakfast I went shopping. When I returned, I would cook rice and prepare vegetables. After the noon meal, Xiong would want to rest because he suffered from insomnia at night. His method of resting was peculiar: he did not lay down but squatted (he was not sitting in meditation). He would squat, with his back resting against the wall or bed, close his eyes, and rest. Only after the evening meal, when we were sitting together in the courtyard enjoying the evening breeze, would Xiong lecture.

According to Chinese etiquette, when eating one is not encouraged to talk; the older generation would not let out a sound while eating. I would first put out the rice bowls and chopsticks and then serve the rice and vegetables. Afterward, I would collect the rice bowls and chopsticks and wipe the table. Thus, although I ate at the same table as Xiong, I had no opportunity to seek instruction. One time, Huang Genyong (黄艮庸) of the Mianren Academy came to visit and I was told to prepare an extra place for the guest, and during the meal Xiong and Huang chatted, so I was able to profit from their conversation. With the exception of that one time, however, the real time for seeking instruction was during the evening while sitting in the courtyard taking the air. The teaching method usually consisted of Xiong first talking about some historical event from the end of the Ming dynasty or the end of the Qing dynasty.

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1. Huang Genyong was Xiong's close friend and occasional amanuensis. Huang compiled juan two and juan three of Shili yuyao from Xiong's notes and wrote a long rebuttal of the monk Yin Xun's critique
Xiong talked about the end of the Ming because he himself adhered [to the teachings of the Ming loyalist] Wang Fuzhi; he talked about the end of the Qing because he himself had participated in the revolution of that time. If I asked a question, Xiong would answer and often my one sentence question would elicit a twenty or thirty minute reply. The Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy had no electric lights, so we could not read during class and could not take notes, we just talked and discussed until midnight and then class was dismissed.

6. Xiong's Academic Career

Xiong taught at Peking University from 1923 until his retirement, at age seventy, in 1954. This period was marked, however, by several long absences. In 1924, Xiong underwent hospitalization and treatment in Peking for neurasthenia. He was visited at this time by friends he had made during his years as a revolutionary. Many of these friends, Zhang Nanxian (張難先) for instance, now held government positions. They urged Xiong to retire from teaching and accept a government sinecure but Xiong insisted that he would return to teaching. In 1927, Xiong taught at Ma Yifu's Fuxing Academy in Hangzhou. In the early 1930's, Xiong again became ill and went to Hangzhou to convalesce. He did not return to Peking University until 1935. In 1937, he fled the Japanese invasion to Sichuan province. In 1939, he taught for a second time at the Fuxing Academy but soon fell ill and went to Suzhou to recover. Later, he taught at Liang Shuming's Mianren Academy in Beipei.

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In 1944, Xiong established the Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy at Beipei.

After the Institute closed in 1945, Xiong was invited by Sun Yingchuan (孫穎川, born circa 1898) to teach philosophy at the Yellow Sea Chemical Industry Research Institute in which Sun had started a philosophy department. Sun, who was an admirer of Xiong's *New Treatise on Consciousness-only*, had met Xiong when both were fleeing from the Japanese to Sichuan. The Yellow Sea Chemical Industry Research Institute was located in Sichuan and was primarily engaged in producing salt. Not many of its students were interested in philosophy and the philosophy department was short lived. In 1946, Xiong taught for a third time at the Fuxing Academy in Hangzhou. In 1947, Xiong returned to Peking University which had just returned to Peking from its war time location in Sichuan. In 1948, Xiong was invited to lecture on the history of Chinese Philosophy at Zhejiang (浙江) University by Xie Youwei (謝幼偉, 1900-1976) who was the chairman of the philosophy department at the University. Xie had previously published two excellent criticisms of Xiong's *New Treatise on Consciousness-only* and his *Essentials for Reading the Classics*. In the spring of 1949, Xiong went to Canton where he stayed with his long time friend Huang Genyong. Finding the Canton weather too damp, however,

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1. For a brief account of Sun, see: Yuan ru, I:59b, and Yuyao, III:79a.
Xiong returned to Hupe in the winter of that year. After the communist government assumed control, Dong Biwu (董必武, 1886-1976), one of the four vice-Premiers in the new government, and Guo Moruo (郭沫若, born 1893), then chairman of the All China Federation of Writers and Artists and soon to be president of the Academia Sinica, cabled Xiong inviting him to return to his teaching post at Peking University. On his way to Peking, Xiong stopped at Hangzhou where a welcoming dinner was given by Lin Biao (林彪, 1907-1971), who, like Xiong, was also from Huanggang county, Hupe province.  

In 1954, Xiong retired from Peking University and lived with his son, Xiong Shipu (熊世菩), in Shanghai. He continued to do research and write in retirement and published four books including two major works: *Origins of Confucianism* (原儒), and *Essay on Substance and Function* (體用論). During retirement, Xiong suffered attacks of neurasthenia which were aggravated by the humid Shanghai summers. In 1957, Xiong suffered a heart attack. In both April of 1959 and December of 1964, however, he was invited to attend, respectively, the third and fourth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Xiong died in Shanghai on May 23, 1968.

2. For a description of these two works, see Appendix I, p. 240.
CHAPTER II: XIONG SHILI'S ACCOUNT OF THE RISE OF THE YOGĀCĀRA IN INDIA AND ITS TRANSMISSION TO CHINA

A. The Yogacara School in India

1. Asanga

The doctrines of the Yogacara school were first systematized by Asanga ( circa 410-500) and his younger brother Vasubandhu ( circa 420-500). According to the Chinese tradition...
initiated by Paramārtha (真諦, 499-569) in his Chinese translation of the Life of Vasubandhu (婆薮槃頭), ¹ Asaṅga received the Yogācāra doctrines from Maitreya, the future Buddha. ² In two works, the Yogācārabhumiśāstra (瑜伽師地論, Taishō 1580) and the Madhyantavibhaga (中邊論, Taishō 1600) ³, Asaṅga claims to have been taught the Yogācāra doctrines by Maitreya but Xiong considers these claims a mere pretext for giving Asaṅga's works the status of scripture. He says:

[The Yogācārabhumiśāstra and the Madhyantavibhaga] were probably composed by Asaṅga himself. Asaṅga falsely claimed he heard them from Maitreya in order to give them the status of scripture. ⁴

1. For an English translation, see: Junjiro Takakusu, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha," T'oung Pao, 2:5 (1904) 269-296.

2. There is controversy over the existence of Maitreya as a historical person. For arguments in favor, see: Giuseppe Tucci, On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya(natha) and Asaṅga, University of Calcutta, 1930; and Hakuju Ui, "Maitreya as an Historical Personage," Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman, Harvard University Press, 1929, pp. 95-102. For the arguments against, see: Paul Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhumi de Saṅgharakṣa," BEFEO, 44 (1954) 381. Demiéville's article is considered authoritative.

3. Xiong says of these two treatises: "The Yogācārabhumiśāstra is an important work of the Faxiang (法相) school [i.e. the Yogācāra]. All who have studied the School of Being [i.e. the Yogācāra] know of it. The Madhyantavibhaga prepares the way for the consciousness-only school." (Foming, II:5b.) For a partial English translation of the Yogācārabhumiśāstra, see: Wei Tat (trans.), "Yogacarya-bhumi-sastra," Faxiang xuehui jikan (法相學會集刊), 2 (June '73) 1-10.

4. Foming, II:5b. Lamotte holds a similar opinion. See:
Since Asanga and Vasubandhu maintain that nothing exists independently of mind, they claim to tread the middle path between the extreme view that nothing exists (the view held by the Madhyamika) and the extreme view that everything exists (the view held by the naive realist schools of the Hinayana). For this reason, Xiong refers to the Yogacara as the School of Being (有宗) to distinguish it from the Madhyamika which he calls the School of Emptiness (空宗).\(^1\) Asanga, says Xiong, was familiar with and influenced by the doctrine of emptiness (空, śūnyatā) promulgated by Nagarjuna (龍樹, circa 150-240), founder of the Madhyamika.\(^2\) Asanga disliked the Madhyamika tendency to nihilism, however, and to correct this Asanga philosophized about the nature of being.\(^3\) But because Asanga was familiar with the doctrine of emptiness, says Xiong, his analysis of being is subtler than the naive realist analyses of some Hinayana schools.\(^4\) Asanga, for example, emphasizes the importance of analyzing phenomena in order to see that any one phenomenon is dependent for its existence on other phenomena and thus no phenomenon has independent existence.\(^5\) For this reason, says Xiong,


1. Foming, I:1b; and I:2b.


3. Foming, I:1b-2b.

4. Ibid., I:2a, and I:2b.

5. Ibid., I:4a.
the Yogācāra was also known in China as the School of the Characteristics of Phenomena (法相, dharmalaksana). Asaṅga's analysis concluded that phenomena are not real entities but the products of mind.

Asaṅga posited a theory of seeds (種子, bīja) to explain how mind can cause phenomena to exist. Asaṅga noted that all phenomena are endowed with an ability to manifest themselves and this ability Asaṅga sometimes calls "function" (功能), and sometimes "habit" (習氣), but most often "seeds." Simply put, seeds are the impressions of past acts stored in the mind. Asaṅga's theory of seeds, says Xiong, is the original theory and as such is similar to the Sautrāntika theory which gave the hypothetical name "seeds" to all mental and material functions of reproduction. This original theory was maintained not only by Asaṅga but also by Sthiramati and Paramārtha. Xiong distinguishes this original theory of seeds from the later theory of Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla, and Xuan Zang. As a definition of Asaṅga's original theory of seeds, Xiong quotes this passage from the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra:

In analyzing phenomena, we do not find a separate substance called seeds. There is no entity called seeds existing apart from phenomena. All phenomena, however, resemble seeds in the way they produce and manifest themselves. Hence, there is the name "seeds" and also the name "fruit." These two names are

1. Foming, I:4a. The term dharmalaksana seems to be a Chinese creation and is not found in Sanskrit. (Cf. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Vijnaptimatrātāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, Paris, 1928, p. 514.)
2. Foming, I:18b.
strictly defined: in relation to past phenomena, present phenomena are called "fruit;" in relation to future phenomena, present phenomena are called "seeds." Thus, from the standpoint of phenomena, seeds cannot be said to be different from phenomena; but [since seeds are not a separate entity] neither can they be said to be not different. Hence, seeds are like "genuine thusness" (真如, bhūtatathā). In this passage, says Xiong, Asaṅga is asserting that seeds are not real substantial entities existing apart from phenomena but simply the reproductive functions associated with phenomena. To clarify this, Xiong uses the following metaphor. Phenomena can be likened to rice plants while seeds, whose function is to reproduce, can be likened to the plants' vitality. Because a plant has vitality, it is capable of producing other plants. But this vitality is not something which exists apart from the plant itself. Likewise, each phenomenon has within itself a function capable of production which is the cause of future phenomena, and this function is called "seeds." But again, these "seeds" should not be construed as a separate entity existing apart from phenomena. As further proof that the original theory of seeds was metaphorical, Xiong quotes this passage from the [Foshuo] Daoqian jing (佛說稻軀經): "Consciousnesses are like seeds while actions are like fields."  

1. Taishō, Vol. 30, No. 1579, p. 588c, lines 10-17. My translation of this passage follows Xiong's exegesis found in Foming, I:19a-19b; and Chuxu, p. 132. For Xiong's definition of "genuine thusness," see: Tiyong lun, p. 65.  
2. Foming, I:20a; and Chuxu, p. 131.  
3. The original passage, which I have translated above, can be found in Taishō, Vol. 16, No. 709, p. 818a, lines 23-24, and reads: 識為種體,業為田體. Xiong quotes the passage as: 識或以種子為因,業者以田性為因. (Cf. Popo lun, p. 46.)
The Yogacāra Master Sthiramati, says Xiong, supported Asaṅga's original theory of seeds. The major work of the Yogacāra school in China, the Completion of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only, records Sthiramati's opinion that seeds are not real entities.\(^1\)

Kui Ji, in his Transmitted Notes, explains Sthiramati's opinion thus:

Seeds are functions of consciousness. It is not the case that they are real entities. (This means that there are no real existing entities named seeds which exist apart from consciousness.)\(^2\) [Their] substance is postulated. (Seeds are functions which rely solely on the ability of consciousness to produce and thus are they postulated. For this reason, it is said that [their substance] is postulated.)\(^3\)

Xiong concludes, on the basis of this passage, that Sthiramati's concept of seeds was quite close to the original theory of seeds of Asaṅga.\(^4\)

Asaṅga did not long maintain his original theory of seeds. In order to convert his brother, Vasubandhu, from the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna, Asaṅga wrote the Mahāyānasam(pari)grahaśāstra (大乘論, Taishō 1592).\(^5\) In this work, says Xiong, Asaṅga changed his original theory of seeds by linking seeds to the theory of causation.\(^6\) In Asaṅga's time there were several theories of

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1. See Doctrine, p. 282.
2. Passages in parentheses are Xiong's.
3. The original is in Shuji, XXVIII:20a. Xiong quotes this passage in Chuxu, p. 198.
5. For a French translation, see: Étienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga, Louvain, 1938.
6. See also Chapter V of this thesis.
causation. The Sarvāstivādins, for example, attributed causation to one's self-nature, while the Brahmins attributed causation to a supreme being, and the Vaiśeṣikas claimed causation was due to a soul. Asaṅga compared these different views on causation to a group of blind men feeling an elephant: each feels a different part of the elephant and comes to a different conclusion as to what the elephant is. Asaṅga stated his argument thus:

If one is ignorant of the arising of the first cause [i.e. seeds] in the ālaya [i.e. the eighth consciousness], then there will be the following errors: some will consider self-nature as cause; some will consider past actions as cause; some will consider the evolution of a supreme being as cause; some will consider the soul (神我, ātman) as cause; some will say there is no cause or causal condition. And again: some will consider the ego as producer or as receiver. [These numerous theories of causation] can be compared to a group of blind men who have never seen an elephant. If an elephant is brought before them and they are told to feel it, some will feel the trunk, some will feel the tusks, some will feel the ears, some will feel the feet, some will feel the tail, and some will feel the spine. Then, if someone asks them what an elephant resembles, some will say a plow handle, some will say a pestle, some will say a winnowing basket, some will say a mortar, some will say a broom, and some will say a stony hill. If one does not understand causality, then one's ignorance will be similar to this.¹

Asaṅga refuted all these theories of causation and presented his own: causation is the maturing of seeds in the ālaya. By thus linking causation to the theory of seeds, says Xiong, Asaṅga broke with his original theory of seeds and gave seeds a cosmological

¹ The original of this passage can be found in Taishō No. 1594, p. 135a, lines 5-15. Xiong quotes this passage in Xinlun, VI:48a-48b; and Tiyong lun, pp. 142-144.
significance similar to western philosophy's first cause.\(^1\) Moreover, says Xiong, this linking of causation to the theory of seeds significantly changed the concept of causality as well as the theory of seeds and thus marks an important turning point in the history of Buddhist thought.\(^2\)

2. Vasubandhu

The most important figure in Indian Yogācāra after Asaṅga is his brother Vasubandhu (世親, 420-500).\(^3\) After Asaṅga converted his brother from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna Buddhism, Vasubandhu wrote numerous treatises explaining Asaṅga's works and two original

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1. Xinlun, VI:48a-48b.
2. Ibid., VI:54a.
Yogācāra works. The first of these two works, the Treatise in Twenty Stanzas (二十頴, vimśiśka), is a defense of the Yogācāra system against the critics of the time.¹ The second work, the Treatise in Thirty Stanzas (三十頴, trimśiśka), is a full statement of the Yogācāra philosophy.² The Chinese translation of this second work was done by Xuan Zang and entitled The Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only (成唯識論, vijnaptimatratabsiddhi). This translation became the authoritative text for the Yogācāra school in China.³

Xiong maintains that Vasubandhu broke with his brother's traditional Yogācāra school and established an offshoot which Xiong calls the consciousness-only branch (唯識支).⁴ In Chinese, the terms Yujia (瑜伽), faxiang (法相), and weishi (唯識) are all used to mean the Yogācāra school. Xiong, however, distinguishes between the Yogācāra school, which he calls either yujia or faxiang, and the consciousness-only branch which he calls weishi.⁵

³. For a French translation, see: Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Vijnaptimatratabsiddhi: La Siddhi De Hiuan-Tsang, Paris, 1928. [Hereafter cited as Siddhi.]
⁴. Yuyao, I:37b; and Chuxu, p. 189.
⁵. The word shi (識) was used to translate both vijnapti and vijnana so that the term weishi is given by some as vijnanamātra. In the Trimśiśka, however, Vasubandhu speaks of only vijnapti. (Cf. Suzuki, Studies, p. 280). Vijnapti is a causative form implying that which is caused by the act of being conscious. (Cf. Warde, Indian Buddhism, p. 432).
Xiong credits his teacher, Ouyang Jian, for the discovery of the difference between the Yogacāra school and the consciousness-only branch.\(^1\) While the traditional Yogacāra school was chiefly concerned with the analysis of the characteristics of phenomena (hence the Chinese name Faxiang), Vasubandhu's consciousness-only branch formulated the tenet that "everything is consciousness-only" (一切唯识).\(^2\) Although this tenet has roots in Asaṅga's works, says Xiong, it was brought to fruition in the works of Vasubandhu, especially his Treatise in Thirty Stanzas.\(^3\) The most important difference, according to Xiong, between the traditional Yogacāra school and its consciousness-only branch is the theory of seeds. The traditional Yogacāra theory of seeds, which Xiong calls the original theory, was that expounded by Asaṅga in the Yogacārabhumiśāstra, while the theory of seeds of the consciousness-only branch, although it originated from Asaṅga's theory, is much different.

Xiong describes the latter theory thus:

In the consciousness-only branch's theory, seeds are a real entity existing apart from phenomena. ... All minds ('心, citta) and mental associates (心所, caīṭṭa) are split into subject portion (見分) and object portion (相分) and these constitute what is called phenomena.\(^4\) The consciousness-only branch theorizes that each subject and object portion has its own seed which brings about its existence. Phenomena are what is produced while seeds are what produces. Producer and production are naturally separate entities. The seeds of the first seven consciousnesses are, therefore, separate from

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1. Foming, II:1b; and Xīnlùn, appendix:12lb.
2. See stanza seventeen of the Trimśikā. (Cf. Doctrine, p. 503.)
3. Foming, I:4a-4b.
4. For detailed discussion of the concepts and terms in this passage, see Chapter III of this thesis.
the phenomena [associated with] these seven consciousnesses and lie latent in the alaya consciousness where they become the object portion of the alaya. Thus, seeds and phenomena each have their own self-nature. In other words, seeds stand, as it were, behind phenomena and act as the causes of phenomena. We could also say that seeds are the roots of phenomena. Hence, seeds are considered real entities which exist independently of phenomena. This consciousness-only [branch's] theory of seeds and the Faxiang [School's] theory are quite obviously different.

Vasubandhu's consciousness-only theory of seeds differs greatly from Asaṅga's original theory, says Xiong, because Vasubandhu, who had spent most of his life as a follower of Hinayāna doctrines, was influenced by the Vaiśeṣika (勝論宗) theory of atoms and the Samkhya (僧伽) concept of self-nature. The Vaiśeṣika, foremost champions of naïve realism among the Brahmanical schools, were an analytical school which maintained that all phenomena consist of atoms which are really existing, minute entities of matter. Vasubandhu borrowed the Vaiśeṣika analytical methodology, grafted their theory of atoms onto the theory of seeds, and claimed that seeds are the causes of phenomena. Aside from this Vaiśeṣika influence, Xiong also maintains that Vasubandhu was influenced by the Samkhya concepts of self-nature and ātman. Chinese tradition mistakenly attributed to Vasubandhu a commentary to the Suvarṇasaptatiśāstra (金七十論, Taishō 2137). This śāstra is Paramārtha's Chinese translation of the Samkhya-kārikā, the main text of the Samkhya school. This error originated when the commentary on the

1. Foming, I:20a-20b.
2. Yuyao, I:58a; and Foming, I:88a. For description of the Vaiśeṣika school, see: Foming, I:84b-88b.
Suvarṇasaptatīśastra was confused with a work written by Vasubandhu to refute Sāmkhya doctrines.¹ Xiong accepted this tradition and consequently mistakenly believed that Vasubandhu had written a commentary to a Sāmkhya work.² For this reason, Xiong maintains that Vasubandhu was heavily influenced by the concept of self-nature. He says:

Vasubandhu's consciousness-only branch relied upon the Sāmkhya concept of self-nature (自性, prakṛti) and changed it to mean seeds. Vasubandhu's concept of the ālaya consciousness is also similar to the Sāmkhya concept of ātman.³

After the death of Vasubandhu, there were three lines of transmission of the Yogācāra doctrines in India.⁴ One of these was the line of Nanda (難陀, 420-500) but this line did not flourish and was short lived. A second line was that of Gunamati (慧, 420-500) who had his center at Valabhi. Gunamati was the teacher of Sthiramati who was in turn the teacher of Paramārtha. In 548, Paramārtha arrived in China where he translated thirty-two Yogācāra texts into Chinese. A third line was that of Dharmapāla (護法, 530-561) whose center was at Nalanda where Xuan Zang studied under Silabhadra (戒賢, 529-645), Dharmapāla's most eminent disciple.⁵

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¹. See G.J. Larson, Classical Samkhya, Delhi, 1969, p. 159. See also Junjiro Takakusu, "La Samkhya-kārika etudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise" BEFEO 4 (1904) 1060.
². Foming, 1:81a.
⁴. Takakusu, Essentials, p. 84.
B. The Transmission of Yogācāra Doctrines into China

1. Paramartha

Paramartha arrived in Canton around 548 and was the first to translate Yogācāra doctrines into Chinese. He is the founder of the first Yogācāra school in China, the Shelun school, so called because it took as its major text Asanga's Mahāyānasam(pari)grahāśāstra which is known in Chinese by its abbreviated title of Shelun (攝論). Many of Paramartha's translations were, however, incomplete. His translation of the Yogācarabhumiśāstra, for example, was halted after five juan (巻) because of political turmoil.¹

Nor was Paramartha's translation of the Yogācarabhumiśāstra free from difficulties: he used lengthy words and phrases, was not precise in selecting Chinese equivalents, and displayed an awkward style.²

Xiong considers Paramartha, like Asanga and Sthiramati, a representative of "ancient Yogācāra," which Xiong distinguishes from the "modern Yogācāra" of Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla, and Xuan Zang.³ Xiong maintains that Paramartha's theory of seeds must have been close to the original theory of Asanga. Xiong believes that the different theories of seeds derived from attempts to solve a continual problem concerning the nature of mind. The doctrine which divides the mind into six consciousnesses was established by the Buddha and maintained by the Hinayāna. It was never made clear,

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however, whether these six consciousnesses were only functions of a single mind or whether each consciousness was itself a separate, independent entity. As the Hinayana sects proliferated they eventually split over the solution to this problem. One group held that the six consciousnesses were different functions of a single mind, while a second group held that each consciousness was itself an independent entity. After the Yogacara school established its doctrine of eight consciousnesses, its members also split over this problem. The Yogacara doctrines introduced into China by Xuan Zang, says Xiong, rigorously followed Dharmapala in doctrinal matters and thus introduced the second solution. This second solution, that each consciousness is an independent entity, is the only one which logically accords with the theory of seeds of the consciousness-only branch which Dharmapala represented. The consciousness-only branch maintains that each consciousness evolves from a seed stored in the eighth or alaya consciousness, and that each seed is a real, separate entity. Logical consistency requires that the consciousnesses produced by such seeds must themselves be real, separate entities.  The consciousness-only branch is thus forced by the need for consistency to advocate the second solution to the problem of mind.

Paramartha, claims Xiong, introduced into China the first solution to the problem of mind: each consciousness is not a separate entity but a function of an integral mind. As proof that Paramartha introduced this solution, Xiong quotes Kui Ji's Transmitted Notes on the Madhyantavibhaga (Taisho 1835) where Paramartha is criticized by Kui Ji for befriending

a master of an "heterodox" Buddhist school. This school was con¬
sidered heterodox by Kui Jì because it held that the six conscious¬
nesses were not separate entities but functions of a single mind.²
This view of mind, notes Xiong, is directly opposed to Dharmapāla's. From this, Xiong concludes that Paramārtha's theory of seeds must also have been quite different from Dharmapāla's. Paramārtha, reasons Xiong, could not have held both a view of mind opposed to Dharmapāla's and a theory of seeds similar to Dharmapāla's because to do so would have involved the following contradiction: if the eight consciousnesses are just functions of a single mind (Para¬mārtha's theory of mind), then how can the seeds from which these consciousnesses arise be considered independently existing entities (Dharmapāla's theory of seeds) ?

Xiong thus concludes that Paramārtha advocated an early theory of mind which probably existed before the formation of the Mahāyāna and which defined the different consciousnesses as functions of a single mind and not as separate entities. This early theory of mind, however, directly opposed Dharmapāla's and so Xuan Zang refused to introduce it into China. Xiong then deduces that, if Paramārtha held a theory of mind completely opposed to Dharmapāla's, then Paramārtha's theory of seeds must also have been completely different. Xiong concludes that Paramārtha was a member of a school

1. The Chinese reads: xiangsi jiao (相似教) which literally means "a sect similar [to Buddhism]." Xiong explains that xiangsi jiao means "heterodox." He says: 相似即謂其非正傳也 (Cf. Chuxu, p. 172.)

2. Foming, II:36a. See also Ren Jiyu, Hantang fojiao sixiang lunji (漢唐佛教思想論集), Renmin chuban she, Peking, 1974, p. 218. (Hereafter cited as Fojiao sixiang.)
of Yogācāra different from that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Xiong says:

From my examinations of the Da zhidu lun (大智度論, Taishō 1509) and Paramārtha’s translations, I have seen that the [Yogācāra] consciousness-only doctrines had another school. This [school’s] theories of the ālaya and seeds were absolutely different from that of Vasubandhu’s. Their theories of mind, mental associates, and even the three natures are all quite different from Vasubandhu’s school. Their theories, moreover, are most interesting and most are not unreasonable. Xuan Zang did not introduce this school and excessively propagated Vasubandhu’s school. [I] guess that when he [i.e. Xuan Zang] was travelling in India, Vasubandhu’s school was really popular.1

Because Paramārtha was a member of this earlier school, says Xiong, he introduced into China a theory of seeds similar to the original theory of seeds. Since this theory of seeds could not be reconciled with Dharmapāla’s theory, however, Xuan Zang and Kui Ji suppressed it. Xiong believed that the Korean Monk Yuan Ce (圓測), a student of Xuan Zang’s, was well versed in Paramārtha’s theory of seeds but was not allowed to express his views. What little is recorded of Yuan Ce supports Xiong’s claims:

When Xuan Zang was lecturing to Kui Ji on the new translation of the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only, Yuan Ce bribed the gatekeeper in order to secretly listen. [Yuan Ce] went back and arranged his notes [together with the new material] for Xuan Zang announced that he would soon stop lecturing. Yuan Ce then rang the bell in the Ximing Temple and gathered the monks together, declaring that he too would lecture on the consciousness-only doctrines. [Kui] Ji was

1. Tiyong lun, pp. 155-156. The Da zhidu lun is a šāstra of the Madhyamika school ascribed to Nāgārjuna and translated by Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, 397-415) in one hundred Juan.
disgruntled because he thought [Yuan] Ce wanted to encroach upon [the doctrines]. Kui Ji therefore criticised [Yuan] Ce's lectures. When Xuan Zang lectured on the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, Yuan, as before, secretly listened to the instruction and [his knowledge of this śāstra] was not inferior to Kui Ji's.  

Since many of Paramārtha's works and most of Yuan Ce's have been lost, Xiong could find no further proof to support his claims.

Xiong's complete argument that Paramārtha represented a school of Yogācāra quite different from that of Vasubandhu is as follows:

Yogācāra doctrine [was established] in China from the time [Kui] Ji received [Xuan] Zang's command and integrated [the ten great commentaries] into the *Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only* which advocates that each consciousness is an independent [entity]. All minds and mental associates are produced from their own seeds. All minds and mental associates cause the evolving of their own perceived portions and do not need to grasp [objects] outside [of consciousness]. These two tenets - that each consciousness is independent and that the perceived portion relies on consciousness - are the fundamental tenets of the *Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only*. After they were defined, later followers did not dare to question [them]. Thus, from the Tang dynasty onwards, those who discussed Mahāyāna Yogācāra, all greatly esteemed the [teaching] of Xuan Zang. I alone felt that Master [Xuan] Zang was biased in his acclaim of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and in fixing his veneration [on them alone]. [Xuan Zang] consequently did not let China see the whole of Yogācāra and that is most regrettable. I mean that Indian Yogācāra was not limited to the one school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The

2. For a discussion of the ten great commentaries, see below.
3. For a discussion of mind and mental associates, and the four divisions, see Chapter III of this thesis.
doctrine that all consciousnesses have the same substance
but different functions differ from that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. But Master [Xuan] Zang rejected [this other doctrine]
and did not transmit it. Even today, however, traces [of it]
can still be detected. For example, in the Transmitted Notes
[on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only],
in his commentary to the passage: "Some believe that all
consciousnesses have the same substance but different functions,"
Master [Kui] Ji says: "This [refers] to a group of Bodhisattvas
who, relying on heterodox teachings, say that all consciousnesses
have the same substance."¹ (This means that, although they
have eight different names, all consciousnesses [are one in
substance]. Moreover, these names accord with the different
functions and hence there are many names. The substance of
all consciousnesses is ultimately a complete whole. Each
consciousness is not an independent entity.) [Kui Ji] also
quotes the following from the Mahāyānasam(parį)grahaśāstra:
["That all consciousnesses have the same substance] is a tenet
of the 'one mind' [school] of Bodhisattvas." [Kui Ji] says that
this is very similar to the tenet of the group of Bodhisattvas [quoted above].² Master [Kui] Ji comments: "The 'one mind'
[school] of Bodhisattvas only explain the first six conscious-
nesses as [functions] of mind. But by reasoning, [we] see that
this is necessarily not so [because] this [part of the text]
says that the eight consciousnesses are one substance."³
According to this passage, then, there is much uncertainty.
Master [Kui] Ji says: "Some say that the 'one mind' [school]
of Bodhisattvas only explain the first six consciousnesses as
[functions] of one mind." [I] think that during the time of

1. Kui Ji's quote can be found is Shuji, II:3a. The translation
   of the passage is mine; compare with Wei Tat's translation of
   the same passage in Doctrine, p. 7.

2. Quote from Shuji, ibid.

3. Shuji, II:3a. The passage from Doctrine on which Kui Ji is com-
   menting is: "Some grasp [the idea] that all consciousnesses are
   the same substance but different functions." (Cf. Doctrine, p. 6.)
the Hinayāna, there were already [those who] explained and advocated that the six consciousnesses were [functions] of one mind. Basically, [what] emanates from the eye organ in order to discriminate colors is called eye consciousness. And what emanates from the body organ in order to discriminate sensations is called body consciousness. The six consciousnesses are thus all [functions] of one mind and do not have their own separate substances. Among the Hinayāna, there were those who held this tenet. Later, the Mahāyāna Yogācara established eight consciousnesses and inherited from the Hinayāna 'one mind' [school] of Bodhisattvas that the eight consciousnesses, although substantially each is a [function of] one mind, have eight names to accord with their different functions. Thus, Master [Kui] Ji says: "This [part of the text] thus says that the eight consciousnesses are one substance." This is [a case of] the Mahāyāna inheriting and using a tenet from the Hinayāna. If [my] inference is correct, the tenet that all consciousnesses are the same substance began with the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna were not the first to advocate it. Master [Kui] Ji, however, does not say this, and it would be improper for me to make an arbitrary judgment. If, however, we survey the statement of Master [Kui] Ji which says: "Some say that the 'one mind' [school] of Bodhisattvas only explain the first six consciousnesses as [functions] of one mind," then this seems to mean that the Masters of the 'one mind' [school] were originally a Mahāyāna [school]. They only advocated that the first six consciousnesses were [functions of] one mind and did not include the seventh or eighth consciousnesses. Master [Kui] Ji concludes that [this is] not so. As to these Masters advocating that the eight consciousnesses are all [functions] of one mind, however, [Kui Ji] only refutes the erroneous explanation of the "some who say" and does not claim these "some" to be Hinayāna [followers]. This [view] and mine are completely different. I have not had time to carefully peruse Hinayāna texts and thus am not in a position to completely refute Master [Kui] Ji's analysis. I thus assume, as before,
that the doctrine that all consciousnesses are the same substance began with the Mahāyāna Yogācāra. Only I infer from this that, when the Indian Mahāyāna Yogācāra began to advocate consciousness-only, there was already a group of Bodhisattvas and a 'one mind' [school] of Bodhisattvas who constituted a school different from that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and whose theories were formulated first. Proof can be found in Asaṅga's Mahāyānasam(pari)grahaśāstra. It is a pity that this school's theories were not transmitted or translated by Xuan Zang.

Before Xuan Zang's time, the theories of Paramārtha had come into China. Master [Kui] Ji's Transmitted Notes on the Madhyāntavibhāga says: "The Master of the Law, Paramārtha, befriended a Master of the 'one mind' [school]." Thus Paramārtha's consciousness-only was different from that of Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu]. Asaṅga's school clearly attacked this group of Bodhisattvas as "similar to Buddhist teachings." ("Similar to" means that they were heterodox.) They likewise refuted the 'one mind' [school] of Bodhisattvas and thus were completely unsatisfied with Paramārtha's theories. Among Master [Xuan] Zang's disciples was the [Korean] monk Yuan Ce. [He] was deeply versed in Paramārtha's theories and often attacked and refuted [Xuan] Zang's other disciples. At this time, however, the [theories] transmitted by [Xuan] Zang's disciples were really quite popular. Ultimately, Yuan Ce could not oppose [them]. Most of his written works have been lost. I have often wanted to read the texts, collect Paramārtha's remaining works, and the scattered remains of Yuan Ce's [works], to collate these and extend their arguments, and thus to keep alive the theories of that school which was opposed to Asaṅga and his brother. I have not yet been able to dedicate my energy to this [task]. What a pity.

1. Correct yi (義) to read shi (識).
2. See also Ren Jiyu, Fojiao sixiang, p. 218.
That there existed in India a school of Yogacāra with a different concept of mind and a different theory of seeds than the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is important to Xiong because his critique of the Yogacāra is centered in general on the concept of mind and in particular on the theory of seeds. The ālaya consciousness, reiterates Xiong time and again, was only created to act as a storehouse for seeds. Without an ālaya, the consciousness-only philosophy becomes a "seeds-only" philosophy.¹ The theory of seeds as expounded by Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, and Xuan Zang is guilty of grievous philosophical errors such as ontological pluralism (every existing entity originates from a seed), metaphysical dualism (seeds and bhūtatathata), and ethical determinism (good and bad seeds).² In order to soften the blow of his critique and salvage the basic truth of Yogacāra thought (i.e. that nothing exists independently of mind), Xiong attempts to show that the school of Yogacāra represented by Paramārtha and Yuan Ce had a concept of mind and hence a theory of seeds philosophically more consistent than the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. By arguing that an earlier, philosophically purer school of Yogacāra existed, Xiong makes his critique seem an attempt to return to the original Yogacāra rather than what it actually is: a profound philosophic attack on the fundamental premises of Yogacāra thought.

2. Xuan Zang.

The most famous of all Chinese pilgrims to India, Xuan Zang (玄奘, 596-664), spent sixteen years in India during which time

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1. Xinlun, VIII:97b.
2. For a complete discussion of these problems, see Chapter III.
he learned Sanskrit, visited Buddhist holy places, and studied Yogācāra at Nālandā University. His teacher at Nālandā was Śīlabhadra, the most eminent disciple of Dharmapāla. Although Dharmapāla is an important figure in the Chinese consciousness-only school, he is a relatively minor figure in Indian Yogācāra.

Dharmapāla held several unorthodox opinions, the most radical of which was that not everyone could become a Buddha. Persons born with tainted seeds (有漏種子, sāsravābīja), said Dharmapāla, could never reach Buddhahood. In spite of these heterodox views, Xuan Zang, probably because of Śīlabhadra's influence, considered Dharmapāla's interpretation of Yogācāra doctrine authoritative and used Dharmapāla's commentaries as the basis for translation.

After his return to China, Xuan Zang, with imperial patronage, set about translating the Buddhist works he had brought with him from India. Between 645 and 662, he translated seventy-five works.

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3. Walter Liebenthal does not believe that Xuan Zang rigorously held to the opinions of Dharmapāla. (Cf. Walter Lienbenthal, "The Version of the Vimśatikā by I Ching and Its Relation to that by Hsuan-Tsang," *Yenching Hsueh Pao*, 17 (June '35) 179-194.

of which eighteen were Yogācāra. Xiong gives three reasons why Xuan Zang became interested in Yogācāra:

First, the works of the Prajñā school [i.e. the Madhyamika] had already been translated by Kumārajīva. Chinese scholars were long familiar with the concept of śūnyatā (空). Second, Xuan Zang travelled to India at a time when the School of Being [i.e. the Yogācāra] was flourishing. And third, the teachings of the Chinese philosophical schools all originate from the Book of Changes. 

Of the eighteen Yogācāra works which Xuan Zang translated, the translation of Vasubandhu's Treatise in Thirty Stanzas became the most important text of the consciousness-only school in China. Xiong describes this treatise as an unfinished work of Vasubandhu's later years. The Indian style of writing, explains Xiong, was to state the main themes in verse form (頌) and then to add to each verse a prose commentary (行) explaining the verse in detail. Unfortunately, Vasubandhu died before he could complete the commentary to his thirty stanzas and consequently ten Indian commentators - known as the Ten Masters - each wrote a commentary to the work. Xuan Zang, says Xiong, originally planned to trans-

2. Xiong maintains that all Chinese philosophical schools derive their philosophy from the Book of Changes. (Cf. Shiyao, III:1-126; and Yuan ru, II:8a-24a.)
5. Ibid., II:7b.
6. For a list of the Ten Masters, their dates, and a brief biography, see: Sylvain Lévi, Materiaux, pp. 18-22. Xiong lists the Ten Masters in Foming, II:6a.
late all ten commentaries but his chief assistant, Kui Ji, argued that ten commentaries would be too confusing and that they should be merged into one. Xuan Zang decided that differences in interpretation found in the ten commentaries would be settled by following Dharmapala's commentary. This made Dharmapala's exegesis the sole authority for Yogācāra doctrine in China. Xiong suspected that another school of Yogācāra had existed in India which had a different interpretation of the theory of mind and hence the theory of seeds as well. Xuan Zang and Kui Ji, however, never translated the theories of this other school but simply made Dharmapala the sole authority on questions of doctrine. For this reason, Xiong classifies Xuan Zang, along with Dharmapala, as representatives of "modern Yogācāra." Xuan Zang's translation of Vasubandhu's Treatise in Thirty Stanzas, incorporating the ten commentaries but following Dharmapala's opinion in doctrinal disputes, was entitled the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only (成唯識論, Taishō 1585). This translation became the definitive work of consciousness-only doctrine in China.

After Xuan Zang's death, his chief assistant, Kui Ji, headed the consciousness-only school. Kui Ji wrote an important commentary on Xuan Zang's translation of Vasubandhu's thirty verses entitled Transmitted Notes on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only (成唯識論述記, Taishō 1830).

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1. See the preface to Cheng weishi lun zhangzhong shuyao (成唯識論掌中摘要), Taishō, Vol. 43, p. 609a, line 8.
2. Foming, II: 35b-36b.
4. I have used Yang Wenhui's 1901 edition (reprinted in Taiwan in 1974 by the Xinwen Peng Publishing Co.). I cite this edition rather than the Taishō because it was the edition used by Xiong.
Because Kui Ji was Xuan Zang's principal assistant during the translation, his *Transmitted Notes* is an indispensable guide to the understanding of the original work. After Kui Ji's death, the consciousness-only school was continued by Hui Zhao (慧沢) who wrote a second commentary on Xuan Zang’s translation entitled *Lamp to Explain the Meaning of the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only* (成唯識論中燈, *Taisho 1832*).

After Hui Zhao's death in 714, the school was headed by Zhi Zhou (智周) who wrote a third commentary entitled *Evolution of the Secrets of the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only* (成唯識論演秘, *Taisho 1833*). These three commentaries by Kui Ji, Hui Zhao, and Zhi Zhou were known as the three great commentaries. Because of the difficulty of Yogacara doctrines, its Indian origins, and the plethora of Sanskrit technical and philosophical terms employed, these three commentaries in general and Kui Ji's *Transmitted Notes* in particular were indispensable for a thorough understanding of consciousness-only thought. Thus, although the school was already in decline after the death of Zhi Zhou in 733, it was dealt a death blow by the loss of the three great commentaries during the Huichang (會昌) persecution of 841-845. Fortunately, copies brought to Japan by monks returning from study and travel in China survived in Japanese Hosso monasteries,

1. For a recent collated edition, see: Nakayama Shobo (ed.), *Kaihōn Joyuishikiron* (會本成唯識論), Bukkyo Taikeihan, Tokyo, 1975.

but these were not recovered by the Chinese until Nanjio Bunyiu sent copies to Yang Wenhui.\(^1\) When Yang reprinted Kui Ji's Transmitted Notes in 1901, he sparked a revival of interest in consciousness-only philosophy.\(^2\) Xiong's critique of the consciousness-only philosophy contained in his New Treatise on Consciousness-only is the outstanding work of that revival.

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1. Several famous Japanese monks, such as Dōshō (道昭), Chitsū (智通), and Chitatsu (智達), studied in China with Xuan Zang and Kui Ji. See: Dong Chu, Zhong-ri fojiao jiaotong shi (中日佛教交通史), The Institute for Chinese Buddhist Culture, Taipei, 1970, pp. 219-222.

A. The Five Skandhas

A central concept in Buddhist doctrines is *dharma* (法) which Stcherbatsky defines as "an element of existence."¹ The meaning of the term *dharma* is so broad as to be virtually untranslatable and so Xiong explains the meaning of *dharma* by comparing it to the Chinese word *wu* (物). Xiong says:

The meaning of the word *dharma* is quite similar to the meaning of the Chinese word *wu*. The Chinese word *wu* is the most comprehensive common noun. All material phenomena and all events are called *wu*. Any mental imagining can also be called *wu*. The word *wu* is often used together with the word *shi* (事, "event" or "affair") in the combinations *wushi* or *shiwu*. Nor is what the word *wu* designates just limited to the phenomenal world. The substantial origins of phenomena, what is often called the natural beginnings of all transformations, such as the so called "Way" (道) or "Reality" (成) - these are also designated by the word *wu*.² Laozi says: "The Way is a thing (*wu*)."³ The *Doctrine of the Mean* says: "[The Way of Heaven and Earth] is not two things (*wu*)."⁴ Both these passages use the word *wu* to indicate ontological

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2. The word *cheng* (成) is translated as "reality" by E. R. Hughes. See his *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*, London, Dent, revised, 1954, p. 32.
substance. The Chinese word wu, then, is the most inclusive and the most comprehensive common noun. The word dharma in the Buddhist scriptures has a meaning quite similar to the word wu and thus is also a most inclusive and most comprehensive common noun.¹

The simplest classification of dharmas is the division into five groups called skandhas (蕴).² Buddhism teaches that an individual has no abiding feature such as the Hindu ātman or the Judaco-Christian soul. Buddhism teaches instead that man is composed of five aggregates called skandhas which, because they have no true self-nature, are neither abiding nor real. These five skandhas are form (色, rūpa), feeling (受, vedanā), perception (想, saṃjña), impulses (行, samskāra), and consciousness (識, vijnana).³ Of these five skandhas, consciousness holds the central position because the other four are subordinate to it.⁴ Consciousness in this context, says Xiong, is one of the many synonyms for mind. Other synonyms include "will" (意), "perception" (了), "discrimination" (分别), and "manifestation of objects" (现行).⁵ The Hinayana analysed the mind into six consciousnesses

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¹ Foming, I:1a. For a more detailed explanation of the word dharma, see: Yuyao, I:40a–43a.
² Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, p. 6.
³ The English equivalents for the five skandhas are taken from Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, Ann Arbor Paperback, Michigan, 1970, p. 109. [Hereafter cited as Buddhist Thought.] For variations, see: Takakusu, Essentials, p. 72, Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 54, and Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, p. 6.
⁴ Foming, I:58a.
⁵ Foming, II:7b. The Chinese character for mind, xin (心), literally means "heart." The Chinese, like Aristotle, believed the heart to be the seat of consciousness.
of which the first five, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses, correspond to the five senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching while the sixth consciousness, called the sense-center consciousness (意識, manovijnāna), synchronises the operation of the five sense consciousnesses.

One knows, for example, that the qualities of hardness, wetness, and clearness all emanate from the same object "glass of water" because the sixth consciousness coordinates the data received from the body, tongue, and eye consciousnesses. For this reason, Xiong considered the sixth consciousness to be similar to the consciousness spoken of in western psychology.¹ The Mahāyāna Yogācāra added two more consciousnesses to these six making a total of eight. They posited a seventh consciousness, called the manas (末那), which is constantly contemplating the eighth consciousness and clinging to it as a real ego. The eighth consciousness, called the storehouse consciousness (阿賴耶識, ālayavijnāna), is the consciousness in which the "seeds" of experience are stored. Ultimately, says Xiong, "seeds" are the causes of all dharmas, including the five skandhas and the eight consciousnesses themselves, and thus the positing of the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness, is crucial to the Yogācāra philosophy because without it the Yogācāra "consciousness-only" philosophy would be a "seeds-only" philosophy.² But to fully appreciate this criticism, it is first necessary to analyse the five skandhas, and especially the fifth skandha of consciousness.

¹ Xinlun, III:96b.
² Ibid., 97b.
Concerning the first skandha, form, Xiong says that whatever has form is made from the four "seed-elements" (四大种) of earth, water, fire, and wind. Earth, whose nature is durability, represents solids; water, whose nature is moistness, represents liquids; fire, whose nature is heat, represents gases; and wind, whose nature is movement, represents energy. The four seed-elements give rise to the five causes which in turn produce the five sense organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body) and the five objects of the senses (forms, sounds, aromas, tastes, and sensations). These objects of the senses are called the five "dusts" (尘) because they can taint or sully one's true nature which is pure.

As to the second skandha, feelings, Sthiramati's Extensive Treatise on the Five Skandhas of the Mahayana says: "Feelings are what consciousness receives (领纳)." Xiong explains this statement thus:

Consciousness here is just another name for mind. Lingna means to receive. By "what the mind receives" is meant all the mental associates of feeling in the mind. [What is] felt and mind each have their own nature, and are not the same dharma. The Treatise in Thirty Stanzas says: "The nature of feelings is to catch whether the characteristics of an object are agreeable, disagreeable, or neither agreeable nor disagreeable. Its function is to arouse craving."

2. Foming, I:6a-10b. See also: The Treatise of the Five Skandhas of the Mahayana, Taishō 1612, p. 848b.
3. Foming, I:21a; and Taishō 1613, p. 851b, lines 18 & 19. This treatise was written by Sthiramati and translated into Chinese by Divākara (地婆阿罗, 676-688). It is a commentary to an earlier treatise entitled Treatise on the Five Skandhas of the Mahayana (Taishō 1612) written by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuan Zang. (Cf. Foming, I:5a.)
4. Foming, I:21a; and Doctrine, p. 159 (slightly modified).
The mental associates of the *skandha* of feeling, adds Xiong, are quite similar to what psychologists call the emotions.¹

The *Treatise on the Five Skandhas of the Mahayana* says of the third *skandha*, perception, that: "The *skandha* of perception is that which selects every kind of object from the phenomenal world."² The *Treatise in Thirty Stanzas* says: "The nature of perception is to apprehend the characteristics of an object; the function of perception is to originate and establish (施設) every kind of name and concept."³ Xiong explains that "to apprehend the characteristics of an object" means to apprehend the characteristics common to all objects in a given class. To apprehend the color green, for example, means to discriminate between greenness and whiteness, or redness, etc. because greenness is the one characteristic common to all objects in the class "green objects."⁴ Xiong says of the fourth *skandha*, impulses, that it is alternately called "thought" (思).⁵ The *Treatise in Thirty Stanzas* says: "The nature of thought is to induce the mind to produce actions (造作). Its function is to maneuver the mind toward good, bad or indifferent actions."⁶ The nature of thought, explains Xiong, is to produce actions and thus the fourth *skandha* is also called thought as well.

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². *Foming*, I:22a; and *Taishō* 1612, p. 848b, line 29.
³. *Foming*, ibid.; and *Doctrine*, p. 160. Kui Ji explains as 建立發起者亦名施設. (Shuji, XVII:17a-17b.)
⁵. Ibid.
⁶. *Doctrine*, p. 161, gives "the good, etc." for *shanpin deng* (善品等) but Xiong says that *shanpin deng* means "good, bad, or indifferent." (*Foming*, I:22b; and also Shuji, XVII:17a-17b.)
as impulses. In this respect, adds Xiong, the fourth skandha is similar to what psychologists call the will.¹

Because the first four are subordinate to it, the fifth and final skandha, consciousness, is the most important. The Extensive Treatise on the Five Skandhas of the Mahayana says: "The nature of consciousness is to discriminate the object of perception (所緣, alambana)."² Xiong explains:

To discriminate the object of perception is a characteristic common to all eight consciousnesses . . . All consciousnesses have discrimination as their nature. Eye consciousness, for example, knows a green object when a green object appears and this discrimination [between green and not-green] is just eye consciousness.³

Consciousness, explains Xiong, can only be spoken of in apposition to an object domain: if there were no object domain, there could be no discrimination and hence no consciousness.⁴ Consciousness itself is just pure sensation and hence it needs always to be supported by a cognitive faculty (eye, ear, nose, etc.) and an object domain (colors and forms, sounds, smells, etc.).⁵ The consciousness-only doctrine, emphasises Xiong, does not deny the existence of objects per se but denies that objects exist independently of consciousness.⁶ In this respect, Xiong interprets the wei of weishi (consciousness-only) not as "only" but as "unique." Likewise, the shi of weishi is interpreted by Xiong not as "consciousness" in the narrow sense but in the broad sense as "mind." Xiong

¹. Foming, I:22a.
². Foming, I:58a; and Taishō 1613, p. 854b, line 28.
³. Foming, ibid.
⁴. Foming, II:7b.
⁵. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, p. 8.
⁶. Foming, II:1a and 7b.
thus understands the term *weishi* to mean "uniqueness of mind" and the uniqueness of mind is simply that nothing exists independently of mind.¹ Indeed it is for this very reason that in Yogacāra doctrines the term consciousness is synonymous with "mind" (心), "perception" (別), "discrimination" (分別), and "manifestation of objects" (現行).²

By way of summary, then, the Buddhists call all phenomena, both mental and material, by the term dharma. All persons are analysed into five groups called skandhas of which the first, form, deals with material phenomena while the last four, feeling, perception, impulses, and consciousness, deal with mental phenomena. Of the five skandhas, however, the fifth, consciousness, holds the central position because ultimately the other four are subordinate to it. Xiong summarises his views on the five skandhas as follows:

The five skandhas are another name for the characteristics of dharmas (法相).³ When the characteristics of all dharmas are analysed, each [is found to consist of] an aggregate called skandha. (Skandha means an aggregate.)⁴ The total number of skandhas is said to be five. Of these five, the first is form and it encompasses all material things. Everything from our own bodies to the heavens and planets is included in the skandha of form. The next four skandhas are feeling, perception, impulses, and consciousness. All mental dharmas can be ana-

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1. Xinlun, I:1a.
2. Foming, II:7b. Xiong explains 現行 as 显現相狀.
   The Buddhists, says Xiong, distinguish between "thing-in-itself" (體相) and "thing-as-perceived" (相狀). (Foming, I:16b-17a.)
3. That is the five skandhas are a classification system for explaining the characteristics of dharmas. (Foming, I:1a.)
4. Skandha literally means "heap" or "group." (Conze, Buddhist Thought, p. 107.)
lysed into these four skandhas. The skandha of feeling refers to the sadness, joy, etc. received from an object domain, and for this reason it is called feeling. This skandha of feeling is established on the basis of the functions of the emotions. The skandha of perception refers to the image perceived in an object domain and hence is named perception. When the color blue, for example, is produced [one] considers it the color blue and not red, white, etc. This is [what is meant by] perceiving the image. From this [skandha] is developed the knowledge which [enables one] to distinguish things and analyse natural laws. The skandha of perception, then, is established on the basis of the function of knowledge. The skandha of impulses refers to the actions which arise from [contact with] the object domain and hence this skandha is called impulses. (If, for example, one sees a flower, likes it, and thinks of breaking the branch [to obtain it], then this is an action. By inference, all movements, even the greatest undertakings, are actions.) The skandha of impulses, then, is established on the basis of the function of the will. One should know that feeling, perception, and impulses - these three skandhas - are also called mental associates. Mental associates is a name given to all the functions of mind. [They] are not just the mind but are the subordinates of mind and hence the name mental associates. Within the impulse skandha, for example, there is not just one mental associate but many. These are not accounted for by establishing another skandha, but are absorbed in the impulse skandha and the student should easily understand this. [I] have already mentioned the three skandhas which are mental associates [i.e. feeling, perception, and impulses], the last skandha is consciousness [or mind] and it encompasses eight consciousnesses. The Hinayana spoke of six consciousnesses, namely: the eye,

1. This term "mental associate" will be explained in detail below.
car, nose, tongue, body, and sense-center consciousnesses. The Mahāyāna Yogācāra was the first to add two more: the seventh or manas, and the eighth or storehouse consciousness. Although the Hinayāna did not posit a manas or a storehouse consciousness, they already had the meaning of these consciousnesses and this is evident in all their Śāstras. In short, the skandha of form particularly applies to matter while the other four all apply to mind. Thus the five skandhas are divided into two aspects: mind and matter.

Yogācāra doctrine is built on a complex analysis of the fifth skandha into eight consciousnesses. We now turn our attention to this analysis and Xiong's critique of it.

B. The System of Eight Consciousnesses

1. The First Seven Consciousnesses

Although there are doubts as to whether one consciousness having six functions or six separate consciousnesses was intended, the Buddha himself posited six consciousnesses and the Hinayāna considered these to be six separate consciousnesses. These six, named after the sense faculties with which they are associated, are: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and sense-center consciousness. When named after their respective object domains, the six consciousnesses are called color consciousness, sound consciousness, odor consciousness, taste consciousness, contact consciousness, and feeling consciousnesses. (Cf. Foming, II:13b.)

2. Tiyoung lun, pp. 67-69. A more detailed account of the five skandhas is given by Xiong in Foming, I:5b-13b, and I:21a-59b.

and dharma consciousness.  

Xiong explains that the first five consciousnesses are quite similar to what psychologists call "pure sensations." These pure sensations are received by the first five consciousnesses as raw sense data and then unified and coordinated by the sixth consciousness (hence the name "sense-center consciousness" for the sixth consciousness). To use the example given above, the sense data of hardness, wetness, and clearness are received by the body, tongue, and eye consciousnesses and then unified by the sixth consciousness so that the single object "glass of water" is perceived as a whole. Because each of the six consciousnesses has as its nature the perception of the objects in its respective object domain, the first six consciousnesses are also known collectively as the perceiving consciousnesses. The eye consciousness, for example, perceives colors while the ear consciousness perceives sounds and so on down to the sixth consciousness which perceives all dharmas.

1. Foming, II:13b.
2. Ibid., 16a.
4. Object domain (心, visaya), according to Wing-tsit Chan, means "the sphere or realm in which the mind gropes for an object which is its own imagination. In its various contexts, it means the external world, external objects, the sphere of color and the eye, the sphere of sound and the ear, etc., domain of perception, and the like." (Chan, Sourcebook, p. 372, fn. 8.)
5. Foming, II:14a, and Doctrine, p. 341.
The first six consciousnesses are related to all the mental associates (心所, caittas) recognized by the Yogācāra.\(^1\) Briefly defined, a mental associate is any function of mind.\(^2\) Xiong explains that the relation between mind and mental associates is analogous to a master painter and his students. The controlling portion of consciousness, called mind (心) or the "King" (心王), perceives the general character of an object (取總相) while the mental associates perceive both the general character and the distinctive characteristics of the object (取別相). The mind, then, is like a master painter who traces the outline of a painting while the mental associates are like the master painter's students who fill in the colors.\(^3\) The Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only lists fifty-one mental associates in six categories. The first category is universal mental associates of which there are five: touch, sensation, thought, idea, and volition. The second category is special mental associates of which there are also five: desire, resolve, remembrance, concentration, and wisdom. The third category is that of the eleven good mental associates: belief, shame, bashfulness, absence of covetousness, absence of hatred, absence of ignorance, zeal, composure, vigilance, equanimity, and non-injury. The fourth category is that of the six fundamental afflictions: covetousness, anger, delusion, arrogance, doubt, and erroneous views. The fifth category is that of the twenty minor afflictions: anger, enmity, concealment, affliction, envy, parsimony, deception, fraudulence, injury, pride,...

2. See above, p. 76. See also: *Tiyong Lun*, p. 68.
shamelessness, boldness, restlessness, dispiritedness, unbelief, sloth, negligence, forgetfulness, distraction, and non-discernment.

The sixth and final category is that of the four indeterminate mental associates: remorse, drowsiness, reflection, and investigation. ¹ Xiong, however, does not follow this division of the fifty-one mental associates into six categories, but gives twenty-seven mental associates in the four categories of universal, special, good, and defiled. ² Nevertheless, Xiong agrees with the Yogācāra that the first six consciousnesses are related to all mental associates.

The Yogācāra added two more consciousnesses to the above mentioned six making a total of eight. The seventh consciousness which the Yogācāra called manas (末那) is a thought center consciousness. ³ Because it is the special nature of the manas to be constantly contemplating or thinking of the eighth consciousness which it mistakenly regards as an ego, the manas is also called "the contemplating consciousness" (思量識). The Yogācāra-bhūmiśāstra says: "Because there is an original consciousness [i.e. an eighth consciousness], thus there is a manas." ⁴ The Lāṅkhavatāra-

1. A list of these, with Sanskrit and Chinese equivalents, is given by Takakusu in Essentials, p. 96.
2. Xinlun, IX:1a-21b; see also: Foming, I:24a-48b.
3. The sixth consciousness' name, manovijnāna, literally means "consciousness of manas." (Cf. Doctrine, p. 251.) The seventh is the manas and, although the term 末那識 occurs in Chinese, the corresponding Sanskrit term, manasvijnāna, does not occur because it violates the rules of sandhi. Although the sixth consciousness is translated as yishi (意識) in Chinese, the word yi can mean either the seventh consciousness as one of the three evolving consciousnesses or it can mean mind. (Foming, II:7b.)
sūtra (楞伽經) says: "Because it has the alaya as support, thus the manas evolves."¹ And Kui Ji in his Transmitted Notes says: "If the eighth consciousness did not exist, then the seventh could not exist."² The term manas means both to think and to support: the manas thinks constantly about the alaya and regards it as the ego while, at the same time, supporting the first six consciousnesses. It is precisely to perform these two functions of thinking and supporting that the manas was established by the Yogacara.³ Xiong says of the seventh consciousness:

The seventh consciousness is also called manas. The Transmitted Notes says: "Manas is called thought (意)."⁴ The Yogacarabhumiśastra says: "All consciousnesses are called either mind (心), thought (意), or discrimination (識). According to their absolute meaning, the eighth is called mind; the seventh, thought; and the remaining [six] discrimination."⁵ The Lankāvatārasūtra and the Mahāyānasam-

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1. Foming, II:11b. Although I have been unable to locate this exact quote used by Xiong, the Lankāvatārasūtra does, however, contain several passages which, although not worded exactly as the one quoted by Xiong, are similar in meaning. See: Taishō Vol. 16, No. 671, p. 575c, lines 7-8 which say:

2. Foming, op. cit.; and Shuji, XXVI:26b.

3. Foming, II:11a-11b; and Doctrine, p. 329.

4. Shuji, XXV:3b. Manas is from the root man- which means "to think."

5. Foming, II:24a; and Doctrine, p. 320. See also: Taishō Vol. 30, No. 1579, p. 651b, line 19.
(pari)grahaśastra have similar sayings. Why is the seventh consciousness especially named thought? It received the name thought because [manas] has two meanings. The first is deliberate contemplation (審思量). [Manas] makes use of consideration and deliberation, and its mode of activity is profound and precise. The second meaning is "constant." [Manas] is constantly active, without interruption. This is to say that the seventh consciousness constantly perceives the ālaya as an inner ego and thus is constantly considering and deliberating that there is an ego. Every thought strengthens [belief in] the ego. Thus, the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only says: "Perpetually deliberating, [manas'] correct name is thought (意)."2 The sixth consciousness, the sense-center consciousness, also deliberates and contemplates, but its mode of operation is unrefined and fluctuating, not at all like the seventh consciousness which evolves methodically and achieves consistent perceptions.3 Moreover, the sense-center consciousness is subject to interruption and does not constantly deliberate.4 The eighth consciousness, although constant, does not deliberate, and the first five consciousnesses neither deliberate nor are they constant. Thus the name thought [means] constantly deliberating and contemplating and this meaning is absolute. Thus, only the seventh consciousness gets this name [of "thought"].5

The Hīnayāna spoke only of six consciousnesses and did not establish the seventh and eighth. The Mahāyāna was the first to establish the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness. At the same time, they also established the seventh consciousness, the manas. The Establishment of the

2. Doctrine, p. 328.
3. Kui Ji explains: "Unrefined means its features are easily known while fluctuating means it constantly changes." (Shuji, XXIII:12a.)
4. The sense-center consciousness is subject to interruption in states of stupor, unconsciousness, and meditation. (Doctrinen, pp. 477-9.)
5. Foming, II:24a-24b.
Doctrine of Consciousness—only says: "The manas constantly produces self-grasping [i.e. an ego (我執, atmagraha)].¹ This is the basis for establishing the seventh consciousness. Because the manas constantly produces self-grasping, it causes the first six consciousnesses to become contaminated.² The Prakaraṇ(ārya)vācaśāstra (顯揚聖教論) says: "Because the [sixth consciousness] takes the manas as its root, it is contaminated. Because there is a seventh consciousness, the other consciousnesses are tied to their objects and can not free themselves.”³ All these [passages] say that the six consciousnesses are contaminated and that this contamination is rooted in the seventh consciousness' self-grasping . . . To sum up, the Mahāyāna established the manas for two reasons: first, to constantly perceive an inner ego, and second, to provide a root for the sense-center consciousness. The proofs given for the establishment of the manas in the Mahāyānasām-(pari)grahaśāstra and other works do not go beyond these two purposes.⁴

Xiong thus regards the establishment of the manas as an attempt by the Yogacāra to explain how the ignorant are deluded into believing in the existence of an ego when in truth there is no ego. Manas, says the Yogacāra, is always accompanied by the inborn concept of "I" (我, satkāyaārti).⁵ The manas also serves as the

¹. Doctrine, p. 336.
². Self-grasping is the cause of the four fundamental vexing passions (煩惱, kleśa). (Doctrine, p. 413.)
⁴. Foming, II:24b-25b.
⁵. Fanyi mingyi ji (翻譯名義集), Sibu zongkan, zibu, Vol. 531, p. 9b.
root of the sixth or sense-center consciousness. For this reason, the sixth consciousness is literally called "consciousness of manas" (意識, manovijnana).¹

The seventh consciousness, the manas, together with the first six consciousnesses are collectively known as revolving consciousnesses (轉識). The Yogacara-bhumisāstra says: "There are two kinds of consciousnesses, first, the alaya consciousness, and second, the revolving consciousnesses. These [revolving consciousnesses] consist of seven kinds from the eye consciousness to the manas."²

The first seven consciousnesses are called revolving consciousnesses because they are capable of revolving from states of contamination to states of purity and back. Xiong explains the term revolving consciousness thus:

Revolving means changing. [Revolving] means that, among the ten stages [to Buddhahood], these seven consciousnesses, when they enter yoga [i.e. meditation], have a "non-flowing" (無漏, anāsrava) nature [i.e. a passionless nature]. When they leave a state of meditation, however, their natures revolve back to a state of "flowing" (有漏, asrava). Thus it is said that the first seven consciousnesses revolve and hence they are called revolving consciousnesses. Someone asks: "After one reaches diamond heartedness [i.e. becomes a bodhisattva], the eighth consciousness revolves from flowing to non-flowing. Why then is it not also called a revolving consciousness?" The answer is that, once the eighth consciousness revolves [to a state of non-flowing], it stays that way forever and thus is different from the first seven consciousnesses. For this reason, the name revolving consciousness does not apply to the eighth consciousness.³

1. Doctrine, p. 251.
3. Foming, II:12b-13a.
Having discussed the first seven consciousnesses, we now turn our attention to the eighth consciousness.

2. The Eighth Consciousness

The most important of the eight consciousnesses, the eighth or alaya consciousness, is commonly called by a total of eleven different names. The first and most commonly used name is alaya (阿赖耶) which means repository and refers to the fact that the major function of the eighth consciousness is to act as the repository for seeds. The second name is storehouse consciousness (藏識). The eighth is called the storehouse consciousness for three reasons: it is capable of storing all seeds; it is that in which seeds are stored, and it is the storehouse which the manas constantly grasps as an ego.

The third name of seed consciousness (種子識, sarvabijaka) is given because the eighth consciousness supports the seeds of all dharmas. The fourth name, ādāna (阿陀那), means "holding together" and refers to the fact that the eighth consciousness ultimately holds the system of eight consciousnesses together. The fifth name is "support for what one knows" (所知依). "Support" means that all dharmas, whether pure or impure, use the eighth consciousness for support and thus come into existence; "what one knows" refers to these dharmas.

The sixth name is "basic support" (根本依). The first seven consciousnesses rely on the eighth as their basic support. The word "support" is used, says Xiong, because the first seven consciousnesses

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1. Xiong lists only eleven names but there are more; see: Mou Zong-san, Foxing yu bore (佛性與般若), Student Book Co., Taipei, 1977, Vol. I, p. 396.
2. Foming, II:26a.
3. Ibid., 26b.
are not produced by the eighth consciousness but are supported by it and thus gain existence.\(^1\) The seventh name is "original consciousness" (本識) and is just an abbreviated form of the sixth name. The eighth name is "varyingly maturing consciousness" (異熟識).\(^2\) This name derives from the fact that the seeds in the eighth consciousness mature at varying times. The ninth name is "spiritual consciousness" (神識). Although the Buddhists vigorously deny the existence of an \(ātman\) (神我), the eighth consciousness contains, in the form of seeds, everything possible and is also an "absolute function" (勝功能), hence the name "spiritual consciousness." The tenth name is "stainless consciousness" (無垢識, \(amala\)). The eighth consciousness is called stainless when it expels all the impure seeds and contains only pure seeds. At this stage, the eighth consciousness is stainless and is said to perceive things as a mirror reflects objects (i.e. without grasping after them).\(^3\) The eleventh and final name is "mind" (心) which means both "to assemble" (集) and "to give rise to" (起). The eighth consciousness is the collection point for all seeds, hence the meaning of "to assemble," and these seeds are ultimately the causes of all phenomena, hence the meaning of "give rise to."\(^4\)

There are several descriptions of the eighth consciousness in the Mahāyāna sūtras which Xiong considers especially important. The Tathāgatagarbhaśāstra (如來功德莊嚴經) says:

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1. Foming, 26b.
2. For the translation of this term, see: Bodde (trans.), op. cit., Vol. II, p. 300, fn. 4.
3. In the Shelun school, founded by Paramārtha, this stainless consciousness is considered a ninth consciousness, and identified with the Buddha-nature itself. (Cf. Takakusu, Essentials, p. 84; and Verdu, Dialectical Aspects, p. 31.)
4. These eleven names are listed in Foming, II:26a-27a.
"The stainless consciousness of the Tathagata (如来), its substance is pure and non-flowing. It casts off all obstructions and knows phenomena as a mirror reflects objects."¹ The Sandhinirmocanasūtra (解深密经) says: "The ādānas consciousness is both profound and minute. The seeds [within it] are like a rushing torrent. I [i.e. Buddha] have not explained [it] to the mediocre and the ignorant for fear that they would take it as an ego."² (Xiong remarks that the "I" in this quote is understood to mean the Buddha.)³ The Lankavatārasūtra says: "[The ālaya] is like the waves in a great ocean. These are blown up by ferocious winds. The great waves produce huge troughs which continue incessantly. The ālaya is also like a great ocean, the object domain moves it like strong winds, and the seeds act like waves rearing up and evolving."⁴ These descriptions are important, says Xiong, because they testify to the uniqueness of the eighth consciousness. The first quote makes it clear that the impure seeds in the eighth consciousness can be eliminated while the second quote warns against mistaking the eighth consciousness for an ego and the third quote indicates that the eighth consciousness is the ultimate source of all dharmas.⁵

The Yogacara, says Xiong, also attempted to verify the existence of the eighth consciousness by quoting from Hīnayāna sūtras.⁶ The

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1. Foming, II:28b; and Doctrine, p. 185. The title of this sūtra is given by Kui Ji in Shuji, XIX:17a; the Sanskrit reconstruction is from de la Vallée Poussin, Siddhi, p. 167. This work is not included in the Taishō collection.
3. Foming, ibid.
5. Foming, ibid.
example, says that all sentient beings "have deep affection for the ālāya, are very fond of the ālāya, take much delight in the ālāya, and rejoice greatly in the ālāya."\(^1\) This quote is said to indicate that the eighth consciousness is the object of desire of the seventh consciousness but Xiong believes this to be a forced interpretation. The term ālāya in the early sūtras, says Xiong, probably did not mean the eighth consciousness.\(^2\) The āgamas of the Mahāsamghikāya school use the term "root consciousness" while the Sthaviranikāyasūtra (上座部經) and the Vibhajyavādins (分別論者) use the term "cause of the triple existence" (有有分識)\(^3\) and the Mahīśasakā (化地) refer to "a skandha which lasts up to the end of samsāra."\(^4\)

All these terms, agrees Xiong, indicate that some Hinayāna schools came close to having a concept of an eighth consciousness.\(^5\)

3. Seeds

The eighth consciousness, says Xiong, is only important because it is the consciousness in which seeds are stored. If the Yogacāra philosophers had not posited an eighth consciousness, insists Xiong, their 'consciousness-only' philosophy would have become a "seeds-

\(^1\) Doctrine, p. 199; and Shuji, XXI:2a; and also Foming, II:29b.
\(^2\) Foming, ibid.
\(^3\) Xiong explains that only the ālāya can be the "cause of the triple existence." (Cf. Foming, ibid.; and Doctrine, p. 199.)
\(^4\) Doctrine, pp. 199-201. de la Vallée Poussin remarks: "Le texte donne, mot pour mot, Sthaviranikāyasūtra-vibhajyāśastrā. Kouei-ki [i.e. Kui Ji] dit que la Siddhi cite en tout quatre écoles. Mais nous devons distinguer ici deux écoles." (de la Vallée Poussin, Siddhi, p. 179, fn. 2; see also Shuji, XXI:1a.)
\(^5\) Foming, II:29b-30a.
only" philosophy. Seeds are defined as "that function which produces its own effect." According to Dharmapāla, whom Xuan Zang considered the authority on Yogācāra doctrine, seeds are of two kinds: original seeds which have existed before the beginning of time, and new seeds which come into being as a result of a process called "perfuming" (सोक्ह, vāsana). Seeds fructify in the eighth consciousness by means of the latent "habit-energy" with which all dharmas are associated and this process is called perfuming. Suzuki explains perfuming thus:

Vāsana is a kind of supersensuous energy mysteriously emanating from every thought, every feeling, or every deed one has done or does, which lives latently in the store-house called ālayavijnāna. ... Vāsana is morally evil and logically erroneous inasmuch as it creates an external world and causes us to cling to it as real and final. In modern psychology, we can say that vāsana corresponds to memory in its widest sense. This perfuming or leaving impressions is sometimes known as sowing seeds (bija). It is a technical term with the Yogācāra philosophers, though the Lankāvatāra does not make many references to it.

The original seeds, explains Xiong, give rise to certain phenomena (e.g. the eight consciousnesses themselves) and these phenomena, by means of perfuming, give rise to new seeds. Original seeds, then, are the causes of certain phenomena which, at the same time, are both the effects of the original seeds and the causes, by means of perfuming, of new seeds.

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1. Xinlun, VIII:97b.
3. Doctrine, p. 117.
5. Foming, II:52b.
According to the Yogacāra, seeds have six characteristics. First, seeds are momentary (刹那, kṣaṇa) which means that they perish as soon as they come into being. Second, seeds are simultaneous with their fruit so that, with seeds, cause and effect are one. Third, seeds are continuous: they never cease producing and extinguishing, coming into being and going out of being. Fourth, seeds produce fruit of the same moral species: good seeds produce good fruit; bad seeds, bad fruit. Fifth, seeds depend on a multiplicity of causes to produce their fruit and thus are incapable of spontaneous causation. And sixth, seeds engender fruit of the same kind. A seed of mind, for example, manifests itself as a mental associate while a seed of matter produces a material phenomenon.¹

4. Three Characteristics and Two States of the Eighth Consciousness

The eighth consciousness, explains Xiong, has three characteristics the first of which is causation: because the eighth consciousness stores all seeds, it is said to be the cause of all dharmas. The second characteristic of the eighth consciousness is to be influenced by the results of causation (i.e. dharmas). The eighth consciousness, by storing seeds, not only causes dharmas but also is influenced by these dharmas through the process of perfuming. The act of producing dharmas perfumes dormant seeds in the eighth consciousness and these perfumed seeds, in turn, produce other dharmas. The third characteristic of the eighth consciousness is its unique self-nature which encompasses both cause and effect in the one entity. As Xiong puts it:

The body of the alaya is that which is supported by cause and effect; cause and effect are that which is encompassed by the

¹. Foming, II:47b-48b; and Doctrine, pp. 127-129.
Aside from these three characteristics, the eighth consciousness, says Xiong, also has two states. The first is called the state of "flowing" which means flowing in the stream of births and deaths, of transmigratory suffering. Xiong says of this state:

The state of flowing refers to all sentient beings who, from the beginning of time, have always had flowing [i.e. impure] seeds which give rise to all phenomena. The pure [i.e. non-flowing] seeds are blocked [by the impure] and cannot arise. This flowing alaya is contaminated and is called alaya, storehouse consciousness, and so on. As for the name "stainless consciousness," the alaya in its flowing state does not have this name.

The second state is called "non-flowing" and means that the eighth consciousness is not flowing in the stream of transmigratory suffering and this state is thus similar to nirvana. Xiong explains this second state thus:

The state of non-flowing refers to all sentient beings who, if they diligently cultivate themselves and study, will ascend the ten stages [to Buddhahood]. The pure [i.e. non-flowing] seeds will arise and the flowing [i.e. impure] seeds will be gradually eliminated. From the eighth stage on, the fundamental kleśas are spent and the "name of alaya is forever abandoned." The eighth consciousness is now only called by the name of "stainless consciousness." Thus to be rid of the name alaya means to be rid of the contaminated portion of the eighth consciousness and not to be rid of the whole substance of the eighth consciousness.

1. Foming, II:72b.
2. Ibid.
4. Foming, II:28a; see also: Shuji, XIX:4b.
When the non-flowing state is achieved, then, the mind still perceives things but the process of perception has radically changed and is now no longer accompanied by "grasping." For this reason, the mind, in the non-flowing state, is said to perceive things as a mirror reflects objects. It is of course this second state for which all Buddhists strive.

5. Mind and Mental Associates

Each of the eight consciousnesses is divided into a mind (心, citta) and its mental associates. Because the mind and its mental associates have the same object, the same supporting base, arise at the same time, and are of the same nature, they appear to the ignorant and deluded as a single entity when in fact they are an aggregate consisting of a controlling portion (mind) and many controlled portions (mental associates). Thus we see that the term mind has several different meanings in Yogacara philosophy. It can mean the system of eight consciousnesses taken as a whole, or it can mean just the eighth consciousness, or, as in this case, it can mean the controlling portion of each consciousness. Xiong explains mind and mental associates thus:

In common discourse the mind is spoken of as if it were a complete entity and for this reason it is called mind. The Buddhists, however, wanted to correct this concept and therefore, for convenience of explanation, they analysed consciousness and said there were six, namely: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses and the sense-center consciousness. (This was the Hinayana's theory.) Afterwards, [mind] was analysed still further into eight [consciousnesses]. To the above mentioned six were added the seventh or manas consciousness, and the eighth or alaya consciousness. (This was the

1. Doctrine, p. 537.
Mahayana theory.) Thus, mind was not a complete entity. There was, however, something still lacking and so every consciousness was analysed to consist of a mind and mental associates. The eye consciousness, for example, is definitely not a complete entity. It is the mind and many mental associates combined together. Thus, we could also call it the "eye consciousness assembly." (Because it is not a complete entity, it is called an assembly.) When the eye consciousness is spoken about in conjunction with the other consciousnesses, then the eye consciousness is an independent consciousness. In speaking of the eye consciousness as a "thing-in-itself," however, it is not an independent, complete entity but is the combination of a mind and many mental associates which is then called an "eye consciousness." The mind is one but the mental associates are numerous. Although they are numerous, they all rely on the one mind and respond to it and cooperate with it. Because the mind is one, it is the "master" of the mental associates. If there were no "master," then the numerous mental associates would be confused and unconnected. The many cannot systematize the many. Thus the mind is the one "master" of the many mental associates. Because of this, the mind is also called the "king." Thus the eye consciousness is really a combination of the "king" [the mind] and his "subjects" [the mental associates]. The eye consciousness is like this as is the ear consciousness and all the other consciousnesses right down to the alaya.¹

Just as the analysis of mind into eight consciousnesses prevents one from grasping onto mind as an ego, so also the analysis of each consciousness into a controlling portion (mind) and numerous controlled portions (mental associates) prevents one from grasping onto consciousness as an ego.²

1. Foming, I:17a-18a.
2. Ibid., 18a-18b.
6. The Four Divisions

Each mind and mental associate is further analysed into four divisions.¹ According to Xiong, the first two divisions were first established by Asaṅga in the *Mahāyānasam(pari)grahasāstra* while the third division was created by Dignāga and the fourth division by Dharmapāla.² The first division is the perceived object (所缘, alambana) and as such is called the perceived division (相分, lakṣanabhaga). The second division is the perceiving subject (能缘, salambana) and as such is called the perceiving division (見分, darśanabhaga). The third division, the self-corroboratory division (自證分, svasamvittibhaga), checks upon or corroborates the results obtained from the first two divisions, while the fourth division corroborates the third and is thus known as the "corroborator of the self-corroborating division" (证自證分, svasaṃvittisamvittibhaga).³ The first two divisions, the perceiving and the perceived divisions, are called outer divisions while the last two, the self-corroborating divisions, are called inner divisions.⁴ Xiong holds that the four divisions play an important role in the Yogacāra theory of mind because they allow for the establishment of an epistemology. Xiong says:

If the four divisions were lacking even one division, then an epistemology could not be established. The *Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only* talks about "that which is measured" (所量), "that which is capable of measuring" (能量), and the "results of measurement" (量果).⁵ When

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1. *Foming*, II:40a; and *Doctrine*, p. 141.
2. *Foming*, II:40b.
measuring an object, for example, with a ruler, the object is what is measured, the ruler is that which measures, and the knowledge of the length etc., is the results of the measurement. In an analogous manner, the mind and its mental associates measure the object domain. The perceived division is that which is measured, the perceiving division is that which is capable of measuring, and the self-corroboratory division is the result of the measurement.\footnote{Foming, II:43a.}

The fourth division, Xiong goes on to explain, corroborates the knowledge (i.e. the measurement) obtained by the third division. The third and the fourth divisions, unlike the first two, are capable of self-knowledge: they not only know but also know that they know.\footnote{Ibid., 43b.} The four divisions thus play an important part in the establishment of an epistemology.

Of the four divisions, the first two are the most important for understanding the workings of the eight consciousnesses. To appreciate this, consider the first two divisions of each of the eight consciousnesses. The perceiving division of the ālaya is capable of producing and discriminating its own perceived division. The perceived division of the ālaya has three parts: the seeds which are stored in the ālaya, the "pure organs" of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body,\footnote{These "pure organs" should not be confused with the actual physical organs. See: Foming, II:9a; and Shuji, VIII:97a.} and the world of phenomena (業界). These three parts constitute the ālaya's perceived division and are what the perceiving division perceives.\footnote{Xinlun, VIII:97a.} The perceiving division of the ālaya acts as the perceived division of the seventh consciousness, the manas. The perceiving division of the manas grasps onto
the alaya and considers it a true ego.¹ The perceived and perceiving divisions of the sixth consciousness work similarly. When thinking of an orchid, for example, an image of the orchid arises and this is the sixth consciousness' perceived division. That which thinks of the orchid is the sixth consciousness' perceiving division. The perceived and perceiving divisions of each of the first five consciousnesses function analogously. The eye consciousness, for example, takes colors and shapes as its perceived division and that which discriminates colors and shapes as its perceiving division. Likewise, the body consciousness takes what it comes into contact with (i.e. sensations) as its perceived division and that which discriminates this contact as its perceiving division.² Xiong emphatically reminds us that not only does each consciousness have a perceived and perceiving division but also that each consciousness' mind and mental associates have a perceived and perceiving division as well.³

C. Xiong's Critique of the Yogācāra Theory of Mind

1. The Mirror Analogy

Having discussed the system of eight consciousnesses which constitute the Yogācāra theory of mind, we now turn our attention to Xiong's critique of that theory. As was stated above, the mind, in the non-flowing state, ceases to grasp after things and simply reflects things as a mirror reflects objects. Consequently, the

¹ Xinlun, VIII:97a.
² Ibid.
³ Foming, II:44b.
the Buddhists maintained that the mind, in its natural, unsullied state, is exactly like a mirror.¹ Xiong completely disapproved of this mirror metaphor because a mirror is passive and simply reflects an object but the mind, argues Xiong, is active and capable of knowledge. For this reason, Xiong suggested that a better metaphor for mind would be the seed of a tree which has its own latent energy and is thus capable of producing a trunk, branches, leaves, and flowers.² Furthermore, says Xiong, a mirror is an inadequate metaphor for mind because it overlooks the fact that the mind is capable of self-knowledge. The mind knows not only objects but also knows itself, but a mirror can only reflect objects and can no more reflect itself than a camera can take a picture of itself.³ Xiong also opposed the Buddhist concept of the mind as a mirror because it reduces mind to the status of an object and hence would ultimately lead to a materialist view of mind. A mirror, argues Xiong, is a passive, material object whereas mind is alive and capable of thought and knowledge. Xiong says:

The materialists want to say that the function of thinking is a material [function]. This is really a meaningless absurdity. If, as they say, matter is capable of thought, then this meaning of matter is not the original meaning. One could say that this meaning includes mind. One must know that the function of thinking is the distinguishing feature of mind.

2. Yuyao, III:50a. Xiong's inspiration for the seed metaphor for mind probably comes from the Lankavatārasūtra. (Cf. Taishō Vol. 16, No. 671, p. 518b, lines 16-17.)
3. Mingxin pian, p. 188.
If we just recognize this one point, then we will not be subject to the absurdities of the materialists. In ancient India there were those who said that a mirror is able to see objects in the same way that the mind is able to perceive objects. When [Bertrand] Russell came to China to lecture, he also said that a camera is able to see objects. This view is common to all materialists. Actually, mirrors and cameras are only able to make the image in the sphere opposite them appear. In this one point they naturally share common ground with mind because when mind perceives an object sphere, it also makes the characteristics of that sphere appear. . . . But the distinguishing feature of mind is thinking. The images which mirrors and cameras make appear can be said to be the same as the images which mind makes appear. But mind has the subtle, unfathomable function of thinking and mirrors and cameras do not.¹

Xiong, then, utterly rejects the Buddhist metaphor of the mind as a mirror because the mind does more than just reflect, it knows.²

2. Mind and Mental Associates

As described above, the Yogacāra divide the mind into eight consciousnesses and each consciousness into a controlling portion (the mind) and controlled portions (mental associates).³ The Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only explains the relationship between mind and mental associates thus: "The mental associates are so called because they always rise in dependence upon the mind, are associated with the mind, and are subordinate to and affiliated with the mind."⁴ Kui Ji attempts to clarify this by saying:

This explains the general term "mental associate" thrice.

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1. Xinlun, III:35b-36a.
2. Ibid.
3. See above, pp. 92-93.
First, mental associates always rise in dependence on the mind. If there were no mind, there could be no mental associates because the mental associates need the mind as a support before they can exist. Otherwise, the mind, with respect to the universal mental associates, should be called a mental associate. Second, "mental associates are matched with the mind." The Buddha and his disciples say: "[Mental associates] are matched with the mind." If the mind was not matched with the mental associates, then how could the four equals of equal time, equal bases of support, equal perceptions, and equal reality between mind and mental associates occur? ... Third, "[mental associates] are subordinate to and affiliated with the mind." The mind is sovereign but not so mental associates. Thus it is said: "subordinated to and affiliated with." Because they have these three meanings, they are named mental associates.¹

This explanation, argues Xiong, does not adequately clarify the difference between mind and mental associates. If one were to press the Yogacāra masters further, they would reply that each mind and each mental associate has its own seed. But, continues Xiong, this explanation is also found wanting because, although a seed of mind and a seed of a mental associate are two separate entities, seeds themselves are said to be of the same kind. Hence, seeds do not fully explain the difference between mind and mental associates. Xiong sees this vague distinction between mind and mental associates as a serious flaw in the Yogacāra theory of mind. He says:

When the Buddhists speak of mind and mental associates, they take what un-thinking people misconstrue to be a really existing mind and, by means of analysis, break it up into many elements. Thereupon, they establish one mind as the "master" and call it "king." [They also establish] many kinds of mental associates which match the mind and simultaneously perceive

¹ Shuji, XXXII:1b.
the same object sphere and thus aid the mind in accomplishing its task. For this reason, mental associates are also called "mind elements" (心数), and "helping partners" (助伴).

According to this then, what is spoken of as mind and mental associates are, as far as their natures are concerned, fundamentally without difference. As far as the relationship between the two, it is one of master and helper and that is all. Later on, the consciousness-only thinkers arose and began to establish their theory of seeds. They said that all minds and mental associates each have their own seeds. This however was nothing more than taking the original method of analysing the mind into many constituent elements and making these elements permanent by giving each element a factor of stability [i.e. its own seed]. . . . Moreover, although the seeds of the mind and the mental associates are said to be different, nevertheless the seeds of the one and the seeds of the other are all called seeds, and the meaning is quite similar. In my New Treatise on Consciousness-only I have said: "What is the fundamental difference between the mind and its mental associates? This question was never fully answered by the old masters. Although they said that the seeds of each were different, the meaning of seeds is similar."¹ The commentary [to this sentence] reads: "As this says, the mind has its own seeds and the mental associates also have their own seeds. Although the same seeds are not common [to both], the meaning of seeds is similar so there is no fundamental difference to be had."²

That there is no fundamental difference between the mind and its mental associates is unacceptable to Xiong. He resolves the problem by means of his own theory of mind. Xiong divides the mind

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¹ Xiong is here quoting from the classical edition (文言本) of his New Treatise which was first published by Peiping University in 1932. See the reprinted edition, Heluo tushu chuban she, Taipei, 1975, p. 77a.
² Foming, I:49b-50b.
into two aspects which he calls "original mind" (本心) and "habitual mind" (習心). Original mind is by its very nature pure and true while habitual mind, because it relies on the senses to respond to things, falsely distinguishes between "ego" and "other." Mental associates, claims Xiong, are the products of the habitual mind. He says:

What is the fundamental difference between the mind and its mental associates? This question was never fully answered by the Indian Buddhists. The masters of the Mahayana said that each mind and each mental associate has its own seed, and that, although they are not produced from one seed, nevertheless, seeds are all the same, (mind seeds and mental associate seeds, although they are not substantially the same entity, are the same kind), and so there is no fundamental difference to be had. I say, however, that the mind is just one's nature [i.e. original mind] and the mental associates are that which emerges through habit. Because the mental associates are only habits, they are completely "man made" (人造) and a posteriori. Because the mind is just one's nature, all its responses are natural, and what it perceives is basic and solid. That which perceives the greenness [of an object] as its general characteristic, and which does not consider the definite characteristics, and which sees the whole and not the parts, and which for this reason is said to have natural intelligence, is just the mind. If however, we have that which perceives

1. Xinlun, I:4b and 6a.

greenness yet shifts [its perception] according to the definite characteristics, and which is established by practice, and which bears witness to being man-made, then this is just the mental associates. Thus we conclude that the mind is just one's nature and the mental associates are one's habits. Thus the difference [between mind and mental associates] is uniform and not confused. Because the mind is just one's nature, it is hidden and minute. Because the mental associates are habits, they are coarse and opportunistic. Mind obtains help from the mental associates and, working together, they are powerful. The mental associates respond to the mind and cannot but struggle for supremacy. Thus the mind is definitely one's nature but the mental associates are none other than [aspects of] one's nature. On the other hand, if a tainted mental associate [i.e. habit] is licentiously indulged in, then the mind will be obstructed and unable to manifest itself. This is a mental associate subjugating the mind. When a mental associate subjugates the mind, then the mind cannot be seen and the mental associate is taken for the mind. This is what is known as losing one's mind.

Whereas the Yogacara Buddhists explain the difference between mind and mental associates by referring to the theory of seeds, Xiong, who completely rejects the theory of seeds, explains the difference within the parameters of his own theory of mind. Xiong distinguishes an original mind which is a function of ontological substance, and thus is pure, immaterial, and omniscient. This original mind, says Xiong, is synonymous with the Confucian concept of man's nature. The habitual mind, on the other hand, is the mind which responds to things, which discriminates, and which manifests itself through the sense faculties. It is the mind which psychologists analyse and unthinking people mistake for the ego. Xiong's concept of

1. Xinlun, VIII:102b-103a.
2. Ibid., I:4b-6a.
original mind replaces the Yogācāra concept of the mind which is the controlling portion of consciousness and Xiong's concept of habitual mind replaces the Yogācāra concept of the many controlled portions called mental associates. Although it can never eradicate it, in Xiong's theory of mind, the habitual mind can subjugate the original mind. But this subjugation is only temporary because, just as the sun will eventually come from behind the clouds which conceal it, so also the original mind ultimately shines through and asserts its proper position.\(^1\) This process by which the original mind conquers the habitual mind, says Xiong, is called by the Zen Buddhists "the self recognizing the self," and by Zhuangzi as "the great awakening," and it is exactly what Mencius meant when he told us to seek for "the lost mind."\(^2\)

3. Seeds

Xiong's most insistent critique of the Yogācāra concept of mind is directed against the theory of seeds. Since we will discuss seeds as causal agents and the metaphysical bifurcation of substance and function implicit in the theory of seeds in subsequent chapters, we will only discuss here the three critiques that Xiong makes against the Yogācāra theory of seeds. The first of these is that the theory of seeds is tantamount to metaphysical pluralism. Xiong believed that Vasubandhu was influenced by Śāmkhya doctrines and that Vasubandhu's theory of seeds was based on the Śāmkhya doctrine of self-nature.\(^3\) Xiong also claimed that Vasubandhu modeled his theory

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2. Xinlun, (classical), I:1a.
3. See Chapter II, p. 54; and Foming, I:44b.
of seeds on the Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms. For this reason, Vasubandhu's theory of seeds is quite different from the original theory. The seeds in Vasubandhu's theory are no longer used metaphorically to designate the power of reproduction associated with phenomena but instead are considered as really existing, independent entities. Vasubandhu's theory of seeds claims that all phenomena are caused by seeds and for this reason each mind and mental associate springs from its own seed. Furthermore, each of the two divisions into which consciousness evolves, the perceiving division and the perceived division, is produced from its own seed. Xiong dismisses this theory of seeds of Vasubandhu's as an "amassing theory": an attempt to explain the metaphysical origins of all phenomena by positing an infinite number of seeds massed together in the eighth consciousness. Xiong also suggests that he is neither the first nor the only one to criticise Vasubandhu's theory of seeds as an amassing theory. The Tang dynasty monk, Dun Lun (道隆), in his work entitled Yujia lunji (瑜伽論記), quotes a now lost Indian work, the Yiye lun (意業論), which was translated into Chinese by Paramartha. The author of the Yiye lun, the Bodhisattva Jing Yi (精意), complains: "The limitless seeds are more numerous that the drops of rain." Xiong takes this quote as proof that before the Yogācāra theory of seeds was transmitted to China, there were those who criticised it for metaphysical pluralism and for resembling an amassing theory.

1. Foming, I:§8a.
2. Yuyao, III:75b.
3. Xinlun, IV:91b; and Appendix, 28b.
Xiong's second criticism of the theory of seeds is that the theory makes for ontological dualism. The Yogācāra, says Xiong, never adequately resolved the dualism between seeds and ontological substance, between seeds and tathatā, between pure and impure seeds, and between seeds of the perceiving and perceived divisions. Xiong accuses the Yogācāra of maintaining the existence of two ontological substances. He says:

Why do we say that the Yogācāra has two ontological substances? They established seeds as the cause of all phenomena and thus seeds are one kind of ontological substance. However, [the Yogācāra] also wanted to respectfully preserve the traditionally handed-down Buddhist ontology which is called "genuine thusness" (真如, tathatā), the true substance of all phenomena. . . . When the Yogācāra speak about the "nature of dependence on others" (依他起性, paratantrasvabhāva), they change the "indirect explanation" (遮诠) of the Mādhyamika and establish a theory of "structuralism" (構造論) [i.e. the theory of seeds]. Thus, on the one hand, when speaking about cosmology, [the Yogācāra] establish plural, instantaneous (ksana) seeds which act as the cause of all phenomena. These seeds are naturally the ontological substance of all phenomena or the cosmos. On the other hand, when speaking about tathatā, [the Yogācāra] only say that it is not instantaneous or that it has no beginning. "Genuine thusness" then is yet another ontological substance. As to just what the relationship is between these two ontological substances, the Yogācāra never stated clearly. . . . Seeds are seeds and genuine thusness is genuine thusness, and these two ontological substances have no connection. [This] not only

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1. The "nature of dependence on others" is one of the three natures. (Cf. Doctrine, p. 633; and Foming, II:110a.) "Indirect explanation" was a method used by the Mādhyamika to help the ignorant realize the truth of śūnyatā. (Cf. Xínlún, III:43a.) Xiong also calls the theory of seeds a theory of structuralism. (Cf. Foming, II:91b; and Xínlún, VI:52a.)
does not accord with truth but also is inconsistent with logic.¹

By not making clear the relationship between seeds and genuine thusness, says Xiong, the Yogācāra philosophy is positing in effect two ontological substances and thus is guilty of ontological dualism.

Xiong's third critique of the theory of seeds is that the theory implies an ethical determinism. The Yogācāra classify all seeds into flowing (i.e. impure) and non-flowing (i.e. pure). A person who follows the precepts of Buddhism can eventually cleanse his eighth consciousness of all tainted seeds leaving only untainted seeds which, because untainted seeds are not subject to perfuming, would allow that person to enter nirvāṇa. Dharmapāla, however, taught that some people are born with no untainted seeds in their eighth consciousness and are thus doomed never to enter nirvāṇa. This teaching, says Xiong, is blatant ethical determinism which contradicts the basic Mahāyāna belief that all men have the Buddha nature and can achieve Buddhahood.²

D. Xiong's Concept of Mind

1. Original Mind and Habitual Mind

Xiong's concept of mind differs significantly from the Yogācāra concept. Because he completely discards the theory of seeds, Xiong has no need of an eighth consciousness and, since there is no eighth consciousness to act as its root, the seventh conscious-

1. Xinlun, VI:55a-55b.
2. Yuyao, II:9b.
ness, the manas, is likewise discarded. These two consciousnesses are replaced by what Xiong calls "original mind." The name original not only means primordial but also indicates that original mind is a function of original substance. For this reason, Xiong likens original mind to the hexagram qian (乾) of which the Book of Changes says: "Qian knows the great beginnings." In the philosophy of the Book of Changes, notes Xiong, qian represents both original mind and original (i.e. ontological) substance. Xiong describes his concept of original mind thus:

I will now briefly give the meaning of original mind. First, this mind is empty and serene: [because] its nature is far from any agitation, it is said to be serene. Because it is serene, its transformation is spiritual (神). If it were not serene, it would be agitated. How then could it be spiritual? How then could it transform? Because it is empty, its life is unfathomable. If it were not empty, it would be obstructed. How then could it have life? How then could it be unfathomable? Second, this mind is "brightly aware" (明覚) [i.e. intelligent]. What is far from ignorance is called "bright," and what is not deluded is called "aware." "Brightly aware" means that there is nothing [original mind] knows but yet nothing it does not know.

Depending on the particular function being designated, original mind, says Xiong, can be called by any of several different names. When original mind refers to the controlling portion of one's body, for example, it is called simply "mind" (心). When it refers to that by which man is man, then it is called "nature" (性).

1. Xinxun, VIII:99b.
2. Ibid., I:5a.
4. Xinxun, ibid. See Chapter five of this thesis for a discussion of ontological substance.
5. Xinxun, I:4b.
When it refers to the great source of all things, it is called "Heaven" (天). Although these names differ to accord with the different functions indicated, nevertheless, that to which these names refer, that is original mind, is single and whole. Thus, for example, when Mencius tells us that, by exhausting one's mind, one can know one's nature, and that by knowing one's nature, one can know heaven, he is speaking, says Xiong, of original mind.  

The first six consciousnesses are replaced, in Xiong's concept of mind, by what Xiong calls the "habitual mind." The first five consciousnesses correspond to the five senses while the sixth consciousness coordinates the sense data received by the first five. For this reason, Xiong characterises the first six consciousnesses as responding to outer stimuli. Likewise, the habitual mind also responds to outer stimuli, and thus it is the mind of every day life whose knowledge is gained through habit or experience.  

Xiong describes the habitual mind thus:

The habitual mind originates in the sense faculties of the body. Although it is a function of the original mind, it cannot but depend on the sense faculties to manifest itself. The sense faculties must borrow it in order to establish their natural intelligence. For this reason, then, [the habitual mind] is said to be the sense faculties of the body. It is not that the sense faculties are the original source and natural intelligence its discovery. The sense faculties of the body emanate and establish themselves by habit. Once habits are established, they unite with the body's sense faculties and become one and pursue phenomena, and this is what is called the habitual mind.

1. Xinlun, I:5a.
3. Xinlun, VIII:99b.
4. Xiong defines 形氣之靈 as 根. (Cf. Xinlun. ibid.)
5. Xinlun, I:6a.
Because the habitual mind is dependent on the sense faculties of the body to manifest itself, it is subject to a process that Xiong calls "materialization"（物化). Unlike the original mind which transcends matter and the world of phenomena and thus is not subject to materialization, the habitual mind is, says Xiong borrowing a phrase from Zhuangzi, "thinged by things."¹ Simply put, to be "thinged by things" means that one regards the phenomenal world as real and then identifies oneself as a thing, as one phenomena among many. The result of this materialization is that the mind becomes tainted by selfishness and greed. When this occurs, it gives rise to what Xiong calls the "mean self"（小己). Original mind, on the other hand, is beyond selfishness and never tainted by greed. It produces what Xiong calls the "great self"（大己).² The difference between a sage and an ordinary man, says Xiong, is simply that the sage avoids materialization and nourishes the great self. This is what Zhuangzi means when he says: "Thing things but do not be thinged by things."³ And this is what Wang Bi (王弼, 226-249) meant when he said: "The emotions of a sage respond to things but are not entrapped by things."⁴ This is also what the Buddhists

². Xinlun, I:5b.
³. See above, footnote 1. And Xinlun, (classical), p. 57b.
mean when they say: "Use things but do not be obstructed by things."^1

2. Original and Habitual Mind Explained by Gongan

Gongan (公案, Japanese: koan) literally means an official document and it connotes a sense of decision to determine truth or falsehood. The chan (禪, Japanese: zen) Buddhist Masters used gongan to help their students achieve enlightenment, while Xiong uses them to explain the difference between original mind and habitual mind. Xiong annotates the first gongan thus:

During the Tang dynasty, Dazhu Huihai (大珠慧海) went to visit Mazu (馬祖, 709-788). Mazu asked: "Why have you come here?" [Huihai] replied: "I have come to seek the Buddhist Law." Mazu replied: "You do not look after your own precious treasure." (Precious treasure is a metaphor for original mind. Because original mind is the source of all change and the origin of all things, it is likened to a precious treasure.) "Why have you left your home and gone wandering about?" (One should avoid relying exclusively on measuring wisdom or [rational] knowledge and searching [for truth] without. Most ancient and modern philosophers "leave home and wander about." ) "I have not a single thing here."

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1. Quoted in Tiyong lun, p. 302.
3. For a biography of Dazhu Huihai, see: Jingde chuandeng lu (傳燈錄), Taishō Vol. 51, No. 2076, p. 246c.
5. In Xiong's system, original mind and original substance are synonymous. Passages in parentheses are, of course, Xiong's.
6. For Xiong's definition of "measuring wisdom" see: Xinlun, VIII: 64a-66b.
"What Buddhist Law is there to seek?" (The deluded think that there is a real Buddhist Law to be sought. Buddha means "enlightened" and this [enlightenment] is just mind. "Law" means rule or truth and this is also just mind. Apart from one's mind, there is no "Buddha" to be had nor is there any "Law" to be had. One should know that the mind has no form or shape and thus cannot be sought after as if it were a thing. The instant that [the mind] is sought after, it is lost, and the seeking becomes absurd.) [Da]zhu again asked: "What is my precious treasure?" [Ma]zu replied: "The one asking me is your precious treasure." (The mind at the time [of asking] is pure and open. It has not a bit of taint or delusion and thus this mind is one's precious treasure.) "Everything is complete; nothing is missing." (All virtues and all goodness are complete [in mind]. See above, Chapter 1, where I discuss original wisdom.) "[All the mind's] functions are free from delusion." (This precious treasure is the principle by which mankind is born, and it is also the principle by which heaven and earth and the myriad of beings take form. Because mankind and heaven and earth and the myriad of beings have the same origin, therefore they cannot be bifurcated. From this, one can see that the precious treasure has endless spirituality and boundless subtle uses. For this reason, it is said to be "free from delusion." And again, if we speak of the mind from the point of view of everyday life, then this precious treasure responds to everything it comes into contact with, and there is no sensation that it does not comprehend. Thus we can see that its function is unhindered.) "Why search for it outside yourself?" (Wang Yangming [王陽明, 1472-1529] admonished his students with a poem that says: "Throwing away one's inexhaustible treasure and begging for alms from door to door like a

1. Original substance equals original mind. (Cf. Xinlun, VIII:99a.)
3. The Taishō edition does not have the words zijia (自家). Taishō, op. cit., line 14.
4. Xinlun, I:2b.
pauper." The meaning of this poem and Mazu's gongan are exactly the same.\(^1\)

This gongan, says Xiong, explains the difference between original mind and habitual mind. Like Dazhu Huihai, the average person considers the habitual mind as the only mind, and the knowledge gained in every day living as the only knowledge. Xiong, by borrowing a Buddhist term, describes this state as "the self not recognising the self."\(^2\) When, for example, Huihai asks Mazu how to seek the Buddhist Law, he is presuming that there is a Buddhist Law to be sought and this kind of thinking is the product of habitual mind and not original mind. Consequently, the Buddhist Law is considered to be a thing which exists outside of oneself, and which the habitual mind can know. But, as Hui Neng (惠能, 638-713) so tersely explains: "Apart from sentient beings, there is no Buddha mind."\(^3\) In fact, original mind, the inexhaustible "precious treasure" which makes a person one with the cosmos, is not a "thing" but is what Mencius so judiciously terms "the nobility of Heaven."\(^4\) Once this is realized, then enlightenment follows and the artificial distinctions between self and others, subject and object, etc., all of which are produced by the habitual mind, are recognized as false and forgotten. Mazu knew that Huihai was still thinking of seeking the Buddhist Law (i.e. enlightenment) by means of habitual

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mind and so scolded him for losing sight of his own "precious treasure" (original mind). When Huihai replied by asking what his precious treasure is, Mazu enlightened him by saying: "The one asking me is your precious treasure." This realization of original mind, says Xiong, is exactly what Mencius is referring to when he states that the end of all learning is to seek for the lost (i.e. original) mind. Original mind, of course, is never really lost but, like the sun on a cloudy day, covered and obscured by habitual mind. To recover the lost mind, says Xiong, one needs to free oneself from all selfish desires and then, like the sun breaking through the clouds, original mind will shine of its own accord.

To illustrate the difference between original and habitual mind, Xiong quotes and annotates a second gongan:

Baizhang Huaihai (百丈懷海, 720-814) was a disciple of Mazu. Master [Huaihai] accompanied Mazu on a walk. [they] saw a flock of geese fly by. [Mazu] asked: "What was that?" Master [Huaihai] replied: "Wild geese." [Mazu] asked: "Where have they gone?" Master [Huaihai] replied: "They have flown away." [Mazu] then turned around, took Master [Huaihai's] nose and tweaked it. [Huaihai] felt the pain and cried out. [Mazu] said: "Will you again say that they have flown away?" Master [Huaihai] reflected on these words and then, sad and crying, returned to the monks' residential hall. A colleague asked: "Are you thinking about your mother and father?"

1. Xinlun, VIII:67b.
2. Ibid.; and Legge (trans.), Mencius, Book VI, Part 1, Chapter 11.
3. Xinlun, VIII:68a.
4. For a biography of Baizhang Huaihai, see: Jingde chuandeng lu, Taishō Vol. 51, No. 2076, p. 249b.
5. The original is in the Zhiyue lu (指月錄), compiled by Qu Ruji (瞿汝稷), juan 8, pp. 1a-2a. In the original, the three words 回頭將 are replaced by 把 and the - omitted.
Master [Huaihai] replied: "No." [The colleague] asked: "Have you been scolded?" Master [Huaihai] replied: "No." [The colleague] asked: "Why then are you crying?" Master [Huaihai] replied: "My nose was tweaked by the great Master [Mazu] and the pain will not subside."¹ The colleague asked: "For what reason?" Master [Huaihai] replied: "Go ask the monk [i.e. Mazu]."² The colleague asked [Mazu]: "When [Huaihai] was accompanying you, what did he do wrong? He is in the residential hall crying. He told me to ask you to explain."³ [Mazu] replied: "He now understands. Go ask him yourself."⁴ The colleague returned to the residential hall and said: "The monk [i.e. Mazu] told me you now understand and to ask you."⁵ Master [Huaihai] guffawed and laughed heartily. The colleague asked: "Just a while ago you were crying, why are you now laughing?" Master [Huaihai] replied: "A while ago I was crying but now I am laughing." The colleague did not understand him. The next day, Mazu ascended the [lecture] hall.⁶ All the monks gathered together. Master [Huaihai] came out and rolled up [his] mat, whereupon [Mazu] sat down. Master [Huaihai] followed [Mazu] to his office. [Mazu] said: "What were you taking heed of yesterday?" Master [Huaihai] said: "My nose does not hurt today." [Mazu] said: "You deeply understand the events of yesterday." Master [Huaihai] bowed and left.⁷

There are, says Xiong, two significant lessons to be learned from this gongan. The first is that original mind transcends the phenomenal world and is independent. But transcends in this context,
warns Xiong, does not mean above and beyond phenomena but rather that "nothing is transcendental apart from the concrete."\(^1\) Original mind manifests itself as phenomena but exists among phenomena as the controller and never becomes materialized and this is what Xiong means when he says that the mind transcends. Consider, for example, the following: the student Zhaozhou Congshen (趙州從諗, 778-897) asked the Master Nanquan Puyuan (南泉普願, 748-834) "What is the Way (道)?" The Master replied: "The everyday mind is the Way."\(^2\) The everyday mind is the Way because the Way does not exist apart from the concrete. The habitual mind, unlike the original mind, does not transcend but on the contrary knows only to search for truth without, in the phenomenal world of things and events. The habitual mind is incapable of introspection and enlightenment and for this reason Xiong describes it as subject to materialization. When Mazu asked Huaihai what was flying overhead, Huaihai did not realize Mazu's true intent and answered "wild geese." This answer indicated that Huaihai was thinking with habitual mind and not original mind. And thus:

To say that the geese have flown away is to work on the intellectual level, to apply simple logic. But this very use of intellectual logic is ignorance to the Buddhists; to rely upon this method of apprehension is to block one's inner light.\(^3\)

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1. Original Teachings, p. 92.
3. Original Teachings, p. 132. What Chang here calls "intellectual logic" is similar to Xiong's habitual mind while Chang's "inner light" is similar to Xiong's original mind.
Mazu asked where the geese were flying and Huaihai, again using habitual mind, replied that the geese had flown away. Mazu then tweaked Huaihai's nose and the pain and shock brought Huaihai to enlightenment. Once the pain had subsided, and Huaihai had discerned Mazu's reason for tweaking his nose, Huaihai laughed with pleasure at his new found awareness. From the point of view of original mind, there are no wild geese because the wild geese and Huaihai are one. After his enlightenment, Huaihai explained original mind in a lecture to the other monks. His explanation, together with Xiong's annotations, is:

"The light of the spirit alone is resplendent." (This refers to the mind. Everyone has an inner spiritual light [called] the honored host. But if one does not know this, what can be done? Honored host is originally a chan term. One definitely should not mistake it for the soul of which religions speak. The first philosophers called the mind the "heavenly prince" because it is the ruler of the body. [Heavenly prince] has the same meaning as honored host.) "It transcends the senses and mundane things." (Senses here means the body's sense organs and does not mean the natural world. This sentence means that the mind transcends the body and all phenomena. For the meaning of transcend, see above.) "Its substance is manifested in the true and constant." (Substance designates the mind's self-substance. Manifest means to manifest what is hidden. True means not preposterous. Constant means unchanging. The self-substance of this mind, although it has no form or characteristics, nevertheless, it has the characteristic of non-characteristics and quite clearly manifests itself and is not empty or non-existent. Its virtue is real and not false, constant and unchangeable. For this reason, it is said to be the

1. Xinlun, VIII:69a gives Xiong's explanation of transcend.
original nature of man and the original substance of all things.) "It is not confined to the written word." (Conventional scholars are restricted by documents. They expect to find the Way from the written word. They do not comprehend that the Way does not exist apart from our minds somewhere outside. Nowadays [scholars] do not seek within their own minds but vainly expect to realize the Way from the written word. This is like thinking that, by merely keeping fish traps and snares, one can catch fish and rabbits.)¹ "The nature of the mind is without taint." (Nature here means self-substance. It means that the self-substance of the mind is without the slightest bit of taint and is pure and perfect.) "It is perfect in itself." (All virtues fill it and all transformations do not exhaust it - this is the meaning of complete. It is naturally made and does not require creation and this too is the meaning of perfect.) "Only apart from habitual ignorance (善�) is there the 'thus so' Buddha nature."² (Selfishness, greed, deceit, taint, etc., are all other names for bad habits. Bad habit means habitual ignorance. The term habitual ignorance indicates falseness, that it is not part of [man's] original nature. 'Thus so' means unchanging. Buddha means enlightenment and is also called the nature of the mind. The nature of the mind is untainted, perfect, and insubstantial and for this reason is called the Buddha [nature]. The nature of the mind, although it can be blocked by habitual ignorance, is, nevertheless, constantly [untainted] as before. It cannot be changed and thus is not moved by habitual ignorance and thus is said to be untainted. Take, for example, the case of dust blocking a bright mirror. The bright mirror's self-substance is, as always, [bright]. It is not stained by


2. The term wangyuan literally means the causes of ignorance but Xiong equates it with habit and so I translate it habitual ignorance.
the dust and, if it is wiped clean, regains its former brightness. It is the same with the nature of the mind—once it discards habitual ignorance, it regains its original illumination.)

From these remarks, says Xiong, we see that, because of Mazu's tweak of the nose, Huaihai has been enlightened and has abandoned the vain pursuit of external things in search of the truth. He has come to realize that what he needs, he has had all along—namely, original mind.  

The second lesson to be learned from this gongan, says Xiong, is simply that it is necessary to actively nourish and protect original mind. The replies that Huaihai made to Mazu's questions about the wild geese were, from the pedestrian point of view, quite correct. Nevertheless, Mazu tweaked Huaihai's nose so strongly that he cried out in pain. This tweaking was done because Mazu knew from Huaihai's answers that Huaihai had allowed his habitual mind to cloud over his original mind. Huaihai was still thinking in terms of subject and object dichotomies and discursive logic. Mazu's tweak on the nose, together with the admonition: "Will you again say that they have flown away?" were sufficient to give Huaihai the needed insight into original mind. Once he realized that, from the point of view of original mind, his answers were totally inadequate, he stopped crying from the pain and laughed instead.

1. Xinlun, VIII:69b-70a; see also Zhiyue lu, op. cit., juan 8, p. 7a.
2. Xinlun, VIII:70a.
3. Ibid.
CHAPTER IV: XIONG SHILI'S CRITIQUE OF THE YOGACĀRA THEORY OF
CAUSALITY

A. The Four Causes

Causality is one of the most important concepts in Buddhism\(^1\) and traditionally the meaning of causality has been stated as:

When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases.\(^2\)

The Buddhists maintain that, whatever exists, exists as the result of a plurality of causes and that nothing exists independently of a cause. For this reason, the Buddhists also call the theory of causality the theory of dependent origination. Stcherbatsky says of dependent origination:

This term means that every point-instant of reality arises in dependence upon a combination of point-instants to which it necessarily succeeds, it arises in functional dependence upon "a totality of causes and conditions" which are its immediate antecedents. . . . Reality, as ultimate reality, reduces to point-instants of efficiency, and these point-instants arise in functional dependence upon other point-instants which are their causes. They arise, or exist, only so far as they are efficient, that is to say, so far they themselves are causes. Whatsoever exists is a cause, cause and existence are synonyms.\(^3\)

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The Buddhist theory of causality, then, means that whatever exists is a cause and whatever is a cause exists.¹ The Yogacara, says Xiong, after inheriting this traditional concept of causality, proceeded to both systematize it and change it radically.² The Yogacara systematized causality by positing a theory of four causes.³ They radically altered the meaning of causality by making seeds the ultimate causal agents.⁴ This change in the traditional meaning of causality was so drastic, says Xiong, that it marks a major turning point in the history of Buddhist thought.⁵ The Mahayana Madhyamika School had previously used causality to show that no dharma has self-nature and this upheld the school's basic tenet that all things are essentially "empty."⁶ The Yogacara, however, by making seeds causal agents, used causality to explain the existence of dharmas and this enabled their philosophy to formulate a cosmology.⁷ Generally speaking, Xiong accepts the concept of causality and the Yogacara's theory of four causes but not uncritically. He criticises, for example, the distinction between immediate and remote object causes because this distinction is based on a premise which Xiong rejects, namely that all consciousnesses are separate entities. Xiong accepts the first cause, cause proper, in principle but completely rejects the Yogacara argument that seeds

2. Tiyong lun, p. 135.
3. The four causes, says Xiong were first posited in the Prajñā-mulaśastratīka (中觀論, Taishō 1564) which is attributed to Nagarjuna and was translated by Kumārajīva. Cf. Popo lun, p. 44.
4. Tiyong lun, ibid.
5. Xinlun, II:41a; VI:48a, 52a, and 54a. And Foming, II:94a.
6. Popo lun, ibid.
7. Xinlun, VI:45a.
are causal agents. Let us now consider Xiong's explication of the four causes.¹

1. The First Cause

In the Yogācāra theory of causality, there are four causes: the cause proper, the preceding moment, the object cause, and the contributory cause.² By means of these four causes, the existence of all phenomena can be accounted for. In the Prāṇyāyamūlaśāstra-tīka, Pingala (青目), a student of Naṭārjuna, says:

Everything that is caused can be encompassed in the four causes. By means of the four causes, the myriad of things are produced.³

The first of the four causes, says Xiong, is unique in that, unlike the other three, it is a true cause. The Hinayāna had earlier posited six causes but these were either causal conditions or supplementary causes and not one met the criteria of a true cause.⁴ The Sarvāstivādin School seemed to distinguish between cause (原因, hetu) and causal condition (緣, pratyaya) but it was the Yogācāra that resolved this dichotomy by positing a true cause.⁵ The positing of a true cause, says Xiong, is a great achievement and a significant contribution of the Yogācāra to Buddhist thought.

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1. For an English account of Xiong's theory of causation, see:

2. English translations for the first three of the four causes are taken from Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1951, p. 220. I have used my own translation of "contributory cause" for the fourth cause because it better suits Xiong's explication of the fourth cause.


4. Foming, II:75a. Kui Ji also held this opinion, see: Shuji, XXXIV:4b-5a.

5. Causality, p. 64.
This true cause is the first of the four causes and is called cause proper (因緣, hetupratyaya). The cause proper, according to Xiong, has three characteristics: first, it must be capable of producing its own effect; second, the effect must be distinct and separate from the cause; and third, it must be a true cause and not a causal condition or supplementary cause. Xiong says:

What is cause proper? First, [we] must briefly explain the meaning of the term "cause proper" (yinyuan, 因緣), and then we can decide on a definition. I have already said above that the meaning of the word yuan (緣) [is "by means of" (憑藉)]. The meaning of the word yin (因) is just "to follow from" (因由). The manifestation of any thing or event does not arise spontaneously; there must be that "from which it follows." In the past, among the non-Buddhist Indian schools, there was one group which held that the world arose spontaneously and had no "that from which it followed." This group's thought was too coarse and shallow and the Buddhists refuted it. Thus, [the Buddhists] said that all the "that from which it follows" of a thing or an event, are just the one kind of cause which that thing or event awaits to enable it to manifest [itself]. In this way, then, [the Buddhists] called yinyou (因由) a cause, [and] thus [they] say "cause proper." Among the four causes, the cause proper is especially important and that is why it is placed first. Now let us decide on the definition of cause proper. Previously, the Indian [Yogacāra] Masters decided on the definition of cause proper by saying that whatever function has the ability to completely produce its own effect, then that should be

1. Xinlun, II:27b. Stcherbatsky describes cause proper as the "cause which settles the character of the result." (Buddhist Logic, p. 139.) See also: Doctrine, p. 535, and Foming, II:72a.
2. Xinlun, III:27b.
3. Xiong defines the word yuan in Xinlun, III:26a.
called cause proper.¹ The old Masters, by so deciding the
definition of cause proper, thus established seeds as the
cause proper of consciousness,² and said that consciousness
was the "fruit" [i.e. effect]³ of the seeds. Now [let us]
first examine the old Masters' meaning of cause proper and
then later appraise their theory of seeds. The definition
of cause proper determined by the old Masters can be divided
into three parts for clarification. First, with regard
the effect, that which acts as the cause proper is absolutely
real. Otherwise, there would be no ability to produce an
effect and thus there could be no cause proper. Secondly,
the effect produced by the cause proper is distinct from the
cause and has its own substance. In other words, cause and
effect are not one thing. Thirdly, the cause proper is ab­s­olutely capable of producing its own effect. This meaning
is the most important. If a cause is not capable of producing
its own effect, or if it is not absolutely capable of producing
its own effect, then that cause is a contributory cause, about
which I will speak later, and not a cause proper. Thus the
third of the three meanings is very important. The old
Masters' meaning of cause proper is just this.⁴

Although Xiong agrees with the Yogacāra on the principle of
a cause proper and praises them for positing a cause proper, never­
theless, Xiong strongly objects to the linking of the theory of
seeds to cause proper. Seeds, claim the Yogacāra, are causal
agents capable of producing distinct and separate effects. By
making seeds causal agents, criticises Xiong, the relationship

¹ Shuji, XXXIV:1b, and Doctrine, p. 534.
² Consciousness here, says Xiong, means the grasping mind which
Xiong calls the habitual mind. (Xinlun, III:27b.) Ren Jiyu
also maintains that the Yogacāra consider seeds to be cause
proper. He quotes the Yogacārabhumiśāstra: "Seeds are called
cause proper." (Ren Jiyu, op. cit., p. 225.)
³ Xiong uses the terms "fruit" and "effect" interchangeably.
⁴ Xinlun, II:27a-27b.
between seeds and consciousnesses becomes analogous to the relationship between atoms and matter.¹ Xiong says:

Let us now appraise their [i.e. the Yogācāra] theory of seeds. The theories of seeds in the old schools were extremely complex. Let me talk about their essentials later. For now, I want to speak about the psychological aspects. The connotation of seeds is a kind of "power" or "influence." They are called seeds just because they have the ability to produce. People say that barley, rice, etc. all have seeds. The old Masters probably took this worldly meaning of seeds and applied it to metaphysics.² [They] conjectured that consciousness arises from a separate kind of productive "power," and so they called this "power" seeds. What the old Masters called "seeds" in their theory, however, was definitely not an abstract idea. They considered seeds to be substantially real functions capable of producing an effect. They also considered seeds to be separate, innumerable, plural entities which were not integral. Why did they theorize about seeds in this way? They probably considered that our consciousnesses, which are constantly arising and extinguishing, cannot but have "that from which they follow." Therefore, they relied on conjecture and said that there are separate, real seeds which are the causes capable of producing consciousnesses, and consciousnesses are the effects produced by seeds. Originally, the Indian Mahāyāna Buddhists considered consciousness, not as a complete whole, but as independent parts.³ Thus they analysed each person's consciousness into eight parts. From this, we must say that the seeds which are the causes proper of consciousnesses are also separate, innumerable, plural entities incapable of being a complete whole. According to their theory, the present instance of eye consciousness, [for example], has its seeds as cause proper and is thus able to

1. Foming, I:98a.
3. See Chapter II, p. 56.
arise. By inference, the past instance of eye consciousness, or any predicted future instances, all operate the same way. The eye consciousness is like this [and so] is the ear consciousness, the nose consciousness, and the other consciousnesses right up to the ālaya— all operate the same way. In summary, each separate seed produces its own separate effect. Thus, [when the Yogacāra] decided on a definition of cause proper, they especially emphasized the ability to produce its own effect. Because their seeds are plural, if each was not capable of producing its own effect, would not there have been utter chaos? The theory of the old Masters was probably like this. (Compare Vasubandhu's explanation in the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra of the item under the six characteristics of seeds which says seeds induce their own fruit.)^1

Now, I would like to add a simple criticism. The old Masters analysed consciousness, just as they analysed matter, into separate, independent elements, and this is their fundamental error. . . . As to positing seeds as the cause of consciousness, and consciousness as the effects of seeds, this split cause and effect into two, like saying a mother and child are two separate persons. This concept of cause and effect is too clumsy. It represents a kind of erratic thinking in their metaphysic. . . . In summary, I want to completely refute the theory of seeds of the old Masters. As to the theory of cause proper, I cannot agree [with them] against principle.  

2. The Second Cause

The second of the four causes is called the preceding moment (等無間緣, samanantarapratyaya).^3 Unlike the first cause, cause proper, the second cause is not a real cause but a supplemen-
tary cause or causal condition. It does not rely on seeds to be established but instead relies on the manifestation of phenomena by consciousness.¹ The preceding moment, says Xiong, has four characteristics. First, only the previous instance of consciousness can be a preceding moment. Second, the preceding moment must be of the same kind (i.e. similar in substance and function) as the following instance and it must be continuous with the following instance. Third, the preceding moment must actively "lead the way" and incur the following instance. Fourth, the preceding moment must inevitably be followed by the following instance of consciousness.² Xiong describes the preceding moment thus:

What is the preceding moment? This cause is also called the sequence cause (次第緣) because the previous instance of consciousness is capable of leading the following instance of consciousness into existence. Thus the previous instance of consciousness is said to be a "sequence cause" to the following instance of consciousness. Why is it said that the previous instance of consciousness causes the following instance? [This is said] because consciousness instantly arises and instantly expires. In other words, the previous instance of consciousness expires just as the following instance arises. The reason the previous instance expires just as the following instance arises is just that the previous instance of consciousness is capable of acting as a sequence cause to the following instance of consciousness, and is also capable of leading the following instance into existence. Thus [consciousness] expires and arises without interruption. If the previous instance of consciousness was unable to cause the following instance of consciousness, then the previous instance, as soon as it expired, would be forever extinguished and there would never

1. Foming, II:75a.
2. Ibid., see also: Liu Shu-hsien, op. cit., p. 400.
be a following instance of consciousness. This type of "fatal­ism" (斷見) is unreasonable.¹ (In ancient India there was a non-Buddhist school which advocated that all dharmas, when expired, were extinguished permanently - just as when a man dies, there is no rebirth.) Because the previous instance is capable of leading the following instance, thus the previous instance is said to be the cause of the following instance. Since the following instance is caused by the previous instance, even though the following instance is newly created, it is not without roots in the previous instance. The establishing of the sequence cause is very significant. Someone might ask: "How is it that the sequence cause is also called the preceding moment?" I would answer that this name can be explained in two parts. First, [it means] "similarity" (deng, 等)² and "leading the way" (kaidao, 開導). Second, [it means] "continuous" (無間). In the first meaning, "similarity," and in the second meaning, "leading the way," the word dao means "to incur" (招引). The word kai has two meanings: first, it means "to avoid" (避開), and second, it means "to give up one's place to a late comer." If the previous instance of consciousness did not expire, then it would stay in its place and obstruct the following instance of consciousness and thus prevent it from gaining existence. The previous instance of consciousness, however, arises and then expires (instantaneously), and does not remain for even a moment. It is as if the previous instance were purposefully avoiding [obstructing the following instance] and relinquishing a place to the late comer. It quickly incurs the following instance of consciousness and causes it to instantly arise. Thus it is said to "lead the way." The word deng means "similar to" (相似). The previous instance of consciousness causes the following instance and when the following instance arises,

¹. Literally: "interruption theory." This theory held that life ended with death and that there was no rebirth.

². Cf. Xinlun, III:30b.
it is always similar to the previous instance. There is not even an iota of an interval in which the arising instance of consciousness and the previous instance of consciousness resemble something different or abnormal, and thus the previous instance and the following instance have a uniform nature.

Someone might ask: "Since the previous instance of consciousness avoids [obstructing the following instance], it expires and there is nothing. How, then, can you say that it incurs the following instance?" I would answer that the previous instance of consciousness, just as it is about to arise, has the power to induce the following instance. It is not that, after it has already expired, it is able to incur [the following instance]. You should know that all things and events, just as they are about to be produced, have already induced their following new mutations and this is not the least bit strange.

In the second meaning of "continuous" (wujian, 無間), the word jian (間) means "an interval" (間隔) or "an interruption" (間斷). When the previous instance expires, that is when the following instance arises. Between the expiring [of the former] and the arising [of the latter], there is no time, no interval. If there was time between expiring and arising, then this would be an interval between expiring and arising. [If there were such an interval], then, when the previous instance expired, [it would be] severed [from the following instance]. How then could the following instance arise? Thus, the expiring of the former and the arising of the latter occur at the same time, and are very closely connected. Between the two, there is not even the slightest interval, and absolutely no interruption. Zhuangzi has already said that the evolution of all things transpires secretly within the formless. The past is completely extinguished while the

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1. The word sheng (生) "coming to be" is often used interchangeably with the word qi (起) "arising." (Cf. Taishō No. 99, p. 85b; and Popo lun, p. 41.) For this reason and style's sake, I translate sheng as "arising" instead of the more cumbersome "coming to be."
future newly arises in constant movement. Because this happens so secretly no one realizes it.\(^1\) ... Someone asks: "The old Masters say that consciousness has times of interruption. For example, there are times when the eye consciousness does not see colors, and the sense-center consciousness is not thinking. Is this correct?" I reply that the old Masters analysed consciousness into separate, independent units. Thus they speculated that eye consciousness and the sense-center consciousness have times of interruption. Actually the function of spirit\(^2\) is integral. We cannot say it is subject to interruption. When the eye consciousness is not seeing colors and the sense-center consciousness is not thinking, the function of spirit which is their ability to see or think is always present. How can you use the sayings of the old Masters as evidence (of interruption)?

When these meanings (of "similarity," "leading the way," and "continuous") are synthesized, then the sequence cause can also be called the preceding moment. This meaning can also be understood. Our minds all have a preceding moment cause. Every instant, the previous instance of consciousness expires and "leads the way" [to the following instance]. The following instance of consciousness is incurred by the previous instance and arises. In this way, the mind unceasingly flows onward. [What is] constant is new; there is no preserving of the old. Thus one can see that the function of spirit has the virtue of being extremely vigorous (剛健).\(^3\) Its movement is subtle and unfathomable. Some scholars think that the movement of mind is from past to present and tending toward the future. It is as if the past has not expired but is constantly having new things added to it. This kind of explanation is erroneous. The Buddhists dismissed it as a

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1. Xinlun, III:30b; and Xinlun, (classical), p. 18a.
2. "Spirit" (精神), in Xiong's usage, means immaterial or supramaterial and is synonymous with mind.
3. This term is from the Book of Changes, under the qian (乾) hexagram. For Xiong's explanation of this term, see: Yuyao, III:31a.
"constancy theory" (常見). (A theory which claims that all things can be constantly kept, the Buddhists call a "constancy theory.") We should know that, within the universe, there are no old things stagnantly piling up.\(^1\)

Xiong rigorously defends the preceding moment cause because it is a mainstay for the Buddhist theory of instantaneity (剎那, kṣaṇa) which theory Xiong incorporates into his own philosophical system. Briefly put, the theory of instantaneity maintains that no dharma has duration but that all dharmas are destroyed at the moment of production. The production and destruction of any dharma is instantaneous.\(^2\) The ignorant consider the ego, the external world, and other phenomena to be real entities having duration when in fact they are just products of mind. The theory of instantaneity is central to Xiong's thesis that nothing exists independently of mind and hence the preceding moment cause is important because it provides a logical base for the theory of instantaneity.

3. The Third Cause

The third of the four causes is the object cause (所緣緣, ālambanapratyaya).\(^3\) Like the second cause, the object cause is not a true cause but a supplementary cause. The Yogacāra distinguished between an immediate (親) object cause and a remote (疏)

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1. Xinlun, III:30a-32a.
2. Xinlun, IV:69b-71a.
3. Doctrine, pp. 543-545, and Foming, II:75a-78a. Stcherbatsky calls it an "object condition" and says: "This cause embraces everything existing. All elements, so far [as] they can be objects of cognition, are object causes." (Buddhist Logic, p. 138.)
This distinction was based on the premise that each consciousness was a separate entity and not just a different function of an integral mind. Since Xiong completely rejects this premise, he also rejects the distinction between an immediate and a remote object cause. Xiong says:

In speaking of the object cause, the old Masters distinguished between an immediate and a remote [object cause]. Because they claimed that each person has eight consciousnesses, and that each of these eight consciousnesses is a separate entity, in speaking about the object cause, they thus determined that there was both an immediate and a remote [object cause]. According to their theory, the sphere of colors discriminated by the eye consciousness, [for example], is transformed [and] manifested by the eye consciousness itself. Moreover, this sphere of colors has real substance. (It is a substantial dharma.) This sphere of colors is thus the immediate object cause of eye consciousness. When the eye consciousness is transforming and manifesting the sphere of colors, however, [it] must also rely upon a kind of original matter (本質) in order to arise. What is this original matter? According to them [i.e. the old Masters], it is called the world of phenomena (器界). (It is also called the material universe, and is quite similar to what is commonly called the natural world.) [This world of phenomena is] just the object sphere transformed and manifested by the eighth consciousness which is also called alaya. The eye consciousness itself does not perceive this object sphere of the eighth consciousness, but it must rely upon [the eighth consciousness'] original matter and then transform and manifest this into its own sphere of colors. The object sphere, i.e. the world of phenomena, of the eighth consciousness is then the remote object cause of eye consciousness. The sphere of colors which eye consciousness itself transforms is the immediate object cause of eye consciousness.

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1. Doctrine, pp. 543-545, and Foming, II:82a-84a. Different versions of the meaning of immediate and remote are given by Kui Ji (Shuji, XXXIV:21a-22a), and Xuan Zang (Doctrine, ibid.).
The division of the eye consciousness' object cause into immediate and remote is as stated above. That the object causes of the ear consciousness, etc. are all divided into immediate and remote can be similarly determined [I have discussed this] in detail in my Comprehensive Explanation of Buddhist Terms and it should be referred to.¹ This essay [i.e. New Treatise on Consciousness-only] and the theoretical system of the old Masters are completely different. Hence, although one is not prevented from dividing the object cause into immediate and remote, nevertheless, the old Masters' meaning of immediate and remote is quite different from mine. I will wait until I write Essay on Epistemology (量論) to discuss this in detail.²

Xiong accepts the Yogācāra concept of an object cause but not the distinction between immediate and remote object cause because this distinction is made on the false premise that the eight consciousnesses are distinct entities. The object cause, by Xiong's definition, has four characteristics: first, the object cause is absolutely a real dharma; second, it is completely consigned to consciousness; third, it is completely carried by consciousness; and fourth, it is completely thought about by consciousness.

Xiong explains:

What is the object cause? All the objects of consciousness are collectively called the object sphere. Consciousness is capable of perceiving while the object is that which is perceived. This "capable of perceiving" consciousness is not able to arise by itself but must rely upon an object cause in order to come into existence. For this reason, the object

¹. Foming, II:78a.

². Xinlun, III:36b-37a. Xiong's Essay on Epistemology, to the best of my knowledge, was never published. Xiong does, however, give an outline for this essay in his 1956 work Origins of Confucianism (原儒). (Cf. Yuan ru, I:1a.)
sphere is called the object cause. This type of cause is very important. If, for example, there is a white object in front of [me], then it acts upon the eye consciousness as an object cause, and causes the eye consciousness to arise at the same time as itself. Thus one can see that the strength of the object cause is great indeed. As to the definition of object cause, the Indian Buddhists were of several opinions. The Mahāyāna had the Bodhisattva Dignāga (陈那, fifth century) who wrote the Ālambanaparīkṣā (觀所緣緣論, Taishō 1624) which, although a small book, has great value. [Dignāga] established a base for Mahāyāna epistemology, and refuted the Hinayāna scheme which advocated [the existence of] real objects independent of mind. I have already spoken about this in my *Comprehensive Explanation of Buddhist Terms* and will not repeat it here. I will now ascertain the definition of object cause. The best [method] is to extensively investigate and select from the theories of Masters such as Dignāga, Dharmapāla, and Xuan Zang. The meaning of object cause is divided into four [parts] as follows.

First) The object cause is absolutely a substantially real dharma. Whatever kind of object acts as an object cause to consciousness definitely has its own substance. Because it has substance, thus it also has a type of power which is sufficient to "draw out" consciousness and cause it to arise.

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1. All objects of cognition are object causes. (Buddhist Logic, p. 138.)
3. Foming, II:40b-41b.
4. Literally the "capable of perceiving consciousness" which I give as just "consciousness" for style's sake. Cf. Xinlun, III:31b. Yuan, in the term "perceiving" (能), has a different meaning than yuan in the term "cause" (緣). Tiyong lun, p. 133.
A white object, for example, is substantially real and is not false or unreal. It is capable of drawing out eye consciousness and causing the eye consciousness to arise at the same time as itself. From this, then, we can say that an object acts as a cause of consciousness. If [the object] were false and unreal, then there would be absolutely nothing to act as a cause. Take, for example, a bottle. According to the worldly explanation, this bottle is the cause of eye and other consciousnesses. Actually, this is a contrary view. We should know that the so-called bottle in reality has no self-substance but is a false and empty thing. How then can it be the cause of consciousness? If you do not believe what I say, I ask you: "What kind of thing is a bottle?" You must reply: "Looking at it, it is white; touching it, it is solid." What you do not know is that your eye consciousness perceives only the sphere of whiteness but never the whole bottle. As to your body consciousness, it perceives only the sphere of solidity and never the whole bottle. Your first five consciousnesses, just as they are perceiving whiteness, solidity, etc., within that instant, the perceiving consciousnesses and the perceived spheres of whiteness, solidity, etc. are all annihilated, are all completed. But your sense-center consciousness arises closely behind the first five consciousnesses and recollects the spheres of whiteness and solidity. It then falsely constructs a complete bottle. In truth, the spheres of whiteness, solidity, etc. have their own self-substance and are not false or empty. They can act as object causes to consciousness. As to the "bottle" constructed by the sense-center consciousness, it is fundamentally a non-substantive and unreal dharma. If it can act as a cause, then causality has no meaning. The "bottle" is like this and so are other similar objects.

As I have said above, the object cause is definitely real. Because of this, the following instance of consciousness

1. The first five consciousnesses are collectively called ganshi (感識). (Xinlun, III:32b.)
2. Xinlun, III:31b-32b.
need not take the previous instance's object as object cause. The Tang dynasty Master, Pu Guang (普光),\(^1\) had said that the following instance of consciousness of the first five consciousnesses takes the previous instance's object as object cause. This statement is erroneous. We should know that all things and events immediately arise and immediately expire, and do not abide even for an instant. The previous instance's object is brought forth with the previous instance and expires with the previous instance. It is fundamentally incapable of abiding until the following instance [arises].\(^2\) . . .

Second) The object cause is completely consigned to consciousness. Whatever is a real dharma, when it acts as the object cause to consciousness, has a kind of attracting power to which consciousness consigns itself, and which causes consciousness and itself [i.e. the object cause] to arise simultaneously. Because the mind does not arise alone, it absolutely needs to consign [itself] to an object and then it can arise. The eye consciousness, for example, must consign itself to a blue or other colored object [because] it cannot arise alone. Even the body consciousness must consign itself to all objects with which it comes into contact and cannot arise alone. The sense-center consciousness, when it is contemplating, must have an image in mind which manifests [itself] as similar to the "thing-as-perceived" (相狀) which is being contemplated.\(^3\) This image, although it relies on mind to be manifested, is taken by the mind as that to which the mind consigns itself. Otherwise, mind would also not arise. If one says that mind is capable of arising alone and does not need [anything] to consign itself to, this is absolutely impossible.

Third) The object cause is completely carried by consciousness. The connotation of "carried" is "clasping closely

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1. Pu Guang was a student of Xuan Zang’s. For his biography, see: Song gaoseng zhuân (宋高僧傳), juan 4.
2. Xinlun, III:33b.
and compelling to join" (挾近逼附). It means that the object sphere causes the consciousness to be clasped and attached to itself [i.e. to the object sphere]. Thus "that capable of causing" [i.e. consciousness] and "that which is caused" [i.e. the object] are blended together inseparably. In other words, consciousness imperceptibly enters the object as if they were one, and for this reason [consciousness] is said "to entail" (挾帶) [the object].¹ The eye consciousness, for example, just at the instant when it sees the color white, before it consults memory or starts to discriminate or deduce, this "seeing" blends with the white color as one and, at this instant, there is no "eye consciousness" or "white object" to be divided. Just at this instant, then, the eye consciousness itself clasps the white object, and for this reason is called "entailing." The meaning of "to entail" was originally created by Xuan Zang. When Xuan Zang was studying in India, the Sammitiya School had a monk named Prajñāgupta (般若毘護多) who often refuted the Mahāyāna's concept of object cause. The Indian king Śīlāditya invited Xuan Zang and assembled a great meeting of the famous and virtuous of the time.³ At this meeting, Xuan Zang delivered an essay in which he countered Prajñāgupta by expounding on the meaning of "to entail." His essay, however, has not been transmitted down to the present.⁴

2. Prajñāgupta was a monk of the Sammitiya, a Hinayana school which held the ego and phenomena to be real. (Foming, II:80a.)
3. Śīlāditya, a patron of Buddhism, supported Xuan Zang. (Shuji, XXXXIV:19b.)
4. Kui Ji states that in his essay, entitled "Controlling Heretical Views" (制惡見論), Xuan Zang refuted Prajñāgupta saying: "To carry means to entail [the object]. The object [means] the thing-in-itself. This means that when correct knowledge (正智) arises, it entails genuine thusness itself and arises. Correct knowledge and genuine thusness are neither the same nor different: genuine thusness is neither an object nor not an object." (Shuji, XXXXIV:20a.) By establishing the concept of "to entail," says Xiong, Xuan Zang reaffirmed Dignāga's concept of object cause, refuted Prajñāgupta, and performed a great service to Buddhism. (Foming, II:80b.)
Fourth) The object cause is completely thought about by consciousness. The above three meanings are not sufficient to establish the object cause. We should know that a real object, although capable of being a cause, and causing the consciousness to consign itself to it, and to carry it, if, however, it is incapable of thinking about itself, then the meaning of object cause cannot be established. This is because consciousness must take the object and think about it; only then can the object be an object cause of consciousness. If a thing incapable of thinking takes an object as its "that which is thought about" then that object cannot be an object cause. A mirror, for example, has the capability of reflection. It is capable of reflecting both people and things. But, although the mirror reflects people and things, it does not think about them. This is because a mirror is basically a thing incapable of thinking. Thus the people and things which the mirror reflects are just reflected by it and are not thought about by it. Thus we cannot say that people and things are object causes to a mirror.

4. The Fourth Cause

The fourth of the four causes is called the contributory cause (增上緣, adhipatipratyaya). The Yogacara states that this cause has three characteristics. First, it is a real dharma; second, it is endowed with a special function; and third, it accommodates the production of the effect while at the same time hindering that

1. Xiong defines lu (慮) as siwei (思維) meaning "to think," or "to ponder." (Foming, II:81a.)
2. Xinlun, III:31b-37b.
3. Doctrine, pp. 547-551, and Foming, II:75a-76a. Thomas refers to it as the "predominating condition." (Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, p. 220.) Stcherbatsky calls it the "cooperating condition" and remarks that it can include everything existing. (Buddhist Logic, p. 138.) I translate it as "contributory cause" because this better suits Xiong's explanation of it.
which might obstruct the production of the effect. Xiong reduces these three characteristics to two: first, the major function of the contributory cause is to contribute to its effect; and second, the contributory cause hinders those conditions which would impede the effect. Xiong says:

What is the contributory cause? The contributory cause is also called the additive [cause]. In the past, it was explained to mean "to help." (This cause can also be called the helping cause.) This means that B, although not produced from A itself, must, nevertheless, rely on A for existence. If there were no A, then B could not come into existence. From this [explanation] we say A is a contributory cause to B, and that B is the effect of A. (The contributory cause, with respect to that thing or event to which it contributes, is called a cause; the thing to which it contributes, with respect to the contributory cause, is called an effect.) To be a contributory cause has two meanings. First, [every contributory cause] contains a prominent function. Any thing or event which is capable of being the contributory cause to another thing or event must have a prominent function in order to produce an effect. . . . Moreover, this prominent function, although it is most helpful with respect to [producing] the effect of the contributory cause, [it] is, however, not limited to being helpful. It need only be that the contributory cause, with respect to its effect, not act as a hindrance but cause the effect to be produced and this will suffice as a prominent function. Let us take an example. I stand in this place and all the accumulated gravel under my feet, with respect to my stance, is a direct contributory cause. Moreover, the vast distances beyond where I stand, even the whole earth, the solar system, and the innumerable worlds - these are also contributory causes to my standing here. How can this be? We

1. Foming, II:85a-86a.
2. Xinlun, III:37b-40a.
must consider that, if beyond where I stand, mountains collapsed and rivers overflowed, if the great planets beyond earth went out of orbit and smashed into each other, then at this time the earth would be smashed to bits. How then would it be possible for me to stand here? Thus we know that my standing here is due to the earth and even to the innumerable solar systems acting as the prominent function of contributory cause. In accordance with this, we can say that the contributory cause is the broadest [of the four causes]. The manifestation of every thing and event carries an inexhaustible and incalculable number of contributory causes. In searching for the contributory cause of a thing or event, . . . however, [we must] seek its most closely related contributory causes and need not select all of the remote contributory causes. As in the above example, my standing here, as long as the earth within a considerable distance of where I stand does not collapse, this is clearly the [most closely related] contributory cause for my standing here. Hence, the event [of standing here] is completed.

Let us now speak about mental contributory causes. When an instance of color consciousness [i.e. eye consciousness] arises, . . . the contributory causes attendant on it are, of course, innumerable. But among the most closely related [contributory causes] is the physical faculty [of sight]. The eyes and the nervous system are what the color consciousness relies on in order to emanate. Space is also a contributory cause. If there is an obstruction, the color consciousness cannot proceed. For the color consciousness to arise, it is necessary to have an unobstructed space. Light is also a contributory cause. The color consciousness will definitely not arise if [one] is in the midst of darkness. For the color consciousness to arise, there must be light. Habit is also a contributory cause. When color consciousness arises, it requires many similar habits to accompany [it] and manifest [themselves] uniformly. The first time [one] sees the face of a person against whom [one] bears a grudge, then [one] becomes angry.
spontaneously. ... This is just an old habit manifesting itself. These [examples] just raised are obvious and readily seen. Actually, regardless of the kind of situation at hand, when the consciousnesses arise, they require many similar habits to be manifested simultaneously. The several types of contributory causes mentioned above [e.g. space, light, etc.] are all closely related contributory causes. We only selected these [closely related contributory] causes to represent the attendant causes of color consciousness and [they are] sufficient [for this]. (By attendant causes is meant that if A awaits B in order to exist, then we say that B is the attendant cause of A.) The other remote causes need not be calculated. The color consciousness is like this and the other consciousnesses, such as sound consciousness [i.e. the ear consciousness], etc. all have closely related contributory causes which can be inferred in a similar manner. When the [sixth consciousness], the sense-center consciousness, arises, the contributory causes which it awaits - the brain, the sum of past experiences, knowledge gained from learning habits, etc. - all these are [its] closely related contributory causes.1...

The second [of the two meanings of contributory cause] is that every contributory cause, with respect to its effect, both accommodates and hinders. In other words, the contributory cause acts towards its effect as an accommodating cause and brings the effect into existence. At the same time, [the contributory cause] acts as a hindering cause to the [adverse] things and events [which might arise] before the effect arises and prevents these things and events from coming into existence. Thus we say [that the contributory cause] both accommodates and hinders. Let us now take an example to explain this meaning. Frost and snow are contributory causes to rice and other plants. [They] are capable of causing rice and other plants to lose their former green color and become withered. Thus, frost and

1. Xinlun, III:37b-38b.
snow, with respect to the present withering, are accommodating contributory causes but, with respect to the former green color, are hindering contributory causes. This is because frost and snow (that is the contributory causes) benefit withering and cause [it] to come into existence. At the same time, [frost and snow] obstruct the former green color and cause it not to continue. From this accommodating and hindering, we can see that the power of the contributory cause is very great.  

As to the contributory cause of consciousness, its power to accommodate and hinder is very great. Let us take attention (作意, manaskāra) as an example. We should know that when an instance of consciousness is produced, although it has an incalculable number of contributory causes, we cannot but say that the most important one is attention. What is attention? I will talk about this in detail later. For now I will briefly explain it. When our every thought arises, there is always a movement or stimulus-like function which acts as a mutual companion to the thought. Mind discriminates the object sphere about which it thinks. This discrimination is our original thought. But the so-called movement or stimulus-like function is a kind of endeavor which we ourselves add to this [original thought]. This then is not the original thought but is just a mutual companion to the thought, and is called "attention." Attention then is a kind of contributory cause to thought. That it has the power of accommodating and hindering is obvious and easily seen. Our common thoughts, for example, are not urgent. Sometimes, however, our attention is called to certain types of compelling circumstances which move or stimulate our minds to seek a solution. At this time, all our thoughts are urgent and attention accommodates our thoughts by making them urgent and hinders other thoughts which are not equally urgent.

1. Xinlun, III:39a.
2. Attention is the second of the five mental associates of the eighth consciousness. (Cf. Doctrine, p. 157.)
3. Xinlun, IX:2a.
We have now presented Xiong's explanation of the Yogacara theory of causality. By way of summary, then, we can say that Xiong holds that the Yogacara accepted the traditional Buddhist concept of causality but both systematized and changed it. They systematized it by positing four causes: cause proper, preceding moment, object cause, and contributory cause. Of these four, the first, cause proper, is the most important because it alone is a true cause and not, like the other three, a supplementary cause or causal condition. The Yogacara, however, proceeded to radically alter the traditional concept of causality by positing seeds as the causes proper. Xiong severely criticises this linking of seeds to causality as "constructionalism." As to the second cause, the preceding moment, Xiong accepts and vigorously defends it because it will later play an important role in his metaphysic. With respect to the third cause, the object cause, the Yogacara distinguished between an immediate and a remote object cause. Xiong rejects this distinction because it is based on the false premise that each of the eight consciousnesses is a separate entity and not just a part of an integral mind. Xiong accepts the fourth cause, the contributory cause, and explains that it has two functions: it helps produce the effect while at the same time hindering any thing or event which would impede the effect.

1. Xinlun, III:41a.
2. See Chapter V of this thesis.
B. Xiong's Critique of the Yogacara Theory of Causality

Xiong makes three criticisms of the Yogacara theory of causality. First, Xiong strongly criticises the Yogacara for making seeds causal agents. Asanga was the first to suggest that seeds are causal agents, says Xiong, and this suggestion became established doctrine in the works of Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, and Xuan Zang. Second, by positing seeds as causal agents, the Yogacara turned the theory of causality into what Xiong calls a theory of constructionalism. By constructionalism, Xiong means that the Yogacara used the theory of causality to explain the construction of the cosmos and all phenomena. Third, by treating causality as constructionalism, says Xiong, the Yogacara endowed their philosophical system with a cosmology thereby becoming the only school of Mahayana Buddhism to have a cosmology. In expounding their cosmology, however, the Yogacara drastically altered several traditional Buddhist doctrines such as the doctrine of the three natures and the doctrine of direct and indirect explanations. Let us now consider each of these three criticisms in detail.

1. Seeds as Causal Agents

Xiong's first criticism of the Yogacara theory of causality is directed against the concept of seeds as true causes. The Yogacara Masters posited seeds as true causes by defining seeds as capable of producing their own effect and thus, by definition, making seeds synonymous with cause proper. When Asanga wrote the Mahayanasam(pari)grahastra to convert his brother Vasubandhu from...
Hinayana to Mahayana Buddhism, asserts Xiong, he established seeds as the causes of all phenomena and thereby established seeds as true causal agents similar to western philosophy's first cause.\(^1\)

As proof of this assertion, Xiong quotes and annotates the following passage from the *Mahayanasaṃ(par)graḥastra*:

"If one is ignorant of the arising of the first causes in the ālaya," (The arising of [the first] causes means that, because seeds are causes proper, all dharmas are produced. The words "arising of [the first] causes" indicates seeds. The seeds in the ālaya are the original causes of all dharmas, and hence is said "the arising of the first causes." "Ignorant" means "not understanding." The meaning of this [phrase] is: If one does not understand that seeds in the ālaya are the original causes of all dharmas, then one will make the following kinds of errors.) "Some will consider self-nature as cause." (The Sarvāstivādins established self-nature as the cause of all mental and material phenomena.)\(^2\) "Some will consider past actions as cause." ("Past actions" are "that which was produced in former existences," and are also called "former deeds." Nirgranthājñatiputra and others believed that former deeds were the causes of all phenomena.)\(^3\) "Some will consider the evolution of a supreme being as cause." (The Brahmans and others believed that there was a supreme being who was capable of transformation and was thus the cause of all phenomena.)\(^4\) "Some will consider the soul as cause." (The Saṃkhya and others believed there was a real soul which was the cause of all phenomena.)\(^5\) "Some will say there is no cause or causal condi-

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\(^1\) *Xinlun*, VI:48a. Takakusu, *Essentials*, p. 23, says that Buddhism does not consider first cause important and does not discuss cosmology.

\(^2\) The Sarvāstivāda (數論) was an early Hinayana sect which held the reality of all phenomena. (*Foming*, I:81a.)

\(^3\) Nirgranthājñatiputra (尼乾子) was an opponent of Buddhism and held that everything was fated.

\(^4\) The Brahmans (婆羅門) believed in an omnipotent deity.

\(^5\) The Saṃkhya (僧伽) was a Hindu school which believed in the existence of a soul.
tion.\(^1\) (Heterodox believers believe that things arise spontaneously, and the Masters of the theory of no-cause, as well as the heterodox [followers] of the view that karma and nirvāṇa are not real, they all believe that all dharmas are uncaused.) \"And some will consider the ego as producer.\" (The Vaiśeṣika established an ātman [or soul] and claimed it had the energy to produce.)\(^2\) \"Some will consider\] the ego as receiver.\" (The Sarvāstivādins established an ātman and claimed it received all spheres [of objects] for use. Colors, sounds, and other things, for example, were received by the ātman for its use.) \"These numerous theories of causation\] can be compared to a group of blind men who have never seen an elephant. If an elephant is brought before them, and they are told to feel it, some will feel the trunk, some will feel the tusks, some will feel the ears, some will feel the feet, some will feel the tail, and some will feel the spine. Then, if someone asks them what an elephant resembles, some will say a plow handle, some will say a pestle, some will say a winnowing basket, some will say a mortar, some will say a broom, and some will say a stony hill. If one does not understand causality, then one's ignorance will be similar to this.\" (If one does not understand that seeds are the causes of all phenomena, then ignorance will make him blind and he will not realize the truth. If one completely relies on personal conjecture and wild guesses [for knowledge] of the ontological substance or cause proper of the universe, then one is just like the blind men guessing what an elephant is.)\(^3\)

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1. Following this, the Taishō edition reads: "If one is ignorant of the arising of the second cause. . . . " This phrase is not, however, quoted by Xiong. (Taishō No. 1594, p. 135a.)

2. The Vaiśeṣika (勝論) were the foremost champions of naive realism among the Brahmanical schools. Xiong held that the Yogācāra theory of seeds was similar to their theory of atoms. (Foming I:84b.)

3. Xinlun, VI:48a-48b. And Tiyong lun, pp. 142-144. The original is in Taishō No. 1594, p. 135a, lines 5-15.
This passage, says Xiong, is extremely important because, by linking seeds to causation, it marks the turning point between the original theory of seeds and the later theory which Xiong designates as the consciousness-only theory. In the original theory, seeds were simply a metaphorical way of explaining the ability of phenomena to manifest themselves. In this passage, however, seeds are treated as real entities and causal agents. Xiong explains:

According to this passage of Asaṅga's, his meaning of causality and the Hinayāna's are completely different. The Hinayāna concept of causality was established on the basis of the mutual relationships among the characteristics of dharmas. At Asaṅga's hands, this meaning of causation was changed into a fundamental metaphysical cause. His establishing seeds as causes can be said to be a kind of pluralism. He thought the different schools of philosophy, when they spoke about the problem of the causal origins of the universe, guessed wildly and speculated chaotically. Only his theory of seeds was the truth. According to him, those who searched in the "outer realm" (外) for a cause (as for example, self-nature, a supreme being, a soul, etc.) were all heretical. Those who advocated no causes or causal conditions were likewise foolish. He established the alaya consciousness in which to store all the seeds. From all the seeds within this alaya consciousness came the causes which bring about the production of all mental and material phenomena. Thus, [Asaṅga concluded] that the universe is caused but that the cause is not an outer dharma. In this way, [Asaṅga] established his theory of con-

2. *Popo lun*, p. 46.
3. The "outer realm" is the material universe and stands opposed to the "inner realm" of the mind. Those seeking in the outer realm for the original cause of the universe, says Xiong, tend to posit a supreme being. Xiong explains outer cause in *Popo lun*, p. 41.
Asanga, in keeping with his definition of seeds as causal agents, also stated, in the *Mahayanasam(pari)grahaśāstra*, that seeds have six characteristics. These six characteristics make it quite clear that seeds are not only real entities but also true causal agents. Especially important, notes Xiong, is the sixth characteristic which states that each seed is capable of producing its own effect. This is precisely the definition of cause proper. Xiong says:

Before Asanga, the Mahayana Masters never said that seeds were substantially real entities. Take, for example, the *Salistambhasutra* (火乘年經) which was discovered in Dunhuang (敦煌). When speaking of the twelve causes, it says: "Consciousness, with its seed-like nature, becomes a cause; action, with its field-like nature, becomes a cause." (The translation made during the eastern Jin dynasty (317-420) is very similar.) This is an explanation of "action causes consciousness" [which is the second of the twelve causes.] This seems to take seeds as just a metaphor for consciousness. It does not say that there are real, separate entities capable of producing consciousnesses called seeds. Asanga’s *Mahayanasam(pari)grahaśāstra*, however, clearly proclaims that seeds have six characteristics. The first characteristic is instantaneous consciousness-only. He was very thorough indeed.

1. Xinlun, VI:48b-49a,
2. A reproduction of the Dunhuang manuscript can be found in *Dunhuang juanzi* (敦煌卷子), Vol. 6, No. 125, Shimen tushu gongci, Taipei, 1976.
4. For the twelve causes, see: Essentials, pp. 25-27.
5. Doctrine, pp. 127-129.
seeds] are simultaneous with their effect. This means that the dharma which is the produced effect exists simultaneously [with the cause]. (This means that seeds are the causes capable of producing while the manifested consciousnesses are the produced effects. "Simultaneously" (俱時) means "at the same time" (同時). The two dharmas, cause and effect, exist at the same time.) The third characteristic is continuous evolutionary accordance (恒隨轉). This means that seeds form a continuous generic series. (Every seed expires in the previous instance and arises in the following instance and this [goes on] uninterruptedly. The "me" of yesterday, for example, and the "me" of today is [constantly] expiring and arising in a continuous generic series. It is not the case that the "me" of yesterday has endured until today. . . .) The fourth characteristic is decisiveness. This means that seeds are decisive, separate [entities]. It is not the case that any seed can produce any phenomenon. (Because seeds are separate [entities], they give rise to separate effects. They are decisive and do not intermingle chaotically. It is not the case that any kind of seed can give rise to any kind of dharma.) From this seed is produced this effect. (This seed produces this effect and does not produce that effect. Hence, [seeds] are decisive, separate [entities].) The fifth characteristic is dependence on a group of causes. This means that a certain seed must await a certain group of causes and only then can it produce an effect. It is not the case that all [seeds] can, at any time, produce all [dharmas]. If in this place and at this time, [a seed] meets its group of causes, then, in this place and at this time, its own effect will be produced. (The eye consciousness, for example, must await other causal conditions such as space, light, physical faculty, etc. When these causes meet and group, only then does the eye consciousness seed produce its eye consciousness effect.)

1. Xiong reverses the order of characteristics two and three but, to avoid confusion, I have restored the original order.

2. See above, p. 139.
The sixth characteristic is called inducing its own fruit. This means that a seed can only induce its own effect. An ālāya consciousness seed, for example, can only produce an ālāya consciousness just as a rice seed can only produce a rice plant. (The above explanations [for the six characteristics] are Vasubandhu's.) If we carefully [study] these six characteristics, we will clearly see that seeds are real, separate dharmas and act as the causes of the eight consciousnesses. That which is capable of producing [i.e. seeds] and that which is produced [i.e. phenomena] are in good order; cause and effect are in good order; [they] will not tolerate confusion. (The world of seeds and the world of phenomena cannot be confused and spoken of as one.) Seeds are separate [entities] and each produces its own effect; they cannot be confused. What was said above [means] that seeds are like a bunch of grains grouped together and all phenomena are like a pile of elements grouped together. The meaning [of the above] is actually like this, how can [I] be accused of misrepresenting ? . . . When we get to the time of Dharmapāla, [we find that] he posited two kinds of seeds: original seeds [which existed from the beginning of time], and perfumed seeds. (He speculated on the origins of all the seeds [and said] that some seeds [existed] naturally while some were newly produced by the perfuming of consciousness. Thus, there are two kinds [of seeds].) His mistake was extremely grievous. . . . Thus seeds, from the time of Asaṅga onwards, were established as real dharmas. This dubious explanation was not objected to as being a forced argument. Before this [time], all the Masters of the Mahāyāna probably had never theorized [about seeds] like this, yet the critic [of my New Treatise] has not investigated into the change [in the meaning of seeds] and thus considers the theory of Asaṅga's school, that seeds cause phenomena, to be the same as the Madhyamika's [theory.

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1. The critic is Liu Dingquan (劉定權) who wrote a critique of Xiong's work entitled *Refutation of the New Treatise on Consciousness-only.* (See Appendix I, p. 232.)
of causality]. The critic has not understood that [the Yogacāra] has used the erroneous theory of constructionalism to destroy the significant meaning of causation.¹

Xiong argues, then, that Asanga, in order to refute the different theories of causality popular in his time, stated that the seeds stored in the eighth consciousness are the first causes of all things. To firmly establish seeds as causes, Asanga further defined seeds as having six characteristics of which the sixth, the ability to induce their own effects, is precisely the definition of a true cause or cause proper. By firmly establishing seeds as true causes, concludes Xiong, the Yogacāra also effectively changed the concept of causality into what Xiong calls the theory of constructionalism to which we now turn our attention.

2. Causality as Constructionalism

By making seeds true causes, argues Xiong, the Yogacāra have completely perverted the original aim of causality and changed the theory of causality into a theory of constructionalism (構造論).² The original aim of causality, says Xiong, was to make the ignorant realize that the mind, like all other phenomena, is not an independently existing, real entity but merely an aggregate of causal conditions. Once this is realized, the ignorant will be enlightened to the true nature of phenomena and will cease clinging to the mind, ego, objects, etc. as if they were real entities.³ But, adds Xiong, the Yogacāra completely changed the aim of causal-

¹ Popo lun, pp. 46-48.
² Xinlun, III:41a, and VI:54a. Also Popo lun, ibid.
³ Xinlun, III:40b.
ity from destruction of delusion to the construction of phenomena. The Yogācāra viewed causes as individual elements out of which mental and material phenomena are "constructed." This tendency is only slight in Asaṅga's works, says Xiong, but becomes more pronounced in Vasubandhu's and is most prominent in the works of Dharmapāla and Xuan Zang. How causality changed from a theory used to destroy grasping to a theory used to construct phenomena is explained by Xiong thus:

[In summary], the cause proper is established [on the basis] of the self-operating power which is integral to the manifesting of consciousness. The preceding moment is established on the ability of the previous instance of consciousness to engender the following instance of consciousness when consciousness manifests itself. The object cause is established from the object on which consciousness relies in order to manifest itself. Apart from the above three causes, there are many relationships, such as the physical faculties (including the nervous system and the brain), attention, etc. which are intimately related to the manifesting consciousness. If these relationships did not exist, then consciousness could not manifest itself, and so the contributory cause is established. Why are these different causes analysed? This is because most people stubbornly cling to the discriminating mind (which is also called the consciousness which grasps the object sphere) as an independent real entity. The Buddhists want to destroy this kind of clinging and thus they analyse the so-called independent real mind into different causes and thus say that mind is produced by causes. [The Buddhists] want people to know that what they call mind is just like a flash of lightning which, in a series of flashes, suddenly manifests its form, and is not a real entity. If one says that mind or consciousness is a real entity, then it must have self-substance. By analysing it, [one sees] that it is just a group of many

2. Ibid.
causes mutually relying on one another and suddenly manifesting itself in the form of mind. [Thus, one] can see that mind has no self-substance and is not real. If [it] leaves the group of causes, then, there is nothing which can be called mind. When the Indian Buddhists first spoke about the meaning of causally produced, this was the meaning and indeed this should be the meaning. Later, however, the founders of Mahāyāna Yogācāra, the two great Masters Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, gradually changed what the Buddhists had previously said was the meaning of causal production. [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] seemed to consider the many causes as single elements. Hence, they considered the so-called mind as if it were constructed from a coalescing of many causes. In this way, they changed the theory of causal production to a theory of constructionalism. [The theory of constructionalism] seems [to maintain that] matter is constructed from the coalescing of many elements. This kind of meaning is not completely obvious in the works of Asaṅga but his theories do have this tendency. All the Masters from Vasubandhu onwards, and especially Dharmapāla, quite clearly change the previous theory of causal production into a theory of constructionalism. ¹

In brief, the theory of constructionalism means that, just as matter is constructed from elements, so all phenomena both mental and material are constructed from causes and causal conditions. These causes are real entities called seeds and are stored in the eighth consciousness. The object "a glass of water," for example, is constructed from a group of seeds which produce in the appropriate consciousnesses the sensations of hardness, wetness, clearness, etc. which are then combined by the sense-center consciousness to produce the object "glass of water."² There still remained,

¹. Xinlun, III:40b-41a. And Foming, II:71b-87b.
². Foming, II:94a.
however, a major difficulty with the theory of constructionalism which the Yogacara had to overcome. Simply put, the difficulty is just how a cause has the power to produce its effect. The early Masters explained mind and other phenomena as the products of an aggregate of causes but never clearly explained just how an effect can be produced from what seems to be the mere random and chaotic piling up of causes. The later Masters overcame this difficulty, says Xiong, by positing a "man-made effect" (士用果, puruṣakāraphalā).¹ This effect results from the first cause, cause proper, acting as a "producer" while the other three causes act as the "tools." What the producer uses the tools to produce is called a man-made effect. The Yogacara Masters, by positing this effect, endowed cause proper with a productive function and thus solved the difficulty of explaining how an effect can result from the mere coalescing of causes.² Xiong explains:

If seeds of the same kind want to produce dharmas, they cannot depend on their own energy alone, but must meet with the combined energy of many causes in order to succeed. Take, for example, a mental dharma. It is not produced from cause proper alone, but must await a sequence cause [i.e. the preceding moment], an object cause, and a contributory cause. Thus the old Masters say that a mental dharma has four causes. As for a material dharma, it too is not produced from cause proper alone, but must await many contributory causes. Thus the old Masters say that a material dharma has two causes. According to these sayings, then, [when] many causes manage to collect together in a heap, an effect is produced. Because this seems to be unreasonable, the consciousness-only Masters

¹. See Doctrine, p. 565, where it is translated as "fruit of virile activity." See also Foming, II:94a and Xinlun, VI:52a.
². Xinlun, VI:52a.
after Vasubandhu advocated the "man-made effect." (In the term shi yong guo [man-made effect], shi means "a scholar," and also "a man." The production of the so-called effect comes from the man like creative energy inherent in cause proper. Hence, [because this energy] is capable of producing the effect, the effect is called the "man-made effect." See my Comprehensive Explanation of Buddhist Terms.)

The cause proper (i.e. seeds) is called the producer, [while] the other causes are called the tools. In this way, so-called causation was not explained as just a heap of causes which, when collected together, produce an effect. A heap [of causes] is just a chaotic mass of things not one of which has the inherent power [to produce an effect] and to control the others. How can there be the superior function [necessary] to produce an effect? Hence, [the Masters after Vasubandhu] called cause proper (i.e. seeds) the producer, and called the other causes the tools. The producer (i.e. cause proper) has the inherent ability to produce. [He] relies on his tools (i.e. the other three causes) to manifest his ability, and so an effect is produced. This theory [of the man-made effect] can be stated quite reasonably, and is sufficient to repair the gap inadvertently left by Asaṅga when he created [the theory of constructionalism]. Thus, the theory of causality, from Asaṅga onwards, quite obviously became even more of a theory of constructionalism.

3. Constructionalism and Cosmology

By positing seeds as causal agents, the Yogacāra turn the theory of causality into a theory of constructionalism and by so doing endow their philosophy with a cosmology. Vasubandhu, before conversion to the Mahāyāna, was, says Xiong, a follower of the

1. Foming, II:94a.
2. Xinlun, VI:51b-52b.
Hinayana and adhered to a naive realist view of the cosmos. After his conversion, he managed to implant his naive realist views in the Yogacara philosophical system by positing seeds as causal agents. Seeds, according to Vasubandhu, are real entities capable of producing their own effects. Because of this, it was quite easy for Vasubandhu to use the theory of seeds to explain the construction of the cosmos and thus endow the Yogacara philosophy with a cosmology. Xiong notes that the other major school of Mahayana Buddhism, the Madhyamika, had no cosmology because their doctrine of "emptiness," which maintained that all phenomena are essentially empty, made a cosmology an impossibility. Indeed the impossibility of a cosmology was an article of dogma with the Madhyamika and was stated in a syllogism by Bhavaviveka (晋辯, circa A.D. 600) thus: "The truth is that produced dharmas are empty because they are causally produced; hence, they are like an illusion." Xiong explains and annotates this syllogism as follows:

The truth (真性, zhenxing) is that produced dharmas (为, youwei) are empty (空, kong). (This is the proposition (宗) of the syllogism. Zhenxing means that the reason for establishing this syllogism is to make known the absolute truth (体). The Madhyamika distinguish between absolute and relative truth. . . . Youwei means that all dharmas which are produced by the four causes are called produced dharmas. Kong means emptiness. From the standpoint of absolute truth, it can be concluded that all produced

dharmas are empty. How does one know this?) Because they are causally produced; (This is the reason (1) of the syllogism. It clarifies why it is that produced dharmas are empty. All produced dharmas await the union of several causes and are then produced and thus they are said to be causally produced. Whatever is produced from a group of causes has no independent, real, self-substance and thus can be said to be empty.) Hence they are like an illusion. (This is the example of the syllogism. Illusionists change the images of different kinds of things which are really empty. Any causally produced dharma has no independent, real, self-substance. Hence, [they] are metaphorically compared to illusions in order to prove the reason of the syllogism, and thus establish the conclusion that produced dharmas are empty.)

To the Yogacāra, says Xiong, this Madhyamika doctrine of emptiness bordered on nihilism. To combat this nihilist tendency, the Yogacāra Masters theorized about the nature of being, and speculated on cosmology. This is most obvious in Vasubandhu's Treatise in Thirty Stanzas which divides into three parts. The first part, which is comprised of the first twenty-four stanzas, explains the characteristics of phenomena while the second part, the twenty-fifth stanza, explains the nature of phenomena and the third part, the last five stanzas, explains self-cultivation.

There are, says Xiong, three points about this division of Vasubandhu's treatise that deserve attention:

1. Tiyong lun, pp. 137-139. Xiong notes that, according to Dignāga's new rules for syllogisms, this syllogism violates the rule which holds that the metaphor must be proof of the reason because an illusion cannot prove causality. (Tiyong lun, p. 139.)

2. Tiyong lun, p. 128.
the doctrine of consciousness-only but did not succeed, so he instructed his brother Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu, in his later years, wrote the thirty stanzas and completed the systematisation of the doctrine of consciousness-only. At this point, the theories of the School of Being [i.e. the Yogacāra] were rigorously systematic but the scope was narrow.

Second, only one of the thirty stanzas [i.e. the twenty-fifth] talks about the nature of phenomena, an exceedingly small number indeed. Thus one can see that, with respect to ontology, Vasubandhu made no significant contributions nor was he able to surpass what he heard from Asaṅga. Third, of the thirty stanzas, twenty-four speak in detail about the characteristics of phenomena. Thus one can see that the theories of the School of Being, from Asaṅga to Vasubandhu, especially emphasized the establishing of phenomena as real entities. This radically opposes the Mādhyamika's principle of destroying [belief] in phenomena.²

Proof that the Yogacāra were opposed to the Mādhyamika concept of emptiness, says Xiong, can be found in the Mahāyānottaratantra-āstrā (究竟乗寶性論, Taishō 1611). Xiong quotes and comments on the following significant passage from this work:

"In all the other sūtras, everything is said to be empty."
(This is said about the sūtras of the Mādhyamika.) "In these [sūtras], how can there be said to be genuine thusness, the Buddha-nature?" (The Mahāyānottaratantra-āstrā belongs to the Yogacāra school. Buddha-nature is another name for genuine thusness.) "The verse says: 'Everyplace in the sūtras says that the inner and outer are all empty. Created dharmas are like clouds, or dreams, or illusions, etc.' (This is a Mādhyamika tenet.) "Why then do [the sūtras] say that all sentient beings have the nature of genuine thusness and do not

1. The thirty stanzas, along with Dharmapāla's exegesis, were translated into Chinese by Xuan Zang as the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only.

2. Tiyong lun, p. 129.
say [that they are all] empty?" (This is a Yogacara tenet.) "In answer, the verse says: 'Because some are timid.' (This is the first kind of error. The Madhyamika say that everything is empty; sentient beings hear this and become frightened, thinking there is no place to return to and so become timid.) ['Some will be] disrespectful to sentient beings.' (This is the second kind of error. If everything is empty, then no sentient being has genuine thusness, the Buddha-nature. This is disrespectful to sentient beings.) ['Some will] cling to fantasies.' (This is the third kind of error. If everything is said to be empty, then there is no reality to show people. Heterodox schools will cling to fantasies and there will be no means of leading them to the truth.) ['These will] slander the true Buddha-nature.' (This is the fourth kind of error. Those who will grasp onto fantasies will not know there is a nature of genuine thusness and will thus indulge in reckless slandering.) ['Some will] believe that their body has a soul.' (This is the fifth kind of error. If the heterodox do not see that there is a genuine thusness, then they will recklessly believe that their bodies have souls.) 'In order to lead these types of people far away from the five kinds of errors, it is thus said that there is a Buddha-nature.'

According to this passage, says Xiong, the Yogacara maintained that the Madhyamika concept of emptiness tended toward nihilism and consequently did more harm than good for Buddhism. Worldly people, upon learning the concept of emptiness, would equate it with nihilism, argued the Yogacara, and thus commit the following five errors. First, they will become frightened and, in their fear, fail to realize the truth of Buddhism; second, they will treat sentient beings as things and not acknowledge that all sentient beings have the

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1. Quoted in Tiyong lun, pp. 117-119, and Xinlun, V:37a-37b. The original can be found in Taisho Vol. 31, No. 1611, pp. 816a and 816b, lines 22-29 (p. 816a) and line 1 (p. 816b.)
Buddha nature; third, they will believe in fantasies and not the truth; fourth, they will not believe in the Buddha nature but will claim that it too is empty (this, in Buddhist eyes, is the most serious error); and fifth, they will believe in the reality of the soul.¹ For this reason, concludes Xiong, the Mahayanottaratantrasāstra states that all of the treatises of the Madhyamika proclaim the tenet that everything is empty, but the Yogacāra treatises, to the contrary, proclaim the tenet of the existence of genuine thusness, the Buddha nature.²

The Yogacāra, by establishing seeds as real entities capable of producing their own effects, endowed their philosophy with a cosmology. But their cosmology, argues Xiong, is philosophically untenable. For one thing, the Yogacāra failed to adequately explain the relationship between seeds and genuine thusness and hence, by postulating two ontological substances, are guilty of an ontological dualism. Furthermore, a dualism is evident in the distinctions between pure and impure seeds and seeds of the perceived and perceiving divisions. Xiong says:

The Yogacāra are guilty of ontological dualism. They established seeds as the causes of all dharmas. Seeds then are the ontological substance of all dharmas. The passage [I] have previously cited from Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasam(pari)grahāśastra is proof.³ The Mahāyānasam(pari)grahāśastra contovers the ontological theories of the non-Buddhist schools (such as the self-nature theory of the Saṃkhya school) and then unveils its own theory of seeds. This theory takes the seeds in the ālaya as the causes of all mental and physical

2. Tiyong lun, p. 119.
3. Xinlun, VI:48a-48b, and above pp. 144-145.
phenomena. Thus [the Yogacāra] avoid mistakes such as "outer cause" or "no cause." (Searching in the outer world for the ontological substance, as theories such as self-nature do, is called outer cause. The theory of no cause holds that all phenomena have no cause [but arise spontaneously]. Theories such as these were vigorously refuted by the Buddhists.) From the ontological view, their theory of seeds can be said to be a pluralist theory or a dualist theory. (Because seeds are innumerable, separate entities, the theory is said to be pluralist. The nature of some seeds is pure while others are impure. Thus, according to their nature, seeds are divided. This is [ethical] dualism. And again, seeds [are divided] by substance. All perceived and perceiving divisions have their own seeds. . . . Thus seeds are strictly divided by substance. This is also dualism.) It is only because [the Yogacāra] established an alaya consciousness in which to store the seeds that [seeds] are not an outer cause. In summary, then, seeds are the ontological substance of all phenomena. According to their theories, [seeds] are exactly like this. They clearly make seeds the origin of the phenomenal world, and thus their line of thought is quite similar to western philosophical views of ontology. (Western philosophy has no method of uniting ontological substance and phenomena. Likewise, the Yogacāra [cannot unite] seeds and phenomena.) Why do I say that the Yogacāra have two kinds of ontological substances? Since they established seeds as the causes of all phenomena, thus seeds are already one kind of ontological substance. [The Yogacāra], however, also wanted to respectfully preserve the traditional Buddhist ontological doctrine which claimed that genuine thusness was the ontological substance of all phenomena.¹

¹ Xinlun, VI:54a-54b.
Not only is the Yogacara ontology philosophically untenable, criticises Xiong, but also, in order to maintain it, the Yogacara amended several Mahayana Buddhist doctrines or, in the case of the doctrine of the three periods of Buddha's teachings, added a new one. In order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the Madhyamika, the Yogacara claimed that the Buddha's teachings were divided into three periods. The first period was said to consist of the naive realist teachings of the Hinayana. Although the Hinayana taught that there was no ego or real person, they did not make it evident that all phenomena were unreal and thus did not clearly refute the existence of material and mental phenomena. The second period is marked by the rise of the Madhyamika which taught that all phenomena lack true self-substance and are empty. The Madhyamika, although they surpassed the teachings of the first period, still failed to reach the profundity of the third period which is marked by the rise of the Yogacara. By showing that phenomena do not exist but are not necessarily empty, the Yogacara take a middle position between the teachings of the first two periods. The Yogacara claim that, although the ego is non-existent, other phenomena are causally produced and cannot be said to be non-existent. These other phenomena, moreover, all have the Buddha nature and thus cannot be said to be empty. In this way, the Yogacara characterised itself as the "middle teaching of non-existence and non-emptiness."
In order to support their cosmology, says Xiong, the Yogacāra also found it necessary to alter several existing Buddhist doctrines among which was the doctrine of the three natures (svabhāva). The Buddhists claim that all dharmas have one of three natures. The first of these three natures is the nature of mere imagination (parikalpitasvabhāva). Dharmas with this first nature are illusory and do not really exist as, for example, flowers in the sky or horns on a hare. The second of the three natures is the nature of dependence on others (paratantrasvabhāva). In this second nature, the nature of dependence on others, "others," says Xiong, refers to the four causes. Dharmas which have this second nature are of dependent origination, lack true self-substance, and thus cannot be said to truly exist. The third of the three natures is the nature of ultimate reality (parinispannasvabhāva). This is the only one of the three natures which is real and as such is identified with the Buddha nature. The three natures are often explained by means of the following metaphor. A fool, walking at dusk, sees a rope and mistakes it for a snake. Afterwards, a wise man teaches him that the snake is an illusion created by the rope which itself is but a form of hemp. In this metaphor, the snake represents the nature of mere imagination; the rope, the nature of dependence on others; and the hemp, the nature of ultimate reality.

2. This nature is often translated as dependent origination but I prefer to translate it literally as "the nature of dependence on others" because it clarifies the relationship between this nature and seeds (i.e. the "others.")
3. Xinlun, VI:42a, and Foming, II:10a.
Both the Yogācāra and the Madhyamika held that only the third of the three natures was real but the Yogācāra also held that the second nature, the nature of dependence on others, which the Madhyamika said was empty, "should not be said to be non-existent." Xiong argues that because the Yogācāra interpreted dependence on others to mean dependence on seeds, which are causal agents, they drastically altered the original meaning of the second of the three natures. This change, says Xiong, was gradual and the first signs of it occur in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. Xiong explains:

Because the School of Being wanted to discuss cosmology, they wanted to fundamentally change the Madhyamika's doctrine of the nature of dependence on others. The sequence for this change was gradually completed. In the beginning, it did not seem [the Yogācāra's explanation] was much different from the Madhyamika's. Take, for example, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* which is a text of the School of Being. It says: "A man with poor vision considers that hair is constantly in front of his eyes. One should know that the nature of dependence on others is similar." The commentary [by Yuan Ce] says: "The man with poor vision thinks he sees hair in front of his eyes. [The hair] is not real but seems real. This metaphor also applies to the nature of dependence on others which does not exist but seems to exist." Looking carefully at the meaning of "does not exist but seems to exist," [one sees] that this only says there is illusory existence and does not completely re-

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1. Xinlun, VI:44b.
fute [existence]. Although this differs only slightly from the Madhyamika, nevertheless, its contradiction is not obvious. By the time Asanga had created the doctrine of consciousness-only, the Madhyamika's use of the nature of dependence on others as an indirect explanation had been changed. By establishing the theory of seeds, the theory of dependent origination had been changed into a theory of constructionalism. (The meaning of dependent origination and the meaning of dependence on others are completely the same. The "others" of dependence on others characterizes a group of causes. All phenomena depend on a group of causes to arise and this is called dependent origination and it is also called causal production.) In this way, the School of Being was trapped in their own set views and the essential meaning of the Madhyamika was lost.

By positing seeds as causal agents, the Yogacara not only turned the theory of seeds into a theory of constructionalism but also radically altered the original meaning and aim of causality. Traditionally, causality was a means of refuting those who clung to a false belief in the reality of the ego and dharmas but the Yogacara used causality to establish a cosmology. To strengthen their cosmology, the Yogacara denied that the second of the three natures, the nature of dependence on others, was empty but instead argued that it was not non-existent.

Still another change that the Yogacara inflicted on the traditional Mahayana concept of causality, says Xiong, was a change in the use of causality from indirect explanation (遮説) to direct explanation (表説). The Madhyamika, asserts Xiong, used causality as an indirect explanation of the emptiness of all dharmas but the Yogacara, on the contrary, used causality as a

1. Xinlun, VI:45a.
direct explanation of the existence of things. Xiong explains:

We should know that the rhetoric of Buddhist philosophy is extremely rigorous. In their doctrines, they distinguish between indirect and direct explanations. The kind of doctrine known as a direct explanation is a direct statement of the thing or principle to be explained. If, for example, in a darkened room, one shouted to a person who did not see a chair in front of him that there was a chair in front of him, this would be a direct explanation. In the kind of doctrine known as an indirect explanation, there is no way to directly express the thing or principle to be explained and thus it is best to refute whatever it is that the person erroneously clings to and thus lead him to self-enlightenment. In the case of the previous example, when a deluded person in a darkened room mistakes a chair for a person or a ghost, then, if we want to refute these delusions to which he clings, we explain to him what kind of a thing a person must be. [He will then see] that the shape in the darkened room is definitely not a person. If he insists it is a ghost, [then we explain that a ghost] must be an unfathomable, extremely illusory kind of thing. [He will then see] that the shape in the dark is definitely not a ghost. In this way, by various explanations, we can refute his delusion and finally, without directly saying that the thing in the dark is a chair, lead him to realize himself that it is a chair. This is called an indirect explanation. We should know that the theory of causality was used in this way to refute those who clung to the delusion that the mind is an independent, real entity. . . . The scholars of the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu took this term causality and spoke of it as a direct explanation. This is their fundamental mistake. In the future, I will discuss this in another essay.¹ I will not say too much about it here.²

1. This is probably a reference to Xiong's Essay on Epistemology (量論) which, to the best of my knowledge, was never published.
2. Xinlun, III:43a-44b.
Thus, concludes Xiong, the Mādhyamika used causality as an indirect explanation to lead the ignorant to realize that all phenomena are empty but the Yogācāra, however, reversed this usage and made causality a direct explanation for the existence of phenomena. In this way, the Yogācāra lost the subtlety of the Mādhyamika.

1. Xintun, VI:45b.
A. Introduction

There is a common ground to all phenomena called ontological substance the study of which is called ontology. According to Xiong, ontology is the proper study of philosophy. In Chinese philosophy, remarks Xiong, there are many diverse terms for ontological substance. Confucians, for example, call ontological substance "Heaven" (天), or the "Great Ultimate" (太极), or the "Great Whole" (大全), while Taoists refer to it simply as the "Way" (道). Buddhists, on the other hand, call ontological substance "Genuine Thusness" (真如), "Original Face" (本来面目), or "Constant Transformation" (恒轉). Although Xiong uses all these terms, he most frequently uses the term "original substance" (本体) to describe ontological substance.

Original substance, argues Xiong, is not dead and inert but alive and creative and thus gives rise to what we know as phenomena. In relation to original substance, each phenomenon is called a function and hence the totality of all phenomena is also called "function."

The proper task of ontology, asserts Xiong, is to demonstrate the basic unity of substance and function. To explain what he means:

1. Xinlun, I:2a.
4. Xinlun, I:1a.
5. Yuyao, III:78a, and Yuan ru, II:3a.
6. Yuyao, ibid.
7. Ibid., 76a.
8. Xinlun, VIII:66a.
by the unity of substance and function, Xiong uses the metaphor of the ocean and waves. Just as one cannot speak about the ocean without including all its waves, so also one cannot speak about substance without including all its functions (i.e. all phenomena). No wave exists independently of the ocean and no function exists independently of original substance. This special relationship between substance and function is exactly what Xiong calls the "unity of substance and function."^2

Xiong criticises the Yogācāra for maintaining philosophical doctrines which ultimately tend to bifurcate this unity of substance and function. Chief among these doctrines is the theory of seeds. That the theory of seeds bifurcates substance and function is put quite clearly and succinctly by Kui Ji who says: "The original consciousness [i.e. the eighth] is the substance; the seeds are the functions."^3 The Yogācāra, moreover, do not clearly state the relationship between genuine thusness and seeds and Xiong believes that, since both seeds and genuine thusness are kinds of ontological substances, the Yogācāra are thus guilty of maintaining an ontological dualism.^4 And again, the Yogācāra distinction between the "nature of phenomena" (法性) and the "characteristics of phenomena" (法相) is, declares Xiong, yet another bifurcation of substance and function.^5

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2. Xinlun, V:la-lb.
5. Xinlun, V:lb.
Before explaining his own concept of original substance, Xiong counters those who argue that there is no original substance. Some philosophers argue that there is a sphere of non-being from which all being arises but Xiong equates this argument with nihilism and opposes it. Xiong suggests that there are two concepts of non-being which he calls total and partial. The total concept of non-being is nihilism and has no validity whereas the partial concept of non-being does have validity. That there is an original substance, continues Xiong, is a basic truth of philosophy but one that many philosophers have been reluctant to treat because of the inherent difficulty in explaining original substance. Xiong likens these timid philosophers to a sick person who, because he once choked on food, has become afraid of eating. Xiong realizes the difficulty of defining original substance and cautions against three mistakes commonly made by philosophers. The first is identifying original substance with an omnipotent deity; the second, monism; and the third, slighting the importance of mind. Having thus cautioned us as to what ontological substance is not, Xiong then proceeds to define the six characteristics of original substance and to offer his own explanation of original substance.

Xiong's concept of original substance is, in a word, change. What Xiong means by change is an amalgamation of Confucian and Buddhist concepts. From the Confucians, Xiong incorporates the

1. Xinlun, IV:53a.
2. Tiyong lun, pp. 293-297.
3. Xinlun, IV:54b-55a.
4. Ibid., 50a-50b.
concept of change as alive and productive and endowed with the
ability to unify opposing forces and tendencies. From the Bud-
dhists, Xiong incorporates the concept of change as a running cur-
rent which instantaneously arises and expires. Xiong borrows the
two terms "opening" (翕) and "closing" (翕) from the Book of
Changes to describe his concept of original substance as change.
Closing, explains Xiong, is the tendency of original substance to
congeal and produce the material world while opening is the tendency
of original substance to break open and influence the material world
as mind. By means of the concepts of opening and closing, Xiong
explains original substance without violating the principle of the
unity of substance and function. In this respect, Xiong believes
that his ontology is superior to that of the Yogacāra. Let us now
consider Xiong's arguments in detail.

1. Xinlun, V:28a and 56a.
2. Ibid., IV:49a, and 69a-72b.
3. Legge (trans.), Book of Changes, Great Appendix, Part I, Chapter
   6.
B. Xiong’s Critique of the Yogacara Ontology

Xiong criticises the Yogacara for positing three different ontological substances. The Yogacara, claims Xiong, say that the realm of manifestations (現界), the realm of seeds (種界), and genuine thusness (真如) all constitute ontological substances.¹ The reason for this plurality of ontological substances, believes Xiong, is that the Yogacara, unlike the Madhyamika, were not content to refute heterodox ontological arguments but tended to expound their own ontological theories as well. This tendency is slight, says Xiong, in the works of Asanga but quite pronounced in the works of Vasubandhu. By positing three different ontological substances, argues Xiong, the Yogacara are guilty of ontological pluralism, of bifurcating substance and function, and of failing to explain the relationship between these three substances.²

Xiong argues thus:

All the Masters of the Mahayana Madhyamika revered the Great Wisdom Sutra (大般若經) and established the Treatise on the Middle (中觀) and other treatises. They swept clean absurd views and taught people to intuit truth themselves. . . . The theories they held were mostly ontological and epistemological. One could even say that they only spoke from the standpoint of epistemology. Thus, although their original aim was to make known original substance, nevertheless, they differed from those wild guessing philosophers who absurdly constructed original substance to be like this or that thing. Instead, [the Madhyamika] only refuted all absurd views until [a person’s] view was clear and he could himself intuit the truth. . . . Thus I say they only spoke from the viewpoint of epistemology. The heterodox schools had

¹ Xinlun, IV:91a, and Mingxin pian, p. 205.
² Xinlun, IV:91b.
many theories for explaining the cosmos all of which they [i.e. the Madhyamika] refuted. For this reason, they did not want to explain the cosmos [but rather] only wanted to get people to make a clean sweep of all views and thus to see all phenomena in the cosmos, not as phenomena in the cosmos, but directly as truth. (Truth is just original substance.) This then is the gist of the Madhyamika. Later, the great Masters of the Yogacara, such as Asanga and Vasubandhu, started to advocate the doctrine of consciousness-only. Asanga compiled the Mahayanasam(pari)grahastra and established the seeds in the storehouse consciousness as the causes of all things. . . . This is a method of explaining the cosmos. Asanga's younger brother, Vasubandhu, wrote the thirty stanzas on consciousness-only and other works which was the beginning of a relatively thorough cosmology. [I will] now talk about their views in sequence. First, [there] is the realm of manifestations; second, the realm of seeds; and third, the realm of genuine thusness. Let us first speak about the realm of manifestations which has two meanings. First, what they [i.e. the Yogacara] call the realm of manifestations is different for each and every sentient being and is most definitely not something that everyone has in common. Second, what they call the realm of manifestations is not an integral whole but is analysed into separate, independent constituents which are the so-called eight consciousnesses.¹ The eight consciousnesses are: first, the eye consciousness which discriminates colors; second, the ear consciousness which discriminates sounds; third, the nose consciousness which discriminates odors; fourth, the tongue consciousness which discriminates tastes; fifth, the body consciousness which discriminates sensations; sixth, the sense-center consciousness which discriminates all dharmas; seventh, the manas consciousness which looks inward and grasps the storehouse consciousness as an ego; eighth, the storehouse consciousness which stores the innumerable seeds. Each person

¹. For a detailed description of the system of eight consciousnesses, see Chapter III of this thesis.
has these eight consciousnesses but again each consciousness is not an integral whole but is further analysed into mind and mental associates.\(^1\) Mind is whole and is the controller of the many mental associates. Although the mental associates are many, they rely on the same single mind and thus [mind and mental associates] make an assembly. Eye consciousness, for example, has a mind and many mental associates which unite as an assembly which is then called eye consciousness. From the ear consciousness to the eighth or storehouse consciousness, all are similar. As I said above, the eight consciousnesses are all analysed into mind and mental associates. Moreover, each mind is analysed into two parts: the perceived portion and the perceiving portion.\(^2\) (The perceived portion is quite similar to what the worldly call "matter" while the perceiving portion is quite similar to what the worldly call "mind.") There are still two more inner portions [i.e. the corroborating portion and the portion which corroborates the corroborating portion] but these can be combined with the perceiving division and hence I do not speak of them here.)\(^3\) Moreover, each mental associate within each mind is also analysed into the two parts of perceived and perceiving divisions. In summary of what was said above, then, the eight consciousnesses are, in analytical terms, just a group of minds and mental associates. Moreover, these minds and mental associates, in analytical terms, are just the innumerable perceived and perceiving divisions. In conclusion, these innumerable perceived and perceiving divisions are comprehensively known as the realm of manifestations. . And thus I say that what they call the realm of manifestations is analysed into separate, independent constituents.

1. For a description of mind and mental associates, see Chapter III of this thesis.
Next there is the realm of seeds. The above mentioned realm of manifestations, or the innumerable perceived and perceiving divisions, is definitely not produced without cause. For this reason, [they] established seeds as the causes of the realm of manifestations. ... As I said above, the realm of manifestations of each person is not an integral whole and thus one can see that the causes [i.e. seeds] of the realm of manifestations have fundamental differences. In other words, the realm of manifestations is many, independent constituents, as many [constituents] as the seeds from which they are produced. The eye consciousness, for example, is analysed into separate perceived and perceiving divisions. Each perceiving division in the eye consciousness is produced from its own perceiving division seed and each perceived division, which is a kind of visual field, is likewise produced from its own perceived division seed. Not only is the eye consciousness like this, but also the ear consciousness and the other consciousnesses right up to the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness. In this respect, we can say that seeds are a myriad of variations. The Indian Bodhisattva, Jingyi (軽意), in his work Yiye lun (意業論), said: "The innumerable seeds are as numerous as the drops of rain." Thus we see that their theory of seeds is pure pluralism.

Next there is the realm of genuine thusness. All Buddhists, no matter what school, say that the original substance of all things is called genuine thusness, and the Yogacara masters are no different. When the Yogacara established seeds as the causes of the realm of manifestations, however, they also established original seeds. ... Since these original seeds are the origin of the realm of manifestations, how can genuine thusness be established [as another original substance]? According to their theory, moreover, one cannot say that

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1. The Yiye lun was translated by Paramartha but was already lost by T'ang times. (Cf. Kaiyuan lu, Taishō Vol. 55, No. 2154 and Xinlun, IV:91b, and Appendix:28b.) According to Xiong, the quote given is taken from the Yujia lun (瑜伽論記), Taishō Vol. 42, No. 1828.
genuine thusness manifests itself as original seeds [because] they say that genuine thusness is a dharma which is neither produced nor destroyed, which is constant and has no cause [literally: has no that which causes it to arise and be produced].

In summary, the Indian Yogacara doctrines seem to contain a very minute and complicated philosophy. They admit to a realm of manifestations but analyse this realm into many constituent parts (i.e. the eight consciousnesses and the innumerable perceived and perceiving divisions). Hence they establish seeds and say that they are the cause of each and every part of the realm of manifestations. They also establish a storehouse consciousness in which to store the seeds and thus complete their theory of consciousness-only. But their cosmology is completely a forced interpretation. Still another problem is that they establish original seeds as the origins of the realm of manifestations but also acknowledge that non-produced and non-destroyed, constant genuine thusness is the original substance of the realm of manifestations. I do not know how they can be freed from this dualism.

That it posits three different ontological substances is just one of Xiong’s criticisms of Yogacara ontology. Another criticism is that the Yogacara bifurcate the unity of substance and function. The Yogacara does this, says Xiong, by referring to ontological substance as the "nature of dharmas" (法性) and referring to functions (i.e. phenomena) as the "characteristics of dharmas" (法相). Since the nature of dharmas is identified with genuine thusness while the characteristics of dharmas are identified with

1. Xinlun, IV:90b-91b.
2. Ibid., 92a.
seeds, the distinction between the nature and characteristics of dharmas represents an irreconcilable division of substance and function because genuine thusness and seeds are totally disparate. The Yogācāra, says Xiong, never attempted to elucidate the relationship between genuine thusness and seeds but that the two concepts are mutually exclusive can be gleaned from the fact that genuine thusness is described as non-produced, non-destroyed, and integral whereas seeds are innumerable, diverse, and stored in the eighth consciousness. The Yogācāra bifurcation of substance and function is anathematic to Xiong who maintains that the one inviolable rule of any ontology must be the unity of substance and function. He says:

I want to correct the doctrine of the two schools of the Mahāyāna, the Madhyamika and the Yogācāra, [concerning] the nature and characteristics [of dharmas] but first I must distinguish and explain this essay's terms substance and function and the Mahāyāna's terms nature of dharmas and characteristics of dharmas. First I will explain substance and function. (Previous philosophers used the two words substance and function much too broadly. This essay talks about substance and function in conjunction with cosmology and the meaning is very special. The reader must rely on this essay's [philosophical] system to garner an understanding.) Substance is an abbreviated term for the original substance of the cosmos. (Original substance is also called real substance.) Function is that function into which real substance changes. (Real substance is constantly changing and constantly reproducing. This change and reproduction is then spoken of as the function of real substance.) Function has the two aspects of opening and closing, of ceaselessly evolving, and of continuously complying with the principle of the unity of opposites.¹ This

¹. These terms will be explained in detail below.
then is function. . . . Great indeed are the cosmos and all its phenomena. As to depth, nothing is more profound than mind (精神); as to renown, nothing surpasses matter. Mind is the dominating force in matter and controls its evolution. . . . Matter accommodates mind and thus can it evolve and transform.¹ . . . Mind and matter are mutually accommodated and mutually advance. Their evolution into the disparate myriad of beings is called function of original substance. . . . This essay is based on the principle of the unity of substance and function. The reader should not look for real substance apart from the great current of function. I myself believe that [the unity of substance and function] is unalterable and cannot be shaken. Throughout my life I expended much effort and only then did I grasp [this principle]. I do not dare to speak recklessly. Someone asks: "Why do you say that substance and function are one?" I answer that original substance arises itself and becomes function. Do you say that substance and function are not one? The great ocean, for example, arises itself and becomes the mass of waves. (Waves are a metaphor for function; the ocean is a metaphor for substance.) Do you say that the ocean and the waves are not one? I have spoken of substance and function, now let me explain the two terms nature of dharmas and characteristics of dharmas. The word dharma is one of the most common terms used in Buddhist studies. The myriad of beings are comprehensively called dharmas. In Buddhist works, the word "characteristic" has two explanations. First, characteristic means the "thing-as-perceived" (相狀).² (Every dharma has its own kind of thing-as-perceived. Matter, for example, has mass which can be seen by the eye. Mind has no mass but, although it cannot be seen by the eye, it can be introspectively known. [Mind] has featureless features and formless form.) Second, characteristic means "substance."

¹ Xiong gives 運 as 翻 (Tiyong lun, p. 62.) and explains 運若運行;斡若主領.² (Yuan ru, II:2a.)
² Cf. Foming, I:16b-17a.
When characteristic is explained as substance, then [its meaning] and the meaning of thing-as-perceived are different. The meaning of the word nature is also varied. Buddhist works explain it as virtuous nature as in good, bad, etc., natures. It is also explained as substance and then [its meaning] is the same as characteristic when it is explained as substance. The term characteristics of dharmas is the general term for all material and mental phenomena. Because all material and mental phenomena are not constant, (all material and mental phenomena are not things which never change), because they are not stable, . . . their evolutionary movements are hidden and their perceivable aspects are suddenly manifested. (Although [dharmas] manifest perceivable aspects, they are not stable; hence I say sudden manifestation.) And thus they are called characteristics of dharmas. (Characteristics of dharmas are called phenomena by worldly people.)

The nature of dharmas is the original substance of all dharmas and is called genuine thusness. (That the word nature in nature of dharmas can be explained as original substance, see the comment above. All dharmas means all material and mental phenomena. The original substance of all material and mental phenomena is called genuine thusness. Genuine means genuinely real; thusness means unchanging [i.e. thus so]. For a more detailed explanation, see the Tang (唐) scholars' work Baifa shu (百法疏). The Mahāyāna term nature of dharmas is quite close to what this essay calls original substance. The Mahāyāna term characteristics of dharmas is quite close to what this essay calls function. But the Buddhist theories of the nature and characteristics [of dharmas] . . . and this essay's principle of the unity of substance and function are radically opposed and cannot be reconciled. The Mahāyāna is divided into two branches: the School of Emptiness [i.e. the Madhyamika] and the School of Being [i.e. the Yogācāra]. . . . The School of Emptiness established the

1. It should be noted that Xiong writes 訳 as 言.

2. Cf. Dasheng baifa mingmen lunjie (大乘百法明門論解), Taishō Vol. 44, No. 1837, p. 60c, lines 21-23.
two truths: absolute truth (真諦) and worldly truth (俗諦). ... What worldly people all acknowledge as a real principle of things and will comply with, [the Madhyamika] established as worldly truth. The real existence of truth is something that worldly truth cannot encompass and thus [they also] established absolute truth. They did not refute the characteristics of dharmas by means of worldly truth. Not until they expounded absolute truth did they forcefully refute the characteristics [of dharmas] in order to make clear their nature. (To make clear means to clearly demonstrate. The characteristics of dharmas are refuted so that the nature of dharmas will be clearly demonstrated, and people will be enlightened.) In their conclusion, however, they established [as real] neither the characteristics of dharmas nor the nature of dharmas. In other words, [they concluded that] substance and function are both empty. ... The Yogacara school arose to correct these errors and had excellent intentions. It is a pity that [they] never had a sound theory and never reached the true source. (Xuan Zang was a great Master of the Yogacara school who propogated the theories of Asanga and Vasubandhu to the extreme. For over a thousand years, intellectuals who discussed him praised him and never doubted him. I was the first to be aware of the errors of the school of Vasubandhu. ...)¹

1. On the Existence of Ontological Substance

Xiong sees the first task in explaining the principle of the unity of substance and function to be the affirming of the fact that there is indeed an ontological substance, a point upon which not all philosophers agree. Some philosophers, for example, argue the nihilist position that everything is ultimately nothing while others acknowledge the existence of phenomena (i.e. function) while denying the existence of substance. The first task Xiong sets himself then is the

¹ Tiyong lun, pp. 62-66.
refutation of ontological nihilism as a prolegomenon to the establishment of the existence of ontological substance. Just as in the West most philosophers have argued against a nihilist ontology, *ex nihilo nihil fit* as the principle was so succinctly put, so also Xiong argues that the concept that everything is ultimately derived from nothing is self-contradictory. He carefully analyses the concept of non-being (無) and recognizes the validity of a partial concept of non-being (別計無) while refuting the total concept of non-being (總計無). Xiong then proceeds to introduce the concept of ontological substance which he calls original substance. This original substance, he explains, commits itself, gives itself over as it were, to becoming the myriad of phenomena which he calls function. Substance becomes function, explains Xiong, as water becomes ice and, just as once the water is frozen, there is only ice and no more water, so also outside of function there is no separate entity called original substance. In this way, Xiong introduces the central theme of his philosophy: the unity of substance and function. Xiong says:

Some will ask whether or not the universe has a sphere of non-being. We answer that within the universe there is absolutely no non-being. If one says that in the universe there is a vast and empty sphere called non-being, then I would like to ask if the universe is like a broken vessel and has some part damaged or lacking. This [method] of using things and events of habitual daily use to fathom the universe is most unreasonable. If one says that there is a vast and empty sphere of non-being which is capable of containing all that exists in the universe, . . . and that this non-being does not

1. Xinlun, IV:51a.
impede being, and that being must manifest itself within this non-being, [then I say] that this explanation is erroneous. Moreover, I ask you, if you say that non-being is capable of containing being, then there is another question which must be settled first. [That question] is: is the so-called being self-produced or is it produced from non-being. If you reply that being is produced from non-being, [then I say that] since non-being is just non-being, how can it produce being? If you say that non-being must produce being, then this non-being is just being so why call it non-being? Moreover, if non-being becomes being, since being and [yet another] being cannot abide in the same place, how can you say that [non-being] contains [being]? If you say that being is self-produced, then, since that is the case, why is it necessary to postulate a non-being to contain it? Moreover, all beings are mutually reliant but non-being is just non-being and does not need to rely on being, so why is it necessary to postulate non-being? From what I have carefully argued above, [one can see] that the universe absolutely does not have a vast and empty sphere of non-being. If one is clear about this, then one will not have the erroneous ideas that non-being produces being or that being is produced from non-being. Many people, nevertheless, acknowledge that there is a vast and empty sphere of non-being. What is the reason for this? It is probably that people consider the things and events with which they come into contact in their every day lives as separate existing things. Because they believe that each existing thing is mutually separate, they feel that there is a vast empty sphere which receives and contains these separately existing things. In short, they split the universe open and see a vast and empty [sphere]. This, then, is the origins of the concept of a vast and empty [sphere] of non-being.

I have often said that, with respect to the idea of non-being, people have two kinds of concepts: total and partial. The total concept of non-being has already been spoken about...
above and I will not repeat it here. The partial concept of non-being means that some consider non-existent the things and events they daily come into contact with or think about. When, for example, I fled from the Japanese invasion into Sichuan (四川), the books which I had everyday, I did not have even one volume of then. When I wanted to look at a certain book, I could not obtain it. At that time, I said that the certain book was non-existent. Ancient and modern scholars, [for another example,] have advanced many correct principles (真理). If we carefully think over one of these principles and cannot believe in it, then we say that that certain principle is non-existent. These considerations all come under the heading of the partial concept of non-being. What I have explained before - the vast and empty sphere of non-being - is the total concept of non-being. The total concept of non-being absolutely does not exist and is a kind of erroneous concept which completely derives from daily life. As to the partial concept of non-being, however, we must admit that it has what it calls non-being. Many people say that the partial concept of non-being is not truly non-existent. If, for example, one wants to look at a [certain book], although that book is not at hand, one cannot say that it is non-existent. This book still exists in another place. And again, if one says that a certain principle cannot be believed and thus is non-existent, perhaps it is the case that one's knowledge is shallow and insufficient to see the principle, and not the case that this principle is non-existent. I believe that this kind of opinion is one-sided. If a certain book, although it exists in another place, is not at hand, then, from that point of view, it is non-existent. As far as principles go, many are of course said by us to be non-existent because we cannot understand them. But there are many principles which are the products of the shallowness and absurdities of ancient and modern scholars. In fact, these principles do not exist. The ancients, for example, said that the earth was flat. This principle is
generally acknowledged today as not being a [true] principle. These kinds of examples are limitless. Thus, the partial concept of non-being has what it calls non-being and is not an erroneous concept. Many philosophers, when discussing the problem of being and non-being, absolutely deny the existence of any non-being. They deny the existence of non-being because they do not distinguish between the total concept of non-being and the partial concept of non-being. This does not avoid [the error] of being too indiscriminate. In fact, there is a partial concept of non-being and it cannot be refuted. Moreover, this kind of concept of non-being is often simultaneously contained in the concept of being. When one admits that a certain event or a certain principle has being, there is, at the same time, a negative aspect that in this being there is non-being. This kind of concept of being and non-being is the fundamental category of knowledge, and hence it cannot be refuted. Only the total concept of non-being claims that in the universe there is a vast and empty sphere of non-being. This kind of idea of non-being is, in fact, completely the invention of absurd speculations. Apart from absurdities, there could be no such sphere. And thus I say that the total concept of non-being is completely an erroneous concept. As to the question of being and non-being, I will wait [until I publish] Essay on Epistemology (量論) to speak in more detail.¹

Here and now I just want to refute the total concept of non-being because one who has this kind of concept of non-being will produce a fundamental error that all being is brought forth from a vast and empty sphere of non-being. Whoever supports this kind of explanation will have no way of thoroughly understanding the original substance of all being. If, however, one sees original substance, then one will know that truth has no fixed locality and yet there is nowhere where it is not. (Truth here is just another name for original substance, and so are following uses of the term, truth.) Although

¹. To the best of my knowledge, this essay was never published.
truth is without appearance, it contains the myriad virtues and encompasses all principles. It commits its substance to the manifestation of the innumerable and unlimited functions which are then known as all that exists. (The word "commits" is important. It means that truth completely commits its entire substance and manifests itself as function; thus, beyond function, there is no substance [i.e. function and substance are one]. Just as, when water commits its entire substance and becomes ice, there is no water beyond the ice.)

Who claims that there is a vast and empty [sphere] of non-being? Who claims that non-being is able to produce being, or that being is produced from non-being? Thus this kind of [total] concept of non-being and [the idea of] truth do not support each other. For this reason, [the total concept of non-being] must be refuted. Previously, those who supported the concept of a vast and empty non-being were divided into two schools: the radical school and the moderate school. The moderate school, on the one hand, supports common sense and does not deny the existing and changing universe or what is called being. They do not, however, understand that the universe has its original substance and they think that the universe is produced from a vast and empty [sphere] of non-being. In China, from the Wei jin (魏晉) period (220-420) onward, most of those who incorrectly explained the philosophy of Laozi (老子, fifth century B.C.) belong to this school.¹ (What Laozi himself explained as non-being is actually not the vast and empty non-being. I have explained this elsewhere in my commentary on the Laozi and will not go into detail here.² However, most of the later students of Laozi misunderstood his meaning.) The radical school not only violates correct principles but also violates, quite badly, common sense. They

¹. For the best discussion of metaphysics during the Wei jin period, see: Tang Xiyu, Wei jin xuansue lungao (魏晉玄學論稿), Peking, 1957.

². This commentary is found in Yuyao, II:20a-41b. Xiong maintains that Laozi's concept of being and non-being are similar to what Xiong calls substance and function. (Cf. Yuan ru, IV:27b.)
do not acknowledge that the present and changing universe exists. (They probably explain it as [an illusion], like a flower in the sky. They think that, in actuality, [the universe] absolutely does not produce affairs and events.) They thus violate common sense. They fundamentally deny that there is an original substance and thus violate correct principles. We should know that, if there is no substance, then there is no function. According to what they say, then, we should deny the universe of common sense. Thus, what the radical school advocates is very thorough and very unified. Up to now, no one had advocated this school's thought in China. In ancient India, however, the unorthodox school of nihilism (空見), which advocated that everything was empty, seems to have been very popular. The Buddhist scriptures often contain passages refuting them. [The scriptures] even go so far as to say that they would rather a person cherish an ego as big as Mt. Sumeru than insult himself by supporting nihilist views. Everyone knows that the works of the Indian Buddhists all refute the [concept of an] ego. That they have a saying like this against the school of nihilism shows us that they consider this kind of explanation gross heresy. In summary, there is absolutely no vast and empty sphere of non-being. Only those who do not understand original substance speculate about this kind of non-being. The universe is completely real and full. Reality is lasting and unceasing. Where is there a vast and empty [sphere] of non-being?

The above is Xiong's refutation of the nihilist ontological position. There is, asserts Xiong, no vast and empty sphere of non-being because the universe is whole and complete. Furthermore, to say that being is produced from non-being is self-contradictory. Xiong analyses the concept of non-being into the total concept of

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1. This nihilist school should not be confused with the Madhyamika.
2. Xinlun, IV:50b-52b.
non-being and the partial concept of non-being. The former is tantamount to the vast and empty sphere of non-being and hence a completely false concept. The latter, on the other hand, is a valid concept and explains a kind of non-being. But, warns Xiong, there are still philosophers who, realizing the impossibility of a total concept of non-being, still refuse to admit the existence of original substance. They acknowledge the reality of the universe and its ceaselessly changing phenomena but deny the existence of an ontological substance. Some philosophers fear that the concept of an ontological substance borders on mysticism, says Xiong, while others posit it, like Plato's ideal, as an entity above and beyond phenomena. Xiong refutes these positions and argues that, although philosophers make mistakes in attempting to explain original substance, that should not deter them from the attempt. If, warns Xiong, we admit to a world of ceaselessly changing phenomena but refuse to acknowledge original substance, then by depriving man's life of any roots we reduce it to the ignominious level of a spark: one flash and it's gone. Xiong argues:

Many philosophers do not accept that being comes from non-being or that non-being is capable of producing being. They do not say that there is a vast and empty sphere of non-being. They just look at the endlessly changing universe as an objectively, independently existing [entity]. They only acknowledge that the ever changing phenomena, or the totality of being, is real, and are not willing to acknowledge the existence of a so-called original substance. Moreover, they dislike to hear theories of original substance [because] they consider these the meaningless playthings of idealists who falsely structure a mystical thing and make it the causal factor of the universe. This, [they say], is completely
erroneous. Their criticism is probably like this. I believe that their criticism, with regards, to those who discuss ontology, can be considered [as the criticism of] a friend who does not hesitate to remonstrate. Previously, many philosophers based their discussions of original substance on conjecture and speculation and thus could not avoid [describing] original substance as something outside which is sought after. Original substance seemed to be something above all events and phenomena which acts as their origin. Many [philosophers] spoke of original substance and the realm of events and phenomena as two distinct entities. They fundamentally did not realize original substance and, relying on their opinions, guessed at it. By thus relying on opinion, each established his own kind of original substance. (Some consider it mental, some consider it material, and some consider it neither mental nor material. But all guess that it is a thing outside. Thus in the case of the idealists, they conjecture that the universe and man's life have a common origin which they say is mind and only mind. They establish their doctrine on conjecture and cannot corroborate it. [Their view] and the view of my generation are vastly different. I will discuss this in another essay.) They also combine a group of theories to explain the cosmos but in fact each constructs his own cosmos and they have absolutely nothing in common with truth. Thus, many ontological theories are specious and thus bring attack upon themselves and this we cannot but admit. However, even though many ontologists construct [theories] based on conjecture, we should not, because of this, give up ontology and refuse to investigate it or even refuse to acknowledge that there is an original substance. [For, in that case], we would be like a sick person who, because he choked on food, was afraid of choking and so refused to eat. This way is self-destructive and even the foolish know it should not be followed. If ontologists today, because of the many conjectures and mistakes, do not talk about original substance or even refuse to admit the existence of original substance, then they will cut themselves off from truth and will be no different
from one who refuses to eat for fear of choking. If one acknowledges that the ever-changing universe is real and does not acknowledge that the universe has original substance, then the universe is equivalent to a flash of lightning or a spark, having absolutely no roots. Actually, then, man's life would be tantamount to a flower in the sky [i.e. an illusion] and this view would be no different from that of the Indian nihilist school.

We should know that [the question of] from what does the universe manifest itself requires an explanation. We must find the source of the myriad changes in order to explain the universe. Otherwise, [our philosophy] would be as shallow and crude as that of the naive realists. It would be unable to satiate man's thirst for knowledge. Some specious thinkers say that the universe has nothing called original substance and is just an endless flux of phenomena or being. The mutual uniting [of phenomena], they say, makes a whole substance which could be called the original substance of the universe. These thinkers do not acknowledge the existence of original substance and simply say that the mutual uniting of everything that exists is a whole substance and this they call original substance. They are thus of the same persuasion as ancient India's fakirs and are not worth arguing with. The term "whole" refers to the sum of all parts; if one part is left out, there is no whole to be had. If a building, for example, is considered apart from each beam and rafter, from each brick and tile, then there is actually no building to be had. [In this case], the term "complete whole" would be only an empty name and would have no reality. How can they say that this [complete whole] is original substance? And again, one should know that the phenomena of each part are ceaselessly changing. In other words, [they are] instantaneously [arising and expiring].

The old does not remain; the new is ever arising. From what

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1. See below for an explication of Xiong's concept of instantaneity, pp. 218-221.
does this [arising and expiring] emanate, from where does this current flow, who controls this? Is this [arising and expiring] like hair on a turtle or horns on a hare [i.e. unreal]? According to reason, however, this cannot be the case. Can it be said that there is no [original] substance? . . .

One should know that things have a real source. (Real source is an adjective and describes original substance.) If, for example, we take a good look at the waves in the ocean, [then we see] that the old [waves] do not remain but that new [waves] are ever arising. Each wave has the ocean as its real source. Confucius made the remark he made while standing in a stream because he saw the flowing of the water and intuitively realized original substance (真常). Who but a sage could have this insight. If one only acknowledges the reality of the ever changing flux of phenomena and does not acknowledge the existence of original substance, then he is like a child playing at the seaside who only acknowledges the reality of the waves and does not know that each wave emerges from the ocean. A child cannot be blamed, but a mature person who supports this view - is he not foolish? In short, whoever [supports] an explanation which denies the existence of original substance, if he carries it to the extreme, will return to the concept of a vast and empty [sphere] of non-being. Although he might base [his explanation] on common sense and affirm the real existence of the constantly changing universe, nevertheless, he will not be able to clarify from where this universe manifests itself, and will be unwilling to acknowledge that the universe has original substance. In this case, he must say that the

1. Cf. Legge (trans.), Confucian Analects, Book IX, Chapter 16: "Confucius, standing in a stream, said: 'It flows like this, never ceasing day or night.'" (Translation slightly amended.) Xiong held that in this passage Confucius was describing original substance. (Shiyao, I:14.) Xiong comments: "'It flows like this,' (this means arising and expiring), 'never ceasing day or night,' (this means constancy [i.e. original substance].)" (Yuyao, III:66b.) (Xiong also calls original substance "constancy")
universe is produced from a vast and empty sphere of non-being. But then, to reason to this extreme and still not fall into a nihilist position, (to absurdly maintain that there is no original substance is called nihilism), is most difficult.\(^1\)

Having refuted ontological nihilism and warned of the dangers of refusing to acknowledge the existence of an ontological substance, Xiong is prepared to explain his concept of original substance. Before he undertakes this, however, Xiong first cautions us against the mistakes that philosophers attempting to describe ontological substance often make. These mistakes, says Xiong, fall into three general categories.\(^2\) The first is mistaking ontological substance for an absolute such as an omnipotent deity. The second is monism or the mistaken definition of ontological substance as either just matter or just mind. The third is underestimating the importance of mind and mistakenly considering it as just a by-product of matter. Xiong explains:

Previously, cosmologists who spoke about original substance made three great errors. . . . First, they sought the absolute beyond the relative. This is the chronic complaint of ancient monotheistic religions. . . . Although learning later arose, it did not depart from this set pattern. It was not known that absoluteness is a characteristic of original substance whereas relativism is used only for the myriad of beings.

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2. See also *Mingxin pian*, pp. 204-205, where Xiong lists these three categories slightly differently. The first is "regarding ontological substance as transcending phenomena and existing independently above it." Xiong includes religious deities in this category. The second is "regarding ontological substance as concealed beneath phenomena." Xiong includes the Yogacara concept of seeds in this category. The third is "regarding ontological substance as a 'nothingness' which contains all cosmological phenomena." Xiong includes the philosophy of Laozi in this category.
Original substance is the embodiment of the myriad of beings, just as the ocean is the embodiment of waves. If scholars realized this, then [they would see that] the absolute and the relative were originally one even though they are divided. Although they are divided, in reality they are one. Once this is clearly and precisely understood, what other doubt can there be? Truth is quite commonplace; there is nothing strange about it. But scholars themselves create a fog of confusion and grow daily further from the truth. Thus, like travellers who have lost their way and do not know the way back, they are to be pitied. (It is really quite sad when those who speak about original substance do not see the truth. But even sadder are those who are for philosophy but disdain ontology and say that the universe and man's life have no original substance.)

Previous scholars, when speaking of original substance and phenomena, all said that phenomena are mutations and original substance is the reality. In this way, they distinguished two kinds of worlds. But if one agrees with my thesis of the unity of substance and function, then original substance is just phenomena (just as the ocean is just waves) and phenomena is just original substance (just as apart from waves, there is no ocean). The arising and extinguishing and constant changing of phenomena is just the arising and extinguishing and constant changing of original substance. (Just as the rising and falling and constantly changing waves are just the rising and falling and constantly changing ocean.) The constant movement of phenomena is just the constant movement of original substance (just as the constant movement of the waves is the constant movement of the ocean). For this reason, then, one should not say that phenomena are mutations and original substance is the reality. Phenomena and original substance, although they are divided, ultimately cannot be split into two, and this meaning is final. We should say that phenomena and original substance are originally one; we should say that the reality is the mutation and the mutation is the reality.

...
Second, I will not discuss those western [thinkers] who do not discuss ontology. Those who do discuss ontology merely display prejudice, and eventually evolve a theory of no original substance. Since the west has had philosophy, schools of thought have consistently split into two major groups: the materialists and the idealists, and these two contend against each other.¹

The idealists vigorously maintain that mind is the one source of all being and that [the concept of] matter must be discarded. If, however, [the idealists] ultimately cannot deny [the existence] of material phenomena, then they relegate them to mind, and indicate that matter is merely the by-product of mind. The materialists vigorously support matter as the sole origin of the universe, and say that [the concept of] mind must be discarded. If, however, [the materialists] ultimately cannot deny [the existence] of mental phenomena, then they relegate them to matter and indicate that mind is a by-product of matter.

At the end of the Qing (清) dynasty, when I first heard the theories of these two great schools, I was very skeptical. From middle age onwards, I saw that their fundamental mistake was in not deliberating about substance and function. . . .

Mind and matter are both obvious [manifestations] of function. . . . I dare to assert that the running current of function does not suddenly arise from nowhere, even less is it an illusion. I dare to assert that function quite obviously has a fixed original substance, just as the many waves have a fixed ocean. Original substance is the embodiment of function, just as the ocean is the embodiment of waves. To observe the myriad of beings and not discover their true feature (the myriad of beings is another name for function, true feature is identical with original substance), is to be like a child watching waves and not realizing [they constitute] an ocean. How can one do this?

Mind and matter are all functions. In other words, [they are] all quite clearly phenomena. The idealists, by grasping mind

¹. That the history of western philosophy is largely the history of the struggle between materialists and idealists is an idea Xiong gained from Lin Zaiping. (Cf. Yuyao, IV:21a.)
as monistic, and the materialists, by grasping matter as monistic, split the cosmos and choose only one aspect of the running current of function as original source. (Original source is original substance.) In fact, they return to a position which admits to no ontological substance. ¹

Third, materialists posit matter as monistic and make mind the by-product of matter. Their theories easily move people and I cannot but object. Mind is neither a deity nor a phantom but is just mankind's natural intelligence (靈性).²

All men have free will. (Confucius said: "The commander of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him."³ That the will cannot be taken is proof enough of the freedom of the will.) [All men] have profound and subtle thoughts, and an abundance of emotions. These are all mental phenomena. To call them the by-products of matter is like saying beans can produce hemp: cause and effect are utterly confused. How can this theory [of mind as a by-product of matter] be comprehensible?⁴

Having refuted those who hold an ontological nihilism as well as those who deny the existence of ontological substance and having warned of the three types of errors common to ontological descriptions, Xiong is now prepared to explain ontological substance. Xiong cautions that, just as it is difficult to perceive the concept square apart from a square object, so also is it difficult to perceive original substance apart from its manifestations which we know as phenomena. Knowledge of original substance, says Xiong, is difficult because it cannot be gained by reason but requires a special kind of

². The same natural intelligence, says Xiong, from which springs what Wang Yangming calls "the innate knowledge of the good" (良知). (*Mingxin pian*, p. 2.)
³. Legge (trans.), *op. cit.*, Book IX, Chapter 25.
Having made this clear, Xiong presents the six characteristics of original substance:

We have previously said that we are bound to conclude that the universe, or all phenomena, has an original substance. As to what kind of thing this original substance is, that is something we cannot [rationally] think about. Our function of thinking is developed from daily experience. Up to now, [when we think] of a sphere we have experienced, [our thinking] constantly manifests an object appropriate to that sphere. Thus, when thinking of [something with] common features, [our thinking] manifests an object appropriate to these common features. (Square, for example, is the common feature of all square things and when we think about "squareness" then [our thinking] manifests the appropriate features.) If, when thinking of original substance, we are unable to eliminate all features, then we will have no way of gaining original substance and will only be pondering whatever feature our minds manifest. One must know that original substance cannot be thought of as having common features. [Whatever] is thought of as having common features is just an object our minds have manifested and this object is subject to materialization. (The objects our minds manifest are just phenomena our minds construct; these are subject to materialization.) This is not original substance making itself evident. Hence I say that original substance cannot be thought about. (Thinking here means what is commonly called thinking. There is another kind of special thinking which is able to sift out the tainted things of everyday life and unite with truth.\(^1\) I call this kind of thinking "profound thinking" [思]. Profound thinking is capable of realizing original substance. When I write Essay on Epistemology [論] I will speak about it in detail.)\(^2\) However, that by which original substance

1. Literally: "the tainted things of a practical aspect."
2. This essay, to the best of my knowledge, was never published.
becomes original substance, roughly speaking, has the following [six] characteristics. First, original substance completes all principles, contains all virtues, and originates all transformations. [It is] natural, pure, and original. Natural means that it needs nothing to complete itself. Pure means it has no pollution, and thus there is nothing evil about it. [In the word] "original" (benran, 本然), ben means "originally" (来) and ran means "like this" (如). One must know that original substance was not originally non-being [which has] now [become] being, nor is it constructed from thought. Hence it is said to be original. It is forever unchangeable and thus I describe it as I do. Second, original substance is absolute. If it lacked something, then it could not be called the original substance of all phenomena. Third, original substance is concealed. It does not have shape and [it does not have a category] of space. Fourth, original substance is constant; it has no beginning or end and thus has [no category] of time.

... Fifth, original substance is complete and perfect with no deficiencies. It cannot be dissected. Sixth, if I say that original substance is unchangeable, this already connotes change. If I say original substance is changeable, this already connotes permanence. This is hard to explain. Original substance manifests itself as the unlimited, innumerable functions that we call phenomena. And thus it is said to be changeable. However, although original substance manifests itself as the myriad functions, or all of phenomena, nevertheless, it ultimately never changes its self-nature. Its self-nature is constantly pure, unyielding, and unobstructing. And thus I say it is unchangeable. As to the question of changeable and unchangeable, it is very broad, profound, subtle, and difficult to explain. I do not have the space to discuss it in detail here but will

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1. Literally: "robust" (剛健). This term is taken from the Book of Changes, Wenyuan zhuang (文言傳), under the qian (乾) hexagram. (Cf. Yuyao, III:31a.)
explain it in another book. One can understand what is called original substance [by means of] the six characteristics outlined above.¹

C. Xiong's Concept of Ontological Substance

1. Change

Xiong's ontological substance, which he calls original substance, is, in a word, change.² Xiong's concept of change, however, is an amalgamation of Yogacāra and Confucian concepts. From the Confucians, Xiong incorporates the concept that change is alive and productive,³ and that it unites opposites such as subject and object, perceiver and perceived.⁴ From the Yogacāra, Xiong incorporates the concept of change as a running current which instantaneously arises and expires.⁵ Xiong characterises original substance as creative change by using two terms borrowed from the *Book of Changes*: "closing" (閉), and "opening" (闔).⁶ Simply put, these represent two aspects or tendencies inherent in the constant flow of change which is original substance. Closing is the tendency of original substance to close in on itself, as it were, and to congeal and hence produce what we know as the material world. Opening, on the other hand, is the tendency of original substance to open out and influence matter. Of the two, closing and opening, opening is the master and is thus identified with mind.⁷

¹. Xinlun, IV:54b-55a.
². Xinlun, Chapter IV, is on original substance as change.
³. Xinlun, V:28a.
⁴. Ibid., V:56a.
⁵. Ibid., IV:49a; and IV:69a-72b.
⁷. Xinlun, IV:57b-69a.
In order to explain his concept of original substance as change still further, Xiong elucidates what he calls the three principles of change. The first of these states that change is not movement. Movement is a scientific notion, says Xiong, which presupposes a moveable object, space to move it through, and time to move it in. Xiong's concept of change, however, refers to the great running current which transcends the categories of matter, time, and space. Xiong's concept of change absolutely cannot be understood as a kind of movement. It is similar to the concept of change described in the *Doctrine of the Mean* as: "Change without movement" (不動而變). The early Chinese philosophers, says Xiong, also described this change as "spiritual transformation" (神化) but the word spiritual does not refer to any deity but to the fact that change is unfathomable. What the worldly call movement, says Xiong, is a scientific concept which can be known rationally, but change is a metaphysical concept that can only be known intuitively.

The second of the three principles of change is vivacity (活). Change is not a dead, static, inert thing, says Xiong, but a lively, vivacious, active process. Xiong explains this principle of liveliness by analysing its six characteristics. First, liveliness has no creator. Xiong remarks that not only did the Buddhists argue against the concept of a deity who is creator of all things, but

1. *Xinlun*, IV:84a-84b.
2. The term running current will be explained in detail below.
so also did the Confucianists and the Taoists. 1 Xiong proceeds to
give several arguments as proof of the non-existence of a creator-
deity. If there were such a creator, argues Xiong, then his nature
would either be pure or impure. If the creator's nature is pure,
he could not create impure things and vice versa. But, adds Xiong,
it is obvious that there are both pure and impure things in the
universe. Another argument states that, if there is a creator, he
must be either permanent or impermanent. If he is impermanent, asks
Xiong, then how can he create phenomena which are also impermanent?
If he is permanent, then he would not create as that would make him
impermanent. A third argument is the so-called first cause argument.
If there is a creator capable of creating the cosmos, who or what
created him? This argument naturally leads to infinite regress
and thus is no argument at all. 2 Change is not the creation of an
omnipotent creator and, for this reason, says Xiong, it is lively
and unrestrained. The second characteristic of the vivacity of
change is its illusory nature. Phenomena are the instantaneous
manifestations of the great running current. Because they are in-
stantly produced and instantly destroyed, they are called illusory.
The third characteristic is reality. The constant transformation
which is change is real and not false. Original substance is a
constant flux which we call change. Although it produces phenomena
which are ultimately illusory, it itself is real. A fourth charac-
teristic is completeness: everything in the universe is complete in
itself just as each wave in the ocean has the whole ocean as its

1. Cf. Xiong Shili, "A Brief Discussion of Chinese and Western
Cultures," Xueyuan (學原 ), 1:4 (August 1947) 1-3; and
Yuyao, II:20a-24a.
2. This argument is taken from the Buddhist logicians. (Xinlun, IV:85b.)
substance. When Zhuangzi says that the tip of an autumn hair, compared with Mt. Tai, is not small, or that Mt. Tai, compared with the tip of an autumn hair, is not large, he is attempting to explain this concept of completeness. The substance of both the autumn hair and Mt. Tai are absolute and complete and hence there is no distinction of great or small. That distinction is produced by man and does not accord with the true situation. To illustrate this point, Xiong uses the example of Chinese characters. The character for man, for example, includes all men and excludes everything that is not man and thus is complete unto itself. The fifth characteristic is universality. In the common sense view of things, the universe is thought to be shared in common by all men but this is not the case. On the contrary, says Xiong, each man has his own universe. Each man is like an Indra's net (帝網) out of which all things can be produced. Three men in the same house, says Xiong, are in fact each in a different house because, if one is standing in the middle, another is sleeping in the corner, while a third is sitting under the window, then the house is different in perspective to each. But even though each has his own universe, adds Xiong, these individual universes do not mutually conflict with one another, just as, if one lights a thousand candles in the same room, each gives its

1. "There is nothing in the world bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, and mount T'ai is tiny." (Burton Watson, (trans.), The Complete Works of Chuang-tzu, Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 43.)
2. Chinese characters do not distinguish number and thus the character ren (人) can mean either "man" or "men."
3. Xinlun, IV:87a.
own light without interfering in the light of another. The sixth and final characteristic is inexhaustibility. The constant flux of change has nothing on which it relies and is thus inexhaustible. The Book of Changes describes this inexhaustibility as "constant production and reproduction" (生生不息),\(^2\) as "an abundance of virtue" (德盛),\(^3\) and as "spiritual transformation" (神化).\(^4\)

The third and last of the three principles of change is that change cannot be known by rational thought alone. In order to explain why change cannot be known by rational thinking, Xiong explains the term "thinking" (思議, siyi):

\[ Si \text{ means the movement of the mind while } yi \text{ means evaluation.} \]

In the term "movement of the mind," movement means wandering. When the mind is pondering a group of principles, it makes many inferences, as if it were wandering about, and thus the term "movement of the mind." As for the term evaluation, it need not come from someone's mouth or be written down to be considered an evaluation. Whoever is in the midst of pondering [something], all his inferences and reasonings, all his arguments and analyses should be called "evaluations." In summary, then, thinking emanates from "measuring wisdom" (量智).\(^5\)

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1. Xinlun, IV:86b-87a.
2. Legge (trans.), Book of Changes, Great Appendix, Part I, Chapter 5, says: "Production and reproduction is what is meant by change." (生生之謂易).
3. Ibid., "Daily renewal is what is meant by an abundance of virtue." (日新之謂盛德).
4. Ibid., Part II, Chapter 2, says: "a spiritual transformation." (神而化之).
5. Xiong distinguishes between "measuring wisdom" (量智) and "original wisdom" (性智). (Cf. Xinlun, I:2b-7a; IV:88a; VIII:61b-66b; and Yuyao, III:9a; III:70b; and Yuan ru, I:1a. See also: Liu Shu-hsien, "The Contemporary Development of a neo-Confucian Epistemology," in Invitation to Chinese Philosophy, Oslo, 1972, pp. 19-27.)
Measuring wisdom is molded from the experiences of everyday life. Thus, when one relies on measuring wisdom for his thoughts, one is constantly making different hypotheses and many of these naturally cannot avoid containing personal conjectures and confused guesses. Even if one could cause himself to have true conjectures with which to speculate about metaphysics, and to discipline thought with rules, although one would then avoid many personal conjectures and confused guesses, ultimately, one would still be unable to deeply enter the basic truth of the thing or event about which one is thinking. At most, one can only make an overall estimation and say that [the thing or event] is probably like this. Naturally, we cannot but rely on thought to realize many principles, but we should not praise the power of thought excessively. The original substance of phenomena, which is the subtlety of change, is ultimately not knowable by thought.¹

To illustrate the limits of rational thought for understanding change, Xiong says that, pondering change with rational thought, gives us two general ideas of change. First, we will consider change to be absolute because, if it were not, it could not manifest itself as the myriad of phenomena. Second, we will consider change to have at least two aspects within itself because without some kind of reciprocity there can be no change. But rational thought can only give us an overall estimation because it stops at the irrational. By irrational, Xiong does not mean absurd or reasonless but rather that which transcends reason, the supra-rational as it were. Take, for example, the two general ideas just mentioned. Concerning the first, we might ask ourselves why, if change is absolute, does original substance manifest itself as the myriad of beings. Rational thinking, says Xiong, cannot answer this question. On the contrary,

¹. Xinlun, IV:88a-88b.
the more we think about an answer, the more confused we are bound to become. As to the second, if we ask why is it that change requires at least two aspects, we will be inclined to answer that there must be another force making this requirement. This answer leads to infinite regress. The answers to these questions, says Xiong, transcend reason and thus to gain the answers we must transcend rational thinking because it is mundane, linear, and based on experience. The answers to these questions can only be had by intuition which is a function of original wisdom and not measuring wisdom.¹ This is why the Confucians call intuition "self-embodiment" (體 認) and the Buddhists call it "self-confirmation" (身作 證).²

2. Opening and Closing

As noted above, Xiong defines original substance as change and derives his concept of change from an amalgamation of Confucian and Yogācāra ideas. To describe the process of change, Xiong uses two terms taken from the Book of Changes: opening and closing.³ Xiong insists that opening and closing are not two separate entities but rather two aspects of the process of change which constitutes original substance. To make this point clear, Xiong uses the metaphor of a coin: original substance is like a coin while opening and closing represent the two different sides of the coin which,

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¹. Xinlun, IV:89a. For Xiong's concept of intuition, see: Chuxu, p. 24, and p. 145; and Shiyao, Preface:3.
². Shiyao, Preface:3.
³. Legge (trans.), Book of Changes, Great Appendix, Part I, Chapter.
⁶. Chan, Religious Trends, p. 35, translates opening and closing as "expansions" and "contraction."
although they are different sides, still constitute the same coin. Closing is a process which leads to what Xiong calls "materialization" (物化) which process results in the production of material phenomena.¹ Opening, on the other hand, is a process completely resistant to materialization and, instead of materializing, becomes the controller of the materialization process.² In conventional philosophical terms, then, opening and closing are similar to the concepts of mind and matter.³ But Xiong warns that, unlike mind and matter, opening and closing are not two separate entities but just two different aspects of the one original substance. Opening and closing, explains Xiong, are processes which occur simultaneously and hence cannot be bifurcated.⁴ Xiong further develops his concepts of opening and closing by comparing them to the first two hexagrams in the Book of Changes.⁵ The first hexagram, called qian (乾), Xiong likens to opening because the three lines of the qian hexagram (☰) are unbroken, odd in number, and represent an amorphous spirit or mind. The second hexagram, called kun (坤), Xiong likens to closing because the three lines of the kun hexagram (☷ ☷) are broken, even in number, and represent matter. Kun's even numbered lines, says Xiong, symbolizes the fact that closing, or matter, requires a partner and is not independent. This partner is just opening which represents mind and which is the controller of the process of change so that without mind, matter cannot

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¹ Xinlun, IV:58a.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid., IV:65b.
⁴ Ibid., IV:58b.
⁵ Legge (trans.), op. cit., first two hexagrams.
Xiong uses his concepts of opening and closing to refute the Yogacara school's concepts of mind and matter. The Yogacara Masters considered mind as an inert, discriminating device similar to a mirror. Xiong, by his use of the concept of opening, depicts mind as a creative force and refutes that mind is dead or inert like a mirror.¹ The Yogacara Masters consider the ultimate source of material phenomena to be the seeds of the perceived division of each consciousness and, since these seeds are real entities, they imply that material phenomena are likewise real entities. Xiong, however, explains material phenomena as the products of the process of closing, the congealing tendency in original substance, and hence material phenomena, in Xiong's philosophical system, are not real entities.² Xiong defines opening and closing thus:³

What are closing and opening? I have already said above that original substance manifests itself as an abundance of functions. And thus we theoretically say that original substance is capable of change and we also call it constant transformation.⁴ We should know that constant transformation is formless and moves subtly. . . . Its movement is "continuous without cease."⁵ (Continuous means that as soon as the former movement expires, the following movement arises. Continuous [also means] there is no interruption, just as lightning is [continuous] flashes. Continuous does not mean

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2. Ibid., 66a-66b.
3. Parts of the following have also been translated by Wing-tsit Chan in Sourcebook, pp. 765-766.
4. This term will be explained below.
5. This is Chan's translation. (Sourcebook, p. 765.)
that the former movement is extended to a latter time. "Without cease" means constantly continuing. . . . If there was cessation, there would be interruption. How can this be?) This kind of ceaseless motion is not itself a solitary and simple function. . . . Each movement always has a congealing [aspect]. . . . If [the movement] did not have this congealing aspect, it would be ephemeral and baseless. Thus, when the tendency to movement arises, there is also a kind of congealing. This tendency to congeal actively solidifies. Consequently, quite unexpectedly, [this congealing] becomes an unlimited number of appearances. Appearances [mean] the extremely fine forms of matter as they just begin to solidify. The roots of this solidification, however, are not physical things but the mere tendency to become physical [things] and for this reason I say "appearances." The material universe is established like this and this tendency to congeal and become appearances is called closing.¹

At the same time in which the tendency of closing occurs, there is another tendency arising simultaneously. . . . Its arising relies on constant transformation [i.e. original substance]. As far as constant transformation is concerned, then we must say that this tendency is a manifestation of constant transformation. Constant transformation, however, is originally empty and without activity but its manifesting this tendency is an activity and hence we must say that this tendency, although its substance is constant transformation, it is not just constant transformation just as ice, which has water as its substance, is not just water. This tendency is strong enough to be self-controlling and does not evolve with closing (i.e. it opposes closing). In other words, this tendency moves into closing and becomes its controller, thereby manifesting its strength and causing closing to transform in accordance with it. . . . This strong and non-materializing tendency is called opening.²

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1. Xinlun, IV:57b-58a.
2. Ibid.
Xiong explains original substance as change by means of the concepts of opening and closing. Closing is a process by which material phenomena are produced but, simultaneously with the process of closing, there also arises the process of opening. Opening represents mind and, because it never gives way to materialization, it is the stronger of the two and thus Xiong calls it the controller. The concepts of closing and opening clearly show the major differences between Xiong's philosophic system and that of the Yogacāra. In the Yogacāra school, change is a mental phenomenon identified with consciousness but in Xiong's system change is ontological and identified with original substance. In the Yogacāra system, material phenomena are produced by seeds stored in the eighth consciousness: seeds produce events and phenomena which then "perfume" other latent seeds and cause them in turn to produce other events and other phenomena. By introducing the concepts of opening and closing into his system, Xiong does not need a theory of seeds. Moreover, since closing is the tendency of original substance to produce material phenomena which are essentially in a state of constant flux and thus not real entities, the major fault of the theory of seeds, namely that seeds are real entities and produce real dharmas, is completely avoided. By equating mind with the process of opening, Xiong is reaffirming his belief that the mind is a creative power which actively transforms what it contemplates. This stands in bold contrast to the Yogacāra view that the mind is merely a reflective device similar to a mirror.\footnote{Xinlun, IV:65b-66b.} By equating matter with the process of closing, Xiong completely does away with the Yogacāra theory of
seeds and its materialist cosmology, its dualist metaphysics, and its bifurcation of substance and function. But Xiong, although not denying the existence of material phenomena, maintains his idealism by arguing that matter, since it is produced and then immediately destroyed in an never ending flux, is ultimately not real.\textsuperscript{1} Xiong says:

We can say that opening is mind and closing is matter. The old Consciousness-only Masters considered mind to be capable of discriminating object spheres. They said mind was discrimination and that is all. Actually, so-called mind is the rising, developing, not willing to be materialized, robust tendency known as opening and just this is called mind. Apart from this tendency what else is there to be called mind? The old Masters only saw mind as discrimination. They looked [at mind] as that which manifests the perception of an object. In other words, [they looked at mind] from its traces [i.e. the objects it manifests and then perceives]. This is looking [at mind] as if it were a static thing and not realizing that the essence of mind is originally a very subtle kind of tendency. The old Masters view of mind is too coarse and shallow. I maintain that mind is the unobstructed running current which cannot be dissected. [It is] the robust, striving upwards tendency which I call opening. One must be introspective and have deep intuition to obtain knowledge of it. If one only looks at mind from its traces and considers mind to be a thing which distinguishes [objects] like a mirror, (a mirror reflects ugliness, beauty and other spheres and this is distinguishing but [a mirror] is just a static thing), then this is a great mistake. Mind, although it moves and yet is always at rest, still it cannot be considered as a static thing.

As to the explanation of matter, the old Masters such as Dharmapala, etc. considered all matter to have another source.

\textsuperscript{1} Xinlun, IV:65b-66b.
(which they called seeds of the perceived portion and which seeds were stored in the eighth consciousness and hence they [i.e. the old Masters] did not violate the [principle] of consciousness-only). Finally, [they] could not avoid considering matter to be a real thing, and this is preposterous. Actually, so-called matter is not a real thing but is only a kind of tendency to solidify in the great running current of function which suddenly manifests itself as a thing which is then said to be material. Apart from this tendency to solidify [i.e. closing], what is there to be called matter?\(^1\) . . .

The materialists consider matter primordial and the old Masters thought matter had its causes (which were called seeds of the perceived portion). These [views] all make matter out to be real and are greatly mistaken. Matter does not really exist and does not have what the old Masters imagined to be its causes. Matter is just what I call the tendency to solidify which suddenly manifests itself as things and that is all. This tendency to solidify is called closing; closing becomes matter. . . . Thus, the concept matter relies on closing to be established.\(^2\)

Of the two processes, opening and closing, which make up original substance in Xiong's ontology, opening is the more important because it controls closing. Just as in the Yogacara system, "mind" is more important than "mental associates" because mind is the controller, so also in Xiong's system opening, which is identified with mind, is more important than closing. This not only shows Xiong's ability to synthesize Confucian and Yogacara concepts but also shows Xiong's strong preference for philosophical idealism. Xiong explains the predominance of opening over closing thus:

Original substance becoming function is not a solitary and simple [process]. . . . It definitely has the two aspects of closing and opening which, through [the principle of]

2. Ibid., 66b.
the unity of opposites, produces change. Closing moves and congeals; opening moves and ascends. (Ascends has many meanings. I speak of two: developing and going up. Congeal means to amass into matter. Ascend means to become "the essence of spirit". Original substance becomes function and within this function there are two extreme [movements] mutually opposed. These arise as the two aspects of closing and opening which then make manifest their differences. From this, the ten thousand changes [evolve] inexhaustibly. The [process] of closing becomes matter and material objects each have their own spheres. All in the world see the mutual separateness and mutual differences of the myriad of phenomena. [The process of] opening becomes the movement of mind. 

Mind is a special kind of energy but the Book of Changes does not call it energy but names it jingshen [精神] [which literally means "essence of spirit."] Thus, its function is so great as to be unfathomable, so subtle as to be difficult to describe. One cannot name it "energy." Movement has two meanings: to move in an orbit, and to employ.) [Mind] thoroughly enters all things, thoroughly embraces all things. It has no fixed position yet there is nowhere it is not. For this reason, matter separates into many [objects] but mind revolves and does not separate. [Mind] follows the separateness and differences of matter and thoroughly revolves in them. What Huizi (惠子, third century B.C.) called the "Great One" (Great One) characterises mind. (Characterises means to name.) Thus mind thoroughly enters all things and thoroughly embraces all things; it has no fixed position yet there is nowhere where it is not. Thus the material world, although it appears as scattered and different, in

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1. Cf. Zhuangzi, Chapter 33, where Huizi is reported to have said: "The largest thing has nothing beyond it; it is called the Great One. The smallest thing has nothing within it; it is called the Small One." (Burton Watson (trans.), Complete Works of Chuang-Tzu, op. cit., p. 374. See also: Mingxin pian, p. 68.)
reality has an essential energy which revolves amid the scattered and separate material [objects] and acts as their ruler. . . . The material world is not long separated [from the mental]. Scholars must deeply ponder this truth.  


To further explain his concept of original substance as change, Xiong describes change, using two Buddhist terms, as a "running current," or "constant transformation," and, by borrowing a Confucian term, as the "unity of opposites." Let us consider these in detail. The term "running current" (流行) is borrowed from the Buddhists but with a difference. The Buddhists described all mental and material phenomena as a running current because they maintained that nothing is permanent and everything is ceaselessly changing. By this term running current, the Buddhists express repugnance for the phenomenal world whereas Xiong, to the contrary, glorifies this ceaseless change and in his philosophy the term running current has none of the opprobrium the Buddhists' associate with it. Xiong explains the term running current thus:

In previous times, the Indian Buddhists called all mental and material phenomena by the term xing (行, literally: "actions."). Xing has two meanings: the flow of movement, and the thing-as-perceived (相狀). They [i.e. the Buddhists] considered all mental and material phenomena to be constantly changing, constantly flowing. (As soon as the old expires, the new

2. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends, p. 35, translates liuxing as running current and I have used his translation.
4. Ibid., II:78b.
immediately arises and this is known as changing. The old expires and the new arises without cease and this is called flowing.) [Material and mental phenomena] are not fixed, durable things and thus it is said [they] move and flow. Although mind and matter are constantly moving, however, they suddenly manifest perceivable aspects just as a light, in the process of flashing, suddenly manifests its image [i.e. light] and hence the meaning "perceivable aspects." The perceivable aspects of matter can be known through the senses while the perceivable aspects of mind cannot be known through the senses but can be introspectively realized. Because mind and matter have the above mentioned two meanings, they are thus called xing. This name is quite correct and we will also use it.¹

Xiong notes that the Buddhists use the term xing to describe all material and mental phenomena in order to point out their impermanence. Because they are impermanent, phenomena have no true nature and only the ignorant grasp on to them as real. Xiong, on the other hand, praises this impermanence as a "running current" and takes it as proof that original substance is alive and not dead, active and not passive. Xiong continues:

The Indian Buddhist view of all phenomena is rooted in their transcendent attitude toward man's life. Transcendent (超生) means to transcend life and death. It means "otherworldliness." (This term "otherworldliness" [出世] comes from the Cien zhuan [慈恩傳] )² One can observe this impermanence from beyond all phenomena. Observe (観) means to illuminate (明照), and to finely investigate (精察), etc. It is much deeper [in meaning] that what is commonly called "reflection" (思維). The "im-" of impermanence means not to have while permanence means endurance. All phenomena "do not have endurance" and thus they are said to be impermanent. In other words,

¹. Xinlun, IV:49a.
². Taishô Vol. 50, No. 2053, pp. 220-280. This is the biography of Xuan Zang.
one observes that mind is impermanent and that matter is impermanent and concludes that all phenomena are impermanent. Since one has this view [of phenomena], then one will not of course be tainted by phenomena. This is what they [i.e. the Indian Buddhists] meant. From the time Sakyamuni taught the [Four] Agamasutras (四阿含经) to the time of the works of the Mahayana, all [upheld] this meaning. Thus when the old scholars say "impermanent" it is meant as a refutation of phenomena. [They mean] that mental phenomena cannot be grasped as having a real function and material phenomena should not be grasped as a real sphere which can be known. The reason for this is that mental and material phenomena have no permanence. Their view is based on their attitude towards man's life and this should be recognized clearly.

Xiong now goes on to say why and how he uses the term "running current." He says:

When my work talks about change, [it means] that no phenomenon is considered to be a real thing. This point and the [Indian Buddhists'] point that all phenomena are impermanent are quite similar. The meaning [of change] in my work, however, and the Indian Buddhists' meaning ultimately differ in [one] place. When the old Masters say that all phenomena are impermanent, this connotes a refutation [of phenomena], but in my work impermanence absolutely does not have this connotation. Because we look at them from a purely cosmological point of view, ... we see that all phenomena lack self-substance.

1. The Four Agamasutras contain the Hinayana doctrine which the Buddha taught in the Lumbini Garden during the first twelve years of his ministry. The four are: 1) the Dirghama (長阿含), a treatise on cosmogony; 2) the Madhyamagama (中阿含), a treatise on metaphysics; 3) the Sanyuktāgama (雜阿含), miscellaneous treatises; and 4) the Ekottaragama (增阿含), the numerical treatises.

2. Xinlun, IV:49b.
In actuality, [they] only exist in the vivid, lively, and uninterrupted process of change. This uninterrupted process of change, we call the "great running current of function" (大用流行), and this [running current] cannot be refuted. We rely on this cosmological view to affirm that man's life is progressive and forward. [Man's life] does not reject phenomena nor is it tainted by them.¹

Xiong’s concept of original substance then is that of change which he calls the running current. To reinforce this concept of original substance as change, Xiong also uses the Buddhist term "constant transformation" (恆轉).² Xiong explains constant transformation thus:

We have said above that original substance is capable of change. From this aspect of change, we see that [original substance] is neither constant nor interrupted. Hence we establish [another] name for original substance and call it "constant transformation." "Constant" means "not interrupted." "Transformation" means "not constant." [Original substance] is not constant and is not interrupted and thus it is called constant transformation. From the view that original substance manifests itself as function, we say that, . . . because [it] is constantly moving, it is not constant. If it were constant, then there would be no movement and it would not become function. Because [original substance] is constantly moving, we say it is not interrupted. If there were interruptions, then there would be no movement and it would not become function. Not constant and yet not interrupted, this then is change and thus does [original substance] become "the great running current of function." And so it is called constant transformation.³

¹ Xinlun, IV:49b-50a.
² The translation "constant transformation" is taken from Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends, p. 34.
³ Xinlun, IV:55b-56a.
Xiong's original substance is ceaseless change which he calls variously the running current or constant transformation. The question arises how does this ceaseless change manifest itself as phenomena. Xiong answers by positing the principle of the "unity of opposites" (相反相成). Briefly described, the principle of the unity of opposites claims that there is an inner contradiction within original substance which manifests itself in the dualism of subject and object, perceiver and perceived, etc. To the unenlightened, these dualisms seem irreconcilable, but the enlightened see them for what they are: two aspects of the one original substance. Xiong describes the principle of the unity of opposites thus:

We must seek in the ceaseless change the most fundamental and most universal principle. What is this principle? We consider that it is the great principle of the unity of opposites. When we speak of change, then there is an object, there is lively movement, and there are inner contradictions. Indeed, within these contradictions are the reasons for the development of change. We must know that change is not a solitary and simple affair and this principle is not difficult to understand. (In the term solitary and simple, solitary means alone and without object; simple means unanimous and without contradiction.) If one says that there is a solitary and simple event, then that event has no change. Unless the world

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1. Chan, *op. cit.*, p. 34, translates this as "simultaneous negation and affirmation." Although Xiong claims that this principle is Confucian because it is found in the *Book of Changes*, it was also expounded by Taoists and Chan (禪) Buddhists. (Cf. Chang Chung-yuan, *Creativity and Taoism*, Harper & Row, New York, 1963, p. 11.)

2. Chan, *op. cit.*, translates this: "Whenever we talk about change, we imply that there must be an opposite, some sort of activity, an inner contradiction, and a reason why contradiction leads to development."
is a dead thing, it is impossible for this to be. Thus, when one speaks of change, it definitely must comply with the principle of the unity of opposites.¹

Xiong explains the principle of the unity of opposites by referring to the three lines of the eight trigrams in the Book of Changes. Xiong esteems the Book of Changes as a work of philosophical excellence which inspired his own insight into the unity of substance and function.² It was Confucius, says Xiong, who first recognised the Book of Changes as a work of philosophy rather than a work of divination.³ Indeed, argues Xiong, it is just because the Book of Changes correctly expounds a philosophy of change that it has survived to the present. Two other works on divination contemporary with the Book of Changes, the Lianshan (連山) and the Guizang (歸藏), based their philosophies on the concept of permanence, argues Xiong, and for this reason were consequently forgotten and lost.⁴ Xiong says:

Of China's oldest philosophical works, none equals the great Book of Changes. The first authors of the Book of Changes drew the lines of the trigrams to explain the principles of universal change. They drew the trigrams and each trigram has three lines. (Each trigram is divided into three lines [yao, 爻] which are called the first line, second line, and third line. The connotations of the word "line" [i.e. yao], if they were to be explained, are too complex. I will simply

1. Xinlun, IV:56a.
2. Shiyaof, III:54-55.
3. Yuyaof, I:3a. Xiong maintains that Confucius "made" the Ten Appendices to the Book of Changes. By "made," Xiong means that Confucius lectured on what his students later recorded as the Ten Appendices. (Shiyao, III:4, and Yuyao, I:6a.)
used? Few of those who previously explained the *Book of Changes* paid attention to this. I have often sought the answer in the book *Laozi*. Laozi says: "One produced two, two produced three."¹ (Produced here means "produced by mutual causation" [相因而有].) This saying is an extension of the meaning of the three lines of each trigram in the *Book of Changes*. Originally, the principle of change talked about in the *Book of Changes* did not go beyond the unity of opposites. The authors of the *Book of Changes* drew a kind of diagram (i.e. the trigrams) to express the principle of the unity of opposites.² Each trigram has three lines and this is the meaning of one produces two and two produces three. This correctly expresses the principle of unity. How can this be? Because there is one, thus there is two. This two is the opposite of one. Simultaneously, there is a three. This three is based in one and opposite two. (Three originally was not just one but only based on one.) Because there is an opposite, thus development is completed. Otherwise [change] would only be a solitary and simple affair and there would be no change or development to speak of. Thus each trigram has three lines to express the principle of change which is nothing else than the great principle of the unity of opposites.³

4. Instantaneous Arising and Expiring

Xiong's theory of ontological substance as change is explained by means of the concepts of opening and closing borrowed from the

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1. Cf. *Daode jing* (道德經), Chapter 42. Lau translates: "The way begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad creatures." (D.C. Lau (trans.), *Tao Te Ching*, Penguin Books, 1972, p. 103.)
2. Cf. *Tiyong lun*, p. 291 where Xiong says that the first line of a trigram represents a beginning; the second, fruition; and the third, conclusion.
Torrent: constantly in a state of flux. Within this running current, the tendency to materialization (which Xiong calls the process of closing) and the tendency to idealization (which Xiong calls the process of opening) make manifest all material and mental phenomena. Although they seem stable and durable, these manifestations are ultimately illusory and false because they too are endlessly evolving and changing. To the unenlightened, phenomena seem to have a certain stability and duration but the wise see that phenomena instantly "come-into-existence" and instantly "go-out-of-existence." This instantaneous "arising" (起) and "expiring" (滅) is the true nature of all phenomena or, in other words, original substance.

Xiong readily admits that this idea of the instantaneous arising and expiring of all phenomena is not easy to grasp. For one thing, it seems to contradict the ostensibly basic philosophic categories of time and space. Nonetheless, says Xiong, instantaneous arising and expiring is the common state of all phenomena. Xiong starts his argument in defense of instantaneous arising and expiring with an explanation of instantaneity. He says:

Before speaking about arising and expiring, I must first explain the meaning of instantaneity. The Indian Buddhists analysed time and called the smallest segment an instant (刹那, kṣaṇa). The Mahāvibhāṣastra (大毘婆沙論) says: "A strong man snapping his fingers takes sixty four kṣaṇa." [It] also says: "The World Honored One did not explain the quantity of an instant because no man could bear to know it."

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1. The terms "coming-into-existence" and "going-out-of-existence" are the translation of Wing-tsit Chan. (Chan, Sourcebook, p. 765.) I prefer the less cumbersome arising and expiring.

2. Taishō No. 1545.
Looking carefully at the statement "A strong man snapping his fingers takes sixty four ksana," this seems to tell the quantity of an instant. A strong man snapping his fingers, however, is an especially rapid [movement]. We have no way of knowing whether or not the snap of a man's fingers takes sixty four ksana. Because the quantity of an instant is so small, the ancients had no instruments to express it. Even today's clocks cannot express it. How can we say for sure that a strong man snapping his fingers takes sixty four ksana? Some say that the Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra, by this statement, is just expressing that an instant is so small as to be inexplicable. The term sixty four expresses a plural number. If the speed of a strong man snapping his fingers requires sixty four ksana, then the quantity of an instant is so small that it cannot be described in words. And thus the Śāstra says that the World Honored One did not explain the quantity of an instant and so forth. According to this, then, the quantity of an instant, compared to an infinite [decimal] in mathematics, is even smaller and more difficult to explain. The average person, when speaking of an instant, probably considers it to be the smallest, fastest [segment of time] and not further analysable. We, following accepted custom, can also say this. Some of the Mahayana Buddhist Masters, however, when speaking of an instant, did not agree to speak of it in terms of worldly concepts of time. An instant, in other words, does not mean time. We cannot say that an instant is the smallest, not further analysable [segment] of time. The great Master, Kui Ji, in his work the Transmitted Notes on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-only, says: "A thought (念) is another name for an instant (剎那)." According to this, then, the occurrence of a thought in our minds is one instant. This thought arises and then immediately expires, and there is no interval. This thought, then, is another name for an instant, and thus an instant cannot be said to be time. If we observe in our own minds, a thought suddenly arises and without lingering [is gone] in a flash — this is an instant. . . . This then postulates an instant

as relying solely on our minds. As far as my opinion goes, I very much agree with the Mahayana Masters who would not allow an instant to be spoken of in terms of the worldly concept of time. This is because what the worldly call time is ultimately space in disguise. Space is segmented (into east and west, etc.) and time is segmented (into past, present, and future). Essentially, time and space are the conditions of existence of the material world. We feel that the material universe, on the one hand, is divided into directions such as east and west and this is called space. On the other hand, the continuity of past, present, and future is called time. Thus, to have the concept of matter, the concepts of space and time must be manifested simultaneously. . . . Because of this, concepts of space and time are quite awkward. In space, to go from east to west, there must be an interval in between. In time, to go from past to present, there must also be an interval in between. Accordingly, if we depend on the worldly concept of time to explain an instant, then, from the former instant to the following instant, there must be an interval in between. If we speak of an instant like this, then we make [the concept of an instant] into a dull framework. Is there another method by which to understand change? Thus, when I speak about the concept of change, I agree with the Masters of the Mahayana who did not allow an instant to be spoken of in terms of the worldly concept of time. As far as Master [Kui] Ji's explanation, which was mentioned previously, it explains an instant as the rising of a thought in our minds. This does not avoid being biased toward mind, and thus seems inappropriate. We should know that philosophical terminology is especially difficult. Language expresses the principles involved in everyday life, and is a kind of inanimate tool. If we take that tool and use it to convey the very subtle and wonderful creative principle which every day life is incapable of attaining, . . . then one can imagine the many difficulties involved. Take the word "an instant" for example. Its original
meaning was the smallest and not further analysable segment of time. When we speak about change, we cannot but utilize this term "an instant" to express the uninterrupted (process) of change which suddenly arises every instant. If, because of this, however, we use the worldly concept of time to understand an instant, then we take the profound, subtle, and unfathomable [concept] of change and pinch it into a dead framework . . . to the extent that between the former instant and the following instant there is a definite interval and thus [the process] of change is cut off in the middle. If this is the case, then there is no way for us to understand change. One should know that in this essay what is called "an instant" is just a kind of convenient pretext. Although I never consider an instant to be the smallest, fastest, and not further analysable segment of time, still, for convenience of expression, I use this term. In this, the student must transcend the worldly concept of time in order to understand the profundity of change and [to prevent] using the word to the detriment of the meaning.¹ 

Having introduced the concept of an instant, Xiong now explains the meaning of instantaneous arising and expiring. All phenomena, says Xiong, are destroyed as soon as they are produced and in this respect are similar to lightning: one flash and its gone. Indeed, Xiong would argue that the flash is the lightning and the lightning is the flash. Xiong explains:

Any dharma which originally was non-existent and now suddenly arises is called arising. ( . . . What above was called opening and closing or mind and matter is here comprehensively called dharma.) The idea, for example, which I just had in my mind is an idea which I have never had before and yet it has just now in an instant suddenly arisen. This "sudden production" is called arising. Any dharma which has arisen does not linger but is immediately returned to non-being and this is called

¹ Xinlun, IV:69b-71a.
expiring. The idea, for example, which I just had in my mind,
definitely does not congeal and continue on but is ultimately
destroyed, and this is called expiring. Arising and expiring
are events which all the world knows and do not pose a problem.
Nevertheless, all the world thinks that all dhammas, after they
arise, must linger and then, after a while, expire. In other
words, all things and events, after they arise, must pass an
interval or a considerably long interval and definitely are not
destroyed at the same time they are suddenly produced. . . .

Even though [some phenomena] are destroyed rather quickly,
nevertheless, from production to destruction, there must be
an interval of time. Even if this interval is only the twinkle­
ing of an eye or the taking of a breath, there is [at least]
an interval of the twinkling of an eye or the taking of a
breath. And one cannot say that the time of arising is also the
time of expiring. . . . Nowhere in the world is there this
kind of contradictory event. This then is the worldly expla­
nation. A question arises here. After any dharma arises, must
it pass an interval [of time]? As to this question, I approve
the explanation of the Indian Buddhists. [They] advocate that
all dhammas instantaneously expire. What is "instantaneous
expiration"? Any dharma which at this instant arises, also at
this instant expires. And thus it is said that the instant of
arising is also the instant of expiring. No dharma is able
to linger for even a flash. . . . The popular view that
there are things which have duration is a view contrary [to
truth]. I remember a passage in the Agamasutra (阿含經)
in which the Buddha spoke to his disciples. . . . According
to what the Buddha said, all dhammas are illusory. They are
produced in an instant and also destroyed in that instant.
There is absolutely no interval in an instant. This theory
of the Buddha's was not changed by the Hīnayāna or the Mahāyāna.
Later, non-Buddhists scholars were unable to believe or under­
stand this and there were many who attacked it. Among the
works of the Mahāyāna (for example, the Taṭṭhāgatagūṇālām卡拉—
many contain answers to these attacks. Even down to the present, when we speak to people about instantaneous arising and expiring, we constantly meet with refutation. . . . According to the theory of instantaneity, all dharmas are destroyed as soon as they are produced and in between there is not even a flash of an interval. The average person considers this theory to be close to nihilism and that it fundamentally does not allow for the existence of things. It goes to the extreme of not allowing even for the existence of one's own body and mind. Thus, [many] hate to even hear the theory of instantaneity. Once, in the old capital (i.e. Peking), I met a violent protester who said: "If, as you say, all dharmas are destroyed in an instant, then this rock here, since it is destroyed in an instant, does not exist. If I now pick up this rock and beat you over the head with it, will you be able to feel pain?" One cannot talk about philosophy with people who protest like this.

As Xiong himself admits, the concept of instantaneous arising and expiring is not easy to grasp. Xiong attempts to clarify this concept by defending it against twelve objections of a would be antagonist. The first objection flatly denies the validity of the concept of instantaneous arising and expiring. Xiong counters this objection by arguing that, if things did not perish, then everything would be permanent and this is obviously not the case. Whatever lives, dies; fruition is followed by decay. In the second objection, the antagonist accepts that all things perish but he rejects the

1. The Chinese title of this sūtra is given in Shuji, XIX:17a. The Sanskrit title is from the reconstruction of de la Vallee Poussin and can be found in his Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, p. 167. This work is not listed in the Taisho collection.
2. Xinlun, IV:71a-72a.
3. Ibid., 72b.
idea that they perish instantaneously. Xiong replies that, if things do not perish instantaneously, then they have duration but, to be durable, a thing must rely on its own power or the power of another. If a thing relies on its own power for durability, then why can it not be permanent? If it relies on the power of another, where does this power come from and on what does it rely?¹ The third objection states that things are not destroyed until they meet a destructive cause. Xiong counters that the antagonist does not understand the laws of causality: expiring, unlike arising, does not require a cause. A thing must have a cause before it can arise but expiring is a natural termination and requires no cause. Fire, for example, is the cause of a piece of black iron thrust into a furnace becoming red but it is not the cause of the termination of its black color.² The fourth objection claims that things indeed have duration. Xiong counters by asking if, after they have perished for a given time, things again arise. If the antagonist answers negatively, then he is guilty of holding the heterodox theory of annihilation (ucchedadarśana).³ If he answers affirmatively, he is guilty of maintaining the heterodox theory of interruption (中斷).⁴ In the fifth objection, the antagonist accuses Xiong of favoring the concept of expiring. Xiong counters that this is not the case because expiring, in Xiong's philosophical system, always implies arising. This accords with the principle of the

¹. Xinlun, IV:72b.
². Ibid., 73a-74b.
³. The theory of annihilation, which states that death annihilates life, is heterodox because it violates the law of karma.
⁴. Xinlun, IV:74b.
unity of opposites of which Xiong has spoken earlier.¹ In the sixth objection, the antagonist asks why it is that people, who are instantly arising and instantly expiring, continue to look the same. Xiong reiterates what he has said before: if, in the process of constant transformation, no new cause is introduced, then the following instant resembles the previous instant. Instantaneous arising and expiring cannot be felt or perceived, insists Xiong, but must be intuited in order to be known.² Xiong counters the seventh objection by saying that, if things have duration, they must also have a fixed form. If things have a fixed form, however, then there is no changing from one condition to another and such clearly is not the case. Milk, for example, has no fixed form and can, under appropriate conditions, change to cheese.³ In the eighth objection, the antagonist argues that if there is no duration, there can be no phenomena. Moreover, everyone admits that things move but, if there is instantaneous arising and expiring, then how can there be movement. Xiong counters that the concept of movement is rooted in the false belief that phenomena have real existence (i.e. exist independently of consciousness). This belief is the result of the erroneous use of the thinking of everyday life to fathom ontological problems. As the Monk Zhao (僧肇, 384-414) has said in his Essay on the Immutability of Things (物不 遂論), if one realizes that matter is unreal, there is no

1. Xinlun, IV: 74b-75b.
2. Ibid., 75b-76a.
3. Ibid., 76a-77a.
4. This is also the objection of Xie Youwei (謝幼偉) to Xiong's philosophy. See his Xiandai zhexue mingzhu shuping (現代 哲學名著述評), Taipei, 1974, p. 69.
mutability. 1

In the ninth objection, the antagonist asks how the concept of instantaneous arising and expiring can account for the gradual development of, for example, an individual's physical faculties. Xiong replies that instantaneous arising and expiring does not exclude gradual development but, on the contrary, is the reason for it. Because things are instantly produced and destroyed, there are no fixed forms to impede development. The old is constantly being destroyed and the new is constantly being created. The flow of change is like a rushing stream: there is no stagnation. 2 The idea of gradual development is ultimately illusory because things are not like snowballs, cautions Xiong, developing as they roll along. Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) has said: "Actually, the heavens and earth, the mountains and rivers have not accumulated and gradually [become] large." 3 This statement, says Xiong, shows a profound understanding of the process of change. The tenth objection refers to changes in quantity and mass. The antagonist argues that, if as Xiong says things are in constant flux, how is it that changes in the quantity of some things can produce changes

1. Xinjun, IV:77a-78a. For the Monk Zhao's essay, see Zhao lun (肇論), Taisho No. 1858. For an English translation, see: Walther Liebenthal, The Book of Chao, Monumenta Serica Monograph XIII, Peking, 1948.
2. The metaphor of a rushing torrent is popular with both Buddhists and Confucianists. (Cf. Doctrine, p. 103, and the Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 29.)
in the mass of other things. Water, for example, under constant barometric pressure, changes in mass from a liquid to a solid when the temperature falls to zero degrees Celsius, and changes from a liquid to a steam when the temperature rises to one hundred degrees Celsius. The antagonist argues that this is a case of changes in the amount of temperature producing changes in the mass of water and asks how this can be reconciled with the concept of constant flux.\(^1\)

Matter, replies Xiong, is only an idea; apart from the constant flux there is no such thing as matter. The Book of Songs says: "The ordinances of heaven, how profound they are and unceasing" (維天之命於穆不已).\(^2\) "Heaven" (天) here, emends Xiong, does not mean a religious deity but original substance.

"Ordinances" (命) mean the "great running current" (大流行) while "profound" (穆) means "deep and far," and "unceasing" (不已) refers to instantaneous arising and expiring. Xiong takes this passage as Confucian proof of the constant flux: there are no old things stagnantly piling up in the universe but only the constant flux of ceaseless change.\(^3\)

To the eleventh objection Xiong counters that only the concept of instantaneous arising and expiring avoids the errors of permanence and nihilism. The theory

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1. This objection is similar to Zhou Guchang's (周谷城) charge of an anti-scientific bias in Xiong's philosophy. (Cf. Zhou Gucheng, Zhongguo shixue zhi jinhua [中國史學之進化], Shanghai, 1947, pp. 30-41.)


3. The Han commentators also explain the "ordinances of Heaven" as ceaseless change. (Shisan jing zhu shu, op. cit.)
of permanence maintains that things never expire but abide forever. The theory of annihilation goes to the other extreme and claims that when a thing expires, it is annihilated. Instantaneous arising and expiring holds the correct middle ground between these two extreme theories insists Xiong. The twelfth and final objection asks how the concept of instantaneous arising and expiring can be reconciled with the Buddhist definition of the two characteristics of any dharma, namely substantiability (任持) and conformity to a pattern (軌範). A writing brush, explains the antagonist, has the ability to maintain its substance and, at the same time, conform to the pattern common to writing brushes. Indeed, it is only because phenomena conform to certain patterns that they are intelligible to man. These two characteristics of phenomena thus constitute man’s knowledge and scientific knowledge. How can they be reconciled with the concept of constant flux? Xiong replies in two points. First, Xiong reiterates that, although phenomena are not real, there is the sudden manifestation of phenomena which is part of the process of closing. Just because a phenomenon is manifested it must conform to a pattern because this phenomenon is not non-existent. Secondly, knowledge is a requirement of daily life. Knowledge, by which Xiong means rational knowledge or "measuring wisdom," is other directed and outward seeking and thus incapable of realizing the constant flux of creation. Everyday knowledge or common sense, cannot know about instant arising and expiring. Knowledge tends to consider phenomena as stable and thus claims that all phenomena have the characteristics of substantiability and conformity to a pattern and

1. Xinlun, IV:79b-80a.
in this way, man's understanding and scientific knowledge evolve. The concept of instantaneous arising and expiring does not invalidate these kinds of knowledge.\(^1\)

1. Xinlun, IV:80a-81b.
APPENDIX I: AN ANNOTATED, CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORKS OF XIONG SHILI

Xiong was a prolific writer and the author of nineteen books and sixteen articles. Of these sixteen articles, only five have been included in Xiong's Shili yuyao and Shili yuyao chuxu. Considering that this writing was largely done in the thirty year period from 1930 to 1960, a period during which China suffered foreign aggression, civil war, economic chaos, and political turmoil, then the quantity, much less the quality, is remarkable indeed. Xiong's written works can be roughly divided into two groups. The first group, from 1923 until the end of the second World War, consists of his writings on Yogacara Buddhism, while the second group, from 1945 until the early sixties, consists of his writings on neo-Confucianism. The following bibliography is arranged chronologically with the title of each work given first in pinyin, then in Chinese, and finally in English translation. Each work is followed by a brief account of its publication and a description of its contents.

1918 Zhenxin shu, "Confessions."

The English translation of the title as "Confessions" is that of Wing-tsit Chan. (Chan, Religious Trends, p. 127.) Tang Junyi (唐君毅), a former student of Xiong's, has told me that this work contains Xiong's Taoist thought. Although it was supposed to be included in the 1947 collection of Xiong's works entitled Shili congshu (see below), I have been unable to locate a copy.
1921 ? Du zhilun chao, "Reading a Copy of the Prajñaparamitāsastra."

According to Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) of New Asia College, this work was probably written by Xiong at the Institute for Inner Learning where copying a famous philosophical work was not only a means of obtaining a personal copy but also a means of familiarizing oneself with the work. This work is also mentioned in the preface to Shili congshu but I have been unable to locate a copy.

1925 Yiming dashu shanzhu, "An Emendation and sub-Commentary on the Nyāyapraśāka."

This work was originally delivered as a series of lectures at Peking University and was first published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai. The work is a simplification and clarification of Kui Ji's commentary and translation of Samkarasvamin's Nyāyapraśāka (Taishō No. 1840). Reprinted from a copy belonging to Xu Fuguan by the Guangwen Book Co. in Taipei in 1971.


This is an orthodox Yogācāra explanation of phenomena according to Dharmapāla. It is the only published part of a work entitled Outline of a Study on Consciousness-only (唯識學概論), which Xiong wrote at the Institute for Inner Learning but later discarded in favor of his critique.

1930 Zunwen lu, "A Record [of Lectures] Respectfully Attended."
This work consists of notes on Xiong’s lectures taken from the diary of his student Gao Zanfei (高赞非). It was re-published in 1934 as juan four of Shili yuyao (see below).

1932 Xin weishi lun, 新唯識論, "New Treatise on Consciousness-only."

This is the first edition of Xiong’s most important work. Written in classical Chinese with a preface by Ma Yifu (馬一浮), it was first published by the Peking University Press and has been reprinted by the Heluo Publishing Co. in Taipei in 1975.

1933 Xin weishi lun cankao ziliao, 新唯識論參考資料, "Reference Materials for the New Treatise on Consciousness-only."

Listed in the Harvard Yenching Library catalogue but, upon request, the book could not be found.

1933 Po po xin weishi lun, 破破新唯識論, "A Refutation of the Refutation of the New Treatise on Consciousness-only."

This is a reply to a critique of Xiong’s New Treatise written by Liu Dingquan (劉定權) of the Institute for Inner Learning. Undoubtedly because Liu’s criticisms had the approval of both Ouyang Jian and Tai Xu, Xiong felt strongly enough about them to write this reply himself. It is the only reply to his critics written by Xiong himself: other replies were written by students and colleagues. This work was reprinted in Taipei by the Heluo Publishing Co. in 1975.
1935 *Shili yuyao*, 十力語要, "The Essential Sayings of Xiong Xhili."
This edition contained only the first juan of what is now the most common edition, the 1947 edition (see below).

1935 *Du jing*, 閱經, "On Reading the Classics."
Published in *Anya xue kan* (安雅學刊 ) 1 (June 1935) 7-8. This article argues that true understanding of the classics cannot be gained from reading commentaries and emendations alone. The gist of this article can be found in *Shili yuyao*, I:61a.

1935 *Zhongguo zhexue shi ruhe yihui shi*, 中國哲學是如何 — , "What is Chinese Philosophy?"
An explanation of the epistemological differences between philosophy and science. Published in *Wenzhe yuekan* (文哲月刊), 1:1 (Oct. 1935) 34-35.

1936 *Fojia mingxiang tongshi*, 佛家名相通釋, "A Comprehensive Explanation of Buddhist Terms."
This work was written to aid students at Peking University to read Yogacāra texts and was encouraged by Tang Yongtong (湯用彤) who was then the Chairman of the Philosophy Department. It contains lucid, detailed, philosophical explanations of the major Yogacāra concepts. First published by Peking University, it was reprinted by the Guangwen Book Co. in Taipei in 1969 and 1974.

1936 *Fu Zhang Dongsun xiansheng*, 復張東荪先生, "Replies to Mr. Zhang Dongsun."
A series of letters between Xiong Shili and Zhang Dongsun published in *Wenzhe yuekan*, 1:6 (March 1936) 1-3 and 4-6. These letters discuss differences between western and Chinese philosophies, between Buddhism and Confucianism, and also discuss science, and neo-Confucianism. They have been included in *Shili yuyao*, II:2a-6a.

1938 郑汉, Zheng Han, "Correcting Han [Feizi]."

Notes taken from Xiong's lectures on Han Feizi (韩非子) by Xiong's student Hu Zhuofu (胡拙甫). This work was reprinted in Taipei under the title *Han Feizi ping lun* (韩非子评论) by the Sanxin Publishing Co. in 1974.

1940-41-44 新唯識論, Xin weishi lun, "New Treatise on Consciousness-only."

This is the colloquial language (语体文) edition which was published in three installments. The complete edition of 1944 was funded by the Chinese Philosophical Association and was published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai. Xiong preferred this edition to the earlier classical edition. Reprinted in Taipei by the Guangwen Book Co. in 1974.

1942 儒家與墨法, Rujia yu mofa, "Confucianism and Mohism."

Xiong argues the Mozi was not opposed to Confucius' thought but sought to develop it. Published in *Sixiang yu shidai* (思想與時代), 17 (Dec. 1942) 48. The gist of this article can be found in *Shili yuyao*, I:72a-74a.

1943 哲學與史, Zhexue yu shixue: dao Zhang Yinlin xiansheng, "Philosophy and History, Dao Zhang Yinlin, Ph.D."
"Philosophy and History: In Memory of Mr. Zhang Yinlin."

A good philosopher, says Xiong, must also be a good historian and Zhang Yinlin epitomized this ideal. Published in Sixiang yu shidai, 18 (Jan. 1943) 21.

"In Studying Confucianism One Must Emphasize Three Classics: the Book of Changes, the Spring and Autumn Annals, and the Rites of Zhou."

Xiong claims that these three classics are the very heart of Confucianism and that Confucius himself composed both the Book of Changes and the Spring and Autumn Annals. Published in Kong xue (孔學), 1 (August 1943) 29-31.

"On Methodology in Metaphysics."

This is a reply to Xie Youwei's critique of Xiong's New Treatise. It was first published in Sixiang yu shidai, 16 (Nov. 1943) 1-4 and can also be found in Xie Youwei's Xiandai zhexue mingzhu shuping, published by the Xin Tiandi Book Co. in Taipei in 1973, on pp. 267-274.

"The Essentials for Reading the Classics."

Originally published by the Chinese Philosophical Association, it was reprinted by the Letian Publishing Co. in Taipei in 1973. This work marks the beginning of what Wing-tsit Chan calls Xiong's
"reconstruction of Confucianism." The work is divided into threejuan, the first of which is entitled "the classics are the unchanging
Way and must be read." This firstjuancontains an explanation of
Confucian political thought in nine points and Xiong's commentary
to the Great Learning (大學), which document Xiong believed
to be a synopsis of the classics. Juan two is entitled "the atti-
tude that must be taken when reading the classics" and contains
Xiong's views on the pre-Qin schools of philosophy as well as a
critique of both Han and Song scholarship on the classics. Juan
three is entitled "a brief description of the great meanings in
the six classics" and, although most of thejuanis given over to
to a discussion of the Book of Changes, there is also a discussion of
the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Book of History, the Book of Odes,
the Book of Rites, and the Book of Music.

1947 Shili congshu,十力叢書, "A Collection of the Works of
Xiong Shili."

Published by the Chinese Philosophical Association, this col-
lection included a revised version of the New Treatise which Xiong
considered the best version. Fortunately, that revised version
from this collection has been reprinted by the Letian Publishing
Co. in Taipei in 1972. The preface to the collection, written by
Xiong's students and colleagues, has also been included as a fore-
word to this revised edition. I have been unable to locate the
complete collection and, judging from the information given in the
preface just mentioned, doubt whether the whole collection was ever
published.
1947  Shili yuyao, 《力言告愛》, "The Essential Sayings of Xiong Shili."

This edition contains four juan. Juan one was first published separately in 1935 (see above). Juan two and juan three were compiled from Xiong's notes by his friend Huang Genyong (黃良庸). Juan four was previously published in 1930 as Zunwen lu (see above). The original juans two, three, and four were destroyed in 1939 by a fire caused by a Japanese bombing raid during which Xiong was badly wounded in the leg. This work has been reprinted by the Guangwen Book Co. in Taipei in 1973.

1947  Lunxue sanshu, 論學三書, "Three Essays on Learning."

The first essay is on neo-Confucian texts and how they should be read; the second, on filial piety; the third, on the need for practice as well as theory in philosophy. First published in Xue yuan, 1:1 (June 1947) 13-14, this article has also been included in Shili yuyao, 1:75a.

1947  Da Mou Zongsan wen gewu zhizhi shu, 《答牟宗三問格物致知書》, "A Reply to Mou Zongsan’s Questions on 'the investigation of things' and 'the extension of knowledge.'"

In explaining these two important philosophic concepts from the Great Learning, Xiong synthesises the commentary of Wang Yangming on "the extension of knowledge" with Zhu Xi's commentary on "the investigation of things." Published in Xue yuan, 1:2 (June 1947) 15-20.
1947 *Lueshuo zhongxi wenhua*, 略说中西文化, "A Brief Discussion of Chinese and Western Cultures."

Xiong speculates on the relationship between geographical differences and cultural differences. Published in *Xue yuan*, 1:4 (August 1974) 1-3. Also found in *Shili yuyao chuxu*, pp. 39-42.

1947 *Yu you lun xin weishi lun*, 與友論新唯識論, "Discussing the New Treatise on Consciousness-only with a Friend."

A long and eloquent defense of the main points of his philosophy including the principle of the unity of substance and function and the epistemological significance of intuitive knowledge. Published in *Xue yuan*, 1:6 (October 1947) 10-16.


The material principle does not exist apart from the transcendental principle which is identified with original mind. The function of original mind, when manifested between man and man, is called ethics; when manifested between man and things, physical laws. Published in *Xue yuan*, 1:12 (May 1948) 1-2.

1948 *Luetan xin weishi lun yaozhi*, 略談新唯識論要旨, "A Brief Discussion of the Essentials of the New Treatise on Consciousness-only."

This article discusses five main points of the New Treatise: 1) intuitive knowledge, 2) rational knowledge, 3) substance and function, 4) change, and 5) ontology. Published in *Xue yuan*, 2:1 (May 1948) 1-4, this article is also included in *Shili yuyao chuxu*,...
1948  Qiyuan ji, "Notes from the Lacquer Garden."

A short and pessimistic account of the state of the world
taking as its theme Zhuangzi's remark: "Knowing nothing can be done
about it, consider it fate." Published in Xue yuan, 2:6 (October
1948) 75, and included in Shili yuyao chuxu, p. 30.

1949  Shili yuyao chuxu, "First Continuation of the Essential Sayings of Xiong Shili."

The first part of this work consists of Xiong's letters to
friends on a variety of philosophical problems and a long reply
to a critique of the New Treatise which critique was written by
Yin Shun (印順), a student of Tai Xu. The reply to this
critique was written by Xiong's friend Huang Genyong. The second
part is an appended section entitled "Notes on Difficult Studies"
(困學記) which was written by Xiong's adopted daughter Xiong
Chi Zhongguang (熊池仲光) and which includes several excellent
articles on Yogacara. This work was first published in Hong Kong
and was reprinted in Taipei by the Letian Publishing Co. in 1973.


This work on the Ming scholar-official Zhang Juzheng (張
居正, 1525-1582) was published in Peking. The University of
Chicago has this work listed in their catalogue but, upon request,
the work could not be found. I have been unable to locate a copy.
1952 Xin weishi lun, 新唯識論, "New Treatise on Consciousness-only."

This is an amended version mentioned by Xiong in Yuan ru, 原儒, I:48a (see below). I have been unable to locate a copy.

1956 Yuan ru, 原儒, "The Origins of Confucianism."

Published by the Longmen Bookstore in Shanghai, the first printing was only two hundred copies while the second, possibly because of the influence of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, was five thousand. This work is divided into two juan entitled "sageliness within" and "kingliness without." The work attempts to prove that the Confucian classics contain a blueprint for a model socialist society, that Confucius was a revolutionary, and that early Confucianism was anti-imperial. Reprinted by the Minglun Publishing Co. in Taipei in 1972.

1957 Tiyong lun, 體用論, "Essay on Substance and Function."

This work is basically a rewrite of the New Treatise but it contains a long discussion and critique of the Madhyamika school and its concept of "emptiness" which is not included in the New Treatise and which shows, as Tang Junyi has remarked, that Xiong, even after retirement from Peking University, continued his interest in Buddhism and indeed was researching new topics. This work was originally published by the Longmen Bookstore in Shanghai but limited to two hundred copies. It was reprinted in Taipei in 1976 by the Student Book Co. from an original copy supplied by Tang Junyi.
1959 Mingxin pian, 明心篇, "Clarifying [the Concept of] Mind."

This is the fifth chapter of the above mentioned Tiyong lun, and like that work, was also published by the Longmen Bookstore in Shanghai but limited to two hundred copies. The work could not be published with the parent volume because Xiong had suffered a heart attack which delayed its completion. Reprinted in Taipei by the Student Book Co. in 1976 from an original copy supplied by Tang Junyi.

1959 Tangshi foxue jiupai fandui Xuan Zang zhi anchao, 唐世佛學舊派反對玄奘之暗潮, "On the Clandestine Opposition of Conservative Buddhists to Xuan Zang During the Tang Dynasty."

Written in 1957, this article was published in Zhongguo zhexue shi lunwen chuji (中國哲舉文讀録集), Peking, 1959, pp. 97-103. This essay refutes the claims of certain Tang Buddhists that the Indian monk Nadi (那提), and not Xuan Zang, translated the works of the Yogacara school into Chinese.

1961 Qian kun yan, 乾坤衍, "The Evolution of Qian and Kun."

This book is an exposition of the idealist philosophy Xiong finds in the Book of Changes and was reprinted by the Student Book Co. in Taipei in 1976 from a photographic copy of the original in the Feng Pingshan Library, Hong Kong, supplied by E.F. Connelly. This original copy, according to Wing-tsit Chan, was "smuggled" from the Chinese mainland by one of Xiong's former students. The original contains no name of a publisher and was probably privately printed.
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