XU GAN'S CONCEPT OF THE NAME AND ACTUALITY RELATIONSHIP AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

JOHN T. MAKEHAM

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian National University
This thesis is wholly my own original work

[Signature]

Joel Makar
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INTRODUCTION

I first began research on the late Eastern Han (25-220 AD) philosopher Xu Gan 徐斡 (170-217) in 1983. The initial result of this work was an annotated translation of his Zhong lun 中論, Discourse That Hits the Mark.\(^1\) Zhong lun is a collection of essays that are predominantly concerned with philosophical questions. As a whole, the text can be best described as an enquiry into the causes of political and social breakdown and the presentation of various ethical and political remedies. Much of Xu Gan’s argumentation appeals to the authority of traditional Confucian ethics; indeed the work is classified under ru jia 儒家 in all bibliographical lists of the standard histories, except for that of Song shi 宋史, where it is listed among miscellaneous writers. Even though in some of the twenty-two pian 篇 that comprise Zhong lun a range of influences may be discerned that derive from non-Confucian sources, for a Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) writing it is remarkably free of the overt eclecticism that characterizes many writings of that period. And, like Xun Yue’s 荀悦 (148-209) Shen Jian 申堅, which also dates from the end of the Eastern Han period, Xu Gan’s Zhong lun evidences a creative and polemical Confucian spirit that was continued in such

\(^2\) For bibliographical details and history of the Zhong lun text, see Appendix A.
post-Han writings as Wang Su’s 王肅 (195-256) Kong Cong 孔叢 and Fu Xuan’s 傅玄 (217-278) Fu Zi 傅子. 3

The most important concept employed in Zhong lun is the 'name and actuality' (ming shi) dichotomy and my purpose in this thesis is to elucidate Xu Gan’s concept of the name and actuality relationship and its philosophical and social background. Xu Gan saw the name and actuality relationship to be of fundamental importance because he believed that the correspondence between name and actuality ultimately affected the harmonious integration of the realm of man with the rest of the cosmos of which man was a part. For Xu Gan the bond between name and actuality was not something to be prescribed by convention or artificially determined by man because, just like the flowering of plants in spring or the regular cycle of the four seasons, it is part of the cosmic order. And if that bond is broken or artificially prescribed, the repercussions were seen to affect not only socio-political order, but even the moral order, leading Xu Gan to address questions such as whether the practice of moral conduct was of any practical worth, and what bearing humane behaviour had on a man’s longevity.

My purpose in presenting the philosophical and social background is to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Xu Gan’s concept of the name and actuality relationship.

3 For studies of these three works, see Chen Chi-yun, Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, Yoav Ariel, K’ung-Ts’ung-Tzu: The K’ung Family Masters’ Anthology, and Jordan D. Paper, The Fu Tzu: A Post-Han Confucian Text.
actuality relationship, by seeing it in relief against the backdrop of a tradition of ming shi discourse, and also to determine what were the more immediate influences that prompted Xu Gan to discuss the name and actuality relationship. As Maurice Mandlebaum writes:

It is only when we view philosophic thought both in terms of its own tradition, and in terms of influences focussed upon it because of the circumstances of the philosopher's life and times, that we can see a particular philosopher's work in proper perspective: as a distinctive philosophic achievement which also belongs within the general intellectual history of the period.4

The thesis is comprised of eight chapters divided into four parts:

Part I: Chapter 1.
Part II: Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Part III: Chapters 6 and 7.
Part IV: Chapter 8.

Each part broadly addresses a particular question: 'What was Xu Gan's concept of the ming shi relationship?', 'How does it relate to earlier views of ming shi?', 'What background social and intellectual factors prompted Xu Gan to discuss the ming shi relationship?' and 'What bearing did his concept of the ming shi relationship have on other thinking in Zhong lun?'

Part I - In this first part, comprising only one but the longest chapter of the thesis, I develop my interpretation of Xu Gan's concept of the proper relationship that should obtain between name and

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actuality. I stress that it is my interpretation because in writing Zhong lun it was certainly not Xu Gan's intention to set forth a systematic account of the body of beliefs and premisses that informed his concept of the name and actuality relationship. Thus, insofar as my interpretation is a reconstruction of beliefs and premisses which all too often lie only partially revealed in the various essays that comprise Zhong lun, of necessity it is hypothetical. (It is, of course, this very reconstruction that makes the whole enterprise a challenge.)

In Chapter 1, I argue that Xu Gan understood shì to mean 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is'. To distinguish this sense of shì from its other sense as 'particular object', I translate it as 'actuality'. I also argue that, as a corollary to this view, Xu Gan subscribed to a correlative theory of naming. By a correlative theory of naming I mean the view that there is a proper or correct correlation between a given name and a given actuality, determined, variously, by what has been ordained by 'Heaven' (tiān 天) or by what is naturally so/so of itself' (zì rán 自然). A correlative theory of naming is to be distinguished from a nominalist theory of naming, the latter being the view that it is man who arbitrarily or conventionally determines which ming should be applied to which shì; there is no proper or correct correlation between a given ming and a given shì other than what has been
I then proceed to show that for Xu Gan, the proper relationship between names and actualities is one where there is accord between them such that names faithfully represent actualities and actualities give names their meaning and significance. When name and actuality are in accord they form a whole where each partner relies on the other such that without names, actualities would not be manifest and without actualities, there would be nothing to be manifest as names. I argue that the conceptual model which best represents this relationship is the substance-function (ti yong) polarity. In the final section of this chapter, I examine the Potency (de) -reputation relationship, the single most important name and actuality relationship discussed by Xu Gan in Zhong lun.

Part II - This is a group of background studies of the ming shi dichotomy in the classical period of Chinese philosophy - approximately 500 BC to 150 BC. During the classical period, discussion of ming and shi was common to all the major schools of thought: the Confucians, the Legalists, the School of Names, the Daoists, and the Mohists. Nevertheless, given that my purpose is not to write a proper history of the ming shi dichotomy - a huge topic warranting a study in its own right - of necessity I have had to be selective in choosing which thinkers and which writings are most germane to my twofold purpose of: i. providing a philosophical backdrop against which my interpretation of Xu Gan’s concept of name and actuality is given depth and perspective, thereby enhancing its
definition; ii. determining the extent to which Xu Gan's concept of the name and actuality relationship is original or derivative. To some extent, the task of selection has been made easier because the only School of Names writing dealing specifically with the subject of ming and shi is no longer extant - the essay entitled "Ming shi" in the received Gongsun Long Zi was forged sometime between 300 and 600 AD. And despite Sima Tan's (d. 110 BC) praise of this school for "correcting the relationship between names and objects", School of Names writings are characterized by an extreme nominalism where ad hoc and circumscribed senses of words (ming), paradoxes and specious logic are used for the purposes of entertainment and winning in disputation. For School of Names philosophers, it is ming, not shi, that are important; whether or not a name does in fact correspond with some object or state of affairs was not a primary consideration. Daoist writings present an even more extremist nominalism: the distinctions represented by ming are held to be determined on the basis of nothing more than arbitrary, subjective, relative and conventional standards.

Worse than this, ming

6 Shi ji, 130.3289. Presumably he means that the subtle semantic distinctions employed by School of Names thinkers in disputation forced their opponents to take more care in defining their terms. It is also possible that in making these comments, Sima Tan specifically had in mind Gongsun Long's "Ming shi" essay.
7 See, for example, my discussion of the 'hard and white' sophism in, "The Chien-pai Sophism - Alive and Well", Philosophy East and West, 39.1 (January, 1989), 75-81.
actually perpetuate false dichotomies by creating the illusion that distinctions exist. Because the focus of these views on ming is extremist, in Part II I have chosen to examine the writings of thinkers, both nominalist and , whose views provide more insight into the notion of a name and actuality relationship.

Chapter 2 is an interpretation of Confucius' zheng ming or correction of names programme, the seminal statement in early Chinese thought of the socio-political role that ming are perceived to play. Confucius' zheng ming programme is also the earliest example of a nominal prescriptivist philosophy in classical Chinese thought. I define nominal prescriptivism as the view that ming can and should be used to prescribe shi. Although Confucius does not employ the word shi in those passages that best exemplify his zheng ming thinking, it is evident that he did believe that ming did (or should) represent what later writers used the word shi to refer to: entities and states of affairs. His concern with the normative and prescriptive function of ming was to be reiterated and refined in a number of later writings on ming and shi.

Chapter 3 is a study of ming and shi in the Neo Mohist summa and the Xun Zi essay, "On the Correct Use of Names" ("Zheng ming" ). I argue that the word shi in these writings is to be understood as 'particular object' and to distinguish it from its other meaning of 'actuality' I translate it as 'object'. I also argue that

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8 This is particularly so in Zhuang Zi's (second half fourth-early third century BC) writings. See Appendix B.
these writings advance the view that ming could and should be used to prescribe shi, and that in each case this view is premised on a nominalist theory of naming. The nominalist theories of naming that are found in these writings stand out as being the most fully developed in classical Chinese thought.

Chapter 4 is a study of the Legalist administrative formula of 'matching word and deed' (xing ming 刑名). I argue that xing ming is a unique application, rich in nuance, of the ming shi dichotomy to Legalist philosophy of statecraft. While xing ming is a further example of nominal prescriptivist thinking, its particular relevance to Xu Gan's thought is Han Fei's 韓非 (d. 233 BC) presentation of xing and ming in a substance-function relationship. In discussions of ming shi before Han Fei there is no evidence to suggest that ming and shi are amenable to a substance-function interpretation.

Chapter 5 is a study of what I identify to be the earliest examples of essentialist theories of naming in early Chinese thought. The main writings studied are the "Xin shu shang" 心術上, "Xin shu xia" 心術下 and "Bai xin" 百心 pian of Guan Zi 管子, and the "Shen cha ming hao" 深察名 horrifying pian of Dong Zhongshu's 董仲舒 (c.179-c. 104) Chun qiu fan lu 春秋繁露. I argue that in these writings, for the first time we find the word shi being used to mean 'that by virtue of which an entity is what it is' and that Xu Gan's theory of naming and his concept of shi share a great deal in common with the ideas adumbrated in these writings.
Part III - The purpose of Part III is to establish that, in particular, two aspects of Eastern Han society can be seen to have influenced Xu Gan's belief that when the conditions for accord between names and actualities do not prevail, the bond between names and actualities becomes dislocated, leaving actualities unable to be properly expressed and names being used to represent actualities which did not exist. Xu Gan sees this changed name-actuality relationship as a fundamental-peripheral (ben mo) relationship.

Chapter 6 is a study of the bearing that the unbridled pursuit of reputation in Eastern Han society had on Xu Gan's understanding of what happens to the name and actuality relationship when name and actuality are seen to be in disaccord. I show how ming jiao encouraged men to pursue personal reputation so that they might secure office. The result of this was that the scholar gentry (shi) class came to attach undue importance to ming and less and less importance to shi.

Chapter 7 is a study of the bearing of Eastern Han classical scholarship on Xu Gan's understanding of what happens to the name and actuality relationship when name and actuality are seen to be in disaccord. I begin by describing the methodological characteristics of the two rival schools of classical scholarship in the Eastern Han: the Old Text School and the New Text School and then proceed to investigate Xu Gan's objections to that methodology. I argue that classical scholarship in the Eastern Han was concerned more with the written word and
glossing than it was with the elucidation of the teachings of the classical texts and, as with ming jiao, this development can be seen to have influenced Xu Gan's view that when the conditions for the proper relationship between name and actuality no longer prevail, name and actuality fall into a fundamental-peripheral relationship.

Part IV - In Chapter 8, I examine what for Xu Gan were the cosmological-cum-ethical implications of name and actuality being in accord and disaccord. The rationale for dealing with this topic last of all is that it builds on an understanding of accord and disaccord developed in Parts I and III. Xu Gan's position on two major contemporary philosophical questions are examined: i. the relationship between a man's practice of humaneness and the length of his life; and ii. the relationship between a man's moral nature and his innate ability.
PART I
Chapter 1

XU GAN'S APPROPRIATION OF THE NAME AND ACTUALITY
POLARITY

Xu Gan, cognomen Wei chang 傳長, lived at a nodal point in the history of Chinese thought, when Han scholasticism had become ossified, and the creative and independent thought that was to characterize Wei-Jin thought was just emerging. His approach to scholarship and philosophy anticipated some important features of the Wei-Jin intellectual renaissance. He was born in Ju Prefecture,¹ Beihai 北海 Kingdom in 170.² We know little about the details of Xu Gan's life and even less about his family background. From the unsigned Preface to Zhong lun we learn that he had a forebear by the name of Xu Ye 徐業 who had lived ten generations before Xu Gan. There is a good possibility that this is the same Xu Ye recorded in Hou Han shu 後漢書 who had held the post of western sustainer (you fu feng 佑扶風),³ and who had been a major Confucian scholar during the early period of Guangwu's (r. 25-57) reign. The Preface also states that for the past ten generations the Xu family had enjoyed a reputation for being virtuous and upright.⁴ Brief notes

¹ This is now part of Changle 崂琴 County in Shandong.
² In the unsigned Preface to Zhong lun, 4a, it is recorded that Xu Gan died in 218 at the age of 48. This, however, is in conflict with San Guo zhi, 21.602, 608, and Cao Pi's (187-226) letter to Wu Zhi 吳質 (177-230), Wen xuan, 42.5b, which record that he died in 217. Given that the great pestilence which killed so many people was in 217, I think the latter account is more probable.
³ This was one of the three adjuncts who administered the metropolitan area of the capital. See Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, 18, 32.
⁴ See Hou Han shu, 79b.2581. The reference to ten generations in the Preface corresponds with the Hou Han shu reference to 'early jian wu 建武 period' (6-55 AD).
in *San Guo zhi* and its commentary state that Xu Gan was appointed, but never served, as magistrate (zhang) of Shang'ai County, probably after taking part in Cao Cao's campaigns. He also held positions on the staff of the minister of works (si kong) some time between 197 and 208, and as literary advisor to the general of the gentlemen of the household for all purposes (wu guan jiang) after Cao Pi's appointment to that position in 211. As one of the 'seven masters of the jian an period' he was most renowned for his composition of poetry (fu) and discourses (lun).

Xu Gan lived his adult years in the prolonged period of internecine warfare following the coup d'etat of 189 AD which marked the demise of the Han order, in actuality if not in name, and the beginning of four hundred years of political division. The factors contributing to this demise had been written about by critics over most of the Eastern Han dynasty; and to the extent that *Zhong lun* may be described as a philosophical enquiry into the causes of political and social breakdown, it is part of the same critical tradition as Huan Tan's Xin lun, Wang Chong's Lun heng, Wang Fu's Qian fu lun, Cui Shi's Zheng lun, and Zhongchang Tong's Chang yan.

At different points in the dynasty's two hundred year history, various combinations of political, social, economic and military factors contributed to this
breakdown. Nevertheless there are certain ideological factors that can be seen to have contributed to this breakdown right from the very beginning of the dynasty. Chi-yun Chen, for example, argues cogently that the failure of Wang Mang's (r. 9 - 25 AD) reformist Confucianism led to considerable doubt being cast "on the cluster of Confucian ideas about the Sage-ruler, the Mandate of Heaven, the Age of Universal Peace and Equality, and the unity of the socio-political, moral and cosmic orders", which in turn fostered developments such as the rise of Old Text School Confucianism, a revival of interest in Legalist methods of statecraft, a renewed interest in man's "inner" realm, and a growth of new criteria for judging a man's moral worth. With these developments, scholar-gentry (shi) in the Eastern Han increasingly came to attach importance to private and partisan interests. In politics, this is evidenced by factionalism, localism and the growth of powerful families; in scholarship, by the proliferation of schools of interpretation that became identified either with the

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6 For an outline of these factors, see Rafe de Crespigny, Man From the Margin: Cao Cao and the Three Kingdoms, 8-18.
7 Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, 25.
8 See also Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, 14-33, and Hsün Yüeh (AD 148-209): The Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian, 10-18, for more detailed discussion of this thesis.
9 Shi, also variously translated as 'scholars', 'gentry', 'aristocrats', 'cultured gentleman', 'upper class', can perhaps be best characterized in the Eastern Han as the intellectual and social elite. For detailed discussions of the term in the Han dynasty, see T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 101-107; Yu Yingshi, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shi lun, 109-165, 205-275, passim in particular; Patricia Ebrey, "The Economic and Social History of Later Han" in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 1: Ch'in and Han Empires, 221 BC - AD 220, 630-632.
orthodox New Text School or the rival Old Text School; in the realm of personal conduct, by the unprecedented pursuit of reputation; even in poetry, we find this trend reflected. 10

Reflecting on how private and partisan interests had contributed to the disintegration of the Han order Xu Gan writes:

The dynasty had crumbled! Above there was no enlightened emperor and below no worthy feudal lords. Rulers did not distinguish between what is the case and what is not, and subordinates did not differentiate between black and white. Gentlemen 11 were not selected by the village communities for recommendation, and examination of a man’s conduct was not based on his achievements and experience. 12 Those with many supporters became the ‘worthy and talented’, while those with few supporters became the ‘good-for-nothings’. 13


11 The term shi here refers to the cultured gentlemen who comprised the social elite or leading families at the village level. They were also part of a larger, national class of shi that was hierarchically divided according to the level at which the shi was engaged as an official. Thus Huan Tan 璜談 (43 BC - 28 AD) divides the shi into five grades: those at the village level, those at the prefectural level, those at the provincial and commandery level, those at the capital, and those whose actions affected the whole country (presumably the three excellencies). Yi lin, 3.10a-10b; Timoteus Pokora, Hsin-lun (New Treatise) and Other Writings by Huan T’an (43 B.C. - 28 A.D.), 15-16.

12 While sometimes fa yue 家族 is used to mean ‘powerful and distinguished families’, here the term means ‘achievements and experience.’ On this usage of the term, see Ōba Osamu, "Kan dai ni okeru kōji ni yoru shōshin ni tsuite", Tōyōshi kenkyū, 2.3 (1953), 14-28.

13 cf. the following comments by Ge Hong, in Bao Pu Zi, 20.1a:

At the end of the Han, during the time of Emperors Ling and Xian, the critical selection of men of quality had become perverted and indiscriminate. Outstanding and refined men were frustrated, while the avaricious secured official positions.
allotment of titles was based on what is heard in unsubstantiated talk and the bestowal of emoluments was based on rumours from various parts of the country. When people saw that this is how things were done they became aware that wealth and position could be brought about by doing as the majority do, and that reputation was obtainable by deceit. Thereupon such people left their fathers and brothers, departed their villages, ceased cultivating the Arts of the Way and no longer practised virtuous behaviour. They discussed fashionable issues and formed intimate cliques. Frantic and frenzied, never stopping even for a day, they took it in turns to sing each other's praises, one reciprocating the other.

There were countless numbers of those who, like a piece of tao wū 桃杌 wood, blossomed into flower, or who presented themselves as emaciated and sickly commoners in order to deceive the ruler or confuse the ministers of state, or who usurped places [rightfully belonging to others] in the recommendation system, or who stole honour and favour. Those who succeeded regarded themselves as men of worth and so onwards they went. Those envious of them hastened one another on in pursuit. Everywhere it was the same - who could not avoid following suit?

During the reigns of Huan and Ling this was particularly so. At the level of the three excellencies, grandees, provincial governors and commandery administrators, none gave their attention to state affairs, devoting themselves instead to their retainers. Officials thronged at the

Names did not accord with actualities nor was value based on worth. Those who were successful became the worthies, while those who were blocked became the fools.

14 The Six Arts are Ritual, Music, Archery, Charioteering, Calligraphy, and Arithmetic.
15 An unpleasant type of wood; also used as a metaphor for men of lowly character in Bao Pu Zi, 15.2a.
16 Presumably Xu is here referring to those who deliberately emaciated themselves to gain a reputation as being filially pious. Examples of this perverse behaviour are discussed in Chapter 6.
17 On the status of retainers, bin ke 賓客, see Patricia Ebrey, "Patron-Client Relations in the Later Han", 
gates [of other officials] and blocked the roads [travelling to see other scholars and officials]. They had no time to eat when hungry and no chance to rest when tired. Their swirling multitudes turned night into day. At the level of minor officials, town after town of prefects and chiefs all praised one another for having obtained the right men and boasted of themselves so as to enlist the service of talented gentlemen of lower rank.

For Xu Gan, the unbridled pursuit of personal reputation was the single most important factor that had led to this situation. A man's reputation should properly correspond with his actual worth, the former being a mark and representation of the latter. In the Eastern Han, however, and particularly so in the second century, an ethos had evolved among the shi class which gave unprecedented status to the attainment of reputation, such that "the fame-seeker could earn himself a reputation (ming) without necessarily securing an actual achievement (shi)", thereby rupturing the bond or

18 cf. Ge Hong's account of Guo Tai (128-169), Bao Pu Zi, 46.2a; Jay Sailey, The Master Who Embraces Simplicity, A Study of the Philosopher Ko Hung, A.D. 283-343, 228:

Kuo permitted his reputation to become very great.... The lanes in front of his house were filled with the ruts of vermilion carriages [of officials]. In the halls were waiting rows of guests in red sashes (i.e. officials). Imperial carriages for summoning officials filled the streets [around his house], and carts followed one another bearing memorials to the emperor [recommending Kuo be given a high office].

19 Prefects had a salary in excess of 10,000 shi, while chiefs had a salary of less than 10,000 shi. On these two ranks, see Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, 100.
20 Zhong lun, B.10a-11a.
21 B.2b.
that should obtain between names and actualities. This excessive emphasis on reputation led to men acquiring quite undeserved reputations, thus making a mockery of the notion that a man's reputation matched his actual worth.

Another related area where names were no longer perceived to match actualities was Han classical scholarship. Thus, in "Mastering Learning" ocreve, Xu Gan laments that the "debased literati" preferred to devote themselves to matters of glossing and nomenclature (ming wu Ⅳ₄) at the expense of the fundamental import or 'essential meaning' (da yi Ⅳ₃) of the sage kings' teachings which Xu Gan considered to be the 'actuality' of the Confucian canon and that which gave the written word its meaning.

In the foregoing I have identified two of the more immediate social and intellectual issues of later Han times that inform Xu Gan's discussion of the name and actuality relationship. In Chapters 6 and 7 I will discuss these background issues in considerably greater detail. My main purpose in introducing them at this stage is to make it clear from the outset that Xu Gan's discussion of ming shi was most immediately and recognizably a response to the peculiar social and intellectual problems that he saw as having contributed to the collapse of the Han order. In part, it is for this reason that his discussions of ming shi differ significantly to that of earlier thinkers. This does not,
however, mean that his discussions are of limited philosophical interest, as I shall proceed to show.

i. Xu Gan's Concept of Actuality

One of the most important premisses upon which Xu Gan formulated his concept of accord or correlation between name and actuality is that names are a reflection or representation of actualities and not vice versa. This in itself is perhaps not so remarkable until one appreciates that Xu Gan seems to have been the first early Chinese thinker to have made this premise a lynchpin in his discussion of the name-actuality relationship:23

23 Zhuang Zi had certainly already proposed that 'names are the guest of actualities' (ming zhe shi zhi bin ye but this view is given philosophical amplification elsewhere in Zhuang Zi. The view that 'names are the guest of actualities' is presented as being Xu You's reply to Yao after Yao had offered to cede the empire to him:

As emperor you have worked at keeping the world in good order and now it is already in good order. If I was still to take your place, would it be for the sake of the name? Yet names are the guest of actualities. Would it be then that I would be doing it for the sake of the actuality? (Zhuang Zi, pian 1, 24.)

In this passage ming refers to the 'name' or 'title' that would be afforded the man who had prompted Yao to cede his throne to him, Yao presumably motivated by the belief that such a person possessed the qualities necessary to put the world in good order. Shi refers to the actual qualities possessed by the person capable of putting the world in good order - the emperor. Xu You is implying that if he did accede to the throne, it would be tantamount to usurpation of the title 'emperor' because good order had already been achieved by Yao. What more could a nameless recluse add? "Names are the guest of actualities", expresses the view that names are dependent on actualities. If a given actuality did not exist then the name corresponding to that actuality should not be used.
A name is that which is used to name an actuality. When an actuality has been established, its name follows after it; it is not the case that a name is established and then its actuality follows after it. Thus if a long shape is established then it will be named 'long' and if a short shape is established then it will be named 'short'. It is not the case that the names 'long' and 'short' are first established and then the long and short shapes follow after them.24

The obvious point that Xu Gan is making is that names are (or should be) dependent on actualities. The philosophical basis for this view is his concept of 'actuality' which I understand to be 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is'. In order to distinguish this use of *shi* from its common pre-Qin sense as 'particular object', I translate it as 'actuality'. Thus, in the above passage, *shi* should not be taken to mean some particular 'long shape' (*chang xing* 長形) but rather that by virtue of which a long shape is 'long'. The shape or form of an object serves to manifest the object's actuality, which, in this case, is its being 'long'. This understanding is based on an implicit conceptual distinction being made between an entity (wu) and its actuality. I stress that the distinction is conceptual rather than real because Xu Gan did not conceive of actualities existing independent of objects nor as substrata in which various qualities inhere. Rather, an object and its actuality are one; the object is the vessel in and through which its inherent actuality becomes manifest.

24 B.5a.
This understanding of shi is clearly related to its primary meaning of 'inner substantiality'. The shi graph is composed of a roof with goods below.\textsuperscript{25} The primary meaning of this 'full house' image is being 'full of', 'filled with', 'inner substantiality'.\textsuperscript{26} This meaning is also implicit in the word \textit{fu}, 'rich', 'wealth', which Xu Shen uses to gloss shi. He in turn glosses \textit{fu} as \textit{bei}, 'to be provided/endowed with'.\textsuperscript{27} This meaning is again evident in the case of the word \textit{ri}, 'sun', which Xu Shen glosses as shi, 'being filled in', as opposed to \textit{yue}, 'moon', which he glosses as que, 'lacking', 'diminished'.\textsuperscript{28} He also uses shi to gloss the word shi, 'room', conveying the idea that a room is that which is filled.\textsuperscript{29} The term \textit{ding shi}, which means 'the contents of a cauldron', is also a concrete employment of this meaning.\textsuperscript{30}

From this primary meaning arose the extended meanings of 'replete', 'complete', 'solidness', 'substantiality', 'filled out'. These meanings share the common sense of 'substantial manifestation'. Shī, meaning 'fruit', is derived from this sense of substantial manifestation. As we shall see in Part II, it is this extended sense of shi that is the basis for shi meaning 'particular object'.

\textsuperscript{25} See Xu Shen's gloss in \textit{Shuo wen jie zi}, 7B.4 (p.150).
\textsuperscript{26} On this interpretation, see also Kasahara Chūji, "Saden ni arawareta jitsu ji no kenkyū", \textit{Ritsumeikan bungaku}, 157. 6 (1958), 8; Chūgokujin no shizenkan to \textit{bijishiki}, 106.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Shuo wen jie zi}, 7A.4b (p. 150).
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Shuo wen jie zi}, 7A.1a (p. 137); 8b (p. 141).
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Shuo wen jie zi}, 7B.3a (p. 150).
\textsuperscript{30} See \textit{Changes}, \textit{Ding} hexagram, Line 2 and Line Text Commentary; Shirakawa Shizuka, \textit{Jitō}, 390.
The sense of 'that which is inherent in the primary meaning of shi is in fact already evident in pre-Han literature where shi is used synonymously with qing 情, 'the genuine', when contrasted with xing 形, 'external shape' or mao 貌, 'visible features' or wei 備, 'false', 'artificial'. Graham describes qing as a very close approximation of Aristotelian 'essence' in contexts where it is translatable as 'what X genuinely is'. In a revised version of his 1967 paper, however, Graham qualifies this by saying, "The ch'ing of X is what X cannot lack if it is to be called 'X'; the difference from Aristotelian essence is that it relates to naming, not being."

My interpretation of Xu Gan's concept of shi as 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is', is an interpretation that is borne out most fully in the following passage:

33 Included in his Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, 63.
This view of the relationship between names and actualities is what I term a correlative theory of naming. As I will show in greater detail in Part II, a number of correlative theories of naming were already current in the Western Han. I define a correlative theory of naming as the view that there is a proper or correct correlation between a given name and a given actuality, determined, variously, by what has been ordained by 'Heaven' (tian) or by what is 'naturally so/so of itself' (zi ran) (as is the case with Xu Gan), and a nominalist theory of naming as the view that it is man who arbitrarily or conventionally determines which ming should be applied to which shi. The nominalist position takes for granted what is known as Nominalism in Western Philosophy: that all things that exist are particular entities. In both China and the West, nominalist theories of naming maintain that objects which are like each other are referred to by the same name. The correlative position differs to that of the nominalist in that it draws a conceptual distinction between entities and actualities. Chinese correlative theories of naming, in turn, differ fundamentally to representative essentialist philosophies of the Western tradition in that they are not Realist because they do not regard actualities as universals. Thus whereas classical Western Realist theories of naming hold that a variety of objects can all be given the name 'long' because they partake of the universal 'longness' or because the universal 'longness' exists in those particulars, a Chinese correlative theory of naming postulates nothing more than that each long entity is long by virtue of its actuality and that it is by virtue of the bond this actuality has with the word 'long' that it is called 'long'.
Names are bonded to actualities just as plants are bonded to the seasons. In spring, plants blossom into flower, in summer, they are covered in leaves, in autumn their foliage withers and falls, and in winter they produce seeds. This is 'uncaused becoming-whole-by-itself (wu wei er zi cheng zhe 無為而自成者)'. If a plant is forced, its natural tendency (xing 公) will be harmed. It is the same with names. Because of this, false names are all those names which will harm the actualities to which they are applied.35

The analogy employed in this passage can, and I believe should, be understood on two levels. At the first level, the focus is on different actualities having different names, while at the second level, the focus is on a single actuality and its corresponding name. At the first level, Xu Gan is saying that when the appropriate conditions are in place, names will come into being just as spontaneously as plants blossom, grow leaves, wither or bear seeds. And just as a plant’s bearing of seeds or shedding of leaves is the 'embodiment' or manifest expression of a particular season, so too are names the manifest expression of their corresponding actualities. Thus, just like the seasons, when an entity’s actuality changes, then, because of the bond between name and actuality, its corresponding name will also change.36

The role of xing ('spontaneous tendency of an organism throughout its lifespan') in the above passage is particularly relevant to our understanding of Xu Gan's concept of shi. In their discussion of xing, Hall and Ames challenge the notion that xing is "an inborn nature, a predetermined potential that is actualized and

35 B.5b.
36 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 16.
completed", arguing instead that it is better understood as a "process in which nature is necessarily and irreducibly 'nature-in-context.' That is, a discussion of 'individual nature' that seeks to separate 'thing' from 'environment' is an abstraction." On the first level of meaning, the above passage supports this interpretation, where the 'context' of a plant is the particular season in which it is growing, and its xing is its natural tendency to blossom in one season and shed leaves in another. Analogously, the 'natural tendency' of a name is to represent the 'context' of which it should be an inextricable part and from which it draws its meaning, that 'context' being its actuality.

At the heart of the second level of meaning is the notion of 'becoming whole'. On this more 'organismic' interpretation, the four stages, of flowering, growth of leaves, withering of leaves and flowers, and the bearing

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37 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 219. See also Ames' more recent and fuller discussion in his article, "The Mencian Conception of Ren xing人懲: Does it Mean Human Nature?", in Henry Rosemont, ed., Jr., Chinese Texts and Their Philosophical Contexts, 143-175.

38 If xing can be understood in the sense of 'inborn nature' (as it seems to have been in a number of Han and post-Han writings), this understanding would not necessarily be incompatible with the view that xing is also concerned with an entity's spontaneous tendency or development. Certainly the following Zhong lun passage (A.9a-9b) reflects an 'inborn nature' understanding of xing:

Pearls contain tiny impurities and jade harbours flaws. This is their nature. A good craftsman works on them to purify their natures, making them unadulterated.

This 'inborn nature' view is also compatible with the notion of de xing 得性, 'moral nature', discussed in Chapter 8.
of seeds, are clearly all part of the unfolding of a spontaneous process that expresses its mature development in 'fruition'. Xu Gan's use of the word cheng, 'to become whole', further supports this interpretation. An actuality, accordingly, is that which, through a process of maturation, has become whole. In Xu Gan's analogy, that actuality is the consummation of the organic process undergone by the four seasons over a year. And, just as names manifest actualities, so too does the mature plant manifest the consummation of that process.

The concept of cheng may be thought to introduce the notion of a development towards a pre-determined end or goal, particularly in the light of the plant metaphor. Ames has recently been reported as criticising the appropriateness of the organismic metaphor as a characterization of Chinese philosophy on the grounds that it:

1) entails a sense of wholeness that is typical of many Western cosmogenic traditions but which is absent in the self-generative cosmologies of pre-Qin China,
2) imparts a potentiality/actuality distinction that obviates the sui generis character and unduly restricts the creativity of the particular, and, most importantly, (3) conjures up images of Aristotelian teleology and the notion of a steady and progressive advance toward a predetermined perfection.39

Yet, as Graham writes in commenting on Hall and Ames' related thesis that "in the Chinese cosmos all things are

interdependent, without transcendent\(^{40}\) principles by which to explain them or a transcendent origin from which they derive", the concept of cheng (which Graham defines as the 'completion' of a thing’s development) is to be understood as "the interdependent becoming integral rather than the realization of an end." The seasons and the plant, and name and actuality, may be seen to be two such interdependent pairs.\(^{41}\)

Xu Gan sees names being bonded to actualities such that only the name appropriate to a given actuality should be employed. According to this type of thinking, a particular name is appropriate to an entity as a function of that name being a genuine expression of the actuality inherent in that entity. The reason that name \(Y\) correlates to actuality \(Y\) is because without actuality \(Y\), name \(Y\) would not be meaningful. Thus, of the Six Arts, Xu Gan writes:

Hence being respectful, sincere, well-disciplined and yielding are the essence (qing) of the Arts, and centrality, harmony, balance and uprightness are its actuality (shi). A mere sufficiency of reverence and alertness is but an embellishment (hua \(\frac{3}{4}\)) to the Arts and an awesome countenance at all times is but an adornment (shi \(\frac{3}{8}\) ) to the Arts.\(^{42}\)

This example also serves to show that an actuality was not necessarily a simple, but could also be a composite of qualities. Nor does Xu Gan maintain the principle of 'one name, one actuality'; rather he accepts that some

\(^{40}\) Understood in the sense that you can have A without B, but not B without A.

\(^{41}\) See Graham, "Relections and Replies", in Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed., Chinese Texts and Their Philosophical Contexts, 288.

\(^{42}\) A.24a-24b.
different actualities can have the same name just as some different names can have the same actuality:

There are cases when the name is the same but the actuality is different, and there are cases when the name is different but the actuality is the same.\(^4\)

If, however, a false name is used to refer to some actuality, it will harm that actuality by stifling its proper expression, just as lengthening a duck's legs with stilts or trimming a crane's legs will harm their respective xing.\(^4\)

Implicit in the term 'false names' (wei cheng zhi ming 偽成之名 or wei ming 偽名)\(^4\) is the sense of 'artificial', 'man-made', as opposed to those names that are 'real' because they are an expression of the 'actual' (shi). Only real names are able to have a genuine correlation with actualities and only real names are the fruit of 'uncaused becoming-whole-by-itself'. Is one then to infer that Xu Gan assumed a correlative theory of naming?

\[\text{ii. A Correlative Theory of Naming}\]

By the Han dynasty Confucian thought had incorporated many ideas and concepts which had been derived eclectically from Daoist, Legalist, and Yin Yang centred philosophies. One of the influences that this borrowing had was to broaden and enrichen the cosmological basis of Han Confucian thought. Changes in

\(^4\) B.7b.  
\(^4\) For this story, see Zhuang Zi, pian 8, 317.  
\(^4\) B.1a.
the cosmological component of Han Confucian thought are reflected in Han thought about language. Whereas a central tenet of pre-Han Confucian thought about language is that it is man who arbitrarily determines the names of things, by Han times a prevailing view came to be that names are not arbitrarily determined by man; rather, to borrow Miller's words, "every word, or name, was the word or name it was, for a reason: and that reason was a reflection of the cosmic order".46 This 'cosmic order' was seen to be reflected in a special correlation that was held to obtain between names and actualities. Thus Liu Xi (fl. 200), a contemporary of Xu Gan, writes in his Preface to Shi ming:

In the correlation between name and actuality, there is in each instance, that which is right and proper.47

Liu Xi's sound glosses, in fact, abound with examples of paronomastic glossing.48 These glosses take the form of etymological puns based principally on the homophonic proximity of two or more words. In these popular etymologies, which are by no means unique to China, "the meaning of a particular word is disclosed by the perception of its likeness to another word or of its identity with that word, whereby its function as a name

47 Shi ming, Preface, 1a; slight modification of Roy Andrew Miller's translation. See his "Review of Nicholas Cleveland Bodman, A Linguistic Study of the Shih Ming" T'oung Pao, 44 (1956), 281.
48 See also Coblin, A Handbook of Eastern Han Sound Glosses, Chapter 2, passim, for analysis of examples from Shi ming. Chun qiu fan lu, Shuo wen jie zi, Bo hu tong, and Zheng Xuan's commentaries are also good sources for paronomastic glossing.
is revealed."⁴⁹ Dong Zhongshu’s *Chun qiu fan lu* provides a good example of this:

If we make a thoroughgoing examination of the overall meaning of the appellation ‘king’ (*gì wang/wang* ¹⁰⁴), we find that it may be divided into five divisions: the august (*gì wàng/huang* ¹⁰⁵) division, the upright (*gì wang/fang* ¹⁰⁵) division, the all encompassing (*kì wang/kuang* ¹⁰⁵) division, the central (*gì wàng/huang* ¹⁰⁵) division and the orientation (*gì wang/wang* ¹⁰⁵) division. When these five divisions are united and referred to by one word, that word is ‘king’. A king is august, upright, all encompassing, central, and the focus of orientation. Therefore if a king’s intentions are not universal and¹⁰⁶ august, then his way cannot be correct and upright. If his way cannot be correct and upright, then his Potency cannot be universally encompassing. If his Potency cannot be universally encompassing then his goodness cannot assume a central position. If his goodness cannot assume a central position, then the four directions will be unable to orient themselves towards him. If the four directions are unable to orient themselves towards him, then as king, he will be incomplete.⁵⁷

In this passage, it is the paronomastic correlation between the key words august, upright, all encompassing, centre, and orientation which lends definition to the meaning of wang, ‘king’. By showing that the correlation of certain words to certain actualities is part of the ‘grand design’ of the cosmological pattern, Dong Zhongshu is able to reinforce his argument that names are bonded

⁵³ Karlgren, *Grammata Serica Recensa*, No. 739m.
⁵⁵ Karlgren, *Grammata Serica Recensa*, No. 739k.
⁵⁷ *Chun qiu fan lu*, 10.4a-4b.
to actualities in a relationship that manifests Heaven’s intentions.

The philosophical basis of Chinese paronomastic glossing is correlative thinking where the correlation or bond between name and actuality is conceived as a type of "mysterious resonance". As a corollary to this bond, if the correct name of some entity is not apprehended, then the actuality of that entity will not be correctly discerned. And if the correct name for the appropriate actuality is not employed, but rather a false one, Xu Gan saw the consequences leading to chaos (luan 龟) on a cosmic scale:

People only know about the good that names do and are ignorant of the bad that false names do. It can be catastrophic!

Nowadays, are the only names which throw Potency into disorder (luan de 龟) the ones uttered by the ‘village worthies’,?

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58 Borrowing Joseph Needham’s terminology; see his Science and Civilization in China, 2:281. For the best recent discussion of correlative thinking in early China, see Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 319-325, 333-338.
59 Emending shan 龟 to ming 龟 .
60 B.5b.
61 Analects 17.13, "The honest villagers are the thieves of Potency". Mencius 7B.37, D.C. Lau, Mencius, 203, mod.:

"What sort of man can be described as an ‘honest villager’?"

"[The man who says] ‘What is the point of having such great ambition? Their words and deeds take no notice of each other, and yet they keep on saying, ‘The ancients! The ancients!’ Why must they walk along in such solitary fashion? Being in this world, one must behave in a manner pleasing to this world. So long as one is good, it is all right.’ Cringingly, he tries in this way to
The myriad affairs are complex and interwoven; when 'aberrant numbers' (bian shu 資數) proliferate it is certain that the path leading to the disordering of Potency has more than one starting-point. 62

The point that Xu Gan is making is that the use of false names had reached such proportions that it had a destabilizing effect on the the rhythms and cycles of phenomena throughout the cosmos. This belief is part and parcel of a cosmology where there is no rigid division between the heavens and their bodies, the earth and its creations, and man and his activities. Within this single cosmos, the happenings of any one of these realms, so far from being unconnected with those of the other two, bore a direct relationship with them. 63

By the Han dynasty it had virtually become a universal article of faith that all things in the cosmos were correlated with the binary numerological categories of yin and yang, and by extension, the Five Processes (wu xing 五行), the Eight Trigrams, and the Sixty-four Hexagrams. It was believed that if the natural succession of the yin and yang cosmological forces was disturbed, this in turn affected other numerical relationships by way of sympathetic magic. Chi-yun Chen notes that the term shu "was interpreted by some scholars of the I-Ching as the principle of synchronicity which regulates the correspondence between conditions in the cosmos, in

please the world. Such is the honest villager....

I dislike the honest villager fearing that he will confound Potency."

62 B.4b.
According to this cosmology, if man upsets any aspect of this interrelated system of correspondences, anomalies both in the natural world and the world of man are bound to occur; and the greater the upset, the greater the scope for anomalies. Xu Gan similarly maintains that if many people use false names and so destroy the proper accord that should exist between the ming and shi, then changes to the numerical balance of yin and yang combinations will proliferate and chaos will ensue. 'Aberrant numbers' is the term Xu Gan uses for the process which leads to this state of affairs.65

Another Zhong lun passage which supports the interpretation that Xu Gan did believe that the proper correlation between a given name and a given actuality is not determined by man is the following which, although attributed to Zi Si,7 Xu Gan quotes approvingly:

In times of chaos (luan), however, practitioners of good do not reap blessings, while wrongdoers meet with misfortune. This is caused by aberrant numbers. The wise man does not doubt the constant Way because of aberrant numbers.

As such, Xu Gan's use of bian shu is to be distinguished from Xun Yue's usage, which Chi-yun Chen, Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, 112, translates as 'changing lots'.

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64 Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, 119, n. 2.
65 As used by Xu Gan, bian shu is a compound term that is to be distinguished from the terms bian and shu as used in the Xi ci Commentary to Zhou Yi; he uses the term bian in the sense of 'aberration', rather than 'alternation' or 'transformation'. See also Ikeda Shûzô, "Jo Kan Chû ron kô", Kyôto daigaku bungakubu kenkyû kiyô, 23 (1984), 40, n. 58. Thus, in "Cultivating Fundamentals", A.11b, Xu Gan contrasts 'aberrant numbers' with the 'constant Way':
Affairs name themselves, sounds call themselves, appearances express themselves, things place themselves and men determine their own office. All do this by themselves. 66

If left to function of their own accord, then as a matter of course (zi ran) those names inherently appropriate to entities and states of affairs will be revealed, sounds will name themselves onomatopoeically, appearances will be self-manifesting, things will naturally be part of the 'world', and by carrying out some deed a man will display his real capabilities and so be delegated office. 67 A similar passage is found in Huai Nan Zi:

[The sage ruler] does not like or dislike things because they are beautiful or ugly, nor is he pleased or angered by punishments and rewards. He lets each name name itself and each category categorize itself. Affairs proceed from what is so of themselves with no interference from him personally. 68

According to these views, names arise spontaneously, in accordance with "what is so of themselves".

As I will show in greater detail in Part II, a number of essentialist theories of naming were already current in the Western Han. I define an essentialist theory of naming as the view that there is a proper or correct correspondence between a given name and a given actuality, determined, variously, by what is ordained by 'Heaven' (tian) or by what is 'naturally so/so of itself' (zi ran), and a nominalist theory on naming as the view

66 A.16b. Takeuchi Yoshio, Eki to Chûyô no kenkyû, 68, proposes that this passage originally came from the last part of the "Shuo xia" X5 section of Zhong yong 9.1a.

67 On the last example in this passage, which relates to xing ming thinking, see Chapter 5.
that it is man who arbitrarily or conventionally
determines which ming should be applied to which shi. The
nominalist position takes for granted what is known as
Nominalism in Western philosophy: that all things that
exist are particular entities. In both China and the West
nominalist theories of naming maintain that objects which
are like each other are referred to by the same name. The
essentialist position differs to that of the nominalist
in that it draws a conceptual distinction between
entities and actualities. Chinese essentialism, in turn,
differs fundamentally to representative essentialist
philosophies of the Western tradition in that it is not
Realist because it does not regard actualities as
universals. Thus, whereas classical Western Realist
theories of naming hold that a variety of objects can all
be given the name 'red' because they partake of the
universal 'redness' or because the universal 'redness'
exists in those particulars, a Chinese essentialist
theory of naming postulates nothing more than that each
red entity is red by virtue of its actuality and that it
is on the basis of this actuality that it is called
'red'.

According to some Chinese correlative theories of
naming, genuine names - that is, names that are
inherently appropriate to given actualities - just like
actualities themselves, are 'discovered' by man but not
determined by man. As a corollary, the names made by man
are false names. Another view is that while there are
names which, having been created by 'Heaven' (tian), are
inherently appropriate to given actualities, nevertheless sages are endowed with the ability to apprehend an entity’s actuality and on that basis select or coin the name that correlates with that actuality. Xu Gan’s views on names and naming have features in common with both of these theories. In common with the first view, Xu presents names as having a special ‘natural’ bond with actualities such that only the name that is inherently appropriate to a given actuality should be used with that actuality. (Nor is there any evidence that he makes an exception for the names of those actualities that are human constructed as opposed to those actualities which ‘just are’.) In common with the second view, he would seem to have accepted that man can coin names, but for those names to be genuine they must have a ‘right and proper’ correlation with the actualities to which they refer. Thus, his understanding of the way that names should relate to actualities does assume a correlative theory of naming. Unlike earlier thinkers, both correlativist and nominalist, however, he shows minimal concern with the question of language. In other words, a ‘philosophy of language’-type of interest is barely developed in Zhong lun. Given this, then what bearing does his correlative thinking have on his understanding of the name and actuality relationship? The answer is that on the basis of the bond that exists between name and actuality, and which is entailed by the correlative theory of naming he assumes, he is able to present name and actuality as two parts of a whole. The following
Section is an interpretation of how Xu Gan conceived this whole.

iii. Name and Actuality as Substance and Function

Xu Gan's concept of the accord that should obtain between names and actualities is one where names truly represent and manifest actualities and actualities give names their meaning and significance. The conceptual model which best characterizes this relationship is the substance-function (ti yong) polarity. Ti yong is one of the primary conceptual models in traditional Chinese thought and has been invested with a variety of meanings. Fang Keli suggests that two basic meanings can be abstracted from the various senses in which it has been employed: 1. The relationship between substance and its application, function or properties; 2. The relationship between essence and phenomenon, or between something and its expression. Xu Gan's concept of accord between name and actuality is close to this second meaning.

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69 Morris Cohen, *Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method*, 165, first coined the term 'principal of polarity' to describe opposites such as "immediacy and mediation, unity and plurality, the fixed and the flux, substance and function, ideal and real, actual and possible" that derive their meaning from the existence of each other. In their discussion of assumptions in classical Chinese metaphysics, Hall and Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius*, 18, similarly define polarity as "a relationship of two events each of which requires the other as a necessary condition for being what it is."

Probably the earliest use of *ti yong* to represent a philosophical relationship is in Wang Bi’s (226-249) commentary to *Lao Zi* 38. Yet even if it was Wang Bi who first used *ti* and *yong* as a pair of terms (and even he did not use the two terms as a compound), there is little doubt that the relationship expressed by the terms was not first formulated by him. Indeed, there is much in Han and pre-Han thought that is amenable to a substance-function interpretation. Moreover, late Han thinkers had already employed similar terminology to *ti* and *yong* to express the same relationship that Wang Bi expressed with *ti* and *yong* (albeit without the same metaphysical application). Thus in his Preface to *Li ji*, Zheng Xuan (127-200) writes:

Ritual is both substance (*ti*) and application (*lü*). Where it is integrated in one’s heart, this is known as ‘substance’; where it is practised and put into action, this is known as ‘application’.

While neither *ti yong* nor *ti lü* is used in *Zhong lun*, nevertheless, Xu Gan’s concept of the proper relationship that should exist between *ming* and *shi* is

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71 If *Zhou yi* can tong qi, attributed to Wei Boyang (late second century AD), is a genuine second century work, then the use the terms ‘inner substance’ (*nei ti*) and ‘external function’ (*wai yong*) in the first zhang of that work would certainly predate Wang Bi’s use. For the argument that the work is indeed a genuine second century work, see Hu Fuchen, "Zhou yi can tong qi zuo yu Han dai kao", *Zhongguo zhexue shi yanjiu*, 1984.1, 60-65. Suzuki Yoshijirō, *Kan Eki no kenkyū*, 597-605, however, concludes that the received text has later material interspersed with Wei Boyang’s original material.

72 Quoted by Kong Yingda in his Preface to *Li ji zheng yi*, 9a. This is an another example of paronomastic glossing. It is interesting in that the relation of *ti* and *li* is based on graphic similarities while that of *lü* and *li* is based on phonetic similarities.
one which is consistent with the second sense of the ti yong polarity: the basis of something and its expression. It would, of course, be gratuitous to argue that, because Zheng Xuan was an older contemporary and a native of the same Kingdom as Xu Gan, Xu Gan's thought therefore may well have been influenced by Zheng Xuan's formulation of the ti liu polarity. It would not, however, be unreasonable to suggest that by the latter half of the Eastern Han the ti yong polarity had started to become consciously articulated as a philosophical paradigm. It is my interpretation that Xu Gan's discussion of the accord between name and actuality was one such articulation.

For Xu Gan, although name and actuality should always be in accord, it is only when the proper conditions are in place that this is possible. This is particularly evident in "Bestowing Emoluments and Titles":

Somebody once asked me, "In antiquity did Superior Persons value titles and emoluments?"

I replied, "Yes."

"Then what do the books of the philosophers mean in stating that titles and emoluments are not honours and that riches and property are not wealth?"

I replied, "Living in times of chaos, they saw that it was Small Persons who were wealthy and honoured, thus they said such things. In antiquity, however, it was not the same. In antiquity, the institution of titles and emoluments was such that titles were bestowed to give station to those who possessed Potency and emoluments granted to foster those who had made meritorious achievements. If one's achievements were great, one's emolument would have been
generous and if one's Potency was extensive, one's title would have been venerable. Yet if one's achievements were modest, one's emolument would have been negligible and if one's Potency was limited, one's title would have been humble.

Accordingly, by observing a person's title, one was able to distinguish that person's Potency, and by looking at a person's emolument, one was able to know the size of a person's achievements without having to ask. This was the reason why Superior Persons of antiquity valued titles and emoluments....

Yet from those times onward, the teachings of kings Wen and Wu have deteriorated, the way of promotion and demotion is no longer employed, feudal lords overstep their position and grandees make theirs hereditary. People are not given titles on account of their Potency, nor emoluments on account of their merit. There are cases where men steal whole states and are honoured, and cases where they steal land and become rich. The treacherous and evil get what they want while the good and worthy have their ambitions frustrated.

For Xu Gan, a man's reputation should be the visible mark and representation of his actual worth: his Potency and meritorious achievements. Only when the proper conditions prevail, however, do reputations perform this role. He appeals to the unquestionable authority of 'lost' antiquity to justify his claim that in antiquity there had been a correspondence between title and Potency, and also emoluments and merit. Titles and emoluments (ming/yong) serve to represent to the world that their holder is a man of Potency and merit (shi/ti). The

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73 Following all other editions in emending ci to jue
74 Early Zhou.
75 i.e. usurp a throne.
76 A.30b-31a; 32b.
bestowing of titles and ranks is regulated by the social customs and ritual behaviour (li) that are practised in a society that is well ordered and ruled by sage rulers. When these conditions are in place, then, as a natural consequence, accord between ming and shi is realized. Where this accord exists, then 'by observing a person's rank, one is able to distinguish that person's Potency, and by looking at a person's emolument, one is able to know that person's merit without having to ask'. When this accord exists names truly represent actualities and actualities can be known for what they are. Thus Xu Gan writes:

That which Confucius esteemed was those names that truly name actualities. In so esteeming names, he thereby esteemed actualities.77

Xu Gan employs the example of Confucius' attitude to reputation to highlight the importance that the Superior Person attaches to name and actuality being in accord. To make his point, however, he has first to defend Confucius against the charge that the latter's attitude to reputation was ambivalent:

My interlocuter asked me saying, "On the one hand Zhongni hated the prospect of dying without having established a reputation.78 Yet on the other hand, he despised false reputations. This being so, then how could such a position be upheld?"79

If Confucius saw the securing of a reputable name as being of the utmost importance, was he thus unreasonably

77 B.5a.
78 This is a reference to a sentiment recorded at Analects 15.19. See my discussion following.
79 B.5a.
concerned with securing a reputation? This suspicion is rendered all the more plausible\(^80\) by the following Shi ji passage which, in quoting Analects 15.19, includes one final sentence that is nowhere else transmitted\(^81\):

> A gentleman has reason to be distressed if he ends his days without making a reputation for himself.\(^82\) How will I appear to later ages?\(^83\)

Was Confucius' desire for reputation like that of the fame-seeker criticised by Xu Gan because he was prepared to "earn himself a reputation without necessarily securing an actual achievement"?\(^84\) Sima Qian, for example, seems to imply that it was in order to secure himself a posthumous reputation that Confucius undertook his work on the Spring and Autumn Annals.\(^85\) Should Confucius' prime motivation for undertaking this work have been to secure a reputation, then it would be cause to call his integrity into serious question.

Yet, on the other hand, both in the Analects and the Spring and Autumn Annals, Confucius criticises fame-

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\(^80\) An observation which is also attributed to Cui Shu. See Takigawa Kametarō, Shi ki kaichū kōsō, 47.82 (p. 763). I have not, however, been able to locate this quotation in Cui Dongbi yishu.

\(^81\) It is my conjecture that this sentence was probably appended by Sima Qian to justify his own interpretation of the passage.

\(^82\) Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 195. D.C. Lau, The Analects, 135, translates as follows, "The Master said, 'The gentleman hates not leaving behind a name when he is gone.'" Both translations are appropriate to the sense in which Sima Qian understood the passage (or wanted it to be understood — a view for which I think a case could be made, especially in the light of Sima Qian's philosophy as revealed in Shi ji, juan 61). In fact, this has become the standard interpretation. As I will argue, however, I believe this interpretation to be incorrect.

\(^83\) Shi ji, 47.1943.

\(^84\) B.2b.

\(^85\) Shi ji, 47.1943.
seekers. Xu Gan cites and discusses the following examples:

In the past, Gongmeng [Zhi 知] of Wei was frequently brutish in his behaviour and so incurred the hatred of the people of Wei. Qi Bao 氓 killed him so as to become famous and the Spring and Autumn Annals recorded him as being a bandit....

Someone asked me, 'Qi Bao killed for the sake of earning a name for himself thus Zhongni detested him and classed him as a bandit. Is it possible that those who presently strive for fame might also have committed the crime of murder?'

I replied, 'In the Spring and Autumn period there were many murderers but if they did not steal they were not recorded. In determining that which he finds commendable and that which he finds detestable, the sage must weigh-up what is significant and calculate what is so in the majority of cases and what is the exception. Because fame-seekers cause truth and falsehood to appear as their opposites and right and wrong to change places, the people are influenced by this. This is a great calamity for the state. A murderer harms but one person - how can he be compared with the fame-seeker? So why then should a murderer be recorded as a bandit? Xun Qing also said, "Those who steal 'names' are more despicable than those who steal goods."

The 'honest villagers' did not murder anyone either, yet Zhongni despised them. Why? Because they confounded Potency.

Thus, on prima facie grounds at least, Confucius' attitude to the matter of securing a reputation is

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87 Following Yu Yue, Zhuzi pingyi bulu, 79, in regarding the sequence of characters 然而 不 管 不 管 as being either corrupt or incomplete. Yu Yue maintains that the passage should read 然而 不 管 然而 不 管. However, by simply changing 不 to 不 the same interpretation as intended by Yu Yue can be reached with less alteration to the text.
88 Xun Zi, 2.10a.
89 B.3b, 4a-4b.
ambivalent. Yet Xu Gan is unequivocal in his defence of Confucius against this charge:

That which Confucius valued was those 'names' that truly name actualities. In so valuing names, he thereby valued actualities. 90

Here Xu is arguing that Confucius only gave his respect and esteem to those names that had a corresponding actuality. Thus, if a man enjoyed a particular reputation but did not measure up to the actuality 'behind' that reputation, then this would be a matter inviting censure.

In the standard interpretation of the Analects 15.19 passage (quoted above), the word 常 is read as cheng on the level tone (ping sheng) and taken to mean, 'to esteem, commend, hold in regard'. Xu Gan, however, unlike his interlocuter, seems to read 常 as chen on the falling tone (qu sheng), meaning 'to match, correspond with'. 91 Following this alternative reading, the Analects passage translates as follows:

The Superior Person is distressed at the prospect of dying and leaving behind him a

90 B.5a.
91 Yu Yue, Qun jing pingyi, 31.19a-19b, and Xu Kan, Yangming chuan xi lu, 1.73b, in Wang Wencheng gong quanji, also follow this reading. Indirect support for this reading is also provided in Liu Yi's (180-221) essay, Zheng ming 7 47.4a. The subject of the passage is also related to Analects 15.19:

"How can names be corrected?"

"If a man's actions are not virtuous, then he should not be called by a virtuous name. In calling a man by a particular name, the title must actualize the way he is and reflect how he is constituted. Thereby there will be no actuality which fails to correspond (chen) to its name and no name which fails to match (dang) its actuality."
name that does not match his actual qualities.

On this reading, Confucius' real concern was that a name should only be applied to its corresponding actuality, and naturally this could only be brought about after that actuality had been established.92

So understood, another well-known sentence from the Analects, also quoted in the "Examining Falsity" pian of Zhong lun, is rendered more intelligible. This sentence occurs twice in the Analects, at 15.18, and with minor variation at 14.32.93 Its occurrence at 15.18 is perhaps significant, preceding as it does the 15.19 passage that has been under discussion. 15.18 reads as follows:

The Master said, "The Superior Person is distressed by his own lack of ability and not by the failure of others to appreciate him."94

In a footnote to his translation of this passage, Arthur Waley comments on what he sees to be a contradiction between 15.18 and 5.19, saying, "As both sayings completely lack context, it would be a waste of time to try to reconcile the contradiction."95 Following the interpretation that I have attributed to Xu Gan, however, the alleged contradiction is seen to be illusory, because it becomes apparent that Confucius was not unduly concerned with achieving a reputation at the expense of the actuality it represented. Only to the extent that posthumous reputation reflects an

92 We also find this interpretation advanced by the Song commentator Zhang Shi in his Geng si Lun yu jie, 8.8b. His phraseology also closely resembles that of Xu Gan.
93 14.32 is in turn related to 1.16.
94 Lau, The Analects, 134, slightly mod.
95 The Analects of Confucius, 197, n. 3.
individual’s actual was Confucius concerned with reputation.

And as noted by Yang Shi (1053-1135), Analects 15.20 can also be seen to be the last in a group of three interrelated and consecutive passages. 15.20 reads as follows:

What the Superior Person seeks, he seeks within himself; what the Small Person seeks, he seeks from others.

Yang Shi’s interpretation of this passage is that it is reputation which the Small Person seeks from others while it is the cultivation of Potency that the Superior Person seeks within himself. This is compatible with Xu Gan’s view that ‘seeking it within oneself and not from others’ "is not a matter of strengthening oneself but rather is a matter of revealing the wealth that exists therein." For Xu Gan, that wealth is the Superior Person’s ‘actuality’ and his reputation should be the visible mark of that actuality. When reputation does not match actual qualities, yet is used to represent those qualities, it is a case of names prescribing actualities that do not exist.

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the significance or value of ming is not merely to ‘register’ or designate the existence of shi; moreover and importantly, ming plays the crucial and active role of

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96 One of the ‘four great disciples’ of the Neo-Confucians Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107). See Zhu Xi, Si shu zhang ju ji zhu, 165-166, where he quotes Yang Shi.
97 Lau, Analects, 135, mod.
98 An interpretation shared by Zhang Shi.
99 A.16b.
making manifest, giving formal significance to that which lies unrecognized and hence incomplete. A man's reputation is a mark of his achievements and personal cultivation. As such it serves to let others know what sort of person he is. If he is a man of worth, yet does not have a worthy reputation, then he cannot act as a model for others to emulate and so his actuality cannot be fully realized. When names and actualities are in accord, however, their relationship is a ti yong relationship: 'internally', actualities sustain names by making them meaningful, and 'externally', names realize, give expression to those actualities. Although actualities initiate the process ("When an actuality has been established, its name follows after it; it is not the case that a name is established and then its actuality follows after it"), it is names which bring it to fruition. In other words, the consummation of the whole is effected through actualities inherently supporting names (by virtue of the bond between them), and names expressing actualities.

For Xu Gan, the whole he considers to be of fundamental importance is that consummated when the Superior Person commands a reputation that matches his Potency. Potency is the Superior Person's actuality. Xu Gan describes Potency as "that by which one is led in accordance with the Way" and the Superior Person as one whose Potency is so full (sheng) that it radiates

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100 A. 22b. This supports Graham's definition of de as a "personal capacity for the course of action which is the Way". See Disputers of the Tao, 497.
outward, enabling him to act as a model for others and thereby exert a transforming influence throughout society.\textsuperscript{101} Without \textit{ming}, however, the full effect of charismatic Potency remains circumscribed. Of the subjects in \textit{Zhong lun} which best elucidate Xu Gan’s vision of the proper relationship that should obtain between name and actuality, the relation between a Superior Person’s Potency and his reputation is philosophically the most significant; a logical and semantic interest in the relation between ‘name and object’, while still lying within the gamut of his discussion of \textit{ming} and \textit{shi}, is of peripheral significance. In short, in modelling his concept of the Potency-reputation relationship on the \textit{ming shi} polarity he has appropriated that polarity and invested it with new meaning.

The very opening line of \textit{Zhong lun} attests to both the primacy of Potency in that work and its relation with reputation:

\begin{quote}
In the past, the Superior Person would make his Potency whole (cheng) and apply it in his conduct; when he died his name would not be forgotten.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

The reason that Xu Gan considers both Potency and reputation to be important is because they are two aspects of a whole: without Potency the Superior Person would not be a Superior Person, and without reputation the Superior Person would be unable to realize fully his

\textsuperscript{101} A.4b.

\textsuperscript{102} A.1a. The \textit{loacus classicus} for the view expressed in this passage is the \textit{Zuo} commentary for the 24th year of Duke Xiang. See Chapter 6, note 67. See also the \textit{Wen yan} commentary to the qian \textsuperscript{6} hexagram in \textit{Changes}. 
Potency. Reputation enables his Potency to continue to transform society even after he has died. In the following Section, I will describe this process of personal realization and its relation to the name-actuality polarity.

iv. The Cultivation of Potency

I have defined shi as 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is'. As the Superior Person's actuality, Potency requires sustained cultivation for it to develop and become whole:

Thus, the Superior Person's cultivation of Potency begins in his youth and ends in his old age; it starts on the flat plains and becomes whole in the lofty peaks. Changes says:

Pushing upwards has supreme success,
One must see the great man.
Fear not.
Departure towards the south,
Brings good fortune. 103

This is what is meant by 'accumulating small things until they become great'. 104

The Small Person, however, expects to reap in the evening what he has sown in the morning. If he gives something one minute, he expects repayment the next. If he does good for one day he expects a good reputation for a lifetime. If this good reputation is not forthcoming then he says that there is no point in doing good.

103 Hexagram text for the sheng hexagram; Richard Wilhelm/Cary Baynes, The Book of Changes, 178, mod. 104 cf. Image to the sheng hexagram:

By following his Potency the Superior Person accumulates small things until they become noble and great.
Thereupon he doubts the words of the sages, turns his back on the teachings of the former kings, sticks to his old ways and continues to do as has always pleased him. Thus, with his person demeaned and his reputation denigrated he is certain to be ostracised by others. 105

The cultivation of Potency starts with the training of one's intentions and demeanour. One's intentions are trained so that they connect the inner (the locus being one's heart) with the outer, while the demeanour is trained so that it connects the outer (the locus being one's countenance and deportment) with the inner. The more fundamental of the two because, unless one can control one's will, learning is not possible:

Thus, even if one had natural ability, yet lacked the intent, one would be incapable of achieving good work. Intentions are the teacher of learning, while ability is the pupil of learning. In learning, one does not worry about a lack of ability but rather that one's intentions are not fixed. It is because of this that there are many who are engaged in learning but only a few who actually learn. 106

In turn, the purpose of learning is to train oneself 'inwardly' and so foster the conditions for the cultivation of one's Potency:

Learning is the means to channel one's spirituality (shen 信), to be thoroughly reflective (si 反), to harmonize one's essential dispositions (qing 情) and give order to one's nature (xing 性). It is the sage's principal undertaking. 107

The teachings to which Xu Gan attaches greatest importance are the Six Arts, especially the first of the Six Arts, Ritual:

105 A.9b-10a.
106 A.2b.
107 A.1a.
Ritual is of critical importance to man; it should be followed for a whole lifetime and never be left even for a moment. If it is left for a moment, then dissolute behaviour will arise. If it is left for a moment, then dissolute thoughts will be born. Moreover, if there was no ritual, would it be possible to complete that which one has started?\footnote{108}

For the Superior Person, the purpose of ritual is to enable him to cultivate his Potency and so act as a model for the emulation of others. Ritual behaviour begins with one's demeanour, in particular one's countenance:

Models and symbols were established so as to enable people to become Superior Persons. Of the various models and symbols, there is none more primary than preserving an upright countenance and taking care to maintain an awe-inspiring demeanour...\footnote{109}

The countenance is the external side of one's tally. The external side of one's tally being rectified, therefore one's essential dispositions and one's nature will be properly ordered. One's essential dispositions and one's nature being in proper order, therefore humaneness (ren) and rightness (yi) will exist. Humaneness and rightness being in existence, therefore full Potency (sheng de) is manifest. When full Potency is manifest, one can act as a model and symbol. This is what is known as a Superior Person.\footnote{111}

The tally is a metaphor for the Superior Person. His inner self - his heart - is the inner side of his tally

\footnote{108} A.6b.  
\footnote{109} cf. Analects 20.2; Lau, The Analects, 159-160, mod: \begin{quote} The Superior Person, with his robe and cap adjusted properly and dignified in his gaze, has a presence which inspires people who see him to be filled with awe. \end{quote}  
\footnote{110} In Zhong lun I understand ren to mean a sensitive concern for others ("The Superior Person is ren so as to make his concern for others widespread", A.28b) and yi to mean the sense of what is the right course of action in each circumstance.  
\footnote{111} A.4a-4b.
and his external appearance is the outer side of his tally. Each side should correspond with the other. 112

The Superior Person's countenance, 113 the external side of his 'tally', works both in an inward and an outward direction. Inwardly a dignified countenance puts the Superior Person's qing and xing in order, thereby giving rise to the particular Potencies of ren and yi. As to whether humaneness and rightness are inborn or acquired Potencies Xu Gan seems to have adopted a compromise view: man is born with the rudiments of these Potencies but he needs to be taught before he is able to discern them.

At the beginning of their life people are ignorant and without knowledge. The situation is analogous to some valuables in a dark room; although they are sought after they cannot be seen. If daylight illuminates the room, however, then all the things therein can be discerned. Learning is the daylight of the heart. It is for this reason that the former kings established teaching officials and made them responsible for educating the sons of nobles.114 They instructed them in the Six Potencies: wisdom, humaneness, sageliness, rightness, centrality and harmony....115

112 Although possibly inspired by a similar metaphor in "The Tally of the Fullness of Potency" (De chong fu pian in Zhuang Zi), Xu Gan uses the metaphor to describe how inner Potency becomes externally manifest on the Superior Person's countenance. In "The Tally of the Fullness of Potency", however, the point that Zhuang Zi is making is that de will be made manifest to others regardless of the physical appearance of a real man of de.

113 Which must conform to the rules governing decorum, an aspect of ritual.

114 According to Zhou li, there were two officials who were responsible for the education of the ruler's kinsmen and high officials: the palace master (shi shi ) and the palace protector (bao shi ). See Zhou li, 14.2a-8a; Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, Nos. 4494, 5302.

115 A.1a.
For Mencius, while it is implicit that education plays a role in the development and refinement of man's incipient moral tendencies, nevertheless he also maintains that man's moral tendencies 'sprout' of their own accord without having been learned. 116 Xu Gan, on the other hand, claims that only learning can enable man to recognize that he has these "valuables" in his heart. Indeed the place that Xu Gan gives to learning draws strongly on Xun Qing's views on learning, although unlike Xun Qing, Xu Gan does not consider human nature to be bad, but rather, impure. Thus even when discerned, humaneness still needs to undergo a process of 'purification' (and not simply nurturing):

Pearls contain tiny impurities and jade harbours flaws. This is their nature. A good craftsman works on them to purify their natures making them unadulterated. Thus in view of the fact that these two things can be made completely pure, one can know that the Potency of humaneness (ren de 德) can be refined. 117

As to the 'outward' function played by the countenance, the existence of humaneness and rightness is said to lead to a fullness (sheng) of Potency in the heart which then becomes manifest on the Superior Person's countenance and demeanour - his external tally. The manifestation of Potency on his countenance and in his demeanour in turn functions as a model for the edification of others. 118

117 A.9a-9b.
118 cf. Analects 12.19:

The Potency of the Superior Person is like the wind while that of the Small Man is
The countenance, however, is but one facet of ritual, and ritual, in turn, is but one facet of the Six Arts. Thus just as the countenance serves both to manifest and to nurture Potency, so too do all the Six Arts:

The Arts are practised so to facilitate in making Potency whole (cheng); Potency is that which guides the body in accordance with the Way. The Arts are the leaves and branches of man119 while Potency is the roots and trunk of man. These two things do not function separately and are not independent of one another. If a tree is without leaves and branches then it is unable to make the roots and trunk thrive and so would be called stark; if men did not have the Arts, then they would be unable to make their Potency whole and so would be called boorish. If one wants to be a Superior Person then is it not imperative both to make one’s Potency whole and to cultivate the Arts?121

Analogous to the tree’s roots, Potency sustains and supports man. The Arts, like the branches and leaves of a tree, in turn give formal expression to his Potency, and also enable him to cultivate his Potency and foster its growth.

The purpose of cultivating Potency is not, of course, to give meaning and substance to the Arts, but to guide and inform the Superior Person’s speech and conduct so that they accord with the Way. And it is in what he says and does that the Superior Person establishes his Potency (li de) and so acquires a reputation:

119 Changing de to ren on the basis of the parallel with the tree analogy.
120 i.e. the Arts and Potency.
121 A.22b-23a.
From his words you can judge a man's Potency. 122

Confucius said, "If you want people to trust you then be circumspect in what you say and be resolute in carrying it out." 123
If one is resolute in carrying out what one says it will take time. If it takes time then the matter will become evident. If it is evident then anyone with eyes cannot fail to see it and anyone with ears cannot fail to hear of it. How could it be fabricated?! Hence if the root is deep then the leaves and branches will be luxuriant. If one continues to do as one says, then over time one's reputation will travel far. 124

Reputation, in turn, enables the Superior Person's Potency to exert a moral influence in his local community:

Therefore, without recourse to anger, virtuous conduct (de xing) will be practised in his house, and without recourse to admonishments, his reputation will have a transforming effect throughout his local community. 125

Now, I have heard that when Shun 126 was still in his local community, it was not because he gave presents to every family that everyone called him good. Similarly, when Xiang 127 was still in his local community, it was not because he stole from every family that everyone called him bad. In view of this, then it does not matter if people are wise or stupid, when they see good they praise it and when they see bad they criticise it. 128

For Xu Gan, the greater one's Potency, the greater one's reputation should be; and the greater one's

122 A.18a.
123 There appears to be no extant source on which this quotation is based.
124 A.16a.
125 A.5b-6a.
126 Pre-dynastic sage ruler.
127 Shun's younger brother.
128 A.15a.
reputation, the greater the transforming effect of one's Potency:

Hence, a piece of embroidery one chi long is enough to see a person's handiwork skills, and a body one ren tall is enough to see a person's cultivation.... The four seasons come to completion in silence; they do not say anything, yet everyone has faith in them. [The Superior Person's] Potency matches that of Heaven and Earth; his accomplishments are equal to that of the four seasons; and his name forms a trinity with the sun and the moon. By cultivating Potency, Shun of Yu and the Great Yu were able to rise from the rank of commoner to that of emperor, shed their cloth jackets and don richly embroidered vestments. An ancient saying thus says, "The nobility of supreme Potency, to which quarter does it not extend? The glory of supreme Potency, in which quarter does it not bring things to completion?"

Ming did not, however, simply mean reputation and nothing more; by extension, it also included title and position. (This is particularly so in Confucius' Zheng Ming programme.) Indeed, for the Superior Person's Potency to be widespread, Xu Gan holds that it is essential that the Superior Person should have title and position. In "Emoluments and Titles" he explains why position (wei) is "the sage's great treasure":

Position is the loom by which Potency is established, while purchase (shi) is the shuttle by which rightness is put into practice. Treading on the crossboard of the loom and grasping the shuttle, the sage weaves the transformations of Heaven and Earth, causing the myriad things to follow in accord, human relations to be put right, and all within the six enclosures (liu he) to realize their aspirations.... If one climbs to a high place and erects a

129 Founder of the Xia dynasty.
130 A.10b-11a.
131 On the meaning of shi, see Ames' discussion in Chapter 3 of his "The Art of Rulership".
132 Heaven, Earth and the four directions.
flag, those who are able to see it will be widespread. If one strikes a bell, then downwind people will be able to hear it from a long way off. This is not because the flag’s colour becomes brighter or because the bell’s sound reaches further; rather it is because of what sound and colour rely on. How much more so will this be the case if those responsible for carrying out government edicts are of wealthy and noble status? Thus when Shun was a common person, he was just like other people. When he acceded to the throne in the temple of the Great Ancestors, calling himself  

yu yi ren  

then the Queen Mother of the West came and presented a white jade bracelet as tribute. 

When the Duke of Zhou was one of the feudal lords, he was just another subject. Yet when he acceded to the throne in the Ming Tang, facing south with his back to the silken screen embroidered with axe-head designs, the gentleman from Yueshang came and presented white pheasants as tribute. Thus if one’s position is not exalted then the working of one’s Potency will not shine brightly, and if one’s station is not high, the transformation effected by one’s Potency will be circumscribed.

In the foregoing passages Xu Gan describes the process whereby the Superior Person cultivates his Potency and has it established in the world. If the proper circumstances prevail, he should command a reputation that corresponds to that Potency. When reputation corresponds with Potency, the whole that constitutes the Superior Person is consummated.

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133 The ruler’s first person term of address.
134 For other references to these stories, see Wen xuan, 11.35a, where Li Shan, in his annotation of He Yan’s Jing fu dian fu, which quotes the Han work, Shi ben; Bo Kong Liu tie, 7.21a, which quotes the Jin work Di wang shi ji. See also Zhou li, 31a.2a, and Shi ji, 4.132.
135 See also Zhou li, 31a.2a, and Shi ji, 4.132.
136 See Tai ping yu lan, 785.2a.
137 A.32b-33b.
As in the analogy that Xu Gan draws between name-actuality and plants-seasons, the concept of cheng, 'to become whole', is also central to his discussion of Potency and reputation. In the plants-seasons analogy, it was shown how an actuality is that which becomes whole through a process of maturation. Similarly, Potency is also something that becomes whole through a process of maturation and cultivation. And just as the mature plant represents the consummation of the process of maturation in the plants-seasons analogy, similarly a reputation corresponding to his actuality represents the consummation of the Superior Person, his actuality being his Potency.

Xu Gan was convinced, however, that by the last half of the second century of the Eastern Han, people saw that "reputation was obtainable by deceit",\textsuperscript{138} and that this resulted in a situation where reputation became more important than the establishment of the actuality that should correspond to that reputation. This situation was the most recent manifestation of a long process in the abuse of the proper name and actuality relationship:

In the past, Xun Qing \textsuperscript{139}, who lived in the Warring States period, was a man of brilliant talents. He transmitted the ancient traditions of Yao and Shun, modelled himself on and glorified the teachings of Wen and Wu, took Confucius as his teacher, and made clear the way to dispelling chaos. Despite this, the rulers of the various states thought him impractical and out of step with the changing times; to the end of his days none of them was prepared to employ him.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{138} B.10a-10b.
\textsuperscript{139} This sentence is based on a sentence describing the fate of Mencius, at Shi ji, 73.2343. Xun Qing had, in
to those itinerant shi who spouted pernicious methods and led groups of followers, their reputations resounded in the courts of the feudal lords. There was no state that they went to where the ruler failed to carry out ceremonial to the fullest by going in person to the outskirts of the city to meet them and sweep the ground in front of them, leading them into the city.\textsuperscript{140} There were countless among them who received titles and were treated as special guests. Thus, long has been the history of names not matching actualities. In what age has it not been so? Only when the world has the Way will this state of affairs come to an end!\textsuperscript{141}

Xu Gan believed abuse of the name and actuality relationship created anomalies in the workings of the normal pattern of things such that "practitioners of good do not reap blessings and wrongdoers do not meet with misfortune. This is caused by aberrant numbers."\textsuperscript{142} When this occurs, then despite a man's Potency there is no mechanism in place to ensure that he will secure a corresponding reputation:

Hence if the Superior Person is not born in the right times (bu yu qi shi 遇其時), then unlike the common shi 他, he will not enjoy a brilliant and widespread reputation. Moreover, common people will hold sway over him, determining both distinctions of high and low and the worth of noble and base. Because of this, then even up until his dying days he will not be able to rise above the status of a common person.\textsuperscript{143}

Given that the Potency of sages is brilliant and resplendent, vast and

\textsuperscript{140} The itinerant scholars referred to here would include Su Qin 孫（d.317 BC), Zhang Yi 張儀 (d.310) and Zou Yan 張（d.250). See Shi ji, 69.2276; 70.2279; 74.2345.
\textsuperscript{141} B.26b.
\textsuperscript{142} A.11b.
\textsuperscript{143} B.26a-26b.
extensive, it should be easy to recognize them. Nevertheless it is still the case that they are not recognized. This being so, then how much more so is it for worthies? Thus argued, then those who are not praised (yu 烟) by the people of contemporary times are not necessarily those who do not deserve a reputation, while those who are praised are not necessarily those who do deserve a reputation. Thus Poetry says:

On the mountains are the mulberry trees;  
In the marsh are the lotus flowers.  
I do not see Zidu 孔子,  
But I see this crazy fellow. 144

This is saying that that which is called beautiful is in fact not beautiful and that which is ugly is in fact not ugly. This too was caused by chaos. In times of order things are not as such.

The last ruler of a dynasty is born out of chaos. In seeking chief ministers and establishing a grand counsellor he listens to common rumours and so does not escape the ridicule of Guo feng 孔夫. 145 Yet with the aid of his ministers he hopes to re-establish harmony with tian, cause the seasons to proceed in their proper sequence, put an end to disaster and chaos, and disperse demons and pestilence. This is no different to flogging a wornout horse to pull a carriage up the precipices of the Taihang 山: it is bound to trip-over. 146

It is for these reasons that Xu Gan writes somewhat despondently, "The Superior Person does not worry that he will not be able to establish his Way and his Potency, but rather that he has not been born in the right

144 Poetry, Mao 84; Legge, Chinese Classics, 4:137 mod.  
On Zidu, Mencius 6A.7 says:

As for Zidu, everyone recognizes him to be a beauty. Those who fail to do so have no eyes.

145 Mao 84 is in this division.  
146 B.25b-26a.
times". What then should the Superior Person do if he is born in times of chaos? Xu Gan proposes that the proper course of action is to withdraw from worldly affairs and concentrate on cultivating one's Way thereby avoiding becoming enmeshed in the folly of the times:

The Superior Person is able to make his heart whole. When his heart is whole then internally he becomes fixed (ding 丁). When internally he is fixed then things cannot upset (luan) him. When things cannot upset him then he exclusively delights in his Way. When he exclusively delights in his Way, then he regards a lack of renown renown and obscurity as eminence... Would one such as this be likely to ek out an insecure existence so as to change that which the ordinary people have not given recognition to?

"That which the ordinary people have not given recognition to" refers to the Superior Person's actuality, his Potency. If the conditions are not in place such that the principle of 'uncaused becoming-whole-by-itself' fails to operate and the Superior Person is not given a reputation that corresponds to his actuality, then name and actuality cease functioning in a substance-function relationship and name becomes something superficial and peripheral. When this occurs the proper accord between name and actuality collapses, and the pair slip into a fundamental-peripheral (ben mo) relationship.

Before discussing this latter relationship in Parts III and IV, I will next examine the traditions of discourse in which ming shi had assumed a variety of

147 A.34a.
148 Here follows a long quotation from Zhong yong.
149 B.5b-6a.
different meanings. In studying these various meanings my purpose is to determine what connection Xu Gan's concept of the ming shi relationship had with earlier views on ming shi.
PART II
Chapter 2

CONFUCIUS AND THE CORRECTION OF NAMES

Of necessity, the aim of this chapter is two-fold: first, to draw some interpretative conclusions about the philosophical import of Confucius' correction of names (zheng ming) programme in the wider context of the Analects, and second to determine its bearing on the ming shi dichotomy.

i. The Meaning of Zheng Ming in the Analects

What Confucius meant by the 'correction of names' has traditionally been and still remains a subject of interpretative controversy, with some scholars even contending that the term's occurrence in the Analects is a later interpolation. The locus classicus of the term is Analects 13.3:

Zilu said, "If the Lord of Wei left the government of Wei in your hands, what would you attend to first?"

The Master said, "It would have to be the correction of names I should think."

Zilu said, "Really? Aren't you really so out of touch with things! Why would you correct names?"

The Master said, 'How boorish you are! In matters that he knows nothing about

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1 An article based on an earlier draft of this chapter was published under the title, "Rectifying Confucius' Zheng Ming", in Papers on Far Eastern History, 38 (September, 1988), 1-24.

2 For discussion of the interpolation charge, see Appendix C.

3 All references to the 'chapter and verse' divisions in Analects follow the traditional divisions of Zhu Xi's Si shu zhang ju ji zhu.
one would expect the Superior Person to show some reserve. If names are not correct then speech loses its accord; if speech loses its accord then affairs are not brought to fruition; if affairs are not brought to fruition then ritual and music will not prosper; if ritual and music do not prosper then punishments and penalties will be inappropriate; if punishments and penalties are inappropriate then the people will not know where to put hand and foot."

Most traditional Chinese glosses of zheng ming fall into either one of two groups: those which follow Sima Qian’s interpretation or those which follow that of Zheng Xuan.

The former is distinguished by interpreting Analects 13.3 in reference to a very specific historical background, the details of which leave little doubt that the term refers primarily to two roles: father and son. There is a passage in Shi ji, immediately preceding the quotation of Analects 13.3, which reads as follows:

At this time the father of Lord Zhe 齊 of Wei 齊 was unable to be installed [as Lord of Wei] and he remained outside of Wei. The feudal lords repeatedly expressed the view that Zhe should yield the throne to his father. Further, many of Confucius’ disciples were serving in Wei and the Lord of Wei wished to obtain Confucius’ political services.4

The fact that this passage immediately precedes a quotation of Analects 13.3 implies that Sima Qian believed or wanted others to believe that Confucius’ views on ‘the correction of names’ should be interpreted in relation to the political situation in Wei from the time of the death of Duke Ling 齊 of Wei in 493 B.C. to the first four years of the reign of his grandson Duke Zhe, 492-489.

4 Shi ji, 47.1933.
In 496, Prince Kuai Kui, the son of Duke Ling, was incensed at rumours that Nan Zi, his mother and the wife of Ling, had renewed an affair with a certain Song Chao (also called Song Zichao). He attempted to have her murdered. When the attempt failed, he fled to Song. Having no other legitimate sons, Duke Ling tried to persuade Ying, his son by consort, to become Heir Apparent but Ying declined.

In 493 Ling died and Zhe, Duke Ling’s grandson and the son of Kuai Kui, acceded to the throne. In the sixth month of the same year, Kuai Kui had attempted to re-enter Wei from the outlying city of Qi where he had been installed by the Jin army. Hearing of Kuai’s attempted re-entry, troops were despatched to attack him, thus foiling his attempt. Four years later in 489, Confucius returned to Wei.

It was against this background that Zilu asked, "If the Lord of Wei [Zhe] left the government of Wei in your hands, what would you attend to first?"

Since at least the time of the Eastern Han, it has generally been assumed that the following passage from Analects 7.14 should also be interpreted in the light of this same background:

Ran You said, "Will the master assist the Lord of Wei?" Zigong said, "Well, I shall ask him." He went in and said,

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5 See the Zuo commentary to Ding 14, 56.17b; Shi ji, 37.1598.
6 See Spring and Autumn Annals, Ai 2, 3; Shi ji, 37.1599.
7 See Shi ji, 47.1933. Qian Mu, Xian Qin zhuzi xinian, 1:49 gives 489, while Lau, The Analects, 195, and Yoshikawa Kōjirō, Ron go, 2:117, give 488 as the year of Confucius’ return to Wei.
8 That is, Zhe.
"What sort of men were Boyi 和 and Shuqi 兄 respectively?" "They were worthy men of old." "Did they harbour enmity?" "They sought humaneness and attained it, so what enmity was there?" When Zigong came out he said, "The master will not assist him."

Boyi and Shuqi were the eldest and youngest sons of the ruler of the small state of Gu zhu respectively. Their father had ordered that upon his death Shuqi should succeed him to the throne. After the father had died, however, Shuqi refused to accede, ceding the throne instead to his elder brother. Boyi in turn also refused to accede because it would be in violation of his father's command. Subsequently they both fled, leaving the throne to a middle son.10 Thus whereas Shuqi, despite having been accorded the honour of being made Heir Apparent, ceded the throne to his elder brother, Zhe, on the other hand, who had not been made Heir Apparent, refused to cede the throne to his father. In the light of this background it was clear that Confucius would not support Zhe who had violated a bond even stronger than

9 Zheng Xuan's commentary (Lun yu ji jie, 7.3b) to the line, "Will the Master support the Lord of Wei?", reads:

When Duke [Ling] died, his grandson Zhe was enthroned. After this, Zhao Yang 趙彥 of Jin installed Kuai Kui in the city of Qi 齊, leading an army, surrounded him. At this time Confucius was in Wei. Hence [Zilu] 諧 asked Confucius if he intended to assist Zhe or not.

(*Following Pelliot's Dunhuang manuscript no. 2510, as reproduced in Kanaya Osamu, To shohon Tei shi shu Ron go shUSEi, 312, in appending .)

In quoting Zheng Xuan here, my purpose is not to show or imply that his understanding of how the term zheng ming functioned in the Analects was compatible with that of Sima Qian. On the contrary, as will be shown, the opposite is true.

10 See Shi ji, 61.2123.
the one between brothers, that is, the bond between father and son.

What bearing did this background have on Confucius' sheng ming doctrine? More immediately, what did ming signify in this context? For Sima Qian, as we have seen, ming referred to the names or roles of 'father' and 'son': "Nanzi hated Kuai Kui, and father and son changed names."¹¹

Commenting on Analects 7.14, Liu Baonan 刘宝楠 (1791-1855) comments: "This is saying that Kuai Kui was not recognized as heir apparent and instead Zhe acceded to the throne. There is no greater example of the confounding of names than this. Confucius desired very much to correct names."¹²

Mao Qiling 毛奇龄 (1623-1716) similarly maintains that Confucius' 'correction of names' stemmed from the "desire to dispute the [legitimacy] of the title under which Zhe acceded to the throne and rebuffed his father. Why? Because Zhe certainly never had such authority invested in him by Duke Ling."¹³

Early Zuo zhuan school commentators such as Xu Shen and Du Yu 杜预 (222-284) also supported the legitimacy of Kuai over Zhe¹⁴ in contrast to the Gongyang 公羊 and Guliang 縱義 commentaries.¹⁵ Zhu Xi 緯 (1130-1200) was also an inheritor of this Zuo zhuan tradition:

¹¹ Shi ji, 130.3308.
¹² Lun yu zheng yi, 281.
¹³ Lun yu ji qiu pian, 5.17b.
¹⁴ Xu Shen, Wu jing yi yi 孫綿陽, cited by Kong Yingda in his sub-commentary, Li ji zheng yi, 10.23b, and Du Yu in his commentary to Ai 3, Zuo zhuan zheng yi, 57.15b.
¹⁵ Gongyang commentary to Ai 3, 27.4b, and Guliang commentary to Ai 2, 20.5a, both recognize kingly commands
Zhe was the son and Kuai Kui the father. Now, in turning his father away with troops, Zhe's action was tantamount to treating him as a bandit. He was not in the least filially pious. How could Zhe rule the country and preside over the people? "Someone asked again, "The Master wished to correct names. Was this to affirm Gongzi Ying's [right to accession]"? [Zhu Xi] replied, "That was a secondary issue. Of primary importance was the need first to correct the names of the son Zhe and his father."

Finally, the following quotation by Huang Shisan (1789-1863) perhaps best encapsulates the reason why this rift between father and son has been regarded by millennia of Confucian scholars as a matter of fundamental importance:

The kingly way does not lie outside the norms of social morality, and in the family no [relationship] is more important than that between father and son....A king's ability to govern has its roots in filial piety. The moral bond between father and son is cardinal. [In the above passage from Analects 13.3] the ruler of the country, despite having failed to correct the names of one family's father and son, nevertheless wished to correct a whole country of fathers and sons!

To recapitulate, the type of interpretation that I have associated with Sima Qian is singularly

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(that is, Duke Ling's) as superseding fatherly orders (that is, Kuai Kui's). It should be noted, however, that such a stance was to become unpopular with later Gongyang and Guliang commentators. See, for example, Chun qiu Gongyang zhuan, 27.5a, and Chun qiu Guliang zhuan, 20.5a, respectively for the commentaries of He Xiu (c. 129-182) and Fan Ning (c. 339-c. 401).

16 Zhu Zi yu lei, 3:1100, (comments on Analects 13.3). According to Spring and Autumn Annals, this was in Duke Ai's third year (492 B.C.) and is described in Shi ji 37.1599, as follows: "After Wei had heard of Kuai's ruse to re-enter Wei, troops were dispatched to attack him thus foiling his attempt."

17 Zhu Zu yu lei, 3.880 (comments on Analects 7.15).

18 Lun yu hou an, 13.7a.
characterized by the highlighting of father and son as the main referents of ming in Confucius' zheng ming programme.

There are other commentators, however, who gloss ming as referring to the title, rank or station of a broad range of subjects. Possibly the earliest example of this interpretation of Confucius' ming is in the bibliographic record, Bie lu compiled by father and son, Liu Xiang (79-8 BC) and Liu Xin (d. 23 AD):

The School of Names probably developed from the Office of Rites. In accordance with differing rank (ming wei) the numbers employed in ceremonial varied. Confucius said: "It would have to be the correction of names I should think." 19

If, however, ming means station or social role, does zheng ming refer to a wider range of subjects than father and son? In a passage in Wang Mang's biography in Han shu for example, the matter of a younger brother addressing his elder brother as 'heir apparent' is criticised on the grounds that this term of address was incorrect. Analects 13.3 is quoted as justification for the censure. Ma Rong (79-166) even defines Confucius' zheng ming as "to correct the one hundred affairs. 21 And Dong Zhongshu, while not referring explicitly to Analects 13.3, says:

The Spring and Autumn Annals traditionally ascribed to Confucius. 22

19 See Yao Zhenzong, Qi lue, Bie lu yiwen, 1.3a (p.16).
20 99C.4160.
21 Lun yu ji jie, 13.1b.
22 Traditionally ascribed to Confucius.
23 Chun qiu fan lu, 10.7a.
It is thus obvious that at least as early as the Han dynasty, some commentators saw the ming of zheng ming as applicable not only to the whole gamut of social roles but also to the names of any and all things generally. There are three probable reasons Han commentators (mistakenly) thought that Confucius' ming was applicable to a broad range of entities:

1. As a consequence of the influence of Xun Zi's "Zheng ming" essay where ming was used more generally than in the Analects.

2. As a consequence of the belief that Confucius wrote the Spring and Autumn Annals,²⁴ where in the words of Dong Zhongshu (already quoted above): "The Spring and Autumn Annals differentiated the distinguishing marks of things so as to correct the names of things."²⁵

3. Because semantically, by the Han dynasty the word ming had come to be associated with a far broader spectrum of problems and issues than had been the case in Confucius' time.

Yet do the examples of zheng ming thought in the Analects support this interpretation? In the following paragraphs I will cite five passages from the Analects which I believe best qualify as examples of Confucius' 'correction of names'.

²⁴ Earliest record of this ascription, Mencius 3B.9.
²⁵ See Hu Shi, Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang, 98-105, and The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, 48-52, for examples of the zheng ming philosophy which, purportedly, "Confucius sought to embody in a work known as the Chun Chiu." (Development, 48)
Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, "If rulers behave in the manner proper to rulers, then ministers will behave in the manner proper to ministers; if fathers behave in the manner proper to fathers, then sons will behave in the manner proper to sons." The Duke said, "Excellent! If rulers fail to behave in the manner proper to rulers, then ministers will not behave in the manner proper to ministers; if fathers fail to behave in the manner proper to fathers, then sons will fail to behave in the manner proper to sons."
proper to sons. 27 Even if there was grain, would I get to eat it?" 28

2) 16.14:

The ruler of a state refers to his wife as 'lady'. She in turn refers to herself as 'young servant'. The people of her state refer to her as 'his lordship's lady', but when in the presence of foreigners, they refer to her as 'our humble mistress'.

27 The onus is on the ruler to set the example and the minister to respond. It is not a case of letting "the ruler be a ruler, the minister a minister, the father a father, the son a son." cf. the translations of Lau, The Analects, 114, and Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 166, which, I assume, follow Huang Kan's (488-545) interpretation, Lun yu yi shu, 6.30a (p.305). I justify my interpretation of an implicit "if...then" structure in light of the following:

a) Analects 12.17:

Ji Kangzi asked Confucius about government (zheng ji, 'enforcement of the correct'). Confucius replied, "Governing means 'being correct' (zheng ji). If one leads with an example of correctness, then who would dare to be otherwise?"

b) Guan Zi, 1:6-2 (see also 3:37-7):

If rulers fail to behave in the manner proper to rulers then ministers will not behave in the manner proper to ministers; if fathers fail to behave in the manner proper to fathers, then sons will not behave in the manner proper to sons. If those above lose hold of their position then those below will overstep their proper boundaries.

d) Han shu, 63.2744:

Thus if fathers do not behave in the manner proper to fathers then sons will not behave in the manner proper to sons; if rulers do not behave in the manner proper to rulers then ministers will not behave in the manner proper to ministers. Even if there was grain, would I get to eat it?

28 Following Shi ji, 47.1911, and Han shu, 63.2744, Yan commentary in reading qi 𠮷 after wu 𦋐.
Foreigners also address her as 'his lordship's lady'.

Kong Anguo (Western Han) comments: "At this time [matters of differentiation] between a feudal lord's legal wife and his concubine(s) were out of order and terms of address had been left unchecked. Hence Confucius correctly addressed this matter of propriety." Liu Baonan similarly remarks that: "In the Spring and Autumn period, propriety regarding distinctions between the proper wife and the concubine was out of order and most concubines were addressed as 'lady'."

3) 3.1

Of Ji Pingzi using eight rows of eight dancers to dance in the courtyard, Confucius said, "If this can be tolerated, then what can not be tolerated?"

According to the Zuo commentary: "The emperor uses eight rows, the feudal lords six, the grand masters four, and..."
servicemen two."\(^{33}\) Ji Pingzi (or Ji Huanzi 姜桓子), of the grand master (dai fu 大夫) ranking, is here described conducting ceremonial practices which were reserved for the Emperor.

4) 3.2

The Three Families\(^{34}\) sung the Yong \(^{35}\) song\(^{36}\) while clearing away the sacrificial offerings. The Master said, "Assisting were the dukes and feudal lords, Presiding solemnly, the Son of Heaven.\(^{37}\)

What possible application do these lines have in the halls of the Three Families?"

This passage is a further criticism of the usurpation of the practice of those rites which where the exclusive privilege of the Zhou Son of Heaven. Bao Xian \(^{38}\) (early Eastern Han) comments: "The three families were nothing but the ministers of the House of Lu."\(^{38}\) Ma Rong comments: "After the Son of Heaven had completed sacrifices in the royal ancestral temple, this song would be sung while clearing away the sacrificial vessels."\(^{39}\)

Herbert Fingarette remarks:

... the peculiarly moral yet binding power of ceremonial gesture and word cannot be abstracted from or used in isolation from ceremony; it is the power of ceremony. It is not a distinct power we happen to use in ceremony; it is the power of ceremony....Thus the power of li cannot be used except as the li is fully respected. This, too, is Confucius's constant refrain. "The Three Families used the Yong Song...
what possible application can such words have in the Hall of the Three Families?" (who were not entitled, according to -li to use this Song.)

In the two examples 3) and 4) above, while it is the usurpation of ceremonial privileges that Confucius is censoring, the real issue is "correction of names" since the effective functioning of rites/ceremonial is contingent upon and directed at the maintenance of social distinctions between ruler and subject, something which names serve to represent and demarcate. The following passage from the Zuo commentary to Ai 16 is a further illustration of this point:

On the eleventh day of the fourth month of summer Confucius died. Duke Ai delivered the memorial speech, "Heaven has not been kind to me! It has refused to let an elderly father of this state remain a little longer to vouchsafe my (yu yi ren) reign. I am alone and ill. Alas! Father Confucius, I am now lost without you to guide me." Zigong said, "I am afraid that Lord Ai will not die in Lu. Confucius said, 'If ceremonial is disregarded there will be confusion; if names are disregarded there will be transgressions.' To disregard one's purpose is obtuse; to disregard one's station is a transgression. When alive, Lord Ai was unable to employ Confucius, yet now that he is dead he has personally delivered his mourning speech - this is not the proper ceremonial. Lord Ai also referred to himself using the royal prerogative [yu] yi ren - this is not the proper name. In both respects Lord Ai has been remiss."

As a consequence of conducting ceremonial and using nomenclature other than that which was proper to his

40 Confucius - The Secular as Sacred, 12-13.
41 Disciple of Confucius, alt. name Duanmu Si.
42 See Zuo commentary to Ai 16, 60.2b.
station as ruler, Duke Ai transgressed ceremonial form and so risked rupturing social and political order.  

5) 6.23

A gu that does not fulfil its function as a gu. What a gu! What a gu! 

Mao Qiling comments:

Gu is the name of a wine vessel which can contain two sheng. The meaning of gu is 'in small quantity'. In ancient times, a measure of three sheng of wine was considered just right, five sheng excessive and two sheng a moderate quantity. Vessels were manufactured accordingly. Hence when making vessels and giving names, the meaning is based on something.... Now although the vessel is called a gu, yet it is frequently used to drink large quantities.

An alternative interpretation is that already in the time of Confucius the term gu had come to represent more than one standard of measurement; thus as a standard it was ambiguous.

\[43\] cf. Analects 16.2.

\[44\] Miller, "The Far East", 217, n. 3, makes the following observation: "It is important to note that the original ku pu ku/ku tsai, ku tsai has the negative pu 'does not [do]', rather than the negative fei 'is not, does not equal'.... The essential point of the original, with pu not fei, is that the object in question is not functioning as it should, because it is not what it should be; the concept is kinetic, not static, and has to do with function and role and not simply form."

\[45\] i.e. in Confucius' time.

\[46\] Lun yu ji qiu pian, 3.8a-8b. Mao's account of the measurements is based on a passage from the no longer extant Han shi shuo, by Han Ying (f1. 157 B.C.), quoted by Xu Shen in his Wu jing yi yi and preserved in the sub-commentary to Li ji, 23.12b.

\[47\] Compare the following conflicting accounts of what the capacity of a gu vessel was:

A) 2 sheng: Han shi shuo, see sub-commentary to Li ji, 23.12b; Gu Zhou li, see sub-commentary to Li ji, 23.12b; Zhou li, see sub-commentary to Li ji, 23.12b; Ma Rong, Lun yu ji jie, 6.7a.

B) 3 sheng: Zhou li, 41.16b; Shuo wen jie zi zhu, 4B, under gu.
If this final example does qualify as a legitimate example of Confucius' 'correction of names', it is unique in the Analects in that here 'name' refers to an object, the gu, not someone's social role. The other four examples all deal specifically with social roles and prescribe that those ming should apply only to certain appropriate shi. The gu example, on the other hand, seems to imply that a shi - in this case the current use to which a gu was put - should be altered to conform with a ming.

In conclusion, the primary arena for the application of Confucius' doctrine of 'correction of names' was socio-political rank and class differentiation; other matters were peripheral to this central concern. Hence in

48 The following apocryphal story from Han shi wai zhuan, 5.17b-18a; James Robert Hightower, Han Shih Wai Chuan, 190, mod., is a good illustration of how choice of terminology was seen to reflect distinctions in social roles:

Confucius was sitting in attendance on one of the Jisun family. The Jisun's Steward Tong said, "If the ruler sends a man to borrow a horse, should it be given to him?" Confucius said, "I have heard that when a ruler takes something from a vassal, it is called 'taking'; one does not speak of 'borrowing'." The member of the Jisun family understood and said to Steward Tong, "From now on, when the ruler takes something, call it 'taking'. Do not speak of 'borrowing'." Confucius thus corrected the expression 'to borrow a horse' and the proper relationship between ruler and vassal was established.

49 Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China, 72, also observes that, "The primary import of rectification of names, then, seems to lie in the manipulation of naming conventions rather than in [the] manipulation of states of affairs (i.e., nonlinguistic states of affairs)." Yet it should not be overlooked that through manipulating naming conventions new states of affairs can be brought about.
the case of the gu vessel, that which was pertinent was
the existence of ambiguous standards which in turn
evidenced a breakdown in the network of society's value
distinctions as encoded in ritual. In other words, the
problem of the gu could not be divorced from or seen in
isolation from a breakdown in people's performing their
proper social roles; rather it was seen to be indicative
of just such a breakdown.

When the Confucian concept of ming, understood to
refer to a broad range of entities, had become
sufficiently popular, a new interpretation of zheng ming
evolved which eventually became the other standard
traditional Chinese gloss of the term. This new
interpretation can be traced to Zheng Xuan:

Zheng ming means the correction of 'written
characters' (shu zi 书 字). In ancient times
they were called ming 矢, now they are
called zi 字. Li ji says, "Where there
are more than one hundred words (ming)
they are written on bamboo strips.
Confucius saw that the teachings of his
time were not being put into practice and
therefore wished to correct the
misinterpretation of written words (wen
zi)."

This interpretation must be seen against the background
of Han classical studies, where the written word was
elevated to an unprecedented status, producing among
other things such important etymological and lexical
works as Er ya 雅 , Fang yan 方言, Shuo wen jie zi and
Shi ming. That Zheng Xuan should gloss ming as 'written

50 Li ji would appear to be a mistake for Yi li 仪 礼. See
Yi li, 24.3a.
51 Lun yu yi shu, 7.3b-4a.
52 This list is by no means exhaustive - see the Xiao
jing 说 真 and Philology (xiao xue 小 学) sections of Han
word' is therefore not surprising, given the disciplinary bias of the greatest classicist of the Han. Zheng's gloss of ming owes more to the prevailing concerns of Han scholarship than to Confucius' usage of the term.

By the Tang dynasty, Zheng's interpretation seems to have been adopted as the orthodox interpretation. Thus in the bibliographic treatise of Sui shu in the summary to the Philology section, the following definition is given: "Confucius said, 'It would have to be the correction of names, I should think.' Names are characters." An anonymous work entitled Zheng ming in one juan is also recorded in this section. Similarly in the first page of his preface to Jing dian shi wen, Lu Deming (c.550-630) equates the ming of Analects 13.3 with words (wen).

Zhu Xi's interpretation of zheng ming, which follows the tradition of Sima Qian, was the official interpretation from the Song onwards. During the Qing period, however, Zheng's interpretation was still advocated by such scholars as Chen Zhan and Pan Weicheng. This interpretation, however, must be regarded as being mistaken in that it reflects an understanding of ming that evolved well after Confucius' time.

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32.946.
32.943.
Lun Yu gu xun, 7.2a-2b.
Lun Yu gu zhu ji jian, 13.1b-2b.
ii. Zheng Ming and Ming Shi

With the foregoing examination of traditional commentators' differing conceptions of zheng ming serving as background, some conclusions about the philosophical import of Confucius' zheng ming doctrine and its relationship to ming shi may now be drawn.

The standard interpretation of zheng ming is that the names of various social, political and ethical institutions were rectified so as to accord or conform with certain immutable standards inherited from tradition. Passages such as Analects 3.14 have also been seen as supporting this interpretation:

Having before it the example of the two former dynasties

According to the standard interpretation, this passage confirms that Confucius regarded himself as a custodian of traditional rites and mores. Hence, despairing at the extent to which the Zhou house had become effete, increasingly suffering the usurpation of its power and privileges by recalcitrant vassal states, Confucius advocated a return to a socio-political system that took the rites and ordinances of the early Zhou rulers as its

57 See for example, Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume 1: From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A.D., 98; A.C. Graham, Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters, 198; Ren Jiyu, Zhongguo zhexue shi, 1:69; Kaji Nobuyuki, Chūgoku ronrigaku no ronrigaku, 61; Kaji Nobuyuki, Chūgoku ronrigaku shi kenkyū, 81-82; D. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, 24; Uchiyama Toshihiko, Chōgoku kodai shisōshi ni okeru shizen ninshiki, 328-329. This selection is by no means exhaustive.

58 The Xia and the Shang-Yin
standard and model. A consequence of this interpretation has been to portray Confucius as a conservative if not, indeed, a reactionary.\textsuperscript{59} Confucius' confession to being a transmitter of past traditions, and not a creator or innovator,\textsuperscript{60} has probably also lent confirmation to this interpretation.

Yet while Confucius obviously harboured a profound respect for the cultural institutions of the Zhou, nevertheless that respect was by no means limited to the Zhou:

Yan Yuan \textsuperscript{61} asked about the government of a state. Confucius said: "Follow the calendar of the Xia, ride in the carriage of the Yin and wear the ceremonial cap of the Zhou. In music adopt the shao \textsuperscript{61} and wu \textsuperscript{61}.

Most importantly, however, it was the principle of cultural eclecticism guided by intelligent selectivity that Confucius was commending in his exclamation, "I follow Zhou". Specifically this utterance was a salutation to the creative discernment that the early Zhou cultural leaders had displayed in assimilating those elements of Xia and Shang-Yin culture that were best able to contribute to the enrichment of their own culture. This statement, moreover, takes on an added significance when read in the light of Analects 2.11:

The Master said, "To review what has gone before and thereby come to learn something

\textsuperscript{59} Graham, \textit{Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters}, 4, for example, comments, "Confucius was a conservative who set out to restore the moral and cultural heritage of the Chou".

\textsuperscript{60} Analects 7.1.

\textsuperscript{61} Shao and wu were the music of Shun and King Wu respectively. Analects 15.10; Lau, \textit{The Analects}, (15.11), 133-134, slightly mod.
"Learning" for Confucius was not an increase in some area of factual knowledge but rather the insight gained through a new perspective. For Confucius personally, that insight was no less than the knowledge that li, the web of social mores, was the fruit of tradition and if tradition itself could be re-animated, li would then be open to re-definition and re-interpretation, thereby preparing the groundwork for the re-structuring and re-orientation of society itself. In Franz Schurmann's words, "There are times in history, and this was one of them, when to discredit the present in terms of the past is to herald a future like neither."63

Ironically, that which Confucius transmitted made him a creator and innovator because he transformed tradition by fashioning it after the image of his own ideal. Confucius took as his ideal the realization of a self-regulating socio-political unity in which li was the principal agent for ensuring the integration and self-regulation of that unity. To realize this goal, however, names - which for Confucius were specific foci on this web-like network called li - had to be clearly pinpointed and demarcated. Accordingly, Confucius selected a small group of role types, each of which had already been invested with an archetypal status in its traditional

62 Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 90, n. 3, comments: "The business of the teacher is to give fresh life to the Scriptures by reinterpreting them so that they apply to the problems of modern life." See also Analects 1.15.
63 Joseph R. Levenson and Franz Shurmann, China: An Interpretive History, 47.
role. Principally, it was 'ruler', 'minister', 'father' and 'son' that were selected by Confucius for this task. It would seem that he believed that if these key role types could be successfully established, all other pertinent social change would be realized as a natural and necessary corollary.  

Confucius lent new definition to this small group of role types by passing judgment on various representatives of the role types. His judgments were made on the basis of a body of norms that he made central to his teachings: humaneness, rightness, filial submission, living up to one's word, fidelity, and reciprocity. By passing judgments on a whole range of situations involving these four role types, Confucius was able to redefine the significance that was attached to the names of these role types. By formulating his own account or myth about an ancient past and imbuing it with his own set of value judgments, he was able to create a vehicle to present his own ideal of social cohesion and political unity "as simply a reaffirmation, an appeal to an ancient, legitimate but neglected tradition".  

Names, not actualities, were Confucius' primary concern. He did not regard names as passive labels but rather as social and hence political catalysts. This was

64 See for example Analects 12.17; 13.6; 13.17; 13.13; 7.1.
65 Pingarette, The Secular as Sacred, 64. Of this 'lost Antiquity', Pierre Ryckmans comments, "Its actual contents were ... highly fluid and not susceptible to objective definition or circumspection by a specific historical tradition." See his article, "The Chinese Attitude Towards the Past", in Papers on Far Eastern History, 39 (1989), 7.
a function of the performative role that names were perceived to play in the networks of social patterns and human relations that constituted the underlying structure of li. The important dynamic focus of li meant that names were also viewed as 'form making'. Thus if a father behaved in the manner proper to a father by being paternal, the son should then respond by behaving in the manner proper to a son, that is, by being filial. Similarly, the name 'ruler' meant more than the title of a particular role type, it also implied a concomitant performance - ruling - the dynamics of which Confucius described as follows:

Ji Kangzi asked Confucius about government (zheng, 'enforcement of the correct'). Confucius replied, "Governing means 'being correct' (zheng ). If one leads with an example of correctness, then who would dare to be otherwise?"

Related to the performative force of names is of course the activity of 'naming', ming ; in fact naming was fundamental to the rectification of names programme. While ultimately Confucius relied on the performative (or more specifically, perlocutionary) force of names in the wider social environment to provide the impetus and direction for social and political change, nevertheless, initially the successful establishment of the names he

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66 For the fullest discussion of Confucius and performatives, see Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 268-275.

67 An aspect characterized by Tu Wei-ming as "a concrete way whereby one enters into communion with others". See "Li as Process of Humanization", reprinted in his Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought, 24.

68 See also Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 273-274.

69 Analects 12.17.
selected was very much dependent on the particular meanings he prescribed for them. To achieve this initial goal he redefined the significance attached to those names based on his own system of normative guidelines. In other words Confucius took it upon himself to prescribe or ordain the normative significance that was to be invested in a given name. As we shall see, this attitude that names could and, in the appropriate hands, should be used to prescribe actualities was later refined and echoed by Xun Qing in his own zheng ming doctrine.

The notion that names have a performative quality certainly has some ancient antecedents in Chinese thought. One early example, which dates back to the last two centuries of the second millennium BC, is provided in David N. Keightley’s study70 of the divination charges of the Shang kings of this period. During the period from Kang Ding 康丁 to Wen Wu Ding 文武丁 (c. 1110 - 1096) the divination charges (that is, the wording that identifies the event being divined and which was written on the scapulars of oxen or on turtle shells) had evolved such that they "always expressed the results desired".71 And by the periods of Di Yi 壹 (1095-1076) and Di Xin 殷辛 (1075-1045), only forecasts of good fortune were recorded. Keightley likens these divination charges "to what modern philosophers have called ‘performatives’,

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statements of intent or fact that satisfy the general rule that 'saying so makes it so'.

Keightley speculates that the Shang kings may actually have used the term ming* to refer to the charges.

As noted by Graham, ming* (which is etymologically related to ming) means to "name something to be brought about".

According to this type of thinking it is the name giver who is instrumental in determining what things will be articulated and how. In naming (ming*), the name giver quite literally 'ordains' things to be brought about. (This idea of 'commanding' something is central to ling 'command', a cognate of ming*.) It is this notion that in naming one can thereby cause something to be brought about which lies at the heart of what I term 'nominal prescriptivism': the use of names to prescribe entities or states of affairs. In the case of divination it seems

72 In Sources of Shang History, 33, he writes:

The term "charge" (ming-tz'u 聴) is used by modern scholars to refer to the topic of the divination inscription. There is no certain evidence that ming was a Shang term. That it was used in Chou plastromancy, however, suggests that the modern term may have been used in Shang times; the Chou usage supports the view that the individual divination sentences were not questions but were wishes, tentative forecasts, or statements of intent with which the bone or shell was being charged.

For a number of expert discussions of whether or not charges were ever questions, see the collection of articles in Early China, 14 (1989), 77-172.

75 In fact it was only after the middle period of the Western Zhou, when the mouth signific was added to ming*, that there evolved two distinct graphs. See Fu Sinian, Xing ming gu xun bianzheng, zhang 2 and 10, in Fu Sinian quanji, vol. 2.
to have been a matter of mystical or religious import, albeit with practical consequences; with Confucius' zheng ming doctrine it becomes a philosophical vision of social engineering based on nominalist principles of naming.

Concluding Remarks

A key difference between Confucius' zheng ming philosophy and Xu Gan's concept of the name and actuality relationship is the issue of nominal prescriptivism. While at one level Confucius presented names as being important because they served to represent and demarcate socio-political distinctions, as far as his own philosophical intentions were concerned their real value was that they could be used to prescribe and not simply describe those distinctions. For Xu Gan, of course, the notion that names should be used to prescribe actualities was the philosophical antithesis of his basic position that names followed from actualities and not vice versa. Nevertheless, in concluding his discussion of Confucius and ming Xu Gan does write:

That which Zhong Ni valued were those names that name actualities. The reason he valued names was in order to value actualities.

Although his discussion of Confucius and ming is confined to ming in the sense of reputation, the discussion is within the context of his more general discussion of the name-actuality relationship. In other words, it is distinctly possible that the conclusion Xu Gan draws in the above paragraph, while having been based on an
interpretation of Confucius' attitude to reputation, was equally intended to be a statement concerning Confucius' stance on the ming shi issue generally. The reason that Xu Gan chose to 'defend' Confucius on the issue of reputation rather than correction of names may well have been because Xu Gan saw it as more defensible. It would then be possible to regard Xu Gan as an apologist for a Confucius (and by implication the Confucian tradition) who had come to be characterized as more concerned with ming (in its broad sense) than shi. Certainly Xun Qing's subsequent development of zheng ming thinking could only have enhanced such a characterization.

Yet even if this is so, it is important to note that the interpretation of Confucius' zheng ming programme as an exercise in nominal prescriptivism is mine, not Xu Gan's, and is one based on the notion that names can function as performatives. Indeed, it is only in the last twenty years that interpretative theories based on the performative dimension in Confucius' thought have been developed.

One crucial reason Confucius was able to develop his prescriptivist zheng ming philosophy was because he did not see the correlation between names and entities to be one bedded in a normative cosmic order; for Xu Gan, however, it was such an order that made the correlation between names and actualities possible. Where Xu Gan's name and actuality thinking does share some common ground with Confucius' zheng ming thinking is that in both ming represents social roles. Admittedly Xu
Gan is more immediately concerned with a man's reputation but as we have seen he is also concerned with title and position insofar as he saw them to be an extension of a man's ming. In later discussions of ming and shi, thinkers tended to be concerned with particular objects and their names rather than socio-political position. As we shall see in the next chapter, the reason for this can in no small part be attributed to the new linguistic and logical direction that Neo Mohist thinkers pushed discussion of ming and shi.
Chapter 3

NOMINALIST THEORIES OF NAMING IN THE NEO MOHIST SUMMA AND XUN ZI

i. The Neo Mohists and Ming Shi

The Neo Mohists were the first group of thinkers in early China to apply the methods of sustained logical enquiry in their philosophical writings, as the definitions and propositions which comprise the body of the Neo Mohist summa bear witness. Their theories and teachings came to maturity in the third century B.C. against a background of diverse and rapidly changing social, political and intellectual values, where Daoist scepticism and School of Names disputation had forced thinkers to reflect critically on traditional and common sense beliefs about their perception of the world and their ability to articulate that perception.

The Neo Mohist thinkers were also the first group of thinkers to define ming and shi:

That by which something is called is its ming; what is so called is a shi.

1 An earlier draft of part of this chapter has been incorporated in my article, "Names, Actualities and the Emergence of Essentialist Theories of Naming in Classical Chinese Thought", Philosophy East and West, 42.3 (July, 1991), 341-364.

2 Explanation to Canon A 80. In referring to the six dialectical pian from Mo Zi (40-45), I have followed Graham's arrangement and numbering of the Canons and Explanations. Where I have followed a different textual reading, I have indicated so in the appropriate footnote. On the estimated dating of the six dialectical pian that are identified as the Neo Mohist summa, see Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 23-24, and Watanabe Takashi, Kodai Chugoku shisô no kenkyû, 533-538, 545, who date both the Canons and Explanations circa late fourth century B.C. to late third century B.C.
I have already explained that from its primary meaning of 'inner substantiality' the word shi evolved an extended sense of 'substantial manifestation'. As an application of this sense of substantial manifestation, throughout the summa shi is used consistently to mean particular object or entity. I will use the word 'object' to distinguish this meaning of shi from its other meaning of 'actuality'. That the Mohist does use shi to mean object is most evident in the Explanation to Canon A 78 where he distinguishes between unrestricted (wu 非), kind (lei 貴) and private (si 貴) names:

'Thing' is the unrestricted name; any object necessarily requires this name. Naming something 'horse' is an example of a kind name; one necessarily uses this name for those things which are like the object. Naming something 'Cang' is an example of a private name; this name is restricted to this object.

The Mohist's overriding concern was not that a name accurately and faithfully represents some object, but rather that the distinctions invested in that name be maintained. He understands shi to be particulars where "a common name is treated as an abbreviation of 'something which is like the object', the object being the particular for which the name is ordained" and "the function of common names is to be explained on purely nominalist grounds."3

The Mohist proposes that objects can be known on the basis of observation, explanation or report (A 80). In other words, it is held that provided certain criteria are adhered to, there can be a correspondence between

3 See Graham, Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 325.
names and the objects which they 'pick out'. Yet although Canon A 80 lists objects (shi) among the four objects of knowledge - names, objects, how to relate them and how to act - more attention is focussed on names than objects. Feng Youlan also notes this primacy of names as an object of knowledge: "The arrangement of these four types of knowledge has names first and action last. This indicates that knowledge begins with knowledge of names and is completed with knowledge of action."\(^4\)

While initially the naming of an object is implicitly an arbitrary association, the distinctions represented by the man-made names are nevertheless considered to be real (B 68). Once a name has been established, it then serves to refer to that object:

**Canon A 32**

To speak is to emit references.

**Explanation**

To inform about this name is to refer to that object. Therefore 'saying' is an emitting of something's characterizations of which any speaker is capable. To characterize something is like drawing a picture of a tiger, but it is in words. To say a word, such as 'stone', is to communicate it.\(^5\)

Just as a picture may serve as an analogue used to refer to an object - but is not the object itself - so, too, names are words used to refer to objects. It is in this sense that names convey meaning. We use words such as 'stone' to communicate the object stone, just as we might


communicate an actual tiger by drawing a tiger. \(^6\) "It is by means of names that objects are picked out" (NO. 11). \(^7\)

On what basis are they picked out? On the basis of similarity:

*Canon A 31*

To pick out is to present the analogue for the object. \(^8\)

To this end a standard is first established:

*Canon A 70*

The standard (fa-li̇) is that in being like which something is so.

**Explanation**

The image (yi-ma), the compasses, a circle, all three may serve as a standard.

*Canon A 71*

The criterion (yin-hua) is that wherein it is so.

**Explanation**

Being 'so' is the characterizations being like the standard. \(^9\)

There are three standards which may be appealed to in the construction of a circle: one's image of a circle, a compass, or an actual circle. It is interesting to speculate why the Mohist's first choice as a standard for a circle is an image. Could he be implying that the image of a circle is the most general or universal

\(^6\) I interpret the 'man' signific that forms part of the character 人, to indicate that the drawn tiger is man-made, not a real tiger. cf. also the characters xiang 像 and wei 偽.

\(^7\) Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 482, slightly mod.


representation of a circle, even though "all three may serve as standard"? The import of such an interpretation is that here yi signifies a mental image of a circle which has been abstracted from particulars. It would then be tempting to see in this interpretation evidence of universals in the Mohist summa. Somewhat surprisingly, Graham lends indirect support to the plausibility of such a Realist interpretation,\textsuperscript{10} by tentatively choosing to follow Liu Chang's\textsuperscript{11} proposal that the pu $\square$ graph in the Explanations to A 58 and A 59 be read pu $\I$, "wood (or jade, or earth, or a man) in its crude state", thus yielding the following translation:

Canon A 58

\begin{quote}
Yuan$\I$(circular) is having the same lengths from the centre.
\end{quote}

Explanation

The compasses draw it in the rough (?) .

Canon A 59

\begin{quote}
Fang$\I$(square) is circuiting in four from a right angle (?) .
\end{quote}

Explanation

The carpenter's square shows it in the rough (?) .

Graham maintains that if Liu's identification is correct, "the meaning is surely that compasses and carpenter's square draw only rough approximations to the true circle

\textsuperscript{10} It should be noted that on the issue of the circle, Graham himself did not maintain that the Mohists understood it to name an idea, a charge against which he defends himself in his review of Hansen's Language and Logic in Ancient China, in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 45.2 (1985), 698-699.

\textsuperscript{11} Xu Mo Zi jiangu, 3.6a.
and square"\(^{12}\) (my italics) and cites the following paradox from Zhuang Zi\(^ {13}\) as further evidence of the plausibility of his interpretation of A 58 and A 59: "The carpenter's square is not square, the compasses cannot make a circle."\(^ {14}\) He even refers the reader to Feng Youlan's Realist interpretation of this paradox. A tentative textual emendation and one interpretation of a contextless paradox, however, are insufficient grounds on which to warrant a Realist interpretation of the Mohist's use of yi. Rather, in the summa, yi is best understood, following Hansen, as a term "used of images of memory or imagination".\(^ {15}\)

Besides the circle, another example of yi is a pillar (A 39, B 57 and NO 3). Again it is Graham who advances the most philosophically stimulating, if albeit controversial, interpretation, maintaining that the "pillar, the stock example of something we recognize by a mental picture ... is known 'a priori' from the definition."\(^ {16}\) This interpretation relies on emending the text at B 57 from *wu zhi* \(\frac{1}{1}\) to *xian zhi* \(\frac{1}{2}\) (on the assumption that *wu* had originally been written as *wu* \(\frac{1}{3}\)). While I do not contend the plausibility of the amendment, nevertheless, in taking *xian zhi* to mean 'to know a priori' rather than simply 'to know beforehand', Graham leaves himself open to the objection that one imports

\(^{12}\) Graham, Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 309.
\(^{13}\) Zhuang Zi, pian 33, 1106.
\(^{14}\) Wang Dianji, Mo jing de luoji kexue sixiang fenxi, 307, also interprets this sophism as referring to universals.
\(^{15}\) Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China, 113.
\(^{16}\) Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 429, 224.
more Western philosophical baggage than is warranted on the evidence. Nor has he demonstrated why 'to know beforehand' would be an unsuitable translation. Even if it is granted that the Mohists did use the words xian zhi to mean a priori, nevertheless, describing their using it in a "more sophisticated sense" (p. 223) than Wang Chong, who used it in the ordinary sense of 'knowing beforehand', would indeed be a considerable understatement of the philosophical implications of a priorism. The problem with this interpretation is further complicated, I believe, by the types of things the Mohist is said to consider to be a priori knowable, such as a pillar.

Returning to the Mohist's claim of being able to identify some object as being analogous to a given object or "being like an object" (A 78), it will be noted that he has not shown how defining characteristics and mere resemblances to those defining characteristics are to be differentiated. He does not, however, appear to have regarded this as problematical (assuming that he ever did address the question), presumably being satisfied that his definition of 'standard' - "that in being like which something is so" - was sufficient to make the critical distinction between defining characteristics and mere resemblances to those defining characteristics. Graham remarks:

The Mohist raises no epistemological questions, he has no doubts that whether by observation, report or explanation we can
know and that when we do "we necessarily do know". 17

Yet if knowledge was so certain, why was disputation one of the major disciplines described in the summa? Disputation for the Mohist was about distinguishing between alternative claims as to what name or set of names applied to an object:

Canon A 74

Disputation is contending over 'That'. 18 Winning in disputation is to be appropriate.

Explanation

One calling it 'ox' and one calling it 'non-ox', this is to contend over That. This being the case, they are not both appropriate. Since they are not both appropriate, one necessarily is inappropriate.

Conforming to the law of the excluded middle, 19 proper disputation obliges one to choose between one of two alternatives: "Someone says it is this and someone says

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17 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 39.
18 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 318, changes you f螳 to f螳 on the grounds that A 73 presents a definition. While not disputing this point, I believe it is preferable to follow Sun Yirang, Mo Zi jiangu, 1:285, in changing you to Bi. (Bi, it will be noted, is the character used in the Explanations to A 73 and A 74.) This alteration is not made at the cost of denying that Canon A 73 is a definition: "Bi is it cannot be the case that both sides are inadmissible." That is, in disputation one side is necessarily wrong, and that side is Bi.

Bi is an important technical term frequently employed in the context of disputation. It refers to the proposition expounded by one's opponent and is often contrasted with ci, one's own proposition. See also Wu Feibo, Mo bian jiegu, in his Zhongguo gu mingjia yan, 1:64-66; Janusz Chmielewski, "Notes on Early Chinese Logic (6)", Rocznik Orientalistyczny, 30.1 (1966), 41-42. See Donald Leslie, Argument by Contradiction in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Reasoning, 8-13; Chmielewski, "Notes on Early Chinese Logic (5)", Rocznik Orientalistyczny, 29.2 (1965), 117-138, passim; "Notes on Early Chinese Logic (6)", 31-35, passim.
it is not and the one whose [claim] is appropriate wins" (B 35 Explanation). What is pertinent is that there must be a winner. In stipulating that something must be either X or non-X, the Mohist leaves no room for shades of grey because once a standard has been established, an object either conforms to it or does not. It is on this basis that the Mohist cuts up the world.

The reason the Mohist raises no epistemological questions is because for him it was the practical implications of conforming or not conforming to a nominal standard, of maintaining a clearcut distinction between 'this' and 'that', that was of fundamental concern, not epistemological problems. It is not that such questions were swept under the carpet, but, not being of obvious practical consequence to the Mohist, they therefore warranted less attention. In short, he was concerned with ensuring that conventionally determined names for objects were implemented and maintained. Knowing and not knowing thus turn out to be differentiable on the basis of one's ability to discriminate by denomination. To be able to denominate even that which one does not know is, paradoxically, sufficient to qualify as knowing:

Canon B 48

Knowing what he does not know. Explained by: picking out by means of the name.

Explanation

If you mix together what he does know and what he does not know, and ask about them, he is obliged to say 'This I do know, this I do not know'. To be capable of picking

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20 See B 86.
I do not know'. To be capable of picking out the one and disclaiming the other is to know them both. 21

The basis of this distinction making is the standard upon which a name is based. Thus the objects which names are said to 'pick out' (NO 11) conform to a standard, while names are the conventionally determined means by which such standards are demarcated. Thus, in the series of problems that deals with the Mohist discipline of explaining names (B 32-82), with only one exception are the problems "conceived as soluble on the plane of names without observation of objects"; 22 similarly, in the series of propositions that lays down rules for relating names to objects (A 88-B 12), it is the 'ruthless consistency' of applying nominal standards that is the overriding principle. This commitment to nominal consistency, in its extreme form, has the Monist upholding propositions such as "killing robbers is not killing people" (NO 15), a position which Yang Liang in his commentary to Xun Zi (preface 819 A.D.) was to criticize for being concerned only with ming and failing to investigate into shi. 23

For the Mohist, names, not objects, are of primary importance because they represent distinctions that are then embodied in definitions. Definitions, which function as standards, serve as the final court of appeal for distinguishing between alternative claims as to what name 'picks out' what object. As we have said already, the

22 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 399.
23 Xun Zi, 16.5a.
Mohist's overriding concern was not that a name accurately and faithfully represent some object, but rather that the distinctions invested in that name be maintained.

ii. Xun Qing and Ming Shi

I have chosen to include both the Neo Mohists and Xun Qing in this chapter because of the striking similarity of Xun Qing's essay "On the Correct Use of Names" with those sections of the Mohist summa that deal with names and naming. Indeed, it is also tempting to see "On the Correct Use of Names" as "a digest of the techniques of Mohist disputation adapted to Confucian purposes".\(^{24}\) Given his nominalism, it is not surprising to find that, like the Mohists, he understands shi to mean particular objects. This understanding of shi is made evident in the distinction he makes between 'objects' (shi) and 'things' (wu):

There are things with the same shape but in different locations and things differing in shape but in the same location; these things are to be differentiated. Although those things with the same shape but in different locations can be combined, nevertheless they are said to be two objects. Those things whose shape transforms but still remain the same object are said to be transformed. To be transformed but not to be different is said to be the one object. It is in this way that we examine into objects and determine their number.\(^{25}\)

\(^{24}\) Graham, _Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science_, 63.

\(^{25}\) Xun Zi, 16.4b.
An example of 'things with the same shape but in different locations' would be two horses. An example of 'things differing in shape but in the same location' would be a caterpillar which becomes a moth, or a foal which becomes an adult horse. For Xun Qing, **wu** is used to refer in a general way to the thing which an object is (insect, horse, man, etc.), while **shi** is used to refer to particular individual objects. In fact, in "On the Correct Use of Names", **wu** functions in a special technical sense as an extension of the above meaning:

Accordingly, even though the myriad things are numerous, sometimes we wish to refer to them collectively and so we call them 'things'. 'Things' is the most general name (**da gong ming**).  

As with the Mohists, Xun Qing identified three broad categories of names: 'the most general name', 'general names', (**gong ming**), and 'great names of distinction', (**da bie ming**). There was only one most general name, and like the Mohist's unrestricted name there was no object to which it did not apply. It should be pointed out, however, that it would seem to be very much a relative matter as to whether a 'general name' or a 'great name of distinction' should apply to a given

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26 See Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 196. Xun Qing's employment of the terms conforms with their respective etymologies. I have already discussed **shi**. Originally, **wu** seems to have meant a motley coloured ox and from this two pairs of extended meanings were derived. The first, 'colour', from which the meanings 'sign', 'mark' or 'symbol' were further evolved, and the second, 'creatures of the same kind', from which the meaning 'myriad creatures' was further evolved. See *Shuo wen jie zi* **gu lin**, 2A.542a, Xu commentary, which quotes Dai Tong **bi juan**, *Liu shu gu* **(33 juan, 1320 AD)*; Shirakawa Shizuka, *Setsumon shingi*, 2:30-32.

27 *Xun Zi*, 16.4a.
object. For example, relative to 'animals', the term 'horses' would be a great distinguishing name, yet relative to 'Shetland pony', 'horses' would be a general name.28

For Xun Qing, the purpose of naming was to demarcate different objects:

A name has no intrinsic appropriateness; rather, the appropriateness of a particular name is demarcated by being ordained (ming, lit. 'to cause to be brought about by naming'). The demarcation having been fixed and its custom established, then the name is called appropriate. Should a name then differ from custom, it is called inappropriate. A name has no intrinsically object; rather its object is demarcated by being ordained. The demarcation having been fixed and its custom established, then it is called the object's name.31

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28 Relative to simple, individual objects, of course, 'Shetland pony' would in turn function as a general name. Xun Qing also made a distinction between what he termed 'single names', dan ming, and 'compound names', jian ming. I surmise that these two categories were specific to particular objects. An example of the former would be 'horse', while an example of the latter would be 'white horse'. Xun Qing further writes that "if a single name and a compound name are not mutually exclusive, then they can be given a general name." Thus 'horse' and 'white horse' (understood as being a 'single' and a 'compound' name respectively) would refer to one horse and one white horse, whereas 'horse', understood as referring to horses generally, would function as a general name. On this interpretation, see Liu Nianqin's commentary, cited by Liang Qixiong, Xun Zi jian shi, 315. In short, it would appear that the fact that the name 'horse' could function ambiguously as a singular and general term was of little consequence for Xun Qing. Following Liu Shipei, "Xun Zi bushi", in Guocui xuebao, 53 (1909), 4a (in particular); 56 (1909), 1b, 3b, in understanding yue in the sense of 'demarcate/demarcation' or 'define/definition' (to determine or fix the boundary or extent of) rather than the standard rendering of 'convention'.

30 Following Wang Niansun, Du shu za zhi, (Xun Zi 7) 2:94, in treating shi after ming as superfluous.

31 Xun Zi, 16.4b.
This is the core of Xun Qing's nominalist theory of naming. Thus just as the heart is the seat of cognition and overseer of the senses, so too the ruler determines what object a name demarcates. By ordaining a particular denomination the ruler establishes boundaries which serve to demarcate one object from another. Only then is a name made a matter of convention. The kingly prerogative to decide how objects should be tailored and the resulting distinctions fixed as names, meant that for Xun Qing, consensus regarding a term's usage came after the king had decided what should be named and how.

\[32\] Xun Zi, 11.10a:

Ears, eyes, nose, mouth and body are each connected but cannot perform one another's tasks. They are called the natural senses (lit. 'Heavenly offices'). The heart resides in inner vacuity and governs the five senses. It is called the natural ruler.

(*Following Wang Niansun, Du shu za zhi, (Xun Zi 5), 2:61, in emending xing neng to xing tai.)

And if it were not for the heart, then "even if white and black were before one, the eyes would not see it, or a large drum beside one, the ears would not hear it" (Xun Zi, 15.1b), because the heart is also the seat of cognition and knowledge:

The heart also recognizes. Because of the faculty of recognition, then by depending on [the sensory impressions of] the ears, sounds are able to be known, and by depending on [the sensory impressions of] the eyes, shapes are able to be known. (Xun Zi, 16.3b)

*A.S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study of Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology, 32, defines the difficult term zhe g zhi as "the confirmatory function of the mind with respect to knowledge", arguing that it "is not just a matter of recognition or identification of objects of sense perception as belonging to different classes, but also a reliance on past experience for sustained perceptual judgments in general." I think 'recognizes' captures this sense quite adequately.
Among modern linguists, the notion that language is a social convention is a commonplace. Hansen argues that similarly, one of the four assumptions that were "implicit in classical [Chinese] thought about language", was "conventionalism", where:

the way of dividing reality into objects to be named (totally apart from what symbol or sounds the community uses) is also a function of common acceptance of a shared and conventional practice of classification or division.... Naming is just making the distinctions, and the distinctions themselves are merely conventional - socially agreed on ways of dividing up the world.33

Certainly it is true that Xun Qing recognized the essentially arbitrary and conventional nature of the practice of giving names to objects, (for example, what is now called horse could equally have been called an ox). Nevertheless, it is evident that for Xun Qing "the way of dividing reality into objects to be named" was the prerogative of the ruler. "Common acceptance" and "conventional practice" were matters subsequent to the ruler's 'ordination' of a name, names being based on his conception, arbitrary or otherwise, of how objects should be differentiated, how the world should be cut up and named. However farfetched this may seem and however much it is at odds with some of the more influential modern views on language, it must be borne in mind that Xun Qing's primary concern with names was pragmatic, not semantic.

33 Hansen, *Language and Logic in Ancient China*, 62-63. See also 57-65.
The following passages records his statement of the purpose in having names:

Thus in order to make distinctions, the wise men (sage kings) instituted names to point out objects. On the one hand, noble and base are made clear, and on the other hand, the same and the different are distinguished.  

If noble and base are clearly differentiated and the same and the different distinguished, then there will be no trouble in [the ruler] conveying his intentions nor misfortune arising from being hampered and frustrated in his affairs. This is the purpose in having names.

Names represent standards by which things that are similar may be grouped together and things that are different may be distinguished. The ultimate justification, however, is not philosophical but political:

Hence with regard to names instituted by the [sage] kings, the names having been fixed, then objects were distinguished, the Way was carried out and the [kings’] will was known everywhere.... Now the sage kings are no more, the upholding of names is remiss, strange words have arisen, names and objects are confused and the shape of what ‘is’ and what ‘is not’ is unclear, thus even officials who maintain the laws and Confucians who recite the scriptures are both confused. Should a [sage] king arise, he would certainly continue both to use old names and create new ones.

For Xun Qing it was imperative that the sovereignty to ordain the appropriateness of a name for a given object be invested in the ruler. His criticism of the

34 Xun Zi, 16.2b.
35 Xun Zi, 16.3a.
36 Following Yu Yue, Zhuzi pingyi, (Xun Qing 1), 132, in his gloss of the Xun Zi, "Quan xue" sentence gu song shu yì guān zhì 《論語》 "是故自遠有之", in understanding shuō to mean
37 Xun Zi, 16.2a-2b.
School of Names'\textsuperscript{38} sophisms was primarily to demonstrate the vulnerability of distinctions to manipulation and distortion, if the power to preserve and institute crucial name distinctions were not kept in the hands of the ruler. Sometimes Xun Qing talks simply of "kings" instituting new names.\textsuperscript{39} By "kings", however, he means true kings or sage kings because only a sage king could make the necessary distinctions:

Therefore, to be the Son of Heaven, one must be the right man. The empire is the weightiest thing of all. Only the strongest can bear it. It is the largest thing of all. Only the most discriminating can make the proper distinctions. It is the most populous thing of all. Only the wisest is able to harmonize it. Only a sage ruler is able to fulfill these three requirements. Hence unless he is a sage, he will not be able to rule as a true king.\textsuperscript{40}

The type of names that a sage king would institute are of two sorts, those creatively culled from tradition and neologisms coined to meet the exigencies of changed times and changed circumstances. In this respect Xun Qing shows himself to be much more amenable to authoritarian political measures than Confucius, as is evinced in his advocating that it was the ruler's prerogative to decree what names should be selected from tradition and also to decide what names needed to be revamped or created.

Of those old names which continue to be used, we learn that the 'later kings' (that is, the rulers of contemporary and near contemporary times) had accepted the Shang terminology for punishments, the Zhou

\textsuperscript{38} Xun Zi, 16.5a-5b, in particular.
\textsuperscript{39} See Xun Zi, 16.2a, 2b.
\textsuperscript{40} Xun Zi, 12.3a, Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 1:299, mod.
terminology for the titles of nobility, the traditional terminology with respect to ceremonial/ritual and even the common names used by the general populace were followed. Commenting on the passage that "a name has no intrinsic appropriateness; rather its appropriateness is demarcated by being ordained", Homer Dubs comments that "the kings probably only fixed such terms as those of nobility and ceremony". It is of course true that the titles of rank and position and the concomitant terms of ritual differentiation were of prime importance because, from a political point of view, if noble and base were not clearly differentiated then all other distinctions and the names based on such distinctions would become meaningless. In the "Zheng lun" clinic, however, Xun Qing makes it clear that the ruler was concerned with a broader spectrum of names than simply those pertaining to rank and etiquette:

Hence in all matters of explanation (yan 演), discourse (yi 謀), definition (qi 起), and naming (ming 明), the sage kings are taken as teachers. One of the divisions made by sage kings is honour and shame. The sage kings established it as a standard, the senior administrators take it as a road to be followed, the lower officials take it as a practice to be observed and the people take it as an accepted custom.

41 See Xun Zi, 16.1a.
43 Following Wang Yinzhi 莊子 as quoted in Wang Xianqian, Xun Zi jijie, 12.16a, in emending shi fei 非到 mo fei 非到.
44 These four terms seem to parallel, albeit in a different sequence, the four terms listed in "Zheng ming", 16.6a: qi 明, ming 明, bian 賢, shuo 說.
45 Xun Zi, 12.12a, 13a, last sentence following Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 228 mod.
The definition of certain basic and primary names (for example those pertaining to social, political and moral distinctions) appears to have been seen by Xun Qing as having a direct effect on the use of ordinary names in general and consequently required the ruler's ordination. (An apt illustration of how a breakdown in name standards affected common names is the case of the gu vessel in Analects 6.23.46) The picture Xun Qing presents is that originally the sage kings had created a system of names that ensured social cohesion and political order. Now, however, that system had broken down and once again needed a sage king to institute new names. The question of what would constitute appropriate jurisdiction in this matter would appear to have been left deliberately undefined so as to maximize the ruler's discretion to act according to the exigency of circumstance.

Concluding Remarks

As with Confucius, nominal prescriptivism is a key characteristic of both the Neo Mohists' and Xun Qing's thinking about the way that ming should relate to shi. Thus, in the summa, it is nominal standards rather than essential qualities which serve as the basis on which objects are 'picked out' and demarcated. For the Mohist, once a standard has been established, an object either conforms to it or does not. It is on this basis that the Mohist tailors the world. This concern with nominal

46 See discussion in Chapter 2.
consistency for the purposes of guiding discourse in the context of disputation necessarily lends to the discussion of 明誓 in the summa a linguistic-cum-logical focus, rather than a socio-political one such as we find in Confucius' 郑明 thinking.

As we have seen, Xun Qing owed a considerable theoretical debt to the Mohists. Most particularly, he was indebted to the Mohists for the techniques they had developed in disputation, adapting them to his own purposes. The result is a political doctrine that champions nominal prescriptivism based on an interpretation of 明誓 that had been developed by the Mohists. It is this distinct blend of political and linguistic concerns that characterizes Xun Qin's nominal prescriptivism.

For Xun Qing, because names serve an important political role, it is imperative that the sovereignty to ordain the appropriateness of names be invested in the ruler. Without names, distinctions remain unfixed and unclear. The names ordained by rulers are normative standards seen as fundamental to the implementation and maintenance of social, political and ethical objectives.

His debt to Confucius was that man's vision of the political importance of nominal prescriptivism, as articulated in the 郑明 programme. Xun Qing seems to have regarded names relating to socio-political distinctions as those most in need of ordination by the ruler. This was because they represented certain primary standards and distinctions that in turn determined other
distinctions, and so could be harnessed to engineer socio-political change. It is thus apposite that these socio-political ends, which Xun Qing saw ming and shi as serving, should be expounded in an essay that takes its name from Confucius' zheng ming programme.

As with the Mohists, Xun Qing's nominal prescriptivism is premised on a nominalist theory of naming; Xun Qing's formulation is, however, stated quite explicitly.

A name has no intrinsic appropriateness; rather, the appropriateness of a particular name is demarcated by being ordained. A name has no intrinsically appropriate object; rather its object is demarcated by being ordained.47

The nominalist theories of naming described in this chapter and Xu Gan's cumulative theory of naming are at philosophical poles. According to the first, names are seen to have no intrinsically appropriate shi; according to the other, a name is used to refer to a shi because that name is intrinsically appropriate to that shi.

The use of shi to mean 'particular object' is a corollary to the nominalist theories of naming articulated in the summa and "On the Correct Use of Names". While Xu Gan makes a conceptual distinction between an entity (wu) and that by virtue of which an entity is what it is, for Xun Qing and the Neo Mohists an object (shi) is nothing more than a group of

47 Following Wang Niansun, Du shu za zhi, (Xun Qing 7) 2:94, in treating shi after ming as superfluous.
characteristics which are arbitrarily picked out and deemed to resemble a standard.

With some justification, we may thus consider the Neo Mohists' and Xun Qing's views on ming shi to be the antithesis of those held by Xu Gan. Yet despite this, Xu Gan holds Xun Qing in considerable esteem, and nowhere criticises his views on ming shi. Why this should be so is a matter of speculation. One possibility might be, given that the actuality/object and nominalist distinctions that I have made would not have been entertained by Xu Gan, therefore his understanding of "On the Correct Use of Names" would have been very different from the one I have presented. Yet even so, Xu Gan would not have concurred with the view that "A ming has no intrinsically shi; rather its shi is demarcated by being ordained". In view of this, it seems plausible that his failure to make any reference to Xun Qing's nominalist views may have been because he did not wish to criticise one of the great teachers of the Confucian tradition. Whatever the case, in stating that "names follow actualities", he plainly rejected the sort of nominalism prescribed by Xun Qing.

48 To which his frequent quotations from Xun Zi and occasional reference to Xun Qing bear witness. He makes no reference to the Neo Mohists.
49 As for the summa, even if Xu Gan had managed to see some or all of it, for scholars in Han times it would have been only intermittently intelligible. See Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 65-66.
50 This interpretation is given indirect support by a passage at B.1b, where Xu Gan is critical of thinkers from a variety of schools, but does not include reference to any Confucian or Daoist thinkers.
CHAPTER 4

HAN FEI'S XING MING THINKING AND MING SHI

If Confucius' rectification of names programme can be regarded as the first phase in the application of nominal prescriptivism to political philosophy, then Xun Qing's "On the Correct Use of Names" thinking represents the second phase. Thus, despite the fact that Han Fei was not a Confucian, it is not altogether surprising that this student of Xun Qing should have refined a theory of matching 'name and deed' (xing ming 行名), based on an appropriation of the ming shi dichotomy, that represents the third phase. What is surprising is how different it is to the types of nominal prescriptivism I have described so far.

Xing ming is one of the central concepts in Legalist philosophy of statecraft. Implicit in the interpretation presented in this chapter are two related claims: First, from probably as early as the Eastern Han or Wei, the full and original meaning of the Legalist term xing ming had already become obscure and forgotten. Second, by utilizing evidence inherent in certain

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1 An article based on an earlier draft of this chapter will be published under the title, "The Legalist Concept of Hsing-ming: An Example of the Contribution of Archaeological Evidence to the Re-interpretation of Transmitted Texts", Monumenta Serica, 39 (1991/1992).

2 I use the term 'Legalism' in a general sense to denote a corpus of politico-philosophical thought contributed to and developed by such statesmen and thinkers as Shang Yang (fl. 359-338), Shen Buhai (d. c. 337 B. C.), Shen Dao (c. 360-285), Han Fei and Li Si (d. 208 B. C.), who laid a primary emphasis on law and methods of administrative control in their various conceptions of how a state should be governed.
archaeological materials unearthed over the last couple of decades, it has now become possible to formulate a much more complete and accurate interpretation of the meaning of xīng ming. The materials that I am referring to are manuscripts, dating from the late third and second centuries B.C., which feature the xīng graph being used to represent the meaning of 'form', 'take on a definite form', 'give form to' and 'pattern/standard', in addition to its more commonly associated meanings. It is the significance of this one graph representing a variety of meanings that is fundamental to my interpretation of xīng ming.

i. Shen Buhai and Method

In attempting to formulate a correct understanding of xīng ming, a good place to start is with the Legalist concept of shu or 'administrative Method'. There seems little reason to dismiss the accounts given in Shi ji and Han Fei Zi which state that Shen Buhai, the statesman who advocated a particular form of statecraft that was known as 'Method' (shu), served as Chancellor of Han under the Marquis of Zhao (r.362?-333?) in the middle of the fourth century B.C. What is less certain, however, is how to interpret the fragments, which, assuming them to be genuine, preserve Shen Buhai's thought, given that we have almost no knowledge of the political milieu in which his philosophy was formulated.

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1 63.2146, 45.1869.
2 17.5b-6a.
3 Qian Mu, Xian Qin zhuzi xinian, 1:200-202.
4 On the question of the precise dates, see Herrlee G. Creel, Shen Pu-hai: A Chinese Political Philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C., 23-24, and notes.
and presumably implemented. For our purposes, however, I believe that enough has been preserved both in parts of the putative Shen Zi fragments and Shen Buhai's purported ipsissima verba, as well as in early commentary material, to be able to identify Shen as having been an originator, if not the major originator of the Legalist doctrine of names.

One of the most succinct definitions of shu is that recorded in the "Ding fa" pian of Han Fei Zi:

Shen Buhai talked of Method while Gongsun Yang made laws (fa). Method is to confer office in accordance with a candidate's capabilities; to hold

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7 See Creel, Shen Pu-hai, 343-392, for a handy compilation of both the purported fragments of the lost Shen Zi and direct quotations of Shen Buhai. Creel's complete inclusion of the "Ren shu" pian from Lü shi chun qiu (his Shen 17), describing it as "a good example of the kind of elaboration of the ideas of Shen Pu-hai that was being made within the century following his death", (370, n. 1) is, however, unwarranted. There are many ideas elaborated in that pian which could just as convincingly be ascribed to a variety of other thinkers. Like so much of the eclectic text Lü shi chun qiu, "Ren shu" is a prime example of late Warring States eclecticism. For more detailed critical comments on Creel's Shen Pu-hai, see the reviews by Michael Loewe, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 39 (1976), 198-200; Derk Bodde, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 36 (1976), 258-269.

8 Such an identification, of course, accepts that the material cited below is an authentic record of the thought of Shen or his followers: no hypothesis of forgery has been shown to be more probable than the assumption of authenticity.

9 i.e. Shang Yang.

10 Ren here means 'capability'. For similar usages see, Zhuang Zi, pian 17, 564: "...that which the humane man despairs over and the capable shi labours over." Jing dian shi wen, 27.20a, cites Li Yi (Western Jin, compiler of Zhuang Zi ji jie in 30 juan, now lost) as glossing ren in this passage as 'ability', neng. Also, Zhuang Zi, pian 33, 1088: "Himself shameless and lacking ability, he derided the honoured treatment everywhere afforded to men of worth." Gu Shi, Zhuang Zi "Tian Xia" pian jiang shu, 58, glosses ren in this passage as 'capability/ability', nengli. Chen Qiyou, Han Fei Zi jishi, 2:908, n. 2, remarks: "If someone was capable of
achievement accountable to claim; and to examine the ability of the assembled ministers. This is controlled by the ruler.11

Through the agency of these several checking systems that together constituted Method, the ruler was able to ensure that only those competent would be admitted to, remain in, or be promoted in office. Perhaps more than anything else, however, it was the principle of 'accountability'12 that was central to Method. Assessing the accountability of a minister’s words and deeds required the ruler’s dispassionate attention. Pei Yin (420-478), in his Ji jie commentary to Shi ji, quotes a now lost passage from Xin xu which says:

fully assuming the responsibilities of a given task, then this was what was meant by ‘assuming the responsibilities of that task’. Hence, by extension, ren came to mean ‘capability’." Finally, the following passages from Han Fei Zi give indirect support to this reading: "to confer emoluments in accordance with a candidate’s capabilities" 因能而授（授授授）, (12.8a); "to bestow office in accordance with a candidate’s capabilities" 因能而授（授授授）, (11.12a). N.B. Chen Qiitan, Zengding Han Fei Zi ji jie, 77, n. 4, and Chen Qiyou both cite Ōta Kata, (1759-1829) as glossing ren as neng 能. I cannot, however, find this gloss in Ōta’s commentary to the relevant passage in his Kan Pishi yokuzei.

A.C. Graham, Chuang-tzu: Textual Notes to a Partial Translation, 6-7, maintains that the phrase yin ren 因任 is "a nominalisation of the verbal phrase which we find in the fuller form 因任任 'going by qualifications he gave them responsibilities'..." (Han Fei Zi, 2.9a-b). (Graham’s gloss is possibly based on Wang Xianqian’s gloss of yin ren. See Wang’s Zhuang Zi ji jie, 4.3b.) This interpretation, however, renders 因任 a tautology. Since, as I have argued above, there is a strong case for translating this as, "confer office in accordance with a candidate’s capabilities", ren would accordingly be employed in a different sense in the verbal phrase 因任任. The phrase, I believe, should be translated as, "in accordance with his claims, a candidate is then allotted a task".

11 Han Fei Zi, 17.5b.
12 I borrow this term from Ames, The Art of Rulership, 47, where it is used to describe the political application of xing ming.
Shen Zi's book says that a ruler should implement Methods rather than punishments. By employing xun \( \text{xun} \), 'passive mindfulness', in overseeing and keeping account of his vassals, the accountability thereby established is deeply engraved. Hence it is termed Method.\(^{13}\)

'Passive mindfulness' is a technical term effectively synonymous with yin \( \text{yin} \), which is defined in the "Xin shu shang" pian of Guan Zi as follows: "Yin is the way of Non-action. Yin is neither to add to nor to detract from anything. To give something a name [strictly] on the basis of its form - this is the Method of yin."\(^{14}\) In the xing ming context, xun was the skill or technique of making one's mind like a tabula rasa, non-committally taking note of all the details of a man’s claims and then objectively comparing his achievements with the wording of the original claim. In Legalist works, these techniques are directed principally at concealing the ruler's intentions, likes and dislikes, skills and opinions. Thereby he could not only avoid being outmanoeuvred or manipulated by treacherous ministers, but also by concealing the limit of his skill and competence in any matter, was better able to secure the services of capable functionaries. Theoretically, the smooth operation of these techniques required that the ruler abstain from arbitrary interference or any other subjective considerations.

Finally, depending on the outcome of the 'cross-checking' of word and deed, the ruler would mete out punishments or rewards. The efficacy of this mechanism

\(^{13}\) Shi ji, 63.2146.
was seen to be guaranteed because an official's words and deeds were his own responsibility - there was no room for excuses.

Shen Buhai Method was also known as xing ming. Sima Qian wrote: "Shen Zi's doctrines were based on the Yellow Emperor and Lao Zi and he advocated xing ming."\(^{15}\) Liu Xiang similarly recorded that: "Shen Zi's teachings are called xing ming. Xing ming is to hold actual outcome accountable to claim."\(^{16}\)

**ii. Various Meanings and Interpretations of Xing Ming**

The term xing ming was not, of course, a technical term applicable solely to Shen Buhai's Method. Perhaps its earliest known occurrence as a compound is in Zhan Guo ce 戰國策: "Su Qin 蘇秦 said to the King of Qin 秦, 'Exponents of xing ming all say that a white horse is not a horse.'"\(^{17}\) Here, "exponents of xing ming" probably refers to the thinkers associated with the School of Names. (It is indeed a distinct possibility that the original term was employed by early School of Names thinkers and other polemicians and that eventually it was invested with an altered signification by the Legalists.)

\(^{15}\) *Shi ji*, 63.2146.
\(^{16}\) *Han shu*, 46.2204, n. 3, where Yan Shigu quotes Liu Xiang's bibliographic record, *Bie lu*. Other slightly differing quotations of the same passage are cited by Yan Shigu, *Han shu*, 9.278, n. 4, and by Sima Zhen in his *Suo yin* commentary to *Shi ji*, 103.2773, n. 3.
\(^{17}\) 19.4a.
In other contexts it is also used to describe the teachings of Han Fei and Shang Yang.\textsuperscript{18} The Western Jin \textit{Han shu} commentator, Jin Zhuo \textsuperscript{19}, even glossed \textit{xing ming} as being a contraction of \textit{xing jia} and \textit{ming jia},\textsuperscript{19} where the former refers to the Legalist School and the latter to the School of Names as described by Sima Tan \textsuperscript{20} (c. 180-110). Extrapolations based on or similar to Jin’s gloss construe the meaning of \textit{xing jia} quite literally as ‘punishments’\textsuperscript{21}.

Modern commentators Hsiao-po Wang and Leo S. Chang, also argue that, while meaning ‘form and name’ in \textit{Han Fei Zi}, \textit{xing ming} had originally meant "punishment and name". They fail, however, to substantiate their thesis that "\textit{Ming} refers to the name of the crime as specified by legal statutes and \textit{xing} refers to the punishments designated as appropriate to the crime committed."\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18} See \textit{Shi ji}, 63.2146; 63.2146-7, n. 2, Pei Yin’s \textit{Ji jie} commentary.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Han shu}, 9.278, n. 4.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Shi ji}, 130.3291.
\textsuperscript{21} In addition to the examples cited by Creel, "The Meaning of \textit{Hsing ming}", 199-200, see also Dai Junren, "\textit{Ming jia yu Xi Han li zhi}", \textit{Wen shi zhe}, 17 (1968), 71-72.
\textsuperscript{22} Hsiao-po Wang and Leo S. Chang, The Philosophical Foundations of Han Fei’s Political Theory, 60. See in particular, 57-65. Their interpretation is advanced on the strength of several somewhat tendentious arguments, the gist of which appears to be that because, a) the received \textit{Deng Xi Zi} "mirror[s] Teng Hsi’s thought" (62); b) Deng drew up a \textit{Bamboo Penal Code} (\textit{Zhu xing}) and was associated with litigation; and c) the \textit{xing ming} concept occurs in \textit{Deng Xi Zi} (see 186-187, note 26), therefore \textit{xing ming} originally meant "punishment and name". Rather than draw attention to the well known problems of the authenticity and dating of \textit{Deng Xi Zi} or even the logic of this argument, I will limit myself to the observation that none of the contexts in which \textit{xing jia} or \textit{xing ming} or \textit{ming} or \textit{xing ming} (\textit{xing ming} does not occur) are employed in the received \textit{Deng Xi Zi} or fragments evidences the slightest support for the Wang-Chang interpretation. (I have used the \textit{Deng Xi Zi}
Other modern commentators are content to equate xing ming with ming shi. In doing so, however, they fail to examine more fully the import of the Legalist's employment of this term, thereby ignoring the important disjunction between the specificity of xing ming and the generality of ming shi. Again there are still others who follow the more literal rendering of 'form and name'. Yet they in turn fail to explain satisfactorily what precisely is implied by 'form and name' that distinguishes it from ming and shi.

Over the past thirty years, however, it has been Creel's translation of xing ming as "performance and title" that has been the most popular and enduring English rendering. It is my contention that this...
translation, too, is based on a mistaken understanding of *xing ming*. Creel’s thesis that *xing*, in a "sense [that] has become almost forgotten", means "performance" (250), has been convincingly discredited by D.C. Lau.25 A.C. Graham also remarks that "Creel’s suggestion that *xing* has a special sense, ‘accomplishment/performance’, seems unnecessary to his own argument; even in the *Li chi* examples quoted by him *hsing* seems to have its ordinary verbal sense, ‘assume a fixed shape’."26

Yet Creel’s interpretation of *xing ming* is mistaken not only in respect of *xing*, but also in respect of *ming*. Based on the claim that *xing ming* is equivalent to *ming shi*, "name and reality", when the term *ming shi* is used with reference to personnel control (202), he attempts to show that the *ming* of *ming shi* "sometimes means ‘title’ or even ‘official title’, which is again contrasted with ‘real’ performance." Yet of the five examples cited by him, only the *Lü shi chun qiu*, 17.10b, passage evidences even a *prima facie* possibility for such an interpretation. In 1974 he again took up the claim, maintaining that *ming* was "the title of an office, together with its implications."27 And again the one

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25 See his review of Creel, "What is Taoism and Other Studies in Chinese Culture", *Asia Major*, 18 (1973), 122–123. It should be noted, however, that Lau’s reservations about Zheng Xuan’s gloss of *xing* as *cheng* seem unfounded. See for example Lao *zi* 51.
27 Creel, *Shen Pu-hai*, 122.
example cited by him fails to substantiate this rendering. 28

Despite these criticisms, Creel's interpretation and translation remain popular. The reason for this, I contend, can to a large part be attributed to a particular understanding of the significance of the 'Steward of the Caps' and the 'Steward of the Cloaks' in the following anecdote from the "Er bing" pian of Han Fei Zi:

On one occasion the Marquis Zhao of Han 29 became drunk and fell asleep. Seeing that his ruler lay exposed to the cold, the Steward of the Caps covered him with a cloak. Waking from his sleep, the Marquis was pleased and asked his attendants, "Who covered me with the cloak?" They replied, "The Steward of the Caps." The ruler thereupon punished both the Steward of the Cloaks and the Steward of the Caps. He punished the Steward of the Cloaks because he had failed to carry out his work and he punished the Steward of the Caps because he had overstepped the bounds of his position. It was not that he did not dislike being cold, but rather that the harm done in encroaching upon the duties of others was even greater than the harm done in being cold. Accordingly, in controlling his ministers, the brilliant ruler does not allow them to be credited with achievements secured by overstepping the bounds of office or to fail to undertake the work appropriate to the original verbal claims. 30

On the Creel-inspired interpretation, the two titles, Steward of the Caps and Steward of the Cloaks, would be regarded as ming, and it is against the standard implicit in these job titles that the Stewards' actual 'performance' is cross-checked. Setting aside the problem

28 See Appendix D.
29 The Marquis Zhao of Han was the ruler under whom Shen Buhai served.
30 Han Fei Zi, 2.7a.
of the 'performance' rendering, Creel's interpretation of ming seems justified by this passage (although, significantly, it is not one he offers in support of his interpretation). The appropriateness of such an interpretation, however, would only be achieved at the expense of ignoring the passage that immediately precedes the anecdote and of which the anecdote serves as an illustration. In that passage it is obvious that by ming, Han Fei meant words or speech or claims:

'If the ruler wishes to bring an end to treachery then he examines into the congruence of xing (form/standard) and claim (ming).' This means to ascertain if words (yan) differ from the job (shi). A minister sets forth his words and on the basis of his words the ruler assigns him a job. Then the ruler holds the minister accountable for the achievement (gong) which is based solely on his job. If the achievement fits his job and the job fits his words, then he will be rewarded. If, however, the achievement does not fit his job and the job does not fit his words, then he will be punished.

Thus should any of the assembled ministers make a large claim yet the subsequent achievement be small, then he will be punished. He is not punished because the achievement is small, but rather because the achievement does not match his claim. Similarly, should any of the assembled ministers make a small claim yet the subsequent achievement be large, he will also be punished. It is not that the ruler is not pleased by a large achievement, but rather that he regards the harm done in not living up to a claim to be

31 Following Ota Kata, Kan Pishi yokuzei, 2.5.14, in regarding the opening sentence as probably an old saying on which the author(s) of this chapter proceeds to comment.
32 Following Gu Guangqi, Han Fei Zi zhi wu, A.5b, in emending er to qi. See also Han Fei Zi, 1.11b, for a similar passage which supports this emendation.
greater than having no large achievement at all.34

"A small claim but a large achievement" corresponds to "being credited with an achievement by overstepping the bounds of office" and "a large claim but a small achievement" corresponds to "failing to undertake the work appropriate to the original verbal undertaking". In both cases punishment is warranted because deed does not match word. Ming does not refer to office but to the claim to possess a certain ability and competence.35

In fact, even Creel in his 1974 publication concedes that ming in this passage means 'speech':

The official, or expectant official, sets forth what he is able to do (his ming) and the ruler then compares this with his actual accomplishment (his hsing).... This interpretation of ming is present in Han Fei-tzu I.10a, 2.6b-7a.... It may be present, though the context leaves this uncertain, in Han Fei-tzu 2.10b, 15.11a.36

Having made this observation, which emasculates his thesis that ming means "title of an office", Creel then attempts to palliate it with the disclaimer that such pian "are almost certainly not by Han Fei-tzu."37

33 Following Tao Hongqing, Du zhuzi zhaji, 341, in emending 爭賢於有大功 to 爭賢於無大功.
34 Han Fei Zi, 2.6b-7a.
35 As for shi, 'job', it is employed both in a potential and a realized sense. The potential sense is where shi refers to the 'task' allocated by the ruler and based on the official's original claim. The realized sense is where it refers to the 'actual work' completed by an official. In the context of the xing ming mechanism, shi is an extra stage added between the verbal undertaking and the accomplishment. This is significant to the extent that it represents a new sub-component in what originally would have been a straightforward dual arrangement (i.e. xing and ming). Its introduction, however, as will become evident, does not alter the fundamental duality of the xing ming operation.
36 Creel, Shen Pu-hai, 122, fn. 69.
37 Creel, Shen Pu-hai, 122, fn. 69.
implication seems to be that since they were not written by Han Fei, then their value as textual sources used to determine the meaning of xing ming is inadmissible. Such an argument, of course, is spurious, for even if it were granted that all the pian cited by Creel were not written by Han Fei himself, this certainly does not prove that the concepts employed therein do not represent the views of Han Fei, or for that matter other late Warring States, Qin and early Han Legalist thinkers, whose interpretation and usage of xing ming are equally valuable to our understanding of the term’s import.

iii. The Meaning of Ming

It is my interpretation that in the xing ming context, ming means ‘words, speech, declaration or claim’, and on the basis of his claim a candidate is appointed to office or allotted a task. Several important passages in Han Fei Zi and other texts, which appear highly cryptic, become much more intelligible on my interpretation. One particular passage I have in mind occurs, with minor variation, in both the "Zhu dao" and "Yang quan" pian of Han Fei Zi. Out of context, and translated literally, the passage reads as follows:

38 Which is a distinct possibility. See, for example, Rong Zhaozu, Han Fei Zi kaozheng, 43b-44b, and Kimura EIichi, Hakka shisô no kenkyû, 223-251.
39 Ironically, the "Yang quan" pian, which is the source of the one passage Creel cites in his 1974 publication as evidence for his claim that ming means "title of office", is one of the pian he lists as almost certainly not by Han Fei.
[The brilliant ruler] orders names to name themselves and affairs to settle themselves. 40

Similar passages occur in the Mawangdui Jing fa texts, "Dao fa" and "Lun" 41 the Shen Zi fragments, 42 Shi Zi 43 Huai Nan Zi, 44 Shi Ji, 45 Guan Zi, 46 and Xin shu. 47 Nor is this list intended to be exhaustive. Obviously, to be given such wide currency this passage meant something of significance. In many, although not all, of the above works, that something was a description of Legalist xing ming. If we look at the broader context in which the passage occurs in "Zhu dao", and understand ming as 'words, speech, declaration or claim', the meaning becomes evident:

The Way is the beginning of the ten thousand creatures and the main thread between 'is-this' and 'is-not'. For this reason the brilliant ruler watches over beginnings so as to learn of the source of the ten thousand creatures and maintains the main thread so as to learn of the starting-point of fortune and defeat. Hence he waits in a state of vacuity and tranquillity 48 letting a man's claim itself serve to nominate [a task], and letting [the completed] work be judged on its own merits. Being in a state of vacuity, he then knows what is genuine in actualities; being in a state of tranquillity, then those who act 49 can be kept in order. Where there are words they in themselves function as the claim; where there is work, this in

40 1.10a.
41 Mawangdui Han mu boshu, vol. 1, line 8A, p. 44, and line 57A, p. 54, respectively.
42 See the "Da ti" pian, 36.26b.
43 See the "Fen" pian, A.6a.
44 10.5b.
45 39.1637; 130.3292.
46 3:14-14.
47 8.3a.
48 Following Tao Hongqing, Du zhuizi zaji, 338, in emending the first ling to zhi.
49 Following Yu Yue, Zhuizi pingyi, 239-240, in emending zhi to wei.
itself functions as the form/achievement (xing). If form/achievement and name are checked and they match, then the ruler is without concern.\(^{50}\)

This passage has a distinctly Daoist quality about it. The dividing line between much of Daoist and Legalist thought has never been a clear one. In particular, the silk manuscripts appended to the beginning of the Mawangdui Lao Zi ‘B’ text provide strong evidence of a syncretic thinking that combines elements of both schools of thought. If we look at the Daoist school as described by Sima Tan in his discussion of the six major schools of thought, "Lun liu jia yao zhi" 論六家 LT, it also seems to be characterized by a strong Daoist-Legalist syncretism. I mention this because there is a passage in Sima Tan’s discussion in the section dealing with the Daoist school that seems unmistakably to be a description of xing ming. Moreover, it throws some more light on the meaning of ming. The passage reads as follows:

When the congregation of ministers has assembled, the ruler lets each one state what he will do [zi ming]. If the actual result coincides with his claim this is known as the ‘upright’; if the actual result fails to coincide with his claim, this is known as ‘hollow’.\(^{51}\)

What is of interest in this passage is the choice of the words zi ming instead of zi ming . The paronomastic connection between ming and ming is of particular significance in this regard. The aptly named dictionary, Shi ming, for example, glosses ming

\(^{50}\) Han Fei Zi, 1.10a

\(^{51}\) Shi ji, 130.3292.

\(^{52}\) On this point, see for example Peter A. Boodberg, "Philological Notes on Chapter One of Lao Tzu", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 20 (1957), 604-605.
In the *xing ming* context the claim that an official makes may thus be seen to function as a declaration. And as a binding declaration it functions like a legal contract. More will be said on this point later.

**iv. The Meaning of Xing and the Tally Metaphor**

Returning to the term *xing*, on my interpretation, it plays a dual semantic role, meaning both 'form' and 'standard', corresponding to the two graphs  and . This interpretation, for which I offer etymological evidence in Appendix D, is implicit in Han Fei's description of the *xing ming* mechanism:

A minister sets forth his words and on the basis of his words, the ruler assigns him a job. Then the ruler holds the minister accountable for the achievement which is based solely on his job. If the achievement fits his job and the job fits his words, then he will be rewarded.

Having verbally committed himself, a candidate is then allotted a job. The achievement brought about by the candidate may be large, small or non-existent, legitimate or illegitimate. Importantly, however, what the above passage serves to demonstrate is that the completion of the job, its assumption of a fixed shape or form (*xing*), is at the same time the candidate's achievement or

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53 4.5b (p.178).
54 2.6b.
55 Thus, in the anecdote about the two Stewards, the Steward of the Caps usurped another's job, effecting an achievement that was not part of his job; the Steward of the Cloaks, in not carrying out his job, failed to live up to his words.
result. And that achievement or result automatically functions as the exemplar or standard (xing 型) by which to check the veracity of the original claim. In short, a two-way process operates:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{XING} \\
\text{GONG} \\
\text{SHI (job)}
\end{array}
\]

"assume a fixed shape" "achievement as standard"

Thus by exploiting the ambiguity of the xing 型 graph and using it as a metaphor for their two-way checking system, the Legalists lent considerable intricacy to xing ming, a term which originally very likely meant no more than literally 'shape' and 'name'. Of course, the semantic niceties of this distinction should not lead one to overlook the essential unity of form and standard, because the realization of a job of work and the achievement thereby effected are really two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, while on the one hand, the realized job of work is held accountable to the claim, on the other hand, it is the claim that is held accountable to the achievement-cum-standard. An image of circularity divided into two phases is suggested, whereby A leads to B_1, B_1 transforms to B_2, and B_2 in turn leads back to A. The following two passages, the first from the "Jiu shou" pian of Guan Zi, and the second from the "Shen ying" pian of Lü shi chun qiu, also employ this image:
According to the claim watch over actual results and based on actual results judge the claim....

In matters of speaking and expressing his reactions on his countenance, the ruler must be cautious. In matters of which the ruler has knowledge he never desires to be the first to speak. Let others take the lead and I will follow; let others go first and I will proceed behind them.

If that which he takes out is that which is to be brought back in; if his words are taken to be his claim; and if it is his actual outcome that is used to hold his claim accountable to, then he who speaks will not dare to make reckless claims and the ruler will possess his contract.

In the second passage, the line referring to "that which is taken out and that which is brought back in" seems to be employing the metaphor of the tally or 'passport' used when leaving and re-entering border-posts. Elsewhere Han Fei employs the qi and fu tallies as metaphors to illustrate the operation of xing ming:

Having responded to a minister's claims [by assigning him a task], the ruler thus holds the creditor's portion of the qi tally; when a minister has augmented the realization of a job of work, the ruler thus holds the [right hand portion] of the fu tally. That which is matched by the two halves of the two fu and qi tallies constitutes the beginning of rewards and punishments.

The qi tally was used to record the details of a transaction where goods were purchased on credit. Details

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56 Following Guo Moruo et al., Guan Zi ji jiao, 7:284, in emending xiu to xun.
57 3:14-14.
58 18.1a.
59 On the 'passport', see Li Junming, "Han jian suo jian chu ru fu, chuan yu chu ru ming ji", Wen shi zhe, 19 (1983), 28-29; Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration, 1:112-113.
60 Han Fei Zi, 1.11b.
of the contract were carved or written on wooden or bamboo slips. The slip was then then split, with the creditor and debtor each retaining one portion of the tally. As there are conflicting accounts regarding who actually retained which portion\textsuperscript{61}, Lao Gan may well be correct in maintaining that originally no particular significance was attached to either the left or right hand portions of the qi tally.\textsuperscript{62}

The fu tally had a variety of uses including the authorization of military commands (such as the mobilization of troops), exit and entry at border passes and admittance to and from the inner chambers of the palace. Such materials as jade, silk, wood and metal have been used in the making of fu tallies. The tally was either written on in ink or engraved and then cut in two. Generally it was the right half that was kept by the emperor, king, general or local official whose authority it represented, while the left hand portion was kept by the person who awaited orders or the person who crossed at the border post or the person who entered or left the inner palace. In short, the right hand portion of the fu

\textsuperscript{61} Shi ji, 76.2370, Bao Biao \textsuperscript{47,9} (f1. 1160) commentary to Zhan Guo ce, in Zhu Zugeng, Zhan Guo ce jizhu huikao, 3:1460, n. 14, and Zheng Xuan’s commentary to Li ji, 2.28a, state that the right hand portion of the tally was the creditor’s portion. Lao Zi 79 gives an exactly contrary account. The Lao Zi passage, however, is open to question, as the Mawangdui Lao Zi B text, Mawangdui Han mu bo shu, line 91, reads you \textsuperscript{50} instead of zuo \textsuperscript{50}. (For a somewhat obscure justification of the alternative reading, see the comments at 94, n. 41.) The Suo yin and Zheng yi commentaries to Shi ji, 46.1897, interpret the passage there to mean to use the right hand portion of the tally to exert control over the left hand portion, but there seems little justification for this reading.

\textsuperscript{62} Juyan Han jian, 2:4.
tally functioned as a standard against which the left hand portion had to tally with to have validity.\textsuperscript{63}

The tally metaphor of course is just that, a metaphor. The statements made by the claimant and the subsequent achievement themselves function as the ruler's portions of the qi and fu tallies respectively. As regards the binding power of the verbal claim, this stems from its being a performative utterance.

It has now become a generally accepted thesis in analytical philosophy that words are used not merely to describe or to report but also to do things. The Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin coined the term 'performative utterance' to name those utterances that are acts as distinct from those utterances that are statements or descriptions.\textsuperscript{64} The following are some typical examples of performative utterances:

1. I name this ship 'Titanic'.
2. I promise to come on Saturday.
3. I give this to you.
4. I apologize.

\textsuperscript{63} In respect of the fu tally, it seems that only in the Han dynasty were there some exceptions to the right hand/ left hand distinction outlined above. See Juyan Han jian, 2:4; Li Junming, "Han jian suo jian chu ru fu chuan yu chu ru ming ji", 28-29.

On the subject of the fu tally see also Wang Guowei, Guan tang ji lin, in particular B.18.11a-15b; R. Rotours, "Les Insignes en Deux Parties (fou ½ ½ ) Sous La Dynastie des T'ang (618-907)", T'oung Pao, 41 (1953), 1-43, in particular.

\textsuperscript{64} Austin introduced the concept of performative utterances in his essay "Other Minds", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 20 (1946), reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, 44-84. His fullest accounts of performatives and the performative use of language are "Performative Utterances", Philosophical Papers, 220-239, and How to Do Things With Words.
5. I bet $20 Pharlap will win.

When uttered in the appropriate circumstances these sentences are or are part of the performance of an action. Thus, in the case of the first example, I am not reporting the name of a ship, but rather, in uttering these words, I perform the action of naming a ship. Again, in the second example, I am not reporting an intention such as I would be if I said, "I think I'll come on Saturday". Rather, I am performing an action, I am making a promise.

While in none of the above five examples is saying so in and of itself sufficient to make it so, nevertheless given the satisfaction of certain appropriate conditions, then for some of them, saying so does in fact make it so, viz., examples 1 and 4. The appropriate conditions, circumstances or conventions prescribe the rules, legal provisions or socially dictated practices which provide the setting in which subsequent actions are performed. Without this setting, actions are meaningless, just as playing a game of cards without rules would be.

In examples 2, 3 and 5, however, in addition to uttering the words, which Austin regards as usually being the "leading incident"\(^\text{65}\) in the performance of the act, something else must be satisfied before the action can be deemed to have been performed. Thus if in example 3, I do not hand the gift over, or in example 5, I do not

\(^{65}\) *How to Do Things With Words, 8.*
produce $20 for the wager (assuming that I am not betting on credit), then the action will remain unperformed.

If we now turn to *xing ming*, it will be seen that an official's claim functions as a performative utterance in the same manner as examples 2, 3 and 5. More exactly, his claim is the leading incident in the performance of the task, the end result of which is the achievement. The official commits himself to the realization of the outcome when he makes his claim, the claim being a performative. The binding power of the commitment that makes his word his bond, derives from ceremonial (li) and law (fa). In a very real sense, the official's claim functions like a legal contract which is enforced through the imposition of sanctions should there be a violation of law or ceremonial, such as a breach of commitment. Seen in this regard, the punitive or penal semantic component also implicit in the word *xing* takes on an obvious significance.

Thus a claim having been uttered, the ruler *ipso facto* possesses a *qi* tally which obliges the official to remain accountable (*ze*) to his verbal commitment by completing the job of work. In effect, the candidate is indebted (*zhai*) to his ruler.66 Conversely, the privilege-cum-obligation of serving his ruler through the realization of the work becomes the official's portion of the *qi* tally. When, however, the work has been completed,

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66 *Zhai* and *ze* were both pronounced *tzhhek* in Archaic Chinese. See Wang Li, *Tong yuan zidian*, 273-274. (Karlgren, "Grammata Serica Recensa", 868m, reads *tsek* for *ze* in Archaic Chinese, but does not list *zhai*. As a graph in its own right, *zhai* was in any case a relatively late coinage, probably Han.)
the consequent achievement functions as a standard against which the original claim is checked. The evidence of the achievement is incontrovertible and so it functions as a standard. The ruler’s portion of the fu tally symbolizes this standard, while the original claim becomes the official’s portion. The qi metaphor is employed to illustrate the initial claim/form phase, while the fu metaphor pertains to the standard/claim phase. This is an obvious theoretical refinement over Shen Buhai’s xing ming theory:

The ruler keeps the [right hand portion (?) of the the qi tally to hold the official accountable to his claims. Claims form the main cord in the universal net and are the sage’s half of the fu tally.

For Shen Buhai, the performative utterance or claim which binds the claimant to the realization of a job of work, may be represented indiscriminately by either of the functionally interchangeable qi and fu metaphors. This stands in contrast to the subtle distinction which Han Fei develops between the claim/form and the

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67 Reading jun 聚 instead of chen 恭 because of a) the statement later in the passage that "claims are the sage’s half of the fu tally"; b) Bao Biao’s comments at Zhan Guo ce jizhu huikao, 3:1460, n. 14: "[The holder of] the left hand portion of the qi tally can but wait until the two halves are joined, while [the holder of] the right portion can exact payment"; c) correspondence with the Han Fei Zi, 1.11b, passage; d) Creel’s correct observation, Shen Pu-hai, 347, n. 3, that "we might suppose that our text meant that the minister holds the creditor’s portion of the contract in order to demand from the ruler his official title. But this would be quite out of harmony with the context, which insists upon the dominant role of the ruler." N.B. despite the validity of this observation, Creel nevertheless chooses to follow the received text, the result being a translation the coherence of which relies more on paraphrase than the wording of the text.

68 Shen Zi, 46.2a.
standard/claim phases. For Han Fei, the qi metaphor is employed to illustrate this initial operation, while the fu metaphor pertains to the latter.

vi. Xing Ming and Ming Shi

Xing ming is the Legalist application of the ming and shi polarity. As with most ming shi theorists, Han Fei took congruence between the ming and shi counterparts as his goal:

Ming and shi support one another and so are brought to completion; form and shadow match one another and so become established.\(^{69}\)

Given the nature of the xing ming mechanism, clearly shi has a meaning that is different from the Neo Mohists' and Xun Qing's 'object' and Xu Gan's 'actuality'. To distinguish this difference in meaning I will translate shi as 'reality' in the Legalist context. Behind this rendering is the idea of 'that which has been realized'.

There are several ways in which the xing ming mechanism can be seen to reflect and parallel ming shi. First the claim/form phase corresponds to ming or name, and represents the primacy of the verbal claim, while the standard/claim phase corresponds to shi or reality, and represents the primacy of the achievement-as-standard:

\(^{69}\) Han Fei Zi, 8.13a. cf. Guan Zi, 3:14-14, for a similar passage.
Their complementarity is what is meant by "ming and shi support one another" and this is reflected in the double bond of name being used to check reality and conversely reality being used to check name:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{REALITY} \\
\text{form // standard} \\
\uparrow \\
\text{claim // claim} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{NAME}
\end{array}
\]

Even within each of the two phases of xing ming a similar pattern is evident. Thus claim and form parallel name and reality just as achievement-as-standard and claim parallel reality and name:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{REALITY} \\
\text{form // standard} \\
\uparrow \\
\text{claim // claim} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{NAME}
\end{array}
\]

Yet while this congruence between ming and shi was the end, control of ming was seen as the means to realize this end. In other words, the control and regulation of ming was seen as the key to ensure the realization of desired realities or states of affairs. Two passages are quite explicit. The first is taken from the "Yang quan" pian:

In the way of using Oneness\textsuperscript{70}, names are of the first importance. When names are put in

\textsuperscript{70} Following the Daoist Patrology edition in reading zhi \(\_\_\) after yi \(\_\_\).
order, things become settled down; when they go awry, things become unfixed.\textsuperscript{71}

The second is from the "Wai chu shu zuo shang" pian:

When names are reliable then the assembled ministers will uphold their duties, [the boundary separating] good and evil will not be overstepped, and nothing will be remiss in respect of the one hundred affairs.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Ming} were not only conceived of as crucial to the realization of \textit{shi}, but furthermore the potential for the prescriptive manipulation of \textit{ming} by controlling \textit{ming} existed. This is because in addition to the official's claim, which functioned as the leading incident, the assignment of a specific task or position was dependent upon the ruler. Following his comments on performative utterances being leading incidents, Austin remarks that: "it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions."\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, an official's claim could only begin to become a reality after the ruler had approved the claim and named a particular assignment: "On the basis of their words, the ruler assigns his ministers tasks";\textsuperscript{74} "In accordance with his claims, a candidate is assigned a task and made to carry it out by himself."\textsuperscript{75} It would have been completely at the ruler's discretion as to what degree this assignment

\textsuperscript{71} Han Fei Zi, 2.9a.
\textsuperscript{72} Han Fei Zi, 11.12b.
\textsuperscript{73} Austin, \textit{How to Do Things With Words}, 8.
\textsuperscript{74} Han Fei Zi, 1.11b, and 2.6b.
\textsuperscript{75} Han Fei Zi, 2.9a-9b.
actually reflected the terms of the official's claims. In short, the leeway for prescriptivism was built into the xing ming formula, despite the Daoist component in Legalist thought which advocated that the ruler employ 'passive mindfulness', 'non-interference' and 'quiescence' and that he should not try to manipulate the workings of xing ming.

Concluding Remarks

Although Shen Buhai's Method does anticipate important aspects of Han Fei's xing ming thinking, nevertheless Han Fei's xing ming thinking should be regarded as a unique and richly subtle application of the ming shi dichotomy to Legalist philosophy of statecraft. Insofar as this application is based on the notion of ming being used to prescribe shi, Han Fei's xing ming formula can be regarded as the third phase in the application of nominal prescriptivism to political philosophy.

As with Confucius, the performative function of naming is central to Han Fei's particular application of the ming shi polarity. Unlike the implicit role that performatives play in Confucius' zheng ming thinking, in Han Fei's xing ming thinking the role of performatives is made quite explicit.

A further characteristic of Han Fei's application of the ming shi polarity is the very specific scope of that application: as a mechanism for ensuring the
accountability of a functionary's word and deed. This stands in contrast to the considerably more general scope to which ming and shi are applied in the Neo Mohist summa and Xun Qing's "On the Correct Use of Names". When compared to Confucius' zheng ming programme, however, a similarly specific scope of application is evident.

Given these characteristics, then, save the last, Han Fei's concept of the ming shi relationship would appear to have almost nothing in common with that of Xu Gan. In fact, this is not the case. What they do have in common is that in both ming and shi partake of a polar relationship. Furthermore, this polar relationship can be seen to be a substance-function relationship where ming and shi are two parts of a whole: without shi, ming would not become realized, and without ming there would be nothing to be realized as shi. This is what is meant by "Ming and shi support one another and so are brought to completion".

In discussions of ming shi before Han Fei, it is not evident that ming and shi are amenable to a substance-function interpretation. Thus, somewhat unexpectedly, it is in Han Fei’s thought that a key element of Xu Gan’s concept of the name and actuality relationship can already be found. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two: whereas in Han Fei Zi it is ming which is substance and shi which is function, in Zhong lun the roles are reversed. The upshot of this is that, whereas in Zhong lun shi determine ming, in Han Fei Zi ming determine shi.
Han Fei's xing ming formula is a good example of the very specific ends to which the ming shi dichotomy could be applied. This serves to demonstrate both the adaptability and fecundity of the dichotomy. Thus, when we reflect on how different Xu Gan's ming shi concept is to that of any of the thinkers discussed so far, we should bear in mind that already in the pre-Qin period there were substantial differences in the way individual thinkers and schools of thought applied ming shi in their own systems of ideas.

Despite such differences, one thing that all the pre-Han thinkers discussed so far do have in common is an understanding of shi that precludes any notion of activity. This is a key reason Xu Gan's discussion of the ming shi relationship differs so fundamentally from all of these thinkers. Thus the development of understanding of shi may be regarded as a watershed in early discussions of ming shi. The following chapter will describe this development.
Chapter 5

THE EMERGENCE OF CORRELATIVE THEORIES OF NAMING IN

GUAN ZI AND CHUN QIU FAN LU

By the late third century B.C., Chinese philosophy had already entered its richest period of cross fertilization, producing new, hybrid schools of thought. One of the products of this period was the emergence of correlative theories of naming. The earliest examples of correlative theories of naming are already evident in late third-early second century syncretic writings, particularly Daoist and Huang-Lao-centred syncretic writings.

One such work is Guan Zì. There are three pian in Guan Zì that best evidence correlative theories of naming: "Xin shu shang", "Xin shu xia", and "Bai xin". Together with "Nei Ye" ("Inner Cultivation"), these pian are now referred to by many Chinese and Japanese scholars homogeneously as the 'Four Pian of Guan Zì'. My exposition begins with the following passage from "Bai xin":

Trace things back to their origins and determine what their actualities are; make

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1 An earlier draft of part of this chapter has been incorporated in my article, "Names, Actualities and the Emergence of Essentialist Theories of Naming in Classical Chinese Thought", Philosophy East and West, 42.3 (July, 1991), 341-364.
2 I concur with Machida Saburô's view that "Xin shu shang", "Xin shu xia" and "Bai xin" should be dated as late Warring States or early Han writings. See Appendix E.
3 Zhang Nie (1096-1148) is the earliest known scholar to have identified these four pian as a homogeneous group. See his "Guan Zì wen ping", in Guan Zì, A.4.
one's foundation that which gave birth to things. If you want to know something's image, then you search its form; if you follow something's distinguishing marks, then you will come to know its essential qualities; if you search back to its starting point, then you will come to know its name.\footnote{2:69-3/4.}

In this passage 'form' (xing 興) is paired with 'image' (xiang 象); 'distinguishing marks' (li 根) with 'essential qualities' (qing 情); and 'starting point' (duan 端) with 'name' (ming). These pairings provide an important key as to how ming and shi should be understood. Relative to the concepts with which each is paired, 'form', 'distinguishing marks' and 'starting point' are all manifest and apparent. For example, distinguishing marks are what lie on the surface of an object while its essential qualities are within and not immediately apparent. Again, the form of an object is its manifest shape, while the image we have of it is not. 'Image' here refers to the mental image that one has of an entity. This same meaning is expressed in the following passage from Han Fei Zi:

> Men seldom see a live elephant, but when they find a dead elephant's bones they resort to its picture to imagine it alive. Therefore everything which men use to form an idea or image is called a hsiang (elephant/image).\footnote{6.9a; Graham, Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 213.}

Presumably a mental picture or model is regarded as being a faithful reflection or representation of the essentials of a given object.

In the same way shi is essential, being the germ or that which is at the origin or core of things. This use
of shi is clearly based on its primary meaning of inner substantiality. To distinguish this meaning of shi from its meaning in nominalist thinking as 'object/entity', I translate it as 'actuality', understanding it to mean 'that without which an entity would not be what it is' or 'that by virtue of which an entity is what it is'.

In the above passage the relation between 'name' and 'starting point' follows the same pattern as the other pairs. 'Starting point' means the manifest or discernible beginnings of something. By searching back to a thing's 'starting point', one is able to determine its name. In other words, a thing's name, like its 'essential qualities', is inherent in that thing from its beginning or inception.

This interpretation is supported by the following "Xin shu shang" passage:

Things inherently have form and forms inherently have names. If the name [fits (dang)] fits, then such a person is called a sage.

The word 'fits' here refers to the correlation between name and actuality, the basis of the correlation between an entity and its name. The 'correct' name of an entity, that is, the name that correlates to the actuality (shi) of that entity, is revealed by the sage by tracing an entity's form back to its inherent actuality.

Thus, far from being understood as conventionally or arbitrarily determined, 'correct' names are characterized...
as constituting part of an entity's basic make-up. This same thinking is found in the Mawangdui Cheng text:

'Although the Way has no beginning, it does have Responsiveness'.

While a thing has still not come, do not possess it; after it has come, regard it as it is. When a thing is about to come, its form precedes it. If we establish it in accordance with its form and name it in accordance with its name, then how would we say it?

This final question is rhetorical, as presumably only a sage could answer it, since only he would be able to discern what name correlates to a given entity's actuality.

When the appropriate name is used then order prevails. Thus in "Xin shu xia" we read that:

In all cases, things come bearing names. In accordance with those names the sage tailors things and so the world is well regulated. If actualities are not violated [by employing inappropriate names], there will be no disorder in the world and the world will be well regulated.

Because an entity inherently possesses a name that correlates to the actuality of that entity, then by correctly discerning what those names are, the sage is able to 'tailor' the world on the basis of 'correct' names.

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7 It is uncertain when the Mawangdui manuscripts were originally written; I am inclined to accept that the so-called 'Daoist-Legalist' material (of which the Cheng text is an example) is middle-late third century BC.
8 Mawangdui Han mu bosu (1), 81, (line 143A).
9 Literally, 'cuts'. Following Liu Ji in reading cai 財, 'wealth', as a loan graph for cai 出, 'to cut'. See Guan Zi jijiāo, 6:432. cf. also Lao Zi 32, "Only when the [Uncarved Block] is cut are there names".
10 2:66-13/13.
The following passage from "Bai xin" describes how a sage or sage ruler apprehends what an object's correct name is:

Therefore [the method of] the sage ruler is to make his body tranquil and wait for things. When a thing comes, then he names it. If correct names are employed then things will naturally be in good order; if perverted names are employed then things will naturally be in a state of collapse.

Huai Nan Zi also presents this view:

For this reason, one who has realized the Way is neither sad nor happy, gay nor angry. When he sits he does not think and when he sleeps he does not dream. When things come he names them and when affairs present themselves, he responds.

By employing the technique of 'passive mindfulness' (yin) the sage ruler's 'clairvoyance and illumination' enable him to apprehend those names that are inherently appropriate to things.

To recapitulate, the conception of names and actualities revealed in the above discussion is premised on a distinction being made between entities and the actualities intrinsic to those entities. Entities are

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11 Following Tao Hongqing, Du zhuzi zhaji, 177, in emending ming zi zhi zhi to ming zhi zhi.
12 Following Han Fei Zi, "Yang quan", 2.9a, in reading yì, not qi.
14 Huai Nan Zi, 10.1a.
15 "Xin shu shang", 2:65-8/9, defines 'passive mindfulness' as follows:

Passive mindfulness is the way of Non-action. Passive-mindfulness is neither to add to nor detract from anything.

16 Following A.C. Graham's rendering of this pair of elusive terms. See Graham, "A Neglected Pre-Han Philosophical Text: Ho-Kuan-Tzu", 515.
regarded as possessing inherently appropriate names, names which are as intrinsic as an entity’s actuality. If the correct name of some entity is not apprehended, then the actuality of that entity will not be correctly discerned. And if the correct name for the actuality is not employed, "then things will naturally be in a state of collapse". This is quite different from the Greek position as represented by Cratylus. As Kirk remarks:

... when Cratylus asked, "How could anyone saying that which he says, not say that which is", he does not mean that any sound uttered by a man for any object is correct. An object only has one correct name and anyone who tries to call it anything else is not naming it at all but only uttering "a piece of voice." (383A)

Despite this difference, the notion of a correct or true name does have a close parallel in classical Greek thought. Leonard Woodbury writes:

It is assumed, in this way of thinking, that there always exists a true name, by which, if we can find it, the truth about things will be revealed.... The true name, which has the power of exposing the revelation of truth, has this power because it was "rightly" given to the object that it signifies. The Greek vocabulary is held to be the product of a name giver and, as in the case of the other arts, the original and authoritative practitioner of the art is held to be divine.... Once the meaning of the true name has been apprehended, all other names, which give or appear to give different information, must be either accommodated to the true name of [sic. s.r. 'or'] rejected as false and deceptive.

The Chinese theory of names that I have outlined above shares some obvious parallels with this Greek view. It is, however, in Dong Zhongshu's writings that we find the closest parallel to the idea of a true name that is 'rightly' given to an object. This theory of naming, as elucidated principally in "Shen cha ming hao", is centred on three main propositions:

1. That it is Heaven's intentions (tian yi 天意) which are the ultimate source of all 'correct' names.\(^{20}\)

2. That names are the criterion for deciding 'what is' (shi 是) and 'what is not' (fei 非) the case.

3. That only sages or sage rulers are capable of apprehending which name is intrinsically appropriate to a given actuality.

It is the first proposition that is the most novel and intriguing. Like Confucius and Xun Qing, Dong Zhongshu maintained that names were essential to good socio-political order: "The starting point in putting a state in good order lies in correcting names."\(^{21}\) Where he differs significantly from Confucius and Xun Qing, however, is in proposing that names should be ordered so as to conform with Heaven's intentions:

The [standard of] correctness for names and appellations is found in Heaven-and-Earth; Heaven-and-Earth provide the ultimate correctness for names....\(^{22}\)

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\(^{20}\) Ming 明 and hao 幫 seem to correspond closely to Xun Qing's san ming, or common names, and gong ming, or general names, respectively. See Chun qiu fan lu yi zheng, 10.3a.

\(^{21}\) Chun qiu fan lu yi zheng, 3.1b.

\(^{22}\) Following Hsiao Kung-chuan, A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume 1, 500, mod.
Although names and appellations have different sounds, yet their basis is the same; both are cries and calls which serve to give expression to Heaven's intentions. Names are that whereby the sage promulgates Heaven's intentions.

According to the standard interpretation, Dong Zhongshu perceived names to be ontologically more fundamental than actualities: actualities rely on names for their identity. Feng Youlan, for example, came to adopt this view in his revised work, Zhongguo zhexue shi xinbian:

[Dong Zhongshu] maintained that actualities must conform to names, and that names should be employed to rectify actualities. He attached to names a primary [ontological] status and to actualities, a secondary [ontological] status.

Ren Ji similarly comments:

[Dong Zhongshu] turned the relationship between names and actualities on its head, such that names were more fundamental than actualities; names were primary while actualities were secondary.

It is my contention that proponents of the above standard interpretation are mistaken, principally because they misinterpret the following passage from "Shen cha ming hao":

Names are born of 'the genuine' (zhen); if it is not the genuine, then it cannot be used to make a name. Names are that whereby the sage affirms what is the genuine in

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23 Chun qiu fan lu yi zheng, 10.2a.
24 2:86.
25 Zhongguo zhexue shi, 2:75. For similar interpretations, see also Fang Keli, Zhongguo zhexue shi shang de zhixing guan, 94-95; Feng Qi, Zhongguo gudai zhexue de luoji fazhan, 2:406; Hou Wailu, Zhongguo sixiang tongshi, 2:123; Guan Hanheng, "Guanyu Dong Zhongshu de xiantian gainian shuo", Guangming ribao, 1964, May 3, p. 4; Lin Jie, "Guanyu Dong Zhongshu de renshilun", Guangming ribao, 1964, May 15, p. 4.
things. Names are so as to be able to speak of the genuine. 26

According to the standard interpretation, 'the genuine' does not refer to an entity or its actuality, but rather to 'Heaven's intention'. Fang Keli, for example, says:

In fact, what [Dong Zhongshu] calls 'the genuine' does not refer to a thing, but rather refers to Heaven or Heaven's intention. "Names are born of the genuine", and "to name things like their 'genuineness'" means that the names of things must felicitously express Heaven's intention. In other words, Heaven's intention alone is the most real component of a name. 27

The fallacy of this interpretation derives from the failure to recognize that while ultimately the 'genuine' is indeed a manifestation of Heaven's intention, yet more immediately and significantly, the 'genuine' is the embodiment of Heaven's will in a particular entity as that entity's actuality. 28 It is the failure to make this distinction that leads exponents of the standard interpretation to argue that names are seen to be more fundamental than actualities. In the following passage Dong Zhongshu makes it plain that by 'the genuine', he is referring to an entity's actuality:

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26 10.5b.
27 Zhongguo zhexue shi shang de zhixing guan, 94. See also Feng Qi, Zhongguo gudai zhexue de luoji fazhan, 2:406; Ren Jiyu, Zhongguo zhexue shi, 2:75; Hou Wailu et al., Zhongguo sixiang tongshi, 2:123; Guan Hanheng, "Guanyu Dong Zhongshu de xiantian gain ian shuo", p. 4; Lin Jie, "Guanyu Dong Zhongshu de renshilun", p. 4. I am aware of only two commentators who uphold a dissenting view: Su Yu, in his Chun qiu fan lu yi zheng, 10.5b; and Li Min, "Lüe tan Dong Zhongshu de renshilun", Shanghai Wenhuibao, 1962, March 2, p. 2.
28 For a detailed exposition of the term zhen and its synonymity with shi, 'actuality', see Kasahara Chûji, Chûgokujin no shizenkan to biishiki, 65-175.
The genuine is a thing’s meaningfulness (yi 真)\(^{29}\); the genuine is a thing’s essential qualities. [The sages] thus uses the genuine to name the thing.\(^{30}\)

In defining 'the genuine' as being an entity’s essential qualities and that which is meaning-bestowing, Dong Zhongshu discloses that by 'the genuine' he is talking about an entity's actuality; in doing so he also draws a distinction between an entity and its inherent actuality: entities embody actualities while actualities are those essential qualities which make entities what they are. The distinction is in turn intimately related to his theory of human nature:

Some say, "Human nature contains the germ of goodness and the heart contains the basic stuff of goodness, so how could it not be good?"

To this I reply, "This is not so. Although the silk cocoon contains silk yet it is not silk, and although an egg contains a chicken, yet it is not a chicken...."\(^{31}\)

Goodness is like a kernel of rice; human nature is like a stalk of rice. Although a stalk of rice produces kernels of rice, yet it may not be called a kernel of rice. Similarly, although human nature produces goodness, yet it may not be called goodness. Kernels of rice and goodness are the external completion of that which is inherited from Heaven; they do not fall within the realm of that which is done by Heaven. That which is done by Heaven extends to a certain point and then stops. That which lies within this realm is referred to as belonging to Heaven; that which lies outside is referred to as belonging to the 'kingly teachings'. Although the kingly teachings lie outside

\(^{29}\) cf. Hall and Ames' characterization of yi as "fundamentally self-assertive and meaning-bestowing", in Thinking Through Confucius, 96.

\(^{30}\) 10.21b.

\(^{31}\) 10.14a.
human nature, yet human nature must advance in that direction.32

Human nature is here conceived to be "the natural capacity one is born with", one's "basic stuff" (zhi kù).33 It is man's latent capacity to be good that is his nature, and it is this nature that is Heaven given and so is one aspect of man's 'actuality'.

The relationship between man's actuality and his name is more fully revealed in the following example:

In accordance with that which Heaven has made, [the sage] gives appellations. Thus people are called 'people' (*mian/min ), because min serves to verbalize that people are inherently the same as 'being with the eyes closed' (mian/mian ).36 The actuality or essential quality of 'people' is said to be their state of being asleep. While people have a Heaven given latent disposition to develop, it is only after they have been educated that they are truly awakened and their potentials capable of being fully realized. In short, the name 'people' (min) refers to those beings whose actuality is their state of not yet having been awakened (mian). Thus elsewhere Dong Zhongshu writes: "Names are the actualities of natures and actualities are the basic stuff of natures."37 For the sage, conforming with the will of Heaven involves coining a name in which the meaning 'not yet awakened' is implicit. This name is min.

32 10.19a-19b.
33 10.6a, 6b.
34 Karlgren, Grammata Serica Recensa, No. 457a.
35 Karlgren, Grammata Serica Recensa, No. 457e.
36 10.10b. This example can also be found in Jia Yi, Xin shu, 9.5b.
37 10.19a.
Accordingly, rather than portraying names as being determinants of actualities or more primary than actualities, Dong Zhongshu presents quite a different picture: names come from actualities:

Investigate into actualities to make names...38

All things come into existence carrying their own name; the sage names a thing in accordance with its image.39

Each entity, upon its creation, has certain identifiable characteristics which are an expression of that entity's unique actuality. The subsequent image a sage forms of these characteristics provides the basis for naming that entity. Thus the notion that things carry their own names should not be construed too literally. What it means is that each entity is sufficiently unique to be able to be given a name that truly represents the qualities of that entity. Ultimately, however, it is Heaven which determines what that name will be:

Each affair accords with its name and each name accords with Heaven.40

The manifestation of Heaven's will in a given entity is that which is genuine to an entity. Thus to accord with Heaven's will requires that the name-giver, the sage, apprehends what is the genuine in a given entity. In apprehending what is the genuine, he is apprehending Heaven's will. It is on this basis that the sage proceeds to name.

38 10.9b.
39 Chun qiu fan lu, 17.11b.
40 10.4a.
That at least is the theory; in practice, however, it would have been totally at the sage’s discretion to determine how things should be named, since only he was capable of ‘apprehending’ a particular entity’s actuality. In this respect, Dong Zhongshu’s doctrine of names is clearly a refinement of Xun Qing’s zheng ming political philosophy, where the authority to coin names and prescribe what they should be applied to rests with the sage ruler. Where he differs from earlier Confucians, and indeed also the Mohists, is that the ontological and epistemological basis of his views on naming is correlative.

In respect of the name-actuality relationship, Dong Zhongshu’s correlative theory of naming differs to the one adumbrated in Guan Zi. This difference evidences both a continuation and modification of the earlier, more rudimentary theory. In Guan Zi, that which makes a name appropriate to a particular entity is the bond it has with that entity’s actuality. There is no notion of names being born of actualities; rather names and actualities are like two sides of the same coin with neither having ontological precedence over the other. As to why certain names correlate with certain actualities, there seems to be no other reason than because this is the way things naturally are (zi ran); names are contrived neither by Heaven nor man.

41 As Xu Fuguan, Liang Han sixiang shi, 2:413, argues, "Dong Zhongshu’s philosophical ideas concerning ‘Heaven’ were, in fact, formulated to support his political thinking."
For Dong Zhongshu, however, it is Heaven that ultimately determines the appropriateness of names. Initially Heaven's 言名, made manifest as actualities, and then these actualities produce names. The actual coining of names, however, is left to the sage or sage king. The same principle that applies to kernels of rice and human nature applies analogously to names: "That which is done by Heaven extends to a certain point and then stops. That which lies outside is referred to as kingly teachings." Thus while in Guan Zi the sage apprehends correct names, in Chun qiu fan lu the sage also coins names. In both cases, the sage plays the role of 'mid-wife', but only in Chun qiu fan lu is it evident that he also chooses the particular words to be used in naming.

42 A similar, although more detailed, generative process is found in pian 5 of He Guan Zi, A.15a-15b, a syncretic text of the late third century B.C. Following A.C. Graham's rendering ("A Neglected Pre-Han Philosophical Text: Ho-Kuan-Tzu", 514), the passage reads:

There being the One there is the ch'i, then the idea, then the picture, then the name, then the shape, then the work, then the covenant. The covenant being decided the time is born, the time being set the thing is born.

Graham rejects the interpretation that the passage presents the rudiments of what he terms a Realist theory of naming where "in the cosmological process itself the generation of things [wu] follows ideas, pictures and names emerging from the primal ch'i." The basis of his rejection is that "nothing in the book suggests that Heaven has mental pictures and puts its decrees into words". Yet given that the passage is describing that which issues from "the One", and the One, not Heaven, is portrayed as the the ultimate source of things in He Guan Zi (Graham, p. 510), Graham's objection is less than persuasive. As to the interpretation of yi as "mental pictures", I think that here the word is better understood to mean "intention" in a similar sense to Dong Zhongshu's usage.
Nevertheless, both views patently conform to a **correlative** theory of naming. It is a matter of speculation as to why rudimentary theories of naming began to emerge in late third century B.C. syncretic writings. Could this be a reflection of philosophical influences derived from Chu thinkers? Whatever the reason, the works stands in marked contrast to the nominalist theories of naming expounded by the Neo Mohists and Xun Qing and eventually became the mainstay of Han philosophy of language, a succinct expression of which is Liu Xi’s statement in the Preface to his *Shi ming*: "In the correlation between name and actuality, there is in each instance, that which is right and proper." This is certainly a far cry from Xun Qing’s doctrine that "a name has no intrinsically appropriate object; rather its appropriate object is demarcated by being ordained."

**Concluding Remarks**

As indicated in Chapter 1, the **correlative** theory of naming that premises Xu Gan’s discussion of the proper accord between name and actuality has features in common with both of the **correlative** theories of naming described in this chapter. In common with the theory adumbrated in Guan Zi, Xu Gan believed that a given name is appropriate to a given actuality by virtue of the natural bond that it shares with that actuality. The reason this bond exists and is
able to ensure a correct and proper correlation between names and actualities is because that is the way things naturally are, 'so of themselves' (zi ran).

Where Xu Gan principally differs from the views expressed in Guan Zi is that he does not regard name and actuality to be of equal ontological primacy: in common with Dong Zhongshu, Xu Gan considered names to be born of actualities. Because of this, in principle at least, his position was compatible with the view that man can coin names so long as those names have a 'right and proper' correlation with the actualities they are used to refer to.

Also in common with Dong Zhongshu is Xu Gan's concept of the name and actuality relationship: in both cases the model which best represents this relationship is the substance-function polarity. Unlike Han Fei's xing ming thinking, it is actualities which play the role of substance and names the role of function; names are the external expression of an entity's inherent actuality; conversely, the actuality inherent in an entity is that which gives meaning to that entity and thereby constitutes the basis of its name.

Despite these similarities, Xu Gan's theory of naming differs from that of Dong Zhongshu in two important respects. First, he does not subscribe to the notion that it is Heaven which creates names. Second, he expresses no interest in the issue of man's coining names, be he sage king or otherwise. Two reasons can be seen for this:
1. Dong Zhongshu’s relative theory of naming provided a cosmological rationale for the view that it is necessary that a sage king determines how things should be named and therefore apprehended. In the new order of Confucian orthodoxy ushered in during the early years of Emperor Wu’s reign, the scope for the political application of this theory of naming would have been broad indeed. Xu Gan’s discussion of ming shi, however, was not directed at establishing a new order but rather at explaining why the old order had disappeared. Indeed, his conservatism not only sets him apart from Dong Zhongshu, but also from Confucius and Xun Qing. As far as the issue of names and the objects which they name is concerned, Xu Gan was very much an apologist of the status quo ante.

2. Nevertheless, it should equally be borne in mind that Xu Gan’s perception that the Superior Person’s Potency was not given due recognition was one of the key reasons for his believing that the old order had disappeared. In other words, in discussing name and actuality, his underlying concern was not with words and objects. Rather he was concerned that names had failed to correlate with actualities. Not being concerned with words and objects, he was not concerned about coining new names.
PART III
Chapter 6

MING JIAO IN THE EASTERN HAN

In Eastern Han society, the pursuit of private and partisan interests was encouraged by the ethos of the scholar-gentry. This ethos can be seen as leading to society's increasingly judging a man by his name (ming) rather than by his actual worth or achievements (shi). Xu Gan saw this development as leading to a situation where:

If the fame-seeker could earn himself a reputation (ming) without necessarily securing an actual achievement (shi), then he would not forsake such a situation. If he could secure an actual achievement without necessarily earning himself a reputation, then he would not remain in such a situation.

For Xu Gan, fame-seekers and charlatans were able to use names to misrepresent actualities or even prescribe actualities that did not exist. Furthermore, many of the actualities which existed in name only were of no real value when it came to addressing the problems of the day. Referring to the situation that prevailed under the rule of the last emperor of the dynasty (here Xu Gan is surely referring to Emperor Ling (~ r. 168-189), rather than the puppet Emperor, Xian (~ r. 189-220)), he writes:

Thus, in those times, while there existed titles that were held in high esteem by the common people such as 'filial piety', 'dutifulness as a younger brother’, 'loyalty' and 'trustworthiness’, yet there were no titles such as 'being able to put the country in order’ or 'peace-maker’.

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1 An article based on an earlier draft of this chapter was published under the title "Ming-chiao in the Eastern Han: Filial Piety, Reputation and Office", in Chinese Studies, 8.2 (1990), 79-109.

2 B.2b.
This was because such titles could not be applied to those scholar-gentry who merely practised textual glossing.  

The situation he is commenting on relates to the decay of the Han recommendation system with its emphasis on selecting candidates based on their moral worth. By the late Eastern Han, 'moral categories' such as 'filially pious' had become increasingly meaningless, as more and more people made ostentatious displays of filial piety so as to secure a filially pious reputation, and thereby obtain recommendation to office. Furthermore, and importantly, as more men attained substantive office on little other than the strength of their purported moral worth, society increasingly found itself confronted with economic, military and political problems with which those who had achieved office by virtue of their moral worth alone, and whose talents were limited to 'textual glossing', were ill prepared to deal.

This phenomenon of fame seeking, and the resulting disaccord between name and actuality that Xu Gan describes, had their roots in the ethos of the Eastern Han shi. The term that comes closest to representing this ethos is ming jiao, of which Doctrine/Teaching of Names, and Moral Teaching are the two standard renderings. Ming jiao may be understood to have two senses.  

3 B.26a.  
4 See Appendix F for arguments supporting my interpretation of ming jiao.
respect and submission (xiao 敬 )'. Despite the distinction, the two senses are closely related, because being seen to practise this particular virtue provided a means of acquiring reputation. As expressed in Xiao jing:

If one establishes oneself in the world and puts the Way into practice, thereby passing one's name onto posterity and so glorifying one's parents, then this is the consummation of xiao.

Xiao begins by serving one's parents, next proceeds to the service of one's ruler, and is consummated by establishing oneself in the world.5

i. Xiao and the Eastern Han Recommendation System

In the Han dynasty one established oneself in the world by securing a commission in official service. There were a number of avenues leading to appointments in the bureaucracy: 1) imperial summons; 2) direct appointment/summons by the highest ministers at the capital and by head officials at the provincial and commandery level; 3) right of inheritance; 4) recommendation.

In the Eastern Han it was the recommendation system that advanced the greatest number of candidates for appointment by the central government.6 This was a continuation and refinement of the system initiated on an annual basis by Emperor Wu in 134 B.C.7 whereby each

5 1.3a-3b.
6 200 per year until 92 A.D. and then 250-300 per year after 92 A.D. See Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, 134-135.
7 Han shu, 6.160; Homer H. Dubs, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, 2:35.
Commandery and Kingdom recommended two men, one as Filially Pious (xiao) and one as Incorrupt (lian). Towards the end of the Western Han, these two categories were compounded, effectively forming one large category. In fact, the single category of Filially Pious and Incorrupt was to become the principal method of recommendation during the Eastern Han.

The other major category by which a candidate could be recommended was that of Abundant Talent (mao cai). The mao cai candidates, also recommended annually, differed from the xiao lian candidates in that they could advance directly to substantive office. Yet, as pointed out by Lao Gan, it should not be

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8 See Lao Gan, "Han dai chaju zhidu kao", Lao Gan xueshu lunwenji, 1:638-639, 658.
9 This category was referred to as xiu cai in the Western Han, but was later changed because of the taboo on the personal name of Emperor Guangwu (r. 25-57). See Rafe de Crespigny, "The Recruitment System of the Imperial Bureaucracy of Later Han", Chung Chi Journal, 6 (1966), 70-71; Bielenstein, Bureaucracy of Han Times, 136.
10 Seventeen or eighteen per year. See Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, 136.
11 The mao cai candidates were recommended either by high ranking officials at the capital (the three excellencies, the superintendent of the imperial household, the colonel director of retainers) or shepherds/inspectors of Provinces, as opposed to the xiao lian candidates who were recommended by the grand administrators and chancellors of the Commanderies and Kingdoms. The typical path of advancement of a xiao lian candidate was to proceed from being a subordinate in the local administration through nomination to become a gentleman at the capital on probation, and then to being a prefect or chief in the local administration or compatible rank at Luoyang. See Yan Gengwang, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi, Part 1, vol. 2; Lao Gan, "Han dai chaju zhidu kao", 669; de Crespigny, "The Recruitment System of the Imperial Bureaucracy of Later Han", 69-70. N.B. For official titles of the Han Dynasty, with one or two exceptions, I follow Bielenstein’s renderings as given in his The Bureaucracy of Han Times.
12 See Lao Gan, "Han dai chaju zhidu kao", 669.
overlooked that a large proportion of the mao cai candidates had first been recommended as xiao lian candidates. Bielenstein also notes that "the recommendary process became two-tiered from A.D. 36 onward. Men who had been recommended as Filially Pious and Incorrupt were enrolled as Gentlemen in one of the Three Corps. Each year, one of them had the chance of receiving a further recommendation as Abundant Talent." Thus, while not a mandatory pre-requisite for securing the more prestigious mao cai courtesy title, it was undoubtedly a most advantageous qualification to have already been recommended as a xiao lian.

Besides xiao lian and mao cai, there were other categories under which individuals could be recommended. They were, however, infrequent and irregular. And as Higashi Shinji writes, in effect the xiao lian recommendation category of the Eastern Han had subsumed most of the other recommendation categories.

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13 Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, 200, n. 24.
14 This conclusion is indirectly supported by Nagata Hidemasa's study of those officials who advanced to the rank of grand commandant (the most powerful of the three excellencies) in the Eastern Han. Of those whose paths are traceable, Nagata identifies the overwhelming majority as having entered officialdom by being recommended as xiao lian. See his "Kan dai no senkyo to kanryō kaikyō", Tōhō gakuhō, 41 (1970), 177-179.
15 These included the Capable and Good (xian liang 賢良), Sincere and Upright (fang zheng 妙正), those who Spoke Frankly and Admonished Unflinchingly (zhi yan ji jian 嘗言理諫), those who Accorded With the Way (you dao 道), the Humane and Worthy (ren xian 仁賢), the Learned in Literature (wen xue 文學), those who were Knowledgeable of the Classics (ming jing 明經), those who were Knowledgeable of the Law (ming fa 明法), and the Exceptional and Unusual (you yi 異). For these and other categories, see Dong Han huiyao, juan 26, 383-399; An Zuozhang and Xiong Tieji, Qin Han guanzhi shi gao, 2:317-325.
inherited from the Western Han.\(^\text{16}\) As much is also stated in an edict by Emperor Guangwu \(\text{r.} \, 25-57 \text{ AD}\) in 32,\(^\text{17}\) where he outlines four general qualities (si ke) that should be looked for in recommending candidates to office: unblemished moral behaviour, well versed in the Classics, well read in the laws and ordinances, and strong of will and resolute in making decisions. The edict continues, saying that each of these four qualities was characteristic of filially pious and incorrupt behaviour. In other words, all four of these general qualities, which in turn effectively represented the whole spectrum of moral categories which had hitherto been used as criteria for recommending candidates, were now regarded as falling under the now all-inclusive category of xiao lian.\(^\text{18}\) It strikes one as more than coincidental that, like the concept of xiao itself, xiao lian should also have become more universal, both in scope and reference.\(^\text{19}\) Nevertheless, despite this universality shared by xiao and xiao lian, it was still filial piety that remained the essential characteristic of both. And it was the display of filially pious

\(^{16}\) "Go Kan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai", Tōyōshi kenkyū, 46.2 (1987), 33.

\(^{17}\) The decree is quoted by Ying Shao (fl. 165-c. 204) in his Han guan yi hōhō and cited in the primary commentary to Hou Han shu at both 4.176, n. 2, and more fully at 24.3559, n. 2. There is some minor textual variance between the two quoted passages. Also, at 4.176, n. 2, the date of this edict is mistakenly given as the eighth year of the jian chu period - 83 AD. Following Chen Li, Dongshu du shu ji, 2.8b, the correct date should be the eighth year of the jian wu period - 32 A.D.

\(^{18}\) On this point, see in particular Lao Gan, "Han dai chaju zhidu kao", 637-639; Nagata Hidemasa, "Kan dai no senkyo to kanryō kaikyō", 181-182.

\(^{19}\) This development with regard to xiao is discussed in Appendix F.
behaviour that helped secure a reputation, and if desired, a chance to be recommended.

ii. The Practice of Xiao and Office

Although one could be recommended as Filially Pious while one’s parents were still alive,\(^\text{20}\) it was also possible to be recommended by faithfully observing the three year mourning period.\(^\text{21}\) In a memorial submitted in 166, Xun Shuang 荊爽 (128-190) even maintained that observance of the mourning period was the highest expression of filial piety.\(^\text{22}\) Having first stated that the Process (xing 行) of the Han dynasty was fire and

\(^\text{20}\) Such as Jiang Ge 江革, who, because of his doting attention to his aged mother, earned himself the epithet Jiang Juxiao 江祿 "Jiang the Immensely Filially Pious". He was subsequently recommended as xiao lian, eventually becoming a grandee remonstrant and consultant. He also received high praise and emoluments from Emperor Zhang 章 (r. 75-88) for his filial piety. See Hou Han shu, 39.1302-1303.

\(^\text{21}\) Jiang Ge, for example, was not recommended as xiao lian until after his mother had died and he had completed the mourning period.

\(^\text{22}\) cf. Mencius 4B.13; Lau, Mencius, 130: "Mencius said, ‘Keeping one’s parents when they are alive is not worth being described as of major importance; it is treating them decently when they die that is worth such a description.’" Yet, as Tu Wei-ming comments: "On the surface, Mencius may seem to have placed too much emphasis on ancestral worship, as if honouring one’s parents after they have passed away is more of a virtue than serving them when still alive. Actually ‘treating them decently when they die’ indicates that filiality, as an overall commitment to one’s origin of existence, is a lifelong task. To serve one’s parents for the duration of their lives is only a part of this overall commitment. Confucius himself stresses the same point [Analects 2.7]: ‘Nowadays a filial son is just a man who keeps his parents in food. But even dogs or horses are given food. If there is no feeling of reverence, wherein lies the difference?’" See his Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-yung, 62-63.
that filial piety was the virtue of the Process fire,\textsuperscript{23} he continues:

Formerly a Han dynasty regulation was introduced that required everyone in the realm to recite Xiao jing and that officials should be selected from those candidates recommended as xiao lian. If one completes the period of mourning for one's parents, then this is the consummation of filial piety.\textsuperscript{24}

In "Re-institute the Three Years Mourning Period" Xu Gan similarly argues for the observance of the three year mourning period on the grounds that the loss of one's parents was the most painful of human emotions:

Of all the creatures in the world that are born breathing, none has greater understanding than man,\textsuperscript{25} and of all the most painful of human emotions, none is more painful than losing one's parents. When a wound is deep, it takes many days to heal; where there is great pain, the recovery is slow.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore the former kings instituted the three year mourning period so as to enable people to express their emotions and establish a formal ceremonial for that expression, because at that time the pain of grief was most intense.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{23} On the choice of this element as the Process which correlated with the Han (from 104 BC), see Michael Loewe, "The Concept of Sovereignty", The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 1, 738, plus notes.
\textsuperscript{24} Hou Han shu, 62.2051. A similar sentiment is expressed by Lu Gong in commenting on Emperor He's reign (r. 88–106) observance of the three year mourning period. See Hou Han shu, 25.875.
\textsuperscript{25} Paraphrase of Xun Zi, 13.13a; Burton Watson, Hsün Tzu, 106:

Among creatures of blood and breath, none has greater understanding than man. Therefore a man ought to love his parents until the day he dies.

\textsuperscript{26} Paraphrase of Xun Zi, 13.12b; Watson, Hsün Tzu, 106.
\textsuperscript{27} Qun shu zhi yao, 46.22b-23a. This partially preserved pian from Zhong lun, (appended to the Longxi jing she edition) like Xun Shuang’s memorial, argues for the re-
The high degree of importance attached to filial piety, however, meant that in the Eastern Han its practice came increasingly to be used as a means of securing a reputation, and so enhancing an individual's chances of being recommended as a xiao lian candidate. In short, rather than for its own sake, the cultivation of xiao provided a socially endorsed means of securing a personal reputation. This 'fame seeking' expressed itself in a variety of ways, frequently engendering some quite perverse behaviour.

One prime example was a type of elegiac oneupmanship where the mourner would not only observe the full three year mourning period,28 but actually exceed it. While in

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28 It would appear that the traditional mourning period only extended into the third year and did not require three full years. Some sources state that the requisite period was twenty-five months (e.g. Li ji, 58.1b; 6.22a,
some cases this was probably motivated by little more than an acutely developed sense of filial devotion, in other cases, the lure of a virtuous reputation would appear to have been an influential consideration. A notorious example is that of Zhao Xuan who carried out a mourning period of twenty years, earning himself the seemingly well deserved accolade of being filially pious. In his twentieth year of mourning, however, it was revealed that during this period he had fathered and reared five children!

Jiang Ge (mentioned above) also exceeded three years of mourning. He did, however, agree to cease when the Grand Administrator requested him to do so and gave him a position as a minor official. He was later recommended as Filially Pious and Incorrupt.

Yet it was not only the length of time that one mourned that could be used to obtain a filially pious reputation. Another method was by growing emaciated during the mourning period. Bao Ang and Wei Biao for example, were both recommended as Filially Pious and Incorrupt after they had become emaciated during the mourning period. For the same reason, Zhou Pan (who had already been recommended as Filially Pious

Kong Yingda sub-commentary; Xun Zi, 13.13a) while some state that it was twenty-seventy months (Li ji, 6.22a, Kong sub-commentary quoting Zheng Xuan; Han shu, 4.134, n. 16, Yan Shigu commentary).

For example, Yuan Shao (Hou Han shu, 74A.2373), Xue Bao (Hou Han shu, 39.1294), Liu Zhen and Liu Jian (Hou Han shu, 42.1426).

See n. 20 above.

Hou Han shu, 39.1302-1303.

Hou Han shu, 29.1023.

Hou Han shu, 26.917.
and Incorrupt before his mother died) was repeatedly summoned for appointment by the three excellencies, an honour greater than recommendation. It is somewhat bemusing that this perverse behaviour should have been accepted as a genuine display of filial piety, not least because it was a violation of the Xiao jing teaching that one should not harm one's body, skin or hair.  

While not every instance of these two types of mourning behaviour was motivated by the desire to acquire a reputation and secure recommendation, such behaviour was nevertheless considered a legitimate and respected means of earning a filially pious reputation. Furthermore, those cases where an individual did not avail himself of the reputation thus acquired, as a shortcut to office, served to enhance further the high regard for such behaviour in society generally.

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35 Xiao jing, 1.3a. cf. also Analects 8.3; Lau, The Analects, 92, and Legge, Chinese Classics, 1:208 mod:

When he was seriously ill, Zeng Zi summoned his disciples and said, "Uncover my feet, uncover my hands. Poetry says:

In fear and trembling,
As if approaching a deep abyss,
As if walking on thin ice.  

Now and hereafter, I know I will be spared, my young friends."

(a Mao 195. b Lau comments, "i.e., to have avoided, now that he was on the point of death, the risk of the mutilation of his body - a duty which he owed to his parents.")

Zheng Xuan, Lun yu zhu shu, 8.2a, comments that Zeng Zi maintained that, since his body had been received from his parents, he should never dare to harm or injure it. He thus instructed his disciples to remove the bed coverings and see what good condition his hands and feet were in.
iii. An Expanded Concept of Xiao

Although rooted in filial devotion and respect towards parents, the concept of xiao was transferred to other relationships also involving respect, obedience and submission. Thus, just as it was an expression of xiao to mourn one's parents for three years, in the Eastern Han it was similarly considered a legitimate expression of xiao to mourn for one's teacher or patron for three years. And, as Patricia Ebrey has written, "patron-client ties were created every time a man took on a teacher, accepted an appointment as a political subordinate, or received a recommendation to office by an official", thus the practice was well established. It is not surprising, then, to find former subordinates (gu lian) observing the three year mourning period for the grand administrator under whom they had served under or with whom they had been associated, because it was the responsibility of the grand administrator to recommend xiao lian candidates. At times the bond between a grand administrator and a xiao lian candidate was strengthened by decades of association, because some grand administrators deliberately selected young candidates so

36 See also Appendix F.
37 Ebrey, "Patron-Client Relations in the Later Han", 533. On this subject, see also Kamada Shigeo, "Kan dai no monsei kori", Tōhōgaku, 7 (1953), 25-38.
38 For example, Wang Yun (Hou Han shu, 66.2172); Huan Luan (Hou Han shu, 37.1259); Li xu, 16.5b, records that, in 143, as many as eighty-seven former-subordinates observed the mourning period for the Grand Administrator of Beihai Kingdom.
that they could continue to repay the favour shown to them.\textsuperscript{39}

There are other cases where the association between an official and subordinate was very brief or even tenuous, yet the former subordinate still faithfully observed the three years of mourning. For example, Li Xun was invited by the grand administrator to serve temporarily in the Bureau of Merit of one of the prefectural offices. Before he had even arrived to take up his post, however, Li Xun was summoned to an appointment as attendant at the provincial office (a much more senior position). Yet, despite the fact that the grand administrator died soon after this new appointment, Li Xun refused to comply with the provincial summons and instead observed the three year mourning period.\textsuperscript{40} An even more remarkable case is that of the famous Xun Shuang who was once recommended as According With the Way by the minister of works Yuan Feng. Although Xun Shuang declined the recommendation, nevertheless, when Yuan Feng died, he still observed three years mourning.\textsuperscript{41}

Another important type of patron-client relationship was that of teacher/patron and student/household disciple (men sheng). Originally men sheng referred to the students of Confucian teachers, but it also came to be used to refer to those individuals who actually enrolled as disciples of powerful families. As with the former

\textsuperscript{39} This practice had been identified already quite early in the Eastern Han. See the summary of Fan Shu's memorial, submitted in 58 A.D., Hou Han shu, 32.1122-1123.

\textsuperscript{40} Hou Han shu, 51.1683.

\textsuperscript{41} Hou Han shu, 62.2056.
subordinates, these relationships were considered to be of a permanent nature; and so a disciple would still identify with his patron even after having secured a position outside his patron's household. Referring in particular to the period when Emperors Huan and Ling reigned (146-189), Xu Gan writes:

In every household there were those who, despite having court appointments, called themselves 'household disciples' of rich and high-ranking families. As for those who were their teachers, they had nothing to teach, and likewise the disciples did not undertake learning.\(^{42}\)

Just as famous private teachers had hundreds, thousands and some even ten thousand or more students,\(^{43}\) patrons also attracted many disciples.\(^{44}\) Unlike former subordinates, household disciples seem not to have observed the three year mourning period. Nevertheless they did take part in funeral ceremonies and also contributed to the erection of steles for their patrons. These funeral gatherings sometimes attracted huge numbers of mourners, including not only acquaintances and relatives, but also former subordinates and household disciples. At Chen Shi's funeral (c. 189), for example, more than thirty thousand mourners attended.\(^{45}\)

\(^{42}\) Zhong Lun, B.11a.\(^{43}\) Hou Han shu records more than twenty examples of teachers who had over a thousand students.\(^{44}\) Nevertheless, to judge by stele inscriptions, the greatest numbers of men sheng affiliated with any one patron seems to have been in the hundreds rather than the thousands. See Ebrey, "Patron-Client Relations in the Later Han", 537.\(^{45}\) Hou Han shu, 62.2066. The expense lavished on the funeral ceremony was also regarded as an expression of xiao. Wang Fu (c.85-162) writes:

Caring for the well being of one's parents and abiding by their wishes are the means
iv. Declining Office and Cultivating Reputation

In the foregoing discussion I have shown that there was a connection between the cultivation of xiao and the attainment of a virtuous reputation. I have also advanced the view that the attainment of such a reputation could be used to secure official recommendation as a xiao lian candidate. Yet there were a great many individuals who, despite having been recommended, declined the recommendation. Why? For some it was a political gesture, or alternatively a matter of personal integrity in keeping with Confucius' dictum: "Enter not a state that is in peril, stay not in a state that is in danger. Show yourself when the Way prevails in the empire, but hide yourself when it does not."46

Yet there were other motivations. Those who aspired to office also took into consideration the personality of practising filial piety. Nowadays most people disregard their parents' wishes and are mean when it comes to caring for their parents' welfare. They limit their support in caring for their lives, waiting for them to die. After they die then they honour and embellish the funeral rites so as to talk about their filial piety, and lavishly entertain their guests so as to secure a reputation.

See Qian fu lun, 20. Elsewhere he describes the trouble and cost expended on coffins (134; also Hou Han shu, 49.1636). For similar criticisms, see also Cui Shi, Zheng lun, 46.5a-5b. 46 Analects 8.13; Lau, The Analects, 94. On the relation between eremitism and the refusal to take up office in the Eastern Han, see Aat Vervoorn, Men of the Cliffs and Caves: The Development of the Chinese Eremitic Tradition to the End of the Han Dynasty, Chapter 3, "The Later Han".
and status of whoever recommended them, because the reputation of the recommending official, as well the subsequent political fate of that official, could affect the recommendee. Such examples would include Zhang Kai, who, having been successfully recommended as a mao cai candidate and then appointed prefect of Changling, refused to take up the appointment. The reason, it transpired, was that he regarded the director of retainers who had recommended him as being irresponsible and lacking in the right moral qualities.

The business of picking and choosing which appointments to accept is also related to another issue, the practice of declining recommendation and/or summons to office, thereby further enhancing one's reputation. (In this connection it is interesting to note that after Zhang Kai refused to take up the above appointment, he went into seclusion where his reputation grew, allowing him to attract a large number of followers.) A celebrated example is that of Jiang Gong, who was recommended as xiao lian once, summoned to appointments by the Three Excellencies ten times, recommended as According With the Way, Of Supreme Filial Piety and Capable and Good nine times, and imperially summoned three times, yet he

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47 This is attested to, for example, by those who were barred from holding offices during the proscriptions of 166, 169, 172, and 176, simply because they were former subordinates of particular officials at some time in their careers.
48 Hou Han shu, 36.1242.
49 Each occasion was marked by the dispatch of an Official Carriage (gong ju) to take him to the capital. Bao Pu Zi, 2.5b (which refers to him as Jiang Boya, but in his Hou Han shu biography he is called Jiang Bohuai, obviously a copyist's mistake), records that Emperor Huan extended him the exceptional
declined on every occasion. His fame was such that "the (three) excellencies vied with one another to summon him to office." Nor is there a shortage of other such examples from the latter half of the Eastern Han.

There was considerable advantage to be gained by persistently refusing to accept a recommendation or to comply with a summons. As one's reputation grew, so did the number of one's followers, friends, supporters and consequently one's social standing. Even when someone declined to accept an appointment or recommendation, he was still sometimes known by the particular title of the recommendation, summons or position he had declined to accept. For example, Zhang Kai is referred to by Emperor Huan as the "former prefect of Changling" even though he had never taken up that office. Others such as Zhang Zhi and Guo Tai were both at one stage recommended as According With the Way and although they both declined, they were still known as Zhang Youdao courtesy of dispatching a comfortable carriage with wheels wrapped in black and light-red precious silk.

50 Hou Han shu jie jie, 53.8b.
51 Hou Han shu, 53.1749. This would seem to have also been the case with Zheng Xuan who was summoned to appointments by the three excellencies no less than fourteen times. See Bao Fu Zi, 2.5b.
52 The following references are all to Hou Han shu or its commentary: Huan Ye, 37.1259; Cui Shi, 52.1725; Xu Zhi, 53.1746; Yang Si, 54.1776; Cheng Aoshi, 57.1840; Huang Qiong, 61.2032; Zhong Hao, 62.2064; Xun Shuang, 62.2056-2057; Dong Ban, 63.2088; Li Xie, 63.2090-2091; Li Gu, 63.2073 n.4; Liu Shu, 67.2190; Zong Ci, 67.2202; Cen Zhi, 67.2212; Meng Min, 68.2229; Li Ying, 68.2233; Zhao Yi, 80B.2635; Wang Lie, 81.2697; Dong Fu, 82B.2734.
53 Hou Han shu, 36.1243.
54 Hou Han shu, 65.2144, commentary cites Wang Yin's Wen zhi 146.
55 Hou Han shu, 67.2225.
and Guo Youdao to their friends and disciples.

There also seems to be a case for the view that those who declined a recommendation were motivated to do so by the belief that such an act would increase their chances to be summoned to office by the emperor or by the most senior officials of the central government. Fukui Shigemasa has compiled a study of sixteen individuals who, while declining to accept candidacy as xiao lian or mao cai recommendees, did, however, either accept candidacy in some of the extraordinary (zhi ke) recommendatory categories (such as Capable and Good, Sincere and Upright, etc.), or else complied with summonses, all of them eventually reaching senior posts. In other words, if one declined candidacy under one of the ordinary recommendatory categories (chang ke) or extraordinary recommendatory categories, this increased the chances of either being selected for extraordinary recommendation or being summoned to office respectively, and so the outwardly 'modest' refusal to

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56 Hou Han shu, 65.2144.
57 Hou Han shu, 68.2227.
58 "Go Kan no senkyo ni okeru suikyo no jitai", Tōhōgaku (1979), 8-9.
59 Somewhat surprisingly, in his conclusion Fukui argues (p.13) that, because the starting salary (six hundred shì) of some of those who waited to be summoned to office rather than accept the initial offer of candidacy under one of the extraordinary categories, was the same as those who did accept the initial offer, therefore there was no advantage to be gained in declining a recommendation and waiting for a summons. This, however, is to disregard completely the status value of a summons vis-à-vis a recommendation, ordinary or extraordinary, and which consequently functioned as a relatively greater guarantee of reaching the more senior positions in the central bureaucracy. And as Nagata Hidemasa, "Kan dai no senkyo to kanryō kaikyū", 187, has argued, from the
accept a recommendation or comply with a summons could be used as a ploy to gain a more senior position.

A number of other pseudo-deferential acts were similarly open to exploitation by those who wished to pursue an official career, one of the more popular being to yield inherited property, wealth or title to a relative (where it still remained within the family). Deng Biao and Liu Kai, for example, ceded their inherited enfeoffments to their younger brothers, whereby they each earned a reputation and so gained office. Xu Wu was even more enterprising. After his father's death, he took the largest share of the inheritance himself, leaving his two younger brothers with poorer and smaller portions. As he had anticipated, the two younger brothers were recommended on the strength of their willingness to yield to their elder brother. While Xu Wu suffered temporary castigation, when he offered to cede all of his (now multiplied) inheritance to his brothers, leaving nothing for himself, he immediately won back the esteem of the community, allowing him eventually to attain the office of privy treasurer.

middle of the Eastern Han, summonses became increasingly necessary to reach the highest offices.

It was, of course, natural that such a state of affairs should have led to situations where individuals who commanded excellent reputations (as a result of repeatedly declining invitations or failing to comply with summonses), did eventually comply with a summons, only for it to be discovered that their reputations far exceeded their capabilities. See for example Li Gu's letter to Huang Qiong, Hou Han shu, 61.2032.

Hou Han shu, 37.1268 and Commentary, n. 3, 4; Hou Han shu, 44.1495.

Hou Han shu, 76.2471.
Sharing some similarities with this last example is the case of Liu Ju 舒吉, who declined summonses to office by head officials at the provincial and commandery level on the grounds that his father had not yet secured an official appointment. When the grand commandant Zhu Chong and grand tutor Huan Yan 蘇業 learnt of this they praised his 'integrity', appointed his father to the rank of gentleman consultant and recommended Liu Ju as a xiao lian candidate.62

The foregoing accounts represent an overview of some of the excesses engendered by ming jiao and portray how the achievement of reputation (which was really a reaffirmation of the Xiao jing teaching that the consummation of xiao lies in successfully establishing oneself in the world) had become integral to the ethos of the Eastern Han scholar-gentry.

Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220), for example, recalls that when as a young man he was recommended as xiao lian, he feared that others would despise him because, unlike many other recommendees, he was not a famous recluse. Thereupon he set his mind on becoming a Commandery Administrator so as to implement his political policies and thereby "establish a reputation, letting every gentleman in the realm know of me."63

62 Hou Han shu, 76.2476. A similar example is that of Zhong Hao 虢 Hao who repeatedly declined summonses from the Three Dukes and went into seclusion because his elder brother had not secured official appointment. See Hou Han shu, 62.2064
63 San Guo zhi, 1.32, commentary n. 1, cites Wei Wu gu shi 武 武."
In a letter to his son, Zheng Xuan (127-200) writes that "outstanding reputations are made in the company of one's friends and comrades, while moral behaviour relies on one's own aspirations. If these should lead to fame, then honour will also be forthcoming. Is this not worth bearing strongly in mind? Is this not worth bearing strongly in mind?"

There are even examples where the achievement of personal reputation was considered to have been of greater worth than life itself. In speaking to Fan Pang, his mother said, "You have now achieved a reputation equal to that of Li and Du so even if you were to die, what would there be to regret? Is it possible both to have a glorious reputation and also seek for long life?" This last sentence implies that if one has already achieved a glorious reputation, something which was regarded as a superior type of longevity, then there was little advantage to be gained in seeking to prolong one's life-span: having secured the former meant that the latter was redundant because one had achieved the ultimate. As Cao Cao said:

64 Hou Han shu, 35.1210.
65 Li Ying (discussed above) and Du Mi, two leading members of the proscribed faction. See Chi-yun Chen, Hsün Yüeh: Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian, 23-24.
66 Hou Han shu, 67.3206.
67 Basing himself on a famous Zuo zhuan passage, 35.22a-24a:

In Spring of the twenty-fourth year, Mu Shu went to Jin. Fan Xuan met him and asked, "The ancients had a saying, 'To die but not to perish'; what does it mean?" "I [Mu Shu] have heard it said that the establishment of Potency is of the utmost importance; secondly, the
The establishment of Potency is of the utmost importance and next to that is the establishment of merit. Thus merit and Potency are the means by which one's name comes to be known to posterity. A gentleman regards it as advantageous not to have his name perish. 68

With such importance attached to reputation, frequently with insufficient regard to ensuring a corresponding actuality behind the name, it was natural that the types of eccentricities, distortions and outright abuses described above would become commonplace. Seen in this light, contemporary and near contemporary criticisms levelled at these excesses are not necessarily as exaggerated as they may initially appear. Wang Fu, for example, writes in his vitriolic essay, "Kao ji"

Among the various officials who recommend gentlemen, there are those who nominate the stupid and boorish as Flourishing Talents, the conceited and recalcitrant as being of Superior Filial Piety, the corrupt and avaricious as Incorrupt Officials, the devious and cunning as Sincere and Upright, the servile and sycophantic as Frankly Spoken, the flippant and superficial as Honest and Ingenuous, the empty and hollow as According With the Way, the stupid and mute as Knowledgeable of the Classics, the cruel and harsh as Clement and Considerate, the timid and weak as Martial and Fierce, and the benighted and obtuse as Resolvers of the Problematical. Name and actuality do not correspond, and what is sought for and what is offered do not match. 69

68 San Guo zhi, 19.568, commentary n. 4, cites Wei lüe
69 Qian fu lun, 68.
In commenting on the situation during the reigns of Emperors Ling and Xian (167-220), Ge Hong (284-364) writes:

Thus the people at that time had a saying, 'Those recommended as Flourishing Talents are devoid of learning and those recommended as Filially Pious and Incorrupt live apart from their fathers.'

v. Name and Actuality as a Fundamental-Peripheral Relationship

The model which best represents Xu Gan's understanding of this disaccord between name and actuality is a fundamental-peripheral polarity where actualities are fundamental (ben) and names peripheral (mo). Ben (literally, 'the roots') refers to the fundamental, the primary, the important, while mo (literally, 'the branches') refers to the peripheral, the secondary, the non-essential. The ben mo polarity is found in a variety of pre-Han literature. In Han literature, ben is frequently used to refer to farming in contrast to mo which is used to refer disparagingly to commerce. Possibly the earliest obviously philosophical use of the ben mo distinction is in zhang 3 of Da xue:

70 Bao Pu Zi, 15.2a. cf. the following lampoon, dating from some time after 147 AD, Hou Han shu, 61.2040; Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, mod:

If one desires to obtain the unbearable, They are the Abundant Talents [recommended by] the superintendent of the imperial household.

71 See for example the Yan tie lun, "Ben yi" pian and the Qian fu lun, "Wu ben" pian.
Things have their fundamental and peripheral aspects while affairs have their beginning and end; if one knows what comes first and what comes after, then one will be close to the Way.  

Where the ben mo polarity is to be distinguished from the ti yong polarity, such as I have described in Chapter I, is a) yong represents or expresses ti, while mo does not faithfully represent or express ben - at best it can be but a hint, trace or suggestion; b) ben and mo are qualitatively differentiated while neither ti nor yong is more important than the other. This qualitative differentiation is quite clear in the following passage from the Zhong lun "Examining Falsity":  

Confucius said: "Do not grieve that others do not recognize your merits." As for someone who does grieve that others do not recognize his merits even if he said to me, "I am a practitioner of good deeds", I would not believe him. Why? Because his fountain does not issue from inside and that which guides its flow is external. If one is like this then the resolve to abide by the Way will not shine forth and the intention to uphold what is right will not be manifest. Although he may comply with the former kings' precedents of extolling Poetry and Documents, yet to what avail is it? All such ways of poisoning the people of the realm reject what is fundamental

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72 This passage is possibly the basis for the following passage from the Zhong lun essay, "Devoting Attention to the Fundamentals", B.20b-21a:

The Way has its fundamental and peripheral aspects and affairs have their petty and important aspects. That wherein the sage differs from other men is nothing other than his being able to make this distinction.

73 Analects 1.16; 14.32.
74 Following Wang Shumin in reduplicating the six characters . See Liang Rongmao, Xu Gan Zhong lun jiaozheng, 88.
In this passage the fame seeker is criticised for not cultivating personal integrity. Instead, he succumbs to external, superficial enticements, seeking to please others at the expense of his own personal cultivation. Similarly, the fame seeker's praise of the classics is little more than lip service, devoid of true meaning because he fails to examine the real import of those works.

Xu Gan is critical of those who regard pursuit of the peripheral to be more worthwhile than cultivation of the fundamental. What is of particular interest, however, is that he applies the same qualitative distinction that characterizes the ben mo relationship to his understanding of the ming shi relationship when name and actuality are in disaccord: shi is fundamental, ming is peripheral. In other words, seen in this relationship, shi is considered to be more important, more fundamental than ming.

As we have seen, in the Eastern Han the excessive emphasis on reputation led to men's acquiring quite undeserved reputations, thus making a mockery of the notion that a man's reputation matched his Potency. Xu Gan writes:

Thus disciples of chicanery and undeserved fame, taking advantage of the people's long departure from the teachings of the sages, have spawned the beginnings of evil and contrived heresies. They use the teachings bequeathed by the former kings to avail themselves of a facade. Although in outward
appearance (wen 美) they conform to these teachings, in actuality (shi 事) they go against them. Although in appearance (mao 貌) they accord, yet in essence (qing 慶) they are far apart. Although they maintain that they have attained the truth of the sages, in fact they rely on a disparate grabbag of views, deceiving a whole era of people.76

In "Recognizing the Importance of the Arts as a Major Principle" 77 , the same distinction is developed with reference to the Six Arts:

Hence being respectful, sincere, well-disciplined and yielding are the essence (qing) of the Arts, and centrality, harmony, balance and uprightness are its actuality. A mere sufficiency of reverence and alertness is but an embellishment (hua 輝) to the Arts and an awesome countenance at all times is but an adornment (shij 節) to the Arts. One may discourse on the Way with a man who understands the essence and actuality of the Arts; one may only discuss ordinary affairs with a man who merely has a knowledge of the embellishment and adornment of the Arts. Ordinary affairs are the task of officials (you 佑) ; the Way is the vocation of the Superior Person.78

Here Xu Gan re-affirms Lao Zi's dictum:

The great man dwells in the depths of the Dao and does not abide on its surface;

76 B.1a.
77 Reference to the Six Arts.
78 cf. Analects 8.4:

[Zeng Zi said], "In according with the Way there are three things which the Superior Person attaches particular importance to: to put on a serious countenance so as to avoid violence and disrespect; to maintain an upright facial expression thereby making it easier to gain the confidence of others; and to speak pleasantly so as to avoid seeming boorish and unreasonable. As for attending to matters concerning sacrificial vessels, officials attend to such tasks.

79 A.24a-24b.
He dwells in its actuality and does not abide in its embellishment.\textsuperscript{80}

Although \textit{ming} is not specifically mentioned in the above \textit{Zhong lun} passage, by virtue of its regular pairing with \textit{shi} in other contexts, then analogously \textit{ming} is not only regarded as 'external' but is also an 'ornamentation' and an 'embellishment', thus re-affirming the \textit{ben mo} qualitative distinction.

In this chapter I have identified and described Han \textit{ming jiao} and shown how its emphasis on securing personal reputation for the purposes of securing official position encouraged Eastern Han scholar-gentry to practise some quite perverse behaviour. I have argued that this emphasis on reputation at the expense of the actuality it should represent led Xu Gan to regard name and actuality to be in disaccord. The model which best represents Xu Gan's concept of this disaccord is a fundamental-peripheral polarity. Yet it is not only with reference to the dichotomy between reputation and a man's actual worth or achievements that supports this interpretation; in the following chapter I will describe another key area of Eastern Han society that can also be seen to have led Xu Gan to regard name and actuality to be in disaccord.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Lao Zi} 38; Rhett Y. W. Young and Roger T. Ames (trans.), Ch'en Ku-ying, \textit{Lao Tzu: Text, Notes, and Comments}, 188, slightly mod.
Chapter 7

WORD WITHOUT A MESSAGE: CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP IN THE
EASTERN HAN

Throughout the two hundred year history of the Eastern Han dynasty, mainstream intellectual activity tended to remain within the parameters of enquiry identified with the Old Text School (OTS) and New Text School (NTS). By the latter half of the second century, however, while the OTS had reached the penultimate stage in its rise to ascendancy over the NTS (the full eclipse of which was marked by the establishment of chairs for the OTS versions of the Classics during the Wei) it is evident that for a growing number of contemporary intellectuals such as Xu Gan, classical scholarship had become synonymous with philological pedantry, where scholiastic niceties were pursued at the expense of the 'gist' or 'essential meaning' (da yi) of the Classics, the legacy of the sages.

i. The Nature of the OTS-NTS Rivalry

One of the root causes of the OTS and NTS rivalry was the debate over which type of text - that written in the 'old or ancient' (gu wen) style characters or

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1 An article based on an earlier draft of this chapter will be published under the title "Study Notes on Xu Gan and Han Classical Scholarship", in Journal of Oriental Studies, 28.2 (1991).
2 See Wang Guowei, Guan tang ji lin, 4.11a-13a.
3 On the history of this rivalry, see Appendix G.
4 That is 'large seal' (da zhuan) or zhou style.
that written in contemporary Han 'cleric' (li fū) style—should be regarded as preserving the most orthodox transmission of the scriptures. OTS partisans maintained that since the Qin 'burning of the books', those versions of the Classics employed by the NTS partisans were incomplete. Thus, for example, the New Text version of Documents transmitted by Fu Sheng 伏生 contained sixteen pian less than that of the Old Text version said to have been found in the wall of Confucius' house. When Liu Xiang collated the three different New Text versions with the Old Text version kept in the imperial library, he recorded a discrepancy of over seven hundred occurrences of different characters and several tens of missing characters in the New Text versions. 5

The related problems of interpretation and exegesis were of course equally contentious issues and quickly came to be of much greater concern than mere orthographic differences. The following account of Poetry by Ban Gu 班固 (32-92) is a good illustration of how divergent commentary traditions were spawned:

Despite having been among the books burnt in the Qin, all three hundred and five poems survived because they were able to be chanted from memory—they were not just written down on bamboo and silk. After the Han was established, Shen Gong 申公 of Lu 蘊 wrote glosses to Poetry, and both Yuan Gushe 阮固 and Han Sheng 韩生 of Yan 蘆 wrote commentaries to it. Some, using the histories (chun qiu 春秋), selected

5 See Han shu, 30.1706, 88.3607, and 36.1969.
6 i.e. Shen Peigong 申培公.
7 i.e. Yuan Gusheng 阮固生.
8 i.e. Han Ying 韓嬰.
9 Yang Shuda, Han shu kui guan, 1:209, comments: "Men of antiquity referred to all histories as chun qiu. Yu shi chun qiu and Lü shi chun qiu are such
various miscellaneous interpretations, yet none was the original meaning. Although they all missed the true meaning, the Lu version was close. These three schools were all established in the academy. In addition there was Mao Gong’s school. Mao himself said that his teachings were transmitted from Zixia and although King Xian of Hejian, favoured Mao’s school, it was not established in the academies.

ii. The NTS and Zhang Ju Commentaries

The style of commentary that in the Eastern Han became identified with the NTS commentators was known as zhang ju or ‘chapter and verse’. This commentary style had begun in the Western Han and Xiahou Sheng’s criticism of Xiahou Jian is an early example of how its critics viewed it. Preceding his criticism proper is a description of zhang ju commentary (albeit with special reference to Documents):

Furthermore Xiahou Jian studied under those who were versed in the Five Classics and asked about writings that were at variance with Documents. At the end of the chapters and verses of Documents he adduced both the examples. This was not a reference to the text of Confucius’ Spring and Autumn Annals."

10 Posthumous title of Liu De, son by concubine of Emperor Jing.
11 Han shu, 30.1708-1709.
12 For a study of the development of the zhang ju commentary tradition in the Western Han, with special reference to Documents, see Nomura Shigeo, "Zen Kan shoku no gaku shidan", Aichi kyoiku daigaku kenkyu hokoku, 27 (1978), 1-12.
13 Han shu, 75.3159; Qian Mu, Liang Han jingxue jin gu wen pingyi, 201-202.
14 David R. Knechtges, "The Liu HsinfYang Hsiung correspondence on the Fang Yen", Monumenta Serica, 33 (1977-1978), 314, n. 32, defines zhang ju as "a type of explication that involved long, sometimes irrelevant, digressions, about the moral and political implications of certain words or lines in a text."
text and interpretations of those other writings.

Undoubtedly, his purpose in adducing such writings was either to criticise them or to employ them as justification for his own interpretation. It is not difficult to imagine how this would have provided ample opportunity to engage in digressions at whatever length one pleased, thereby producing huge commentaries.

By the Eastern Han, while the zhang ju style of commentary was not used exclusively by NTS scholars, it had already become well established as a method of commentary practised predominantly and typically by NTS scholars. At the end of his Qi lüe, Liu Xin notes that some scholars wrote as much as twenty or thirty thousand words to explain a five character phrase. In his Epilogue to the "Ru lin zhuan", Ban Gu writes:

From the time that Emperor Wu established chairs for academicians of the Five Classics, instituted the position of

15 For example Zheng Zhong 車充 wrote a Zuo shi tiao li zhang ju 加氏騐例章句, see Jing dian shi wen, 1.27a; Jia Kui 管逵 wrote a zhang ju commentary to Chun qiu Zuo shi chang 漢秋左氏春秋, see Sui shu, 32.923. (NB Nomura Shigeo, "Zen Kan shoku no gaku", 6-7, argues that these two works are not legitimate examples of zhang ju commentary); Lu Zhi 濮植 wrote a Shang shu zhang ju 尚書章句, see Hou Han shu, 64.2116; Zheng Xing 鄭興 wrote a zhang ju commentary to Zuo zhuan, see Hou Han shu, 35.1217; and even the chief protagonist of the OTS in the Western Han, Liu Xin, seems to have harnessed this method to graft passages from Zuo zhuan to the relevant sentences in the Spring and Autumn Annals. See Han shu, 36.1967; Michael Loewe, Chinese Ideas of Life and Death: Faith, Myth and Reason in the Han Period (202 B.C.-220 A.D.), 186-187; Robert P. Kramers, "The Development of Confucian Schools", The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 1, 761-762.

16 See Kaga Eiji, Chūgoku koten kaishaku shi: Gi-Shin hō, 18-19.

17 Han shu, 30.1723.
Disciple, held examinations and encouraged candidates with rewards of office and emolument, up to the yuan shi period (1-5 A.D.), more than one hundred years had passed. In this interim, transmitters of the classical heritage gradually prospered and their off-shoots increased and multiplied. Commentaries of up to a million words were written on the explanation of one Classic, and the number of famous masters exceeded a thousand. The reason for this was that therein lay the way to emoluments and profit.

Huan Tan (c. 43 B.C. - 28 A.D.) even cites an example of one Qin Jinjun whose explanation of the two characters Yao dian reached one hundred thousand words. Wang Chong writes that "in Wang Mang's time the chapter and verse commentaries to the Five Classics were each shortened by two hundred thousand words", which, as Qian Mu notes, implies that commentaries in excess of two hundred thousand words had been written for each of the Classics.

Besides long-windedness, the NTS commentaries were also frequently criticised for being facile and shallow, and failing to elucidate the true meaning of the Classics. In Wang Chong's words:

In explaining the Five Classics, the literati frequently miss the true meaning. Former literati could not distinguish

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18 Instituted in 124 B.C. See Han shu, 6.172; Dubs, History of the Former Han Dynasty, 2:24.
19 Han shu, 88.3620. Compare Tjan Tjoe Som's translation, Po hu t'ung, 1:143. As a passing remark, while Tjan's study remains an invaluable work, nevertheless his translations are frequently imprecise.
20 Disciple of the Documents academician Zhang Shanfu (who participated in the 'Stone Canal' discussions, and who in turn, interestingly, was a disciple of Xiahou Jian). See Han shu, 88.3605.
21 Han shu, 30.1724. See also Pokora, Hsin-lun, 89, and 97, n. 2.
22 Lun heng, 1:583.
23 Liang Han jingxue jin gu wen pingyi, 206.
fundamentals from superficialities and in vain produced empty explanations. Later literati believe the words of these former masters; they follow the past teachings and conform to the old dogmas, learning thoroughly the words and sayings of these past masters. If, by pursuing the teachings of a particular master they make a name for themselves, then they hasten to become teachers themselves. And then, by taking advantage of an opportune moment, they are able to secure office very early in their careers. Yet, frantically competing for advancement, they have no time to concentrate and apply their minds to the examination and verification of essentials. Thus empty theories are transmitted without end while the truth remains suppressed and invisible.

In the Han shu and Hou Han shu biographies of some of the OTS partisans, the fact that they did not or would not write zhang ju commentaries seems to function almost as an accolade. And in the Hou Han shu biographies of two principal OTS partisans, Huan Tan and Ban Gu, it is stated that, rather than writing zhang ju commentaries,

24 That is, those of the contemporary period. 25 Lun heng, 2:1119. 26 For example, Yang Xiong (Han shu, 87A.3514); Huan Tan (Hou Han shu, 27.955); Ban Gu (Hou Han shu, 40A.1330); Liang Hong (Hou Han shu, 83.2765); Wang Chong (Hou Han shu, 49.1629); Xun Shu (Hou Han shu, 61.2049); Han Rong (Hou Han shu, 62.2063). 27 Hou Han shu, 27.955 and Hou Han shu, 49.1629. Elsewhere (Han shu, 30.1723), in setting forth his views on the limitations of the NTS, Ban Gu writes:

In the past scholars were accustomed to till the fields and provide for their families and it was only after three years that they would be conversant with a single work of the classics. They retained the principal lessons of its main content and did no more than familiarize themselves with the text itself. For this reason, despite the brevity of time they spent on study the cumulative results in spiritual terms were considerable, and at the age of thirty the five classics were firmly established in their minds.*

*Loewe, Chinese Ideas of Life and Death, 185.
they simply glossed the 'essential meaning' of the Classics. Even Liu Xin, the father of the OTS, was accused by Jia Kui, one of the most important OTS partisans in the Eastern Han, of not being sufficiently vehement in discoursing on the 'essential meanings' of Zuo zhuan. This emphasis on the essential meaning of the Classics thus represented an important difference between the two Schools and one which increasingly threatened the authority of the NTS.

iii. The OTS and Xun Gu Glossing

If one were to attempt a very general characterization of OTS scholarship, it may be said that overall the OTS was much more eclectic than the NTS, as is evinced by its greater familiarity with and interest in a wide range of literature and a desire to treat the corpus of classical literature as a coherent whole, frequently with the aim of finding a synthesis in that corpus.

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28 Hou Han shu, 36.1237.
29 Later in this chapter I discuss some specific examples of differences between the two schools. For other examples, see also Roy Andrew Miller, "The Wu-Ching I-I of Hsü Shen", Monumenta Serica, 33 (1977-1978), 12-18; A. Cheng, Etude sur le Confucianisme Han; L'élaboration d'une Tradition Exégétique sur les Classiques, Chapter 2. For some generalized examples of doctrinal differences see also Zhou Yutong, "Jing jin gu wenxue", in his Zhou Yutong jingxue shi lunzhu xuanji, 25-26; Gu Jiegang et al., Gu shi bian, Preface, 5:18-20; Jiang Boqian, Jingxue zuanyao, 181-184; Loewe, Chinese Ideas of Life and Death, 184.
30 See Kano Naoki, Ryō Ken gakujutsu kō, 133-134; Qian Mu, Liang Han jingxue jin gu wen pingyi, 220; Kaga Eiji, Chūgoku koten kaishaku shi, 19, 25-26.
On the whole, however, this eclecticism did not extend to the use of prognosticatory (chen) and apocryphal (wei) literature.\textsuperscript{31} There are, of course, exceptions to this opposition to the apocrypha, the best known example being that of Zheng Xuan who not only cited passages from the apocrypha when glossing other texts, but is also said to have written commentaries for a number of apocryphal works.\textsuperscript{32} Even for an OTS scholar, Zheng was in any case exceptionally eclectic, seeking, as he did, not only to synthesize the teachings of the Classics but also to eliminate the differences between the NTS and the OTS.\textsuperscript{33}

As for the characteristic method of textual commentary practised by the OTS, this was the employment of xun gu\textsuperscript{34} glosses, in contradistinction to the zhang ju commentary method of the NTS scholars. The xun gu method had been practised since the early Han to explain

\textsuperscript{31} Prominent OTS scholars who refused to use prognosticatory and apocryphal literature include Huan Tan (Hou Han shu, 28A.959-960; Pokora, Hsin-lun, 238-241; Jack L. Dull, A Historical Introduction to the Apocryphal (Ch'an [sic]-wei) Texts of the Han Dynasty, 235-239); Zheng Xing (Hou Han shu, 36.1223; Dull, A Historical Introduction to the Apocryphal (Ch'an-wei) Texts of the Han Dynasty, 237-238); and Zhang Heng (Hou Han shu, 59.1912). Jia Kui should probably also be included in this group for he is recorded as having drawn up a list of more than thirty examples of mutually contradictory statements in the apocryphal texts (Hou Han shu, 59.1912). Elsewhere, however, he considered the Zuo commentary to be in conformity with the apocrypha, while the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries were not (Hou Han shu, 36.1236-1237). I believe, nevertheless, that a case can be advanced for the view that his main purpose in making such an alliance was to secure official recognition of the Zuo commentary.

\textsuperscript{32} For a comprehensive list, see Gao Ming, "Zheng Xuan xue'an", in his Li xue xin tan, 244-272. For a detailed study, see Lü Kai, Zheng Xuan zhi chenwei xue.

\textsuperscript{33} Yet even this type of eclecticism was very much an OTS trait.
the meaning of ancient or obscure terms, and scholars who studied texts written in the gu wen style of characters relied on xun gu glosses both to understand and to transmit their texts. Thus, for example, the early Western Han transmitters of Zuo zhuan, Zhang Cang 張苍, Jia Yi 賈誼, Zhang Chang 張敞, and Liu Gongzi 劉恭, transmitted only xun gu glosses and no other form of commentary.

What precisely is xun gu (or gu xun 古文?)? Xun means 'to gloss', 'to explain'. Gu, also variously written as 古 or 楚 in the xun gu compound, means 'ancient words or terms'. Thus xun gu means 'to gloss ancient terms using contemporary terminology'. The very nature of this type of glossing meant that OTS scholars were generally also accomplished philologists. In light of this, it is hardly surprising that the Han dynasty produced a great number of etymological and lexical works of which the

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34 Qian Mu, *Liang Han jingxue jin gu wen pingyi*, 203.
37 Zhang Yi 張揖 (227-233), *Za zi 齊史*, cited in *Jing dian shi wen*, 29.1b and 29.13b; Wang Guowei, *Guan tang ji lin*, 5.4b-5b; Zhou Daup, *Xunxue yaoju*, 1-2, 38-39; David R. Knechtges, "The Liu Hsin/Yang Hsiung correspondence", 312, n. 14, quotes Paul L-M Serruys' dissertation, "Prolegomena to the Study of the Dialects of Han Times According to Fang-Yen", University of California, Berkeley, 1956, (I have been unable to get access to a copy), where Serruys defines xun gu as "explanations of old words and characters (ku), and readings (hsün)....it stressed the study of separate words in their original meaning and their relations with modern words (yen)".
39 See, for example, the titles listed in the Xiao jing and Philology (xiao xue), sections of *Han shu yi wen zhi* and the Lun yu and Philology sections in *Sui shu jing ji zhi*; Gu Jiegang, *Han dai xueshu shi lue*, 154-155; Lü Simian, *Qin Han shi*, 740.
major ones, such as *Fang yan* 和 *Shuo wen jie zi*, were written by prominent OTS scholars.

It seems, however, that *xun gu* scholarship tended to focus on narrow philological niceties and not the 'essential meaning'. Even when such commentaries did not concern arcane points of philology, but rather the more straightforward work of listing the modern equivalent or pronunciation of some ancient graph, all too often the fundamental meaning and philosophical import of the Classical texts was not addressed.

Zheng Xuan, for example, "accounted for discrepancies in the different versions of *Book of Documents* on the basis of differences in pronunciation, on the basis of differences due to former and later interpreters [sic] (which he left vague and unexplained) and on the basis of differences in the script in which the texts were written." 40 And as Lü Simian observes, "In his commentary to *Yi li*, although Zheng gives a complete and thorough account of discrepancies between Old and New character forms, yet this amounts to nothing more than noting examples such as *wei* is written as *li*, or *yi* is written as *yi*. Where is there anything concerning the essential meaning?" 41

40 Dull, *A Historical Introduction to the Apocryphal (Ch'an-wei) Texts of the Han Dynasty*, 396, who bases his account on Zheng's preface to *Shang shu da zhuan*, 2a, in *Zheng Kangcheng ji*.
41 Lü Simian, *Qin Han shi*, 757.
iv. Xu Gan’s Critique of the NTS and the OTS

It was precisely this last point that Xu Gan makes in his criticism of xun gu glossing and its emphasis on nomenclature, and which was animated by the same strength of conviction as his deprecation of the NTS zhang ju commentaries.42 Indeed, for Xu Gan, the methodologies of both the OTS and NTS warranted criticism because they sacrificed meaning for word, content for form, actuality for name:

In learning, the essential meaning is of foremost importance, while nomenclature (wu ming 物名) is secondary. If the essential meaning has been elucidated, then the nomenclature will follow thereafter. The ‘broad learning’ of the debased literati, however, is devoted to nomenclature, meticulous in keeping accounts of utensils and weapons43 and painstaking in matters of xun gu glossing. Such scholars select chapters and verses for commentary yet are unable to draw together that which is fully revealed in the essential meaning and so capture the mind of the former kings. This is no different from a female scribe44 intoning poetry or a junior eunuch45 passing on messages. Such a state of affairs thus has scholars tax their minds yet fail to understand the Way, wasting days and months with no achievement. Thus

42 In Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shi lun, 205-329, Yu Yingshi lays the blame for intellectual discontent during the Han-Jin transition at the feet of the NTS zhang ju commentators exclusively; see his discussion at 275-288 in particular. This, I contend, is not an accurate assessment of the overall situation.
43 For the meaning of qi xie 卜写, see Zheng Xuan’s commentary and Jia Gongyan’s sub-commentary to Zhou li, 7.2a, under ‘manager of writings’ (si shu 司書) (see also Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, no. 5769).
44 See Zhou li, 8.3a-3b; Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, no. 4345.
45 See Zhou li, 7.32a-24a; Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, no. 4254.
the Superior Person needs to be selective in choosing a master.\(^\text{46}\)

Han scholasticism had become ossified, incapable of self renewal. For too long scholars had devoted their energies to xun gu glossing and chapter and verse commentaries - the methodological approaches associated with the OTS and the NTS respectively - rather than the 'essential meaning' (\(\text{da yi}\)) of the classical teachings. 'Essential meaning' refers to the wisdom and fundamental import of the sagely teachings that had been transmitted from high antiquity to Confucius.

Xu Gan traces the roots of this problem to the Spring and Autumn period when, after Confucius and his immediate disciples had died, the Master's subtle teachings came to an end and their fundamental import was no longer understood; what ensued was a proliferation of commentary schools, the hallmark of which was pedantic concern with trifling points of exegesis and questions of textual transmission and orthodoxy. In "Examining Falsity", he writes:

Confucius died several hundred years ago. In this interim the sages have not created,\(^\text{47}\) the laws of Tang and Yu have become effete, the teachings of the three dynasties have ceased, the Great Way has disintegrated, and the mean for correct human relationships is not fixed.\(^\text{48}\)

For Xu Gan classical scholarship had become sterile, distracted by the methodological excesses of the NTS and

\(^{46}\) Zhong lun, A.4a.
\(^{47}\) For zuo \(\%\) as 'create', a term frequently associated with sages, see Tjan, Po hu t'ung, 2:529; Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 259.
\(^{48}\) B.1a.
the OTS and their rival claims to orthodoxy based on textual differences.

The contrast between the fundamental import of the sagely teachings on the one hand, and the pursuit of superficial accomplishments on the other hand, is developed in "Recognizing the Importance of the Arts as a Major Principle":

Of that which remains of the Six Arts it is only superficial details (mo jie 木切) that stand out. It is said that the techniques involved in displaying bian 便 and dou Dou, arranging zun 孽 and zu 竇, holding yu 吏 and yue 箫, striking a bell or qing 青, and raising and lowering [the leg], moving forward, turning, [bending the arm] in and out, and [moving the head] up and down, do not constitute the basis (ben 本) of ritual and music.56 Is not the basis of ritual and

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49 cf. passages such as Shi ji, 24.1204; Li ji, 38.18a.
50 Bian 便 - a bamboo splint basket with cover, used to contain fruits offered in worship.
51 Dou 道 - platter-like vessel made of wood, bronze or porcelain, used for holding food in sacrifices.
52 Zun 酒 (also written as 酒) - wine vessel used in sacrifices.
53 Zu 肇 - stand for meat at feasts or sacrifices.
54 Yu 鳳 and yue 箫 - literally the 'music of feathers and pipes'. The yu, a feathered fan-like object, and the yue, a three-holed flute, were two objects that served as props or dancing accessories, and distinguished the type of dances they were used in as being 'civil' (wen 文), as opposed to 'martial' (wu 武), in nature. See Zhou li, 24.6a-6b, and sub-commentary.
55 Qing 青 - a musical stone made in a 'L' shape. Sometimes arranged in rows of sixteen.
56 See Li ji, 37.15b.
music the virtuous teachings of the former kings?57

In his criticisms in the above passages it is obvious that Xu Gan regarded the essential meaning of the classics and glossing/nomenclature to be in a fundamental-peripheral relationship. It is equally obvious that he regarded textual glossing and nomenclature as an example of ming and analogously the essential meaning of the classics as an example of shi.

In Chapter 6 the fundamental and the peripheral were defined as being qualitatively differentiated. In the case of the 'reputation-actual worth' dichotomy, we have seen that when reputation and actual worth are in disaccord, Xu regards a man's actual worth as fundamental. In the 'essential meaning-glossing/nomenclature' dichotomy, he regards essential meaning as fundamental. Given that Xu Gan believed that ming and shi were no longer in accord in his own times, then this qualitative differentiation should be reflected in a

57 A.24a. Xu Gan proceeds to quote Poetry, Mao 161; Legge, Chinese Classics, 2:46.mod:

I have here admirable guests,  
Who make resplendent the sagely teachings of the former kings,  
And show the people not to be mean;  
Superior Persons have in them a pattern and mould.  
I have good wine,  
Which my admirable guests drink, enjoying themselves.

This is what is valuable in Propriety and Music.

Xu Gan's interpretation of de yin as "the sagely teachings of the former kings" follows, or at least accords with, that of his earlier contemporary, Zheng Xuan (who, incidentally, was also a native of Beihai Kingdom). See both Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda's commentaries, Shi jing, 9.3.4a-4b.
special weighting or priority that he gives to *shi* over *ming* in his own scholarship. Does Xu Gan’s own scholarship conform to this expectation?

v. Xu Gan’s Approach to Classical Scholarship

As a Confucian, he naturally held the classics in the highest regard, and in *Zhong lun* the classical corpus is cited on more than one hundred occasions. His approach to the interpretation of the classics is eclectic:

The successful composition of a great work of music is not the product of just one note. The harmonious blend of fine cuisine is not the product of just one flavour. Similarly, the sage’s Potency is not the product of just one Way. Hence it is said that learning is that process whereby the many Ways are united. When the many Ways are brought together in one’s mind, then the many teachings are united in one’s speech.  

Some examples may serve to illustrate this. On the one hand, many of the passages he quotes from *Poetry* have been identified as either having been based on the text of the Lu (NTS) recension as opposed to that of the other three schools, or as conforming to the interpretation associated with the Lu school. Yet Xu also used the recensions of the Han, Qi (both NTS versions) and Mao

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58 A.2b-3a. This eclecticism with regard to classical studies was, of course, not unique to Xu Gan. Zheng Xuan, for example, was an eclectic par excellence. See Pi Xirui, *Jingxue lishi*, annotated by Zhou Yutong, 135-136, 142-143; *Hou Han shu*, 35.1207-1212, 70.2259. Other prominent examples include Jia Kui, Xu Shen, He Xiu 何休, and Wang Su 王肃. For further examples see Tjan, *Po hu t'ung*, 1:149-150; Wang Guowei, *Guan tang ji lin*, 4.11b.

59 See Appendix H Part A.

60 See Appendix H Part B.
Schools (OTS version) as well as the interpretations of the Mao and Qi Schools. Nor were such examples of eclecticism limited to Poetry; Xu also quotes from both Zhou li (OTS) and Li ji (NTS) and both the New Text and Old Text versions of Documents.

This eclecticism, however, should not be seen as precluding an affiliation with either school. Indeed, as noted above, one of the characteristics of OTS scholars was a familiarity with and interest in a wide range of literature, in contrast to NTS scholars who tended to specialize in one text or even one school of interpretation for a specific text. Xu Gan's fundamental inclination was towards the OTS. One example of this concerns the question of the transmission of the Six Classics, and Confucius' role in that transmission and in their authorship. The following passage from the "Ordering Learning" pian presents Xu Gan's account of the line of transmission of the sagely teachings from the ancient sage kings to Confucius:

Confucius learnt from Kings Wen and Wu, Kings Wen and Wu from Cheng Tang, Cheng Tang from the Lord of Xia and the Lord of Xia from Yao and Shun. Thus the Six Classics have been passed on from

61 See Appendix H Part C.
62 See Appendix H Part D.
63 In the case of Documents, two such examples are: 1. "Valuing the Verifiable" 购验, A.18a, where Xu quotes a passage from the NTS version of Documents. See Pi Xirui, Jinwen Shang shu kaozheng, 15.5a. 2. "Dying Young and Longevity" 貴年, B.17a, where Xu quotes a passage from the OTS version of Documents. See Pi Xirui, Jinwen Shang shu kaozheng, 20.4a-4b.
64 Traditional founder of the Shang dynasty. Another name for the legendary ruler Da Yu, the legendary first ruler of Xia.
65 Yao is the most famous of the legendary emperors; Shun succeeded him upon his death.
one sage to another. Although these men have gone, their Way still exists.

The passage is notable firstly because it differs markedly to the line of teachers proposed by NTS scholars. Secondly and importantly, the NTS view was that the Six Classics were texts that had been meaningfully edited, arranged and commented on by Confucius and thus were the vehicle of his particular visionary teachings. Therefore the NTS did not subscribe to the view that by the time that the Classics were passed down to Confucius they were already essentially complete.

This in turn meant that the two schools' evaluations of Confucius differed. On the one hand, the NTS regarded him as a messianic sage and even as an 'uncrowned king' (su wang 丄). On the other hand, the OTS, while holding Confucius to be a sage, also maintained that the Duke of Zhou - the putative author of, variously, the Line Texts, (yao ci 丄丄), and the commentary to the Line Texts, (xiao xiang 丄丄), in Changes, and the inspired

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67 Obviously Xu cannot mean that the Six Classics were passed on book by book from the time of Yao and Shun as much of the subject matter of the Classics pertains to events that occurred well after the lives and the times of the sage kings. His meaning, rather, is that there was an accretion of sagely teachings and principals that was gradually incorporated in the Classics.

68 "Ordering Learning", A.3b.

69 For example, see Tjan, Po hǔ t'ung, 2:483. Similar lists are also found in Han shi wai zhuan, 5.11a, and Qian fu lun, 1. Lü shì chun qiu, 4.5a, has a similar list but does not include Confucius.

70 See Pi Xirui, Jingxue lishi, 81-90; Jiang Boqian, Jingxue zuanyao, 182-183.

71 For example, Ma Rong and Lu Ji. See Zhou yi zhu shu, Preface, 10a.

72 For example, Zheng Zhong and Jia Kui. See Zuo zhuan zhu shu, 42.2b.
creator of the bureaucratic system recorded in Zhou li - was a very important sage, thereby precluding any outright 'monopoly' that Confucius might otherwise have enjoyed in the OTS camp.

These differences were also reflected in textual interpretation, a pertinent example of which is found in the "Wisdom and Moral Behaviour" pian of Zhong lun:

> In the past, after King Wu had died, because King Cheng was still young the Duke of Zhou acted as regent. Because Guan and Cai had incited [the remaining descendents of] the Yin to treachery and rebellion, so the Duke of Zhou had them executed. King Cheng, however, failed to understand why the Duke of Zhou had so acted and the Duke of Zhou became afraid. Heaven then issued thunder, lightening, wind and rain so as to proclaim the Duke of Zhou's Potency. Only after this was King Cheng enlightened.

This passage is a paraphrase of Documents, 13.11a-13a, a passage which the OTS and the NTS give markedly different interpretations. The NTS interpretation was that the Duke of Zhou had already died and that King Cheng was deliberating whether or not the Duke of Zhou should be given a funeral with the ceremonial appropriate to a king or to a vassal. It was while he was pondering this question that Heaven blew up a storm to proclaim the duke's Potency.

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73 Son of Wu and successor to throne.
74 See Shi ji, 4.131-132.
75 Guan Shuxian 蒋叔鮮 and Cai Shudu 蔡叔度. The third and fifth sons respectively of king Wen, and brothers to king Wu, the second eldest brother.
76 See Shi ji, 4.132; 35.1565; Zuo zhuan, Ding 4, 54.19b, Legge, Chinese Classics, 5:754. N.B. according to these three sources only Guan was executed, while Chai was banished.
77 A.29b.
The OTS interpretation, which Xu Gan follows, was that Heaven raised the storm not only to proclaim the duke's Potency but also to show its anger that King Cheng should suspect the Duke of Zhou of scheming to usurp the throne. In other words, the storm occurred when Zhou was still alive and acting as regent and was related to a matter of quite different significance. Xu Gan proceeds to use this interpretation to support his claim that wisdom and ability are of more value than moral uprightness.

More than anything else, however, proof of Xu Gan's OTS leanings, as well as his concern with the "essential meaning", is evident in the exegetical method he employs when citing and commenting on passages from Changes (Canonical Text and Commentary). Han scholarship on this text was concerned almost exclusively with systematising alleged correlations between, on the one hand, the hexagrams (and also the lines of the hexagrams), and on the other hand, the supernatural, natural and the human spheres. While the correlative thinking involved is of some interest to us today, being a unique expression of one culture's method of conceptualizing, on the whole Han Changes theory was excessively superstitious and

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78 See Pi Xirui, Shang shu dazhuan shuzheng, in Shang shu leiju chuji, vol. 8, 5.4b-6b; Pi Xirui, Jin wen Shang shu kaozheng, 17.10b-11a; Huang Hui, Lun heng jiaoshi, 2:788-789, text and Huang Hui's commentary. N.B. Ikeda Shûzo, "Jo Kan chûron kôchû (2)", Kyôtô daigaku bungakubu kenkyû kiyō, 24 (1985), 92-93, n. 53, maintains that Xu bases himself on the New Text version of Documents but there seems to be no evidence for this claim. The fact that in Zhong Lun is used rather than (a New Text usage) would also weaken this claim.

79 See Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
irrational. (The irony is that the tremendous interest in Changes in the Han seems to suggest a search for system and order.) Its principal shortcomings were twofold: First, as Needham observes, Changes "tempted those who were interested in Nature to rest in explanations that were no explanations at all. The Book of Changes was a system for pigeon-holing novelty and then doing nothing more about it. Its universal system of symbolism constituted a stupendous filing-system."  

Second, while Han specialists of this text developed a plethora of systems to explain how the individual hexagrams, as well as the individual lines of the hexagrams, were interrelated, yet no one account was shown to be inherently more feasible than the next. Thus, rather than being towards standardization and compatibility, the trend was towards the proliferation of many different esoteric systems, leading eventually to the wholesale negation of this tradition. In other words, the preoccupation with formulating systems of cosmological-numerological symbolism, xiang shu, meant that symbolic form rather than the substance of the text.

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81 See Suzuki Yoshijirō, Kan Eki kenkyū, 131-279; Gao Huaimin, Liang Han Yixue shi, 104-272.
82 Even to the extent of developing a new system of figures - the Tai xuan jing. For a recent introductory study to this work, see Michael Nylan and Nathan Sivin, "The First Neo-Confucianism: An Introduction to Yang Hsiung's 'Canon of Supreme Mystery' (T'ai hsüan ching, c. 4 B.C.)", 41-100. One minor point concerning the description of Yang's philosophy as "the first Neo-Confucianism": if any Han "synthesis of beliefs" could justifiably be labelled 'Neo-Confucian', surely Dong Zhongshu would have considerably greater claim to being the first such 'Neo-Confucian'. 
became the focus of enquiry. There was, however, an OTS tradition of *Changes* exegesis which remained independent of the *xiang shu* tradition. This was the so-called Fei Zhi tradition.

Fei Zhi, who lived in the second century B.C., is notable on two accounts: first because he transmitted an Old Text version of *Changes*, a version purportedly identical with the text that Liu Xiang had found in the imperial library, and second because, according to *Han shu*, his method of exegesis is said to have been to employ only material from the Tuan, Xiang, and Xici Commentaries; no other material is recorded as having been used. Before Fei Zhi, the text and

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83 *Han shu*, 30.1704.
84 88.3602.
85 As regards this second point, however, there has been considerable controversy as to precisely what parts of the Commentary were first appended to the text, in what fashion, and by whom. For a summary of the major arguments, see Suzuki Yoshijirō, *Kan Eki kenkyū*, 63-65; Kaga Elji, *Chūgoku koten kaishaku shi*, 224-251, passim; Gao Hualin, *Liang Han Yixue shi*, 169-172; Pi Xirui, *Jingxue tonglun*, Section 1, 25-26. The most likely development seems to have been as follows: Fei Zhi was the first to begin to explain the text with the Commentary. He probably appended parts of the Tuan, Xiang and Xici Commentaries throughout the main text. Whether or not his arrangement was one where the Commentaries were included as part of his own somewhat larger commentary, or whether he only appended relevant passages verbatim from the above three Commentaries, without any additional comments of his own, is something on which we can only speculate. (I am inclined to believe that he probably included selections from these Commentaries as part of his own commentary.) The next step in the application of Fei's exegetical method was to append the relevant Tuan and Xiang Commentaries to each of the individual hexagrams. See *San Guo zhi*, 4.136; Dai Zhen, *Jing kao*, 2.6b-8b. The third and final arrangement conferred upon *Changes* the appearance that it has today; this was to append the Wen yan Commentary to the qian and kun hexagrams, and the Xioa Xiang Commentary to the line texts of the sixty-two hexagrams from kun onwards. See Kong Yingda's sub-commentary to the Xiang commentary of the first line of the kun hexagram, *Zhou Yi*
Commentaries are thought to have been transmitted independently. 86

The most significant characteristic of the Fei Zhi tradition of exegesis was the use of the Commentaries to gloss the text. This method eventually resulted in the dismissal as irrelevant by Wang Bi (226-249), the most influential thinker of third century China, of the arcane symbolism that was the mainstay of the Han xiang shu tradition:

If the meaning [of the qian hexagram] is 'strength' then why does one need the symbol of a 'horse' to explain it? If the meaning of [the kun hexagram] is compliance then why does one need the symbol of a 'cow' to explain it?" 89

Wang Bi is frequently credited with a very literal application of Fei Zhi's exegetical method: using the Commentaries to gloss the text. Certainly this is a marked feature of the particular method which he inherited and developed. 90

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86 This hypothesis is strengthened by the Mawangdui version of Changes which has the text alone with no commentary.
87 The characteristic of the qian hexagram according to the (Da) Xiang Commentary.
88 The characteristic of the kun hexagram according to the Tuan Commentary.
89 Ming xiang.
90 Chen Li cites some appropriate examples from Wang's gloss of the qian hexagram. To the text of the first line, for example, Wang comments that the Wen yan Commentary by itself is sufficient and that there is no need of any further commentary. See Dong shu du shu ji, 4.55, where he also cites examples from other hexagrams where Wang does not make any commentary, deeming a relevant passage from one of the Commentaries as sufficient. And Wang's gloss of the second line is obviously based on the Wen yan Commentary. If we thus accept Chen's criterion that "All cases where the text is explained on the basis of the Ten Commentaries are examples of complying with the methodology of the Fei
Zheng Xuan had anticipated Wang Bi in using the Commentary to gloss the text and, like Wang Bi, his method was paraphrase. Zheng Xuan, however, also employed Jing Fang's (c. 140 – c. 80) technique of 'nuclear trigrams' (hu ti 虎体), and even developed his own techniques of 'line trigrams' (yao ti 蚁体) and 'line and horary character' (yao chen 蚁辰) correlates, techniques that were the epitome of Han numerological symbolism.

In contrast, like Wang Bi after him, Xu Gan was more faithful to the original method of Fei Zhi. Not only does Xu make no reference to the xiang shu techniques when glossing passages that he cites from Changes, but also he glosses the Changes Text with the Commentary, and when he paraphrases the Commentary, changes are kept to a minimum.

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91 See the examples cited by Kaga Eiji, Chūgoku koten kaishaku shi, 239-240.
92 There were two Western Han Changes scholars named Jing Fang and there is some uncertainty as to which of the works that goes by the name Jing Fang Yi zhuan 易傳 was written by which Jing Fang. See A.F.P. Hulsewé, "The Two Early Han I Ching Specialists Called Ching Fang", T'oung Pao, 72 (1986), 161-162. The dates I give in the text are those of the elder Jing Fang; the dates of the younger Jing Fang are c. 76 – 37 BC.
93 See Suzuki Yoshijirō, Kan Eki kenkyū, 273-279; Gao Huaimin, Liang Han Yixue shi, 162-167; Qu Wanli, Xian Qin Han Wei Yi li shuping, 127-129.
94 Qu Wanli, Yi li shuping, 108-109; Gao Huaimin, Liang Han Yixue shi, 185-188.
95 Suzuki Yoshijirō, Kan Eki kenkyū, 226-240; Gao Huaimin, Liang Han Yixue shi, 177-185; Qu Wanli, Xian Qin Han Wei Yi li shuping, 109-116.
96 See Appendix H Part E.
At other times, Xu simply quotes the Xiang and Xi ci Commentaries without adding any further glosses of his own. This is significant in two respects: first because these two Commentaries were two of the three Commentaries to which Fei Zhi is said to have restricted himself in explaining the main text, and second because the general practice of not explaining the Commentaries but regarding them as self-explanatory is an exegetical method frequently employed by Wang Bi. Xu Gan's exegetical

97 A.2b quotes the Xiang Commentary to the qian hexagram; A.11b quotes the Xiang Commentary to the kun hexagram; A.12b quotes the Xiang Commentary to the xian hexagram; A.14 quotes the Xiang Commentary to the zhen hexagram; and A.8b, A.23b, A.32b quotes the Xi ci Commentary.

98 For example, Wang made no commentaries to the t'ai, pi, qian, yu, yí, and ming yi hexagrams, and no commentary to the Xiang Commentaries of the shí, lu, pi, yu, guan, shi he, jie, gou, sheng, zhen, sun, huan, jie, and xiao guo hexagrams. As for examples of this regarding the (Xiao) Xiang Line Commentary, they are so numerous as to be not worth enumerating here. As for the Xi ci and other Commentaries, Wang made no commentaries at all. In citing these examples, I am not, of course, arguing that Xu Gan exerted an identifiable philosophical influence on Wang Bi; rather, the point I wish to establish is that Xu Gan's concern with elucidating the 'essential meaning' contributed to the new direction that philosophical enquiry took in the third century. A number of scholars have speculated that Wang Bi's philosophical methodology and thought were influenced by the academic community that became known as the the Jingzhou school and which was established under the patronage of Liu Biao.}

Liu (d. 208) and flourished c. 200-214. Two lines of influence have been proposed: 1) From Song Zhong, through his disciple Wang Su to Wang Bi. See in particular Tang Yongtong, Weijin xuanxue lungao, 84-87; Yu Yingshi, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shi lun, 287-282. Mou Runsun, Lun Wei Jin yilai zhi chongshang tanbian ji qi yingxiang, 18-21, however, challenges the historical evidence upon which this thesis is based. 2) From Wang Can (177-217) (who had inherited Cai Yong's library), through his cousin Wang Kai and Wang Kai's son Wang Ye, the father of Wang Bi. See Tang Yongtong, Wei Jin xuanxue lungao, 86-87; Nozawa Tatsumasu, "Go Kan matsu Keishū ha no kenkyū", Risshō Daigaku Bungakubu Ronshō, 41 (1972), 144-145. The most comprehensive study of the
method thus evidences a move away from pedantic philological concerns and the cosmological-numerological system-building of the Han commentators, to a new interest in the text and its basic Commentaries. Commenting on this development in the Han-Jin transition generally, Tang Yongtong compares it to the Protestant "return to the Bible" movement, where independent thought, having torn itself away from conservative Han scholasticism (albeit a scholasticism with a penchant for some very novel correlative associations), entered a period of Aufklärung where the emphasis was on a simple, clear and concise explication of the (perceived) original meaning of the classics. This new direction, while rising above the partisan distinctions of NTS and OTS, was nevertheless the product of the independent spirit that typified the OTS. Where it rose above and beyond the limitations of OTS scholarship was in its disdain for pedantic xun gu glossing.

These same observations apply to Xu Gan. In his frequent references to the classical corpus in Zhong lun, Xu rejects the pedantic philological concerns of the Han scholiasts who concentrated on the written word at the expense of the message behind it, seeking instead to elucidate the essential meaning and to base his own


In certain cases, of course, xiang shu symbolism was clearly employed to serve a political purpose. Such an example is that of Xun Shuang. See Chi-yun Chen, "A Confucian Magnate’s Idea of Political Violence: HsUn Shuang’s (128-190 AD) Interpretation of the Book of Changes", T‘oung Pao, 54 (1968), 73-115.

100 Tang Yongtong, Wei Jin xuanxue lun gao, 87-88.
interpretations on the classical texts themselves and their basic commentaries. For him, it was the original and essential meaning of the classics that was of fundamental import. In contemporary scholarship, however, the written word (ming) was no longer employed principally to elucidate the actuality (shí) that gave the written word its message. For Xu Gan this state of affairs was another manifestation of name and actuality being in a fundamental-peripheral relationship. When name and actuality are in a fundamental-peripheral relationship, names do not faithfully or adequately represent the actualities they nominally represent; the correspondence between them is no longer fixed. Richard Gilman describes this disjunction as follows:

A word, after all, is a sign for a thing, an action, a quality, or a condition, and signs have a way of breaking loose from their fixed positions or of being uprooted from them. When time, duration, enters in as a protracted influence, the word as sign may come to find itself at a great remove from the actuality it was once employed to indicate. It would be like a piece of wreckage with a ship's name on it floating away from a sunken hulk, or a marker in a desert pointing to a vanished city. The word retains a reality, a fragment of consciousness clings to it, but there is nothing "real" to which it now corresponds.101

Similarly, Xu Gan's criticism of the fame-seeker who earns himself a reputation without having first secured an actual achievement, or the scholar who disregards the essential meaning of the sagely teachings, preferring to devote himself to details of nomenclature, are examples

of míng "being at a great remove from the actualities they were] once employed to indicate". When name and actuality are in disaccord, names are no longer a reliable representation of actualities and only actualities remain "actual". This rift between name and actuality, however, was for Xu Gan of cosmological import, affecting not merely scholarship but the harmonious integration of the realm of man with the rest of the cosmos. As we will see in the next chapter, when this integration was upset, the consequences eventually worked their way back into the realm of man.¹⁰²

¹⁰² For a note on the discussion of míng shì after Xu Gan, see Appendix I.
PART IV
Chapter 8

THE COSMOLOGICAL-CUM-ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NAME AND ACTUALITY BEING IN ACCORD AND DISACCORD

Xu Gan believed that accord between name and actuality contributed to order in the realm of man. If name and actuality are thrown into disaccord, they no longer partake of a substance-function relationship but fall into a fundamental-peripheral relationship. He saw this dislocation to have consequences that affected the realm of man in a variety of ways. In this chapter, I will examine two contemporary topics of discussion in Zhong lun which deal with questions that arise as a consequence of name and actuality being in disaccord.

i. Humaneness and Longevity

By the Han dynasty, the belief in the interplay between the microcosm of human affairs and the macrocosm of the cosmos was stronger than ever, fostered by the new cosmology that had begun to win philosophical respectability from about the middle of the third century BC. Of this cosmology, Graham writes:

It is through a cosmology rooted in the Yin and Yang and the Five Processes, which by correlating moral with physical categories incorporates human morality into the cosmic order, that the threatening gulf between Heaven and man was closed before man had time to rethink himself as a solitary exception in a morally neutral universe.¹

¹ Disputers of the Tao, 313.
As a consequence of this morally normative cosmic order, once again 'Heaven' or 'the Way of Heaven' (tian dao 天道) came to assume an anthropomorphic quality, rewarding man for his good actions, punishing him for his bad actions, and making its pleasure or displeasure known to man through reward and retribution. Yet, despite the pronounced character of tian in Han thought, particularly from Dong Zhongshu on, in 'Huang-Lao' writings of the late Warring States period, "Disaster occurs not because an anthropomorphic heaven wills it, but because there is an objective, proper order which is predetermined by the natural order. Failure to comply with the natural order leads to disorder and eventually misfortune."2

I believe that this 'natural-law' view of the relationship between Heaven and man remained as a persistent undercurrent in Han thought, concealed only by a thin veneer of "seemingly anthropomorphic language which need not entail an anthropomorphic world view."3 As a result of this 'naturalistic' view, a number of thinkers were inclined to the view that there was no moral cosmic order, a view supported by those cases where it was deemed that Heaven had failed to reward the good and to punish the bad. Sima Qian, for example, in his biography on Boyi and Shuqi,4 challenges the view that

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3 Peerenboom, "Natural Law in the Huang-Lao Boshu", 317.
4 This is the first of the Shi ji biographies. It differs from all the other biographies because from the outset, Sima Qian sets forth his own judgments, rather than appending them after the biographical details.
Boyi and Shuqi bore no enmity at the set of circumstances which ultimately resulted in their starving to death on Mt. Shouyang. In support of his scepticism, he quotes an old song which, having described their sorry plight on Mt. Shouyang, ends with the lines:

Where can we turn to?  
Alas! Onwards to our deaths!  
Circumstances have reached their lowest ebb.

After relating that Boyi and Shuqi died soon after this, Sima Qian asks rhetorically, "Seen in this light, did they harbour enmity or not?"

Later in this biography he queries the belief that "Although the Way of Heaven has no favourites, yet it is often found to be on the side of good men" by citing the examples of Boyi, Shuqi and Confucius' disciple, Yan Yuan, all of whom were exemplary men, and asking, "Is this how Heaven rewards good men?" Next he cites the example of the infamous robber, Dao Zhi, who, despite having committed numerous atrocities, lived a long life and died of old age. Sima Qian confesses bewilderment at

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5 Analects 7.14, records Confucius' views as follows:

[Zigong] went in and asked, "What sort of men were Boyi and Shuqi?" Confucius replied, "They were worthy men of old." "Did they harbour enmity?" "They sought to practise humaneness and attained it, so what enmity was there?"

6 Boyi and Shuqi had fled to Mt. Shouyang after having refused to eat the grain of King Wu, whom they regarded as a usurper to the Zhou throne. See also my discussion in Chapter 2.

7 Shi ji, 61.2122, Sima Qian refers to it as an yi shi, which the Suo yin commentary says was one that was not included in the original Poetry collection.

8 Shi ji, 61.2123.

9 Lao Zi 79.

10 He died an early death in impoverished circumstances.
such glaring anomalies, prompting him to query the very existence of a normative order overseen by Heaven.\textsuperscript{11}

In "Dying Young and Longevity" Xu Gan uses an unnamed interlocuter to voice the implications of this scepticism:

Confucius said that "those who practise humaneness are long-lived",\textsuperscript{12} yet Yan Yuan died prematurely;\textsuperscript{13} although the house that heaps good upon good is sure to have an abundance of blessings,\textsuperscript{14} yet Bigan\textsuperscript{15} and Zixu\textsuperscript{16} both lost their lives and met with great misfortune. Is it the case that the words of the sages are untrustworthy, thus deceiving those of later times?\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{11} Unlike for Sima Qian, for Confucius the issue of Heaven's being the overseer of a morally normative order simply does not enter the picture. Rather, Confucius' justification for doing what is right - which in the case of Boyi and Shuqi was the refusal of either of them to accede to the throne of Gu Zhu - seems to have been simply because it is the right (yi) thing to do given that particular set of circumstances and as such was reward enough in itself.

\textsuperscript{12} See Analects 6.21.

\textsuperscript{13} See Analects 6.2:

The Duke of Ai asked which of the disciples loved to learn. Confucius replied, "Yan Hui loved to learn; he did not vent his anger on others nor make the same mistake twice. Unfortunately his circumstances were mean and he has died already.

In Yan Yuan's biography (Shi ji, 1.2124), Sima Qian writes:

Of the seventy disciples, Zhongni especially singled out Yan Yuan as being fond of learning. Hui was often so poor that he could not even eat his fill of the left-over grain used in distilling, so he died prematurely. What can Heaven's rewarding of good men be compared to?

\textsuperscript{14} Changes, 1.26a (kun hexagram, Wen yan commentary).

\textsuperscript{15} Uncle of the tyrant Zhou. He was put to death for remonstrating with him. See Analects 18.1; Shi ji, 3.108.

\textsuperscript{16} Cognomen of Wu Yun 子云. See his biography in Shi ji, yuan 66. See also Zuo zhuān, Zhao 20; Ai 11.

\textsuperscript{17} B.14b.
Xu Gan himself did believe in a morality rooted in the cosmic order in which the good were rewarded and the bad were punished. He believed that the more one practised humaneness the longer one would live. In other words, a man's life-span was held to be a mark of his humaneness. For this correspondence to obtain, however, it was necessary that the right circumstances prevail. If those circumstances did not prevail, then there was no guarantee that a humane man would be long-lived. And it was disaccord between name and actuality that could lead to the right circumstances no longer prevailing.

In order to establish his position that longevity can be achieved in one's own lifetime by practising humaneness, he first counters Xun Shuang's view that longevity can only be achieved by securing a virtuous reputation bestowed by posterity. As already noted in Chapter 6, Xun Shuang maintained that observance of the mourning period was the consummation of filial piety, and he himself even observed the three year mourning period for the Minister of Works, Yuan Feng, who had once recommended Xun as According with the Way, despite the fact that he had declined the recommendation. I believe that Xun Shuang's views and actions were motivated by the peculiar awe in which Han scholar-gentry held reputation. In "Dying Young and Longevity", Xun Shuang's resolution of the problem posed by the anonymous interlocuter is based on the belief that the establishment of a virtuous

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18 This same view seems to have been shared by Sima Qian; see Shi ji, 61.2127.
19 Later, Xun actually became minister of works.
reputation guarantees that although one may die, one will not perish:

To this, the former minister of works, Xun Shuang of Yingzhou, argued that the ancients had a saying, 'to die but not to perish', which means that that which is of utmost importance is the establishment of one's Potency, next the establishment of meritorious deeds, and then the establishment of one's words. Hence, when one dies, one's Way is still preserved, thus it is said 'not to perish'. One's body is the refinement of one's animal soul and the reputation of one's Potency and rightness is the crowning glory of one's refined animal soul.

Although Xu Gan concurs with Xun Shuang's views on the relationship between Potency and reputation, he nevertheless counters Xun Shuang's claim that longevity is simply a long lasting, posthumous reputation, by arguing that the wiser ancient kings achieved longevity in their own times by benign and wise government, which in turn afforded them long terms as rulers. His arguments are based on the evidence of the following passage attributed to the Duke of Zhou, which Xu Gan quotes from Documents:

In the past, Zhongzong, King of Yin, was grave, humble, referential and fearful. He measured himself with reference to the appointment of Heaven and cherished a reverent apprehension in governing the

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20 This alludes to a famous passage in Zuo zhuan, Xiang 24, 35.22a-24a (translated in Chapter 6, n. 67). cf. Horace, Odes III, 30, 6-7:

Non omnis moriar; multaque par mei Vitabit Libitinam.

21 B.14b-15a.
22 Po refers to the animal or sentient life which inheres in the body and, by extension, means the body itself in this sense. cf. Zuo commentary, Zhao 7, 44.13a.
23 B.15a.
24 The 'temple name' of Dawu.
people, not daring to indulge in useless ease. It was thus that Zhongzong enjoyed the throne for seventy-five years.

Coming to the time of Gaozong, he worked for a long time among the people. When he came to the throne, it is said that while he was in the mourning shed, he did not speak for three years. When he did speak, his words were full of harmonious wisdom. He did not dare to indulge in useless and easy ways, and made the Yin domain beautiful and peaceful, until there was no one, old or young, who harboured ill feelings towards him. It was thus that Gaozong enjoyed the throne for fifty-nine years.

In the case of Zujia, he did not think it right that he should be emperor, and for a long time remained an ordinary person. When he came to the throne, he understood the sufferings of the people, and was able to protect and love them, and did not dare to treat the widower and widow with contempt. Thus it was that Zujia enjoyed the throne for thirty-three years.

Next Xu Gan introduces and then counters Sun Ao's cynical dismissal of the belief that the accumulation of goodness leads to blessings and that the practice of humaneness results in longevity. Little is known of Sun Ao other than that, like Xu Gan, he was a native of Beihai Kingdom; he was probably a contemporary of Xu Gan. As in the saying quoted by Zixia in Analects 12.5, that "Life and death are determined by ming; wealth and honour rest with Heaven", Sun Ao proposed that "death and life are determined by ming". He continues:

Views such as 'the accumulation of goodness leads to blessings' or 'the practice of humaneness results in longevity' have an edifying import; they entice the people and draw them toward the principle of goodness. If one were to say that 'the accumulation

25 The 'temple name' of Wuding.
26 16.9a-11b; Legge, Chinese Classics, 3:465-468, mod; Zhong lun, B.17a-17b.
of goodness reaps no rewards' or that 'the practice of humaneness will lead to misfortune', then the benighted people would move towards evil and so contravene Heaven's constant standards. Therefore it is said: "The people can be made to travel along it, but they cannot be led to understand it." 27

"It" here refers to Heaven, or the Way of Heaven, which is portrayed as the ultimate normative authority. For Sun Ao, however, the constant standards ordained by Heaven are not rooted in a moral cosmic order. Rather, the naturalistic Way of Heaven portrayed in the above passage is oblivious to the affairs of man.

Xu Gan objects that Sun Ao's argument is invalid because it only applies to the 'benighted people':

The benighted people may be threatened with decapitation, punished with tattooing on the forehead, forcibly moved to other districts or banished to the frontier lands, and still some would not change. How much more so would this be the case if only words [not punishments] were used? Thus it is said, "Only the most intelligent and the most stupid cannot be changed". 28

His own position is that those who practise humaneness are long-lived:

General accounts can be heard of the affairs of Tang and Yu and Three Dynasties, 29 and from Yao to King Wu, Ji to Zhou and Shao, all were humane. The number of rulers and their ministers in this period was many, but if their life spans are examined, it can be

27 B.15b-16a. The final quotation is Analects 8.9.
28 B.18a. This sentiment was widely shared by many Han thinkers. The passage quoted is Analects 17.3.
29 Xia, Shang and Zhou.
30 Ji refers to Hou Ji or 'Lord Millet', who, according to traditional accounts, was the minister of agriculture under Shun. Both the Dukes of Zhou and Shao were known as virtuous administrators. For further details, see Shi ji, juan 4. Xu Gan cannot mean literally all rulers, as this would include rulers such as the tyrant Zhou.
seen that they did not die prematurely. Is this not proof that those who practise humaneness are long-lived? Further, is it possible that among Confucius' disciples there were those who were cruel and violent? If, however, one looks at their practice of humaneness, there were those who were outstanding and those who were inferior. Of those who died prematurely, there was only Yan Hui. Yet to take this instance of Yan Hui's premature death to suspect most of the other disciples is no different from weighing a cartload of feathers against a hook of gold. Of course the gold will be lighter than the feathers!\(^32\)

Given that longevity should properly function as a reflection of a man's moral qualities, then why were sages not able to explain such apparent anomalies in the workings of the Way of Heaven? Xu Gan writes:

The Way of Heaven is obscure, mysterious and abstruse. Because sages take the overall situation to be the established norm, how could they possibly avoid some slight inaccuracies when trying to accommodate things to conform with the overall situation? In matters of trustworthiness, nothing surpasses the four seasons, yet in spring sometimes the flowers do not blossom; in summer sometimes frosts descend; in autumn sometimes it rains and snows; and in winter sometimes there is no ice. Does this not make extrapolations based on the overall situation even more problematical?\(^33\)

In "Calendrical Calculations"\(^34\), Xu Gan explains how in antiquity correct observance of the heavens, and the formulation of calendrical calculations based on those observations, allowed the sage kings to ensure that "yin and yang were harmonized" and that "disasters and pestilence did not occur".\(^34\) The reason they were able to

\(^{31}\) i.e. to suspect that the reason they were able to live full lives had nothing to do with their being humane.

\(^{32}\) B.18a-18b.

\(^{33}\) B.18b.

\(^{34}\) B.12b.
do this was because the realms of Heaven and man were interdependent, and by observing the 'heavenly patterns', rulers could safeguard the affairs of man by conforming with those patterns. Xu Gan writes:

Thus, when Confucius compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals and recorded the affairs of man, he did so with reference to natural time (tian shi ) so as to make it clear that the realms of Heaven and man became whole by virtue of their mutual interdependence.

How, then, does one explain the anomalous situation of men practising humaneness yet dying prematurely? Is it simply a case of calendrical miscalculation that harmony between yin and yang is upset, and the proper progression of the four seasons is thrown out of kilter? No; discord between name and actuality could also effect the same results. In "Cultivate the Fundamental", he explains that, so long as the Way proceeds on its regular course, good actions are rewarded, just as wrong actions are punished. When, however, the Way changes from its regular course, the usual pattern of retribution and reward may be temporarily suspended:

Someone said to me, "This Way, do you really believe in it?" I replied, "Why should I not believe in it? In times of order, practitioners of good reap good fortune, while wrongdoers meet with misfortune. In times of chaos (luan), however, practitioners of good do not reap blessings and wrongdoers do not meet with good fortune. This is caused by aberrant numbers. The wise man does not doubt the constant Way because of aberrant numbers. Hence we should trace blessings to their source and guard against the arrival of calamities. Whether or not I meet with good fortune is not determined by me, but rather

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35 i.e. eclipses of the sun, appearances of comets, etc.  
36 B.14a.
upon when I live. To do something which should bring good fortune yet be repaid with misfortune is called circumstance (ming); to do something that should bring misfortune yet be repaid with good fortune is called luck (xing). One need only be concerned about being steadfast of will.37

In the Han dynasty, three different types of ming, 'conditioning circumstances', were distinguished: concordant ming, sui ming; predetermined ming, shou ming;38 and converse ming, zao ming. Concordant ming is the view that blessings are a reward for moral actions, and misfortunes a retribution for wrongdoing. This is contrasted with predetermined ming, which is the view that someone's ming is fixed and determined before birth,39 and converse ming, which is the view that good actions are repaid with misfortune and bad actions are repaid with blessings.40

37 A.11a-11b.
36 Also variously called zheng ming, shou ming, and da ming.
39 Xun Yue seems to have subscribed to this view. The following quotation is from Shen jian, 3.3b; Ch'en, Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, 160, mod.:

Someone asked, 'How about Yan [Hui] and Ran [Boniu]?'

I said, 'This is ming. The wheat plant cannot outlast the summer and a flower cannot outlive the spring, no matter how harmonious the elements are. Although the lives of Yan and Ran were short, nevertheless they lived as long as they could within their destined life-spans."

Wang Chong also subscribed to this view, proposing that different quantities of qi determined such factors as strengths and weaknesses, life expectancy, wealth, and social position. He did, however, also believe that a limited number of post-natal 'chance' factors did have an influence on the individual, e.g., blindness caused by lightening. See his Lun heng, "Qi shou" pian.

40 For accounts of the 'Three Ming Theory', see, for example, Chun qiu wei yuan ming bao, in Yu han shan fang ji yishu, 4:2110; Xiao jing wei shou shen
Xu Gan's position is that, so long as concordant ming prevails, good actions will serve to increase a person's longevity. Nevertheless, when the proper set of circumstances does not prevail, virtuous actions are liable to be repaid by misfortune; he uses the word ming to describe this situation. This sense of ming is clearly what I have described as 'converse ming'. According to Xu Gan, converse ming is brought about by aberrant numbers (bian shu). Thus, if disaccord between name and actuality is on a large enough scale, such as that produced by the excesses of ming jiao and the narrow pursuits of classical scholarship, then aberrant numbers will proliferate, and human affairs, including longevity, will be determined by converse ming.

Another aspect of human affairs that reflects Xu Gan's views on the consequences of name and actuality's falling into disaccord concerns the question of the relationship between man's moral nature and his innate ability.

ii. Moral Nature and Innate Ability

As a consequence of the renewed interest in pre-Han thought in the Han-Wei transition, there was also re-awakened interest in disputation and argumentation. One obvious stimulus to this development was the evolution of

$qi$ 貢經學術神理，in Yu han shan fang ji yishu, 4:2148; Zhao Qi's 趙岐 (c. 108-201) commentary to Meng Zi, in Zhuzi jicheng, 1:518-519; Bo hu tong, "Shou ming" 祖命篇; Chun qiu yan Kong tu 春秋演孔圖，in Yasui Kožan and Nakamura Shōhachi, 1 sho shusei, 4A:55-56.
qing tan 清談 discussion from qing yi 清議 criticism.

In his study of tan lun 論論 'discourse', in the late Eastern Han, Shiba Rokurō42 distinguishes two broad categories of discourse in this period: critical discourse and investigative discourse. The former was where a subject (frequently the character of an

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41 Numerous studies have been done on qing yi and qing tan. See for example, Zhou Shaoxian, Wei Jin qing tan shu lun, esp. 1-133; Tang Changru, Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao shi luncong, 289-298; Yu Yingshi, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shi lun, 275-329, passim; Chi-yun Chen, Hsün Yüeh, the Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian, 3-8 passim, 62-65, 145-147, 20-39, passim esp.; Ichimura Sanjirō, "Seidan genryū kō", Shigaku zasshi, 30.4 (1919), 1-11; 30.5 (1919), 1-14; 30.6 (1919), 1-14; 30.9 (1919), 31-47; 30.11 (1919), 1-17, 1919; Itano Chōhachi, "Seidan no hitotsu kaishaku", Shigaku zasshi, 50.3, 358-386, 1939; Miyazaki Ichisada, "Seidan", Shirin, 31.1, 1-15, 1946; Aoki Seiji, Shina bungaku shisōshi, 349-408; Kaga Eiji, "Gi Shin gengaku no suii to sono jissō, 1-3", Jimbun ronkyō, 18 (1958), 1-43; 19 (1959), 50-76; and 19 (1959), 28-77. In his article "Seidan no keifu to igi", Nihon Chūgoku gakkaihō, 15 (1963), 100-119, Okamura Shigeru's interpretation of the evolution of qing tan differs to the standard one; he argues that the origin of this type of discourse can be traced to the Western Han. Certainly in the reign of Emperor Huan the Imperial Academy was already known as a centre of discussion and debate well before the advent of the seven character rhyming slogans which mark the true beginning of qing tan. See, for example, HHS, 76.2481; 68.2232. See also Okamura's discussion of this period, 102-105. As to the earliest meaning represented by the term qing tan, it seems to have been synonymous with qing yi; see Okamura, 112-113; Fukui Fumimasabunga, "Seidan no gainen to sono kaishaku ni tsuite", Nihon Chūgoku gakkaihō, 20 (1968), 95.

42 See his "Go Kan makki no tanron ni tsuite", Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō, 8 (1955), 213-242. Itano Chōhachi, "Seidan no hitotsu kaishaku", 83-84, makes a similar distinction, characterizing qing yi as being essentially concerned with character assessments and qing tan with a much broader range of concerns; he further describes qing yi as having been but one type of qing tan subject. On the subject of 'discourse' in the late Eastern Han, see also He Qimin, Wei Jin sixiang yu tanfeng, 46-73; Nakashima Chiaki, "Go Kan no tanron ni tsuite", Ehime daigaku kiyō (jimbun kagaku), 1.2 (1951), 71-85; Okamura Shigeru, "Go Kan makki no hyōronteki kifu ni tsute", Nagoya daigaku bungakubu kenkyū ronshū, 22 (1960), 67-112.
individual) would be assessed or evaluated\textsuperscript{43} by someone in accord with certain established standards, and with little or no reference to dissenting views. In contrast, investigative discourse was concerned with the discussion of a much broader range of topics and accommodated a wider range of points of view. Xu Gan's discussion of the longevity-humaneness relationship is a classic example of investigative discourse.

One topic of discourse that reflects the evolution from critical to investigative discourse, eventually

\textsuperscript{43} Such character assessments in turn generally fell into four categories: a) those used to secure a candidate's appointment to office; b) those concerned with criticising treacherous behaviour; c) those used for no other purpose than to provide an assessment of a man's character and actions; d) those used to predict a man's future. For details, see Okamura Shigeru, "Go Kan makki no hyöronteki kifū ni tsuite", 3-9. Okamura also makes the interesting point (p.7) that the predominant number of those recorded as being skilled at character assessments were natives of the three central Commanderies of Chenliu, Runan and Yingchuan. Because these three Commanderies were centred on the political and cultural centre of China, and also because they were located near the Imperial University, the resulting high cultural and educational levels enjoyed in these Commanderies meant that recommendation and selection became much more competitive. This competition was made keener by the fact that the commonest way to enter officialdom in the Eastern Han was by being recommended as a xiao lian candidate, of which each Commandery, based on its population, was limited in the number of candidates that could be recommended in this category each year. Because of the disproportionately high number of qualified potential candidates in these three Commanderies, it was more difficult to be successfully recommended as a xiao lian candidate than in other Commanderies, and this in turn led to considerable importance being attached to character assessments. On the development of pure judgments as a method of assessment used in recruiting new officials at the end of the Han, see Donald Holzman, "Les débuts de système médiéval de choix et de classement de fonctionnaires: les neuf catégories et l'Impartial et Juste", in Mélanges publiés par l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises 1, 387-414. For the evolution of the meaning of qing yi after the Han, see Ochi Shigeaki, "Seigi to kyōron", Tōyō Gakuho, 48.2 (1965), 1-48.
becoming a favourite in qing tan discussions of the Wei-Jin period, was the debate over the relationship between a man’s moral nature (xing) and his innate ability (cai). The work most commonly associated with discussion of the ability-moral nature question is Si ben lun or Treatise on the Four Basic Positions on the Relationship Between Innate Ability and Moral Nature by Zhong Hui 鍾會 (225-264). Although the treatise has been long lost, we do know what were the four basic positions adopted in the four essays that compose the treatise: one was that ability and moral nature are the same, (tong), (position represented by Fu Jia (205-c. 255)); one was that they are different, (yi), (position represented by Li Feng (d. 254)); one was that they are combined or united, (he), (position represented by Zhong Hui); and one was that they are separate (li), (position represented by Wang Guang (ca. 210-251)). To date, however, scholars seem to have failed to formulate a coherent distinction between ‘same’ and ‘united’, and also ‘different’ and ‘separate’, such that the ‘four basic positions’ are shown to be four fundamentally different positions.

The roots of the ability-moral nature discussion can perhaps be traced directly to Wang Chong’s writings on the topic where he makes the following distinctions:

This hypothesis is strengthened by evidence that Wang Chong’s Lun heng was not introduced into north China until 189 or after. This is the year that Cai Yong returned to north China after having been in hiding in Wu, where it is recorded he first obtained a copy of Lun Heng. Wang Lang is also credited with introducing
The purity or baseness of virtuous conduct (cao xing) is a function of moral nature (xing). 45

A man's virtuous conduct is either good or evil depending on his moral nature. 46

The wisdom (zhishi) or stupidity (yi) that someone displays in handling affairs, and the purity or baseness of one's virtuous conduct, are a function of one's moral nature and one's ability (cai). 47

In these passages Wang Chong makes a clear distinction between moral nature and ability and the respective qualities which they determine: virtuous conduct is a function of moral nature, and wisdom and stupidity are a function of ability. It should be noted that in this and later discussions of the ability-moral nature question, the term xing had a special technical sense, referring as it did to the moral qualities inherent in a man's character. To distinguish this sense from its usual meaning, I render it as 'moral nature'. Subsequent discussion will support this rendering.

On my interpretation, the 'same' view regards ability and moral nature to be two inseparable parts of a single whole, where virtuous conduct is just as much an expression of moral nature as it is an expression of ability. Although the details of Fu Jia's thesis that ability and moral nature are the same are no longer

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45 Lun heng, "Gu xiang", 112.
46 Lun heng, "Ming yi", 47.
47 Lun heng, "Ming lu", 19.
preserved, nevertheless a passage in his San Guo zhi biography provides an important clue as to one possible interpretation of his thesis:

In the past when former kings selected men of ability (cai), they invariably based their judgments on the opinions passed on a man's conduct (xing) by his own local community and also on his teachings on the Way given in the local schools. If his conduct was satisfactory, then he would be called worthy (xian); if he cultivated the Way, then he would be called capable (neng).

'Ability' refers to a person's innate competence or capacity to do things. What is significant in the above passage, however, is that 'ability' is seen to be reflected in a person's conduct and cultivation of the Way, both of which might otherwise be thought to be a reflection of moral character alone, rather than ability, which is morally neutral. The import of this view is that virtuous conduct is seen to be just as much a representation of ability as it is of moral nature, a view that would be compatible with the thesis that moral nature and ability are the same. By the 'same', it is meant that moral nature and ability are two components of man's inner self. Similarly, virtuous conduct and the practical application of ability are two parts of man's external self. The two halves may be understood to work together in a substance-function relationship.

Xu Gan similarly proposed that the relationship between ability and moral nature should be such that in the case of the Superior Person at least, his "artistic
capabilities are able to be measured in terms of his virtuous conduct (de xing).".49

The Superior Person is one whose inner and external qualities correspond and is thereby able to fathom what is fundamental and what is peripheral. Therefore his speech and countenance will correspond with his heart and will, and his artistic capabilities (yi neng) will be measured in terms of his virtuous conduct (de xing). When beauty is within it will flow freely to the four limbs; when purity fills the inside, its aura will shine outwards.51

Throughout Zhong lun Xu Gan uses the word yi to refer to the Six Arts. In the opening paragraphs of "Recognizing the Importance of the Arts as a Major Principle" he describes the Arts as that which "highlight wisdom (zhi) and ornament ability". He also explains that originally it was the sages who had used wisdom to create the Arts. 'Artistic capabilities', on the other hand, refers to innate artistic capability, which is one aspect of wisdom, rather than the external practice of that capability, while virtuous conduct refers to external behaviour, hence the character xing, not xing. In other words, Xu Gan believed that virtuous conduct could or should serve as a measure of inner ability, a view which like that of Fu Jia is compatible with the thesis that moral nature and ability are the same.

49 A.23b. I understand de xing to be analogous to Wang Chong's cao xing.
50 cf. Guo yu, 11.1b: "One's external appearance is the flower of one's inner feelings and words are the vehicle of that external appearance"; Mawangdui Han mu boshu, Shiliu jing, "Xing shou" text, line 136B: "For this reason, words are the tally of the heart and one's facial expressions the flower of one's heart."
51 A.23b.
In contrast to the 'same' view, the 'different' view would then be that ability and moral nature are completely different and necessarily function quite independently of one another.

The combined view, in turn, would be that while ability and moral nature are two different components of a person's character, yet they are able to function together. Xun Yue (148-209), an older contemporary of Xu Gan, advanced the following thesis:

Someone asked, "Is it ability that the sages valued?" I replied, "When combined (he), it is ability that is valued; when separated (fen) it is virtuous conduct (xing) that is valued. If someone possessed the ability of Yao or Shun, but did no good, then he would be more evil than Jie or Zhou. If, however, a man had the humaneness of a Yao or Shun, but not the ability, he would still be a good man."

'Combined' and 'separate' refer to the combination and separation of ability and virtuous conduct. Given its pairing with 'virtuous conduct' in this passage, 'ability' should here be understood as 'applied ability', or ability as function (yong), rather than as 'ability

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52 Here understanding xing to be a contraction of de xing.
53 Shen jian, 5.30b-31a.
54 cf. the following passage from Yuan Zhun's Cai xing lun (fl. 265-274) Cai xing lun, in Yi wen lei ju, juan 21, (p.386), where moral nature and ability are presented as a whole in a substance-function relationship:

A man's worthiness (xian) or worthlessness (bu xiao) are his moral nature. The worthy are the teachers while the worthless are functionaries. Worthiness and worthlessness are the raw materials (cai) of teachers and functionaries respectively. Thus it is clear that moral nature refers to a man's basic stuff (zhi
as capacity', or ability as substance (ti). Xun Yue maintains that if ability and moral conduct - the visible expressions of 'ability as capacity' and moral nature respectively - are combined, it is ability that is the more important partner, presumably because ability enables moral conduct to be effectively and intelligently translated into action. If, on the other hand, ability and moral conduct are not allowed or are unable to function in partnership, it will be virtuous conduct - and by analogy, moral nature - that is of greater value, because ability used independently of virtuous conduct cannot be harnessed to serve morally good ends. Lu Yu (d. 257) maintained a similar position:

It will be noted, however, that in this passage no distinction is made between inner ability and outer ability or moral nature and virtuous behaviour.

Chi-yun Chen, *Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China*, 181, n. 8, gives a different interpretation, explaining that cai is used both in this passage and the preceding one (5.1a) to mean "end-product", something that is acquired by training. This interpretation would seem to be based on his different understanding of the preceding passage, which I translate as follows:

[Xun Yue] said, 'In antiquity, that which was called ability referred to the fundamental (ben); now what is called ability refers to the peripheral (mo) and so virtuous conduct is exalted. Thus, even though an individual may not be lacking in ability, ability itself has lost its importance.

Chi-yun Chen (p.180) renders the first sentence as follows:

I said: "In ancient times what was called ability referred to essence; now what is called ability refers to the end-product."
In matters of men and official selection, Yu gave priority to 'moral nature-cum-virtuous conduct' (xing xing) over ability. The eunuch Li Feng asked Yu about this, and Yu replied, "Ability is that which is used to do good, and so a man of great ability is able to perform great good deeds while a man of small ability is able to perform small deeds. Now, if you say that a man has ability yet is unable to do good, then this is a useless sort of ability."  

Xun Yue's use of the term fen, 'separate', is, I conjecture, synonymous with the term li, 'separate', as used in Si ben lun. When ability and moral nature do not function complementarily, then, depending on the relative proportion of talent and moral nature in a person's makeup, either one could exert a dominating or suppressive role over the other. For Xun Yue, when moral nature and ability do function in such a relationship, he regarded it as preferable to have moral nature playing the dominant role rather than ability. A similar view is espoused by Liu Shao (c.180-c.245) in his Ren wu zhi:  

If discussed as separate (bie) entities where humaneness and wisdom function independently of one another, then it will be humaneness that is superior; if, however, they are combined and employed together, then it will be wisdom that plays the leading role.  

Xu Gan also subscribed to the 'combined' view. Above I have already shown that he subscribed to the 'same'  

56 This refers to the inner and outer or substance and function aspects of man's morality. See also Chi-yun Chen, Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China, 181, n. 8, on the the xing/xing distinction.  
57 San Guo zhi, 22.652.  
58 In this passage, bie, 'separate', like Xun Yue's use of the term fen, corresponds to li, 'separate', in Si ben lun.  
59 Ren wu zhi, B.26b.
view; subsequent discussion will explain why he adopted two different positions.60 His combined view is most apparent in the following passage:

For these reasons the sage values the particular capacity of men of ability and wisdom to render achievements and services that are beneficial to the age.... Someone said, "Yes, but Confucius said, 'Without wisdom how can one be humane?'61 Didn't he thus put humaneness on a higher level? What do you say?" I replied, "Humaneness is certainly important. Nevertheless, Confucius used this example to stimulate others; he was not particularly intending to belittle wisdom. Rather, it was as if he was saying to someone, 'If you still do not have even a modicum of wisdom, then how could you possibly know how to practise humaneness?'" 62

For Xu Gan, ability and moral nature clearly do function in a 'combined' relationship. As with Xun Yue and Liu Shao, Xu Gan argues that ability is the critical partner because, without some ability, man's moral nature could not be translated into action. Unlike Xun Yue and Xu Shao, however, when asked to consider the relative importance of ability vis-à-vis moral nature, (in a situation that would seem to approximate the notion of 'separation'), Xu Gan argues that ability is more important than moral nature:

Someone asked me, "Suppose a scholar-gentleman had to choose between being

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60 Strictly speaking, he adopted three positions, as it will be noted that the 'combined' position and the 'separate' position are not mutually incompatible, unlike the 'same' position and the 'different' position. The combined position did not exclude the possibility that the relationship between ability and moral nature could change so that the separate position better described their relationship. In short, the combined and separate positions were two related views.

61 As Huang Hui, Lun Heng jiaoshi, 1:406-407, demonstrates, zhixu was read as zhixu here by Han scholars.

62 A.29a-29b.
either brilliant and intelligent enough to fathom the principles of things or someone whose will and moral actions were pure and sincere. Which would a sage choose?"

I replied, "Would it not be brilliance and intelligence?! In their practical application, brilliance and intelligence are able to benefit the people with great wealth and enable all the myriad creatures to realize their full potentials. That which the sage is able to achieve is not the product of mere empty moral conduct, but rather is the product of wisdom.... In a man's moral conduct, there is nothing greater than filial piety nor anything more splendid than purity. Youyu was not able to better Zeng Shen's filial piety nor was Boyi able to fault Yuan Xian's purity. Despite this, Zeng Shen and Yuan Xian were not counted alongside You and Xia in the Four Categories of Behavior because they

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63 The locus classicus of the term ming zhe is Poetry, Mao 260, Legge, Chinese Classics, 4:543:

Intelligent he is and wise, Protecting his own person.

For other classical works which cite this line, see Wang Xiangqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 2:969.

64 Cognomen of Shun.

65 Zeng Shen (cognomen Ziyu 聖 ) was one of Confucius' best known disciples. Traditionally he is reputed to have written Xiao jing and is famous for his filial piety. See Shi ji, 67.2205.

66 See Chapter 1, p. 64.

67 Yuan Xian (cognomen Zisi 善思 ) was another of Confucius' best known disciples. He was noted for his purity and modesty and for his contentment to live by the teachings of his master, even though in great poverty. See Shi ji, 67.2207.

68 i.e. Ziyou 之友 and Zixia 之 嘉 , the cognomens of Yan Yan 儒 and Bu Shang 傅, respectively. Again, both were well known disciples of Confucius. See Shi ji, 67.2201-2202.

69 See Analects 11.2:

Distinguished for their virtuous conduct were Yan Yuan 雲, Min Ziqian 維賢, Ran Boniu 蘭伯尼 and Zhonggong 張公; for speech were Zai Wo 贏武 and Zi Gong 張公; for government were Ran You 爲 and Jilu
failed to match them in ability. When Confucius asked Zigong Ḗ, "Who do you consider superior, yourself or Hui 飄?", Zigong replied, "How dare I compare myself with Hui? Hui hears one point and knows all about a subject; I hear one point and can only infer a second point." 72 Although Zigong fell far short of Yan Yuan, it was not in regard to moral conduct that Zigong conceded his inferiority; rather it was Yan Yuan's ability to hear one point and know all about a subject. From these examples one can see that it is abundant ability that makes others defer to one. 73

Xu Gan's position is decidedly un-Confucian; yet it is also a reflection of the social and political climate of his day. The Han order had crumbled, leaving in its wake chaos and disorder, and many were convinced that exceptional circumstances required exceptional measures. In the attempt to create a new order, increasing emphasis was placed on a man's practical worth.

The champion of this attitude was, of course, Cao Cao. Although he did not specifically address the question of 'moral nature versus ability', from the edicts he issued between 203 and 217 (a period during which Xu Gan served Cao Cao) it is apparent that he regarded ability as having a value independent of and superior to moral nature.

Edict issued in 203:

Thus the enlightened ruler does not bestow office upon servants who are without 賢能; for culture and learning were Ziyou and Zixia.

See also Chen Li's discussion, Dong shu du shu ji, 2.4b-6a.
70 Zigong (cognomen of Duanmu Si 邓.
71 i.e. Yan Yuan.
72 Quoted from Analects 5.9
73 A.27a-28a.
achievements nor reward soldiers who do not fight. In times of peace it is virtuous conduct (de xing) that is honoured, but in times of trouble it is achievement and ability which are rewarded.\textsuperscript{74}

Edict issued in 210:

If only upright men were deemed fit to serve, then how would Duke Huan of Qi have secured his hegemony?\textsuperscript{75} Is it likely that nowadays there is no one ‘dressed in coarse garments, concealing real jade’\textsuperscript{76} who is fishing by the side of the Wei river?\textsuperscript{77} And is it possible that there are not those who have coveted their sisters-in-law and accepted bribes but have still not encountered their Wuzhi\textsuperscript{78}? You must all assist me in locating such men of hidden talents. As long as a man has ability, then recommend him so that I can use him.\textsuperscript{79}

Edict issued in 214:

Those who are morally upright in their conduct are not necessarily those who are suitable for selection to office; those who are suitable for selection to office are not necessarily morally upright in their conduct.... Therefore, even if a man is imperfect in certain respects, how can he be rejected?\textsuperscript{80}

Edict issued in 217:

Even if a man has a despicable reputation, is laughed at for his conduct, and practises neither humaneness nor filial piety, yet possesses political and military skills, then each of you must recommend such men and make no omissions.\textsuperscript{81}

Xu Gan adopted two mutually incompatible views on the question of the relationship between ability and

\textsuperscript{74} Commentary to San Guo zhi, 1.24
\textsuperscript{75} Allusion to Guan Zhong’s services to Duke Huan.
\textsuperscript{76} Allusion to Bian He 箕子.
\textsuperscript{77} Allusion to Jiang Töigong 井公.
\textsuperscript{78} Wei Wuzhi 類之 recommended Chen Ping 陳平 to Liu Bang 劉邦 despite the fact that Chen Ping was supposed to have had an illicit relationship with his elder brother’s wife and also to have accepted bribes.
\textsuperscript{79} San Guo zhi, 1.32.
\textsuperscript{80} San Guo zhi, 1.44.
\textsuperscript{81} San Guo zhi, 1.49-50.
moral nature because one view represented his vision of how their relationship should be, while the other was a recognition of how he actually saw their relationship. The same view is a formulation of how things ought to function given the proper set of circumstances: virtuous conduct should serve as a measure not only of moral nature but also of innate inner ability, and practical achievement should serve as a measure not only of innate inner ability but also of moral nature. That virtuous conduct and practical achievement were able to function thus was because inner ability and moral nature were seen to be two components of the same inner whole. Virtuous conduct and practical achievement were also seen to be two parts of the same external whole. The relation between the internal and external conforms to the substance-function model.

The 'combined' position, on the other hand, represents Xu Gan’s resignation to the fact that the times in which he lived had failed to provide the proper set of circumstances that would ensure that moral nature and ability functioned as a whole. For Xu Gan, the root cause of the train of events which led to this situation was name and actuality’s being in disaccord. Xu Gan’s subscription to the 'combined' view, maintaining that ability rather than moral nature and virtuous conduct functioned as the main partner, should be regarded as a blunt and somewhat cynical acceptance of the fact that the times in which he lived meant that his vision of the
proper accord between name and actuality was unrealisable.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{82} See Appendix I for a note on discussion of \textit{ming shi} after Xu Gan.
CONCLUSION

In the Introduction I explained that each of the four parts of this thesis broadly addresses a particular question. It is appropriate here to summarize the answers to each of those questions, based on the findings of my research.

1. 'What was Xu Gan's concept of the ming shi relationship?'

Basic to my interpretation of Xu Gan's concept of the ming shi relationship is the understanding that by shi he meant 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is', and that he subscribed to a correlative theory of naming. Based on this understanding, I have shown that for Xu Gan the proper relationship that should obtain between names and actualities is one of correlation or accord, and that this accord is a function of the special bond that exists between names and actualities and which is as natural (zi ran) as the bond between plants and the seasons. When name and actuality partake of this bond they function as two parts of a whole where each partner relies on the other to such an extent that, without names, actualities would not become manifest, and without actualities, there would be nothing to be manifested as names. I have argued that the model which best represents this relationship is the substance-function polarity and that the name and
actuality relationship that principally concerned Xu Gan was the Potency-reputation relationship.

2. 'How does it relate to earlier views of ming shi?'

This question encompasses two more specific questions:

a. How did earlier thinkers understand the ming shi dichotomy?

The most distinctive feature of pre-Han thinking about ming and shi is the focus on ming. This is because nearly all pre-Han thinkers were nominalists. As a consequence of their nominalist premises, many thinkers held that ming could and should be used to prescribe and determine shi.

Although the roots of this nominal prescriptivist thinking can be traced back into the Shang period, it is in Confucius' zheng ming programme that this thinking is first applied to philosophical writing, in particular, political philosophy. Confucius did not regard names as labels but rather as social, and hence political, catalysts which could bring about new states of affairs. This was a function of the performative role that names were perceived to play in the networks of human relations and social patterns that constituted the underlying structure of ritual.

I have identified Xun Qing's zheng ming thinking as the second phase in the political application of nominal prescriptivism. The nominal prescriptivist component in
Xun Qing’s thought is much more explicit than it is in Confucius’ thought, supported as it is by the most fully developed nominalist theory of naming in classical Chinese thought. As we have seen, Xun Qing’s theory of naming owes a significant theoretical debt to the Neo Mohists. As a corollary to each of their nominalist theories of naming, the Neo Mohists and Xun Qing use the word *shi* to mean ‘particular object’. For the Neo Mohists, names, not objects, are of primary importance because as definitions they serve as the final court of appeal for distinguishing between alternative claims as to what name picks out which object. Xun Qing similarly regarded names to be of primary importance because they demarcate objects: "a name has no intrinsically appropriate object; rather its appropriate object is demarcated by being named".

The third phase in the political application of nominal prescriptivism is Han Fei’s *xing ming* mechanism, which I have described as the application of the *ming shi* dichotomy to Legalist philosophy of statecraft. As with Confucius’ *zheng ming* programme, Han Fei’s *xing ming* mechanism is very specific in the scope of its application of the *ming shi* dichotomy and serves to underscore that discussion of *ming* and *shi* in pre-Han times was by no means limited to linguistic and logical matters. Furthermore, Han Fei’s concept of the *ming shi* relationship is the earliest example of one that is amenable to a substance-function interpretation.
With the emergence of correlative theories of naming in the late third and second centuries BC, the ming shi dichotomy is radically transformed; for the first time, shi, in the ming shi context, begins to be used to mean 'that by virtue of which an entity is what it is', representing a conceptual distinction being made between an entity and its actuality. Furthermore and importantly, each actuality is seen to have a name that is inherently appropriate to that actuality. That which makes a name appropriate is the bond it has with that actuality. Hand in hand with these changes in thinking about ming and shi and their relationship is the belief in a normative cosmological order. It is this belief that supports the notion of there being a bond which correlates names with actualities and which is correct or proper by virtue of it being part of that normative cosmological order.

My identification of the emergence of correlative theories of naming in the late third and early second centuries B.C. is the most important conceptual interpretation advanced in this thesis. Not only does it serve as the basis for my explication of Xu Gan's theory of naming, and hence his views on the name and actuality relationship, but it also identifies a conceptual distinction that is just as great as the Realist-Nominalist distinction in Western thought. Unlike Realist thought in the West, however, in classical Chinese thought there is no hint of a belief in universals. Different ontological premises may be seen to
account for this. Thus, whereas in classical Western thought the characteristic ontology is one grounded in a fundamental dualism where the world is regarded as being constituted of particular entities that are instantiations of transcendent qualities or principles, in classical Chinese thought the characteristic ontology is one of part and whole, where the world is seen as a whole constituted of particular entities as its parts. Indeed, the belief in such an immanental cosmos quite simply "precludes the existence of any transcendental being or principle"; even an anthropomorphic tian such as we find in Analects or Chun qiu fan lu is seen to be an inseparable, immanent part of the cosmos, in just the same way that man is.¹

As for the particular entities that constitute this Chinese world, they are distinguished from actualities. Yet despite this distinction, actualities are conceived neither to exist independently of those entities nor to be fixed and unchanging essences or substrata in which various qualities inhere. Thus, in "Shen cha ming hao", Dong Zhongshu describes how the name 'people' (min) refers to those beings whose actuality is their state of not yet having been awakened (mian). Actualities, however, are the 'basic stuff' (zhi) of a person's natural tendencies (xing), and by virtue of their xing people have the latent capacity to awake from their state of ignorance and become good. Thus, for Dong Zhongshu, a person's actuality is not fixed or static but is a state

¹ Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 1-17; 204-208.
of development that offers the potential for growth. In *Zhong lun* this concept of actuality being a state of development is even more pronounced. This may be seen to be a consequence of the fact that whereas for Dong Zhongshu an actuality is 'that by virtue of which an entity is what it is', for Xu Gan that concept had evolved to mean 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is'.

Finally, in connection with these comments on shi and early Chinese ontology, it should be noted that none of the various meanings of shi identified in this thesis, nominalist, support Chad Hansen's much discussed "stuff" or substance ontology. "Stuff" is the translation Hansen gives for shi and which he understands as follows:

> We can characterize Chinese semantic theories as a view that the world is a collection of overlapping and interpenetrating stuffs and substances.... The mind is ... a faculty that discriminates the boundaries of the substances or stuffs referred to by the names.²

The ontological counterpart to this is that all members of an abstract set of objects form one discontinuous stuff, hence "identifying different members of the same set is the same as identifying spatiotemporally different parts of the same stuff".³ For Hansen, shi refers to the whole rather than its "spatiotemporally different parts", yet he provides no textual support for this

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² *Language and Logic in Ancient China*, 30.
³ *Language and Logic in Ancient China*, 31.
interpretation. My research, however, has shown that as a philosophical concept in early Chinese thought, *shi* means either particular entities or states of affairs, or that by virtue of which entities or states of affairs are what they are.\(^4\)

b. To what extent is Xu Gan's concept of the *ming shi* relationship original or derivative?

Xu Gan's concept of the *ming shi* relationship stands in sharpest relief to the views of those thinkers who subscribe to a nominalist theory of naming and who maintain that *ming* can and should be used to prescribe *shi*. In my reconstruction of Xu Gan’s *ming shi* thinking, I have shown him to subscribe to a \(^1\) correlative theory of naming that has elements in common with both the \(^2\) correlative theories of naming discussed in Chapter 5. According to those theories, a given name is appropriate to a given actuality because of the inherent correlation that exists between them. Insofar as Xu Gan’s plants-seasons/names-actualities analogy supports the interpretation that he believed that a name is appropriate to an actuality by virtue of the bond that exists between them, and that this bond is a function of the way that things naturally are (*zi ran*), his own

\(^4\) These criticisms are not worth pursuing further here as in any case the mass-noun hypothesis, which is the basis of Hansen’s stuff ontology, has come under increasingly serious criticism. Christoph Harbsmeier’s criticisms have been the most sustained and penetrating; see his review of Language and Logic in Ancient China in Early China, 9-10 (1983-1983), 250-257; "Marginalia Sino-logica", in Robert E. Allinson, Understanding the Chinese Mind, 155-161; and "The Mass Noun Hypothesis", in Rosemont, Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, 49-66.
theory is closer to the theory adumbrated in Guan Zī; there is no evidence that he subscribed to the belief that Heaven ordained the appropriateness of names to actualities. On the other hand, his theory of naming is closer to that of Dong Zhongshu in respect of his views that names are born of actualities and that man is able to coin names. Furthermore and importantly, the substance-function model which characterizes Xu Gan’s concept of this relationship also characterizes Dong Zhongshu’s concept of the name and actuality relationship. Both of these views of the name and actuality relationship are to be distinguished from Han Fei’s xīng míng thinking where it is míng which plays the role of substance and shì the role of function.

Thus, when isolated, three elements in Xu Gan’s concept of the name and actuality relationship are seen to be derivative: i. a name is appropriate to an actuality by virtue of the bond that exists between them and this bond is determined by the way things naturally are; ii. names are born of actualities; iii. without names actualities would not be able to become manifest, and without actualities there would be nothing to be manifest as names. Where Xu Gan’s concept of the name and actuality relationship is original is in his creative appropriation of these elements for the purposes of elucidating his own thinking on the Superior Person’s cultivation of Potency and the significance of reputation in that process of cultivation. That he developed and refined earlier concepts, rather than simply adopted them
with little or no change, is borne out especially by his concept of actuality: 'a state of development in an entity or state of affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is'.

3. 'What background social and intellectual factors prompted Xu Gan to discuss the ming shi relationship?'

I have identified the pursuit of personal reputation that was encouraged by ming jiao, and the preoccupation of classical scholarship with the written word as the two main background social and intellectual factors which prompted Xu Gan to discuss the relationship between name and actuality. In regard to the former, I have described how Eastern Han scholar-gentry misused ming jiao to enhance their own reputations and so secure office, and have shown how Xu Gan is critical of those who regarded the pursuit of reputation to be more worthwhile than the attainment of the qualities of which reputation should serve as a mark. Xu Gan saw it as a breach of the proper relationship that should obtain between name and actuality if reputation is pursued at the expense of the actuality it should represent. As for classical scholarship, I have shown how Xu Gan regarded the elucidation of the essential meaning of the sagely teachings to be the true purpose of scholarship, not textual glossing and zhang ju commentary writing, and that this is borne out both in explicit criticism and in his citations from the classical corpus in Zhong lun. I have proposed that for Xu Gan the emphasis on pedantic
scholastic concerns at the expense of the essential meaning represented another manifestation of name and actuality being in disaccord. In both cases, the model which best represents Xu Gan's understanding of the name-actuality disaccord is a fundamental-peripheral polarity where actualities are fundamental and names are peripheral. Finally, it should be reiterated that these two types of disaccord take on a special significance in the light of Xu Gan's belief that the more widespread the disaccord between name and actuality, the more serious the ramifications:

Nowadays are the only names which throw Potency into disorder the ones uttered by the village worthies? The myriad affairs are complex and interwoven; when 'aberrant numbers' proliferate it is certain the the path leading to the disordering of Potency has more than one starting-point.5

4. 'What bearing did his concept of the ming shi relationship have on other thinking in Zhong lun?'

Two questions were discussed: i. the relationship between a man's practice of humaneness and the length of his life, and; ii. the relationship between a man's moral nature and his innate ability. Xu Gan adopted two positions on each of these questions. On the question of the relationship between the practice of humaneness and the length of a man's life, he held that when the proper set of circumstances prevails, humaneness is rewarded by a long life; when it does not prevail, humaneness will no longer serve as a guarantee of long life. For Xu Gan,

5 B.4b.
accord and disaccord between name and actuality affected whether or not the proper set of conditions prevailed: when in accord, aberrant numbers are not produced and concordant ming prevails; when in disaccord, aberrant numbers proliferate and converse ming prevails. On the question of the relationship between a man's moral nature and his innate ability, he holds that moral nature and innate ability are two components of a whole, and that virtuous conduct should serve as a measure, not only of moral nature, but also of innate inner ability, while practical achievement should serve as a measure, not only of innate inner ability, but also of moral nature. When name and actuality are in disaccord, however, this affected the workings of the moral nature-innate ability relationship such that a man of moral worth was not necessarily a man of ability. When asked to choose which was of greater practical worth, Xu Gan argues that it is ability and not moral worth. The disparate positions he holds on each of these questions are a function of whether name and actuality are seen to be in accord or disaccord, and the accord/disaccord distinction represents a disjunction in his philosophical outlook between ideal and reality.
Appendix A

HISTORY OF THE TEXT

1. Structure and Arrangement of the Text

1.1 The Number of Pian

According to the unsigned Preface and Li Shan's (c.630-689) comment to Cao Pi's letter to Wu Zhi 義男, Zhong lun comprised 20 pian, but there is reason to believe that these accounts may have been mistaken. There are at least two references to the work as consisting of more than 20 pian. In addition, Wei Zheng's 許微 (580-643) Qun shu zhi yao 荒書治要 includes substantial parts of two pian that have been transmitted nowhere else. There are also statements recorded in Wu Jing's 無靜 (670-749) Zhen guan zheng yao 甄覲政要 (see entry for 643; 6.20a) and Chao Gongwu's 趙公武 Jun zhai du shu zhi 導重書志 (10.17a (p. 671)) to the effect that the book included two pian, entitled, respectively, "Fu san nian" 伏三年 [sic] and "Zhi yi" 質意. The material which is included in Qun shu zhi yao is of a nature that matches these two titles and may be regarded as being abridged versions of the two pian. It is not possible to determine whether the book had originally contained more than twenty-two pian.

1 A bibliographical note based on an earlier, abridged draft of this Appendix is be published in Michael Loewe and William Boltz, eds., Bibliography of Early Chinese Literature.

2 Wen Xuan, 42.9b.

3 See the versions of Cao Pi's letter to Wu Zhi in San Guo zhi, 21.602, and Wen Xuan, 42.5b.
1.2 The Number of Juan

The entries in different books vary as follows:

1.2.1 1 juan: the note to the entry to the Sui catalogue (Sui shu, 34.998) refers to an item listed in the Liang catalogue, Qi Lu 彦, by Ruan Xiaoxu 彦興, in 1 juan.

1.2.2 2 juan: this figure is given in Jun zhai du shu zhi (10.17a), Chen Zhensun 楚振孫 (fl. 1234), Zhi zhai shu lu jie ti 真善書錄解題 (9.6b), and Ma Duanlin 马端臨 (fl. 1254), Wen xian tong kao 文獻通考 (2:846). The notes to Zhong lun (usually printed as a postface) by Shi Bangzhe 許邦哲, (dated 1158; first appended in extant editions to that of Huang Wen 黃鶴, 1502) and Lu Youren 劉友仁 (dated 1323) refer to the work in 2 juan as a "personally collated copy of Zhu Cheng's book".

1.2.3 5 juan: Qian Zeng 錢曾 (1629-1701) lists a hand-copied text in 5 juan in his Yu shan Qian Zunwang cang shu mu lu hui pian 廬山錢遵王藏書目錄編 (124).

1.2.4 6 juan: this figure is given in Yi lin (5.14b), Sui shu, "Jing ji zhi" (34.998), Wang Yaochen 王堯臣 (1001-1056), Chong wen zong mu 聞仲穆 (3.4b), Xin Tang shu 新唐書 (59.1510), and Yang Dezhou 楊德周 (fl. 1768), Jian an qi zi ji 建安七子集 (26a-28a).

1.2.5 7 juan: Wen xian tong kao (2:846) cites Chong wen zong mu as listing a 7 juan edition.
1.2.6 8 juan: According to Gao Sisun 高似孫 (c. 1160-c. 1230), this figure appears in a list used by Yu Zhongrong 楊仲容 (468-549) for compilation of his Zi chao 子操. See Zi lüe 子錄 (11b) where the entry reads "Xu Gan si lun" 徐幹士論. (Presumably the character si is a copyist’s mistake for zhong 仲).

1.2.7 10 juan: Song shi, "Yi wen zhi" (205.5208) and Yu hai 玉海 (62.11b; citing Zhong xing 中興 [guan ge] shu mu 章凝閣書目).

2. Editions of the Text

2.1 Arranged in 2 juan

2.1.1 Yan Lingfeng 嚴靈鳳 copy; format 8 by 16. The earliest copy of Zhong lun is allegedly that one belonging to Yan Lingfeng, and which is held (February 1989) in the National Central Library, Taipei. Yan Lingfeng claims that this may be a copy of the redaction made in 1323 by Lu Youren of the collated edition of Shi Bangzhe (of 1158); he dates the calligraphic style at anywhere between the Southern Song and the Ming periods. Yan Lingfeng further claims that this redaction served as an exemplar for Huang Wen’s 黃文 edition of 1502, which had hitherto been considered the earliest available print of Zhong lun. It is equally possible that both Yan Lingfeng’s copy and the Huang Wen edition derived from a common source, which was reproduced more faithfully in the
latter; there is no evidence to prove which of the two prints was the earlier. Yan Lingfeng’s copy appends both the original preface and that of Zeng Gong (1019-1083). See Yan Lingfeng, “Wu qui bei zhai xian cang Xu Gan Zhong lun ji” (see Luo Jianren, Xu Gan Zhong lun yanjiu, 180-183, as cited below).

2.1.2 Huang Wen 黄文 edition (1502); format 8 by 16; text with original preface and that of Zeng Gong, notes by Shi Bangzhe and Lu Youren, and postface by Du Mu 裕穆 (dated 1502), from which Huang Wen is identified as being responsible for printing the edition; there are some lacunae. The Fu Sinian library, Academia Sinica, Taipei, and the Shanghai Library both have copies of this edition.

A re-cut Ming edition (date unknown) based on the Huang Wen edition is kept in the Beijing library; format 10 by 17; text with prefaces etc. as in Huang Wen edition plus postface by Huang Pili 黃季烈 and a single marginal note by Gu Guangqi 郭廣圻 (1770-1839). There are no lacunae in this edition, the unknown editor having replaced them with characters.

2.1.3 Xue Chen 夏澄 edition (1565); format 8 by 16; text with prefaces etc. and lacunae as in 2.1.2. A note on the first folio of each juan ascribes collation to Xue Chen; printed by Du Si 杜思, as stated in his preface (1565). This edition has been reproduced in the Si bu cong kan series.
2.1.4 Liang jing yi bian 藝術蓬編 edition (1582); punctuated text in 9 by 17 format, with material as in 2.1.3; compiled by Hu Weixin 言惟新.

2.1.5 Zhu zi pin ji 莫子品節 edition (1591); punctuated text in 9 by 20 format; occasional marginalia; compiled by Chen Shen 陳深.

2.1.6 Han Wei cong shu 漢魏叢書 edition (1592); format 9 by 20, with material as in 2.1.3; compiled by Cheng Rong 程榮.

2.1.7 Guang Han Wei cong shu 廣漢魏叢書 edition (early 17th century); format 9 by 20, with Zeng Gong preface; this edition of Han Wei cong shu edited by Sun Yinji 孫胤智 (fl. 1622).

2.1.8 Zeng ding Han Wei cong shu 增訂漢魏叢書 edition (1791); format 9 by 20, with material as in 2.1.3; this edition of Han Wei cong shu edited by Wang Mo 王謨.

2.1.9 Qian Peiming 錢培名 edition (1854); format 10 by 20; a revised edition of 2.1.3 including Qian Peiming’s reading notes and the text of two lost pian ("Fu san nian sang" and "Zi yi"); first published in Xiao wan juan lou cong shu 小萬卷樓叢書. A punctuated edition of the text, based on the re-cut edition of this cong shu of 1878 and the 2.1.4 edition, was included in the Cong shu ji cheng 收書集成 series; reproduced in the Guoxue jiben cong shu series (Taiwan Shangwu yinshu guan, Taipei, 1968).
2.1.10  Bo zi 白氏 edition (1875); punctuated edition in 12 by 14 format; appends the Zeng Gong preface and included in the Bo zi quan shu 白氏全書, published by the Hubei Chong wen shu ju. There is no indication of which edition it is based upon, although it does show some similarities to 2.1.6 and 2.1.7.

2.1.11  Zheng Guoxun 鄭國欣 edition (1917); format 9 by 17; text with prefaces as 2.1.3. A note preceding the prefaces states that this edition took Lu Youren’s edition as its exemplar, thus putatively claiming it to be a redaction of the oldest edition then extant. Some commentators, seemingly with good reason, have implicitly denied that Lu cut a new edition, as his note states only that he had acquired the version which had been personally edited by Shi Bangzhe; there is no specific reference to a new edition. Indirect support for the view that Lu did indeed produce his own edition and that this served as the exemplar for Zheng Guoxun is forthcoming from a note by Zhang Wenhu 張文虎 (Shu yi shi xu bi 書逸史續補, 1879, 1.30a). He writes that in 1876 he saw a Yuan redaction of a Song edition of Zhong lun in 20 pian. Almost all variants which he cites (30-31a) are identical with those in Zheng Guoxun’s edition, the difference being obviously due to Zheng’s preference for another, more coherent reading. It would thus appear that Lu Youren’s redaction existed until the early years of the Republic.
2.2 Arranged in 6 juan

The only extant edition in 6 juan, entitled Xu Weichang ji 徐偉長集, is included in Jian an qi zi ji (revised edition, edited by Chen Chaofu 陳朝輔, 1768). A work entitled Xu Gan zhong ji 徐幹中集, which is listed in Zhao Yongxian 趙用賢 (1535-1596), Zhao Dingyu shu mu 趙廷玉書目 (Gudian wenxue chubanshe, Shanghai, 1957), 72, may be related to this edition. The text includes some poetry as well as the twenty pian; whose order varies from that of the editions in two juan. Some of the variants are similar to the text given in Qun shu zi yao and Hao Jing 郝經 (1223-1275), Xu Hou Han shu 續後漢書 (1841 ed.), 69B.1a-6b.

While all of the foregoing 2 juan editions are almost certainly derivatives from Zhu Cheng's copy, as used by Lu Youren, no single one is sufficient to serve as a standard text, although 2.1.11 would seemingly be the most faithful to the Yuan edition. As they all include textual variants, they should be consulted along with the edition in 6 juan. Of the 2 juan editions, the most important are either 2.1.1 or 2.1.2, and 2.1.11.

2.3 Arrangements of Selections and Abridgements From Zhong lun

2.3.1 Zhong lun lei zuan 中論類纂 (1567); format 11 by 22. Abridged versions of all pian except "Qian jiao", "Li shu", "Lun ao shou", "Shen suo cong" and "Min
shu". Preface by Shen Jin 沈津 and included in his Bai jia lei zuan 白家列萃.

2.3.2 Zhong lun xuan yan ping yuan 中論玄言評議 (1587); Punctuated 10 by 20 format; hand-copied; abridged versions of all pian except "Li shu", "Lun ao shou", "Shen da chen", "Shen suo cong", "Shang fa". Extensive marginalia by Luo Dajing 罗大經, Qian Fu 錢福, Chen Houshan 陳厚山, Min Rulin 民如霖, Yuan Liaofan 袁利凡, and Lin Xiyuan 林西元. Included in Lu Kejiao 魯可教 and Li Tingji 李廷機, Zhu zi xuan yan ping yuan 諸子玄言評議.

2.3.3 Ping dian Xu Zi 評點徐子 (1625); format 13 by 28; punctuated; abridged versions of "Zhi xue", "Fa xiang", "Xiu ben", "Xu dao", "He bian", and "Kao wei". Extensive marginalia by Li Zishi 李子實, Luo Jinglun 龍景潤, Liu Ziwei 劉子威, Hu Juren 胡居仁, and Chen Qinxuan 陳琴軒. Included in Gui Youguang 隱有光 and Wen Zhenmeng 文震孟, Zhu zi hui ban 諸子匯貫.

2.3.4 Zhong lun qi shang 中論奇賞 (1626); format 9 by 20; Zeng Gong preface; abridged versions of 13 pian from Zhong lun with occasional marginalia. Included Chen Renxi 陳仁錫, Zhu zi qi shang 諸子奇賞.

3. Textual and Secondary Studies

3.1 Selections of the text are printed with emendations and variants in Qian Peiming’s reading notes (2.1.8 above).
3.2 Zhang Wenhu, *Sui yi shi xu bi* (2.1.10 above); Zhang compares the Yuan edition with that of Qian Peiming, recording variants that are not noted there.

3.3 Luo Jianren, *Xu Gan Zhong lun yanjiu* (Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, Taipei, 1973). This study includes a bibliographical section, detailed commentary on selections from the text (based essentially on Qian Peiming's work) and traditional literary evaluations of Xu Gan's *fu*, poetry, and *Zhong lun*.

3.4 Liang Rongmao, *Xu Gan Zhong lun jiaoshi* (Mutong chubanshe, 1979); revised edition, entitled *Xu Gan Zhong lun jiao zheng* (Mutong chubanshe, Taipei, 1980). Selections from the text are printed with annotations, the most complete to appear in Chinese studies. There are also a few pages of general interpretation.

4. Recent Editions

4.1 Ding Lüzhuan, *Zhong lun jiaozhu* (Gaoxiong shifan xueyuan bao, 2 (December, 1973), 255-337); punctuated text, with notes derived mainly from those of Qian Peiming and Luo Jianren.
5. **Japanese editions**

5.1 A work entitled *Chû ron kô* 中論考, which is attributed to Okamoto Hôkô 圓本保（1797-1878; see Ozawa Masatane 小澤雅胤, ed., *Keichô irai kokugakka* ryakuden 延長以來國學講談, (Kokkôsha, Tokyo, 1900, 692) appears to be no longer extant. The Seikadô library holds a copy of a Qing print of *Zhong lun*, annotated in manuscript by Okamoto Hôkô.


5.3 Ikeda Shûzô 池田秀三, *Jo Kan Chû ron kōchû* 藪解中論校注 (Kyôto daigaku bungakubu kenkyû kiyô, 23 (1984), 1-62; 24 (1985), 73-112; 25 (1986), 117-200; punctuated Chinese text followed by the most complete annotation of any study; *Kambun* transcription.
Appendix B

ZHUANG ZI'S SCEPTICISM ABOUT NAMES AND NAMING

For Zhuang Zi, only in so far as they are conventionally determined do words say something. If, however, there is lack of consensus about the standards to which the convention should comply, then words have no fixed meaning:

If one takes one's own fixed ideas\(^1\) to serve as authority, then who is without such an authority? Why should it only be those who are aware of the process of alternation and whose heart approves its own judgments who possess such an authority? Fools also possess such an authority. Yet to go ahead and make judgments about what is and what is not before one even has his own fixed ideas is like 'going to Yue today and arriving there yesterday.'\(^2\)

The paradox about going to Yue is one attributed to Zhuang Zi's friend, the School of Names thinker, Hui Shi.\(^3\) The paradox trades on the relativity of the terms 'today' and 'yesterday': 'today' will be 'yesterday' tomorrow just as 'yesterday' was once today. Hui Shi presumably used the paradox to undermine opponents' arguments in disputation. Zhuang Zi's purpose in citing it, however, is somewhat different. He wants to show that, on one horn of the dilemma, our choice of standards is ultimately based on nothing other than subjective and

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\(^1\) Literally 'completed heart'. It refers to the preconceived notions and subjective values that each of us harbours. The term should be understood as a parallel concept to the cheng xing \(\text{完成形}^1\) 'completed body' of the preceding few lines.

\(^2\) Pian 2, 56.

\(^3\) Hui Shi served King Hui of Liang (r. 370-319). See Zhuang Zi, pian 33, 1102.
arbitrary value judgments, the consequence of which is that the wise man has no more claim to being correct than the fool, yet on the other horn of the dilemma, without these subjective judgments, the consequence is as equally absurd for those who still wish to make distinctions.

In the celebrated anecdote about feeding monkeys, "Three in the Morning", again Zhuang Zi satirises the arbitrariness of naming and the essential meaninglessness of the distinctions or 'facts' they purport to represent:

A monkey keeper handing out nuts to his monkeys said, "I'll give you three in morning and four in the evening". The monkeys were furious. "All right then," he said, "I'll make it four in the morning and three in the evening." The monkeys were all delighted.⁴

For Zhuang Zi, the meaning attributed to words is derived solely from the subjective and limited perspective of a particular speaker in a specific context. With a change in perspective and/or context, then the meaning of that word changes. Hansen remarks:

Chuang-tzu's critique emerges from his concentration on indexical terms and sentences. An indexical is a term whose referent can only be specified relative to the context of utterance, such as I, here, this, now.⁵

Indeed, the whole critique of disputation undertaken in "Qi wu lun" 物論, focusses on the shi fei 是非 and bi ci 彼此 distinctions, Zhuang Zi's point being that disputation is unable to reconcile different claims because distinction-making relies on giving names to things the meanings of which are not fixed:

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⁴ Plan 2, 70.
⁵ Language and Logic in Ancient China, 91.
This is That and That is also This. From the perspective of That, there is one type of 'what is' and 'what is not'; from the perspective of This, there is another 'what is' and 'what is not'. Are there really This and That? Are there really no This and That?6

Suppose that you and I have entered into a dispute and that you have won and I have lost. Is it really the case that you are right and I am wrong? Alternatively, let's suppose that I have won and you have lost. Is it really the case that I am right and you are wrong? Is one of us right and one wrong? Or are we both right and wrong? .... Yet even supposing we get an independent party to decide it, how will he be able to do so if his position is different from either of us?

For Zhuang Zi, the distinctions drawn by names are not only changeable and relative, they are also limited and limiting; the act of using words to describe or define something is also one of exclusion. In the following passage Zhuang Zi brings this point home in his comments on Hui Shi and the two famous musicians Zhao Wen and Shi Kuang:7

These three men each excelled in their skills and so their names will be known to posterity. Only because they liked some particular thing was this thing in turn distinguished from That. Because they liked this thing, they wanted to illuminate it; however, because they illuminated it without an understanding of That, they ended up in the confusion of the 'hard and white'.8

Each of these men was accomplished in one particular skill. In cultivating and giving expression to that skill, however, whether it be performing a piece of music or engaging in discourse, there will always be some notes

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6 Pian 2, 66.
7 Pian 2, 107.
8 Pian 2, 75.
that are selected instead of others\(^9\) or some points of view expounded and not others. Zhuang Zi's meaning is clear: only when they stop playing or discoursing will they stop leaving things out. It is the same with naming: names are arbitrary and conventional and with their imposition of artificial boundaries they distort and straight-jacket, creating many pseudo-facts at the expense of not being able to respond to and consciously partake of the undifferentiated Dao.

\(^9\) Guo Xiang develops this interpretation in his commentary, *Zhuang Zi ji shi*, 76, n. 9.
Appendix C

ZHENG MING: AN INTERPOLATION?

The only occurrence of the term zheng ming in the Analects is at 13.3. Moreover, in the second great pre-Qin Confucian text, Mencius, it does not occur at all. And although Xun Zi includes a chapter entitled "Zheng ming", no reference is made to Confucius' use of the term. This is curious, for such a reference would have lent both prestige and authority to Xun Qing's use of the term.¹

Some scholars have even doubted the authenticity of the passage in the Analects.² Waley, whose charge has proved to be the most enduring, argues that the reference to zheng ming is an anachronism. Accepting the middle of the fourth century B.C. as the date of the material contained in the Analects, and arguing that in "Mencius (early third century B.C.) there is not a trace of the 'language crisis',"³ Waley thereby concludes that "we have no reason to suppose that the whole sequence of

¹ Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 24, however, notes that this failure to mention Confucius accords with his general practice, as "there are only half-a-dozen direct quotations from Confucius in his essay chapters (Hsün-tzu chs. 1-24), none of them from the Analects."² Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 21-22, 171, n.1; Herrlee G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way 221, 313, n. 11; 321-322, n. 13; Creel, Shen Pu-hai: A Chinese Political Philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C., 116-119.³ Waley understands this language crisis to have been centred on questions pertaining to the relationship between language and reality. See his The Way and its Power, 59-68.
ideas embodied in this passage could be earlier than the end of the fourth century [B.C.]."

Waley's argument takes the form of a syllogism, the major premise being that zheng ming was a doctrine devised in response to some 'language crisis' and the minor premise being that even by the early third century B.C. no such crisis had developed, therefore zheng ming is an anachronism. The argument, however, rests on a false major premise, because the zheng ming doctrine was formulated in response not to any 'language crisis' but rather to a socio-political one.

Takeuchi Yoshio agrees with the Late Edo Confucian scholars, Nakai Riken 甲井履 (1732-1817) and Ikai Keisho 稲葉春所 (1761-1864), that the following lines are a later interpolation: "If affairs are not brought to fruition then ritual and music will not prosper; if ritual and music do not prosper then punishments and penalties will be inappropriate." The cause of his misgiving is a lack of logical coherence in the description of a breakdown in ritual and music leading to a breakdown of punishments and penalties. While Takeuchi

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4 The Analects of Confucius, 22. At 22 and 172, n. 1, he also argues that the "chain-argument" style of the passage is further evidence of its being written at or after the end of the fourth century B.C. While few early examples of the chain style of argumentation (sorites) survive in the received literature, Lao Zi 59 provides quite an early example. It would be rash to insist that Lao Zi 59 was written at or after the end of the fourth century. For an examination of this style of argumentation and the appropriateness of the term sorites used to describe it, see Janusz Chielewski, "Notes on Early Chinese Logic (2)", Rocznik Orientalistyczny, 26.2 (1963), 91-105; Mary Margret Garrett, "The Mo-tzu and the Lü-shi ch'un-chiu: A Case Study of Classical Chinese Theory and Practice of Argument", 45-50, n. 31.

5 Takeuchi Yoshio, Rongo no kenkyu, 1:135.
limits his suspicions to these lines, saying nothing about the appearance of the term zheng ming in this passage as a later interpolation, other scholars such as Waley and Creel have seen the allegedly "un-Confucian" reference to punishments and penalties as cause to impugn the whole of Analects 13.3.

A facile evasion of this latter charge would be to adopt the stance taken by Takeuchi et al. and to regard the lines quoted above as being the full extent of any interpolation. Such an approach at least avoids throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A more constructive approach, however, would be to question the thesis that the juxtaposition of punishments and penalties with ritual and music was alien to the teachings of Confucius. First, the teaching of ritual was meant to establish the difference between right and wrong. If a person was not taught ritual, or improperly taught, then it would be inappropriate to punish that person. If people do not know why they are being punished, then 'they would not know where to put hand and foot'. Second, as Ames has argued, punishments were regarded by Confucius as a necessary adjunct to the inculcation of ritual. If we thus assume Ames' conclusion that ritual and punishments can be seen to function complementarily in the Analects, then their juxtaposition at 13.3 can be understood to mean that moral education is an indispensable prerequisite to the just and impartial dispensation of

6 Ames, The Art of Rulership, 115-120.
punishments. Both these points negate the claim that this passage is a Legalist or 'Legalistic' interpolation.

Despite these criticisms of the Waley-cum-Creel position, the fact remains that the term zheng ming occurs only once in the Analects, not at all in Mencius\(^7\) and the precedent of Confucius’ usage is not acknowledged in Xun Zi. The cumulative weight of these anomalies is sufficient to query too ready an acceptance of the authenticity of the passage. This having been pointed out, however, it is nonetheless true that there are many passages in the Analects that deal with the correction of names even though they do not employ the specific term zheng ming. Hence, even if one were to concede that the locus classicus is an interpolation, there is still no shortage of examples of zheng ming thinking to be found in the Analects. If the substance of this thinking is thus compatible with that which is basic to the teachings of Confucius in the Analects, then the question of the legitimacy of the form (that is, the term zheng ming) is surely misplaced. As F. W. Mote appositely comments:

Creel rejects the doctrine of the rectification of names, cheng-ming, as a later Legalist interpolation, incompatible with the spirit of Confucius. He does so, however, entirely in terms of the credibility of one sentence in the Analects, rather than in terms of the significance of the concept in the total system of Confucius’ thought. By rejecting the one sentence in which the term appears, he feels he has proved its non-Confucian origin; but he has disregarded its presence.

\(^7\) This is not, of course, to claim that examples of zheng ming thinking cannot be found in Mencius; see for example the famous 1B.8 passage.
as a functional concept throughout the Analects.  

See his note to his translation of Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, Vol.1, 98, n. 42.
Appendix D

AN ETYMOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE XING 王 GRAPH

As Creel¹ has observed, a popular view shared by both traditional and modern scholars is that in the xing ming context, although the xing 王 graph is used, in fact it was simply another way of writing xing 形. Furthermore, his suspicion that over the millennia editors and copyists have been altering occurrences of xing 王 to xing 形, because of the popular assumption that the two characters were anciently interchangeable, seems not without foundation. By way of indirect confirmation of this suspicion, a contemporary example of the unacknowledged substitution of one graph for another is provided in Yinqueshan Han jian shi wen 銀雀山漢簡釋文.² This work includes a transcription of pian titles from Sun Zi bin fa 孫子兵法 as recorded on a wooden tablet from tomb number one (c.140-118 B.C.) at Yinqueshan. The "Di xing" 王 pian, which is included in the received text, is one of the titles recorded on the tablet. On the wooden tablet, the xing 王 graph is written, but in the transcription it has been altered to 形, with no note or explanation. It is only after having seen a faithful hand transcription of the original wooden tablet that one learns of the alteration.³

¹ Creel, "The Meaning of Hsing Ming", 203-204.
² Compiled by Wu Jiulong.
³ See Li Ling, "Sun Zi pianti mudu chulun", Wen shi, 17 (1983), 75.
Yet even if there is some substance to the claim that "xing" represented the meaning 'form', it was not, however, so much another way of writing "xing" as it was a graphic form that embraced the meanings associated with "xing" within its semantic field. The ancestral form of "xing" was "jing", which, in bronze inscriptions, had as one of its basic meanings 'law/pattern/standard/model'.

One of the extended meanings to derive from this was 'take on a shape after having been patterned on a model/template', and from this the more general meanings of 'form', 'be realized', 'to take on a definite form' and 'give form to' evolved. It may be queried why the "xing" graph was not used to represent the meaning of 'assume form' or 'be realized'. The answer, it seems, is that that graph did not exist until some time in the Eastern Han, and for this reason was always represented by the "xing" graph. No example of "xing" has been found, either in oracle bone or bronze inscriptions, nor has it, to the best of my knowledge, been found in any of the Qin and Western Han bamboo and wooden strip or silk manuscripts. In fact, the compilers of "Yinqueshan Han mu zhu jian" state that: "In bamboo and wooden strip script, all examples of "xing" are written as "xing"." This claim

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4 See Shirakawa Shizuka, Jitô, 492; Zhou Fagao, Jinwen gulin, 5B.3284-3285.
5 See Shirakawa Shizuka, Setsumon shingi, 9.38.
6 Even in the silk manuscripts of the late Qin/early Han we can find examples of "xing" still being used to represent the meaning of 'take on a definite form'. See for example the "Wu xing" text, line 232, Mawangdui Han mu boshu, Vol. 1, 19.
7 See Shirakawa, Setsumon shingi, 9.38. The graph is not listed in either Hanyu guwenzi zixing biao or Jinwen gulin.
8 2.48b.
is certainly supported by the results of a check I conducted of a selection of Qin and Western Han wooden and bamboo strip and silk manuscripts. Every occurrence of xing in the sense of 'form', 'to take on a fixed shape', 'to give shape to' is written as  and not  

The materials checked were:

I. Mawangdui Han mu boshu, vols. 1, 3 and 4.

I.i Vol. 1:
- Lao Zi A + 4 texts; 28 occurrences; manuscripts copied circa 206-195.
- Lao Zi B + 4 texts; 31 occurrences; manuscripts copied circa 179-169.

I.ii Vol. 3:
- Chun qiu shi yu 春秋事語 ; Zhan Guo ce zong heng jia shu 戰國策縱横箋; 1 occurrence; manuscripts copied late Qin/early Han.

I.iii Vol. 4:
- 14 medical texts; 20 occurrences; manuscripts copied late Qin/early Han.

II. Yinqueshan Han jian shiwen.

38 occurrences: 52, 101, 126x3, 146x3, 168, 181, 197x4, 253x2, 304, 361, 408, 441, 572, 751, 810, 1406, 857, 1442, 1463, 1484, 2174, 2354, 2582, 2734, 2939, 3595, 4064, 4197, 4462 and the single occurrence in the wooden tablet discussed above.

9 While many of the bamboo strips have been identified as belonging to a particular text (including such famous militarist texts as Sun Zi bin fa 孫子兵法 , Sun Bin bin fa 孫臏兵法 , Wei Liao Zi 戰記子 and Liu dao 六韜 ), nevertheless, a significant number of the strips are severely fragmented, frequently making textual identification impossible. Because of this I will refer to the number of the relevant strip as given by Wu. Opinions differ as to the date of the manuscripts - for example, Wu Jiulong, Yinqueshan Han jian shiwen, Preface, 13, estimates that they were copied sometime during the reigns of Emperors Wen (180-167), Jing (157-141) and the early years of Wu (141-87), whereas Zhang Zhenze, Sun Bin bin fa jiaoli, Preface, 2, dates the copying of Sun Bin bin fa to the reign of Emperor Gao (206-195).
The following materials were also checked, but no occurrences of either the 刑 or 形 graphs, employed in the sense of 'form', 'be realized', 'to take on a definite form' or 'give form to', were found:

III. Juyan Han jian.

IV. Shuihudi Qin mu zhujian 睡虎地秦墓簡.

V. Wuwei Han jian 武威漢簡.

Furthermore, the earliest examples of the 形 graph included in Qin Han Wei Jin zhuan li zixing biao 秦漢魏晉南北朝表 10 and Sano Kōichi's 佐野光/ Mokkan jiten 本簡索引 11 are Eastern Han stele inscriptions taken from Li bian 青銅 12 and the earliest example recorded in Li bian 13 and Li shi 輿説 14 is dated 143 A.D. 15 This leaves Shuo wen jie zi (completed in 100 A.D. but not presented to the throne until 121 16) as the earliest source of the 形 graph. Nor is there any shortage of examples of 形 still being used in the Eastern Han to represent the meaning of 'form', 'take on a definite shape', a fact which also serves to support the claim that the 形 graph had at that time only recently been put into currency. 17

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10 637.
11 290.
12 Compiled by Gu Aiji.
13 2.47a-48a.
14 Compiled by Hong Kuo.
15 Li bian, 7.8a; Li shi, 6.9b. This earliest example is from Beihai xiang jing jun ming 北海相令銘 15B.1a, 2b.
16 See Shuo wen jie zi, 15B.1a, 2b.
17 See Chengyang ling tai bei 成陽陵墓碑, (172 A.D.), Li shi, 1.8a; Chu xiang Sun Shuaó bei 重陽堂墓銘碑, (174 A.D.), Li shi, 3.4b; Pingdu xiang Jiang jun bei 平度縣蔣君碑, (post 152 A.D.), Li shi, 6.14b; Zhuji jiang jin Feng Gun bei 周姬鳴君銘碑, (post 167 A.D.), Li shi, 7.14a; Guang-Han shu guo hou Li Yi bei 廣漢屬國侯李壹碑, (post 173 A.D.), Li shi, 9.8a; Li Yi
As for xing 刻, while there are attested examples of it as an independent graph already current in the Warring States period, they are extremely rare (although a few more are bound to come to light with new archaeological finds). Xing, with the meaning of 'mould', 'template' or 'model', also occurs with the 'field' element instead of the 'earth' element, as 餫. Thus we have evidence that some elements in the graph were interchangeable. Another example of the graph appears without the 'knife' element, as 餫. Some scholars have speculated that the 'field' element in the xing graph perhaps signified the shape of the mould, while others have speculated that the 'earth' element served to indicate that the mould was earthen.

I would like to advance an alternative hypothesis. In the Eastern Zhou we find the 'earth' 元 element appended to a number of graphs, for example, wan 與, and chen 磨, where it seems to have functioned as...

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18 Chen Qiyou, Lü shi chun qiu jiaooshi, 3:1022-1023, also glosses xing 刻 in the xing ming compound as 'model/mould' (xingfan 刻範). His etymological evidence, however, is based on the now discredited Shuo wen jie zi gloss. For a comprehensive repudiation of Xu Shen's etymological account, see Zhang Shuyan, "Shi tan xing zi de fazhan", Wen shi, 25 (1985), 349-352.
19 See Jin wen bian, 885, and Liu Yu, "Xinyang Chu jian shiwen yu kaoshi", in Xinyang Chu mu, 125, line 1; Rao Zongyi, Zeng Xiantong (eds.), Chu boshu, 262, n. 151.
20 For wan, see Gu wenzi leibian, 422; Shirakawa, Jito, 229.
21 See Ding Foyan 丁拂言, Gu zhou bu bu 古周補補, as reproduced in Shuo wen jie zi gu lin, 13B.6130a.
22 Shirakawa, Jito, 229.
23 Duan Yucai, Shuo wen jie zi zhu, 13A, under 刻 entry.
24 For chen, see Jin wen bian, #23330. Another example of 'non-semantic embellishment' is the frequent addition of a horizontal stroke to the following graphs (examples are to be found...
an artistic embellishment of no semantic significance and was eventually dropped entirely. It is my interpretation that similarly the 'earth' element of the xing ⾍ graph originally served no semantic purpose. Unlike the fate of this element in those other graphs, however, in the case of xing ⾍, increasingly it was used to represent a conceptual refinement that had originally been left undifferentiated in the wider semantic field that was represented by the orthographic form 利. That the xing graph with the 'earth' element was accepted only gradually is supported by examples of the unembellished xing 利 graph still being used throughout the Han to represent the meanings of 'pattern/model', 'to pattern in the image of' and 'template/mould'.

from as early as the Western Zhou: xia 卯, Gu wenzi leibian, 2, Jin wen bian, #0010; pi 稲, Gu wenzi leibian, 3; bu 包, Gu wenzi leibian, 4, Jin wen bian, #1581; tian 天, Gu wenzi leibian, 28, Jin wen bian, #0003; zheng 聖, Gu wenzi leibian, 90, Jin wen bian, 0198; ke 刻, Gu wenzi leibian, 120, Jin wen bian, #0750; za 葉, Gu wenzi leibian, 450, Jin wen bian, #0976. Dr Noel Barnard also informs me that a feature of the Chu system of writing is the appendage of a 'heart' or 'mouth' radical to graphs, with no apparent semantic function.

25 See, for example, Shi liu jing 小六经, "Guan" 淮, line 81B. p. 62 and 63, n.13, "Wu zheng" 卜征, line 92A (x2), p. 65, "Bing rong" 彬容, lines, 116B (x2), 117A, 117B, p. 71, Mawangdui Han mu boshu, vol.1; Tai chan shu 太倉手, line 2, p. 136, Shi wen 石文, line 29, p. 147, Mawangdui Han mu boshu, vol. 4; lines 451, 1214 from the "Wen qi" 文器 pian of Liu tao as transcribed in Yinqueshan Han mu zhujian shiwen; Huai Nan Zi, 10.8b (see Yang Shuda, Huai Nan Zi zheng wen, 99); Gao You's 3下 (late Eastern Han) gloss of fang 方 in his commentary to Huai Nan Zi, 11.10b; Huang Hui, Lun heng jiao shi, 1:137, 300; Qiu Xigui, "Lun heng zhajii", Wen shi, 5 (1978), 233, gloss 29. N.B. Qiu's reference to Wu Chengshi 吴承仕, (style Jianzhai 晋斋) would appear to be mistaken as Wu's Lun heng jiao shi, included in the series, Wu Jianzhai yishu, does not gloss the xing 利 graph in his notes to either the "Wu shi" 吴史 or the "Lei xu" 雷绪 pian.
turn lends confirmation to the above hypothesis, because in most cases the meaning of xing was close enough to its root meaning, from jing, 'law/pattern/standard/model', to be intelligible without recourse to a more specific graph. Accordingly, I think it is reasonable to speculate that in pre-Han times, and for much of the Han as well, xing was generally used to represent what was later written as xing. Nor was this simply a matter of loan graphs. Rather it was a case of having a term of which the semantic field was fecund enough to rely on a single orthographic form to convey a variety of different but related meanings. This same observation, of course, also applies to the generic case of xing representing xing.

To recognize xing as representing only that meaning which, from some time in the Eastern Han, came to be written as , is to fail to appreciate the full semantic import of xing as it functions in the Legalist adaptation of the xing ming compound. There, both the 'realized form' of a completed job of work and the 'outcome-cum-standard' against which the veracity of the original claim is ascertained are equally implicit.
Appendix E

ON THE DATING OF THE "XIN SHU SHANG", "XIN SHU XIA"
AND "BAI XIN" PIAN OF GUAN ZI

W. Allyn Rickett remarks that the "most widely accepted theory concerning the origin of the Guanzi holds that the so-called proto-Guanzi, that is, the core around which much of the present Guanzi finally took shape about 250 B.C., originated with the Jixia Academy".¹ The Jixia Academy began in the reign of King Huan of Qi (374-357) and, despite a couple of periods of decline, was to continue for about one hundred and fifty years until the demise of the Qi state. The Academy was a meeting place for intellectuals and can in some respects be likened to some of the larger government funded research centres of today; it has also been seen as a precursor of the Han Imperial Academy, albeit without the constraints of orthodoxy that were imposed upon the latter.²

¹ Guanzi: Political, Economic and Philosophical Essays from Early China, 1:15.
² See Qian Mu, Liang Han jingxue jin gu wen pingyi, 165; Zhou Yutong, "Boshi zhidu he Qin Han zhengzhi", in Zhou Yutong jingxueshi lunzhu xuan, 729-730. The standard account of the Jixia Academy is that it was established in the reign of King Xuan of Qi (319-301). (Yet this is rather hard to accept, especially as one of the main passages used to support this account (Shi ji, 46.1895) explicitly states that after Zou Yan, Chun Yukun, et al. were appointed to the rank of dai fu during King Xuan's reign, then "from this time the schools of Jixia in Qi thrived once again.") Rickett even dates the establishment of the Academy as "about 302 B.C." (p. 15). Xu Gan, however, records that "Duke Huan of Qi established the Jixia Academy and set up the rank of dai fu" (Zhong lun, B.31b). For a justification of Xu Gan's account, see Sun Yikai, "Jixia xuegong kaoshu", Wen shi 23 (1983), 41-42. For another good overall account of the Academy, see the collection of articles in Qi Lu xuekan, 52 (1983), 21-37; 54 (1983), 23-26; 55 (1983), 21-36.
A host of theories has been advanced as to when the 'Four Pian of Guan Zi' were written. The hypothesis advanced by Liu Jie and Guo Moruo that the four pian are the writings of two scholars associated with the Academy, Song Xing and Yin Wen (floruit of both latter half of fourth century B.C.), and their disciples has been influential, although it is difficult to understand why, given the tendentious arguments advanced in its support. This same criticism applies to the attempt made by Zhu Bokun to prove that the four pian were the work of Shen Dao's later followers. A similar thesis to that of Zhu has also been advanced by Qiu Xigui. The objections raised by Feng Youlan and Machida Saburō to the spuriousness of the Liu-Guo hypothesis are wholly apposite. Furthermore, Machida's thesis that the four pian are not the product of some individual or group of thinkers associated with the Jixia Academy, but rather are the writings of a late Warring States (475-221 BC) or early Han (206 BC-220 AD) school of Daoist thought, is, I

These articles are a significant improvement on Jin Shoushen, Jixia pai zhi yanjiu, which for decades served as the standard study on the Academy.

3 See Liu Jie, "Guan Zi zhong suo jian zhi Song Xing yi pai xueshuo", (originally published 1939-1941 in Shuowen yueman), Gu shi kao cun, 238-258; Guo Moruo, "Song Xing Yin Wen yizhu kao", (dated 1944), in Qingtong shidai, included in Guo Moruo quanjji, 1:547-572. N.B. Guo also includes "Qu yan" in this group.

4 See his article, "Guan Zi sipian kao", Zhongguo zhexue shi lunwenji, 1:107-127.

5 "Mawangdui Lao zi jia yi ben juan qianhou yi shu xu "dao fa jia" - jian lun Xin shu shang, Bai xin wei Shen Dao Tian Pian xuepai zuopin", Zhongguo zhexue, 2 (1980), 68-84.

6 See Machida Saburō, "Kan Shi shi hen ni tsuite", (originally published 1961), in his Shin Kan shishō no kenkyū, 358-361; Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi xinbian, 1:180-181. More recently, see also Kanaya Osamu, Kan Shi no kenkyū, 263-264.
believe, the most tenable of the various theories on the
dating and authorship of the pian. Rickett also gives
support for this view by maintaining that the three pian
of Guan Zi under discussion were likely to have been
among those that:

originated in the old state of Ch’u and
entered the Kuan-tzu through a group of
scholars centered around the court of Liu
An (180-122), the second king of Huai-an,
who is best known as the reputed author of
the Huai-nan-tzu.8

A decisive strength of Machida’s theory is the plausible
account he gives of Confucian and Legalist concepts being
hierarchically brought together and subsumed under a
Daoist mantle.9 This type of syncretism is particularly
characteristic of late third century/early second century
philosophical writing.

It may be objected that the division into Text and
Commentary in the "Xin shu shang" pian and the frequent

7 See also his article, "Futatabi Kan Shi shi hen ni
tsuite", in Tōhoku daigaku kyōyōbu kiyō (jimbunka hen) 4
(1966), 170-193. A number of Western scholars are of the
view that Nei Ye is the oldest of the four pian, is a
product of the Jixia Academy, and pre-dates Mencius. See
for example, Rickett, Kuan Tzu: A Repository of Early
Chinese Thought, 12-13; Jeffrey Riegel, "Reflections on
an Unmoved Mind: An Analysis of Mencius 2A2", Journal of
the American Academy of Religion Thematic Issue, 47. No.
Three S (September, 1979), 453, n. 23; Donald Harper,
"The Sexual Arts of Ancient China as Described in a
Manuscript of the Second Century B.C.", Harvard Journal
of Asiatic Studies, 47.2 (December, 1987), 560-563, n.
49; A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 100. In none of
these writings, however, is much evidence advanced to
support this view. In any case, even if Nei Ye should be
from an earlier period, this has little bearing on my
arguments because discussion of ming does not come into
Nei Ye.

8 See his article, "Kuan-tzu and the Newly Discovered
Texts on Bamboo and Silk", in Le Blanc and Blader,
Chinese Ideas About Nature and Society, Studies in Honour
of Derk Bodde, 247.

9 "Kan Shi shi hen ni tsuite", 357-384, passim, and
"Futatabi Kan Shi shi hen ni tsuite", 171-174.
use of the formula, "therefore it is said", in quoting passages in the "Xin shu xia" and "Bai xin" pian, are indicative of the inclusion of older materials into each of those pian. Nevertheless, by showing that portions of the Text itself evidence a syncretism characteristic of late Warring States and early Han Daoism, Machida develops a strong case for his claim that these pian were written relatively late.¹⁰

¹⁰ See "Kan Shi shi hen ni tsuite", 362-373.
Appendix F

THE MEANING OF MING JIAO

The stock renderings of ming jiao are 'Teaching/Doctrine of Names' and Moral Teaching'. Yet in their literal simplicity these stock renderings tend to obfuscate rather than clarify understanding of the term. It is my contention that only by focussing on meanings implicit in both of the above renderings of ming jiao, rather than either one or the other, are we able to formulate a more comprehensive understanding of the term's import in the Eastern Han.

While the earliest known usage of the term ming jiao pre-dates the Han, the next known usage is in Xi Kang's Shi si lun essay: "Since arrogance and self-praise do not exist in his heart, the Superior Person can transcend ming jiao and abandon himself to nature." From this point on, during the Six Dynasties, the term is frequently encountered as a broad reference to Confucianism and its moral precepts, in contrast to Daoist inspired 'naturalism' (zi ran). More specifically, however, an important clue as to how the term was understood with reference to the Eastern Han

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1 See Guan Zi, 3:78-6. The meaning of the term ming jiao in this passage, however, is a matter of conjecture and may have no bearing on its later meaning.
2 See Quan shang gu San Dai Qin Han San Guo Liu Chao wen, 50.1a.
3 See, for example, Tang Yongtong, Wei Jin xuanxue lun gao, 127-129; Tang Yongtong and Ren Jiyu, Wei Jin xuanxue zhong de shehui zhengzhi sixiang lüelun, 26-43; Mather, "The Controversy Over Conformity and Naturalness During the Six Dynasties", 160, and passim.
period may be gleaned from the following Shi shuo xin yu passage: 4

Li Yuanli's 李元理 (name Ying 杨) (110-169) manner and style were outstanding and proper and he proudly maintained a haughty dignity. He wished to take responsibility for ming jiao assessments for the whole realm. All those younger gentlemen 5 who ascended his hall 6 regarded this as having 'climbed through the Dragon Gate 龍門:’

Li Xian's 李賢 (653-684) commentary to this same passage in Hou Han shu quotes San Qin ji: 7

Another name for Hejin 河津 is Dragon Gate. The precipice of water is so steep at this place that it is impassible. Fishes and turtles are unable to ascend and so giant fish from the rivers and seas crowd together in their thousands at the bottom of Dragon Gate, unable to ascend it. If they do ascend they become dragons. 8

The fish in this passage may be understood as a metaphor for candidates aspiring to office.

Li Ying, who had served in several senior positions (including intendant of Henan, colonel director of retainers, privy treasurer), was a central figure in the anti-eunuch league or the "pure faction" (qing liu 清流) 9 and a key participant in the events which

4 In the corresponding Hou Han shu, 67.2195, passage we do not find the term ming jiao. It is, however, my implicit assumption that even if the term ming jiao did not appear in the original second century sources upon which Fan Ye 范曄 (398-445) and Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 (403-444) base their respective accounts, Liu Yiqing’s employment conveys a meaning the antecedents of which may be traced to the Eastern Han.
5 Allusion to Analects 11.1.
6 Allusion to Analects 11.14.
7 Shi shuo xin yu, 1:4; Mather, A New Account of Tales of The World, 5, mod., following Yoshikawa Tadao, Gi Shin seidan shu, 310.
8 Hou Han shu, 67.2195.
9 On this subject, see for example Chi-yun Chen, Hsün Yüeh: The Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian, 19-30; Rafe de Crespigny, "Political Protest
sparked the first major proscription in 166. Of more immediate interest, however, is his role as assessor and promoter of candidates for officialdom, an activity that lends a particular meaning to the words "to take responsibility for the ming jiao assessments for the whole realm", implying as it does a prominent role in assessing the suitability of candidates for office. The following passage is recorded in Tai ping yu lan:

Once Li Ying's assessment had been uttered, no one was able to oppose it. If someone objected to his assessment, then Li Ying's supporters would criticise that person. If Li Ying shared a carriage with someone, then that person's name would become known throughout the realm.

In fact, it was his favourable judgment of Guo Tai (128-169) - the man who was to become the most famous of the Eastern Han character assessors and a leading figure in the 'pure faction' - that secured Guo's reputation. Li's own reputation was such that the students at the Imperial Academy lauded him with the
epithet "model for the empire" and he headed the list of proscribed faction notables known as "the eight heroes."

The high regard for reputation during the Eastern Han underpins the interpretation of ming jiao as "an ethos based on fostering reputation/name" an interpretation to which, in part, I also subscribe. Yet what factors would have led to the propagation of an ethos based on reputation? In commenting on the fashion to make a reputation on the strength of one's moral integrity, ming jie, Zhao Yi remarks:

By the Eastern Han it was pursued even more actively. This was a consequence of the fact that at that time recommendations and summonses were invariably based on a candidate's reputation. Hence those who aspired to office made an all out effort to secure a reputation in any manner possible. As this proved to be a popular solution to overcoming contemporary problems, it thus became an established practice.

Similarly, in commenting on ming jiao in the Eastern Han, Gu Yanwu writes that "when the people cannot be made to regard that which is morally right (yi) as advantageous, yet can still be made to regard reputation

14 Hou Han shu, 67.2186.
15 See Hou Han shu, 67.2187. The seven other "heroes" were Xun Yi (biography Hou Han shu 62.2050), Du Mi (biography Hou Han shu, 67.2197-2198), Wang Chang (biography Hou Han shu, 57.1823-1826), Liu You (biography Hou Han shu, 67.2199-2200), Wei Lang (biography Hou Han shu, 67.2200-2201), Zhao Dian (biography Hou Han shu, 27.948-49), and Zhu Yu (no biography although we know that he came from Pei Kingdom and held the office of colonel director of retainers, see Hou Han shu, 67.2188, 2190).
16 For example, Tang Changru, Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao shi luncong, 312; Chen Yinke, "Tao Yuanming zhi sixiang yu qingtan zhi quanxi", in Chen Yinke xiansheng lunwenji, 311.
17 Nian er shi zha ji, 1:89.
(ming \(^7\)) as advantageous, then although this is not the approach taken by a true king, it will nevertheless redress the build-up of decadent ways." He even concludes that in the Han "reputation was used as a means to effect social and political order \(\langle \langle \rangle \rangle\), accordingly there was a proliferation of talented men."\(^{18}\) On these accounts ming jiao may thus be seen to refer to the practice of cultivating a reputation, based on an individual's alleged moral integrity, so as to secure official placement.

Yet how could ming form the basis of a pervasive moral ethos, to be employed as a "means of effecting social and political order?" The answer to this question, I believe, is related to the notion of ren lun \(\langle \langle \rangle \rangle\), the moral and social bonds linking individuals and defining their roles in a number of key relationships, such as the five listed by Mencius: "Love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends."\(^{19}\). In the Han dynasty we find similar pairs of relationships institutionalized as the Three Cardinal Bonds (san gan \(\langle \langle \rangle \rangle\)) and the Six Secondary Bonds (liu ji \(\langle \langle \rangle \rangle\)).\(^{20}\)

\(^{18}\) Ri zhi lu, 13.12b, 13.14a.
\(^{19}\) Mencius, 3A.4; Lau, Mencius, 102.
\(^{20}\) The three Cardinal Bonds refer to the relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife. See Chun qiu fan lu, 12.8b-10a; Bo hu tong, 7.15a; Tjan Tjoe Som, Po Hu T'ung, 2:559; Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2:42-43. For a study of the Three Cardinal Bonds in the Han dynasty, see Tanaka Masami, "Byakko tsū no san kō setsu", in his Ryō Kan shisō no kenkyū, 121-137. The Six Secondary Bonds (a category of Five Secondary Bonds is referred to in Chun qiu fan lu, 10.14b, but is not elucidated) are the relation between
Yuan Hong (328-376), the compiler of *Hou Han ji*, singles out the first two of the Three Cardinal Bonds and comments that "Ruler and subject, and father and son are the basis of ming jiao." The reason he focused on these two bonds is, as he makes apparent in the paragraphs following, because they were regarded as fundamental to the whole fabric of social morality.

There is, however, no obvious connection between the definition of ming jiao as an ethos espousing the cultivation of reputation based on moral integrity which in turn could be used to secure official placement, and Yuan Hong's account. What then, if anything, is the connection between these cardinal bonds and the practice of cultivating a reputation based on alleged moral integrity? I propose that there is such a connection and that it is centred on the concept of xiao - filial piety, obedience, and submission. This in turn is also the key to answering the question posed above (viz. "how could ming form the basis of a pervasive moral ethos to be employed as a 'means of effecting social and political

paternal uncles, elder and younger brothers, relatives of the same surname, maternal uncles, teachers and elders, and friends. See Bo hu t'ung, 7.15a; Tjan Tjoe Som, Po hu t'ung, 2:559; Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 244.

21 *Hou Han ji*, 26.8b.
22 *Hou Han ji*, 26.9a.
23 As discussed in Chapter 2, this type of thinking can be traced back to Confucius' correction of names programme, where Confucius took it upon himself to prescribe the significance that was to be invested in certain names. In particular, he selected a small group of key role types, those of ruler and vassal, father and son. He selected these four role types in the belief that if they could be successfully established on the basis of the particular meanings he prescribed for them, then all other pertinent social change would be realised as a necessary corollary.
order’?") because, in the Han, particularly the Eastern Han, xiao had come to be regarded as the "keystone of the whole moral edifice", and its visible practice the virtual sine qua non of a successful reputation.

A striking characteristic of xiao in the Han dynasty is that it no longer simply referred to dutiful respect for parents and ancestors, but had grown in meaning to incorporate respect for and obedience to all manner of superiors, ranging from parents and teachers to officials and the emperor.

In the Analects, Confucius defined xiao as follows:

When your parents are alive, comply with the rites in serving them; when they die, comply with the rites in burying them; comply with the rites in sacrificing to them.

Mencius similarly remarked:

The greatest act a filial son can do is honour his parents.

What is the most important duty? One’s duty towards one’s parents.

By the Han dynasty, however, it is apparent that the concept of xiao had become much more generalized, as is attested to, for example, by the following passage from the "Xiao yang" pian of Fan tie lun:

To be dishonest in speech, untrustworthy in keeping promises, timid in the face of danger and disloyal in serving one’s ruler are the greatest examples of not being xiao.

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24 Donald Holzman, Poetry and Politics: The Life and Works of Juan Chi A.D. 210-263, 76.
25 Analects 2.5; Lau, The Analects, 63. See also Analects 2.6, 2.7, 2.8.
26 Mencius 5A.4; Lau, Mencius, 142 slightly mod.
27 Mencius 4A.19; Lau, Mencius, 125.
28 5.13a-13b.
A less generalized, but no less telling, example of this expanded concept of xiao is provided by Wei Biao, a grand herald under Emperor Zhang (r. 75-88). The passage he cites, part of a memorial submitted to the emperor, is attributed to Confucius and quoted from one of the Xiao jing apocrypha: 29

Confucius said, 'If one is filially pious in serving one's parents, then this loyalty (zhong 諸) can be transferred to the service of one's ruler. Accordingly, in looking for a loyal subordinate, one must look in the house of a filially pious son.' 30

This passage reflects the use of xiao as applying not only to the filial bond between child and parent but also to the loyal service a subject renders his ruler, and, by implication, a variety of other relations as well. As Donald Holzman writes in commenting on filial piety in the Han, it was "the respect one felt for one's progenitors being translated on different levels to the respect of a wife for her husband, of a younger brother for an elder, a subordinate for a superior, a subject for

29 It is interesting to note that Wei Biao was successfully nominated as a xiao lian candidate after having undergone several years of medical treatment as a result of the physical emaciation incurred during the three years of mourning he observed on the death of his parents. See Hou Han shu, 26.917. As Yasui Kozan and Nakamura Shōhachi observe in their introduction to volume five of their revised six volume Isho shusei, 9, the Xiao jing apocrypha took pride of place among the apocrypha generally, being ranked together with the Spring and Autumn Annals apocrypha. This also testifies to the importance of the concept of xiao in the Eastern Han particularly.

30 Hou Han shu, 26.918. A similar sentiment is expressed by Fu Xie 附 9 , Hou Han shu, 58.1874.
his sovereign, and of the sovereign, 'son of heaven', for his metaphysical father'.

While it is probable that loyalty to one's ruler was already latent in the early concept of xiao, it is in late Warring States, Qin and early Han thought that the concept of xiao noticeably assumes a broader spectrum of meaning. Thus, rather than being limited to the respect and obedience a son or daughter shows his or her parents, xiao was enhanced to become a major virtue applicable to a variety of relationships and duties. The following passage from the "Xiao xing" pian of Lü shi chun qiu expresses this clearly:

In applying oneself to fundamentals, none is more important than xiao. If the ruler is xiao, then his name will be glorified, those below will heed him and all in the realm will be happy. If a subordinate is xiao, then he will serve his ruler with loyalty, be honest in office and not flinch at sacrificing himself in the course of his duties. If shí and ordinary people are xiao, they will ardently cultivate the land, staunchly apply themselves in battle and not suffer defeat. Xiao was the fundamental duty to which the three emperors and five kings applied themselves and is the bond uniting the myriad affairs.

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31 Poetry and Politics: The Life and Works of Juan Chi, 74.
32 cf. Analects 1.2; Lau, The Analects, 59, slightly mod.:

You Zi said, "It is rare for a man whose character is such that he is dutiful as a son (xiao) and obedient as a young man (ti) to have the inclination to transgress against his superiors."

33 On this development, see Itano Chōhachi, "Kō kyō no seiritsu", in Shigaku zasshi, 64.3 (1955), 1-27; 64.4 (1955), 1-15.
34 14.1a-1b.
Reminiscent of the Yan tie lun passage translated above, Zeng Zi is quoted in this same pian and also in Li ji as saying:

If in one's private life one is not dignified, this is not xiao; if one does not serve one's ruler with loyalty, this is not xiao; if one serves in office without due respect for that office, this is not xiao; if one is untrustworthy in dealing with one's friends, this is not xiao; if one is a coward in battle, this is not xiao.

One of the texts most influential in the propagation of this expanded concept of xiao was of course Xiao jing, which quotes Confucius as proclaiming that "xiao is the root of Potency and that from where the moral teachings (jiao) are born." In this passage, the term jiao recalls Yuan Hong's comments on ming jiao, the basis of which he maintained was the bond between father and son, and ruler and subordinate. That bond, of course, was xiao. In light of this, the Xiao jing passage could be understood to mean that it is xiao, "the root of Potency", that constitutes the fundamental moral category (ming) of the 'moral teaching (jiao)'. Thus understood, ming jiao may also be seen to be 'the moral teaching based on xiao.'

35 48.5a.
36 14.1b-2a.
37 There is little consensus as to when this text was written. There are, however, some strong arguments for believing that it reached its present form in the early Western Han. For a detailed exposition of this view, see Watanabe Shinichirō, "Kō kyō seisaku to sono haikei", Shirin, 69.1 (1986), 53-85.
38 1.2b.
39 This interpretation is supported by a related passage at Li ji, 48.5a: "The moral teaching that forms the basis of all moral behaviour" is called xiao." ("Following Kong Yingda's sub-commentary, 48.6b, in understanding zhong as referring to zhong xing, 'all moral behaviour'.)
Thus two possible senses of the term ming jiao have been distinguished. One is 'the ethos that fosters the cultivation of a virtuous reputation'; the other is 'the moral teaching that champions the cultivation of a particular virtue - xiao'. The two senses are closely related, because it was being seen to practise this particular virtue that provided the means of acquiring a reputation.
Appendix G

AN OUTLINE OF THE OLD TEXT SCHOOL-NEW TEXT SCHOOL RIVALRY IN THE HAN DYNASTY

The history of the OTS and the NTS rivalry is, to a significant extent, one of competition for official recognition and hence orthodoxy. The twin issues of office and orthodoxy were already manifest in the first year of the reign of Emperor Wu (r. 141-87) and therefore considerably pre-date any rivalry between the two schools, since the dichotomy did not yet then exist. In Dong Zhongshu’s celebrated memorial of circa 140, he recommends that "all teachings not encompassed within the categories of the Six Arts (that is, the Six Classics) and the methods of Confucius should be terminated and shall not be allowed to be promoted side by side"¹ with the Six Classics.

It was, however, not only Dong Zhongshu who sought to promote Confucianism as the sole state orthodoxy. According to Shi ji,² other Confucians who held senior posts in the first year of Emperor Wu’s reign, such as

¹ Han shu, 56.2523. Qian Mu, Liang Han jingxue jin gu wen pingyi, 175, argues that the memorial submitted in November, 140 B.C., in Han shu, 6.156 (for translation see, Dubs, History of the Former Han Dynasty, 2:28), which is attributed to the chancellor Wei Wan, was incorrectly attributed, and that it is really based on the above memorial of Dong Zhongshu. Gu Jiegang, Han dai xueshu shi lüe, 70-71, also dates Dong’s memorial at 140. For a discussion of the problems in dating Dong’s three memorials, see Tain Tzey-yueh, Tung Chung-shu’s System of Thought, its Sources and Influence on Han Scholars, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974, 46-54.
² 107.2843, and 121.3118.
the imperial counsellor, Zhao Wan 趙晧 and the director of palace gentlemen, Wang Cang 王藏, had taken a prominent position in supporting Confucianism and criticising Yellow Emperor Daoism which still enjoyed the patronage of the powerful Empress Dowager Dou 妲。3 In their efforts to have a Ming Tang 明堂 constructed,4 Zhao and Wang suggested to Emperor Wu that it should be "forbidden to memorialize matters of government to the Empress Dowager Dou".5 Although this action resulted in Zhao and Wang's being arrested and finally committing suicide in prison, official patronage of Confucianism was imminent.

As Emperor Wu grew older and took the conduct of affairs more and more into his own hands, the following two events bear witness to the victory of Confucianism over the other schools of philosophy. First, in 136, chairs were established for the Classics and academicians were appointed to these chairs.6 Second, in 135, the

3 She was consort of Emperor Wen 恭 (r.180-157) and mother of Emperor Jing 景 (r. 157-141).
4 For a description of the actual Ming Tang that was later built for Emperor Wu, see Han shu, 25B.1243; Loewe, Chinese Ideas of Life and Death, 135-136.
5 Han shu, 6.157, and 52.2379. Huang Qingxuan, Shi ji Han shu ru lin liezhuan shuzheng, 25, n. 2, even raises the possibility that the Han shu attribution of the 140 memorial to Wei Wan is actually a mistake for Zhao Wan.
6 Han shu, 6.159. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the exact number of classics for which chairs were established. Han shu, 6.159, gives five, rather than six (the OTS view is that the Music Classic was omitted because it disappeared in the Qin 'burning of the books', while the NTS view is that originally it was no more than a collection of musical scores used to accompany Poetry; see Jiang Boqian, Jingxue zuanyao, 6-7, 188), as does Han shu, 88.3620-3621, which then proceeds to list them as Documents, Rites, Changes, and Spring and Autumn Annals with the Gongyang commentary. According to Wang Yinglin, Kun xue ji wen, 8.33b, however, the fact that only four classics are listed is because the chair for Poetry had already been established in the reigns of Emperors Wen and Jing. Similarly, Qian Mu, Liang Han
Empress Dowager died and Tian Fen was made chancellor whereupon he "dismissed the doctrines of the Yellow Emperor Daoists, xing ming theoreticians and other philosophical schools, and invited several hundred Confucian literati to take up official service".  

Confucianism thus secured a position where it alone was respected as the state orthodoxy. Yet it was not the monopoly afforded Confucianism per se that was most significant; the real victor was classical scholarship, the key to interpreting tradition. One telling example of this distinction is evident in Liu Xin's Qi lüe, where,

jingxue, 178, and Zhou Yutong, "Boshi zhidu he Qin Han zhengzhi", in Zhou Yutong jingxue shi lunshu xuanji, 733, both observe (as already had Quan Zuwang (1705-1755) in his annotation to Kun xue ji wen, 8.32b) that in Emperor Jing's reign, Humu Sheng and Dong Zhongshu had already been appointed as academicians for the Spring and Autumn Annals. Wang Guowei, Guan tang ji lin, 4.7b, observes that already in the reigns of Wen and Jing, chairs for Poetry, Documents and Spring and Autumn Annals had been established. Nevertheless, the important point to be made is that the Five Classics were established as canons to the exclusion of all other texts.  

7 Shi ji, 121.3118.  
8 It should, of course, be borne in mind that Confucianism had already incorporated many of the teachings of the other schools. And as Chi-yun Chen, "Confucian, Legalist and Taoist thought in Later Han", The Cambridge History of China, Volume 1, 770, remarks:

Many eminent Confucians in Han times who had been adherents of other schools of thought were converted through the official education system. After a nominal conversion, such men tended to think and act in accordance with principles found in the philosophic systems to which they had originally given allegiance, expressing these in Confucian terms.

On this point, see also Benjamin E. Wallacker, "Han Confucianism and Confucius in the Han", in David T. Roy and Tsuen-hsuin Tsien, Ancient China: Studies in Early Civilization, 215-228.  
9 This catalogue was based on his and his father's bibliographic resume, Bie lu, and is substantially
while the Confucian school does head the list of schools in the Philosophers division, nevertheless, in the arrangement of the Yi wen zhi, pride of place is given to the Six Classics which comprise the first division. Furthermore, the fact that the sub-sections for Analects and Xiao jing are appended to this division (Mencius and Xun Zi are included in the Philosophers division) suggests that, like the Philology sub-division also appended to this first division, these specifically Confucian texts took second place to the Classics. Borrowing Wang Guowei's analogy, we may even regard the Classics as comprising a tertiary curriculum, the Analects and Xiao jing a secondary curriculum, and the philology sub-division, a primary curriculum. Thus the triumph belonged not so much to Confucianism in the narrow sense of the term but rather to classical studies, which, in consequence of developments attendant upon the canonization of the Classics (such as the role that these texts were to play in the training of officials), evolved into a discipline that absorbed and reshaped Confucianism.

The Classics having been canonized, it was natural that contending schools of interpretation should develop. From Emperor Wu's reign on, the most important of the

preserved in Han shu, "Yi wen zhi". See Gu Shi, Han shu Yi wen zhi jiangshu, 11-12.
10 Wang Guowei, Guan tang ji lin, 4.7a. I do not, however, accept his thesis that the arrangement in "Yi wen zhi" represents the upgrading of the latter two to tertiary status.
11 See also Qian Mu, Liang Han jingxue, 180-182.
12 This development is also reflected in the term ruicon, which was increasingly used to refer to literati or scholars generally.
Classics politically was the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, of which only the *Gongyang* commentary was recognized as an official scripture. The first major challenge to this monopoly of orthodoxy culminated in the so-called "Stone Canal" discussions held in 51 B.C., which resulted in the establishment of the post of academician for the *Guliang* commentary to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, thus breaking the monopoly of the *Gongyang* school.13 Another important consequence of the discussion was that the number of academicians was increased to twelve,14 which signified imperial support for an expanded corpus of scholastic expertise. This trend continued, and in the reign of Emperor Ping (1 B.C.-5 A.D.) the number of academicians was increased to thirty and new chairs were established, not only for *Music* but also for the Old Text versions of *Documents, Rites*, the Mao recension and commentary to *Poetry*, and the *Zuo* commentary to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. The significance of the establishment of chairs for these Old Text versions of commentaries to the Classics is that for the first time the *OTS* was given official recognition alongside the *NTS*.

The first true protagonist of the *OTS* was Liu Xin, whose arguments15 led to the establishment of chairs for the above-mentioned four *OTS* texts, thus properly marking the beginning of the rivalry between the *OTS* and the *NTS*.

Up to that time the *OTS* texts had been transmitted, not as officially recognized texts, but as 'popular'

texts or texts preserved (unknowingly?) in the imperial library. Their value, according to Liu Xin, was twofold. First, as texts they were less corrupt than the New Text versions and second, because they were not 'official texts', they were less subject to the interpretative distortions imposed upon the New Text versions. Ban Gu (32-92) remarks:

Hitherto the literati have disregarded lacunae, making do with vulgar expressions to bridge the gaps. They have cut-up passages and analyzed characters, appending prolix explanations and disjointed commentaries. Scholars have grown old and tired without being able to master even one Classic. They trust oral transmission and reject written records; they give recognition to recent events yet denigrate the ancients. Thus when the nation is confronted with really important matters, such as the construction of the "Hall of the Circular Mote" or the ceremonial appropriate to the Feng and Shang sacrifices, or Tours of Inspection, there is ignorance as no one knows the origin of these ceremonies and institutions. Yet still they want to preserve their defective texts, all the while fearing that their selfish interests will be exposed.

The OTS continued to enjoy official patronage under Wang Mang (r. 8-23) who even ordered the establishment of a chair for Zhou li, a text that he used to legitimize his reign. This situation, however, was not to

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17 See Burton Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China, 2:13-69; Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 184-186; Loewe, Chinese Ideas of Life and Death, 130-140.
18 See Tjan, Po hu t'ung, 2:495-503.
19 Han shu, 36.1970.
continue. When Guangwu (r. 25-57) came to power, all the fourteen chairs established were for NTS academicians.\textsuperscript{21}

OTS partisans were quick to react. In 28 Han Xin submitted a memorial seeking the recognition of the Zuo commentary to *Spring and Autumn Annals* and the Fei Zhi recension of *Changes*. This move culminated in the convening of a large number of scholars to debate the proposal, the result of which was that Li Feng was appointed as academician for the Zuo commentary in the Imperial Academy. This was, however, the first and last time in the Eastern Han that an OTS text was officially recognized by the appointment of an academician.\textsuperscript{22} The arguments upon which the debate focussed were, according to *Han shu*, principally concerned with rather general questions of textual transmission. That this debate was centred almost entirely on the commentaries to *Spring and Autumn Annals*, and not *Changes*, also highlights the central importance of the former text and its commentaries in the controversy between the two schools.

The next major official forum for debate between the two schools was the famous 'discussion in the White Tiger Pavilion' of 79 A.D. Issues that had prompted Emperor Zhang (r. 75-88) to convene the discussion had already been mooted by Emperor Guangwu in 56 A.D., in a

\textsuperscript{21} See Han guan yi, cited in the commentary to Xu Fang's biography, *Hou Han shu*, 40.1502, n. 4. See also Wang Guowei, *Guan tang ji lin*, 4.10b.
\textsuperscript{22} *Hou Han shu*, 36.1228-1233; Tjan, *Po hu t'ung*, 1:150-151.
decree which stated that "the chapter and verse commentaries to the Five Classics are prolix and numerous. Discussions should be held with an aim to reduce and abridge them." 23 The following year (in the first year of the reign of Emperor Ming (r. 57-75)), Fan Shu, Colonel of the Changshui cavalry, memorialized that "the various literati should jointly participate in revising the interpretations of the Classics." 24 Both these precedents are cited in the edict issued by Emperor Zhang in 79 A.D. Although not mentioned in this edict, it seems that Emperor Zhang's decision to hold the discussion was really made in response to a proposal initiated by the NTS Spring and Autumn Annals scholar, Yang Zhong, on the grounds that "chapter and verse scholars are destroying the fundamental structure of classical scholarship". 25 We may observe that the main practitioners of zhang ju commentaries were NTS scholars, but, rather than seeing it as an irony that this criticism should come from Yang, we may better regard it as a measure of just how seriously the zhang ju problem threatened to undermine the authority of the NTS.

Thus, that the discussions at the White Tiger Pavilion in 79 A.D. were convened at all, and prominent OTS scholars invited to participate and take a leading role, bears testimony that these discussions were a watershed in the ascendancy of the OTS, even though they did not lead to official recognition of the OTS texts. 26

23 Hou Han shu, 3.138.
24 Hou Han shu, 3.138.
25 Hou Han shu, 48.1599
26 See Tjan, Po hu tung, 1:163.
The discussions, however, did not rectify the problem of the NTS commentaries, as is evident not only from a putative record of these discussions, Bo hu tong, but also from the fact that in 83 A.D., a mere four years after the discussions, Emperor Zhang again issued an edict expressing his concern at the proliferation of the zhang ju commentaries. The principal import of this edict was the decree that talented students be selected to study both the Zuo and Guliang commentaries to Spring and Autumn Annals, the Old Text version of Documents, and the Mao recension of and commentary to Poetry.

Subsequent developments include the participation in 110 of prominent OTS scholars such as Xu Shen and Ma Rong (to whom the latter was given charge, as editor-in-chief) in the collation of the Five Classics and other texts in the Dong Guan scriptorium; the selection in 123, from the ranks of gentlemen of the three corps and minor officials, those candidates (one per text) who were conversant with the Old Text version of Documents, the Mao recension of Poetry, and the Guliang commentary; the selection in 180 of candidates (one per text), by the Three Excellencies and Nine Ministers, of those who were conversant with the Old Text version of Documents, the Mao recension of Poetry, and the Zuo and Guliang commentaries, and the commissioning of them to the rank of gentleman consultant; and the

27 On the authenticity of this work, see the discussion in Tjan, Po hu tung, 1:166, and vol. 1, passim.
28 Hou Han shu, 3.145, 36.1239.
29 Hou Han shu, 60A.1954, 5.215, and 10A.424.
30 Hou Han shu, 5.237.
31 Hou Han shu, 8.344.
summoning in 188 of a number of independent and OTS scholars, including Zheng Xuan, to the post of academician, but they all declined. This last example can be regarded as representing the penultimate step in bestowing official recognition on the OTS and the eventual displacement of the NTS from its coveted position of orthodoxy.

32 Hou Han ji jiaozhu, 710; Liu Rulin, Han Jin xueshu biannian, 2:740-741.
Appendix H

EXAMPLES OF Xu Gan' S CLASSICAL ECLECTICISM

Part A

Examples of passages that Xu Gan quotes from Poetry that have been identified as having been based on the text of the Lu recension:

1. (Mao) No. 208, Xiao ming 小明 in Zhong lun, "The Precepts and Models of Correct Behaviour" 仲裁, A.6a. For this identification, see Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 2:744-745. (N.B. on the evidence presented by Wang, the passage could also be taken from the Qi recension.)


3. No. 130, Zhong nan 中南; "Titles and Emoluments" 尊榮, A.32a. See Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 1:452.

Obviously on many occasions no such identification is possible because two or more recensions will include passages where no textual variance occurs. In such cases it is of course impossible to ascertain if Xu has quoted, for argument's sake, the Mao recension or the Lu recension.
Part B

Three examples of Xu Gan's interpretation of poems from Poetry, where his interpretation matches that of the Lu school:

1. One would be able to describe events that occurred a thousand years ago as if one was living at the same time, and discourse on such things as different types of customs as though one lived in the same house [as the practitioners of such customs]. One would be able to fathom the dark and the bright as they inherently are as if one could see into their essential natures, and trace the advance of order and chaos as if their import had already become evident. Poetry therefore says:

"By learning one will become more and more enlightened."^4

This is what is meant.\(^5\)

2. Hence the Small Person values a bright mirror and the Superior Person values sincere words. Unless the person being addressed is a friend of the highest calibre, then he will fail to heed sincere words. Thus the Superior Person must choose friends of the highest calibre. Poetry says:

\(^1\) Other examples are No. 208, Xiao ming, in "The Precepts and Models of Correct Behaviour", A.6b, see Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 2:744-745; No. 196, Xiao yuan 个字, in "Valuing the Verifiable", A.17b, see Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 2:695; No. 130, Zhong nan, in "Titles and Emoluments", A.32a, see Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 1:452.

\(^2\) The four characters 乖＠ are from the Xi ci Commentary to Changes, 7.9a. I follow Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, 5:1890-1891 (juan 74), in understanding you 乖 and ming 明 as being analogous to 明 and 阳．

\(^3\) Following all other editions of Zhong lun (except Liang jing yi bian) in emending 他 to 小 个.

\(^4\) No. 288.

"They hew the trees, (it sounds) teng-teng
And the birds cry out, eng-eng.
From out of the dark valley
They move to the lofty trees."6

This says that it is the obligation of friends to be forthright so as to enable one to ascend to the way of goodness.7

3.

The Superior Person does not worry that the Potency of the Way has not been established but rather that he has not been born in the right times. Poetry says:

"I yoke my four stallions,
My four stallions stretch their necks;
I look to the four quarters
Frustrated that there is nowhere I can drive to."8

I am hurt because I have not met the Way in my times.9

(N.B. It must be noted that sometimes the criteria that Wang uses, to establish what the Lu interpretation was, seem to be circular, e.g. simply because it was the interpretation given by Xu Gan, therefore it is the Lu interpretation.)

Part C

Examples of Xu’s use of recensions of the Han, Qi (both NTS versions) and Mao schools (OTS version).

As previously noted, when Xu quotes a passage from some recension that is the same as the Mao recension, it is impossible to determine if it is Mao or otherwise. I have

7 A.18a. See Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 2:570.
8 No. 191, Karlgren, Odes, mod.
9 A.34a. See Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 2:663-664.
not included those examples. In the examples below the following recensions have been identified (although sometimes the conclusions I draw on the basis of Wang's evidence differ to those drawn by Wang):

1. Han


2. Mao and Lu


3. Mao, Han, and Qi or Lu


**Part D**

Examples of Xu's interpretations of passages from Poetry that are based on the interpretations of the Qi and Mao schools.

1. Interpretation based on the Qi school:

   Of those who travel to make acquaintances, after their departure some die in other countries, while others grow old without returning home, leaving their parents harbouring thoughts of solitude and their wives with the grief [expressed in the poem] "Eastern Mountains" 引頸北望.  

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10 B.11b. "Eastern Mountains" is Poetry, Mao 156. On the basis of the sources cited by Wang Xianqian, Shi san jia yi ji shu, 1:531, Xu's interpretation is based on the Qi Preface.
2. Interpretations based on the Mao school:

i.

When the former kings were to invest the feudal lords, presenting them with their titles and emoluments, this was necessarily conducted in the ancestral temple where bell and stone music and a banquet were provided. Ancestral intendants\(^\text{11}\) assisted while the royal secretary\(^\text{12}\) of the inner palace announced the names of the titles and emoluments to be bestowed. The \([Zhou \, \text{Song}]\) says:

"King Wen laboured earnestly; We should receive the fruit of his labours, And diffuse his virtue, ever cherishing the thought of him. Henceforth we will only seek the settlement of the kingdom. This is the mandate of Zhou, Oh! Let us ever cherish the thought of him."\(^\text{13}\)

In view of this, it is clear that titles and emoluments were matters to which the former kings attached importance; they were not matters to be trifled with.\(^\text{14}\)

ii.

Although Duke Huan \(^\text{15}\) of Lu was both of handsome appearance and very adept in the Arts, he lacked ability and great wisdom. He was incapable of using propriety to guard himself and so rectify his mother’s behaviour. This resulted in her unending debauchery with the marquis of Qi \(^\text{16}\) and her hastening down the road [to meet him]. Therefore Poetry criticised him saying:

"Alas for him so famous! His beautiful eyes so clear! His manner so complete! Shooting all day at the target,

\(^{11}\) See Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, no. 7104.
\(^{14}\) A.312b. Xu’s interpretation is obviously based on the Mao Preface.
\(^{15}\) This would appear to be a mistake for Duke Zhuang.\(^\text{14}\)
And never hitting outside the bull's-eye! Indeed our ruler's nephew."

Part E

Examples of glossing the Changes text with the Commentary:

1. Guan

Emperor Yao of the Tang was sincere, courteous and deferential so the aura of his Potency spread over the four quarters of the realm. Cheng Tang did not dare to be remiss in obeying Heaven's will and so he came to possess the nine regions. King Wen respected Heaven and held it in awe, and so founded the Zhou dynasty. Changes says:

"Contemplation. The ablution has been made but not yet the offering. Full of trust they look up to him with solemnity." This is to say that 'those below look toward him and are transformed'.

18 Following all other editions in emending Yu to Yao.
19 Documents, 2.6b.
20 Line from Poetry, No. 305, Yin wu. The nine regions are also variously referred to as 九 and 九州. Accounts differ as to exactly what were the names of the various regions. See for example Er ya, 7.1a-2b, under 九州.
21 Line from Poetry, No. 303, Xuan niao. Accounts differ as to exactly what were the names of the various regions. See for example Er ya, 7.1a-2b, under 九州.
22 Paraphrase of Documents, 14.3a.
23 Hexagram Text, Changes, 3.8b; Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes, 82 mod. Wilhelm comments:

The sacrificial ritual in China began with an ablution and a libation by which the Deity was invoked, after which the sacrifice was offered. The moment of time between these two ceremonies is most sacred of all, the moment of deepest inner concentration. If piety is sincere and expressive of real faith, the contemplation of it has a transforming effect on those who witness it.

24 A.6a.
The line in single quotation marks is from the Tuan Commentary to this hexagram.25

2. Sheng (jj)

Thus, the Superior Person’s cultivation of Potency begins in his youth and ends in his old age; it starts on the flat plains and becomes whole in the lofty peaks. Changes says:

"Pushing upward has supreme success,
One must see the great man.
Fear not.
Departure towards the South
Brings good fortune."26

This is what is meant by ‘accumulating small things until they become great’.27

The line in single quotation marks is a close paraphrase of the Xiang Commentary to this hexagram.28

3. Pi (jj)

Evil is like a disease. If treated, one’s condition will increasingly improve. If not, then it will worsen daily. Hence Superior People seek one another’s company in order to combat evil, rather than specifically to promote goodness. If evil is not eliminated, then goodness cannot prevail. This is the way that things are. Changes says:

"Bad is the inhumane person.
He does not further the perseverance of the Superior Person.
The good departs, the small approaches."29

This is what is meant by the waxing of the yin (jj) and the waning of the yang (jj).30

25 Changes, 3.9a.
26 Hexagram Text, Changes, 5.9b; Wilhelm, Book of Changes, 178 mod.
27 A.9b.
28 Changes, 5.10a; "The Superior Person uses his prudent Potency to accumulate small things until they become something noble and great."
29 Hexagram Text, Changes, 2.23b. NB the phonetic proximity of bi (jj) and pi (jj) would appear to have led to pi being written as bi by a copyist. The text is from the pi hexagram, Changes, 2.23b.
30 A.13a.
This last sentence is a paraphrase of the Tuan Commentary to this hexagram.31

4. **Heng**

Hence, if the root is deep then the branches and leaves will flourish. Likewise if one assiduously practises [the good teachings], one's name and reputation will travel far. *Changes* says:

"Duration.
Success.
No blame.
Perseverance furthers."32

This says that '[the sage] assiduously follows the Way'.33

The line in single quotation marks is from the Tuan Commentary to this hexagram.34

5. **Gen**

The Superior Person is sure to value his speech.... Hence if the Superior Person does not approve of a man he will not speak to him. If he does speak to a man he will certainly speak to him of matters in which the person is competent.... *Changes* says:

"Keeping his jaw still.
his words have order."36

This is what is meant by not losing the mean of a situation.37

31 *Changes*, 2.23b.
33 A.16a.
34 *Changes*, 4.4b.
35 On the expression *fei qi ren* 非 其人, see Rafe de Crespigny, "Politics and Philosophy Under Emperor Huan", 53.
36 Sixth line of the hexagram, *Changes*, 5.28b; Wilhelm, *Book of Changes*, 203 mod.
37 A.19a.
This last sentence is a paraphrase of the Line Commentary, (Xiao) Xiang, to this line.38

6. Feng

Thus, if one's position is not exalted then the workings of one's Potency will not shine brightly; if one's station is not high, then the transformation effected by one's Potency will be circumscribed. Changes says:

"Abundance. Success without harm.39 The king attains abundance. Do not worry. One should be like the midday sun." 40

This is what is meant by exalted position and high station.41

While not a paraphrase of the Commentary, Xu's comments in the last sentence are obviously based on the Tuan Commentary to this hexagram.42

38 Changes, 5.28b.
39 The Changes text does not have the two characters.
40 Hexagram Text, Changes, 6.1a; Wilhelm, Book of Changes, p. 213 mod.
41 "Titles and Emoluments", A.32b.
42 Changes, 6.1a.
Appendix I

FROM NAME AND ACTUALITY TO NAMES AND PRINCIPLES

The new direction that philosophical thought took in the third century was stimulated by the rejuvenation of a number of key philosophical concepts which were invested with changed signification; this in turn facilitated the re-interpretation and re-animation of the very traditions from which those concepts were derived. Among the concepts discussed by xuan xue thinkers, Wang Bi invested the fundamental-peripheral and substance-function polarities with metaphysical import. I have shown that a mere generation before Wang Bi committed his ideas to writing, Xu Gan's discussion of the name and actuality relationship already evidences the appearance of a mode of conceptualizing in which the fundamental-peripheral and substance-function polarities assume central importance. I am, of course, not implying that Xu Gan exerted a manifest philosophical influence on Wang Bi; rather, the point I wish to make is that Xu Gan's concept of the name and actuality relationship contributed to this new direction that philosophical conceptualizing took in the third century.

While discussion of the ming shi dichotomy continued in the Three Kingdoms and Six Dynasties periods,¹ as a

¹ For example, Yin Wen Zi (authorship of extant work, c. 200 AD; see Dan Daor, The Yin Wenzí and Renaissance of Philosophy in Wei-Jin China, 1-39; N.B. Doar's thesis is cited in Graham, Disputers of the Tao; I have been unable to locate a copy); Ouyang Jian 戴恕 (c. 268-300), Yan jin yi lun 談今義論; Yan Zhitui 燕子推 (531-595), "Ming shi", in Yan shi jia xun 謝氏集訓; and the "Ming shi" pian of...
conceptual paradigm it underwent no further significant
development. Instead, creative philosophical thought was
channelled into qing tan discussions and xuan xue
metaphysics. There is, however, one style of qing tan
discussion that may be regarded as an application of the
ming shi dichotomy to qing tan discourse: ming li \\ or
'names and principles'. As with discussions of the
relationship between a man’s moral qualities and his
innate abilities, ming li discussions are most readily
identifiable as a philosophical outgrowth of discussions
concerning character judgments in the late Han and Wei.
In its most literal sense, ming li referred to the
discussion of the relationship between words and the
abstract principles or patterns of thought represented by

Gongsun Long Zi. (see Introduction, p. 6); Liu Xie
(465-532), "Shen ming" and "Bi ming" in Liu Zi. For the identification of Liu Xie as
the author of this work, see Lin Qitan and Chen Fengjin, Liu Zi jijiao, 335-396.
2 Tang Junyi, "Lun Zhongguo sixiang shi zhong li zi liu yi", 66-67, also makes this observation. Mather, A
New Account of Tales of the World, 643, actually defines ming li as "the art of matching names with their
corresponding realities". This definition, however, while
preserving the connection with ming shi, fails to
distinguish ming li from ming shi.
3 A sense which is already evident in the term’s earliest
known employment, in the Mawangdui silk manuscript, "Ming li" in the Jing fa text. In the Wei-Jin period
ming li can also be seen to refer to discussion of the
relationship between abstract principles or patterns of
thought and their non-verbal expression. This would
include such topics as "Musical Sounds are Without Sorrow
or Joy" ("Sheng wu ai le") and "Nourishment of Life"
("Yang sheng"), which, together with "Speech
Fully Expresses Ideas", were known as the "Three
Principles", san li. For English translations of Xi
Kang’s (223-262) essays on the topics, "Musical
Sounds are Without Sorrow or Joy" and "Nourishment of
Life", see Robert G. Hendricks, Philosophy and
Argumentation in Third-Century China, 21-30; 71-106.
those words. This is most clearly explained in Ouyang Jian’s “Essay on Speech Fully Expressing Ideas” ("Yan jin yi lun"):  

It is certainly true that if it were not for speech (yan) then a principle grasped in the mind could not be expressed, and that if it were not for names (wu) that is to be fixed as being distinct from ‘that’ could not be distinguished. If speech did not express intentions, there would be no way to establish a connection with intentions, and if names failed to distinguish between things, then discriminatory judgments would not be made clear.

If discriminatory judgments are made clear, then nominal categories will be distinct, and if terms of speech establish a connection with essential dispositions and intentions, then the latter will be given expression. If one traces the reasons for this and fathoms into the causes, it is not because things have naturally appropriate names nor because principles have terms by which references to them must be made. If some object is to be distinguished, then its name should be peculiar to it; if some intention is to be made manifest, then its term should be established. Names change as things change, and speech transforms in accordance with principles. This is just like an echo which responds to a sound or a shadow which accompanies a shape: they are inseparable. If they are inseparable, then there is nothing which words cannot fully

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4 For example, Tang Junyi, "Lun Zhongguo sixiang shi zhong li zhi liu yi", 72-75, interprets ming li in the Wei-Jin period to refer to the discussion of the relation between the conception of principles as ideas and the words and language that are used to represent those ideas. He Qimin, Wei Jin sixiang yu tanfeng, 66-72, 132-142, however, argues that ming li quite simply meant ‘famous principles’. While the term clearly did have this second meaning, the prevailing view is that it also meant ‘the discussion of principles’. In addition to Tang Junyi and Mather, see also Fung Yulan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2:175-179; Tang Changru, Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao ghi luncong, 320-323.

5 Emending yan to ming based on the following text.

6 That is, something that is differentiable as a ‘this’ (ci) from a ‘that’ (bi).
express. For this reason I say that speech can fully express ideas.

This is not the place to analyze this rich passage but we may note that Ouyang Jian is clearly a nominalist and that he rejects the position held by Xu Gan that 'things have naturally appropriate names', evidencing that by the latter half of the third century the essentialist position was under attack. (It will, nevertheless, also be noted that Ouyang's concept of the ming shi relationship still conforms to the substance-function model.) The important point to note about the above passage, however, is the discussion of the speech-principle polarity together with the name-actuality polarity. The difference between the two polarities is that whereas the former is limited to discussion of the relation between names and particular objects or states of affairs, the latter represents a conceptual leap to discussion of 'patterns of names' (speech) and their relation to 'patterns of ideas' (principles).

This development, which was a product of the new discursive trend favoured in qing tan discussions, is already evident in Zhong lun:

That which common gentlemen call disputation is not disputation. The fact that it is not disputation yet is called disputation is probably because they have heard the name disputation yet do not understand its actuality.... Disputation is about persuading people in their hearts and not verbal submission. Thus matters are disputed in order to articulate distinctions and also to separate and distinguish different categories of affairs effectively, thereby dealing with them clearly. Disputation does not mean being

\[ Yi\mbox{ wen lei ju, juan 19, p. 348. } \]
eloquent and then deceiving others with this eloquence. Hence the [Zuo] Commentary remarks that the Spring and Autumn Annals are "subtle yet evident, tactful yet discriminating." Given this, then the words used in disputation should be terse and to the point; not tedious but informative; and the tempo of their delivery rhythmic and not offensive to the code of propriety. This will suffice to win the praise of others. Delighting in making others run out of arguments and skilfully guiding their minds enables each speaker to achieve fully his intentions, and those with whom they are discoursing to understand what is being said. After all, without names, principles would not be particularly evident. If things are as such then this is what is meant by disputation.

Unlike Ouyang Jian, Xu Gan sees ming li to be something subsumed under the all encompassing ming shi dichotomy, where li is but one example of shi; within two generations of Xu Gan's death, however, it is apparent that ming li had come to be distinguished from ming shi as an independent and more widely embracing polarity.

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8 Following Yi lin, 5.15a, in emending qie to jie and ling to ling. Xu Gan was not, of course, the first to have raised such criticisms; see, for example, Zou Yan's description of what constitutes good and bad disputation, Shi ji, 76.2370, n. 2, translated by Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, 20-21.
9 Zhao 12, 53.20a; Cheng 14, 27.19b.
10 A.25a-25b.
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- This bibliography is divided into two main sections: works in Chinese and Japanese languages, and works in Western languages. The Chinese and Japanese languages section is in turn sub-divided into Classical Works and Sinological Works.
- Works listed under Classical Works are arranged alphabetically by title.
- Works listed under other categories are arranged alphabetically by author/compiler; where no author/compiler is identifiable the work is listed alphabetically by title.
- Dates are given only for authors/compilers who died before the twentieth century.

Abbreviations

BMFEA: Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities
BSS: Basic Sinological Series (Guoxue jiben congshu)
HJAS: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society
PEW: Philosophy East and West
PFEH: Papers on Far Eastern History
SBBY: Si bu bei yao
SBCK: Si bu cong kan
TP: T'oung Pao
TSK: Tôyôshi kenkyû
1. Chinese and Japanese

1.1 Classical Works

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- Insert between the Loewe and Mather entries:


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