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META-THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS

OF SEMIOTICS TO PSYCHOTHERAPY

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ABSTRACT

Most semiotic approaches to psychotherapy involve the application of semiotic concepts directly to manifestations of psychological disorder, and constitute an alternative to more traditional approaches. This essay explores the utility of applying semiotics to psychotherapy as a meta-theoretical framework. Psychoanalytic theory is studied first, due to the fact that there already exists a tradition of applying a semiotic reading to Freudian theory within French structuralism. Using a different approach, it is shown here that Freud's most important discovery, the interplay of unconscious and conscious processes, is actually formulated in terms of sign phenomena, and the distinction between the two corresponds to a distinction between two types of representation involving notions of continuity and discreteness, respectively. Other theories are examined to see if they yield the same dimension. To facilitate this process, Carkhuff's eclectic model of therapy, claimed by him to constitute a 'theoretic convergence' of all existing approaches to psychotherapy, is evaluated. This model turns out to represent a fusion of humanist and behaviourist schools, but is largely opposed to the psychoanalytic school. However, since its ideological commitment is virtually identical with that of Rogers' approach, it is reasoned that Rogers' theory can be regarded as an approximate representative of those approaches generally opposed to Freud. A semiotic analysis of Rogers' theory reveals the same dimension that was identified in Freudian theory. It is suggested that such a dimension may well be an essential feature of psychotherapy in general; this being the case, psychotherapy can be seen to imply a philosophical position that differs radically from the rationalism that has dominated most of traditional science and philosophy. From a more narrow point of view, it is concluded that the meta-theoretical
application of semiotics serves to give a particularly useful perspective for the evaluation of theories of psychotherapy, and in particular, serves to emphasise the continuing (if not increased) relevance of Freudian theory for today.
I am very grateful to have been a member of the course whose requirements this essay is intended partly to fulfil; for its existence, and for the time and opportunity to pursue quite varied personal interests within it, I thank the Psychology Department of the Australian National University. In particular, I would like to address a personal appreciation to my supervisor, Associate Professor P. Pentony, for his patience and the freedom allowed to investigate areas of interest not generally covered by Psychology courses.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: SEMIOTICS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

As implied by the title, this essay is concerned with some of the consequences of taking a semiotic (or, roughly, communicational) approach to psychotherapy. One of the more interesting claims for such an approach is that semiotics, with its basis in the American school of philosophy known as 'pragmatism', is the most promising candidate for providing a common theoretical framework into which the various other approaches to psychotherapy can be mapped (Bür, 1973, p.134). However, most of the well-known exponents of the semiotic approach, while undoubtedly in agreement with such an idea, have, in practice, proceeded quite differently. Semiotic concepts and terminology have been applied directly to behaviour in the therapeutic situation, and there has been very little serious attempt (at least within English-speaking countries) to apply such concepts to the theoretical constructs of existing approaches to psychotherapy. Effectively, this means that the semiotic approach to therapy has become yet another alternative form of treatment of psychological disorder.

What this essay sets out to do is to show that this is not the only possible application of semiotics to psychotherapy, and that the utilisation of semiotics as a meta-theoretical framework in psychotherapy leads to a highly significant insight into the essential structure of psychotherapeutic theory in general. Specifically, aspects of the Freudian and Rogerian approaches are examined from a semiotic point of view. This proves to be remarkably useful, partly because some of their most central features are involved, which makes possible a direct and
insightful comparison between the two. More importantly, though, this approach highlights the existence of a dimension common to both and equally fundamental, corresponding to the idea of primary and secondary processes in the Freudian terminology, and it is further suggested that such a dimension is a central element of most theories of psychotherapy. The inevitable result is a possibly surprising reassessment of the significance of Freudian theory for psychotherapy today, together with a suggestion of the form that a general theory of psychotherapy might take.

However, the significance of this kind of approach is not confined to psychotherapy alone. What the semiotic approach does is to translate the concepts of psychotherapy into a terminology which places it close to the concerns of current philosophic inquiry. This being the case, a secondary aim of this essay is to touch on some of the more philosophical consequences of the semiotically based idea of psychotherapy hinted at above.

With this breadth of scope, the major function of this chapter is to set these aims in as wide a context as possible. First, the field of semiotics is described. This is followed by an outline of the development of thought accompanying its foundation and subsequent growth. As such, this section will not be concerned with the accumulation of a specialist subject-matter so much as to throw light on the movement of ideas that led to the application of semiotics to psychotherapy in the first place, and which must still be understood as implicit in any such approach. Next, an elaboration of the particular relevance of semiotics to psychoanalysis leads naturally to a fuller specification of the aims of this essay, and the chapter ends with an outline of the main body of this report.
1.1 The Field of Semiotics

According to one of the pioneers in this field, 'semiotics'¹ is the "the science of signs, whether animal or human, language or non-language, true or false, adequate or inadequate, healthy or pathic" (Morris, 1946, p.223).

To be more precise, semiotics, like linguistics, is a communication science. For the purposes of this essay, a perfectly adequate way of defining it is obtained simply by contrasting these two fields. The difference between them is ultimately one of scope, linguistics being the more restricted (though developed), semiotics the more general and inclusive. Two aspects of this difference in scope are worth elaborating upon.

The obvious one concerns legitimate objects of study. For the sake of comparison, linguistics can be defined as the study of naturally occurring human languages (using 'language' here in its technical sense, as a verbal system, utilising conventional and arbitrary symbols). Semiotics, on the other hand, is the study of all systems of signification, with no restrictions on the nature of the signs involved. Thus linguistics, together with fields such as kinesics and zoosemiotics (the study of animal communication), is best regarded as a specialised branch of semiotics (cf. Saussure, 1959, p.16).

1. This term is the one most often used today, although others, more common in the past, exist too. For instance, Morris (amongst others) always referred to this field as 'semiotic' (using this term as the noun - see Morris, 1946, p.2, for example); and before him, Saussure proposed the word 'semiology' (1959, p.16). All these merely reflect minor variations in the derivation from the Greek word 'sēmeion' (meaning 'sign').
This is sufficient to define semiotics in general, but there is a second aspect which is particularly relevant to psychology, concerning approach to objects of study. The linguist assumes that there exists an ideal form of the language used by any speech-community, and attempts to determine the underlying system of rules that govern it (cf. Chomsky, 1965, pp. 3-4). This results in a strong emphasis on the construction of an abstract model of that language, in relation to which the mannerisms or distortions of individual native speakers are considered largely irrelevant (ibid.). Semiotics is not so exclusive. To the familiar linguistic divisions of syntax and semantics it adds a third, concerned precisely with the interaction between abstract sign systems and concrete behaviour. This is the field of 'pragmatics', which, again in the words of Charles Morris, "deals with the origin, uses, and effects of signs within the behavior in which they occur" (1946, p. 219).

1.2 Development of the Semiotic Viewpoint

Essentially, the growth of what may be termed the 'semiotic viewpoint' consists of a constantly expanding notion of communication, set in the framework of the approach to philosophy called 'pragmatism'. Its association with the latter is by no means accidental, and indeed, one is tempted to say that the growth of semiotics is best seen as one aspect of the growth of pragmatism, as perhaps the following paragraphs will show.

A complete history of semiotics would really have to go back to the ancient Greeks, for whom 'semiotic' was one of the three divisions of medicine, concerning diagnosis and prognosis by signs (Morris, 1946, p. 285). However, the foundation of the area now designated by the
term 'semiotics', with its emphasis on the study of signs in relation to concrete behaviour, can largely be attributed to Charles Peirce, an American philosopher of the latter half of the nineteenth century (ibid., p.287). Some authors also credit Ferdinand de Saussure with a founding role (e.g. Eco, 1973, p.60), but in comparison with Peirce, his contributions in this capacity must be regarded as minimal. This is partly because Saussure never went beyond speculating about the "right to existence" of a "general science of semiology" (Saussure, 1959, p.16). More importantly, though, Peirce's contributions assume an extra dimension of significance (perhaps retrospectively) from the fact that he was also the founder of pragmatism (see Cohen, 1962, p.340).

Peirce's literary output was anything but systematic, so that his ideas on semiotics and pragmatism (amongst many others) cannot be regarded as other than seminal. However, much of his work was inspired by his 'pragmatic maxim', a unifying principle that provided the initial impetus for the growth of pragmatism, and which states that the meaning of any idea resides in the consequences for conduct arising from its acceptance or rejection (ibid., p.342). The significance of this position is that meaning can only be found in action, and is related to particular surroundings. Taken together with his belief in the primacy of chance (ibid., pp.343-344), which challenges the idea that the world of events is ruled absolutely by simple eternal laws, and implies that each event takes place as a result of a special interaction of individual circumstances, one sees here the seeds of a general philosophy based on ideas of process and context.

William James did much to popularise pragmatism, but a systematic development did not emerge until John Dewey established the 'Chicago school' of philosophy (ibid., pp.356 and 364). Of chief interest here
is Dewey's transformation of the emphasis placed by Peirce on action into one on transaction. In his words:

"... human life itself, both severally and collectively, consists of transactions in which human beings partake together with non-human things of the milieu along with other human beings, so that without this togetherness of human and non-human partakers we could not even stay alive, to say nothing of accomplishing anything. From birth to death every human being is a Party, so that neither he nor anything done or suffered can possibly be understood when it is separated from the fact of participation in an extensive body of transactions - to which a given human being may contribute and which he modifies, but only in virtue of being a partaker in them" (1948, p.198).

Such a passage may almost be said to function as a statement of first principles for this more developed form of pragmatism - a new 'pragmatic maxim'. Be that as it may a new emphasis on cooperation (as opposed simply to operation) paved the way for the increasingly important role semiotic considerations were to play within the pragmatic framework, for, as Dewey and Bentley state, "(t)he transactional is in fact that point of view which systematically proceeds upon the ground that knowing is co-operative and as such is integral with communication" (1949, p.vi; emphases added).

A greater reliance on communication was already apparent in the writings of George Herbert Mead, who, sharing Dewey's general outlook, sought to demonstrate how 'mind', or 'self', is similarly co-operative. His interactional analysis of self and society treats the "self, as that which can be an object to itself" (Mead, 1934, p.140), as quite distinct from the physiological organism - it is "essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience" (ibid.). It is here that communication has its elevated role, for it "provides a form of behavior in which the organism or the individual may become an object to himself" (ibid., p.138), which is to say that it constitutes the medium for, and in fact underlies, the whole process of the formation of self.
A similar conception of self led Harry Stack Sullivan to affirm that "interpersonal relations ... (constitute) the field of study of psychiatry" (1964, p.220). However, for him, not only mind but the bulk of human behaviour is viewed most satisfactorily from a semiotic perspective. For example, he states that:

"... for practical purposes, all human behavior so purely and unquestionably manifests the organization of experience into what are in effect signs - whether signals or symbols - that an attempt to discriminate intelligibly in human behavior between what is symbolic and what is nonsymbolic is far more misleading than it is helpful. Therefore, without denying that there may be purely nonsymbolic performances in human beings, I would say that for the purposes of psychiatric theory I am concerned exclusively with covert and overt symbolic activity" (1955, pp.187-187).

A further extension of the semiotic horizon emerged from the writings of Charles Morris, in all likelihood the man who did most to raise semiotics from an "appendix of philosophy" (Rossi-Landi, 1975, p.155) to the level of an independent social science. In his book, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (1946), he asserted that what is true of individual behaviour is equally true of much of human culture: "Human society in its most characteristic traits, like the developed human individual, is dependent in its nature and for its continued existence upon signs" (p.207). While this does not place all of human experience within the scope of semiotics, it was a sufficient basis for Morris to go on to suggest that semiotics, in addition to pursuing its specialised interests, may in fact function as a meta-discipline. In particular, he stressed its potential role as "an instrument for describing and furthering the unification of science" (ibid., p.225) by mediating between the various scientific 'languages'.

In the wake of Morris's contributions, the notion of semiotics as a meta-discipline received increasing support as the concept of communication continued to broaden. Perhaps the most important step in this
progression was the publication of Shannon and Weaver's formalised theory of communication. Central to their account was the following conceptualisation:

"The word communication will be used here in a very broad sense to include all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another. This, of course, involves not only written and oral speech, but also music, the pictorial arts, the theatre, the ballet, and in fact all human behavior" (Weaver, 1949, p.95; emphases added).

From this it is only a minor step to the view current in semiotics today, namely that "the whole of culture must be studied as a phenomenon of communication" (Eco, 1973, p.61; emphases deleted).

At this point, one can see that semiotics has truly developed into a meta-discipline, for far from being restricted to a relatively isolated area of interest it is seen by its adherents as embracing all of human experience, and like pragmatism, it is now above all a point of view. Significantly enough, this point of view corresponds to what Shands calls "the epistemological revolution of the 20th century" (1971, p.357). Since it is this general outlook that may be said to characterise the semiotic approach to psychotherapy, overshadowing even the application of technical semiotic formulations to psychotherapeutic phenomena, it is worthwhile spelling out exactly what this entails. In Shands' words, it is equivalent to the understanding that:

"... what is is what can be communicated in some coded form. What cannot be so managed remains unknown, and as we develop new means of reaching out into a presumably (but never certainly) existent universe, that universe will by token of the new messages achieve novel form, repetitively and perhaps endlessly. The revolutionary idea is most precise in its denial of the individual existence of any thing or object; the mutuality of process between the putative object and the putative subject is the new basis for understanding" (ibid.).

Clearly, then, if all behaviour and all that can be known are phenomena of communication, psychotherapy must also be viewed as such.
It should be noted, however, that if, as claimed above, this constitutes the basis for the semiotic approach to psychotherapy, by no means does it negate similarly important roles played by developments within systems theory and cybernetics. Indeed, the semiotic approach, by virtue of its growth within the pragmatic framework, assumes a systems-type outlook (the peculiar flavour of semiotics deriving from its emphasis on the idea that transaction is indistinguishable from communication), as possibly implied by the Shands quotation above; and certainly, systems theory must be seen as a complementary development of the pragmatic viewpoint.¹

At any rate, it was within such a conceptual framework that Ruesch and Bateson produced the first truly semiotic approach to psychotherapy with the publication of their *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry* in 1951. This line of thought has proved to be quite fertile, resulting in, for example, the 'double bind' theory of schizophrenia (Bateson et al., 1956). However, for the purposes of this essay, it is less important here to account for individual achievements within such a framework than to consider the significance of this approach as a whole with respect to alternative directions in psychotherapy. This will be the subject of the next section.

### 1.3 Practical Significance of the Semiotic Approach to Psychotherapy

The ultimate significance of the semiotic approach to psychotherapy

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¹ For example, Bertalanffy states that: "In modern science, dynamic interaction appears to be the central problem in all fields of reality. Its general principles are to be defined by System Theory" (1950a, p.165).
can as yet only be glimpsed. In the context of this essay, it initially performs a simplistic but important function, in that it facilitates the identification of two extreme positions in psychotherapy—what may be called the interpersonal and the intrapsychic (cf. Carson, 1970, pp.16-17). Of course, this does not do justice to the variety and subtlety of the numerous individual approaches to the subject, but it serves as a useful enough heuristic device here.

The first position can generally be ascribed to all those who espouse an approach along pragmatic lines. Clearly, this includes the semioticians. However, it may also be applied to the bulk of those approaches usually labelled 'humanist'. For instance, Rogers has often stressed the importance of interpersonal and process elements for his orientation (e.g., Rogers, 1942, p.30). On the other hand, the role of archetypal intrapsychic theorist is almost universally assigned to Freud (ibid., p.54).

Now it must be understood that these are merely stereotypes, for in fact most approaches included under either position contain elements that are more characteristic of the other. For instance, most 'interpersonal' theorists will at least allow for some kind of division of the human organism into subjective and objective components (e.g., Angyal, 1941, p.116). And similarly, such Freudian notions as 'ego' and 'repression' are only conceivable within a context of interpersonal relationships (cf. Freud, 1923, p.51, and Wilden, 1968, p.265). Thus the difference between the two positions amounts to one of emphasis.

None the less, the unfortunate impression one gains from the writings of 'interpersonal' theorists is that they are united in their
overcompensation for what they see as Freud's lack of emphasis on interpersonal phenomena. The practical result is that Freud's contributions are largely ignored, and have in fact been superseded by what are now alternatives instead of possible complements (cf. Ruesch, 1951, p.62).

Thus it is that the semiotic approach (in the case of all but some its most recent adherents), in spite of its meta-theoretic potential, has also mainly constituted an alternative to the Freudian position (as well as, to lesser extent, most others utilising more traditional terminology). The point of view taken here is that such an attitude is unnecessarily restrictive, and that semiotics has a far more useful role to play by virtue of this potential. This idea will be further explored in the next section.

1.4 Freud and Semiotics

There can be no argument over the fact that if the semiotic viewpoint is consistently adhered to, a semiotic interpretation of psychoanalytic theory is perfectly feasible. However, the intellectual climate of English-speaking countries has not been one to particularly encourage such a venture. On the other hand, a considerably different situation has prevailed in Europe, and indeed, a French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, has become well-known there for his interpretation of Freud from a structuralist point of view.

Lacan is probably best known for the idea that "what the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the whole structure of language" (Lacan, 1970, p.103). In general, his position is that
psychoanalytic theory as a whole is really a theory of language, one that Freud could not properly formulate because the appropriate conceptual tools did not exist at that time, but which structuralism now provides. With Lacan's distinction between conscious and unconscious aspects of discourse, and with philosophy's current preoccupation with language and its variety of uses, it is not surprising that Freud has come to be held in high regard in certain sections of European philosophy (e.g., see Ricoeur, 1970), particularly in the structuralist and hermeneutic schools.

Evidently, then, it cannot be maintained that semiotics and psychoanalysis are in any essential way opposed to one another. However, in spite of Lacan's contributions, it is still not immediately obvious what the implications of adopting a semiotic approach to psychoanalysis actually are. The Lacanian position is in fact extraordinarily complex and obscure, so much so that an alternative approach to this question becomes almost obligatory: one task of the remaining chapters of this essay to outline such an alternative.

The starting point is Lacan's starting point: a re-reading of Freud's original works. There one discovers that Freud is indeed talking in terms that can only be described as semiotic (ignoring the charge that, from the semiotic viewpoint, all of his terms must be reducible to a semiotic terminology). In particular, it emerges that from a semiotic viewpoint, Freud's theory is in many respects actually quite advanced. The basis for this statement is that 'orthodox' semiotic approaches to psychotherapy, though productive, are predominantly divergent in their visible products: they have not as yet identified an unambiguous basis for a unified theory of psychotherapy that remains one of their
stated aims. However, it is claimed here that the semiotically interesting features of psychoanalytic theory provide such a basis, by way of a semiotic interpretation of the primary and secondary processes.

Thus, the bulk of this essay is devoted to a justification of this position. This breaks down into two aims. First, it must be shown that if the primary and secondary processes indeed supply the basis for a comprehensive semiotic approach to psychotherapy, they must form an element of all major approaches to psychotherapy. Secondly, it can be shown that a semiotic interpretation of the primary and secondary processes has important positive consequences outside of the narrow field of psychotherapy, so that placing this element at the centre of psychotherapeutic theory is more than a matter of finding perhaps a lowest common denominator. The next section presents a more detailed summary of the line to be pursued in the rest of the essay.

1.5 Summary of the Argument

Chapter Two consists of a demonstration of the semiotic bias that may be found in Freud's original contributions. In particular, it is shown that what may be called primary and secondary processes relate specifically to sign phenomena.

Chapters Three and Four are concerned with the ubiquity of this dimension within psychotherapy. Since it would be impossible to consider all the possible approaches to psychotherapy individually, Chapter Three looks at the question of narrowing down the field to manageable proportions. This means examining various approaches to
the question of order and unity in psychotherapy in general. In this regard, the concept of three 'forces' in psychology is introduced as an ordering principle. This facilitates an examination of the various eclectic approaches to psychotherapy that are typical of the current scene. In particular, Carkhuff's attempt at "theoretic convergence" (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, p.23) is analysed. It is found that his unified model of psychotherapy is only partially successful. Essentially, it consists of a merging of the humanist and behaviourist approaches, but remains, at Carkhuff's level of analysis, very much at odds with the psychoanalytic school. However, with Carkhuff's unmistakably Rogerian outlook, it is concluded that the ubiquity of the Freudian dimension is strongly suggested if it can be shown to exist as an essential feature of the Rogerian orientation. This is the task of Chapter Four.

Chapter Five consists of an examination of the semiotic equivalent of primary and secondary processes (analogue and digital coding), from a more philosophical viewpoint. A concluding chapter then summarises the main points made and provides a general discussion.
CHAPTER TWO

THE FREUDIAN ORIENTATION

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the considerable potential interest that Freudian theory holds for a semiotic approach to psychotherapy. Perhaps surprisingly, in view of popular and largely unquestioned stereotypes of Freud's general position, it is extremely easy to verify the semiotic bias in Freud's writings, particularly in his 'metapsychological' papers. Furthermore, far from being confined to incidental features of his writings, the semiotic aspect of Freud goes to the very heart of his contributions, namely his theory of the interplay of conscious and unconscious processes, aptly labelled the "dialectic of rationality and irrationality in man" (Fromm, 1973, p.54).

In the following sections, a certain degree of familiarity with basic Freudian ideas is presupposed. Thus the main emphasis will rest on a demonstration of the semiotic status of certain key Freudian notions, without prefacing such a demonstration by a lengthy review of the complexities of Freud's position in general. The first section acknowledges Lacan's contributions, insofar as he is usually credited with having brought out the full significance of the semiotic point of view in Freud (Wilden, 1972, p.41). The second section locates the semiotically interesting aspects of Freudian theory within Freud's original writings, and provides a fairly detailed account of the semiotic nature of the primary and secondary processes. A third section complements this by briefly illustrating the extent of Freud's semiotic preoccupation.
2.1 Freud and Lacan

As already noted, Jacques Lacan is noteworthy for having proposed a radical alternative to traditional ways of evaluating Freud's contributions, his position being that "psychoanalysis is a theory of language" (Wilden, 1968, p.310). It is worth noting that although it involves a re-reading of Freud from a contemporary point of view, at its basis this approach does not entail a reading into his works of material that is essentially foreign to them, or indeed, that was not there in the first place. On the contrary, Lacan generally encourages a 'return to Freud' (cf. quotation in Lavers, 1971, p.278), a critical and detailed reading of the actual text of Freud, from which "much is to be gained" (Lacan, 1970, p.121).

Of course, Lacan makes the more commonplace observation that "verbal communication is the instrument of psycho-analysis" (1953, p.11). However, he takes this much further, by noting the general philological bias that exists throughout the whole of Freud's writings. As he puts it:

"One out of every three pages in the complete works of Freud is devoted to philological references, one out of every two pages to logical inferences, and everywhere the apprehension of experience is dialectical, with the proportion of linguistic analysis increasing just insofar as the unconscious is directly concerned" (1970, p.117).

From the point of view of this essay, the most significant aspect of Lacan's re-reading of Freud is the recognition of the fact that only 'ideational presentations' (see Freud, 1915, p.109) have psychological existence (cf. Lavers, 1971, p.271, and Wilden, 1968, pp.199-200) in Freudian theory. This "insistence of the signifier" (Lacan, 1970, p.121) in Freud is perhaps the single most important piece of evidence for the centrality of the semiotic viewpoint in his theoretical writings,
and it is this aspect that above all constitutes the basis for the
analysis conducted in the next section of this essay.

With Lacan's structuralist background, and his apparently natural
inclination towards obscurity, his writings quickly assume a complexity
far beyond the scope of this essay. Consequently, the next section
is devoted merely to an elaboration of the notion of 'ideational
presentations' in Freud, to derive whatever consequences seem best to
apply.

2.2 Freud's Semiotic Viewpoint

Freud's notions of 'ideational presentations' are applied speci-
fically to the contents of what came to be known later as the ego and
id. Since it is the intention here to give a fairly detailed account
of Freud's semiotic bias, it seems worthwhile to begin with a fairly
general statement of Freud's position in regard to the 'mental
apparatus', and show how the semiotic aspect fits in.

Although numerous points of view are reflected in the various
descriptions of the psychic system that appear amongst Freud's writings,
a certain overall consistency is always apparent. Consequently, it is
not too misleading to accept as a suitable representative the description
to be found in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Here, Freud decides upon
"the topographical division of the mental apparatus into an ego and an
id, with which the difference in quality between preconscious and
unconscious runs parallel, ... (although) this quality is only an
indication of the distinction and does not constitute its essence"
In this scheme, "the ego stands for reason and good sense" (Freud, 1933, p.76), and the "processes which are possible in and between the assumed mental elements in the id (the primary process) ... (are not) subject to the critical restrictions of logic" (Freud, 1940, p.68). Elsewhere, Freud uses the terms 'rational' and 'irrational' to characterise the same dichotomy (1900, p.636).

However, such an attribution of rationality to the ego and irrationality to the id equally does not constitute the essence of the distinction between these two systems. As to the "true nature" of this distinction, Freud offers "a glimmer or two of light" (1940, p.24) through his postulation of two forms of "nervous or psychic energy ... one freely mobile and the other, by contrast, bound" (ibid.) (his 'economic' point of view), saying that "the distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious condition also lies in dynamic relations of this same kind" (ibid., p.25). The significance of this can hardly be overemphasised, for Freud has stated elsewhere that "this discrimination represents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the nature of nervous energy" (1915, p.121).

This idea of psychic energy underlying mental processes is, of course, of central importance to Freud, for he says:

"... conscious processes do not form unbroken series which are complete in themselves; so that there is no alternative to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes which accompany the mental ones and which must admittedly be more complete than the mental series, since some of them have conscious processes parallel to them but others have not. It thus seems natural to lay the stress in psychology upon these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence of what is mental and to try to arrive at some other assessment of the conscious processes" (1940, pp.16-17).

Indeed, an earlier statement makes clear that "the final result of
psycho-analytic research ... (is to) succeed in describing a mental
process in all its aspects, dynamic, topographic and economic" (Freud,
1915, p.114) - Freud's 'metapsychological' point of view.

However, an acceptance of the notion of two forms of psychic
energy does not necessarily commit one to a bioenergetic framework.
Although the distinction between freely mobile and bound energy is,
for Freud, the fundamental distinction between the primary and secondary
processes (the laws in their totality that the govern the processes in
the id and the ego respectively (Freud, 1940, p.25)), it is essential
to realise that the 'mental elements' comprising the two systems, id
and ego, are in fact not the instincts (or the energy pertaining to
them) themselves, but representatives (or 'presentations') of them
(cf., for example, Freud's references to "instinct-presentations"
(1915, pp.118-119), which are equivalent to the "psychical expression"
(1933, p.73) of instinctual needs). This is brought out most clearly
in his essay, 'The Unconscious', where it is stated that:

"An instinct can never be an object of consciousness - only
the idea that represents the instinct. Even in the unconscious,
moreover, it can only be represented by the idea" (1915, p.109).

Thus although Freud postulates the existence of these two forms
of energy, it is relatively unimportant that the concept of 'energy'
is specifically invoked (and consequently that "(t)he mechanics of
these processes are unknown to me" (Freud, 1900, p.638)), for his
description of the psychic apparatus is actually in terms of two forms
of 'ideation', whose properties need only be considered, at least in
the first instance, as analogous to (and deriving from) the notions
of freely mobile and bound energy. Consequently, if an idea is to
be regarded as the cathexis of a memory-trace (cf. Freud, 1915, p.111),
and if the energy associated with such a cathexis in the id, or unconscious, is freely displaceable to another memory-trace (ignoring a consideration of the processes involved), it is clear that, in this case, the precise representation of a particular instance of energetic excitation is associated with a considerable amount of ambiguity. It is impossible to establish exact boundaries for such an 'idea' (if the use of 'an' can be justified here at all!), for there is an easy sliding of the idea from one 'aspect' to another. It seems reasonable, then, to assert that the psychic dimension corresponding to the notion of freely mobile energy in the id is a kind of very fluid representation (what Laplanche and Pontalis term a "free circulation of meaning" (quoted in Wilden, 1972, p.146), appropriately enough). Indeed, Freud seems to indicate just such a type of representation when he characterises the mental elements to be found in the unconscious ('thing-presentations') as involving something "which is not closed and almost one which cannot be closed" (1891, p.214).

On the other hand, by a similar process of reasoning, if the energy associated with a cathected memory-trace in the ego, or preconscious, is bound, then there is no such ambiguity involved in the representation of that energy: at that particular moment, that idea and no other represents that energy. As Freud says of the mental elements in the preconscious, "the word-presentation is seen to be something closed" (ibid.). It may be noted that it is only when ideas become discrete, or fixed, in such a way, that fixed relationships between them, and ultimately logical processes, become possible, although it must not be forgotten that it is the binding action of the secondary process that allows this to take place.
As well as 'not closed' and 'closed', Freud uses a number of similar adjectives that may perhaps be likewise construed as distinguishing between the id and ego, or aspects of them. For instance, one may find in his writings terms such as 'connected' and 'disconnected' (cf. 1915, p.99), 'complete' and 'broken' (cf. 1940, p.17), and "filled" (1933, p.73) and "full of holes (luckenhaft)" (Wilden, 1972, p.269). Be that as it may, it seems beyond doubt that Freud's 'dialectic of rationality and irrationality', his most conspicuous contribution, is in fact defined by an interaction of two types of representation which, in their most fundamental aspects, are characterisable as an essential discreteness of representation in the ego, as opposed to continuity in the id.

Before passing on to the next chapter, it is of some interest to consider briefly in the next section how Freud himself conceptualised this distinction in what may perhaps, for want of a better expression, be termed its 'phenomenological' aspects. This also serves to reinforce the idea of the central place occupied by semiotic considerations in Freud's writings.

2.3 Further Semiotic Aspects of Freudian Theory

In 'The Unconscious', Freud explicitly states that "the conscious idea comprises the concrete idea plus the verbal idea corresponding to it, whilst the unconscious idea is that of the thing alone" (1915, p.134). This 'concrete idea' (variously denoted in the English translations of Freud's works, and perhaps best rendered as 'thing-presentation'; cf. Wilden, 1972, p.23) is strongly visual in quality (cf. Freud, 1923, p.23). More importantly, however, it must be
emphasised that the thing-presentation is by no means a unitary or discrete entity, but is in fact "a complex of associations made up of the greatest variety of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinaesthetic and other presentations" (Freud, 1891, p.213), which involve "a large number of further impressions in the same chain of associations" (ibid.). This notion that "concrete terms ... are richer in associations than conceptual terms" (Freud, 1900, p.375) clearly relates to the 'free circulation of meaning' of the primary process. Furthermore, Freud notes that "the relations between the various elements of (concrete) subject-matter, which is what specially characterises thought, cannot be given visual expression" (1923, p.23). By this is meant that thing-presentations are ideally suited for the representation of physical quantity or form ('substantives'), but are quite incapable of representing logical relations, such as 'either-or', and in particular, 'not', between them (cf. Freud, 1900, p.347).

On the other hand, the 'verbal idea' (hereafter referred to as 'word-presentation') is primarily auditory in quality (cf. Freud, 1923, p.22). It, too, involves a "complex presentation" (Freud, 1891, p.213), but it is apparently not linked to a further 'chain of associations', and is thus "closed" (ibid., p.214). Freud does not elaborate on the special attributes of 'sound-images' (ibid.) in the same way as he did for concrete images, but one suspects that in addition to the discreteness of the word-presentation, the linearity of speech is an important correlate of the operations possible within this mode of representation.

A distinction between the visual and the verbal has always been a source of attraction for the human mind, and it is tempting to make the discrimination between thing- and word-presentations on this basis, especially when Freud, in one place, explicitly does so (ibid.).
Nevertheless, it will be clear from the preceding section that this would be an over-simplification of the nature of the 'complexes' that actually constitute the two types of representation, and in view of the importance in Freud's writings of the underlying notions of freely bound and mobile energy, it is maintained here that the notions of continuity and discreteness denote a far more general and conceptually more useful distinction. This issue will be taken up more systematically in Chapter Five, where the whole question will be set in a more contemporary semiotic framework.
An explicit recognition of Freud's semiotic leanings in the previous chapter revealed the fact that a central feature of Freudian theory is the postulation of two types of representation. In order to show that this is a feature of psychotherapeutic theory in general, one approach would be to examine a sufficiently large sample of other theories to see if, in fact, they yielded such a dimension when translated into the framework of semiotics. Fortunately, this is not the only way to proceed.

One finds within current psychotherapy a growing movement characterised by a high degree of eclecticism. In particular, there exists a model of psychotherapy claimed to represent a "theoretic convergence" (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, p.23) of all earlier approaches. Thus an alternative to examining each individual theory separately would be to apply a semiotic reading to this model.

To do this directly, however, would be premature, for serious doubts can be raised about the legitimacy of Truax and Carkhuff's claim of a complete convergence. Consequently, the greater proportion of this chapter will be devoted to a critical examination of their model, as a preliminary to the semiotic analysis shown to be appropriate in the next chapter. In order to facilitate this examination, it will be useful first to introduce the notion of 'three forces' in psychology. Whatever it may lack in rigour, such a ready-made formalisation of what are generally regarded as the most significant similarities and differences between particular schools of psychotherapy acts as a convenient framework for the evaluation of Truax and Carkhuff's position that follows.
3.1 The 'Three Forces' in Psychology

This can be seen as a reasonably comprehensive attempt at classification of schools of thought in psychology, apparently attributable to Abraham Maslow. It finds equal application in both the area of academic psychology, taken as a heterogeneous whole, and psychotherapy, as a more specialised discipline (although the relative emphases in each on the various 'forces' would certainly not be equivalent). Broadly speaking, the three schools of thought involved here can be identified as the 'psychoanalytic', the 'behaviouristic', and the 'humanistic'. No doubt these terms will be reasonably self-explanatory at the level of generality intended. Certainly there will be no attempt to make as fine a distinction as possible between them, further than to make the point that the basis for a loose, though significant, differentiation of schools of psychotherapy exists at this level.

As an indication of the degree of looseness involved, it is interesting to compare Rogers' and Maslow's descriptions of the 'psychoanalytic' and 'humanistic' schools of thought. Maslow explicitly equates the psychoanalytic stream with traditional orthodox Freudianism (1968, p.iii), placing "the Adlerians, Rankians, and Jungians, as well as all the neo-Freudians (or neo-Adlerians) and the post Freidians (psychoanalytic ego-psychologists ... (etc.))" (ibid., p.ix) in the 'Third Force' (together, of course, with existential, phenomenological, 'Self-' and other related types of psychologists). On the other hand, Rogers' psychoanalytic school is associated with "terms such as 'Freudian,' 'Neo-Freudian,' ... 'psychology of the unconscious,' ... 'ego-psychology,' 'id-psychology,' ... " (1964, p.109), whereas he connects "terms such as 'phenomenological,' 'existential,' 'self-theory,' 'self-actualization,' ... (etc.)" (ibid.) with his idea of a 'Third Force'.

What seems to be the principal aim here of both Rogers and Maslow, as leading participants in the humanistic stream, is a suitable (though idiosyncratic) conceptualisation of the 'third force'. This being so, Maslow can be seen as trying to integrate contributions from a large number of disparate sources (transcending what might be considered the rather antagonistic objectives of movements such as 'ego-' and 'id-psychology'), whereas Rogers makes a more strict differentiation of schools. In this essay, Rogers' framework will be preferred as a point of departure. This is mainly because the psychoanalytic school will be taken to include people like Lacan and others, as a result of whose work Freud's theorising assumes the special significance outlined in the previous two chapters.

3.2 Eclecticism in Psychotherapy

No single approach to psychotherapy has yet been universally embraced, for the simple reason that no single theory or technique has been shown to be successful with all possible interactions of the variables, 'therapist', 'patient/client', 'situation', 'problem', etc. The often noted bewildering expansion in the number of such theories and techniques is a clear reflection of this. (It is also thus apparent that insofar as the main criterion for the acceptance of a particular approach has been its practical utility, psychotherapy is an applied psychology first and a theoretical discipline second.) However, a recognition that the search for the ultimate technique (one of Kiesler's (1966) "myths of psychotherapy research") could lead to an indefinite proliferation of approaches has given rise to a somewhat divergent current of thought, characterised by an appreciation of how whatever therapeutic success is discernible relates to "which people, in what circumstances, responding to what therapeutic
stimuli" (Sanford, 1953, p.336). As a result, an increasingly distinctive feature of current therapeutic practice is to be found in its recourse to an eclectic program of treatment.

An obviously greater rate of success in the utilisation of such an approach has led to a certain degree of theoretical refinement or systematisation in approach. Broadly speaking, it is possible to distinguish between two positions in this regard, what may be called, for want of a better terminology, 'simple' and 'systematic' eclecticism. The former approach is certainly not to be equated with a random application of available techniques. Nevertheless, the theoretical justifications that are presented in its favour tend to be relatively insubstantial. (And after all, what better justification for a therapist can there be than that he is successful?) An example of this approach (presented quite non-pejoratively) is Ellis' 'Rational-Emotive Therapy', "a comprehensive approach to therapy ... which not only openly and avowedly employs cognitive, emotive, and behavioristic approaches, but also does so on theoretical grounds. For it hypothesizes that human beings normally think, emote, and act in an interrelated and inevitably pluralistic manner ..." (1973, p.70). And in a similar vein, Lazarus advocates a program of 'Multimodal Behavior Therapy' whose "basic assumption is that durable (long-lasting) therapeutic results depend upon the amount of effort expended by patient and therapist across at least six or seven parameters" (1973, p.404).

What is called here 'systematic' eclecticism is exemplified par excellence by the model developed by Robert Carkhuff and his associates. (Hereafter, for convenience, this group will be referred to by the single name 'Carkhuff', unless specific others in the group are cited.) This work derives from the debate that was current two decades ago concerning
the effectiveness of psychotherapy at all. At that time a number of studies were reported, which tended to show that, on the average, the rate of improvement of 'mentally ill' patients was identical whether the patients received therapy or not (e.g., Eysenck, 1952). However, therapy can be shown to be effective with particular therapists (see Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, pp.14-18), which led Carkhuff to reason that if on the average psychotherapy is ineffective, then in some cases it must be positively harmful. His conclusion was that "differences in effectiveness between therapists are much larger than differences between therapy and counseling and no treatment" (ibid., p.6). Consequently, the prime motivation for his approach has been the search for, and elaboration of, the actual dimensions that correlate with effectiveness in the practice of psychotherapy.

The results of his research have been formalised in a "comprehensive model of facilitative processes" (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, p.21), which differs from any of the 'simple' eclectic approaches through a systematic division of elements into "primary factors, or a central core of facilitative dimensions around which secondary factors involving a variety of potential preferred modes of treatment can be built" (ibid.). More specifically, what Carkhuff has proposed is that there exist a number of personal qualities of therapists (the 'primary factors') "which are shared by all interactive human processes, independent of theoretical orientation" (ibid., p.4), and whose positive application accounts for "the greatest part of therapeutic effectiveness" (ibid., p.23). Originally, three such dimensions were identified, "accurate empathy, nonpossessive warmth, and genuineness" (Truax and Carkhuff, op.cit.,p.25). (Since then, the model has undergone some degree of metamorphosis, with a corresponding modification in the number and designation of primary factors, although the essential structure has been retained (see, for
example, Gazda, 1973). None the less, these dimensions are not regarded as universally sufficient for therapeutic change, so that the primary factors are complemented by any of the vast number of existing therapeutic techniques (the 'secondary factors'), the choice of which depends solely on the judgement of the therapist or the demands of the situation.

Now the exact relations between the primary and the secondary factors in this model are of some interest, but in order to make them clear, it will be necessary to introduce Carkhuff's notion of two 'phases' in the process of therapy:

"(1) the downward or inward phase involving the therapist's offering of high levels of facilitative conditions which enable the client to turn inward and to explore himself and his problem area intensively and extensively; (2) the upward or outward phase or period of emergent directionality where the therapist, in conjunction with the client, seeks to give some direction toward constructive action to the client's life" (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, pp.228-229).

Thus it would appear that the primary factors play their essential role in phase one and then yield to an application of the secondary factors in phase two.

However, this is not the whole story, for there is a stronger conceptual link between the primary and the secondary factors: the various primary factors play a differential role with respect to the two phases of therapy, with a primary factor like 'empathy' being most important in the initial phase, and a primary factor like 'genuineness' being more dominant in the second (ibid.). Furthermore, taking note of the fact that 'genuine' is synonymous with "integrated, non-defensive, and authentic" (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, p.1), it becomes abundantly clear that, when the therapist's "ultimate choice of approaches (secondary factors) will be as effective as he is a fully integrated
and creative person" (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, p.143), or when psychotherapy "has direction only insofar as the therapist is whole" (ibid.), an effective application of the secondary factors actually presupposes, and is inseparable from, the operation of the primary factors. By underlying both phases of therapy, as well as the secondary factors, the primary factors represent the essence of the Carkhuffian model, and its dominant ideological commitment.

3.3 Carkhuff's Model as 'Theoretic Convergence'

So far, there can be little objection to the direction taken by Carkhuff in the development of his 'comprehensive model of facilitative processes'. However, Carkhuff makes the additional claim that his model is also comprehensive from a theoretical point of view. It is easily shown that this is not the case, but it is worthwhile examining the reasons why in some detail, so as to establish the true theoretical significance of his model.

In the first place, the primary factors were derived, not from a detailed comparison of the body of theory central to each particular approach to psychotherapy, but specifically from Rogers' humanistic client-centered approach. Carkhuff is quite happy to acknowledge this, saying: "Rogers' position was, of course, the basic impetus for the present authors' research and current thinking" (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, p.25). But of even greater significance is the fact that there effectively exists a one-to-one correspondence between Carkhuff's primary factors (as originally formulated) and the essence of Rogers' theoretical orientation, his 'necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic change' (1957, p.98). The important thing to note, then, is that if
Carkhuff's collection of primary factors (the essence of his model) indeed represents the highest common denominator of all theoretical orientations, the relationship between it and Rogers' position, as a whole, is trivial because it is one of virtual identity. ¹

Of course, this fact, in itself, need not be at all damaging to Carkhuff's position. Indeed, he then proceeds to assemble an impressive array of quotations, in a "theoretic convergence" (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, pp.23-43), saying: "The search is for common elements cutting across divergent theories ... The chapter also focuses on what these theories ... have to say about the person and the characteristics of an effective therapist" (ibid., p.1). However, the first objective of this search is lost somewhere in a conglomeration of citations which have in common the feature that they are incidental to the essentially unique aspects of the theories they are intended to represent, and which result instead in a convergence of practice. This is clearly conveyed in statements such as: "When viewed in terms of actual behavior rather than differences in jargon, the analytic and client-centered approaches to empathic understanding seem to converge" (ibid., p.40), and, "Rogers' ... client-centered approach to therapy ... differs more in print than in practice from others" (ibid., p.43). While such an enterprise is on

¹. The later addition of primary factors such as 'concreteness' (see Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, pp.29-30) may be seen as representing some shift away from the specifically Rogerian orientation of this central core. However, it is maintained here that, more importantly, it represents a refinement of Carkhuff's model as a whole, facilitating a conceptual integration of the primary and secondary factors by forming a bridge between the humanistic intangibles and the very down-to-earth techniques available from areas such as behaviour modification. Nevertheless, the very strong essential 'humanism' of the primary factors is still retained, as indicated in Carkhuff's more recent affirmation that Rogers' philosophy is still "in keeping with ... the development of thought concerning a central core of conditions" (ibid., p.75).
the whole quite unreproachable, the consequence of accepting the ideological orientation of Rogers' 'necessary and sufficient conditions' as an a priori frame of reference is that the possibility of a more profound convergence of actual theory (by exploring 'differences in jargon') is precluded.

It is, then, somewhat ironic that Carkhuff has gone on to relegate the client-centered approach to the 'potential preferred modes of treatment', or secondary factors. Interestingly enough, this is closely connected with the particular relations the behaviouristic approaches to psychotherapy have to the Carkhuffian model. The main point of contention between Carkhuff and Rogers results from the fact that Rogers considers his conditions of therapeutic change (equivalent to the primary factors) to be both necessary and sufficient, rendering any extra conditions (secondary factors) superfluous. Specifically, it is Rogers' non-directive approach to therapy, resulting from his belief in an inherent and spontaneous "general tendency of clients to move in the direction of growth when the factors in the situation are clear" (Rogers, 1951, p.489), that Carkhuff finds objectionable. Whereas Rogers clearly believes that the client is his own best agent for change, Carkhuff places great emphasis on the outside agency of "a 'more knowing' therapist" (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, p.142), "equipped with all that is knowable from theory and technique" (ibid.).

1. It is a little unclear as to how great a division in outlook between Carkhuff and Rogers this actually represents. Presumably, insofar as Carkhuff's primary factors constitute the essence of his model, he must agree in significant measure with Rogers' statement that "the techniques of the various therapies are relatively unimportant except to the extent that they serve as channels for fulfilling one of (his conditions of therapeutic personality change)" (1957, p.102) (cf. Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, p.66). Thus it seems best to attribute this division to a difference in interpretation as to the precise nature of one or more of the primary factors; more will be said about this in the next chapter, at the end of Section 4.1.
Thus it is that the behaviouristic approaches to psychotherapy (behaviour therapy and behaviour modification) find a reasonably prominent place in Carkhuff's model. And it is precisely here that his notion of 'theoretic convergence' has its most inappropriate application, for there would appear to be little basis for the overlap of concepts like 'empathy', 'warmth' and 'genuineness' with the strict positivistic outlook implied in the following statement:

"The language and orientation of the proposed approach are rooted in contemporary learning theory. The conceptual framework is consonant with the view that the course of psychiatric disorders can be modified by systematic application of scientific principles from the fields relevant to the patient's habitual mode of living, e.g., biology, psychology, sociology, clinical medicine" (Kanfer and Saslow, 1969, pp.429-430).

Indeed, there appears to be every reason for a direct ideological confrontation. Carkhuff's solution to this, of course, is that "a behavioristic approach (except for the language) need not be antagonistic, and may even be complementary, to a more humanistic approach" (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, p.2; emphases added). Perhaps surprisingly, this proposition is in fact accepted here, but, as in Carkhuff's case, for reasons that are quite unrelated to a theoretic convergence.

In the first instance, a plausible argument can be advanced for the proposition that the techniques of behaviour modification (or therapy - these terms will be loosely interchanged here without great damage), in themselves, entail no particular philosophical outlook at all.¹ This being so, they would obviously act as a perfect complement to Carkhuff's primary factors, functioning solely as secondary factors, whose successful

¹. For example, Kitchener presents a case along the following lines: "Skinnerian psychology is applied psychology. It is not, however, the application of pure psychological laws of behavior; it is applied psychology in the tradition of cookbook knowledge. Skinnerian psychology patiently gathers data and then forms generalizations about how to change, maintain or prevent behavior" (1974, pp.89-90).
application depends upon their being employed within the context of the 'facilitative dimensions'. The result is another trivial example of 'theoretic convergence', for the techniques of behaviour therapy neither confirm nor disconfirm the validity of Carkhuff's primary factors.

On the other hand, to the extent that the principles of learning theory actually do imply a positivistic outlook, it can be argued that all but the most extreme behaviour therapists in fact deny such a philosophy and instead presuppose a more humanistic orientation. Put more strongly: "We might even say that behaviour therapy works in spite of its foundations in animal learning theory, not because of them. Successful therapy is done by good therapists, those who have the necessary qualities of kindness, empathy, and practicality" (Heather, 1976, p.114). Lazarus ('multimodal behavioral techniques') certainly confirms this idea (1973, p.404), but it is perhaps stated most cogently in the following quotation:

"Systematic desensitization takes place within the larger framework of a therapeutic alliance, in which careful attention to interpersonal factors is crucial. ... Systematic desensitization, like any other therapeutic intervention, will be ineffective if interpersonal issues are oversimplified or major issues in a patient's life are ignored" (Braff, Raskin and Geisinger, 1976, p.794).

(Even Wolpe takes what must amount to a similar, though idiosyncratic, position by stating that the behaviour therapist is "kind and supportive to his patients because he has been conditioned to be so (sic!)" (1976, p.114).) Consequently, the behaviour therapists are left in a kind of ideological limbo: their techniques imply a certain philosophical outlook which they reject, but their technical formulations do not explicitly incorporate the kinds of interpersonal dimensions that form the essence of Carkhuff's model. Certainly a highly significant convergence of practice exists here, but, by the same reasoning as
presented on the previous page, one finds yet again a trivial example of 'theoretic convergence'.

At this point it need hardly come as a surprise to discover that Freudians, too, are warm, empathic and genuine (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967, p.27), but there is little in the central aspects of Freudian theory that specifically enters into Carkhuff's 'theoretic convergence'. Indeed, he portrays the psychoanalytic approach on the whole as a singularly cheerless enterprise (see Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, pp.117-129). In relegating it to the secondary factors, he makes the additional qualifications that:

"From our viewpoint, there are no major contributions of psychoanalytic theory, (above and beyond the limited concentration upon the central core of facilitative therapeutic conditions) when applied to therapy and counseling. If there are contributions beyond the historical, they are infrequent and limited to the rather unique experiences of a small number of people amenable to this kind of therapy: ... (2) psychologically attuned, affluent (emphasis added), intelligent, sophisticated, and intellectually curious (emphasis added) persons who are functioning adequately at a concrete level; and (3) future analysts (sic!)" (ibid., p.121).

It would almost seem that from Carkhuff's perspective, whereas the humanists (or, more properly, Rogerians) proved to be philosophers without a technique and the behaviourists technicians without a philosophy, Freudians are without philosophy or technique.

By this time, then, it should be quite obvious that Carkhuff's model does not in fact constitute a convergence of all theoretical approaches to psychotherapy. As to its actual status, by identifying the relationships of this model to representatives of each of the 'three forces', it is clear that it has most affinity with the humanist and behaviourist schools, and least of all with the psychoanalytic. (Indeed, Carkhuff is on record as saying that "psychoanalysis has become a gross perversion for the empty
middle-class man" (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, p.128), and that "it is destructive for any individual to accept the implications which Freud uncovered" (ibid.). Consequently, the position taken here is that Carkhuff's model is the best available approximation to a 'theoretic convergence' of the humanist and behaviourist schools.

The fact that the psychoanalytic approach is left out of such a convergence is of course quite convenient for the concerns of this essay. Clearly, if the intention is to show the ubiquity of the Freudian dimension isolated in the previous chapter, there can be no better model for comparison than one which can be seen as representing 'the rest', as it were. Admittedly, the validity of the assumption that the result of such a comparison will be completely general is easily questioned. However, in the absence of a true model of theoretic convergence, this comparison will be undertaken, and the results must be suitably qualified.

The next step clearly is the application of a semiotic reading to Carkhuff's model. Now since, in actual fact, this model represents a formal synthesis of the Rogerian approach and the techniques of behaviour therapy, with the ideological commitment lying heavily on the Rogerian side, it is far more satisfactory to examine Rogers' theoretical writings directly. These are far more voluminous than Carkhuff's, and more strongly oriented towards presenting a distinct theoretical line. Clearly, what applies to Rogers must equally apply to Carkhuff, for it is the ideology of the 'primary factors' that is under consideration, which, as pointed out earlier, is directly attributable to Rogers himself. Consequently, the next chapter will be directed towards an extensive analysis of the Rogerian orientation, with a view to establishing whether the Freudian dimension of two types of representation may be discovered there.
As one approaches the writings of Carl Rogers, an important consideration to bear in mind is that he is very much the innovator, the pioneer, rather than the master theoretician. Even at his most abstract, what characterises his work is its breadth, as opposed to depth and consistency; instead of the minute details of a rigorously constructed system one finds the vague formalisation of an intuitive outlook and more than half a lifetime of highly personal experience. Indeed, Rogers specifically rejects a more systematic approach as his own preferred mode of expression (remaining none the less convinced of the possibility and utility of such a method), saying that "in a new field perhaps what is needed first is to steep oneself in the events, to approach the phenomena with as few preconceptions as possible, to take a naturalist's observational, descriptive approach to these events, and to draw forth those low-level inferences which seem most native to the material itself" (1958, p.142).

Turning, then, to the notion of two types of representation, it is ultimately not all that difficult to verify its existence in Rogers' theory, for it is quite basic to his approach. Indeed, it has been said that "most of Rogers' psychological concepts bear such striking likeness to Freud's as to force the somewhat cynical observation that for each Rogerian word there is a Freudian one" (Homans, 1974, p.320). On the contrary, the real problem that emerges is the question of which of Rogers' terms are most nearly adequate to describe such a dimension. This is an unfortunate consequence of his casual approach to their
precise definition, for the fact that they derive their explanatory power chiefly from their "intuitive appeal" (Wexler, 1974, p.51) means, in this case, that the most serious difficulties are encountered when they are subjected to a rather more searching analysis than Rogers himself undertakes.

With this in mind, the first section of this chapter is devoted to a general outline of Rogers' theoretical position. This provides a necessary orientation for the critical discussion which follows. The third section is specifically concerned with the concepts of 'experiencing' and 'symbolization', and has the somewhat optimistic aim of trying to reduce the amount of confusion surrounding the use of these terms, both in Rogers' works and in those of other authors associated with his school.

4.1 Rogers' Theory of Human Personality

It has always been something of a point of honour amongst client-centered therapists that their school is "relatively free of dogmatism" (Rogers, 1974, p.9), or even that "(t)he idea of fixed doctrine or ideology ... has been abhorrent to Rogers" (Barrett-Lennard, 1973, pp.6-7). This, of course, is not strictly true, but what can be said of Rogers' theory, and what the citations really refer to, is that more so than most other approaches to psychotherapy, the fundamental elements of his theory represent not static entities but modes of process. As Rogers says, "I have long been interested in the invariant aspects of change in personality ... Most important of all, what is the process by which such change occurs?" (1958, p.142). Consequently, his theoretical formulations tend to consist of descriptions of the dynamic interplay of a
small number of these basic processes, with a minimum of emphasis on
their specific content. In the following outline of the dynamics of
personality development, Rogers' ideas will be presented more or less
in his own words, and a more detailed consideration of the conceptual
problems that arise will be deferred until Section 4.2.

At birth, the human infant, or the 'organism', functions as "an
organized whole" (Rogers, 1959, p.222). His behaviour may be fully
described in terms of the concepts of 'experiencing', the 'actualizing
tendency' and the 'organismic valuing process'. The term 'experience'
may be broadly conceived of as the universe of bodily sensation that
is registered by the organism at any given time; it is concrete,
directly felt, and hence preconceptual in nature. Various synonyms
for it include "the phenomenal field, the experiential field" (Rogers,
1951, p.483), and "sensory and visceral sensations" (ibid.). Although
"only a portion of that experience, and probably a very small portion,
is consciously experienced" (ibid.), an essential criterion for any
sensation to qualify as experience is that it is "potentially available
to awareness" (Rogers, 1959, p.197). Thus experience does not include
"such events as neuron discharges or changes in blood sugar, because
these are not directly available to awareness" (ibid.). What this
means is that Rogers' definition of experience is "a psychological, not
a physiological definition" (ibid.). It is unfortunate that Rogers
does not elaborate further on this theme, for it is here that the seeds
of great confusion are already sown.

The concepts of 'actualizing tendency' and 'organismic valuing
process' are so highly interrelated that they will be considered
together here. The actualizing tendency is defined as "the inherent
tendency of the organism to develop all its capacities in ways which serve to maintain or enhance the organism" (ibid., p.196), and involves a "development toward the differentiation of organs and of functions, expansion in terms of growth" (ibid.). It is characteristic of the organism "as a whole, and only the organism as a whole ... There are no homunculi, no other sources of energy or action in the system" (ibid.). Thus it is a motive, supposedly the only motive in Rogers' entire theory, for "it seems entirely possible that all organic and psychological needs may be described as partial aspects of this one fundamental need" (Rogers, 1951, pp.487-488); it functions clearly as the sole principle of organisation for the organism. As a corollary, the organism values, or finds satisfying, those experiences that are consistent with the actualizing tendency, as it is manifested at any given time. This disposition is termed the 'organismic valuing process'; the basis for evaluation is solely an internal criterion, as opposed to criteria which arise independently of the organism in the (external) environment. An example that Rogers gives of this process in action is that of an infant "who at one moment values food, and when satiated, is disgusted with it" (1959, p.210).

An all-important concept which functions as a bridge between the infant personality and its adult counterpart is that of 'symbolization'. However, it is completely ambiguous as to precisely where this notion fits into Rogers' theory. It seems possible that the process of 'symbolization' does not occur at birth, due to the fact that the infant's whole reality consists of his experiencing (cf. Rogers, 1959, p.222). None the less, no other stage of his development, where such an ability specifically appears, is indicated.

To make matters worse, Rogers' 'definition' of 'symbolization' is
totally non-specific. An early indication of his conceptualisation of this term is to be found in the analogy he draws between the relationships of 'symbolization' to experience on the one hand, and map to territory on the other (Rogers, 1951, p.144). However, his formal definition of the concept simply consists of the intriguing proposal that the terms 'awareness', 'symbolization' and 'consciousness' be considered synonymous (1959, p.198). Admittedly, awareness (and thus, by definition, 'symbolization') may vary over several degrees of "sharpness" (ibid.). And of course, 'symbols' may be both verbal and non-verbal in character (ibid.; cf. also Rogers, 1951, pp.498-499).

Possibly the best clue to Rogers' thinking in this regard is provided by his reference to Angyal (Rogers, 1959, p.198), and it will be useful for later discussion to quote Angyal's definition:

"Symbolism is a triadic constellation, whose terms are: the primary object, its symbol, and a third member, the subject, for whom the symbol means the object. The crucial factor is this third member, who has to be endowed with the capacity to connect the symbol with its referent. This implies the ability of meaning function, that is, of 'mentation'. If we eliminate this third member the symbolism is destroyed, and what were previously symbol and referent become unrelated objects" (Angyal, 1941, p.57).

Since Rogers himself offers no further explanation, a fuller discussion of this concept will appear in the succeeding sections of this chapter.

Whether by the process of 'symbolization' or not, but certainly through the capacity for differentiation of the actualizing tendency, as a result of his interactions with the environment the infant, or organism, develops a number of concepts "about himself, about the environment, and about himself in relation to the environment" (Rogers, 1951, p.498). These concepts, which function as "guiding principles" (ibid.), are "nonverbal, and may not be present in consciousness" (ibid.). Of the ones that do actually emerge into awareness, those relating to the infant
himself are collectively termed 'self-experience' (Rogers, 1959, p.223). Presumably the child also becomes aware of the existence of other persons within his experiential field, and furthermore, becomes at least minimally, reflexively aware of correspondences between his own self-experience and the behaviour of those others.

These developments are of more than passing significance, in that they make possible the growth of another important construct, the 'need for positive regard'. The concept of 'positive regard' is somewhat more involved than the others so far introduced, and is described in the following terms:

"If the perception by me of some self-experience in another makes a positive difference in my experiential field, than I am experiencing positive regard for that individual. In general, positive regard is defined as including such attitudes as warmth, liking, respect, sympathy, acceptance. To perceive oneself as receiving positive regard is to experience oneself as making a positive difference in the experiential field of another" (ibid., pp.207-208).

It is never explained in Rogers' theory, in what way this need for positive regard is a 'partial aspect' of the 'one fundamental need' of the actualizing tendency (cf. the description of this term presented earlier). Nevertheless, once it has arisen, a means for the child's introjection of societal values is set into motion. As particular self-experiences become associated with 'positive regard satisfaction' (Rogers, 1959, p.209), that is, as certain of the child's conscious actions draw the consistent approval of significant others in his environment, they tend to be retained as more permanent patterns of behaviour. Inevitably, these patterns are later reproduced as inherently satisfying behaviours, independently of the presence of those other persons (but still according to their values). When this occurs, the need for positive regard is said to be supplemented by a secondary need,
the need for 'positive self-regard' (ibid.). The external values that
determine the apportionment of these positive regard satisfactions are
collectively termed 'conditions of worth' (ibid.), the social equivalent
of the organismic valuing process. When the self-experiences, thus
moulded, are organised into a relatively stable and integrated system,
the 'concept of self', the organism's personal 'symbolic' representation
of itself, is attained (Rogers, 1951, p.191).

It is only at this highly significant stage of development that
the conditions necessary for personality disorder first obtain (cf.
Rogers, 1961, p.339), for at this point the child begins clearly to
function at two semi-autonomous and systematically distinct levels, the
'experiential' and the 'symbolic' (the former pertaining to the organism
and the latter to the 'self'). Such a statement, of course, conceals a
vast amount of complexity, not the least of which involves the greatly
misunderstood relationship between self and organism. By definition,
the self, as an organised pattern of self-experiences, is a product of
'symbolization'. Consequently, the process of 'symbolization' is a
necessary precondition for the constitution of the self, and it follows
that it must also be a function of the organism (as opposed to the self).
As was clear in Angyal's definition, 'symbolization' resides in the third
member of the 'symbolic' triad, the subject (in this case the organism),
so that the products of 'symbolization', presumably retained in some kind
of memory store, become assimilated to the organism as elements of its
psychological make-up, functioning in the manner of tools or 'guiding
principles'. This applies equally to all products of 'symbolization',
including the self, even though this self may exhibit its own elaborate
and seemingly independent principles of organisation. However, the self
is rather a unique tool, for it is also a 'symbolic' representation of
the organism in its totality. Apart from the question, in general, of how representative of its 'primary object' a 'symbolic' object is, special considerations arise, as in this case, where the subject and the primary object actually coincide. The crucial point to be made here is that no matter how reflexive the concept of self may become, there must always exist a conceptually separate 'mentating' subject to connect this elaborate 'symbolic' self with its referent (the organism). This "unreflecting" (Sartre, 1962, p.61) subject, who necessarily extends beyond the boundaries of any concept of self, is the organism itself (cf. also Chein, 1972, pp.92ff). In consequence, the self must always remain an incomplete representation of the organism, for the organism is necessarily of a higher logical type than the self.

An interesting consequence of the fact that the self is ultimately a subsystem of the larger organismic complex is that the actualizing tendency, which is characteristic of the organism as a whole (that is, of all its differentiated subsystems simultaneously), must necessarily manifest itself partly through this self. Because of the special qualities of the self, Rogers introduces another secondary construct for this interaction between the self and the actualizing tendency, the tendency toward 'self-actualization' (1959, p.196). As its name implies, this is a motive for the self's maintenance and enhancement of itself. In other words, the self truly becomes a "state within a state" (Angyal, 1941, p.118; Angyal also suggests that the above-mentioned tendency is what is actually represented by 'the will').

Ideally, the complementary interplay between the organism and the self is such that all preconceptual experience at the organismic level is free to acquire a 'symbolic' status, so as to enter the domain of the
self, where the peculiar facilities afforded by language and the operations of logic act as a powerful instrument for the organism's transactions with the environment. However, there is one further property of the need for positive regard which eventually transforms these necessary conditions for organismic disorganisation into sufficient ones. Rogers states that this need can become so "compelling" (1959, p.224) that the child may introject social values (conditions of worth) which actually conflict with the organismic valuing process. What this means is that certain self-experiences which conflict with social norms are either not assimilated to the concept of self (not 'symbolized'), or else are 'symbolized' inaccurately (their 'meaning' for the organism is distorted in awareness in such a way that their 'meaning' for the self is not in conflict with the conditions of worth). Consequently, what was originally an incomplete representation of the organism may become one that actually contradicts aspects of it, and it follows from the dominance of the need for positive regard over the organismic valuing process that it is this erroneous self, as opposed to the organism's raw experience, that the organism utilises in its interactions with the environment (abetted, ironically enough, by the organism's modified, or one might even say perverted, actualizing tendency). But perhaps more seriously, the fact that the organism continues to employ this self as if it were a true representation of itself signifies the foundation of a classical confusion of map with territory; the organism begins to lose touch with itself.

Thus the organism is aware of a self, but continues to experience as a preconceptual organism. The gulf that exists between experience and what is 'symbolized' is termed 'incongruence' (ibid., p.203). Even so, this state may in fact not be overly disruptive, for if the organism is
able to 'defend' (cf. ibid., pp.204-205) against experiences that do not accord with its concept of itself (by the techniques of distortion or denial mentioned above), it may still function adequately within its environment. It is only when this incongruence becomes so pronounced, in which case the defence mechanisms of the organism are insufficient to prevent the 'symbolization' of the offending experiences, that the contradiction between self and experience becomes apparent (at least minimally). This leads to a state of 'anxiety' (ibid., p.204), and ultimately to a breakdown in the structure of the self, for a contradiction at the 'symbolic' level cannot be tolerated indefinitely. It is at this point that the therapist is called upon to intervene.

Rogers' most concise statement as to his particular approach to therapy is as follows:

"For constructive personality change to occur, it is necessary that these conditions exist and continue over a period of time:

1. Two persons are in psychological contact.
2. The first, whom we shall call the client, is in a state of incongruence, being vulnerable and anxious.
3. The second person, whom we shall term the therapist, is congruent or integrated in the relationship.
4. The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client.
5. The therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference and endeavours to communicate this experience to the client.
6. The communication to the client of the therapist's empathic understanding and unconditional positive regard is to a minimal degree achieved.

"No other conditions are necessary. If these six conditions exist, and continue over a period of time, this is sufficient. The process of constructive personality change will follow" (1957, p.96).

Briefly, the goal of therapy is that of "increasing the congruence between self and experience" (Rogers, 1959, p.230), and since it would seem that a modification of the client's experience does not bear contemplation, all therapy is directed towards a reorganisation of the
structure of the client's self to be more in accord with his experience. This is achieved in the first place by the therapist's 'unconditional positive regard', which effectively frees the client from the damaging constraints imposed by his own need for positive regard: whatever is experienced or 'symbolized' by the client receives a uniformly positive acceptance by the therapist. Theoretically, this should permit the client to 'symbolize' a greater proportion of his experience, but more importantly, to allow it to be valued to a greater degree according to the organismic valuing process.

However, the therapist's 'congruence' and 'empathic understanding' makes him an even more potent agent for change. In Roger's terminology, 'empathic understanding' is more than mere intellectual insight, for it includes "the emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto" (ibid., p.210). Consequently the therapist perceives, and experiences, something of the client's experience, and being 'congruent or integrated in the relationship', he is able to 'symbolize' it accurately in awareness, and communicate this to the client. With the therapist thus acting in many ways as a model, or surrogate 'symbolizer', and in the atmosphere of unconditional positive regard, the client is gradually able to associate the appropriate 'symbolizations' with his own experience for himself, and eventually develop a new, more satisfying, concept of self.

Before passing on to the next section, with reference to the previous chapter, it is now possible to point out that the interpretation of the term 'congruence', as it applies to therapy, seems to constitute the single most important difference in the outlooks of Carkhuff and Rogers. Rogers describes this term more fully, saying that:
"The third condition is that the therapist should be, within the confines of this relationship, a congruent, genuine, integrated person. It means that within the relationship he is freely and deeply himself, with his actual experience accurately represented by his awareness of himself. It is the opposite of presenting a facade either knowingly or unknowingly" (1957, p.97).

It follows from this that there should be no discrepancy between what the therapist overtly expresses and what he experiences internally, but Carkhuff has extended this idea in such a way as to make congruence the "equivalent of therapist self-expression" (Wexler, 1974, p.112). Consequently, there is a shift away from the exclusively client-centered emphasis, with the therapist becoming much more active through his introduction of his own preferred therapeutic techniques, rather than relying upon the positive resources of the client's own actualizing tendency for a spontaneous reconstruction of a more adequate concept of self (cf. ibid., pp.111-113).

4.2 A Critical Discussion

From this overview of Rogers' theory, it may be apparent that many issues arise, both particular and general. An example of a 'particular' issue would be the question of the need for a special concept of self at all, a question increasingly posed by writers with an orientation towards the body of theory and experiments derived from cognitive or information-processing approaches to psychology. The role of the self in Rogers' theory is that of an arbiter, or regulator, of consciousness and conscious behaviour (cf. Rogers, 1951, p.191). More recently, it has been suggested that such a concept is merely a reification of, and possibly misleading metaphor for, "a collection of organizing statements about the world that serve to retain and process information consistent with these statements"
(Zimring, 1974, p.135). The change in connotation which this entails is that if the self indeed signifies the organism's capacity for selective (or focal) attention at the 'symbolic' level of short-term memory, this neutral construct need not involve the idea of a more or less active diversion of attention away from particular sensations (Rogers' notion of 'defence'). Experience that is not 'symbolized' is simply not transferred from its sensory store to the limited capacity short-term memory because the organism has not acquired the particular rules of organisation of this sensory input that would permit such a process to occur. One immediate consequence of this point of view is that the therapist's role is primarily one of providing a means for the client to learn the appropriate rules.

Naturally, issues such as this raise further problems of their own, but of greater relevance to this essay are those problems that relate to Rogers' theory as an integrated whole. Mention has already been made of Rogers' casual approach to the definition of constructs, and at least one consequence of this is his unnecessarily confused and inconsistent portrayal of the dynamics of his system. One of the most glaring discrepancies results from his assertion that the actualizing tendency is the only motive contained in his theory, for Rogers also finds it necessary to introduce a need for positive regard (which may in fact become even more 'compelling' than the actualizing tendency!), that is never related to the actualizing tendency in any obvious way, and whose development at all remains unmotivated within his system.

A possible resolution of this quandary, and one which results in a greater conceptual unity to his theory, may be derived from a more detailed consideration of the precise nature of the actualizing tendency.
From what Rogers says of this construct, it seems clear that it is deeply rooted in the type of thinking that has become prevalent in the biological sciences, and which has been formalised as 'General System Theory' (see Bertalanffy, 1950b, p.28). Indeed, the essential features of the actualizing tendency can be equated perfectly with at least three characteristics of open systems, 'negative entropy' (Katz and Kahn, 1972, p.40), the 'steady state' (ibid., p.41), and 'differentiation' (ibid., p.44), for "in counteracting entropy (all complex living systems) move toward growth and expansion" (ibid., p.42), in which dynamic "they maximise their basic character" (ibid., p.43), and moreover, "(o)pen systems move in the direction of differentiation and elaboration" (ibid., p.44).

It would seem, then, that by explicitly calling the organism an open system, a move that Rogers presumably would not find objectionable (cf. Rogers, 1958, p.142), the actualizing tendency is automatically entailed.

However, the most important consequence here for taking an explicit systems-theoretic approach (with the emphasis on open systems) is that one is committed to what Weiss calls "the principle of hierarchical organization" (1969, p.33). According to this principle, the organism must be conceived of as an integrated concrescence of various subsystems, each of which may be further separated into successively finer subsystems within subsystems. On the other hand, the organism, as an open system (which, by definition, involves a free exchange of energy or information between the organism and its environment; cf. Bertalanffy, 1950b, p.23), itself exists only as a semi-autonomous subsystem of a higher-order suprasystem (its immediate environment), which is likewise subordinated to successively still higher-order suprasystems. What this means is that, theoretically, any open system may be located within a vast hierarchy of systems within systems that encompasses the living universe. In practice,
however, as Emery points out, "in analysis of any one level of system organization it probably would be adequate to consider only the ones immediately above and below" (1969, p.15).

But Weiss's principle has a second aspect, already hinted at, which is that "the top level operations of the organism ... are neither structurally nor functionally referable to direct liaison with the processes on the molecular level ... but are relayed ... from higher levels of determinancy" (Weiss, 1969, p.33). That is to say, the organism's behaviour cannot be accounted for solely in terms of the needs of and pressures exerted by its (internal) subsystems, even when supplemented by the organism's need to maintain its integrity, for the organism as a whole is also at least partly energised by the quite distinct demands of its environmental suprasystem. In particular, to use Rogers' term, the organism cannot be conceived of as being motivated entirely by its own actualizing tendency.

Relating this train of thought more fully to Rogers' theory, one notes that if all open systems share a common property that may be termed an 'actualizing tendency', the organism's immediate environment, as an open system, must have an actualizing tendency of its own. Consequently, the organism (as an integral member of its environment) must be regarded as the locus of two basic motives, its own actualizing tendency (perhaps best viewed as an 'upward-acting' force whose goal is to assert some kind of autonomy, or even mastery, over the environment), and the 'downward-acting' force of the environment's 'need' to integrate the actions of its various subsystems in the interests of its own preservation and enhancement (despite the animistic notions this may appear to entail).
Since the similarities in basic philosophical outlook between Rogers and Angyal are so pronounced upon comparison of their writings, it seems appropriate here to make use of the two terms Angyal employs for just such a dichotomy: the 'trend toward increased autonomy' (1941, pp.20-55), the obvious correlate of Rogers' 'actualizing tendency', and the 'trend toward homonomy' (ibid., pp.167-207), defined as "a trend to be in harmony with superindividual units" (ibid., p.172). The choice of this particular pair of terms is somewhat arbitrary, of course, for this type of dichotomy seems to have attained a certain measure of ubiquity. It appears, for example, in the writings of Bateson with his concepts of 'symmetrical' and 'complementary' relationships (e.g., Bateson, 1971, p.9), and even invites comparison with Piaget's notions of 'assimilation' and 'accommodation' (cf. Maya, 1972, p.6).

Parenthetically, it may be further noted that the attribution of a second motive to Rogers' 'organism', apart from its necessity from a systems-theoretic point of view, encounters no contradiction with other aspects of Rogers' theory. Furthermore, it makes possible a degree of convergence between Rogers and other writers who have emphasised the extreme physiological and psychological dependence on others of the human infant. A case in point, Macmurray states that the infant "cannot, even theoretically, live an isolated existence; ... he is not an independent individual. He lives a common life as one term in a personal relation" (1961, p.50).

The major result of adopting the idea of two motives present from birth is that the introduction of a need for positive regard in Rogers' theory is no longer quite so inexplicable. Quite obviously, this need can be seen as the manifestation in the organism of an environmental
pressure on all of its constituents to conform to certain standards which serve to regulate the functioning of that environment; its resemblance to the trend toward homonomy is immediately apparent. However, Rogers' definition of this need is rather more involved than that of Angyal's trend in a highly significant way, in that it presupposes the existence of self-experiences in the organism, which further presupposes the capacity for 'symbolization'. Indeed, it might be said that Rogers' need for positive regard is most accurately described as the trend toward homonomy expressed at the 'symbolic' level.

As has been pointed out earlier, Rogers is not clear about what exactly is involved by the term 'symbolization', but it is significant that most of his examples of this process are verbalisations of organismic experiences, especially in relation to his concepts of 'congruence' and 'incongruence' (cf. Rogers, 1961, pp. 339-341). One actually gains the impression that incongruence becomes a serious problem only after language (in its technical sense) has been well and truly acquired by the organism. Whether or not Rogers himself would explicitly subscribe to such a proposition, it is profitable to consider the possible role of language in Rogers' account of personality disorder.

The functional aspects of language in society have been the subject of ever-increasing attention this century, and a person well-known for his views in this regard is Benjamin Lee Whorf. His point of view is that "every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness" (Whorf, 1956, p. 252; emphases
added). It follows, then, that language is predominantly an 'environmental' tool, and a vehicle par excellence for the satisfaction of the environmental (cultural) actualizing tendency, or alternatively, the organism's trend toward homonomy. With this bias inherent in the very essence of language, the obvious danger for the organism is the lack of a full expression or satisfaction of its own trend toward increased autonomy through that medium. This danger would appear to be all the more serious with the strong emphasis that exists, at least in Western society, on a reality based on processes highly related to language: the opportunities for genuine organismic expression become severely limited.

If, then, 'symbolization' is assumed predominantly to involve language (this view will be modified when the concept of 'symbolization' is examined more fully below), and at an admitted risk of great oversimplification, a surprisingly parsimonious account of the essential features of the Rogerian orientation becomes possible. Rogers' theory may be said to consist essentially of a description of the interplay of two dualities: that of the trends toward homonomy and increased autonomy, and that of experience and 'symbolization'. Initially, the organism functions in a fully integrated manner at the experiential level. However, as the process of 'symbolization' is acquired, the ideally complementary interaction of the two trends at the experiential level is inadequately translated into the 'symbolic' domain, in such a way as to emphasise the trend toward homonomy at the expense of the trend toward increased autonomy. With the cultural dominance of 'symbolic' over experiential reality, incongruence in the organism results. Rogerian therapy aims to restore the experiential balance at the 'symbolic' level.
Of these two dualities, it might be said that the first (the two trends) is one that characterises all living processes. Accordingly, it is of the greatest importance for an understanding of the human animal, but it is only when the second duality is introduced that humanity is specifically created; the development of 'symbolization' as a counterpart to experience is what makes possible human culture, and at the same time, ironically enough, psychological breakdown.

There seems to be no good reason for seeking the equivalent of two types of representation in the first duality, but every reason to find it in the second, if only because the concept of 'symbolization' has already been specifically invoked. Accordingly, the next section is devoted to a detailed examination of the two concepts of 'experience' and 'symbolization'.

4.3 Experience and 'Symbolization'

With the identification of this duality as the one most likely to be of relevance to the concerns of this essay, the problem arises, as the second major consequence of Rogers' previously mentioned casual approach to his definitions, that it is not at all easy to identify an exact line of demarcation between 'experience' and 'symbolization'. To overcome this problem, the following approach will be adopted. Firstly, it will be clearly affirmed that two distinct modes of process can be identified within the Rogerian framework, ignoring confusions of terminology. Secondly, an attempt will be made to revise this terminology so that these two modes of process are more unambiguously identifiable.

It is an unfortunate fact that the description of 'experience'
appearing in the previous section very nearly exhausts Rogers' published analysis of this concept. Additional insight into its mode of functioning may only be gleaned from fairly indirect allusions to it scattered throughout his writings. An example of this is a passage where Rogers makes the comment that "the innermost core of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his 'animal nature,' is positive in nature - is basically socialized (cf. Angyal's 'trend toward homonomy!'), forward-moving, rational and realistic" (1961, p. 91).

On the other hand, there does exist a slightly more revealing passage, where Rogers speaks of "a unity of experiencing", which constitutes the "essence of some of the deepest parts of therapy", when the "total organism" (as contrasted simply with consciousness) takes over (1955, pp. 267 and 268). In his words:

"The client is freely able to experience his feeling in its complete intensity, as a 'pure culture,' without intellectual inhibitions or cautions, without having it bounded by knowledge of contradictory feelings; and I am able with equal freedom to experience my understanding of this feeling, without any conscious thought about it, ... without any type of diagnostic or analytic thinking, without any cognitive or emotional barriers to a complete 'letting go' in understanding. When there is this complete unity, singleness, fullness of experiencing in the relationship ... there is, to borrow Buber's phrase, a real 'I-Thou' relationship, a timeless living in the experience which is between the client and me. It is at the opposite pole from seeing the client, or myself, as an object. It is the height of personal subjectivity" (ibid., p. 268).

While the thoughts contained here are expressed in typical Rogerian fashion, so that to some extent one must sift through it to make clear what is actually being proposed, this passage is highly significant in that it represents one of the few clues in Rogers' writings as to what precisely characterises a concrete, directly felt process. The common thread that runs through this entire quotation is the idea of a removal of various blockages or barriers, so that one is left with 'pure'
experience. With pure experience there is no distinction, or boundary, between subject and object; experience is unbounded by 'intellectual inhibitions', 'knowledge of contradictory feelings', 'cognitive or emotional barriers'. The 'unity' of experiencing clearly reflects a process which involves no distinction or separation of elements.

This idea is explicitly confirmed in the writings of one of Rogers' more thoughtful associates, Eugene T. Gendlin. Gendlin identifies a number of properties of experience, but one in particular stands out. He writes: "There are no given discrete units in experiencing (or any aspect of it) except as units are further specified and created. By the application of some scheme there will be units" (1962a, p.29), and as to the creation of such a scheme, "only symbolizing makes it so" (ibid., p.153).

It would seem to be no exaggeration to maintain that this property of experience, its fundamental continuity, constitutes its single most important characteristic, for it is possible to draw from it a number of conclusions of the greatest significance. In the first place, as a corollary to there being no units to which experience may be reduced, an experience as a whole cannot be identified (marked off) without the introduction of a conceptual scheme. As Gendlin further remarks:

"... there is one experience, or an experience ... only, if one takes into account that it must already have been specified, selected, created, as an experience ... Experiencing is multiple, non-numerical. An experience is a symbolic creation ... There are no units. Anything like a unit experience is always a product, embodying its experienced production and selection... Accordingly, external and internal relations of experiences are basically not distinguishable" (ibid., pp.152-153).

Thus it follows that experience is unbounded. Furthermore, without units, without boundaries, it is clear that "we cannot consider experience to be a logically schematic construct, no matter how complex" (ibid., p.3);
"(i)t is supralogical, or, if you wish, prelogical, capable of functioning in the creation and application of many different logical schemes" (ibid., p.29).

Turning to the concept of 'symbolization', one finds that there is nothing more of a specific nature to be found in Rogers' works that has not already been presented here; once again, it is Gendlin who supplies something of a more explicit analysis. The first point to be made is that 'symbolization' does not function apart from experience. On the contrary, a 'symbol' is an aspect of experience which has acquired a 'symbolic' function (ibid., p.97n). This function is to "specify an experience" (ibid.), and since "'a feeling' can occur only if something functions to refer to it, or specify it, or set it off, or mark it off" (ibid., p.97), it seems clear that 'symbolization', for Gendlin, is essentially a process of applying boundaries to experience so that particular aspects of it may be more unambiguously referred to, as, for example, in the process of communication. Of course, the establishment of boundaries implies a separation of elements, or the introduction of discontinuity. Thus logical processes become possible, and indeed, "symbolized products ... simply have the necessary attributes defined in logic" (ibid., p.149).

One may conclude then, that 'experience' and 'symbolization' clearly function according to two distinct modes, involving, respectively, continuity and discreteness. However, no analysis of Rogers' theory that lays any claim at all to completeness can ignore the peculiar problems that arise from a consideration of Rogers' ambiguous usage of the terms 'experience' and 'symbolization'. Indeed, a most surprising conclusion that one reaches, in view of the importance Rogers and his
associates attach to the concept of 'experience', is that in order to be entirely consistent, one must dispense with it (in its present form) altogether.

To begin with, one may refer to Rogers' definition of 'symbolization', which equates that concept with those of 'awareness' and 'consciousness'. It follows that an awareness of any sensation at all, no matter how directly felt, involves 'symbolization', simply by definition. But it appears that one may also experience some sensation without ever being aware of it, as indicated, for example, by the following passage:

"... in this private world of the individual, only a small portion of that experience, and probably a very small portion, is consciously experienced ... In other words, most of the individual's experiences constitute the ground of the perceptual field, but they can easily become figure, while other experiences slip back into ground" (Rogers, 1951, p.483).

Here, unconscious experience is likened to the Gestalt term, 'ground'. However, Rogers has stated elsewhere that "symbolic representation ... may have varying degrees of sharpness or vividness, from a dim awareness of something existing as ground, to a sharp awareness of something which is in focus as figure" (1959, p.198). Here, the same term, 'ground', is explicitly associated with both 'awareness' and 'symbolization'. While this hardly constitutes anything like a complete argument, it does put on in a frame of mind conducive to the idea that all experience involves 'symbolization'.

The stronger support needed for this idea is to be found in Rogers' definition of 'experience'. It is stated there explicitly that it is "a psychological, not a physiological definition" (Rogers, 1959, p.197).  

1. Gendlin makes the identical point, when he states: "The word 'experience' in psychology, wherever employed, means concrete psychological events" (1962b, p.52; emphasis added).
The problem now centres on what is meant by 'psychological', as opposed to 'physiological', and once again it is appropriate to refer to the writings of Angyal, where it is stated that:

"The characteristic feature of things psychological is their symbolic nature, which distinguishes them from all other phenomena in the world. I do not wish to state only that symbolism is a highly important characteristic of mental life, but also to emphasize that all psychological functions can be understood as processes of symbolization. Psychological activity may also be called the symbolizing function of the organism" (1941, pp.58-59).

One can only conclude that it is impossible to distinguish 'experience' (whether conscious or not) from 'symbolization', and to that extent the former term is redundant in Rogers' theory. However, it still remains the case that two distinct modes of process have been identified within the Rogerian framework, and it follows that if the terms 'experience' and 'symbolization' do not adequately specify this duality, a different terminology must be introduced. It seems clear that, Gendlin's admirable attempt at (relative) explicitness notwithstanding, it is his conception of 'symbolization' that must be modified.

The main source of difficulty in Gendlin's usage of the term 'symbol' (and this applies equally to both Rogers and Angyal) is that it is thoroughly confused with the related, but quite distinct, notion of 'sign'. This is clearly indicated in Gendlin's statement that his concern is with "symbols in the widest sense" (1962a, p.97n). In fact, the word 'symbol' has been used since Peirce's days to denote a species of sign which bears only an arbitrary and conventional relationship to whatever is being signified (as in the case of the word 'book' to such an object), distinguishing it from (at least) 'indexical' and 'iconic' signs (see Sebeok, 1975, pp.242 and 247-248). What Gendlin is actually referring to is the more general concept of 'sign'. Once this is appreciated, it is easy to see that his assumption that a 'symbol in the widest sense'
(that is, a sign) always involves a boundary is quite false, for there exists a whole class of signs, labelled 'analogue', that entail no such restriction.

Consequently, it is quite acceptable to speak of two types of 'representation' (replacing the misleading word, 'symbolization') which can be distinguished precisely according to the same notions of continuity and discreteness that were earlier shown to distinguish between the two modes of process in the duality under consideration: 'experience' corresponds to a kind of continuous representation, whereas 'symbolization' pertains to discrete representation. On this basis, it is concluded that, as with the Freudian position, a dimension characterised by the idea of two types of representation is also an essential feature of the Rogerian orientation (and, by implication, the Carkhuffian model).

This completes the analysis of Rogers' theory. The position thus attained is that a dimension corresponding to two modes of representation seems to be a feature common to much of psychotherapy, independent of theoretical orientation. The remaining two chapters are devoted to a consideration of the consequences of this idea.

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1. Interestingly enough, a distinct mode of representation appropriate to the representation of feeling has actually been suggested within the Rogerian school. Writing about the 'iconic mode', Butler states that, "it would seem that this kind of abstraction is quite different from logical abstraction. Iconic abstraction probably is the minimum example of symbolizing" (1974, p.178). His further analysis of this mode, however, is rather minimal.
The preceding three chapters collectively affirm the existence of a dimension common to both the Freudian and Rogerian (and most likely all major approaches) to psychotherapy, that readily corresponds to the idea of an interplay between two distinct modes of representation. That this is a central ingredient of both is undeniable: in Rogers' formulations, a discrepancy between these two modes ('incongruence') is the very essence of psychological disorder, constituting in fact "the basic estrangement in man" (Rogers, 1959, p.226), while in Freud's case, the centrality of such a dimension has often been acknowledged by both Freud and his various commentators (e.g., Freud, 1931, p.xxxii, and Hilgard, 1962, p.478). Now as mentioned in Section 1.4, a common meeting ground for all modern philosophical investigations is the area of language (cf. Ricoeur, 1970, p.3). Consequently, it should not be too surprising that the idea of a generalised theory of psychotherapy, featuring an explicit recognition of the semiotic nature of this common dimension, is a very interesting proposition philosophically. This chapter is a preliminary attempt to indicate the nature of these wider implications; of necessity, it will be more speculative than previous chapters.

The first section introduces the more technical terms of 'analogue' and 'digital' coding, replacing the less specific terminology of 'two modes of representation'. In the second section, the kind of philosophical outlook entailed by any theory based upon what is in essence a distinction between analogue and digital coding, with the relative emphases on each as typically applied by psychotherapeutic theorists,
5.1 Analogue and Digital Coding

Up to this point, most ideas relating to semiotics have been presented in a very general and largely non-technical fashion, tending to reflect the role of semiotics as a meta-discipline. It must be acknowledged that it would be quite possible to continue in such a manner, and still draw much the same conclusions as will be found in the rest of this essay. Certainly, the idea of 'two modes of representation' already helps to remove the stigma of vagueness and mystery that undoubtedly surrounds the terms 'primary and secondary processes' and 'experience and symbolization' in the minds of many people, and is of course free of hidden connotations that might result from too close an alignment with the letter of either of the Freudian or Rogerian frameworks. Still, there is some justification for introducing a more specialised terminology here.

In the first place, terms that specifically denote the appropriate modes of representation, 'analogue' and 'digital' codes, do exist, and there seems to be no good reason to ignore them. More significantly, though, these terms have actually been applied in 'orthodox' semiotic approaches to psychotherapy (e.g., Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967, various pp.), so that they obviously provide an important link between all the approaches to psychotherapy considered so far.

The terms 'analogue' and 'digital' are derived from the well-known distinction that goes by the same designation, between the two fundamental types of computing devices. An analogue computer is defined as "any
device which 'computes' by means of an analog between real, physical, continuous quantities and some other set of variables" (Wilden, 1971, pp.155-156). For example, a thermometer is such a device - the volume of mercury in the tube is directly proportional to the amount of ambient heat. The essential point to note here is the central importance of the physical properties of the materials that constitute any type of analogue computer: there is no manipulation of abstract entities, but instead the analogue computer 'calculates' by responding to changes in its surroundings, to produce 'answers' that are based entirely on the natural physical states resulting from such changes.

On the other hand, a digital computer is any device which manipulates discrete elements in order to arrive at the solution to a problem, as in the case of an abacus, or even our ten fingers. Thus discontinuity is of the very essence of such a system. In contrast with analogue computers, the physical characteristics of the materials used in the construction of a digital device are irrelevant to its logical operation, except insofar as they can produce phenomena that can be interpreted as representing discrete units. Computation depends entirely on a patterning of elements rather than their nature (which may perhaps be another way of saying that the concrete substance of an analogue system is somehow inherently 'meaningful', while the elements of a digital system are completely neutral and uninterpreted).

The terms 'analogue' and 'digital' of course need not apply only to computers, for any system involving the manipulation of continuous physical quantities can be regarded as an analogue system (noting that it need not be literally analogous to any other specified set of circumstances); and similarly, any system involving discrete elements will
be a digital system. Before passing on to slightly more detailed consideration of relevant differences between such systems, it should be pointed out that the concept of 'digital' is not as simple as it might at first seem. In particular, one can identify what Wilden calls "at least two main levels of semiotic freedom in the form of the digital" (ibid., p.165). At the first level, discreteness may be introduced into a continuum in the form of a threshold, which represents a decision as to the presence or absence of some continuous quantity, as in the case of a thermostat or the firing of a neuron. Here, the nature of the system is still very much determined by the physical characteristics of the substances constituting it, and it is considered to be digital in form and analogue in function. At the second level, discrete elements make up the entire system, and there is no question of merely labelling extremes (say) in continua as distinct. In this case, the physical characteristics of the elements of the system are irrelevant to its purpose, and the system as a whole is considered to be digital in form and function. It is this second use of 'digital' that will enter into subsequent discussion here. (For a fuller treatment of 'form' and 'function' in this context, see Wilden, 1972, pp.164-167).

The principal aim of this section to indicate the profound differences that exist between codes (sets of principles of organisation and patterning of signs) labelled 'analogue' and 'digital'. Clearly, the former involve signs that are essentially 'real, physical and continuous', while the latter involve signs that consist of patterns of discrete elements. Taking analogue coding first, it is instructive to consider what kinds of 'limitations' follow from the assumption of continuity of physical quantity. A physical quantity has a definite existence, and is necessarily positive. Therefore, it can only represent positive
quantities - it cannot represent a true zero, or negative quantities. Any quantities represented must be relatively imprecise, due to the fact that the assumption of continuity precludes the existence of precise boundaries. Consequently, all normal logical processes are quite impossible in the analogue - apart from the limitations in logic already expressed, it is impossible to represent 'either/or' in the analogue, for any attempt to do so must necessarily represent 'both-and'. It follows from this last property that the only syntax possible in the analogue is pure sequence, in a positive direction.

On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically from some points of view, a digital type of code may represent logic processes, precisely because it is essentially independent of real physical quantities. Since the digital consists of organised patterns of elements, 'imaginary' entities, such as 'zero' and 'minus', can be readily defined (as a matter of convention). However, perhaps the most important feature of the digital is its capacity to isolate or separate: since its elements are discrete units, it can be extremely precise about the placement of boundaries. (Again, see Wilden, 1972, pp.161-163, for a fuller discussion of these distinctions in logical form between the analogue and the digital.)

On this basis, it is relatively easy to distinguish between analogue and digital features of spoken communication. The actual sounds of speech are analogue (ibid., p.169) because they are real (physical) and continuous. As such, they allow for a great deal of freedom in idiosyncratic emotional expression. For example, the louder one shouts, the angrier one appears (in the appropriate context) (cf. Sebeok, 1962, p.436). This is only possible because the volume of sound produced is infinitely
and continuously variable (within the physical constraints of the human vocal apparatus). Now in these circumstances, the emotion is simply expressed, or proposed; there is no statement made about its applicability or the denial of such an applicability (cf. Bateson, 1972, p.422). In short, there is no manipulation of elements beyond simple expression. Furthermore, it is difficult to say when the emotion precisely begins or ends, but while it is being experienced, the volume of sound is a remarkably accurate representation of this emotional state.

On the other hand, the utterance, "I am angry", plays a completely contrasting role. It is digital, consisting of a pattern of (discrete) letters of the alphabet. The word 'angry' is completely unambiguous and precise, in itself. Further, it is quite possible to qualify the word 'angry', and in particular, there is no problem in simultaneously introducing the word 'not', so that a boundary between 'angry' and 'not angry' can be unambiguously applied, at the digital level (i.e., considering only the words themselves). However, it is clear that the word 'angry', by itself, conveys nothing of the emotion being named. Although the words 'very', 'a little', etc. may be used as qualifiers (making for a high degree of combinatory and manipulatory power), there is simply no way of actually expressing the emotion in words, and whatever representation is possible must be very approximate and greatly distorted. For this reason, Wilden makes the generalisation that "what the analog gains in semantics it loses in syntactics" (1972, p.163). (See also Maslow's (1948) article for a discussion on this theme, noting, however, that the words 'rubricizing' and 'experience' are used there for the digital and analogue aspects of behaviour.)

In fact, linguistics has determined that language is digital through and through. As a result of his studies in phonology, Roman Jakobson
proposed that all phonemes (the minimum linguistically significant units of language, which in themselves are not meaningful) can be ordered into a set of 'binary oppositions' (see Jakobson et al., 1963, pp.8-13). This is equivalent to regarding phoneme \( x \) as a manifestation of either 'A' or 'not-A', clearly something that is only possible with a digital code. The idea of 'binary oppositions' constitutes a fundamental element of the structuralist approach, and there will be occasion to refer to this in passing in the next chapter.

These ideas are sufficient to distinguish between the concepts of 'analogue' and 'digital', so as to emphasise how fundamental such a difference is. Of course, the subject has not been nearly exhausted, and a deeper investigation along the lines of this essay would have to take this into account (in this regard, Wilden, 1972, pp.155-201, can be highly recommended). The next section will be addressed to the question of the general implications of psychotherapy for philosophy, considering that a central feature of it is an interaction of analogue and digital processes.

5.2 The Philosphic Import of Psychotherapeutic Theory

In order to arrive at an assessment of the philosophic impact of psychotherapeutic theory, it is necessary to appreciate the ideological bias that permeates almost all of philosophy and science. Although a number of distinct schools of thought can be identified throughout history, there is one very basic commitment that unites most of them against what they would regard as a thoroughly heretical position. This basic commitment is to the primacy of reason, expressed in such phrases as "reason alone can establish true knowledge" (Polanyi, 1974, p.117), and
"what is real is rational" (Marcuse, 1964, p.123). Against this, the voice of romanticism has been raised at various times, but largely ineffectually, as the overwhelming growth of science testifies.

The idea that reason governs both man and reality can be traced back to the giants of Greek philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. To Plato can be attributed the notion that "all knowledge must be stateable in explicit definitions which anyone could apply" (Dreyfus, 1972, p.xv). This meant that all knowledge should be reducible to the application of a set of formal rules to a number of basic concepts. Yet the meaning of these elements still had to be intuited, making Plato's approach essentially 'semantic' rather than 'syntactic' (ibid., p.xvi). However, Aristotle reversed this state of affairs and proclaimed the supremacy of reason by defining man as a rational animal (ibid., p.xxvi). The practical result is that ever since, reason has been assumed to be of the essence of man, and as a corollary, Western thought has come to be dominated by the idea that all knowledge could be totally formalised (ibid., p.xvii). Contrasting this with Plato's approach, this means that even basic elements can be left uninterpreted, knowledge consisting entirely of the application of a set of formal (logical) rules. Consequently, it is easy to see why the digital computer, operating as it does by means of pre-programmed rules manipulating uninterpreted binary digits, has been seen by some philosophers as "the culmination of the philosophical tradition" (ibid., p.xx) (and why some scientists think that 'artificial intelligence' is possible).

Although this bias has existed through "three consecutive periods of rationalism" (Polanyi, 1974, pp.116-117) from the Greeks to the present day, it is still not completely clear whether this is an
ontological position (relating to the nature of reality) or an epistemological one (relating to the nature of our knowledge about reality).

For instance, Turing, in defining the essence of a digital computer, makes the statement that:

"Strictly speaking, there are no such machines. Everything really moves continuously. But there are many kinds of machines which can profitably be thought of as being discrete state machines" (quoted in Dreyfus, 1972, p.xix).

Clearly, this implies a rationalistic epistemology which does not extend into an ontological position. Yet the temptation to make such an extension is great, for the intellect seems powerful, and there is often a curious twist in one's philosophical position such that even if the intellect does not reveal the ultimate reality it is far better to act as if it did - implying at least a functional rationalistic ontology, as possibly indicated in the following quotation:

"As yet, the old saying of Lord Kelvin holds true: 'If I can make a mechanical model, I can understand it. So long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through, I cannot understand it.' This intellectualization may utterly falsify and distort reality. Nevertheless, it is the only scientific method we poor mortals possess" (Bretscher, 1931, p.24).

At the very least, this illustrates the rationalistic epistemology that necessarily permeates the scientific approach.

Against this background, psychotherapy presents a distinct contrast. While there certainly is a rationalistic aspect involved, by way of the digital component, the fact that analogue processes play such an important part in psychotherapeutic theory means that such a theory represents a fundamental break with traditional philosophical ideas. Furthermore, the more one examines the role of the analogue in psychotherapy, the greater the rift, for it is clear that in both of the psychotherapeutic theories studied in detail, the analogue has primacy over the digital. Not only does the analogue precede the digital in ontogenesis (both the
primary process and experiencing precede the secondary process and 'symbolization' respectively), but the analogue remains dominant even when the digital emerges. Thus, Freud mentions several times that the pleasure principle ultimately rules both primary and secondary processes (e.g., 1900, p.640; 1923, p.27); and similarly, Rogers states that: "Experience is, for me, the highest authority" (1961, p.23; emphases deleted).

According to Freud, "(r)eality will always remain 'unknowable'" (1940, p.66; cf. Rogers, 1955, p.270), so that psychotherapy is not directly concerned with ontology. However, it does present a distinctive epistemological position, the essence of which is that man primarily orients himself towards, and 'knows', reality by means of an analogue type of communication. An immediate consequence of the kind of 'logic' possible in the analogue, is that there can be no subject-object distinction (which can only occur with the application of boundaries, a digital process). Furthermore, all ideas of separateness (such as 'other minds', 'objects', 'the world outside', 'me', etc.) are thus not automatically given, but have to be created by the human mind with its apparently unique capacity for digitalisation. And of course, one's primary 'knowledge' of reality is a non-logical, non-analytic one, more in keeping with a 'dialectical' interaction of physical quantities that was seen earlier to characterise analogue computers.

Clearly, the point of view implied by psychotherapy makes complete nonsense of the scientific endeavour. If science is directed towards the explanation of objective events (cf. Rogers, 1955, p.272), the 'problem' of explanation lies not in the disentanglement of the subtle processes of reality, but in the fact that objects have been defined in
the first place. This is perhaps most clear in the case of the controversy over 'other minds' - how is it possible to know the mind of another person? Now as a consequence of the psychotherapeutic viewpoint, one would have to say that in order to pose the question in the first place, one would have had to place a boundary between oneself and that other person. Yet one's primary orientation to that person would be according to analogue processes, implying no essential separation. Consequently, the question one should ask is not how one person can reach the other, but how they were separated in the first place.

Of course, to minds brought up in Western culture (including the present author's) notions such as these constitute the 'nonsense', against which scientific method is designed to protect us. But it is significant that general systems theory, which presents a radical alternative to traditional notions of causality and objectivity, is becoming such a strong movement within certain sections of science. Certainly, Rogers' theory is quite compatible with such an approach, so much so that one is tempted to consider seriously the intellectual upheaval implied in the previous paragraph that would similarly appear to be the ultimate consequence of adopting a systems type of epistemology.

From another point of view, it cannot be denied that all digital processes, no matter how conceptually independent of the physical properties of the medium 'carrying' them, are, in another sense, completely dependent on that medium. Digitalisation is a convention that cannot be established perfectly (due to the assumed continuity of physical matter): the digital 'message' is always subject to fluctuations within the medium ('noise'). And of course, the medium can be
eliminated entirely (e.g., the power cut off), which destroys all possibility of 'communication' (in the widest sense) (cf. Sebeok, 1962, p.439).

From still another point of view, non-verbal communication (which is generally considered to be analogue) has primacy in at least one respect over verbal communication (digital). As Bär puts it, "when lexical behavior contradicts kinesic behavior, the kinesic modality is usually the bearer of truth" (1974, p.275). All of which help to make the idea of the primacy of the analogue over the digital, as a philosophical position, seem less implausible.

At any rate, it is clear that, however justified it is in its position, the theory of psychotherapy does imply a "new philosophy of psychological and behavioral science" (Rogers, 1974, p.9) (although it does not derive exclusively from the client-centered orientation, as Rogers would have it). As Fromm originally said of Freud's theory, this represents "the fruitful synthesis of rationalism and romanticism" (1973, p.55).
The theme of this essay was the meta-theoretical application of semiotics to psychotherapy. The approach taken here has certainly confirmed the feasibility of such a project. Perhaps more significantly, however, this essay has demonstrated that in general, it is not necessary to interpret the hypothetical constructs of existing theories in terms of a specialised semiotic terminology in order to produce a semiotic version of that theory: semiotic elements were already central features of each theory examined in detail.

In particular, it was found that the dimension formed by isolating the specifically semiotic aspects of Freud's theory corresponded to the idea of the operation of two distinct modes of representation, later identified as analogue and digital codes. An interesting question was whether the same dimension could be found in other theories of psychotherapy.

A way of testing this was to analyse Carkhuff's model of 'theoretic convergence' of all existing approaches to psychotherapy. An evaluation of this model showed that it constituted only a weak convergence, since it mainly represented a generalisation of the Rogerian approach in such a way as to subsume as many other approaches as possible under the ideological wing of what are essentially Rogers' 'necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change' (Rogers, 1957). Because of this, approaches that were immediately (or easily shown to be)
compatible with Rogers' general position showed 'true convergence', whereas others that were ostensibly at odds with the Rogerian orientation were regarded as, at best, irrelevant to the question of convergence. However, the advantage of considering this model was that it demonstrated that the supposed opposition between the Freudian and Rogerian approaches is probably representative of the single most important source of antagonism in psychotherapy as a whole. Consequently, the Rogerian position was, in turn, analysed in some detail, as a particular theory on its own, but also with a mind to its representative role in this essay: if the Freudian dimension could be discovered in Rogers, its generality within the greater part of psychotherapy would be strongly suggested.

The analysis of Rogers' theory revealed that the specifically semiotic aspects of his theory formed a dimension that was indeed identical with the one uncovered by a semiotically oriented reading of Freud. An immediate conclusion is that a true theoretic convergence between the Freudian and Rogerian approaches is quite possible, reflecting the superficiality of the Carkhuffian approach. Indeed, it is ironic that the central feature of Carkhuff's model, his 'primary factors', ultimately reflect the same basic interplay between analogue and digital processes that is condemned in Freud's theory. It is of some significance for this essay, of course, that these relationships are best highlighted within a semiotic framework.

From a wider perspective, it was concluded that since a common dimension corresponding to the interplay of analogue and digital processes within the Freudian and Rogerian theories could be identified, it was likely that it permeated much of psychotherapy. Additional
support for the generality of this dimension may be found in the statement by Gendlin, that: "Subception is vital in most theories of psychotherapy" (1962a, p.53n). 'Subception' is the name given to the supposed phenomenon of discrimination or perception without awareness (e.g., see Lazarus and McCleary, 1951); whether such a process actually exists or not does not immediately matter - it is enough that Gendlin considers such a process to underlie most theories of psychotherapy. This process is equivalent to a process of being aware of one's surroundings without being aware that one is aware - a 'consciousness' that is 'un-self-conscious'. This process seems to describe exactly the primary mode of orientation to the world, mentioned in Section 5.2, that would be predicted if the epistemology implied by at least the Freudian and Rogerian approaches were adopted. Clearly, a consciousness that is un-self-conscious is precisely what is entailed by the 'logic' of the analogue, where there is no separation of 'self' from the 'object' of one's perceptions. (A similar analysis would seem to be applicable to all positions in psychology that involve the postulation of a 'hidden observer' (e.g. Hilgard, 1977, p.22).)

Returning to the specific comparison of the Freudian and Rogerian approaches, it is obvious that although a common dimension can be identified, there is also much that separates them. However, the reduction of Rogers' theory into the interplay of two dualities (see Section 4.2) provides a useful basis for further comparison. Essentially, Rogers' theory can be seen as a fusion of semiotic and systems theoretic viewpoints: 'experience' and 'symbolization' relate to analogue and digital communication, whereas the trends toward homonomy and increased autonomy are properties of open systems. Now Freud's theory can be very easily related to this Rogerian framework due to the fact that a feature of Freud's thinking, not as yet touched upon here, is his closed systems
orientation. For example, he says:

"If it is true that life is governed by Fechner's principle of constant equilibrium, it consists of a continuous descent towards death; but the falling of the level is delayed and fresh tensions are introduced by the claims of Eros, of the sexual instincts, as expressed in instinctual needs" (1923, p.66).

In systems terminology, there is no importation of energy from the organism's environment; the system is energised from within, and eventually finds a state of equilibrium at death. One can see how Thanatos is readily derived within this framework. On the other hand, Rogers emphasises the open systems concepts of growth and interaction (importation of energy from the organism's environment), which gives his theory its optimistic outlook. Accordingly, if Rogers can be seen as combining a semiotic and open systems approach, Freud combines a semiotic and closed systems approach.

There are several other comments that can be made, both specific and general. It was noted in Section 1.4 that the approach taken in the semiotic analysis of Freud's theory would differ from Lacan's. One advantage of this is that the epistemological bias inherent in the structuralist approach has been bypassed. An essential tool in structural analysis is Jakobson's notion of 'binary oppositions' (see Section 5.1), but the danger here is that what was originally an heuristic device can be transformed into an ontological category (cf. Wilden, 1972, pp.414 and 421). Of particular interest here is the fact that all semiotic systems are regarded by structuralists as "structured by means of oppositions" (Eco, 1973, p.70). Thus Lacan's structural analysis of the unconscious must contradict at least some aspects of the analogue nature of processes that are held to take place there.

In view of the low esteem with which Freudian theory is generally
It is all the more surprising, then, when an 'orthodox' semiotic approach to psychotherapy contains the statement that "psychotherapy is undoubtedly concerned with the correct and the corrective digitalization of the analogic" (Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967, p.100), yet the fundamental implications as to the nature of man and of his relationships to the world are never completely stated. At any rate, it seems clear that instead of providing an alternative to Freud, the semiotic approach actually helps to clarify the basis for Freud's fundamental achievements, and in emphasising the centrality of the analogue/digital dimension, Freud points the way to a truly comprehensive theory of psychotherapy that has yet to emerge. In this progress, Rogers plays a significant role by substituting open systems for Freud's closed system approach. But this too remains a clarification of the basis for Freud, for the essence of the human condition lies in the dialogue between analogue and digital processes, and this is an area where Freud reigns supreme.

What the semiotic approach indicates above all is that traditional
approaches to psychotherapy, particularly the Freudian, should not be summarily discarded, for there is much that is still highly relevant today. In doing so, it also indicates the nature of the fundamental dimension that forms the basis for a new 'science' of man. If, as Angyal said long ago, "psychiatry is the application of a science that doesn't exist" (1941, p.5), then semiotics, with the aid of a systems theoretic framework, may begin to provide such a 'science'.

In general, the works of authors referred to in the main body of this essay are identified by the dates of publication of the actual editions consulted. The only exceptions are the writings of Freud, which are identified by their original dates of publication; the actual editions consulted are included in parentheses.


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