USE OF THESES

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ARE PROPOSITION-ENTITIES THE OBJECTS
OF THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES?

by

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Statement of Contribution

All work in this thesis is to the best of my knowledge original, except where otherwise explicitly stated.

D.W. Broadbent.

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Grateful acknowledgement is made to my supervisor, Dr. Peter Roeper (Faculty of Arts, A.N.U.) and to my adviser, Professor J.J.C. Smart (Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U.).
In this thesis I examine the proposal that proposition-entities are the objects of the propositional attitudes in the sense that they are what we believe, doubt, desire, etc. As a corollary of this, I also examine the proposal that proposition-entities are the objects of such acts of speech as asserting or stating in the sense that they are what we assert or state.

So as to present the best side of these proposals, which I do not view favourably, I attempt to give an account of, and draw together, what I believe are the main arguments and assumptions that are endemic to them.

But there are a number of theories that dispute the validity of holding that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, state, etc., are proposition-entities. Might not one of these theories prove to be more viable? I attempt to answer this question, at least in part, by critically discussing what I take to be the major theories of this kind.

First up, some theories that substitute other types of entities for propositions are looked at. These include theories that appeal to facts (e.g., Broad, and to a lesser degree, Anderson), multiple objects (e.g., Russell, Wozzley, and Geach), sentences (e.g., Carnapians), and inscriptions (e.g., Scheffler). A theory by A.R. White which partly retains and partly rejects proposition-entities is also considered. I then assess some major theories that deny that proposition-entities or entities of any other type are objects of the attitudes. These theories include the
believes that' analysis (Prior and Quine), the paratactic analysis (Davidson), some forms of behaviourism (e.g., Russell, Braithwaite, and Ayer), adverbial analysis (e.g., Aune, Ziff, and Sellars), and a theory by Searle which eschews proposition-entities as objects of the attitudes, but retains them in an innocuous sense. A more radical approach is to deny that there are such things as propositional attitudes. Stephen Stich drifts towards this view, and I examine his position. Finally, I evaluate some recent arguments of Perry and Fodor that are of relevance.

All these theories, with the exception of those of Perry and Fodor, contain serious, particular flaws which I try to draw out. In some cases an attempt is also made to ascertain whether there is an underlying problem with, for example, the type of analysis or paraphrase used. I also draw attention to some problems that any theory of the propositional attitudes would have to face, such as providing an analysis or treatment of 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not', and eventually make some suggestions of my own in this regard.

In the final Chapter I attempt to show by appealing to certain paraphrases that neither proposition-entities nor entities of any other type are objects of the attitudes or speech acts. I defend the type of paraphrase used, and explain why it does not succumb to certain objections that were previously raised.
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Philosophers speak of propositions for a multiplicity of reasons. It has been held that propositions are the meanings of sentences, the bearers of truth values, and are required for entailment relations. It has also been held that propositions are the objects of what Russell (1919, p.309; 1940, p.21) called the "propositional attitudes", i.e., beliefs, doubts, desires, hopes, fears, suppositions, expectations, and so on. Some philosophers have even claimed that the best case for speaking of propositions is furnished by arguments designed to show that propositions are the objects of the attitudes. Whether this claim is justified or not, such arguments certainly present a formidable case. Sometimes it is maintained that propositions are the objects of intentional states. But since it is also held that intentional states are beliefs, doubts, desires, etc., the claim that propositions are the objects of these states does not seem to be appreciably different to the claim that propositions are the objects of the attitudes.

However, the expression 'objects of the propositional attitudes' is imprecise. Objects of the propositional attitudes may be (1) what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., or (2) what our beliefs, doubts, desires, etc., are about. For example, following a suggestion of Prior's (1971, p.3), we may say that an object of the thought that grass is green is what is thought, namely, that grass is green, or what the thought is about, i.e., grass. I think we should add, though, that the thought is not simply about grass. It is also about the colour of grass and, more loosely, vegetation.
The word 'about' gives us a certain leeway here. Further, Gilbert Harman (1973, p.93) has suggested that to treat beliefs, doubts, desires, etc., as propositional attitudes is not to suppose that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are propositions. Rather it is to suppose that believing, doubting, desiring, etc., may be analyzed as relations of believing-true, doubting-true, desiring-true, etc., to propositions. For instance, on this view, to fear that Nixon will retire is not to fear the proposition that Nixon will retire but to fear-true the proposition. Precisely how a relation such as fearing-true is itself to be analyzed, if it is to be analyzed at all, Harman does not say. All the same, we are given a third sense in which it can be said that propositions are the objects of the attitudes; they are objects of the attitudes in that they are what we believe-true, doubt-true, and so forth. (Harman, incidentally, does not adopt this proposal.)

Nevertheless, in asserting that propositions are the objects of the propositional attitudes philosophers are usually proposing that what we believe, doubt, desire, hope, fear, suppose, expect, and so on are propositions. Harman's claim that philosophers have opted for holding that propositions are, for example, what we believe-true rather than what we believe is simply wrong. W.E. Johnson (1921, Part I, Chapter I), for instance, proposed that assertions, beliefs, disbeliefs, doubts, assumptions, suppositions, proposals, postulations, and presumptions are

1. But for a critical account of the notion of believing-true cf. Chapters III and IV.
"attitudes of thought" directed towards propositions.\textsuperscript{1}
This in itself is not clear. But Johnson mentions asserting, entertaining, and doubting a proposition as examples of what he has in mind. A.J. Ayer (1940, Chapter II, Section 10) once held that what we know, doubt, suppose, imagine, wonder and believe are propositions, although he did not think it was particularly informative to say this. G.E. Moore (1953, Chapter III) maintained that we apprehend, believe, disbelieve, understand, and entertain propositions. More recently, Bradley and Swartz (1979, Chapter 2) have claimed that what is believed, stated asserted, remarked, hypothesized and denied is a proposition. In fact, the thesis that what we say, believe is a proposition is a traditional one, but the notion of believing-true has only been promulgated since the Second World War, particularly under the auspices of Scheffler and Quine. In any case, it is more usual for philosophers to hold that what we believe-true are sentences or inscriptions rather than propositions (See Chapters III and IV).

Some philosophers have also maintained that propositions are the objects of speech acts, such as acts of asserting or stating. It is perhaps less common for philosophers to speak of propositions as the objects of speech acts than as the objects of the attitudes. Even so, there are certainly those, for example, Robert Stalnaker (1976, p.80), who are happy to support both conceptions. The claim

\textsuperscript{1} It is interesting to note that Johnson explicitly states that assertion is an attitude. I find this difficult to accept. Asserting does not seem to be an attitude at all, though it may be said to involve one.
that propositions are the objects of acts of asserting or stating normally amounts to the thesis that what we assert or state are propositions. More usually, it is simply said that what we assert or state are propositions.

I have no objection to those who wish to say that propositions are the objects of the propositional attitudes or speech acts where this just means that we believe, doubt, desire, assert, state, etc., propositions. I do not inveigh against all talk in which the word 'proposition' appears. Such locutions as 'Stacy believes a proposition', 'Stacy asserts a proposition', 'Stacy believes the proposition that p', and 'Stacy asserts the proposition that p' are quite alright provided they can be paraphrased (which I believe they can) in a manner that does not commit us to the postulation of propositions as entities. Of course, there are other locutions that will need to be handled. Some philosophers would perhaps hold that (i) 'There is a proposition that Stacy believes' and (ii) 'p is a proposition that Stacy believes' have a greater claim to making reference to a proposition than 'Stacy believes a proposition' or 'Stacy believes the proposition that p', and thus will be more difficult to paraphrase. However, in Chapter VI I argue that a sentence of the form 'There is (are) a P' is not ontologically committed to P. Thus there would seem to be no reason to suppose that (i) is ontologically committed to some proposition believed by Stacy. Also, it might well be argued that (iii) 'Stacy believes some proposition' and (iv) 'Stacy believes the proposition that p' serve
respectively any useful purpose served by (i) and (ii). Consequently, the difficulty in eliminating purported reference to a proposition in (i) and (ii) by means of a suitable paraphrase is no more difficult in principle than eliminating such a purported reference in (iii) and (iv), however difficult that might be. In any case, in this thesis I argue that it is a mistake to hold that what we believe are proposition-entities. If (i) and (ii) really do affirm that Stacy believes a proposition-entity of some type then both sentences are simply false. On the other hand, if they both affirm that Stacy believes a proposition, but do not affirm that he believes a proposition-entity, then they must in principle be capable of being paraphrased in a manner that eliminates any seeming reference to a proposition.

Certainly there are a number of philosophers who maintain that what we believe or assert are propositions whilst denying that propositions are entities. D.M. Armstrong, for instance, takes this view in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (1973) and *Universals and Scientific Realism* (1978). I have no quarrel with someone like Armstrong. But I am opposed to the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities. In this sense I am opposed to the claim that proposition-entities are the objects of the propositional attitudes. As a corollary of this, I also reject the view that what we assert or state are proposition-entities.

We should rule out an objection that might be raised at this point. Many philosophers seem to treat 'object' and 'entity' as synonymous terms. So might it not be argued that a part of what 'propositions are the objects of the attitudes' means is that propositions are entities?
However, this is rather difficult to accept. If someone were to tell us that the object of his desire is happiness, it would seem a bit perverse to insist he had committed himself to the claim that happiness is an entity; he may simply mean that he desires happiness. Similarly, if someone affirms, for example, that propositions are the objects of belief, it may be that he simply means we believe propositions. But, as we have already seen, this need not be taken as an affirmation that propositions have entity status. I hold, then, that the thesis that propositions are the objects of the attitudes is distinct from the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities. The latter entails the former (on its usual construal) but the former does not entail the latter.

Still, might it not be held that to deny that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are proposition-entities is not in itself entirely unambiguous? For instance might not what is believed be construed as either the content of a belief or what is believed of a subject? The content of Stacy's belief that the Queen of England is married is that the Queen of England is married whereas what he believes of the Queen of England is that she is married. But we cannot ascertain the content of a person's belief merely from the fact that he believes such-and-such of a subject. Suppose, for instance, that Stacy believes that the woman wearing the diamond tiara is married. If that woman and the Queen are one and the same, then there is a sense in which we may say that Stacy believes of the Queen that she is married. But we cannot ascertain from this the content of Stacy's belief. We cannot infer, for example, that he believes
that the Queen is married, since Stacy might not believe that the woman wearing the diamond tiara is the Queen. He might be of the opinion that she is, say, Phyllis Diller.

However, I do not think that this shows that the expression 'what is believed' is ambiguous. After all, the very fact that we can speak of a distinction between what is believed and what is believed of a subject demonstrates that 'what is believed' does not mean 'what is believed of a subject'. All the same, in denying that what we believe are proposition-entities, I certainly wish to also disclaim any suggestion that what we believe of a subject is a proposition-entity.

To be clear, to deny that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are proposition-entities is to deny that we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., propositions on any construal of propositions as entities. Certainly various sorts of entities have been postulated by philosophers. Perhaps the least controversial of these are physical entities, i.e., things that exist in space and time, such as trees, houses, and people. The treatment of propositions as physical entities is often manifested in the claim that propositions are literally to be found in the brain. More usually, I believe, it is held that propositions are abstract entities - things that do not exist in space and time. An example of an abstract entity would be the Universal of Beauty. Those who take this view of propositions frequently hold that, although propositions do not exist in space and time, they exist in some more rarefied form, or perhaps subsist. It is interesting to note, though, that those who postulate propositions as abstract entities need not hold that proposit-
ions either exist or subsist. Meinong took the view that some entities neither exist nor subsist, but lie 'outside of being'. Propositions can also be conceived as abstract entities along these lines. Some philosophers are reluctant to invoke abstract entities because such entities do not stand up to empirical or scientific verification. A third view treats propositions as mental entities. Irreducible mental entities exist in time but not space. However, some philosophers, particularly in North America and Australia, maintain that mental entities 'reduce' to physical entities. On this view, propositions construed as mental entities are contingently identical to propositions construed as physical entities. Those who support the thesis that propositions are entities hold that propositions are either physical, abstract or mental entities.

I shall now give a resumé of some of the major arguments in favour of the claim that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities. In the process, an attempt will also be made to show that philosophers who endorse this claim tend to share some of the basic assumptions of those who argue simply that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are propositions.

(a) According to a number of philosophers, mental phenomena such as love, hate, belief, doubt, etc., may be characterized in the following way. To love is to love someone or something, to hate is to hate someone or something, to believe is to believe something, to doubt is to doubt something, and so on. Now philosophers have not been inclined to argue that we love or hate propositions. However, in

the case of the propositional attitudes, it has frequently been held that the something believed, doubted, desired, etc., is a proposition. C.D. Broad cites a proposal of this type in *An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy* (1933):

> We cannot believe or disbelieve without believing or disbelieving something, any more than we can have a sensation without sensing something. And in the case of judgement, the something in question is a proposition. (p.59)

Some philosophers prefer to say that the something in question is a 'thought' or 'judgement'. But the express disadvantage of this is that the terms 'thought' and 'judgement' are equivocal: they can stand for either an act of thought (or judgement) or what is thought (or judged).

This does not show that propositions must be treated as entities. But some philosophers have attempted to bolster their position by arguing that it is not possible to analyze sentences such as 'Stacy believes something' in a manner that does not presuppose that there is some entity Stacy believes. On this view, the believed entity is referred to by the word 'something'. There are, I think, a number of considerations that have induced many philosophers to take this stand.

(i) Some philosophers still cling to what Strawson (1950, p.191) has described as the ancient, but no longer respectable, error of supposing that, whenever we use a singular substantive, we are, or ought to be, using it to refer to something. Persuaded by the fact that standard grammar tells us that 'something' is a singular substantive, they have inferred that the term must at least refer to something in 'Stacy believes something'.

(ii) In the *Theaetetus* (189) Plato attributes to
Socrates an argument in favour of the view that whenever we think something we must think something which is:

Soc. And does not he who thinks think some one thing? Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is? Theaet. I agree.
Soc. Then he who thinks of that which is not thinks of nothing? Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. And he who thinks of nothing does not think at all? Theaet. Obviously.

This is quite similar to an argument cited by Russell in 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions' (1904):

If I believe that A is the father of B, I believe something; the subsistence of the something, if not directly obvious, seems to follow from the fact that, if it did not subsist, I should be believing nothing, and therefore not believing. (p.61)

More recently, Zeno Vendler (1974) has argued:

...if we say that George believes something (e.g. that Josef is dead), we can always add that Jim believes it too. Consequently, with believing...there must exist something for the person to believe. (p.406)

Vendler's argument has not been as influential as those mentioned by Russell and Plato, but all three arguments, though they would not be said to stem from the same school, reflect a certain tendency of thought that has appealed to many philosophers. And it is surely to be admitted that if it is the case that whenever we believe something we believe something which is, subsists, or exists, and the something in question may be said to be a proposition, then it becomes rather difficult to deny that believed propositions are entities. The same line of argument would seem to equally apply to doubts, desires, etc.

(iii) A number of philosophers, for example,
Quine (1953), argue that to assert 'There is an x' is to count x among one's ontology. Equally, on this view, to assert 'There is something that Stacy believes' is to count among one's ontology something that is believed by Stacy. That is, it is to assert that some entity is believed by Stacy. Now, it is not infrequently thought that we can infer that if someone believes, doubts, or desires something, then there is something that he believes, doubts, or desires.

If this is correct then, unless Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is defective, it does seem to follow that whenever Stacy believes something, there is some entity that he believes. Quine can make as much out of such kindred locutions as 'Stacy doubts something' and 'Stacy desires something'.

(b) We frequently speak of the same person as believing the same thing at different times. For instance, if Stacy believes on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday that the Queen is married, then we may say that he believes the same thing at different times. In such a case, it is held, there is a distinction between Stacy's believing that the Queen is married - what Stacy does at different times - and the thing he believes which is the same on each occasion. Some philosophers describe this type of case by saying that the thing believed on each occasion is a proposition.

We often speak of different people as believing the same thing. For instance, if several people all believe that the Queen is married, we may say that they all believe the same thing. In such a case, it is said, there is a distinction

1. For some sceptical thoughts on this plus mention of an alternative account cf. Chapter VI. My treatment of such sentences is given in Chapter XIII.
between the various believing: each person's act or state of belief - and the thing they all believe. Some philosophers describe this type of occurrence by saying that the same proposition is believed by several people.

Sometimes we also speak of some people as believing and others as disbelieving some one thing. (It seems that there could be no real conflict of opinion unless this description were correct.) For example, if Stacy believes and Susan disbelieves that the Queen is married, we may say that Stacy believes and Susan disbelieves some one thing. Here, it is held, there is a distinction between Stacy's believing and Susan's disbelieving that the Queen is married and the thing which is believed and disbelieved. Certain philosophers describe this type of case by saying that one person believes and the other disbelieves the one proposition.

Some attempts have been made to go beyond this by arguing that we cannot give an account of any of these cases which does not presuppose that the subject(s) are related by a relation of believing (or disbelieving) to a numerically identical object. For instance, it is sometimes maintained that if two people believe the same thing then the proposition they both believe cannot be in the mind of either. It is then assumed that both individuals must be related by a relation of believing to a numerically identical object outside their minds.

(c) It is often pointed out that it is natural to draw a distinction between what is believed and the belief-state. Sometimes the distinction is referred to as being between what is believed and the act of belief, or what is believed and the believing of it. The same kind of dichotomy
applies in the case of the other propositional attitudes. For example, a distinction may be drawn between what is doubted and the state of doubt, what is desired and the state of desire, and so on. In the opinion of some philosophers, we may say that what is believed, doubted, desired, etc., is, in each case, a proposition.

A parallel distinction is sometimes drawn between what is asserted or stated and the act of asserting or stating, or what is asserted or stated and the asserting or stating of it. In the view of some philosophers, we may also say that what is asserted or stated is a proposition.

There are philosophers who prefer to hold that what is stated is a statement. But it has been objected by David Armstrong in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (1973, Pp 39-40) that the term 'proposition' seems better suited, since it brings out clearly that what is stated can be exactly the same as what is believed or entertained but never expressed verbally.

Some philosophers have gone beyond this to treat such expressions as 'What Stacy believes', 'What Stacy doubts', and 'What Stacy asserts' as definite descriptions on a par with 'The first man to climb Mt. Everest' and 'The tallest man in the world', and thereby, in their view, referring to entities. I think that some philosophers have felt that this claim gains a degree of support from the fact that 'what' functions as a pronoun in such expressions as 'What Stacy believes'. On the other side of things, it should be noted that, whether 'What Stacy believes' is a definite description or not, not all philosophers agree that definite descriptions must be referential.
(d) It is often held that what is true or false is true or false whether or not anyone believes or asserts anything. If it is true, for example, that Jansoon discovered Australia then it is true whether anyone believes or asserts it is not. And if it is false that Jansoon discovered Australia then it is false whether anyone believes or asserts it or not. Consequently, some philosophers contend, what is true or false are not acts of belief or assertion but propositions. It is then added that since what we believe or assert is either true or false, what we believe or assert is a proposition.¹

Sometimes it is also argued that what is true or false is eternally (or timelessly) true or false. So that if it is true that Jansoon discovered Australia then it eternally true; and if it is false that Jansoon discovered Australia then it is eternally false. However, it is held, acts of belief or assertion only have a temporal existence whereas the existence of propositions may be construed as eternal. It is then added that since what we believe or assert is eternally true or false, what we believe or assert is best viewed as being a proposition. This alleged eternal (or timeless) nature of propositions has led some philosophers to conclude that propositions must be abstract entities of some sort.

(e) It is often pointed out that many of our

¹ It should be noted that not all philosophers accept that what we believe or assert is always either true or false. For example, if what I believe is that the king of France is bald then, although what I believe is not true, it is philosophically controversial as to whether it is false.
beliefs seem to involve logical incompatibilities. For example, there is a logical incompatibility apparent when Stacy believes that the Queen is married and Susan believes that the Queen is not married. But, according to a number of philosophers, mental acts or states cannot be incompatible with one another. An argument of this type is mentioned by Ryle in his well known article, 'Are There Propositions?' (1930):

Nor can A and B [where A and B are incompatible] denote states of mind such as opining or surmising. For, though A is incompatible with B, there is no incompatibility in my opining A and my surmising B, or even between my believing A and my believing B. In other words, states of mind may very well co-exist though the things thought cannot both be true. (p.103)

Following this line of argument, some philosophers (though not Ryle) have held that logical incompatibilities are not between acts or states of belief but propositions. If this view is correct, it certainly follows that, since the logical incompatibilities involved between certain of our beliefs are between the things we believe, the things we believe are propositions. Thus, on this thesis, the logical incompatibility involved when Stacy believes that the Queen is married and Susan believes that the Queen is not married is between the proposition believed by Stacy, namely, the proposition that the Queen is married, and the proposition believed by Susan, namely, the proposition that the Queen is not married.

However, it is sometimes argued that logical incompatibilities hold whether we believe anything or not. On this supposition, the proposition that the Queen is married is incompatible with the proposition that the Queen is not

...
married independently of the existence of our beliefs. Yet if logical incompatibilities between propositions are independent of the existence of our beliefs then so are propositions. This consideration has led some philosophers to conclude that propositions must be entities.

It would appear that the same account can be given of the other propositional attitudes, since they may also involve logical incompatibilities. For example, when Stacy desires that the Queen be married and Susan desires that the Queen be not married there seems to be an incompatibility between the things desired.

(f) One thing we require is an analysis of oratio obliqua sentences, i.e., sentences of indirect discourse, such as 'Stacy asserted that the Queen is married'. This is equally true of the attributions of attitude, for example, 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' and 'Stacy doubts that the Queen is married', which are not sentences of indirect discourse since they do not report discourse at all.

Frege went at least a part of the way towards advancing an analysis when he proposed that the that-clause in such sentences refers to a proposition. That Frege held this view is, I believe, generally accepted. Certainly it is the interpretation espoused by such people as Susan Haack in Philosophy of Logics (1978, p.125), and Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman in The Logic of Grammar (1975, p.9). But John Perry (1977) suggests an alternative reading. Says Perry:

Consider a report of a belief: "Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles". On Frege's analysis, this is relational. "Believed that" stands for a relation, which is asserted
to hold between Copernicus and whatever it is that "the planetary orbits are circles" refers to as it occurs in this sentence. (p.476)

However, it is difficult to see how this interpretation could be correct. Frege's own words in 'On Sense and Reference' (1892) seem to rule it out:

The case of an abstract noun clause, introduced by 'that', includes the case of indirect quotation, in which we have seen the words to have their indirect reference coinciding with what is customarily their sense. In this case, then, the subordinate clause has for its reference a thought... This happens after 'say', 'hear', 'be of the opinion', 'be convinced', 'conclude' and similar words. (p.66)

It seems clear that Frege is saying here that the subordinate clause (the that-clause) refers to a thought. In fact, Frege (p.68) even goes on to propose that the subordinate clause may be regarded as a proper name of a thought in sentences of the kind in question.1

To be sure, the word translators use to translate Gedanke (Frege's word for what the that-clause refers to) is 'thought' rather than 'proposition'.2 But the niceties of translation aside, the term 'thought' is not a happy one. A thought may be either an act (or state) of thought or what one thinks, whereas Frege's (1977, p.30) thoughts are not created by the thinker and can be true without being grasped by anyone. Given that Frege (Ibid, p.27) also holds that thoughts are timeless, eternal and unvarying, the claim that thoughts are nothing more nor less than propositions looks

1. Frege allows, though, that sometimes the subordinate clause names a command or request.
2. See, for example, Frege (1918), P. Geach and M. Black (1970), and Frege (1977).
extremely plausible. In fact, philosophers have generally taken Frege's thoughts to be identical to propositions. I think it must be admitted that if they are not identical then they certainly seem to be close relatives.

At any rate, Frege's proposal that the that-clause is a naming or denoting expression in sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' has been highly influential. A large number of philosophers, particularly in the first half of this century, have adopted the proposal, and usually in conjunction with the claim that the thing named or denoted is a proposition. On the analysis proposed by these philosophers, the word 'believes' in 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is a two-place predicate which expresses a relation of believing between Stacy and the proposition named or denoted by 'that the Queen is married'.

For those who argue that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc. are proposition-entities, this analysis is not an option but a necessity. If we ask 'What does Stacy believe?', we can always answer the question with a sentence of the form 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married'. This is because 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' specifies what Stacy purportedly believes. But if what Stacy believes is a proposition-entity then 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' specifies what Stacy believes only if some part of the sentence refers to a proposition. However, if some part of 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' names or denotes a proposition believed by Stacy then we should be able to substitute the coreferring expression 'the proposition that the Queen is married' for that part of the sentence to get a meaningful result. But it is only if the
naming or denoting expression is 'that the Queen is married' that the substitution yields a meaningful sentence: 'Stacy believes the proposition that the Queen is married'.

The only other expression which could plausibly be construed as naming or denoting a proposition is 'the Queen is married'. But if in 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' we substitute 'the proposition that the Queen is married' for 'the Queen is married' the resultant sentence 'Stacy believes that the proposition that the Queen is married', is clearly nonsensical. Moreover if the that-clause names or denotes a proposition in 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' then 'believes' is a two-place predicate expressing a relation between Stacy and the proposition named or denoted. The relation expressed is one of believing. An analogy with this is provided by the analysis of 'A loves B' whereby 'A' and 'B' are names or denoting terms and 'loves' is a two-place predicate which expresses a relation of loving between A and B.

This does not imply that every philosopher who holds that 'that p' names or denotes a proposition in sentences of the form 'A believes that p', 'A doubts that p', 'A desires that p', etc., does so on the basis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities. Rather, a number of philosophers hold that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities on the basis that we cannot give a credible analysis of such sentences as 'A believes that p', 'A doubts that p', 'A desires that p', etc., unless we take 'that p' to be a name or denoting expression of some object. This distinction is, I believe, an important one and I shall refer to it again in this thesis.

The arguments listed above are only some of those
used by philosophers to support the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities. I think, though, that they are fairly central ones.

There is, however, an important distinction to be drawn when speaking of entities. We may differentiate between physical entities (which exist in space and time), such as tables, chairs, lakes, and pieces of chalk, and abstract entities (which do not exist in space and time), such as Platonic Forms. On a radical nominalist view, sentences are simply certain marks on paper, on blackboards, etc., certain patterns of sound, and the like.\(^1\) As such, sentences are construed as physical entities. Now a good number of philosophers, though perhaps not as many these days, have held that propositions are simply declarative (or indicative) sentences.\(^2\) Hence, could it not be argued that, although we believe proposition-entities, what we believe are not abstract entities but physical ones in the form of declarative sentences?

But there are some arguments against this. One argument of a not unfamiliar sort may be put as follows. If an Englishman and a Frenchman both believe that the Queen is married then we may say that they believe the same thing. But what sentence do they both believe? We cannot presume it is the English sentence 'The Queen is married, since the

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1. Against this, it is sometimes argued that although sentence tokens exist in this form, sentence types are abstract entities. The treatment of sentence types has been a traditional difficulty for radical nominalism.

2. A.N. Prior, in The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms (1976, Chapter 1), lists a number of philosophers who identify propositions with declarative sentences.
Frenchman may not understand it; nor can we presume that it is the French sentence 'La Reine est mariée,' since the Englishman may not understand it. Therefore, the argument goes, what they both believe is not a declarative sentence.

An argument of a similar sort but regarding assertion is as follows. Suppose an Englishman and a Frenchman both assert that the Queen is married. The Englishman utters 'The Queen is married' and the Frenchman utters 'La Reine est mariée.' Although they both assert the same thing, what they utter is different. Therefore, what they assert cannot be identical to either of the sentences they utter. But, then, what declarative sentence can we say they have both asserted?

Argument (d) may also be interpreted as an argument against the view that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are physical entities in the form of declarative sentences.

I certainly agree that we do not believe, doubt, desire, etc., declarative sentences, whether we call declarative sentences 'propositions' or not. A case to this effect is presented in Chapter III. However, an attempt will also be made to argue against the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities, no matter how proposition-entities are to be construed. In fact, the position is somewhat stronger than that for it is also denied that entities, whether in the form of propositions, mental images, possibilia, possible worlds, classes of possible worlds, states of affairs, or any other kind of exotica, are what we believe, doubt, desire, etc. at all.

There are various theories that disclaim the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, and so on,
are proposition-entities. So if opposition to proposition-entities is warranted, why not simply accept one of these theories? In this work I examine some of these theories - what I take to be the major ones - and in the process an attempt is made to demonstrate their unacceptability. A critical examination of these theories is important if we are to ever have an adequate theory of mind. An adequate theory of the mind will include an account of the will, emotion, inference, perception, bodily sensations, as well as the propositional attitudes. But any account of the propositional attitudes that invokes proposition-entities as what we believe, doubt, desire, and so on, is, I argue, bound to be unsatisfactory.
CHAPTER I

FACTS

An alternative to holding that proposition-entities are what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., is to hold that what we believe, doubt desire, assert, etc., are facts. Such a view is quite consistent with the claim that the that-clause in 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is a name - only we would have to say that it names a fact, not a proposition. In connection with this, we might note that the that-clause can be construed with at least some plausibility as naming a fact in sentences such as 'That the Queen is married is a fact'. It might also be remarked that ordinary language does sanction talk of believing facts, for we do say such things as 'Stacy believes the facts' and 'What Stacy believes is a fact'. 'Stacy asserted the facts' and 'Stacy is denying the facts' are equally licensed. So the view that what we believe, doubt, deny, assert, etc., are facts is to a certain degree natural, whether or not it is in fact logical.

However, in maintaining that what we believe, etc. are facts, we could have two different views of facts in mind. We might wish to hold that facts are entities, and hence that to believe a fact is to believe an entity. But alternatively it might be argued that sentences such as 'Stacy believes the fact that the Queen is married' and 'Stacy believes the facts' can be analyzed in a manner that does not require the term 'fact' to refer to anything at all. On this view, 'fact' would be a manièr de parler occurring in sentences which express truths, but it would not be a naming or denoting term.
The former view is more closely akin to the thesis that proposition-entities are the objects of the propositional attitudes, since it accepts certain assumptions that lead to our maintaining that what we believe are entities. One of these assumptions is that in sentences such as 'A believes something' and 'A believes some of the things that B believes' the expressions 'something' and 'some of the things' are referential. We saw in the Introduction various reasons as to why some philosophers have been attracted to this position. On this view, 'A believes something' and 'A believes some of the things that B believes' may be read as '(3p) (A believes p)' and '(3p) (A believes p & B believes p)' respectively, where these readings are to be interpreted objectually. (For an account of the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers cf. Chapter VI.) But if we suppose that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are facts, but that facts are not entities, these readings are quite wrong. On this supposition, to believe something is to believe a fact, but it is not to believe an entity. The analysis of 'A believes something' would then depend upon a "non ontological" analysis of 'fact'.

As things are, though, philosophers have tended to shy away from arguing that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are facts, whatever their conception of facts. There are various, but not equally compelling, reasons for this. One standard objection, which is often thought to be conclusive, may be put like this. If Stacy believes, for example, that the Eiffel Tower is in Stockholm then what fact does he supposedly believe? Presumably, this is the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Stockholm. But as there is no
such fact, Stacy can hardly be said to believe it. If there were such a fact then the Eiffel Tower would be in Stockholm, which it is not.

However, this objection is not decisive. For what is it to say that there is no such fact as that the Eiffel Tower is in Stockholm? If this is to say that no such fact exists, it could still be held that the fact in question has some kind of being other than existence, perhaps subsistence. What we might suppose is that we have two kinds of facts: those that exist and those that do not exist but subsist. We could then maintain that if Stacy's belief is true, he believes a fact that exists, but if his belief is false then he believes a fact that merely subsists. Certainly this is a view that would not appeal to a great number of philosophers, and I myself am not recommending it. But the point is that the objection that there is no such fact as that the Eiffel Tower is in Stockholm really does not prove as much as is intended.

Nevertheless, there is a common objection which appears to be conclusive. As already noted, the term 'fact' is commonly employed in ordinary discourse; it occurs in such sentences as 'What Stacy believes is a fact' and 'Stacy believes the facts'. Now these sentences are quite meaningful, and one thing they seem to assert is the truth of what Stacy believes. For example, we may say that 'What Stacy believes is a fact' entails 'What Stacy believes is true'. Similarly, 'What Stacy asserts is a fact' entails 'What Stacy asserts is true'. The problem is that since not all our beliefs or assertions (what we believe or assert) are true, we can hardly hold that whenever a person has a belief or makes an
assertion, what he believes or asserts is a fact. In other words, if it were the case that what we believe or assert is always a fact then what we believe or assert would always be true. But clearly sometimes what we believe or assert is not true.

A similar objection is more direct. Given the Queen’s actual marital status it may be said that it is not a fact that the Queen is a spinster. Nonetheless, someone could be of a state of mind that we would describe by saying that what he believes is that the Queen is a spinster. In such a case, though, what he believes is not a fact. Consequently what we believe is not always a fact.

All the same, some emendation of theory is possible. It does not follow that because it is not the case that what we believe is invariably a fact, what we believe is never a fact. And in fact some philosophers have argued that we do sometimes believe facts, i.e., whenever we believe a true proposition. One philosopher who pursued this line of argument was the Sydney realist, John Anderson.¹ Anderson accepted that there is a sense in which we may say that what we believe are propositions, but he flatly dismissed the claim that a proposition is ever an entity or object that stands between the knower and the objective state of affairs which he knows:

When we assert the proposition "All men are mortal", what we are asserting is the actual mortality of men, and to call the assertion of the proposition merely a means to the asserting of the fact is to say that we have found no way of asserting the fact, just as we have no way of specifying the "reality" with which

Thus, on Anderson's view, what we believe, assert, or know - the proposition - cannot be a "tertium quid or mediator, something by which we can assert facts but which is distinct from the facts as well as from us" (p.169). Anderson, however, does not suggest that whenever we believe or assert a proposition, what we believe or assert is a fact. Rather, it is the proposition that is commonly said to 'assert a fact' which is a fact, i.e., the fact it is commonly said to assert; it is only the true proposition that is a matter of fact.

Now, as Anderson does not propose that all the propositions which we believe or assert are true, some account of what it is to believe or assert a false proposition might be expected. Anderson's eventual answer was that:

...what is meant by the occurrence of a "false proposition" is explained, by reference to the distinction of subject and predicate, as someone's mistaking X for Y (taking X to be Y when it is not) - the question of this threefold relationship not being one that the person who is mistaken intends to raise, and not arising when he is not mistaken, when he is presenting the single situation X is Y. (1962, p.170)

But to say that an occurrence of a false proposition consists in someone's mistaking X for Y is hardly to tell us enough. What we require is an analysis of the concept of someone's mistaking X for Y (of someone's taking X to be Y when it is not). Regrettably, this is something Anderson never bothered to give us. Yet without it his theory remains
programmatic at best. 1

It might be noted, by the way, that Anderson goes on to say that:

No coherent position can be got by dividing the class "propositions" into two species, "the true" and "the false" (the species "what is" and the species "what is not") - there is no parallel between this and the division of animals, say, into the male and female. (loc. cit)

However, Anderson is not denying here that we can speak of someone's 'believing a false proposition' as distinct from his 'believing a true proposition'. What Anderson is really claiming is that the only kind or realm of reality is the spacio-temporal; and although we may identify true propositions with facts as spacio-temporal items, there is no level of reality with which a false proposition can be identified. False propositions, Anderson holds, are not to be construed as entities.

Anderson's theory, however, is not one that has secured many adherents. Certainly Anderson's (1927, p.254) view that facts are "occurrences in space and time" has not

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1. Nor is our understanding of the matter helped by David Armstrong's remark (1973, p.44) that Anderson was inclined to accept Russell's multiple relation account of false belief. Whatever similarities their accounts of false belief may have had, Anderson would not have cared for Russell's theory. Russell argued, in The Problems of Philosophy (1912, Chapter 12), that when, for example, Othello believes, either truly or falsely, that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello is related to Desdemona, Cassio, and the relation of loving which is a universal. Russell held, at this time, that even if no individuals love, Othello is still related to the universal of loving. But such a thesis stands firmly against Anderson's 'deflationist' views which deny that there is a realm of universals over and above bare particulars; that there is a level of reality apart from the spacio-temporal. (See, e.g., J. Anderson, 'Universals and Occurrences', in Studies in Empirical Philosophy, 1962). If, however, Armstrong's claim is that Anderson was (inadvertently) committed to the Russelian view, then I think that this is something that Armstrong needs to argue.
generally been well received. Most philosophers would hold, for example, that the fact that $2+2=4$ is a fact irrespective of what occurs in the spatio-temporal world. Nevertheless, this is a complex matter and I am not prepared to pursue it here. In any case, one could adopt the essence of Anderson's theory without accepting his particular view as to the nature of facts.

But there are other objections. Suppose, for instance, that Stacy believes that $X$ is $Y$. We may say that what Stacy believes if his belief is true is the same as what he believes if his belief is false. That is, the nature of what he believes is the same - obviously there is the difference that in one case what is believed is true whereas in the other case it is false. Unfortunately, Anderson's theory is discordant with this. According to Anderson, if Stacy's belief is true then what he believes is a fact which constitutes a part of "reality", but if his belief is false then what he believes does not constitute a part of "reality". But how, then, can what Stacy believes, if his belief is true, be in any sense the same as what he believes if his belief is false? That is, how can what constitutes a part of "reality" be the same as what does not constitute a part of "reality"? Certainly Anderson can say that when Stacy believes falsely that $X$ is $Y$, $X$ and $Y$ are "in reality". But what Stacy believes is not $X$ and $Y$. It seems to me that Anderson has overlooked this problem.

There is another objection. On Anderson's view, Stacy's belief that $X$ is $Y$, if it is true, consists in a relation to a fact, but if his belief is false then it consists in a three-fold relationship between Stacy, $X$, and
Y. The problem with this is that it suggests there is an intrinsic difference between true and false beliefs, and that (what is obviously impossible) we are able to discover the truth or falsehood of a belief merely by ascertaining its intrinsic nature.¹

A possible rejoinder to this is to argue that if Stacy, say, takes X to be the lover of Y, and X is in fact the lover of Y, then there is a relation between Stacy and a fact, i.e., the fact that X is Y. But in such a case there is also a threefold relationship between Stacy, X, and Y. So could it not be said that true and false beliefs are intrinsically the same in that they both involve a threefold relationship?

However, it is difficult to see how this helps Anderson. Anderson maintains that a true belief does not "agree" or "correspond" with a fact (i.e., is not something that is related to a fact), but is itself a direct relation to a fact. But any such relation to the fact that X is the lover of Y must be of a different nature to the threefold relationship of taking X to be the lover of Y. For otherwise to take X to be the lover of Y would be to have a direct relation to the fact that X is the lover of Y. That is, quite unacceptably, the belief that X is the lover of Y could not be wrong.

An alternative to Anderson's theory is to hold that we never believe facts but that facts are intentional

¹ I derive this objection from a point once made, though not directly in relation to Anderson, by Russell (1910, Pp. 152-3). If I understand him correctly, it is also the same objection that Professor Armstrong (1973, p.441) brings against Anderson.
in some other sense. A view of this kind has been espoused by C.D. Broad (1933). Broad asks us to consider the situation in which I am acquainted with the physical surface of the side of a certain sheet of paper which is facing me, and I make the judgement that the other side of this paper is blue. In such a case, according to Broad, I may be said to know the following facts, and not merely have beliefs. (i) I know that there is another side to the paper. (ii) I know that this other side must have some colour or other, if white and black be counted as colours. (iii) I know, with regard to blue, green, yellow, red, white and black, that they are determinates which fall under the determinable of colour. What I do not know is the fact about the determinate colour of the opposite side of the paper. I believe that it is blue. The fact that I believe this consists in the fact that my thought of the alternative blue stands in a certain relation to my three states of knowing, whilst my thoughts of the other alternatives do not stand in this relation to these three states of knowing. My thoughts of the other alternatives stand in a relation to these three states of knowing which is opposed to the relation in which my thought of the alternative blue stands. The relation in which my thought of blue stands is called the relation of 'being inserted', and its opposed relation is called the relation of 'being extruded'. My belief is true if and only if the thought which stands to my three states of knowing in the relation of being inserted is the thought of that determinate colour which in fact characterizes the opposite side of the paper; and it is false if and only if the thought which stands to my states of knowing in the relation
of being inserted is the thought of one of the other determinate colours. (Pp 72-3)

Broad generalizes this example as follows. Every belief is a complex state of affairs, in which we can distinguish the following factors. (i) Acquaintance with some fact whose subject or predicate is a determinable, and lack of acquaintance with the more determinate fact in which this determinable subject or predicate is specifically determined. (ii) Acquaintance in the same mind with the fact that certain determinates of which it is thinking are specifications of this determinable. (iii) The thought of one of these determinates being marked out from the thoughts of the others by standing to the acts of acquaintance, already mentioned, in the relation of being inserted in them. The acts of acquaintance may be called the 'noetic framework' of the belief, and the fact that I have a belief consists in the fact that my thought of a certain alternative specification is inserted in this noetic framework. In like manner, the fact that I have a disbelief consists in the fact that my thought of a certain alternative specification is extruded from the noetic framework. (Pp 73-4)

This enables Broad to present an account of what makes a judgement true. The fact to which a judgement refers, we are told, is the unknown determinate specification of the relatively indeterminate fact which the maker of the judgement already knows and is trying to specify further. When the judgement is a belief, it concords with the fact to which it refers, and is therefore true, if and only if the thought which is inserted into the noetic framework of the judgement is the thought of that determinate which
occurs in the fact referred to. When the judgement is a
disbelief, it concords with the fact to which it refers,
and is therefore true, if and only if the thought which is
extruded from the noetic framework of the judgement is the
thought of a different determinate from that which occurs
in the fact referred to. (p.78)

Broad has some awareness that his theory runs
the risk of over-simplification. It is acknowledged, for
instance, that if I have a certain visual experience and
make the judgement *that is a solid object*, I might be
mistaken in such a way that it could not be said that part of
the noetic framework of my judgement consists in my knowing
that this is a voluminous (solid or hollow) external physical
object. It might not be a fact that it is voluminous or
that it is an external physical object. I am in a state of
mind that takes it for granted that this is a voluminous
external physical object and believe that it is solid. In
taking so much for granted I do not contemplate the other
alternatives, such as that my sensum is hallucinatory or that
the object is flat and not voluminous. Nevertheless,
Broad insists, at the back of 'taking something for granted'
there is always the knowing of some fact, though exactly
how far back this knowing is, and exactly what fact is known
in any particular case, may be a matter for controversy.
If it is the case, for example, that whenever I sense a
sensum, I *ipso facto* know that it is a manifestation of
something somewhere in the physical world, then my knowing
this fact is at the back of my taking for granted that I
am in the presence of an external voluminous physical
object. (Pp 75-6) "In all judgement", Broad holds, "whether
true or false, there really is a unique kind of complex object before the mind. But it is a fact, and not a proposition; it is known, and not believed" (p.76).

To be sure, Broad does not claim for his theory that it is generally applicable to the propositional attitudes. Rather, he is concerned to show that the intentional objects of judgements (beliefs or disbeliefs) are not propositions but facts. Even so, if Broad's theory is sound then some extension of it to cover the other propositional attitudes could be attempted.

However, I do not think that the theory, even in its present form, can be recommended. Suppose, for instance, that Stacy knows very little about the Royal Family: he knows that the Queen is married, but he does not know any other fact about the Royal Family, except, of course, those facts which he must know in order to know that the Queen is married, such as that there is a Queen. Suppose, further, that Stacy has been told, and believes, such things as that Prince Philip is the Queen's consort, Princess Anne likes foxhunting, and Prince Charles has two brothers. Now, in the case of Stacy's belief concerning Prince Charles, what fact should we say is Stacy trying to specify further in believing what he does? By hypothesis, the only fact, more or less, that Stacy knows about the Royal Family is that the Queen is married. But if we say that Stacy, in believing that Prince Charles has two brothers, is trying to specify the fact that the Queen is married then we should, on Broad's theory, conclude that Stacy's belief refers to the unknown determinate specification of the fact that the Queen is married. Yet if Stacy's belief that Prince Charles has
two brothers refers to any fact at all, then it seems that it
would refer to the fact that Prince Charles has two brothers.
Clearly, though, this fact is not the same as the fact that
the Queen is married. Nor can the fact that Prince Charles
has two brothers be a further specification of the fact
that the Queen is married. If it were a further specification
then it would entail that the Queen is married, in the same
way that 'Willander is a top tennis player', as a further
specification of 'Willander is a tennis player', entails
the latter. But the fact that Prince Charles has two
brothers certainly does not entail that the Queen is married.¹
I do not suggest that it is impossible for Broad to emend
his theory so as to avoid this objection. But it is far
from clear how this could be done.

Another proposal that treats facts as intentional
objects has been put forward by Lord Russell in The Analysis
of Mind (1921). Russell held, at that time, that beliefs
are related to facts but in different ways: true beliefs
point towards facts, whereas false beliefs point away from
them. Thus, Russell wrote:

You may believe the proposition "to-day is
Tuesday" both when, in fact, to-day is
Tuesday, and when today is not Tuesday.
If to-day is not Tuesday, this fact is the
objective of your belief that to-day is
Tuesday. But obviously the relation of
your belief to the fact is different in
this case from what it is in the case when
to-day is Tuesday. We may say, metaphor­
ically, that when to-day is Tuesday, your
belief that it is Tuesday points towards
the fact, whereas when to-day is not Tuesday
your belief points away from the fact. (p.272)

¹ Dr. Peter Roeper has helped me to focus more clearly on
this objection.
However, in proposing this view, Russell did not consider that he had dispensed with proposition-entities. On the contrary, Russell accepted that what we believe are propositions, and held these to consist of either images or words (p.241).

Russell's theory notwithstanding, it might still be argued that if facts are intentional objects in that beliefs either point towards or away from them then there is no need to hold that propositions are intentional objects. But such a view, which still awaits development, does not look promising. As already pointed out, the word 'fact' is not a technical term but is to be found in ordinary discourse, in sentences such as 'What A believes is a fact' and 'A believes the facts'. The difficulty is that if we say that beliefs point towards or away from facts, we seem to be ruling out the possibility that we can ever believe the facts. Sentences such as 'What A believes is a fact', however they are to be analyzed, could not possibly be true. But, then, it seems that we have succeeded in introducing a new sense of 'fact', a sense which runs against established usage. Of course, it could be argued that to say that A's belief points towards a fact is just to say that A believes a fact, and to say that A's belief points away from a fact is just to say that what A believes is not a fact. But if this is all we mean then there seems to be no real advantage in introducing the metaphors of 'pointing towards' or 'pointing away from' a fact. Moreover, we would still require an account of false belief. To say that in false belief what we believe is not a fact is hardly informative.
This objection can also be made to apply to Broad's theory, as well as to any theory that supposes that facts are intentional objects in a sense other than that they are what we believe.

The case against taking facts as the objects of the propositional attitudes or speech acts can, I think, be summarised this way. Either the claim is that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are facts, or the claim is that facts are intentional objects in some other sense. The former proposal is wrong since there are cases in which what we believe or assert is not a fact. The latter proposal falls down since there are cases in which what we believe or assert is a fact.
(a) Russell's Theory

1. An alternative to holding that the object of a belief is either a proposition-entity or a fact is to hold that a belief consists in a relation to more than one object. One rationale for adopting this position is the difficulty in determining what a single object of belief is if it is neither a proposition-entity nor a fact. Moreover, if we suppose that the objects of a belief are ordinary objects then we have the advantage, or what would seem to many philosophers to be an advantage, of retaining objects of belief without supposing that these objects have an abstract nature. This is the thesis endorsed in Lord Russell's (1910; 1912) multiple relation theory of judgement.\(^1\) Or, it is almost the thesis endorsed. As we shall shortly see, Russell in fact held that one of the objects of a belief is always a relation, and Russell took the view, at this time, that relations are abstract entities. Consequently, Russell's theory is not to be seen as marking a complete shift from the thesis that beliefs require abstract entities. In any case, Russell still accepts the lesser assumption that beliefs must have objects of some sort.

But before discussing the details of Russell's theory, it is worthwhile pointing out that Russell did have independent reasons for thinking that a judgement cannot consist in a relation to a single object, whether it be

\(^1\) Russell, incidentally, uses the words 'belief' and 'judgement' as synonyms.
a proposition, a fact, or anything else, and it seems that this is what led him to propose that a judgement consists in a relation to more than one object. These reasons deserve some mention if for no other purpose than that they help to explain the progeniture of Russell's theory.

On Russell's view, at this time, truth and falsehood are the properties of judgements, and thus there can be no truth or falsehood unless there are minds to judge. Nevertheless, we are told (perhaps a little paradoxically), the truth or falsehood of a judgement depends in no way upon the person judging, but solely upon the facts about which he judges. If I judge, for example, that Charles I died in his bed, my judgement will be false, but this will be so because in fact he did not die in his bed, not because of anything to do with me. Similarly, if I judge that he died on the scaffold, my judgement will be true because of an event which actually occurred. Thus, Russell maintains, the truth or falsehood of a judgement always has an objective ground, and it is natural to ask whether there are not objective truths and falsehoods which are the respective objects or 'Objectives' of true and false judgements. In the case of true judgements, Russell considers that the view that they have objectives is plausible. The event described as 'Charles I's death on the scaffold' may be thought to be the objective of the judgement that Charles I died on the scaffold. But the same analysis, Russell argues, cannot be applied in the case of the judgement that Charles I died in his bed. For there was no such event as 'Charles I's death in his bed'. Thus, if there is an objective, it must be something other than 'Charles I's
death in his bed'. We might suppose it to be 'that Charles I died in his bed'. We would then have to apply the same analysis in the case of true judgements: the objective of the judgement that Charles I died on the scaffold will be 'that Charles I died on the scaffold'. (1910, Pp 149-51).

Russell maintains that there are two objections to this view. For one thing, we are told, it is difficult to accept that there are such objects as 'that Charles I died in his bed', or even 'that Charles I died on the scaffold':

It seems evident that the phrase 'that so and so' has no complete meaning by itself, which would enable it to denote a definite object as (e.g.) the word 'Socrates' does. We feel that the phrase 'that so and so' is essentially incomplete, and only acquires full significance when words are added so as to express a judgement, e.g. 'I believe that so and so', 'I deny that so and so', 'I hope that so and so'. (p.151)

This, Russell admits, is not a decisive argument, but he believes it must be given a certain weight.

Another problem, one that we are told is more serious, is that if all judgements have objectives then there must be objectives which are false. That is, there must be entities, not dependent upon the existence of judgements, which are objective falsehoods. Russell suggests that this is almost incredible. "We feel that there could be no falsehood if there were no minds to make mistakes" (p.152). In addition, we are told that this has the drawback of making the difference between truth and falsehood quite inexplicable. "We feel that when we judge truly some entity 'corresponding' in some way to our judgement is to be found outside our judgement, while when we judge falsely there is no such 'corresponding' entity" (p.152). Russell
seems to accept that these objections are not logically
conclusive, but he considers that the theory that there are
objective falsehoods is one that is best avoided. Against
this, though, I think that there are some who would argue
that if Russell's objections are inconclusive, his eschewing
of objective falsehoods reveals a prejudice against jungle
landscapes.

Nevertheless, it might be thought that we could
share Russell's reluctance to postulate objective falsehoods
and simply say that a true judgement has an objective
while a false one does not. But Russell points out that if
we adopt this view then we imply that there is an intrinsic
difference between true and false judgements, and that we
would be able (which is clearly impossible) to ascertain
the truth or falsehood of a judgement merely by examining the
intrinsic nature of the judgement. Thus, Russell concludes,
we must say that no judgement consists in a relation to a
single object. (Pp 152-3)

When, for example, Othello believes that Desdemona
loves Cassio, Othello does not have a single object before
his mind, whether it be 'Desdemona's love for Cassio' or
'that Desdemona loves Cassio'. Rather Desdemona and loving
and Cassio are all terms in the relation which subsists
when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. This
relation will in fact be between four terms, since Othello
is also one of the terms of the relation. This is not to
say that Othello has a certain relation to Desdemona, and
has the same relation to loving and to Cassio.1

1. Although Russell (1910, p.153) does say that when we are
judging we must be conscious of the objects of the judgement.
That is, we must have to each object of the judgement a rela-
tion called 'being conscious of it'. But this, we are told,
does not give us the essence of judgement.
Othello's believing is not a relation which he has to each of the other three terms, but to all of them together. When Othello entertains his belief, the relation of believing 'knits together' into a complex whole Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio. Russell writes:

What is called belief or judgement is nothing but this relation of believing or judging, which relates a mind to several things other than itself. An act of belief or of judgement is the occurrence between certain terms at some particular time, of the relation of believing or judging. (1912, p.73)

We may say that in every act of judgement there is both a mind which judges, and terms concerning which, it judges. We may call the mind the subject and the remaining terms the objects. Thus, in the case of Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello is the subject, and Desdemona, loving and Cassio are the objects. The subject and objects form the constituents of the judgement. Each judgement will be said to have a 'sense' or 'direction' which, to put it metaphorically, arranges the subject and objects in a certain order. Othello's judgement that Cassio loves Desdemona differs from his judgement that Desdemona loves Cassio, though the same constituents are involved, in that the judging relation places the constituents in a different order in the two cases. Similarly, if Cassio judges that Desdemona loves Othello, the constituents of the judgement are again the same, but they are in a different order. (p.73)

In the sense that the relation of judging or believing knits together into one complex whole the subject and the objects, it is, Russell maintains, exactly like
every other relation. That is, whenever a relation holds between two or more terms, it unites them into a complex whole. If Othello loves Desdemona, there is the complex whole 'Othello's love for Desdemona'. In every act of believing there is a complex comprised of 'believing' which is the uniting relation, and the subject and objects which are arranged in a certain order by the 'sense' of the believing relation. One of the objects of the belief must be a relation. In the case of Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio, the relation is 'loving'. But this relation does not bring about the unity of the subject - object complex. According to Russell:

The relation 'loving', as it occurs in the act of believing, is one of the objects - it is a brick in the structure, not the cement. The cement is the relation 'believing'. When the belief is true, there is another complex unity, in which the relation which was one of the objects of the belief relates the other objects. Thus, e.g., if Othello believes truly that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there is a complex unity, 'Desdemona's love for Cassio', which is composed exclusively of the objects of belief, in the same order as they had in the belief, with the relation which was one of the objects occurring now as the cement that binds together the other objects of the belief. On the other hand, when a belief is false, there is no such complex unity composed only of the objects of belief. If Othello believes falsely that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there is no such complex unity as 'Desdemona's love for Cassio'.

Thus, Russell concludes, a belief is true when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and false when it does not. If the objects of the belief are two terms and a relation, the terms being put in a certain order by the 'sense' of the believing, then if the two terms are united by the relation into a complex with the same order...
as in the judgement, there is a complex called the fact corresponding to the belief, and the belief is true; if there is no such corresponding complex, the belief is false. This, Russell claims, gives us our definition of truth and falsehood:

Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true; if not, it is false. (p. 74)

It is interesting to note that Russell's statement of his theory in 1910 and his statement of the theory in 1912 are not without their differences. In 1912 Russell, as we have noted, held that the subject and objects of a belief are arranged in a certain order by the 'sense' of the judging or believing relation. However, this was not quite Russell's view in 1910. Then Russell wrote:

Let us take the judgement 'A loves B'. This consists of a relation of the person judging to A and love and B, i.e., to the two terms A and B and the relation 'love'...the relation must not be abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A...We may distinguish two 'senses' of a relation according as it goes from A to B or from B to A. Then the relation as it enters into the judgement must have a 'sense'...Thus the judgement that two terms have a certain relation R is a relation of the mind to the two terms and the relation R with the appropriate sense. (p. 158)

Hence it would seem that in 1910 Russell considered that the order of the objects of the judgement is arranged by the sense of the relation which forms one of the objects of the judgement.

Finally, it is to be observed that Russell only gives us an account of belief or judgement - he makes no
mention of the other propositional attitudes. However, we do have a model for extending Russell's theory. We could give a quite identical account of, say, Othello's fear that Desdemona loves Cassio, with the sole difference being that we would say that the objects of Othello's fear are knitted together by a relation of fearing, not believing. In the same way Russell's theory could be expanded so as to account for all the propositional attitudes, i.e., hopes, doubts, desires, suppositions, expectations, etc.

2. There are some serious objections to Russell's theory.

Russell purports to be giving us an account of belief in which no reference is made to propositions. Now, one thing we would expect of a satisfactory account of belief is that it include an account of both true and false belief. Russell certainly does not deny that there are true and false beliefs, as he holds that a belief is true if it corresponds to a certain associated complex and false if it does not. So we would expect of Russell that he not only give us an account of true and false belief, but that he do so by invoking some sort of account of the alleged correspondence between a true belief and its truth conditions.

As things turn out, however, this is precisely what Russell does not do. We are told, for example, that if Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio then Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio are united into a complex by a relation of believing or judging. (The belief or judgement, we are informed, is 'nothing but this relation of believing or judging'.) And Othello's belief is true if
and only if Desdemona and Cassio are united by the relation of loving in the same order as they are united by the relation of believing. But presuming that on this account there really is some sort of correspondence when Othello's belief is true (as we shall shortly see, some philosophers doubt this) the correspondence is between a factual complex consisting of Desdemona and Cassio united in a certain order by the relation of loving and a judgement complex consisting of Othello, Desdemona, loving, Cassio and a relation of believing which acts, as it were, as the cement in the structure. That is, the correspondence would be between a judgement complex, of which the belief or judgement may be said to form a part, and a factual complex; it would not be between Othello's belief or judgement and the factual complex. But, then, we have been given no account whatsoever of the alleged correspondence between Othello's belief and the factual complex.

If Russell had attempted to get out of this difficulty by saying that Othello's belief or judgement consists in the judgement complex then he could no longer have held that the relation that cements together Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio whenever Othello has his belief is Othello's belief or judgement. In that case, Russell would have quite failed to tell us what that relation is, which would be no small drawback to his theory.

Sir Alfred Ayer (1971, p.99) mentions another objection. Since, on Russell's theory, the singular terms on which a judgement operates are to be taken as actual individuals, the theory makes no provision for cases in which a person believes something to be true of a subject under
one description but not under another. If I judge, for example, that the author of Coningsby was a romantic writer, then because the author of Coningsby and Disraeli are one and the same, I am construed as judging that Disraeli was a romantic writer. Yet this is inappropriate if I think of Disraeli only as a statesman and am entirely ignorant of the fact that he wrote novels.

A fairly common complaint against Russell's theory centres on his treatment of the relation of loving as an abstract entity. Certainly in the case where Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio is true, Desdemona is said to be related by an actual relation of loving to Cassio. But, on Russell's theory, the relation of loving is taken to be an object just as much as is Desdemona or Cassio, even although when Othello's belief is false there is no relation of loving between Desdemona and Cassio. The relation of loving is thus for Russell an abstract entity. But, against this, it is often objected that if we are committed to relations as abstract entities then we might as well keep proposition-entities as the objects of belief.

Certainly Russell cannot, in all consistency, refuse to sanction proposition-entities as the objects of belief on the general ground that there is something wrong with admitting abstract entities to one's ontology, while at the same time postulating relations as abstract entities. However, Russell's reasons for dispensing with proposition-entities as the objects of belief have already been noted, and he did not in fact rule them out because of their abstract nature. Rather he held that there are particular problems with the postulation of proposition-entities as such. In fact Russell could not have consistently dispensed with
proposition-entities on the general ground that abstract entities are implausible, since at that time, 1910-12, Russell's sense of reality was far from 'robust'. For instance, Russell (1912, Pp 52-7) still believed in a world of universals as timeless subsistents. Consequently the objection to Russell does not appear to be compelling. It is interesting to note, though, that one of the reasons Russell came to abandon his own theory was that it implies that when Othello's judgement is false we have a non-existent love between Desdemona and Cassio; and this, Russell (1918, p.225) held, is just as wrong as postulating non-existent unicorns.

(b) Woozley's Emendation.

Another objection, a fairly standard one, is discussed by A.D. Woozley (1949, Pp 122-4). Woozley asks us to suppose a simple two-term relational proposition (which we may assume to be true), and symbolize it as \( \text{ArB} \), where \( A \) and \( B \) are the terms, \( r \) is the relation between them, and the order of the terms or the direction of the relation is indicated by the order in which the symbols are written down. Now, taking this proposition as the object of the judgement, where \( M \) is the subject or judging mind, and \( j \) is the relation of judging, we get two complexes:

(a) the judgement complex \( Mj\text{ArB} \)

(b) the factual complex \( \text{ArB} \)

On Russell's theory, these two complexes are said to correspond because in each of them \( A, r \) and \( B \) occur in the same order \( \text{ArB} \). There are, however, certain differences between (a) and (b):

(i) In (a) there are four terms (\( M, A, r, B \)) and one relation (\( j \)). In (b) there are two terms (\( A \) and \( B \)) and
one relation (r).

(ii) In (a) r is a term; in (b) it is a relation.

(iii) In (a) the order of A, r and B is determined by j; in (b) the order of A, r and B is determined by r.

In the light of these differences, it is difficult to see how there can be a correspondence between the two complexes. It is not merely that the judgement complex contains a judging mind M and the factual complex does not. The real difficulty is that r functions as a term in the judgement complex whereas in the factual complex it functions as a relation. In whatever way the relation j may unite A, r and B in the judgement complex, the fact remains that it is j which does it, not r. Given that this is so, r in the judgement is not performing its function as a relation, with the consequence that the correspondence which we want between ArB within the judgement and the fact ArB, in which r is performing its function as a relation, does not exist.

This objection is, I believe, quite sound. Admittedly, in Russell's 1910 statement, unlike in his 1912 statement, the 'sense' of the relation r is said to run from A to B. But whatever Russell means by this, and it is not perfectly clear what he does mean, he is certainly not contending that r in the judgement complex must relate A and B. Russell (1910, Pp 155-6) is quite definite that when the judgement complex is true r relates A and B, but r does not relate A and B when the judgement complex is false. The objection, moreover, does not presume that Russell's theory falls down merely because it is unable to provide an adequate account of 'correspondence'. Rather the point is that Russell's theory is a correspondence theory which lacks any way of explaining how a correspondence can occur.
All the same, Woozley considers that the objection can be met by a suitable emendation of Russell's theory:

If we distinguish between two phases of judgement, namely, entertainment and assertion (or denial), the difficulty can be made to disappear. At the stage of entertaining, if the mind has to combine the two terms A and B and the relation r, it can produce not more than two combinations, entertaining either ArB or BrA; the remaining verbal combinations ABr, rBA, etc., represent no thinkable combinations, nothing which can be entertained. That is to say, at the entertaining stage r must already be doing its job as a relation, restricting the possible propositions to ArB and BrA, and already providing the propositions with their unity. Then, in the light of the evidence or prejudice, or whatever else induces one to make up one's mind, intervenes the second stage of asserting or denying the proposition entertained. (Pp 123-4)

However, this argument seems quite unsatisfactory. If whenever I entertain, say, ArB r relates A and B as either ArB or BrA, it would follow that either Arb or BrA is the case. But this is clearly wrong; for it may neither be the case that ArB nor BrA. If, for example, I entertain the thought that A loves B, and love is a relation uniting A and B as either A loves B or B loves A, then it is either the case that A loves B or B loves A. Yet this fails to provide for the possibility that neither A nor B have any love for each other.

Woozley's emendation is, by the way, also subject to the first two of the three previous objections mentioned against Russell.

(c) Geach's Theory
1. Some of the strongest, if not the strongest, criticism of Russell has come from P.T. Geach (1957). According to Geach, Russell's theory suffers from a number of difficulties.
For one thing, Geach points out, Russell does not account for judged propositions not having the form aRb. Russell's theory would require different relations of judging (differing as to the number and the logical types of the terms which they relate) for every different logical form of proposition judged. As Geach observes, this difficulty could be overcome if we were given some recursive device whereby the judging relations for more complex cases could be defined in terms of those for simpler ones. But Russell gives us no indication even of the need for such a device, let alone of its actual form. (p.49)

Also, on Russell's theory, if James judges that a is larger than b, then the relation larger than is one of the objects related by the judging relation. But, as Geach informs us, a relative term like 'larger than' is incomplete carrying with it two blanks that need filling in ('____ is larger than ____'). The blanks need not be filled in with singular terms such as in 'Jemima is larger than Joey', since 'some cat is larger than any rat' equally satisfies the requirement. Moreover, the blanks may be filled in, either explicitly or implicitly, with variables; 'larger than is converse to smaller than' is exponible as 'for any x and any y, x is larger than y if and only if y is smaller than x'. But how are the blanks to be filled in in 'James judges that a is larger than b'? On Russell's view, 'a' and 'b' do not fill in the blanks, since a, b and the relation larger than enter into the judging relation as separate terms. Yet failing some specification as to how the double incompleteness of 'larger than' is eliminable, such as that given for 'larger than is converse to smaller than', Russell's theory remains obscure and unsatisfactory. (Pp 50-1).
A connected difficulty noted by Geach is that since 'larger than' is not to be read in 'B (j, a, larger than, b)' (where B = the believing relation, and j = some psychical element in James) as having its first blank filled in by 'a' and its second by 'b', how are we to distinguish this from 'B (j, b, larger than, a)'? That is, how are we to distinguish between 'James judges that a is larger than b' and 'James judges that b is larger than a'? Russell's 1912 answer is that "the relation of judging places the constituents in a different order". But, as Geach points out, this is no explanation, but just a way of stating the difference to be explained. On the other hand, Russell's 1910 answer that the relation R (larger than) has a 'sense' which proceeds from a to b rather than from b to a fares no better. For if the relation R does not relate a and b, but is only a term of the judging relation that holds between the subject, a, the relation R, and b, how can R be said to 'proceed' from a to b rather than from b to a? That is, how can a relation that occurs not as relating things, but as one of the things related by another relation, occur with one or other 'sense'? (p.51)

I think that these objections pose at least a strong prima facie case against Russell's theory, and give us additional grounds for putting it aside. However, Geach proposes a revision of Russell's theory which he considers avoids these objections.

Geach begins by introducing the operator §( ). We are not given an explicit interpretation of §( ). But we are told that if a relational expression is written between the brackets, we get a new relational expression of the
same logical type as the original one. Thus if \( R \) is dyadic then so is \( \$ (R) \); if \( R \) is triadic then so is \( \$ (R) \); and so on. In the 1971 Preface to *Mental Acts*, Geach suggests a way of roughly conveying the force of the operator \( \$ ( ) \):

\[
\alpha \text{ is } \$ (R) \text{ to } \beta \text{ if and only if } \alpha \text{ and } \beta \text{ are simultaneous Ideas occurring in a person who is judging (or assuming) that what } \alpha \text{ is an Idea of is in the relation } R \text{ to what } \beta \text{ is an Idea of}.
\]

Geach next explains the term 'Idea'. By 'an Idea' Geach means 'the exercise of a concept in judgement'; the exercise of James's concept *man* in a judgement will be his Idea of *man*. Geach deliberately leaves this explanation vague because he does not want to commit himself to too many assumptions. (p.xii)

A man's Idea of *every knife* is a particular exercise of his concept of *every knife*, exercised in any judgement to the effect that *every knife* is so-and-so. Similarly, a man's Idea of *some spoon* is a particular exercise of his concept of *some spoon*, exercised in any judgement to the effect that *some spoon* is so-and-so. (p.xii; Pp 53-4)

Geach now states his theory. Suppose James judges that *every knife* is sharper than *every spoon*. This judgement comprises James's Idea of *every knife*, \( \alpha \), and his Idea of *every spoon*, \( \beta \). The theory is that James's act of judgement consists of his Idea \( \alpha \), of *every knife*, standing in the relation \( \$ (\text{sharper than}) \) to his Idea \( \beta \), of *every spoon*. This analysis, we are told, avoids Russell's difficulties concerning 'sense': the difference between James's judging that *every knife* is sharper than *every spoon* and his judging that *every spoon* is sharper than *every knife* constitutes the difference
between the Idea $\alpha$'s standing in the relation $\$(\text{sharper than})$ to the Idea $\beta$ and $\beta$'s standing in that relation to $\alpha$. According to Geach, we also extirpate another of Russell's difficulties — that we did not know how to extend his theory to, for instance, three-termed relations. A judgement to the effect that a three-termed relation $R$ holds will consist in a person's having Ideas $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ such that we have $\$(R)$ $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$; for '$R$', like 'R', will stand for a triadic relation, one therefore which can relate $\alpha, \beta$ and $\gamma$. (p.54)

2. This gives us the structure of Geach's theory. So far as I can see, however, it has little to recommend it. First, a disadvantage of Geach's theory is that it is far from clear how it could be extended to cover propositional attitudes other than beliefs. At least in the case of Russell's theory, as we previously noted, it is easy to conceive of how a generalization could be made.

Second, and more important, it is difficult to see how Geach's theory can give an account of, say, James's belief that it is not the case that some spoon is sharper than every knife. We cannot suppose that James's judgement consists of his not having an Idea $\gamma$ of some spoon, standing in the relation $\$(\text{sharper than})$ to his Idea $\alpha$ of every knife. For we can hardly ascertain what James does believe from the fact that he does not have certain Ideas standing in a certain relation. The same problem arises if we suppose that the judgement consists in James's having an Idea $\gamma$, of some spoon, and an Idea $\kappa$, of every knife, the former not being related by the relation $\$(\text{sharper than})$ to the latter. Nor can we take James's belief to comprise his Idea $\gamma$.
standing in the relation $\not\succ$ (not being sharper than) to his Idea $\alpha$. On this account, James's judgement is true if and only if some spoon, what $y$ is an Idea of, stands in the relation of not being sharper than to every knife, what $\alpha$ is an Idea of.

The problem with this is that to say that some spoon stands in the relation of not-$\succ$ to every knife presupposes that some spoon exists, whereas the belief that it is not the case that some spoon is sharper than every knife is true if no spoons exist at all. In addition, it is not obvious that there can be negative relations such as $\not\succ$ (not being sharper than). It is also of no advantage to point out that James's belief is equivalent to the belief that no spoon is sharper than every knife. James does not have an Idea of no spoon standing in the relation $\not\succ$ (sharper than) to an Idea of every knife. For one thing, it is not at all clear as to what would constitute an Idea of no spoon. Also we would not want to say that if James's belief is true then there is a relation between what his Idea of no spoon is an Idea of and every knife. There is no such thing as a no spoon to stand in a relation to anything. Geach seems to have overlooked this difficulty.

It is instructive to note that Geach's theory bears a striking resemblance to a number of theories put forward in the heyday of British empiricism, which variously held that a judgement consists in affirming or denying one idea of another, putting two ideas together, bringing one idea under another, comparing two ideas, or supposing an agreement or disagreement between two ideas. A theory of this type comes from John Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There Locke held that a judgement is:
the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. (4,14,4)

And a judgement is true, we are hold "if it so unites or separates them [the ideas] as in reality things are" (Ibid).

In making this last point, though, Locke seems to have forgotten that elsewhere in the Essay (4, 4,6) he maintains that mathematics is concerned with the truth and properties only of ideas as they occur in the mind. On this proposal, the question as to how things are in reality (extramental reality) is thus irrelevant to the truth of mathematical judgements.

In the quote above concerning the nature of judgement Locke does not specify how many ideas may be involved in a judgement. But in the Essay (4,1,2) Locke claims that "Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas". The difference for Locke between knowledge and mere judgement seems not to consist in the number of ideas involved but in the difference between perceiving and merely presuming the agreement or disagreement of certain ideas. Consequently, on this view, if knowledge only involves two ideas then so does mere judgement. However, such a view has the drawback that there are some judgements which, if they are to be held as involving ideas, would appear to involve more than two of them. For example, it is difficult to see how the belief that Canberra is between Sydney and Melbourne can consist merely in two ideas which we relate in a certain way. In this respect Geach's theory seems to be superior to Locke's, since Geach makes provision for judgements involving a multiplicity
Another difficulty for Locke is that to say that a subject's act of judgement consists in certain ideas which he presumes to be in agreement or disagreement is to tell us what the subject presumes to be the case. But presumptions are not beliefs. So we do not appear to have an account of belief after all. Also if we are to really insist that an act of judgement consists in presuming that certain ideas are in agreement or disagreement, how are we to analyze a subject's presuming, rather than believing, that p?

It also appears that Locke's theory suffers from an inability to give an account of James's belief that it is not the case that some spoon is sharper than every knife for precisely the same reasons as does Geach's theory. So far as I can see, this is a difficulty that faces any theory that attempts to analyze an act of judgement into certain ideas related in a certain manner. In this respect Geach's theory is not an improvement on Locke's.

In this Chapter we have examined Russell's multiple relation theory and two well-known emendations of it. But are not further emendations, which avoid the difficulties that have been raised here, possible? Also, it should be kept in mind that Russell was not the first philosopher to suppose that a belief has more than one object. For example, the medieval philosopher, Walter Burleigh, held that in belief there are things outside the mind, universals or particulars, which we mentally compound or separate in the sense that we claim the identity or non-identity of these things. In false belief, the things compounded or separated in thought.
exist but they lack the alleged identity or non-identity; whereas, in true belief, these things are as a matter of fact identical or non-identical as claimed. Burleigh's theory is clearly too simplistic, since not all beliefs or assertions can be analyzed as affirming an identity or non-identity of objects. If someone believes, to take Russell's example, that Desdemona loves Cassio, his belief cannot be accounted for by saying that he supposes that there is an identity or non-identity of Desdemona and Cassio. Nevertheless, what we may well ask is whether or not there is an underlying difficulty with theories of this type.

In the case of Geach's theory, we have the proposal that there are various sorts of relations between Ideas, the Ideas themselves being constituents, not objects, of the belief. I have, however, expressed doubt about analyses taking this form. In the case of Russell, we are told that the multiple relation encompasses some quite ordinary objects, or what are supposed to be ordinary objects, e.g., Othello, Desdemona, and Cassio. It is extraordinary, though, that Russell attempts to give an account of such a bad example as Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio. For suppose that someone really does believe that Desdemona and Cassio are actual individuals and that the former loves the latter. In such a case, we can hardly say that there is a relation of believing which knits together Desdemona and Cassio as actual individuals, since no such individuals have ever existed. Certainly

it could be argued that although Desdemona and Cassio are not actual individuals, they are individuals of a different sort, such as objects in a possible world. But if we adopt this view, it is difficult to see what advantage we have over the proposition-entity theory. We would have rid ourselves of one abstract entity at the expense of postulating several such entities. Of course, it might be held that the advantage is that we can give a satisfactory account of a belief by appealing to multiple abstract entities, whereas we cannot do this by appealing to a proposition-entity. But an advocate of the multiple relation theory would have to argue more than this. What he would need to establish is that any account of belief that fails to postulate multiple entities as objects of belief, whether it postulates no entities or a single entity for this role, will prove unsatisfactory. Otherwise he would seem to run up against the principle of entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Certainly I am not suggesting that it is impossible to establish this (although I do deny that the required multiple objects can be construed as ordinary individuals, i.e., individuals existing in space and time), but I think it must be admitted that it would be an exceedingly difficult accomplishment. It really would go far beyond showing that a multiple relation (multiple object) theory of belief can be given. In any case, this is the direction in which I think that the multiple relation theory should be headed.

But if we accept Russell's reasons for rejecting proposition-entities, yet reject the multiple relation theory, we might look for some alternative as objects of
considered in the next chapter.

the attributes, such as sentences. This alternative is
A number of philosophers maintain that declarative sentences are objects of the propositional attitudes or speech acts. Their reasons for doing so are very much the same as those outlined in the Introduction for taking proposition-entities to be these objects. In fact, a minority of philosophers actually use the term 'proposition' to simply mean 'declarative sentence'. So that for them to propose that declarative sentences are objects of the attitudes or speech acts is to propose that proposition-entities are these objects. But whether we call declarative sentences 'propositions' or not, the thesis that declarative sentences are objects of the attitudes has the advantage of parsimony in that it rejects any suggestion that objects of the attitudes are additional to sentences; whereas if we hold that proposition-entities are objects of the attitudes we may or may not wish to maintain that such objects are distinct from declarative sentences. This is one of the reasons as to why some philosophers have preferred the sentential theory. (I shall mention another important reason at the end of this Chapter.)

There is, however, as suggested in the Introduction, more than one sense in which declarative sentences may be said to be 'objects of the attitudes'. It is sometimes claimed that declarative sentences are objects of the attitudes and speech acts in that they are what we believe,
doubt, desire, assert, etc. But sometimes it is held that declarative sentences are objects of the attitudes and speech acts in a different sense, in the sense that they are what we believe-true, doubt-true, desire-true, assert-true, and so on. One of the reasons for preferring this proposal is that it better allows us to account for the beliefs of dumb animals, since it does not presume that such organisms believe things that they cannot be said to understand. I shall discuss the former of these proposals first.

1. Thesis I. The sentence (1) A asserted that the moon is round can be analyzed in such a way that the term 'asserted' is a two-place predicate expressing a relation of asserting between A and the sentence 'The moon is round'. Thus the analysans of (1) may be put as

   (2) A asserted 'The moon is round'.

Objection (1) An objection sometimes referred to as The Translation Argument, and emanating from Church (1950), is as follows. If (1) is to be analyzed as (2) then the German translation of (1) ought to be afforded a similar analysis. Thus

   (3) A hat gesagt, dass der Mond rund ist

should be analyzed as

   (4) A hat gesagt "der Mond ist rund".

Now (4) is not a translation of (2) since (4) mentions the

1. Clearly (1) only serves as an example. The term 'asserted' can be substituted for any attitude term, i.e., 'believes', 'doubts', 'desires', etc.
sentence 'der Mond ist rund', whereas (2) mentions the sentence 'the moon is round'. But if (4) is not a translation of (2), (3) cannot be a translation of (1). But (3) is a translation of (1). Therefore (2) is not the analysans of (1).

It may be observed that this particular version of The Translation Argument presumes the principle that it is illegitimate to translate a quotation contained in a sentence that is being translated into another language. That is, the argument takes it for granted that if $S$ and $S_1$ quote different expressions then, because quoted expressions are not subject to translation, $S$ cannot be a translation of $S_1$.

Against this, however, it is sometimes maintained that translations of fiction (including the Gospels) and historical narrative translate even directly quoted dialogue. We might note that it would seem rather perverse, for example, for the Daily Telegraph to report for English readers what Helmut Kohl said in the Bundestag by quoting his words in German. Moreover, it is sometimes thought to be allowable, while making certain translations, to substitute a quoted expression for a non-equivalent one. Dummett (1973, p. 372) cites an example occurring in Austin's translation of Frege's Grundlagen where the sentence 'Der Begriff "Silbe des Wortes Zahl" hebt das Wort als ein Ganzes...heraus' is translated as 'The concept "syllables in the word three" picks out the word as a whole', for the simple reason that the English word 'number' has two syllables.

It is not perfectly clear, though, that this line
of objection is conclusive. It is true that we do often translate directly quoted dialogue. But might it not be that in doing so we are not making correct translations but are merely being guided by pragmatic considerations that would have monolingual readers understand the resultant sentences? An argument in favour of this view is presented at the end of Chapter XIII. As for the example taken from Austin, Dummett seems to take it for granted that it is a translation. I can only say that it is far from obvious to me that the passage is really a translation rather than the best practicable approximation in the circumstances.

Nevertheless, even if these objections were conclusive I doubt that an advocate of The Translation Argument need feel greatly perturbed. The problems can surely be circumvented by slightly altering Objection (i). What could be argued is that, although (4) is plausibly a translation of (2), it is not strictly synonymous with (2) since (4) mentions the sentence 'der Mond ist rund', whereas (2) mentions the sentence 'the moon is round'. But given that (1) and (3) are strictly synonymous, the analysans of (1) ought to be strictly synonymous with the analysans of (3). Since this is not so, (2) is not the analysans of (1). Of course, this argument presumes a satisfactory notion of synonymity. But if there is an objection to this, it is certainly not the objection supplied by Dummett and Co.

Objection (ii) There is a more obvious and better objection to Thesis I. That the thesis is implausible becomes clear when we consider extending the now familiar analysis to 'A believes that the moon is round'. The
analysans now becomes 'A believes 'The moon is round''.
But if A is a monolingual speaker of German, we can hardly
insist that he believes a sentence ('The moon is round')
which he does not even understand. Among other difficulties,
to do so would be to imply that no monolingual speaker of
German understands what he believes. The force of this
objection, incidentally, does not rely upon a satisfactory
notion of synonymity being found. (A modification of
Thesis I which avoids this objection will be considered
later).

Objection (iii) Another objection sometimes
raised is that 'A asserted 'The moon is round'' cannot be
the analysans of 'A asserted that the moon is round'
because there could be a language in which the sentence
'The moon is round', i.e., what A supposedly asserted,
has a different meaning to what it has in English.

P.T. Geach (1957) suggests that a problem with this
objection is that it falsely presupposes that the sentence
'The moon is round' can belong to two different languages.
According to Geach (Pp 86-7), the Polish word 'ja'
(meaning 'I') and the German word 'ja' (meaning 'yes') are
simply different words. In the same way, Geach (Pp 88-9)
holds, an expression equiform to the English expression
'The moon is round' but different in meaning, would just be
a different expression.

But if we suppose that Geach is right on this, it
would not be certain when A asserts 'The moon is round'
that A is asserting a sentence belonging to English. On
Geach's view, there is no need to explicitly mention that
A asserted an English sentence unless "one's hearer were
likely not to know that the quotation "[The moon is round]" is a quotation of the English expression; in practice it is not necessary" (p.89). But this only seems to sweep the problem under the carpet. We do not need to explicitly mention that the sentence A supposedly asserted is an English sentence only if we already know that it is an English sentence. In practice this is something that we simply assume. But assumption is not knowledge. (2) simply does not state that A asserted an English sentence. Yet if, as is therefore possible, the sentence quoted in (2) is not an English sentence then (2) could be true although (1) is false. (2), therefore, is not the analysans of (1).

Another criticism of Objection (iii) comes from Robin Haack (1973, Pp 302-3). According to Haack, if we suppose that A's words ('The moon is round') did mean something different from what they mean in English, then it is false to suppose that (1) tells us the meaning of A's words. To the extent that there is doubt about what A's words mean from (2) this doubt is equally present in (1). Objection (iii) assumes, Haack holds, that it would not be false to report what A asserted by (1) even in the circumstance when A's words mean something different from what they mean in English. Yet in such a circumstance the claim that (1) accurately reports the meaning of A's words is ruled out.

This argument seems to be misbegotten. Haack is simply wrong in saying that advocates of Objection (iii) are in the position of denying that if A's words mean something different from what they mean in English then (1)
is false. What they would argue, I suggest, is that if (2) is true then A’s words could mean something different from what they mean in English. But if (2) is true then ex hypothesis (1) must be true. Yet (2) can be true although (1) is false, i.e., when A’s words mean something different from what they mean in English. Therefore, (2) is not the analysans of (1). This argument accepts—in fact it depends upon—the claim that if A’s words (the words allegedly asserted by A) mean something different from what they mean in English then (1) is false.

In an attempt to circumvent Objection (iii) a second thesis has been proposed.

Thesis II. The analysan of (1) is

(5) A asserted in English 'The moon is round'.

So far as I can see, Thesis II avoids the difficulty raised by the previous objection, but it is not without its critics.

Objection (i). An objection has been proposed by Stephen Leeds (1979). Leeds puts his argument (with minor modifications) as follows:

If sentences (1) and (5) were synonymous, it would not be possible for a monolingual speaker of English who understood both sentences to sincerely affirm (1) but deny or doubt (5). But exactly this is possible: so long as the speaker does not know that the language he himself speaks is called 'English', he may affirm (1) but have no reason to believe (5). So (1) and (5) are not synonymous. One cannot reply to this

1. (5) is usually taken to be equivalent to 'A asserted 'The moon is round' as it is used in English' or 'A asserted 'The moon is round' in its English sense'.
argument by claiming that such a speaker would not understand the word 'English', and so would not understand (5); on the contrary, a monolingual speaker of English might have learned the word 'English' as you and I have learned the word 'Finnish' — e.g., by reading a very general description of what the language is like, where it is used, etc. So long as the description is not too detailed, our English speaker need not be aware that it refers to the very language he himself uses — he will then be able to understand (5) without seeing it as following from (1). (p.46)

The underlying principle of this argument, as Leeds himself states, is that if two sentences are synonymous then A cannot understand them both and believe one but not the other. However, this principle is not as obvious as Leeds seems to think. Understanding can be at different levels: a given person can understand one sentence better than he understands another. But if we admit this, there seems no reason to suppose that if A has only a partial understanding of (1) but a clearer understanding of (5) then it cannot be the case that A believes (1) but not (5), even though (1) and (5) are synonymous. In like manner, A might have a partial understanding of (A) 'Jones has diabetes' — he might know that if this sentence is true then Jones has a natural deficiency of insulin — and A might have a clearer understanding of (B) 'Jones has a pancreatic condition which causes a natural deficiency of insulin'. In these circumstances, A might believe (A) but not (B). Yet it surely seems that (B) is a satisfactory analysans of (A).

Of course, it might be replied that if A has a complete understanding of both (1) and (5) then, if (1) and (5) are synonymous, A cannot believe (1) but not (5).
But Leeds has certainly not shown this. And even if it
could be shown, it would, as a corollary, need to be demon-
strated that it is not possible for A to simply have incoher-
ent beliefs concerning (1) and (5). It might also be remarked
that Leeds' argument presumes that an analysans must be
synonymous with its analysandum, but this is certainly a
moot point.

Objection (ii) Another objection becomes clear if,
in keeping with the present analysis, we analyze (A) 'A
believes that the moon is round' as (B) 'A believes 'The
moon is round' in English'. On this proposal, to suppose
that (B) is true is to suppose that A believes a certain
sentence belonging to the English Language. But is this to
say that if (B) is true then A attributes to this sentence
the sense it has in English? An affirmative answer would
hardly seem tenable, for it would suggest that (A) cannot
be true, i.e., that A cannot believe the moon is round,
unless he has some acquaintance with the English Language.
On the other hand, if A does not attribute to 'The moon is
round' its English sense, he may attribute to it some other
sense. If A has a confused use of the English language,
he may, for example, attribute to 'The moon is round' the
sense that 'The moon is made of cheese' has in English.
However, in such a circumstance, we surely would not infer
that A believes that the moon is round.

It would do no good to object that if A attributes
to 'The moon is round' a sense it does not bear in English
then A does not believe an English sentence. The answer
to this is that 'The moon is round' is an English sentence
- it has a sense attributed to it by English usage -
irrespective of whatever sense A bestows upon it.
There is also no use in supposing that Objection (ii) can be avoided by altering (B) to 'A believes a sentence whose meaning as attributed to it by A is the same as 'The moon is round' in English'. For consider the case of Freddy the schoolboy who is told by his schoolmaster that the Lyman-alpha line has a wavelength of 1,215 angstroms. Unfortunately Freddy has some difficulty understanding physics, and his teacher, being a member of the N.S.W. Teachers' Federation, is more adept at bullying and bludging than teaching children. As a result, Freddy does not understand what he is told. Despite his lack of understanding, it is still quite conceivable that Freddy, if he puts enough stock in the credibility of his schoolmaster, believes that what his teacher tells him is true. In such a case, Freddy could (and ought to) decline to attribute a sense to the sentence he purportedly believes in believing that the Lyman-alpha line has a wavelength of 1,215 angstroms. In fact, if he did try to attribute a sense to the sentence, he could (and we might expect that he would) attribute to it a sense quite different to the sense that 'The Lyman-alpha line has a wavelength of 1,215 angstroms' has in English.

Objection (iii) We have noted the objection raised by Dummett and others to the original formulation of The Translation Argument that translation is not dependent upon the presence of strict synonymity. Even although (4) is not strictly synonymous with (2), it can still be plausibly said that (4) is a translation of (2). However, this kind of manoeuvre is of no advantage to advocates of Thesis II. For if we now analyze (3) in like manner to (1), the analysans we get is
But although (3) is plausibly a translation of (1), (5) is not (by even the loosest extensional standards) a translation of (6). This is because the correct translation of (5) is given by translating 'English' as 'Englisch', not as 'Deutsch'. And once the word 'English' has been so translated, we cannot then translate under the quotes, i.e., we cannot translate 'The moon is round' in (5), for the result would be a palpably false sentence. This is a standard but, I think, effective objection. Moreover, it avoids making any reference to the notion of synonymity.

It may also be pointed out that Thesis II is subject to Objection (ii) to Thesis I. However, a third thesis aimed at avoiding this particular objection has been proposed.

**Thesis III.** The analysans of (1) is

(7) A asserted a sentence which means what 'The moon is round' means in English.1

**Objection** That Thesis III is unsatisfactory is apparent if we again turn to the case of belief. By parity of reasoning we ought to say that (A) 'A believes that all bachelors wear grey ties' is to be analyzed as (B) 'A believes a sentence which means what 'All bachelors wear grey ties' means in English'. Now, it is surely to be admitted

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1. Obviously there can be a number of variants here. For example, 'A asserted a sentence whose translation from some language S, into English is 'The moon is round' or 'A asserted a sentence which is intensionally isomorphic to the English sentence 'The moon is round''.
that if anything has the same meaning as 'All bachelors wear grey ties' then it is 'All unmarried men wear grey ties'. The problem is that if they do have the same meaning, and A believes 'All unmarried men wear grey ties' in English, then A believes a sentence which means what 'All bachelors wear grey ties' means in English. But it certainly does not follow that A believes that all bachelors wear grey ties. A might simply not believe that unmarried men are bachelors. In fact, he might positively disbelieve it. Thus (B) may be true, though (A) is not. (B), therefore, is not the analysans of (A).

A Carnapian might hold that this objection does not work where the requirement is that A believe a sentence that is intensionally isomorphic to 'All bachelors wear grey ties' in English. 'All bachelors wear grey ties' is not intensionally isomorphic to 'All unmarried men wear grey ties'. (The formal definition of 'intensional isomorphism' is very technical, but a concise account by Carnap (1954; p.130) is that two expressions are intensionally isomorphic if they are "constructed in the same way out of signs with the same intensions".)

However, a not entirely dissimilar problem may emerge where there are two sentences, $S$ and $S_1$, that are intensionally isomorphic to 'All bachelors wear grey ties' in English. A might believe $S$ but, not realizing that $S$ entails $S_1$ let alone that both sentences are intensionally isomorphic, he might disbelieve $S_1$. On the present analysis, we ought to conclude that A both believes and disbelieves that all bachelors wear grey ties. But although A may lack a sound appreciation of the entailment relationship between
S and $s_1$ — perhaps S and $s_1$ belong to a language with which A is not well acquainted — it seems unduly harsh to conclude that A must have incoherent views about the attire of bachelors. If we attempt to get around this difficulty by making it a condition of A's believing that all bachelors wear grey ties that he not disbelieve any sentence that is intensionally isomorphic to 'All bachelors wear grey ties' in English, then we give up any pretense of providing an analysis of A's belief. At best, we would have a sufficient, not a necessary, condition of A's belief. After all, A may believe that all bachelors wear grey ties even though he imprudently disbelieves $s_1$.

It is worthwhile noting that Objection (iii) to Thesis II is also applicable to Thesis III. We might try to avoid this particular objection by substituting 'in this language' for 'in English' in (7). But this manœuvre does not escape the above objection to Thesis III. 'A asserted 'The moon is round' in this language' does escape the objection but is too restrictive. Where 'in this language' has an implicit reference to English, 'A asserted 'The moon is round' in this language' entails that A asserted an English sentence. But, once again, we would not be taking into account monolingual speakers of non-English languages.

**Thesis IV.** In relatively recent times some philosophers have argued that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are not sentences of the kind that we write or utter but sentences in the mind (or brain) — what Daniel Dennett (1982) and others have dubbed 'sentences of
Mentalese'.

One philosopher who has pursued this line of thought is Jerry Fodor (1978). According to Fodor:

Propositional attitudes should be analyzed as relations. In particular, the verb in a sentence like 'John believes it's raining' expresses a relation between John and something else, and a token of that sentence is true iff John stands in the belief-relation to that thing. (p.502)

And to what kind of thing is John related? Fodor tells us that "propositional attitudes are relations between organisms and formulae in an internal language; between organisms and internal sentences, as it were" (p.508). "The [recommendation] is...to take the objects of PAs [propositional attitudes] to be sentences of a non-natural language; in effect, formulae in an Internal Representational System" (p.514).

For Fodor internal sentences are prior to natural languages such as English and German:

On any theory of language learning we can now imagine that process must involve the collection of data, the formulation of hypotheses, the checking of the hypotheses against the data, and the decision about which of the hypotheses the data best confirm. That is, it must involve such mental states and processes as beliefs, expectation and perceptual integration. It's important to realize that no account of language learning which does not thus involve propositional attitudes and mental processes has ever been proposed by anyone, barring only behaviourists. And behaviourist accounts of learning are, surely, not tenable. So,

1. Actually the notion of a mental sentence is far from new. William of Ockham, for example, seems to have had such a notion in mind when he held that the propositionale mentalis consists of categorematic and syncategorematic mental terms integrated in a certain way. For Ockham a mental term does not belong to any particular language, e.g., Greek or Latin, but belongs to the main operations of the human mind. cf. Nuchelmans (1973; Pp 195-202).
on pain of circularity, there must be some propositional attitudes which are not functional/causal relations to natural language sentences. (p.514)

This would suggest that Fodor holds that the internal language is not learned but is innate. In fact, Fodor specifically uses the word 'innate' to describe it.

Fodor also proposes that the internal language is "as universal as human psychology; viz., that to the extent that an organism shares our mental processes, it also shares our system of internal representations" (p.517). Hence, on this view, there is not an internal language for monolingual speakers of German and another for monolingual speakers of English. Rather, the same internal language is common to all human cognitive psychology; and to the extent that infra-human organisms share our cognitive psychology, it is common to them. This allows for the possibility of attributing beliefs to organisms lacking natural language skills. Fodor maintains that much of animal behaviour cannot be explained unless we are prepared to make such attributions.

In relation to beliefs, at any rate, Fodor holds that there are three pieces in play: (a) belief-ascribers (like 'John believes it's raining'); (b) complements of belief-ascribers (like 'it's raining' in 'John believes it's raining'); and (c) correspondents of belief-ascribers (like 'it's raining' standing free). All three converge on the same internal formula, which we call 'F (it's raining)'.

The general idea is this. Belief-ascribers are true in virtue of functional/causal (belief-making)
relations between organisms and tokens of internal formulae. Thus, 'John believes it's raining' is true in virtue of a belief-making relation between John and a token of F (it's raining).

The complement of a belief-ascriber determines which internal formula is involved in its truth conditions; in effect 'it's raining' in 'John believes it's raining' functions as an index which picks out F (it's raining) and not, say F (elephants have wings) as the internal formula that John is related to iff 'John believes it's raining' is true.

So, says Fodor, viewed along one vector, the complement of a belief-ascriber connects it with an internal formula. But, viewed along another vector, the complement of a belief-ascriber connects it to its correspondent: the correspondent of 'John believes it's raining' is 'it's raining' because the form of words 'it's raining' constitutes its complement. And we can now close the circle, since F (it's raining) is also semantically connected with the correspondent of 'John believes it's raining', i.e., by the principle that 'it's raining' is the sentence that English speakers use when they are in the belief-making relation to a token of F (it's raining) and wish to use an English sentence to express what they believe. (p.315).

Fodor makes no real mention of sentences of indirect discourse such as 'John asserted it's raining'. However, the fact that we are given no analysis of such
sentences is not due merely to Fodor's concentration on the propositional attitudes. For equally Fodor does not suggest an analysis of 'John believes it's raining'. What Fodor proposes he has given us is "a piece of empirical psychology, not an analysis" (p.520). In fact, we are told that we ought to give up asking for analyses because psychology is all the philosophy of mind that we are likely to get. All the same, it seems that Fodor holds (or is committed to holding) that 'John believes it's raining' is true if and only if John believes F (it's raining). For if, as Fodor maintains, 'believes' in 'John believes it's raining' expresses a relation between John and F (it's raining) then 'John' and 'it's raining' are terms which name or denote John and F (it's raining) respectively. But, then, 'John believes it's raining' is true if and only if John believes (rather than, say, believes-true) what is named or denoted by 'it's raining', i.e., F (it's raining).

I think it may be admitted that there are certain advantages to Fodor's theory. For one thing, Fodor eschews the thesis that if 'John believes it's raining' is true then John believes an English sentence. Consequently, his theory avoids at least one prominent version of The Translation Argument. In fact, it is difficult to see how any version of the argument applies. Moreover, it is clear that Fodor's theory is not bothered by the claim that certain organisms possessing no competence with regard to natural language, e.g., dogs, may have beliefs.

There is one (perhaps obvious) objection which Fodor has to handle, though I think this can be done. The problem can be put this way. It seems that when Stacy and
Shirley both believe, for example, that the moon is round, we may say that they both believe the same thing. But if what Stacy and Shirley each believes is a sentence in his/her mind (or brain), then how can they both be said to believe the same thing?

However, what I think Fodor could do is to distinguish between sentence types and sentence tokens, and hold that whenever someone has a belief he believes a mental token of a sentence type (the sentence type would be classified as abstract, not mental). It could then be said that Stacy and Shirley believe the same thing in that they both believe a mental token of the same sentence type.

This is, of course, only the scenario of an answer, but it seems to indicate a possible way out for Fodor.

All the same, Fodor's theory can only be viewed as a relative improvement on its predecessors. As Fodor has it, 'John believes it's raining' is true if and only if John believes F (it's raining). But Fodor also holds that "the correspondent of a belief-inscriber inherits its logico-semantic properties from the same internal formula which functions as the object of the belief ascribed" (p.515). This seems to imply that the internal formulae have sense, or something closely related to sense. A problem that arises, though, is that if John has a confused use of the internal language, he might attribute to F (it's raining) a sense quite different to what it has in the internal language we are all purported to share. He might, for example, attribute to it the sense possessed by F (it's not raining). In such a case, however, it would hardly seem plausible to insist that if John believes F
(it's raining) then he believes that it's raining. Still, Fodor claims to be giving us a piece of empirical psychology. ¹ So perhaps it could be replied that although it is conceivable for John to attribute the wrong sense to F (it's raining), as a matter of empirical fact this kind of thing just does not happen.

But it is far from clear that Fodor's theory looks healthy even as empirical psychology. Certainly there are times when we misconstrue or confuse the sense of sentences of spoken or written languages, e.g., English, German, or Greek. Children do this and so do adults. But then what reason is there for supposing that this is not equally true of any internal language? Would not even an internal language have to be learned? If this is so, however, some misconstruals of sense are not only possible, but bound to occur.

It might seem that this is ruled out by Fodor's claim that the internal language is "innate" - Fodor claims this because he thinks that an innate language is necessary in order to mediate the learning of spoken or written languages. But there are different senses in which a language may be said to be innate. Suppose that John really is born with sentences in his mind (or brain), but without any a priori knowledge of, or a priori knowledge as how to determine, the sense of these sentences. The sentences in question may still belong to an internal language, i.e., they may still be tokens of sentences of an internal language, used meaningfully by the rest of

¹. This would prompt some philosophers to reply that Fodor has stepped outside the domain of philosophy.
us. In such a case there seems to be a sense in which John may be said to have an innate internal language. Yet Fodor should be prepared to acknowledge that in such a case John has to learn the internal language that we are said to share in that he has to learn, or learn how to determine, the sense of sentences in that language. It could hardly then be denied that some misconstruals of sense are bound to occur. On the other hand, if we are to say that the internal language is innate in that we all have a priori knowledge of, or a priori knowledge as to how to determine, the sense of each sentence in the language, then the thesis stretches credibility a bit too far. It is palpably false that we are born with such knowledge.

To be sure, Fodor also holds that

"it's raining" is the sentence that English speakers use when they are in the belief-making relation to a token of F (it's raining) and wish to use a sentence of English to say what it is that they believe. (p.515)

So might it not be argued that if John believes F (it's raining), but attributes to it a deviant sense, then he simply would not use 'it's raining' to say what he believes? But if John would not use 'it's raining' for this purpose, then he simply fails to satisfy Fodor's stated conditions of believing it's raining, and hence it is no objection to point out that John does not believe it's raining.

But there really is no reason to presume that if John attributes a deviant sense to F (it's raining) then he would not use 'it's raining' to express what he believes. John might attribute to 'it's raining' a deviant sense that parallels his attribution of sense to F (it's raining). In such a case, there would be no reason to suppose that
John would not use 'it's raining' to express his belief that it is not raining just as much as would someone who is adept at English use 'it's not raining' to express his belief that it is not raining. It is no use objecting that if John does not attribute to 'it's raining' the sense it has in English, then John is not a speaker of English. Speakers of English need not know the sense of every sentence in the English language.

It seems, then, that we cannot conclude that if John believes $F$ (it's raining), and is a speaker of English who uses 'it's raining' to express his belief, then John believes it's raining. Certainly this does not show that whenever we believe that it is raining, we do not believe a mental sentence. Nevertheless, I think that this conclusion can be reached. The case of Freddy the schoolboy demonstrates that the common assumption that we must understand what we believe is fallacious. All the same, we do seem to be warranted in maintaining that what we believe is capable of being understood. Otherwise we should have to falsely suppose that we can never understand what we believe.

Further, we may draw a distinction between a sentence with extra-syntactical characteristics and a sentence simpliciter. A sentence with extra-syntactical characteristics has such characteristics as semantic properties, causal relationships to behaviour and/or mental states, or perhaps an inferential role within its own surrounding conceptual framework. A sentence simpliciter lacks such characteristics. However, in the case of sentences lacking extra-syntactical characteristics of this sort it is difficult to see how there can be anything to understand. Such sentences would have no
truth conditions, reference, sense, causal relationships, or inferential role to be understood. How, then, can we believe such sentences if they leave us with nothing that is capable of being understood? On the other hand, in the case of a sentence, S, that has the appropriate extra-syntactical characteristics there does appear to be something that can be understood. We can understand the truth conditions, reference, sense, causal relationships, etc., of S, or, what is perhaps not quite the same thing, that S has certain truth conditions, a certain reference, a certain sense, certain causal relationships, etc. However, in such a case what we understand is something that concerns S rather than S itself. Consequently if A believes the sentence S, then what A believes is incapable of being understood by him. But what we believe is capable of being understood. Therefore A does not believe S. This would seem to show that what we believe are simply not sentences, whether sentences are construed as having extra-syntactical characteristics or not. The argument, incidentally, appears to constitute a general objection to supposing that what we believe are sentences, not just an objection to the view that we believe mental sentences.

2. We might expect to avoid some of the aforementioned objections — perhaps all of them, if we are unduly optimistic — by giving up the claim that declarative sentences are what we believe, doubt, assert, etc., while continuing to hold that such sentences are intentional objects. One way of doing this is to maintain that declarative sentences are what we believe-true, doubt-true, assert-true, and so
On this view, the verb 'asserted' in a sentence such as 'A asserted that the moon is round' does not express a relation of asserting between A and a certain sentence, but expresses a relation of asserting-true (or saying-true) between A and a certain sentence.

In Word and Object (1960, Pp 211-16), Quine makes an attempt to explore this proposal. One suggestion he considers is that we take

(8) A asserted-true 'The moon is round'

as the analysans of (1). The two-place predicate 'asserted-true', we are informed, is not to be confused with the 'asserted' of direct quotation: (2), as with (1), does not tell us that A asserted the words 'The moon is round'.

Moreover, taking sentences as intentional objects in this way does not require the subject to speak the language of the quoted sentence. The advantages of this are clear. For one thing, it allows us to accommodate monolingual speakers of non-English sentences. But also we can extend the analysis so as to include dumb beasts as believing, doubting,

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1. Those who hold that sentences are what we believe-true, and so on, do, I think, wish to maintain that sentences are intentional objects. Quine (1960, p.213) held that to take sentences as what we believe-true, say-true, etc. is to take them as 'objects of the propositional attitudes'. (Quine, though, did not go on to accept that we do in fact believe-true sentences.) Also, Scheffler (1963, Pp 88-110) repeatedly refers to what we believe-true as objects of belief, although for Scheffler these objects are inscriptions rather than sentences. But objects of the propositional attitudes, including objects of belief, are intentional objects.

2. This seems to show that Quine does not intend 'A asserts S' and 'A asserts-true S' (where 'S' names a sentence) to be equivalent. Presumably, 'A believes S' and 'A believes-true S' are also not to be taken as equivalent.
and desiring agents without supposing that the agents comprehend the quoted sentence or any other.

All the same, Quine is not enthusiastic about the analysans. For, as he suggests, the sentence 'The moon is round' may conceivably belong to another language and possess a sense other than we require. (See Objection (iii) to Thesis I.) So we might propose, following now familiar reasoning, that the analysans of (1) is

(9) A asserted-true in English 'The moon is round'.

Quine notes a version of The Translation Argument which runs against this proposal. According to this objection, a German translation of (9) reads as

'(10) A hat gesagt wahr auf Englisch
'The moon is round'.

Yet a German ignorant of English will not get from (10) the information about A that he would get from a full translation of (1). Since (10) reproduces the meaning of (9), (9) must miss that of (1). However, Quine (p.214) finds this argument unconvincing because it turns on a notion of which he takes a dim view: the notion of sameness of meaning (or synonymy).

Undoubtedly, the argument Quine mentions does appeal to the notion of sameness of meaning, and Quine may well be justified in rejecting such a notion. Nevertheless, I do not think that the notion is one upon which The Translation Argument need rely. It is certainly not mentioned by Objection (iii) to Thesis II. The same stringency can be exercised here. If we are to take (9) as the analysans of (1), then in like manner we should take

(11) A hat gesagt wahr auf Deutsch „der Mond ist rund“
as the analysans of (3) 'A hat gesagt, dass der Mond rund ist'.

But although (3) is a translation of (1), (10), not (11), is a translation of (9). In fact, (11) and (3) are so far removed as translations of each other that they do not even refer to the same sentences. Yet we would at least expect that the analysans of (3) refers to the same things as the analysans of (1). This argument relies upon certain facts about translation, but it certainly does not make any reference to the notion of synonymy. There would be no use replying that although the argument does not make any reference to the notion, it still relies upon it because translation requires synonymy. If this really were the case, it would follow that, since we do in fact make translations, the notion of synonymy is intelligible after all. But, then, we could hardly object to The Translation Argument on the basis of misgivings about synonymy.

But Quine has doubts about (9) anyway because of its 'dependence on the notion of a language'. Questions such as 'What are languages?' and 'When do they count as identical or distinct?' should, Quine (p.214) holds, be unconnected with the propositional attitudes. This prompts Quine to suggest

(12) A asserted-true 'The moon is round' in my sense

as the analysans of (1). By treating 'asserted-true' as a triadic relative term relating a man, a linguistic form, and a man any worry created by previous reference to a particular language is removed. Interestingly, Quine does not adopt this proposal though he makes no objection to it. The proposal he does adopt is quite different and will be
Donald Davidson (1968, p.167) suggests that (12) may be paraphrased as

(13) A uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what 'The moon is round' means now in mine.

According to Davidson (p.168-9), the idea underlying this paraphrase is that of samesaying: when I say that A asserted that the moon is round, I represent A and myself as samesayers. But, Davidson holds, the proposal suffers from this flaw. If I merely say that A and I are samesayers, I have yet to make us so. I can do this by saying what he said: by using words the same in import as λ's. Yet this is precisely what (13) precludes for it seals the content-sentence (i.e., the words 'The moon is round') in quotation marks, and on any standard theory of quotation this means that it is mentioned and not used.¹

But this is not the only objection against taking (12) as the analysans of (1). (12) names a sentence by quoting it. But if (1) is the analysandum of (12) then (1) must name the same sentence. So which part of (1) is the naming expression? If 'that the moon is round' names the sentence, it follows that (1) affirms that A asserted a sentence. For if the expression 'that the moon is round' names anything at all in (1), then (1) affirms that

¹. However, Davidson has not had the last word on this. His objection has recently been criticized by John McDowell (1980), although McDowell thinks that the quotational approach as represented by (12) proves to be unsatisfactory anyway. I shall not buy into the Davidson-McDowell dispute here as a proper evaluation of the issues involved would unnecessarily take us far afield. But I do make an attempt to critically evaluate Davidson's paratactic account of samesaying in Chapter VII.
A asserted what is named by that expression: in this case, a sentence. We could not, then, analyze (1) in a manner that affirms that A asserted-true, but did not assert, a sentence. The alternative for the 'asserted-true' analyst seems to be to say (rather neatly) that the words 'The moon is round' in (1) name the sentence 'The moon is round'. On this view, 'asserted that' is a two-place predicate in (1) which expresses a relation of asserting-true between A and 'The moon is round' in my sense.

A problem with this is that if we know the sense of (1) then we can infer that if (1) is true then A asserted that the moon is round. However, if we know the sense of (12) we cannot infer that if (12) is true then A asserted that the moon is round unless we also know the sense of 'The moon is round'. But (12) does not tell us this. Rather it affirms that 'The moon is round' has a sense, my sense, but it does not specify what that sense happens to be. What sense is my sense? Certainly this is not an obstacle to understanding the sense of (12). We can know the sense of (12) even if we do not know the sense of 'The moon is round'. But if (12) is the analysans of (1) then we should be able, once we know the sense of both these sentences, to infer the same things from each sentence. Since this cannot be done without additional information as to the sense of 'The moon is round', (12) is not the analysans of (1).

That the notions of asserting-true, believing-true, etc., are even cogent is also doubtful. (12) 'A asserted-true 'The moon is round' in my sense' entails that what A asserted-true is 'The moon is round' in my sense. But what
we may ask is whether what A asserted-true is the same as what A asserted or not. If it is, then to assert-true 'The moon is round' in my sense is to assert 'The moon is round' in my sense. That is, (12) would be equivalent to

(14) A asserted 'The moon is round'
in my sense,

and would thus unacceptably suppose that what we assert are sentences. This supposition is precisely what (12) was designed to avoid. If, on the other hand, what A asserted-true is not what A asserted then (12) does not give us an account of what A asserted. Consequently in holding that A asserted-true 'The moon is round' in my sense we are doing absolutely nothing to rule out the thesis that what we assert are proposition-entities. A supporter of analyses like (12) could quite consistently maintain what whenever A believes or asserts that the moon is round, A believes or asserts a proposition-entity as well as believing-true or asserting-true a sentence which expresses that proposition.

This problem is particularly apparent in Quine and Ullian’s *The Web of Belief* (1978). According to Quine and Ullian (Pp 11-12), the criterion for saying that someone believes-true a sentence is for most purposes the obvious one: he or she assents to the sentence when asked. But it seems fairly clear that there is no inconsistency in holding that whenever A believes a proposition-entity, A assents to a certain sentence when asked. Consequently, the 'believes-true' theorist can hardly say that by introducing the notion of believing-true a commitment to proposition-entities has been avoided.

None of this should be taken as suggesting that
if a person has a belief then he is not related to a sentence. Rather, I endorse the view expressed by A.N. Prior (1971) that:

Whoever fears or thinks that there will be a nuclear war, although he does not fear the sentence 'There will be a nuclear war', does stand in a relation to this sentence, since he fears that something is the case which could be asserted by uttering this sentence. But his fear does not consist in this relation to this sentence. (p. 15)

The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other propositional attitudes and acts of asserting or stating. Furthermore, it is an error to suppose that if a person who has a belief stands in a certain relation, which is other than a relation of believing, to a particular sentence then there is no need to hold that what we believe is a proposition-entity. This point also applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other propositional attitudes.

Throughout this chapter I have put forward a number of objections to two senses in which declarative sentences have been construed as objects of the attitudes or speech acts. In the first sense, declarative sentences are said to be what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc. In the second sense, they are what we believe-true, doubt-true, desire-true, assert-true, etc. On the first view, the that-clause in 'A believes that the moon is round' names or denotes a sentence which is purportedly believed by A. Similarly, 'something' in 'Stacy believes something' and 'some of the things' in 'Stacy believes some of the things that Smith believes' are taken to be referential expressions that refer to unspecified declarative sentences. The same position is adhered to by those who maintain that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., are proposition-entities, with the
difference being that it is held that the reference is to propositions. It is precisely this view, the view that takes these expressions to be referential, that I argue against in Chapter XIII. Throughout this Chapter I have stated some particular criticisms of the thesis that what we believe, etc., are declarative sentences. But if I am right that this thesis falls down because it lies essentially in the same perspective as the thesis that proposition-entities are what we believe then we seem to have an objection that is threaded right through the particular criticisms that have been raised.

Still, we have the proposal that declarative sentences are what we believe-true, and so on. On one side of things, this view does not take the that-clause to name or denote a declarative sentence in 'A believes that the moon is round'. Similarly, on one side of things, it does not take 'something' in 'Stacy believes something' or 'some of the things' in 'Stacy believes some of the things that Smith believes' to be referential. If, for example, 'some of the things' really is referential, and refers to unspecified declarative sentences, then 'Stacy believes some of the things that Smith believes' affirms that Stacy and Smith believe the things referred to, i.e., declarative sentences. But advocates of the believes-true theory want to say that although we believe-true, we do not believe, declarative sentences. Otherwise they have not provided an alternative theory at all. On their position, 'Stacy believes some of the things that Smith believes' may be read as '(3p) (Stacy believes-true p. Smith believes-true p)', where this reading is to be interpreted objectually. (See Chapter VI for an account of the
objectual interpretation.) But if in the paraphrase 'p' is to be understood as taking as its values entities such as sentences or propositions then the sentence that is paraphrased must contain a reference to some believed-true object. Apart, though, from 'Stacy' and 'Smith' the only expression capable of referring to anything in this sentence is 'some of the things'. But if this expression is referential then our paraphrase should be '(3p) (Stacy believes p. Smith believes p)' , where this is interpreted objectually, which for the believes-true theorist is unacceptable. The problem seems to be that the believes-true theorist attempts to get outside the perspective that supposes that what we believe are declarative sentences, and this is laudable, but by retaining the doctrine that declarative sentences are intentional objects he forces himself back into the very perspective that he repudiates.

Even although both versions of the sentential theory are, in my opinion, untenable, it is understandable that some philosophers have come to hold that sentences are objects of the attitudes. As already mentioned, construing sentences as objects of the attitudes has the advantage of philosophical parsimony in that it avoids taking these objects to be additional to sentences. Another advantage, which I think helps to explain both its generation and subsequent growth in acceptance, is its ability to account for the well-known invalidity of such arguments as

(i) Stacy believes that the Queen is married
(ii) the Queen = the Head of the Church of England
(iii) Therefore, Stacy believes that the Head of the Church of England is married.
According to the sentential theory, this argument may be rewritten as

(iv) Stacy believes 'The Queen is married'
in English
(v) The Queen = the Head of the Church of England
(vi) Therefore, Stacy believes 'The Head of the Church of England is married' in English,
or some variation of this. On standard theories of quotation, the quotation "'The Queen is married'" in (iv) names a sentence, and the parts contained within the quotation do not have their usual semantic role. For example, 'the Queen' no more refers to the Queen in "'The Queen is married'" than does 'duke' refer to a duke in 'Marmaduke'. If the parts of a quoted sentence did have their usual semantic role, e.g., reference, then we would have to suppose that (iv) affirms some thing about the Queen since it contains a quoted sentence of which 'the Queen' forms a part. But this does not appear to be correct. Consequently 'the Queen' in (iv) cannot be substituted for any other expression, such as 'the Head of the Church of England', on the basis of coreference; and thus we are able to explain the invalidity of inferring from (iv) and (v) to (vi). The explanation is extended to the first argument by taking 'the Queen' in (i) and 'the Head of the Church of England' in (iii) to each form part of an expression that names a sentence, thereby lacking their usual reference.

To be sure, this advantage as claimed for the sentential theory depends upon a certain view of quotation, which is perhaps not unquestionable. However, if this view is correct then it seems that the sentential theory is also
saddled with a quite unacceptable consequence. As Donald Davidson has pointed out, the truth conditions of each sentence in a language depends upon the systematic contribution of the meanings of its parts. Thus the truth conditions of 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' depends upon each of its parts as 'the Queen', 'is' and 'married' having their usual sense. If this were not the case then we would not be able to give the truth conditions of every sentence, for an infinite number of sentences fill in the blank in 'Stacy believes that __________'. However, if (i) reduces to (iv) then the parts of (i) cannot have their usual sense, and therefore do not contribute systematically to the truth conditions of (i). This point is more fully explained in Chapter VII, where a fuller account of Davidson's position is given.

It seems, then, that what underlies one of the chief advantages of the sentential theory also underlies one of its major flaws. This flaw, however, did not become widely apparent until the publication of Davidson's semantic theory, which postdates most of the major attempts to defend the sentential theory.
1. Instead of holding that sentences are the objects of the propositional attitudes, we might take inscriptions to be these objects. This would not constitute a radical shift in theory, since inscriptions just are sentences that have been inscribed. In fact, the inscriptive theory is best viewed as having its origins in the sentential theory, for it was largely designed to avoid certain difficulties that beset that theory.

However, as we saw in the Introduction, 'objects of the attitudes' is an ambiguous expression. If we say that inscriptions are objects of the attitudes in that they are what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., then we surely fall into the pitfalls apparent in holding that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are sentences of natural language. Inscriptions, as with sentences of natural language, belong to a specific language, e.g., English, German, or Greek. Yet we cannot maintain that a person who has a belief must believe, say, an English inscription. For if the person has no understanding of English, we would be precluding the possibility that he understands what he believes. On the sentential theory, we can get around this difficulty by supposing that what we believe are sentences of a universal mental language, i.e., sentences in Mentalese (although, in my opinion, this view succumbs to other difficulties). This, though, is not an option available
to the inscriptive theory, since there are no inscriptions of mental sentences. Nevertheless, taking our cue from Section 2 of the previous Chapter, and thus still retaining an affinity with the sentential theory, we can avoid this particular problem by proposing that inscriptions are not what we believe but what we believe-true.

This, in fact, is the position adopted by Israel Scheffler, in The Anatomy of Inquiry (1963). Specifically, Scheffler suggests that a believes-that sentence such as

(1) A believes that the moon is round

may be read as

(2) There is some $x$, such that $x$ is $\text{That (The-moon-is-round)}$ and A believes-true $x$.

(Here the range of the variable '$x$' is restricted to concrete inscriptions, though a broadening of the range to include concrete utterances is conceivable.) Other believes-that sentences can be paraphrased in like manner. Moreover, the same form of analysis is available in the case of doubts-that, desires-that, and fears-that sentences.

According to Scheffler, 'believes-true' functions in (2) as a two-place predicate expressing a relation between an agent, $A$, and all rephrasals of the inscription contained within the parantheses of the predicate-inscription 'That (The-moon-is-round)'. The predicate-inscription denotes all rephrasals of the contained sentence-inscription which is included in the denotation of the predicate as a whole. Thus the existence of a sentence-inscription denoted by the predicate is guaranteed by the existence of the predicate-inscription itself. Sentence-inscriptions are rephrasals of one another if and only if they are replicas of each other (i.e. are spelled exactly alike), have similar language
affiliation (i.e. both are French, both Italian etc.), and lack indicator terms (p.103). Scheffler takes it that 'believes-true' statements are to be understood as "true under just those conditions in which 'believes-that' statements are considered true, no matter what those conditions may be" (p.104). Thus, "when the 'believes-true' relation holds, it need not be expected that the agent produce, be aware of, or even understand the inscription believed-true" (p.104).

As to what constitutes the precise nature of the believes-true relation Scheffler fails to say. But the significance of his proposal remains: the believes-true paraphrases ascribe relations between agents and inscriptions and make no mention whatsoever of propositions. No need, therefore, to construe believes-that sentences such as (1) as ascribing a relation between an agent and a proposition.

But it is not merely that Scheffler considers that proposition-entities are unnecessary additions to ontology. Inscriptions, Scheffler notes, are "physical objects of certain shapes" (p.74) and are "likely already to belong to any ontology associated with inquiry into human conduct" (p.100). There is no ontological extravagance in treating believes-that sentences as ascribing relations between agents and inscriptions, we are told, "since inscriptions must in any event, be acknowledged to exist" (p.101). Thus, Scheffler gives us general reasons for being committed to the existence of inscriptions apart from the fact that his theory has a particular commitment.

The treatment of inscriptions as the objects of the attitudes also satisfies nominalistic strictures. Since inscriptions are physical entities their postulation is
acceptable to nominalists, whereas proposition-entities, on their usual construal as abstract entities, arouse nominalists' suspicions, if not outright hostility. This, in the view of some philosophers, is one of the factors that make the inscriptive theory preferable to the proposition-entity theory.

2. It might seem that one advantage Scheffler's analysis has over its sentential counterparts — with the possible exception of Fodor's theory — is that it is not subject to The Translation Argument. In fact, in an earlier statement of his theory Scheffler (1954) explicitly claimed that he had avoided this objection. Certainly (2) contains no directly quoted sentence, and thus like (1) it is completely translatable into another language. But there is still a version of the Translation Argument that applies. (2) does not quote an English inscription, but it refers to one. Therefore, if (1) is the analysandum of (2), (1) must also refer to an English inscription. However, if we analyze the German translation of (1) along the lines of (2), then the German translation will refer to a German inscription. But unless there is some overriding practical difficulty, we would expect any translation of (1) to refer to the same things as (1).

Nevertheless, Scheffler might be able to avoid this objection if he emended his theory to hold that rephrasals of the contained sentence-inscription denoted by the predicate-inscription do not all belong to one language, i.e., all to French, all to Italian etc. On this view, 'The moon is round' and its German translation 'der Mond ist rund' would be
rephrasals of the one sentence-inscription. However, this would involve a re-definition of the term 'rephrasal', and I have no suggestion as to how Scheffler might work out the details of this.

Another objection looks more decisive. Scheffler maintains that the existence of a sentence-inscription denoted by the predicate-inscription of a believes-true paraphrase is guaranteed by the existence of the predicate-inscription itself. And this, we are informed, would be so even if no rephrasals of the denoted sentence-inscription happen to exist. But there is a special problem for Scheffler in the case of so-called quantified belief sentences such as

(3) Smith believes something that Jones believes.

It would be quite unsatisfactory to attempt a paraphrase of (3) along the lines of

(4) There is some inscription which Smith and Jones both believe-true.

For (4), unlike (2), does not produce an inscription which can serve as an object of belief. That is, (4) does not guarantee the existence of an inscription purported to be believed-true by Smith and Jones. But, then, it would seem to be possible for (3) to be true even though no one has made an inscription (or utterance) of the kind that (4) purports Smith and Jones to believe-true. In other words, it is possible for (3) to be true although there exists no inscription believed-true by both Smith and Jones. In fact, any attempted paraphrase of (3) that produced a sentence-inscription which it reported Smith and Jones as believing-true would only be ill-conceived. This is because on Scheffler's story we would be able to infer from such a paraphrase the
specific content of the belief supposedly shared by Smith and Jones. But it is clear that we cannot infer that much from (3).

To be sure, Scheffler is aware of this (not uncommon) objection. His reply, following Quine, is that quantified belief sentences such as (3) tend to be trivial in what they affirm and can be "given up". Unlike Quine, though, Scheffler does not think it follows that we are entitled to give up all quantifications over belief objects. Rather, it is just that "isolated existential quantifications" like (3) are expendable (1963, Pp 109-10).

This (somewhat concise) retort is hardly satisfactory. What Scheffler appears to be saying is that we need not be concerned with formulating adequate paraphrases of sentences such as (3) because the information they supply us with is inclined to be trivial. But to say that they afford us trivial information still implies that they afford us some information. And surely one thing we can get from (3) is that Smith and Jones both have the same belief. But, then, if (3) is true, and if it happens that there is no inscription that Smith and Jones believe-true (as certainly seems possible), it cannot be supposed that in order for Smith and Jones to have the same belief they must be related to an inscription by a believes-true relation. Scheffler's (p.104) claim, therefore, that beliefs are to be construed as relating agents and inscriptions is false.

The same point appears to arise in relation to sentences such as

(5) There is a natural blonde whom Stacy believes would make a good wife.
(5) reports on some (purported) belief of Stacy's but, unlike (2), does not guarantee the existence of a suitable sentence-inscription for Stacy to believe-true. Stacy may not believe-true (5) since, for one thing, he may not believe that the woman in question is a natural blonde. Also we cannot be sure that he believes-true some part of (5). This is not to say that Scheffler cannot provide a paraphrase of (5) that does not incorporate a suitable sentence-inscription for Stacy to believe-true, although I have my doubts. Rather the point is that (5), and other inscriptions of this kind, may be true even if no paraphrases of them have ever been inscribed, in which case there may be no suitable sentence-inscriptions for the believing subjects to believe-true.

Perhaps Scheffler could simply insist that although neither (5) nor (3) guarantee the existence of a believed-true sentence-inscription, there are bound to be sentences that someone has inscribed somewhere which serve as suitable believed-true inscriptions. However, although this may be accepted in the case of commonplace beliefs, for example, that which is attributed by (1), it does not appear to be true in the case of bizarre beliefs affirmed by such inscriptions as, to modify (5) somewhat,

(6) There is a natural blonde whom Stacy believes to be the sadistic reincarnation of Lilly Langtry's pyridine drinking great aunt.

(6) does not guarantee the existence of an appropriate believed-true sentence-inscription for exactly the same reason that (5) does not. And, I would suggest, it is highly probable that no one has ever inscribed the required
believed-true sentence-inscription. In any case, it does seem that even if there are suitable believed-true inscriptions for (3), (5) and (6), (3), (5) and (6) could have been true even if no such inscriptions had existed. And this is enough to refute Scheffler.

Also, Scheffler’s appeal to the notion of believing-true’ suffers from the same objection as was brought against Quine and Ullian in Chapter III. Either the things we believe-true are what we believe or they are not. If they are then 'There is some x, such that x is a That (such-and-such) and A believes-true x' is equivalent to 'There is some x, such that x is a That (such-and-such) and A believes x'. This is precisely the conclusion that Scheffler wishes to avoid. And quite rightly so. For, as pointed out in the beginning of this Chapter, we do not believe inscriptions. On the other hand, if the things that we believe-true are not what we believe then this is consistent with the claim that what we believe are proposition-entities. Consequently, it would not have been shown that such entities are an ontological extravagance.

But, in my opinion, the chief problem underlying Scheffler's theory, which equally underlies any theory that takes inscriptions to be the objects of the attitudes, is the nature of the inscription itself. Inscriptions just are sentences that have been inscribed. But this makes inscriptions unsuitable as objects of belief, for the very possibility of our having beliefs would depend rather implausibly upon the human activity of inscribing sentences. As I have argued, however, there may well be certain beliefs for which no suitable inscriptions exist (or have ever existed).
In other words, there may not be enough inscribed sentences to match the number of our beliefs. In this respect, both the sentential theory and the proposition-entity theory are to be preferred. We may hold that declarative sentences are the objects of the attitudes without supposing that these sentences have been inscribed. Also, we may hold that proposition-entities are the objects of the attitudes without any consideration as to the existence of inscriptions.

In my view, if we want to retain a nominalistic bent, which Scheffler certainly does, then the way out of the problem is to abandon the assumption that the propositional attitudes require genuine entities as their objects. I present a case against this assumption in Chapter XIII.

The theories that we have hitherto considered have attempted to provide a blanket alternative to the view that to believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., a proposition-entity. We might, however, as a second alternative, propose a dichotomy whereby it is held, for example, that to believe that p is not to believe a proposition-entity but that to assert or state that p is to assert or state a proposition-entity. A theory of this type, which includes some interesting twists and turns, is considered in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER V

ON A PROPOSAL BY WHITE

There are only two answers to the question 'Is it the case that to assert, state, believe, doubt, desire, hope, fear, suppose, suspect, expect, or remember that p is to assert, state, believe, doubt, desire, hope, fear, suppose, suspect, expect, or remember a proposition-entity?': (a) Yes or (b) No. But we can maintain a 'Yes' answer by holding, for example, that to assert or state that p is to assert or state a proposition-entity, whilst denying that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., a proposition-entity. This, in fact, is the position adopted by A.R. White (1972; 1979). According to White (1972, p.69), to assert or state that p is to assert or state the proposition that p. Moreover, White tells us, propositions are such things as people's actual or possible statements, stories, hypotheses, theories, rumours, alibis, etc., (1979, p.242) which exist (1979, p.246) and are 'genuine objects' (1972, p.70). However, White is also clear in denying that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., a proposition-entity.

But it does not follow that if it is not the case that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., a proposition-entity then what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., is never a proposition-entity. It is a conceivable thesis that, although we cannot infer, for example, from A's believing that p that A believes a
proposition-entity, sometimes it is the case that when A believes that \( p \) A believes a proposition-entity. One way of arguing this is to hold that if A believes a rumour or story that \( p \), and thus A believes that \( p \), it follows, presuming rumours, stories, etc., are proposition-entities, that A believes a proposition-entity, but to believe that \( p \) is not in itself to believe a proposition-entity since A may believe that \( p \) even though there are no rumours, stories, etc., that \( p \). Such a thesis, though not commonly maintained, has been espoused by A.R. White. However, this requires some qualification because White appears to deny that what is feared, suspected, or remembered is ever a proposition. The rationale behind this seems to be that it is unnatural to say that one fears, suspects or remembers a proposition (see 1973, p.244). (It perhaps comes as no surprise to learn that White is a leading exponent of the school of linguistic analysis.)

According to White, we may distinguish between two kinds of 'accusative' which can follow verbs like 'believe': the 'object-accusative', or 'what (objectively) is believed', and the 'intentional-accusative', or 'what (intentionally) is believed'. What is believed when one believes a proposition or a person, we are told, is denoted by an object-accusative, whereas what is believed when one believes that \( p \) is denoted by an intentional-accusative. Similarly, White claims, what is suspected, doubted, feared, diagnosed, advised or believed in when one suspects the butler or his motives, doubts a man or his word, fears one's teacher or his temper, diagnoses a patient, advises a trade union or believes in one's political party is denoted by an object-accusative;
whereas what is suspected, doubted, feared, diagnosed, advised or believed in when one suspects foul play, doubts someone's sanity, fears the loss of one's reputation, diagnoses tuberculosis, advises a return to work or believes in fairies is denoted by an intentional accusative. White holds that these two kinds of accusatives denote different kinds of things. (1979, p.245).

If White's arguments in favour of an object-accusative/intentional-accusative distinction are correct then sentences such as 'A believes the rumour that p' do not reduce to sentences of the 'A believes that p' form: and hence we cannot expect to avoid an ontological commitment to propositions, which White alleges sentences of the first kind possess, by paraphrasing them into sentences of the second kind. Certainly I agree with White's denial that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., a proposition-entity. But what I hold to be suspect is White's claim that we still sometimes believe or doubt proposition-entities, i.e., when we believe or doubt statements, stories, hypotheses, theories, rumours, alibis, etc. I hold this because I think that White's thesis that sentences such as 'A believes the rumour that p' and 'A believes that p' have different kinds of accusatives denoting different kinds of things is suspect. However, White does offer a number of arguments which he claims show that "there are several clear differences between [the] two kinds of accusatives and consequently between the kinds of thing which are denoted by them" (1979, p.245). I shall now consider these arguments.

Argument 1. "Outside of philosophy, it is usually
only what is denoted by the object-accusative and not what is
denoted by the intentional-accusative which is called the
'object' of what is expressed by the verb. It is the butler,
not foul play, that is the object of one's suspicion, a man
or his word, not his sanity, that is the object of one's
doubt, a teacher or his temper, not the loss of one's
reputation, that is the object of one's fear, a man or his
story, not that p, which is the object of one's belief" (1979, p.246). In 1972 White adds "This is because the
former are genuine objects which may present themselves to
us for some attitude, emotion action, etc., on our part"
(p.70).

Reply. The suggestion here seems to be that because
when we, for example, believe a man or his story the man
or his story is in ordinary language said to be the object
of our belief, what we believe when we believe a man or his
story is a genuine object or entity; but we do not in
ordinary language say that when we believe that p the object
of our belief is that p, and hence to believe that p is not
to believe a genuine object. Unfortunately, I think that
this is to put too much stock in ordinary language. To
say that x is spoken of in ordinary discourse as an 'object'
is not an argument to the conclusion that x is a genuine
object (entity). It is quite acceptable to say, for instance,
that happiness is the object of one's desire, but no one
would infer from this that happiness is an entity. Yet
if we are to accept White's line of argument, it would seem
that we should.

White might reply that there still must be some
difference between believing a man or his story and
believing that $p$ since there is something that we may say of the former that may not be said of the latter, namely, that the former are objects of belief. Certainly I agree that to believe a man or his story is not the same thing as believing that $p$. But the issue should be whether believing a man or his story is a form of believing that $p$ (as distinct from merely believing that $p$). The fact that there is something that may be said of the former but not of the latter does not show that the former does not come under the generic type of the latter, that of believing that $p$. Analogously, being a kangaroo is not the same thing as being a marsupial — there are some things that may be said about the former that may not be said about the latter — but all kangaroos are members of the marsupial family.

**Argument 2.** "Though some thing can be what is suspected, doubted, feared or believed in either of [the] ways [stated in Argument 1], some person can be only the object of one's suspicion, doubt, fear or belief" (1979, p.246).

**Reply.** White is apparently arguing here that there is a difference between suspecting, doubtig, fearing or believing some thing and suspecting, doubting, fearing or believing some person. I agree. But, for essentially the same reason as was given in the Reply above, it does not follow that suspecting, doubting, fearing and believing a person are not forms of suspecting, doubting, fearing, and believing some thing (as distinct from merely suspecting doubting, fearing, and believing some thing).
Argument 3. "The intentional-accusative, but not the object-accusative, has an equivalent nominalization form, 'that p'. Suspecting foul play, diagnosing tuberculosis and advising a return to work amount to suspecting that there is foul play, diagnosing that there is tuberculosis and advising that there be a return to work; but suspecting the butler, diagnosing a patient and advising a trade union do not amount to suspecting that there is a butler, diagnosing that there is a patient and advising that there be a trade union. Similarly believing in fairies amounts to believing that there are fairies; but believing in one's party does not amount to, even though it implies, believing that there is one's party" (1979, p.246).

Reply. It is true, for example, that believing in one's party does not amount to believing that there is one's party. Nevertheless, 'suspecting the butler', 'diagnosing a patient', 'advising a trade union' and 'believing in one's party' all seem to reduce to the 'that p' form. Suspecting the butler = suspecting that the butler did it, diagnosing a patient = diagnosing that a patient has such-and-such, advising a trade union = advising that a trade union do such-and-such, and believing in one's party = believing that one's party is right.

Argument 4. "The object-accusative, but not the intentional-accusative, must signify something which exists. One can believe or suspect that there is a life after death and believe in fairies or suspect tuberculosis, although it is not the case that there is a life after death or fairies
or tuberculosis; but one cannot believe or suspect a person
or his story unless he or it exists. Hence, to believe the
proposition that $p$ implies that there is the proposition
that $p$, whereas to believe that $p$ does not imply that $p$" (1979, p. 246).

Reply. Everyone would agree that one can believe
in fairies or suspect tuberculosis even though it is not the
case that there are fairies or tuberculosis, and one can
believe or suspect that $p$ even though it is not the case
that $p$. I think, though, that a number of philosophers would
fight the imputation that if it is not the case that $p$, and
$A$ believes that $p$, then $A$ does not believe something that
exists. However, this is not a line that I care to pursue.
What I do question is White's claim that we cannot believe
or suspect someone's story unless it exists. It is, I hold,
simply a mistake to predicate existence of stories. Undoubtedly,
the word 'story' is quite useful and frequently occurs in
sentences which are true (or which express truths) such as
(i) 'A believes Smith's story'. But any suggestion that
(i) contains a reference to such a thing as a story is
dispelled if we read it as (ii) 'Smith has storied that such-
and-such, and $A$ believes that such-and-such'. A substitutional
reading of (i) could be put thus: 'For some $p$, Smith has
storied that $p$, and $A$ believes that $p$'. However, the substi-
tutional theory is not without objection (cf. Chapter VI).
So I think it is prudent to have an alternative reading.

It is no objection to say that (ii) neither entails
that $A$ believes that it is a story that such-and-such nor
that $A$ believes that such-and-such is Smith's story. For
neither does (i) have such entailments. A may hear Smith’s story and believe it without believing that the person telling the story is named ‘Smith’. Moreover, A may not even believe that it is a story that such-and-such if he has an inadequate comprehension as to what actually constitutes a story.

There is also an issue as to whether A need be aware, or be of the opinion, that someone has been saying that such-and-such. In my view, no such condition need be satisfied. Suppose, for instance, that A suffers from senile dementia and genuinely comes to believe, for some reason or other, that a witch tried to eat Hansel and Gretel, but is not aware, or of the opinion, that anyone has ever said that a witch tried to eat Hansel and Gretel. In such a case, surely, as a way of allaying A’s concerns, we can correctly remark, ‘Oh what you believe is a fictitious story invented by the Grimms’. So that in such a case we may still say that A believes a story. But even if I am wrong on this, it is no great complication to add to (ii) the condition that A be aware, or of the opinion, that someone has said that such-and-such. Further, the issue as to whether this condition needs to be satisfied does not arise only in relation to (ii), but arises in relation to any analysis of (i).

‘A believes Smith’s statement’, ‘A believes Smith’s theory’ and ‘A believes some rumour’ may be read as ‘Smith has stated that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such’, ‘Smith has theorized that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such’, and ‘Someone has rumoured that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such’ respectively. Certainly paraphrases of this sort will not always be available.
It is difficult to see how, for example, 'A believes two of Smith's stories' or 'A believes every statement made by Smith' can be paraphrased in quite this way. But the problem is not pernicious. If on every occasion that A believes a statement or story we had precise information as to which particular statement or story is believed, we could still adequately report what A believes without making reference to a statement or story. For example, if we know in a particular case that A believes Smith's story that the P.M. is a little crook, we could then report what A believes with the sentence 'Smith has storied that the P.M. is a little crook, and A believes that the P.M. is a little crook'. That we are not in every case in which someone believes a statement or story able to make a report of this type is not due to a difficulty in principle, but only to our lack of information as to which particular statement or story is believed.

White is undoubtedly right that one cannot believe some person unless some person exists. But it is difficult to see why we should be bothered by this. It certainly does not help White's claim that in certain cases, such as when we believe stories or rumours, we believe proposition-entities. Persons are not propositions. Moreover, to believe a person is nothing more nor less than to believe what he/she says, and anything that a person says is of the that-p form.

Argument 5. "When I believe that there is a life after death, that there is a life after death is my belief, just as when I suspect that there has been foul play and
diagnose that my patient has tuberculosis, that there has been foul play is my suspicion and that my patient has tuberculosis is my diagnosis, or just as when I fear the loss of my reputation or advise a return to work, the loss of my reputation is my fear and the return to work is my advice. But when I believe a man or his story, neither he nor his story is my belief, any more than when I suspect the butler, diagnose my patient or advise a trade union is the butler my suspicion, the patient my diagnosis or the trade union my advice." (1979, p.246)

Reply. Reading 'A believes some man's story'. 'A suspects the butler', 'A diagnoses his patient' and 'A advises a trade union' as 'Some man has storied that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such', 'A suspects that the butler did it', 'A diagnoses that his patient has such-and-such' and 'A advises that a trade union do such-and-such' respectively, 'Some man has storied that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such' becomes 'Some man has storied that such-and-such, and that such-and-such is A's belief', 'A suspects that the butler did it' becomes 'That the butler did it is A's suspicion', 'A diagnoses that his patient has such-and-such' becomes 'That his patient has such-and-such is A's diagnosis', and 'A advises that a trade union do such-and-such' becomes 'That a trade union do such-and-such is A's advice'.

Argument 6. "What is disbelieved, mistrusted, or viewed with scepticism is, and only is, a person or what he says. One does not disbelieve that the earth is flat and
that there is a life after death. To be credulous, is to be too prone to believe people and their stories; it is not to be too prone to believe that p and that q. To be superstitious, on the other hand, is to believe in the supernatural rather than to believe stories about the supernatural” (1979, p.246).

Reply. It is true that we do not say such things as 'A mistrusts that p' or 'A views with scepticism that p'. However, to mistrust is simply to have no confidence. Hence, we can extirpate the meaningless 'A mistrusts that p' in favour of the perfectly sensible 'A is not confident that p'. Instead of 'A views with scepticism that p' we may posit 'A doubts/is unconvinced that p'. As for White's claim that we cannot disbelieve that the earth is flat and that there is a life after death, I must say that this is the first I have heard of it. 'A is credulous' may be read as something like 'However A hears or reads things are, A is too prone to believe thus they are'. 'A is superstitious' may be read as something like 'A believes that the supernatural is real' or 'A believes that the supernatural exists'.

Argument 7. "Just as suspecting the butler, as contrasted with suspecting foul play, is feeling suspicious of the butler, and advising a trade union, as contrasted with advising a return to work, is giving advice to a trade union, so believing a man or his story as contrasted with believing that p, is putting some trust in him or his story" (1979, Pp 246-7)
Reply. Certainly (i) 'A believes some man's story' entails (ii) 'A puts trust in some man's story', whereas no one would propose that (iii) 'A believes that p' entails (ii). But the real issue here is whether a sentence such as (ii) reduces to the that-p form. Following previous suggestions, (i) may be paraphrased as (iv) 'Some man has storied that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such'. But equally it could be held that any purpose served by (ii) is just as well served by (v) 'Some man has storied that such-and-such, and A trusts that such-and-such'. Once again the matter of believing a man need not be perceived as a problem.

Agrument 8. "To believe someone or his story, unlike believing that p, is not to believe correctly or erroneously, much less is it to have a correct or erroneous belief. That which one believes when one believes a story may be true or false, scurrilous or amusing, just as the person whom one believes when one believes a person may be male or female, but one does not thereby have a true or false, scurrilous or amusing, belief any more than one has a male or female belief. This is not, of course, to deny that when one believes a person or his story one will also acquire a belief that p and, therefore, when one believes a liar or his false story one will also acquire a false belief that p. To continue or cease to believe someone or his story, unlike believing that p, is not to stick to or revise one's belief" (1972, p.71).

Reply. White appears to be holding that we can say
certain things about someone's believing that $p$ that cannot be said about someone's believing a story. It seems to be implied, for instance, that it is quite all right to say 'A believes correctly that $p$', but to say 'A believes correctly someone's story' is not all right. Now, undoubtedly, there are differences between believing that $p$ and believing someone's story. But the point White is apparently making is that the accusatives in sentences about someone's believing that $p$ are so different from those in sentences about someone's believing a story that they must denote things of different kinds. However, reading 'A believes someone's story' as 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, and A believes that such-and-such' enables us to add without reticence that A believes correctly or erroneously. Any disquiet we might feel over 'A believes correctly (erroneously) someone's story' is lost on the preferred proferring 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, A believes that such-and-such, and A believes correctly (erroneously)'. Moreover, if we take 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, and A has a belief that such-and-such' as also doing the job of 'A believes someone's story', we can introduce the notion of a correct or erroneous belief as in 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, A has a belief that such-and-such, and A's belief is correct (erroneous)'.

White further remarks that that which one believes when one believes a story may be true or false, scurrilous or amusing, but one does not thereby have a true or false, scurrilous or amusing, belief. Presumably, this is to imply that that which one believes when one believes that $p$ may be true or false, scurrilous or amusing, and one does
thereby have a true or false, scurrilous or amusing, belief. Otherwise I simply cannot understand the point White is making. But again reading 'A believes someone's story' as 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, and A has a belief that such-and-such', we can clearly speak of A's belief being true or false, scurrilous or amusing, as in 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, A's belief is that such-and-such, and A's belief is scurrilous'.

As for White's claim that to continue or cease to believe a story, unlike believing that p, is not to stick to or revise one's belief, this becomes problematic by reading 'A continues to believe someone's story' and 'A has ceased to believe someone's story' as 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, and A sticks to his belief that such-and-such' and 'Someone has storied that such-and-such, and A has revised his belief that such-and-such' respectively.

I conclude that White has failed to show that what we believe when we believe a statement, story, hypothesis, etc., is of a different nature to what we believe when we believe that p. Specifically, believing a statement, story, hypothesis, etc., is not to believe a proposition-entity since believing statements, stories, hypotheses, etc., are just special cases of believing that p. Certainly there are those who maintain that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity. However, this is not something with which White would agree. According to White, to believe that p is neither to believe a proposition nor a sentence nor merely nothing. White is unsure as to what it is that we believe when we believe that p, but he holds that it is
something which exists when the belief is true and does not exist when it is false. (1972, p.83) Unfortunately, White is no more informative on this. Nevertheless, in arguing in this thesis against the view that 'that p' names or denotes a proposition in sentences such as 'A believes that p', I also reject the claim that 'that p' names or denotes anything, existent or otherwise. My aim in this Chapter has been to show that sentences such as 'A believes someone's story' and 'A believes someone's alibi' are in principle no more troublesome than 'A believes that p' and 'A believes that q'. That the latter are not too troublesome is the concern of Chapter XIII.

The underlying problem with White's approach, in my opinion, is that White puts too much stock in locutions of ordinary language. White is right, I believe, in holding that we have to take into account sentences like 'A believes someone's story' and 'A believes someone's alibi' when considering the question as to whether we believe proposition-entities. White has certainly given us some reasons as to why we should take such sentences into account. However, White seems to operate only at the level of surface grammar and reads an ontological commitment into these sentences that, I have argued, just is not there.
An alternative to holding that proposition-entities are the objects of the propositional attitudes and speech acts in the sense of being what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc., as well as an alternative to the eclectical approach adopted by White, is to deny that entities of any sort are ever objects of the propositional attitudes and speech acts in this sense. This is a more austere alternative than any of the theories hitherto considered. Admittedly, in the case of Russell's multiple relation theory it was denied that we believe entities, but this was done at the expense of introducing multiple objects as constituents of belief. The proposal I wish to consider here denies that what we believe, doubt, desire, assert, and so on, are entities but it does not do so by way of introducing entities as objects in some other sense.

But why would anyone want to endorse such a proposal? One reason is that some philosophers have come to the opinion that we can make standard attitudinal or speech act reports without naming or denoting anything that is believed, doubted, desired, asserted, etc. For example, a standard belief report such as (1) 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' reports (or purportedly reports) what Stacy believes, but (1), we are told, need not be construed as naming or denoting a believed object. Therefore, there is no need to suppose that what Stacy believes is a
However, before assessing the merits of this proposal it is, I think, important to look a little more closely at the type of analysis with which it is concerned to rebuke. According to a number of philosophers, sentences such as (1) 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' are formed by attaching a two-place predicate to two names. It is proposed that here the predicate 'believes' expresses a relation between Stacy and an object designated by 'that the Queen is married'. Thus, just as 'Stacy' is said to be a name designating an object, the subordinate clause 'that the Queen is married' is also to be construed as a name designating an object, in this case an object called a 'proposition'. And when the sentence (1) is true, there is a relation between Stacy and some object (proposition), this object being what Stacy believes. Some philosophers vary the theme a little by saying that 'that the Queen is married' functions as a denoting term, but not as a name. Nevertheless, both views are in agreement that when (1) is true, there is a relation between Stacy and some other designated object. Clearly this opens the way for a like analysis of such sentences as 'Stacy doubts that the Queen is married', 'Stacy says that the Queen is married', etc.

A.N. Prior (1963; 1971) has put a case against our analysing sentences such as (1) in this way. The fundamental mistake of the analysis, Prior holds, is that it parses 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' as 'Stacy believes/that the Queen is married'. According to Prior, the correct parsing is 'Stacy believes that/the Queen is married'. What Prior has in mind here is that the
word 'that' doesn't go with the sentence that follows it (i.e., 'the Queen is married') to form a name; rather it goes with the verb that precedes it to produce a member of an unchristened lexical category: 'believes that'. Thus we dispense with the claim that (1) is constructed out of two names and a transitive verb. 'Believes that' is not a two-place predicate, i.e., it does not express a relation between Stacy and some other object, for what follows it isn't a name but a sentence. And sentences, Prior maintains, do not designate anything whatsoever. Hence, we retain the name 'Stacy' but eliminate the apparent name 'that the Queen is married'. The suggestion that if the sentence (1) 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is true then 'that the Queen is married' designates a proposition believed by Stacy thus falls away. On Prior's view, we may say that expressions such as 'believes that', 'fears that', and 'says that' are:

predicates at the left and connectives at the right, in the quite precise sense that if the right-hand gap is filled in by an actual sentence what remains with a left-hand gap is simply a one-place predicate (e.g. 'fears that there will be a nuclear war'), while if the left-hand gap is filled by an actual name what remains with a right-hand gap is precisely a one-place connective (to employ a reasonable logical barbarism), 'X believes that ____'. (1971, p.19)

Although Prior and Quine seem to agree on very little, there is some merging of opinion between Prior and the Quine of Word and Object. There Quine writes:

there is no need to recognize 'believes' and similar verbs as relative terms at all; no need to countenance their predicative use as in 'w believes x' (as against 'w believes that p'); no need, therefore, to see 'that p' as a term. Hence a final alternative that I find as appealing as any is simply to
dispense with the objects of the propositional attitudes. We can continue to formulate the propositional attitudes with help of the notations of intensional abstraction ... but just cease to view these notations as singular terms referring to objects. This means viewing 'Tom believes [Cicero denounced Catilene]' no longer as of the form 'Fab' with \(a=\text{Tom}\) and \(b=\text{[Cicero denounced Catilene]}\), but rather as of the form 'Fa' with \(a=\text{Tom}\) and complex 'F'. The verb 'believes' here ceases to be a term and becomes part of an operator 'believes that', or 'believes [ . ]', which, applied to a sentence, produces a composite general term whereof the sentence is counted an immediate constituent. (1960, Pp 215-6)

Of this passage Prior says 'This is precisely my own proposal' (1971, p.20).

Now, as this proposal has it, we are able to eliminate from a number of typical contexts what appear (or what appear to some) to be references to propositions. But there is one sort of context to which it has no obvious application. That is, the proposal covers sentences of the 'A believes that p' form, but sentences such as 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not', in which no 'believes that' is present, still need to be catered for. (We saw in the Introduction the importance of dealing with sentences of the latter kind.)

Interestingly, Quine's response on this differs widely from Prior's. According to Quine, sentences such as 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not' are "expendable; for such quantifications tend anyway to be pretty trivial in what they affirm, and useful only in heralding more tangible information" (1960, p.215). But this seems to be a rather curious rationale for dispensing with a sentence. After

1. Incidentally, expressions such as 'believes that' remain for Prior in an unchristened lexical category, whereas Quine in Philosophy of Logic (p.32) dubs them the *attitudinatives*. 
all, to say that a sentence is trivial in what it affirms implies that it still affirms something, that it still conveys some information. Moreover, intuitively, at any rate, 'A believes that p' entails 'A believes something'. So if we dispense with the latter kind of sentence, we dispense with the entailment.

Prior's (1963, Pp 150-3; 1971, Pp 24-6) recommendation is more compelling. He suggests that we get our 'that' back by reading 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not' as 'For some p, Paul believes that p and Elmer does not believe that p', where the latter is to be interpreted substitutionally, i.e., the quantifier is to be taken as binding variables that stand for sentences. Similarly, it is suggested that 'Everything that Cohen says is true' may be read as 'For any p, if Cohen says that p, then it is the case that p', or more briefly 'For any p, if Cohen says that p, then p'. Also 'Mrs Murphy believes that everything Father Gordon says is true' may be read as 'Mrs. Murphy believes that, for all p, if Father Gordon says that p, then p' which is to be distinguished from the quite different 'For all p, if Father Gordon says that p, then Mrs. Murphy believes that p'.

In order to appreciate Prior's paraphrases it is important to draw a distinction between an objectual (referential) and a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers. According to Quine (1953, p.102), "the quantifiers '(∃x)' and '(x)' mean 'there is some entity x such that' and 'each entity x is such that '." Strawson (1952, Pp 150-1) expresses a like-minded sentiment by holding that the existential quantifier '(∃x)' is to be read as 'There is
(exists) at least one thing (person) which (who)'. Both Quine and Strawson may be said to support an objectual (referential) interpretation of the quantifiers. In fact, they explicitly rule out any other interpretation. On their view, an existentially quantified sentence such as

\[ (\exists x) Fx \]

is to be read as

\[ (\exists x) \text{ There is some entity } x \text{ such that } x \text{ is } F \]

or

\[ (\exists x) \text{ (exists) at least one thing which is } F \]

Actually Quine (1970) words the quantifiers a little differently. There we are told that "the universal quantifier '(x)', ...corresponds to the words 'each thing x (in the universe) is such that'" (p.113) and "the so-called existential quantifier '(\exists x)' corresponds to the words 'there is something x such that'" (p.113). But although there is a variation in the wording of Quine's reading of the quantifiers, there is no difference in substance. So far as Quine is concerned

\[ (\exists x) \text{ There is something } x \text{ such that } x \text{ is } F \]

is just another way of writing (2). Both affirm that there is at least one entity referred to by 'x' which is F. On the objectual interpretation, the variables take as their values the objects (entities) over which the variables are said to range. The objectual reading thus locates ontological commitment in the bound variables.

Quine, in fact, sees the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers as providing the criterion of ontological commitment. Quine puts the criterion in various ways:
...entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some of them must be counted among the values of the variables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be true. (1953, p.103)

...to say that a given existential quantification presupposes objects of a given kind is to say simply that the open sentence which follows the quantifier is true of some objects of that kind and none not of that kind. (1953, p.133)

In support of his ontological criterion, Quine argues:

To insist on the correctness of the criterion...is, indeed, merely to say that no distinction is being drawn between the 'there are' of 'there are universals', 'there are unicorns', 'there are hippopotami', and the 'there are' of '∃x', 'there are entities such that'. To contest the criterion, as applied to the familiar quantificational form of discourse, is simply to say either that the familiar quantificational notation is being re-used in some new sense (in which case we need not concern ourselves) or else that the familiar 'there are' of 'there are universals' et al. is being re-used in some new sense (in which case again we need not concern ourselves). (1953, p.105)

There is, however, a reading of the quantifiers called the 'substitutional interpretation', which does not appeal to values of variables — the variables are not construed as taking values — but to substituends for variables, i.e., expressions that can be substituted for the variables. On this interpretation,

(1) (∃x) Fx

may be read as

(5) Some substitution instance of 'Fx' is true

and

(6) (∀x) Fx

as

(7) Every substitution instance of 'Fx'
These readings are suggested by Ruth Marcus (1962a, pp. 252-3; 1962b, p. 847) and Susan Haack (1974, p. 143). The result of replacing the variable in 'Fx' is said to be a substitution instance of 'Fx'. An example of a substitutional reading that somewhat predates Marcus (and Haack) comes from Benson Mates. According to Mates (1950, p. 133), the sentence '(\exists x) (x is prime and 5 < x < 11)' may be substitutionally interpreted as 'there is a constant such that the sentence which results from substituting this constant for 'x' in the matrix 'x is prime and 5 < x < 11' is true'.

On the substitutional account, ontological commitment is not eschewed but held in abeyance; questions of ontology are taken to depend upon the truth conditions of the substitution instances. If we restrict the class of substituends for the variables of quantification to singular terms then '(\exists x) Fx' carries an ontological commitment if the singular term contained in the substitution instance of 'Fx' is non-empty (e.g. 'Venus') but not if it is empty (e.g., 'Pegasus'). However, the class of substituends need not be confined to singular terms. Often the substitution class is extended to other syntactical categories, such as sentences. Thus

(\exists p) p,

where the substituend for the variable 'p' is construed as a sentence, is also held to make good sense.

There are at least three views that can be taken in relation to the quantifiers. (a) The only viable
interpretation is the objectual reading, (b) the only viable interpretation is the substitutional reading, or (c) both the objectual and substitutional readings have a place. I say 'at least three views' because it is not certain that the objectual and substitutional interpretations are the only ones possible. Hugly and Sayward (1977, Pp. 104-12), for example, claim to be able to give an account of quantification that is neither substitutional nor referential. Also, Charles Parsons (1971, Pp. 231-7) has proposed an interpretation which Quine (1974, p.140) has suggested may best be described as 'semisubstitutional'. However, it is true to say that interpretations of the quantifiers usually take a substitutional or objectual form.

There are a number of advantages claimed for the substitutional interpretation which underlie its introduction and the various attempts to develop it. It would take us far afield to discuss all of them here, but I shall discuss some of them. One purported advantage of the substitutional account is that it provides a way out of certain anomalies generated by the objectual interpretation in connection with existential generalization.¹ Ruth Marcus (1962a, p.256) mentions the case in which we might wish to claim the truth of

(8) Pegasus is a winged horse.

Existentially generalizing we get

(9) (∃x) (x is a winged horse).

¹. On the substitutional theory the term 'existential generalization' is something of a misnomer.
But on the objectual interpretation (9) is to be read something like

(10) There is at least one thing which is a winged horse

and thus (8) is rendered false. So on that interpretation we are forced to renounce (8). However, since on the substitutional interpretation (9) is read as

(11) There is a true substitution instance of 'x is a winged horse'

it would surely seem that if (8) is true then (11) is true; for a substitutional instance of 'x is a winged horse' is (8) itself. It does no good to object that although (9) is rendered false on the objectual interpretation this is not a problem since (8) is also false. It is true, I think, that (8) is false if taken as a literal statement about reality. But there is a sense in which we might want to assert the truth of (8). If we imagine (8) to be implicitly preceded by 'it is pretended that' or 'in fiction' then (8) may be regarded as true (see Devitt 1981, Pp 171-2).

The same type of problem is held to arise when we attempt to quantify into belief contexts. Existentially generalizing from

(12) Stacy believes that Pegasus is a winged horse

we get

(13) (∃x) (Stacy believes that x is a winged horse).

On the substitutional interpretation (13) is to be read as 'Some substitution instance of 'Stacy believes that x is a winged horse' is true' and thus existential generalization
appears to go through. However, on the objectual interpretation (13) affirms that there is (exists) something which Stacy believes to be a winged horse. Yet surely Stacy can believe that Pegasus is a winged horse even although Pegasus does not exist.

There is another criticism of the objectual interpretation. Suppose we change the picture a little and wish to maintain the truth of

(14) Stacy believes that Venus is a planet.

Existentially generalizing we get

(15) (∃x) Stacy believes that x is a planet.

However, if the quantifier in (15) is objectual then the quantified — in sentence, if true, is true in virtue of there being an object such that Stacy believes that it is a planet. It therefore does not matter how that object is (truly) described. Hence

Stacy believes that...is a planet

is true where the referential slot is filled in by any designation of Venus. But since Venus = the second planet we should suppose that if (15) is true then so is

(16) Stacy believes that the second planet is a planet.

Clearly, though, we do not want to accept (16) as a consequence of (14). The problem is apparently obviated if (15) is interpreted as 'Some substitution instance of 'Stacy believes that x is a planet' is true'. For on this interpretation we do not allow just any designation of Venus to be a member of the class of substituends.

It might be thought that the objectual theory can
side-step the two previous objections by appealing to the 'believes-true' locution. If we rewrite (12) 'Stacy believes that Pegasus is a winged horse' as

(17) Stacy believes-true 'Pegasus is a winged horse'

then existential generalization does not go through to produce (13). But clearly on reading (12) as (17) it ought not to, for 'Pegasus' is sealed in the quoted sentence and is thereby not in referential position. Similarly, if (14) 'Stacy believes that Venus is a planet' is rewritten as

(18) Stacy believes-true 'Venus is a planet'

we cannot existentially generalize to get (15) '(\exists x) (Stacy believes that x is a planet)', and therefore there is no problem about deriving (16) 'Stacy believes that the second planet is a planet' from (15). However, this response seems unsatisfactory for the very notion of believing-true is suspect (cf. Chapter III).

A related problem for the objectual theory is its difficulty in handling such ordinary language sentences as 'There is something such that Stacy believes that it is a planet'. For how do we read the quantified-in sentence in this particular case?

(15) (\exists x) (Stacy believes that x is a planet)

is unacceptable, if read objectually, for exactly the same reason it is unacceptable above: (15), if true, is true on any designation of the object that Stacy believes is a planet. This difficulty is avoided by

(19) Stacy believes that (\exists x) (x is a planet)

but still falls down: for although, on the objectual interpretation, (19) affirms that Stacy believes in the
existence of some planet, (19) does not affirm the existence of some planet.

It is of no help to the objectual theory to try reading 'There is something such that Stacy believes that it is a planet' as

\[(20) \exists x \ (\text{Stacy believes-true '} x \text{ is a planet'})\]

Apart from difficulties arising over the notion of believing-true, (20) does not seem to make sense. Since 'x' in 'x is a planet' is mentioned, but not used, it is not bound by the quantifier '(\exists x)'. Also 'x is a planet' is an open sentence (propositional function), as distinct from a substitutional instance, and therefore is strictly incapable of being true or false. But it is not clear that it is beneficial to affirm that Stacy believes-true something that cannot have a truth value. How, for instance, could we ascertain whether Stacy's belief is true?

A suggestion once toyed with by Quine (1956, Pp 104-5) is to construe 'believes' as a triadic predicate expressing a relation between Stacy, an attribute, and an object as in

\[(21) \exists x \ (\text{Stacy believes } z \ (z \text{ is a planet) of } x)\]

where \(z\ (z \text{ is a planet})\) is the attribute planethood. Although by no means a fatal objection, some philosophers have considered (21) to be unwelcome because it saddles us with attributes. A more recent suggestion has come from Kaplan (1968). However, this proposal has also been challenged (see, e.g., Perry 1979, Pp 11-12).

The substitutional theory seems to run more smoothly here. One proposal we might adopt is to read 'There is something such that Stacy believes that it is a planet' as
(22) (\exists x) (x \text{ exists. Stacy believes that } x \text{ is a planet})

where this is interpreted as 'Some substitution instance of 'x exists. Stacy believes that x is a planet' is true'. So far as I can see, (22) serves any purpose served by 'There is something such that Stacy believes that it is a planet', and avoids the difficulties of the standard attempts to quantify into belief contexts on an objectual theory.

To be clear, the problems (or purported problems) of the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers mentioned above remain at an introductory level. I am aware that a large amount of complex work has been written on the subject. In fact, I have not even touched on some of the issues. For example, Ruth Marcus (1962b) and others have also argued that substitutional quantification is able to resolve a number of problems generated by the objectual interpretation of modal predicate logic. Because of the introductory nature of my remarks I certainly do not wish to claim that the difficulties posed above are fatal to the objectual theory. Some of them clearly are not. What I have attempted to do, though, is to put the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers into some kind of setting — the substitutional theory did not arise out of a vacuum.

Now, as Prior has it, 'For some p, Paul believes that p and Elmer does not believe that p' is a suitable paraphrase of 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not'. According to Prior, the variable 'p' does not range over anything here at all, but stands in for a sentence. In the light of what we have said about the substitutional
theory, Prior's paraphrase may be understood as true if and only if some substitution instance of 'Paul believes that p and Elmer does not believe that p' is true. Whether or not the sentence 'p' stands in for is a name or denoting expression is a matter for further consideration. So far as Prior is concerned sentences simply do not have this function. For reasons that I shall go into later I think that Prior is quite right on this. Of course we are still left with the 'that p' construction. But both Prior and Quine give grounds for denying that the 'that p' clause is a name or denoting term, and this will also be dealt with shortly.

An alternative to Prior's paraphrase provided by the objectual theory is to read 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not' as

\[(23) (\text{Jp}) \quad (\text{Paul believes } p. \text{ Elmer does not believe } p)\]

where 'p' is construed as a sentential variable ranging over entities such as propositions. Hence (23) is held to affirm that Paul believes some entity (proposition) not believed by Elmer. On the objectual theory, (23) may be read in ordinary English (or quasi-English) as

\[(24) \text{There is some entity } p \text{ such that Paul but not Elmer believes } p\]

or

\[(25) \text{There is something believed by Paul but not by Elmer.}\]

On this view, (23), (24) and (25) have an (identical) ontological commitment to at least one believed thing. However, not all supporters of the objectual theory would care for (23) as a formulation. Quine (1953, p.109),
for instance, holds that the letters 'p', 'q', etc., are not to be construed as variables which take as their values entities (propositions) referred to by sentences that they stand in place of; for 'p', 'q', etc., are not genuine, binding variables, but are to be viewed, instead, as 'schematic letters'. But Quine's view can be readily accommodated, if need be, by simply substituting 'x' for 'p' in (23) and (24). Here 'x' would take the place of a referring term whilst ranging over entities such as propositions.

But the thesis that (23), (24), and (25) have an identical ontological commitment runs into difficulty. If these sentences do in fact have the same ontological commitment then any doubt about the ontological affirmations of one of them implies a doubt about the others. Specifically, a problem arises in relation to the view, in particular the one espoused by Quine, that any sentence of the 'There is (are) a P' form is ontologically committed to P. For consider a sentence such as 'There is much barbarity in the world' or 'There is a chance we shall win the lottery'. Both these sentences seem perfectly meaningful. Yet it would be rather perverse to insist that they carry with them an ontological commitment to barbarity and chance. But, then, it appears that we are in no position to insist that (25) is to be construed as affirming there is some entity believed by Paul but not by Elmer. At least we cannot maintain this merely on the basis that (25) takes the 'There is (are) a P' form. Consequently if we are to lump (23), (24), and (25) together we can hardly support the objectual interpretation of (23). Certainly it is
difficult to dispute the ontological import of (24). But the point is that the suggestion that (24) and (25) are equally good readings of (23) looks somewhat dubious.

Of course, we could still stick with the claim that (24) is a correct reading of (23), and simply give up any such claim about (25). But note that if we make this move there can be no suggestion that 'There is something believed by Paul but not by Elmer' or 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not' affirms that there is some entity believed by Paul but not by Elmer. Sentences of this kind could not be held to carry an ontological commitment to believed things.

But does this show that a substitutional reading of 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not', such as that provided by Prior, is in order? That such a conclusion is warranted is far from incontrovertible in the light of various difficulties that face the substitutional theory. One objection comes from Hugly and Sayward (1977) who maintain that Prior's theory is unable to supply an analysis of sentences such as

(26) There are truths about real numbers which will never be expressed in any language.

According to Hugly and Sayward (Pp 105-6) (26) would be rendered on Prior's analysis as

(27) For some p, it is true that p and that p is about real numbers and that p will never be expressed in any language.

But it clearly will not do to say that (27) is true if and only if some substitution instance of its unquantified part
It is not a satisfactory reply to say that a sentence can belong to a language and be a potential substituent for 'p' even if it is never uttered. The Hugly and Sayward objection is based on the claim that there may be truths that will never be expressed by sentences of any language, not the claim that there may be truths that will never be expressed by us.

But there might be a way around the problem. If the primary bearers of truth values are sentences then it would be wrong to suppose that there can be truths that will never be expressed in any language. It may at least be said that Hugly and Sayward beg the question on this.

A number of other objections, some dealing with particular aspects of the substitutional theory and some quite general, have been brought against the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers. An adequate treatment of these objections cannot be given here. I do not say that neither these objections nor the objection that we have discussed can be dealt with. I am not entirely unsympathetic to the substitutional theory. In the previous Chapter a suggestion was made as to how the theory might be put to good use. However, the substitutional theory is clearly not uncontroversial, and I have attempted to provide some explanation of why I do not uncritically accept Prior's readings of sentences like 'Paul believes something that...'

1. The difficulty of providing a substitutional reading of (26) is not a direct problem for Prior's paraphrase of 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not'. But if we add 'and which are believed by Paul but not by Elmer' to (26), the problem is unambiguous.
Elmer does not'. In the final Chapter of this thesis I offer paraphrases of sentences of this type that are neither objectual readings (which I flatly reject as appropriate readings) nor substitutional readings.

But what of the Prior-Quine proposal concerning that-clauses? One objection comes from Rundle (1967-8).

Rundle writes:

Prior is right in making a division of the complete sentence after rather than before that, in so far as the history of the construction suggests that the that was originally a demonstrative pronoun, and has only subsequently weakened to a conjunction. So, "James says that: man is mortal". Given the extent to which the demonstrative force of that has lapsed, it is implausible to regard it as object of says, with "man is mortal" an object in apposition, but I should have thought it was now at best a "vestigial" object, and could be safely ignored in favour of the phrase which it heralds and which has now, perhaps, displaced it as object-assuming, that is, there is any question of an object here at all. At any rate, although coupling that with "man is mortal" involves conflating two possible candidates for object in a way which invites confusion, transitivity of says does not require that we accept "that man is mortal" as its object, nor that we construe this ill-assorted assemblage as a name. We can reject the spurious unity of "that man is mortal" and construe "man is mortal" as both object and sentence, for all that Prior has shown. Certainly, whether an object governed by says is at the same time a name is a further question, for, as Kenny points out in his reply to Prior, in "James said 'man is mortal'" the quotation "'man is mortal'" is not to be understood as a name either - though it at least makes sense, I believe, to take it as object of said. (Pp 188-9)

A suggestion that Rundle gives serious consideration to, in relation to this, is that we think of 'that' as having the function of a punctuation mark, a comma; a marker separating the two parts of the sentence, not a name-forming operator which combines with the following words to produce an object for the verb, nor even an
anticipatory object. It is not to be construed as combining grammatically with either half of the complete sentence; rather, as with (co-ordinating) conjunctions in general, it links two members of a complex without being an integral part of either. To this extent it is like the conjunction 'and' - which is also similar to a comma in some contexts.

(p.198)

I think that Rundle is right to suggest that transitivity of says ('believes', 'doubts', 'desires' etc.) does not require that we accept 'that man is mortal' as either its object or a name. Even so, by coupling 'that' with 'says' to form a member of a new lexical category ('says that') we eliminate 'says' as a two-place predicate; we eliminate its transitivity. But 'says that' is not transitive for, although it makes sense to say that what James says (‘asserts’ sounds better) is a proposition or sentence, it makes no sense to say that what James says that (or asserts that) is a proposition or sentence.

Unfortunately, though, this is not quite what Prior argues. Prior maintains that:

'thinks that' is not a two-place predicate - it does not express a relation between James and anything whatever, for what goes on the other end of this expression isn't a name - neither the name of a form of words nor the name of a 'proposition' - but another sentence. (1963, p.148)

But this seems to be the wrong reason for holding that 'thinks that' ('says that' etc.) are not transitive; for the fact that what follows 'thinks that' is a sentence, not a name, does not show that 'thinks that' does not express a relation between James and that sentence.

Rather, the correct reason 'thinks that' is not a two-place
predicate is simply that it makes no sense to say that James thinks that a proposition or sentence or anything else. But there seems no reason as to why Prior could not have argued this. Thus, although I think that Rundle’s objection has some force, it would require no great labour on Prior’s part to avoid it.

Nevertheless, I think that the Prior-Quine analysis is essentially superficial. What Prior and Quine seem to be arguing is that it is possible to read, for example, 'A believes that p' in such a way that we do not need to take 'that p' as the name of a proposition. We have an alternative analysis of 'A believes that p' 'A doubts that p', 'A desires that p', etc., which allows us to avoid supposing that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., a proposition entity.

However, the Prior-Quine proposal is, at best, only successful against a certain type of propositionalist. We can see this if we draw a distinction between two claims that a propositionalist might make:

(a) We can give a plausible analysis of 'A believes that p' without taking 'that p' to be the name of a proposition, but such an analysis will lack veracity because to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity.

(b) The thesis that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity is veracious because we cannot give a plausible analysis of 'A believes that p' without taking 'that p' to be the name of a proposition.

A supporter of (a) could well agree with Prior and Quine that we can give a plausible analysis of 'A believes that p' without supposing that 'that p' names a proposition, but...
he would say that a reason for expecting that 'that p' names a proposition is that there are good arguments in favour of the view that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity. (A number of these were mentioned in the Introduction, and I do not think they need to be repeated here.) On this basis our propositionalist may well expect that 'that p' names a proposition. Only he would add this as an afterthought, rather than as the basis of his claim that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity.

Now it seems clear to me that the Prior-Quine objection just does not apply to this kind of propositionalist. What Prior and Quine would need to argue against a supporter of (a) is that we have no grounds for expecting that 'that p' names a proposition in 'A believes that p' because there is no need (or it is incorrect) to suppose that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity. And this they have not done. What would have been shown, at best, is that support for (b) is untenable. In other words, the most that would have been shown is that to claim that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity because on any plausible analysis of 'A believes that p' 'that p' names a proposition is erroneous; it is erroneous because we can give a plausible analysis of 'A believes that p' without construing 'that p' to be a name. But there are philosophers who would sanction the view that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity for reasons stronger than (or other than) those involving support for (b). Whether or not they are right to do so is, of course, another matter.
In sum, the underlying difficulty of the Prior-Quine proposal is that it is enmeshed in an essentially superficial appreciation of the problem. Both Prior and Quine seem to think that it is enough to show that there is an alternative analysis to the one proposed by the propositionalist. But the issue is whether or not we are justified in employing an alternative analysis.

Certainly this objection raises broader concerns. If the Prior-Quine proposal is unsatisfactory in this manner then would not any attempt to produce a paraphrase or analysans of 'A believes that p' that does not name or denote a proposition be short-circuited in the same way? Moreover, would not any paraphrase with the point of avoiding an ontological commitment to xs prove equally to be futile?

In my opinion, paraphrases do different jobs in different circumstances. Let us look at the last question first. Consider, for example, Russell's well known Theory of Descriptions. In 'On Denoting' (1905, Pp 103-119) Russell attempted to give a paraphrase of sentences such as 'The present king of France is bald' in which the definite description 'the present king of France' is eliminated. Now, in this particular case Russell knew, or had very good reasons for thinking, prior to giving his paraphrase that 'the present king of France' is not referential. How, for instance, can 'The present king of France is bald' contain a reference to the present king of France, given that France does not presently have a monarchy? Also, how would it be possible to make a true negative existential claim such as 'The present king of France does not exist' if some object must be denoted by 'the present king of France'?
These were some of the considerations that Russell had in mind when he attempted his famous paraphrases of sentences containing definite descriptions. In the view of many philosophers, these considerations make it rather implausible to suppose that a definite description must be referential. But if this view is correct then it ought not only to be possible, but also a challenge to formulate a paraphrase of 'The present king of France is bald' in which it does not even look as if reference is being made to such an object as the present king of France. In this context, it is clear that the type of problem facing Prior and Quine does not apply to Russell. (Of course, there is a lot more to Russell's theory than I have set out here.)

There is another way in which a paraphrase can get around the Prior-Quine type of problem. In my opinion, if 'that p' does name or denote a proposition in 'A believes that p' then no paraphrase that does not refer to a proposition is possible. But if, on the other hand, we can formulate a paraphrase of 'A believes that p', or, more strictly speaking, a paraphrase of a sentence of this form, and then show that the paraphrase does not name or denote a proposition, we may infer that the claim that 'that p' names or denotes a proposition in 'A believes that p' is false. In my view, we put to the test the claim that 'that p' names or denotes a proposition in 'A believes that p' whenever we attempt to formulate a paraphrase of this sort. In Chapter XIII I defend this conception of the paraphrase and endeavour to put it to good use. However, it is clear that Prior and Quine cannot adopt this line of argument since they do not offer us a paraphrase of any sort.
Certainly paraphrases serve more useful purposes than I have outlined here. However, a discussion of the paraphrase is resumed in Chapter XIII.

There is another objection to Prior and Quine. According to Donald Davidson (1968, p.167), in Word and Object Quine gives up holding that the content-sentence, i.e., the sentence following 'believes that', in 'A believes that p' has logical structure. However, Quine has denied that this was ever what he intended. In his 'Reply to Kaplan' (1969), Quine says:

I should stress that I have not meant to represent them [sentences such as 'A believes that p'] without logical or grammatical structure. This would be intolerable, for it would represent us, absurdly, as acquiring an infinite vocabulary. On the contrary, I attributed a logical grammar to the intermediate contexts. I construed 'that' as an operator that attaches to a sentence to produce a name of a proposition. Then switching to an alternative approach which shunned propositions, I construed 'believes that' rather as an attitudinative: a part of speech that applies to a singular term and a sentence to produce a sentence. More complex operations come into play in the analysis of polyadic belief. (p. 344)

So who are we to believe? I think that we may well accept that Quine did not intend to represent the content-sentence in sentences of the form 'A believes that p' as not having logical structure. But Quine's accomplishments do not appear to match his intentions. Quine's portrayal of logical structure cannot correspond to the actual structure had by sentences that take the 'A believes that p' form. For if we know the logical structure of these sentences we would be able to resolve the apparent paradox that arises if we, for example, substitute 'the Head of the Church of England' for 'the Queen' in 'Stacy
believes that the Queen is married' yet end up with a sentence of a different truth value. But Quine has said nothing that resolves this apparent dilemma. So the logical structure that Quine proposes cannot be the actual structure of sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married'. But precisely why finding logical structure should enable us to resolve the apparent dilemma that arises when we make substitutions such as those above, and the importance of resolving this apparent dilemma, is explained in the next Chapter.
1. In one of his famous articles, 'On Saying That' (1968), Donald Davidson, despite his differences with Prior and Quine (cf. Chapter VI), follows both these philosophers in presenting a case against the thesis that that-clauses name or denote propositions in sentences of indirect discourse. More specifically, Davidson proposes a novel account of the logical form of sentences of indirect discourse, such as 'Galileo said that the earth moves', in which the that-clause is banished, and thereby not counted as a term that names or denotes anything at all let alone a proposition. Moreover, it is implied that sentences of propositional attitude, for example, 'Galileo believes that the earth moves' and 'Galileo doubts that the earth moves', generally exhibit the same logical form and hence, for the same reason, do not contain that-clauses that name or denote propositions. A discussion of propositional attitude sentences is taken up a little more fully in a later article of Davidson's, 'Thought and Talk' (1975).

However, reprobating against proposition-entities is not Davidson's prime concern. Of somewhat greater concern for Davidson is the question as to just what is the logical form of such sentences as 'Galileo said that the earth moves'. Davidson notes that if we take surface grammar as a guide, we see that 'Galileo said that the earth moves' contains the sentence 'the earth moves', which in turn
contains the singular term 'the earth', and a predicate, 'moves'. But unless we are to put ourselves up against the principle of substitutivity, the singular term 'the earth' can be replaced, so far as the truth or falsity of the containing sentence is concerned, by any other coextensive singular term.  

Clearly, though, there may not be a preservation of truth value if, say, 'the third planet' is substituted for the coextensive 'the earth' in 'Galileo said that the earth moves'. Consequently, either we are wrong about the logical form, or we are wrong about the reference of the singular term. So it seems.

Further, we cannot solve the difficulties surrounding indirect discourse by simply abolishing singular terms. For the difficulties affect not just singular terms and whole sentences, but also quantifiers, variables, predicates and connectives. As Davidson points out, not only is there a problem, for example, with substituting 'the Evening Star' for 'Venus' in 'Scott said that Venus is an inferior planet', there is equally a problem with substituting 'is identical with Venus or with Mercury' for the coextensive 'is an inferior planet' (1968, Pp 158-9).

We have some idea, then, of the difficulty confronting any theory that attempts to give an adequate account of the logical form of each sentence of a language. But what should we expect of an adequate account of the logical form?

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1. The principle of substitutivity can be expressed in a number of different ways. An ordinary language formulation comes from Quines (1953, p.139): "given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true". In symbols the principle may be put thus: \( (x \equiv y) \rightarrow (Fx \equiv Fy) \)
of a sentence? According to Davidson, such an account must enable us to see how the truth conditions can be given for all sentences of the language. But given that the language consists in an infinite number of sentences, this can be done instructionally only by introducing recursive devices. Essentially the idea is to find a finite number of parts from which all the sentences are constructed (the vocabulary), state the truth-affecting characteristics of the parts, and then give the truth conditions of each sentence on the basis of the truth-affecting characteristics of its parts and the way in which they are assembled. (p.159)

For Davidson, to give the logical form of a sentence is also to catalogue "the features that determine what sentences it is a logical consequence of, and what sentences it has as logical consequences" (p.160). Thus consequence and theory of truth are interlocked. But of the two theory of truth is more basic, for logical consequence is defined in terms of truth. To say that a sentence $S_1$ is a logical consequence of a sentence $S$ is to say that $S_1$ is true if $S$ is no matter how the non-logical constants are to be interpreted in $S$ and $S_1$. (p.160)

1. Davidson also considers that there is a fundamental connection between the concept of truth and the concept of meaning. But he seems to have wavered somewhat as to the precise nature of this connection. In 'Truth and Meaning' (1967) we are told that "to give the truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence" (p.456). But in more recent times Davidson appears to have softened his position. In his 'Reply to Foster' (1976) it is conceded that "A theory of truth, no matter how well selected, is not a theory of meaning" (p.41).

In The Logic of Grammar (1975, p.4) Davidson and Harman also suggest that logical form is designed to facilitate the statement of rules of valid argument. Thus, on this view, logical form also determines the logical consequences of a sentence in conjunction with other sentences and what conjunction of sentences entail it.
The trouble is that in the case of attitudinal sentences and sentences of indirect discourse the relation between truth and consequence appears to break down. In sentences such as

(1) Galileo said that the earth moves

we perceive familiar structure in the words 'the earth moves'. And structure there must be, Davidson tells us, if we are to have a theory of truth at all, for an infinite number of indicative sentences meaningfully fill in the blank in 'Galileo said that __'. Thus, we cannot give the truth conditions of all the resultant sentences one by one, but only by discovering a structure in virtue of which we can treat each sentence as composed of a finite number of devices that contribute systematically to its truth conditions. Once we assign familiar structure, however, we determine the consequence relations of the sentence. Yet, as we know, these are in the case of sentences of indirect discourse such as (1) consequences that we are not prepared to accept. Worse still, common sense is able to sanction few inferences based on the words following the 'said that' of indirect discourse.

The paradox can be put this way. We seem to require semantically significant structure in the content-sentences of indirect discourse, i.e., the sentences following 'said that'. But equally the failure of consequence-relations suggests that the content-sentences are semantically dormant. But logical form and consequence-relations cannot be divorced in this way. (p.161)

Davidson considers a number of theories of indirect discourse. But Davidson's own proposal aimed at solving
the above paradox is that the logical form of (1) is represented by two paratactically joined utterances:

(2) Galileo said that. The earth moves.

To utter (2) is to make two utterances. The first refers to the second in virtue of the demonstrative 'that', but the second has no logical or semantic connection with the first. As will shortly be explained, it is upon this last point that everything depends: "from a semantic point of view the content-sentence in indirect discourse is not contained in the sentence whose truth counts" (p.171).

Combining this proposal with a gloss on 'Galileo said that' which Davidson puts as 'Some utterance of Galileo's and my next utterance make us samesayers', we obtain the following reading of (1)

(3) Some utterance of Galileo's and my next utterance make us samesayers. The earth moves.

The underlying notion here is that of samesaying: if I utter (1) then I represent Galileo as having samesaid my second utterance 'The earth moves'; and we are made samesayers as such when some utterance of Galileo's matches my second utterance 'in purport'.

Davidson is now able to explain a great deal indeed. The appearance of the failure of the laws of extensionality for utterances of indirect discourse is due to our mistaking what are really two logically independent utterances for one. Given this independence, there can be no general rules concerning the effects of substitution,

1. Apparently (3) is not to be understood as an analysans, but as an 'expository and heuristic device'. See Davidson (1976, p.39).
which is made in the second utterance, on the truth value of the first. But since the 'that' refers to the utterance of the content-sentence, any change in that sentence changes the reference of 'that', and hence might alter the truth value of the first utterance.

The paradox that utterances of indirect discourse do not have the logical consequences they should if we are to have an adequate theory of truth is also resolved. What usually follows the verb 'said', the demonstrative 'that', has only the structure of a singular term. Where the 'that' in 'Galileo said that' succeeds in referring, we can infer that Galileo said something; but this is an agreeable inference.

The thesis that (1) contains a that-clause which names or denotes a proposition is also ruled out simply because (1) does not contain a that-clause. The 'that' in 'Galileo said that' may refer, but the reference is to an utterance, not a proposition.

The fact that Davidson retains the semantic structure of the content-sentence, e.g., the parts retain their usual reference (or purported reference), thus enabling the logical form of sentences such as (1) to be preserved, gives Davidson's proposal a great advantage over rival theories such as those of Prior and Quine (see Chapter VI) and the quotational approach adopted by major strands of the sentential theory (see Chapter III), which abolish the semantic structure of the content-sentence.¹

¹ Davidson holds that semantic structure is also abolished on Scheffler's theory. However, there is some controversy as to whether this is correct. See R.J. Haack, 'Davidson on Learnable Languages' (1978).
Davidson's proposal also has an advantage over all the alternative theories that have been examined so far, which, although they might not abolish the semantic structure of content-sentences, have done nothing to explain how the required structure is preserved.

Another advantage of Davidson's theory over quotational theories, i.e., theories that analyze (1) as quoting a sentence, inscription, or utterance, is that the gloss Davidson puts on (1) does not quote anything. Davidson's theory, therefore, is not subject to the various versions of The Translation Argument that seriously damage these theories.

It should be pointed out that the problem solving purport of Davidson's theory underlies the theory's very derivation. In other words, it is not that Davidson has come up with a theory that happens to have certain side-benefits, but that the very genesis of Davidson's theory lies in the fact that Davidson set out to present a theory that resolves a certain number of serious problems. Davidson's theory is to be perceived as a reaction to a specific set of problems.

In 'Thought and Talk' (1975), Davidson's programme is extended somewhat so as to include certain utterances of propositional attitude. Utterances such as 'I believe that snow is white' and 'He believes that snow is white', we are told, have the logical form of two utterances paratactically joined, with the 'that' referring ahead to an utterance on the verge of production. (p.18)

But what gloss should we put on 'I believe that' and 'He believes that'? Clearly we cannot gloss 'He believes
that', along the lines of 'Galileo said that', as 'Some utterance which samesays my next utterance is believed/believed-true by him'. For even if my utterance of 'He believes that snow is white' consists of two utterances, there may not exist any utterance that samesays my second utterance. Believing unlike saying need not produce utterances. Nor can we gloss 'He believes that' as 'My next utterance is believed/believed-true by him'. A person unfamiliar with English may intelligently believe that snow is white even though he does not understand my utterance 'Snow is white'. Moreover, there is no point in saying that he believes-true my utterance, as the very notion of believing-true is disadvantageous (see Chapters III and IV).

However, Davidson does have a suggestion: he does not give us a gloss but an intimation of one when he writes:

> When I say, 'Jones believes that snow is white' I describe Jones's state of mind directly: it is indeed the state of mind someone is in who could honestly assert 'Snow is white' if he spoke English. (p.20)

I think it must be admitted that this claim requires greater elucidation. However, I do not know how Davidson could make the elucidation. Davidson, I gather, would not want to read 'Jones believes that snow is white' as 'Jones is in a state of mind whereby he could honestly assert 'Snow is white' if he spoke English' for two good reasons: (a) The reading contains a quotation and, therefore, falls victim to the objections, some of which Davidson accepts, that beset quotational theories (cf. Chapter III for a discussion of these objections), and (b). We would not be making use of the recommended paratactic construction.
Possibly, Davidson could try a reading something like: 'Jones is in a state of mind whereby he could honestly assert, as a competent speaker, some utterance which samesays my next utterance. Snow is white'. But a belief that snow is white does not consist in a honest assertion by a competent speaker which samesays my utterance 'Snow is white', since someone may have this belief even though he makes no assertions whatever. Rather, an honest assertion made by Jones which samesays my utterance 'Snow is white', where Jones is a competent user of the language he is speaking, is an enunciation of Jones's belief that snow is white. But, then, 'Jones is in a state of mind whereby he could honestly assert, as a competent speaker, some utterance which samesays my next utterance. Snow is white' is itself explicated by reference to Jones's belief that snow is white; so that even as a loose reading of 'Jones believes that snow is white' it is circular.

Davidson also has to handle utterances such as 'Galileo said something true' and 'Galileo believes something true'. Some attempt is made to do this in 'True to the Facts' (1969). There Davidson recognizes that:

(4) Peter said something true

cannot be read as 'Some (past) utterance of Peter's makes us samesayers', since I may not have said, or know how to say, the appropriate thing. Davidson's tentative recommendation is that we render (4) as something like 'Peter uttered a sentence that translates a sentence of English true under the circumstances'. (p.763)

The suggestion that we retain, rather than dispense with, utterances such as 'Galileo said something true'
and, presumably, 'Galileo said something' seems laudable. Intuitively, at any rate, 'Galileo said that the earth moves' entails 'Galileo said something'. But even if we do not accept the entailment, utterances such as 'Galileo said something' and 'Galileo said something true' are of a common variety and apparently deliver us some information. Thus it is better to come to terms with such utterances rather than banish them. In this respect, Davidson's theory has an advantage over the approach taken by Scheffler and Quine.

There is, so far as I am concerned, another factor that favours Davidson's theory over its sentential rivals, as well as Scheffler's theory. If either 'Galileo said something true' or 'Galileo said something' is true, we may take it that Galileo has made some utterance. This is not so, however, if 'Galileo believes something' is true. For, as Davidson well recognizes, believing unlike saying need not produce utterances. Moreover, if the utterance 'Galileo believes something' is true then, unlike when an utterance of the form 'Galileo believes that the earth moves' is true, there is no suggestion that someone else has made an utterance that in any sense represents Galileo's state of belief. Thus, as Davidson has things, if 'Galileo believes something' is true, there may be no utterance that can serve as the object of Galileo's belief. This is similarly the case with such utterances as 'Galileo doubts something' and 'Galileo desires something'. Consequently Davidson dispenses with any suggestion that the

1. Well, generally speaking, this is the case. An exception is when someone says something using sign-language without actually uttering any words.
propositional attitudes must take utterances as their objects. Nor does Davidson construe the propositional attitudes as having objects of some other kind. This sets him apart from Scheffler who claims that beliefs relate agents to objects (inscriptions), but his position accords with Quine's decision to extirpate objects of the attitudes.

2. Although Davidson's theory has won as wide degree of acceptance, a number of objections have been brought against it. I shall consider some of these, and propose some of my own.

(a) Davidson's claim that sentences of indirect discourse such as (1) consist of an expression referring to a speaker, the two-place predicate 'said', and a demonstrative referring to an utterance has been objected to by I.G. McFetridge (1976). According to McFetridge, since on Davidson's account the expression 'that' in (1) has the logical role of a demonstrative singular term referring to the ensuing utterance 'The earth moves', the position it occupies is open to first-order quantification. Thus, McFetridge holds, on Davidson's theory "(∃x) (Galileo said x)" may be inferred from (1) and may seem to provide a reading for 'Galileo said something'. Moreover, if in uttering 'Galileo said that', the speaker does succeed in referring to an utterance, by means of the demonstrative, we can deduce that Galileo said something. Hence we are provided with a plausible explanation of the inference from (1) to 'Galileo said something'. McFetridge suggests that Davidson's theory has the odd consequence that the things said by Galileo are not (or
at least not necessarily) his utterances but utterances of mine, yours or possibly anyone's. But while McFetridge considers this odd, he finds it difficult to see in it an actual error.

All the same, McFetridge proposes that Davidson's theory does have an untenable consequence:

Suppose we ask: how many things did Galileo say (possibly on some particular occasion which interests us)? The answer must be given: as many distinct things as he came by his utterance on that occasion to stand to in the saying relation. But if the things to which he stands in that relation are utterances, possibly of anybody's, this number can be indefinitely extended. For example, each appropriate utterance of 'The earth moves' is a distinct thing to which Galileo stands in the saying relation i.e., a distinct thing said by Galileo. Producing more and more such utterances we can multiply at will the number of things said by Galileo, which is absurd. (p.136)

I think, however, that McFetridge is a bit too hard on Davidson. Certainly on Davidson's theory (1) affirms that Galileo said what is referred to by the demonstrative 'that', i.e., my utterance 'The earth moves'. But the force of McFetridge's objection hangs on how on Davidson's theory the word 'said' in (1) is to be explicated. In relation to utterances of direct discourse, such as 'Smith said "The earth moves"', the words quoted may be said to name just those words the speaker purportedly uttered in the asserting mode.¹ In this case the word 'said' is interchangeable with 'uttered assertively'. If Davidson were to hold that (1) affirms that Galileo said my utterance 'The earth moves' in this sense then it would seem that McFetridge is right.

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¹ Not that this is the only account of direct discourse. It is sometimes accepted that the words quoted may be a translation of the words actually uttered by the speaker.
to hold that Davidson's theory is untenable. But it is
difficult to see how Davidson is committed to such a restricted
use of 'said' in (1). What I think Davidson could (and
would) say is that the word 'said' in (1) expresses a
relation of samesaying (is interchangeable with 'samessaid').
Davidson could then simply say that in asserting (1) 'Galileo
said that the earth moves' I affirm that Galileo uttered
some utterance the same in import as my utterance 'The earth
moves'. On this proposal, there is no suggestion that
Galileo uttered my utterance 'The earth moves'. Moreover,
although it is true that by producing more and more utterances
of 'The earth moves' we multiply the number of things said by
Galileo, this is true only in the sense that we multiply the
number of utterances of which Galileo's utterance is the same
in import. But there is no particular problem with this.

(b) It is sometimes argued that Davidson faces a
problem over iterated oblique contexts such as

(5) Davidson said that Galileo said that the
earth moves.

One philosopher who has pursued this line of
objection is Robin Haack (1971). Haack points out that on
Davidson's theory when I assert (1) 'Galileo said that the
earth moves' I make two utterances: (6) 'Galileo said
that' and (7) 'The earth moves'; but it is (6), not (7),
that is asserted. (Clearly in asserting (1) I do not assert
that the earth moves.) (7), rather, is put on display. Now,
following davidson's procedure, we should say that an assertion
of (5) breaks up, first, into

(8) Davidson said that
(1) Galileo said that the earth moves.

Accordingly, Haack holds, (8) is asserted whereas (1) is put on display. However, (1) in turn breaks up into (6) and (7). This gives us the sequence

(8) Davidson said that

(6) Galileo said that

(7) The earth moves

The problem with this, Haack argues, is that (8) is asserted and (7) is displayed but (6) is apparently (though impossibly) both asserted and displayed. For (6) is displayed when considered as referred to by (8) and yet is asserted when considered in relation to (7).

However, as it stands this objection is not quite convincing. I think that Haack is right to hold that on Davidson's theory (8) is to be understood as asserted and (6), considered in relation to (8), as displayed. But it is not clear as to why Davidson is committed to holding that (6), considered in relation to (7), must be asserted. Haack (p. 356) says that if Davidson's explanation that (1) is broken up into (6) and (7) is to be made general then (6) must be asserted and (7) displayed. But there seems no reason to accept the assumption that if (6) is asserted in the sequence (6):(7) then it must be asserted in the sequence (8):(6):(7). Surely Davidson could argue that since (8):(6):(7) forms a different sequence to (6):(7), the function of (6) in the former is different to what it is in the latter. It could, then, be argued that in the sequence (8):(6):(7) (8) is asserted but both (6) and (7) merely displayed. (6)'s being displayed, not asserted, would not disqualify it from referring to (7) any more than (7)'s being displayed, not
asserted, would disqualify it from referring to the earth.

Nevertheless, iterated oblique contexts do appear to present Davidson with a problem. On Davidson's theory, the logical form proposal of (5) 'Davidson said that Galileo said that the earth moves' apparently is 'Davidson said that. Galileo said that. The earth moves'. Putting Davidson's gloss on the logical form proposal, we obtain

\[ (9) \text{Some utterance of Davidson's and my next utterance make us samesayers. Some utterance of Galileo's and my next utterance make us samesayers. The earth moves.} \]

A difficulty with this, though, as pointed out by Roger Gallie (1977/8, p.24), is that what 'my next utterance' in the first utterance in (9) refers to is the second utterance in (9), i.e., 'Some utterance of Galileo's and my next utterance make us samesayers'. But this is at best only one of the utterances the first utterance needs to refer to if the analysis is to work.

We might try to get around Gallie's objection by introducing parentheses in (9) thus:

\[ (9') \text{Some utterance of Davidson's and my next utterance make us samesayers. (Some utterance of Galileo's and my next utterance make us samesayers. The earth moves.)} \]

where the first utterance refers to what is contained in the parentheses. But since the first utterance in (9') refers to two utterances in the parentheses, incorporation of 'my next utterance' in the first utterance makes (9') technically

1. This use of parentheses is suggested by Platts in Ways of Meaning (1979, p.122).
To avoid this difficulty we would need to rewrite (9') as

(9'') Some utterance of Davidson's and my next two utterances make us samesayers. Some utterance of Galileo's and my next utterance make us samesayers. The earth moves.

'Davidson said that' would thus contain a certain degree of ambiguity in that sometimes it would make mention of one utterance, sometimes of two, and so on. But now suppose I utter:

(10) Davidson said that. The earth moves. Pigs fly.

Here the ambiguity of 'that' in 'Davidson said that' makes it unclear as to whether one or two utterances is being referred to. Suppose, though, that I utter:

(10') Davidson said that the earth moves. Pigs fly.

Here there is no such ambiguity. But if we are to believe the paratactic story then the same ambiguity should be present since

(10') Davidson said that the earth moves. Pigs fly

reduces to

(10) Davidson said that. The earth moves. Pigs fly.

I do not say that this constitutes a fatal objection to Davidson's theory, but it is certainly a problem that Davidson needs to resolve.

(c) A more fundamental objection has been put forward by William Lycan (1972-3). According to Lycan, 'my
last utterance' in

(11) The earth moves. (3x) (Galileo's utterance
x and my last utterance makes us samesayers)¹:

being an indexical which picks out the immedi-
ately previous utterance of 'The earth moves',
is a singular term in referring position (there
is no suggestion on anyone's part that it occurs
within an opaque construction). If so, we may
safely apply existential generalization to it,
and thus eventually derive.

[(12)] (3x) (x = my last utterance) from [(11)].

But if [(11)] is the correct analysis of
(gives the logical form of) (1) ['Galileo said
that the earth moves'], then whatever is
entailed by [(11)] is entailed by (1)...So if
[(11)] entails the existence of my (the speak-
er's) last utterance of 'the earth moves', so
does (1). (1), then, according to Davidson's
analysis, is an indexical sentence which is
ontologically committed (whenever a speaker
utters it) to a current utterance of the
speaker's. E.g., if I accept and utter (1)
in 1972, I commit myself to the existence of
a certain utterance dated 1972.

But this cannot be right. (1) taken by
itself does not entail anything about any
1972 utterance. Galileo could have said any-
thing he liked without there having been any
utterances (or even any people) after 1900.

(Pp 138-9)

A number of remarks may be made in relation to this.

First, both (1) and (11) may be construed either as sentences
simpliciter or as utterances (uttered sentences), but see
ahead. If we construe (11) as a sentence simpliciter, and
presuming that declarative sentences are truth value bearers,
is it the case that (11) entails (12)? Gallie (1977/8),
commenting upon Lycan's argument, suggests that the sentence
(11) taken by itself does not entail '(3x) (x = my last
utterance)'. The reason for this, he tells us, is that
although my uttering of a token of (11) produces a reference

¹. This is just another way of phrasing (3).
for 'my last utterance', this is not the case with the sentence (11) taken by itself because it is "conceivable that one have not said other things than [(11)] or its first part" (p.20).

However, Gallie is guilty of a confusion here. It is true that (11), construed as a sentence simpliciter, does not produce a reference for 'my last utterance'. What we require in addition to sentence (11) is that I make the appropriate utterance. But it does not follow that (11) does not entail (12). In fact, (11) does entail (12) because (11) is true only if some utterance of mine is my last. In a similar way, the sentence 'The present King of France is bald' does not guarantee a reference for the singular term 'The present King of France'. But 'The present King of France is bald' entails '(\exists x) (x = the present King of France)' because the former is true only if the latter is.

So the sentence (11) taken by itself does not provide us with a reference for 'my last utterance'. But there is no problem with this because neither does (1). On the other hand, although (11) entails (12), it is true to say that (1), construed as a sentence simpliciter, does not entail (12). For presuming sentences are truth value bearers, we can conceive of (1)'s being true as a sentence even although Galileo is the only person to have ever uttered anything.

All the same, it might be said that this is not a worry for Davidson since he is concerned with the treatment of (1) and (11) as utterances. Now (11), taken as an utterance, entails (12) for at least the same reason that (11),
taken as a sentence simpliciter, entails (12). But, contra Lycan, Gallie (p.21) proposes that (1), construed as an utterance, also entails (12). The reason for this, we are told, is that as soon as I utter (1) 'Galileo said that the earth moves', it is true that some utterance of mine is my last. In fact, Gallie suggests, as soon as I formulate any utterance it is true that (3x) (x = my last utterance).

We might attempt to counter this rejoinder to Lycan by arguing that the claim that (1), construed as an utterance, entails (12) because as soon as I utter it I make (12) true cannot but arouse suspicion. For it could be equally claimed that my utterance 'Is today Friday?' entails (12) because as soon as I utter the question I make (12) true. But a question can hardly be said to have entailment relations, for questions are simply not the kind of things that can be true or false. If we are going to hold that my utterance (1) entails (12) then we cannot justify this by saying that in uttering (1) I make (12) true.

However, this counter does not quite prove enough. It could be replied that, although utterances of questions cannot have truth values, this is certainly not the case with declarative utterances. But once we grant truth values to declarative utterances we must grant them entailment relations. (1) though, if construed as an utterance, is to be construed as a declarative utterance. Hence, it might be argued, if we grant that (1), construed as a declarative utterance, can be true, we must admit that whenever it is true (12) is also true, since as soon as I utter (1) I make (12) true. But this is to suppose that (1)
entails (12).

Nonetheless, I do not think it is correct to say that (1), whether construed as a declarative utterance or not, entails (12). Of paramount concern to Davidson is that we be able to ascertain logical form. But what should we say has logical form? Davidson wants to give the logical form of (1) 'Galileo said that the earth moves' construed as an utterance. So it would seem that Davidson is concerned with the logical form of utterances. However, we cannot give the logical form of (1) unless we can give its entailment relations. On Davidson's theory, one entailment that (1) has is (12) (\(\exists x\) (x = my last utterance)). But what are we to say is this entailment relation between? Is it supposed to be between two utterances or an utterance and a sentence? In other words, although (1) is to be construed as an utterance, is (12) to be construed as an utterance, or could it equally be construed as a sentence? If Davidson allows that there may be entailment relations between utterances and sentences, he must also allow that sentences, not just utterances, have logical form. Davidson, then, would be concerned not just with giving the logical form of (12), construed as a sentence, but also with the logical form of any sentence, including (1) where (1) is construed as a sentence. The problem with this, as I shall shortly argue, is that Davidson's logical form proposal does not work for (1) where (1) is taken as a sentence. Of course it might be replied that even if Davidson has not succeeded in giving the logical form of (1), construed as a sentence, which he would need to do if he holds that there can be entailments between utterances and sentences,
at least Davidson can still maintain that (1) entails (12) provided that both (1) and (12) are construed as utterances. However, as I shall now attempt to show, this proposal does not hold either.

What I think we must allow is that the term 'utterance' is ambiguous — it can be taken to mean either 'an act of utterance' or 'what is uttered', just as the term 'assertion' may be taken to mean either 'an act of assertion' or 'what is asserted'. Now, the notion that my act of uttering (1) entails my act of uttering (12) can be firmly put to rest. Certainly, given that I have uttered both (1) and (12), if my act of uttering (1) is true then so is my act of uttering (12). But this does not show that the former act of utterance entails the latter act of utterance. To say that an act of utterance a entails an act of utterance b implies that both a and b exist (or have existed). However, although it did not in fact happen, it could have been the case that I uttered (1) even although neither I nor anyone else uttered (12). In such a circumstance, my act of uttering (1), presuming acts of utterance can be true, may have been true even though no act of uttering (12) existed. That is, my act of uttering (1) could have been true even though no act of uttering (12) were true. But, then, it cannot be said that my act of uttering (1) entails my act of uttering (12).

So if we are still to say that there are entailment relations between utterances, we should be supposing that the entailments are between what we utter. What we utter (as distinct from what we assert or state) are sentences. To utter (1) is simply to utter a sentence. Davidson fully
recognizes this. But it is not a necessary feature of uttered things that they are uttered. This is not to suggest that it is possible for something to be both uttered and not uttered. Rather, it is to say that circumstances could have been such that the things that have in fact been uttered (sentences) did not get uttered. Or, to put this in 'possible worlds' talk, there is a possible world in which the things that have been uttered in the actual world (sentences) have not been uttered. Now, undoubtedly, as soon as I utter (1) 'Galileo said that the earth moves' it is true that (3x) (x = my last utterance). Moreover, we cannot alter the fact that (1) has been uttered by many people. But given that of anything that has been uttered it could have been the case that it did not get uttered, it follows that it could have been the case that (1) was not uttered by anyone. Yet if things had been such that (1) was not uttered by anyone, and Galileo said that the earth moves, then (1) would have been true even although no one uttered it. In other words, if a possible world in which (1) is not uttered had been actual, and Galileo said that the earth moves, then (1) would have been true in the actual world even although it had not been uttered. But, then, the claim that (1) construed as my utterance (construed as uttered by me) entails (12) because as soon as I utter (1) I make (12) true is simply false.

A conceivable reply is that although it is possible for (1) never to have been uttered, if it had not been uttered then it would not have been true. On this presumption, sentences are true only if they have in fact been uttered. But at least one problem with this is that we know that
uttered sentences have entailment relations even if the entailed sentences have not been uttered. For example, 'Most people have two eyes' as uttered by me entails 'It is not the case that most people have three eyes', 'It is not the case that most people have four eyes', and so on ad infinitum. But if 'Most people have two eyes' as uttered by me is true, it cannot be the case that all the entailed sentences (the related sentences that must also be true) have been uttered. For these sentences are indefinite in number.

Of course it does not follow that because Gallie's basis for holding that (1) entails (12) is unsound (1) does not entail (12). But this is now not difficult to show. If (1) 'Galileo said that the earth moves' as uttered now by me could have been true even if no one had uttered it, there does not seem to be any difficulty in supposing that things could also have been such that Galileo was the only person to have ever uttered anything. That is, it seems that (1) as uttered now by me could have been true even if no one had uttered it and Galileo was the only person to have ever uttered anything. But if this is so, (1) as uttered by me certainly does not entail (12).

The notion that (1) could have been true even if Galileo was the only person to have ever uttered anything has also been pursued by Simon Blackburn (1975). Well, almost. Strictly speaking, Blackburn suggests that (1) could have been true even if Galileo was the last person to have ever uttered anything. According to Blackburn, there is no logical equivalence between (S) 'X said that the earth moves' and (D) 'X same said this: "the earth moves"'
This is because:

I cannot now make an utterance such that (S) entails that X same-said that utterance. At least two different classes of possibility rule that out. Firstly (S) doesn't entail that there were any utterances at all ever made after X said that the earth moved, since it is possible that the utterance made by X was the last one ever. Secondly of any utterance I now make it will be possible that X should have said that the earth moved and not same-said that, since that utterance might have failed to mean what X said. Even if it does mean it, there is a possible world in which it does not. So (S) does not entail (D).

(Pp 185-6)

I shall not discuss the second of Blackburn's reasons for denying that (S) entails (D). The first reason is, I believe, correct. However, the argument is rather succinctly stated, and Blackburn cannot be said to have made any serious effort to rule out likely objections.

One objection that has been levelled against Blackburn is that if my utterance (S) is true then (S) must have been uttered by me, and hence X could not have been the last person to ever utter anything. Nevertheless, this objection is wrong for exactly the same reason it is wrong to maintain my utterance (1) must entail (12) because as soon as I utter (1) I make (12) true. My utterances (what I have uttered, i.e., sentences) need not have been uttered in order to be true.

Perhaps, though, it might be objected that although (S) (or (1)) construed as my utterance (construed as uttered by me) need not have been uttered in order to be true, if (S) (or (1)) is true then I must have uttered 'The earth moves'. For (S) (or (1)) purports to refer to my utterance
'The earth moves' and as such is true only if I have in fact uttered those words. To claim otherwise is simply to beg the question against Davidson by presupposing that (S) (or (1)) cannot be glossed as (D) (or (2)) respectively. This is precisely what I deny. Surely Galileo could have said that the earth moves even if no one had uttered anything which same says Galileo's utterance, or even if no one other than Galileo had uttered anything. That is, it is surely the case that what Galileo said does not depend upon anyone's other then Galileo's having uttered anything. Things could have been such that Galileo was the only person to have ever uttered anything. Yet in such a circumstance the sentence (1) 'Galileo said that the earth moves' (which in the circumstance would have remained unuttered) would have to be true. At least this is so if we presume that the sentence existed. But, then, we can hardly suppose that (1) refers to my utterance of 'The earth moves'. To deny that (1) would be true in the circumstance implies that (1) is incapable in the circumstance of accurately reporting what Galileo said.

Another objection comes (indirectly) from John McDowell (1980, p.231). McDowell in effect accepts that (11), but not (1), entails (12). But he suggests that because Davidson only intended (11) to be an 'expository and heuristic device', an aid in instructing novices in the use of the saying primitive, there is no need to suppose that (1) must have all the entailments of (11).

However, there does appear to be an answer to this. On Davidson's theory, my utterance (1) cannot be true unless my utterance (11) is true. But if (1) entails (11)
then, since (11) entails (12), it must be the case that
(1) entails (12). Yet (1) does not entail (12). So the
thesis that (1) entails (11) (what Davidson is committed to)
must be false.

I do not propose that the case I have put against
Davidson proves that utterances such as 'Galileo said
that the earth moves' and 'Galileo believes that the earth
moves' do not amount to two utterances paratactically joined:
'Galileo said that. The earth moves' and 'Galileo believes
that. The earth moves' respectively. Hence it may still
be possible by appealing to a paratactic construction to
abolish that-clauses purporting to name or denote propositions.
What I do maintain, however, is that the gloss Davidson
puts on utterances of indirect discourse such as (1)
'Galileo said that the earth moves' is subject to serious
objection. It is also not clear what gloss Davidson
could put on utterances of propositional attitude such as
'Galileo believes that the earth moves'. But without an
adequate gloss, let alone an analysis, the paratactic
proposal is of little use.

Certainly Davidson's theory, if it held up, would,
as has been explained, achieve a great deal, especially with
regard to the retention of logical form. It is this side of
the theory which makes it very appealing. In my view, a
good theory of either the propositional attitudes or indirect
discourse should achieve what Davidson's theory sets out to
achieve. Unfortunately, in my opinion, Davidson's particular
way of going about this does not come off.

There are other theories that still need to be
looked at which, like Davidson's theory, provide readings
of sentences (utterances) of indirect discourse and propositional attitude that do not name or denote propositions that we are said to believe, doubt, desire, assert, etc. One of these theories is behaviourism. Behavioural theories have traditionally not claimed to achieve as much as Davidson's theory insofar as logical form is concerned, but it is also true that in this regard they do not make claims that they fail to live up to. In one respect, though, behaviourism does claim more than Davidson's theory: behaviourists often, though not always, maintain that they are giving analyses of sentences such as (1), whereas Davidson proposes more modestly, only to have given them a gloss. In the next Chapter, this much stronger claim of the behaviourist is examined.
Some of the strongest criticism of the view that what we believe when we believe that p is a proposition-entity has come from behaviourism. According to many philosophers of this school, it is possible to give an account of A's believing that p which completely avoids any mention of propositions as believed entities. There are a number of behavioural theories of this kind. I shall examine some of the best known of these and then attempt to give a general objection to the behavioural programme.

But, first, we might note some of the reasons as to why various philosophers have turned to behaviourism. Undoubtedly, one of these reasons is dissatisfaction with alternative theories. However, behaviourism does have a certain appeal in its own right. On our commonsense view of things we do seem to take certain forms of behaviour, or dispositions to behave in certain ways, as evidence of various mental states, such as beliefs, doubts, desires, etc. Sophisticated behaviourists do not identify actual forms of behaviour with mental states. Rather they tend to hold that to be in a particular mental state is simply to have a disposition to behave in a certain way, or to have a disposition to behave in a certain way in certain circumstances, and that actual forms of behaviour may provide evidence of these dispositions. One of the advantages often claimed for behaviourism is that it does away with supposing that
there are two different worlds: one of mental occurrences and another of physical occurrences, for the former, construed as behavioural dispositions, are wholly describable in terms of the latter. As a corollary of this, the well-known difficulty of having to explain how two worlds of a different nature can interact is held to vanish. In addition, since on standard behavioural theories our knowledge of 'mental' states is always based upon publicly observable phenomena, behaviourists are able to avoid appealing to introspection as a means of gaining knowledge of beliefs, desires, sensations, etc. This view does seem to have merit in the case of unconscious mental states; for introspection is rather inappropriate as a means of gaining knowledge of such states, whereas even psychoanalytically-minded psychologists put a great deal more stock in the evidence of one's behaviour in ascertaining unconscious thoughts and desires.

We might question whether all the purported advantages of behaviourism are unique to behaviourism. Defenders of Central State Materialism, for example, also represent themselves as having eliminated a dualism of mind and body, albeit by different means. Also, it should be pointed out that although behaviourists take the criteria of mental states to be behavioural, this view does not in itself imply that there are no private mental happenings. To draw this conclusion we need the further premise, which behaviourists usually accept, that there are no forms of mental behaviour that cannot be wholly described in the physical object idiom. But I can see no reason in principle why a behaviourist cannot reject this premise - after all,
'irreducible' mental behaviour is still a form of behaviour. All the same, behaviourists maintain that their approach has firm advantages. And it is largely from within the general stream of claimed advantages that behavioural attempts have been made to analyze propositional attitude sentences, particularly standard belief reports, without reference to propositions as objects of the attitudes. Let us now look at some specific theories. One fairly well known theory is to be found in Lord Russell's *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth* (1940), where an attempt is made to marry an analysis of belief to a non-intentional account of the interpretation of signs. Russell's theory is largely stated as an emendation of an earlier position put forward by Kaplan and Copilowish (1939). The latter had introduced the term 'implicit behaviour' to refer to whatever happens to or 'in' an organism when it uses signs. Implicit behaviour occasioned by a sign-vehicle is called an 'interpretation'. Associated with each sign-vehicle is a law of interpretation which describes the kind of interpretation that it occasions. (Where there is more than one law of interpretation the sign-vehicle is said to be ambiguous.) A sign is defined as a class of sign-vehicles bearing the same law of interpretation; this law being called an interpretant of the sign. An interpretation of a sign-vehicle is correct if the law which describes that interpretation has previously been taken as standard for sign-vehicles of that kind, i.e., of that sound or shape.
the objects of belief or as the bearers of truth-values. 

On the question of belief, we are told that an organism $O$ may be said to believe a sign-vehicle when $O$ has a correct interpretation of that sign-vehicle accompanied by an 'attitude of affirmation'. (This term is left undefined.) An organism $O$ may be said to believe a sign when, under certain conditions, $O$ has a (correct) interpretation of a sign-vehicle of that sign, accompanied by an attitude of affirmation. Thus, we are told, believing a sign is a disposition. On this account of belief:

an organism may be said to have a belief even where signs are not involved. This is the case where the organism has an implicit behaviour of such a kind that, had it been occasioned by a sign-vehicle, it would have constituted a belief of that sign-vehicle. Thus to say "$O$ believes that $S$" is ambiguous: we may mean that an instance of '$S'$ occasioned in $O$ a belief in '$S$'; or we may simply mean that, although no instance of '$S'$ was operative on $O$, under certain conditions, $O$ behaves (implicitly, at least) in such and such ways. (Pp 481-2)

The term 'appropriate' is now introduced to describe a certain kind of relation that may obtain between implicit behaviour and situations. When an organism $O$ is in the presence of, and recognizes, a situation $S$, we may say that the implicit behaviour of $O$ occasioned by $S$ is appropriate to $S$. Interpretations being instances of implicit behaviour (namely, those occasioned by sign-vehicles), we may say that a correct interpretation made by $O$ is appropriate to $S$ if the interpretation is an instance of the implicit behaviour which would be appropriate to $S$ if $O$ were in the presence of, and recognized, $S$. From this follows a definition of 'true':

A sentential sign is true if and only if there
exists a situation of such a kind that a correct interpretation of any sign-vehicle of the sign is appropriate to the situation.

Unfortunately, this account is not as clear as it could be. Kaplan and Copilowish, I gather, do not wish to hold that a sentential sign is true if and only if there exists a correct interpretation of a sign-vehicle of the sign. Sign-vehicles can surely be true even if there are no correct interpretations of them. The sign-vehicle 'Sydney was founded in 1788' is uninterpreted if it is not seen or heard. But it is implausible to suppose that if no one had ever seen or heard this sign-vehicle then it would not be true. Rather, I take it, Kaplan and Copilowish wish to maintain that a sentential sign is true if and only if there exists a situation of such a sort that if there is a correct interpretation of a sign-vehicle of the sign then it is appropriate to the situation. However, although this does not rule out the possibility that a sentential sign may be true even if there are no interpretations of sign-vehicles, it fails to take account of this possibility. As such, it is inadequate as a definition of 'true'. Admittedly, though, this is largely a peripheral objection as it does not challenge Kaplan and Copilowish's account of belief.

Another objection, one which has been pointed out to me by Professor J.J.C. Smart, is that if postulating situations is the price of avoiding the postulation of propositions then it is difficult to see how Kaplan and Copilowish's theory leaves us any better off.

Although Russell has sympathy for Kaplan and Copilowish, he does propose a number of emendations. His
first comment is that the term 'sign', or rather 'sign-vehicle', is not defined. Russell suggests that one event only becomes a sign-vehicle of another in virtue of similarity in its effects. We should say that:

a class of events S is, for an organism O, a sign of another class of events E, when, as a result of acquired habit, the effects of a member of S on O are (in certain respects and with certain limitations) those which a member of E had before the habit in question was acquired. (1940, p.185)

Russell admits to being unsure that the use of a sign cannot be an unconditioned reflex as well as an acquired habit, and he concedes that his definition is incomplete so long as the 'respects and limitations' mentioned are not specified, but this is not considered to be an objection in principle.

Commenting further, Russell suggests that Kaplan and Copilowish's concept of correctness is best eliminated. We might suppose a situation in which a man thinks that 'cat' means the kind of animal that other people call 'dog'. If he sees a Great Dane and says 'there is a cat', he believes a true proposition but utters an incorrect one. Thus, Russell concludes, 'correct' cannot be used in defining 'true', since 'correct' is a social concept but 'true' is not. But the difficulty can be overcome:

In the fundamental discussions of language, its social aspect should be ignored, and a man should always be supposed to be speaking to himself — or, what comes to the same thing, to a man whose language is precisely identical with his own. (p.186)

Hence we may say that speaker and hearer (or writer and reader) must have the same interpretive habits.

On the term 'appropriate' Russell finds less grounds for complaint, but suggests that it can be absorbed into the definition of 'sign-vehicle':
If $s$ is, for $0$, a sign-vehicle of a class of events $E$, that means that $0$'s reactions to $s$ are "appropriate" to $E$, i.e. are (with suitable limitations) identical with the reactions which $0$ makes to a member of $E$ on occasions when such a member is present. (p. 187)

Russell now proposes the following definition of 'true':

A sentential sign present to an organism $0$ is true when, as sign, it promotes behaviour which would have been promoted by a situation that exists, if this situation had been present to the organism. (p. 187)

Russell includes the qualification 'as sign' in order to exclude such irrelevant behaviour as the sign's being so loud as to cause the hearer to stop his ears.

Another difference between Kaplan-Copilowish and Russell is that the latter asserts that we believe propositions, whereas the former deny this. However, the difference seems to be that Russell considers that we are committed to a certain way of speaking which is disavowed by Kaplan and Copilowish. There is mutual agreement that believing that $p$ does not consist in or involve believing a proposition-entity. Russell goes on to say that:

the "implicit behaviour" assumed by Kaplan and Copilowish is exactly what I mean by "proposition". If you say to an Englishman "there's a cat", to a Frenchman "voila un chat", to a German "da ist eine katze", and to an Italian "ecco un gatto", their implicit behaviours will be the same; this is what I mean by saying that they are all believing the same proposition, though they are believing quite different sentences. (p. 188)

Russell adds that we can believe a proposition though no words are involved. A dog, for example, may believe a proposition when it is excited by the smell of a cat. Despite Russell's attempts to improve upon Kaplan and Copilowish, I do not think that his position fares well. For one thing, Russell gives us an account of
a sign's being true when it is present to an organism. But
this is clearly not a definition of 'true' since a sign
may be true whether or not it is present to an organism.
Also, it is again not clear that we are any better off
postulating situations instead of propositions.

There is another problem. It seems to be agreed
by Russell and Kaplan and Copilowish that, although it is
not necessary for signs to be involved in order for
O to have beliefs, if O has reactions of a certain sort to
a sign-vehicle 's' then O believes 's', but these reactions
must be the same as those which are, under certain conditions,
occaisioned by some situation. The trouble with this is that
the analysis seems to fall into circularity since we
would expect O's reactions to a sign-vehicle to be the
same as those that are occasioned by, say, a situation X
only if O either believes or knows that there is a situation
X. If O does not believe or know that X is the case then
X is not likely to occasion the appropriate reactions.

Another attempt to give a behavioural account of
belief is to be found in R.B. Braithwaite's 'Belief and
Action' (1946). According to Braithwaite, we may say that
a man's belief in a proposition is sincere if, under
suitable conditions, he would act in a manner appropriate
to the proposition's being true; and insincere if, under the
same conditions, he would act in a manner appropriate to
its being false.¹

The 'suitable conditions' under which an action is
said to be appropriate are of two sorts - external (called

¹ This is somewhat curious to me, as I have not before
heard of an insincere belief.
'occasions') and internal (called 'springs of action').

External conditions are those which call for the appropriate action. Braithwaite tells us that his sincere belief that 《The Origin of Species》 was published in 1859 and not in 1860 does not give rise to any action on his part until there is an occasion for it, such as when he was writing his paper and went to a book to verify the date. The internal conditions are the believer's own intentions, desires, wants, motives, instinctive needs, and drives at the time when an occasion for appropriate action arises. These springs of action are causes, or part causes, of a man's goal directed activity, and must tend to attain the goal, whatever it might be, of the goal directed activity. An 'action which is appropriate to a proposition's being true' is an action that tends to fulfill the spring's of action if the proposition is true, but does not tend to fulfill them if the proposition is false.

This leads Braithwaite to propose the following criterion of a man's sincere belief in a proposition p:

If at a time when an occasion arises relevant to p, his springs of action are s, he will perform an action which is such that, if p is true, it will tend to fulfill s, and which is such that if p is false, it will not tend to satisfy s. His belief in the truth of p, if it is a sincere belief, will lead him to act in a different way from that in which, given the same occasion and the same springs of action, he would act had he believed p to be false. And the difference in his disposition to action is the necessary and sufficient criterion for the sincerity of his belief. (p.10)

Braithwaite concedes that his analysis, as it stands, is suited to beliefs about empirical propositions, rather than beliefs about the truths of logic and mathematics. Since these truths are not matters of fact, we are told,
belief in them can make no difference to our empirical expectations, nor to the way in which we adapt ourselves to the world. Nonetheless, Braithwaite supposes that, with a slight modification, his account of belief will still hold:

...since the function of knowledge of logically necessary truths is that such knowledge enables us to deduce empirical propositions from other empirical propositions, knowledge of mathematics does make a difference to behaviour in that it permits deductions and calculations to be made which result in a different, or at any rate more rapid, adaptation to the world than would otherwise be made. (p.11)

Braithwaite jumps here from talking about our beliefs in the truths of logic and mathematics to our knowledge of them. I take it, however, that his point about the knowledge of these truths is meant to equally apply in the case of our merely believing them.

It is to be noted that Braithwaite does not consider that his analysis of believing a proposition holds in the case of 'unverifiable beliefs', i.e., religious, ethical, or metaphysical beliefs. Braithwaite suggests that the logical positivists are right that there can be no unverifiable propositions; hence, in the case of unverifiable beliefs, there is no proposition to whose truth any action can be appropriate. But we are told that it would be a mistake to infer from this that there are no unverifiable beliefs. Although propositions are not involved, a sincere holder of any unverifiable belief may still be said to behave differently to how he would behave if he did not hold that belief. Thus what sincere beliefs, both verifiable and unverifiable, have in common is that the criterion for their being sincerely held is behavioural. Unverifiable beliefs seem, however, to be of secondary importance to Braithwaite's
A further point of qualification is, I think, in order. It is to be observed that Braithwaite's treatment of belief certainly does not get rid of propositions. The reduction of 'A believes some proposition' to 'A would, under suitable conditions, act in a manner appropriate to some proposition's being true' still leaves us, at the least, with talk about propositions. But the point is that if Braithwaite's position is sound then we have no need to postulate propositions as believed entities. Propositions are introduced into the analysis as the bearers of truth values. But whether or not Braithwaite would wish to quantify over propositions having this function, I am not quite sure. What is clear, though, is that on Braithwaite's theory there is one reason less for endorsing propositional entities.

I think, however, that Braithwaite's position can be shown to be quite untenable. Suppose that Jones believes the proposition p where p = 'I am dying of a fatal disease'. On Braithwaite's account, if Jones' only springs of action (apart from irrelevant ones, e.g., his desire to drink Eton's Scotch) are such that he desires, wants, etc., not to die from the disease, he will perform an action which, if p is true, will tend to satisfy his springs of action. But it is clear that if p is true, Jones will perform no such action because no such action will be possible. Of course, Braithwaite could avoid the difficulty by adding the rider that a believing agent will perform an action which tends to satisfy his springs of action provided it is practicable for him to satisfy his
springs of action. Suppose, though, that Jones believes the proposition \( p \) where \( p = 'I \) have Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever', and \( p \) is true. It may be that if Jones has no idea as to how to go about curing, or seeking a cure for, this disease, he will perform no action that has a tendency to cure the disease, even although it is practicable to cure it and he desires that it be cured. This demonstrates that Braithwaite has not supplied us with a necessary criterion for saying that a man sincerely believes a proposition.

Nor has Braithwaite provided us with a sufficient criterion. Consider the case in which Smith, a politician, desires on some occasion to win an election. He performs certain actions, for example, initiating rumours that his opponent is a wife basher, which, if the proposition \( p \) (where \( p = 'Smear tactics will win Smith the election' \)) is true, will tend to satisfy his desire to win the election, and which, if \( p \) is false, will not tend to satisfy his desire to win the election. On Braithwaite's analysis, it would seem that we ought to conclude that Smith believes that smear tactics will win him the election. But this may not be so. Smith may falsely believe that under no circumstances can he win the election, but he might decide to smear his opponent anyway perhaps because he dislikes the man or because his party expects it of him. I think it will be widely agreed that this illustration is not unrealistic.

Sir Alfred Ayer has also made an effort to argue along behavioural lines that to believe that \( p \) is not to believe a proposition-entity. Ayer's best statement emerges
out of an examination in *The Origins of Pragmatism* (1968) of Peirce's account of belief.\(^1\) Ayer suggests that the behavioural analysis of belief to which Peirce seems to be most often committed centres on his claim that a belief is simply equivalent to a propensity to action. On this account, to say of someone that he believes such-and-such a proposition is just to say that he is disposed to act in such-and-such ways. Ayer expresses some sympathy for this position, but considers that it is not without its difficulties. A belief, we are told, cannot be defined in terms of the actions to which it actually gives rise; for many beliefs, such as those about the past, may never in fact give rise to any action at all. We have to put things hypothetically and say that A's belief that \( \text{p} \) consists in the fact that A would act in the appropriate manner, if the requisite conditions were fulfilled.

But even this modification is not considered by Ayer to be sufficient. It is pointed out that two persons may believe the same proposition but be disposed to act in quite different ways, under the same conditions, because they have different purposes or characters. We see this, for example, in the different reactions which people have when they believe in the imminence of war. The only satisfactory way out of this problem for the behaviourist, Ayer suggests, is to introduce the notion of utility.

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1. Other espousals by Ayer of a behavioural theory are to be found in *Thinking and Meaning* (1947), 'Meaning and intentionality' in *Metaphysics and Common Sense* (1969), and *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage* (1971).
and say that an action is useful to a person A, in a given set of circumstances, if and only if it is conducive to the fulfilment of the purposes that A is pursuing. We might then attempt to analyze belief in such a way that we may say that 'A believes that p' is equivalent to 'A is disposed to behave in a way that is useful to him if p and not useful if not p' (p.43).

However, we are told that an even more serious difficulty now arises. For not only will A's behaviour in any actual situation depend on his belief in a given proposition p, it will also depend on his belief in various other propositions. But then there is the possibility that A's purpose is frustrated because one or more of these other propositions is false. We might consider, for example, the case of a doctor who believes that his patient has a certain disease and wishes to cure him of it, but because of a lack of skill he applies a treatment appropriate to some other disease and makes the patient worse. Ayer concedes that if the analysis of belief he has sketched were correct we should have to conclude that the doctor really believed that the patient suffered not from the ascribed disease but from the disease to which his treatment was appropriate. And this is manifestly absurd.

Nonetheless, the objection is not considered to be entirely fatal. Ayer maintains that even if no satisfactory general definition of belief in behavioural terms is forthcoming, it may still be possible to give a purely behavioural account of any belief held by a particular person in a particular situation:
For to the extent that we are able to specify the subject's other relevant beliefs, we can provide for their being false by making the utility of his action depend upon the states of affairs that would exist if they were true. Thus, in our example of the inefficient doctor, we could say that his belief that his patient had the disease in question consisted in the fact that he behaved in a way which was useful if the patient had the disease and not useful if he had not, this being subject to the further condition that the given treatment does in general cure this disease. Since the equation is not supposed to hold unless the further condition is satisfied, the fact that it is not satisfied does not ruin the analysis. (p.44)

Ayer concedes that this approach will not afford us with any necessary conditions of belief, not even in particular cases. But he contends that it might still enable us to give a sufficient behavioural account of A's belief that p, A's belief that q, B's belief that p, and so on.

In the light of a suggestion made by Peirce, Ayer's analysis is developed further. According to Peirce (or Ayer's Peirce), every type of belief, with the possible exception of beliefs concerning 'direct perceptual facts', involves expectation. In the case of practical beliefs the expectation consists in a readiness to perform certain actions under the appropriate conditions, and in the case of theoretical beliefs, the expectation mainly consists in the anticipation that certain observations would be made under the relevant conditions. Ayer finds Peirce's position fairly attractive, and it is proposed that we resolve theoretical beliefs into expectations rather than into habits of action. Here the suggestion is:

...to treat expectation as consisting ultimately in a readiness to confront the relevant facts: we should be 'set'
to confront them in the sense that the observation of them in the appropriate circumstances would not come as a surprise; the stimuli which they afforded would find us psychologically prepared. This interpretation would also have the effect, which would be consonant with Peirce's general view, of narrowing the gap between theoretical and practical beliefs: for one way in which our expectations would be manifested would be through our disposition to act, in the relevant conditions, in ways that were consistent with the fulfillment and not with the disappointment of our theoretical beliefs. (p.49)

There are a number of comments which may be made about Ayer's analysis. For one thing, although Ayer's concession that no general behavioural definition of belief can be found makes his position somewhat weaker than what behaviourists usually argue, it would be a mistake to think that Ayer's position does not have important consequences. After all, if we can give a sufficient account of any particular belief without supposing that what is believed is a proposition-entity, then there is clearly no basis for holding that to believe that p is to believe such an entity.

I also think that Ayer's criticism of the thesis that 'A believes that p' is equivalent to 'A is disposed to behave in a way that is useful to him if p and not useful if not p' is quite sound. But after criticizing this view Ayer immediately indicates how he thinks a behaviourist might still be able to give a sufficient account of particular beliefs. We are told that insofar as we can specify a subject's other relevant beliefs, we can provide for their being false by making the utility of his action depend upon the situations that would exist if they were true. Thus, in the example of the inefficient doctor, we may say that his belief that his patient had a certain disease
consisted in the fact that he behaved in a way which was useful if and only if the patient had the disease in question, and if the given treatment does in general cure this disease. Unfortunately, this just does not provide us with a sufficient account of the doctor’s supposed belief. We might consider the case in which a doctor desires to cure his patient, and believes that the patient has either disease X, Y, or Z, but, after considering that there is a slightly better chance that the patient has disease X, he experiments a little by applying treatment which is in fact useful if and only if the patient has disease X, and if it is true that the treatment will generally cure this disease. But the doctor does not believe that the patient has disease X.

To be fair to Ayer, we ought not to ignore the fact that he does modify his theory by suggesting that, in the case of theoretical beliefs, these can be resolved into expectations. On Ayer’s view, an expectation consists in a readiness to confront the relevant facts such that the observation of them in the appropriate circumstances would not come as a surprise. But a fact which we (supposedly) have a readiness to confront when we believe that p is conceivably one of two sorts: either it is a fact that provides evidence that p, or it is the fact that p. We would not generally consider it to be the latter, even if we presume that facts are observable. For suppose, for instance, that Jones has the theoretical belief that some amoeba moved before man. We would expect that even if Jones has a die-hard empirical outlook on facts, he would be quite surprised to observe the fact that some amoeba moved before
man. There is no point in replying that Jones would expect to observe such a fact if he were sufficiently back in time. Jones may have enough nous to realize that under no circumstances could he observe a fact which depends upon his non-existence at the time of its alleged occurrence. Alternatively, we can hardly suppose that a belief that \( p \) is simply identical to a readiness to observe, under certain conditions, a fact providing evidence that \( p \). In fact, a person with a theoretical belief might have no expectations of evidence at all. Someone who believed, for example, that he was being universally persecuted might consider that there are no possible circumstances in which he would observe evidence supporting his belief, if he thinks that his persecutors will always be successful in withholding such evidence from him. The fact that such a belief would be grossly irrational does not seem to preclude the possibility of anyone's holding it. Thus, since 'expectations' do not constitute a necessary condition of theoretical beliefs, such beliefs cannot be resolved into expectations.

We may also conclude that 'expectations' do not constitute a sufficient condition of theoretical beliefs, at least not on Ayer's construal of an expectation. It is difficult to see how (A) 'A would not be surprised to observe, in the appropriate circumstances, the fact that \( p \)' would entail (B) 'A believes that \( p \)' unless (C) 'A believes that he would observe, in the appropriate circumstances, the fact that \( p \)'. That is, (A) entails (B) only if (C), and this would seem to make the analysis circular. The same point would apply in the case of A's not being surprised to observe, in the appropriate circumstances, a fact giving
In any case, it is simply false that \( A \) entails \( B \). A doctor, for example, on detecting cardiac arrhythmia in a patient, may consider that there is a possibility that the problem is caused by hyperthyroidism. If the patient has other symptoms such as extreme puffiness, pale or yellow skin, weight gain, fatigue, hoarseness, and cold intolerance, but is still young and has not suffered from such childhood illnesses as rheumatic fever, the doctor might not be surprised to observe, in the appropriate circumstances (the appropriate medical testing), the fact (or a fact providing evidence) that the patient has hyperthyroidism. However, we ought not to presume that the doctor does in fact believe that his patient has this illness; he may not be ruling out the possibility that his patient’s arrhythmia (but not necessarily the other symptoms) is caused by a congenital heart defect or nervous disorder.

Another position sometimes maintained by behaviourists, and one that is not at all uncommon, is that a criterion of \( A \)'s belief that \( p \) is \( A \)'s disposition to assent to a relevant sentence in the appropriate circumstances, such as when asked. A thesis of this kind is considered in W.V. Quine's 'Mind and Verbal Dispositions' (1975).

But the criterion certainly does not provide us with a necessary condition of belief. For one thing, do not certain animals possessing no linguistic competence have beliefs? Also if a person has an unconscious belief that \( p \), we would not normally expect him to assent to \( 'p' \). Admittedly, some philosophers claim that dumb animals
cannot have beliefs, and a few have even gone so far as to deny that there are such things as unconscious beliefs. It would take me too far afield to answer either of these objections here. Nevertheless, even if we restrict ourselves to a person's conscious beliefs, it is not necessary that assent ever be given to a relevant sentence. Someone who believes, for example, that Negroes, gypsies, and Jews ought to be boiled alive might never assent to the sentence 'Negroes, Gypsies, and Jews ought to be boiled alive' when asked, if he has a strong enough fear of social disapprobation.

The criterion also fails to give us a sufficient account of belief. As Quine (p.92) himself acknowledges the criterion is inadequate given that there may be cases in which A's assent is insincere. (Interestingly, this difficulty does not restrain Quine from still holding that mental states are behavioural dispositions.) The criterion also proves inadequate given that there may be cases in which A assents to, but misunderstands, the sentence of the questioner.

We might attempt to avoid this charge of inadequacy by claiming a sufficient account of belief as follows: if A has a disposition to assent to 'p' when asked, and A's assent is sincere and he understands the sentence asked, then A believes that p. The difficulty with this, though, is that sincere assent is conceptually posterior, not prior, to that of belief. When A understands the sentence asked, A's assent to 'p' would be sincere only if A already believes that p. Thus the behavioural analysis only avoids supplying us with an account of belief
that is insufficient by providing one that is circular. This is a common objection but, so far as I can see, it poses no less a difficulty for that.

Of course the above objections do not prove that the behavioural analysis of belief is unsound. I have argued that some significant espousals of behaviourism contain certain definite flaws. But behavioural arguments exist in numbers beyond what I am able to consider here. Additionally, theories can sometimes be emended so as to avoid particular criticisms. Even so, there do seem to be some pervasive objections to the behavioural programme.

Behavioural analyses of belief have tended to take one of two forms by identifying beliefs with (a) certain kinds of behaviour or (b) dispositions to behave in certain kinds of ways. Neither proposal presumes that behaviour must consist in outward bodily movement. The possession of mental images or inward motions of assent are also sometimes interpreted as relevant behaviour. However, the view that beliefs consist in certain forms of behaviour, whether outward or inward, has always been difficult to sustain. For it does seem that we can have a belief that even though it is not the case that for every instant of the belief's duration we are conjuring up some mental image, making some inward motion of assent, or exhibiting outward behaviour of some relevant kind. In fact, when we consider that each of us at any moment has hundreds, perhaps thousands, of beliefs, the suggestion that they all consist in various forms of actual behaviour looks rather absurd. It is for this reason that behaviourists have overwhelmingly preferred the view that beliefs consist in dispositions to
behave in certain ways.

But this view has been objected to on general grounds. One such objection comes from Gilbert Harman (1973, p.1 & p.41). Harman points out that a belief is not a simple behavioural disposition. At best, it is a disposition to behave in certain ways given certain desires. For example, a belief that it will rain will be manifested in the carrying of an umbrella only in the presence of a desire not to get wet. On the other hand, a desire is at best a disposition to act in certain ways given certain beliefs. For example, the desire for money will manifest itself in acts that tend to get one money only if one believes that those acts will get one money. Thus there can be no noncircular way to give a purely behaviouristic analysis of either belief or desire.

There is, I believe, another general objection to the view that beliefs consist in dispositions to behave. For either we say that if A has a belief that p then A does in fact have a disposition to behave in a certain way or that A has a disposition to behave in a certain way (his disposition actually comes about) if and only if certain circumstances arise (where these circumstances ≠ A’s believing that p). If we say that A does in fact have a disposition to behave in a certain way then we seem to be implying that A has behaved in that manner and, I think, on more than one occasion. It would seem rather bizarre, for example, for someone to say that Smith is disposed (has a disposition) to sing comic opera if in fact Smith has never sung comic opera in all his life. But, as A.J. Ayer has pointed out, surely many of our beliefs, such as
those about the past, have never been manifested in some form of actual behaviour. Advocates of the dispositional version of behaviourism often acknowledge as much. But, then we cannot identify beliefs with dispositions to behave in certain ways. To insist on the identification is, I think, to misunderstand what a disposition is.

A possible reply to this is to claim that the objection confuses truth with assertibility. If Smith has never sung comic opera then we may have no reason to ascribe the disposition to him. Nevertheless, it might be held, this is not to say that he does not have the disposition.

The trouble with this reply, though, is that it leaves us at a loss as to what would count as disconfirming that Smith has a disposition to sing comic opera. If Smith's never having sung comic opera does not count as disconfirming that Smith has such a disposition then it is difficult to see what possibly could. Of course, we could say that if Smith does not sing comic opera if and only if certain circumstances arise then this disconfirms that Smith has the disposition. But, then, we are taking Smith's disposition to be of the same type of disposition as a belief would be as construed in the second sense above.

If we try to retain the identification of belief with disposition by saying that A's belief that p consists in his disposition to behave in a certain way if and only if certain circumstances arise, then we have to face the possibility that these circumstances might not arise. However, if the circumstances do not arise then A will not be disposed (will not have a disposition) to behave in the appropriate manner. But A may still have his belief that p. Therefore,
A's belief that $p$ does not consist in his disposition to behave in a certain manner if and only if certain circumstances come about.

It would seem, then, that beliefs cannot be identified with behavioural dispositions in either of these two senses. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility of the behaviourist providing us with a dispositional analysis of belief. A behaviourist may continue to ratify 'A will be disposed (will have a disposition) to behave in a certain way if and only if certain circumstances arise', or something like this, as the analysans of 'A believes that $p$' provided that he renounces the thesis that beliefs consist in dispositions to behave in certain ways, or to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances. His analysis may still be labelled 'dispositional'. To describe A's belief in this way is just to say that A would, or would be likely, to behave in a certain way if and only if certain circumstances come about. This is the type of analysis that I think many behaviourists wish to endorse. Braithwaite, for example, seems to have had something like this in mind.

However, the analysis is, I believe, still unsatisfactory. One problem is that A will behave in a particular way only if he believes that it is in fact possible for himself to behave in that way. But this makes the analysis circular. For the analysans entails 'A will, if certain circumstances come about, believe that it is possible to behave in a certain way' or some such sentence, which in turn will need to be analyzed, and so on ad infinitum. In other words, the proposed analysans of 'A believes that $p$' itself appeals to the notion of a belief which, by parity of
reasoning, cannot be explicated in purely behavioural terms.

Certainly the assumption that an agent will not behave in a specified way unless he believes that it is possible for him to behave in that way does depend upon a certain amount of folk psychology. According to folk psychological theory, a person's behaviour is to be causally explained by reference to certain of his beliefs and desires, except in cases of purely involuntary behaviour. For example, we might explain, albeit in a somewhat rough-and-ready fashion, A's visiting the National Gallery in London by saying that he desires to see The Fighting Temeraire and believes that by going to the National Gallery he will get to see this art work. An underlying assumption of this explanation is that if A did not believe that he could perform certain actions that would get him to the National Gallery then he would not perform those actions with the intention of getting there. A, however, need not be aware or conscious of his belief that it is possible for him to perform certain actions. But we would expect that, if asked, he would on reflection recognize that he did in fact have such a belief.

It is to be admitted that the explanation of A's behaviour that I have offered is a rather simplistic one, and depends upon certain unspecified ceteris paribus clauses. However, despite the simplicity of the model, the type of explanation it provides is fairly well entrenched in modern day psychology, history, literary criticism, as well as social science. It is certainly not unchallengeable — folk psychology has in fact been challenged — but to challenge it simply to preserve the cogency of behaviourism would seem...
to be rather ad hoc. (For a detailed account and defence of 'folk psychology' cf. the Chapter entitled 'Are There Such Things as Beliefs?')

Certainly, though, there are various forms of behaviour, i.e. involuntary behaviour, which cannot be explained on the model that has been provided. For example, a person's knee-jerk reaction when his knee is tapped with a hammer is not going to be explained by reference to certain of his beliefs and desires. However, it is also true that we are not going to be able to ascertain much information about an agent's beliefs by noting his dispositions to have knee-jerk reactions, indigestion, twitches, epileptic fits, and so on.

Throughout this Chapter some particular theories of behaviourism have been examined, and some particular objections raised. Some of these objections have alleged circularity in the account of belief being proposed. That there are particular problems of circularity, however, should come as no surprise. For as I have tried to argue, a general underlying problem with behavioural accounts of belief, at least in their most sophisticated versions, is that they are circular. As such, it is difficult to see how behaviourism can be salvaged in any meaningful way.

Still, the fact that behavioural paraphrases fail to show that the that-clauses of standard belief reports do not name or denote propositions does not prove that no paraphrases show this. An alternative form of paraphrase provided by adverbial analysts, which also purports to demonstrate that that-clauses do not name or denote propositions, is considered in the next Chapter.
1. Over the years a growing number of philosophers have argued against the existence of mental objects by appealing to adverbial analyses. For instance, it has been argued that sentences which purport to be about sensations and after-images can be reconstrued as being about the way in which we sense. Hence, 'I have a red after-image' and 'I have a pain' are read as something like 'I sense red-ly' and 'I sense painfully' respectively.

In relatively recent times some philosophers have attempted to combine an adverbial analysis with the thesis that that-clauses do not name or denote propositions in sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married', 'Stacy doubts that the Queen is married' and 'Stacy asserts that the Queen is married'. According to these philosophers, that-clauses in sentences of this kind are to be understood as adverbial objects modifying the associated verb. For example, we are to take it that in the sentence 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' the that-clause 'that the Queen is married' adverbially modifies the verb 'believes'. 'That the Queen is married', therefore, is not to be construed as a singular term naming or denoting anything. If this view is correct, we can thus dispense with the claim that sentences of the kind in question affirm relations (relations of believing, asserting, etc.) between persons and proposition-entities, or, for that matter, entities of
any kind.

That adverbial analysis has been extended to sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is, I think, not at all surprising. A number of philosophers consider adverbial theories of sensing to be quite successful in what they set out to achieve. The adverbial analysis of propositional attitude sentences and sentences of indirect discourse fits in quite nicely with these theories. However, although adverbial accounts of sensing have been proposed in some detail, adverbial accounts of believing, doubting, desiring, asserting, etc., are as yet only thinly developed.

D.M. Armstrong (1973, p.45), though no champion of adverbial analysis, has suggested a model to aid our explication of the adverbial theory. The adverbial account of two people believing the same thing, Armstrong argues, can be compared to two people dancing the same dance. Dancing, Armstrong notes, is not a relation which holds between a person and the dance he dances. Rather, to say that a man is dancing a certain sort of dance is to characterize his dancing further. If two people dance the same dance, p, then they both dance in the p-ish way. Similarly, on the adverbial theory, if two people believe the same thing, they are not related to a numerically identical object. To say that two people believe the same thing is to characterize the manner of their believing. If they both believe the same thing, p, then they both believe p-ishly. In the same way, to say that two people assert the same thing is to characterize the manner of their asserting. If they both assert the same thing, p, then they both assert p-ishly. Armstrong admits that the analogy is
not quite a perfect one. Dancing is an action which springs from a person's will, whereas beliefs are not actions. But even here the model of dancing fits asserting, since asserting also is an action.

None of this is to suggest that the adverbial analyst is committed to denying that the terms 'statement' and 'proposition' have a legitimate usage. Individual adverbial analysts may still accept that we assert statements and believe propositions. Nevertheless, the adverbial analyst does deny that statements and propositions are entities; they are held to be 'nominal objects', i.e., objects in name only. Bruce Aune (1967), one of the chief advocates of adverbial analysis, has argued that propositions and statements are objects only in the sense in which, for example, Mary's smile is an object. Aune (p.217) presses this analogy somewhat by asking us to consider the following locutions.

(1) Mary's smile was enchanting
(2) Tom's serve was forceful
(3) Dick's handshake was firm and manly

Here, we are told, the possessive singulars involved in the locutions (e.g. 'Mary's smile') have the appearance of referring to objects, but their reference is purely nominal; it is a reference only in name. This, Aune maintains, is illustrated by the following paraphrases.

(4) Mary smiled enchantingly
(5) Tom served forcefully
In (4), (5), and (6) the only things referred to are Mary, Tom, and Dick. They are characterized as doing something, and their doings are qualified by adverbs of manner.

In like manner, Aune (pp 217-8) holds, the reference to a statement in a sentence such as 'Tom's statement is true' is purely nominal. The force of this sentence is explicitly captured by

(7) Tom speaks (or spoke) truly

where the only reference is to Tom and where his activity of speaking is characterized by what grammarians call an 'adverb of affirmation'.

Aune also makes an attempt to deal with such sentences as 'John's statement that snow is white is true' and 'John entertains the proposition that snow is white'. Again it is suggested that the reference to a proposition or statement is entirely nominal. According to Aune, both these sentences may be paraphrased into sentences which characterize some activity of John's. Aune (p.221) proposes that a full adverbial translation of the first sentence can be made if we transform the predicate 'is true' into 'truly' and introduce a new verb to characterize the act of saying that snow is white: 'to snow-is-white'. This, Aune maintains, allows us to translate 'John's statement that snow is white is true' in a purely verbal manner as 'John snow-is-white truly'. In the case of 'John entertains the proposition that snow is white', it
is suggested that this sentence simply means something to the effect that John wonders, considers, or perhaps weighs the question, whether snow is white. But we cannot make an adverbial translation of the sentence using the verb 'to snow-is-white'. This is because by definition the verb applies solely to speech acts whereas entertaining a proposition is a mental act. So Aune (p.227) proposes that we introduce dot quotes to contrive the verb 'to.snow-is-white.', which we may apply to either acts of saying or thinking that snow is white. Aune claims that if we then know the specific attitude John has, we can make a translation into a contrived verbal construction such as 'He 'snow-is-white.s wonderingly'.

Of course Aune's proposals for paraphrasing sentences about a person's statement or his entertaining a proposition are only examples of one kind of paraphrase an adverbial analyst might adopt. Adverbial analysts are not committed to Aune's idiosyncracies. For that matter, an advocate of adverbial analysis could even hold that sentences attributing a statement to someone or affirming that someone entertains a proposition are quite illegitimate, and thus deny that they require paraphrasing at all. But the thesis on which a number of adverbial analysts seem firmly agreed is that the that-clause in sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' does not name or denote a proposition but functions adverbially. Now, I think the adverbial analyst must admit that 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is not unambiguously adverbial. Otherwise alternative readings would never have been proposed. But if the adverbial reading is a
plausible one, then it must be possible to paraphrase 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married', or any other sentence of this kind, into a sentence which is unambiguously adverbial. It perhaps comes as no surprise, then, that this is precisely what a number of adverbial analysts have attempted to do.

One apparent attempt comes from Aune (p.221) when he tells us that 'John asserted that snow is white' may be paraphrased as 'John snow-is-white assertingly'. Aune gives us no further examples of paraphrases of sentences taking the that-p form. But, presumably, 'John believes that snow is white' and 'John doubts that snow is white' would be translated as 'John .snow-is-white assertingly' and 'John .snow-is-white doubtingly' respectively.

However, such paraphrases can hardly be taken seriously. To say of someone who is dancing the waltz that he is dancing waltzingly is not to give an adequate description of his dance. Someone who is, for instance, dancing the minuet may, if he has a certain proclivity towards extravagant behaviour, do it waltzingly without actually dancing the waltz. Similarly to utter something assertingly is not necessarily to assert anything. For example, an actor in a play may utter assertingly the words 'I killed the butler' without actually asserting that he killed someone. Admittedly, this point depends on our giving a sense to 'assertingly' which is independent of Aune's theory. I think, though, that we do have such a sense. It would not be unnatural to read 'A uttered something assertingly' as 'A uttered something in an asserting manner'; yet the latter sentence seems to have sense.
But we may note that 'assertingly' has no sense that is independent of Aune's theory, then Aune has only introduced a new way of talking which casts no light on anything.¹

It is perhaps not unconnected to this that, although Aune's paraphrase 'John snow-is-whited assertingly' is adverbial, it is difficult to see how it can be taken as an explication of the alleged adverbial nature of 'that snow is white' in 'John asserted that snow is white'. This is because the verb 'asserted', not the so-called adverb 'that snow is white', is transformed into the adverb 'assertingly' in the paraphrase.

Another proposal has come from Paul Ziff in his book Understanding Understanding (1972, Pp 51-2). Ziff argues that on one reading of 'George is hunting unicorns' the word 'unicorns' is best seen as an adverbial object modifying the verb 'hunting'. (The motive for this is clear. There is surely a sense in which George can be hunting unicorns even although unicorns do not exist.) This adverbiality, Ziff suggests, is captured by 'George is unicorn hunting'. In like manner, Ziff holds, in the sentence 'George thinks that Josef is dead' the phrase 'that Josef is dead' is best seen as an adverbial object modifying the verb 'thinks'. The adverbiality in this case, it is suggested, is pellucid in the paraphrase 'George that-Josef-is-dead-thinks'. Sentences such as 'George doubts that Josef is dead' and 'George asserted that Josef is dead' would, I take it, be paraphrased by Ziff as 'George that-Josef-is-dead-doubts' and 'George that-Josef-is-dead-asserted' respectively.

¹. Paul Thom has helped me to see this objection more clearly.
Professor Armstrong has indicated that an adverbial paraphrase of 'A and B believe the same thing, p' is 'A and B both believe p-ishly'. Certainly the 'ishly' adverb is not a contrivance on Armstrong's part. Murray Kiteley (1964, p.255) who, unlike Armstrong, is a defender of the adverbial theory, has suggested, for example, that 'We all believe that he once lived here' can be adverbially paraphrased as 'We all believe (that-he-once-lived-here) — ishly'.

A slight variation of this is to be found in the work of Wilfrid Sellars (1974, p.97). Sellars suggests 'Othello believes-Desdemona-loves-Cassio-ishly' as an adverbial paraphrase of 'Othello believes Desdemona loves Cassio'. Presumably, then, Sellars would view 'Othello doubts-that-Desdemona-loves-Cassio-ishly' and 'Othello asserts-that-Desdemona-loves-Cassio-ishly' as adverbial paraphrases of 'Othello doubts that Desdemona loves Cassio' and 'Othello asserts that Desdemona loves Cassio' respectively.

2. Professor Armstrong has proposed an objection to the adverbial theory as follows:

We believe propositions, but we do not believe features of our believings. Therefore believed propositions are not features of our believings. Or again, we assert propositions, but we do not assert features of our assertings. So asserted propositions are not features of assertings. What we believe is, in general at least, something which lies beyond the belief-state itself. What we assert is, in general at least, something which lies beyond the asserting itself. If Othello believes or asserts something about Desdemona, the belief or assertion concerns Desdemona. If what he believes or asserts is that she loves Cassio, it is about her and her relations to that man that Othello has a belief or makes an assertion. (1973, Pp 45-6)
It should be pointed out that Armstrong does not admit propositions to his ontology. Rather he considers that we are committed to talk about propositions, and consequently that adverbial analysts must be able to give an adverbial account of such talk.

Now, in arguing that we believe propositions, but we do not believe features of our believings, therefore believed propositions are not features of our believings, Armstrong seems to be suggesting that in sentences such as 'A believes some proposition' and 'A believes the proposition that p' the terms 'some proposition' and 'the proposition that p' do not function adverbially. But might it not be objected that it could be equally argued: A dances the waltz, but A does not dance features of his dancing, therefore the waltz is not a feature of A's dancing? Hence, by parity of reasoning, should we not conclude that 'the waltz' does not function adverbially in 'A dances the waltz'? This suggests that there is something wrong with Armstrong's line of argument.

The mistake, I think is that Armstrong seems to hold that the adverbial analyst supposes that believed propositions are characteristics or features of our believings. It is not clear, though, that an adverbial analyst need adopt this view. Armstrong claims that to say that A is dancing the waltz is to characterize A's dancing. But should we say that to characterize A's dancing is to point out certain characteristics or features of A's dancing? It is far from obvious that we should if to characterize something is just to describe it in a specific way. If we insist that to 'characterize someone's dancing' just means to 'point out
certain characteristics or features of someone's dancing' then it is open to the adverbial analyst to simply deny that we ever characterize a person's dancing. Rather he could hold that to say that A is dancing the waltz is to specify the manner of A's dancing but not some characteristic or feature of his dancing. In like manner, it could be held that to say that A believes a particular proposition is to specify the particular manner of A's believing, not some feature of his believing. So where is the commitment of adverbial analysis to characteristics or features of believings?

Nonetheless, this rejoinder would not take the adverbial analyst very far. For Armstrong's argument can be reintroduced this way: we believe propositions, we do not believe manners of believing, therefore believed propositions are not manners of believing. Possibly an adverbial analyst might agree with this argument whilst not agreeing that it is an objection by holding that, although to believe a certain proposition is to believe in a certain manner, this does not imply that believed propositions are manners of believing. Similarly we might want to say that to dance the waltz is to dance in a certain manner without supposing that the waltz is itself a manner of dancing. Rather the waltz is something (a dance) we do in a certain manner.

But if we are to adopt this retort then what are we to say is a believed proposition? Is a believed proposition then something (a proposition) we believe in a certain manner? To say this, however, is perfectly consistent with maintaining that we believe proposition-entities—proposition-entities, we could say, are what we believe in a certain manner.
And thus the attempt to extirpate propositions as believed entities would not have been successful. Speaking of 'manners of believing' here would seem to be superfluous.

One might attempt to avoid this objection by holding, contra Armstrong, that we are simply not committed to talk about propositions. But even if this is true, the same could not be said about the word 'statement' (in the sense of 'what is stated') since it features prominently in ordinary discourse. (The word 'proposition' is more a philosopher's term of art.) Yet we cannot give an analysis of a 'statement' (as what is stated) along the lines of that considered above for 'believed propositions' by supposing that a statement is a certain manner of speaking for precisely the same kind of reason that a believed proposition is not a manner of believing. Nor can we follow the analogy of a waltz by maintaining that a statement is something we state in a certain manner.

I think though, that the way out of Armstrong's objection (or the revised version of it) is for the adverbial analyst to deny in the first place that there is a strong analogy to be drawn between the waltz and believed propositions or statements. I do not see any objection in principle to his doing that.

There is another objection to the adverbial theory. I think we may say that (i) 'A believes that p' entails (ii) 'What A believes is that p'. (Not unreasonably, it might even be argued that these sentences are simply equivalent.) But it is clear that 'that p' cannot function as an adverb in (ii). Hence, even if the adverbial treatment of 'that p' is appropriate to (i), some other analysis is required to
show that 'that p' does not name or denote a proposition in (ii).

The inadequacy of adverbial analysis shows up in another way. On the adverbial theory, 'A believes that p' is akin to 'A is hunting unicorns'. Here the term 'unicorns' does not refer to anything, since A can be hunting unicorns even if there are no such animals. In like manner, it is held that 'that p' in 'A believes that p' does not name or denote anything. Rather, it is said to function as an adverbial modifier. On the other side of things, though, in a sentence such as 'A is shooting elephants' the term 'elephants' must be assigned reference; for it simply isn't possible for A to be shooting elephants if there are no such things as elephants. But, then, how do we know that 'A believes that p' is not more like 'A is shooting elephants' than 'A is hunting unicorns'? The objection amounts to this. An adverbial theorist can know that the adverbial analysis of 'A believes that p' is warranted only if he independently knows that 'that p' does not name or denote a proposition. Otherwise the adverbial analysis simply begs the question. But if the adverbial analyst independently knows that 'that p' does not name or denote a proposition, he can hardly be said to have reached this conclusion through the adverbial analysis of 'A believes that p'. Thus the adverbial theory looks rather lame.

This problem is similar to the main objection that was brought against Prior and Quine in Chapter VI. Although the latter proposed a parsing, rather than a paraphrase, of 'A believes that p', their proposal like that of adverbial analysis either amounts to a petitio principii or is redundant.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the problem is a general one for those who attempt to provide paraphrases of sentences such as 'A believes that p'. The problem lies not with the nature of the paraphrase but with the nature of the sentences that adverbial analysts claim to be paraphrases. If we could, for example, find a natural language sentence, which, on the evidence of English usage, may be counted as a paraphrase of 'A believes that p', and then show that no part of the paraphrase names or denotes a proposition, then, so far as I can see, we would get around the problem. (I explicate and defend a view of this type in Chapter XIII.) But the adverbial analyst in claiming, say, that 'A believes-that-the-Queen-is-married-ly' is equivalent to 'A believes that the Queen is married' cannot appeal in this way to the evidence of natural language. And I do not see what other type of evidence can be possibly available to him. Of course the adverbial analyst could simply insist that the two sentences are logically equivalent. After all, 'A believes-that-the-Queen-is-married-ly' is his construction. But if we are going to be arbitrary in this way then we could just as well formulate a sentence that clearly does name or denote a proposition, or purport to do so, and assert that it is equivalent to 'A believes that the Queen is married'.

But the problem runs even deeper for adverbial analysis, and in a way that is not applicable to the proposal made by Prior and Quine. All the adverbial paraphrases that we have dealt with are highly contrived. The trouble is that they are too contrived. We are told that sentences such as 'A that-the-Queen-is-married-believes', 'A believes-that-the
Queen-is-married-ly' and 'A .the-Queen-is-married.s believingly' are readings of 'A believes that the Queen is married'. However, if we had not been told this then how would we know what these sentences are supposed to be readings of? If, for example, someone uttered the sentence 'A .the-Queen-is-married.s believingly' and conveyed no further information, would we not be rather baffled as to what was meant? But, then, it would seem that the adverbial paraphrases are themselves in need of explication. In fact, in each case the analysandum is clearer than the analysans.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that adverbial paraphrases cannot be instructive. Unless there is a special case for counting smiles amongst our ontology, which I strongly doubt, 'Mary smiled enchantingly' does seem to be an adequate paraphrase of 'Mary's smile was enchanting'. In this particular case, the proposed paraphrase appears to serve any useful purpose served by its analysandum. Moreover, it is certainly not contrived but is a locution of ordinary English that does not itself require explication. In the same way, adverbial paraphrases in natural language might be able to elucidate the alleged adverbial function of the that-clause in a sentence of the 'A believes that p' form. This is the type of paraphrase that I think an adverbial analyst would be better off trying to provide instead of constructing unnecessary and unhelpful contrivances. But I do not know what adverbial paraphrases of sentences such as 'A believes that the Queen is married' are available in ordinary English. The fact that adverbial analysts resort so heavily to contrivances may be an indication that they do not know of any either.
However, it does not follow that if there are no paraphrases available in either an artificial language or ordinary English that satisfactorily capture the alleged adverbiality of the that-clauses then the adverbial theory is false. For there might be a way of showing that that-clauses function adverbially that does not rely upon any form of paraphrase at all. I know, however, of no adverbial analyst who claims to be able to show this. In any case, my concern in this Chapter has been to show that attempts by adverbial analysts to establish their case by appealing to paraphrases have not proved successful.

Another theory which rejects the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities is considered in the next Chapter. This theory, which is proposed by Searle, marks something of a shift in analysis to the present Chapter, and the three previous to it, in that it does not base its case on providing either paraphrases or a direct treatment of the that-clause.
1. John Searle, in three recent publications (1979a; 1979b; 1983), pursues the proposal that although it is not the case that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities, the propositional attitudes and certain other mental states are still intentional. Propositions are introduced, but in an innocuous sense. And it is held that no peculiar ontological status need be assigned to intentional objects. Intentional objects, we are told, are just actual objects or states of affairs. That it should be suggested that mental states, or some of them, are intentional is, of course, hardly novel. However, what is somewhat unusual about Searle's theory is his argument that intentional states may be related to things which do not exist, or have never existed.

It is this last aspect that leads to a specific, initial problem for Searle's theory. According to Searle, the things to which intentional states, such as beliefs, desires, wants, and fears, are related are objects and states of affairs. But Searle also maintains that the objects and states of affairs to which intentional states are related are in the world, i.e., actual objects and states of affairs. Yet how can this be if it is not the case that there are actual objects and states of affairs for all our intentional states to be related to? How, for example, can my belief that it is raining (a so-called intentional
state) be related to the actual state of affairs that it is raining if there happens to be no such state of affairs?

Searle acknowledges the problem:

Notice that if we try to construe Intentionality on the model of ordinary relations like being on top of or sitting to the left of, then on the face of it, it appears to be a very puzzling relation because for a large number of Intentional states I can have the state without the object or state of affairs that the Intentional state is directed at even existing at all: I can believe that the King of France is bald even if, unknown to me, there is no King of France. (1979a, p.74)

However, Searle considers that there is a simple solution to this problem which lies in our holding that "Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs" (p.75). Searle attempts to give some support to this claim, and helps to make it clearer, by suggesting certain points of similarity and connection between speech acts and intentional states. 1) The distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force often made by speech act theorists, Searle holds, carries over to intentional states. Just as I can order you to leave the room, and suggest that you will leave the room, I can believe that you will leave the room, and hope that you will leave the room. In the first group of cases, the speech act cases, a distinction may be drawn between the propositional content that you will leave the room and the illocutionary force, whether it be an order, or suggestion, with which that propositional content is presented in the speech act. In the second group of cases, the intentional states, a parallel distinction can be drawn between the representative content that you will leave the room, and the psychological mode,
whether it be a belief, or hope, in which one has that representative content. 2) Members of the Assertive class of speech acts (e.g. statements, descriptions and assertions) are supposed to match an independently existing world; and depending on whether or not they do this they are said to be true or false. On the other hand, members of the Directive class of speech acts (e.g. orders, commands, and requests) and members of the Commissive class of speech acts (e.g. promises, vows and pledges) are supposed to bring about changes in the world so that the world matches the speech act; and depending on whether or not they do that, they are not true or false, but are obeyed or disobeyed, fulfilled, complied with, kept or broken. Something like this, according to Searle, applies in the case of intentional states. Beliefs are supposed to match the world, and are true or false depending on whether or not they do this. On the other hand, intentions and desires are not supposed to match the world. If they are not carried out or are unfulfilled, then it is, so to speak, the fault of the world. They can be complied with or fulfilled, but are not true or false. 3) In general, in the performance of each illocutionary act with a propositional content, we express a certain intentional state with that propositional content, and the intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of speech act. For example, if I make the statement that p, I express a belief that p. If I make a promise to do A, I express an intention to do A. If I order you to do A, I express a wish or desire that you should do A, and so on. In each case the performance of the speech act is eo ipso an expression of the corresponding intentional state. 4) Both speech acts and
intentional states have quite generally 'conditions of satisfaction'. A statement is satisfied if and only if it is true, an order is satisfied if and only if it is obeyed, a promise is satisfied if and only if it is kept. Similarly, my belief is satisfied if and only if things are as I believe them to be, my desires are satisfied if and only if they are fulfilled, my intentions are satisfied if and only if they are carried out. Moreover, the conditions of satisfaction of the speech act and those of its expressed intentional state are in general identical. (Pp 75-80)

Searle maintains that these four connections between intentional states and speech acts suggest a certain picture of intentionality:

...every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain psycholog­ical mode. Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs. Just as my statement that it is raining is a representation of a certain state of affairs, so my belief that it is raining is a representation of the same state of affairs. (p.80)

Now this approach to intentionality, Searle holds, enables us to answer the traditional problems concerning the ontological status of intentional objects. It is often thought that intentional objects have some peculiar ontological status and must be distinguished from actual objects. But, Searle informs us, the intentional object of a mental state just is the actual object or state of affairs represented by an intentional state. If John loves Sally and believes that it is raining then the intentional object of his love is the actual flesh and blood Sally, not some mental phenomenon, and the intentional object of his belief is the state of affairs in the world that it is raining,
not the proposition that it is raining (1979b, p.185). Sometimes there will be no object that satisfies the propositional or representative content of a speech act or intentional state. In such cases, just as there is no 'referred-to-object' of the speech act, there is no 'intentional object' of the intentional state. Thus, for example, the statement that the King of France is bald cannot be true because there is no King of France, and similarly the belief that the King of France is bald cannot be true because there is no King of France. The fact that a statement may fail to be true because of reference failure no longer inclines us, Searle maintains, to suppose that there is a need to erect a Meinongian entity for that statement to be about. The statement simply has a propositional content which nothing satisfies, and in that sense it is not 'about' anything. In precisely the same way, the fact that an intentional state may fail to be satisfied because there is no referred to object ought no longer incline us to suppose that there is a need to erect an intermediate Meinongian entity or intentional object for that state to be about. (1979a, pp 82-3)

Searle suggests that if the view that intentional states consist of representative contents in psychological modes is correct then:

...it is simply a mistake to say that a belief, for example, is a two term relation between a believer and a proposition. An analogous mistake would be to say that a statement is a two term relation between a speaker and a proposition. One should say rather that a proposition is not the object of a statement or belief but rather its content. The content of the statement or belief that De Gaulle was French is the proposition that De Gaulle was French. But
that proposition is not what the statement or belief is about or is directed at... There is indeed a relation ascribed when one ascribes an Intentional state to a person, but it is not a relation of representation between a person and a proposition, rather it is a relation of representation between the Intentional state and the things represented by it; only remember, as with representations in general, it is possible for an Intentional state to exist without there actually being anything that satisfies it. (Pp 83-4).

This last point makes it fairly clear what Searle takes to be the solution to his original problem, i.e., the puzzle inherent in supposing that intentional states may be related to objects and states of affairs which do not exist, or have never existed. As Searle would have it, this puzzle is resolved by taking intentional states to be related to objects and states of affairs by a relation of representation. According to Searle, there is nothing extraordinary in supposing that representations may represent things which do not exist.

2. There are a number of objections that might be raised against Searle's theory.

(a) One criticism that is sometimes brought against representational theories of the propositional attitudes is that representations represent in virtue of certain conventions whereas an analysis or account of belief can hardly appeal to conventions. A map, for example, may contain symbols that represent streets, rivers, hospitals, schools, etc., and their relationships. But a symbol that, say, represents a hospital as being in a certain street does so in virtue of certain conventions adopted by the cartographer. But nothing outside beliefs, and in particular not conventions,
makes a belief what it is. However, this objection is not quite convincing. The point that symbols on maps represent in virtue of cartographical conventions seems well given. And it would be unacceptable to hold that beliefs depend upon conventions. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that a representation must be conventional. After all, a fossil may be said to be a representation of an animal. But a fossil is a natural representation, not a conventional one. Admittedly, it is far from clear how a fossil might be counted as an inaccurate representation of an animal. But we still have the point that in principle, at any rate, a representation need not be conventional. (b) It is plain that Searle wishes to hold (i) Intentional states are things such as beliefs, desires, wants, and fears. This is clear from the fact that Searle opens his exegesis by claiming that mental states such as beliefs, wants, and fears are in fact intentional. But Searle also endorses (ii) Psychological modes are things such as beliefs, desires, wants, and fears. Searle says, for example, that "there is a distinction between the representative content that you will leave the room, and the psychological mode, whether belief or fear or hope or whatever, in which one has that representative content" (p. 76). It is apparent from this that Searle treats psychological modes as things such as beliefs, fears, hopes, etc. However, Searle also maintains
Now, this leads Searle into upholding a rather confused theory indeed. If, from (i), intentional states are things such as beliefs, desires, wants, and fears then, following (iii), we should say that a belief, for example, consists of a representative content in a psychological mode. But, then, in what psychological mode does a belief consist? According to (ii), psychological modes are things such as beliefs, desires, wants, and fears. Yet it would be ludicrous to suppose that a belief consists of a representative content in a desire, want, or fear. And if we say that a belief consists of a representative content in a belief, we are led into an infinite regress. For it would follow that a belief consists of a representative content in a belief which consists of a representative content in a belief, and so on ad infinitum. I think it is clear that the regress is vicious.

However, this is not a fatal objection. Searle could, I believe, avoid the problem by continuing to hold that intentional states consist, or consist in part, of representative contents whilst simply dropping the illogical thesis that intentional states consist of representative contents in psychological modes. So far as I can see, this would not be a drastic revision of his theory.

(c) According to Searle, the propositional attitudes contain representations of their conditions of satisfaction; and an attitude is satisfied if and only
if its representative content is satisfied. For example, A's belief that it is raining contains a representation of its conditions of satisfaction, and the belief is satisfied, or, more precisely, it is true, if and only if its representative content is satisfied, i.e., if and only if it is in fact raining.

But in the case of disbeliefs and doubts, at any rate, it is very difficult to see how there can be representative contents representing conditions of satisfaction. On Searle's theory, if A disbelieves or doubts that it's raining then A's disbelief or doubt contains the representative content that it is raining. This content is the same representative content as that which is contained in the belief that it is raining, only the psychological mode is different. However, since on this theory the representative content that it is raining is satisfied if and only if it is raining, it would seem to follow that the representative content of A's disbelief or doubt, and hence A's disbelief or doubt, is satisfied if and only if it is raining. Yet it seems extraordinary indeed to hold that if it is raining then A's disbelief or doubt that it is raining is satisfied. If we are to speak in terms of A's disbelief or doubt being satisfied, we would surely say that the disbelief or doubt is satisfied if and only if it is not raining.

I think it should be admitted, though, that this is essentially a verbal problem. Searle could get around the objection by allowing that disbeliefs and doubts are exceptions to the general run of the attitudes. Instead of maintaining that a disbelief or doubt is satisfied if and
only if the representative content is satisfied, he could hold that a disbelief or doubt is satisfied if and only if the representative content fails to be satisfied. I do not suggest, however, that such an emendation will ultimately prove worthwhile.

(d) Some philosophers argue that a representation represents only in virtue of being used as a representation. For example, a particular drawing is a representation of the Queen only if it used as such. It would be wrong to suppose that a drawing need have a fundamental resemblance to its subject, since some drawings are notorious for their lack of such a resemblance. There does not appear, for instance, to be any telling resemblance between a certain drawing of a person dressed as an undertaker and the treasurer — at least there is none that I can detect. Nonetheless, this drawing is repeatedly used by a Sydney newspaper to represent the treasurer.

Now, if it really is the case that a representation represents only in virtue of being used as a representation then it could be argued that Searle has not offered us an account of the alleged intentionality of belief at all. For if all representations, including mental representations, represent only in virtue of being used as representations then the way in which they are used is dependent upon the intentions of the user. In other words, in explaining the so-called intentionality of belief Searle would need to appeal to external factors, i.e., factors beyond the representation itself;

1. The claim, incidentally, that all representations represent only in virtue of being used as representations is not the same as the claim that all representations are conventional. For it might be the case that some representations are used unconventionally.
and hence he could hardly hold that mental representations are intrinsically representational.

This is not an uncommon line of argument, and is certainly one with which Searle is familiar. However, it is rather unconvincing. It was noted earlier that a fossil is a representation even although it does not represent conventionally. But it may also be remarked that a fossil need not be used in any particular way in order to be a representation. Rather, it is a natural representation. Another example is that of a photograph. A photograph is a representation of something quite independently of whether anyone uses it as a representation or not. Moreover, there is a sense in which a photograph may be accurate or inaccurate. For instance, if the chemical processing of a negative goes wrong a photograph of, say, someone in an orange coloured shirt may turn out showing the person in a blue shirt. In such a circumstance we may say that the photograph is an inaccurate representation.

Consequently, the objection does not show that mental representations cannot represent intrinsically as Searle supposes. All the same, there does appear to be a difficulty that Searle has overlooked. For although it may well be granted that some representations are intrinsically representational, what Searle needs to do is to explain how in the case of various mental states their contained representations are intrinsically representational. The point has been put by Richard Double (1984, Pp 436-7) this way. What we require from Searle is not an assurance that there are intrinsic representations but an explanation
of the phenomenon of intrinsic representation. It may well be that if various mental states are intrinsically representational then certain problems concerning their purported intentionality are resolved. But the point is that if we are to accept this, what is then needed is some account of the phenomenon of intrinsic representation as it pertains to mental states.

(e) Certainly Searle’s theory has a certain attractiveness about it. Philosophers who argue against the sanctioning of intentional relations do so in many cases on the basis that they consider that intentional relations must hold between agents and abstract entities, and they contend, perhaps not always without prejudice, that the postulation of abstract entities is undesirable. Searle attempts to get around this by arguing that if we treat intentional relations as relations of representation between propositional attitudes and intentional objects then we can (surely not ‘must’) construe the latter as objects or states of affairs in the world represented by the propositional attitudes, but which, like all things that are represented, need not exist. There is no need, therefore, to suppose that propositional attitudes are relations to propositions — propositions can simply be identified with the representative contents of propositional attitudes.

Nonetheless, there is a serious difficulty facing Searle’s theory. As Searle has it, if A, say, believes that it is raining then the representative content of his belief represents the state of affairs that it is raining. So, in such a case, we may say that A has a relation of representation to the state of affairs that it is raining,
or that A represents the state of affairs that it is raining. However, philosophers who postulate intentional objects frequently take these objects to be what we believe, doubt, deny, hope, desire, expect, and so on. What we may ask, then, is whether Searle holds that the intentional objects (the objects or states of affairs) that we represent in having beliefs, doubts, denials, etc., are what we believe, doubt, deny, etc. It would seem that the answer is that he does. At one point we are told that "the questions 'what do you believe, what do you hope for, what do you expect, what do you desire?' must have answers, if the agent can be said to have a belief, hope, desire, or expectation at all; and those answers will specify objects and states of affairs that are not identical with the mental states" (1979b, p.182). But if we cannot specify what we believe, hope, desire, expect, and so on, without specifying certain objects and states of affairs then those objects and states of affairs must be what (or some part of what) we believe, hope, desire, expect, and so on. So, on Searle's view, it would seem that if A, say believes that it is raining then (i) A believes the state of affairs that it is raining, and (ii) A represents that state of affairs.

Further, although it is questionable that 'believes' is a two-place predicate in 'A believes that it is raining', this is not the case with 'believes' in 'A believes the state of affairs that it is raining'. Here 'believes' is a two-place predicate which expresses a relation (what is often called a 'relation of believing') between A and the state of affairs that it is raining. In much the same way, 'kicks' in 'A kicks a mule' is a two-place predicate which
expresses a relation of kicking between A and a mule. Thus it would seem that Searle himself is committed to holding that someone who believes that it is raining is related by a relation of believing to the state of affairs that it is raining.

However, relations of propositional attitude (relations of believing, doubting, denying, hoping, desiring, expecting, etc.) between agents and states of affairs do not consist in simple representational relations, i.e., relations that are nothing more than relations of representation, between agents and states of affairs. If A, say, believes the state of affairs that it is raining then A has a relation of believing to that state of affairs such that if anyone has a relation of that type to a state of affairs then he believes that state of affairs. But if A has a simple relation of representation between, say, the representative content of a belief state and a certain state of affairs then, on Searle's theory, he believes that state of affairs. Yet it does not follow that anyone who has a relation of the same type to a state of affairs believes that state of affairs. For if we are to believe Searle, whether a person believes, doubts, or denies a certain state of affairs he will have a relation of the same type (a simple relation of representation) to the state of affairs; it is only what the relation would be between that is of a different type — in each case the relation of representation would be between a different type of intentional state and a certain state of affairs. Consequently, a relation of believing between an agent and a state of affairs — there would have to be such a relation if what the
agent believes really is a state of affairs — cannot be analyzed as a simple relation of representation between the agent (or the representative content of the agent’s belief state) and a state of affairs.

Of course, it does not follow that a relation of believing cannot consist partly in a simple representational relation. To put things another way, it may still be that 'A believes B' entails 'A represents B'. But although Searle may well hold that there can be simple relations of representation between agents and states of affairs even if the represented states of affairs do not exist, it is not at all clear that a complex intentional relation, i.e., a relation that consists in more than a simple representational relation, such as a relation of believing might be, need not relate an agent to something that exists. In other words, how do we know that it is not in the nature of such a relation, that the complexity of it does not require, that it be a relation between an agent and some existent? But if this were in the nature of, for example, a relation of believing then we really would not want to say that we believe states of affairs. For how could it be said that in believing the state of affairs that it is raining we believe an existent state of affairs, if in fact it is not raining, i.e., if there is no such state of affairs? The dilemma would be worse than the one that Searle began with.

In sum, the objection to Searle can be put this way. Simple representational relations cannot do the job, so to speak, of the relations of propositional attitude (intentional relations) that Searle himself is committed to
postulating, and if we suppose that relations of propositional attitude are complex relations, i.e., are only partly representational relations, between agents and states of affairs, which seems a possibility, then the complexity of the relations might require, quite unacceptably, that they always relate agents and existent states of affairs. Consequently, Searle has not provided us with a viable alternative to the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations between agents and propositions.

A more radical alternative to this view of the propositional attitudes than any that has so far been considered is to deny that there are such things as propositional attitudes. All the theories that we have hitherto dealt with operate within the perspective that presumes that there are in fact propositional attitudes. In the next Chapter we examine one of the most major cases, if not the major case, against this presumption that has yet been propounded.
CHAPTER XI

ARE THERE SUCH THINGS AS BELIEFS?

In recent years a small number of philosopher have actually questioned whether there are such things as beliefs. That is, they have come to question whether the postulation of such things as beliefs is in fact warranted. If it turns out that there really are no such things as beliefs then any suggestion that beliefs are, or involve, relations to propositions is simply false. Moreover, theories of the mind would generally stand in need of a radical reassessment. The significance of this newly found scepticism is thus fairly clear. Only to those unacquainted with the literature will the claim that anyone has voiced such scepticism seem farfetched.

One philosopher of note who has cast aspersions on the commonsense assumption that there are such things as beliefs is Stephen Stitch. I shall begin with an expose of Stitch's views as related to us in his paper 'Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis' (1978). There Stitch proposes to demonstrate that a tension exists between what he calls the 'principle of psychological autonomy' and the belief-desire thesis. According to Stitch (Pp 573-4), the principle of psychological autonomy states that if two living human beings are atom for atom and molecule for molecule replicas of each other then any psychological property had by one will be had by the other. That is, they will be psychologically identical.
Stitch gives some qualification as to what it is for two persons to be "psychologically identical". A person may, for example, remember seeing the Watergate hearings on television whereas his replica, if created after the Watergate hearings, could not possibly remember seeing them. However, it does not follow that the two subjects do not share the same psychological properties. Remembering that p and knowing that p are not, Stitch holds, purely psychological properties, but are "hybrid" states consisting of psychological properties (such as seeming to remember that p, or believing that p) plus certain non-psychological properties and relations (such as p's being true, or a memory trace being caused in a certain way by the fact that p).

Stitch quite rightly points out that we expect a psychological theory that purports to explain behaviour to appeal to only the purely psychological properties of the subject(s). It might be held, for example, that Jones' belief that there is no greatest prime number played a role in explaining the particular answer Jones gave to an exam question. Even if Jones had known that there is no greatest prime number his knowledge would have been psychologically irrelevant in that his behaviour would have been the same if he had had mere belief. Similarly, the difference between remembering that p and merely seeming to remember that p makes no difference to a subject's behaviour. Stitch maintains that the principle of psychological autonomy,

1. My only reservation about this is that Stitch's use of the word 'property' could be metaphysically suggestive.
in affirming that physical replicas must be psychologically identical, is to be understood as restricting itself to those properties that enter into explanations of behaviour as provided by psychological theory. Indeed, we are told:

...the principle is best viewed as a claim about what sorts of properties and relations may play a role in explanatory psychological theory. If the principle is to be observed, then the only properties and relations that may legitimately play a role in explanatory psychological theories are the properties and relations that a subject and its replica will share. (p.575)

Stitch, then, in holding that the principle of psychological autonomy affirms that the psychological properties of a subject and his physical replica are identical means to say that the principle affirms that the psychological properties that contribute to explanations of their behaviour must be identical, and not that the subjects need share all their psychological properties. There is something of a difference between these two claims as it may be that a subject has certain psychological properties not shared by his replica but which do not enter into explanations of his behaviour. The reason that Stitch is not inclined to hold that a subject and his physical replica need share all their psychological properties will become clear shortly.

Stitch next expounds the belief-desire thesis. According to Stitch, the thesis states that human action is to be explained, at least in part, in terms of beliefs and desires. More specifically, the thesis takes beliefs and desires to be among the causes of human action or behaviour. We might, for example, explain a particular case of Jones' rushing towards the telephone this way. Jones is watching
television, nervously clutching a lottery ticket in his hand. The announcer announces the winning number, and it is the number on Jones' ticket. Jones believes that he has won the lottery and that to collect his winnings he must telephone the lottery office promptly. Moreover, Jones desires to collect his winnings. He rushes to the telephone. Here the belief-desire thesis supposes that Jones' specified beliefs and desires are literally among the causes of his racing towards the telephone.\footnote{Needless to say, the example Stitch uses is rough-and-ready. I think that Stitch should, and perhaps would, accept that the belief-desire theorist would maintain that the explanation of Jones' behaviour requires filling in by certain \textit{ceteris paribus} clauses.} Further, Stitch maintains, the belief-desire theorist would also hold that the singular causal statement that Jones' action was caused (or partly caused) by his belief that he had won the lottery and his desire to collect his winnings is true in virtue of being subsumed by psychological laws which specify certain relations between beliefs, desires, and actions of Jones' type. (Pp 576-7)

However, Stitch does not consider it necessary to expound the belief-desire thesis in detail. Rather his concern is with one particular premise, which he takes to be intrinsic to our intuitive notion of belief. The premise, to put things in a nutshell, is that if a particular belief of one subject has a certain truth value and a particular belief of another subject has a different truth value then they are not the same belief. Or, if a belief token of one person differs in truth value from a belief token of another person then they are not tokens of the same belief type.
This, Stitch claims, gives us a sufficient account of the non-identity of belief types. But it is not an analysis of belief-type identity, since belief tokens may be of the same truth value without being of the same type. (Pp 578-9)

Stitch now attempts to show that a certain tension exists between the principle of psychological autonomy and the belief-desire thesis. More precisely, it is claimed that if the autonomy principle is sound then a large number of beliefs cannot play a role in explanations of behaviour as provided by psychological theory. In support of this claim, Stitch appeals to four different kinds of case. However, I do not think it will greatly detract from Stitch's position if we only mention two.

Case 1: Self-Referential Beliefs. Suppose that I have tasted a bottle of Chateau d'Yquem, 1962, and believe that I have. If asked whether I had ever tasted a d'Yquem, 62, I would be likely to reply, 'Yes, I have'. The belief-desire theorist would hold, not implausibly, that my belief is a cause of my utterance. But suppose that a replica of me has just been created. He is asked the same question, and would be equally likely to reply, 'Yes, I have'. The belief desire theorist would also count my replica's belief as one of the causes of his utterance. However, Stitch argues, the belief which is a cause of my utterance cannot be of the same type as the one which is a cause of my replica's utterance, since my belief is true whereas his is false - he has just been created and has never tasted a d'Yquem. But, Stitch maintains, granted the supposition of the principle of autonomy that my replica and I share all our explanatory psychological properties, my belief
that I have tasted a Chateau d'Yquem, 1962, cannot play a role in an explanatory psychological theory.

Case 2: Beliefs About One's Spatial and Temporal Location. Suppose I now believe that it is the 20th century and that there are many strawberry farms nearby. The belief-desire theorist will hold that these beliefs may serve as contributory causes of my behaviour in a number of cases. But now suppose that I am cryogenically preserved this afternoon. I am then transported to Iceland where, after a century or two, I am defrosted. However, after being defrosted I still believe that it is the 20th century and that there are strawberry farms nearby.

According to Stitch, given that my present beliefs are both true and my future beliefs both false, they cannot be tokens of the same belief type. But I have the same psychological properties after defrosting as before freezing. Consequently, Stitch claims, the psychological properties that play a role in explaining my behaviour cannot have changed, and therefore my beliefs that it is the 20th century and that there are strawberry farms nearby cannot play a role in an explanatory psychological theory.

Stitch concludes that since these particular cases can be easily multiplied, there must be a large class of beliefs which have no place in psychological explanations of behaviour.

But what if, as follows, the belief-desire thesis is false? How does this show that we are unwarranted in postulating such things as beliefs? The answer to this, so far as I can see, is not expressly contained in Stitch's paper 'Autonomous Psychology' but emerges in his book
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (1983). There Stitch maintains that:

For folk psychology, a belief is a state which can interact in many ways with many other states [including desires] and which can be implicated in the etiology of many different sorts of behaviour. (p.230)

This suggests that the folk (ordinary) psychological conception of belief entails the belief-desire thesis. In fact, Stitch takes the belief-desire thesis to be fundamental to the folk psychological conception. Moreover, somewhat tellingly, Stitch says elsewhere that:

...if it turns out that the overall structure of the human cognitive system is significantly different from the structure postulated by folk psychology then...there will be no belief-like state, and thus S will be in none...If folk psychology turns out to be seriously mistaken about the overall organization of our cognitive economy, then there will be nothing to which the predicate 'is a belief that p' applies. (p.229)

The upshot of this seems to be that the folk psychological conception of belief (fundamentally) entails the belief-desire thesis, and if the folk psychological conception is (fundamentally) false then there are no beliefs; therefore if the belief-desire thesis is false then there are no beliefs.

It is interesting to note that Stitch sets out to establish that there is a tension between the principle of psychological autonomy and the belief-desire thesis, but ends up by maintaining that the belief-desire thesis is false. However, even if we presume that Stitch has been successful in demonstrating that such a tension exists, this would only show that either the autonomy principle or the belief-desire thesis must be false; it would not show
which is false. Stitch in fact does not offer any argument in defense of the principle of psychological autonomy in his paper 'Autonomous Psychology'. Nonetheless, Stitch recognizes that some argument is required for his purposes, and attempts to carry one through in Folk Psychology. I shall not discuss Stitch's argument here. But I do happily go along with the principle of psychological autonomy.

Stitch specifies four different kinds of case in which it is held that the beliefs in question cannot be of the same type because they have different truth values. I think, though, that the two cases that have been set out are sufficient to show that if we are to type-individuate beliefs, at least in part, by reference to truth values — if beliefs of the same type must have the same truth value — and presuming the principle of psychological autonomy, then the belief-desire thesis is false. However, it is far from clear that belief-types need be individuated, whether partly or fully, by reference to truth values.

This is apparently what Kent Bach (1982) suggests when he says that Stitch relies

...on the arbitrary assumption that beliefs are or ought to be type-individuated only by truth-conditions, but surely beliefs, like anything else, can be type-individuated in different ways for different purposes. Rather than conclude that for the purposes of explanation and prediction psychology does not need belief, [Stitch] should have concluded that psychology should individuate types of beliefs in a way suitable to those purposes, viz., by contents. (p.134)

Strictly speaking, in the paper to which Bach refers, Stitch 1978, Stitch does not hold that beliefs are or ought to be type-individuated only by reference to truth conditions. Rather he maintains that beliefs are type-
individuated partly by reference to truth values. Still, the suggestion of Bach's is that belief-types may be individuated in different ways for different purposes; truth values or truth conditions need not always be appealed to. And with this I quite agree. In Chapter XII support is given to the computational thesis that beliefs are type-individuated for psychological purposes without reference to such semantic properties as truth values.

What I think Stitch could maintain, though, is that if we attempt to type-individuate, for whatever purposes, without reference to truth values then our purported concept of belief will be so far removed from the ordinary notion as to not constitute a concept of belief at all.

However, as things turn out, this manoeuvre is in effect ruled out by Stitch. In an appendix to his paper, Stitch (p. 586-7) has second thoughts and admits that intuition does not always bear out the principle that if two belief tokens do not have the same truth value then they are not of the same type. For example, we are told, if Jones and Smith each believes that he will win the next presidential election then, on an intuitive level, we may say that Jones and Smith have the same belief. This notwithstanding the fact that if Jones' belief is true then Smith's belief is false. Stitch maintains, though, that intuition equally supports our saying that Jones and Smith have different beliefs. The suggestion, then, is that the principle that beliefs of the same type must have the same truth value is not unequivocally supported by intuition.

Other examples surely spring to mind. Suppose that A and B both believe that the present Prime Minister of Australia is a grazier. On an intuitive level, we would say
that both A and B have the same belief. Yet if A believes what he does in 1982, his belief is true; whereas if B believes what he does in 1984, his belief is false. We cannot presume that because A and B's beliefs occur at different times, A and B will, at the time of holding their beliefs, have different beliefs as to what time constitutes the "present". It may be that neither A nor B have any opinion as to what time it is when they have their respective beliefs. I do not think there are any counterintuitions that count A and B's beliefs as different (as of a different type).

Having done something of a volte-face, Stitch (p.587) now maintains that there is a conflict between the principle of psychological autonomy and the belief-desire thesis, given a certain conception of belief. On that conception, a belief is a relation to an abstract object which is either true or false, and the belief is true if and only if the abstract object is true. Moreover, two belief tokens are of the same type when they are related to the same abstract object, and thus have an identical truth value.

It does seem that there is a certain tension in granting this conception of belief, plus the autonomy principle and the belief-desire thesis. But what conclusion are we to draw from this? Presumably, something has to give, but Stitch does not actually say just what. Previously Stitch had argued that if we presume the ordinary concept of belief, then either the principle of psychological autonomy or the belief-desire thesis must go. Stitch opted for dispensing with the latter. However, things are now not
quite the same. The concept of belief Stitch now refers to is a philosophical one somewhat removed from the ordinary notion of belief. This makes it theoretically less entrenched than the ordinary notion. Moreover, as Stitch (p.573) previously pointed out, both the belief-desire thesis and the autonomy principle play an integral role in established theory. It seems to me, then, that if anything has to give, and I think it does, then it is the philosophical conception of belief mentioned by Stitch.

Interestingly, this provides us with an additional argument against the PDP (cf. Chapter XII). For if the thesis that two belief tokens are of the same type only if each 'is related to the same abstract object is false, then any thesis that takes such an abstract object to be a proposition is also false.

It follows that we are not warranted in concluding that there are no such things as beliefs, not yet, at any rate. Even if we agree with Stitch that the belief-desire thesis is intrinsic to our folk psychological concept of belief, and that if we radically abandon the folk psychological concept then we are giving up on beliefs, it is simply not incumbent upon us to renounce the belief-desire thesis.

However, the case against belief is not yet dismissed. Stitch's position is developed further in his more recent work, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (1983, Pp 228-42). Again Stitch attempts to show that the overall organization of our cognitive system as posited by folk psychology is seriously mistaken, and thus that there are no belief-like states; that there is nothing to which the predicate 'is a belief that p' applies. As
already mentioned, Stitch holds that fundamental to folk psychology is the view that a belief is a mental state which interacts with other mental states, and which contributes to the causation of various sorts of verbal and nonverbal behaviour. Stitch proposes two lines of argument aimed at showing that this cognitive picture is radically wrong.

First, it is pointed out that folk psychology is a **folk** theory. And this, we are told, is enough in itself to make us suspicious. Stitch maintains that folk theories almost universally have a bad track record. Folk astronomy was false and not just in detail. The general folk conception of the cosmos turned out to be thoroughly mistaken. So, too, with folk biology, folk chemistry, and folk physics. Folk theorizing, we are informed, has turned out to be seriously mistaken in every domain in which we now have a reasonably developed science. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that the ancients would have had greater insight when dealing with the structure of their own minds than the structure of matter or the cosmos. Stitch admits that this does now show that the folk conception of the structure of the mind is false, but he claims that "the general failure of folk theories is reason enough to think that folk psychology might suffer the same fate" (p.230).

There are several points that may be made about this. (a) Stitch maintains that folk theorizing has turned out to be false in every domain where we now have a reasonably developed science. Certainly folk astronomy, folk biology, folk chemistry and folk physics have all been replaced by scientific theories. But the suggestion that the same might eventuate for folk psychology can hold only if folk
psychology is displaced by a science of cognitive psychology. This presumes that cognitive psychology properly belongs to science. But that this is so is far from clear, and certainly needs to be argued. In fact, a number of philosophers have despaired of ever turning cognitive psychology into a science. (b) Stitch wants to say that if the folk psychological concept of belief is fundamentally wrong then we must simply give up any hope of ever having a concept of belief. Yet when folk astronomy was found to be false, we revised our astronomical outlook; we did not conclude that there is no concept of astronomy. Similarly, we did not abandon the notions of biology, chemistry, physics, etc. Folk astronomy and scientific astronomy are both astronomy, but one is discredited whereas the other is theoretically respectable. (c) As Stitch (p.230) acknowledges, a great deal of recent work in cognitive science (what is called 'cognitive science') has assumed very much the cognitive structure posited by folk psychology. (See, for example, Fodor in Chapter XII.) This at least suggests that the theoretical expendability of folk psychology is not easily come by.

However, Stitch puts much more weight on a second line of argument. It is a fundamental tenet of folk psychology, Stitch (p.231) holds, that not only may the belief that "p" contribute to the causation of its own linguistic expression, i.e., the uttering of "p", but also the very same belief state may causally contribute to various forms of nonverbal behaviour. But, Stitch maintains, there is strong evidence to the effect that our cognitive system contains two subsystems of vaguely belief-like
states: one subsystem which interacts with those parts of the system responsible for verbal behaviour, while the other interacts with those parts of the subsystem responsible for nonverbal behaviour. It is suggested that although the two subsystems frequently agree with each other, there are times when this is not the case. If this is so, Stitch argues, then:

...states similar to the one underlying our own ordinary utterance of 'p' do not also participate in the production of our nonverbal behaviour. In those cases when our verbal subsystem leads us to say 'p' and our nonverbal subsystem leads us to behave as though we believed some incompatible proposition, there will simply be no saying which we believe. Even in the (presumably more common) case where the two subsystems agree, there is no saying which state is the belief that p. If we really do have separate verbal and nonverbal cognitive storage systems, then the functional economy of the mind postulated by folk theory is quite radically mistaken. And under those circumstances I am strongly inclined to think that the right thing to say is that there are no such things as beliefs.

(p.231)

In support of this claim, Stitch invokes the results of certain research done in attribution and dissonance theory. Basically attribution theory holds that people attribute their behavioural responses to the hypothesized causes suggested by the relatively crude theory they adopt as to how they function. Moreover, this attribution itself has further mental and behavioural effects. Typically, an attribution experiment attempts to focus on the attributional processes by leading a subject to make the wrong inference about the causes of his behaviour. The subject is then led to behave as if his mistaken attribution were correct.

Stitch cites a case study of insomniacs carried out
The subjects were asked to record the times they went to bed and the times they finally fell asleep. After some initial recordkeeping, one group of subjects (the “arousal” group) was given a placebo to take shortly before going to bed. They were told that the pill would produce rapid heart beat, breathing irregularities, bodily warmth, and alertness, which are typical symptoms of insomnia. A second group (the “relaxation” group) was told that the pills would produce opposite effects such as a lowering of heart beat, breathing rate, body temperature, and alertness. The attribution theorists predicted that the arousal group would get to sleep faster on the nights they take the pills because they will attribute their symptoms to the pills rather than to their emotionally laden thoughts. They also predicted that the relaxation group will take longer to get to sleep. Since the symptoms of this group persist despite their having taken pills supposedly used to alleviate such symptoms, they will infer that their emotionally laden thoughts must be particularly bad. This will upset them further making it even more difficult to get to sleep. As things turned out, both predictions came true. The arousal group got to sleep 28% faster on the nights they took the pills, while the relaxation group took 42% longer to get to sleep.

Basic to dissonance theory is the idea that subjects who are led to behave in a manner they find unattractive or unpleasant, and who are given an “inadequate justification” for enduring the effects of this behaviour, will come to view their behaviour or its effects as less

unattractive. The explanation offered for this is that subjects note that they have done something they considered to be unpleasant without adequate justification and explain this apparently anomalous behaviour by hypothesizing that the behaviour or its consequences were not so unpleasant as they had supposed. On the other hand, subjects who are given a reward for engaging in behaviour they consider to be unattractive (the "adequate justification" group) will come to view that behaviour as less attractive than if they had not received the reward. The explanation offered for this is that the subjects note they were rewarded to engage in the behaviour, and infer that, because it was the reward that motivated them, the behaviour itself must have been less of a motivating factor. They then infer that the behaviour is not quite so attractive as they had supposed.

Here Stitch cites a case study undertaken by Zimbardo et al., who asked subjects to perform a learning task while receiving a series of electric shocks. After the task was completed, the subjects were asked to repeat the procedure. One group was given "adequate justification" for repeating the task (the research was important, etc.), while the other group was given "inadequate justification" (the experimenter was curious as to what would happen). It was predicted that the inadequate justification group would come to view the shocks as not so unpleasant. The prediction was borne out. The inadequate justification

group performed better in the second round of tests than did the adequate justification group. Moreover, they exhibited lower galvanic skin responses to the shocks than did the adequate justification group.

These data are conjoined with further research carried out by Nisbett and Wilson.¹ Both investigators concluded that the experimentally manipulated effect (or "dependent variable") in attribution and dissonance research was generally a nonverbal indicator belief or attitude. However, when the nonverbal behaviour of a subject indicated that he came to differ in belief or attitude, his verbal behaviour did not indicate this difference. Further, when the subject's attention was drawn to the fact that the change in his behaviour indicated that there had been some change in his belief, he denied that the experimentally manipulated cause (or "independent variable") had played any part in producing the changed behaviour. Rather, the subject offered some explanation of the change in accordance with crude, socially shared views about what sorts of causes are likely to bring about the behaviour in question. For example, arousal group subjects typically explained their getting to sleep more quickly after taking the pills by claiming such things as that they found it easier to get to sleep later in the week, or that problems with a roommate or girlfriend seemed closer to resolution; while relaxation group subjects offered not dissimilar sorts of reasons to explain their increased sleeplessness.

When asked if they had thought about the pills after taking them, the subjects insisted that they had completely forgotten about them. Moreover, they made little pretence of believing that anyone could have gone through the cognitive processes proposed by the attribution researchers. Similar results were reported in the shock experiment. Typical responses were: "I guess maybe you turned down the shock". No subject described anything like the process of dissonance reduction postulated by the researchers. It is concluded by Nisbett and Wilson that the subjects' verbal reports of the cognitive processes underlying their nonverbal behavioural changes do not have an accurate introspective basis.

To be sure, Nisbett and Wilson speak of cognitive processes rather than states. It is held that the subjects provide inaccurate reports of the cognitive processes underlying their nonverbal behaviour. But, as Stitch (p.235) points out, attribution and dissonance theory is going to have to invoke certain mental states such as thoughts. For example, attribution theory requires that, in the insomnia experiment, the relaxation group subjects undergo a reasoning process involving thoughts such as the following: I am alert, breathing irregularly, have a rapid heart beat etc.; I have just taken a pill to alleviate these symptoms; since the symptoms persist, the troubled thoughts or emotions which cause these symptoms must be even worse than usual tonight. However, the subjects flatly deny that they or anyone could have had such thoughts.

In a recent work, Wilson affirms that the subjects'
verbal reports are on internal states.\textsuperscript{1} He goes on to propose that there are two relatively independent cognitive systems: a first system which mediates behaviour (especially unregulated behaviour), is largely unconscious, and is the older of the two in evolutionary terms, and a second system which is largely conscious, and attempts to verbalize, explain, and communicate what occurs in the unconscious system. The second system is called the "verbal explanatory system", and does not generally tap into the unconscious. Rather its function is to make inferences based on theories about one's self and situation.

In (alleged) defense of this hypothesis Wilson refers to experimental work conducted by Wilson, Hull, and Johnson, who induced subjects to agree to visit elderly citizens in a nursing home.\textsuperscript{2} For one group of subjects (the pressure group) pressure from the experimenter was made salient as a reason for making the visit. For a second group (the no-pressure group) pressure was not made salient. It was hypothesized that the behaviour controlling system of subjects in the no-pressure group would infer that they had agreed because they were helpful people, but no such inference was expected from subjects in the pressure group. A behavioural test of this hypothesis was included in the experiment. Investigators.

\textsuperscript{1} Wilson, T. 'Strangers to Ourselves: The Origins and Accuracy of Beliefs About One's Own Mental States' (an unpublished mimeograph referred to by Stitch (Pp 235-6)).

in what was passed off as a second study, asked subjects to volunteer to help former mental patients. As expected, subjects in the no-pressure group demonstrated a greater willingness to volunteer their help.

An attempt was also made to manipulate the verbal explanatory system. Immediately after agreeing to visit the nursing home, half of the subjects from each group were asked to list the reasons they agreed to go, and to rate their relative importance. (This group was called the "reasons analysis" group.) All the subjects were later given a questionnaire, supposedly as part of a second study, in which they were asked to rate themselves on traits relevant to helpfulness. It was hypothesized that the reasons analysis manipulation would not affect their nonverbal behaviour, i.e., their willingness to help the former mental patients. It was also hypothesized that the reasons analysis manipulation would prime the subjects' verbal explanatory system and thus affect their reports about how helpful they were. Both predictions were claimed to be borne out. Subjects in the no-pressure group rated themselves as significantly more helpful than did those in the pressure group. Moreover, as already noted, subjects in the no-pressure group had a greater willingness to volunteer to help the former mental patients. Stitch (p. 237) maintains that these results are precisely what we would expect if there are separate behaviour controlling and verbal explanatory systems which are subject to independent manipulation. The results, we are told, thus provide "intriguing evidence in favor [sic] of the model which postulates two more-or-less independent cognitive
In concluding that there are two independent cognitive systems, Stitch, of course, rules out any suggestion that either subsystem can be regarded as a system of beliefs, otherwise the exercise would seem to be rather self-defeating. So far as I can see, however, the results of the Wilson, Hull and Johnson experiment give us no reason whatsoever for concluding that there are two cognitive systems. What the experiment shows is that there are two kinds of behaviour, one verbal and one non-verbal, such that one may be manipulated without the other, and if both are manipulated then one will not affect the other. (Although one lot of verbal behaviour may prime another lot of verbal behaviour.) There is thus a clear sense in which both kinds of behaviour may be said to be 'independent'.

But it does not follow that there are two independent (non-belief) cognitive systems underlying this behaviour. The data may be equally explained by supposing that there is only one cognitive system, a system that incorporates beliefs, underlying both sorts of behaviour. We are told that the behaviour controlling system of subjects in the no-pressure group, but not those in the pressure group, inferred that they had agreed to visit the nursing home because they were helpful people. The suggestion here seems to be that a causative factor in the nonverbal behaviour of subjects in the no-pressure group was that they had thought (or had some view) of themselves as being helpful.
people. Now, if we suppose that the subjects actually had the belief that they were helpful people, we can certainly then explain their willingness to help, at least in part, by construing that belief as a cause of their willingness. Moreover, we can explain the lower degree of willingness to help on the part of subjects in the pressure group as being partly due to the fact that they do not have, or do not have to the same degree, the belief that they are helpful people. But we can equally explain the verbal behaviour of subjects in the no-pressure group by supposing that a cause of their rating themselves as fairly helpful was their belief that they are helpful people, or beliefs of a related sort. Subject in the pressure group did not verbally rate themselves as helpful to the same degree partly because they do not, to the same degree, have a positive belief about their own helpfulness. Granted this much, there is no reason to expect that the verbal behaviour of either group of subjects will affect their willingness to volunteer to help the former mental patients. Rather, what we would expect is that if the same belief underlies both the verbal and nonverbal behaviour of the subjects then their verbal behaviour will be commensurate with their nonverbal behaviour, which is precisely what it is. There is also no reason to construe the beliefs

1. I think it would have been preferable to have hypothesized that a causative factor was that the subjects had the thought that they should help the people in the nursing home. One suspects that the subjects would have been more disposed to have a thought such as this than one about their own merits. Still, we can let the point ride without any great loss.
underlying the nonverbal behaviour as unconscious, since the subjects' verbal reports accurately describe their mental states.

However, we still have to deal with the evidence supplied by Storms and Nisbett/Nisbett and Wilson. What Stitch claims is that this evidence demonstrates that the folk psychological thesis that the belief that \( p \) may causally contribute to its own linguistic expression, i.e., to the uttering of '\( p \)', as well as to various forms of nonverbal behaviour, is simply mistaken. And this, Stitch claims, should incline us to conclude that there really are no such things as beliefs.

So far as I can ascertain, though, Stitch simply has not shown that it is false that the belief that \( p \) may causally contribute to nonverbal behaviour as well as to its linguistic expression. What he has succeeded in showing is that it is a mistake to suppose that a belief which contributes to bringing about nonverbal behaviour will also contribute to bringing about its verbal expression under any form of stimulus, such as being questioned by an investigator. But it does not follow that if a belief that underlies a subject's nonverbal behaviour is not given its verbal expression under these conditions, then it is not given its verbal expression under any conditions. Perhaps if the full details of the experiments were explained to the subjects, and they were given some background knowledge of attribution and dissonance theory, we would eventually bring the subjects to an awareness of the particular mental states that underlie their nonverbal behaviour. In those circumstances, if some of these mental states
do indeed turn out to be beliefs, the beliefs might well casually contribute to their own linguistic expression when the subjects are suitably questioned about what they believe. Stitch has done nothing to rule out this possibility.

Actually the fact that the mental states underlying the subjects nonverbal behaviour do not, in the experiments, lead to their verbal expression does not lend any weight at all to Stitch's position. Wilson, it is to be recalled, proposes that the mental states underlying nonverbal behaviour are in fact unconscious. And Stitch appears to go along with this. But if this proposal is correct, and I think it is, then the subjects' failure to linguistically express these mental states, rather than showing that such states cannot be beliefs, is precisely what we would expect of unconscious beliefs. We would not suppose that a subject's unconscious beliefs causally contribute (in fact, we would expect that they would not causally contribute), in the normal course of things, to his verbal expression of them. And where a subject's beliefs do causally contribute to his verbal expression of them, we would in the normal course of things, expect those beliefs to be conscious.

However, Stitch has one more argument against belief. According to Stitch, the folk psychological view supposes that to attribute a belief to someone is to say that that person has a belief state similar to the one that would play the central causal role if our utterance of the content sentence had had a typical causal history (p.237; p.229). Thus, for example, in saying 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' we are saying that Stacy has a belief state similar to the one that would
typically underlie our own utterance of 'The Queen is married'. This assumes, we are told, a certain degree of modularity in the organization of our belief or memory store. Stitch proposes that:

A belief or memory storage system is modular to the extent that there is some more or less isolatable part of the system which plays (or would play) the central causal role in a typical causal history leading to the utterance of a sentence. (Pp 237-8)

If the modularity assumption is false, Stitch maintains, then belief ascriptions will typically lack a truth value. "They will in effect be invoking definite descriptions ('similar to the belief state which would play the central causal role...') which fail to denote." (p.238)

One mental model compatible with the modularity assumption comes from cognitive psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers concerned with the structure or organization of human memory. On this model, as it is related by Stitch, each memory contains a distinct sentence or sentence-like structure, with each sentence corresponding to a separate belief. It is held that we can then locate the belief underlying an utterance by identifying the sentence or sentence-like structure on the memory list to which the belief corresponds. It is not supposed, however, that to believe that p is simply to have a sentence-like structure on the memory list. There must be other related sentences on the list in addition to the one that is central to the utterance of 'p'. This, we are told, gives us a straightforward sense in which some part or element of the memory store can be said to underlie a sincere assertion of the content sentence.
One of the disadvantages of sentential models of this kind, Stitch claims, is that:

...their relatively unstructured format makes it difficult to locate information which is relevant to the task at hand. If the model is supposed to explain how subjects recover information from memory in, say, answering questions, then as the size of the memory increases, the task of locating the answer gets harder. (p.239)

But, as Stitch points out, our ability to locate relevant information in memory is both quick and efficient. Moreover, we are told:

The problem is compounded if the answer is not explicitly represented in the memory but is entailed by formulae which are explicitly represented. For in that case no simplistic matching search will suffice, and complicated heuristics are required to locate premises which may be relevant to answering the question. (p.239)

Stitch maintains that there is an additional problem. He argues that:

...language use and comprehension require enormous amounts of non-deductive inference. Information relevant to the subject matter of the discourse, the intentions of the speaker, the setting of the conversation, and more must all be brought into play in reaching an interpretation of simple, everyday discourse. And much of the needed information is not logically entailed by anything the hearer believes. It is at best plausibly suggested by the information he has stored in memory, plus the information conveyed by the utterances to be interpreted. Thus models which aim at explaining our ability to interpret a discourse must propose a memory structure which will facilitate the efficient use of memory in non-deductive inference. Similar problems confront theorists concerned to model thinking, problem solving, or creative thought. (Pp 239-40)

Stitch (p.240) suggests that the best way to tackle these problems is to build a model in which no single component or naturally isolatable part can be said to underlie the expression of a belief or desire. To employ an
analogy, one which Stitch (p.241) draws from D.C. Dennett, we might say of a particular chess-playing programme: "It thinks it should get its queen out early", meaning to say that we can usually count on chasing the queen around the board. We will thus be describing the programme in a useful and predictive way. Yet despite the many levels of representation to be found in the programme, nowhere is there an explicit tokening of anything even roughly synonymous with "I should get my queen out early". Stitch proposes that we apply the same idea to human cognitive functions. By modelling cognitive processes in this way, no part of the model can be identified with individual beliefs, desires, etc.

Stitch (Pp 241-2) acknowledges the advisability of coupling such "programmatic" and "metaphorical" views with a description of some up-and-running non-modular models of memory and language use. The fact that there are as yet no such up-and-running models is not, Stitch holds, particularly disturbing, since his goal is merely to show that modular theories might be false, not that they are definitely false.

This line of objection, however, is not very compelling. One of Stitch's complaints against the sentential version of the modularity theory is that its relatively unstructured format implies that as the size of the memory increases, the difficulty of retrieving information from it, such as in finding an answer to a question, also increases; but our ability to locate relevant information is quick and efficient. Precisely what Stitch means by the sentential theory's "relatively unstructured format" is not clear.
Stich simply does not spell this out. All I can gather he means is that the sentential version of the modularity theory is relatively unstructured in that, although to believe that p is not merely to have a sentence (or sentence-like structure) on the memory list, the other related sentences on the list are few in number, and thus each sentence forms part of a relatively limited network or structure. However, if each sentence on the memory list is related to at least some other sentences, won't these sentences in turn be related to certain other sentences, and so on? So wouldn't we have interconnections of sentences threaded right through the network? And wouldn't this constitute a relatively structured format? It is a pity Stich does not elucidate his notion of a "relatively unstructured format". A great deal depends upon it. Still, lack of perspicuity does not count as saving grace. Sentences (represented as certain groups of bits) can be stored in the memory-banks of computers independently of any other sentences that may also be in store. This would seem to make the relationship between sentences, where and to the extent they are stored in this manner, highly unstructured. Yet random-access (the method of retrieving stored information) is for many computers extremely quick and efficient. Hence, it would appear that the drawback Stich assigns to "relatively unstructured" memory or belief models just does not hold.

To be sure, Stich does add that the problem (claimed above) is compounded if the answer to a question is not explicitly represented in memory but is entailed by formulae that are explicitly represented. For in that case,
we are told, no simplistic matching search will suffice, and complicated heuristics are needed to locate premises relevant to the question. Stitch is undoubtedly right that in such circumstances information recall is not a simplistic matching search. Only an unusually crude theory would suppose otherwise. But is it really the case that the sentential version of the modularity theory would, in the circumstances, require complicated (too complicated?) heuristics? Suppose that we ask a subject the question 'Did you meet your first wife in Manchester?', and the subject does not have the sentence 'I did not meet my first wife in Manchester' explicitly represented in his memory. Rather the closest sentence he has explicitly represented is 'I met my first wife in Sydney'. Now it might well be that when the subject is questioned his memory processes attempt to retrieve information germane to the question asked. If so, the subject, on failing to find an explicitly represented sentence such as 'I did not meet my first wife in Manchester', might go on to retrieve the sentence 'I met my first wife in Sydney', and then infer that he did not meet his first wife in Manchester. In order for this to happen, the subject will need to determine that 'I met my first wife in Sydney' entails 'I did not meet my first wife in Manchester'. But this is surely not an unacceptably complicated task. The subject, in order to single out the sentence 'I met my first wife in Sydney', will also need to recognize its germaneness to the question asked. But it is difficult to see how recognizing the germaneness of this sentence to 'Did you meet your first wife in Manchester?' is going to embroil us in a excessive degree of "complicated heuristics".
After all, we do seem to accomplish this feat where it concerns sentences/questions of natural languages. Of course, we need to locate a sentence before we can recognize its germaneness. But this is equally so of a sentence that is explicitly represented in memory. And Stitch has not demonstrated that there is any obstacle to this. Essentially, I think the objection amounts to this: Stitch's claim that "the problem" (cited previously) is compounded if sentences are not explicitly represented in the memory but are entailed by those that are explicitly represented is true only if there is a problem to begin with, but this is not a point that we need to concede.

Nonetheless, Stitch still has his general objection to the modularity theory that language use and comprehension does not simply require deductive inference, but also requires information stored in the memory, as well as information conveyed by utterances; hence any model that purports to explain our ability to interpret discourse must propose a cognitive system that will aid the efficient use of memory in non-deductive inference. I agree with this. But the problem is surely one that any theory aiming to explain our ability to interpret discourse must face. Stitch does not give us any reason to think that it is unique to the modularity theory. Instead, he suggests that the best way to tackle the problem is to develop a non-modularity theory. He then gives us a rough picture of the way in which such a theory might go, drawing an analogy with a chess-playing programme etc. But this picture, to use Stitch's own words, is 'programmatic' and 'metaphorical'. In fact, Stitch does not even bother to tell us how the
non-modularity theory (supposedly) explains our ability to interpret discourse. Consequently, it becomes rather difficult to see that Stitch has shown that (a) our ability to interpret discourse cannot be explained by the modularity theory, (b) it can be explained by a non-modularity theory, or (c) it is best explained by a non-modularity theory. As such, it is hard to understand why the modularity theory is particularly disfavoured by Stitch in his (very sketchy) remarks concerning the interpretation of discourse.

It seems, then that Stitch's case against the modularity theory, and thus, on his own terms, against beliefs, does not come off. This case is developed via a critique of the sentential version of the modularity theory. But in rejecting this critique we need not be taken as giving allegiance to the sentential theory. Rather, if, as it seems, Stitch's critique of the sentential theory falls down, then the difficulties Stitch attributes to it cannot be expanded into a criticism of non-sentential versions of the modularity theory.

Stitch's fundamental objection to the commonsense concept of belief is that it is committed to certain assumptions that are in tension with various research findings in cognitive psychology. One might question whether the commonsense concept is committed to everything that Stitch maintains that it is. However, my main concern in this Chapter has been to show that even if Stitch is right about these commitments the tension that he claims to have found is either not there or is not particular to the assumptions of commonsense. For all that Stitch has shown, we can have our commonsense concept of belief, troublesome as it sometimes is, as well as our research findings.
It would be wrong to conclude, though, that the overall failure of Stitch's attempt to disprove that there are such things as beliefs shows that there must be beliefs. It might be that some other line of argument would prove more successful. Certainly Stitch is not the only person to have expressed scepticism about the postulation of beliefs. Nonetheless, he has of late been recognized as a substantial — if not the most substantial — advocate of this particular form of scepticism.

Earlier in this Chapter I mentioned that at one point Stitch had in effect provided an argument against a narrow conception of propositions called the 'PDP'. In the next Chapter I make an attempt to explicate and discuss this conception of propositions. Clearing away Stitch's objections also clears away some of the objections that Stitch would raise against the views of Perry and Fodor which are examined in the next Chapter.
John Perry (1979) explicates a doctrine which he labels "the doctrine of propositions". According to Perry, this doctrine has three main tenets. First, beliefs are relations between persons and objects called 'propositions', the latter being denoted in standard attitudinal reports by that-clauses. Secondly, propositions are taken to be vehicles of truth values, but they have truth values in an absolute or eternal sense, i.e., a proposition cannot have different truth values for different people or at different times. Thirdly, propositions with different truth values or different truth conditions are not identical. This is not to imply that if a proposition $S$ and a proposition $S_1$ have the same truth conditions then $S$ and $S_1$ are identical. But it is to say that $S$ and $S_1$ cannot be identical unless they have the same truth conditions. Perry suggests that built into this doctrine is the view that if we are in the same belief state (have the same belief type) then we believe the same proposition; and if we are in different belief states then we believe different propositions.\(^1\) It follows from these assumptions

\[^1\text{It is not obvious what Perry means by his assertion that this view is "built into" the doctrine of propositions. Does he mean that it is implied by the doctrine? It is not clear to me that someone who holds that we believe eternal propositions must maintain that the only way of individuating belief-types is by reference to propositions. All the same, I do accept that the view that we are in the same belief state (have the same belief type) if and only if we believe the same proposition is often endorsed in conjunction with the three tenets mentioned by Perry.}\]
that if A and B are in the same belief state then the proposition that A believes has the same truth conditions as the proposition that B believes; and if A and B are in different belief states then they are related to propositions with different truth conditions.

However, whilst it may be agreed that Perry describes a theory of long standing, it is surely a misnomer to call it "the doctrine of propositions". It is simply wrong to suppose that it is the only doctrine of propositions. What about the theory that propositions are the meanings of sentences? Nor is it the only theory of propositions concerned with beliefs. At one point Perry does refer to it as "the traditional doctrine of propositions". But is this to say that no alternative view has a tradition? In the 14th century Gregory of Romani and Pierre d'Ailly took the view that a proposition may be successively true or false. For instance the latter claimed that the propositio (proposition) 'The Antichrist will exist at the future moment c' is true before c if the Antichrist exists at c, but false after c. Also Abelard maintained that a propositio may change from truth to falsity, or vice versa, according to changing circumstances. All the same, the theory with which Perry is concerned is, in my opinion, a Predominant Doctrine of propositions, and will, for the sake of brevity, be hereafter referred to simply as 'PDP'.

The PDP has of late come under renewed fire. Two of its most recent, substantial critics are John Perry in his


1. (a) Perry bases his case on a number of different examples. However, as each of the examples presents essentially the same point we need only specify one of them here. The example with which Perry is largely concerned is related to us in the first-person thus: I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor. Pushing my trolley down one aisle and up the next, I sought the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip along the aisle, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper whom I was trying to catch.

At the outset I believe, quite correctly, that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. But I did not believe that I was making a mess. That was something that I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail, and tended to my torn sack. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in behaviour (p. 3).

In order to explain my own behaviour, Perry maintains, it is essential that I use an indexical to characterize the belief that I came to have. Replacement by some other term destroys the force of the explanation (p. 4).

According to Perry, if he had said 'I came to believe that John Perry is making a mess', he would no longer
have explained why he stopped and tended to his trolley. In order to explain that he would need to add 'and I believe that I am John Perry', which, once again, brings in the indexical. The only reason Perry's saying 'I came to believe that John Perry is making a mess' appears to explain his action is our natural, but not necessarily justified, assumption that Perry believed that he was John Perry, and not, say, DeGaulle. Consequently, Perry informs us, replacing the indexical 'I' in 'I came to believe that I am making a mess' with another term designating the same person really does destroy the explanation (Pp 4-5).

Perry argues that the essential indexical poses a serious problem for the PDP. The difficulty, Perry suggests, lies in the apparent inability of the doctrine to provide a satisfactory answer to the question, 'What did I come to believe when I straightened up the sugar?' as addressed to Perry. We are told that the sentence 'I am making a mess' does not identify a proposition since this sentence is not true or false absolutely, but only as said by one person or another. If some other shopper had said it when Perry did, he would have been wrong. Hence the sentence by which Perry identifies his belief does not, by itself, identify a proposition. According to Perry, there is a missing conceptual ingredient that refers to him. In order to identify the proposition Perry purportedly came to believe, the advocate of the PDP must identify this missing conceptual ingredient. (Pp 6-7)

It might be held that indexicals are really communicative shortcuts. For instance, it might be said that just before Perry straightened up the sack he must have come
to believe some proposition with the structure $\alpha$ is making a mess, where $\alpha$ is some concept which Perry alone fits. However, according to Perry, this analysis suffers from a problem already mentioned. If $\alpha$ is making a mess is what he came to believe, then 'I came to believe that A is making a mess', where 'A' expresses $\alpha$, should be an even better explanation than the original, where 'I' was used as a communicative shortcut. But such an explanation must surely fail, for it works only on the assumption that Perry believed that he is $\alpha$.

A conceivable reply is to hold that, although no replacement for 'I' generally preserves explanatory force, we require only that there be such a replacement on each occasion. In other words, might it not be held that each time Perry uses the word 'I' there is some concept he has in mind that fits him uniquely, and which is the missing conceptual ingredient in the proposition, but which is not necessarily the same concept he uses on each occasion he thinks of himself. The PDP is surely not committed to holding that there is a general replacement for 'I'. (Pp 7-8)

Perry objects to this on the following grounds. First, even if he thought of himself as, for instance, the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi, that he came to believe that such a philosopher was making a mess explains his behaviour only on the presumption that he believed that he was that philosopher. But this brings in the indexical once again. Second, the missing conceptual ingredient of the proposition Perry supposedly believed will have to fit him. However, supposing that he thought of himself in the way described, but that he was
neither bearded nor in a Safeway store — he had forgotten that he had shaved and gone to the A & P instead — the proposition he believed on this strategy would be false, whereas what he came to believe, which he would express by 'I am making a mess', would be true. (p.8)

Perry goes on to consider a number of different conceptions of propositions that might seem to provide a solution to the problem of the essential indexical, but which he rejects. However, I am largely concerned to give an overview of Perry's position, and so I do not think it is necessary to examine here all the alternative theories that Perry deals with. Nevertheless, there are two theories that Perry goes on to consider about which I would like to offer some remarks in defence of Perry.

Perry claims that if we are to deal with essential indexicality then it seems that we must somehow incorporate the indexical element into what is believed, the object of belief. However, if we are to do so then we abandon that tenet of the PDP which states that propositions are true or false absolutely. Instead of taking 'I believe that I am making a mess' as identifying an absolutely true proposition, with the 'I' expressing the missing conceptual ingredient, we would take it to identify a different kind of proposition, one that is true or false at a time and for a person. Since the relativized proposition is completely specified, there is no missing conceptual ingredient.

But Perry has an argument against this. According to Perry, our problem would still be unresolved: I believed that a certain proposition, that I am making a mess was true — true for me. So belief that this prop-
osition was true for me then doesn't differ­
entiate me from the other shopper, and can't
be what explains my stopping and searching
my cart for the torn sack. Once we have
adopted these new-fangled propositions,
which are only true at times for persons, we
have to admit also that we believe them as
true for persons at times, and not absolutely.
And then our problem returns. (p.14)

Nonetheless, Perry recognizes that for all that
he has said it could be argued that there is a special class
of propositions, propositions of limited accessibility.
That is, it might be argued that when Perry asserted 'I
am making a mess' he believed the proposition expressed on
that occasion by this sentence: but the fact that we cannot
find a sentence that always expresses this proposition when
said by anyone does not prove that there is no such
proposition. Rather, we should conclude that there is a
class of propositions which can only be expressed in certain
circumstances. In particular, only Perry could express the
proposition he expressed when he asserted the sentence 'I
am making a mess'.

Perry admits that he has "no knock-down argument
against such propositions, or the metaphysical schemes that
find room for them", but adds, perhaps a little lamely,
"I believe only in a common actual world. And I do not think
the phenomenon of the essential indexicality forces me to
abandon this view" (p.16).

But Perry's objections to alternative conceptions
of the proposition largely aside, his case against the PDP
may be summarised this way. Various people can assert such
sentences as 'I believe that I am making a mess'. None of
these sentences can be taken to identify a proposition since
they are not true or false absolutely, and thus do not
identify an absolutely true or false proposition, and no other kind of proposition appears to be suitable. Nonetheless, these sentences do seem to individuate beliefs. One primary reason for this is their role in providing plausible psychological explanations of behaviour. For instance, we may say that all shoppers who are in the same circumstances as Perry and could truly assert 'I believe that I am making a mess' possess a certain belief state, a state which, given normal desires and other beliefs they can be expected to have, will lead each of them to examine his trolley. If we drop the indexical from 'I believe that I am making a mess', we seem to destroy the force of the explanation that each individual would offer, in explaining his behaviour. But although all our shoppers are in the same belief state, they do not believe the same proposition. Hence the assumption of the PDP that beliefs should be classified by propositions; that if A and B have the same belief state then they believe the same proposition, and if they have different belief states then they believe different propositions, would seem to be false. At least this is what Perry has tried to show.

It would, however, be wrong to think that this proves that we never believe propositions. There are belief states that can be individuated without appealing to indexicals. Perhaps their individuation requires the postulation of propositions. Nevertheless, Perry holds, the simple model provided by the PDP looks to be fallacious.

(b) I agree with the general thrust of Perry's position, although there are some aspects of it that appear to be a bit tenuous. For instance, in considering the claim that on each occasion someone utters 'I believe that I am making a mess' the 'I' stands in for some
concept in the proposition that uniquely fits the utterer, but is not necessarily always the same concept, Perry makes two objections. The second of these is that if Perry were thinking of himself as the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi, but that he was neither bearded nor in a Safeway store, then the proposition he is supposed to believe on this strategy would be false, whereas the belief he expresses with the words, 'I believe that I am making a mess', would be true.

But which proposition is Perry supposed to believe on this strategy? According to Perry, it is the proposition that the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi is making a mess. The problem with this is that if Perry was neither bearded nor in a Safeway store then the description of the person making the mess would not refer to Perry to begin with. In other words, if Perry believes the proposition that the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi is making a mess, then the proposition he believes is simply not an example of one that contains a concept that fits Perry. But, then, Perry has not shown - not with this argument - that the problem of the essential indexical is not resolved by supposing that he believes a proposition that contains a concept that fits him uniquely. What has been shown is that the problem is not resolved by supposing that Perry believes a proposition that does not contain a concept that fits him. But this seems to get us a bit off the track.

Nevertheless, Perry is not far from giving us a satisfactory argument. As pointed out to me by Dr. P. Roeper, what Perry could say is that if on each occasion that he
believes a proposition of the sort expressed by 'I am making a mess' the 'I' stands in for a concept, but not necessarily always the same concept, that fits him uniquely, such as the concept that he is the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi would have been if it had fitted him, then it is always a contingent fact that the concept fits him, not something that is guaranteed by the intrinsic nature of the believing. But when 'I' is used there is no such contingency. Hence 'I' does not properly stand in for such a concept.

Certainly, also, if Perry thinks of himself as the only bearded philosopher etc., then he would not simply believe the proposition that the only bearded philosopher etc. Rather, he would have to believe that he is this philosopher. As Perry points out in his first objection, it is only if he came to believe that he was the philosopher in question that we are able to explain his action in the supermarket. But this brings in the indexical again. Consequently I agree with Perry's first, but not his second, objection, although his second objection can be turned into a satisfactory criticism.

Perry also objects to the view that we believe relativized propositions, i.e. propositions that are true or false for a person at a time. According to Perry (p.14), if I believe that I am making a mess then on the relative view of propositions I believe that a certain proposition, that I am making a mess, is true for me. But Perry's objection to this is that if someone else also believes that the proposition that I am making a mess is true for me then I would not be differentiated from the other person, and hence believing this proposition is true for me does not explain
my tending-to-my-torn-sack-of-sugar behaviour.

However, it might be argued that this objection is not conclusive. Might not a proponent of the relative view reply that the proposition that I am making a mess is a special kind of proposition such that if anyone believes it then he must believe that it is true for him? Thus if I believe the proposition that I am making a mess then I believe that it is true for me, whereas if Smith believes the proposition then he believes that it is true for him. Certainly we can report someone else's belief by saying 'So and so believes that I am making a mess'. But it could be held that what is really going on in such a case is that so and so believes some such proposition as 'Broadribb is making a mess', and 'So and so believes that I am making a mess' is just an indirect report on this, a report which does not affirm that so and so believes the proposition that I am making a mess. This seems to be a possible counter to Perry's objection which Perry has not explored.

The difficulty with this though, is that even if it is true that someone else can believe the proposition that I am making a mess only if he believes that the proposition is true for him, this is not to say that someone else cannot believe that the proposition that I am making a mess is true for me without believing the proposition that I am making a mess. That is, someone else could have a belief about the proposition that I am making a mess, that it is true for me, without believing the proposition his belief is about. But if my believing that I am making a mess amounts to my believing that the proposition that I am making a mess is true for me, then what I believe may be the same as
what some other person believes. Consequently we cannot suppose that I believe something that the other person does not, namely, that the proposition that I am making a mess is true for me, but that the other person believes that the proposition that I am making a mess is true for him.

Still, the proponent of the relative theory might attempt to avoid Perry's criticism by denying his claim that the relative theory presumes that if I believe that I am making a mess then I believe that the proposition that I am making a mess is true for me. The proponent might argue, instead, that I believe the proposition that I am making a mess as relativized to me without believing that the proposition is relativized to me (or to anyone else).

This reply would not take the relative theory very far, though. One difficulty is that on this theory we cannot infer that I am making a mess from the fact that I believe the proposition that I am making a mess. Somebody else who believed the same proposition, but as relativized to himself, would not thereby believe that I am making a mess. But we also cannot infer that I believe that I am making a mess from the fact that I believe the proposition that I am making a mess as relativized to me. For on this theory somebody else who believes the proposition that I am making a mess as relativized to himself will, since the same proposition is equally relativized to me, also believe the proposition that I am making a mess as relativized to me (although _ex hypothesi_ he will not as a result of that believe that the proposition is relativized to me).

But the other person does not on the relative theory thereby believe that I am making a mess.
Perry mentions an objection against his position that there may be propositions of limited accessibility. As this objection would have it, there is a class of propositions which can be expressed only in special circumstances. Only I could express the proposition I expressed when I said 'I am making a mess'.

Perry admits to having no counter argument to this view. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that this flaws Perry's case against the PDP. Perry treats the limited accessibility theory as a rival to the PDP. If it is a rival theory and, contrary to Perry's unsupported belief, a true one then we would have further grounds for rejecting the PDP. So Perry's failure to provide an argument against the limited accessibility theory (I admit that I have no particular argument against it either) need not be seen as a lacuna in his case against the PDP. It does, however, hamper Perry's critique of rival doctrines to the PDP provided that the limited accessibility theory is in fact a rival doctrine. But contrary to Perry's presumption, there is nothing in the nature of the limited accessibility theory that is incompatible with the PDP. An advocate of the theory may in all consistency hold that two people have the same belief-type only if they believe the same proposition. Thus he may hold that since the proposition that A believes as affirmed by his uttering 'I am making a mess' is different to the proposition that B believes as affirmed by his uttering 'I am making a mess', the belief had by A is not of the same type as the belief had by B. This would constitute a limited accessibility version of the PDP. But if Perry has no argument against the limited
accessibility theory, should we not conclude that his case against the PDP thereby falls down? However, if we construe the limited accessibility view in this way then Perry has already provided us with a counter argument. For, as Perry has pointed out, we do, for purposes of psychological theory, need to construe the beliefs of A and B as being of the same type.

2. (a) An attack upon the PDP on the basis that there is an incompatibility between the doctrine and explanations of the mental causation of behaviour as required by cognitive psychology also emerges in Fodor (1980). Fodor, like Perry, makes use of the role of indexicals, but goes far beyond Perry by claiming that for purposes of psychological theory an agent’s mental states are individuated according to their intrinsic properties, not according to relations the agent has to things in the world.

According to Fodor (as well as a growing number of philosophers and psychologists), some version of the representational theory of mind is warranted if we are to construct an adequate cognitive psychology. Fodor claims that in its broadest outline the representational theory of the mind holds that intentional states consist in or involve relations to internal states which represent the objects and properties that the intentional states are about.¹ (An

1. Strictly speaking Fodor endorses the claim that mental states consist in or involve relations to representations. But a pain is a mental state. Yet what does a pain represent? It seems to me that it is better to construe the representational theory of mind as holding that intentional states or propositional attitudes consist in or involve relations to representations.
example of a representational theory of mind is Searle's
theory, considered in Chapter X).

But somewhat stronger than the representational
theory of mind is the computational theory of mind, which
Fodor also accepts. Integral to the computational theory
is the thesis that mental states and processes are formal.
Fodor maintains that a mental state or process is formal if
it is specified without reference to such semantic properties
of representations as truth, reference and meaning. (p.64)

To accept the formality condition is, as Fodor
points out, to accept a version of methodological solipsism.¹
In sum, methodological solipsism is the thesis that what
lies outside a person's mind is irrelevant to psychology.
On this thesis, and still accepting the representational
theory of mind, the psychologically appropriate way to
individuate types of beliefs, desires, and other intentional
states is by specifying the intrinsic features of their
representations, not the relations the subject has to things
in the world. In other words, the theoretical taxonomy
of intentional states demanded by cognitive psychology
will be determined solely by the solipsistic features of
representations, and not by such things as the referential
properties of representations.

According to Fodor, the only alternative to
methodological solipsism is naturalistic psychology. On
a naturalistic psychology, intentional states are (type)

¹. The term 'methodological solipsism' was, I believe,
coined by Hilary Putnam (1975) for "the assumption that
no psychological state, properly so-called, presupposes
the existence of any individual other than the subject
to whom that state is ascribed" (p.220).
individuated for purposes of psychological theory by reference to organism/environment relations. That is, the theoretical taxonomy of intentional states required by an adequate psychology is determined by the extrinsic relations between the states and the environment. For reasons that shall be gone into shortly such a theory is not considered by Fodor to be feasible.

To be sure, the difference between the computational and naturalistic theories is not that the latter affirms that intentional states have extrinsic relations to things in the world and the former denies this. Fodor accepts that intentional states have semantic properties, and thus relations to the world. For example, we are told that beliefs are just the kinds of things which exhibit such semantic properties as truth and denotation, properties which are fixed by organism/environment relations (p.69). The real difference is that the computational theory holds that intentional states are taxonomized for purposes of psychological theory by reference to their intrinsic features, not their extrinsic relations, whereas the naturalistic theory holds that theoretical taxonomies must refer to such relations. I think it is important that we keep this distinction in mind.

If we accept a formality condition then all sorts of states that would ordinarily be classified as psychological will turn out to be not strictly psychological after all. As Fodor points out, we cannot, for example, know that p unless it is true that p. But truth is a semantic notion. So we are not going to be able to have a psychology of knowledge. As Fodor seems to acknowledge, though, this is
not to say that, given a formality condition, such states as knowing, remembering and seeing are not in part psychological. For example, belief might be a condition of knowledge, but we do expect to have a psychology of belief. (p.64)

But what grounds are there for endorsing the formality condition? According to Fodor, at least some part of psychology should honour the formality condition because (a) it is typically under opaque taxonomies that attributions of propositional attitudes enter into explanations of behaviour, and (b) opaque taxonomies satisfy the formality condition by individuating propositional attitudes without reference to their semantic properties. Opaque taxonomies would, for example, count the belief that $a$ is $F$ as type distinct from the belief that $b$ is $F$, even where $a = b$. Transparent taxonomies, on the other hand, are such as would, for example, count the belief that the Morning Star is $F$ as type identical to the belief that the Evening Star is $F$ because of the coreference of 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star'. Since coreference is a semantic property, transparent taxonomies are semantic (i.e., nonformal, nonsyntactic). But Fodor questions that such taxonomies can properly belong in explanations of behaviour.

Fodor provides an informal example. Suppose we know that John wants to meet the girl who lives next door where 'wants to' is construed opaquely. Given even rough-and-ready generalizations about how an agent's behaviour is contingent upon his utilities, we can make some reasonable predictions about John's likely actions. For instance, he
is likely to utter 'I want to meet the girl who lives next
door'. He is likely to visit his neighbour. He is likely,
all things being equal, to exhibit next-door-directed behav-

But, according to Fodor, if all we know is that

John wants to meet the girl who lives next door where

'wants to' is construed transparently, i.e., if all we know

is that it is true of the girl next door that John wants to

meet her, then there is little or nothing we can predict

about John's likely behaviour. This is not merely because

rough-and-ready psychological generalizations require
ceteris paribus clauses, but also for the deeper reason

that we cannot form any relevant description of the mental

causation of John's behaviour on the basis of what we know

about him. For instance, Fodor holds, we have no reason

for predicting that John will say such things as 'I want to

meet the girl who lives next door'. For John may well

believe that the girl he wants to meet languishes in Latvia.

However, Fodor argues, the claim that opaque
taxonomies individuate propositional attitudes without
reference to their semantic properties is not quite correct.
Strictly speaking, we are told, what is essential to the
example used is nontransparency (= full opacity), and
nontransparency is not quite the same thing as opacity.
The difference between the pretheoretic notion of type identity
of propositional attitudes opaquely construed and the
notion of type identity of the attitudes required by the
formality condition is that there are some semantic conditions
on the former. In particular, Fodor holds:

(a) some formally distinct but coextensive
token thoughts are tokens of the same opaque type; and
(b) noncoextensive thoughts are, ipso facto, opaquely type-distinct.

An example of (a) is: I think that I am sick and you think that I am sick. What is running through my head is 'I am sick', while what is running through your head is 'He is sick'. But we are both having thoughts of the same opaque type.

An example of (b) is: Sam feels faint and Misha knows he does. What runs through Misha's head is 'He feels faint'. Also Misha feels faint and Alfred known he does. Then 'He feels faint' also runs through Alfred's head.

Fodor maintains that because of the noncoextensiveness of Alfred and Misha's thoughts the opaque taxonomy counts them as type-distinct despite the fact that Alfred and Misha have the same things running through their heads. But, then, formal identity of mental representations is not sufficient for type-identity of opaquely taxonomized mental states.¹

The conclusion that Fodor draws from these and certain other examples is that intuitive opaque taxonomy is best called 'semitransparent'. On the one hand, it imposes certain conditions concerning coreference as shown by the examples of (a) and (b). On the other hand, it does not allow substitutivity of identicals (beliefs about the Morning Star are type-distinct from beliefs about the Evening Star) and existential generalization does not go through

¹. To be sure, the examples that I have used are Fodor's. In both cases Fodor bases the opaque type identification on intuition.
for beliefs about Santa Claus. (At least existential
generalization does not go through on the objectual theory.
But see Chapter VI).

Thus the notion of type-identical mental state
that we get from a theory which strictly honours the formality
condition is related to, but not equivalent to, the
notion of type identity that intuition provides for opaque
construals. In Fodor's view, both taxonomies should be
retained. If we taxonomize purely formally then we get
identity of belief compatible with difference in truth
value (Misha and Sam's beliefs will be type-identical when
each believes himself to be ill, but one may be true while
the other is false). But if we taxonomize solely according
to the intuitive criteria then we run up against the thesis
that people's behaviour is contingent upon their beliefs
and desires. We seem to require a taxonomy by which Misha
and Sam may be said to have the same belief so as to explain
why it is that they exhibit the same behaviour. (p.67)

It might be thought that since Fodor holds both
that opaque (as distinct from fully opaque or nontransparent)
type identification has certain semantic conditions on
it and there is a place for opaque taxonomies, Fodor must
consider that there is a place in psychology for naturalism.
Such a conclusion would certainly be incompatible with what

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1. Note that this example is not the same as the previous
   example of b). In the example above 'I am ill' is
   running through Misha and Sam's heads. In the previous
   example, 'He feels faint' is running through Misha and
   Alfred's heads. I do not know why Fodor bothered to
   invent a quite different example. Although Misha and
   Alfred's beliefs both happen to be true, a purely formal
taxonomization would count these beliefs as type-
identical even if one of them were false.
Fodor goes on to argue: that "a computational psychology is the only one that we are likely to get; that qua research strategy, the attempt to construct a naturalistic psychology is very likely to prove fruitless" (p.69).

However, I think it would be ungenerous and unfair to saddle Fodor with such an inconsistency. Fodor does not actually say that opaque type identifications enter into psychology; rather he just says that such taxonomies should be retained. But there is no inconsistency in this for Fodor if he takes it that opaque taxonomies have a role to play outside of psychology. Perhaps propositional attitudes can be individuated in different ways for different purposes. This is how I read Fodor, and it is the only way in which his position seems to make any sense to me.

Fodor proceeds to argue that a naturalistic psychology is out of the question (that the only viable psychology is a computational one). Somewhat ironically, Fodor employs an argument against naturalism which is based upon a thought-experiment used by Hilary Putnam (1975) to refute methodological solipsism. (Fodor claims that Putnam has inadvertently shown naturalism to be false.) But before examining Fodor's adaptation of Putnam's argument, it would be useful to provide a summary of Putnam's thought-experiment.

Putnam draws a distinction between psychological states in the 'wide sense' and psychological states in the 'narrow sense'. A psychological state in the narrow sense is said to be one which does not presuppose the existence of an individual other than the person who is in that state (p.220). All others are psychological states in the
wide sense. X's jealousy of y is an example of a psychological state in the wide sense because it presupposes the existence not only of x, but also of y. Putnam holds, as previously mentioned, that methodological solipsism is the requirement that only psychological states in the narrow sense belong properly to psychological theory.

Now, clearly a psychological state in the wide sense is one which cannot be characterized without reference to a relation between a subject and something external to that state. But Putnam suggests that this is also true of psychological states in the narrow sense.

Putnam proposes that we imagine that there is a near duplicate of Earth called 'Twin Earth' which contains Doppelgängers — identical copies of people on earth. But there is an important difference between the two planets: the liquid on Twin-Earth that is found in lakes, rivers, waterpipes, clouds, etc., is not $H_2O$ but a liquid with a different chemical formula — XYZ — which is indistinguishable from $H_2O$ at normal temperatures. Now since our Doppelgängers and ourselves are physical replicas (or, as we are to suppose) we also share the same psychological states, such as beliefs. But if someone on Earth has, say, the belief that he would express with the words 'Water is $H_2O$', his Doppelgänger will also have a belief which he would express with just the same words. However, the Earthian's belief is about water and is true; whereas the Twin-Earthian's belief is not about water, but about what he calls 'Water', i.e., XYZ, and is false.

The conclusion Putnam draws is that a person's psychological states in the narrow sense do not 'fix'
the extension of the words he uses to specify those states. Rather the extension of our terms is determined, at least in part, by the environment. It would seem to follow on this view that we cannot specify what our beliefs in the narrow sense are about simply by determining the intrinsic features of those states, but must refer to items in the environment.

Fodor holds that psychological states in the wide sense look to be very closely related to psychological states transparently construed, although he is a bit wary about saying this. But in the case of psychological states in the narrow sense, Fodor considers that it is clear that these are to be construed as fully opaque (non-transparent). The reason for this, we are told, is that it is only full opacity that allows type identify of beliefs that have different truth conditions (Sam's belief 'I am ill' with Misha's belief 'I am ill'; Twin-Earthian's belief about XYZ with Earthian's belief about H20). There is thus little wonder that Fodor views with concern Putnam's suggestion that psychological states in the narrow sense require a naturalistic individuation.

All the same, Fodor maintains that as things turn out Putnam's argument is (albeit unintentionally) an argument against naturalistic psychology. Fodor argues that if Putnam's example is correct then the narrow thought that water is wet may not even be about water — the Twin-Earthian's token of that thought is not about water. Rather, whether the narrow thought that water is wet is about water depends on whether it is about H20. But whether it is about H2O depends upon certain truths of chemistry. Hence in order
to distinguish the thoughts of Twin-Earthians from ours as a whole, we would need a complete science of chemistry, putting off psychology indefinitely.

Fodor admits that this argument depends upon certain assumptions of Putnam's, whereas it might be plausibly argued that, for all Putnam has shown, there could still be two kinds of water: Earthian ($H_2O$) and Twin-Earthian ($XYZ$). Nevertheless, Fodor does have another general argument against naturalistic psychology, one which does not depend upon our intuitions concerning $XYZ$. According to Fodor a naturalistic psychology requires:

lawlike generalizations of the (approximate) form: $X$'s utterance of 'salt' refers to salt iff $X$ bears $R$ to ... Since this whole thing is supposed to be lawlike, what goes in for 'must be a projectable characterization of the extension of 'salt'. But, in general, we discover which descriptions are projectable only a posteriori: in light of how the sciences (including the nonpsychological sciences) turn out. (p.71)

So, on Fodor's view, even without invoking the Putnamian argument, naturalistic psychology has the dire consequence of requiring a vocabulary (one by which our thoughts are to be described, I gather) which is only available to us on the completion of the nonpsychological sciences.

One might wonder what all this has to do with the PDP. In fact it has an important bearing this way. On the computational theory, propositional attitudes are individuated for purposes of psychological theory without reference to such semantic properties as truth and reference. Ipso facto, they are type-individuated without reference to such properties. On the PDP, $A$ and $B$ have the same belief-state only if the proposition believed by $A$ has the same truth value as the
proposition believed by B. In other words, the PDP takes identity of truth value as necessary for type-identity of belief-state. But, then, the PDP cannot type-individuate belief-states without reference to the actual truth values of those states — except in cases where belief-states are mutually entailing, we cannot determine that two belief-states have an identical truth value unless we make reference to their truth values. Consequently, if the computational psychology is true then the PDP is false.¹

It would not be correct to say, however, that if naturalism is true then so is the PDP. Even if it were the case that propositional attitudes are individuated for psychological purposes by reference to semantic properties, it would not follow that propositional attitudes cannot be individuated for other purposes without reference to these properties. The PDP is somewhat stronger than naturalism in that it holds that identity of truth value is necessary for type-individuation period, not just necessary for psychological purposes. Of course, if the PDP is true then so is naturalism. But the point which is of chief relevance to my concerns is that computational psychology flies in the face of the PDP.

(b) The important claim that an adequate cognitive psychology requires that mental states be individuated without reference to extrinsic relations between these states and the environment is one which, I believe, can hold even if the treatment of mental states (or intentional states)

¹. To be sure, Fodor does not represent himself as attacking the PDP. His concern is to defend computational psychology (criticize naturalistic psychology). That it is an implication of his position that the PDP is false is something that I am claiming.
as representations proves to be unwarranted. In fact, Fodor has two general arguments aimed against naturalistic psychology (aimed in favour of computational psychology) which do not in any obvious way depend upon mental states (or intentional states) being construed as representations. However, the first of these — the argument that relies specifically upon Putnam's notion as to what XYZ is — runs into a difficulty raised by Sir Alfred Ayer (1982). Ayer writes:

Suppose that in some part of this world we come upon stuff which had the chemical composition H2O but did not have the properties of falling as rain, allaying thirst, quenching fire and so on, perhaps even failed to appear in liquid form. I certainly should not call it water and should be surprised if the majority of English speakers did so either. Conversely, I believe that most English speakers would still apply the term 'water' to stuff that had such manifest properties as I have listed, even if it had a different chemical composition. And the same would apply mutatis mutandis to speakers of other natural languages.

If this is correct then both here and on Twin-Earth it may be said that our Twin-Earthian's belief is about water even though water is not H2O on Twin-Earth. Certainly Ayer's position is an intuitive one. But in matters such as these it is difficult to avoid appealing to intuition. I can only say that my intuitions run the same way as Ayer's. Actually Fodor is not quite convinced that they do not have water on Twin-Earth either. It is this which prompts him to advance his final general argument against naturalistic psychology.

But I think that there is something wrong with this argument also. Let us return to Fodor's earlier claim that it is typically under (fully) opaque construals that
attributions of propositional attitude enter into explanations of behaviour and that it is reasonable to believe that such explanations are provided only within a computational theory. I take it that Fodor's argument for this position is not a general argument in favour of computational psychology. It would be rather arbitrary to suggest that cognitive psychology is concerned only with providing explanations of behaviour. Cognitive psychologists are, for example, also concerned with giving theories of problem solving, inference, and memory. Thus Fodor's argument would, at best, show that some part of cognitive psychology requires a computational theory. In fact, on my reading of Fodor, this is all he does claim for the argument.

Now, Fodor argues that we really are going to have to give a (fully) opaque reading of sentences such as 'I want to meet the girl who lives next door' if we are to provide certain explanations of behaviour. And with this I quite agree. But it is what Fodor says about transparent readings that is worrying. Fodor maintains that if all I know is that John wants to meet the girl who lives next door where 'wants to' is construed transparently, i.e., if all I know is that it's true of the girl next door that John wants to meet her, then "there is little or nothing I can predict about how John is likely to proceed". Surely, though, what Fodor should be positively affirming is that on the transparent construal we can make no predictions about John's behaviour whatsoever. The reason for this is that if the transparent construal can enter into an explanation of behaviour at all then both of Fodor's general arguments against naturalistic psychology (the Putnam derived argument

1. Cf. Stitch in Chapter XI.
and the one following it) are unsound.

Unfortunately for Fodor, transparent construals do enter into explanations of behaviour even if only in a limited form. It is true that if all I know is that John wants to meet the girl who lives next door where 'wants to' is construed transparently, then I have no reason to predict that John will say 'I want to meet the girl who lives next door'. But the transparent construal will still allow us to make some predictions about John's behaviour. For example, we may say that if John wants to meet the girl next door then he will not hide away in a cave by himself and never come out. Of course, this requires certain ceteris paribus clauses. Thus John must not have an overriding fear of meeting people. But this is no objection in principle since even fully opaque construals require ceteris paribus clauses. Actually transparent construals explain why we can only make weak predictions about behaviour as against strong predictions on certain occasions. Sometimes we are able to predict from John's belief that he will, in certain circumstances, say such things as 'I want to meet the girl who lives next door'. But at other times we are not able to predict as much. The opaque/transparent distinction, as it enters into explanations and predictions of behaviour, is able to account for this difference. Strong predictions of behaviour stem from opaque (both fully opaque and semitransparent) construals whereas weak predictions stem from transparent construals, all things being equal.

Basically similar remarks apply, I believe, to the role beliefs play in the inferential process. We might in a particular case partly explain Mr. Smith's
drawing the conclusion that someone nearby is wealthy by saying that he inferred this from his beliefs that (i) If the man next door owns a Bentley then someone nearby is wealthy, and (ii) The man next door owns a Bentley. However, both beliefs (i) and (ii) would need to be construed either fullyopaquely or semitransparently in order for Smith's inference to hold. If either (i) or (ii) is construed transparently then Smith's inference would simply not make sense without further premises. If all we knew of, say, Smith's belief, as expressed by (ii), is that it is true of the man next door that Smith believes him to own a Bentley then we would feel little assurance in Smith's inference. After all, if Smith, say, believes that the man who owns a Bentley lives a thousand miles away (or languishes in Latvia), his inference that someone nearby is wealthy would, in the absence of further premises, be bizarre. This is not to say, though, that neither (i) nor (ii) can play a role in inference at all if construed transparently. I can see no reason as to why they cannot, but they would not have the same inferential potency as when construed fullyopaquely or semitransparently.

It seems, then, that beliefs as construed fullyopaquely, semitransparently and transparently have a role to play in explaining behaviour and in the inferential process (which is not to suggest that they do not have an even wider role). But it is not merely that cognitive psychology requires beliefs construed in all these ways; we also require fully opaque, semitransparent and transparent taxonomies of belief-states for psychological purposes. If we are to have psychological laws then we do not want to
speak merely of, for example, Smith's belief serving some psychological purpose, but also of the psychological function of beliefs of Smith's type. Thus we will want to taxonomize beliefs, whether fully opaquely, semitransparently or transparently, to meet certain psychological requirements.

Certainly admitting transparent taxonomies of belief-states into explanations of behaviour and the inferential process is incompatible with Fodor's full-blooded support for computational psychology, and lessens the impact of the theory against the PDP. Nevertheless, the requirement of cognitive psychology for (a measure of) fully opaque taxonomies in explaining behaviour and in the inferential process shows that the model provided by the PDP is far too simplistic. That is to say, the claim that the PDP has a universal application can no longer be viewed as plausible.

Both Perry and Fodor have appealed a great deal to indexicals in presenting their case against the PDP. Fodor's position is more fine-tuned, drawing on distinctions that Perry does not make. However, Fodor is more extreme in that he attempts to show that the only viable psychology is a computational one. I have argued that in this respect Fodor takes his case too far.

The attack on the PDP in this Chapter is only a limited one. The fact that the PDP does not have a universal application does not show that it has no application whatsoever. Moreover, a propositionalist could avoid the difficulties facing the PDP by dispensing with any commitment to taxonomizing beliefs by reference to such semantic properties as truth and reference. He could do this by abandoning the thesis that propositions are capable of
bearing truth values. The claim that propositions cannot have truth values is not unheard of. John Dewey (1941), for example, once argued for this view. But the point that I am chiefly concerned to make in this Chapter is that some recent work in philosophy has seriously emasculated the PDP. However, since this is a problem for many, but not all, of those who defend the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities, some more encompassing critique is required. In the next Chapter I attempt to provide such a critique.
Throughout this work a number of theories that either explicitly or implicitly reject the thesis that proposition-entities are the objects of the propositional attitudes, where this thesis is construed as the view that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities, have been examined. Although some of these theories have supplied us with some useful insights, they have all been found wanting.

First, we considered the claim that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that p is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., a fact (cf. Chapter I). This proposal seemed to fall down because to say, for example, that what A believes is a fact implies that what A believes is true, but what we believe is certainly not always true.

An alternative is to hold that when our beliefs and assertions are true they are relations to facts, but that when they are not true they are not relations to facts, but are explained in some other way. Anderson, as we saw, adopted this proposal. However, a particular problem for Anderson's account of belief is that it has the unacceptable consequence that what is believed when a belief is true cannot be of the same nature as when the belief is false.

We might hold, instead, that what we believe are never facts, but that facts are intentional in some other sense. Two views of this kind, one by Russell in The Analysis
of Mind and the other by C.D. Broad, were examined.

Broad's theory suffered from a particular problem. But both theories are subject to the objection that sometimes we do believe or assert the facts.

Another alternative is to deny that there are singular objects of the attitudes such as propositions or facts, but to introduce multiple objects of some sort. Russell advanced a position of this type when he held that if Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio then the relation of believing knits together Othello, Desdemona, loving, and Cassio into a complex unity (cf. Chapter II). A number of objections to this were raised. One problem, it was argued, is that Russell commits himself to giving us an account of the correspondence between a true belief and its truth conditions. But what Russell in fact gives us is an account of the alleged correspondence between a complex, of which the true belief forms only a part, and the belief's truth conditions. The required account of correspondence remains mysterious.

Woozley proposed an emendation of Russell's theory but this, apart from suffering from its own difficulties, did not fully escape the quandaries that beset Russell. Geach, too, propounded an emendation, a rather 'mentalistic' one. But it was argued that Geach's theory is incapable of giving an account of certain types of belief. It was pointed out that, to this extent, it can hardly be viewed as an improvement on some of the old theories of British Empiricism.

A number of philosophers, looking for some better alternative, argue that sentences are the objects of the
attitudes (cf. Chapter III). Since sentences appear to be theoretically indispensable, this theory is not likely to be impugned for ontological excess. Often it is held that sentences are objects of the attitudes in that they are, for example, what we believe or doubt. However, not all the propositional attitudes are equally accommodated as some philosophers who hold this view would balk at the suggestion that we, say, desire a sentence. Philosophers who maintain that we believe, doubt, deny, consider and entertain sentences usually also propose that what we assert or state are sentences. A different approach takes sentences to be what we believe-true, doubt-true, deny-true, etc.

But both views of sentences as objects of the attitudes are subject to some serious difficulties. Prime among these is The Translation Argument which holds that sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' cannot be analyzed as affirming that Stacy believes a sentence since an analysis along these lines would mention an English sentence, whereas the German translation of 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' would then have to be analyzed in a way that mentions a German sentence. But, then, unacceptably, the German analysis will not be a translation of the English analysis. This argument was developed in some detail. The thesis that what we believe-true, etc., are sentences was designed, at least in part, to avoid The Translation Argument. In this respect it was shown to be unsuccessful. In addition, The Translation Argument was not exhaustive as other objections to both versions of the sentential theory were raised.

Israel Scheffler held that the objects of the
attitudes are inscriptions (cf. Chapter IV). This thesis is not unrelated to the sentential theory since inscriptions just are sentences that have been inscribed. According to Scheffler, the inscriptional theory has the advantage of avoiding The Translation Argument since the analysans of 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' ('There is some x, such that x is a That (The-Queen-is-married) and Stacy believes-true x' contains no directly quoted sentence and is completely translatable into another language. It was argued, however, that a version of The Translation Argument still applies, but that the problem might be avoided on a re-definition of some terminology. Nevertheless, Scheffler's theory succumbed to the objection that there may be more propositional attitudes than inscriptions.

All the above theories work on the assumption that there are objects (in the sense of 'genuine entities') of the attitudes. In the case of the multiple-relation theories an attitude such as a belief was held to have more than one object. But all these theories belong to the same perspective in that, on an intrinsic level, they all require entities of one sort or another as objects of the attitudes.\footnote{There is the exception, as we saw in Chapter I, that a theory which takes facts as the objects of the attitudes need not construe facts as entities. But note that Anderson, Russell, and Broad seemed to think otherwise.} This approach is, in my opinion, wrong-headed and makes the failure of such theories unavoidable.

A partial shift in theory is to be found in the work of A.R. White where, in common with the theories previously considered, it is denied that proposition-entities
are the objects of the attitudes (cf. Chapter V). But, unlike all the previous theories, it is held that to believe, doubt, desire, etc., that \( p \) is to believe, doubt, desire, etc., something that may or may not exist. White claims, for instance, that if \( A \) believes that \( p \) then \( A \) believes something that exists if his belief is correct but that does not exist if his belief is mistaken. White admits that he does not know what this something is but he holds that it is denoted by the that-clause in a standard attitudinal report such as 'A believes that \( p \)'. Significantly, though, White maintains that we do sometimes believe or assert proposition-entities such as when we believe or assert statements, stories, hypotheses, theories, rumours, alibis, etc. According to White, sentences such as 'A believes some story' must have different accusatives to sentences such as 'A believes that \( p \)' since they are not reducible to the that-\( p \) form. But even if this were so, it would not follow that 'A believes some story' and kindred sentences cannot be paraphrased in a manner that eliminates any seeming reference to propositions construed as stories, etc. However, it was argued that simple sentences such as 'A believes some story' are in fact reducible to sentences of the that-\( p \) form. Consequently, there is no greater nor lesser basis for holding that they refer to propositions than sentences distinctly of the that-\( p \) form. It was acknowledged that 'A believes two of B's stories' and 'A believes every statement made by B' are more difficult to paraphrase. But it was argued that if sufficient information were available we could still adequately report what is believed in any particular case with a sentence of the that-\( p \)
The underlying problem for White is that he appears to operate only at the level of surface grammar and reads ontological commitments into ordinary language that are just not there.

A radical cleavage emerges with the advent of theories that deny that objects of the attitudes of any sort are named or denoted by the that-clauses of standard attitudinal reports. Theories of this type include the 'believes that' analysis (cf. Chapter VI), the paratactic analysis (cf. Chapter VII), some forms of behaviourism (cf. Chapter VIII), and adverbial analysis (cf. Chapter IX). To be sure, all these theories have come about partly as a reaction to the perceived flaws of theories that take entities to be the objects of the attitudes.

The 'believes that' analysis, as put forward by Prior and Quine, contends that a sentence such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' need not be taken to refer to a proposition, or any other believed entity, if we eliminate the that-clause by parsing 'that' with 'believes' to form a one-place predicate. An objection to this is that parsing 'that' with 'believes' is an effective countermeasure only to those who argue that the reason proposition-entities are what we believe is that there is no plausible analysis of sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' that avoids construing the that-clause as the name of, or denoting term for, a proposition. In addition, it was argued that Davidson's charge that Quine had eliminated logical structure from the content-sentence in 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is justified. More specifically, Quine's analysis does not allow the
preservation of logical structure. The same objection applies to Prior.

Davidson's own proposal is that the logical form of 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' is represented by 'Stacy believes that. The Queen is married'. Davidson was chiefly concerned to present a proposal that would salvage the laws of extensionality. But there is a side-benefit that parallels the position taken by Prior and Quine: that-clauses are extirpated as naming or denoting expressions. We can thus on this view report what Stacy believed without affirming that he believed a propositional, or any other type of, entity. The main objection to Davidson was that the gloss he put on the paratactic construction (Davidson despaired of giving an analysis) was quite implausible. Yet without an adequate gloss Davidson's theory is rather otiose.

A small group of adverbial analysts have attempted to eliminate the relevant that-clauses as naming or denoting terms in a different way by arguing that these clauses are adverbial objects which modify the associated verb. An adverbial analysis of a statement (in the sense of 'what is stated'), which construes a statement as a certain kind of speech act, has also been given. But it was argued that a difficulty with this is that although we may say that a statement is what is stated, we do not state certain kinds of speech acts. An additional problem is that we cannot treat 'that p' as an adverbial object in sentences such as 'What A believes is that p'. It was also argued that the adverbial analyses of 'A believes that p' that were examined are warranted only if we already know that 'that p'
does not name or denote a proposition. So that adverbial analysis is either a petitio or is redundant. This difficulty is not unlike the one that thwarted the Prior-Quine analysis. However, the problem runs deeper for adverbial paraphrases in that they tend to be so contrived as to be in need of explication themselves.

Behaviourism is inclined to be eclectic in that some behavioural analyses presuppose entities as objects of the attitudes while other behavioural analyses do not. If we analyze 'A believes that p' as 'A is disposed to assent to the sentence 'p' in the appropriate circumstances' then we are certainly supposing that sentences are objects of belief, though we need not be construed as holding that they are what we believe. On the other hand, an analysis such as 'A is disposed to behave in a way that is useful to him if p and not useful if not p' completely avoids any commitment to intentional entities. All the behavioural analyses managed to avoid supposing that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities. Nonetheless, various problems arose, including that a number of the analyses suffer from particular forms of circularity. A general objection alleging circularity was also defended.

Another theory in which it is denied that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities has been advanced by John Searle, although the theory does retain propositions in an innocuous sense (cf. Chapter X). Searle, unlike various behaviourists and adverbial analysts, does not propose a paraphrase of sentences such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married'. Nor does he propose any direct treatment of their that-clauses. Rather, he holds
that we can avoid supposing that what we believe, etc., are proposition-entities by construing intentional relations as relations of representation between intentional states and states of affairs that are intrinsically represented by those states. However, it was objected that Searle's theory does not get down to explaining the phenomenon of intrinsic representation. It was also argued that the intentional relations to which Searle himself is committed cannot be accounted for in terms of representational relations.

A more radical way of disavowing proposition-entities as objects of the attitudes that also does not appeal to paraphrases comes from Stephen Stitch (cf. Chapter XI). Stitch argued that there are no such things as beliefs, and held that his arguments could be extended to rule out the other propositional attitudes. Certainly if there are no propositional attitudes then there are no objects of the attitudes. Stitch's case was extensively based upon experiments in cognitive psychology. But it was argued against Stitch that the results of these experiments are compatible with our commonsense conception of belief.

In recent years a small group of philosophers have either directly or indirectly brought a predominant doctrine of propositions (the PDP) into disrepute (cf. Chapter XII). This doctrine states that two persons have the same belief type if and only if they are both related by a relation of believing to the same proposition, and the proposition that they are related to has an invariant truth value. Perry held that this doctrine runs up against the apparent fact that sentences containing indexicals are required in order
to identify certain types of belief states as they enter into explanations of behaviour. Fodor also appealed to the role of indexicals in arguing, in effect, that for purposes of psychological theory propositional attitudes are type-individuated in ways that are inconsistent with the PDP. Sympathy was expressed with the arguments advanced by both Perry and Fodor, although some aspects of Fodor's position were thought to be too extreme. However, it was pointed out that a debunking of the PDP need perturb only a limited number of propositionalists.

I think, though, that the thesis that what we believe, doubt, desire, etc., are proposition-entities, or that proposition-entities are objects of the attitudes in some other sense, can be shown to be false. A sentence such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' affirms what Stacy believes. But, as was argued in the Introduction, the sentence affirms that Stacy believes a proposition-entity only if its contained that-clause names or denotes a proposition. This was Frege's insight. Consequently, if the that-clause can be shown not to name or denote a proposition then 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' affirms what Stacy believes but does not affirm that he believes a proposition-entity, in which case what he believes is not a proposition-entity.

But what proposal can we recommend for eliminating the purported reference of the that-clause? A proposal put forward by Pospesel (1969, p.287) is tempting. According to Pospesel,

(1) Stacy believes that the Queen is married
(2) Stacy believes the Queen to be married.

But (2) contains no phrase that denotes a proposition; so neither does (1).

A drawback with this, though, is that we also have to handle sentences such as

(3) Stacy believes that the Queen should be married.

But (3) cannot be neatly paraphrased along the lines suggested by (2). Certainly (3) can be read as

(4) Stacy believes the Queen should be married.

However, (4) still leaves us with the contained sentence 'the Queen should be married', which is a prime candidate for a naming or denoting expression. Some further argument would then need to be adduced to show that sentences do not name or denote propositions.

A better proposal, I think, is to read (1) as

(5) Stacy has a belief that the Queen is married.

Here the that-clause is retained but there is no suggestion that it names or denotes a believed proposition. Rather, the that-clause in (5) functions as an adjective which describes Stacy's belief. If it names or denotes anything at all then it would appear to name or denote an attribute or feature of Stacy's belief. This is not to say that the that-clause cannot name or denote a proposition, for we can simply identify the proposition with an attribute or feature of Stacy's belief. However, if the that-clause does name or denote a proposition then the proposition is not affirmed by (5) as being believed by Stacy, since (5) simply does not contain a two-place predicate that expresses a relation — a
The only verb contained in (5) is 'has'. But clearly 'has' does not express the required relation; otherwise we should have to suppose that any sentence of the form 'A has Y' affirms that A believes Y. The same argument can be used to show that the that-clause in (5) does not name or denote any other intentional object — 'has' simply does not express the required intentional relation. Moreover (5) contains no other expression that can plausibly be said to name or denote an intentional object. Yet (5) seems to paraphrase (1). Consequently, if (5) does not name or denote a proposition, or any other intentional object, we can hardly suppose that (1) does. (But see ahead for some remarks about paraphrases.)

Nevertheless, it might be argued against this that there is an important distinction between (1) and (5): (1) directly affirms that Stacy believes that the Queen is married whereas (5) directly affirms that Stacy has a belief that the Queen is married. Therefore, the difference between (1) and (5) is that the former is directly about what Stacy does while the latter is directly about what Stacy has. Thus (5) does not capture the logical form of (1). Consequently, the analysis of (1) that construes the that-clause as naming or denoting a proposition is not overturned by the fact that the that-clause does not name or denote a proposition in (5).

However, I think that the answer to this is that the 'distinction' between what Stacy does and what Stacy has is really spurious. It is true that (1) directly affirms
that what Stacy does is to believe that the Queen is married whereas (5) directly affirms that what Stacy has is a belief that the Queen is married. But to have a belief that the Queen is married is nothing more nor less than to believe that the Queen is married. Consequently, (5) directly affirms exactly the same as what (1) directly affirms. (5), therefore, is directly about what (1) is directly about, and vice versa. But if (5) directly affirms what (1) directly affirms, although (5) contains no term that names or denotes a believed proposition, it would seem rather implausible to suppose that (1) contains any such term.

We might try to force a wedge between (1) and (5) by arguing that the former directly affirms that what Stacy believes is that the Queen is married whereas the latter directly affirms that what Stacy has is a belief that the Queen is married. But, again, to say that someone has a belief that the Queen is married is just to say that he believes that the Queen is married. Hence, if (1) directly affirms what Stacy believes then so does (5), and if (5) directly affirms what Stacy has then so does (1).

Still, it might be argued that even if the that-clause in (1) does not name or denote a proposition, this is not to say that (1) is not indirectly about a proposition. There is nothing curious in supposing that a sentence may be indirectly about a particular object even though it does not contain a naming or denoting term for that object. 'Smith choked', for instance, may be said to be indirectly about Smith's throat even though no part of it names or denotes Smith's throat. But, then, although the that-clause in (1) does not name or denote a proposition, and (1) therefore is
not directly about a proposition-entity, why cannot (1) be indirectly about a proposition-entity and indirectly affirm that Stacy believes such an entity?

The difficulty with this objection, though, is that (1) is directly about what Stacy believes, namely, that the Queen is married. But if (1) is directly about what Stacy believes, but only indirectly about a proposition-entity, then what Stacy believes is not a proposition-entity.

To recognize, by the way, that (1) and (5) are about what Stacy believes is not to concede that (1) and (5) must be about an entity of some sort. The sentence 'The average family has 4.2 members' may in ordinary language be said to be about the average family. But it is certainly not about an entity or combination of entities. 'About' does not imply 'about an entity'.

Another objection that might be raised is that the word 'belief' is ambiguous — it may be taken to stand for either a belief-state or what is believed, say, a proposition. Hence might not (5), and therefore (1), directly name or denote a believed proposition after all?

However, although there is a general ambiguity with the word 'belief' it certainly does not refer to a believed proposition in (5). Otherwise we should have to suppose that (5) is tantamount to

(6) Stacy has a believed proposition that the Queen is married.

But (6) is not a reading of (5). (6) affirms that Stacy has a certain proposition, whatever that might mean, and that the proposition is believed, but (6) does not affirm that Stacy believes the proposition. Nor, for that matter,
does it affirm that Stacy believes anything. Consequently, we cannot ascertain from (6) what belief-state Stacy has. But we can certainly ascertain this from (1) and (5).

There is another objection that I think should also be looked at. In some languages relational expressions are used between (the translations of) 'belief' and 'that p'. Might it not be argued that in 'A has a belief that p' some preposition such as 'in' has been suppressed. So that the logical form of 'A has a belief that p' is really represented by 'A has a belief in that p'; and although 'in that p' is as a whole adjectival 'that p' may be construed as referential, just as in 'picnic in the forest' 'in the forest' is adjectival but contains the referential 'the forest'. Certainly 'A has a belief in that p' has no sense in ordinary English. But the sentence might be said to belong to a higher-order English which properly captures the logical form of sentences of ordinary English. Possibly we could take things even further and say that 'the proposition that p' has been suppressed in 'A has a belief that p' such that the real logical form of the sentence is represented by 'A has a belief in the proposition that p'. In this case, we would not require the use of a higher-order English. We would also have to suppose that 'the proposition that p' is ineliminably referential.

I think, though, that this objection is not incontrovertible. The syntactical construction 'A has a belief that p' without any supplementation has sense in the English language. As such, its parts contribute in certain ways to its sense; and one thing we know is that 'that p' does not contribute by naming or denoting a believed proposit-
ion. So if the logical form of 'A has a belief that p' is given by 'A has a belief in that p' and 'A has a belief in the proposition that p' then neither of these two sentences will name or denote a believed proposition. For we cannot say that the logical form of a sentence is at variance with its sense. Consequently the logical form of 'A has a belief that p' cannot be represented by either of these two sentences. If 'A has a belief that p' did not as an unsupplemented syntactical construction have sense then we could perhaps argue that it is a defective version of 'A has a belief in that p' or 'A has a belief in the proposition that 'p. But since 'A has a belief that p' has sense in its own right, it does not require any other sentence to represent its logical form for it.

It is important to note, by the way, that although (5) is a quite natural reading of (1), it would be wrong to suppose that 'believes' in (1) is explicated by any part of (5). 'Belief' in (5) is not intended to explicate 'believes'. Otherwise the analysis would clearly be circular. The point of (5) is that it eliminates the purported reference of (1)'s that-clause to a believed proposition or intentional object by being a paraphrase of (1) as a whole, not by paraphrasing every term contained within (1).

The proposal for reading (1) is easily extended to other attitudinal reports. Thus, for example, 'Stacy doubts that the Queen is married' and 'Stacy fears that the Queen is married' may be read as 'Stacy has a doubt that the Queen is married' and 'Stacy has a fear that the Queen is married' respectively. Sentences of indirect discourse such as 'Stacy asserted that
the Queen is married' and 'Stacy stated that the Queen is
married' may be read as 'Stacy made an assertion that the
Queen is married' and 'Stacy made a statement that the Queen
is married' respectively. The that-clause in the last two
cases describes the act of assertion or statement.

Sentences of the form 'That the Queen is married
is believed by Stacy' also require handling. But since this
sentence is equivalent to 'Stacy believes that the Queen
is married' it might just as well be read as 'Stacy has a
belief that the Queen is married'.

Also in need of handling are sentences such as
'Stacy believes something'. In Chapter VI we saw a proposal
of Prior's that paraphrases these sentences in a manner that
gets back the that-p form. For instance, 'Stacy believes
something' would be read by Prior as 'For some p, Stacy
believes that p'. These readings allow us to avoid an
ontological commitment to believed objects by relying
upon a substitutional, rather than an objectual, interpretation
of the quantifiers. So that this point could be properly
understood I gave an account of both substitutional and
objectual quantification in Chapter VI. There I also mentioned
a number of objections to objectual quantification. It was
important to do this for otherwise the fact that some
philosophers have come to adopt a substitutional interpreta-
tion of the quantifiers would not have been adequately
explained. Substitutional quantification came about largely
as an attempt to find a way around the sort of objections

1. As pointed out in the Introduction, some philosophers
attempt to make a great deal out of sentences of this kind.
Moreover, contra Quine and Scheffler (cf. Chapters IV and
VI) these sentences are not readily expendable.
to the traditional (objectual) interpretation of the quantifiers that I mentioned. Also it seemed important to see how the objectual theory fared under the weight of these objections. As things turned out, some of the objections did seem to be troublesome, but the nature of the discussion was only introductory. I was not unsympathetic to Prior’s readings. But some philosophers have also expressed misgivings about the substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers. One of these misgivings was mentioned in Chapter VI.

However, in one respect Prior’s readings were really not necessary. After all, if sentences that specify what we believe (e.g. 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married') do not affirm that we believe proposition-entities, or entities of any other type, then it is hardly credible to suppose that sentences which convey much less information as to what we believe (e.g. 'Stacy believes something' and 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not') affirm that we believe entities. A sentence such as 'Stacy believes something' is just an imprecise report on what Stacy believes which is more fully reported by a sentence of the that-p form, such as 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married'. Only since in some cases all we happen to know about a person’s belief is, say, that he believes something we are not always able to determine which sentences of the that-p form are appropriate reports.

Given that a sentence such as 'Stacy believes something' does not affirm that Stacy believes an entity of some sort, it would appear that the 'somethings', 'everythings' and 'some of the things' contained in sentences of this type are non-nominal in the same way that the
'something' in 'Stacy does something' is non-nominal. Moreover, any suggestion that we can read

(7) Stacy believes something

as

(8) (\exists x) (Stacy believes x),

where (8) is interpreted objectually, is clearly illegitimate. Admittedly, where A believes or doubts something we may say that there is something that A believes or doubts. But it would be wrong to infer from this that A believes or doubts some entity. For if this reasoning were correct then we would be equally warranted in inferring that if A does something then there is something that A does, and hence that A does some entity. But such an inference is palpably nonsensical. This is not to imply that no sentence of the 'There is a x' form is ontologically committed to an x. It is difficult to see, for example, how 'There is someone at the door' is not committed to the existence of someone who is at the door. Nevertheless, it seems wrong to suppose that a sentence is ontologically committed to an x merely because it takes the 'There is an x' form.

(Cf. Chapter VI for a discussion of this point.)

Still, if (7) does not affirm that Stacy believes some entity or other then should we not in principle be able to paraphrase (7) in a way that makes this apparent? I think that this is right. But suitable paraphrases of sentences such as (7) do appear to be available. Although Prior's substitutional readings are, as we have seen, not without difficulty, Prior (1971, p.38) did once suggest that a very natural rendering of 'For all p, if he says that p, then p' (where this is a substitutional reading of
'Everything he says is true' is 'However he says things are, thus they are'. Although this was a rather isolated proposal of Prior's part— he does not attempt to extend it to the other so-called 'quantifications'— we have here, I believe, a pointer to how sentences like (7) are to be read. However, we not only speak of 'how' things are, but also of the 'way' things are, and, as I shall shortly explain, it may sometimes be preferable for our purposes to speak in terms of the latter.

By reading (7) as 'Stacy believes that things are a certain way' we eliminate the allegedly troublesome 'something'. Moreover, the injected that-clause does not name or denote a proposition here either. For our reading is equivalent to 'Stacy has a belief that things are a certain way', and the that-clause does not name or denote a proposition in this sentence for essentially the same reason that it does not do so in (5) 'Stacy has a belief that the Queen is married'. Yet, 'Stacy believes that things are a certain way' seems to serve any useful purpose served by (7).

Similarly, 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not', 'Cohen and I always believe the same things', 'Some of the things he says are true', and 'Mrs. Murphy

1. We might, instead, try to read (7) simply as 'Stacy has a belief'. This also rids us of 'something'. But, then, how do we read 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not'? 'Paul has some belief that Elmer does not' would itself require explication, for in no case does Paul have a numerically identical belief to Elmer. If we propose 'Paul has a belief of a certain type that Elmer does not have' as an explication, then how do we explicate 'Paul believes some of the things that Elmer says'?
believes that everything Father Gordon says is true' may be read as 'Paul believes that things are a certain way that Elmer does not believe them to be', 'However Cohen believes things to be, I believe them to be', 'Some of the ways he says things are thus are', and 'Mrs. Murphy believes that however Father Gordon says things are, thus they are' respectively. In the case of 'Paul and Elmer agree on just three things' it does not appear that we can get a rendering in terms of "how" Paul and Elmer believe things to be. But the sentence may, I think, be read as 'Paul and Elmer agree that things are three ways'.1 'Stacy believes many of the things that Smith says' may be read as 'Many of the ways that Stacy believes things to be Smith asserts them to be'. (It is important to keep in mind here that Stacy may believe many of the things that Smith says without believing that anyone has said anything. If, for instance, Smith asserts that grass is green and Stacy does not believe that either Smith or anyone else has done this, then Stacy may still believe that grass is green. But in such a case the thing that Stacy believes is the thing that Smith asserts.)

Contrary to the views of some philosophers (cf. Introduction), there is also no need to suppose that where there are incompatibilities between the things we believe,

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1. It is perhaps a little unusual to speak of things being three ways (or of believing things to be three ways), but it is not, I believe, incorrect. We might well imagine, for example, a conversation between a doctor and a patient going this way. Patient: "Tell me the way that things are, Doctor". Doctor: "Well, things are three ways. You have Reiter's Disease. You have Crohn's Disease. And Alzheimer's Disease is finishing you off."
the incompatibilities are between proposition-entities. If, for example, we read 'Some of the things that Stacy believes are incompatible with some of the things that Smith believes' as 'Some of the ways that Stacy believes things to be are incompatible with some of the ways that Smith believes things to be' then, since the latter avoids an ontological commitment to incompatible propositions, so does the former. (The related claim, also mentioned in the Introduction, that incompatible belief-states cannot co-exist also seems to me to be wrong. Surely there can be incompatible belief-states in the sense that the truth conditions of certain belief-states may be incompatible with the truth conditions of certain other belief-states.)

It is to be appreciated, though, that these paraphrases receive their license partly from the fact that sentences such as (1) 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' do not affirm that so-and-so believes such-and-such an entity. Clearly if the that-clause in (1) names or denotes a proposition then any attempt to show that a sentence such as 'Stacy believes something' does not affirm that Stacy believes some entity would seem rather pointless. Since the 'something' in 'Stacy believes something' is non-referential the suggestion of some philosophers (cf. Introduction) that to believe something is to believe something which is, subsists, or exists falls by the wayside. If the word 'something' does not refer in sentences of this type, there can be no suggestion of its referring to something which is, subsists, or exists. The same point applies to such kindred sentences as 'Paul and Elmer agree on just three things', 'Cohen and I always believe the same things'.
etc. The expressions 'just three things' and 'the same things' do not refer to anything in these sentences either.

We might also consider that if the arguments mentioned in the Introduction were correct in holding that to believe something is to believe something which is, subsists, or exists then we would be equally entitled to infer, which we plainly are not, that to do something is to do something which is, subsists, or exists.

It is also often maintained that the 'it' in 'A believes it' is referential (again cf. Introduction). Some philosophers are persuaded into this position by the antiquated view that a pronoun must refer to something. However, 'it' is merely a place-holder for a that-clause in 'A believes it'. In principle it can always be replaced with a that-clause. For instance, if I say 'Smith believes that grass is green' and then add 'Jones believes it too', the 'it' can be substituted for a that-clause thus: 'Jones believes that grass is green too'. Sometimes we might say 'Smith believes such-and-such a story' and add 'Jones believes it too'. But the 'it' does not refer to a story. As pointed out in Chapter V, in any particular case in which someone believes a story we can, if sufficient information is available, report what that person believes with a sentence of the that-p form without making reference to a story.

Also, if it followed from the pronouness of 'it' that 'it' in 'A believes it' actually refers to some entity, then the same would be true of 'it' in 'A is doing it'. However, 'it' clearly has no such role in the latter. The same point applies to 'what' in 'what A believes'. Compare this with 'what' in 'what A does'.

At several points throughout this thesis I have attempted to give some indication of what may be regarded as a suitable type of paraphrase or analysans of sentences of the 'A believes that p' form. Prior and Quine provided a parsing of 'A believes that p' that avoids construing the that-clause as a name or denoting term. But not all propositionalists base their claim that the that-clause names or denotes a proposition in 'A believes that p' on the supposition that there is no alternative treatment of the that-clause. Their reasons, as we saw, run deeper than that.

However, it would be wrong to infer that this objection must also apply to any attempt to show by paraphrase that 'that p' does not name or denote a proposition in 'A believes that p'. If the propositionalist is right that 'that p' does in fact name or denote a proposition then no such paraphrase will be possible. But on the other hand, the production of such a paraphrase would settle the issue against the propositionalist. In my view, 'A has a belief that p' is a satisfactory paraphrase of 'A believes that p', and shows that 'that p' does not name or denote a proposition in the latter.

But there are certain types of paraphrases that are best avoided. Paraphrases that are so heavily contrived as to be in need of explication are unsatisfactory by themselves. Adverbial paraphrases fall into this category. For example, 'A p.s believingly' as a purported reading of 'A believes

1. It is worthwhile keeping in mind here that Prior and Quine do not in fact propose a paraphrase, but a parsing, of 'A believes that p'.

that p' amounts to an *ignotum per ignotius*. In this respect, grammatically well-formed sentences of natural language, or those taking this form, such as 'A has a belief that p', appear to have an advantage since they are understandable in their own right.

This is not to imply, though, that to be a contrived paraphrase is to be illegitimate. The paraphrases that I offered of sentences such as 'A believes Smith's story' were a little contrived. Nevertheless, they do seem to be understandable in their own right. Moreover, if the contrivance is too obscure, we might define the terms contained within it. One thinks here of analyses of the type that Carnap frequently employed. But, to be sure, neither of these approaches was adopted by the adverbial analysts whom we examined.

We also need to give some grounds for saying that a certain formulation is a satisfactory paraphrase of 'A believes that p'. Thus it is not good enough to simply declare, for example, that 'A is disposed to behave in a way that is useful to him if p and not useful if not p' is a satisfactory paraphrase of 'A believes that p'. If this behavioural formulation were a satisfactory paraphrase then it would certainly be wrong to suppose that to believe that p is to believe a proposition-entity. But, quite apart from the particular objections that were raised in Chapter VIII, it is far from obvious that this formulation even has the same truth conditions as 'A believes that p'. At least in the case of 'A has a belief that p' there is a certain level of intuitive support in claiming that it is a satisfactory paraphrase of 'A believes
However, some philosophers take a rather dim view in general of paraphrases aimed at avoiding certain ontological commitments. (It was pointed out in Chapter VI, incidentally, that this is not the only function of paraphrases.) For instance, William Alston, in his famous paper 'Ontological Commitments' (1958, Pp 8-10), argues that we cannot avoid an ontological commitment to Ps by translating (by which Alston seems to mean 'paraphrasing') sentences of the form 'There are Ps' (or sentences which imply sentences of this form, such as 'The P is R') into sentences of some other form. Alston holds, for example, that we cannot avoid an ontological commitment to possibilities by translating

(a) There is a possibility that James will come

into

(b) The statement that James will come is not certainly false.

According to Alston, if the translation (paraphrase) of (a) into (b) is adequate, then (a) and (b) make the same assertion. But, then, (b) makes the same assertion as (a), namely, that there is a possibility that James will come. Consequently, in uttering (b) we would be asserting that there is a possibility (committing ourselves to the existence of a possibility) just as much as we would if we uttered (a). On the other hand, Alston argues, if the translation is not adequate then it has not been shown that (b) can be used to make the same assertion as (a). Hence it cannot be said that the translation saves us from an
ontological commitment to a possibility.

It is not perfectly clear as to what Alston means by saying that if (b) is an adequate translation of (a) then (a) and (b) "make the same assertion". The impression that I get, though, is that Alston wishes to maintain that if (b) is an adequate translation of (a) then (a) and (b) are synonymous. However, I am not certain of this, and I think that it is a matter upon which Alston could have been more perspicuous.

Quine (1960) takes a less demanding view of the paraphrase. We are told that in giving an analysis or explication of a sentence we are not claiming synonymy or exposing hidden meanings, but supplying lacks:

We fix on the particular functions of the unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. Beyond those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our interests and purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the head of "don't cares". Under this head we are free to allow the explicans all manner of novel connotations never associated with the explicandum.

Quine's claim that an analysans does not preserve synonymy (identity of meaning) is supported by his well-known critique of the notion of synonymy itself. It would take us too far afield to discuss the details of Quine's objections here. But quite apart from the objections raised by Quine, the thesis that a translation, analysans, or paraphrase needs to be synonymous with the translated, analysed, or paraphrased sentence is not unquestionable. The Oxford English Dictionary allows that a paraphrase may be an "amplification" of a passage or expression.
much, why cannot a paraphrase add to the sense of a sentence, rather than be synonymous with it? This would in fact fit in quite well with Quine's claim that an analysans or explicans supplies lacks in meaning.1

There may be some question as to what extent an analysans may have different connotations (and keep in mind that connotations are not denotations) to its analysandum. Nevertheless, so far as I can see, a translation, analysans or paraphrase should, except perhaps in cases of overriding practical difficulty, retain the same significant entailments as the translated, analysed, or paraphrased sentence, even if by way of amplification it adds a little to those entailments. And this is to say that, as a general rule, a translation, analysans, or paraphrase should at least preserve reference and truth value. If a sentence $S$ does not have the same reference, i.e., is not about the same objects, or does not have the same truth value, as $S_1$ then it is difficult to see how $S$ can have the same significant entailments as $S_1$. When we attempt to formulate a translation, analysans, or paraphrase of $S$ we do seem to seek a sentence that has a special logical affinity with $S$, and a sentence that has the same significant entailments as $S$ better satisfies this criterion than one that does not have the same significant entailments.

It might appear that Donald Davidson (1976, Pp 39-40) rejects this view when he remarks that if a translation must

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1. To deny, by the way, that $S$ and $S_1$ are synonymous need not be to deny that they are mutually entailing. We may recognize, for example, that 'S has shape' and 'X has size' are not synonymous but still accept their mutual entailment.
preserve reference then very few utterances would turn out to be satisfactory translations provided the utterances contain indexicals. Davidson claims that, leaving aside bilinguals, no French utterance can state the same fact that I do by using 'I', and I cannot state the same fact twice by uttering 'I'm warm' twice. Moreover, Davidson notes, translators often change the reference contained within an utterance when that reference is token reflexive.

A question that immediately comes to mind is whether Davidson's case can be extended beyond translations to show that an analysans need not preserve the reference of its analysandum. Davidson seems to be suggesting that it should be extended in the case of utterances containing indexicals. For if I cannot state the same fact twice by uttering 'I'm warm' twice (I must admit that I am not clear as to why Davidson says this) then surely by uttering an analysans of 'I'm warm' I would also be stating a different fact.

There are numerous other particular examples to which we might also appeal. An utterance of 'Sir Winston Churchill is alive' made in 1964 would have been true, whereas a translation of that utterance made in 1966 would have been false. So might it not also be argued that since two utterances of 'Sir Winston Churchill is alive' may have different truth values an analysans of 'Sir Winston Churchill is alive' need not preserve truth value either?

However, I think that this type of preoccupation with utterances is too constrictive. As I argued in Chapter VII, we cannot give the truth conditions of utterances without giving the truth conditions of sentences. But we can give the truth conditions of sentences without giving
the truth conditions of utterances. Sentences, therefore, are paramount. So although Davidson makes certain claims about the translation of utterances containing indexicals, we are, more importantly, going to have to consider whether the same claims hold with regard to the translation of sentences containing indexicals.

Certainly sentences containing the indexical 'I' are true or false of different people (or objects) at different times. For instance, 'I am warm', taken as a sentence, may be true of me at $T_1$ whilst false at $T_2$, and false of someone else at $T_1$ but true of that person at $T_2$. I think that essentially this point could be derived from the discussion on Perry and Fodor in Chapter XII.

There are also sentences that do not contain the indexical 'I' that are true of particular people (or objects) at different times. 'Sir Winston Churchill is alive' is an example of this sort when construed as a sentence.

But it does not follow that there are any sentences at all whose translations do not in a quite vital sense preserve reference and truth value. If the sentence 'I am warm' is true of me at $T_1$ then any translation of this sentence will also be true of me at $T_1$. This is so notwithstanding that a translation of 'I am warm' may also be true of someone else at $T_1$ or false of me at $T_2$. So there is a significant sense in which both reference and truth value are preserved. Similarly, if the sentence 'Sir Winston Churchill is alive' is true in 1964 then any translation of this sentence will also have the value true in 1964 (reference is eternally invariant in this case).

Consequently Davidson's claims concerning the translation of utterances containing indexicals do not show
that there is no significant sense in which a translation of a sentence needs to preserve reference, or, for that matter, truth value. Davidson's arguments, therefore, do not extend to showing that an analysans need not have the same reference or truth value as its analysandum, where the analysans and analysandum are construed as sentences.

This is not to imply, though, that a translation may never alter reference or truth value. Might it not still be said that in certain cases of overriding practical difficulty reference or truth value need not, or cannot, be preserved? For instance, might it not be argued that a translation of the sentence 'This sentence contains thirty six letters' into certain languages cannot retain reference to the same number of letters and still be true?

But in such a case is it perfectly clear that translation is permissible? Might it not be preferable to say that our sentence is in these circumstances untranslatable? In any case, examples of this type surely constitute a minority of cases. They would not show that translations, analyses, and paraphrases do not in general, at any rate, preserve reference and truth value. Perhaps some overriding practical difficulties do produce exceptions. But with apologies to Locke, exceptions probe a general rule; they do not disprove it. (Keep in mind, though, that our concern here is with sentences.)

Still it might be claimed that there are numerous other cases in which translation alters reference. Do we not commonly translate even directly quoted dialogue in works of fiction and newspaper reports? But on the standard view that quotations are names, are we not then
However, I think that it is questionable that in such cases what are held to be translations are in fact genuine translations. Suppose that Chancellor Kohl asserts the words 'Der Mond ist rund' and a German newspaper correctly reports on this with the sentence 'Kohl hat gesagt „Der Mond ist rund"'. An English newspaper purports to translate the report thus: 'Kohl asserted 'The moon is round''. But Kohl usually understands what he asserts, and in this case he understands his words 'Der Mond ist rund'. However, if Kohl is not bilingual, and hence does not understand 'The moon is round', then contra the English newspaper report, these words cannot be what he asserts. Our so-called English translation would thus be false while the sentence allegedly translated would be true. If it be replied that if the English newspaper report is the best that we can come up with to serve as a translation then it will just have to do, then it should be pointed out that we do have a literal translation of 'Kohl hat gesagt „Der Mond ist rund"' which is 'Kohl asserted 'Der Mond ist rund''. Of course, this is not a very appealing translation for English newspaper readers since most of them would not understand it. But it does accurately report what Kohl asserted, whereas 'The moon is round' is a translation of what he asserted which is, strictly speaking, illegitimately translated in 'Kohl asserted 'The moon is round''.

But if a translation, analyses, or paraphrase

1. This point emerged in Chapter III in a slightly different context concerning the sentential analysis of 'A asserted that the moon is round'.
preserves reference and truth value, at least as a general rule, then is not Alston's objection given substance? After all, if a sentence $S$ names or denotes a certain object then any paraphrase or analysans of $S$ would by these standards also name or denote the same object. So how can a paraphrase or analysans of $S$ be used to eliminate an ontological commitment of $S$?

However, the paraphrase or analysans has more than one *modus operandi* in relation to ontological matters. In many cases where paraphrases are attempted the situation is not that a certain sentence, say, $S$ is ontologically committed to a certain object, say, $0$, but that if we come up with the right type of paraphrase then we can show that $S$ is not ontologically committed to $0$. Rather, the situation often is that we have a claim, one for which there may or may not be conclusive reasons for making, that $S$ is ontologically committed to $0$; and this claim can then be tested by seeing whether we can come up with a paraphrase of $S$ that is not ontologically committed to $0$. Certainly if the reasons for saying that $S$ is ontologically committed to $0$ are in fact conclusive then, in Alston's view and mine, no satisfactory paraphrase or analysans of $S$ can fail to be ontologically committed to $0$. But, on the other hand, if we are able to formulate a satisfactory paraphrase or analysans of $S$ that is not ontologically committed to $0$ then the claim that $S$ has this ontological commitment is fallacious. In my view, for instance, the fact that 'A has a belief that $p$' is an adequate paraphrase of 'A believes that $p$', and is not ontologically committed to a believed proposition, shows the claim that 'A believes that $p$' is ontologically committed
to a believed proposition to be false. Thus paraphrases have a role in avoiding ontological commitments that Alston has not taken into account.

The upshot of this thesis is not a theory of the propositional attitudes let alone a theory of mind. All sorts of problems remain. For one thing, we still want to know the logical form of standard attributions of attitude. A major obstacle to this is that such attributions are notorious for providing cases in breach of the principle of the substitutivity of identicals. For instance, we can make trouble for (1) 'Stacy believes that the Queen is married' by substituting 'the Head of the Church of England' for the coreferring 'the Queen'. Welcome as it would have been it has not been one of the objects of this thesis to furnish a solution to this complex and much discussed problem. Thus no proposal for giving the logical form of sentences such as (1) has been offered. In the case of Davidson we do have a proposal concerning logical form. However, as was argued in Chapter VII, this theory seems seriously flawed. But even if this were not so, Davidson's paratactic proposal has no application to sentences such as (5) 'Stacy has a belief that the Queen is married'; for clearly 'Stacy has a belief that. The Queen is married' has no apparent sense. Although I maintain that (5) is a paraphrase of (1), we would in any case need to give the logical form of (5). Consequently, no new problems have been generated by reading (1) as (5), not so far as logical form is concerned. We may agree with Davidson's argument for the need to show logical form which, as Davidson has demonstrated, can only be given by a recursive semantics. However, it is the way in which
Davidson attempts to give logical form that I question. Admittedly, I have no better proposal to propound. So far as I can see, though, the difficulty of giving the logical form of sentences such as (1) and (5) is everybody's problem.

Consequently, the central tenet of this thesis that it is wrong to suppose that proposition-entities, or any other type of entities, are objects of the propositional attitudes in that they are what we believe, doubt, desire, suppose, consider, entertain, etc., or objects of speech acts in that they are what we assert, state, etc., is only one very small part of a theory of mind. But if I am correct then no theory of mind that runs counter to this proposal can hope to prove adequate. Moreover, it would seem that there has been a long line of failed attempts to establish even this much.
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Plato


