USE OF THESES

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF MAN

by

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This thesis was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University.

May 1974
Ja, aus der Welt werden wir nicht fallen. Wir sind einmal darin.

Christian Dietrich Grabbe

(Indeed, we shall not fall out of this world. We are in it once and for all.)
SYNOPSIS

This thesis is a study of some major aspects of Martin Heidegger’s conception of the nature of man. Central attention is given to Heidegger’s major work, *Sein und Zeit* (1927). In the opening chapters, the context within which the theories presented in this work are to be understood is fixed through successive examinations of some important philosophical concepts. The first chapter looks into the notion of philosophical anthropology, and analyses Heidegger’s attitude towards this philosophical discipline and towards the question “What is man?”. In the second chapter Heidegger’s description of his philosophy as an ontology is discussed, and it is argued that he can appropriately be seen as a thinker standing in the Kantian tradition of transcendental philosophy. In the next chapter Heidegger’s links with the existential philosophy of Kierkegaard are discussed, and a general perspective is suggested for an understanding of the tasks of Heidegger’s theory of human existence: it is the idea that Heidegger is attempting to present a ‘this-worldly’ philosophy which nevertheless preserves themes originating in a dualistic and religious mode of thought.

The fourth chapter treats a number of aspects of the relationship between Heidegger and his phenomenological predecessor, Edmund Husserl. The problem of reconciling the existential and the ontological aspects of *Sein und Zeit* is explored here. The next two chapters are designed to supply a basic
outline of Heidegger’s conception of human existence, setting out the possible interpretations of his notion of existential possibility, and then moving on to look into the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic modes of existence.

The seventh, eighth and ninth chapters focus on particular elements within Heidegger’s general theory of the human being: the notions of temporality and of Being-towards-death, and the question of interpersonal relations. These last two are treated as 'test cases' for judging the adequacy of the Heideggerian concept of human existence. On the one hand, it is seen that Heidegger is prevented from offering any plausible account of the interpersonal sphere by his own fundamental assumptions. On the other hand, however, his theory of Being-towards-death is defended against the criticisms of a number of his interpreters, and it is argued that this theory provides insights which are lacking in the traditional conception of human mortality. The difference between these findings suggests that it may be impossible to construct a theory of human existence which will be equally adequate to every aspect of the human being.
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CHAPTER ONE

"WHAT IS MAN?"
Our topic in this inquiry is the theory of human nature that is to be found in the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger - the answer that Heidegger offers to the question: "What is man?". Our attention will be directed primarily towards Heidegger's major work, *Sein und Zeit*, which was first published in 1927. When we refer to other writings of Heidegger, the purpose of these references will be, by and large, one of throwing additional light upon the ideas expressed in this central work. This use of Heidegger's other works is certainly valid at least to the extent that much of his writing in the years immediately following the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, and even later, was specifically designed either to elucidate aspects of *Sein und Zeit* which, in Heidegger's view, had not been properly understood by his readers, or to amplify the earlier treatments, drawing them further in certain directions. *Sein und Zeit* is the appropriate central reference here, because it is in this work that the direct inquiry into human existence is a main concern for Heidegger. In addition, it is here more than anywhere else that Heidegger presents the themes that led his readers to locate his philosophy - rightly or wrongly - in the tradition of existential thinking seen as proceeding from Kierkegaard.

In quoting from *Sein und Zeit*, I shall work from the German text, and my translations will inevitably vary to a greater or lesser extent from those of the English edition of the

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*All footnotes are to be found after the main text.*
work, the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson published in 1962. However, I shall use the equivalents for Heidegger's key terms which appear in this translation. It would be merely confusing to depart in this respect from what is obviously the definitive English edition of his major work. I have carried these equivalents over to the other writings of Heidegger cited in the text. One reviewer of the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Sein und Zeit accused the translators of excessive zeal in coining technical terms as equivalents for expressions of Heidegger which are clearly grounded in some colloquial usage. Though there is room for legitimate disagreement over some particular instances, one can, I think, defend Heidegger's translators simply by pointing to the difficulty of finding English words which convey both the meaning and the colloquial character of Heidegger's German expressions. And in cases like the choice of 'the being' for das Seiende, these translators have even been less prone to neologisms than the English translators of certain other works of Heidegger.

Our first four chapters will be largely concerned with establishing the context within which the ideas of Sein und Zeit should be approached. In one respect, they will be concerned with those particular philosophers whose concepts or doctrines appear most prominently in the background of Heidegger's thinking. In the first two chapters, the main influence to be considered will be that of Kant. In the third, the role of Kierkegaard will be discussed, and in the fourth, that of Heidegger's teacher and immediate philosophical predecessor,
Edmund Husserl. At the same time, however, these introductory chapters will focus on certain key terms which serve to indicate large areas of philosophical concern: expressions like 'anthropology', 'ontology', 'existential philosophy' and 'phenomenology'. The motive for our special attention to these expressions is not any preoccupation with labels as such; what matters is that they serve to point out whole complexes of conceptions which determine the course of philosophical inquiry. We use them to supply a perspective for our approach to the ideas or theories of a philosopher; and it is easy enough to see that without such perspectives the task of grasping what a thinker has said is made far more difficult, if indeed it is not rendered impossible. And yet there is a danger here: the danger of attributing to a thinker a set of presuppositions or a programme or an ultimate goal which is not his at all, and which distorts the whole meaning of his philosophising. The more original the philosopher, the greater is this danger; hence the special need in Heidegger's case for discussion of these points.

Having gained an understanding of various aspects of the philosophical setting of *Sein und Zeit*, we shall, in the fifth and subsequent chapters, proceed to a direct study of Heidegger's theory of the nature of man as it is presented in that work. There will, of course, be some inevitable overlap in these divisions, and some anticipation of themes later to be taken up in greater detail; but these aspects of the plan indicated above will not, I hope, take away its usefulness.

I said at the beginning that the task of this inquiry
was to examine the answer given by Heidegger to the question: "What is man?". In the context of European philosophy, the title given to the philosophical attempt to answer this question is philosophical anthropology. It might seem, therefore, that if we are to look into Heidegger's conception of the human being, we will be inquiring into his philosophical anthropology. And yet to make this apparently simple inference is to face an immediate challenge from the philosopher himself. The various writings of Heidegger contain many passages in which the expression 'philosophical anthropology' (or simply 'anthropology') is used - yet in nearly all of these passages Heidegger is characteristically concerned to repudiate the idea that he is engaged in the project of philosophical anthropology. What is more, he often explicitly criticises the very validity of this project itself.

How, then, are we to understand Heidegger's attitude towards a philosophical attempt to answer the question "What is man?"? Just why is it that he finds in the expression 'philosophical anthropology' an inappropriate and misleading conception of his thinking about human existence? To answer these questions, we must begin by looking further into the discipline (if it is a discipline) of philosophical anthropology.

An immediate difficulty for the English-speaking reader of Heidegger should be briefly mentioned. Like the word 'science', the term 'anthropology' has come to have a distinctly restricted (and, arguably, somewhat artificial) sense. To the English speaker, it characteristically refers to a particular social or human science: to the scientific study of particular
cultures, and commonly more specifically to the study of primitive peoples. This is what is elsewhere called 'cultural anthropology' or 'ethnology'. It must be made clear at the beginning that we are not using the term 'anthropology' in this sense. In any case, Heidegger explicitly denies that his analysis of the most fundamental aspects of human existence can be taken as referring to "some primitive stage" of human life; in other words, that he is engaged in some project parallel to ethnology.6

It can readily be seen from the etymological formation of the word 'anthropology' that, in a stricter sense, any study going under this title must have a much more general reference than to this or that particular human culture: that is must, in fact, extend the range of its subject-matter to man as a whole. But now we are faced with important questions about the philosophical character of this inquiry. What is the relation of anthropology in this sense to the various positive sciences that already take some particular aspect of the human being as their subject-matter: medicine, psychology, sociology, and so on? Does it stand side-by-side with them, as it were, on the same level? Does it, on the contrary, encompass all of them, and attempt to bring them into a systematic unity? Or, again, does it ignore their specific contents and rather attempt merely to treat their fundamental concepts and principles?

Since our concern here is not so much with the idea of philosophical anthropology as such as with Heidegger's conception of what philosophical anthropology is, only thinkers
referred to by Heidegger himself in this connection will be
touched upon here. Now one of the points that recur in
Heidegger's remarks on anthropology is the assertion that a main
danger in the opening-up of this field is an exaggerated notion
of its scope and significance. Consider, for example, the
following passage:7

If there is a philosophical task for which our era
demands a solution with unique urgency, it is that of
philosophical anthropology. I am referring to a basic
science which investigates the essence and essential
constitution of man, his relationship to the realms of
nature (organic, plant and animal life) as well as to
the source of all things, man's metaphysical origin as
well as his physical, psychic, and spiritual origins
in the world, the forces and powers which move man and
which he moves, the fundamental trends and laws of his
biological, psychic, cultural and social evolution,
along with their essential capabilities and realities.

This is the introductory statement of a lecture
delivered by Max Scheler in 1925. We may, I think, take it as a
definitive formulation of Scheler's conception of the scope of
philosophical anthropology. It is Scheler who must draw our
attention at this point, for two reasons. Firstly, it is Scheler
who stands out as the foremost professed exponent of philosophic-
al anthropology in the twentieth century. Secondly, it is
Scheler whom Heidegger has in mind more than any other thinker -
even in contexts where his name is not explicitly mentioned -
when he is talking about philosophical anthropology. His most
lengthy treatment of the topic is to be found in the concluding
section of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929): the book
So much, then, for the propriety of taking these words of Scheler as an indication of what might be expected of a philosophical anthropology. Now several things immediately spring to mind in reading the passage just cited. The most obvious, I think, is that it sets an extremely daunting task for the philosophical anthropologist. One is not surprised, then, to find the undertaking never fulfilled by Scheler himself beyond a number of preliminary sketches. But secondly, this programme of a 'basic science' of the human essence leaves the exact relationship between anthropology and the positive human sciences unclear. We can, however, see in Scheler’s completed outlines of his philosophical anthropology clear evidence that he drew no sharp dividing-line between the philosophical science and the empirical one. One example should suffice to bring this out. In Man’s Place in Nature, Scheler considers whether the notion of intelligence gives us an adequate criterion for drawing a definite distinction (a distinction in kind, not merely in degree) between man and the animals. ‘Intelligence’ here has a specific sense: it means the capacity for insight into previously unperceived aspects of a given situation. Such insight is not the result of trial and error, not produced by recurring typical features in the environment; it occurs suddenly, and it is productive rather than reproductive. So far, what Scheler has said is largely a piece of conceptual analysis. However, when he comes to ask the question whether animals can ever be said to possess intelligence (in this sense),
Scheler appeals to scientific evidence in order to answer the question in the affirmative, and so to repudiate the use of this concept as the key to the distinction between man and the animals. 11

Various other examples of the same procedure could easily enough be drawn from Scheler's writings on philosophical anthropology. Are we to understand, then, that this study is essentially continuous with the positive sciences? Or are there other ways of understanding it? There are; and Heidegger's is one. But before looking into his critique of Scheler's semi-empirical conception, let us touch upon another position which is in some ways intermediate between those of Scheler and Heidegger: that of Kant.

Kant draws an important distinction between anthropology of the 'physiological' and the 'pragmatic' varieties. He explains: 12

A doctrine of the knowledge of man, systematically set out (anthropology), can adopt either the physiological or the pragmatic point of view. The physiological knowledge of man proceeds from the investigation of what nature makes of man, while the pragmatic proceeds from what he as a freely acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.

In 1798, Kant published a work bearing the title: Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View, containing material derived from lectures on the subject of anthropology given by him over a period of "some thirty years". 13 As the
title indicates, the work adopts the 'pragmatic' approach to a knowledge of man, as defined in the passage quoted above. In terms of this distinction, Scheler's anthropology would fall largely in the 'physiological' category. Kant's study of anthropology has, on the whole, attracted little attention from readers of his philosophy, although William James praised it as "a marvellous, biting little work." One problem is that the content is, in large part, neither philosophical nor scientific, but rather designed to display a worldly wisdom and a familiarity with human foibles. Kant even goes so far as to assure his readers, in distinctly defensive tones, that a comprehensive acquaintance with the ways of the world can easily be gained in "a large city ... such as Königsberg" without the necessity of travelling to other parts of the world. Whatever may be the truth of this, Kant's actual observations prove him to be no La Rochefoucauld or G.C. Lichtenberg. The reader finds himself warned against marrying into a family in which insanity is to be found; or against trying to assess the true temperament or character of someone while he is drunk. One of Kant's contemporary readers, J.W. von Goethe, was particularly offended by "the assertion that young women try to please all men so that after the death of their husband they may have another suitor in reserve." Fortunately, this is not all that is to be found in Kant's Anthropology. Part of the work covers ground which is recognizably similar to that of, say, James's Principles of Psychology. The mental 'faculties' (the senses, emotions, and
so on) are discussed in a way which is hardly rigorous but nevertheless not merely of anecdotal significance. In other words, Kant's subject-matter in the Anthropology is largely that of modern psychology.

In view of this, one might suppose that a reading of the Anthropology could furnish the student of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason with useful insights into many of the conceptions encountered there. That this is not the case points directly to the discrepancy between the Kantian 'anthropology from the pragmatic point of view' and a truly philosophical anthropology. And here we are brought back to Heidegger. Heidegger's judgement on the Kantian anthropology is given in his work of 1929, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. The bulk of this work is devoted to what is essentially a re-interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. The details of this re-examination are not particularly relevant here. We need only remark that it involves a very considerable emphasis on the Kantian notion of 'transcendental imagination'. Heidegger describes the transcendental imagination not only as the key to the "primordial essential constitution of man", but also as "the ground upon which the inner possibility of ontological knowledge, and hence of *metaphysica generalis*, is constructed." Yet he finds the account given by Kant in the Anthropology of the faculty of imagination to be quite inadequate to the requirements of his re-interpretation of the Critique. What is wrong with the Kantian anthropology, in Heidegger's view, is its empirical character: the fact that it "moves within the sphere of the
knowledge which ordinary experience supplies concerning man. The anthropological treatment of the faculty of imagination presents it as dependent upon empirical intuition; but this will not do for the transcendental imagination, whose function is to make possible the syntheses that give rise to empirical experience in the first place. Hence Heidegger judges the account of the Anthropology to be superficial compared to that of the Critique. Any attempt to use the Anthropology as a means to grasping the content of the Critique is "nothing but a misconception." And its error is a failure to see "the empirical character of the Kantian anthropology."

From all this we can see that the notion of anthropology, for Heidegger, implies an inquiry that is distinct from any relying upon empirical experience for support — whether its general orientation be 'physiological', like Scheler's, or 'pragmatic', like Kant's. Philosophical anthropology is pure anthropology. How, then, does Heidegger conceive this pure anthropology, and what does he see as its philosophical significance?

The best source for an answer to these questions is the fourth, and concluding, section of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Here again it is Kant who supplies the starting-point of the discussion — but this time it is not the Kant of the Anthropology. Instead, it is the Kant who gave a strong impetus to philosophical anthropology by putting forward the question: "What is man?" as a question of central importance to philosophy as such. Kant claims, in fact, that this single question
encapsulates within itself all of the primary concerns of metaphysics. And Heidegger's one great aim in his whole treatment of anthropology is to assess the validity of this claim.  

For reasons which will become apparent shortly, I shall offer a few more general remarks on Heidegger's re-interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason before I turn to a discussion of the concluding section of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Heidegger's study of Kant is one of the major contributions to the reaction which arose in the 1920s in Germany against the then dominant Neo-Kantian school, with its picture of Kant as a thinker concerned primarily with the task of building a philosophical foundation for scientific knowledge. (A picture not entirely unknown in the English-speaking world at the present time.) In deliberate contrast to this approach, with its orientation towards the positive sciences, Heidegger reaffirms Kant's concern for metaphysics. For Heidegger, the aim of the Critique is the establishing of the possibility of metaphysics, or as he puts it, the "laying of the foundation" of metaphysics. The knowledge whose validity is to be secured is not that of either the natural or the human sciences, but rather metaphysical knowledge.

In reaffirming the metaphysical orientation of the Critique, Heidegger follows the same path as another leading figure in the reaction against Neo-Kantianism: Heinz Heimsoeth. Yet the courses of their interpretations reveal a sharp contrast: and it is a contrast that throws light on the
main theme of Heidegger’s study of Kant. Since this is the theme that is also the most explicit link between the content of this work and the doctrines of Sein und Zeit, it is all the more worth drawing attention to.

The theme is that of the finitude of man. Now both Heimsoeth and Heidegger place considerable emphasis upon Kant’s distinction between finite and infinite modes of knowledge. The difference is, in brief, that whereas finite knowledge is dependent upon the givenness of some object, infinite knowledge creates its object in the very act of cognition. The latter form of knowledge could belong only to a divine being; Kant would even doubt our ability to form a conception of such knowledge—a doubt that does not, however, trouble either Heidegger or Heimsoeth. Now the difference between their interpretations is this. On the one hand, we find Heidegger deriving his whole analysis of human knowledge from the fact of its finitude, and seeing in this the basic source of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Heimsoeth, on the other hand, uses ingenious arguments to lessen the gap between the human and the divine modes of knowledge. (And, one might add, to lessen the gap between the pre-Critical and the Critical Kant.) For him, Kant’s primary conception of knowledge is its infinite mode: intellectual intuition. Finite knowledge, with its dualism of sensibility and understanding, is to be seen as derived from the other mode, which is knowledge in the strictest sense. Accordingly, in various aspects of finite knowledge Heimsoeth seeks to display its kinship to infinite knowledge.
Such, then, is the contrast between Heimsoeth and Heidegger. We shall soon see the further implications of Heidegger's emphatic pronouncement of the Kantian doctrine of human finitude.

The detailed working-out of the general line of interpretation just sketched out is what occupies the first three main sections of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. The fourth and final section moves away from the direct interpretation of Kant towards two further topics: the relation between metaphysics and philosophical anthropology, and the relation between metaphysics and the 'fundamental ontology' of Heidegger's own *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger's treatment of anthropology takes Kant as its announced starting-point, but it soon becomes clear that it is Max Scheler who, for Heidegger, stands out first and foremost as spokesman for the claims of anthropology.

Heidegger begins by recalling the importance of the notion of subjectivity in Kant's attempt to establish the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics. The question that is easily suggested by this approach (which is just what Kant terms the 'transcendental' viewpoint) is whether the inquiry is really an inquiry into man: that is, whether it is really an anthropology. Heidegger's immediate reply to the question is negative; and he supports it in terms of the failure of Kant's *Anthropology* to present an account of the faculty of imagination adequate to the requirements of the *Critique*. However, he goes on: "But all that follows from this is that the anthropology
worked out by Kant is an empirical one, and not one which is adequate to the transcendental problematic, i.e. not one which is pure."

Thus the question has not really been answered as yet. Instead, what has been revealed is the need for a pure (i.e. non-empirical) philosophical anthropology. Now a link between such an anthropology and metaphysics is indicated in certain often-quoted words of Kant himself. Near the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sets out three questions in which, as he puts it, "the whole interest of my reason, whether speculative or practical, concentrates itself:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?"

What Kant intends to be noticed about these three questions is their dual role. On the one hand, they express the most intense concerns of any human being as a thinking being - the 'interests' which belong necessarily and universally to mankind as such. On the other hand, these three questions are precisely the central questions of speculative philosophy. They are the questions asked by the branches of metaphysics which inquire into the highest objects: the world, the soul, and the supreme being. In other words, they serve to define the philosophical disciplines of rational cosmology, psychology, and theology.

In the Critique, Kant does not draw any further conclusion from his identification of these questions as the
necessary and universal concerns of the human being. But in his later Logic, he transforms this viewpoint into a new question, to be added to the other three:

4. What is man?

And to the four questions Kant adds the comment:31

The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by morality, the third by religion and the fourth by anthropology. But basically one could classify all of these questions under anthropology, since the first three questions refer themselves to the last one.

What this means is that Kant regards the question about the nature of man as encapsulating all of the main questions of speculative philosophy. Citing this same passage, Heidegger comments: "With this, Kant himself has unequivocally stated the real result of his laying of the foundation of metaphysics."32 As we have said, Heidegger's aim is to retrace what he sees as the Kantian project of establishing the possibility of metaphysics; hence the conclusion just reached leads him immediately to ask whether such a 'repetition' must inevitably take the form of a philosophical anthropology.

First, a definition: *anthropology is "the study of man", and it "encompasses every"thing ascertainable about the nature of man as this being involving body, soul and spirit."*33 It is probable that in putting forward this definition, Heidegger is simply intending to summarise the traditional orientation of philosophical anthropology. The body-soul-spirit schema is quite
alien to his own philosophical thinking about man. This is evident enough from the content of *Sein und Zeit*. There is no treatment of embodiment in the work—barely even an acknowledgement of its reality. This is, indeed, one of the most noticeable gaps in the work, albeit one which was later to be amply compensated for in the writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. As for soul and spirit, these notions tend to appear only in quotations from or allusions to thinkers of the past. And Heidegger rejects in plain terms at least one version of the traditional schema when he writes: "But the 'substance' of man is not spirit as the synthesis of soul and body, but rather existence." Heidegger alludes to Kant's definitions of 'physiological' and 'pragmatic' anthropology (quoted above, page 9), without explicitly naming the source, when he goes on to assert that anthropology must treat man not only in his natural aspect but as a being that "acts and creates"—it must therefore consider "what man as an active being 'makes of himself', or can and should make." 

Immediately after this allusion comes another one. Anthropology, Heidegger continues, must also look into the "basic attitudes" which man is capable of adopting and which determine "his 'can' and 'should'." The name we give to these attitudes, Heidegger says, is 'Weltanschauungen', and the 'psychology' (Heidegger's inverted commas) of Weltanschauungen "encompasses the whole of the study of man." 

The allusion here is to the important work of Karl
Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919). This book is significant not only for modern philosophical anthropology (as Heidegger implies here), but also specifically for twentieth-century existential philosophy. For it is arguably in this work of Jaspers, more than anywhere else, that the figure of Kierkegaard makes a formal entrance, as it were, into the main arena of Western philosophical thinking. Jaspers treats the *Weltanschauung* of Kierkegaard as a coherent and legitimate philosophical standpoint, to be set beside those of such thinkers as Plato or Kant.

To this one might add that Jaspers' own analyses (e.g. his treatment of temporality) show strongly the influence of Kierkegaard. Heidegger, too, shows the same influence; and to this extent it is possible that without Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* would not have been written. (Hence the need for these remarks on Jaspers in the present context.) However, whereas with Heidegger the influence of Kierkegaard is largely restricted to the simple choice of leading themes (such as dread — and, of course, the theme of existence itself), the case with Jaspers is more decisive. Both here and in his later works, the whole structure of his treatment of these themes is frequently taken over from Kierkegaard. The significance of this difference is that Heidegger fits the Kierkegaardian themes into a philosophical setting which is quite different from Kierkegaard's, as it is from Jaspers' as well.

This point will be discussed in Chapter Three. As to
Influence of Jaspers' Psychologie der Weltanschauungen on Heidegger, it is significant that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger several times singles out this work for praise, twice making the comment that its significance goes beyond the merely 'psychological' relevance implied by its title. He also comments: "Here the question of 'what man is' is raised and defined in terms of what he essentially can be." This comment hints at one source of Heidegger's analysis of human existence in terms of possibility.

These points about Jaspers, as well as the preceding reference to Kant, have been brought forward partly in order to illustrate the allusory character of much of Heidegger's writing. One can very frequently find there an expression or phrase which, without making explicit reference, hints at a wide complex of relationships between his thinking and the thinking of other philosophers. It would be an enormous task to bring every one of these cases to light; the ones just discussed may, however, serve as fairly typical examples.

Having listed, somewhat in the manner of Scheler in the long passage quoted earlier (page 7), the various aspects of the human being that will be encompassed by the subject-matter of philosophical anthropology, Heidegger expresses a misgiving which inevitably arises from confrontation with any such diverse collection of topics. If many studies converge in this one area, then the science of philosophical anthropology will tend to grow in so many directions that all precision will be lost. Now in this objection, Heidegger expresses, I think, something more than
an ordinary reaction against any diffuse and undirected undertaking. One can also detect here something of the spirit of 'rigorous science' that is so evident in many German philosophers. (In Chapter Four we shall treat this topic with particular reference to Husserl.) This spirit is the same 'architectonic' zeal that is displayed in the formal layouts of Kant's major Critical works. It is the demand for the setting-out of philosophical investigations in precisely defined areas of conceptual thinking, specified as far as possible by concise verbal formulations. Whether this side of Heidegger's thinking comes from the German rationalist and idealist traditions, or from Aristotelian sources, is unclear. At any rate, it is this tendency that is a prime factor (though not the only one) in Heidegger's eventual rejection of the project of philosophical anthropology in favour of his own 'fundamental ontology'. The latter is an undertaking which, as Heidegger sees it, does take its origin in a clearly formulated statement of subject-matter and philosophical task.

At the same time, however, we find an opposite tendency in Heidegger: a tendency to stress the provisional character of any formulations set down in his investigations. (This attitude is more evident in Sein und Zeit, on the whole, than in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, probably because it is the conclusion of the second work that corresponds to the starting-point of the first.) Heidegger, then, has a tendency to take even the questions he raises as merely provisional, as capable of being replaced later by more profound, more radical
and more decisive ones. In this regard, he places great importance on the uncovering of presuppositions which lie within the questions asked by philosophers. An excellent example of this is his approach to the question "What is man?" itself. By 1935 Heidegger writes: "The question of man is not an anthropological question but rather a historically metaphysical question." Further: "Since man as a historical being is himself, the question about his own being must change from the form: 'What is man?' to the form: 'Who is man?'." In a sense, the basis for this stipulation had already been implicit in Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger had asserted every entity to be either a 'who' or a 'what', and had summarised his inquiry into human existence by saying, "What we are seeking here is what we inquire into when we ask: 'Who?'." But only in the later work does he explicitly infer the formal inadequacy of the question "What is man?".

In a later philosophical work still, yet another shift in position is seen. The work is the "Letter on Humanism" of 1946. Here Heidegger rebuts attempts to interpret the question of the 'essence' of man, as raised in Sein und Zeit, in terms of the traditional metaphysical categories of essentia and existentia. He adds: "We customarily put this question in an equally inappropriate way whether we ask what man is or who man is. For in the 'who?' or 'What?' we are already on the lookout for something like a person or for an object." Heidegger now sees the notion of 'person' as a false guide to the question about man; he detects in it the same tendency towards
reification that disallows the notion of an 'object' in this context. Again, this apparent shift is really only the working-out of something that is present in Sein und Zeit but not given particular emphasis there. The term 'person' is not used very frequently in this work. Near the beginning, however, Scheler is singled out for praise for his doctrine that "the person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object." Yet later in the book Heidegger sharply comments:

One may well reject the 'soul-substance', and equally the thing-hood of consciousness or the object-hood of the person; yet ontologically it is still a question of something whose Being retains the sense of presence-at-hand, whether explicitly or not.

Heidegger's reason for testing and rejecting these various locutions is his concern for the avoidance of premature formulations. In the question about man, for example, he sees the whole discussion as having been thrown into confusion by the acceptance (here too, 'whether explicitly or not') of either one or the other of two traditional conceptions of the human being: the classical definition of man as the 'rational animal', and the religious doctrine of man as a being created by God 'in his image and likeness'. Heidegger sees the modern conception of man as essentially an intertwining of these two viewpoints, despite their very different origins. Some such conception is merely taken for granted, and the whole question about man never comes to be asked in a truly radical way. It is because Heidegger is determined to raise this question that he takes
great care in formulating the question itself; for the whole course of the inquiry is determined by this initial formulation.

The 'architectonic' side of Heidegger is, perhaps, the side that most clearly links him with his philosophical predecessors, notably Kant and Husserl. In a sense, however, the counter-examples just set out do not contradict this tendency. For the other, more Socratic side of Heidegger's philosophising aims at providing a healthy counter-influence to temptations either to fix formulations prematurely or to take over ideas which contain hidden assumptions. This is not a simple rejection of coherent formulation as such; on the contrary, it implies taking this as one's ultimate goal. To philosophise is to explicate, to transform an unexamined idea into "a concept at one's disposal."

One incidental use of this counter-tendency, freely drawn upon by the later Heidegger, has been to rebut attempts by his interpreters to systematise the content of Sein und Zeit into a fixed set of philosophical doctrines. Apart from specific cases, we find in Heidegger's later writings a series of renunciations of the philosophical labels still employed in his earlier works: 'phenomenology', 'metaphysics', 'ontology', and even, in the end, 'philosophy' itself. For in the "Letter on Humanism" we read:

Terms like 'logic', 'ethics', 'physics' begin to appear only when primordial thinking has come to an end. The Greeks, in their great age, did their
thinking without such labels. They did not even call this thinking 'philosophy'.

These, then, are two sides of Heidegger's approach to philosophical investigation. The balance between the two sides tends to shift after the period with which we are here concerned. At this stage the 'architectonic' side, the side recalling the German philosophical tradition from Wolff onwards, is still in evidence; and it comes out particularly in the treatment of anthropology and its relation to philosophy as such. It is largely because anthropology seems to be an area in which many and diverse kinds of investigation into man are to be found that Heidegger concludes that anthropology is to be understood not as a discipline, but rather as a tendency characteristic of the thinking of modern man. It is the tendency to treat all meaning and truth as relative to man. Now we may comment on this that such a tendency finds expression in Heidegger's own Sein und Zeit: in regard to both meaning and truth. It was no doubt for this reason that one contemporary reviewer of the work remarked that Heidegger's approach "continually recalls the methods (unmentioned by Heidegger) of critical pragmatism, those of John Dewey in particular." But having this tendency in terms of man as such is not exactly attributable to Heidegger: for him it is not a question of man as such as a question of what makes man man, as we shall soon see.

Paraphrasing the opening remarks of Max Scheler's Man's Place in Nature, Heidegger notes that the great store of knowledge accumulated in modern times on the various aspects of
man has nevertheless left man's basic nature still "mysterious." This, he says, was the motive behind Scheler's attempts to formulate a philosophical anthropology. Now Heidegger's respect for Scheler's attempts in this direction is not so much an admiration for the actual results obtained (which, as I said earlier, amounted only to a number of preliminary sketches) as one for Scheler's awareness of the methodological problems involved in his project. In particular, Heidegger praises Scheler's awareness of the problem of unity in the determination of man's essence. This is the problem of the integration of the various disciplines and results drawn upon in the investigation.

Scheler's own answer to the problem tends to be an ambitious attempt to construct a thoroughly interdisciplinary science. Heidegger's solution is quite different. It consists in a move which typifies his whole method of thinking: the move from one level of conceptual thinking to another, more fundamental level - to those more basic concepts which underly the familiar everyday concepts, thus making it first possible for us to think in terms of the latter. Preparing the way for this move, Heidegger suggests that "perhaps" the fundamental problem is that of understanding the nature of anthropology itself. He now poses the question of a 'philosophical' anthropology.

Now, then, does an anthropology become a philosophical one? Is it only because its knowledge has a degree of generality which differentiates it from that of an
empirical anthropology, in which case the question continually arises, at what degree of generality knowledge stops being empirical and becomes philosophical?

Heidegger's question is rhetorical, and it is clear enough that he rejects any such view. It is evident enough, in any case, that a conception of philosophy which turns it into a mere "summary of the most general results" of empirical knowledge removes from it any distinctive character, and certainly the character that has drawn the great thinkers to philosophy. Heidegger's rhetorical question is curiously reminiscent of an important passage which occurs towards the end of Kant's Critique:

I ask: Does the concept of the extended belong to metaphysics? You answer: Yes! Very well, and that of body too? Yes! And that of fluid body? You are now taken aback, for if things go on much further like this, everything will belong to metaphysics. One can see from this that the mere degree of subordination (the particular under the general) cannot determine the limits of a science. On the contrary, in our case this can only be done by a complete difference of kind and of origin.

We shall return to this passage later. For the present, let us see Heidegger's answer to the question about the difference between a philosophical anthropology and an empirical one. He gives an answer which at first seems to refer to a specific method as the distinctive feature of the philosophical approach, but then immediately shifts to an explanation in terms
of a distinctive subject-matter. For he writes, "An anthropology can be called 'philosophical' if its method is a philosophical one, in the sense of a treatment of the essence of man."64 To do this is to describe the essential characteristics that distinguish man from other beings. As Heidegger says in a later essay, knowledge of the essences of things "has long been called 'philosophy'."65

As I have just said, Heidegger's specification of the philosophical approach to anthropology runs together method and subject-matter. Is this an ambiguity? Not to Heidegger; to him it is axiomatic (and so self-evident as not to need explicit pointing-out here) that subject-matter and method of investigation must stand in a one-to-one relationship. The subject-matter of philosophy is 'essences'. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger writes: "Syncretistic universal comparison and classification certainly does not of its own accord give a genuine knowledge of essences."66 Such a knowledge can arise only through the method that Heidegger calls 'phenomenology'. In Chapter Four, we shall look in detail at Heidegger's conception of phenomenology; for the present, the question of philosophical method arises only out of the seeming ambiguity in Heidegger's quoted definition of a philosophical anthropology. In Sein und Zeit, the unity of method and subject-matter is emphasised by a contrast between a method proper and a mere 'technique'.67

The more genuinely a concept of method is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the fundamental guidelines of a science, all the more
primordially is it rooted in our dialogue with the subject-matter itself, and the farther it is removed from what we call a technical device, of which there are many even in the theoretical disciplines.

Suppose, then, that philosophical anthropology directs its attention towards the essence of man, and that it works out a method appropriate to its subject-matter. Its task will be to set out the characteristics that 'make man man' and thereby constitute the precondition for the various other properties of man. Heidegger adds what he seems to think is a corollary to this programme: the development of that part of a Weltanschauung which defined 'man's place in nature'—again referring to Max Scheler.

Have we now reached an adequate conception of philosophical anthropology? Not in Heidegger's view—and for two reasons. Firstly, he is still concerned about the diversity of the areas into which the investigation of man reaches, a diversity which appears as a vagueness and indeterminateness in the very conception of this task. Secondly, he is dissatisfied with the failure of the discussion so far to substantiate Kant's claim that the question "What is man?" encompasses the central problems of philosophy. And as I suggested earlier (page 13), Heidegger's interest in anthropology is bound up with his interest in this claim of Kant's.

The view that anthropology and philosophy as such have a special inner unity is taken seriously by Heidegger, even if he finds it unacceptable in that particular form. Hence his feeling
that some proof is necessary. We must find out just what it is about philosophy that by its very nature implies a relatedness to the essence of man. Without some such proof, the making of high claims for anthropology is merely arbitrary, and easily answerable by the (obviously correct) assertion that the world contains many beings other than man, and the inference that in this sense man can hardly be taken as the centre of the world. But Heidegger shrewdly remarks that this assertion is "no more philosophical" than is the anthropocentrism that it rebuts.69

Heidegger's way out of this impasse is a return to the four questions of Kant. He hopes that a closer examination of them will show the true nature of the link claimed by Kant between the first three questions and the final one. Heidegger sees such a link in the theme of finitude. (The solution has, in a sense, been prefigured by the prominence of this concept throughout Heidegger's re-interpretation of the Critique.) Each of the three leading questions of philosophy as traditionally conceived, Heidegger argues, is a question that by its nature is asked by a finite being.

The first question, 'What can I know?' concerns a power and the limitations of its possibilities: note that these are terms that will recur constantly in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger argues that an omnipotent being would never ask such a question. An omnipotent being could not ask the question, in the sense of making a genuine enquiry; though this 'could not' represents no deficiency, but rather precisely the absence of deficiency. As for the second question, 'What ought I to do?', the finitude of
the questioner is evident in the implied disparity between what has already been done and what still awaits fulfilment. I would add the comment that the essential finitude of the category of 'ought' was long since brought out in Hegel's critique of the Kantian system, and given its closest analysis in the Science of Logic. Finally, the question: 'What may I hope?'. This question, says Heidegger, is a question about something that may or may not find a place in the expectations of the questioner, something that may be granted or denied to him. But this fact too points to finitude, for it implies a condition of unfulfilled needs. These analyses lead Heidegger to his conclusion:

Thus, human reason does not only betray its finitude in these questions, but also its innermost interest refers to finitude itself. Hence the task of human reason is not to remove the 'can', 'ought' and 'may', and thus eliminate this finitude, but rather just the opposite: to become wholly certain of this finitude, in order to hold oneself in it.

Now in giving his interpretation of the three questions, Heidegger is, as I have said, following the lines of his general interpretation of Kant. I would argue that just as that interpretation is distinctly one-sided in its emphasis on the Kantian doctrine of human finitude, so too is the exegesis just described. Something very similar occurs again in Heidegger's reading of Kierkegaard: a reduction to the finite and purely this-worldly. Kierkegaard writes: "Existence is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, and the existing individual is both infinite and finite."
dialectical method hinges on the opposition and tension between these poles. But all of this is lost in Heidegger, though retained to a large extent in Jaspers. (What is more, Heidegger's quoted remarks about 'holding oneself in finitude' bear an unfortunate resemblance to Kierkegaard's account of the fall into sin— which, Kierkegaard says, consists in freedom's "grasping at finiteness to sustain itself."73)

What is questionable about Heidegger's interpretations of Kant's three questions, taken simply as a piece of exegesis, is the elimination of the reference to the transcendent that, with Kant, always goes hand in hand with any setting of bounds to human reason. It is in terms of this reference that Kant makes the distinction, in the Prolegomena, between 'boundaries' and 'limits.'74 The notion of a limit is merely negative; but the notion of a boundary contains something positive: a reference to what lies beyond the boundary. In Kant's view, mathematics and natural science have limits, but no boundaries: they take no account of what lies beyond possible experience, but within this sphere they need see nothing as beyond their scope. Metaphysics, on the other hand, does have boundaries, which its dialectical aspect reveals. Kant offers some very suggestive remarks (which we cannot go into here) about the need for metaphysics to locate its thinking "exactly on the boundary" of reason.75 This idea goes unrepresented in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, simply because of Heidegger's determination to stand firmly within the sphere of finitude. The resulting one-sidedness of his reading of Kant is carried over to the exegesis he gives of the three
These comments were made on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant taken, as I said, simply as a piece of exegesis. But I wish to add a further suggestion concerning the perspective within which we should see Heidegger's one-sided view of the Kantian doctrine of man. It must be said, firstly, that my suggestion is tentative, and, secondly, that it is not drawn from Heidegger's own account. Nevertheless, it may throw some light upon what has been said in the last few pages.

I suggest that Heidegger's line of interpretation may be understood as an attempt to avoid the many difficulties faced by what has been called the "two-worlds" mode of philosophy. In the case of Kant, the problems are those arising out of the systematic dualism that runs through his philosophy: the dualism of the intelligible and the phenomenal worlds. Put more generally, it is the problem of relating the infinite to the finite. This problem has many aspects which cannot be set out here. The point that I wish to make is that the whole problematic is one to which a number of differing lines of thinking might be applied - of which Heidegger's is one.

One solution is to make a virtue of the unresolved tensions between the infinite and the finite which such a theory tends to involve. This is the solution of Kierkegaard. For him, any philosophical reconciliation of the two would merely falsify the real nature of human existence. What appears in the
course of philosophical thinking may be cogent enough in terms of pure logic - yet human thinking is deluded if it pretends to solve problems which of necessity must remain unsolved for a being whose situation is that of man. We shall see more of Kierkegaard's position in Chapter Three. Now another solution to the problem is that of the German absolute idealists at their most extreme. It is simply the absorption of the finite by the infinite. The finite is denied any truth or reality in its own right; confronted with the infinite, the finite (in Hegel's words) "melts away" and "shrinks into nothing."

Heidegger's solution, I suggest, is precisely the opposite. While he does not openly repudiate the infinite, his attention is firmly fixed upon the finitude to which, as he says, one must 'hold oneself'. The 'feeling for infinity' so evident in Kant is lacking in Heidegger. For him, as we shall see, the notion of transcendence does not involve any rising above temporal sphere into a realm of supra-temporal reality; on the contrary, it is closely bound up with temporality itself. In what follows, we shall be largely concerned to see whether the elaboration of the fundamental attitude expressed in Heidegger's words on 'holding oneself in finitude' does give rise to an adequate account of human existence. Adequate in what sense? Here I have another suggestion to make; and again it is one that proposes a perspective within which Heidegger's ideas are to be seen, rather than one that comments directly on the content of those ideas. Heidegger wishes, I think, to maintain within the context of the theme of finitude many of the concepts which
formerly occurred in a dualistic setting; for example, the Kantian notion of transcendence, Kierkegaard's concept of 'the moment', and a number of others. He wishes to re-interpret these themes in a way that will preserve their essential vitality, yet which will draw solely upon the context of finitude and temporality. A theory of human finitude which simply abandoned these themes would be inadequate in Heidegger's view. (I am thinking here of a naturalistic or materialistic mode of philosophy.) For it would fail to recognise phenomena which constitute essential elements in human existence.

These remarks are inevitably tentative in the sense that no direct confirmation by reference to texts of Heidegger is to be expected for them. I put them forward as an indication of a general approach which, I think, brings out the challenging character of Heidegger's project: the difficulty, and perhaps the value, of the task he has set himself in Sein und Zeit.

Returning to the text under discussion, we find that Heidegger takes the theme of finitude to determine wholly the character of the fourth Kantian question, "What is man?". Through the interpretations of the first three questions, and the referring of their inner unity to the fourth, this question, in Heidegger's words, "has lost its former generality and indeterminateness and has acquired the univocal character of a question about the finitude in man." Thus the question 'What is man?' is replaced by the question 'What is human finitude?', or 'What makes man the finite being that he is?'. This is the question whose connection with the central concerns of
philosophy is to be investigated.

But what are the central concerns of philosophy? So far we have merely followed the Kantian formulations. We still have to answer this question in Heidegger's terms. In other words, we still have to direct our attention towards the concept of ontology, which is at the heart of Heidegger's philosophical thinking. The next chapter, therefore, will be devoted to this task, and to the task of relating Heidegger's conception of ontology to the 'fundamental ontology' that is the programme of Sein und Zeit.
CHAPTER TWO

ONTOLOGY
It would be wrong to suppose that an adequate insight into Heidegger's conception of ontology can be gained simply through a historical account of the origin of the term in the philosophy of the German Enlightenment. For one thing, this term was largely only 'a new name for some old ways of thinking'. And for another, although Heidegger certainly claims to be engaged in ontology in Sein und Zeit, he is disinclined to accept the traditional conception of ontology as a definite philosophical discipline standing among others, on the grounds that this presupposition may involve pre-judging various questions he wants to raise. Rather, he sees a discipline of ontology as something that has to be developed in the course of the inquiry, not assumed at its start. ¹

Despite this, however, Heidegger's conception of ontology is one that does grow out of the historical tradition, as his own references to his predecessors frequently point out. In this chapter I shall argue that one philosopher is particularly relevant here: Kant. This may seem a strange assertion, for Kant is commonly taken to be a thinker who is radically opposed to the kind of philosophising that falls under the title of 'ontology'. Surely, one might argue, the roots of Heidegger's ontological orientation lie rather in the Aristotelian 'first philosophy'. It is undeniable that an Aristotelian context does fit parts of Sein und Zeit, although even then it is an Aristotelianism of a historicised kind, as we shall see later in the present chapter. Yet despite this, it is the link with Kant that is most fruitful as a clue to Heidegger's
In general terms at least, there is no difficulty in defending a reference to the philosophising of Kant in the course of an account of Heidegger’s basic viewpoint. For one thing, the thinking of Sein und Zeit can plausibly be placed in the tradition of transcendental idealism that finds its origin in Kant. But alongside this implicit parallelism, there are also the explicit acknowledgements of affinity with Kant that occur in the several extended studies of Kant’s philosophy which have been published by Heidegger. Again, it is hardly accidental that the name of Kant occurs more than that of any other philosopher in Sein und Zeit. For these reasons, it is at least not obviously irrelevant to begin a discussion of what Heidegger means by ‘ontology’ with a look at Kant’s employment of the same term.

The term ‘ontology’ itself has been traced back to a number of obscure seventeenth-century German writers. Its real legitimisation as a standard philosophical name was due to Christian Wolff, who gave one of his major works the title: Philosophia Prima, Sive Ontologia. The seventeenth-century rationalists were much concerned with the re-organisation of philosophy, and with the demarcation of various areas within philosophy. Hence their tendency towards philosophical neologisms, some of which (‘ontology’, ‘phenomenology’, ‘psychology’) have become standard usage, while others (‘ontosophy’, ‘dianoiology’, ‘alethiology’, ‘thelematology’) have long since fallen by the wayside. One of the motives for this systematisation was a desire to distinguish theology from
the other parts of metaphysics - a desire understandably not much in evidence amongst the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. 'Ontology' is thus not to be confused with metaphysics as such. From the beginning it applies to one particular division within the field of metaphysics. It will be convenient to note the scheme presented by the Wolffian rationalist A.G. Baumgarten in his work *Metaphysica*.

1. **Metaphysics** is the science of the first principles in human cognition.

2. To metaphysics belong ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology.

(I omit 3 - R.S.)

4. **Ontology** (ontosophy, metaphysics, cf. para. 1, universal metaphysics, architectonics, first philosophy) is the science of the most general characteristics (praedicatorum) of the thing.

5. The general characteristics of the thing are the first principles of human cognition, and hence ontology belongs, para. 2, with good reason to metaphysics, para. 1, 4.

When Kant refers to ontology, we may take it that he has this scheme, or something very like it (with minor differences in terminology) in mind. Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* was, in fact, the textbook employed by Kant in his university lectures on metaphysics, as late as the 1790s.

To see the Wolffian systematisation in full, we must add a further detail to this extract: the distinction between *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*. The first deals with 'the thing' in the most general sense. It is thus
formally equivalent both to the Aristotelian 'first philosophy' and to ontological, as defined above. The second kind of metaphysics, on the other hand, deals with a particular class of things: the unconditioned. There are just three such objects: the world as a whole, the soul, and God. In terms of the schema already set out, then, we have ontology as metaphysica generalis, and rational cosmology, psychology and theology together constituting metaphysica specialis.

Such, then, is the general structure of metaphysics as it confronted Kant. Let us now see his assessment of ontology as a philosophical science. It has seemed to a number of commentators that the Critique of Pure Reason deals a crushing blow to rationalistic metaphysics in every one of its aspects. In the following pages, I shall show that this is a mistaken interpretation of Kant. To this extent, I shall be defending Heidegger's 'ontological' approach to the Kantian philosophy against what I earlier termed the approach 'oriented towards the positive sciences' (above, page 13).

In his article of 1924 referred to earlier, Heinz Heimsoeth said: "The time is probably gone when Kant could be used as the precursor of a purely 'epistemological' and scientific way of philosophizing against every kind of metaphysical position." Heimsoeth was too hopeful. Just such a use of Kant is made in Alasdair MacIntyre's article "Ontology" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967). After noting Kant's pre-critical tolerance of the notion of ontology, MacIntyre goes on to say: "But when Kant came to write the Critique of Pure
Reason, he settled matters with ontology once and for all. The two key passages are the discussion of the second antinomy of pure reason and the refutation of the ontological argument. What is curious about this last observation is that the two passages of the Critique referred to by MacIntyre in support of his claim that Kant "settled matters with ontology once and for all" really have nothing to do with ontology as such. The second antinomy (like the other three antinomies) is directed against rational cosmology. The ontological argument for the existence of God, on the other hand, belongs (despite its conventional name) to rational theology. In neither of these passages does Kant mention ontology — and rightly so, for he is well aware of these distinctions.

While Kant was a revolutionary in the content of his philosophising, he was nevertheless conservative in the formal disposition of the Critique of Pure Reason. For the layout of this work, or at least of its central part, the "Transcendental Logic", follows precisely the divisions of rationalist metaphysics. The "Transcendental Analytic" corresponds to metaphysica generalia: that is, to ontology. The "Transcendental Dialectic" corresponds to metaphysica specialia. Within the "Transcendental Dialectic" we find the expected three divisions: the "Paralogisms", a critique of rational psychology, the "Antinomies", a critique of rational cosmology, and finally the "Ideal", a critique of rational theology. (Kant's major formal innovation lies in the "Transcendental Aesthetic", but we cannot here go into the significance of this.) The passages cited by
MacIntyre as dealing with ontology come from the "Antinomies" and the "Ideal". It is therefore not surprising that they do not in fact concern ontology.

What does Kant think of ontology? If we look at the *Critique* bearing in mind the remarks just made, we can see that he treats ontology a good deal more lightly than he treats the several component parts of metaphysica specialis. For example, he does not convict of particular errors of logical reasoning in the way that he does these others. The paralogisms, the antinomies and the proofs of the existence of God are, for Kant, all illusions. They are errors to be refuted. There is no corresponding disclosure of fallacies committed by ontology. Of course, this is not to guarantee that Kant finds ontology acceptable. Let us see what he does have to say concerning ontology.

Firstly, a passage from the "Architectonic":

*(Transcendental philosophy) treats just the understanding and reason itself in a system of all of the concepts and principles that refer to things in general, without paying attention to objects that may be given. (Ontologia)*

A few lines further on, Kant sets out the 'four main parts' of metaphysics in a way that is too similar to Baumgarten's (above, page 40) to need quoting at length. Now what comes out about Kant's attitude towards ontology in the passage cited? He understands ontology as taking no account of the limitations of human thought, as extending its scope to
'objects in general' rather than just 'objects that may be
given'. In view of this assumption, we need not be surprised to
find Kant making what at first seems to be a dismissive remark
about ontology near the end of the "Transcendental Analytic".
It occurs in the chapter on the distinction between phenomena
and noumena, where Kant is particularly concerned to urge
recognition of the bounds of the understanding.11

Its principles are merely principles of the exposition
of appearances; and the proud name of an ontology,
which presumes to supply synthetic knowledge a priori
of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g.
the principle of causality), must give place to the
modest title of a mere analytic of pure understanding.

Is this a condemnation of ontology? It is, to the
extent that over-confident pride and presumption are the
failings with which Kant charges rationalistic metaphysics in
general, and which he spells out in specific cases in the
treatment of metaphysica specialis in the "Transcendental
Dialectic". On the other hand, what Kant says in the passage
just quoted suggests that ontology may free itself from this
suspicion simply by accepting the Critical setting of its proper
boundaries. Such a course is hardly open to the branches of
metaphysica specialis, in view of the fact that their subject-
matter lies wholly on the farther side of the boundary. In short,
the suggestion is that ontology may make a separate peace with
the Critical philosophy.

That this suggestion not only occurred to Kant himself
but was taken up by him in the years following the publication of the Critique is evident in a number of texts dating from those years. Of particular interest is a passage from Kant's unpublished draft essay of 1791, "On the Advances of Metaphysics since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff." Significantly, this piece is referred to more than once by Heidegger in his writings on Kant. Not surprisingly, the 'advances of metaphysics' discovered by Kant turn out to be those embodied in his own Critique of Pure Reason. The piece is thus a defence of his philosophy: hence my use of this source rather than the later lectures on metaphysics, which are geared rather to Baumgarten's Metaphysica. On ontology Kant has this to say:

Ontology is that science which, as a part of metaphysics, constructs a system of all concepts and principles of the understanding, but only so far as they refer to objects which can be given to the senses, and thus verified by experience. It does not extend to the supersensible; but since this is the final goal of metaphysics, it thus belongs to metaphysics only as a prologue in the entrance chamber or outer court of genuine metaphysics; and it is termed 'transcendental philosophy', since it contains the conditions and first elements of all our knowledge a priori.

What is this but a description of the Critique of Pure Reason, in its positive aspect? Such an identification must be qualified to some extent, for the Critique does not present the fully worked-through system of a priori concepts and principles which would constitute transcendental philosophy. Kant says in the Introduction that "this is still too great a task for the
present." The Critique aims only at laying down "the whole plan, architectonically." Now this seems to make the Critique merely the propaedeutic to a propaedeutic. But we may remark, firstly, that the 1791 passage's seeming tolerance for transcendent metaphysics is only an opening manoeuvre, to be negated as Kant proceeds to defend his Critical standpoint. And secondly, Kant's view of the status of the Critique in relation to transcendental philosophy altered in his later years, as he watched with displeasure his followers' attempts to go beyond the Critique and to construct the system for which it had supposedly been a preparation. The climax came in 1799, when Kant published an "Open Letter" repudiating J.C. Fichte's recently-published Wissenschaftslehre. Here he went as far as to say:

I must remark here that the assumption that I have intended to publish only a propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy and not the actual system of this philosophy is incomprehensible to me. Such an intention could never have occurred to me, since I took the completeness of pure philosophy within the Critique of Pure Reason to be the best indication of the truth of my work.

In Kant's final view, then, the Critique is not only not the propaedeutic to a propaedeutic; it is not even a propaedeutic simpliciter. It is a transcendental philosophy, and it is an ontology.

The arguments I have presented so far in this chapter give general support to Heidegger's interpretation of the Kantian philosophy as one whose aim is to secure ontological
knowledge. Now Heidegger has, as he admits, something of an ulterior motive in urging this viewpoint. His aim, as I explained in Chapter One, was to link the fundamental questions of philosophy with the question of human finitude. It is within the philosophical conception of ontology that Heidegger seeks this link; for ontology is the fundamental stratum of philosophy, the foundation upon which all particular philosophical disciplines are constructed. Here we see another reason for Heidegger's denial (above, page 38) that ontology can be seen as one philosophical discipline amongst others.

In this chapter I plan to give an account of the Heideggerian conception of ontology which will emphasise its links with the Kantian approach to ontology. Accordingly, I shall not introduce the themes of the 'question of Being' and the 'ontological difference' until these links have been sufficiently clarified. Furthermore, these themes will not be treated in a comprehensive way. What concerns us is their relevance to the question of human existence.

In the question about philosophy's link with the essence of man, one side is narrowed down by Heidegger to the finitude in man, and the other to ontology. These are the two elements to be related. The 'narrowing down' is not a matter of settling upon something that is a part within the whole on each side. Rather, to Heidegger, it means a precise specification of what is essential to each side. Finitude is what is essential to man; the interpretation of the three central questions posed by
human reason as the expression of its 'highest interests' points in this direction. That ontology is the primary task of philosophy and the necessary prerequisite of its other tasks is a view that goes back to Aristotle's notion of 'first philosophy'. Heidegger's interpretation of it remains to be seen.

We have already gained some idea of what ontology must consist in within the Kantian context. It must be an exposition of the a priori components of our knowledge of things which are possible objects of experience. Kant calls this 'transcendental' philosophy. This label must be understood in accordance with Kant's basic definition of the term 'transcendental'. "I call all knowledge 'transcendental' which is occupied generally not so much with objects as with our mode of knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be a priori possible."18 But Kant's philosophy has as its most revolutionary feature the move that ensures an a priori basis for knowledge: the move that is commonly referred to by the phrase 'Copernican revolution'.

In his last work, Edmund Husserl argues for a categorisation of every philosophical system as either 'transcendental' or 'objectivist' in character.19 I propose to borrow these expressions in the following discussion. The key to the distinction is that whereas objectivism begins by assuming a world of objects as already given, as already having its reality and truth, transcendental philosophy, on the other hand, does not accept reality as already given, but instead goes further back to ask what makes it possible for reality to have the status of objectivity. In treating this question, it points towards the
role of subjectivity in supplying the categorial structures in terms of which the real world is taken as valid. The Kantian 'Copernican revolution' is a turn to the transcendental orientation. It is clearly Kant that Husserl has in mind in choosing this terminology, despite his frequent appeals to Descartes as a philosophical patron. Kant's development of the notion of 'transcendental philosophy' from the starting-point of the definition of 'transcendental knowledge' just cited is a model for the course of Husserl's own thinking as a professed exponent of 'transcendental' philosophising.

Strictly speaking, Kant describes the Copernican move only as an 'experiment' (Versuch). The analogy between his new philosophical theory and the new astronomical theory of Copernicus is not merely literary; Kant wishes to model his method on the experimental method of the natural scientist. But he does not take his 'experiment' to maintain a merely hypothetical character. He takes it to be a successful experiment, at least as regards the first part of metaphysics (that is, ontology), which is thereby assured "the secure path of a science." (On the other hand, the result is "alarming and apparently very damaging" for the goals of the second part of metaphysics.) Hence the label 'revolution' is not too inappropriate.

It is, I suggest, philosophical Copernicanism (to coin a phrase) that most clearly links Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. It is this that explains what is common to their conceptions of ontology. For Kant, as we have seen, ontology sets out "the
That is, it deals with a special kind of knowledge which has "a complete difference of kind and of origin" (to recall the important passage quoted above, page 27) from all empirical knowledge. Now Heidegger terms this 'ontological knowledge'.

It is ontological knowledge that ontology is concerned to gather. The project of 'laying the foundation of metaphysics' is the project of demonstrating the possibility of ontology, of ontological knowledge. And this is the goal of the Copernican experiment, the criterion of its success. Although Heidegger criticises Kant's conduct of the experiment (in ways we need not go into here) he basically concurs as to its success.

Philosophical Copernicanism makes ontology possible in the only way in which it can be made possible.

How, then, does it do this? By a shift to the viewpoint of transcendental philosophy, which points to "the subjectivity of the subject" as the locus of the categorial structures that figure in a priori knowledge. From this standpoint, "we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them." The actual givenness of the thing is, of course, not our doing; for we are finite and not infinite beings, and our mode of knowledge is that appropriate to a finite being. It is not knowledge that creates its object in the act of cognition itself. Rather, it is dependent upon and conditioned by a presence which it cannot command as an act of pure spontaneity. Yet it can command something - it does have a spontaneous as well as a merely receptive side. In Kant's schema,
the knowledge of a divine being is purely spontaneous. (To fill out the range of possibilities, I would suggest that the view of a philosophical objectivist in Husserl's sense must be that human knowledge, at its most fundamental level, is purely receptive.) Now 'what we put into things' is misleading if it suggests that the things are first given, and only later have something "put into them" by our mind. On the contrary, they are not given to us in knowledge until subjectivity has already done its work in applying its categories.

The repudiation of objectivism in favour of the transcendental viewpoint is made most explicitly in the course of Sein und Zeit in Heidegger's treatment of the category of 'reality'. Here he states that as an ontological category, applicable to things in the world, "reality has no priority"; and explains: "In the ordering of ontological systems of foundation, and of possible categorial and existential demonstration, reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care." If 'referring back' of the category of reality is the hallmark of transcendental philosophising (above, page 48), then this passage firmly places Heidegger within that area. But since the text quoted involves concepts that have not yet been touched upon, it might be better to approach Heidegger's transcendental viewpoint from another, more immediately accessible, angle.

Like Kant, Heidegger sometimes presents major features of his philosophical point of view by referring to the difference between modern science and its older counterparts, and by trying to draw a philosophical moral from the contrast.
His clearest exposition of this line of thinking occurs in the 1935-6 lecture course on Kant published as What is a Thing? 31 Here Heidegger rebuts some common ideas about the distinguishing feature of modern science. He denies that it consists in an orientation towards 'facts' rather than 'concepts', or in the adoption of the experimental method, or again in the use of calculating and measuring operations. He does, however, agree that the difference is appropriately expressed in the application of the word 'mathematical'. Yet this agreement with the common view is only superficial. Through a somewhat contrived piece of etymological exegesis, Heidegger gives an interpretation of the concept of the 'mathematical' that goes far beyond what we normally call 'mathematics' — as he freely admits. 32 I shall not trace through the steps of this exegesis, but merely set out its result.

The mathematical, in Heidegger's interpretation, is what we know in advance of the objects that we meet with in science, and indeed in everyday life. "Therefore we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us." 33 What we call mathematics is a paradigm example. We can, for instance, count things only if we already have a grasp of numbers and their applicability to the real world. But this is only one case of the 'mathematical' in Heidegger's interpretation. All kinds of principles play an advance role in our knowledge of nature. The characteristic feature of modern science, in Heidegger's view, is its conscious recognition of the place of these preliminary blueprints in
empirical knowledge, and its direct treatment of them in their own right. He analyses Newton's laws of motion as an illustrative case. Sketched out in advance in what Heidegger terms an 'axiomatic' fashion, the basic plan determines the character of the phenomena that will come to be taken into account. It serves to ensure the validity of methods of investigation which rely upon the ability to calculate and measure. These methods are, of course, what constitute the element in modern science that is 'mathematical' in the stricter sense. Heidegger's point is that the use of such a method presupposes some kind of uniformity amongst the objects to be dealt with. The function of the modern conceptions of space, time and motion is to provide this uniformity.

Without spelling out further details of Heidegger's account of modern 'mathematical' science, one can see its strong links with the Copernican orientation in philosophy. It is not surprising to find Heidegger, in a later part of this work, remarking that it is in the Kantian Critical philosophy that "the 'mathematical' in the fundamental sense first comes to its unfolding." The theory of modern science set out by Heidegger closely parallels Kant's doctrine of 'pure natural science'. Yet this is a corollary to the Kantian 'transcendental philosophy' itself. So too in Heidegger's theory one that needs only to be generalised and extended to cover the whole range of our dealings with the world in order to become a theory of ontological knowledge.

Something has already been indicated here of a central
aspect of the ontological knowledge that has as its subject-matter the preliminary conceptual framework underlying the ordinary course of experience of the world. This is the indispensability of ontological knowledge — though here it must be specified that 'ontological knowledge' is not the knowledge of the philosopher engaged in the study of ontology, but rather a kind of knowledge attributable to all of those subjects whose knowledge of the world rests upon a prior categorial 'blueprint' of the kind already described. Heidegger also calls this an 'understanding', and this is a more appropriate term to the extent that it perhaps does not suggest conscious and explicit formulation in the way that 'knowledge' tends to. It may be a recognition of this connotation of the term 'knowledge', and of a similar one attaching to 'ontological' itself, that leads Heidegger to speak of a 'pre-ontological understanding' in this context. The questions that arise in this respect will be dealt with more fully in Chapter Four. For the present, the term 'ontological knowledge' will continue to be used, with the qualifications indicated above.

It is a fundamental thesis of transcendental philosophy that ontological knowledge is wholly indispensable for empirical knowledge of things, or as Heidegger terms it, 'ontic' knowledge. Ontological knowledge is what makes ontic knowledge possible. The phrase 'what makes ... possible' has already occurred many times in the course of this discussion, and will do so again. It is the locution that expresses the essential thrust of Heidegger's ontology. But it is also the key to the notion of transcendental
philosophy (see above, page 48). If ontology is the investigation of the basis of the possibility of our knowledge in general, and if we accept that a central objective of the Kantian Critique is to secure, in turn, a basis for the possibility of ontology, then we can understand quite clearly what Kant meant when he described the Critique as containing "the metaphysics of metaphysics." On the interpretation I have suggested, this phrase is not a mere quip, but rather an intelligible and accurate description of the programme of the Critique. If it is taken as equivalent to 'the ontology of ontology', it may well serve also as an expression of Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology', as we shall see when that concept is touched upon.

How does this identification of ontology with transcendental philosophy fit in with the Aristotelian side of Heidegger's idea of ontology, mentioned earlier? The connection lies, I think, largely in the interpretation of ontology as a theory or doctrine of categories: a Kategorienlehre. Kantian ontology is a theory of a priori categories as much as of a priori knowledge. Kant links the two very closely, and in his alteration of his definition of 'transcendental' between the First and Second Editions of the Critique he replaces one formulation by the other, clearly not taking this to imply any substantive shift in meaning.

Aristotelian 'first philosophy' is also a science of categories. Here, though, we must take account of a special feature of the Aristotelian conception of ontology, that, transmitted in several ways to Heidegger, makes a significant...
reappearance in Sein und Zeit. This is the notion of 'regional ontology'. The term is one used by Husserl, but the idea is much older. Heidegger borrows the expression in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. The concept, though not the label of 'regional ontology', occurs prominently on an early work of Heidegger: his book of 1916 on the Kategorienlehre of Duns Scotus. This work is essentially a commentary on the Grammatica Speculativa of Duns Scotus - a work which, as has since transpired, is not in fact by Duns Scotus. Our interest here is not in the main course of the commentary, but in certain introductory and concluding passages in which Heidegger supplies an insight into his own thinking. The first of these is a passage in which Heidegger sets out lucidly the meaning of 'category theory'.

The particular sciences study various objective fields, or even the same one considered from different points of view, 'side by side'. From our point of view, each of these objective fields is recognized as belonging to determinate domains of reality. And to these domains correspond, in accordance with their specification, a determinate constitution and structure. We thus find ourselves faced with a task which is customarily summed up by the term 'category theory'.

Category theory, then, is a task or a programme. Its subject-matter is the fundamental categories that constitute the original 'blueprints' for the various 'domains' of reality. This implies a whole series of more or less distinct philosophical investigations. One is reminded of Aristotle's statement that "there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of
And, indeed, the whole spirit of the quoted passage is that of Aristotle's conception of the business of philosophy. It may be that the Aristotelian background for Heidegger's thinking derives ultimately from his early education at a Jesuit seminary at Konstanz. On the other hand, Heidegger is on record as tracing his earliest interest in philosophy back to his reading, in 1907, of a work by Franz Brentano on the metaphysics of Aristotle. The Aristotelian influence of Brentano (himself the product of a seminary education) must also have been felt through Husserl, the pupil of Brentano and teacher of Heidegger. Though Husserl came to reject the unbroken allegiance of the later Brentano to the Aristotelian background, describing his writings as "distilled scholasticism", his own thinking nevertheless retained elements drawn from this source. One of these is the notion of 'regional ontology'.

That this Aristotelian influence on the thinking of Heidegger was not merely passing but far-reaching is seen in the occurrence of a passage in Sein und Zeit which almost repeats word-for-word the formulations of the 1916 passage just quoted. The totality of beings, Heidegger claims, consists of "various domains", in accordance with which it can undergo "a laying-open and delimiting of determinate subject-matters." As examples of these domains Heidegger mentions history, nature, space, life, language - and human existence. One might claim that all of these areas of reality are dealt with by some positive science or other. Heidegger's point is that the setting-up of the basic subject-matter (which will usually have occurred in a relatively
rough-and-ready fashion, in ordinary pre-scientific experience) is something that is prior to any results gained by positive science. He writes: "Basic concepts are the determinations in terms of which the subject-matter underlying all of the thematic objects of a science amounts to an understanding which precedes and guides all positive investigation."50 The basic identity between this statement and the interpretation given by Heidegger of the 'mathematical' character of modern natural science is evident enough. So, too, are its links with the Kantian doctrine of a priori concepts and principles, and with Heidegger's reading of this doctrine as a theory of 'ontological knowledge'.

In the present context, Heidegger goes on to speak of a 'preliminary investigation' of the basic concepts underlying any science. "Such research must run ahead of the positive sciences; and it can do so. The work of Plato and Aristotle is proof of this."51 Heidegger pointedly contrasts this research to that philosophy of science (to use the current term) which, as he puts it, "limps along after" a science.52

But Heidegger also adds something that is definitely not present in the Aristotelian picture: a recognition of historical change in the basic concepts of science. He cites cases of modern sciences which have gone, or are undergoing, radical revisions at the most fundamental conceptual level: physics, biology, the historical sciences, theology, and, with the conflict between formalists and intuitionists, even mathematics.53 Though Heidegger does not say so, one may guess that an awareness of this kind of theoretical ferment in the
positive sciences is a strong factor in the adoption of a programme of radical renewal for ontology itself. At any rate, it is clear that whatever Aristotelianism is present in Sein und Zeit is there in a historised form.

Even in the 1916 work on Duns Scotus we find strong indications of a new development of the basic Aristotelian approach to the categories defining particular areas of reality. Heidegger rejects the idea that the Aristotelian categories have universal scope. He writes:

Our project of a categorial characterisation of the domains of reality, and our (still preliminary) viewpoint, have a much more extended scope, in such a way that the Aristotelian categories appear only as a class of one definite domain, and not as the categories pure and simple.

At the present stage of the investigation, he adds, we do not know whether there are in fact different domains of reality in this sense. This is mere speculation. How, then, can the uncertainty be settled? Not, in Heidegger's view, by any a priori deduction. Only an ostensive pointing-out can do what is needed. And because of this, it is impossible to predict at the beginning just how many distinct domains will be found, or what their characters will be. Heidegger gives little explanation of his rejection of a priori deduction here: he merely states that in the face of matters of fact (Tatsächlichkeiten) appeal must be made to some kind of direct acquaintance which leaves no room for doubt, semblance or illusion.
should, I think, be seen in the context of Heidegger's conception of the phenomenological method, which will be discussed in a later chapter. It is at least clear at this stage that Heidegger's programme of category theory involves a commitment to a particular philosophical method: in Sein und Zeit this thesis reappears as one that is announced in the maxim, "Ontology is possible only as phenomenology."57

The project of category theory faces another problem: where are we to start? Heidegger's answer in his 1916 study of Duns Scotus provides another anticipation of the standpoint of Sein und Zeit. The starting-point of the investigation, he says, should be what is most familiar and lies closest to us - "the empirical reality within which we live our everyday lives."58

Having said this, however, Heidegger immediately goes on to take a different path, reverting to a much more recognisably Aristotelian and Scholastic approach to category theory. This is regrettable from our present point of view, for a working-out of the plan of starting with the everyday mode of experience would have shown a close analogy to the approach adopted by Heidegger eleven years later in Sein und Zeit. For there the primary access to human existence is taken to be its everyday form. 59

Heidegger claims that although this is what is closest and most familiar to us, it nevertheless has never received proper attention from the point of view of ontological investigation. He quotes Augustine's remarks in the Confessions on the difficulty of getting a clear view of what lies closest of all things to me: namely myself. This is, perhaps, a common enough point; but it
forms, in this case, part of a general thesis about philosophical knowledge as such, as we shall see later in discussing Heidegger's conception of the phenomenological method.

In Heidegger's opinion, the reason for both the neglect of 'everydayness' and the difficulty in coming to terms with it once the need to do so is recognised, lies in the peculiar vagueness and apparent lack of character of this everyday state. But Heidegger replies that such indeterminateness is "not nothing, but rather a positive phenomenal characteristic of this being." At this stage, we need not go further into the actual analysis of everydayness; the purpose of these observations has been primarily to show how the approach of *Sein und Zeit* can be traced back to Heidegger's earlier treatment of an Aristotelian ontology.

The idea of different 'domains' of reality, each to be investigated by philosophy in terms of its specific categories, is carried over to *Sein und Zeit*, where, for instance, one can find what is clearly a regional ontology of the realm of instruments. The thesis that the number and structures of these domains is to be determined not by a logical a priori deduction, but rather by some kind of ostensive process is, as I have already remarked, an earlier version of the later description of phenomenology as the only method of investigation appropriate to ontology. A third link is the specification of 'everydayness' as the point of departure for the whole project. And finally, a fourth link is one that comes out most clearly in the concluding section of Heidegger's study of Duns Scotus.
Here Heidegger writes: "Categories are the most general determinations of objects. But object and objectivity, as such, have meaning only for a subject. It is within the subject that objectivity is constructed through judgement." Hence, he concludes, the theory of categories amounts to the theory of judgement—"as it did with both Aristotle and Kant." Now in Sein und Zeit little is heard of the topic of judgement, but much is heard (though not in this same form) of the derivative character of objectivity as such. (See above, page 51.) Even if the subject is no 'I think', no merely knowing subject, as we shall see, the basic move of transcendental philosophy is still made in Heidegger's thinking: the move from the categories as they appear in the object itself to a 'constructing' source which lies outside the sphere of objectivity. In other words, Sein und Zeit may be seen as carrying on the Copernican experiment of Kant.

Husserl has already been mentioned as a mediating link between Heidegger and the Aristotelian conception of ontology. A point concerning the use of the term 'essence' needs to be made in this respect. In Husserl's 'regional ontologies', the systems of categories which are the objects of philosophical investigation are accorded, in conformity with traditional terminology, the title of 'essences'. Hence we find Husserl speaking of "the pure regional essence" as the correlate of any regional ontology. And in his general theory of the phenomenological method, Husserl constantly takes the subject-matter corresponding to this method to be the realm of essences.

With Heidegger this is not the case, even during the
period of his explicit self-identification with phenomenology. The most significant instance of the use of this term in Sein und Zeit finds it enclosed in inverted commas: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence," (These inverted commas are omitted in the translation of Macquarrie and Robinson.) Heidegger has a particular reason for writing in this way. He intends to indicate that the term essence is not to be understood along the lines of the traditional conception of essentia. Nor is 'existence' to be identified with existentia; having pointed that out in the lines immediately preceding the formula just quoted, Heidegger feels no need to give further indications of the special meaning that this word has taken on in Sein und Zeit. In any case, what is said about 'existence' in the course of the work makes this particular divergence abundantly clear. That is not so much the case with 'essence'. In his "Letter on Humanism" of 1946, Heidegger takes pains to repudiate Jean-Paul Sartre's definition of 'existentialism' in terms of the maxim: "Existence precedes essence." For he sees in the formulation a regression to the conceptions of traditional metaphysics. An interpretation along these lines of Heidegger's statement that "the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence" might merely turn it into a paradox; and although Heidegger occasionally feels obliged to adopt some seemingly paradoxical mode of expression, the paradox is one to be resolved and eliminated in due course. An alternative interpretation of this statement along traditional lines might be one that assimilates it to the traditional description of God as a being whose
essence involves existence. But this would contradict Heidegger's fundamental conception of human existence as finite. It is, therefore, an unacceptable line of interpretation.

What, then, does Heidegger mean by 'essence' in those cases when he does use the word? Sometimes it bears little or no real meaning: thus in the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger writes: "That which man is, which in the traditional language of metaphysics is called the 'essence' of man, lies in his ex-sistence." The 'essence of man' here means merely 'what man is'. The term 'nature' is also used at times with minimal connotation (as in my own title). As a comment on cases like these, the following remarks of Alexandre Koyré seem to me to be essentially correct:

The terms 'nature' and 'essence' are vague enough; if you define 'nature' as it used to be defined in scholastic philosophy, then you have a being determined in all its operations, and all its actions flow from its determinations. It is clear that, in this sense, the Heideggerian Dasein is neither a 'nature' nor an 'essence'. It is true, nevertheless, that Dasein does possess an essential structure... There is an essential finitude; and in that sense I would use the term 'essence' without discomfiture.

I wish now to suggest that there is another use of the term 'essence' in Heidegger, and that it is one that does involve connotations of a specifically theoretical kind. As a primary text I refer to a passage in the 1930 essay, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit", which gives something very close to a definition
of this term. "'essence'" writes Heidegger, "is understood here as the ground of the inner possibility of whatever is immediately and generally accepted as familiar." Here we can detect another version of the formulation 'what makes ... possible'. This is what was said earlier (above, pages 54-55) to be "the key to 'transcendental' philosophy", and at the same time to be an expression of one of the leading themes in Heidegger's ontology. It may be suggested, therefore, that it is the 'transcendental' context rather than the Aristotelian one that is indicated in Heidegger's use of the term 'essence' in contexts where it acts as more than a mere label for general subject-matter. Yet this is not stated in a clear-cut way in the quoted definition. If the essence of a thing is taken merely as its specific properties, as those of its characteristics which are indispensable to its being the kind of thing it is, then these may be described as 'the basis of the possibility' of the various other properties of the thing. This is a line of thinking that appears in the Husserlian theory of essences. Nevertheless, the contents of the essays of Heidegger which bear the term 'essence' in their titles tend to bear out the stronger interpretation suggested above; especially in the case of the essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1929) which consists largely in a Kantian 'transcendental deduction' of the principle of sufficient reason.

A number of motifs have so far been discussed in this survey of the Heideggerian notion of ontology and its major sources. One has been left for last: the notion of Being. Here
I shall follow the convention of using the capital letter to distinguish the terms 'Being' (in German: \textit{Sein}) from that which 'has' Being: the 'being' (in German: \textit{das Seiende}). The distinction between Being and the being is what Heidegger terms the 'ontological difference'. Heidegger has remarked, "It is probably not accidental that the 'ontological difference' cannot be adequately stated in either English or French." Nevertheless, we must make some attempt to do so, and the convention used by Macquarrie and Robinson in their translation of \textit{Sein und Zeit} seems to me to be the most successful, since it does not involve the coining of strange-sounding technical terms as equivalents for Heidegger's comparatively simple and colloquial expressions. Again, I shall follow Macquarrie and Robinson in taking over Heidegger's term 'Dasein' as it is, in referring to the kind of Being that belongs to a particular being: the human being.

Fortunately, our overall purpose here does not require anything like an exhaustive treatment of this most difficult aspect of Heidegger's philosophy. The purpose of the present chapter is primarily to secure the perspective within which the theory of the human being contained in \textit{Sein und Zeit} is to be seen. That this perspective is that of ontology, and of what Heidegger calls the 'question of Being' (\textit{Seinsfrage}), stands out from the very beginning of the work. On the first page Heidegger states, "The concrete working-out of the question of the meaning of 'Being' is the aim of the following work." And it is made equally clear by Heidegger that his long and detailed analysis of
human existence is undertaken only as "the first requirement in
the question about Being." Here a problematic question is
raised: the question whether an inquiry into human existence
undertaken for its own sake would take a different course from the
same inquiry undertaken (as it is by Heidegger) with this further
purpose. Is it not possible that this subordination of the
inquiry distorts the whole analysis - for example, by enforcing
a selective treatment of some aspects only of the subject-
matter?

The answer, I think, is that in the present case this
charge is not justified. It is true that at one stage Heidegger
himself does make some such suggestion. He states that the
further aim of his analysis of human existence 'determines its
limits', and that for this reason the analysis cannot serve as
'a philosophically adequate basis' for a philosophical anthropol-
ogy. He concludes: "As far as a possible anthropology is
concerned, or the ontological foundations of such an anthropology,
the following interpretation provides only some 'fragments',
though not inessential ones." Now this last phrase points to
the crux of the problem. Objections to the incompleteness of the
account given should reasonably be proportioned to the degree to
which it leaves out what is essential and central to the subject-
matter. But what Heidegger says here hints that on this basis,
his account is not, after all, open to objections of this kind.

This problem is really a repetition of the Kantian
question of the relation between the leading questions of
metaphysics, on the one hand, and the question, "What is man?" on
the other. We have already seen how Heidegger redefines this problem by transforming it into the question of the relation between ontology and the finitude in man. Now a further step in his redefinition can be made. For 'ontology' we must now read 'the question of Being'. As for the other side, what is essential to the human being, what determines his character as a finite being, is identified by Heidegger with the 'kind of Being' possessed by him. This he calls 'Dasein': literally 'Being-there'. The Kantian question is thus transformed into the question of the relation between Dasein and the question of Being.

Heidegger takes a peculiar relation to Being to be the basic core of what it means to be a human being: this thesis, whatever the difficulty in grasping its sense, is one that persists continuously in Heidegger's thinking from *Sein und Zeit* onwards, despite other changes of direction in his philosophy.

In *Sein und Zeit* it is linked with the choice of strategy in the approach to the question of Being. The approach is to be made from the starting-point that is most accessible and lies closest to us; and this is ourselves. But it would be pointless to start here if there were no reason to suppose that a path leading on in the right direction could be followed. It is the thesis just described that gives this assurance, and so ensures the validity of the starting-point.

Heidegger's later writings, in which this line of approach to the question of Being is made far less explicitly than in *Sein und Zeit*, are not our primary concern here. Yet they have, for this reason, strengthened the impression mentioned
above (page 67), that Heidegger's analysis of the human being is so much a secondary matter for him that its significance is greatly diminished by the 'limited' character depicted by Heidegger himself (above, page 67). Yet it is also Heidegger himself who has rebutted this view, as recently as 1969. During a television interview, Heidegger was asked by the interviewer, Richard Wisser, whether his preoccupation with the question of Being reflected a lack of concern with "the conditio humana, the Being of man in society." Heidegger immediately rejected this idea as a "great misunderstanding", pointing out that in his philosophical thinking the question of Being presupposes "a determination of the essence of man". He summed up: "One cannot inquire into Being without inquiring into the essence of man."

I have now to offer a tentative elucidation of the Heideggerian problematic of Being, keeping within the limits set by the function of this elucidation as part of the general description of Heidegger's theory of human existence. One qualification of the account offered here should be made. It is this: I do not propose to go into the distinction between the notion of 'the Being of the being' and that of 'Being' tout court. The distinction is made in the work of 1935, Einführung in die Metaphysik. There Heidegger uses it to urge an objection to (traditional) metaphysics: the objection that it suffers from a "forgetfulness of Being." He considers a reply to this charge: "insofar as metaphysics raises the question why there are beings rather than nothing, it does go 'beyond beings' (meta ta physika). But, Heidegger says, even if metaphysics does go 'beyond' beings
to their Being, to do this is by no means to inquire into "Being as such." (Even this concession is withdrawn later in the work, when Heidegger states that traditional metaphysics "remains essentially 'physics'.") In Sein und Zeit no such separation of 'Being as such' from 'the Being of the being' is to be found. On the contrary, there it is argued that because Being is the Being of beings, the way to gain access to it is through beings. "These are, so to speak, interrogated as regards their Being," Heidegger writes. Since this is a point that determines the whole methodology of Sein und Zeit, we can, I think, take it that no significant difference between 'the Being of beings' and 'Being as such' enters into the analysis presented there. Accordingly I shall not introduce one here.

The distinction that we are faced with here is that between the being and what makes it a being: its Being. It is really a distinction between two different levels of thinking, of talk and of knowledge: a difference 'both of kind and of origin', to recall again the Kantian phrase. Heidegger calls knowledge of Being 'ontological', and knowledge of the being 'ontic' (alternatively, 'ontical'; in German, ontisch). It is not hard to see that these labels are arbitrary. Mere inspection of them tells us nothing about the difference in their uses. There is no more reason to distinguish between the 'ontic' and the 'ontological' than between the 'psychic' and the 'psychological' - to pick an analogy with a pair of terms which do have the same use. But in addition, if a distinction is to be sought here, one's first guess at its nature might be that one
term refers to the subject-matter and another to the science which studies it. But this is certainly not what Heidegger means. As a further point, 'ontological' is etymologically a misleading term for the kind of inquiry or knowledge whose object is not the being but rather Being itself. Its derivation suggests just the opposite. If traditional ontology has, as Heidegger suggests, directed its attention towards the being rather than its Being, this might represent a failure to penetrate into the philosophical problem, but it does not involve any misunderstanding of the meaning of 'ontology'. It is, indeed, for this reason that Heidegger drops this expression in his later works as the title for the philosophical project he is engaged in.81

Much of what has already been said in the present chapter on the Heideggerian conception of ontology can now be restated in terms of the 'ontological difference'. We can, for example, separate the inquiry into Being in its most general sense from inquiries into the 'kinds' or 'modes' of Being which correspond to some class or species of being. Heidegger calls this "ontology taken in the widest sense."82 It is clearly contrasted to 'regional ontologies', in Husserl's terminology. These in turn are to be distinguished from the corresponding 'ontic' investigations, which are directed towards beings rather than their mode of Being. Heidegger claims that just as the positive sciences rest upon assumptions which are to be revealed by regional ontologies, so too these are themselves dependent upon ontology in the general sense. He writes: "Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, contrasted with the ontic
inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains itself naive and opaque if its investigations into the Being of the being leave undiscovered the meaning of Being in general. The context shows, I think, that the contrast drawn here is that between particular ontologies and ontology in general, not the problematic distinction between 'the Being of the being' and 'Being as such'. What Heidegger is saying, then, is that regional ontologies are grounded in a general ontology, which treats the Being, not of this or that particular kind of being, but of 'the being' as such.

Since more will be said in the next chapter of this notion of 'kinds' or 'modes' of Being, and more in the fourth chapter on the relation between Dasein and the question of Being, these points will not be gone into further here. Instead I shall attempt to sketch out in general terms the Heideggerian approach to Being, and, in particular, Heidegger's claim that the question "What is Being?" is a legitimate and meaningful one.

Sometimes Heidegger puts the question in the form: "What is the meaning (Sinn) of Being?". But he insists that this is not a question about the meaning of the word 'Being', answerable in terms of its grammar and etymology. To undertake the inquiry along these lines would be like trying to discover the nature of atomic processes by a grammatical study of the word 'atom', instead of the appropriate and necessary physical experiments. It is important to make this clear, because Heidegger's philosophical method does involve close attention to words as such. He does not regard words as mere labels whose
function is to facilitate our everyday dealings with things and people. Words express a relation to things which can be (as Heidegger puts it) either an authentic or an inauthentic one. And in philosophy as such, Heidegger holds that a study of words which (in his estimation) are of particular value as expressing an authentic relation to important phenomena is of great value. Yet, as his analogy with the investigation of atomic processes shows, he has no interest in the study of logical grammar as an end in itself. He does not regard philosophical problems as arising only on the level of linguistic expression, or as being soluble merely on this level. Thus the question of the meaning of Being is not a question about the origins or grammars of words like 'is', 'was' and 'be'. Heidegger does discuss, in his Einführung in die Metaphysik, the etymological roots of these three family variants of our terminology for Being. But he uses his exegeses merely as 'clues' for answering a question directed not towards words but towards 'the subject-matter itself'.

The question about the 'meaning of Being' is the same as the question about Being. This way of putting the question is designed to stress that what is wanted is an explication, an account which will give us a grasp, an understanding of what is expressed in this term 'Being'. Of course, we must start with some indication, however vague, of the object of the inquiry. A method frequently used by Heidegger is that of contrast with 'the being'. This method is prominent in his well-known lecture of 1929 entitled "What is metaphysics?". This lecture is about
Being. Its aim is to show how the metaphysical question 'Why are there beings rather than nothing?' takes one 'beyond' beings to their Being (as remarked above, page 69). Yet the whole discussion is dominated by the notion of 'nothing'. Heidegger's use of this term has puzzled some of his readers and repelled others. Yet what he says is made much more meaningful when one recalls that the sense of 'nothing' is defined in exactly the same way as that of 'Being': by contrast with 'the being'. (It is because of this that I do not follow the practice of most translators in capitalising 'nothing': this, I think, incorrectly suggests that the term is to be understood in contrast to 'Being'.) Nothing is the 'other' of the being. Heidegger is even disinclined to pose the question 'What is nothing?' for fear that it should appear that nothing is, contradictorily, some peculiar kind of entity.87 That some of his readers have accused him of holding that view shows how necessary this care is - and also, perhaps, how ineffective it is in the face of hasty judgement. (For example, A.J. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic, claims that Heidegger "bases his metaphysics on the assumption that 'nothing' is a name which is used to denote something peculiarly mysterious."88) Now Being is also the 'other' of the being: this is the meaning of the 'ontological difference'. Does it follow that Being and nothing are the same? Not exactly: Heidegger denies that they are simply to be identified as one and the same (einerlei).99 His point is rather that they must appear to be the same when seen from the point of view of the being - that is, when defined in the way
The apparent sameness of Being and nothing is most important for Heidegger. He takes it to explain the difficulty in raising and attempting to answer the question of the meaning of Being. In his later writings, Heidegger is fond of quoting Nietzsche's derogatory remarks on the topic of the concept of Being: Nietzsche describes it as "an empty fiction", as "the last smoke of evaporating reality."90 Heidegger comments that this judgement is 'wholly true',91 yet he means something very different from Nietzsche. For Heidegger, the emptiness of the notion of Being is a fact about us, the thinkers. It expresses our inability to go 'beyond the being' to its Being. (And this is, in turn, linked by Heidegger to a wide-ranging view of Western civilisation, which we shall not touch upon here.) It is our reluctance to make this "leap" away from the familiar world of entities into a realm requiring a quite different kind of thinking that makes the notion of Being an empty one for us.92 Because of this, we remain at the viewpoint of the being. But as we have said, from this point of view Being appears to be the same as nothing, because the relation of contrast to the being appears to be the same for both. Hence Being is identified with nothing - 'nothing' here being understood as something purely negative (das Nichtige).93 However, Heidegger writes:

Instead of hastily giving way to such empty ingenuity, and abandoning the enigmatic ambiguity of nothing, we must rather prepare ourselves for the unique task of experiencing in nothing the vastness (Welträumigkeit) of that which gives
every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself.

In the last few pages, I have been referring to works written after Sein und Zeit. I have tried to sketch out, very briefly, the context of the question of Being which is set out by Heidegger more directly there than in Sein und Zeit. My description has inevitably omitted many points. I hope, though, that it has conveyed some indication of the general mode of thinking that is involved in the raising of this uniquely difficult question by Heidegger. To the extent that this has been achieved, some understanding of the ontological perspective of Sein und Zeit will have been provided. As was mentioned earlier (above, page 72), some points involved here have been reserved for treatment in the next two chapters, because of their special significance within the context of Sein und Zeit. The theme of the 'ontological difference' will recur later in the more restricted setting of human existence. Some other ideas touched upon in the present chapter will also reappear. However, the main purpose of this outline of the ontological programme has been that of indicating the wider perspective within which Heidegger himself wishes us to see the theories of Sein und Zeit.
CHAPTER THREE

EXISTENTIAL THINKING
One of the reasons for the importance of Heidegger in modern philosophy is that he stands at the confluence of two major philosophical tendencies: phenomenology and existential philosophy. The topic of Heidegger's phenomenology will be treated in the next chapter. But even in making these preliminary remarks, one must take account of a difficulty. The difficulty arises from a striking difference in the uses of these two expressions, 'phenomenology' and 'existential philosophy'. On the one hand, there can be little objection to applying the term 'phenomenology' to the philosophical method used by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, at least insofar as this term is repeatedly deployed by Heidegger himself in characterising his own thinking. On the other hand, he nowhere describes his philosophy as 'existentialist'. This is, of course, not in itself sufficient to make the use of the term invalid in this context. After all, it is certainly the case that most commentators have located the thinking of Sein und Zeit in the particular philosophical tradition that takes in such writers as Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Sartre. And this is the philosophy known under the title of 'existentialism'.

However, the question is not as simple as this. For there are certain problems in this categorisation: some of a general kind, and some directed specifically towards its application to Heidegger. The first one is an objection to the word 'existentialism'. The objection concerns a misleading implication which the similarity of this word to such common philosophical labels as 'Marxism', 'positivism', 'Thomism', and
so on, gives rise to. Any word of this sort, any '-ism'
expression, tends to suggest a philosophical movement or school
of some kind. It refers to a way of thought that is shared by
a number of thinkers who see themselves as engaged in a common
pursuit, working for a common cause. Of course, some '-isms'
would be likely to bear this implication more than others.
Marxism, for instance, is by its very nature a self-conscious
movement, all the more so since its ideas "merely express, in
general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class
struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very
eyes."
Again, supporters of the so-called 'philosophia
perennis' consider their philosophical thinking to be a contrib­
ution to an enduring school of thought.

The case with existential philosophy is different; in
fact, it is just the opposite. This is why the implication of
the term 'existentialism' is a false one. The existentialist
cannot look upon his kind of philosophising as a joint enterprise
or even as a common pursuit. For him, thinking is bound up with
the individual thinker in a way that forbids the individual's
simply taking over another thinker's findings as his own. Not
only can the individual not derive his thinking from an outside
source, but equally - and this follows immediately from what has
just been said - he cannot pass on his conclusions as ready-made
data for the use of some other individual. These points imply,
I think, that existential philosophy cannot be a philosophical
movement in the way that the other philosophies mentioned above
are; even though commentators as sympathetic as Paul Tillich
have referred to it as such. For the present, the problem does not concern the existentialist approach to interpersonal relations generally. There is an important problem for existential philosophy to that area: the problem whether its basic assumptions prevent it from supplying any coherent account of the social existence of individuals; but I shall consider that in a later chapter. For the moment I am concerned only with the existentialist conception of philosophical thinking itself. I have argued that this is such that the label 'existentialism' is liable to mislead. Now the difficulty could be avoided in two ways: by stipulating that this term is not to be understood as analogous to others that apparently resemble it, or else just by avoiding the use of the term. I shall follow the latter course. I shall speak instead of 'existential philosophy' (or 'existential thinking') and of the 'philosophy of existence': the latter term corresponding to the German term Existenzphilosophie.

Another terminological point is related to these remarks. I have used the word 'existential' as if it were more or less equivalent to 'existentialist'. Paul Tillich, however, makes a sharp distinction. For him, the term 'existential' "points to the universally human involvement in matters of genuine concern", while the term 'existentialist' "points to a philosophical movement which fights the predominance of essentialism in modern thought, be it idealistic or naturalistic essentialism."

What Tillich says about the term 'existentialist' is debatable from the viewpoint set out above. The contrast he draws with 'essentialism' moves one's thinking, in addition, into
the area of the traditional metaphysical concepts of *essentia*
and *existentia*; and we have already seen Heidegger's repudiation
of this association (above, page 63). But the definition of
'existential' that Tillich puts forward in the passage quoted
is, it seems to me, equally unsound. If 'existential' thinking
is defined through its 'involvement in matters of genuine
concern', then we may begin to wonder whether - to paraphrase
Kant - at this rate, everything will not belong to existential
thinking. At any rate, any philosophy may well claim to be as
'existential' as any other. In that case, the phrase 'existential
philosophy' becomes a mere tautology, of no use in picking out
any one particular kind of philosophical thinking. It is of
some interest that Heidegger claims this about the term
*Lebensphilosophie*, which, he remarks, says no more than does a
phrase like 'the botany of plants'. The context leaves it a
little unclear, however, whether he is talking about what the
business of philosophy necessarily is, or rather about what it
ought to be. As for 'existential', it seems to me a mistake to
make terms like this more generally acceptable by depriving them
of clearly definable roles. I shall come to the proper function
of this term shortly.

I referred earlier to the tradition of existential
philosophy as one taking in such thinkers as Kierkegaard,
Jaspers and Sartre. Here another, and more serious, difficulty
arises. To begin with, it is easy enough to point out that the
label of 'existentialism', as commonly used, is a vague and
ill-defined one. It has been used to cover a great variety of
thinkers and writers from Heraclitus to Herman Melville. How can we hope to encapsulate in any single definition something that is common to such diverse figures? Is not any attempt to do so bound to lead only to the sort of diffuse generality just criticised? First of all, the term 'existentialist' is far from being alone amongst philosophical expressions in being subject to misuse. Such terms as 'idealism' and 'materialism' are notoriously put to uses very different from their strictly philosophical applications. It is common for labels of this sort to be applied to various quite non-philosophical ways of thinking. Yet it might be replied that, even granting this point, the term 'existentialist' differs from these others: for they at least retain a definable philosophical sense, by reference to which their misuse can be corrected. Can this be said of 'existentialist'?

This leaves us faced with a challenge. Our task is to explain what kind of philosophical thinking we mean. At this point the real force of the objection emerges. For, it may be argued, is not there something in the very nature of existential philosophy that prevents us from giving it a single definition? We ordinarily specify a philosophy in terms of its characteristic tenets. If we are asked to explain what we mean by 'Marxist', we can do so by specifying what one must believe in order to be a Marxist. But can we do this for 'existentialist'? The problem is that existential philosophers have differed widely in their beliefs concerning religion, political philosophy, and other topics. Seeing this, one might attempt a methodological
approach, taking existential philosophy to be a way of thinking, a style rather than a fixed body of philosophising. Yet here too a similar difficulty arises. For the existentialists are, if anything, even further apart in their philosophical methods than in their doctrines. Kierkegaard's method is a dialectical one; though he distinguishes it sharply from the Hegelian dialectic (as 'qualitative' rather than 'quantitative' or 'modal'), it nevertheless uses the terms, and often the operations, of the Hegelian model. (Here my view differs from that of John Wild, who describes Kierkegaard as "a radical empiricist".)

Heidegger's method is phenomenological; Jaspers' is a mode of investigation that he calls 'elucidation'. Where, then, does this leave us?

Let us begin again, this time with a positive suggestion. The suggestion I make is that existential philosophy can, at least as a first step, be identified in terms not of a doctrine or a method, but rather of a subject-matter. And this is human existence. Existential thinking is the philosophising that recognises this subject-matter (as other philosophies do not) and seeks to give an account of it. The working-out of this account, and the methods involved in it, may well differ, but there is at least this common ground.

The expression 'human existence' has been used from time to time in the first two chapters as a fairly neutral expression, without anticipation of any specific technical connotation. From here on, however, both 'human existence' and 'existence' by itself will be used in a particular sense, which it is the main task of
"A new philosophy," wrote Ludwig Feuerbach, "always makes its appearance with a new name; i.e. it elevates a name from a low, unprivileged station to the princely station - transforms it into the designation for the highest." This certainly holds true of existential philosophy, which removes both Existenz and (in the case of Heidegger) Dasein from their distinctly lowly positions in the Hegelian logical system of categories and transforms them into the central concepts of philosophical thinking. The word 'existence', which is our concern here, takes on a sense which is quite different from both that of ordinary language and that of traditional metaphysical philosophy. Karl Jaspers has written:

The word 'Existenz' through Kierkegaard has taken on a sense through which we look into infinite depths at what defies all determinate knowledge. The word is not to be taken in its worn-out sense as one of the many synonyms for 'Being'; it either means nothing, or it is to be taken with its Kierkegaardian claims.

Whether the sense of a word can become 'worn-out' in the historical course of human thinking is a question I shall not go into here; I quote this striking piece of advocacy in order to bring out the importance of the notion of 'existence' to the existential mode of philosophy. Jaspers' words also imply that the whole point of the terminological innovation is to direct our attention towards some phenomenon that urgently requires pointing out - towards a subject-matter that non-existential philosophy has ignored, glossed over or tried to explain away. It is with
this in mind that I shall discuss the Kierkegaardian background
of Heidegger's thinking, and again the question of the unity of
existential philosophy.

It is characteristic of Heidegger that he minimises his
debt to Kierkegaard; in this he has been followed by many of his
commentators, for whom Kierkegaard represents only a 'minor
influence, upon the thinking of Sein und Zeit. I shall shortly
question this judgement. Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard by name
only three times in Sein und Zeit, each time in a footnote rather
than in the main text. What he has to say each time is similar:
it takes the form of a criticism through faint praise. Heidegger
grants Kierkegaard some merit as a commentator on certain
striking psychological phenomena; but he goes on to claim that
Kierkegaard failed to ground his observations in an appropriate
ontological doctrine. Kierkegaard, he observes, "explicitly
seized upon the problem of existence" and "thought it through in
a penetrating way." Having said this, Heidegger continues:

However, the existential problematic was so alien
to him that, from the ontological point of view,
he stands completely under the domination of Hegel
and, as this follows, of ancient philosophy. Hence
there is more to be learned philosophically from
his 'edifying' writings than from the theoretical
ones - with the exception of the work on the
concept of dread.

Yet in reading Heidegger, one may query whether he has
in fact learned more from Kierkegaard's 'edifying' works than from
his theoretical ones. Heidegger himself specifies one theoretical
work, *The Concept of Dread*, explicitly in two of his references
to Kierkegaard's thought, and implicitly in the third. In
addition, Heidegger's use of 'existence' constantly recalls the
ideas of Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Now
this, I think, raises the question to what extent the separation
between the indication of some empirical or psychological element
in human life, and the supplying of an ontological explanation of
that element, is valid. This is the distinction between the
ontic and the ontological levels of thinking; in the specific
context of human existence Heidegger expresses it as a difference
between the 'existentiell' and the 'existential'. Thus his
criticism of Kierkegaard is that insights on the existentiell
level are not matched by an adequate account on the underlying
existential level. Heidegger would say that insofar as Kierkeg-
aard does offer ontological theories, these are dependent upon
either Hegelian or traditional metaphysical concepts, and are not
developed in an original way to suit the subject-matter.

The question that we must ask here is whether the
notion of existence is an 'existentiell' or an 'existential' one.
I shall argue that it properly falls into the latter class; and
I shall argue further that since this is the case, Heidegger's
borrowing of this important concept from the thinking of
Kierkegaard cannot be reduced to a mere borrowing of certain
psychological themes.

At the same time, this question must be related to the
earlier question of the unity of the existential tradition in
philosophical thinking. Both of these topics require some
direct attention to the ideas of Kierkegaard.

Existential philosophy is one of the major streams of
thought that can in some sense lay claim to being the rightful
successor of Hegelian philosophy. The other leading contender
for this role is, I think, Marxism. Both of these are genuinely
innovatory kinds of philosophy. In both cases, it seems to me,
the innovatory character consists primarily in the widening of
the philosophical agenda to include previously untreated topics.
But there is more than this: the 'widening' is accompanied by an
insistence that philosophical thinking is not a self-contained
activity, that it is rather a process which inevitably moves from
the sphere of conceptual thought into another sphere altogether.
It is because of this that neither Marx nor Kierkegaard consid­
ered himself to be a 'philosopher'. Whether that conclusion
follows is debatable; in his Recherches dialectiques, Lucien
Goldmann argues cogently that a narrow interpretation of the
notion of philosophy as "a coherent and closed system of concept­
ual discourse" excludes many thinkers - especially religious
ones - whose works are "philosophical to the highest degree." He
therefore recommends that we should understand philosophy as
also taking in ways of thinking which assert, "on the conceptual
level, the inadequacy of the concept by itself, its merely
relative autonomy, its character as a stage towards something
which transcends and completes it." In the case of religious
thought this 'something' is the divine wisdom that transcends
finite knowledge; in the case of Marxism it is historical and
social action. (Such is the analogy that Goldmann is even prepared to suggest that Aquinas is to Aristotle as Marx is to Hegel.) Taking up these remarks of Goldmann, let us see their application to the significance of existential philosophy. Here the advance beyond conceptual and logical thought consists in what Kierkegaard called 'becoming subjective'. It is an advance into the area that Kierkegaard refers to by calling it 'existence'. To see what this amounts to, I shall begin by recalling the link suggested above between existential philosophy and Marxism as post-Hegelian forms of thinking.

In its all-embracing systematic character, Hegelian philosophy occupies a special place in Western thought. Herbert Marcuse has written that "after Hegel, the mainstream of Western philosophy is exhausted... what follows is epilogue." This is also Heidegger's view. (Indeed, Marcuse's formulations often echo Heidegger's: whereas Heidegger speaks of Hegel's system as embodying the "highest intensification" of "the domination of the logos", Marcuse inverts the phrase: "The logos of domination has built its system." "Through Hegel," writes Heidegger, "metaphysics for the first time expresses in language its absolute essence, in the system."

The formulation of metaphysics as an absolute and complete system poses a problem for Hegel's successors. One alternative to merely repeating Hegel's systematic dialectic, with or without alterations here and there, is to return to what are essentially pre-Hegelian modes of philosophy: to atomistic empiricism, to Hume or Kant, albeit with new resources in logical
technique. But there is another alternative: that of granting the
status of the system as the absolute formulation of pure
thought, but criticising the adequacy of pure thought itself.
Hence, for example, Marx's criticism of the 'theoretical' school
of social criticism: "Its main defect may be summarised as
follows: It believed that it could actualise philosophy without
transcending it." And what does this 'transcending' consist
in? Feuerbach had already indicated it when he wrote: "The
philosopher must take into the text of philosophy that aspect of
man which does not philosophise, but, rather, is opposed to
philosophy and abstract thinking, or in other words, that which
in Hegel has been reduced to a mere footnote." And this, to
Feuerbach, is the life of feeling and sense-perception. He
concludes: "only thus can philosophy become a universal, free
from contradictions, irrefutable, and irresistible power." Now
what is striking about this last is its essential identity
with the Hegelian programme, its acceptance of the goal of
completeness and freedom from all contradiction. Something
similar is implicit in the words of Marx quoted above: for to
'actualise' philosophy must, to a Hegelian thinker, mean to
bring it to the fullest mode of existence. Hegel considers that
his own system does this, for it takes up all previous kinds of
philosophical thought (and, as Hegel sees it, all possible kinds
of philosophical thought) and integrates them in its own single
all-encompassing structure. In the system, all of the problems
set by philosophy are solved in the course of the logical advance
of thought. But the crux of the Marxian rejection of this
this doctrine is an insistence that philosophy cannot solve its own problems. Only a move from philosophical thinking into social practice can give rise to a resolution of the conflicts and problems posed by philosophy within its own sphere. "All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and the comprehension of this practice."^23

Now the Kierkegaardian alternative is quite different in this respect: it does not retain the Hegelian goal of the resolution of all conflicts, tensions and contradictions. Kierkegaard might have written the words of Feuerbach quoted on the last page concerning the need for philosophy to take account of "that aspect of man which does not philosophise, but, rather, is opposed to philosophy and abstract thinking." But he would not have gone on, as Feuerbach did, to see this move as providing a solution to the inadequacies of pure thought, in the sense of a resolution of its contradictions. On the contrary: "It is impossible to do this in existence, for in so doing the thinker abrogates existence as well."^26 I have already touched upon this theme in passing (above, page 34). Here it must be gone into in more detail, and its several aspects brought out.

Firstly, then, Kierkegaard's decisive rejection of the Hegelian goal of thinking: that of resolving all contradictions. Hegel saw philosophy as achieving this by finding in each case the higher unity of the opposed terms, "posing Being in non-Being, as becoming; disunity in the Absolute, as its appearance; the finite in the infinite, as life."^27 Now Kierkegaard too
sees life—specifically, human life—as "a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." In this sense it must be said that he agrees entirely with Hegel's logical syntheses. But he makes a proviso which is crucial: "So regarded, man is not yet a self." The synthesis cannot be completed for man in the present life, by the very nature of that life. In the sphere of 'existence', the tension present in the relation between finite and infinite, temporal and eternal, is ever-present. Now Hegel too, in his analysis of religious consciousness, had recognised this conflict, and recognised it as the very essence of human religious existence. "I am the conflict, for the conflict is just this antagonism... I am both the combatants, and am the strife itself."

"I am... what holds together the conflicting elements, the effort put forth in this act of holding together, and represent the labour of heart and soul to obtain the mastery over this opposition." But Hegel had no doubt that such 'mastery' could be achieved; and so the passage just quoted is soon followed by a transition to the category of "Worship", in which the successful unification and synthesis is announced.

Not so with Kierkegaard. From the standpoint of eternity, all contradiction is eliminated; for God, reality can be a 'system' in this Hegelian sense; "but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit." For the conflict and contradiction vividly depicted in the words of Hegel quoted above are what make existence what it is. To eliminate them, therefore, is to eliminate existence, and to enter a different
sphere: that of 'pure thought'. But is this possible for a human being? Can he see the world sub specie aeterni, raising himself above the conflicts of his individual existence to a higher level of abstract universality? Kierkegaard's answer is that he cannot. He ironically suggests that in approaching any philosopher of the Hegelian school, one should first enquire whether or not it is a human being "with whom one has the honour to discourse." If the thinker is indeed an existing human being, as he will no doubt be, then he cannot claim to have transcended the sphere of existence, to have moved beyond the essential structure of the human situation.

In one sense, both Marx and Kierkegaard make this particular charge against the Hegelian system: the charge that it illegitimately transcends the sphere of human existence. Both agree that for this reason, its solution to the problem of human self-alienation and the conflicts of human existence is ineffective, however logically valid it may seem. There is a difference here, however. For Marx, higher regions of reality are mere illusion, no more than abstracted aspects of the empirical world. There is nothing higher than the human world. Kierkegaard, however, makes no such claim. On the contrary, he recognises, as a Christian, the sphere of the ideal, eternal and infinite - from whose point of view reality is a system. What is more, he defines human existence in terms of an essential relation to what is higher. But what he denies is the existing individual's ability or right to adopt that higher point of view. The system-builder who supposes that he has achieved this is
merely self-deluded. In the system he constructs a mighty palace, but he can only live beside it in a hovel. Kierkegaard unflaggingly stresses the ludicrous and comical character of the systematic thinker's error, ironically attributing it to "absent-mindedness". I quote the following passage at length because it both sums up this theme and points on to another important one:

Is (the systematic thinker) a human being, or is he speculative philosophy in the abstract? But if he is a human being, then he is also an existing individual. Two ways, in general, are open for an existing individual: Either he can do his utmost to forget that he is an existing individual, by which he becomes a comic figure, since existence has the remarkable trait of compelling an existing individual to exist whether he wills it or not. (The comical contradiction is willing to be what one is not, as when a man wills to be a bird, is not more comical than the contradiction of not willing to be what one is, as in casu an existing individual; just as the language finds it comical that a man forgets his name, which does not so much mean forgetting a designation, as it means forgetting the distinctive essence of one's being.) Or he can concentrate his entire energy upon the fact that he is an existing individual.

Why this 'or'? One might well object that an analysis of the notion of 'not willing to be what one is' will not reveal the same kind of contradictoryness and absurdity that is present in the notion of 'willing to be what one is not'. But the 'or' is very important: it points to the task that Kierkegaard calls "the task of becoming subjective". I earlier drew an analogy between the Marxist and Kierkegaardian repudiations of the Hegelian system: to the extent that both deny the validity of
thinking that poses as "thought without a thinker", thought claiming freedom from the conditions of existence of the human thinker. But it would be unsatisfactory to break off the description at this point. If their thinking consisted merely in a refusal to rise in thought above the human situation, Marx and Kierkegaard could rightly be seen as conservative forces in philosophy. This refusal would differ little from a positivist repudiation of metaphysics. What makes all the difference is the additional thesis that each attaches as a corollary to this one. I mean by this the view that I earlier (above, page 87) asserted to be the source of the innovative character of the thinking of Kierkegaard and Marx. It is an advance within the sphere of human existence beyond that narrower sphere that is encompassed by the logical thinking of traditional philosophy. And this, as I said, amounts to a 'widening of the philosophical agenda to include previously untreated topics'.

We thus have to consider what Kierkegaard means by the 'or' of the last page: the 'becoming subjective' that involves the thinker's concentrating 'his entire energy upon the fact that he is an existing individual'. The subjective thinker does not abstract from the contradictory character of human existence; instead, he "lives in it while at the same time thinking." He wills to be what he is.

This means that 'becoming subjective' is, for Kierkegaard, intimately bound up with the basic character of human existence: that of relating the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, in a bond of 'paradox'. This is what
makes 'becoming subjective' both necessary and possible. For the question of one of the existing individual's relation to 'eternal truth': by which Kierkegaard means, of course, primarily the truth of Christianity. Kierkegaard certainly does not deny that eternal truth and objectivity exist: but his concern is with the question of what is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual." This must be a truth that corresponds to the situation of the existing individual. Kierkegaard thus seeks a conception that expresses the separation between the existing subject and the higher object, together with the tension and the never-ending striving involved in this relation. If it were a question simply of the content of this eternal truth, one would be presupposing that the knowing subject had attained to its level. Here Kierkegaard uses the Hegelian doctrine of absolute truth as the identity of subject and object to indicate what he means. What makes this doctrine unacceptable to him is what we have seen to be the great error of the system in his eyes: a false abstraction from the conditions of existence.

The conclusion thus follows: a notion of truth appropriate to the existing individual's situation cannot be one that merely has to do with the content of what is known. It must instead be one that centres upon the thinker's relationship to the truth. It must refer to subjectivity. Thus Kierkegaard writes: "Objectively we consider only the matter at issue, subjectively we have regard to the subject and his subjectivity; and behold, precisely this subjectivity is the matter at issue. This must constantly be borne in mind, namely, that the subjective
problem is not something about an objective issue, but is the subjectivity itself. The problem is that of a mode of subjectivity which fully expresses the existing individual's relation to the truth. This truth is something with which he can never become identical, as Hegel supposed; it is one of which he can never gain absolute certainty. Yet it is one with which he must be vitally concerned, for to Kierkegaard this truth is nothing less than the truth of Christianity. Christianity "proposes to bestow an eternal happiness upon the individual man." Even if Christianity did not demand an "infinite passionate interest" from the individual, as a command overruling all earthly duties, it would still be the case that such an interest is 'demanded' in a purely logical sense by the question of the individual's eternal happiness.

All of these factors unite in Kierkegaard's definition of "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" as "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness." Here "the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity." It becomes a matter of choice, because of its 'objective uncertainty', and a matter of passion, because of the 'infinite interest' that the individual has in it. Like existence itself, it is a paradox. "The eternal essential truth is by no means in itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its relationship to an existing individual." And finally, subjective truth is uniquely personal, because it does not refer abstractly to man in general, but concretely to "this particular existing being."
It is important to see that the various aspects of subjectivity brought out by Kierkegaard coincide with the characteristics that he attributes to existence itself. This suggests a query: how can one not be subjective? Kierkegaard himself said that "existence has the remarkable trait of compelling an existing individual to exist whether he wills it or not" (above, page 93). The answer is, I think, that while Kierkegaard certainly holds that every human being must be an existing individual (literally, 'an exister'), he also holds that there are two ways of being an existing individual. Either one can 'forget' one's situation, or else one can concentrate one's entire energy upon 'living in it'. In the first case, subjectivity as it occurs is not a subjectivity that is truth. "Subjectivity is untruth if it refuses to understand that subjectivity is truth, but, for example, desires to become objective."50

Similarly, Kierkegaard draws a distinction between 'really existing' and 'what is loosely called existing'.51 One might, he says, think of existing as an easy matter, "since we all exist"; but really existing is not easy at all: it is "truly difficult." Clearly, what Kierkegaard means by 'really existing' is what he means by 'becoming subjective'.

Here I end my outline of Kierkegaard's conception of existence. As a discussion of Kierkegaard in his own right, it is very far from being adequate. I have, however, tried throughout to bring out the coherence of Kierkegaard's position: to show, for example, that his idea of 'becoming subjective', of truth as subjectivity, is not at all an arbitrary one. Rather
it is wholly bound up with his theory of human existence. Points like this one have a relevance to Heidegger which we shall soon see.

I come, then, back to Heidegger. The following discussion of Heidegger's theoretical debt to Kierkegaard will be determined by the hypothesis which I suggested earlier (pages 34-35), and which is, in a sense, the key to my whole interpretation of the Heideggerian theory of human existence. It is the hypothesis that, while Heidegger sets out to elaborate a theory of man as an essentially finite being, he nevertheless wishes to integrate into this theory elements which originate in theories of a quite different kind: theories which, like those of Kant and Kierkegaard, do not take man to be a wholly finite being. This idea is not put forward as an account of Heidegger's conscious intentions, but as a point of view which enables us to gain a much greater insight into what is said in Sein und Zeit than we could otherwise do. If this implies an ambition to 'understand the author better than he understood himself' (to paraphrase Schleiermacher), then it is an ambition that is encouraged by Heidegger himself, and practised by him in his writings on Kant, and still more in his studies of pre-Socratic philosophy.

The whole question is: does Heidegger succeed? We are, of course, as yet in no position to answer this. It is, perhaps, already apparent that his task is a difficult and challenging one. It might even seem, at this stage, to be an absurd undertaking. Surely, it may be argued, we cannot simply
extract such themes as take our fancy from one philosophical setting, and transplant them into a quite different philosophical setting? A philosophical theory is not like this. If it is a truly articulated theory, its elements belong to that framework and no other. Something like this could have been suggested in the earlier critique of the one-sidedness of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's four leading questions of philosophy. But here it makes itself felt more clearly. The Kierkegaardian notions of 'existence' and 'subjectivity' are structured by the relation between the finite and the infinite - as my brief review of them has tried to bring out. How, then, can they be recast in terms of finitude? How can Kierkegaard's insistence that the existing individual's task is to 'concentrate his entire energy upon the fact that he is an existing individual' be identified with Heidegger's claim that 'the task of human reason' is to become 'wholly certain' of its finitude, 'in order to hold oneself in it'? Kierkegaard says: "In his immediacy the individual is rooted in the finite." But he goes on to say of the truly subjective thinker: "He still lives in the finite, but he does not have his life in the finite... He is a stranger in the world of the finite." He does not pretend to have attained the realm of the infinite, for to suppose this is to "become fantastic". But still less does he cling to finitude: this is a "despairing narrowness" which "consists in having emasculated oneself, in a spiritual sense."

These remarks really only spell out what is inferable from the earlier description of the Kierkegaardian concept of
existence. They spell out the difficulty in the undertaking that I have attributed to Heidegger. His task is to give an account of existence which is purely temporal, which refers only to finitude, and yet which contains the distinction between 'really existing' and 'what is loosely called existing', the notion of truth as subjective appropriation, the category of the 'individual', and a large number of the other Kierkegaardian themes touched upon in the course of this chapter.

But now an extremely important point emerges. It is this: if these were merely psychological themes, as Heidegger himself seems to suggest (see above, pages 85-6), then there could be no prima facie objection to the provision of an alternative philosophical account of them. If they could be located purely on what Heidegger calls 'existentiell' level, then we could - as Heidegger does - applaud Kierkegaard's keen psychological insight while deploring his failure to supply an adequate existential grounding for his descriptions. Again, if this were the case, then it would be implausible to argue, as I did earlier (above, page 87) that Kierkegaard's thinking widens the scope of philosophy to take in what was previously untreated. Notions like those of choice, passion, the individual, and so on, have been treated by philosophers of many different persuasions, from Aristotle to Ryle. Different accounts may have been given of them, but these have been different accounts of the same (or much the same) things. Now, then, does Heidegger's attention to such themes show a debt to Kierkegaard in particular?

Clearly, these two problems are closely related. To
answer them in reverse order: Heidegger undoubtedly does consider that the existential themes represent something that is a real part of human existence, and yet which has been neglected. He does consider that there is more in human existence than is dreamed of in the philosophy of, say, the physicalist. This 'more' is to be explained, not explained away. The distinction is, I think, crucial. Is it merely a rhetorical one? What is the difference between an existential interpretation of choice and an 'analytic' interpretation that would lead us to say that the first explains something that the second explains away? It is not enough just to say that the second account is less interesting than the first, however true this may be. To say that it eliminates the feeling and pathos of the existential account is to say a little more, but not enough to justify, by itself, the distinction indicated. For although this too is true enough, it does not, I think, say anything to justify the demand that these characteristics ought not to be eliminated: it leaves that apparently arbitrary, and almost as much a matter of personal taste as the tag 'interesting'.

The solution to this problem is the solution to the other problem mentioned on the last page: that of the distinction between the existentiell and existential aspects of the concepts and themes drawn from the thinking of Kierkegaard. The solution is, I suggest, that these themes are neither merely psychological and existentiell, nor so fully integrated in a theoretical framework that revision on the existential level is impossible. (At least, this is the solution that seems to be the only one
that fits the Heideggerian task as it has been interpreted so far.) That they are not merely psychological is most evident in the case of the category of 'existence' itself. This expression is clearly a technical one, whose sense is, as Jaspers pointed out, not that of an everyday synonym of 'Being'. But to the extent that other terms have a theoretical involvement, they too will be technical expressions, however great their familiarity and their rootedness in colloquial language may be. It is the second question that is the real problem. Only our discussion of Heidegger's actual account of human existence will lead to any answer.

Some preliminary remarks on Heidegger's use of 'existence' are now required. The first, and most obvious, is that Heidegger restricts 'existence' to human existence. "The being that exists is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist." Two comments by Heidegger make it clear that these statements aim at specifying the mode of Being possessed by the human being. Firstly, "the statement, 'man alone exists' does not mean by any means that only man is a real being, while all other beings are unreal, and mere semblance or human phantasy." Secondly, "the statement, 'man exists' does not answer the question whether or not there are actually men or not. Rather, it answers the question about the 'essence' of man." These explanations show how we are to understand the statement, at first sight very strange-looking, that man alone
exists, and that rocks, trees, horses, angels and God do not exist, although they 'are' - or at least, although they may 'be'.

Can some such usage be attributed to Kierkegaard? He does write: "God does not think, he creates; God does not exist, he is eternal." Occasionally Kierkegaard does link existence with God in a way that superficially contradicts this quoted passage, but closer examination reveals that he is referring in these cases quite specifically to God's existence as a man.

In this case, then, Kierkegaard's usage coincides with Heidegger's in its application. What about other cases? Here there is room for disagreement. Walter Lowrie writes that Kierkegaard, "though he would not deny that in some sense things exist, was interested only in the existence of human beings." The truth of the second part of this makes it hard to judge the truth of the first part. If one's attention is on the position of 'existence' as a comparatively subordinate element in the Hegelian system, it may seem plausible. However, if one considers Kierkegaard's analysis of existence as a relation between the finite and the infinite, between temporality and eternity, it is less plausible. This is particularly the case when the analysis is specifically identified with Christian doctrine. Christianity does not, after all, 'propose to bestow an eternal happiness' upon rocks, trees and horses.

Some things are purely finite and temporal, and to these the category of existence is inapplicable.

This conclusion is, perhaps, supported by Kierkegaard's use of the word Tilvaerelse - corresponding to the German Dasein but without any readily fixable equivalent in English. It is this
word that Kierkegaard uses when he is speaking of existence in a fairly everyday sense: not referring to the peculiar structure of human existence, but usually with reference to the difference between existence and non-existence. This question may be raised about the human being, but also about other beings to whom 'existence' in the strict sense would not be attributed. Thus we find Kierkegaard frequently speaking of Guds Tilvaereelse: 'God's existence'. He also, less frequently, uses the word Vaeren, corresponding to the German Sein and the English 'Being'. The use of these other terms tends to confirm the restriction of Existents to the specific connotations of human existence - though the restriction is never laid down definitively by Kierkegaard. These three terms are employed by Kierkegaard with the background of the corresponding German words in mind, and in particular that of their use by Hegel as categories within his system. Because all three re-appear importantly in Heidegger's writing, a brief note of their uses is appropriate here.

The earliest philosophical applications of these terms by German thinkers were confused: Wolff rendered the Latin existentia as Dasein, but his contemporary Thomasius translated it sometimes as Sein and sometimes as Existenz. In the Hegelian system, however, the three are given precise definitions. Sein stands for the most general and abstract concept of Being: this is also the sense of Kierkegaard's equivalent, Vaeren. Dasein is the Being of determinate finite things. Hegel criticises philosophers (such as Kant) for applying this term to the existence of God: "the Being of God is not in any way whatever a
limited Being." As we have seen, Kierkegaard does not follow this prohibition, though it is interesting that his closest German follower, Karl Jaspers, uses Dasein once again in the Hegelian sense of natural, determinate being. Kierkegaard seems to use Tilveerelse, as Walter Lowrie says, "without any special significance". He does, however, exploit its 'either/or' character in his polemic against pure logical thought, which, he says, is indifferent to the difference between existence and non-existence - unlike subjective thinking. As for Existenz, this has a rather odd sense in the Hegelian context. It is a category of essence, not of Being: simplified considerably, existence involves an indefinite multitude of inter-related finite things. It would be difficult and probably not very rewarding to attempt a derivation of the Kierkegaardian usage from this one. Perhaps the characteristics of immediacy and relatedness are involved - but Kierkegaard's conception seems to me to be largely original.

As I said, Heidegger uses all three terms. Existenz has for him, as for Jaspers, the sense of Kierkegaard's term: the mode of being peculiar to the human being. Dasein is transformed by Heidegger into a term with this same use. (I shall not go into Heidegger's etymological excurses on the different aspects of human existence expressed by these words.) This leaves him without any term for the being of the finite things of the natural world; hence he coin's a new expression: Vorhandensein, 'Being-present-at-hand', or simply 'presence-at-hand'. We shall come to the significance of this shortly.
Heidegger’s notion of Being (Sein) has been sketched out in Chapter Two. But even to say ‘Heidegger’s notion of Being’ is misleading, for what Heidegger aims to do is to work towards the question of Being. He certainly does not pretend to have attained to a grasp of the nature of Being. How, then, can we relate his idea of Being to, say, that of Hegel? It may seem as if some such link had already been established in the description of Heidegger’s theory about Being and nothing. But Heidegger himself repudiates an identification of this theory with Hegel’s doctrine that pure Being and nothing are one and the same, rightly commenting that for Hegel this is a consequence of the emptiness and utter indeterminacy of both notions. 

Heidegger does not take either to be vacuous. He rebuts the idea that Being is indefinable as a consequence of its unique universality. All that follows, in Heidegger’s view, is that the common concept of definition, which is geared to beings, is inapplicable to Being itself. “The indefinability of Being does not dispose of the question of its meaning; on the contrary, it demands just that question.”

It is clear from this that the link between Heidegger and Kierkegaard must lie in the concept of existence and in the themes that are bound up with this concept. Heidegger’s transformation of these will be seen in later chapters. Before entering into that discussion, however, I wish to round off my survey of the figures who stand in the background of the thinking of Sein und Zeit by looking at Heidegger’s relation to his immediate predecessor and teacher, Edmund Husserl.
CHAPTER FOUR

HUSserL AND HeIDEGGER
1. The Concept of Philosophy

One aim of this chapter is to trace the main links and divergences between Heidegger and Husserl, looked at in the broadest sense. In more specific areas these relationships will be treated elsewhere: for example, in the chapter on temporality. Our concern here is the conceptions that these two writers have of the nature of philosophy itself, and so of the natures of their own philosophical projects. Here I shall distinguish two particular questions. The first, to be discussed in this section, is the question of the general notion of philosophy, and in particular between the concept of philosophy and the concept of a science. As we shall see, Husserl's firm conviction that the vocation of philosophy is the attainment of the status of a 'rigorous science' (strenge Wissenschaft) is rebuffed by Heidegger, yet in a way that leaves room for equivocation. This topic follows on from those discussed in the last chapter, and so it continues the discussion of Heidegger's role as an 'existenti- nal' philosopher.

The second section of this chapter is concerned with the idea of phenomenology: the philosophical method created by Husserl and professedly adopted by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. Just as in the first case we shall find an opposition which is not as clear-cut as it may at first appear, so in the second we shall see that the agreement between Husserl and Heidegger on the need for a specific method of investigation in philosophy is consistent
with different interpretations of the nature of this method.

Firstly, then, what are the similarities or differences between the viewpoints of Husserl and Heidegger concerning the nature of philosophy as such, its place in human life and its possible role in society? Both writers can be said to have a keen awareness of this question. Both are self-conscious as philosophers in a way not commonly found among the philosophers of the English-speaking countries. Moreover, each is convinced that his thought is directed towards a task which is crucial for the philosophy of his time.

It may be that this last belief represents a trait which can be traced back to Husserl's teacher, Brentano - the founder, in a sense, of the modern phenomenological tradition. Brentano announced the aim of his Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint (1874) as being to obtain for psychology the same status of science that, in his view, mathematics, physics, chemistry and physiology had already won. All of these had established a core (Kern) of acknowledged truth. Only on such a secure basis, Brentano thought, could a science go on to further development. "In place of the psychologies," he wrote, "we must seek to set up a single psychology." But this could not be done by mere eclecticism; that would prove fatal to the unity of the science, an Aristotelian assumption unquestioned by Brentano. Hence a whole new beginning would have to be made, setting psychology on firm foundations at last. Such was the goal of his work.

Husserl's conception of philosophy as a rigorous science parallels Brentano's visionary programme for psychology, as we
Brentano himself extended his thesis to philosophy. In his Habilitation-Theses of 1866, he defended the proposition: "Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est." In 1892, Brentano delivered an important lecture entitled "On the Future of Philosophy". Though this was a polemical contribution to a current debate on the relation between philosophy and the sciences, it also reveals Brentano's whole conception of philosophy. Philosophy, Brentano claims here, is 'the queen of the sciences'; but just as a queen must always be one of her people, so too "the queen of the sciences must necessarily be itself a science." If it fails to set objective truth as its goal in the way that a science does, philosophy becomes nothing more than 'ein künstliches Geistespiel'.

Brentano supports his claim in a number of ways: by appealing to the authority of the great thinkers who have conceived of philosophy as a scientific enterprise, by generally denigrating the alternative picture of philosophy, and in the course of his lecture by rebutting a number of specific objections to his view. I shall not go into these, but merely point out that Brentano's identification of philosophy with science heralds Husserl's more elaborate version of the same thesis.

There is no difficulty in finding texts of Husserl which display this orientation, for a single conception of philosophy as a rigorous science runs throughout his work. It differs in no significant way between his manifesto of 1911, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", and the lecture of 1935, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man". For convenience,
I shall take the first of these as the source of this brief description of Husserl's point of view. What is said in the other works repeats, generally speaking, this definitive pronouncement. Furthermore, this is the work of Husserl which Heidegger names in Sein und Zeit as revealing "the basic orientation of his problematic." 12

Like Brentano, Husserl takes up an inflexible position on the question of philosophy's character as a 'rigorous science'. To the extent that philosophy fails to attain this status, it fails to be truly philosophy. Husserl begins with a striking assertion: "From its earliest beginnings philosophy has claimed to be rigorous science." 13 The sense of 'rigorous science' is not defined by Husserl at any one point; we are left to pick up its various implications as we go along. Husserl perhaps conceives himself to be addressing an audience which already has a grasp of the idea. At any rate, something of its implications is accessible enough, even at this first stage. The term 'rigorous science' suggests to us such requirements as systematic structure, completeness, a demonstrative method, and so on. We might, for example, take mathematics as a model for a 'rigorous science'.

But here we must not take the term 'science' too narrowly. Brentano objected to its restriction to such simple and non-historical sciences as mechanics; 14 Husserl would take a similar line. It must be seen that 'science' is not to be defined by reference to a certain subject-matter, but rather by reference to a specific method, a way of approaching the subject-
matter, whatever that may be. As a classic defence of this usage, I quote R.G. Collingwood: 15

The word 'science', in its original sense, which is still its proper sense not only in the English language alone but in the international language of European civilisation, means a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject-matter. This is the sense and the only sense in which I shall use it. There is also a slang sense of the word, unobjectionable (like all slang) on its lawful occasions, parallel to the slang use of the word 'hall' for a music-hall or the word 'drink' for alcoholic drink, in which it stands for natural science.

I should, perhaps, remark that in earlier chapters I have not followed Collingwood to the extent of altogether shunning the common usage, but have used 'scientific' in this narrower sense in one or two places where a paraphrase would have been cumbersome.

'Science', then, refers to any strictly methodical inquiry. In saying this we are not committing ourselves to belief in some single all-powerful method whose application to a subject-matter will infallibly generate new knowledge. It has never been shown that there is any such method in natural science, and still less in philosophy. Such philosophical methods as dialectical reasoning, or the phenomenological method, or so-called 'linguistic analysis', show this by their fate in the hands of the epigones. But this is by the way. Husserl's point is about the discipline imposed upon philosophy by the scientific model, a discipline expressed in a rigorous refinement of concepts. What is essential to a science is that it turns back upon its
fundamental concepts and keeps a continual check on their coherence and adequacy: that is, on their validity. In this sense it would not be out of place to speak of a 'science of logic', or even perhaps of a 'science of ethics', and so on. It should be noted that, on this account, the phrase 'rigorous science' must be a tautology; for how can science which is not rigorous be science at all? However, any science develops over a period of time into a rigorous discipline. We can reasonably relax our usage to call it a science during this development insofar as it is an inquiry which self-consciously adopts the scientific goal, and which employs self-criticism to further its approximation to this goal.

The status of rigorous science may or may not be a plausible ideal for philosophy. But Husserl asserts that as a matter of historical fact, this ideal is the one that philosophers throughout the ages have aimed at, and have presumably supposed themselves to have attained. Husserl is working with a pre-conceived picture of the history of philosophy as a single unified system. This is, to say the least, debatable. It would be debatable even if it were supported - as, say, in Hegel - by some thorough survey of past philosophies. Husserl gives it no such support. To question his historical model, however, is not to rule out either the validity or the fruitfulness of the idea of philosophy that he finds embodied in it. Husserl occasionally drops the term 'philosophia perennis'; but it is characteristic ally with reference to the future of philosophy rather than its past. It would thus be hasty to assimilate his thinking to the
organisation of the history of philosophy into a unitary 'perennial philosophy'. Husserl is, in fact, not much concerned with the past of philosophy, and it is indeed doubtful whether he has a clear grasp of it, for only a few thinkers are mentioned in his historical remarks. Descartes figures prominently as the creator of a programme of rigorous reconstruction in philosophy - of a decisive turn in thinking towards a new mode capable of putting philosophical knowledge on a firm foundation. But as I remarked earlier (above, page 49), Husserl's real orientation is towards Kant rather than Descartes; his use of a Cartesian starting-point is followed quickly by a divergence in thinking. 17

If Husserl's historical picture is largely mythic, what is its function? What Husserl calls the "historical purpose" of philosophy is, I think, really his own self-conceived mission: a mission to redeem philosophy from what he takes to be its degenerate condition. Husserl goes even further in this regard, for he identifies his work as a contribution towards "the eternal work of humanity", towards the satisfaction of "humanity's imperishable demand for pure and absolute knowledge." 19 In the lecture of 1935 mentioned earlier, Husserl claims that European man (whom he tends to identify with rational man as such) can escape destruction only through a "rebirth... from the spirit of philosophy." 20

Something quite similar, and on an even higher level (if that is possible) of world-historical significance, is present in the thought of Heidegger, taking progressively greater hold from Sein und Zeit onwards. But it would, I think, be too
hasty to assume that the doctrines and arguments that these thinkers present as the solutions to supposed problems of world-historical scope are merely the expressions (or, if one prefers, the symptoms) of their strongly convictions of personal mission. If that were the case then their theories would be of psychological rather than philosophical interest. On the contrary, the conceptions of the nature of philosophy that emerge from these claims and arguments are of great interest in their own right.

We saw that Husserl took the goal of rigorous science to be the single constant goal of the philosophical project. He does not, however, believe that philosophy has ever succeeded in achieving its ideal. Indeed, he does not believe that it has even made a start. "I do not say that philosophy is an imperfect science; I say simply that it is not yet a science at all, that as science it has not yet begun."21 This may fit in poorly with Husserl's historical model, but it does give an added urgency to his project of philosophical reconstruction. He brings out the exact nature of philosophy's failings by contrasting its state with that of the natural sciences. These, he allows, have achieved the status of rigorous science; and he includes mathematics in this judgement.22 A revealing explication follows. The natural sciences, Husserl explains, are no doubt imperfect, incomplete, and sometimes confused in part, yet they do have a "doctrinal content."23 Here Husserl clearly echoes Brentano's "core of acknowledged truth". These sciences offer "objective truth",24 the 'pure and absolute knowledge' referred to earlier as
'humanity's imperishable demand'.

The significance of 'doctrinal content' (Lehrgehalt) is made clear by a pointed contrast with the alternative. Of the positive sciences Husserl notes approvingly that "here there is, by and large, no room for private 'opinions' (Meinungen), 'views' (Anschauungen), or 'standpoints'." The state of affairs currently prevailing in the field of philosophy is, Husserl says, just the opposite. In philosophy we find no universally recognised truths. "Each and every question is contested here, every position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given by a school, of a 'standpoint'."

As a comment on twentieth-century philosophy, this seems just; though one may doubt whether it would have been inappropriate to many preceding periods - even mediaeval scholasticism allowed room for quite radical disagreement. Further, one might object, is it right to say that in the positive sciences there are no 'standpoints' or 'views'? Do not these often extend to the very foundations of the science? The example of mathematics shows this. Husserl might reply that such controversies lie within the philosophical foundations of mathematics, rather than in the body of the science. He would no doubt argue that disagreements that do occur within the sciences proper differ importantly from the disagreements amongst philosophers. They differ by being resolvable in principle; we can see that scientific progress has always come about by such resolutions of disagreement. The same cannot be said of philosophy. The crucial point here, I think, is the
inability of philosophers to bring their theories together in the same way that scientists. Husserl's complaint is that the philosophers are not engaged in a common enterprise; their differences extend to the basic conception of the goal of philosophy itself. (Here I am reconstructing his case to some extent, but not, I think, misrepresenting its drift.)

Husserl's polemic against personal 'opinions' or 'convictions' in philosophy reveals the source of the hostile attitude which he was later to take against the introduction of the themes of existential philosophy into phenomenology. We can see why he was later to describe Scheler and Heidegger as "meine Antipoden." Condemning as he does the presence of individual conviction in philosophical thinking, Husserl could hardly fail to reject utterly a philosophising that explicitly places central importance upon the personal role of the thinker. His model of 'rigorous science' implies the impersonal approach to the subject-matter that is characteristic of the natural sciences.

Husserl's programme for philosophical reconstruction is at this stage very reminiscent of that of another thinker, not often associated with him: Hegel. His condemnation of philosophies that express opinions, views and standpoints, finds a close parallel in Hegel's demand for a systematic form of philosophy. Hegel writes: "Philosophising without a system cannot amount to anything scientific. Apart from that such philosophising by itself expresses rather a subjective disposition of character, and is accidental as to its content... Yet many philosophical works are limited in just such a way to expressing
opinions (Meinungen) and convictions (Gesinnungen)." Both Husserl and Hegel select for disapproving comment the statement of Kant that one cannot learn philosophy, but only how to philosophise. Husserl replies: "What is that but an admission of philosophy's unscientific character? As far as science, real science, extends, so far can one teach and learn, and this everywhere in the same sense."31 Hegel makes the same point more aphoristically: "Kant is cited, full of admiration, for teaching philosophising, not philosophy; as if somebody taught carpentry, but not how to make a table, chair, door, cabinet, etc."32 It is, perhaps, ironic, that these words of Kant occur in a part of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant is concerned to urge the development of philosophy into a scientific system. "Till then," Kant says, "one cannot learn philosophy..."33

In view of these analogies, it is surprising for the reader of Husserl's "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" to find Hegel dismissed in a few lines. Husserl says only of him that he is the author of a "romantic philosophy", one that "lacks a critique of reason."34 Both comments are debatable, especially the second; but one must doubt whether Husserl really has an informed criticism of Hegel to offer. What he holds against Hegel is what he takes to be the misdeeds of Hegel's philosophical successors, who turned the Hegelian "metaphysical philosophy of history"35 into a relativistic philosophy that Husserl refers to as 'Weltanschauung' philosophy. Thus Husserl has little or no interest in Hegel's philosophy as such.

The latter part of "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" is
devoted to rebuttals of two streams of thought that Husserl sees as the leading trends in contemporary philosophy. One is naturalism, the other historicism (Historismus) or 'Weltanschauung' philosophy. The latter, Husserl seems to think, is the greater danger, since naturalism by now "appears completely discredited". I shall not discuss the details of his arguments against these philosophies, but simply note in a few lines their relation to the theme of philosophy as rigorous science.

By 'naturalism' Husserl means an approach that sets out to reduce philosophical concepts to those of natural science. He allows naturalism one virtue: it certainly considers philosophy as a rigorous science. But, he adds, it goes about realising that ideal in an inappropriate way. It rests on "a widespread tendency to look upon positive science as the only strict science and to recognise in scientific philosophy only one that is founded (fundiert) upon this sort of science." This error, Husserl thinks, has a harmful consequence: anyone who comes to see the impossibility of a reduction of philosophy to positive science may well come to the conclusion that a scientific philosophy is not possible.

It is in his polemic against relativistic historicism, however, that Husserl reveals the full stature of his idea of science. Science, he writes, transcends history because it is 'supratemporal' and 'eternal'. "Science is a title standing for absolute, timeless values." This is one side of the concept. Another is the side of the power and command of science: 'There is, perhaps, in all modern life no more powerfully, more
irresistibly progressing idea than that of science. Nothing will hinder its victorious advance. In fact, with regard to its legitimate aims, it is all-embracing."39 Such, then, is the movement to which philosophy must assimilate itself: the scientific force that Husserl sees as the advancing wave of Western civilisation. That the model of natural science has, for various reasons, lost some of its appeal since 1911, should not blind us to the force of Husserl's position. His demands for science rather than 'wisdom' (Weisheit)40 in philosophy, for "conceptual distinctness and clarity" rather than 'profundity' (Tiefeins)41, and for a discipline "based on sure foundations, and progressing according to the most rigorous methods"42 rather than a collection of chance insights, represent a powerful and plausible ideal for philosophical thinking. We have now to see why, for Martin Heidegger, this is not the true vocation of the philosopher.

Heidegger's readers have disagreed in their interpretations of his conception of philosophy. In her book Existentialist Ethics, Mary Warnock informs us that Heidegger "is above all an old-fashioned Hegelian system-builder, who aims to present the complete truth about the universe in absolute terms."43 On the other hand, we find the following judgement passed upon Heidegger by a champion of the phenomenological school, Marvin Farber: "The 'philosophy of existence' is a type of philosophy which can only alienate one for whom the canons and ideals of logic are meaningful, and especially one for whom the ideal of philosophy
The second line of criticism has been put forward far more frequently than the first against Heidegger; but I think that a prima facie case can be made for each side, although the comparison with Hegel is definitely mistaken. I shall not repeat my observations in Chapter One (pages 21ff.) about Heidegger's tendency towards an 'architectonic' approach to philosophy, an approach stressing the importance of clearly defined inquiry. I said then that a concern for the avoiding of prematurely formulated conclusions was not inconsistent with this general orientation. The discussion of ontology, and the summary of Husserl's programme of scientific philosophy in the last dozen pages, should be taken as filling out the presentation of this topic. The similarities between the Husserlian 'regional ontologies' and the corresponding investigations of Heidegger suggest a similarity in their general approaches to philosophy; Heidegger's advance to ontology 'in the general sense' might be taken as merely a further step along the same path.

On the other hand, Heidegger nowhere explicitly accepts the ideal of rigorous science as the goal of philosophy. In Sein und Zeit, 'science' is used mainly to refer to the positive sciences, and there is no mention of rigor or strictness in relation to science. However, in the later works that have already been drawn upon for supplementary insights into Heidegger's thinking, many passages occur which repudiate the scientific model of thinking as an appropriate form for philosophy. In particular, one important section of Einführung in die Metaphysik...
seems almost specifically designed to rebut the Husserlian conception of philosophy, even though Husserl is not mentioned by name. While I do not think that Heidegger here is attacking any one figure in particular, there is nevertheless reference to many of the ideas we have come across in surveying Husserl's doctrine of philosophy as rigorous science. Husserl holds that philosophy must meet the demands of mankind; he demands a 'doctrinal content' that can be taught and learned; and he asserts a single telos for all genuinely philosophical thinking. Each of these ideas is rejected by Heidegger.

Heidegger's one central concern here is for the autonomy of philosophy; for this reason he rejects all theories which take it to have a useful function. Philosophy is not, he holds, something called into existence in order to meet the demands of epochs or cultures. Heidegger describes it as "essentially untimely" (unzeitgemäß) - a phrase no doubt intended to recall Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations. He has no hesitation in restricting philosophy to "the few": a philosophy that does become "fashionable" by conforming to the demands of its time has lost its integrity, has become a vulgarised and misunderstood one. But more important, for Heidegger, is his conviction that philosophy must set its own goals, and not merely accept goals laid down for it in advance. The question, he says, is not what we can do with philosophy, but what philosophy can do with us. From philosophy's autonomy he infers that "there is no way of determining once and for all what the goal of philosophy is, and accordingly what must be expected of it." Again, he
takes it that, as another consequence, philosophy is "not a
knowledge that one can learn directly like technical and manual
skills."\textsuperscript{48}

One may, perhaps, suspect that these observations of
1935 are made with implicit reference to Heidegger's own
excursion of 1933 into the political application of philosophy:
an episode best summed up by his own aphorism: "Wer gross denkt,
muss gross irren."\textsuperscript{49} However, as I have suggested, one can also
see in them an approach to philosophy which is incompatible with
any programme like that of Husserl.

What of philosophy's relation to the model of science?
In "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger states categorically:
"Philosophy can never be measured with the yardstick of the idea
of science."\textsuperscript{50} His reason for making this assertion is his
view - already seen by us in Chapter Two - that philosophy is
first and foremost the inquiry that goes beyond the familiar
world of beings, into the unfamiliar realm of nothing and Being.
This makes it an exploratory venture in a much more radical
sense than natural science, whose object is always, in a sense,
present at the beginning. And it, in turn, disallows the
setting-up of a detailed plan of investigation in advance, after
the fashion that Heidegger takes to be characteristic of all
natural science.\textsuperscript{51}

Yet this does not tell us much about Heidegger's final
judgement on the goal of rigorous science, for it is arguable
that there are aspects of this goal that are not considered in
the line of thinking just sketched out, which is clearly put
forward with the picture of natural science in mind. Nothing is
said here about 'rigor', for instance. Some remarks are,
however, made on that topic elsewhere in the same lecture.
These are interesting in that Heidegger opposes the adoption of
a single interpretation of 'rigorous' methodology throughout the
empirical sciences. He writes: "Mathematical knowledge is no
more rigorous than philological or historical knowledge. It has
merely the character of 'exactness', which is not to be confused
with rigor."52 This separation raises the interesting question
whether, by a further step in the argument, a sense of 'rigor'
might be understood as applicable to philosophy. In Heidegger's
later works we do find such a sense. Though it is not part of
my plan to examine these later writings, I shall briefly
draw upon their conception of philosophy as a 'rigorous' mode
of thinking in order to bring out the relation in which Heidegger
stands to Husserl on this point.

Husserl wrote: "The true method follows the nature of
the things to be investigated and not our prejudices and
preconceptions."53 I have already (above, pages 28-9) had
occasion to quote Heidegger's closely analogous remarks in
Sein und Zeit. The link with rigor is made in the 1943
"Nachwort" to "What is Metaphysics?". "Exact thinking is never
the most rigorous thinking, if the essence of rigor lies in the
vigor of determination with which knowledge maintains its
relation to the essential aspects of the being."54 Philosophy,
Heidegger can now say, is not opposed to rigor. On the contrary,
genuine philosophy has more rigor in this proper sense than modes
of thinking which approach their subject-matter in an external fashion, attempting to force their own categories upon it, rather than penetrating into its own innate structure. Much of the work of the later Heidegger is devoted to a critique of modes of thinking that he takes to commit this error. 'Exact' thinking is one such mode; it "binds itself to calculation of the being and serves this exclusively." What Heidegger has to say in these later writings on the employment of 'logic' and 'reason' as techniques divorced from and imposed upon their subject-matter is both profound and important; but it cannot be entered into here. I have referred to these ideas primarily in order to show that Heidegger does indeed take the conception of rigor as the guide for his thinking, and that his interpretation of its sense coincides with a leading theme in the Husserlian conception of philosophical method.

The real problem about Heidegger's basic approach to philosophy comes from another direction: the direction of Kierkegaard and existential thinking. It is to that that I shall now turn.

What I said in the last chapter about the introduction of the 'existential themes' into philosophy was possibly misleading in one respect. I discussed the extent to which one could separate psychological or existential themes from their underlying ontological or existential basis. I drew an analogy between Kierkegaard and Marx as extending the scope of philosophy to take in new topics. I did not, however, go in any detail into the very important question of the change in the
mode of thinking that must correspond in each case to these innovations on the level of subject-matter. To neglect this would be to miss the essential point. One might suppose, for example, that the novelty of Marxism lies in its introduction of the category of praxis into philosophy. But praxis is one thing, and the concept or category of praxis is quite another. One might well write a treatise entitled "On Practice", offering in it a philosophical theory concerning the interdependence of theory and practice; but to do this would not be 'to actualise philosophy by transcending it'. On the contrary, it would merely be to produce another philosophical theory of the traditional kind. Here I would recall to the reader the observations of Lucien Goldmann cited on page 87.

Something similar holds true of existential philosophy, and of its advance into the area of subjective 'inwardness'. In my exposition of the theory of existence found in the philosophical writings of Kierkegaard, I depicted his idea of subjectivity as truth in the context of a philosophical theory of human existence. This was not wrong, but it was incomplete. For if the conclusion is that, for an existing individual, truth must lie in his power to appropriate, subjectively grasp and concernfully commit himself, then this must be taken by the philosophical thinker to apply to himself; for he too is an existing individual. In other words, his thinking must itself become a thinking that is personal and passionate. As such, it will be very different from the traditional theoria, or purely contemplative thought, associated with philosophy. For what
that implies is an impersonal and dispassionate kind of thinking.

The question for us is which of these modes of thinking is that employed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. This I take to be the question to which the two opposing interpretations quoted on page 120 give differing answers. Further, it is the real question about Heidegger's relation to the Husserlian project of rigorous science.

Husserl describes rational, scientific investigation as taking place "in a way that compels any rational individual." In the first part of the present chapter we saw his attitude towards philosophising through 'opinions' and 'individual convictions'. One can easily imagine Husserl's judgement on a definition of truth as 'an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness'. In one sense, though, Husserl and Kierkegaard share a common standpoint: neither finds room for disputation or argument in the authentic mode of thinking. Husserl's aim allows only whatever criticism occurs within a collaborative relationship between thinkers engaged in the common pursuit of science; he means to rule out dispute of any more radical kind. As well as being opposed to 'argument' in this colloquial sense, he also finds little place in philosophy for 'argument' in the sense of deductive logical demonstration - a point that will be looked at in the second part of this chapter. His belief that disputation is inconsistent with the nature of science forms another link with Hegel, in addition to those already mentioned, for Hegel too is concerned to distinguish philosophical procedure from mere
Kierkegaard: 'argumentative thinking' or 'ratiocination'. 61

Now Kierkegaard, too, holds that argument has no place in genuine thinking — that is, in subjective thinking whose whole concern lies in existence. He holds that logical reasoning abstracts from the distinction between existence (here *Tilværelse*) and non-existence. It is therefore incapable of answering questions whose whole meaning lies in this difference. "I always reason from existence, not toward existence, whether I move in the sphere of palpable sensible fact or in the realm of thought." 62 Thus, for example, it is wrong to expect any proof of the existence of God, or for that matter of anything else. We may, perhaps, employ logical reasoning within the realm of concepts, but the all-important move from there to real existence is a leap (Spring); 63 and such real movement is something of which logic is incapable. 64 But if logic is indifferent to the difference between existence and non-existence, subjective thinking is vitally concerned with it. Here we come back to the correlation between 'objective uncertainty' and subjective appropriation. The detour serves to emphasise that the importance of subjective thinking, for Kierkegaard, is that it, and it alone, puts us in touch with what is real and actual — as opposed to what is merely located in the realm of abstract logical possibility.

I shall take the question about Heidegger's mode of philosophical thinking to be approachable through another question: that of the nature of his philosophical writing. In short: what sort of a book is *Sein und Zeit*? Is it a philosophical
treatise of the traditional kind, or has it some different goal? To show what this different goal might be, I again refer to Kierkegaard. "Existential reality," he writes, "is incommunicable." If this is the last word to be said on the subject, then it casts a good deal of doubt on the value of Kierkegaard's own writings. But it is not; Kierkegaard has in mind here just one mode of communication: the sort appropriate to objective thinking. Existential reality cannot be communicated in this way because its personal and subjective character eludes objective thinking, but also because of the factor touched upon on the last page: the inability of logical thinking to grasp the actuality of existence. Kierkegaard writes: "Objective thinking is wholly indifferent to subjectivity, and hence also to inwardness and appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct... It can be understood directly and be recited by rote." Just for this reason, he goes on, it "is not in the strict sense of the word a form of communication at all." This surprising reversal in Kierkegaard's position is explained by his theory of another, indirect form of communication, which deserves the title of 'communication' to a greater extent because of the special attention it must pay to the possible understanding of the recipient.

What, then, is this indirect communication, and how does it function as a communication of subjectivity and existential reality? This is a question about the basic nature of Kierkegaard's philosophical writing. It must be evident to any reader that Kierkegaard's mode of writing differs considerably from that of
conventional philosophical works. His continual use of humour and irony, his dramatic devices, his highly personal tone, are all deliberately adopted in order to create a mode of communication appropriate to what he wants to communicate: existential reality. His aim is to address the reader in an ‘existential communication (Existents-Meddelelse). Christianity itself, Kierkegaard holds, is “not a doctrine but an existential communication.”68 So is ethics—hence its notable absence in the Hegelian system. What, then, is this special kind of communication, given that its task is to communicate something that cannot be communicated directly? Kierkegaard’s answer is that it is communication in terms of possibility. But this is “not an aesthetically and intellectually disinterested possibility”69 like the ‘possibility’ which pure logic substitutes for reality; rather, it is one that confronts the recipient with a challenge.70 “A communication in the form of a possibility compels the recipient to face the problem of existing in it, so far as this is possible between man and man.”71 It must be pointed out, though, that it is up to the recipient whether or not he recognizes in the existential communication something that is not a mere report of what is or has been the case, but instead an indication, necessarily indirect, of a possibility of his own existence. Kierkegaard gives, in the following passage, what is essentially the requirements of the recipient:72

It is intelligent to ask two questions: (1) Is it possible? (2) Can I do it? But it is unintelligent to ask these two questions:
To repeat, then: what sort of a book is Sein und Zeit? does it fit the model of existential communication set up by Kierkegaard? As I said earlier, Heidegger's critics have disagreed. Their disagreement largely coincides with the difference between the points of view from which they approach Heidegger's work. Those who see it from the standpoint of existential philosophy tend to criticise its seeming conformity with the style of traditional philosophical writing.

"Heidegger's thinking," one such critic writes, "is objective and detached, interested in pure Being, and therefore only existential in a somewhat Pickwickian sense." He concludes: "Heidegger's ontology is not really an existential enterprise after all; it is classical metaphysics disguised in the terminology of human concern." (Oddly, however, this writer also attacks from precisely the opposite direction: "Heidegger's 'metaphysics' is at bottom simply the ontologising of emotional experience." Another critic puts the point in a nutshell: "Instead of existing, he speculates upon existence." This sentence I take to express the same line of criticism that I developed above (page 126) in a slightly different connexion.

Often Heidegger is, from this point of view, compared adversely with Karl Jaspers. For Jaspers takes pains to assimilate his writing to 'indirect communication' in the sense proposed by Kierkegaard. Thus, for example, he writes: "On the
surface, as words, the specific signs we use to elucidate Existenz are derived from objects of world orientation, often explicitly characterised by the adjective 'existential'. In the end, however, they turn out to be not object-forming categories but indices for thoughts that appeal to existential possibilities. Jaspers differs somewhat from Kierkegaard in asserting an apparent similarity between existential communication and objective communication: existential communication, he holds, inevitably uses the words of objective discourse, but 'in the end' their function is seen to be wholly different from the function they have in objective discourse. This is presumably another aspect of the 'indirect' character of existential communication. On the face of it, Jaspers' style of writing tends to resemble that of Heidegger more than that of Kierkegaard, being somewhat impersonal and objective in tone - though also rather diffuse and vague in comparison to Heidegger. However, Jaspers wants to say that this is only a superficial characterisation of his mode of philosophising, that its true function lies in the indirect link that it creates between one Existenz and another.

In his "An Introduction to Existential Philosophy", Moritz Geiger contrasts Heidegger's Sein und Zeit with Jaspers' Philosophie along these lines. Heidegger's work, he says, "has done precisely the one thing which a serious existential philosophy should not do: it has confused existential and ontological issues." Jaspers' Philosophie, on the other hand, "is of quite a different type. It is a real philosophy from an
existential standpoint, not a confusion of points of view. Here, all the problems are seen from the point of view of human existence. As a consequence he has achieved deep solutions and profound insights.77 Other writers have made similar comparisons between Heidegger and Jaspers, similarly locating the difference in Heidegger's wish to give an ontological account of human existence. Most, like Geiger in the passage just quoted, conclude in favour of Jaspers.78

We can, I think, distinguish two aspects in the general question: I shall, for convenience, label them the problems of objectivity and of universality. So far I have concentrated on the first, which hinges on the difference between detached, dispassionate theoría and personal, subjective thinking, and the corresponding difference between 'direct' and 'indirect' modes of communication. The second problem is, of course, closely related to this one, but its accent is somewhat different. It is the question of the universal validity of the account of existence which Heidegger gives in Sein und Zeit. Is the 'Dasein' of which he writes primarily his own existence (and, perhaps, through indirect communication, that of his reader) or is it the existence of any human being? In other words, do his analyses and conclusions apply not only to himself but to mankind as a whole - men of all times and all cultures? Husserl took his scientific model to imply such a universal validity. His observations concerning the human being were intended as valid for all men: "even the Papuan."79 So this problem, like the first one, is a problem relating to the
differences between Husserl and Heidegger.

It is also another point of contrast with Jaspers. Whereas Heidegger's analyses certainly seem to be intended as universal in reference, Jaspers takes a line which is, if anything, more Kierkegaardian than Kierkegaard himself. For he will not allow talk of Existenz as many in any sense belonging primarily to objective thinking. Existenz, he says, is "multiple, but not countable." He defends this strange view by arguing that apprehension of some other Existenz is possible only "in singular, uninterchangeable communication, in a mutual, noncompetitive approach." Jaspers seems to allow that one can have an awareness of the 'multiplicity' just referred to, but he specifies that this can only have the character of an indistinct prefiguration of possible one-to-one relations. To make anything like a survey of the multiple realm, one would have to 'step out of Existenz', but this is quite impossible. Hence the impossibility of anything like a universal account of Existenz.

The problem of universality is also a problem about talk of "the 'essence' of Dasein". I have already mentioned this (above, pages 63-64). I said in the earlier discussion that 'essence' was not to be understood in the traditional sense of essentia, because of the associations possessed by that term - its reference, recalling the words of Alexandre Koyré, to "a being determined in all its operations, and (whose) actions flow from its determinations." I did not, however, deny there the applicability of the notion of essence on the grounds merely of
its universality. This is a question that has given rise to a fascinating variety of intellectual devices—many, however, on what one may suspect is a merely terminological level. Does existential philosophy, as critics like Jean Wahl suggest, reinstate the traditional concept of essence whenever it puts forward formulations of 'the general characteristics of human existence'? Jean-Paul Sartre attempts to solve the difficulty by fine distinctions: "Although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition." He goes on to elaborate this 'human condition in terms of "all the limitations which a priori define man's fundamental situation in the universe."' This is, it seems to me, a distinctly dubious distinction. Whatever characteristics apply a priori—that is, both necessarily and universally—to human existence may reasonably be said to constitute a human essence or nature; unless the very strict interpretation of those terms suggested by Koyré is accepted.

Instead of going on to detail more such shifts, I shall move on to a brief summary of the problem that we are here concerned with, and then turn to suggested solutions. As an authoritative source, Karl Jaspers may be quoted:

This philosophy seems to me grounded in ambiguities. It operates with existential terms; in fact, it derives from Kierkegaard, Luther, and St. Augustine. But at the same time it operates scientifically, phenomenologically, objectively. The appeal to selfhood, to authenticity, and to actual being... is present as it is in the great philosophical tradition, though the ideas of that tradition tend
to acquire a hollow sound. At the same time, Heidegger's thought is presented in objective terms, as a doctrine, and as a result it commits us no more than the traditional systems. What we have, then, is a noncommittal, phenomenological knowledge, and by the same token, a learnable, usable knowledge that is a perversion of philosophy.

This is a strong challenge: how can it be met? The first attempt at a solution that I will consider is one that is to be found in an article of 1930 by Rudolf Bultmann, entitled "The Historicity of Man and Faith." I do not suggest that the viewpoint put forward here by Bultmann is designed to meet the problems I have set out, rather that what he says here can be used in the service of such a solution. What Bultmann proposes is a kind of division of labour between philosophy and theology. 'Philosophy' here tends to mean 'the philosophy of Martin Heidegger' - as Jaspers pointedly notes in his critique of Bultmann's theory of demythologising. Bultmann makes this distinction: "Philosophy shows that my being a man uniquely belongs to me, but it does not speak of my unique existence; this, however, is exactly what theology does." Philosophy "inquires concerning existence with respect to existentiality, but it does not speak to concrete existence." This is what theology does: its manner of address is that of the sermon. Bultmann does not identify theology with the art of the sermon, however; he takes it to be "a historical science in that it speaks of a specific occurrence in human existence." What it has in common with the sermon is that it speaks to the 'man of faith'; it is not an objective communication but instead one that confronts the
concrete individual with a challenge addressed uniquely to him. What makes theology different from a sermon, on the other hand, is— if I understand Bultmann correctly— its status as a science, which it possesses by virtue of its intimate relationship with the philosophical analysis of existence. The two work together, in Bultmann's scheme. First philosophy establishes that human existence is open to the possibilities of (Christian) faith and unfaith, and then theology steps in to 'proclaim' these possibilities in a concrete and personal communication. One's impression is that Bultmann takes this to be a natural step; at any rate, the conflict between universality and individuality, objectivity and subjectivity, is removed by a distinction between these two stages. If, then, one asks, 'What kind of work is Heidegger's Sein und Zeit?', Bultmann's answer is that it is an objective philosophical analysis of human existence; but one that in some sense points onward to a theology grounded in the picture of existence already set out.

There is, I think, a good deal of plausibility in this line of thinking. (I take it that one could, if one wanted, substitute 'ethics' or some such alternative for 'theology' in this context, with appropriate modifications.) For it is plausible in terms of the idea that traditional philosophical thinking is something to be 'transcended'. To 'transcend' philosophy surely requires that one first work through philosophy, not merely criticising its adequacy from an external standpoint but rather seeing how philosophy itself comes to conclusions which point to a move beyond philosophy as such. This is why
Marx, while criticising the 'theoretical party' for "believing that it could actualise philosophy without transcending it," also criticised the 'practical party' for attempting to negate philosophy in a merely external way: "In short: you cannot transcend philosophy without actualising it." Applying a similar principle to the case of Bultmann means making a stronger claim than the claim that philosophical analysis of human existence makes theology possible. It suggests that this philosophical analysis makes theology (or some analogue) necessary. Though Bultmann himself does not explain just why philosophy should lead on to theology, an argument along these lines does seem to make sense of his position.

On the converse, the necessity for theology to be preceded by philosophy, Bultmann is more explicit. Even preaching, he thinks, presupposes some conception of the nature of human existence. Preaching may not need to make this conception an articulated one, but theology's status as a science requires it to do that — and this in turn refers it to philosophy. In reply to Jaspers' charge that he identifies philosophy with the theories of "one book by Heidegger", Bultmann quotes Friedrich Gogarten: "Needless to say, we may learn from others besides Heidegger. If we can learn those things better elsewhere, it is all to the good. But they have to be learned." In other words: a philosophical analysis of human existence other than Heidegger's may serve equally well — provided that it says what Heidegger's says.

What, we may wonder, is Heidegger's response to this
construction upon his theory of human existence? In the Einführung in die Metaphysik he seems to repudiate any use of his philosophy in the service of theology or religion. His motive is partly a concern for the autonomy of philosophy, an opposition to any use of philosophy as a mere means towards some further end, whether this is cultural, political or religious. The idea that philosophy can supply a 'freshening-up' (Auffrischung) of theology, in accordance with the needs of the present time, is one that shows a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy. More pointedly for Bultmann, Heidegger argues that it also shows a failure to grasp what theology is, and adds - in what, for him, is a rare flash of wit - that "for the original Christian faith, philosophy is foolishness."

Heidegger, then, appears to be distinctly unsympathetic towards the Bultmannian reading of Sein und Zeit as a propaedeutic to theology. We may, perhaps, infer from this that he would be equally unsympathetic to any interpretation of Sein und Zeit attempting to answer the question of its status by proposing a separation between objective and subjective phases of thinking about human existence. Some effort, then, must be made to see what other solution to this problem might be available.

In Sein und Zeit itself, Heidegger at times seems to be identifying the ontological analysis of existence as a project to be seized upon by the existing individual as a personal commitment. In the 'Introduction', for example, he writes: "Only if the inquiry of philosophical investigation is itself seized upon in an existentiell way as a possibility of the Being of the
existing Dasein in question does the possibility exist of a disclosure of the existentiality of existence, and hence the possibility of undertaking an adequately founded ontological problematic in general. This suggests that the analysis of existence is not a detached theoretical enterprise at any of its stages; rather that from the very beginning it must be linked with a personal and subjective approach. In other words, Heidegger hints that an understanding of Sein und Zeit cannot be separated from the individual pursuit of authenticity, of the 'genuine' mode of existence. Yet elsewhere in the book one can find passages in which Heidegger appears to be taking a different line. One occurs in the course of his analysis of conscience. He distinguishes an ontological understanding of conscience from the business of 'answering its call'. And he writes: "Just as little as existence is necessarily and directly impaired by an ontologically inadequate understanding of conscience, so little is an existentiell understanding of the call of conscience guaranteed by an existentially appropriate interpretation." Heidegger, then, is not claiming that his interpretation of this aspect of existence - an interpretation which he holds to be superior to those offered in the past - supplies any kind of edifying moral benefit to a recipient. Yet he soon modifies this position significantly, for he writes: "Nevertheless, the interpretation which is more primordial existentially does disclose possibilities of an understanding which is more primordial existentially, as long as the ontological grasping does not allow itself to be cut off from ontic experience."
The problem, then, is the problem of the relation between the 'ontological' and the 'ontic', the 'existential' and the 'existentiell'. This will be dealt with in a later chapter. Our conclusion from the discussion so far is that the problems of the universality and objectivity of the theories of *Sein und Zeit* are explicable in terms of this distinction which forms part of the theories themselves. The problem is that of the difference between ontological and ontic thinking, and in particular the question how one passes from one level to the other. Here we have asked how thinking on the existential level gives rise to thinking on the existentiell level: the process which is hinted at by Heidegger in the passage just quoted. There is, however, a problem in the converse transition, the move from the existentiell to the existential. Because this move is, in one sense, the key to Heidegger's phenomenological method, it is to that that the next section of this chapter will be directed.
2. The Phenomenological Method

The problems that arise in attributing a use of the phenomenological method to Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* are quite different from those involved in categorising the work as a contribution to existential philosophy. Heidegger himself repeatedly asserts that his method is that of phenomenology. He makes stronger claims than this. He holds that phenomenology is not merely one possible line of approach to the questions of ontology - one option among various others. Rather is phenomenology the only possible method for ontological inquiry. And further, phenomenology and ontology are united as merely differing aspects of the same pursuit. "Ontology and phenomenology are not two separate disciplines within philosophy, over and above each other. These terms characterise philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object."^2

Heidegger's willingness to call himself a phenomenologist does not of itself establish that this label can validly be attached to his thinking, any more than his refusal to adopt the title of 'existentialist' placed him outside the line of philosophical thinking which the term is intended to indicate. And in fact, the relationship between Heidegger's phenomenology and the main tradition of phenomenology arising from the work of Husserl is a matter of controversy. Some critics of Heidegger have claimed that the difference is such that Heidegger has no real right to the title of 'phenomenologist'. Thus, for example, Marvin Farber writes: "Having regard to his main drift in
philosophy, he does not deserve to be classed as a phenomenologist in a good (methodological) sense. Yet in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger does explicitly place himself within the phenomenological movement. He acknowledges Husserl, to whom the work is dedicated, as his immediate predecessor in the development of the phenomenological method. "The following investigations," he writes, "became possible only on the ground prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logical Investigations phenomenology made its breakthrough." In view of the divergence between his and the orthodox Husserlian use of the phenomenological method, Heidegger later ceased to describe his method as phenomenological. But he did not do this as an admission that the term had become inappropriate to his mode of thinking. Thirty years after the publication of Sein und Zeit, we find Heidegger writing: "The question of Being unfolded in Sein und Zeit parted company with this philosophical position, but did so on the basis of what I still believe today to be a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology."

Many of the objections to Heidegger's application of the term 'phenomenology' to his philosophy hinge on the opposition between existential philosophy and 'philosophy as rigorous science'. I shall not repeat what was said in the first section of the present chapter on that issue. Instead, this section will be concerned with some of the more concrete problems involved in the application of the phenomenological method to existential and ontological problems.

In order to avoid any lengthy exposition of Husserl's
theory of phenomenology, I shall leave aside the various aspects of his development of that theory from a starting-point of Cartesian doubt, and instead recall what was said earlier: that Husserl sees phenomenology as primarily an investigation into essences. The question whether Heidegger can be said to deal with essences, or at least the essence of human existence, was also dealt with earlier. Now, however, we shall see what is in a sense the other side of this question posed in terms of essence: the question of the 'bracketing' of existence. I wish to bring out this question because it is one on which, it seems to me, many otherwise reliable commentators on Heidegger's philosophy have gone astray.

Husserl proposes to study essences by using a special kind of intuition, an 'eidetic intuition', which is different from ordinary experience of things in the empirical world. In other words, his philosophical method is based upon immediate acquaintance with pure essences. Once this is achieved, he holds, it will be possible to undertake a descriptive analysis of what is thus presented: comparing, distinguishing, relating - 'but all within pure 'seeing'.' Philosophy, in Husserl's view, "does not theorise or carry out mathematical operations; that is to say, it carries through no explanations in the sense of deductive theory." It is a purely descriptive science. But now we must ask: how is this apprehension of essences gained? What is, for our present purposes, the crucial feature of Husserl's answer, is his view that in seeking to find those characteristics of any object which make up its essence, it is immaterial whether we take
as our example a real object or a merely imagined one. For the difference between the two is a difference in existence, not in essence. "Just on that account is the general judgement of essence, which we usually just call the judgement of essence, independent of the distinction between perception and imagination," Husserl concludes. Elsewhere he puts the matter the other way around: "The positing of the essence, with the intuitive apprehension that immediately accompanies it, does not imply any positing of individual existence whatsoever; pure essential truths do not make the slightest assertion concerning facts."  

Hence Husserl recommends what he calls the 'bracketing' of existence: that is, a procedure which excludes from consideration the question of the real existence of whatever thing is being investigated as to its essence; its existence is set aside as if by the use of parentheses. Thus the danger of paying misleading attention to the difference between perception and imagination is avoided. Husserl thinks that this is an indispensable step in the attainment of intuition of essences. He thus lays it down that a phenomenological science must exclude all "existential affirmations."

Does Heidegger exclude existential affirmations from his analysis of human existence? An authoritative commentator on Heidegger's philosophy is Alphonse de Waelhens: in his book La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger we find these observations on the Husserlian 'reduction' or 'bracketing':

If the reduction, in fact, is designed to 'set aside
existential validity', one will hardly be surprised to find no trace of it in Heidegger. The difference is easily explained by taking account of the goal that Heidegger is proposing: to study existence itself, existence just as it is. How could this goal be realisable by a method one of whose first concerns is to eliminate it? We can thus conclude that if Husserl makes neutrality vis-à-vis existence the condition sine qua non of phenomenology, Heidegger regards this neutrality as the very negation of the philosophical attitude.

Various other commentators make essentially the same contrast. G.A. Schrader writes: "Heidegger gave up the bracketing in order to embark upon his own version of 'phenomenology'." 13 Again, Ronald Grimsley, in his Existentialist Thought: "Heidegger maintains a significant silence on the subject of the famous 'phenomenological reduction' or epoche through which we bracket our 'natural' questions concerning the real existence of objects. To retain an attitude of strict neutrality towards the question of human existence would negative the whole meaning of Heidegger's inquiry." 14 Other similar quotations could be presented, but these may suffice. 15

It is certainly true that Heidegger maintains a silence on the subject of the 'bracketing' of existence, as he does on many other aspects of the Husserlian conception of phenomenology. But a silence can have several significances; and I query whether the significance of this one is an abandonment of the theme of bracketing - a theme which is quite central to the whole Husserlian notion of the phenomenological method. In reply to these critics, I quote Heidegger himself: "The statement, 'man exists' does not answer the question whether or not there actually
are men or not. Rather, it answers the question about the 'essence' of man.\textsuperscript{16} Heidegger, then, is not working within the traditional disjunction of essentia and existentia, as Husserl tends to do. In what he says about human existence, Heidegger is not reporting on the reality of this or that human being. As he says here, he is answering the question about the 'essence' of man. His 'existential assertions' are not 'existential assertions' in Husserl's sense: that is, assertions of an empirical kind which 'posit' individual existence as real. This being the case, is there really any difference on this point between him and Husserl?

But, one might object, Heidegger makes it clear that in reflecting on the nature of human existence one is directing one's attention towards one's own existence. He writes: "The being whose analysis is being undertaken is precisely the one that we ourselves are. The Being of this being is in each case my own."\textsuperscript{17} At this point, Heidegger's English translators, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, insert an explanatory note: "The reader must not get the impression that there is anything solipsistic about the second of these sentences. The point is merely that the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is of a sort which any of us may call his own."\textsuperscript{18} At least one reader of \textit{Sein und Zeit} did gain just such an impression: Gilbert Ryle, who in his 1929 review of Heidegger's book argued that an element of solipsism had been "interpolated into" Heidegger's use of the phenomenological method.\textsuperscript{19} Heidegger himself invites this interpretation when he states that "anxiety individualises Dasein and thus discloses it
He even goes on to speak of "existential 'solipsism'". Though the inverted commas here are a warning, one can see how Ryle's impression arises from much of what Heidegger says—either from passages like the analysis of anxiety, or from his more general directions on the project of existential analysis. Now I would agree with Macquarrie and Robinson that this impression is a mistaken one, but I am not sure that their way of expressing the real sense of the statement that Dasein is "in each case my own" is correct. For as it is written, it leaves Heidegger open to an interpretation which is as misleading as the 'solipsist' interpretation. If I call something 'mine' or 'my own', this may not carry the implication that nobody else can call it his with equal validity. 'My country' would be a simple example. Now as these writers put it, what one calls one's own in this case is a certain sort of Being: the sort of Being that corresponds to the human being. But is it not true to say that every human being has an equal right to call this sort of Being 'mine', in much the same way as the case with 'my country'? This sort of 'mineness' is what one might call the non-exclusive sort. But I do not think that Heidegger means this, or at least that he means merely this. His idea is that in each instance of human existence, there is a 'mineness' in which something is taken to be uniquely 'mine': that is, 'mine' in a way that a priori rules out any kind of 'sharing' between distinct individuals.

This concept of 'mineness' must be a central topic later. However, a few further remarks seem appropriate at this point.
Here I wish to qualify the remarks of the last page on the topic of 'mineness'. It may be that these allowed a confusion between the senses of 'a certain sort of Being' and 'Being of a certain sort', although I do not think that any such confusion is present in the explanation by Macquarrie and Robinson just criticised.

In everyday speech we do commonly run expressions like these together, or rather assimilate the first sort to the second. But in a stricter context, there is a difference which is relevant to the question what is supposed to be 'my own' in this theory of 'mineness'. The answer is that it is not merely a certain sort of Being, but rather an individual instance of this general kind. But now this seems to bring us back to existencia, in its traditional opposition to essentia. It recalls what was said earlier (page 104, 128ff.) about Kierkegaard's term Tilvaerelse, which he uses when talking about the difference between existence and non-existence. Though this 'existence' is not to be identified with 'existence' in the sense of human existence, there is a close link. It is that the concerns of subjective thinking are primarily concerns about this difference between existence and non-existence, whereas objective, logical thinking abstracts from and ignores this difference. Logical thinking is concerned with general essences: one might well use Husserl's terminology, and say that it 'brackets' existence.

So once again we are drawn back to the question whether Heidegger follows Husserl in putting existence 'within parentheses'. The simple approach so far adopted has failed to solve this problem. In order to carry the argument further, let us make the
shift of emphasis made before in connection with Kierkegaard—a shift from the question of thinking as such to the question of the expression or communication of thinking. Our original question, after all, was 'What sort of work is Sein und Zeit?'. Something of Kierkegaard's conception of communication of existential thinking has been discussed, notably his view that a direct communication of existential reality is impossible. This idea may be illuminating when applied to Heidegger's task in his work. Kierkegaard recognises that the link between one existential reality and another must be mediated by something whose character is that of possibility. This cannot, however, be the abstract possibility of logical concepts; though we may depart here from actual existence, our final purpose is to return there. The notion of possibility will thus be that of the possibility of a certain mode of existence. Just how this is to be brought out is rather obscure; yet it seems to me that some line of thinking similar to this one is necessary in order to understand Kierkegaard's theory of communication.

Jaspers, following and to some extent systematising Kierkegaard, is more detailed in his account. He is open in recognising that communication takes place in terms of concepts which are general by their nature. Yet, he wants to insist, in the case of those concepts used in 'elucidating Existenz', "their generality does not exist in detachment." For, Jaspers goes on, they are "indices for thoughts that appeal to existential possibilities. As signs they have a general side whose generality, however, is not mundane any more but already
existential. Their proper conception requires the general
statement to find an echo in Existenz. Without Existenz, the
signs are not just empty; they are nothing." If we wish to
find a line of interpretation which will clarify the basic
character of Heidegger's philosophical writing, yet which will
not do so in the way of the solution I first proposed—that is,
by separating distinct 'objective' and 'subjective' phases of
philosophical discourse—then the general line indicated in
these words of Jaspers seems to me to be the most plausible one
available. It is a more subtle solution, but it is also one
that is harder to explain and to grasp.

One might, perhaps, see Jaspers as reversing Hegel's
well-known argument concerning the universality of language and
thought. Words like 'this', 'here', and 'now', Hegel argues,
are universal. When we use them, we may 'mean' (meinen) to refer
to what is purely individual and unique, but we find that
this simply cannot be done in language. Particularly relevant to
our topic is that Hegel holds this to be true of 'I'. (He
dismisses proper names as 'meaningless sounds', thus not properly
part of language as such.22) Thus he writes: "In the same way
when I say 'I', 'this individual I', I say quite generally 'all
'I's', every one is what I say, every one is 'I', this individual
I." "No doubt I 'mean' an individual I, but just as little as I am
able to say what I 'mean' by Now, Here, so it is impossible in the
case of the I too."23 This universality is inherent in language,
in Hegel's view, because it "belongs to consciousness, i.e. to
what is inherently universal."24 The 'I' is, in fact, the best
expression of this universality of thought.\textsuperscript{25}

Hegel uses this line of argument to claim that the purely individual is "untrue, irrational, something barely and simply 'meant'."\textsuperscript{26} Jaspers, however, draws a different moral: to him, the generality of language is a fact, and so too is the inability of language to express directly what is present in individual existence. But this is a fault of language and of objective thinking, not of individual existence. He writes:

"In elucidating Existenz I speak of the self as if it were a universal whose structures I demonstrate, but I can mean only my own self for which nothing can substitute. I am not 'the I' - I am myself." Thus if we use the terms of objective language in communicating existence, as it seems we must, they function in an indirect way - as we have already discussed. "In existential elucidation I speak also of the many selves and of their Existenz; but I cannot mean it that way, because the many do not exist as cases of a universal."\textsuperscript{27}

This last is closely paralleled by Heidegger: "Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as a case or instance of some species of things present-at-hand."\textsuperscript{28} Yet even that is rather ambiguous: it is unclear whether being a case of a universal holds only of things that are 'present-at-hand' - that is, things other than Dasein - or whether it is applicable to Dasein, being objectionable only when the further reference to 'presence-at-hand' is added to it. The first alternative would point to something like Jaspers' solution to what I earlier called 'the problem of universality', the second to the alternative solution
treated earlier. Are these all the approaches there are to this question? I have seen what may be an attempt at a different approach again in an article by R.F. Grabau, entitled "Existential Universals." Grabau claims, first of all, that we may conceptualise our existential situation in a 'symbolic construct'; but he takes this to be in the first instance something purely personal and private. Such constructs, he argues, become universal by being "successfully communicated", and thus shared with others.29

To this one feels inclined to reply that 'successful communication' of a conception presupposes that it is not a merely private one (supposing even this to be a coherent notion) but rather already universal in character. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the distinction is being made between 'universal' as meaning 'generally applicable' and 'universal' as meaning 'used by many (or most) people'. My suspicion is that the position which Grabau is attempting to take will, if these confusions are eliminated, revert to that of Jaspers - and, in turn, to Kierkegaard's doctrine of 'indirect communication'.

The problems raised in this chapter, in the first instance with respect to the relation between the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, have been problems of the objectivity and universal validity of philosophical thinking. Several possible lines of solution have been indicated. None, I think, can be unequivocally pointed to as Heidegger's own doctrine; for nowhere does he face these problems as problems of the kind that I have tried to describe. As we have seen, a prima facie case can be made out for each; and it is true to say that each has
found support amongst commentators on Heidegger. What I have tried to do so far is to develop the problem to a point where the concrete treatment of Heidegger's existential analysis will be intelligible in terms of this perspective.

Our final point of comparison between the phenomenological methods of Husserl and Heidegger deals with a rather different topic: the question of presuppositions. In the criticism by Ryle already referred to, this was one issue. Ryle took Heidegger to have compromised his use of the phenomenological method by 'interpolating' themes drawn from elsewhere: "both the positive element of Humanism and the negative sceptical element of Relativism and Solipsism". It is likely that what Ryle is referring to here is essentially the existential orientation of the theories of Sein und Zeit. It is understandable that the existentialist aspect of the work could not, at the time that Ryle's review was published, be as apparent as its phenomenological aspect. For one thing, it is less explicitly signalled in the text. But in any case, existential philosophy was not at that time a philosophical trend well-known amongst philosophers at large. However, this omission does not affect the essential point made by Ryle.

Implicit in Ryle's words is an important contrast between phenomenology and existential philosophy. Husserl's intention was always that phenomenology should be a philosophy operating without presuppositions. This is the significance of his theory of 'bracketing existence', with its analogy to Cartesian doubt. But it is the further sense of radical empiricism
that concerns us here. Husserl takes the method of phenomenology to be an intuition that is purely a 'seeing'. Heidegger, too says, 'What matters in these analyses is seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being.' Yet the existential orientation does, on the face of things, seem to involve assumptions, as Ryle puts it, 'views interpolated into and not won by the phenomenological method.' To take the most obvious example, is not the category of 'existence' assumed at the start to be one that indicates some genuine subject-matter? And are not certain (even minimal) theses involved in the bare use of this category - ideas about individuality and subjectivity?

Heidegger's replies to this line of objection are of much interest. He freely admits that his procedure is circular in the sense that it presupposes the concepts that are to be the subject of the subsequent analyses. Yet he tends to deny that it is circular in the strictest sense. For the concept as it is originally grasped is as yet unarticulated, and therefore not to be simply equated with the fully explicated concept as it appears after the completion of the analysis. The two are, no doubt, the same concept in another sense, and in that sense the whole procedure is a circular one. Various passages could be quoted from Sein und Zeit to bring out Heidegger's views on the topic of circularity. Let us look at one which occurs near the beginning of the work. Heidegger here has in mind the overall inquiry into Being, and his proposal to work towards an understanding of Being in general through a study of the Being of some particular entity (namely: ourselves). He writes:
Is there not, however, a manifest circularity in such an undertaking? First of all having to define an entity in its Being, and then wanting to formulate the question about Being just on this basis—what is this other than going in a circle? For the working-out of the question, is not it already 'presupposed' what is supposedly only supplied eventually by the answer to this question? Formal objections about 'circular proof', which can easily be raised at any time in the investigation of first principles, are always sterile in the consideration of concrete ways of investigation. When it comes to understanding the matter at hand, they carry no weight and hinder the advance into the field of study.

Heidegger's position is, however, rather less clear-cut than it appears here. His frequent polemics against 'logical thinking'—especially those that appear in the later works—may give the impression that he sees objections from that point of view as beneath his notice, as springing from a viewpoint so misguided as not to be worth serious consideration. This is not, however, a line of thinking that can reasonably be read back into Sein und Zeit. After the passage just quoted, Heidegger continues, "But in point of fact there is no circle at all in our way of approaching the question. We can define beings in their Being without already having the explicit concept of Being at our disposal."34 This is the line of reply that I have already described. It meets the charge of circularity directly, thus admitting its force. Obviously, this does not imply any disdain of the canons of logic— if anything, it reveals a concern to meet their requirements.

Elsewhere, however, Heidegger adopts a rather different line of defence. For example, he writes: "A 'circle' in proof can never be 'avoided' in the existential analytic, because this
analytic does not do any proving at all by the rules of the 'logic of inference'." Whether this is intended to rule out the notion of 'proof' altogether, or only the logical model of proof, is unclear; but it is clear that Heidegger is denying that the function of his 'presuppositions' is the function of some kind of axiom from which theorems are progressively developed according to the laws of deductive inference. Since this is the case, the onus must reasonably be on Heidegger to explain what other kind of procedure can be employed by philosophy.

In his book *Philosophical Reasoning*, John Passmore writes: "Are there philosophical modes of reasoning, which are neither inductive nor deductive? To that question, the answer can be given immediately, 'No'. Philosophical reasoning, if it is to be valid at all, must be deductive in its formal structure." Against this short way with non-deductive models of philosophical thinking, what plausible alternative can be drawn from Heidegger's explanations of his own method? (I am assuming here that 'reasoning' as used in the passage just quoted is not trivially identical with 'deduction'.) To see more clearly what Heidegger's method of philosophising is, we must pay closer attention to the question of 'presuppositions' and to the vital distinction between 'having' a concept in a tacit, unarticulated fashion, and having it as a genuinely graspable concept 'at one's disposal'. Heidegger's philosophising is designed to move from one of these poles to the other. This being the case, it must differ from deductive reasoning. For, one might argue, deductive reasoning works, as it were, on a uniform
level of conceptual determinateness. How one attains to this level is not its concern. Hence explication of concepts cannot proceed through the use of deductive reasoning, although once its results are available the use of deductive logic will also be appropriate. Something like this line of thought may be present in Heidegger’s assertions that the source of the ‘circularity’ objection lies in common-sense thinking, which, he says, deals only with everyday objects capable of being readily grasped.37

At any rate, Heidegger’s notion of ‘interpretation’ is that of a process of explication which operates on a concept that we, in some sense, already possess. "An interpretation" he writes, "is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something given."38 This picture of philosophical procedure is hardly compatible with the Husserlian conception of phenomenology. And yet Heidegger does claim to be a phenomenologist, to be engaged in ‘uncovering’ and then describing important ‘phenomena’ — of which existence itself is the most obvious example. We need not go into Heidegger’s meticulous sorting-out of the senses of the term ‘phenomenon’, beyond noting that it bears no connotation of ‘mere’ appearance.39 In other words, Heidegger uses no contrast between ‘phenomenon’ and ‘thing in itself’. Indeed, even in his study of Kant, he plays down this distinction by insisting that it is merely one between two ‘aspects’ of the same thing.40 A phenomenon is just something that appears; but a phenomenon, in Heidegger’s scheme, may well be hidden — may not appear — and so call for a process of ‘uncovering’ before it can be apprehended. In this sense, the task of the philosopher is to make it into a
phenomenon. And to do this is to practise phenomenology.

The point about 'uncovering' is used by Heidegger to make a link between phenomenology as a philosophical procedure and the subject-matter to which it is to be applied:41

What is it that phenomenology is to 'let us see'? What is it that must be called a 'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense? What is by its essence necessarily the theme of an explicating pointing-out? Obviously something that, first and foremost, does not show itself at all, something that is hidden in contrast to what does first and foremost show itself, yet at the same time something that belongs essentially to what does first and foremost show itself, so much so that it constitutes its meaning and its ground.

And this, he goes on to claim, is precisely Being. Being is what makes beings beings; but in our ordinary concerns directed towards the various properties of things, we ignore and forget their hidden 'ground' that is Being. If ontology is what once again opens up an inquiry into Being, then one can see why Heidegger makes the claim (quoted earlier, page 142) that ontology and phenomenology are essentially the same thing, the terms differing only in their stress on, respectively, the subject-matter and the way of approaching that subject-matter. Being is not the only 'phenomenon', however, that phenomenology sets out to uncover. Heidegger gives the example of Kant's treatment of space and time as an instance of philosophising in a phenomenological way.42 (And indeed, Kant did give his "Transcendental Aesthetic" the earlier title of "General Phenomenology",43 though a linking of his rationale for this term with Heidegger's
would be rather circuitous.) But there are other examples within Heidegger's own theory: the 'world', the 'Being of nature', and Dasein itself. Each of these expressions are ontological ones in Heidegger's terminology; each is correlated with some subject-matter of a more or less familiar kind, to which it 'belongs essentially' and whose 'meaning and ground' it indicates—recalling Heidegger's words cited on the last page. Dasein is, of course, the Being of that being which 'we ourselves are'; that is, of human beings. 'The Being of Nature' is self-explanatory; but Heidegger's use of the term 'world' (and 'worldhood') is just the opposite. Without anticipating too much, we can note that it functions as an ontological term correlated with the ontic expression 'environment' (Umwelt).

Phenomenology, as explained by Heidegger, has clear links with the transcendental orientation of his philosophy, in the sense explained earlier (pages 48ff). Transcendental philosophy characteristically operates by performing a regress from the given world of reality to the conditions that make this world possible. This implies an 'uncovering' of something that is, in all likelihood, overlooked in the ordinary course of experience. Kant sometimes calls this the 'analytic' (as opposed to 'synthetic') method of philosophical thinking; but he also suggests the more appropriate label of 'regressive' (as opposed to 'progressive') for it. The association allows us to say something more about what it is that constitutes a 'phenomenon' in the Heideggerian sense. For in transcendental philosophy the 'regress' is a regress to the categorial structure of subjectivity.
This suggests that, by analogy, such Heideggerian phenomena as
the 'Being of nature' and the 'world' are to be seen as somehow
either aspects of or identical with Dasein itself, for this is
his analogue with the Kantian 'subjectivity'.46 And in fact, we
find Heidegger making such comments as: "world belongs to
selfhood; it is essentially linked to Dasein."47 And even:
"As existing, Dasein is its world."48 Less explicit directions
are given for directly linking the Being of nature with Dasein,
largely because Heidegger has no particular interest in the Being
of nature, which, for him, is something secondary and derivative
compared to worldhood.

Since the topic of the 'world' still has to be
discussed, nothing more will be said on it for the present. What
has just been said, however, suggests a particularly intriguing
possibility: might not Being itself be really only something that
belongs to Dasein? Heidegger writes: "Of course only as long as
Dasein is, i.e. as long as there is the ontic possibility of an
understanding of Being, 'is there' Being."49 But here again we
find Heidegger's use of inverted commas an indication that a
misunderstanding of his meaning is possible. In this instance he
means to imply a literal sense of 'gibt es': thus his meaning is
that only in the context of human understanding can Being be said
to emerge as a phenomenon, as something 'given'. To gain any
real understanding of Heidegger's ideas on the relationship in
which Dasein and Being stand to each other, one would have to
refer extensively to Heidegger's later works; and that is not
possible here.
It is clear, then, that in Heidegger's view the essential procedure of philosophical thinking is a regression from everyday experience to what underlies it and makes it possible. Without attempting to elaborate any general thesis about the many historical forms of philosophical thinking, one could at least suggest that this idea of philosophy as an attempt to uncover what has been presupposed throughout the whole course of ordinary experience, though seldom or never in any explicit and conscious way, is not a new one at all. From Plato's theory of knowledge as recollection to R.G. Collingwood's plan of a science of absolute presuppositions, something of this project is implicit in many philosophies. Essential to it—and, perhaps, distinguishing it from an empiricist alternative—is the idea that, in one important sense, philosophy gives us no new knowledge, but only brings to clarity in our minds what was previously there in a hidden or obscure way. Wittgenstein writes, in his Philosophical Investigations, that in seeking "to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical", we do not have "to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view."\(^{50}\) For Wittgenstein, this 'something' seems to be, ultimately, the Lebensform in which our categorial thinking and behaviour is grounded.\(^{51}\) Like Heidegger,\(^{52}\) Wittgenstein finds occasion to quote Augustine's reflections on the difficulty of getting a clear view of what lies closest to us.\(^{53}\)

In making these comparisons, I am not trying to
eliminate the important differences between philosophers. Nor, in the last references to Wittgenstein, am I setting up any facile rapprochement between the 'analytic' philosophy of the English-speaking countries and Heideggerian phenomenology. (In any case, I do not pretend to a comprehensive grasp of the thought of Wittgenstein.) I am, instead, attempting to sketch in very general terms, a way of thinking about philosophy which makes some sense out of the idea that philosophical reasoning is by its very nature 'circular'.

The general line of thinking is this: First, accepting the identification of philosophy with ontology, and, in turn, with a Kategorienlehre, the basic question must arise: How are we to show that our categories are the right ones? No doubt we can draw up a system of concepts which is internally consistent, and apply it to the data of experience. But how is the system validated? Kant seems to hold that the avoidance of internal contradiction in the content of the philosophical 'experiment' is sufficient for its success; for he sees that no 'experiment upon the objects', as practised in natural science, will meet the case. But this assumes the uniqueness of the self-consistent scheme of categories - and that we may well doubt.

The failure of the analogy with natural science (which here, perhaps, should mean so-called 'normal' science) lies in the problem of correlating the theory with its subject-matter. In the case of the philosophical system, this would assume that we have access to the data apart from categorised experience. But that is surely absurd. Of course, one solution to the whole
problem is to suppose that alternative systems of concepts are equally valid, and that choice between them can take place only on methodological grounds, or perhaps even only according to personal judgement of a quasi-aesthetic kind. If this is not Heidegger's standpoint, how does he propose to solve the problem of the justification of the philosophical theory that he offers? His phenomenological methodology is the key to the solution — though it is not being suggested here that he raises the problem in the form described above. Heidegger's phenomenology is designed to uncover presuppositions which are more truly fundamental than, for example, those of any branch of natural science, and which are truly universal in their scope. If he is able to fit alternative schemes, such as the Cartesian ontology, into his theory in a way that shows them as secondary in character, as derived from those schemes that Heidegger claims as fundamental, then all such demonstrations add support to his overall theory. To do this is, in one sense, to take into account things that are left out of the narrower view: are we to say, then, that Heidegger sets out to account for aspects of human existence which other philosophical viewpoints cannot deal with? Rather it is something like the difference between 'explaining' and 'explaining away' touched upon earlier. There seems to be no good reason to deny that, say, an analytic philosopher can take account of the experience of objectless anxiety or 'dread', but from the Heideggerian point of view his treatment of it will inevitably be quite inadequate and superficial, leaving out the vital role of this experience as a source of ontological insight.
But how is this to be demonstrated to Heidegger's reader? His answer presumably lies in the statement quoted before: "What matters in these analyses is seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being." Whether or not this is 'seen' is whether or not Heidegger's project of 'uncovering' the primary phenomena of his phenomenology has been successful.

Heidegger does not, however, hold that these phenomena are ever wholly lost to view. His theory of 'pre-ontological knowledge' implies a denial of that proposition. We could not, Heidegger argues, raise the question of Being at all unless we had some idea of what it is that this question is about: no doubt a vague, dim and 'average' awareness, 'bordering on mere acquaintance with a word', but an acquaintance nevertheless.

This means, in fact, that the indispensable prerequisite for the project of philosophical explication is guaranteed. As Hegel said of his Absolute: "It is already at hand - otherwise, how could it be sought?" This more or less vague presentiment plays an important role in Heidegger's picture of the phenomenological method. For it acts as a 'signpost' which guides the course of the investigation.

There is an interesting parallel here with Kant, who also admits a circularity in his deduction of principles such as the principle of causality. In Kant's view, a synthesis of concepts is impossible without the assistance of "some special guide" (Leitfaden) over and above these concepts. "A concept cannot be combined with another synthetically and yet immediately, since, for us to be able to get beyond a concept, a third something
is required to mediate our knowledge." In empirical knowledge this mediating agency is experience; in mathematics it is pure intuition; in 'transcendental knowledge', "this guideline is possible experience." But principles like that of causality are what make possible experience possible. "It has the peculiar character that it is itself what first makes possible the ground of its proof, namely experience - so that it must always be presupposed by this." Of course, the details of Heidegger's 'circularity' in method are very different from Kant's; but the analogy between the asserted need for 'guidance' in the construction of the philosophical results and the admission of an inevitable circularity in the path of reasoning is, I think, a striking and plausible one.

Little more need be said about this function of 'pre-ontological understanding'. Interpretation involves "a guiding (Leitung) and regulating of its own"; and its guide (Leitfaden: the term used by Kant) can only be an idea that is 'presupposed', albeit in an indeterminate way. Thus Heidegger's theory of phenomenology, and of philosophy as the explication of our fundamental presuppositions, is designed to account for both the goal of the investigation and the path taken by the inquiry in pursuit of this goal.
CHAPTER FIVE

EXISTENCE
One of the basic claims made by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit is that there are several different 'kinds' or 'modes' of Being. It is a little unclear just how many he supposes there to be: at one point he speaks of existence (that is, of course, human existence) and reality as the 'primary' modes of Being; elsewhere a threefold schema of Dasein, 'presence-at-hand' and readiness-to-hand' seems to be envisaged; elsewhere again hints are dropped of further modes of Being; an 'ideal' realm of mathematical objects, and, more mysteriously, something that Heidegger calls 'mere 'subsistence'. It is certainly clear, however, that Heidegger strongly asserts a difference in kind between the Being that belongs to human beings, and the Being that belongs to beings other than human beings. The Being that belongs to human beings is 'Dasein' or 'existence', and what can be said about it is very different from what can be said about other kinds of Being.

How are Heidegger's 'kinds of Being' related to his notion of Being in general? I mentioned earlier (page 57) that Heidegger's original interest in philosophy arose from his reading of Brentano's treatise on 'the manifold senses of 'Being' in Aristotle'. It is a matter for controversy whether Aristotle has any conception of Being, as distinct from conceptions of 'the being'; but for the sake of our argument we may accept the line of interpretation that does take him to be investigating Being in his Metaphysics. To bring out the general area of the problem, I shall quote the following passage from a work somewhat different in orientation from Heidegger's:
It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for existence is not a generic word like 'coloured' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hopes are rising', and 'the average age of death is rising'.

The passage occurs in Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. One would not immediately think of this book as an essay in ontology; yet it does offer a theory of categories, and as we have seen, category theory and ontology are closely linked. Let us recast Ryle's remarks in terms of 'Being' rather than 'existence', to avoid confusion with the existentialist use of that term, and see what they amount to. Ryle denies that there are a number of 'kinds' of Being, if this is taken to mean species within a single genus. Yet he does think that there is something to be said about different uses of 'Being'. He first expresses this, with what is no doubt deliberate vagueness, in terms of the 'logical tone of voice' with which the term is used. But he soon goes on to talk of 'two different senses', and draws an analogy with the different senses of a word like 'rising' in different contexts.

Several points, I think, are being made here. That expressions like 'there is...' are used in several more or less distinct senses is one. This is a thesis not likely to recommend itself to logicians who symbolise such expressions with a single existential operator; nor is Ryle's talk of 'logical tones of voice' likely to win their favour. But secondly, Ryle
does not assert that 'Being' is an ambiguous expression. One can, perhaps, distinguish having different senses from having different meanings. In Ryle's own example, one can see that the senses of 'rising' in the three sentences he lists are somehow linked, though it may be that this is confused by the presence of metaphor. What, then, is the nature of the link between the different senses of 'Being', and is there any sense in talking about Being 'as such'?

Aristotle, too, says that there are various kinds of Being, but that these are not to be taken as species of a common genus. (In other words, 'Being' is, in Ryle's words, "not a generic word"). This view of Aristotle arises from his picture of the definition of a species in terms of a genus and a specific difference which distinguishes the species from others falling under the same genus; together with his stipulation that a genus must not be predicated of its own specific differences. The reason for this stipulation is obscure, but the conclusion that necessarily follows from it is that there can be no single summa genus. For any such genus would cover not only the species under it but also the specific differences, thus infringing Aristotle's second requirement for definition.

Heidegger accepts these arguments in their application to the most general of all concepts: that of Being. He agrees that the universality of Being cannot be that of a class or genus. He also agrees with the inference that Being must as a consequence be indefinable - provided that 'definition' is understood according to the Aristotelian schema of genus and
specific difference. But his next move is to claim that this is only one kind of definition; it is not definition as such, but merely definition of the kind that "is justified, within certain limits, for beings." He can, perhaps, see in this a position developed out of Heidegger's earlier view of the Aristotelian categories generally as only 'a class of one definite domain, and not as the categories pure and simple' (quoted above, page 59). He infers from this merely that Being is not a being, not an entity—which is clear enough in any case, in view of the vicious regress that would arise if Being were taken to be itself a being.

What, then, is Heidegger's attitude towards the Aristotelian solution to the problem of Being: the solution based on the principle of analogy between the different senses of the term? In his remarks on the universality of Being, Heidegger praises Aristotle for having put the question "on a fundamentally new basis", yet immediately qualifies this by saying that even Aristotle failed to dispel "the obscurity of these categorial relationships." Later in *Sein und Zeit* a particularly interesting passage is devoted to a critique of the ontology of Descartes. Heidegger criticises Descartes for taking the categories of *res* and substance as universally applicable to all beings whatsoever, whether creator or creation, and whether thinking or corporeal. He objects, along extremely traditional lines, that this conferred the same status on God and his creation; and he comments that in allowing such consequences, Descartes "remains far behind the Scholastics", with their doctrine of
analogy. Referring in particular to Cajetan, Heidegger praises this solution as one which avoids the consequences of either taking 'Being' to have a single sense in each of its uses, or taking it to be an ambiguous word, 'merely the same name' in the different cases. Yet even in saying this, Heidegger does not identify his own position with the analogical interpretation of the different senses of 'Being'. The most that we can infer from what he says on the topic is that he sees this theory as somehow pointing in the right direction, while leaving many issues unresolved. Whether Ryle's remarks also point in this direction is unclear. His comparison between 'Being', on the one hand, and a word like 'rising' on the other may suggest this. However, his contrast between 'existence' and the words 'coloured' and 'sexed' creates a difficulty, since it is arguable that these are not, in fact, 'generic words' in the way that Ryle says they are. But I will not go into this here.

We are so accustomed to categorising Descartes as the leading proponent of 'dualism', that Heidegger's line of criticism against him may be surprising. For Heidegger's criticism is just that Descartes is not dualistic in any adequately radical way. Here I shall set aside Heidegger's statements about the creator, which are quite extraneous to the general themes of Sein und Zeit, and concentrate on the distinction between the being of the human being and the being of the other beings of the world. The central line in Heidegger's critique of such philosophers as Descartes and Kant is that their theories about the nature of the human being were not grounded in an ontological distinction between the mode
of Being belonging to man and that belonging to beings other than man. With Descartes, Heidegger is able to point to the use of terms like "one" with very general reference, in supporting his criticism. With Kant, his approach is more roundabout— for Kant does, after all, take considerable pains to deny that the soul is to be understood according to the category of substance. Heidegger, however, argues that by attributing to the subject "the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always just present-at-hand", Kant relapses into the ontological framework of substance. The point seems to be one about temporality; at least this is how I would interpret it on the basis of Heidegger's words. Thus Heidegger is inferring an assimilation of the Being of the 'I' to that of what is 'present-at-hand' from the use of a common conception of temporality in explicating each. We shall see more of his association of temporality with mode of Being later.

If there is an ontological distinction to be made of the kind Heidegger suggests, then his sweeping criticisms of his philosophical predecessors may well be justified. However, it seems reasonable to say that the onus must be upon Heidegger (or upon his interpreters) to show that the difference between human beings and the objects of the world is such as to amount to a difference in the kind of Being belonging to each kind of entity. Unless this is done, it is always open to an opponent of Heidegger to say, as one critic does, that "'kinds of Being' is only a tortuous expression for 'properties of things'." When Heidegger asserts that human beings have a kind of Being different from that of other things, he would not see himself as simply
making the fairly uncontroversial assertion that human beings have various properties that other things do not have. Indeed, he would even deny this thesis as stated, on the grounds that 'having different properties' implies a process of comparison that can take place only between things that are basically of the same kind. If we can compare the differing cases here, it will be a comparison that takes place on the ontological level of thinking, not one that proceeds in terms of qualities or properties as ordinarily understood.

Heidegger's expression Seinsart is being rendered here as 'kind of Being', and Seinsmodus as 'mode of Being'. The expressions by themselves give little help in establishing the exact meanings of these important terms. Art, in German, can mean 'kind', 'type', 'species' and so on, but it can also mean 'manner', 'method', 'way'. One could arrive at several different understandings of what a 'kind of Being' consists in by stressing one or the other of these senses. The first line would, perhaps, indicate a Seinsart as a 'kind of Being' in something like an Aristotelian sense. So let us again examine this approach.

In his book Toward Reunion in Philosophy, Morton White considers a question of 'kinds of Being' which may be of indirect assistance to our present problem. He is concerned with the difference between existence in space and time and existence outside space and time - supposing the latter idea to be explicable in some way or other. Physical objects would have the first sort of existence, which, White explains, would be called 'existence' in a narrow sense of that term - rather as the word 'man' is used
in a wider and a narrower sense. Universals would have the second sort of existence, which White calls 'subsistence'—following Bertrand Russell, whose theory it is that he is considering. The question that White now raises is the same one, in its basic point, as the one raised here in connection with Heidegger's ontology. It is the question why one should want to express the difference between things in space and time and things not in space and time (supposing there to be such a difference) as a difference in their kinds of Being. White writes:  

But why should the fact that one thing exists in space and time, while another does not, make it more convenient for Russell to say that only the first exists and that only the second subsists? Reasons that are no more indicative of a profound philosophical point than those which impel us to call only males 'men' and only females 'women' in certain contexts.

In taking White's argument here to show an analogy with the problem concerning Heidegger's 'kinds of Being', I am assuming that his point is not merely a terminological one. Or rather, I am assuming that, in a sense, his concern is whether or not the question is merely a terminological one, like the corresponding question about the use of the word 'man'. He is asking, not about terminology as such, but about the philosophical point that lies behind the particular terminology adopted by Russell; and this is a point that, to revert to our own terminology, concerns the validity of distinguishing differing 'kinds of Being'.

One answer is the one that draws upon earlier remarks
on the Aristotelian treatment of the question. The logic of the distinctions made in White's argument seems to be essentially the logic of genus and species; in fact, his choice of illustrative example recalls Ryle's mention of 'sexed' as a 'generic term' earlier. But if Being is to be treated as a genus divided into species by the use of the specific difference 'in space and time', then from the Aristotelian point of view the standard form of objection to the idea of a single summum genus will apply, and the theory will be invalid. If this argument is accepted, then a certain terminology is appropriate: namely, one that makes a sharper distinction between 'kinds of Being' than the terminology of species.

How sharp, then, is Heidegger's distinction between his kinds of Being? Here a number of questions can be asked. First of all, do things of any given kind always have one particular kind of Being? Secondly, can a thing have more than one kind of Being at any one time? And thirdly, can a thing have a certain kind of Being at one time but not at another?

In answer to the first question: Heidegger is definite in holding that a human being has Dasein as his kind of Being, and that nothing other than human beings can have Dasein. Hence his statement that various other entities "are, but they do not exist", where 'exist' is to be understood in the special sense discussed earlier. Now Heidegger does preserve the distinction between genuine existence and 'so-called existence' that was made by Kierkegaard; in his terminology it is the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. But in adopting either of these
modes of Being (Seinsmodi). Dasein does not change its kind of Being: it remains Dasein throughout. To anticipate our later discussion of authenticity: a human being can have a mistaken understanding of what he is, an understanding which assimilates human beings to 'objects within the world'. Yet even though he sees himself in this way, and even though his behaviour may be such as to substantiate the idea, the basic difference remains between human beings and other entities. At best (or rather at worst) a person can only pretend to be a 'thing'; and pretending to be something is far from being that thing in fact.

The fact that Heidegger uses the term Seinsart on the one hand, and such terms as Seinsmodus and Seinsverfassung ('state of Being') on the other hand in different contexts is significant. It seems to indicate that there are further distinctions to be made within any one kind of Being, or at least within this particular kind of Being, Dasein. Further, it suggests that these are made in a rather different way from the more basic distinctions between the kinds of Being. If this were the case, it would count against an interpretation relying on a single principle of classification throughout.

But a different line of interpretation is suggested by an answer to the second question raised above. It does appear that a thing can have several kinds of Being, at least in one case, and perhaps in others. An object in the world can be said to have both presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. Admittedly, there is room for disagreement on this point. A possible view is that Heidegger, in one commentator's words, "distinguishes
178 sharply between three sorts of Being: the 'Dasein' of the human being, the 'Vorhanden' ('being there') of ordinary objects, and the 'Zuhanden' (utilisability) of a tool.\(^1\) It would seem on this account that Heidegger is not to be taken as admitting that the thing which is 'ready-to-hand' may be seen as one and the same with something that is 'present-at-hand'. Yet while Heidegger never explicitly states such an identification, some of his remarks do hint at such a possibility. The term 'readiness-to-hand' is introduced as an expression for the kind of Being possessed by things that have a use. These are the things that form what Heidegger calls our 'environment' (Umwelt). A hammer or a signpost is part of the environment, and has readiness-to-hand. It should be noted that readiness-to-hand does not mean utilisability as such; something that cannot be used is, Heidegger says, still to be seen in terms of readiness-to-hand to the extent that the question of its utilisability arises in the first place. For things which merely 'occur somewhere', this question does not arise: they are neither useful nor useless.\(^2\)

For the moment, we are looking at these points as they give a lead to Heidegger's conception of the relationships that obtain between differing kinds of Being. First of all, he wants to deny that readiness-to-hand can be derived from presence-at-hand. He writes: \(^3\)

The kind of Being that these beings have is readiness-to-hand. But this must not be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if such 'aspects' were being talked into the things we originally encounter, as if a world-stuff which is originally in itself present-at-hand were given 'subjective colouring' in this way.
On the other hand, Heidegger wants to say that we encounter things first in terms of readiness-to-hand, and only later in terms of mere presence-at-hand. The move from the first to the second way of approaching things is carried out by setting aside the question of the thing's utilisability, and considering it merely as something that is present. It is a transition from a 'concernful' approach to a contemplative one. However, as Heidegger insists, this is not merely a question of the attitude that we choose to adopt on this or that occasion, but rather one of the kind of Being that the object has 'in itself'. It is easiest to set aside the question of the thing's utilisability when the thing is actually unusable. Heidegger says that in such a case the thing's "pure presence-at-hand announces itself", though as long as the question of utilisability still applies, this presence-at-hand "is still not free from all readiness-at-hand whatsoever." Still he does envisage an abstraction from readiness-to-hand that will isolate presence-at-hand as such.

And this does suggest that whatever is ready-to-hand is also present-at-hand, even though we cannot apprehend it in both roles at the same time. If this is correct, then the interpretation of Heidegger's theory which takes him to be distinguishing two exclusive classes of entities in making this distinction between kinds of Being is open to objection.

The third question raised above was whether a thing could have a certain kind of Being at one time but not at another. This is a puzzling question. For such a transformation to be possible, there would have to be a notion of the identity of a
a thing which would carry across the boundaries between different kinds of Being. The difficulty of explaining any such notion of identity is perhaps what lies behind Heidegger's hint that the entity that is present-at-hand is not, after all, one and the same with the entity that is ready-to-hand. Yet other passages suggest a different line of thinking. In his discussion of 'Being-in-the world', Heidegger contrasts the senses of 'Being-in' appropriate to Dasein and to other kinds of Being. With objects, he asserts, 'Being-in' refers to a certain spatial relationship between things; but with Dasein it has the sense of 'residing in' or 'dwelling alongside' the world. However, the first part of this explanation seems to imply that objects will sometimes have this kind of Being and sometimes not have it. This is suggested clearly enough by Heidegger's own examples: "This term designates the kind of Being (Seinsart) possessed by a being which is 'in' another one, like water 'in' the glass, or a garment 'in' the cupboard." It may be that the best way to interpret this is to take it as a slip in terminology, to suppose that Seinsart here should read Seinsmodus or Seinsverfassung; or else that the ambiguity of the word Art mentioned above is taking effect. And in any case, the 'Being in' of objects is mentioned by Heidegger only in order to point out, by contrast, the special character of the 'Being-in' of Dasein - a kind of Being that Dasein does necessarily and always have. In other words, this is a result of Heidegger's expository method, which relies largely on setting up contrasts of this sort between the existential structures of Dasein and the various categories of presence-at-hand.
In making these points about Heidegger's use of his notion of differing kinds of Being, I have had in mind a possible line of criticism analogous to that put forward by Morton White against Bertrand Russell in the passage from Toward Reunion in Philosophy quoted earlier. In Heidegger's case the question is whether human beings share characteristics in common with things other than human beings in such a way that it is merely arbitrary to express the differences that obtain as a difference of Being. To work towards an answer to this question we need to look more closely at what Heidegger means by 'Dasein'.

In describing various aspects of Heidegger's thinking, I have taken him to be saying a number of things about human beings and about human existence. In reading Sein und Zeit, however, one is struck by the absence of these terms in Heidegger's analyses. He states his theories in terms mainly of 'Dasein', though occasionally also in terms of 'existence'. For example, he does not say that human beings have potentialities, but rather that Dasein has potentialities. It is tempting to suppose that this is because Heidegger simply has a tendency towards using very abstract terms. However, I think that this is a wrong answer - or, at least, that it is far from the whole truth. For our statements to the effect that 'Dasein', for Heidegger, stands for a kind of Being, now have to be qualified somewhat.

A kind of Being is, presumably, something universal - yet Heidegger speaks of ein Dasein, and again at a number of places refers to Dasein as 'a being'. Often he speaks of Dasein
in ways that immediately suggest the substitution of 'a person' for 'Dasein', as when he says: "Dasein hears, because it understands." How are we to sort out these varying uses of the same term? There are various ways of characterising Dasein, and it is doubtful whether any one of them can be singled out as a single definition. Heidegger is not a philosopher who starts from axioms and proceeds to deduce various consequences from them. As the discussion of the last chapter showed, he holds that philosophical thinking starts, by its various nature, with what is vague and indeterminate; precisely explicated concepts are its final goal - indeed, perhaps even one that we can never truly expect to reach. At the very beginning of Sein und Zeit, the term 'Dasein' is introduced by Heidegger in the following words: "This being, which we ourselves each are, and which has amongst other possibilities of Being that of questioning, we refer to terminologically as Dasein." Heidegger, I suggest, introduces 'Dasein' here by fixing its denotation. We can grasp what it refers to in a quite immediate fashion simply by being told that it is 'the being that we ourselves are' - and what can this mean but that it is just ourselves? In addition, questioning is said here to be something that Dasein does (strictly, though, a Seinsmöglichkeit that it possesses); yet questioning is what we, as human beings do. Hence it seems to follow that each of us is Dasein, or rather, to avoid strange paradoxes of identity, that each of us is 'a' Dasein, or an individual case of Dasein.

That Dasein is elsewhere explicitly equated with "the Being of man" shows the inadequacy of the view that takes the term
to be merely an obscure or pretentious synonym of 'human being'.
Yet this duality does seem to run through the whole work. Dasein
is at one time a certain kind of Being, and at another the being
that has this kind of Being. A possible way of resolving this
ambiguity is to explain the second usage by a paraphrase —
supposing, for example, that when Heidegger treats Dasein as 'the
being that each of us is' he really means this being, considered
from the point of view of its kind of Being. If this is an
extension to the strict sense of 'Dasein', then, it is one that
is explicable without too much difficulty. A motive for this
extension might lie in Heidegger's disinclination to employ the
usual terminology of philosophical anthropology. For he holds that
words like 'life', 'man', consciousness', and the like, "always
go together with a notable ignoring of the necessity to inquire
into the Being of the being thus designated." As a reason for
the introduction of a whole new terminology, this is, by itself,
not very strong — after all, merely because philosophers have not
investigated these concepts as thoroughly as they could have, why
should we abandon them altogether? Does this mean that each
philosopher should invent a new terminology for his theories?

Heidegger is not quite making such an arbitrary demand.
For one thing, the 'guilt by association' that he attributes to
the usual expressions of philosophical anthropology rests not
just upon the 'ignoring' mentioned in the quoted passage, but
upon what he sees as a positive error bound up with almost all
previous approaches to the questions of philosophical
anthropology. This error is the failure to draw a truly
rigorous and systematic distinction between Dasein and the Being of other things, a failure which Heidegger seems to think leads inevitably to an actual assimilation - conscious or unconscious - of Dasein to presence-at-hand. For he thinks that philosophy has traditionally been dominated by the categories that belong to this one kind of Being; categories that, as Heidegger says of the Aristotelian case, are taken as the categories pure and simple. "Ancient ontology took as the basic example for its interpretation of Being the kind of being encountered within the world. 30"

The assumption that human existence as well as the Being of other things could be understood in terms of the notion of 'presence' was, Heidegger asserts, a consequence of this choice of starting-point. And this led to a false interpretation of the Being of the human being, which has lasted to the present day (or rather, to 1927).

We have, with this last point, in fact come back to Heidegger's introduction of the theme of Dasein. What is wrong with traditional philosophy, in his view, is its inappropriate choice of starting-point. What is, therefore, the right starting-point for the ontological enterprise? As we have seen, for Heidegger it is the realm of Being that lies closest of all to the enquirer - for it is to this that we can gain access in the way required if the enterprise is to proceed. Thus the first task of ontology is the explication of the Being of the enquirer himself: Dasein. But as we have also seen, Heidegger's conception of the phenomenological method as one of uncovering and making explicit the obscure phenomena underlying ordinary objects is
accompanied by the view that in any such case the concepts involved are ones that we already have some understanding of: a 'pre-ontological' understanding. Heidegger introduces the term 'Dasein' simply by fixing its denotation. Another way of expressing this, which Heidegger himself uses, is to say that the initial presentation of the concept is a formal one. The word 'I' is, he says, only a formal indicator. Heidegger contrasts such formality with the 'phenomenal content' that is to be uncovered in the course of the phenomenological investigation whose starting-point is indicated by these formal expressions. The formal specification of Dasein is not, however, limited to the use of the term 'I' to indicate the term's denotation. At the beginning of his analysis, Heidegger supplies, in a very concentrated passage, the essential formal elements of Dasein which are to guide the course of what follows.

The first of these is expressed in the statement that 'the essence of Dasein lies in its existence.' Heidegger remarks that the task of the ontology of Dasein is to show that this term 'existence' does not have the sense of the traditional existentia. The contrast between existence and presence-at-hand will, Heidegger hopes, substantiate this point; for he identifies presence-at-hand with existentia - and both in turn with the area of Being corresponding to the Aristotelian categories. The task indicated by this 'formal indication', then, is that of a systematic series of distinctions between the various categories of presence-at-hand on the one hand, and on the other, the aspects of existence. Heidegger terms the latter 'existentialia'.

"Existentialia and categories," he writes, "are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being."³⁵ This suggests a dualistic schema, in which Dasein and presence-at-hand are taken as the two kinds of Being which together are comprehensive for everything that has Being. The 'characters of Being' - that is, the terms in which these kinds of Being are to be elaborated - are existentialia and categories; thus within these two kinds of Being there are structures which have some kind of formal analogy.

In the rest of the present chapter I shall pursue this question of analogy further. The second 'formal' indication of the character of Dasein given by Heidegger during his initial presentation of the concept, the notion of 'mineness', will be dealt with later.

What are existentialia? The leading clue that Heidegger gives is that they are possibilities. He says, in fact, that Dasein is its possibilities.³⁶ If we can manage to understand the sense of 'possibility' in this context, we will have gone a long way in understanding the whole conception of Dasein. First of all, it must be noted that the very use of this idea as the key to the contrast between Dasein and other kinds of Being seems to imply that we have to do with a special kind of possibility, a kind attributable only to Dasein. We might speak of 'existential possibility' in order to distinguish it from the possibility attributable to things other than Dasein. If, now, we proceed to clarify this notion of existential possibility, it is clear enough from many passages in Sein und Zeit that the
answer will not lie in any traditional account of possibility. Heidegger deliberately contrasts his theory of existentialia to the whole traditional categorial system, which he frequently refers to as a scheme operating in terms of properties. Just what 'property' means here is left unclear: there certainly are problems in explaining, within a more or less conventional ontological framework, what sort of thing a 'property' is, and how we are to determine which predicative statements about things function as attributions of properties. Heidegger is not concerned with such problems; presumably he supposes them to have been adequately dealt with by category theory. In any case, his use of the notion of a property is merely as a contrast to that of existential possibility. Yet, one may object, even this implies some determinate conception of the notion of a property: otherwise the contrast would be meaningless. In the course of our discussion of Heidegger's notion of possibility, therefore, some indication will emerge of its counterpart in the categorial system.

The kind of possibility formalised in modal logic is clearly so universally applicable to all kinds of beings that it cannot be anything like the concept wanted here. Still, it might be worthwhile considering the differences between existentialia, as conceived by Heidegger, and other concept of possibility, since the reasons for their failure to supply a grasp of Dasein's 'characters of Being' will help us to see what is required there. As a first clue in narrowing down the range of our survey, let us recall Heidegger's explanation of Dasein's possibilities as
"possible ways to be and only that."37 This formulation also occurs in the contexts of Heidegger's allusion to the work of Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen: Jaspers, Heidegger says, raises the question of what man is in terms of what he can be.38 But, we may remark, Jaspers' emphasis upon a formulation of his views in terms of possibility, which is so insisted upon that he writes of 'possible Existenz' rather than 'Existenz' as such, derives from the Kierkegaardian theory of existential communication. Kierkegaard contrasts the communication of knowledge (Viden) with the communication of capability (Kunns). The first of these coincides with direct communication, the second with indirect — that is, existential — communication.39 This difference is clearly bound up with his distinction between the 'intelligent' and the 'unintelligent' attitude on the part of the recipient — or, in fact, of the existing thinker as such. The questions "Is it possible?" and "Can I do it?" are those which are appropriate to an existential communication; they are the questions which a communication of capability is designed to raise in the recipient.40 Yet our earlier discussion of Kierkegaard's theory of existential communication made it clear that, for Kierkegaard, the formulation of existence in terms of possibility is merely a means towards an end which, if it were directly commumicable, would be expressed in terms of actuality and reality. On this basis, one could argue that Heidegger's position is based upon a misunderstanding of Kierkegaard, a failure to see the characteristic functions of indirect communication.

In reply to this line of criticism, however, it could
equally be argued that it relies on a too traditional notion of what Kierkegaard means by 'reality' in such phrases as 'existential reality'. Kierkegaard does, after all, describe existence as a constant striving, a continual process of becoming. This is the temporality of existence; but it is also something that is to be described in terms of possibilities. "Possibility means I can," Kierkegaard writes. As before, this is not mere abstract logical possibility, but the possibility that is grasped only in subjective appropriation. Far from being the possibility that is expressed in logical thinking, this is just the sort of possibility that science sets aside and refuses to consider. In The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard links freedom, dread, and temporality in terms of this notion of existential possibility. Clearly, then, his conception of existential reality is not one that operates in terms of an actuality that is opposed to all 'mere' possibility; rather, it is opposed only to the abstract logical possibility of 'objective' and systematic thinking.

We can thus use the analogy between the theories of Kierkegaard and Heidegger to further our survey of the possible meanings of terms like Sein & Kenntnis in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. Kierkegaard's talk of 'capacity' has already been noted. This suggests several lines of thinking. First, let us try a comparison with the idea of potentiality. It is not hard to see that, at least in its Aristotelian form, the notion of potentiality has serious faults as a suggested equivalent to that of existential possibility. These centre upon the dependence of potentiality (in this sense) upon actuality. The potentialities that belong to a
tree, for example, have a special connection with the nature of
the tree, being determined by its specific essence. But Dasein
is specifically said to have no essence apart from its existence,
determining in advance its relation to its possibilities.
Heidegger expresses this by saying that here the relation between
potentiality and actuality is reversed; instead of being
subordinate to actuality, potentiality is the basic foundation
upon which whatever actuality possessed by Dasein rests. Thus
Heidegger writes:

As a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility
signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at
any time necessary. It characterises the merely
possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than
actuality and necessity. Possibility as an existentiale,
in contrast, is the ultimate and most promordial
positive way of defining Dasein.

Heidegger's repudiation of the interpretation of
possibility in the existential context as the possibility of what
is 'not yet' actual will be particularly important when he comes
to discuss the possibility which, in his theory, stands in a
unique prominence amongst the various possibilities of Dasein:
that is, the possibility of death. For here he finds the presence
of a very strong tendency to fall back into the inappropriate
conception of possibility, which (as he sees it) really draws
one's attention away from possibility as much towards an
envisaged or expected actuality. He therefore insists that the
possibility of death "must be understood in an unweakened way
as a possibility, be cultivated as a possibility, and be borne
as a possibility in our attitude toward it. And this is emphasised still further: "The closest closeness of Being-towards-death as a possibility is as far as possible from anything actual."

Closely related to this is another objection to any interpretation of existential possibility in terms of potentiality. Aristotelian potentiality always involves some actual tendency for the actualisation of the condition that is as yet only in potentia. It means that the entities in question alter, or rather develop, along certain lines. One may have to suppose certain appropriate external conditions for this to occur, but the direction of the development is already determined by the thing's nature. There is no sign that Heidegger considers this to be true of human possibilities. After all, if the possibility of authenticity were to Dasein as the possibility of becoming a frog is to a tadpole, why should there be any need to consider authenticity as a task? The point that I am making here is, I think, linked with the Kierkegaardian objection to the progressive dialectical development of the philosophical system, and the insistence upon qualitative 'leaps' in place of smooth transitions taking place along pre-determined lines.

If we restrict our attention to the Aristotelian parallel, however, the force of the objection is less clear. Several aspects of Heidegger's presentation tend to lessen its force. One might argue that if both authenticity and inauthenticity are intrinsic possibilities of Dasein, then there can hardly be the sort of tendency towards one of them that the Aristotelian
model of development requires. Yet Heidegger does not put
authenticity and inauthenticity on an equal footing; as the very
wording implies, authenticity is the 'true' (in some sense)
condition of Dasein; it is genuine existence, as opposed to
what Kierkegaard termed 'so-called' existence. There is thus a
formal asymmetry between the opposed poles of authenticity and
inauthenticity. Another feature of Heidegger's position
complicates matters still further. He does not hold only that
inauthenticity is a contingent possibility, but rather that it has
some kind of inevitability. "Dasein can be inauthentic, and as a
matter of fact does occur first and foremost in this manner."48
Dasein's "alienated" state, to use an expression which Heidegger
occasionally employs as an equivalent for 'inauthentic',49 is its
normal one. It cannot be avoided, for reasons that we shall come
to shortly. Anticipating these, we can at least say that this
'fall' into inauthenticity is not due to outside influences so
pressing that one's own inclinations are insufficient to stand
against them. On the contrary, it is the work of Dasein itself,
brought about by the nature of the situation into which Dasein has
placed itself. It may be that Heidegger's ideas on this point are
derived from Kierkegaard's analysis of the origin of sin in his
The Concept of Dread; certainly one can hardly avoid tracing talk
of human 'fallenness' back to the context of Christian doctrine.
But as a philosophical theory, Heidegger's position must stand on
its own merits.

In the course of his discussion of the notion of
potentiality (or 'potency') in the Metaphysics, Aristotle makes
the link between potentiality and a capacity for opposite states, in the following passage: 50

Everything of which we can say that can do something, is alike capable of contraries, e.g. that of which we can say that it can be well is the same as that which can be ill, and has both potencies at once; for the same potency is a potency of health and illness, of building and throwing down, of being built and being thrown down.

Aristotle infers from this that potentiality is inferior to actuality, since it is as open to 'bad as it is to good. While Heidegger certainly does not make any such inference, he does give a similar account of the openness of Dasein's 'possibilities of Being'. Just as Aristotle says that 'the same potency is a potency of health and illness', so Heidegger would say that the same possibility of Being is the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. This is spelled out in detail in Vom Wesen des Grundes: 51

The statement "Dasein exists for the sake of its..."
does not involve the positing of any egoistic-anti goals for a blind self-seeking on the part of this or that factical man. Thus it cannot be "refuted" by showing that many men do sacrifice themselves for others, and that men do not, in general, exist for themselves alone but rather in community. What is involved in the statement in question is neither a solipsistic isolation nor an egoistic exaltation of Dasein. On the contrary, it provides the condition for the possibility of man's behaving either "egoistically" or "altruistically".

Heidegger goes on to say that the notion of Dasein is
neutral as regards the possibilities of being an 'I' or a 'Thou', and even more towards 'sexuality', "since it is what makes all this first possible."52 I take it that 'sexuality' here (the inverted commas are Heidegger's, and are unexplained) refers to the possibilities of being a sexual or an asexual being. If our purpose were to draw a point-by-point contrast between Heidegger's analysis and the corresponding treatment of existence by Sartre in his Being and Nothingness, this would certainly be one of the most striking differences; for Sartre's 'existence' is by no means neutral with respect to this question. But this is by the way. We could add a large number of opposed alternative possibilities toward which Dasein is by itself 'neutral' by drawing upon the analyses of Sein und Zeit. Perhaps we could even add others not mentioned there - as Bultmann does when he speaks of the possibilities of faith and unfaith. Heidegger does say that the analysis of Dasein is neutral as regards the possible existence of God, but this seems to be a rather different neutrality than the one involved in the ontological structure of Dasein itself.53

The passage from Heidegger quoted on the last page uses some of his characteristic ways of expressing the ontological, as opposed to ontic, way of thinking. He expresses a certain characteristic of Dasein as "the condition for the possibility" of certain ways of behaving - that is, of things which clearly belong on the empirical, ontic level. A few lines further on he says, "All of the essential statements of an ontological analytic of the Dasein in man treat this Dasein from the very beginning in
On passages like this one, T.W. Adorno comments: "In Weber's interpretation of sociology, a discipline denounced by Heidegger, this was called neutrality of values." The comparison is not intended to be a complimentary one. It is, in fact, a penetrating one when we recall the discussions of the last chapter. It points to what, for Heidegger, is the distinctly embarrassing aspect of the line of interpretation of his thinking spelled out most clearly by Rudolf Bultmann in a number of his writings, and most centrally in the article cited earlier (above, page 130). Bultmann there uses the distinction between the ontological and the ontic, the existential and the existentiell, to attribute a 'value-free' character to the Heideggerian analysis of Dasein. As we saw, Bultmann contrasts philosophy's treatment of existence, which operates in formal, ontological terms, with that of theology, which is ontic and concrete. What this 'formality' means is seen by Bultmann's referring his reader to Heidegger's account of the ' neutrality' of his analysis. The philosopher, Bultmann says, has to do with the "natural man", whereas the theme of theology is rather the "man of faith". He goes on:

In this instance, however, 'natural' does not have the theological meaning of antidivine, but is a purely formal ontological designation; i.e., the philosopher completely disregards whether something like faith or unfaith can take place. Were he to reflect on such phenomena, all he could say is that his analysis exhibits the condition of the possibility that a man can comport himself faithfully or unfaithfully.
This last statement is clearly modelled on the similar statement of Heidegger quoted above (page 193). In general, it is arguable that the whole of Bultmann's general interpretation of Heidegger is supportable in terms of various passages within Heidegger's own writings. For it capitalises on Heidegger's frequent assertions concerning the 'neutrality' of his existential analysis - whether or not these are made in that particular form.

The whole tendency of the present chapter has, I think, been to support this line of interpretation. Initially, we were concerned to clarify the understanding of Dasein as a 'kind of Being'. Though a number of unclarities in Heidegger's various statements about 'kinds of Being' were outlined, it remained apparent that the contrast between Dasein and the Being of entities other than the human being was, for Heidegger, the centrally important one. In the second part of the chapter, the formal characteristics of this distinction were explained in terms of the contrast between existential possibility and, on the other hand, both the properties of things and the 'possibilities' associated with and dependent upon these. This led to an emphasis upon the 'open' character of existential possibility, the fact that, in each case, it is equally the possibility of several quite opposed conditions of Dasein. But such a view seems to imply the 'neutrality' of the existential analysis itself; and in doing so, it supports one and opposes the other of the general lines of interpretation of Heidegger set out in the last chapter.

And yet - we saw earlier (pages 139ff.) that Heidegger
himself could be seen as discouraging such a 'scaled-down' interpretation of his theories. Even Jaspers, too, in his critique of the Bultmannian reading of *Sein und Zeit*, suggests that Bultmann "misunderstands that book when he emphasises its 'scientific', objective, scholastic aspect." He goes on to ask: "Why do things that have resonance in Heidegger sound so hollow in Bultmann?" Jaspers' answer is that Bultmann selects from Heidegger what is only one side of his thinking, and forces it into the mould of scientific thinking. He does say that Heidegger's writing is 'ambiguous' (above, page 135), but does not press his charge on Heidegger with any particular emphasis. His conclusion is worth quoting as a reminder of the line of interpretation of existential philosophy which stands opposed to the one followed, be it explicitly or implicitly, throughout the present chapter:

Existential analysis can never give scientific insight or replace moral earnestness. Existential analysis, when it is philosophical, is never neutral in the manner of science, is never universally valid, but is at the same time existentiell: it speaks out of moral earnestness with a view to commitment, out of deep emotion to arouse emotion.

And, a few lines further down:

I escape from commitment by the linguistic distinction between 'existential' and 'existentiell'. It is not a critical, clarifying distinction, but one that seduces into noncommitment. It paralyses instead of awakening. It leads to endless talk, which does not advance. It gives a hollow tone to what is said.

Ironically, even Bultmann admits that Heidegger does
not allow a sharp distinction between the ontological and the ontic; and he concedes that this poses a problem for his line of thinking. Clearly, then, there is more to be said here. It remains to be seen whether Jaspers' summary judgement on the whole distinction between the existential and the existentiell is justified. This is something that will, I hope, be seen in the discussion of the notion of authenticity that will form the main part of the next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX

AUTHENTICITY
Heidegger approaches the concept of authenticity through its opposite, inauthenticity. The reason for this is his strategy of approaching Dasein generally in its commonly found condition, its 'everyday' state. As it happens, Dasein is encountered first and foremost (to use a favourite expression of Heidegger: _zumélchst und zumeist_ ) in its inauthentic mode of Being. How do we know that this is the case? An answer to this question has to be inferred from Heidegger's overall account of Dasein; he gives no short answer. At first it may seem, indeed, that he has no answer to give — that the primacy of inauthenticity is merely an empirical and contingent fact about the way that people live. This impression has been seized upon by commentators who want to say that Heidegger's analysis of human existence merely expresses the Lebensform of a particular society at a particular time. For example: 'What we actually have here is a picture of human relations in bourgeois society, a picture which Marx outlined a century ago.' Various commentators on Heidegger's existential philosophy have adopted some such line of attack: some restricting the time-scale of the social context to a few years, others expanding it to take in all of the social formations of past history, excluding only possible future societies of a more or less radically different kind.

Even apart from such socially-oriented criticisms, there are difficulties within Heidegger's own conception of philosophy in the apparent presentation of Dasein's state of inauthenticity as an empirical observation. How can the ontological investigation of Dasein be linked with some kind of sociology, however well
founded this is? Of another kind is the problem of clarifying the notion of authenticity itself. How are we to draw up criteria for attributing authentic or inauthentic existence to Dasein? This question seems to arise even if the study of Dasein is restricted to a study of one's own existence. Heidegger would no doubt that to raise the question of 'criteria' in this way at the outset is to assume a general approach which is not that of the phenomenological method. For he sees this method as one which works towards the formulation of concepts which will be 'at one's disposal', a phrase which is arguably relatable to the use of concepts according to criteria of application.

Despite this point, it is, I think, advisable to take at least some notice of this important problem at the beginning. For, as we shall see, it is a problem that directly concerns the question of the relation between the existential and the existentiell. In accordance with his general interpretation, Rudolf Bultmann writes: "'Authenticity' can be defined formally as taking place in resolution... it remains completely open what particular thing is resolved upon." Yet this conclusion is not, in fact, necessarily bound up with the particular conception of existential philosophy adopted by Bultmann. For what amounts to the same thing is found in Kierkegaard. In Either/Or he writes: "The great thing is not to be this or that but to be oneself, and this everyone can be if he wills it." And, further: "It is therefore not a question of the choice of something in particular, it is not a question of the reality of the thing chosen, but of the reality of the act of choice." However superficially
similar these statements of Bultmann and Kierkegaard may be, there is nevertheless a sharp difference in their implications. One can see it hinted at in Bultmann's use of the term 'formal' in characterising his 'definition' of authentic existence. Kierkegaard would certainly not apply any such term to his observations on the reality of the act of choice; for him, the formal is the objective, and existential reality, including the reality of choice, is just what lies outside the view of objective thinking. We have already seen that Heidegger usually characterises his starting-points as 'formal', meaning by this that the initial formulations serve to indicate the area within which the 'phenomenal content' of existence is to be uncovered in the course of the subsequent analysis.

What, then, are Heidegger's 'formal' indications of the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity? In introducing these terms, he states that "these expressions have been chosen terminologically according to the strict sense of each word." This strict terminological sense is one that is lost in the English translation. Heidegger says in the same place that "These two modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity, are both grounded in the fact that Dasein as such is characterised by mineness. " 'Mineness' here is Jameinigkeit; the translation is a literal one. 'Authenticity' is Eigentlichkeit, and might be rendered in a literal way as 'being one's own'. Heidegger, in fact, writes that Dasein is "in its essence something that can be authentic - that is, something of its own (sich zueigen ist)."

These associations provide the formal starting-point
for the investigation of authenticity. In the following pages, I propose to set out Heidegger's development of this theme, and from that to pass on to the drawing of conclusions concerning some of the questions so far raised.

As we have seen, Heidegger intends to open the way towards the inquiry into Being as such by carrying out an analysis of one particular kind of being: the kind that we ourselves are. The ontological analysis of the Being of this being will, he thinks, provide the necessary means of access to the further task of ontology. Heidegger's introductory remarks lay down certain 'formal' guidelines for this analysis. This being is marked out by a number of characteristics which are unique to it and which specify its peculiar mode of Being: Dasein. One such characteristic lies in the fact that its Being 'is an issue' for it - borrowing the Macquarrie and Robinson version of the untranslatable es geht um... Heidegger makes the same point rather more often by saying that this being 'takes up an attitude' towards its Being. In this it is unlike any other being. It must be repeated that these formulations are, as Heidegger himself is careful to point out, only provisional; nevertheless one can see in them the beginnings of the whole existential theory of human existence as something far removed from the contemplative theoria of traditional rationalism.

The two aspects of this fundamental characteristic of Dasein that Heidegger draws out further have already been mentioned. One is the 'mineness' which, he says, is always intrin-

sic to Dasein. The other is the fact that Dasein's 'essence' lies
in its existence; this is in turn immediately explained in terms of the contrast between the existentialia of Dasein and the categories which define things other than Dasein. Dasein's characteristics are 'possible ways for it to be, and only that'. Both aspects represent, in somewhat different ways, Dasein's characteristic of 'taking up an attitude' towards its Being. The notion of authenticity is now introduced as one of the ways in which Dasein can be 'mine' - for Heidegger holds that it must always be 'mine' in some more specific way, either as 'its own' or as having failed to realise itself in this way. What this distinction consists in is still unclear. Before we come to its concrete analysis, however, let us continue to bring together some more of the themes that have previously been mentioned, in order to see their relevance to the present question.

The starting-point for the analysis of Dasein is its everyday state: a state which, according to Heidegger, is not defined by any sharply differentiated character; on the contrary, this is a state of 'averageness'. It is just because of its vagueness and apparent lack of any distinctive character that the everyday state of Dasein has, in Heidegger's view, been ignored by philosophical anthropologists. And yet, he argues, in this one can see an attitude adopted by Dasein towards itself, an attitude of a particular kind which can be analysed in its own right. Furthermore, the basic structure of Dasein must be as present within this everyday state as in any other. Here Heidegger calls upon his distinction between the ontic and the ontological: the vagueness and averageness of everyday Dasein belongs to the
ontic level of understanding. It does not, therefore, imply an
equal vagueness on the ontological level. To admit that would
of course, be to rule out the possibility of any coherent
ontological account of Dasein, at least one starting from this
immediately accessible point.

When Heidegger later comes to open the question of
authenticity in an explicit way, it is in the context of the ideas
just set out. He raises the question in what at first sight
seems a strange way: by asking who Dasein is. As Heidegger
himself says, this seems to be a quite superfluous question in
view of his earlier characterisation of Dasein as being in each
case "mine." Yet it is really a question of the more concrete
content that is to be given to this merely formal indication of
the answer to this question. Such a content is supplied by words
like 'subject' and 'self'. Yet Heidegger finds fault with these
answers. He explains the notion of the 'self' as that of
something that persists identically through a sequence of
varied experiences and items of behaviour. But this, he argues,
is a conception that is modelled on that of substance, that is,
on a category which belongs to the realm of objects other than
Dasein. 'Substantiality is the ontological guideline for defining
the being that is to provide the answer to the 'who'-question.
Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-
hand. Every case in which its Being is indeterminate hints at
this interpretation. And yet presence-at-hand is the kind of
Being that belongs to beings other than Dasein.'

This argument is presented by Heidegger not so much as
a refutation of theories which he has not, after all, shown demonstratively to be bound up with the use of terms like 'self' and 'subject' in the writings of various philosophers; its role is rather that of a prima facie argument which reminds us of the dangers implicit in giving any answer to a question with ontological implications without careful consideration of its meaning. A different use, however, is made of another possible answer to the question by Heidegger, the answer "that it is I that the Dasein in question is".¹⁴

In the first place, this seems to be a mere tautology. What we have here, Heidegger explains, "is the simple, formal grasping of the 'I'."¹⁵ But, he continues, its very formality leaves open important questions as to the content of what is being referred to here.¹⁶

The 'I' must be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator of something that may perhaps reveal itself as its 'opposite' in some particular phenomenal context of Being. If that is the case, then 'not-I' does not at all signify a being that by its essence can never be an 'I'; on the contrary, it means a particular mode of Being of the 'I' itself - for example, self-loss.

Heidegger's mode of argument at this point is interesting in that it implies a somewhat 'experimental' procedure. He admits that what he has said so far has not led to any real answer to the question of the 'who' of Dasein. At the most, it has merely ruled out a number of inadequate answers. What this means, however, is that we have not found the right
guideline (Leitfaden: ‘clue’ in Macquarrie and Robinson) for advancing the existential analysis. The guideline followed so far has been the idea of ‘mineness’. But, Heidegger now says, this is of less use to us in the present context than the other description of Dasein given earlier, identifying its ‘essence’ as existence. Presumably he would say that had this been kept in mind, there would have been no temptation to resort to concepts linked with that of substance in answering the question. At any rate, it seems to be the case that Heidegger’s idea of pursuing existential analysis according to ‘guidelines’ indicated by some preliminary indication of the subject-matter does not rule out a process of trial and error in following through this or that initial suggestion.

We start again, then, by recalling the definition of Dasein as a kind of Being which consists essentially in the having of what are not properties in any ordinary sense of that term, but rather possibilities, or ‘possible ways to be’. In looking into the everyday way in which this characteristic of Dasein is manifested, Heidegger draws special attention to the relation that Dasein takes up towards other Daseins. He describes this relation in the following terms:

In one’s concern for what one has taken up with, for, or against others, lies a constant care as to the difference between oneself and the others - whether the difference is merely one to be evened out, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the others and wants to catch up in relation to them, or whether one’s Dasein currently has an advantage over the others and wants to keep them back.
Heidegger seems to think that the drawing of such comparisons is an inevitable consequence of social existence as such. What is more, it is a process that is inevitably disturbing to Dasein, producing an uneasiness—although in the same breath he adds that this uneasiness will no doubt be hidden. That the process is hidden does not make it any the less real, in Heidegger's view; on the contrary, he suggests that its inconspicuous place in everyday existence is one that allows it to work itself out all the more freely.

Supposing that we do allow the essential part of this thesis: the idea that an existence that is lived in the context of social relationships with other existences will be one that is continually being compared with those others; what now follows? The inference is immediately drawn by Heidegger that such an existence must be inauthentic; for it has fallen under a subjection (Beschaffenheit) to the others. "The others have taken Being away from it. The preferences of the others rule the everyday possibilities of Dasein."18 This is, however, a rather misleading way of making the point. It tends to suggest some active domination on the part of the others: an enforcement of limitations upon the possibilities of the individual. But that cannot be what Heidegger means, if he is talking about something that arises directly out of the concern of Dasein for the similarities or differences that may obtain between it and others.

What, then, does he mean? Apparently that this domination by others is merely the manner of presentation of an attitude which Dasein takes up towards itself, and takes up, it
seems, entirely of its own accord. While the presence of others may be a necessary pre-condition for this to occur, it acts merely as the occasion and not as the motivating force of the process. This is supported by Heidegger's next observation. The others who are in question here are not definite others. Any Dasein can serve as well as any other for the temptation to carry on the comparison that, as Heidegger sees it, surrenders one's existential possibilities to external domination.

Thus the 'who' here is not this or that particular person, but something which has a peculiarly neutral character. Heidegger calls it das Man. Macquarrie and Robinson translate this phrase, Heidegger's own coinage, as 'the they'. I shall use both this equivalent and the more literal 'one', which is less reminiscent of common English colloquial expressions but which has the advantage of not specifically suggesting a third-person reference.

How does this concept answer the question of the 'who' of Dasein? Heidegger's argument is very compressed, and not wholly explicit. Yet there is, I think, a coherent line of thinking here. The question of the 'who' of Dasein has been filled out by the hint that its answer is to be sought by following through some implications of the idea of existence as the 'essence' of Dasein. If, now, the explication of existence in terms of the opposition between existentialia and categories, 'possibilities of Being' and properties belonging to objects present-at-hand, is drawn upon, the question takes on a more definite shape. It appears as the question whose possibilities
are the ones that determine the existence of the individual.
The answer to this is, Heidegger seems to be saying, to be found
in the 'phenomenal content' of existence that is revealed in
a phenomenological study of everyday existence. Heidegger's
remarks quoted above on the tendency of Dasein to become
entangled in comparisons between itself and others are to be
seen as elements in his phenomenological description of
everydayness. However, they are only part of what he has to say
on this point.

Heidegger describes the process of the 'loss' of one's
own possibilities in greater detail by finding it implicit in the
whole range of social existence. The social environment in which
our everyday lives are lived is a public one: that is, we are
continually making use of, or more generally being concerned with,
things which serve human purposes, yet which are not geared
to the purposes of this or that particular individual. Public
means of transport and mass information media are examples
given particular mention by Heidegger in this context. Heidegger
defines the relation between the social environment and
individual existence involves a kind of social commentary that
seems out of place in a supposedly ontological analysis; yet this
is one aspect of Heidegger's existential philosophy that has
undoubtedly had considerable influence. One might cite as an
example of this influence Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man,
which has been described as "fundamentally Heideggerian in
character", and more pointedly as "a re-run of the Heideggerian
theme of das Man." It is true that in One-Dimensional Man,
Marcuse refers not to *Sein und Zeit* but only to some of the later writings of Heidegger on the role of technology in modern social life; yet the link with *Sein und Zeit* and its theory of authenticity and das Man is also present in Marcuse's work. Heidegger's remarks on the function of the newspaper and public transport as typical forms of standardised, impersonal public existence are closely paralleled by Marcuse's observations concerning television and the automobile. What Marcuse has to say about the uniformity imposed upon human existence by this public environment is fully in the spirit of these words of Heidegger:

> We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as one (man) takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as one sees and judges; and we even draw back from the 'great mass' as one draws back; we find 'annoying' what one finds annoying.

But, as has already been pointed out, Heidegger's apparent attribution of dominance over individual existence to social forces is not to be taken wholly literally. In this he differs from Marcuse, for whom the inauthenticity of human existence in everyday social life is attributable to a repressive social structure — and ultimately, perhaps, even to a given material mode of production. Heidegger does spell out a number of aspects of das Man: for instance, its 'average', superficial and flattening character, and again its role as something that conveniently disburdens the individual of his
But he does not take the 'they' to be either the actually existing multiplicity of other Daseins, or any kind of construction based upon these. Rather, "the 'they' is an existentiale, and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of Dasein." In other words, it is simply one of Dasein's own ways of existing, one of its possible ways of adopting an attitude towards itself and its existential possibilities. "The self of everyday Dasein is the 'they'-self, which we distinguish from the authentic self, i.e. the self taken hold of in its own way (eigen ergriffen)." Heidegger can be seen here as contrasting two primary attitudes available to Dasein. One is the attitude of the 'they', the other that of the 'authentic self'. Some of the content of this contrast has already been set out. Partly, it is a contrast between which possibilities Dasein takes to be its own: "Dasein takes its possibilities from the world it discovers - but primarily according to the interpretation of the 'they'. This interpretation has already restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the acceptable, to what is fitting and proper." But it goes beyond this. For one thing, Heidegger says that there is a loss of any sense of possibility as such in the inauthentic mode of existence. The emphasis is on what is actual. That is, one's possibilities are defined by the ways of behaviour and the attitudes that happen to be already present in one's environment: there is no arising of "positive new possibilities." This point is particularly relevant to the question
about the notion of authenticity that was raised earlier in the present chapter: the question whether this says anything about the actual choices or behaviour of the authentic person.

Marjorie Grene writes: "Now of course it is true that the authentic person is seldom a conventional person... Yet there may be authentic individuals who live all their lives, like the knight of infinite resignation, as highly respectable members of highly respectable societies." The reference involved in the phrase 'knight of infinite resignation' is to Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. In this work, Kierkegaard distinguishes what seem to be two types of authenticity (though he does not here use any such terminology). One is that of the 'knight of infinite resignation', who renounces all finite ties out of loyalty to the infinite: that is, to God. The other is that of the man who "goes further, and reaches faith." This is the 'knight of faith'.

We, too, performs "the first movement of faith, the infinite resignation"; but advances beyond it to a further stage: he accepts whatever was renounced as something that he can receive after all, "in virtue, that is, of the absurd, in virtue of the fact that with God all things are possible." Kierkegaard says this about these two figures:

The knights of the infinite resignation are easily recognised: their gait is gliding and assured. Those on the other hand who carry the jewel of faith are likely to be delusive, because their outward appearance bears a striking resemblance to that which both the infinite resignation and faith profoundly despise... to Philistinism.
I take it that Marjorie Grene's intended allusion is to the second of these figures, the knight of faith, rather than to the first, and that "knight of infinite resignation" in the quoted passage is a slip of the pen. Assuming for the sake of argument that this amendment reproduces her intended position, what can we say about the relation of Kierkegaard's knight of faith, who "looks like a tax-collector", to Heidegger's concept of the authentic human being? Is it right to say, as she does, that the person who is authentic in Heidegger's sense, who 'takes hold' of his own existential possibilities rather than allowing them to fade away into the anonymous averageness of the 'they', need not manifest any outward differences from the inauthentic 'Philistine'?

Firstly, it must be obvious that Kierkegaard's descriptions of his two 'knights', as outlined on the last page, rely wholly upon his general conception of human existence as essentially a relation between the finite and the infinite, as a striving which is paradoxical because its object is a state that is unattainable in the present life. What we must ask, can replace this specific notion of striving and transcendence in a philosophical theory that is directed solely towards the present finite and temporal world, and, moreover, that explicitly proclaims itself as a theory of man's essential finitude? Heidegger cannot possibly set out an analysis of authenticity that is anything like Kierkegaard's in its structure, since he cannot appeal to the dialectic of the finite and the infinite, or of temporality and eternity. In short, his problem is, as I have
suggested several times already, to re-create the existential themes in a purely this-worldly setting.

I shall attempt to show the central arguments in his reconstruction of the Kierkegaardian concept of existence when I come to treat his doctrines of existential temporality and Being-towards-death. In particular, I shall concentrate upon this latter theory as the crucial "test-case" for the whole Heideggerian approach. In the meantime, however, the contrast between Heidegger's conception of authenticity and the corresponding Kierkegaardian conception can be clarified further by recalling a number of points already touched upon.

First amongst these is the difference between their ways of clarifying the opposition between authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger sets out his theory of existence by contrasting it with the Being of things other than human beings: and this means, usually, the contrast with 'presence-at-hand'. Inauthenticity consists in an attitude adopted towards oneself which resembles an attitude towards something that is merely present-at-hand. This explains its various characteristics: its tendency to stress what is actual as against the openness of possibility, and its peculiar impersonality. Now Kierkegaard also takes inauthenticity to be an attitude of impersonality, of generality rather than individuality, and a basic lack of real commitment and involvement. But the delusory identification that Kierkegaard holds to be present here is the individual thinker's identification of himself with pure thought: that is, with a level of Being that stands above the finite temporal world.
One could draw out various differences that result from this basic difference in the two theories of authenticity and inauthenticity under discussion. For example, Kierkegaard's theory, as it is set out in his philosophical works, has far less reference to specifically social patterns of existence. In fact, his whole theory has a very limited application to the extent that it identifies inauthenticity with the speculative thinking of the Hegelian philosopher. It is easier to see in Heidegger's description of inauthenticity something that could have general relevance. However, some of Kierkegaard's less central positions do bear a resemblance to Heidegger's descriptions of inauthenticity. In the Journals, he remarks that most people do not manage to become an 'I', but rather turn into a mere 'third person' - an idea which resembles Heidegger's concept of das Man. The same idea is expressed in a rather different way in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. There Kierkegaard contrasts the subjective intensification of individuality with being merely "a something in general"; an even closer approximation to the Heideggerian notion of das Man. "For the late Herr Soldin, his own death is supposed to have been such a something in general: 'when he was about to get up in the morning he was not aware that he was dead.'" I should like here to pursue this notion of 'self' a little further; for it plays an interesting role in the theories of both Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Both see authenticity as related to self-realisation, but in rather different ways. For Kierkegaard, the quest for authentic existence may be seen as
one of self-realisation. In ethical choice, what is chosen is the 'absolute self'. The notion of 'self' takes on a more technical role, however, in Kierkegaard's religious philosophy. The 'self' here is the synthesis of the finite and the infinite that the existing individual is perpetually striving towards, yet which he cannot attain as long as he is within the realm of existence. "So regarded, man is not yet a self." For Heidegger too, the project of authenticity is the project of becoming a self, or rather an 'authentic self', as opposed to the 'they-self'. This enables him to say later that "the question of the 'who' of Dasein has been answered with the expression 'self'." What, however, are the implications of this expression? First of all, the self is a 'way of existing' rather than some thing that is present-at-hand. In other words, it is to be explained in terms of the concept of existence. Heidegger links his explanation of 'selfhood' with an explanation of what he terms Ichheit: 'I'-hood. He rests his account partly on Kant's treatment of the 'I' in the "Paralogisms" chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is the chapter in which Kant is concerned to rebut the illusions of rational psychology: the science which purports to supply us with a priori knowledge of the soul as an unconditioned object. Kant charges that certain terms which we necessarily use in giving any account of the sense of 'I' are incorrectly assumed by rational psychology to be identical with corresponding categories; the result is that they are taken to supply knowledge of the nature of the soul (which can here be taken as the self). Heidegger gives an interpretation of Kant's
treatment of the 'paralogisms' which is slightly surprising. He writes: "The characteristics of 'simplicity', 'substantiality' and 'personality' which Kant, for example, made the basis of his theory of the 'paralogisms of pure reason', arise from a genuine pre-phenomenological experience." Kant, however, makes it clear that the origins of these characteristics lie in the logical grammar of the expression "I think"; he speaks of their merely "logical function". Admittedly, this is more evident in the Second Edition version of the "Paralogisms" than it is in the more lengthy and detailed First Edition version (which is the one preferred by Heidegger), yet it seems to fit both accounts. It is hard to see where Kant carries out the project attributed to him by Heidegger of seeking "to keep hold of the phenomenal content of saying 'I', in a more rigorous way than his predecessors." Heidegger asserts that Kant's refutation of rational psychology is also the result of a use of the phenomenological method - an even more dubious interpretation. But setting aside these questions of exegesis, let us see how Heidegger's critique of Kant's positive theory concerning the 'I' points to his own conception of the self.

Heidegger praises what he terms the 'negative' side of Kant's theory: the repudiation of any interpretation of the 'I' as a substantial entity. Yet he attacks Kant's replacement of this account by one that centres upon the concept of a 'subject'. For in Heidegger's view, these two concepts, when traced through to the ontological level, really amount to the same thing. "To define the 'I' ontologically as subject means to regard it as
something that is always just present-at-hand. The Being of the "I" is understood as the reality of the res cogitans." In a footnote, Heidegger refers us to an article of 1924 by Heinz Heimsoeth on the relation between self-consciousness and the thing-in-itself in Kant's philosophy. If we turn to this article, we find Heimsoeth using his metaphysical approach to Kant's philosophy discussed earlier (above, page 14) with particular application to the 'I think', attempting to draw out passages from Kant's writings which compromise the ostensible conclusion of the "Paralogisms" chapter by hinting at some knowledge of the soul as a Wesen - and even as a substance. Heidegger's own line of thinking in connection with Kant's assumptions about the 'I', however, is rather different. He seems to be arguing that Kant went wrong by taking the 'I' as something that runs through the sequence of experiences in a 'constant' way, being 'bound' to them in a 'co-presence-at-hand' (Mitvorhandensein). But such a view, Heidegger claims, betrays an inadequate phenomenological penetration into the meaning of the 'I'.

This criticism of Kant (whose significance will become clearer in the course of our description of Heidegger's theory of temporality) is closely linked with Heidegger's ideas about the inauthenticity of the everyday 'I'. In its everyday state, Dasein tends to interpret itself in the terms appropriate to the things of the world with which it is absorbed. Its own unique mode of Being is forgotten. This is what leads to the replacement of the true self by the inauthentic 'they'-self.
"The 'they'-self says 'I', 'I', most loudly and most frequently just because it basically is not genuinely itself and erases its authentic possibilities of Being." Heidegger has already expressed the inauthentic conception of the self in terms of the 'constancy' of something that is always present-at-hand. He now expresses the authentic attitude by setting out a sense of 'constancy' which is appropriate to the self, relying to a large extent on the associations of the word Ständigkeit: the ideas of steadfastness, 'standing by' something, and stability. To be authentic, then, is to 'stand by' oneself and one's existential possibilities. Heidegger suggests that this involves not being continually involved in saying 'I', in opposition to the trait that he has associated with the 'they'-self. Authenticity is reticent. The significance of this reticence is a little obscure. It may, I think, be referred to the theory of direct and indirect communication. Authenticity, on this reading, would imply a recognition of the way that the essentially individual character of existence determines the nature of communication in the way already described. However, aspects of this question will recur in a later discussion of Heidegger's notion of Being-with-others, or Mitsein.

What, now, is meant by 'standing by oneself'? It refers to an attitude adopted towards one's own existential possibilities. Something must be said here about Heidegger's notion of 'understanding' (Verstehen). This term is part of the standard terminology of Lebensphilosophie: its presence in Heidegger's philosophy is, perhaps, indicative of his biggest single debt to
this stream of philosophical thinking. He does remark near the beginning of *Sein und Zeit* that the term *Lebensphilosophie* is a tautology; but makes it clear that, in his view, the category of 'life' is a secondary and derivative one in relation to that of Dasein; so that a *Lebensphilosophie* in the strict sense is merely a "privative" extension of the ontology of Dasein. 58

Understanding, Heidegger states, is a 'fundamental existential': that is, "a basic mode of Dasein's Being." 59 What it means is indicated by a number of ordinary associations: with 'being able to manage (vorsähen) something', 'having the capacity for something', and so on. Applied to Dasein's relation to itself, 'understanding' indicates Dasein's ability to manage its own existential possibilities. "As such an understanding it 'knows' what is involved in itself, that is, in its potentialities for Being... And only because Dasein, in its understanding, is its 'there', can it miss its way and misunderstand itself." 60

Understanding is, in turn, explicated by Heidegger in terms of the important concept of 'projection' (Entwurf). This is both the way that possibilities of Being first arise, and the way that they are grasped by Dasein. Heidegger emphasizes that it does not indicate any approach made to some plan of possibilities that is already supplied. His reason for saying this is linked with his idea of projection as a kind of understanding which is different from a 'thematic' grasping of some subject matter. Here he explains: 61

As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself
and always goes on understanding itself in terms of possibilities. Furthermore, the character of understanding as a projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically what it projects towards, the possibilities. What such a grasping removes from what is projected is precisely its character of possibility; it reduces it to some given situation that we have in mind, whereas projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be as such. Understanding, as projection, is the mode of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities.

Thus there are two ways of grasping possibilities. One 'lets them be as such', that is, grasps them as possibilities. The other 'reduces' possibility to actuality; even if this is only an envisaged, conceived actuality, it is nevertheless something that is no longer possibility 'as such'. Heidegger expresses this distinction as a distinction between a 'thematic' mode of understanding and a kind of understanding which grasps its subject-matter in a non-thematic way. What does 'thematic' mean here? Heidegger associates an activity that he calls 'thematising' with the positive sciences. We have discussed in an earlier chapter something of Heidegger's ideas on the fundamental basis of scientific inquiry (above, pages 52-53), referring to his work What is a Thing? In Sein und Zeit a similar theory is set out in relatively brief form. The term "thematising" is used to indicate the preliminary activity performed by the regional ontology which sets out the conceptual guidelines for any subsequent scientific research. "Thematising objectifies," Heidegger writes. He describes it as a kind of projection, "the scientific projection of nature." This suggests some kind
of analogy between scientific projection and the projection by
Dasein of its own possibilities. Heidegger, in fact, uses much
the same terminology in each case. For example, he speaks of
what is projected as a Spielraum; Macquarrie and Robinson
translate this as 'leeway', but note its literal sense as that of
a 'space - or room - for playing'. 64 In the case of scientific
projection, the Spielraum opened up in advance is one within which
"things - i.e. facts - show themselves." 65 "The mathematical
project is the anticipation (Vorausgriff) of the essence of
things, of bodies; thus the basic blueprint (Grundriss) of the
structure of every thing and its relation to every other thing is
sketched in advance." 66 The same line of thinking appears in
Heidegger's study of the Kantian philosophy, Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik. The whole transcendental deduction is explained
in terms of the projecting by the finite subject of a Spielraum
within which things can present themselves as objects. 67 The
point that must be stressed here is that this projecting is not
directly related to the object of knowledge. It is something that,
as Heidegger repeatedly states, takes place 'in advance'. Since
we are finite beings, our knowledge of objects is dependent upon
the 'givenness' of independent things. Thus if 'projecting' is
an act of spontaneity, it cannot just for that reason determine
the concrete content of subsequent experience. It can only lay
down the ontological framework within which this content will make
its appearance.

How, now, does this theory of 'projection' which works
in the context of an ontology of objects and the things of nature
find an analogue in the theory of the 'projection' of existential possibilities? The answer to this question lies in the idea of Being-in-the-world, to which we must now turn. The various questions about projection, authenticity and existential possibility raised in the present chapter cannot be answered without a more general treatment of Heidegger's theory of the Being-in-the-world of Dasein. The central question about the application of the notion of projection in the sphere of existence will be the question about the nature, the extent and the determinate content of the possibilities of Being that are open to Dasein. These are those possibilities which Heidegger has said are to be grasped and appropriated in the authentic mode of existence. Hence a clarification of questions about them will be a clarification of the notion of authenticity itself.

I shall not, however, follow Heidegger's own ordering of his line of argument in the exposition of his theory of Being-in-the-world. In Sein und Zeit this theory is, in effect, set out twice. After the first presentation, Heidegger introduces a topic which has not been in evidence in the first chapters of Sein und Zeit: the notion of temporality. The treatment of temporality leads on to a lengthy recapitulation of the whole preceding theory of Dasein, this time filled out by being integrated with Heidegger's theory of existential temporality. What I shall do here is, however, to begin with this theory of temporality, leaving the setting-out of the structures of Being-in-the-world aside until some indication has been given of their basis in the fundamental temporal character of Dasein. It may be
that this order of approach parallels the actual process of the formulation of Heidegger's theory of Dasein, in contrast to the order of its presentation in Sein und Zeit; but this can only be speculation.
CHAPTER SEVEN

TEMPORALITY
In this chapter I shall work towards Heidegger's theory of temporality (Zeitlichkeit) through the theories of Brentano and Husserl. This is a useful way of getting into the Heideggerian conception of temporality because Heidegger's is essentially a theory which operates by contrasting two kinds of temporality: the 'authentic' and the 'everyday'; and the everyday kind of temporality is largely the kind that is portrayed in the writings of Heidegger's phenomenological predecessors, Brentano and Husserl. We will not find Heidegger saying as much, because he is a philosopher who covers his traces, but this discussion will try to show the background of his theory as the theories of these older writers.

It must be pointed out at the start that in none of what follows are we concerned with time as an objective process: that is, with the sort of time that is measured by clocks. What these writers are treating is "internal time-consciousness", to use Husserl's phrase. Husserl calls the content of his lectures on this topic "an analysis of pure subjective time-consciousness - the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time (Zeiterlebnisse)." Since we shall be concerned with 'experience' and 'consciousness' in what follows, some remarks are needed here to avoid possible misunderstandings. The usages of Brentano and Husserl vary somewhat between applying the term 'consciousness' to mental acts in general, to the awareness that we have of our mental acts, and (in the earlier writings of Husserl) to the organised totality of mental acts. It is, however, not too hard to relate these usages. But Heidegger makes no use of the term.
It turns up now and again in the context of references to other writers, but plays little of no part in Heidegger’s own analyses. When it does occur, it is commonly within inverted commas, a signal that Heidegger means to refer to some theory to which he is opposed—though this is often left to be read between the lines. Often, too, one can pick the intended target. For example, when Heidegger claims that the study of the “immanent consciousness of truth” is inadequate, he is probably writing with Husserl in mind. Again, his remarks on “consciousness of reality” seem to be aimed primarily at Scheler. But even were no such reference is intended, Heidegger’s use of ‘consciousness’, as for example in his remarks on ‘consciousness of guilt’, is usually to characterise what he sees as some mistaken way of looking at things.

Does this mean that Heidegger has nothing to say about consciousness or about experience as such? One interesting answer to this question is that given by Jean-Paul Sartre in his work _Being and Nothingness_. The existential philosophy presented there is, in fact, largely a translation of Heidegger’s _Sein und Zeit_ into the language of ‘consciousness’. To this extent, it represents a reversion to a far more orthodox Husserlian mode of phenomenology. Thus Sartre can be found saying: “Certainly we could apply to consciousness the definition which Heidegger reserves for Dasein, and say that it is a being such that in its Being, its Being is in question.” This basic formulation is still employed by Sartre in his supposedly post-existentialist _Critique de la raison dialectique_: “In this case the questioner..."
finds himself to be precisely the questioned, or, if you prefer, human reality is the existent whose Being is in question in its Being. It is self-evident that this 'being-in-question' must be taken as a determination of praxis and that the theoretical question comes in only as an abstract moment of the total process. Both of these passages undoubtedly paraphrase the words of Heidegger: 'For this being, in its Being, this Being itself is in question.' It is clear, then, that Heidegger's basic formulation of the character of Dasein is translated by Sartre, first into terms of consciousness, and next into terms of praxis. (Further, in the quotation from the Critique de la raison dialectique, the term 'human reality' is used: an expression used frequently in the earlier Being and Nothingness as an equivalent for Heidegger's Dasein.)

But, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre also wishes to complain about Heidegger's neglect of consciousness—a criticism that would seem groundless if Heidegger's theory is, as suggested above, readily re-castable in terms of consciousness. The following passage is typical:

But since the Dasein has from the start been deprived of the dimension of consciousness, it can never regain this dimension. Heidegger endows human reality with a self-understanding which he defines as an 'ekstatic pro-ject' of its own possibilities. It is certainly not my intention to deny the existence of this project. But how could there be an understanding which would not in itself be the consciousness of being understanding? This ekstatic character of human reality will lapse into a thing-like, blind in-itself unless it arises from a consciousness of ekstasis.
Firstly, then: why is it that Heidegger does not express his views in terms of 'experience' and 'consciousness'? His main objection to this kind of philosophising is, I think, that it is superficial. Heidegger's concern is ontological rather than ontic: that is, he is asking about Being, and in particular about the kind of Being peculiar to human existence. But talk of experiences as such, he thinks, leaves this Being unexamined and unclarified. As he puts it, "The immanent perception of experiences (Erlebnissen) fails to provide an ontologically adequate guideline." Moreover, Heidegger does not just think that the study of experiences is by itself inadequate as a means of access to ontological structures; he thinks that it leads into positive error. If we remain on this level, we will very probably come to conceive of human existence as a 'sequence of experiences'; but Heidegger thinks that such a view is radically mistaken. He says, for example, "The order of the sequence in which experiences run off (ablaufen) does not give us the phenomenal structure of existing." And more directly, "Dasein does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities of experiences which successively come along and disappear." In these passages, Heidegger is rebuking what he sees as a false view of the temporality of Dasein. And this is just the theory put forward by Husserl in his lectures on inner time-consciousness, as is shown, I think, by Heidegger's use of the term 'running-off', which plays a key role in the Husserlian doctrine.

That this is the point of the passages just quoted may suggest that Heidegger's disinclination to speak of 'experiences'...
resembles his aversion to the traditional terminology of 'life', 'man', and 'the person';\textsuperscript{14} in other words, that this is another case of 'guilt by association'. The use of the term Erlebnis in orthodox Husserlian phenomenology is bound up with various lines of thinking which Heidegger rejects, and foremost amongst these is the Husserlian theory of temporality. Hence his preference for a terminology which will not summon up pre-conceived ideas in the reader's mind. However, Heidegger's assertion of the inadequacy of 'the immanent perception of experiences' as a clue to ontological phenomena is less easy to minimise. 'Immanent perception' recalls Brentano rather than Husserl; it may be that it has the sense of introspection that is present in Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, but not taken over by Husserl in his formulation of the phenomenological method.\textsuperscript{15} If some such specific reference is involved in what Heidegger says at this point, then again we need not attribute to him a repudiation of the study of experience as such.

Heidegger considers his own phenomenology to have advanced beyond that of his phenomenological predecessors. The advance consists in penetrating to a more fundamental level of phenomena than those of consciousness or experience. (Hence my earlier description of Sartre's modifications of Heidegger as constituting a regression to an earlier, Husserlian-Cartesian, standpoint.) Heidegger's attention is directed to what comes prior to experience, to what pre-determines and accounts for the structure that experience will be seen to possess. Thus, to take a single example, Heidegger can say in the course of his account...
of conscience: "The ontological analysis of conscience thus begun is prior to any psychological description or classification of experiences of conscience."  

Passages like this raise a number of problems, and one of these directly concerns our present aim of relating Heidegger’s theory of temporality to Brentano’s and Husserl’s theories of time-consciousness. Can we, in fact, legitimately make a comparison or draw contrasts between what Heidegger says about temporality as a condition of human existence, of Dasein, and what the phenomenologists say about inner time-consciousness as a condition of human experience? I shall argue that we can, and that in doing this we are able to see how Heidegger’s theory has arisen largely out of those of these two of his predecessors.

This whole question is really the question of the relation between the ontological and the ontic levels of thinking. It is the question whether, in his determination to penetrate to the ontological structure underlying the familiar range of the psychological aspects of human life, Heidegger has not cut himself off from these phenomena, as Sartre suggests in the passage quoted a few pages back. In his book Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, the Heideggerian psychotherapist Medard Boss rebuts this interpretation as being, in his words, the "Platonic misconception" of the nature of Heidegger’s theory of human existence. One can, of course, see why a psychologist would be concerned with this problem: for him, the task is to apply Heidegger’s theoretical pronouncements to a context which is undoubtedly 'ontic' and empirical in character. (One could no
doubt make an analogous point about any Heideggerian approach to theology.) As Boss explains it, to make this mistake in reading Heidegger is to suppose that "these 'ontological' structures belong to a completely different realm than to the level of the 'ontic' givens of human behaviour (the actually observable, concrete actions) with which psychology deals." This line of interpretation undoubtedly would lead to the difficulty in returning to the level of experience and behaviour that Sartre claims to be implicit in Heidegger's theories. However, I think that Boss is right in rejecting it. The difference between the ontological and the ontic, or between the existential and the psychological, is not the difference between two distinct and separated realms. Looking at this distinction in the restricted context of human existence, we have the distinction between the existential and the existentiell, accurately explained by John Macquarrie in his *The Scope of Demythologising*:

An existential possibility is one that is revealed by existential analysis and which belongs to all human existence in virtue of the way this existence is constituted. An existentiell possibility is one which is open to me in a particular situation so that I can decide for it. All existentiell possibilities must lie within the horizon of existential possibility; but there may be existential possibilities which are not existentiell possibilities for a given individual at a given time.

Macquarrie gives the existentiell possibility of love as an example, and, since he is writing about the theological use of Heidegger's existential analysis by Rudolf Bultmann, adds to this the possibility of grace, which depends upon an act of God. It is
of some interest that Heidegger himself suggests a theological application of his analysis of guilt in Sein und Zeit. Yet in doing so, he seems to draw a sharper distinction between the level of ontological analysis and that of ontic description than was suggested in the passage just quoted from Macquarrie. For he states that philosophy cannot say anything about sin. For its part, theology can draw upon the ontological analysis of guilt to explain the possibility of man’s possession of a sinful nature. But, Heidegger continues: 19

The guilt (Schuld) implied in the idea of this status is a factual indebtedness (Verschuldung) of quite its own kind. It has its own indication, which remains closed off in principle from any philosophical experience. The existential analysis of Being-guilty proves nothing either for or against the possibility of sin. Strictly speaking, one can not even say that the ontology of Dasein of itself leaves this general possibility open, for, as philosophical inquiry, it 'knows' in principle nothing about sin.

Here Heidegger appears to widen the separation of ontic and ontological understanding: ontology 'knows nothing' about the ontic phenomenon of sin. Yet at the same time he states that theology can draw upon existential analysis in order to elucidate the meaning of sin and guilt. How, one must wonder, can these two claims be reconciled? The peculiar 'neutrality' of existential possibility has been noted earlier. Heidegger repeatedly states that existential possibility is always open to more than one realisation: the possibility of authenticity, for instance, is inevitably accompanied by the possibility of inauthenticity. One might now ask, in fact, in what way we can describe or specify
existential possibilities other than by specifying the range of existential possibilities that they give rise to? If it is admitted that this is the only way in which existential possibility can be described, then what becomes of the point that Heidegger is attempting to make in the quoted passage? It becomes the problem of how we come to have some possibilities and to lack others in our actual existence in the world. And this is the problem I shall be concerned with later in this chapter.

Leaving this aspect of the problem aside for the present, we may not the other side of the question of the relation between the existential and the existentiell levels of understanding. The side that I mean is the question how one moves from the existentiell to the existential level. That such a move does take place is, I think, the key to Heidegger's whole phenomenological method of investigation, as a method which consists in the 'uncovering' of the phenomena which underly those of everyday experience. We reach ontological phenomena through ontic phenomena. In one passage, Heidegger refers significantly to the use of a 'basic experience' (Grundfarbung) in the pursuit of ontological investigation. Though he does not use this locution elsewhere, it does, I think, express something that is implicit throughout the whole range of his existential analysis. This is nothing less than a repeated use of particular experiences as avenues of approach to ontological phenomena. An obvious example is Heidegger's reference to moods as experiences which reveal the character of Being-in-the-world. One particular mood, that of dread (Angst) is treated in detail in the lecture
Was ist Metaphysik? the ontological theory of being and nothing described in Chapter Two (above, page 74) is put forward by Heidegger as a phenomenological description of the phenomena revealed by this special experience. Generally speaking, then, Heidegger's mode of investigation is not one that turns its back on the range of human experience. Existential categories are reached through their embodiment in concrete experience: how else could they be reached?

The tendency of these observations on Heidegger's way of thinking is to point out the analogy between his programme of existential analysis and the attempts of phenomenologists such as Husserl to describe certain fundamental structures of consciousness. The similarity is sufficient to justify our making some kind of comparison between the theories of Heidegger and those of his phenomenological predecessors and contemporaries such as Brentano, Husserl and Scheler. Heidegger's basic aims are not those of Brentano or Husserl; yet there is a certain overlap - we have now to see how this appears in the theory of temporality.

Husserl's views on time-consciousness are to be found primarily in his lectures of 1925, edited by Martin Heidegger and published in 1928 as Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness. In the following pages, I shall describe the main theses put forward by Husserl in these lectures, and attempt to show the relation between his theory and the Heideggerian conception of temporality.
Of Husserl's thinking here we can make some introductory remarks that apply equally to all of his earlier work. The first remark is that Husserl's theories arise primarily out of a critical examination of the theories of his teacher Brentano. The second is that Husserl's criticisms take a characteristic form. They are criticisms of Brentano for not taking his own thought far enough, for not seeing the full implications of, for example, the phenomenological exclusion of considerations of objective existence, or the distinction between the mental act and its (intentional) object. As Husserl characteristically puts it in the Logical Investigations, his task is "to separate what is indubitably significant in Brentano's thought-motivation from what is erroneous in its elaboration." This approach is evident in Husserl's treatment of time-consciousness.

Husserl's starting-point is, in his own words, "an exposition of Brentano's analysis of time, which, unfortunately, he never published, but imparted only through lectures." Brentano's later writings on time-consciousness have been published, but the standpoint taken in them differs in important respects from the earlier lectures followed by Husserl. Since this earlier theory of Brentano's is not directly accessible, we shall follow Husserl's summary of it: so 'Brentano' in this context means 'Brentano as Husserl reports him'.

Husserl announces his main purpose in the examination of inner time-consciousness as being to explain how objective time is 'constituted' in subjective time-consciousness. The notion that what is objective is 'constituted' in subjectivity is central
to Husserl's philosophy, as remarked earlier. What we are considering here is simply one application of this, the basic principle of all 'transcendental' philosophy. The aim of Husserl's investigation, then, is to "make the attempt to account for time-consciousness, to put objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the right relation and thus gain an understanding of how temporal objectivity - therefore, individual objectivity in general - can be constituted in subjective time-consciousness."

Our earlier description of the philosophical methodology that Husserl associates with the investigation of the constituting of objectivity applies here also. In this case it involves "an analysis of pure subjective time-consciousness - the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time (Zeiterlebnisse)." In accordance with the 'bracketing' of all assumptions concerning the existence, reality or objectivity of the phenomena under consideration, Husserl attempts to exclude systematically all reference to objective time in his study of time-consciousness. He does not thereby doubt or deny that our experiences do in fact occur in objective time. The point he is making is that it is not as such events that phenomenology is concerned with them. In this aspect, they are the concern of psychology, the "natural science of the psychical". Husserl thus asserts that in his phenomenological approach he will not even assume that there is an objective time. He will assume only our experience of 'immanent' time in the flow of consciousness. This is sufficient to get the analysis of experience of temporal duration under way. If it is
objected that one should not start with assumptions, Husserl's reply is that subjective temporality is not something that can be called into question: "The evidence that consciousness of a tonal process, a melody, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as to make every doubt or denial appear senseless." This, then, is not really an 'assumption' in the usual sense, though Husserl is prepared to use the term.

In making these points, Husserl is concerned to ward off any identification of his phenomenological inquiry into time-consciousness with some corresponding psychological inquiry. This is a difference between Husserl and Brentano, who is usually ready to refer to his theories of consciousness as 'psychology'. To some extent the difference is merely one of terminology: Husserl redefines the term 'psychology' so that it has a narrower sense than with Brentano, excluding those a priori investigations that Brentano had called "the first task of psychology". Husserl's aim, then, is to see how the various characteristics of objective time are constituted - to see, for example, how we are able to experience an object as having temporal duration, or, again, how we are able to assign positions in time to events.

Brentano's starting hypothesis, according to Husserl, is that whenever we have some perceptual experience, the presentation (Vorstellung) always remains in consciousness for a period of time, but is modified as it does so. The modification that is referred to here is of a special kind: through it, the presentation takes on 'pastness'. An example makes this point clearer: Husserl usually uses the hearing of a melody as the
standard case of experience of a 'temporal object'. This is in accord with his attaching a stricter sense to the phrase 'temporal object' than the reader might at first suppose. A 'temporal object' in this sense is not simply any object that has duration in time, or that has a self-identity over a temporal interval. Husserl explains: "by temporal objects, in this particular sense, we mean objects which not only are unities in time but also include temporal extension in themselves." One can perhaps see from this definition why a melody can be taken as a representative temporal object. For, putting the point in terms of our knowledge of the object, one cannot hear a melody without a definite course of experience lasting over some period of time. However, we could raise questions about the distinction that Husserl is apparently trying to make. What was said about hearing a melody would, it seems, apply equally to our knowledge of a personality, or again to our perception of a living being as such. But then we might begin to wonder whether it is not necessary to the notion of any physical object that it 'includes temporal extension in itself.' Husserl's tendencies towards a Kantian theory of synthesis would lead him in this direction. Indeed, in the passage cited earlier (above, page 238) Husserl seems to equate temporal objectivity with "individual objectivity in general". At any rate, a melody can no doubt be said to involve temporal extension in a more conspicuous and clearly defined way than these other classes of object, and that is perhaps enough to justify its use as an example for time-experience.

Now the claim being made by Brentano is that unless
his theory, according to which presentations remain in the mind in a modified form for some period of time, were true, then there would be no possibility of our hearing a melody as such. On the one hand, if there were no persistence of presentations, then each note would vanish without trace as it was heard. But in that case we would have no awareness of the relations between the notes, and hence no awareness of the melody at all. This is a familiar enough point in empiricist writings, made clearly— to take a single example, in William James' *Principles of Psychology*. What, on the other hand, would happen if the notes remained presented to us just as they were—that is, not in a modified form? The result would be, in Russell's word, that "instead of a melody we should have a chord of simultaneous notes or rather a disharmonious jumble of sounds such as we should obtain if we struck all the notes simultaneously that have already been sounded." In order to arrive at the hearing of the melody, then, we must suppose that each sound remains as a presentation, but remains in a way that permits the sequence in time of the sounds to be apprehended. It is the function of the temporal modification to allow that. The temporal modifications acquired by the presentations must presumably be different in each case; for the function of these determinations must be to give the presentations their places in the temporal sequence, relative to the present.

What emerges from these arguments of Brentano is the picture of time-consciousness as a continuous process of, firstly, acquiring a steady stream of new presentations, and secondly,
steadily modifying past presentations and uniting them, so modified, with the present one.

The significant thing about this theory of Brentano is, as Husserl sees it, that the central role in the origin of time-consciousness is played by phantasy. Phantasie here seems to mean much the same as imagination: this choice of terminology is no doubt a result of Brentano's Scholastic background. It is phantasy, in his theory, that carries out the process of modification of presentations that is crucial to time-consciousness. In doing so, phantasy creates a new aspect of presentations, namely the temporal moment. We can say that it works productively here, rather than, as in its other workings, merely re-productively.

Husserl's high praise for Brentano's theory goes along with his reading into it a phenomenological orientation which might have surprised Brentano himself. Husserl accompanies his praise of Brentano with a polemic against the psychologists who, as he charges, have supposed that we sense temporal duration in just the same way that we sense colours, sounds, and so on. He claims that such a view springs from the simple fallacy of taking enduring sensations for sensations of duration. Reading what Husserl says here, we may feel doubtful (as so often with philosophers' exposures of fallacies) whether anyone has in fact every committed the fallacy as set out here. However, it might be replied that such a faulty procedure can be wrapped up and disguised in talk of 'stimuli' and the like - which, to Husserl, is also objectionable in its reference to objective
existence. Against these views, Husserl makes the observation that we could conceivably have sensations without being aware of their enduring or of their succeeding one another. Thus we would have enduring sensations but not sensations of duration. This is, of course, essentially the same situation as that described earlier in connection with Brentano's theory.

A striking consequence of Brentano's theory, as Husserl reports it, is that in a strict sense, we do not perceive succession at all. Our awareness of it lies in phantasy. For it consists in the way that an idea, temporally modified by phantasy, is placed in the sequence of experiences relative to the present. Husserl writes: "As a consequence of this theory, Brentano came to disavow the perception of succession and alteration. We believe that we hear a melody, that we hear something that is certainly past. However, this is only an illusion..." 34

Another point to be noted for later reference is that, on Brentano's theory, the past is the primary 'dimension' of time-consciousness. Husserl does not remark on this aspect of the theory, because although he modifies Brentano's theory in constructing his own, he agrees fully with Brentano in locating time-consciousness first and foremost in consciousness of past experiences and their objects. It is true that both writers are aware of the need to account for the future as well. Clearly, any theory which aims at explaining the origin of an infinite objective time must do this. It must explain how we come to conceive time as extending beyond the past and the present, which have already been accounted for. Brentano does this in
terms of phantasy, as one would expect from his theory of the past. If we can call phantasy's constitution of the past the work of memory, then its extension to the future can be called expectation (Erwartung). Brentano seems to be saying that in expectation, phantasy extrapolates to the future on the basis of the temporality that it has already constituted with respect to the past. What results from this extrapolation is a conception of infinite time, analogous to the conception of any infinite numerical series, or again to the conception of infinite space.35

Let us now see the general lines of Husserl's critique of the theory of Brentano just described. One criticism he makes is that Brentano sometimes lapses into allusions to objective stimuli in a way inappropriate to a study of purely subjective time-consciousness. However, Husserl seems to think that such errors are easily eliminable from Brentano's theory, and so no real objection to it.

The line of criticism which is, I think, central to Husserl's commentary on Brentano, arises from a feature of Brentano's theory already noted. Husserl recalls that Brentano drew a distinction between the original gaining of time, and its extension from the past and present into the future by extrapolation. But is this not, Husserl asks, essentially the distinction between an intuition of time on the one hand and the 'mere idea' of time on the other? He continues in these words:36

"It is most extraordinary that in his theory of the intuition of time Brentano did not take into consideration the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time, for the
But Brentano cannot very well draw such a distinction. For, as the foregoing summary of his doctrine has shown, he has located both kinds of time-awareness in phantasy. It is that central thesis that is, as now proves, unacceptable to Husserl.

For Husserl feels quite certain, as the passage just cited shows, that there must be a clear distinction between a perception of duration and a mere phantasy. As we remarked earlier, Brentano’s theory requires one to say that in a strict sense the temporal is not perceived at all, except for the isolated ‘now’-point. Husserl, however, is very sure that we do sometimes perceive succession, and that this experience can clearly be seen to be different in kind from the experience of merely calling to mind the succession long after it has ceased to be at hand. To argue for this means to rebut Brentano’s theory, which implies that both cases are equally instances of phantasy. Husserl does speculate that the second case might accordingly be termed ‘phantasies of phantasies’, but he is clearly not much impressed by any such shift, and immediately drops it. 37

How are we to evaluate this objection of Husserl’s? As an actual counter-argument, it cannot be called very strong. One could, indeed, mount a strong counter-argument on Brentano’s behalf. Even if we do assume, for the sake of argument, that any experience A is distinct in kind from our later recollection of it, this does not at all prove that A is a perception, and not phantasy or some other mode of experience. If it did, then we
would have to count all experiences as perceptions; for there is no good reason to doubt that any experience that we have can be brought to mind in recollection at some later time. And we could take the argument further: if any act can be recollected, presumably this is true of recollection itself. But this, according to the above argument, means that recollection itself must be counted as perception. And that destroys the assumed distinction just as effectively as does the assimilation of temporal perception to phantasy.

These considerations appear to deprive Husserl's objection of its demonstrative force. But is it intended to constitute an argument of the demonstrative kind? Husserl does not see phenomenology as a philosophical method that works by argument; rather is it a procedure for "seeing" phenomena, as pointed out earlier (above, page 144). We may therefore see his remarks about the 'obtrusive' difference between the perception of duration and the mere phantasy as designed to draw our attention to a feature of our own experience for which a phenomenological description is required. This move determines the task of Husserl's own account of time-consciousness. It must be an account that clarifies the distinction between the 'pastness' that lies within a currently perceived temporal process, and the 'pastness' of one that is recollected as standing some distance in the past.

Husserl's presentation of his own theory begins with an assertion that the first view that occurs to us in considering the question of temporal experience is that strictly speaking, in
hearing a melody we really hear only the tone that is now present. What makes the rest objective for us is memory and expectation. Clearly, this is much the same as the theory of Brentano. Husserl now looks more closely at the concept of the 'now'-point that is involved in this picture. He argues that if we follow the method, implied by this first answer, of directing our attention towards what is strictly perceived, this will turn out to be only one phase of the given individual note or tone. The rest of that tone lies outside this phase, and therefore the whole tone will have to be constituted in much the same way as the whole melody. What Husserl is arguing for here appears shortly thereafter as an assertion that the 'now'-point has the character of an 'ideal limit'. The example indicates that whatever we refer to as present in our experience 'now' can be further divided by closer examination into a 'now' taken in a stricter sense and a temporal duration external to that 'now'. And though Husserl does not yet say so, it is arguable that such a procedure could be continued indefinitely.

These considerations lead Husserl to replace the distinction between perception and phantasy with a threefold distinction between intuition, retention, and recollection. 'Retention' in this context refers to our memory of the completed phases of an extended experience that is still current; 'recollection' means our memory of an experience that is over, and thus presumably at some distance in the past. The basic difference between Brentano and Husserl can now be stated: it is that whereas Brentano classes retention together with recollection under the
category of 'memory'. Husserl draws his main dividing line between intuition and retention, taken together, and recollection. We can thus say, on Husserl's view, that experience of the 'now' is inseparably united with experience of the 'just past'. Retention is, he says, like a "comet's tail" joined to actual perception. By emphasising the unity of the current impression and the retention involved along with it, Husserl hopes to make good his criticism of Brentano. He often uses other phrases whose function is the same as that of 'comet's tail' - phrases like 'halo' or 'fringe', and more often the 'horizon' metaphor. The theory as it thus results is in many ways reminiscent of theories of the 'specious present', the best-known of which is that of William James. When James draws a distinction between what he terms "elementary memory" or "primary memory", and recollection, his theory exactly parallels Husserl's distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' remembrance; that is, between retention and recollection. Since one pupil of Husserl tells us that Husserl "admired" and "studied carefully" the Principles of Psychology, the similarity is probably not accidental. James does use the term 'retention', but in a different sense; for him, retention is one's "liability to recall" - something that Husserl does not discuss at all. Husserl's description of the 'now'-point as an "ideal limit" is paralleled by these words of James:

'The notion of the 'now' as a point is an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed
to philosophical meditation. Reflection leads us to the conclusion that it must exist, but that it does exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience.

On the next page, James concludes:

In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were - a rearward- and a forward-looking end.

Husserl writes of a "'gross' now" which is very like the 'specious present' of James. The main difference is Husserl's far stricter confining of his analysis to subjective temporality. James moves freely from the subjective to the objective level; thus we find him asking about the length of the specious present, as measured in seconds. He cites the estimates of various psychologists: the consensus seems to be that it can extend for up to twelve seconds. Husserl does not commit himself on the point, and that is not surprising. But in other respects he follows James quite closely. His theory of the 'now'-point as an 'ideal limit' should be seen in this light. The 'gross now' can be divided on reflection into "a finer now and a past", and this procedure can be continued indefinitely. Thus the indivisible 'now'-point is merely an 'ideal limit' of this sequence. It is, as Husserl somewhat mysteriously puts it, "something abstract which can be nothing for itself." At any rate, it is, just as in the theory of James, not something that
What has just been said expresses Husserl's insistence on the unity of perception and retention. Yet Husserl does not run the two together wholly. He holds that retentional content cannot be called 'given' in the same sense as the content of sensation. In ways like this he remains largely in agreement with Brentano. There is, in fact, a certain tension between the doctrine of the 'gross now' and the equally manifested tendency of Husserl to preserve the assumption of sensation as something occurring, to use Kant's characteristic phrase, "in einem Augenblick". On Husserl's view as set out in the passages cited above, the Augenblick as an indivisible point is something of a mythological entity; yet during many of his worked-out phenomenological analyses of temporal experience we come across it playing a part. This remains an unresolved duality in his theory.

Yet it does not remove the main difference between his theory and Brentano's, the difference that is embodied in the theory of retention. Brentano, by classifying retention as the working of phantasy, assimilates it to mere recollection. Husserl rebuts that assimilation, and supports his counter-thesis by a series of phenomenological descriptions of the differences between perception of a temporal process and recollection or remembrance of that experience. The differences are expressed in terms of such characteristics as the clarity or certainty of the content; but together they may (summarising briefly) be brought under the heading of what Husserl terms the 'self-givenness' of
perception. That the content of experience is given to us in perception is what distinguishes it from all types of phantasy, which present content only in what Husserl calls an "as-if" way. All content originates in perception, so understood. If we now consider retention as opposed to recollection, we see (or so Husserl claims) that it must fall under the heading of perception. The notion of perception is, in fact, somewhat widened to take it in, as in the following passage:

Heretofore, consciousness of the past, i.e. the primary one, was not perception because perception was designated as the act originally constituting the now. Consciousness of the past, however, does not constitute a now but rather a 'just-having-been' that intuitively precedes the now. However, if we call perception the act in which all 'origination' lies, which constitutes originally, then primary remembrance is perception.

We can, I think, take this as Husserl's last word on the subject - even though it does not come at the end of the lectures on time-consciousness, and even though the duality referred to on the last page is still present in the subsequent analyses.

Another aspect of Husserl's and Brentano's theories has been somewhat neglected in this discussion, though the neglect is largely present in the writers themselves. As we have seen, their emphasis in discussing time-consciousness is always on our awareness of the past. Yet both have something to say about the future, and it is that aspect of their theories that has now to be summed up. In both cases the treatment of the past is the model for the treatment of the future. For Brentano, the past is
constituted by memory, and the future is constituted by expectation. Just as Husserl modifies this account of the past, so too he modifies this account of the future. His distinction between primary and secondary remembrance is paralleled by a distinction between primary and secondary expectation. Primary expectation is called 'protention' by Husserl; the coined term is obviously intended to complement 'retention'. Thus he writes: "Each perception has its retentional and protentional halo."

These are what James called the "bow and stern" of present experience (above, page 249). Every experience involves what we might call assumptions about what is to come in the immediate future, just as it involves knowledge of what has just been in the immediate past. But Husserl has little to say in his lectures on time-consciousness concerning this forward-looking aspect of mental acts; it is developed in a more general and less specifically temporalised way in works such as his Cartesian Meditations. Presumably, like Brentano, Husserl thinks that the essential part of the constitution of time has already been done by considering our awareness of the past.

Some final remarks on Husserl: the tendency involved in the movement of Husserl's conception of time-consciousness away from Brentano's, at least as it is expressed in the theory of retention and protention, is a tendency towards the re-uniting of the past and the future with the present. It is a move away from the separatedness implied by the conception of mental life as a 'stream of experiences' in the sense of a succession of distinct presentations each of which occurs in einem Augenblick. And yet
Husserl does not make any sharp break with the 'stream of consciousness' theory. We saw that he tends to revert to this picture, and to that extent to a position not unlike that of Brentano. Bearing all this in mind, we can foreshadow the further, and much more radical, changes that will be seen in Heidegger's conception of temporality. Heidegger will attempt to carry the tendency just described to an extent that will shatter the whole picture of the stream of consciousness.

We have already seen how Heidegger's radical dualism of existence and presence-at-hand is accompanied by a theory of two modes of existence itself: the authentic and inauthentic modes. We now have to consider the form that these principles take in relation to the centrally important topic of temporality. Here our attention will not be upon the contrast between the temporality of Dasein and the 'Being-in-time' of things other than Dasein, as much as upon the contrast between Dasein's own opposed modes of authentic and 'everyday' temporality. We have to see how such a contrast can be worked out on the existential assumption that human existence is constituted by possibilities, and not by actual states or properties in the way appropriate to things that are present-at-hand.

The basic contrast between a common, everyday way of conceiving the temporality of human existence on the one hand, and a supposedly more primordial and more authentic way of conceiving it, on the other, is by no means one that is original with Heidegger. Its roots are perhaps not so much in the existential
tradition of Jaspers and Kierkegaard as in that of Lebensphilosophie, in which it appears without its specifically existential character. I shall mention briefly the ideas of Bergson and Dilthey on the subject of temporality.

Bergson is mentioned once or twice by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. Typical is a passage in which Heidegger criticises Bergson's account of temporality as "ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate." Later he informs the reader that "this is not the place for a critical coming to terms with Bergson's concept of time," and promises that this will take place in Part Two of Sein und Zeit - which was never published. We can speculate that this sort of criticism, whose essential assertion is that the writer in question has grounded his arguments or theses in an inappropriate ontological framework, at the same time implicitly allows some merit to those arguments or theses, if only as ontic or psychological insights. This is certainly the case with Heidegger's analogous criticism of Kierkegaard. Bergson, it seems, has something to tell us, even if his actual formulations are unacceptable as they stand.

Bergson's main assertion concerning temporality is that the conception of time that is found in natural science - and in everyday life, insofar as science is continuous with this - is not one which accurately represents duration, the temporality of our immediate experience. Scientific or objective time is "that homogeneous and impersonal duration, the same for everything and everyone, which flows onward, indifferent and void, external to all that endures." Bergson no doubt intends to bring to mind
the formulations of Newtonian mechanics and its philosophical counterparts from Kant onwards. To later readers, a work like Strawson's *Individuals* might be appropriate as an example of a theory of time similar to the one that Bergson labels as 'objective'. Bergson, however, goes on to say that "this imaginary homogeneous time is... an idol of language, a fiction." While it is a useful tool for our practical purposes, for the organizing of the world, it is not a genuine representation of the duration that appears in our immediate lived experience. It is, in short, a derivative conception. Bergson explains the difference in terms of the separateness of temporal points in objective temporality: in real experience, such separateness is not found. "The systems science works with are, in fact, in an instantaneous present that is always being renewed; such systems are never in that real, concrete duration in which the past remains bound up with the present." But how, one may ask, are we to conceive of this 'real, concrete duration'? Here Bergson tends to disappoint the reader who hopes for a coherent presentation of the alternative conception of temporality. His criticisms of the objective conception are more interesting: for example, his claim that this way of looking at time is one that assimilates it to space. "For," Bergson writes, "homogeneity here consisting in the absence of every quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the homogeneous could be distinguished from one another." And a few pages further on: "When you attribute the least homogeneity to duration, you surreptitiously introduce space."
This is one of the specific points from Bergson's theory that Heidegger takes up in Sein und Zeit in addition to his general complaint that the theory lacks a suitable ontological basis. While Heidegger agrees that we can distinguish an authentic conception of temporality from an inauthentic one, he denies that this second is simply an assimilation of time to space: on the contrary, it is a conception which springs from the authentic one and which retains, for all its inauthenticity, the basic structure of authentic temporality. We shall see soon how Heidegger attempts to work out this idea.

As I have said, Bergson's explanations of his own theory are not as lucid as one would wish. He frequently uses a contrast between 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' concepts, and insists that authentic duration involves only "qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number." This expression is reminiscent of Jaspers' description of Existenz as 'multiple, but not countable' (quoted above, page 136); and it seems just as hard to explicate, without running into paradox. In another work, Bergson explains duration as "the continuation of what precedes into what follows, and the uninterrupted transition: a multiplicity without divisibility and a succession without separation." And in Creative Evolution, he goes over to a wholehearted irrationalism: "We do not think real time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect." Once one has said this, there is nothing more to be said about subjective duration. We can see, then, that Heidegger's task is largely to think what Bergson says here cannot be thought: to supply us with coherent
categories for thinking about temporality - categories which lapse neither into paradox nor into poetic imagery.

In his claim that authentic temporality is very different in kind from the objective time of the positive sciences, and that this temporality is "the foundation of our Being", Bergson is putting forth theories that find a place in Sein und Zeit. If we try to eliminate the paradoxical formulations of Bergson's viewpoint, and to disregard his hints that duration cannot properly be grasped conceptually at all, then what is left is a theory rather similar to the theory of the 'specious present' or 'gross now' already discussed with reference to thinkers like James and Husserl. Bergson even has a theory very like that of 'retention' or 'primary memory'. Of the experience of duration he writes:

It is memory, but not personal memory, which is external to what it retains, distinct from the past whose preservation it ensures. It is a memory within the changing itself, a memory which prolongs the 'before' into the 'after' and prevents them from being pure instants, appearing and disappearing in a present which is ceaselessly being reborn.

Bergson's theory, then, is not as radical as it may at first have seemed. The contrast that it draws between objective, scientific time and the temporality of immediate lived experience is largely that between the abstract, indivisible 'now'-point and the extended, forward- and backward-looking present duration. And this is a contrast present equally, though more intelligibly, within the theories of James and Husserl.
Dilthey's ideas on temporality show many similarities to Bergson's, both in their common insistence on the special nature of lived duration, and in their common tendency to deny the ability of thought to grasp this duration. Like Bergson, Dilthey takes temporality to be "the primary categorial determination" of life, the foundation of all its other characteristics. His discussion of temporality begins with a conventional distinguishing of present, past and future; all actual content, Dilthey says, is in the present, and we look forward to the future and backwards to the past as separated from the present. Dilthey notes a difference in the character of our attitudes towards past and future: we see the past as unchangeable, and to that extent are passive in our attitude towards it; in our attitude towards the future, on the other hand, we take ourselves to be active and free. The future is determined in terms of the category of possibility, just as the present was linked with the category of actuality.

But in later parts of his discussion, Dilthey moves in a rather different direction, following the characteristic tendency of Lebensphilosophie to place lived experience outside the bounds of conceptual thought. His reason for applying this general principle to the case of temporality comes out in this passage:

The antinomies that thought finds in the lived experience (Erlebnis) of time spring from the opacity of such experience for knowledge. The smallest portion of the progression of time still encloses a temporal duration within itself. The present never is; what we
experience as present always contains within itself memory of that which was just present.

Clearly, though, what Dilthey means by 'thought' and 'knowledge' is only one particular mode of conceptualising temporality. The very fact that in the last two sentences of the quoted passage he is able to make some coherent comments on temporality as it is really experienced seems to prove that this is not a point about thinking as such. It is rather a point about the use of appropriate or inappropriate categories. Dilthey lays it down as a general rule that "observation destroys lived experience." In the case of temporality, 'observation' (which clearly has a special sense here) fixes the flow of time, brings it to a standstill, and so falsifies it. The moral is not, however, that, recalling the words of Bergson, we cannot think time but can only live it; it is that we must take great care to think about time in the categorial terms appropriate to immediate experience. Dilthey writes: "One must always bear in mind to get hold of the categories that spring from life itself." But since he takes the conventional terminology of time to apply only to the inauthentic attitude of the impersonal observer, Dilthey concludes that the time-process is not, "in the strict sense, experiencable", on the grounds that immediate experience involves the "presence of the past" (die Prängent des Vergangenen).

In both of these writers we have found an interpretation of what is essentially the theory of the 'gross now' - an
interpretation, however, which sets out to make a contrast between objective, scientific time and immediately experienced temporality in a way that the accounts discussed earlier did not. The importance of this contrast grows even greater in Heidegger's theory of temporality, as we shall see: it becomes crucial by being linked with his doctrine of the dualism of existence and reality, and of the contrast between authentic and inauthentic existence.

Heidegger's theory is a theory of temporality (Zeitlichkeit). He takes care to avoid any confusion between this and ordinary notions of time by the adoption of this term, which is to be understood in a specifically existential sense. "The terminological use of this expression is primarily designed to ward off all of the significances of 'future', 'past' and 'present' which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary conception of time." This, he goes on to say, applies to conceptions of 'subjective' as much as 'objective' time: a proviso which may well be designed as a disassociating of his theory from that of Husserl. Heidegger's reason for insisting on a break with ordinary ways of understanding time lies in his general position concerning the nature of 'everyday' human existence. If the state of 'everydayness' is first and foremost an inauthentic mode of existence, then its various characteristics are to be seen as derivative, as based upon an ontological structure which is covered over in everyday life and forgotten. Heidegger thus sees his own task as one of disclosing the true nature of temporality, to describe it in terms which are drawn from the existentialia of
Heidegger's account of temporality begins with Dasein's existence: that is, its constitution in terms of possibility. This points to the leading temporal characteristic of Dasein, what Heidegger terms its being always "ahead-of-itself". Dasein projects itself into its possibilities; in doing so it is, in a special sense, 'ahead of itself'; it 'runs ahead' towards what is not yet the case. In other words, it is directed towards the future. "The primary meaning of existentiality is the future." He has rendered the key term Vorlaufen as 'running ahead'; in the translation of Macquarrie and Robinson its equivalent is given as 'anticipation'. Though this is certainly appropriate if grasped in its strict sense, there is, perhaps, a danger that a common practice of using this word as synonymous with 'expecting' may lead to misunderstanding. For Heidegger is concerned to stress the sharp distinction that is to be made between 'running ahead' and expecting or awaiting what is to occur in the future. If the distinction is not made, then, Heidegger says, the 'ahead' in 'running ahead' (i.e. the 'vor' in Vorlaufen) will be understood in a sense paraphrasable in some such formula as "not yet", or "not yet now - but later". And in that case, Dasein would be thought of as a being that 'runs its course' (ablauf: a characteristic expression of Husserl) in time. "The Being of a being of Dasein's character would become assimilated to presence-at-hand." Hence, Heidegger concludes, the 'ahead' in 'running
ahead' must "indicate the future in the way in which it generally makes it first possible for Dasein to be such that its potentiality-for-Being is an issue." 84 Now all of the various formulations of the future-directedness of Dasein that we have cited above are designed to make clear Heidegger's conception by overlapping and thus revealing the idea from several aspects. If, however, we want to gain a direct understanding of what this future-directedness consists in, we might pay attention to some of Heidegger's statements about what it is not.

Firstly, it is not expectation or awaiting (Erwartung). Why not? Because, as Heidegger puts it: 85

Every awaiting understands and 'has' what is possible for it with regard to whether and when and how it will be actually present-at-hand. Awaiting is not just an occasional looking away from the possible to its possible actualisation, but essentially a waiting for this actualisation. Even in awaiting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a foothold in the actuality for which what is awaited is awaited.

In expecting or awaiting, actuality has the first and the last word: firstly, one's ideas of what is to be expected are drawn from the realm of actuality, and secondly, in expecting the future event one's attention is upon what will then be the realm of actuality. The category of possibility, then, plays only a subordinate mediating role in the passage from one actuality to another. However, as our earlier descriptions of Heidegger's notion of human existence as constituted by its possibilities have indicated, any subordination of existential possibility to
actuality is seen by him as unacceptable. One might suppose upon reading Heidegger's criticism of 'awaiting', that it is the passive character of this attitude towards the future that he takes to constitute its inauthenticity - as if an authentic attitude, in contrast, would be one involving active willing and a practical seizing of one's possibilities of being. One passage tends to support this view: a passage in which Heidegger contrasts willing with what he sees as its inauthentic everyday counterparts: mere wishing, habit and instinct, all of which belong to the 'they' rather than to the true self. And yet if willing is (as Heidegger implies, although he does not say so explicitly) in this contrast to be seen as the authentic mode of Dasein's existence, we cannot go on immediately to identify the basic authentic 'future-directedness' of Dasein as one of willing. Of 'anticipation' (Vorlauf en) Heidegger says:

But does not this attitude involve in itself a coming-close (Naherung) to the possible, and with closeness to the possible does not its actualisation emerge? On the contrary, this coming-close does not tend toward a concernful making-available of something actual, but rather in coming-closer understandingly the possibility of the possible just becomes 'greater'.

This certainly indicates something quite different from actual praxis. It does not, however, constitute an argument against practical activity, as if to act were ipso facto to exist in an inauthentic mode. Rather, I think that Heidegger would class practical life as authentic or inauthentic according to its origin in a grasping of one's possibilities as possibilities to
the highest degree of intensity possible. Willing as such is not by itself sufficient. As for willing of an immediate and unreflective kind, this would presumably be just as unacceptable in Heidegger's view as a passive attitude of 'awaiting' events to come, for it would involve exactly the same passing-over of possibilities as such in favour of things actual and present-at-hand.

It must be evident that Heidegger's conception of 'running ahead' as the authentic mode of Dasein's 'Being-ahead-of-itself' bears a marked resemblance to the Kierkegaardian programme of subjective appropriation. Like the Kierkegaardian equivalent it is, perhaps, in the last analysis something quite sui generis, to be grasped only by a direct acquaintance on the part of the subjectively thinking individual, and not something that can be directly communicated. For it is, to recall the Kierkegaardian terminology, a matter of capacity rather than knowledge. Heidegger's talk of an understanding which is not 'thematic' seems to be most plausibly understood by association with Kierkegaard's conception of subjective appropriation. When Kierkegaard demands that one should ask oneself the 'intelligent' questions: "Is it possible?" and "Can I do it?", rather than the unintelligent questions: "Is it real?" and "Has my neighbour Christopherson done it?", his point is essentially similar to Heidegger's point about the need to grasp existential possibility as possibility.

So far I have been talking about Heidegger's approach to temporality only with regard to one aspect of the topic: the
future-directed side of temporality. What, one may wonder, can Heidegger have to say about the past, when his whole conception of existence is set out in terms of a conception, that of 'potentiality for Being', which seems to point specifically towards the future? We can gain a hint of one side of his approach to the question of Dasein's 'pastness' by making a further point about the idea of 'anticipation', and then seeing if some analogous point can be made about an authentic and an inauthentic attitude to the past.

Heidegger expressed anticipation, or 'running-ahead', as a way of 'coming closer' to one's possibilities: in contrast, he would say that the attitude of awaiting or expecting future events is one that sets them apart from the here-and-now, places them at a distance, and thus removes them from the sphere of our concern and involvement with our condition. Now this process of separation is one that has been linked closely with the adoption of an 'objective' attitude toward the past. In his work Man's Place in Nature, Max Scheler argues that the human ability to organise memory into an objective structure has a far-reaching significance for human life:

It is a process which invariably contributes to the dissolution, yes, the actual death, of a living tradition. Traditional contents are always given as 'present', 'without a date'; they operate in our present activities without being objectified in a definite temporal distance. In tradition, the past influences more by suggestion than by knowledge. The reduction of the power of tradition is a continuous process in human history. It is an achievement of human reason which, in one and the same act, objectifies the content of the tradition, thus throwing it back, as it were, into the past where it
belongs and, at the same time, clearing the ground for new discoveries and inventions in the present.

Hence, for Scheler, the value of the historical sciences: by 'objectifying' the content of tradition in the way he has described, they free man from the weight of tradition that (as Scheler supposes) presses down upon his spirit in a way all the more powerful for being largely hidden and unrealised.

We have now to see why it is that Heidegger rejects this whole picture, why he classes 'remembering' as an attitude which is as inauthentic with regard to the past as 'expecting' is with regard to the future. This means looking into the notion of Dasein's 'having been' which he proposes as a counterpart to that of being 'ahead of itself', and the further notion of resoluteness which acts as the authentic mode of 'having been' in the same way that 'running-ahead' expressed the authentic attitude toward the future. Just as 'anticipation' is an expression which risks misunderstanding, as explained above (page 261), so too 'resolution' (Entschlossenheit: alternatively, 'resoluteness') may be misunderstood. Ordinarily, we understand 'being resolute' as a forward-looking attitude, rather than a backward-looking one. It is somewhat surprising to be told that resoluteness is a way of grasping the past. Yet this is what Heidegger asserts.

Here a crucial feature of Heidegger's theory of existence plays its part: the idea that although Dasein is to be understood in terms of possibilities, this does not mean an indeterminate and infinite range of possibilities. Such a notion would, in fact, turn out to be quite vacuous. Rather, Dasein is
faced with a definite range of possibilities — a range that is finite in extent, in accordance with Dasein's essential finitude. As Heidegger puts it:  

 Possibility as an existential does not signify free-floating potentiality-for-being in the sense of the 'liberty of indifference' (libertas indifferentiae). In every case Dasein... has already entered into definite possibilities. And as the potentiality-for-being that it is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly giving up the possibilities of its Being, seizing them or mishandling them.

This passage contains a number of points of interest. One is worth digressing to mention: Heidegger here (though rarely elsewhere in Sein und Zeit) seems to be putting forward three ways of approaching one's own existential possibilities. Elsewhere he usually contrasts the alternatives of 'taking hold' of them and of letting them 'pass by': here, though, there is what is either a third possible alternative or else a further distinction within the category of 'taking hold'. He speaks of seizing (ergreift) one's possibilities and of mishandling them (vergreift sich). What we may infer from this is that the authentic appropriation of existence is not by itself a guarantee of real attainment as such.

The failure of the inauthentic person who remains bound by the restrictions of the 'they' is not the only kind of failure. In his book Philosophy of Existence, Karl Jaspers writes: "When man reaches for his highest possibilities, he may deceive himself most radically. He may fall down all the steps he has climbed and end up lower than he was at the beginning." Something similar may be drawn from the words of Heidegger in the passage quoted above.
But to return to the question of temporality: the possibilities that are currently available to Dasein depend upon the way that its possibilities have already been grasped. Hence grasping one's possibilities involves grasping the way that one has existed, and doing this in the way appropriate to existence: namely in the kind of subjective appropriation already linked with the projecting of possibilities. To do this is to be 'resolute' in Heidegger's sense of that term. Heidegger seems to intend a close analogy in many ways between anticipation and resoluteness. In both cases, what is in question is Dasein's ability to grasp itself in terms of its possibilities: firstly, as possibilities, and secondly, as these determinate possibilities. But there is clearly an ordering in the listing of these two aspects of authentic existence. The general projection of possibilities comes first: Hence Heidegger can write, "Dasein can authentically be as having been only insofar as it is futural. Having-been arises, in a certain way, from the future."92

Heidegger contrasts the term used in the passage just quoted, 'having-been' (Gewesenheit) with the term 'pastness' (Vergangenheit). He finds that the first expresses the past-directed aspect of Dasein in a way that the second expression fails to do. "As long as Dasein factically exists, it is never past, but it always is indeed in already having been, in the sense of 'I am as having-been'... In contrast, we call a being 'past' when it is no longer present-at-hand."93 Of course, it is hardly enough simply to allocate one expression to one kind of Being and another to another kind; we must see what connotations of each
need to be brought out for us to see Heidegger’s intention in making this sharp distinction. The significance that he attaches
to the term Gewesenheit is to be understood by referring to
the structure of such German expressions as Ich bin gewesen,
translated in this context (as in the above quotation) as ‘I am
having-been’: a clumsy phrasing, but one that is necessary to
bring out the force of Heidegger’s line of thinking. What he
sees in this expression is something that is not found in the more
ordinary English expression ‘I have been’. It is a recognition
of the determination of current existence by past existence; the
emphasis is on the word ‘am’, italicised by Heidegger in his use
of the expression and those like it. The determinate possibilities
that constitute existence spring from the possibilities that
Dasein has already faced and dealt with in one way or another.
Since the fundamental character of Dasein lies in its concern about
the possibilities that face it, Heidegger infers that Dasein must
be concerned about the possibilities that it has already faced.
If this is a concern for the past, it is of a special kind, for
the its whole purpose is to answer the question about the
possibilities that one has, not those that one had. Hence the
use by Heidegger of a locution which places its emphasis here.

It is easy to see that, for Heidegger, a similar contrast
must arise in comparing Dasein’s possible attitude toward its
past with the authentic and inauthentic attitudes which it may
adopt toward its future. The inauthentic attitude will be that
which sets the past at a distance from the concerns of current
existence, which regards the past as that which was once present-
at-hand, but is no longer present-at-hand. At this point one might recall the words of Max Scheler quoted earlier in this chapter (above, page 265). Scheler approvingly describes the appearance of an objective attitude towards the human past as a process which destroys the power of tradition by separating the events of the past from the tasks and concerns of the present.

Historical thinking, as Scheler explains its function, 'objectifies' tradition, "thus throwing it back, as it were, into the past where it belongs and, at the same time, clearing the ground for new discoveries and inventions in the present." Scheler is contrasting two different attitudes which we may adopt towards the past, bearing in mind, however, that one of these is said by him to work on what he terms the 'pre-conscious' level of thinking. Let us see how his remarks can be related to Heidegger's ideas about existential temporality. It should, of course, be pointed out that these remarks are being considered out of context, as a useful counterpoint to the Heideggerian orientation rather than as an adequately comprehensive indication of Scheler's view of historical thinking.

With this proviso, what can be said about the idea of 'objectifying' the past? If Heidegger's idea of an inauthentic attitude towards the past is that of an attitude which is designed to separate it from current concerns, then it would seem that the historical objectivity that Scheler sees as a liberating force must be condemned by Heidegger as a token of inauthentic existence. Heidegger quotes with apparent approval passages from the writings of Count Yorck which strongly deplore the work of
'objective' historians such as Ranke. "At heart they are natural scientists," Yorck writes; and he goes on with these remarkable words:

One must keep oneself wholly removed from all such rubbish (Krimskrams) as, for instance, how often Plato was in Magna Graecia or Syracuse. For nothing vital (Lebendigkeit) depends upon this. Such superficial affectation, which I have now seen through critically, ultimately arrives at a great question-mark, and is put to shame by the great realities of Homer, Plato, and the New Testament.

Heidegger's implicit endorsement of the Yorckian position is, I think, largely independent of Yorck's conviction that an 'objective' investigation into history wie es geschehen ist, to recall Ranke's characteristic phrase, must inevitably end in scepticism and 'a great question-mark'. Heidegger's point is rather that even if certainty is possible in this sphere, the whole project bears within itself the mark of inauthenticity. Again, this is best seen in relation to the formulations of Scheler: Heidegger, one may suppose, would argue in reply that the 'clearing-away' described by Scheler is a mere illusion - as if we could break away from what we have been merely by performing an intellectual operation! Furthermore, even if such a feat were possible, it would lead only to a predicament as destructive of true life as that of domination by the unconscious burden of tradition. For it would lead to a range of possibilities without any finite and determinate content - but this would amount to having no possibilities at all. Though Heidegger does conceive
of Dasein as in its essence a being constituted by possibilities, this is not a case of 'wings beating in the void'. In every case, Dasein has already taken hold of its possibilities in some way or other, has placed itself in its world in a way that defines and limits the possibilities that will now be open to it.

And yet Dasein does not, in its everyday mode of existence, recognise this: Heidegger says that it forgets what it has been. This forgetfulness (Vergessenheit) is, in his view, not merely a failure to remember: it is something positive, like every other aspect of inauthentic existence. It is a 'backing away' (Ausrücken) from one's own 'having-been'. Furthermore, just as what one has been is forgotten, so too this repression itself (to use a term that Heidegger does not use, but which seems appropriate enough) is forgotten. The place of what is repressed and forgotten is taken by something analogous to the awaiting of what is to come: this is called retaining by Heidegger. What is retained is what is or was encountered as present-at-hand within the world; this, in Heidegger's view, is what customarily occupies our attention in our dealings with the world, and it does so in such a way that we forget that our concern is our own in the sense of being an existential possibility which involves an essential reference to what we have been and what we may yet be.

Even if one omits many of the technical terms that Heidegger uses in setting out his theories of temporality and of Being-in-the world - and I have omitted many, if not most, of them in the description offered here - his thinking tends to
fall into formal patterns in many parts of his existential analysis, and this is especially evident in his treatment of temporality. For this reason it is helpful to bear in mind some kind of general picture of the intention of Heidegger's conception of existential temporality. He wishes to set out an idea of human existence as moving from the past towards the future, as looking both forwards and back. This means, in the first place, that he means to eliminate any conception of future or past which involve separation from existence as currently undergone; and, in the second place, that he means to (as it were) extend existence beyond the 'now' into both directions. This is an idea that will recur later.

Given that Heidegger regards 'forgetting' what one has been as an inauthentic mode of existence, what is the authentic mode that corresponds to it? "If Being-as-having-been (Gewesen-sein) is authentic, we call it repetition." The word that Heidegger uses here is Wiederholung: a more literal equivalent would be something like 'taking up again', or perhaps, in a more adequate rendering of Heidegger's meaning, 'retrieval'; but 'repetition' serves to bring out the important link between his thinking and that of Kierkegaard on this point. Something must thus be said here about Kierkegaard's work Repetition, although only those ideas relevant to the use of this category by Heidegger will be touched upon here.

Kierkegaard puts forward the category of repetition as contrasting to that of recollection. (He also treats it as the real meaning of the Hegelian notion of mediation, but this side of
his theory is less relevant to our present concern.) He writes: "Just as (the Greeks) taught that all knowledge is a recollection, so will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition." The problem that Kierkegaard sets himself in offering an alternative to the Greek theory of recollection is that of preserving what he thinks to be valid in this theory, while turning the whole direction of emphasis around: "It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards." The problem is thus to unite the understanding of life with actual living, a process which involves constant movement, novelty and striving for what is not yet realised. Kierkegaard's solution is the idea of repetition: "Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards." The difference is that repetition is located in existential reality, while recollection is really a directing of one's attention away from existential reality, an idle and (to use Heideggerian terminology) inauthentic pursuit. Thus Kierkegaard can write: "He who would only hope is cowardly, he who would only recollect is a voluptuary, but he who wills repetition is a man, and the more expressly he knows how to make his purpose clear, the deeper he is as a man." One difference between Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's theories of repetition as a mode of existence is that Heidegger by no means takes repetition to be a literal repeating of the
past, as Kierkegaard tends to do, at least in his manner of presentation. In this sense, 'repetition' is a misleading translation of the term Wiederholung as it is used by Heidegger. Repetition, Heidegger explains, is an "explicit handing-down" of the possibilities that Dasein has had - it is a kind of loyalty to what one has been. In Heidegger's view, Dasein exists first and foremost in its inauthentic everyday mode; this, therefore, is the mode in which resolute re-possession of the past finds Dasein as it has been: hence Heidegger's use of the idea of conscience in characterising this 'explicit handing-down'. But of particular importance is this clarification:

Repetition which involves handing down to oneself a possibility that has been does not, however, disclose the Dasein that has been in order to actualise it over again. Repetition of what is possible is neither a bringing-back of the 'past', nor a backward binding of the 'present' to what has been surpassed.

Repetition instead grasps past possibilities as possibilities. Heidegger discusses this positive concept further when he comes to set out his idea of the science of history (Historie). His conception of history as proceeding from the historicality of Dasein, which is essentially the same as the authentic 'having-been' already set out in terms of resoluteness and repetition, is strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche's category of 'monumental' history, as described in the essay entitled "The Use and Abuse of History". Nietzsche there writes: "What is the use to the modern man of this 'monumental' contemplation of the past, this
preoccupation with the rare and classic? It is the knowledge that the great thing existed and was therefore possible, and so may be possible again." If we may take Heidegger to endorse the disdain of mere historical fact professed by Count Yorck in the quotations cited earlier (above, page 271), he would presumably amend Nietzsche's formulation by setting aside the question whether the 'great thing' in fact did exist, and taking as the starting-point only the question whether it was possible.

It is interesting that in this work, Nietzsche goes on to express doubts on the validity of this function of the 'monumental' approach to history. For he continues: "Ultimately, of course, what was once possible can only become possible a second time on the Pythagorean theory, that when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again, the events on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail." Only if this were the case would monumental history be able to lay claim to complete truth. However, the Pythagorean hypothesis remains mere speculation; until it is somehow proven valid, monumental history must fail in its object. "Till then... it will always bring together things that are incompatible and generalise them into compatibility, will always weaken the differences of motive and occasion."

In his later thought Nietzsche indeed takes this further step, with his doctrine of the eternal recurrence. If we read this retrospectively in application to the views expressed in the earlier essay on history, then the 'monumental' approach seems to be validated after all. Nietzsche himself does not make this
reference. Instead, he uses the doctrine to solve the problem that the past poses for the will. In Thus Spake Zarathustra we read:

Willing liberates; but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? 'It was'—that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.

The function of the doctrine of eternal recurrence is to eliminate the difference between future and past, and so to remove this barrier to the will's freedom and creativity. 'All 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident—until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I willed it'. Until the creative will says to it, 'But thus I will it; thus shall I will it'. It is not, I think, too strained a comparison to link these words of Nietzsche with the words of Kierkegaard in Repetition: "Repetition, if it is possible, makes a man happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy." For in both cases there is a crucial concern for the appropriation of the past in a way that does not at all impair the capacity of human existence to 'live forwards', in Kierkegaard's phrase. And this, too, is the key to Heidegger's whole account of Dasein's 'Being-as-having-been'.

It must be noticeable that, as described so far, Heidegger's whole theory of temporality makes surprisingly little
reference to the present. Heidegger frequently describes authenticity as "resolute anticipation"; this phrase clearly is a combination of the terms that Heidegger uses for Dasein's authentic ways of looking forwards and back, but it makes no mention of the present. Heidegger does, however, make what is at least a token attempt to make up this deficiency. He writes:

To the running-ahead which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a present in accordance with which a resolution discloses a situation. In resoluteness, the present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of closest concern, but it is held in the future and in having-been. The present that is held in authentic temporality and is thus an authentic present, we call the moment.

The 'moment' (Augenblick), Heidegger goes on to explain, refers to the manner in which Dasein, supposing it to exist authentically, is 'carried away' towards its possibilities, while maintaining the resoluteness which acknowledges the limitations of these possibilities. One must remark that this seems to add little or nothing to the idea of resolute anticipation. Heidegger has, significantly, little more to say in any positive way about the 'moment'; his further elucidations of this notion are mainly of a negative kind. He observes, for example, that the 'moment' has nothing to do with the 'now' (Jetzt) in which things occur: that is, become present-at-hand. He then refers the reader to Kierkegaard for further explanations of the 'moment' - or, rather, to Kierkegaard as interpreted in Karl Jaspers' work Psychologie der Weltanschauungen.

Some brief remarks on this source will, I think, help
us to see just why it is that Heidegger does not allow any real place to the present in his theory of existential temporality. Jaspers approaches the concept of the 'moment' through a critique of what he terms the 'reflective' attitude towards living, which directs its attention towards the past or the future, but in either case away from the present. Against this he proposes a view which recognizes the 'self-worth' of the present moment. But his real motive is related to the relation between the finite and the infinite, between temporality and eternity. To exist only in time, Jaspers claims, is to be "fragmentary and finite"; but it seems as if one could transcend this finitude in the experience of the moment. In elucidating this thesis, Jaspers offers a historical survey of the category of the 'moment': this is really in the main an exposition of the account given by Kierkegaard in The Concept of Dread, although such thinkers as Aristotle and Giordano Bruno are called upon to provide a background for the Kierkegaardian conception. The essential thesis here is that the category of the moment provides us with a meeting-point of the eternal and the temporal. We shall look directly at what Kierkegaard says shortly.

Continuing with Jaspers' own account, we find him asserting the central importance of the moment in human existence. "To see human life, one must see how the human being lives the moment." Life is fully present only in the moment: this, and not the future or past, is where it is immediate and actual. And yet, Jaspers goes on, the moment is part of the temporal flux, and as such is merely transient and vanishing: how, then, can we...
locate existential reality here? His answer is that this objection springs from a confusion between the moment, taken in a strict sense, and the 'time-atom' which is often inaccurately referred to by the use of this term. "The time-atom is indeed nothing, but the moment is everything." And yet one does not always realise the experience of the moment: on the contrary, in our everyday existence we experience time rather in terms of the succession of empty 'time-moments' (Zeitmomente). Jaspers distinguishes two forms which this inauthentic temporality may take. One is the form already touched upon: the subordination of the present to an "imagined future"; the other is what Jaspers calls an "aesthetic glorification of the isolated moment". In the first, future-directed view, life is seen as a mere means towards some future end: an end which is never actually reached. Jaspers cites, in opposition, Dilthey's assertion of "the independent value of every day", and the directive following from this: "In one word: Live!" On the other hand, Jaspers is also concerned to rebut the second view mentioned above, which he identifies with the Epicurean 'carpe diem'. What he objects to in this attitude is its failure to see the full content of the moment: the aesthetic attitude sees only the sensuous. By divorcing it from its relation to infinity, the Epicurean eliminates the moment's fullness and turns it into a mere abstraction.

Much of this description is drawn from what is said about the 'moment' by Kierkegaard in *The Concept of Dread*. In briefly setting out Kierkegaard's ideas on the subject, I shall take 'moment' as the English equivalent for his term øjeblikket.
This is the customary translation of the corresponding German word Augenblick, and it follows Swenson's usage in his translation of *Philosophical Fragments*. Lowrie, on the other hand, uses 'instant' in his version of *The Concept of Dread*. Heidegger's English translators use the phrase 'moment of vision' to bring out the literal connotations of the original word; 'glance of the eye' would be an even more literal translation.\(^{121}\)

Kierkegaard writes, "Man, a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal."\(^{122}\) However, he adds, a synthesis must always take place in a third term: what is this third term here? To answer this question, he analyses the nature of time: \(^{123}\)

When time is correctly defined as infinite succession, it seems plausible to define it also as the present, the past and the future. However, this distinction is incorrect, if one means by it that this is implied in time itself; for it first emerges with the relation of time to eternity and the reflection of eternity in it.

The reason why the distinction between past and future cannot be 'implied in time itself' is, in Kierkegaard's argument, that such a distinction requires a 'foothold' in a present from which one could look forwards and back. But in a constant succession, no such foothold is possible. (If it seems to be possible, Kierkegaard adds, this is because one illegitimately spatialises time, thus abolishing movement and succession.\(^{124}\)) There is no present in the pure flux of time, "unless precisely as something infinitely void, which is again precisely the infinite vanishing."\(^{125}\) Where, then, can we find a notion of the present that is not empty? Kierkegaard answers: in the idea of
eternity. "The present is the eternal, or rather the eternal is
the present, and the present is full."126 Yet there is no past
or future to be found in eternity, for there is no succession
there: eternity is nothing but the present. This might seem to
lead to an impasse, for neither time nor eternity, each taken by
itself, can give rise to the temporal categories of past or
future. Kierkegaard's solution is the synthesis of time and
eternity in the moment, "in which time and eternity touch one
another, thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly
intersecting eternity and eternity constantly permeating time.
Only now does that division we talked about acquire significance:
the present, the past, and the future."127

This synthesis of time and eternity is not to be
identified with the synthesis of temporality and eternity which
Kierkegaard identifies as man: that question raises fresh problems
(see above, pages 91ff). However, it is in this way that
Kierkegaard constructs one of the sides of that further synthesis:
the side of temporality.

It can easily be seen that Heidegger's notion of
temporality cannot possibly be constructed in any analogous
manner, since the notion of eternity plays no part in any of his
analyses. Heidegger's orientation, as already seen, is wholly
towards finitude. If he distinguishes temporality from time in
a manner seemingly similar to Kierkegaard's, it is a distinction
not to be explicated by allowing any role for eternity. Now, then,
is it carried out by Heidegger? His theory moves in what is, in
one sense, precisely the opposite direction to that of Kierkegaard.
Temporality is what is primary; objective time, the infinite succession of 'now'-points, is derived from temporality. In the theory of Kierkegaard as it was described above, on the other hand, temporality is generated by the 'intersection' of eternity with time. In Kierkegaard's theory, again, temporality is developed from the 'foothold' that is identified with the moment (Øjeblikket): it is this that allows the distinction between past and future to be made, and so this which gives rise to the structure of temporality. In Heidegger's theory, in sharp contrast, the 'moment' is presented as being the product of future-directed anticipation and backward-directed resoluteness. What is more, it seems to have little function in Heidegger's theory other than as a mere point of reference for anticipatory resoluteness.

As one might expect, Heidegger contrasts the authentic mode of existence with respect to the present with a corresponding inauthentic attitude. The latter he terms 'making-present' (Gegenwärtigen).\textsuperscript{128} The term seems to be drawn from Husserl's lectures on inner time-consciousness.\textsuperscript{129} Husserl, however, more often uses the word Vergegenwärtigen:\textsuperscript{130} this is a common German expression which in ordinary usage means simply imagining something or bringing it to mind. In Husserl's theory it is taken more literally as denoting a mental act which brings content into the present. Heidegger comments on this notion that it is 'merely a mode' of 'making-present' in his sense. By this he seems to mean that his concept is a wider one in that it takes in what is present-at-hand or ready-to-hand as well as what is absent.\textsuperscript{131}
Heidegger has little to say about the exact nature of 'making-present': it seems to be identifiable with the absorption in the world of objects that are present-at-hand which Heidegger takes to be a prime factor in the everyday inauthenticity of Dasein. There is, of course, a dilemma here: Dasein is, by its nature, concerned for the possible ways in which it exists in its world; this concern is inevitably a concern for Dasein's situation and for its environment - yet it is precisely that which leads on to the absorption giving rise to the most characteristic form of Dasein's inauthenticity. It seems, therefore, that either Dasein is inauthentic by virtue of deficiency in its concern for its projects, or it is inauthentic by virtue of the absorption arising from just these projects. One can easily see why Heidegger is so sure that Dasein is to be found, first and foremost, in a mode of existence which is inauthentic.

Heidegger takes it that the ordinary conception of time arises from inauthentic temporality as he has described it: 132

What is characteristic of the 'time' accessible to ordinary understanding consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that within it the ekstastical character of primordial temporality is levelled-off (nivelliert) as a pure sequence of 'nows', without beginning and end. But this very levelling-off, in terms of its existential sense, is grounded in a definite possible temporality (Zeitigung), in accordance with which temporality temporalises, as inauthentic. 'time' in this sense.

In the final chapter of Sein und Zeit (which was, of course, intended originally only as the final chapter of its
Heidegger attempts to show how the ordinary conception of time is based upon the inauthentic modes of temporality that he has already set out: that is, in "a making-present which retains and awaits." The unifying theme is Dasein's absorption in the sphere of its everyday concerns. Dasein directs its attention towards what is present-at-hand, or what was present-at-hand, or again what will be present-at-hand. It expresses this by using temporal terms like 'now' and 'then' (which is, of course, ambiguous in that it serves for both past and future). Heidegger remarks that such expressions refer to a "seemingly self-evident relational structure which we call 'datability' (Datierbarkeit)." They involve a kind of time that can be measured and counted - this was, indeed, Aristotle's basic definition of time. Heidegger asserts that all subsequent philosophical accounts of time have been based on the Aristotelian treatment. But in its formalised character, this measurable, calculable time loses even that minimal reference to our concerns that is still to be seen in the notion of 'datability'. "Thus for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of 'now', which are constantly 'present-at-hand', simultaneously passing away and coming along."

In this levelled-off temporality one can recognise the traditional philosophical interpretation of time that is assumed by both Brentano and Husserl in the theories discussed earlier in the present chapter. Heidegger even grants to Husserl (though without specifying Husserl) that each 'now' "has an essentially continuous extension into its just-passing and
The allusion occurs not in *Sein und Zeit*, but in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. There the relationship between primordial, existential temporality and ordinary time is traced out in the direction opposite to that taken in *Sein und Zeit*, and the recognition that consciousness cannot be confined to extensionless 'now'-points is Heidegger's first move in breaking away from the traditional conception of time in an attempt to show its concealed pre-supposition of genuine temporality. In this connection we may recall the remark offered earlier in this chapter: that Heidegger's theory of temporality is in a sense a continuation of the movement which can be seen in Husserl's theory when it is set against such traditionally-conceived doctrines as that of Brentano. Husserl's theory was in part an attempt to break out of the schema of 'time-atoms' (to recall Kierkegaard's term), and to admit a forward- and a backward-looking character of temporal consciousness. Yet it was admitted only in a limited way by Husserl, and against a theoretical background essentially similar to the traditional one. Heidegger transforms this theoretical situation with his existential conception of temporality. Furthermore, Heidegger puts his theory to work in a systematic application to various aspects of human existence. The most important of his temporal analyses will be treated in the final chapter - the theory of Being-towards-death. Before that, however, some further discussion of Heidegger's treatment of relations between existing individuals will be given.
CHAPTER EIGHT

EXISTENCE AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
I turn now to consider a part of Heidegger's analysis of human existence which has been the subject of much criticism: his account of the existential possibilities of interpersonal relationships. Heidegger gives the name Mitsein to the mode of Being that corresponds to this possibility: that is, to the ontological category which underlies the various antinomic phenomena of interpersonal relations. It is important for Heidegger to say something on this topic, for he is well aware of the importance of this aspect of human existence for philosophical anthropology generally, but also for specific applications of philosophical anthropology to the social sciences or to questions of the moral life.

And yet even what has been said so far about Heidegger's conception of authentic existence indicates the difficulty of his task. The whole topic of authenticity arises out of the basic characterisation of Dasein in terms of 'mineness': the Being that is an issue for Dasein is 'in each case mine'. In other words, the Being of others is not an issue for me: this seems to be a necessary inference from the first proposition. If I am concerned with others, it is not on the fundamental level at which my self-concern operates. Heidegger's critics have not been slow to draw this conclusion; furthermore the conception of authenticity as a realisation and intensification of inwardly-directed 'mineness' draws Heidegger even further away from the realm of the interpersonal. According to Georg Lukacs, the very idea of authenticity "has an antisocial character." The position from which that criticism is made is the position of Marxism, for which "the essence
of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships.\textsuperscript{3}

To the Marxist viewpoint one might add other socially-oriented conceptions of human nature, such as John Dewey's, with its dismissal of the whole idea of inwardness.\textsuperscript{4}

- The idea of perfecting an 'inner' personality is a sure sign of social divisions. What is called inner is simply that which does not connect with others—which is not capable of free and full communication. What is termed spiritual culture has usually been futile, with something rotten about it, just because it has been conceived as a thing which a man might have internally—and therefore exclusively.

Though Dewey, writing in 1916, did not have existential philosophy in mind, his polemic against the inwardness of 'spiritual culture' does seem readily applicable to existential thought. Especially relevant is his emphasis on the lack of direct communicability involved in the inner life. To communicate is to make common: but as Dewey rightly says, what is located within subjective inwardness is what is 'exclusive', and incommunicable precisely because it cannot become common property. It is inconsistent with the ideal of 'social efficiency' prized by Dewey as a human goal.\textsuperscript{5} Nor is it compatible with Marx's relegation of individual participation in 'the essence of man' to the level of a mere abstract moment within the social totality; in this sense, Lukacs too is correct in attaching the 'antisocial' label to the category of authenticity.

These are, of course, viewpoints deliberately chosen as
offering the sharpest possible contrast to Heidegger's radically individualistic theory of human existence. Yet even critics of Heidegger who are basically sympathetic to his existential mode of philosophising find fault with his treatment of the possibility of interpersonal relations. Martin Buber points out that although Kierkegaard, too, tended to divorce the authentic mode of existence from the whole sphere of social relationships, he nevertheless retained (and, indeed, stressed all the more) the relational character of existence by defining it in terms of the relation to the infinite and eternal.6 Heidegger cannot do this, however, for this further dimension is absent from his thinking. Buber writes: "In his anxiety and dread Kierkegaard's man stands 'alone before God,' Heidegger's man stands before himself and nothing else, and - since in the last resort one cannot stand before oneself - he stands in his anxiety and dread before nothing."7 Buber finds Heidegger's account of interpersonal relationships inadequate in allowing no contact between one existence and another on the deepest level. Heidegger's theory "knows nothing of any essential relation with others or any real I-Thou with them which could breach the barriers of the self."8

The problem posed to philosophy by the whole question of interpersonal relationships is not, of course, one peculiar to the existential mode of philosophising. Nor, one might add, is Heidegger alone in his failure (if it is a failure) to supply a basic conceptual scheme which would allow us to gain some philosophical insight into the logic of the basic ways in which human beings stand in relation to one another. Amongst
English-speaking philosophers, emphasis on the 'problem of our knowledge of other minds' tends to work against any further advance into the area of interpersonal relationships. The inquiry is oriented towards the challenge of skepticism, and, such are the difficulties in providing a wholly satisfactory refutation of the skeptical attack on our claims to knowledge of other minds, it remains within this particular problematic. The limited character of the problem - its stress on knowledge alone, to the exclusion of other modes of experience, and its equally limiting reference to minds - also acts as a barrier to further investigation. In contrast, it is significant that those philosophers who do offer categorial interpretations of the interpersonal sphere commonly ignore the whole question of skepticism as it operates here. They take apprehension of the other to be immediate and certain: this seems to hold true, for example, of both Heidegger and Sartre.

Heidegger entitles one chapter of *Sein und Zeit*: "Being-in-the-world as Being-with and being-one's-self. The 'They'". Much of the content of this chapter has already been described in the earlier discussion of Heidegger's account of inauthentic everyday existence and his theory of das Man. Here, however, we are concerned with the more general indications that Heidegger offers of his theory of Mitsein: 'Being-with'. He begins his remarks with something of a paradox: "By 'the others', we do not mean everyone else over and above myself, from whom I set myself apart; the others are rather those from whom one usually does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is too."
is really designed to point out certain differences between the use of 'other' in Heidegger's theory and what he takes to be its common use within the context of a categorial rather than existential structure. There the term has a sense appropriate to things present-at-hand; this, however, cannot express the basic way in which relations between one existing individual and another occur. First of all, Heidegger stipulates that any apprehension of others occurs primarily within the context of Dasein's concern for its world, of its grasping of its own projects in terms of the environment in which it finds itself. Thus Heidegger would certainly not have any sympathy with attempts to demonstrate the existence of 'other minds', whether by the traditional argument from analogy, or by some other kind of argument. All he will say is that other existing individuals are encountered in the course of one's own existence, and that they are apprehended neither as present-at-hand nor as ready-to-hand. This, Heidegger remarks, is the only formulation that fits the "phenomenal facts of the case" (Tatbestand). Heidegger explicitly states that Dasein is primarily un related to others, although "it can, of course, still be 'with' others afterwards." This is in accordance with his remarks on the subject in Vom Wesen des Gründen, where he says that "selfhood is never bound up with a 'thou', but is rather neutral towards being an 'I' and being a 'thou', and even more toward 'sexuality', since it is what makes them all possible in the first place." Or, again, in "Was ist Metaphysik?": the experience of dread reveals Dasein not as 'I' or 'thou', but merely as 'one'
Yet although he takes Dasein to be originally unrelated to others, Heidegger also states that "Dasein is in itself essentially Being-with." This is not to say that there are many Daseins standing in relation to one another - that is a contingent matter, not something belonging to the 'essence' of Dasein itself.

To say that Being-with is part of Dasein's essence is to say that it is something attributable to Dasein even when, as a matter of fact, it is not in some relationship to this or that other. "Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world." On the one hand, when no others are present, we say that they are 'missing', thus identifying this as a deficient mode of the relatedness of the existing individual to other existing individuals. On the other hand, Heidegger thinks that Dasein may be said to be alone even when it is amongst others, in those cases where their presence is "indifferent and alien."

This implies that there is some kind of relation to the others which expresses an authentic form of Mitsein. Heidegger terms this 'solicitude'. His term, Fürsorge, is clearly intended to suggest close links with the expressions 'care' (Sorge) and 'concern' (Besorgen) which have been used throughout his analysis of Being-in-the-world. In all of these expressions, the emphasis is on the character of existence as a dynamic, striving process; such terms bring out the fuller meaning of what is set out in a more formal way in Heidegger's analyses of existential possibility and of temporality. Thus he writes: "The essential Being-possible of Dasein refers to the characterised ways of its
Mitsein has a negative mode: the 'indifference' and 'alien' character already referred to. This, Heidegger seems to be saying, is the way that Mitsein occurs in everyday existence. He is also prepared to say that ordinary objects are 'indifferent' to one another - but he insists, as one would expect, that this is an 'indifference' of a quite different kind from the indifference that is a privative mode of Mitsein.

More striking is Heidegger's description of two positive forms of solicitude. He calls them the "two extreme possibilities" of solicitude in its positive form. He describes one of these 'extremes' in the following terms:

(Solicitude) can, as it were, take away 'care' from the other and place itself in his place in concern: it can leap in (einspringen) for him. Such solicitude takes over the subject of concern for the other... In such solicitude the other can become one that is dependent and dominated, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from the dominated one.

This seems to be more or less a counterpart of das Man, seen, as it were, from the other side of the relationship. In discussing Heidegger's concept of the 'they', I said earlier that while the presence of others is a necessary pre-condition for Dasein's domination by the 'they', this presence acts only as the occasion and not as the motivating force of the process (above, pages 209ff). What has just been said may seem to be inconsistent with this. Heidegger does speak of the possibility of taking away the care of the other. Yet he places the word 'care' within
inverted commas in a way that seems to indicate that this whole statement is not to be understood in any straightforward sense: in other words, that one cannot really 'take away' from the other what is essential to him. If the other falls under the domination of the 'they', this is just as much a particular mode of his essential concern for his existence as any other. Hence the earlier claim that domination by the 'they' is not any process of direct influence is not contradicted here.

In contrast, Heidegger describes the authentic mode of solicitude as one "which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him (ihm vorausspringt) in his existential potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care', but rather primarily to give it back authentically as such."²³ Now this is, one must comment, an obscure conception. Heidegger's only further elucidation is a comment that such authentic solicitude is not directed towards 'what' the other is concerned with, but rather towards the authenticity of this concern itself. It "helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it."²⁴ It seems that this 'help' must be as little a direct acting upon the other as the domination implied in the inauthentic form of solicitude which 'takes over' the other's responsibility for his existence. In that case, it must be some indirect form of influence. Perhaps further exegesis of this idea, which is not pursued further by Heidegger, would have to be based upon the Kierkegaardian conception of indirect communication. One would have to widen the notion of communication to taken various forms of interpersonal relationship not, or at least
not primarily, related to the field of discourse or language. In that case, it might be that something like setting an example of authentic existence would constitute a form of solicitude for others that would satisfy Heidegger’s requirements. Yet even here there are difficulties, for Heidegger makes it clear that it is comparison between one’s own existence and that of the other that is the source of domination by the anonymous ‘they’. Hence this idea is of doubtful value in providing a solution to the problem, at least until further elucidation can be given of the distinction between attention to the ‘what’ of concern and to the character of the concern itself with respect to authenticity or inauthenticity.

There are, I think, two major reasons for Heidegger’s failure to supply an account of the interpersonal aspect of existence which goes beyond these vague hints and largely formal distinctions. I shall deal with these in turn.

The first is a reason that is closely linked with Heidegger’s theory of temporality. As we saw in the last chapter, Heidegger formulates the concept of authenticity in terms of resoluteness and anticipation (or ‘running-ahead’) – attitudes which are directed respectively towards the past and the future. Although he adds to these a third category which is supposed to express an authentic mode of existence oriented towards the present, this remains something of a token gesture. The other, inauthentic side of the present-tensed aspect of Dasein looms much larger throughout Heidegger’s whole existential analysis. Indeed, it seems that the present is the primary point of origin
of inauthenticity, insofar as this consists in Dasein's absorption in the world of objects which are present-at-hand and which Dasein has to deal with in pursuing its projects. The present is where Dasein 'falls' into everydayness and inauthenticity.

What makes this point of view an obstacle to the development of any theory of Mitsein is that relations with others seem, on the face of things, to be located precisely in the present. This is where the reality of such relationships lies, not in future- or past-directed departures from the present. As has been pointed out, however, the ordering of the 'moments' of temporality in Heidegger's theory is a different one. In the first place, Heidegger subordinates the present to the future and past; in the second place, he identifies the present as the component of temporality which appears most prominently in the analysis of inauthentic existence. This general disparity seems to work against Heidegger's chances of developing any theory of Mitsein that will extend beyond the bare acknowledgement of it as part of the essential structure of human existence.

In this light we may note the significant tendency of the few remarks that Heidegger does make concerning social existence in his chapter on Being-with-others, apart from his account of das Man. "Being-with-one-another," he writes, "is based first and foremost upon what is a matter of common concern in such Being."26 He goes on to contrast authentic and inauthentic ways in which several existing individuals may share a common concern for some aim or project. The difficulty for the reader...
at this point is the difficulty of seeing the real difference in the two alternatives as Heidegger formulates them. On the one hand, a Being-with-one-another which arises from one's pursuing the same thing (dass man dasselbe betreibt) leads to a relationship which is superficial, distant and reserved. Heidegger gives an example: those who are merely assigned (angestellt) to the same task are likely, if anything, to have a relationship of mistrust. "On the other hand, a common commitment (Sicheinszetzen) to this task is determined by the way in which each has taken hold of his own Dasein." And this is "authentic association." 17

One can see in these remarks what is a plausible necessary condition for authenticity in a human relationship; whether it constitutes a sufficient condition is another matter. As to the first point, Heidegger is trying to distinguish a real self-determination from a mere pursuing of some goal: whether his use of betreiben has further implications is unclear, for it is a term that seems to occur nowhere else in his existential analysis. At any rate, it may be agreed that a 'common concern' that arises only through external direction is very different from one that arises from the anticipatory resoluteness of each existing individual. And it may also be agreed that the first kind of sharing of goals can never be the basis for communication that reaches beyond the superficial aspects of the person. Yet this truth is a limited one. We are left in the dark as to the way in which the authentic commitment of each individual, taken by himself, to some goal or other, gives rise to a genuine
relationship. Nothing has been said, for example, about actual co-operation in the undertaking. And this is not accidental. For Heidegger makes no link between basic commitment to some goal and the actual business of finding ways and means for its attainment. To do that would presumably be to fall into the insincere way of conceiving the goal as something 'not yet present-at-hand.' Authenticity, on the other hand, involves a 'running-ahead' which constitutes an immediate relationship to the content of the project in question. Furthermore, this authentic anticipation grasps the project purely as possibility; indeed, it implies a special determination to avoid all conceptions which refer, directly or indirectly, to actuality. This again works against the kind of calculative thinking which gives rise to human co-operation.

The idea that Heidegger has of 'authentic association' as constituted by a common commitment on the part of each individual, taken singly, to some goal or other, thus does not go beyond the idea of, as it were, parallel projections. Even the geometrical metaphor, however, says too much: for parallel lines at least meet at infinity; but in Heidegger's schema of human existence there is no such thing as infinity.

We must conclude, then, that Heidegger's conception of existential temporality is a barrier to his development of any real theory of interpersonal relations. One might note, as an indirect confirmation of this criticism, that the theory of the interpersonal which is found in the writings of Martin Buber is based upon a quite different interpretation of temporality.
In I and Thou he writes: "The real, filled present exists only so far as actual presentness, meeting and relation exist. The present arises only in virtue of the fact that the Thou becomes present." To the I-Thou relation which is lived in the 'real, filled' present Buber contrasts the inauthentic I-It relation which, he says, is lived primarily in the past. "Put in another way, in so far as man rests satisfied with the things that he experiences and uses, he lives in the past, and his moment has no present content." In a later work entitled The Knowledge of Man, Buber employs the term 'making present' (Vergegenwärtigen) to express the authentic mode of one's relation to others. But this same term was, as we saw earlier (above, page 283), assimilated by Heidegger to the inauthentic form of temporality which, in turn, he associated with Dasein's absorption into the world of objects and its loss of its own character. It is, I think, clear enough that Buber is working with a quite different idea of temporality. It is an idea that has its own problems: for example, Buber is conspicuously silent on the topic of the future. His identification of objective being with the past is a thesis linked with a philosophical tradition other than that of existential thinking. It appears also in Sartre's Being and Nothingness, but there an explicit indication is given of its debt to the Hegelian formulation: Wesen ist was gewesen ist. But, most importantly, Huber's stress on the present ("true beings are lived in the present") points directly towards his affinity with mysticism - an affinity that arguably makes it impossible to classify him as an existential philosopher. The link
can be seen when one recalls the traditional conception of eternity as a present. (See, for example, the statements of Kierkegaard quoted earlier: above, page 282.) When Buber places authentic relationship in the present alone, he is, in effect, turning it into something essentially timeless.

So much for the difficulties that lie in reconciling Heidegger's theory of temporality with the task of giving an account of Being-with-others. There is another line of objection to his whole theory of Mitsein, however, which comes from a different direction. It raises the question to what extent Heidegger can really be said to recognise the existence of others at all. The 'they' is, as already noted, not to be taken as any actual being existing over and above the given Dasein: hence the invalidity of Georg Lukacs' complaint that Heidegger 'making myths, erects this word into an ontological existent.' The question now is whether Heidegger's use of the term 'other' is as much to be explained purely in terms of a certain condition of Dasein itself as is his use of 'das Man'. If it is, then this is surely a most damaging criticism of his theory as a theory of genuinely interpersonal relations.

We should recall here Heidegger's initial definition of 'the others': "By 'the others', we do not mean everyone else over and above myself, from whom I set myself apart; the others are rather those from whom one usually does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is too." Here we can see a connection between the notion of the 'other' and the whole theory of the 'they'. To fall into a tacit identification of oneself with the
anonymous 'they' is to fail to distinguish oneself from 'the others'. But the 'they' is not this or that person, or even any group of persons: it is the inauthentic self. Yet Heidegger also speaks of "Being-with-one-another in the 'they'" in a way that clearly does refer to a peculiar kind of relation between one existing individual and others. This must mean either that the specification of the 'they' as the inauthentic mode of Being of the self is not, after all, an adequate account of it, or else that Being-with-one-another is itself nothing more than a mode of Being of the self. It is, I think, unclear just which of these lines of interpretation corresponds to Heidegger's real meaning, because of the rather fragmentary character of his whole treatment of Mitsein. The first alternative would be the one retaining most of the usefulness of his theory of the 'they' to any investigations into social existence. The other would reinforce the label of 'solipsism' applied by Ryle to Heidegger's philosophy.

Something of this criticism is, perhaps, present in the discussion of Being-with-others that Sartre offers in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre has little trouble in showing how the Husserlian approach to the question of the 'other', an approach wholly geared to meeting the challenge of skepticism, fails to escape the predicament of solipsism. He goes on to praise the treatment of Mitsein in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit as one which recognises the ontological, and not merely epistemological, character of the whole question. Sartre summarises Heidegger's theory, stressing Heidegger's claim that Mitsein is part of the
essence of "human reality". "Henceforth the problem of the other is a false problem. The other is no longer first a particular existence which I encounter in the world - and which could not be indispensable to my own existence since I existed before encountering it." Yet it soon appears that Sartre finds this thesis unacceptable. He repeats his general criticism of Heidegger's distinction between the ontological and the ontic levels of analysis; and he applies it to the present case by claiming that a purely ontological account of Being-with-others leaves out the contingent factuality of the other's existence. "We encounter the other; we do not constitute him." In this, Sartre is really objecting to the transcendental mode of philosophy as it is present in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. Husserl, in his Cartesian Meditations, has no hesitation in saying that we 'constitute' the other in our own subjectivity, just as we 'constitute' all objects; though here the process is more complex and difficult to unravel. Heidegger does not use the terminology of 'constitution', yet insofar as his thinking moves within the problematic of transcendental philosophy, it seems reasonable to apply such expressions in considering his theories. Is it, now, reasonable to apply it to the theory of Mitsein in the way that Sartre does, if only by implication, in the words just quoted? It is, I think, possible to argue that this is a charge which is not justified by what Heidegger actually says in Sein und Zeit. He never derives characteristics of the other from characteristics of the given Dasein in the way he does with presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. Moreover, if he does omit any mention of the
contingent givenness of the other as encountered, this is because that is something that, according to his theory, finds its place in the area of ontic description. Sartre observes that the ontological theory of Mitsein "does not constitute the slightest proof of the other's existence;" but Heidegger would surely freely admit this. He actually states that Mitsein "is not an acquaintance arising out of knowledge, but a primordial existential mode of Being which, more than anything else, makes acquaintance and knowledge possible."

The difficulty that is involved in these problems is, I suggest, one that really lies in the existential rather than in the transcendental aspect of Heidegger's thinking. It is a problem that arises out of the existential isolation of Dasein as a being for whom its own Being is an issue, and for whom the Being of other entities does not appear to be an issue — at least not in this fundamental sense. The problem of interpersonal existence is one that has not been satisfactorily solved within the limits of existential philosophy. Others have made more conscious efforts to meet the challenge than Heidegger, but one cannot help feeling the justice of, for example, Marjorie Grene's pointed remark: "Both Jaspers and Marcel have introduced concepts of communication into existentialism, but in both cases the treatment is so vague and sentimental as to contribute little."

Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* is another matter. His treatment of Being-with-others is neither vague nor sentimental. Nor, however, is it Heideggerian. Instead, Sartre draws upon a
different source: Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, as presented in
The Phenomenology of Mind. His use of the dialectical method
of philosophising allows him here to develop a sequence of distinct
relationships, a basic typology of the sphere of the interpersonal.
However, to pursue such a path requires a basic opposition and
tension between related concepts, without which the dialectic
has neither its impulse nor its subject-matter. For Sartre this
is supplied by his contrast between the 'en-soi' and the 'pour-
soi'; for Hegel, it is the opposition between the universality
of the 'I' and the particularity of the other. "I see myself in
this other as an I, but I also see there an immediately existing
other object, which as an I is absolutely independent from me."46
Both Hegel and Sartre move on from this kind of starting-point
to the development of further relations. There is, however, one
important difference between the two. Sartre's dialectic is an
'open-ended' one in that he sees no resolution of the conflicts
inherent in being-with-others. Hegel, on the other hand, does
envision such a resolution; in the course of his dialectic, the
aspect of particularity comes to be aufgehoben, overcome and
relegated to a mere moment within "universal self-consciousness".47

It is somewhat ironic that in his later Critique de la
raison dialectique Sartre gives an interpretation of interpersonal
relations which is much more Heideggerian than that of the earlier
work. His contrast between the "series" and the "group" is very
similar to Heidegger's distinction between a merely external
association and one that arises out of a genuine 'common commit-
ment' to some project. Yet here too we find the use of a dialect-
ical method of development which is designed to overcome the inadequacies of Heidegger's basic outline as it stands. That some such additional move is needed does seem to follow from our discussion.
CHAPTER NINE

BEING—TOWARDS—DEATH
In this chapter we shall be looking closely at Heidegger's theory of 'Being-towards-death', in order to study both its coherence and its central place in his overall conception of human nature. The starting-point for this examination must be a clear recognition of the function of this theory in the context of Sein und Zeit. As the chapter on Being-towards-death appears in the work, it is directed towards meeting a specific problem raised by Heidegger's general theory of existence. The problem is that of grasping Dasein as a whole. It is even more than just a problem: it is a challenge, for Heidegger presents a line of argument at the outset of his discussion which seems to show the impossibility of any total view of Dasein. And in his eyes, that impossibility would, if it were a real one, imply our incapacity to gain any real grasp of Dasein at all.

That, briefly, is the context within which this whole discussion of Being-towards-death will be placed. Strangely, even though the point is clearly indicated in Heidegger's text, it has been missed by many commentators whose eagerness to press on into the substance of the doctrine has led them to ignore its wider function. The result is generally that they suppose Heidegger to have some other purpose in mind for stressing the importance of taking up a certain attitude towards one's own death; for the commentators seem to feel that they must, after all, supply some background or other. Having assumed that, they go on to offer suggestions far weaker and more arbitrary than anything to be found in Heidegger's own account.

A few examples will show what is meant. One case is
Walter Kaufmann's criticism of Heidegger in his article "Existentialism and Death".1 Kaufmann suggests that Heidegger is merely indulging a personal idiosyncracy in attaching crucial significance to the way in which the individual person regards the prospect of his own death. He hypothesises that this idiosyncracy may be explicable in terms of the influence of the Great War upon the generation to which Heidegger belongs. And he goes on to point out reprovingly that many members of that generation managed to overcome this gloomy influence and to attach a more 'healthy' attitude towards death.

Few commentators, it is true, fall into the trap of an ad hominem interpretation which is as clearly external to Heidegger's actual text as the one just mentioned. But many make an assumption that the aim of Heidegger's doctrine of Being-towards-death is to edify the reader of Sein und Zeit. This is at least defensible with reference to Heidegger's development of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of Being-towards-death. One can easily assume that his aim is to recommend the first to us and to condemn the second. Further, this interpretation fits Heidegger's own hint that he intends the content of the inquiry into existence to be appropriated by the existing individual who follows the inquiry through.2 If this requirement is applied specifically to the investigation of Being-towards-death, one arrives at the conclusion that Heidegger intends us to treat the question as a question about our own existence. That is, we must treat it not in any purely theoretical and detached manner, but rather in the existential attitude
which seizes upon the possibilities revealed in the inquiry and makes them truly one's own. Yet does this imply that Heidegger's purpose is didactic, that he is trying to edify, to exhort and direct the reader in certain directions? Such a conclusion would pass over some of the problematical aspects of Heidegger's philosophy, the questions raised earlier about the relation between the theory and the existential appropriation which transcends theory as such, or again about the distinction between direct and indirect modes of communication. As it happens, the interpreter who assumes that Heidegger is exhorting his readers soon falls into confusion, for he inevitably finds it hard to see that Heidegger's doctrines do effectively have such a function. Thus, for instance, we find A.J. Ayer, in an essay included in his collection *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, concluding that Heidegger's theory is a pervasively morbid one. After conceding that man cannot escape death, Ayer continues: "But why should it be his duty to dwell upon the prospect in guilt and Angst? It is not as if his life would thereby become more agreeable or useful. Quite the contrary."³

A rather similar viewpoint can be found in a 1935 essay of Bertrand Russell, which is entitled "Stoicism and Mental Health." Although Russell is writing in general terms and without any reference to the philosophy of Heidegger (then, as later, quite unknown to him), he expresses ideas which closely parallel Ayer's comments on the Heideggerian theory of Being-towards-death.⁴

It is a mistake to think too exclusively about any one subject, more particularly when our thinking cannot
issue in action... We cannot prevent ourselves from dying ultimately; this is, therefore, a profitless subject of meditation. Moreover, it tends to diminish a man's interest in other people and events, and it is only objective interests that can preserve mental health.

And, again:

... there is the same kind of objection to such absorption as to absorption in pornography, namely that it diminishes efficiency, prevents all-round development, and leads to conduct that is unsatisfactory both to the person concerned and to others.

For both of these thinkers, then, any granting of a central place in one's outlook to an attitude directed towards the prospect of one's own death must be harmful. For Ayer, it will make life less 'agreeable' and 'useful'. For Russell, it will draw one away from healthy 'objective interests', diminish one's social efficiency, and lead to unsatisfactory conduct of some unspecified kind. Clearly, some set of values is hard at work here; and I shall later in this chapter come to draw these out more explicitly. For the present I simply note that philosophers whose thinking involves a certain amount of sympathy for a somewhat untheoretical 'common sense' standpoint object to any attribution of utility to preoccupation with death.

Strange though it may seem, Heidegger has been defended on the same level as this objection: that is, on the criterion of utility. In his article "The Vitality of Death", Peter Koestenbaum argues unequivocally that thinking about death does indeed make the thinker's life more agreeable and useful. Typical of his treatment are these representative passages:
Once he has recognised and admitted the inevitability of his own death, the individual is on the way to becoming courageous, fearless and decisive. He abandons excuses and procrastinations. The thought of death enables man to laugh off vicissitudes and pains.

He will never indulge in self-pity. He will accept his fate stoically. He will face all human contingencies with calmness, cheerfulness, equanimity, and peace of mind. No situation that life offers will make him 'lose his mind'. Discouragement will have vanished from his vocabulary.

Koestenbaum sums up his thesis in these memorable words:

> The realisation of death leads automatically to what in the business world is called 'thinking big'.

It is important to notice that, although there is on one point a sharp opposition between this writer's judgements and the views of Ayer and Russell cited above, there are on other points wide areas of agreement. Firstly, both sides agree that the validity of Heidegger's doctrine is to be assessed primarily with reference to its utility or disutility in directing the concerns and activities of the thinker who takes up the attitude described by Heidegger as 'authentic'. Secondly, there is a fair measure of agreement on the nature of this utility. The Stoic virtues have a strong appeal to all of these thinkers, as is indeed explicitly indicated by two of the three. All would, one supposes, deprecate any indulgence in anxiety, especially in the kind that is not directed towards a specific object and geared to practical action. Healthy-mindedness, the active life, and a cheerful extravertedness make up their idea of the good life.

What is controversial is simply whether Heidegger's theory points
in this direction.

The temptation to lapse into a somewhat narrow instrumental interpretation is strong, even amongst those of Heidegger's readers who are able to realise that his concern is with the authentic human existence rather than with the agreeable and useful life. A.R. Manser, for example, links Being-towards-death with authenticity, but in the following way: "I take it that what Heidegger is trying to point out is that the kind of activity a man would cease indulging in because he knew he was going to die in a month's time would be for that man an inauthentic activity." These words seem to suggest that Being-towards-death functions as a useful instrument for testing the authenticity of this or that human activity in its relation to the individual's existence - that it is a yardstick to be brought out at suitable intervals and applied to the project in hand. In short, the idea is that of a device not too dissimilar in its function from R.M. Hare's 'principle of universalisability', though perhaps with a greater degree of grounding in a conception of human existence than Hare's principle.

One should note the special role in Manser's interpretation of the phrase "in a month's time". The quantitative factor implied in this presumably plays some part in the use of Being-towards-death as a criterion of authenticity. Yet, as I shall argue later in this chapter, the quantitative factor is just what is irrelevant and alien to Heidegger's theory of Being-towards-death, as it is to his whole theory of human existence. It is true, however, that this quantitative factor does appear in very
many of the dramatic or literary presentations of the theme of facing death. An example is Jean-Paul Sartre’s short story "The Wall", which explores the feelings of political prisoners under sentence of execution. Heidegger himself refers to what is the classic work of this kind, Tolstoy’s story "The Death of Ivan Ilyitch". However, what Heidegger remarks upon is Tolstoy’s presentation of the inauthentic attitude that we commonly adopt (as he sees it) towards the dying of others as "a social inconveni­ence, if not even a downright tactlessness, against which the public ought to be guarded." This is one important theme in Tolstoy’s story, but not the central one: that is rather Tolstoy’s very convincing portrayal of his protagonist's growing realisation of his own mortality. These are, of course, by no means separate topics. At any rate, it may simply be noted for the time being that Manser’s association of Being-towards-death with the imminence of death is an idea which finds echoes in much of what has been thought and written on the subject.

Leaving this aside for later treatment, we may return to a criticism of what Manser says which is aimed at his identif­ication of the attitude of Being-towards-death with some technique of evaluation of activities. What is wrong with this is that such a technique must be essentially a means which is distinct from the end sought, and again from the subject-matter to which it is applied. The same comment can be made on the more obviously utilitarian interpretations of Being-towards-death described earlier. The following discussion of Heidegger’s theory will be largely designed to bring out what is wrong in this
presupposition, to reveal its failure to grasp the unity of
Heidegger's conception of human existence and its inability to
grasp the integration of the theory of Being-towards-death in
that wider context. This is the basic source of the errors in the
comments cited above. It is the reason for their interpretation
of Heidegger's doctrine as either an arbitrary one which merely
reflects its author's idiosyncracies, or else a piece of thinking
that serves as a means to some other end, and so has primarily an
instrumental validity.

I have already said that the theory of Being-towards-
death is developed by Heidegger in response to a problem that
arises out of the theory of Dasein which he has previously
sketched out. Our discussion proper must start with this problem.

Division II of Sein und Zeit follows on Heidegger's
preliminary account of the ontological structures of Dasein. Now
one striking feature of this account, and indeed of the whole
work, is the tentativeness with which Heidegger sets out his
findings. To point this out is not to say that Heidegger does not
present identifiable claims and theses. He does; but he also
insists many times that what he says is merely provisional, and
that a deeper insight into the phenomena under discussion might
lead to a more or less drastic revision of his account of them.

It is not surprising, then, that Division II begins with the raising
of serious doubts as to the adequacy of what has gone before.
If integrity in a philosopher consists largely in the recognition
and explicit presentation of objections to his assertions, then
Heidegger can hardly be faulted on that score, at least in the
context under discussion. He does set out a strong objection to his whole enterprise of grasping the nature of human existence, and it is a closely argued objection - one that, at first sight, even seems conclusive.

One side of the objection springs from methodological grounds. It is the demand that a genuine understanding of Dasein must be an understanding which grasps it as a whole. What Heidegger finds unsatisfactory about much of his treatment so far is its analytic character. We are not here using this term in its unusual Kantian sense (see above, page 160) but rather in the more common sense in which it refers to a mode of thinking which differentiates and separates out the various aspects or components of the subject-matter. Insofar as one can infer methodological principles that are never stated as such, still less discussed, Heidegger appears to hold that while analysis - whether phenomenological or logical or linguistic presumably making no difference - is a necessary part of philosophical inquiry, it has an intrinsic limitation. It presents us only with various parts and differing aspects of what we are studying; it does not give us the whole phenomenon. And without a view of the whole, we cannot grasp the unity of the various aspects already distinguished. This general idea runs through the whole tradition of German idealism; presumably Heidegger thinks it a methodological requirement too obvious to require justification. In the present case, Heidegger has already set out a number of features of the ontological structure of human existence. But, he now states, it is not enough just to do this, even if the analysis
is adequately grounded in the subject-matter. We also need an explicit assurance that the whole of the "thematic being" has been brought into our sight. Furthermore, we need to see the unity of the various aspects of the phenomenon. "Only then can the question of the meaning of the unity which belongs to the whole being's wholeness of Being (Seinsganzheit) be posed and answered with phenomenal assurance."13

When Heidegger says, "we must see...", he does not mean simply, "we must think..." Just as the various aspects of Dasein were set out through a phenomenological study of 'the thing itself' rather than through any logical or linguistic analysis within the sphere of thought, so too the recovery of the whole is to be attained through an appropriate phenomenological insight. In other words, it is not any kind of logical synthesis that is wanted, nor even any hypothesis whose function is to unify and reconcile the several sides of Dasein described in Division I of Sein und Zeit. Interpretation in philosophy is, in Heidegger's view, identical with use of the phenomenological method. It is always based upon an apprehension of the object to be studied, gained through an 'uncovering' of phenomena ordinarily hidden and overlooked. Its task is to make explicit the already existing, but as yet unarticulated, structure of this phenomenon. Heidegger describes 'interpretation' in this sense as the "working-out and appropriation of an understanding."14 He adds:15

If interpretation becomes the explicit goal of an investigation, then the totality of these 'assumptions', which we call the 'hermeneutical situation', needs to
be clarified and secured in advance both in and on the basis of a basic experience of the 'object' to be disclosed.

As was pointed out earlier, this approach is Heidegger's employment of the phenomenological method in a way that parallels Husserl's characterisation of the method of philosophy as basically one of 'seeing'. Now if this point is brought together with the demand for a grasp of the phenomenon in its totality, the result is a demand for some experience or other that will reveal to us the totality of Dasein: for it is Dasein that is the subject-matter of this investigation. Having said this much, we have stated one side of the problem that Heidegger is now concerned with.

What is the other side? Simply that Dasein cannot be grasped as a whole in any experience that is open to the existing individual. This at least seems to follow from the general outline of existence already set out by Heidegger. That is, it seems that the nature of Dasein itself is such as to frustrate any attempt we may make to carry out the overall grasping demanded by the methodological principle described above. This comes about in the following way. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is a progressive elaboration of the implications of his initial definition of Dasein as a being whose Being "is an issue" for it. This was developed into the theory of existence as a kind of Being consisting in possibilities and potentialities for Being into which the existing individual 'projects' himself. To describe Dasein in this way is to describe it as something which is always "ahead of itself", or alternatively "beyond itself".16
But, Heidegger now points out, this implies that for Dasein there is always something still outstanding, something still to be settled. Such a situation ceases to be the case only when Dasein itself ceases, when it is annihilated. So there is a dilemma here. On the one hand, as long as Dasein does exist, it is impossible to grasp it as a whole, because at every stage there are still possibilities and potentialities which are 'an issue' for Dasein, which therefore remain to be settled in one way or another. On the other hand, if Dasein does gain its 'wholeness' — meaning a condition in which nothing is still outstanding — it does so only at the cost of its very Being. The conclusion seems to follow: "Any being whose essence is constituted by existence is essentially opposed to the possibility of grasping it as a whole being." This impossibility, Heidegger is careful to point out, is not of an epistemological kind. It "does not lie in a deficiency of our capacity for knowledge. The hindrance is located rather in the being of this being." The whole problem is, in other words, an ontological rather than an epistemological problem. This point reflects the general care that Heidegger takes to point out that his aim is to undertake an investigation into ontology rather than into the philosophy of mind or the theory of knowledge. But it equally reflects the degree to which (as with Kant) such inquiries are inter-related. One cannot grasp Dasein as a whole because there is no such whole; and the reason for that lies in the fundamental essence of Dasein itself.

Having summarised the antinomy (so to speak) of Dasein's wholeness in this way, Heidegger expresses doubts as to whether
the argument is really conclusive. Is there anything that has been overlooked that might provide a way out of this impasse? He hints that the argument may have been "merely formal", and again that it may have used concepts appropriate to things present-at-hand rather than appropriate to Dasein. What this suggestion seems to lead towards is a re-application of the phenomenological method, which may reveal some way of making Dasein accessible as a whole through some 'basic experience'.

Heidegger follows this renewed approach to the problem in a methodical way. First he looks at a plausible but, as is soon seen, inadequate solution, and then he moves into a re-examination of some of the basic terms involved in this problem. The notions of 'ending' and 'wholeness' are concepts which are applied to things other than Dasein; but Heidegger takes their application to such things to differ in important ways from their use in the existential context. Only after this latter meaning is explicited can a genuine solution to the problem be found. Before turning to that, let us look at the first attempt at a solution, an attempt that, in Heidegger's judgement, fails to supply a coherent and satisfactory answer.

The suggestion that he considers is this: it must be admitted that Dasein can never apprehend the wholeness that it attains in ceasing-to-be; yet it can surely apprehend this "transition" (Ubergang) as it takes place in others. Indeed, Heidegger adds, this fact gives the experience of death an 'objective' status that it would not otherwise have had. He further adds several remarks on the notion of the death of the other:
In the dying of the other we can experience the remarkable phenomenon of Being which may be defined as the change-over of a being from Dasein's kind of Being (or life) to no-longer-Dasein. The end of the entity qua Dasein is the beginning of this being qua something present-at-hand.

These are puzzling remarks. For it is hard to see just what it is that in the death of the other passes from having Dasein as its mode of Being to having presence-at-hand. Is it the person? A person might well be said to have Dasein as his kind of Being while alive — indeed, this is what fits Heidegger's whole theory. But it is surely very odd to say that a person is 'present-at-hand' when he has died. Alternatively, is it the human body that is the 'being' referred to in the passage quoted? Heidegger himself seems to suggest this when he states that the Being of someone who has died is the "presence-at-hand-and-nothing-more of a bodily thing which we encounter." But now the converse difficulty arises. Granted that a corpse is something present-at-hand, is a living person simply a body that currently enjoys a certain kind of Being, namely Dasein? This is an intriguing suggestion, because it hints at an Aristotelian approach to the philosophy of the person — an approach, however, which could hardly be further from the existential approach. In Heidegger's historical view of philosophy, Aristotle appears as one of the key figures in what Heidegger sees as the mistaken turn taken by Greek thought: the mistake consisting precisely in the indiscriminate application of the categories of the realm of nature to beings of a very different kind. In any case, as already remarked, Heidegger shows little interest in or appreciation of
the general problems of embodiment.

It soon appears, however, that the assertions of the passage quoted are not, after all, to be identified as Heidegger's own. For he goes on to point out the differences between what may be said to be present-at-hand after the death of the other and what is present-at-hand in ordinary cases. It is not, after all, a "mere bodily thing": it is not "lifeless" but rather "unalive" (Unlebendiges): that is, something which has lost its life. But even this does not fully express the 'phenomenal content' of the phenomenon in question. We must take note of the concern which human beings have for the dead person, as manifested in mourning and commemoration. Heidegger calls this a "respectful solicitude" which is really a mode of Being-with.23 In other words we are still in some sense with the other, even though this other is no longer in the world.

In making these observations, Heidegger has been trying to bring out some of the content of the phenomenon which is precisely the relationship that we may have with the death of the other. This relationship was, of course, not brought to our attention in an arbitrary way: it was pointed to as a suggested source for an apprehension of the ending of Dasein - and, as a consequence, an apprehension of the wholeness of Dasein. It now appears that this has not been attained. For, as Heidegger writes:24

The more appropriately we grasp the phenomenon of the no-longer-Dasein of the deceased, the more plainly is it shown that such Being-with the dead is precisely what
does not experience the genuine having-come-to-an-end of the deceased. Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but more as a loss that those who remain experience. In suffering this loss, however, we gain no access to the loss of Being as such which the dying person 'suffers'. We do not experience, in the genuine sense, the death of the other; we are never more than 'alongside' at the most.

What Heidegger is saying here - and it is a point of the greatest importance - is that there is a sharp difference between the death of the other as it is for him and as it is for me. For me it is a transition, albeit of a more complex kind than the becoming merely present-at-hand of something formerly living. For the other it is not a transition, but an ending. (Considerations of immortality, it should be pointed out, are quite irrelevant to this analysis: on the one hand, a belief in the resurrection of the dead does not imply any doubt of the reality of death itself - on the contrary, it assumes this. On the other hand, a view like Plato's, which does deny the reality of death as an ending, does not seem to be grounded in phenomenological insight into what is actually experienced, but rather in certain philosophical arguments which are designed precisely to refute phenomenally-based opinion.)

I cannot, then, appreciate the meaning of death merely by experiencing the death of, say, my neighbour Christopherson. For his death cannot possibly mean to me what it means to him. Heidegger sees the error here as an opinion "that any Dasein can be arbitrarily substituted for any other, so that what remains unexperiencable in one's own Dasein may become accessible in an
alien Dasein.”

Death is something uniquely individual. “No one can take the other's dying away from him.”

This last statement has been seized upon by many of Heidegger's critics as an indication that he takes dying to be the only human possibility which cannot be shared with others, which is inalienably the 'property' of the existing individual. Thus, for example, Marjorie Grene: "It is only a man's death, Heidegger says, which is irreplaceably his own, which is not interchangeable with the experience of others." It is not surprising to find many of those who attribute this view to Heidegger voicing strong dissent. Two cases, drawn from rather different sources, will suffice to illustrate this. The first is from A.J. Ayer. Ayer summarises the Heideggerian theory of Being-towards-death in the following way: "The significance of death is that it is the most personal of our possibilities - the least exchangeable, in the sense that no one else can die for me: he can die in my place, but he cannot die my death. I have to die my own." So far this is, I think, an accurate account of what Heidegger is saying. Ayer goes on: "But equally no one else can smile my smile, or cry my tears, or even suffer from my cold (he can catch my cold of course but the one he has then is not mine but his... ). There is nothing, therefore, peculiar about death in this respect." Side-by-side with this passage we may set the following passage from Jean-Paul Sartre:

In the first place it is perfectly gratuitous to say that 'to die is the only thing which nobody can do
Or rather there is an evident bad faith in the reasoning: if one considers death as the ultimate subjective possibility, the event which concerns only the for-itself, then it is evident that nobody can die for me. But then it follows that none of my possibilities taken from this point of view... can be projected by anyone other than me. Nobody can love for me — if we mean by that to make vows which are my vows, to experience the emotions... which are my emotions. And the 'my' here has nothing to do with a personality won by overcoming everyday banality...; it refers simply to that selfness which Heidegger explicitly recognizes in every Dasein.

It is not strange to find a general rejection of the idea that it is only death that can be said to be an existential possibility that cannot be shared with others; what is surprising is to find this idea attributed to Heidegger. One interpreter writes, of the existing individual: "All of his other possibilities can in some sense be duplicated... by others." But does not this make nonsense of Heidegger's whole theory of the uniqueness of existence? Heidegger does indeed write: "Death is, in so far as it 'is', essentially in each case my own." But he says exactly the same thing about Dasein as such; that is, about Dasein generally. I cannot see how it can be compatible with this to suppose that merely one of the (presumably very many) possibilities which are open to Dasein has this character of 'mineness'. Furthermore, Heidegger never says that it is only Being-towards-death that is an inalienable possibility for Dasein; nor can this reasonably be inferred in any direct way from anything that he does say. How, then, one may wonder, could his readers have supposed him to be making this so patently unsatisfactory claim? To this question there is no unambiguous answer: perhaps, though, some hint may emerge in what follows.
From another point of view, might it be possible to mount a criticism of Heidegger's refusal to allow one any genuine experience of the other? Though it is not aimed at rebutting the viewpoint of Heidegger, such a counter-position is set out in an impressive way in a work by the writer P.-L. Landsberg published in 1933 and entitled *L'Expérience de la Mort*.33 Landsberg argues that in certain cases, the death of the other does give us a direct experience of the meaning of death. Where the other is a friend, the uniqueness of the person is disclosed to us. At his death, we experience what Landsberg calls an awareness of the mysterious absence of the person as spirit—the irrevocable loss of a unique being. Like Heidegger, Landsberg takes it that religious doctrines which assert this absence to be merely temporary are irrelevant to the character of the actual experience under consideration.

Landsberg's claim is a strong one in that he argues that this special case of experiencing the death of the other involves apprehension of the necessity of death. Personal love creates a community through which we share in, and ourselves experience, the other's mortality—and are thus aware of our own. He does specify, however, that the necessity that we sense here is not a universal one. Rather, it relates primarily to those we love and to ourselves, and only obscurely to others. What generality it has is symbolic rather than literal: as if the other is 'Every-man', representing all human beings. Again, it must be noted that Landsberg presents the experience he is bringing forward as essentially independent of the feelings that may accompany it.
For he takes it that such feelings as pity are directed towards dying, rather than towards death as such. Summing up, then: 34

Consciousness of the necessity of death awakens only through participation, through the personal love with which this experience is completely imbued. We have constituted an 'us' with the dying person. And it is in this 'us', it is through the power peculiar to this new personal order of Being, that we are led the lived awareness of our own having to die.

It is, of course, Heidegger's incapacity to develop a real theory of the interpersonal sphere of existence that rules out the possibility of his following any line of thinking at all comparable to that of Landsberg - and, furthermore, that leads him in exactly the opposite direction, as seen in our description of his dismissal of this solution to the problem of grasping the ending of Dasein.

Let us continue to trace the course of Heidegger's arguments. After dismissing the suggested solution to the problem just discussed, he turns to a review of the basic concepts used in the original posing of the problem, hoping to find in this examination some opportunity to escape from the impasse reached so far. The concepts to be examined are, first and foremost, those of totality and of the end of something; the task is to elucidate the senses that these notions have in the context of existence. Here Heidegger begins by contrasting the 'not-yet' of Dasein - the characteristic involved in the fact that there is always something still outstanding for it - with the corresponding conception that operates within the sphere of presence-at-hand. He finds an
immediate and obvious difference. With ordinary things that we attach such expressions as 'incomplete' to, it is implied that the completion of the thing will give it a thoroughgoing 'togetherness' (Zusammen). But this is not so with Dasein. "That Dasein should be together only when its 'not-yet' has been filled up is so far from the case that it is precisely then that Dasein is no longer." \(^\text{35}\) The completion of Dasein is not a matter of adding on this or that component to Dasein in its incomplete state. In ordinary cases of that sort, what is missing nevertheless exists somewhere in the world - and exists having the same kind of Being as the incomplete being in question. None of this can apply to Dasein.

Heidegger considers a more plausible model: one, in fact, which he says is "formally analogous" to Dasein. \(^\text{36}\) It is the example of the ripening of a fruit: a process of completion whose source lies in the essential nature of the fruit itself, not in some external agency. What is 'outstanding' for the ripening fruit is not something that is already present in the world, and only stands outside and apart from the fruit. In these points we find an analogy with the case of Dasein. However, on other points we find essential differences. The main one is important as revealing a difference between the notion of existential possibility and the somewhat Aristotelian notion of potentiality that Heidegger is using in his description of the 'ripening fruit'. The difference is that the ripe fruit has 'used up' its specific possibilities; Dasein, on the other hand, is simply deprived of its possibilities by its ending. To say
that Dasein 'comes to its ripeness' with death is simply false, in Heidegger's view. On the one hand, he replies, it may have passed its mature stage before the end; on the other, it may not have attained maturity at all.37

Implicit in these remarks is, I suggest, a rebuttal of the traditional Epicurean-Stoic doctrine concerning death. Epictetus, indeed, likened death to the falling of a ripe fruit from the tree, thus using the same image as that used by Heidegger in the passage just discussed. The purpose of the doctrines of thinkers like Epictetus was primarily the practical one of therapeia: to counteract the fear of death by presenting death as a natural process to be faced with equanimity. Some such view seems to be perennially persistent — it reappears, for example, in the article by Bertrand Russell cited at the beginning of the present chapter. Russell too has his homely metaphor: "It is important to prevent any sense of mystery about death. It should be brought into the same category with the wearing out of toys."38 In all fairness, I hasten to add that Russell is speaking here of the explanations that parents should give to children concerning deaths; and yet one cannot help feeling that his advice to adults (as exemplified in the earlier quotations — see above, pages 310-311) would not be, in its essence, very different from this. As to the model of the 'ripe fruit', the rebuttal of Heidegger is, I think, effective. That death coincides with the attainment of 'ripeness' is a pious hope, or else a comforting myth. To this might be added a rebuttal of another idea which also springs from the classical tradition: the idea of
the 'noble death'. Heidegger does not mention this, but one of the commentators on his theory of Being-towards-death, J.C. Gray, does - and, indeed, supposed that this is what Heidegger is defending. He writes:39

Many a fairly routine and uninteresting life has become memorable for us through the manner and choice of its ending. In this sense Heidegger is right in speaking of death as the most extreme possibility within the human career.

This idea is not, in fact, Heidegger's, as will soon appear; but in any case, it is surely a weak reed to rely upon in taking up an attitude towards the prospect of one's own death. It ignores the fact that death is, for finite human beings, possible at any time. One needs a certain amount of notice to prepare a noble pose or to formulate memorable 'last words'. And supposing, for example, that a man is in a position to do this - while awaiting execution, say - can one guarantee that he will not trip and fall fatally while ascending the scaffold, thus wasting an eloquent speech? It is hardly necessary to detail the various other considerations that point out the basic futility of this general approach to human mortality. Furthermore, it seems certain, extrapolating from comments he makes on the 'ripe fruit' model, that Heidegger would reject this idea as unequivocally as the other.

Heidegger concludes from his examination of the notion of totality that it is simply wrong to take the ending of Dasein as a fulfilment. This, he comments, makes it all the more important to look into the sense that 'ending' has here; and it is
this notion that assumes central importance in his discussion. This time he does not describe the senses of 'ending' applicable to things present-at-hand in any detail, but almost immediately states that none of these senses can be the one that applies to Dasein. Just as Dasein's ending is not a 'fulfilment, so too it is not a 'disappearance', to use the term that commonly expresses the ending of things that are present-at-hand. Heidegger writes:40

On the contrary, just as Dasein constantly is already its not-yet, as long as it is, so too it always is already its end. The ending implied with death does not signify a Being-at-an-end of Dasein, but rather a Being-towards-the-end of this being. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. 'As soon as a man comes into life, he is at once old enough to die.'

This is the key to Heidegger's whole theory of Being-towards-death. Dasein is constituted by its possibilities; thus its 'ending' must be grasped as a possibility; and to do this is to think of it not as an event (which is what Heidegger means when he speaks of 'Being-at-an-end') but rather as the 'Being-towards-the-end' just mentioned. And this is precisely Being-towards-death. We have now to see what it amounts to. What is the difference between this possibility and the others that make up Dasein's Being? Heidegger specifies, in a very concentrated passage, three characteristics which, he claims, single out this possibility as unique amongst the possibilities of Dasein. (Here I do not follow his ordering.) Firstly, this possibility is, in Heidegger's terminology, 'not to be outstripped' (nichtuberholbare).41
This means that it sets a limit beyond which one cannot project further possibilities. It reveals, one might say, the finitude of the future-directed aspect of human existence. In fact, if Heidegger’s basic conceptions throughout Sein und Zeit are, on the one hand, the essential finitude of Dasein, and on the other, the notion of existence, existential possibility and temporality, then what we have here is simply the uniting of these sides of Heidegger’s theory of human nature into a single conception.

The next aspect of Being-towards-death we should note is its 'non-relational' (unbezügliche) character. The other possibilities that Dasein has seem all to involve relations either to objects in the world, whether present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, or else to other existing individuals. Being-towards-death has no such relations. In it one stands before the prospect of the loss of one’s own Being: what is an issue here is therefore something to which all relations to external things are irrelevant in any direct sense.

The third characteristic that Heidegger ascribes to Being-towards-death is somewhat harder to elucidate. He states that this is Dasein’s 'ownmost' (eigensten) possibility. On the face of it, this is distinctly disconcerting: are there, one wonders, degrees to which possibilities are one’s own? If so, what becomes of the whole theory of the 'mineness' of Dasein? And might not such speculation be the source of the belief of several of Heidegger’s interpreters set out earlier in this chapter: the belief that he holds Being-towards-death to be the only possibility that is truly one’s own?
What Heidegger actually says is this: "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. In this possibility the issue for Dasein is precisely its Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there (Nicht-mehr-dasein-können)." What is being indicated here is, it seems to me, the encompassing character of Being-towards-death: the fact that it takes in, as it were, the whole range of Dasein's possibilities. To this exegesis I would add a tentative interpretation of the threefold nature of Heidegger's analysis of Being-towards-death in terms of a possibility which is "the ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped possibility." As I have said, that death is 'not to be outstripped' indicates the impossibility of projecting further possibilities beyond it. (This presumably being an impossibility attaching to no other existential possibility.) Next, the 'non-relational' character of death seems to refer in a direct way to what is involved in this loss of one's own being. Now these may be seen as quasi-temporal perspectives, which as such need to be complemented by a third factor, this time dealing with what lies on 'this side' of death: that is, with the possibilities that Dasein has before its death, or up to its death. But is not this the same as dealing with all of Dasein's possibilities as such? This suggestion, that we are here dealing with an encompassing overview of all of Dasein's possibilities which lie within the limit of its ending, may perhaps explain why the word 'ownmost' is used by Heidegger here. Of course, it must be admitted that the totality of one's possibilities is, in a strict sense, no more
one's own than any given single existential possibility; and yet in a slightly looser sense the label does seem appropriate enough. If the general line of interpretation just suggested is correct, then we are able to see both why the commentators have made the error touched upon earlier, and how a closer examination shows Heidegger's terminology to have an intelligible sense which escapes this common objection to his theory of Being-towards-death.

All of these characteristics of Being-towards-death are taken by Heidegger to point out its special place amongst the possibilities of Being that are open to Dasein; for each of them involves something which is peculiar to this one possibility, and which cannot be attributed to any other possibility. These factors constitute the formal structure of Being-towards-death.

Heidegger now moves on to a description of the everyday attitude towards death. His description draws on the theory of the 'they' already laid down. The 'they' imposes an impersonal, anonymous character upon Dasein's potentialities; and the present case is no exception — on the contrary, because of its status as the possibility which embodies the very nature of existential possibility most unambiguously, the 'they' is hardest at work here. Heidegger says that in the public sphere of das Man, death is taken as a "case of death" (Todesfall), a "familiar event" which is continually occurring throughout the world. In this everyday mode of existence we say "one dies" ('man stirbt') — and in saying this we are not talking about ourselves at all: "for this 'one' is the 'no-one'." Death is certainly acknowledged, but as something that happens to no-one in particular. Instead of being
recognised as something which is essentially 'my own' in each case, it is turned into something public, prevalent and impersonal. (It is at this point that Heidegger refers to Tolstoy's story, in whose opening pages this observation is presented very clearly.)

"This kind of talking speaks of death as a constantly occurring 'case'. It gives it out as something that is always already 'actual', and conceals its character of possibility, together with the associated moments of being non-relational and not to be outstripped." The adoption of an authentic attitude towards death, one that does recognise these factors, is discouraged. "The 'they' does not allow the courage for anxiety in the face of death to arise." Anxiety is the appropriate response to the prospect of one's own death, since anxiety has as its object precisely the lack of being that is in question here. "The 'they' concerns itself with transforming this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event." It then counteracts this fear by passing it off as a mere weakness on the part of the existing individual, to be eliminated through the adoption of a suitably lofty indifference towards death.

What is at stake here is the difference between thinking of death as an event and thinking of Being-towards-death as a possibility which Dasein projects before itself. In Heidegger's view, the only way of thinking about death which is strictly appropriate to the kind of being that the individual engaged in existing is, is one which recasts the concept into terms of possibility. To understand the word 'death' in this way is to shift away from ordinary usage, for there can be no doubt
that in ordinary usage 'death' is one thing and 'the prospect of death' is another. This point will be returned to shortly.

Heidegger breaks off his discussion of the everyday attitude towards death to treat the specific topic of the certainty of death. The everyday admission that 'one dies', he says, does acknowledge the certainty of death: but in what way? Is this a certainty of the genuine kind? Heidegger's answer is that it is not. "To be certain of a being," he writes, "means to hold it for true as something true." It implies making an effort to uncover the phenomenon in question: Heidegger takes it that what is primary here is the characterisation of Dasein as 'Being-certain', and that the attribution of certainty to the object of knowledge is derivative from this basic sense of 'certainty'. In this sense, everyday Dasein is not at all certain of death, for it has covered over the true phenomenon of Being-towards-death as a uniquely individual possibility.

But, one might object, is not human mortality as certain on empirical grounds as any other universally confirmed fact about the course of the world? Heidegger's answer to this objection is uncompromising: "Taken strictly, a certainty which is 'only' empirical may be attributed to death. Such certainty necessarily falls short of the highest certainty, the apodictic, which we attain in certain domains of theoretical knowledge." But his real point is not exactly this one, which merely contrasts inductive certainty with that of certain unspecified disciplines of a purely theoretical order - perhaps mathematics, or alternatively, the phenomenologically grounded regional ontologies of Husserl.
It is rather a point which strongly recalls the Kierkegaardian definition of truth as subjectivity. For Heidegger is here talking about appropriation in precisely the sense of Kierkegaard; and this link is reinforced by the connection that Heidegger makes between the subjective certainty of death and its objective uncertainty. He writes: "Together with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its 'when'." The fact that death is possible at any time is covered up by the everyday acknowledgement of death as something that occurs only 'sometime later'. Now this same point is made clearly by Kierkegaard in the Postscript: "The elusiveness of the infinite now expresses itself through the possibility of death at any moment. All positive security is thus rendered suspect. If I am not aware of this in every moment, my positive confidence in life becomes mere childishness, in spite of its having become speculative." This objective uncertainty of death makes the need to appropriate its possibility inwardly all the more pressing: in other words, there seems to be a kind of inverse proportionality between the two factors. And in the few remarks of Heidegger just cited we can see something very similar.

To follow up this parallel, we may briefly look further at what Kierkegaard has to say on this subject later in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. As might be expected, his target is the speculative viewpoint which sees the phenomenon of death sub specie aeternitatis. Yet he also makes some pointed remarks about an everyday worldly familiarity with death as a common occurrence. For all this knowledge, he says, it is still
possible that I have "forgotten to understand what will some time happen to me as to every human being - sometime, say, what am I saying: suppose death were so treacherous as to come tomorrow."53

Just this single uncertainty, "when it is to be understood and held fast by an existing individual," is sufficient to change his whole attitude towards death. Like Heidegger, Kierkegaard takes the uncertainty of death to be something that is glossed over and forgotten in everyday social life. If it is ostensibly recognized, it is recognized only as a generality, and not in its application to each existing individual. And yet if the certainty of death were merely a generality, this would make one's death itself merely something in general: as in the case of Herr Soldin (see above, page 216). "But the fact of my own death is not for me by any means such a something in general, although for others, the fact of my death may indeed be something of that sort. Nor am I for myself such a something in general, although perhaps for others I may be a mere generality. But if the task of life is to become subjective, then every subject will for himself become the very opposite of such a something in general."54

In Heideggerian terminology, this is just the process of freeing oneself from the domination of das Man. Kierkegaard's way of pursuing this idea in the context of the problem of one's own death is equally evocative of Heidegger's treatment. Like Heidegger, Kierkegaard poses a problem: how can one grasp the possibility of death while one is still a living being? Can one experience death "in an anticipatory conception"? If, on the contrary, "its only Being is its actual Being", then death cannot
possibly be apprehended at all, for "the actual Being of death is a non-Being." Tantalisingly, Kierkegaard leaves this whole question open. "I must confess I am very far indeed from having understood it... And yet I have thought about this subject again and again; I have sought for guidance in books - and I have found none." Yet it is clear enough that Kierkegaard does believe in the possibility of this 'anticipatory conception' of death which tears us away from the inauthentic passing-off of death as merely 'something in general'.

Oddly, Heidegger does not allude to Kierkegaard in his chapter on Being-towards-death, despite the close resemblance that we have just seen between the approaches of these two existential thinkers to the topic. He does, however, indicate Jaspers' Psychologie der Weltanschauungen as a source of the themes treated in this chapter. And Jaspers' account of death as a 'limit-situation' (Grenzsituation) has strong Kierkegaardian overtones. Jaspers stipulates that the relation I have to my own death is quite different from all relations to the death of the other, of the neighbour. It has a "total character" that makes it something quite unique, comparable only to the non-Being of the world generally. Again, "our general knowledge about death and our lived relation to death are quite heterogeneous things." And so on: Jaspers gives a lengthy historical survey of the ideas of various philosophers on the subject of death, concluding, significantly enough, with Kierkegaard, and with an extended quotation from the section of the Postscript discussed above.

Let us now return to Heidegger. So far we have seen
his development of the theory of Being-towards-death from the initial problem of the wholeness of Dasein. We have, in fact, reached the point where Heidegger is prepared to claim that he has solved the original antinomy by showing it to have been conceived on the basis of an ontologically inappropriate idea of what it means for Dasein to be constantly 'ahead-of-itself'. Understood in an existentially appropriate way, this 'ahead-of-itself' does not rule out Dasein's capacity to grasp its own ending. Quite the opposite: it is precisely what makes a 'Being-towards-the-end' possible.60

Further elucidatory comments of some interest are added by Heidegger. These are designed to fill out the idea of an authentic Being-towards-death. Firstly, he emphasises that Being-towards-death is Being towards a possibility. "Obviously, the Being-towards-death that is in question cannot have the character of a concernful Being-out-for its actualisation."61 Kierkegaard put the point more wittily: the existing individual "cannot experimentally come near enough without comically sacrificing himself upon the altar of his own experiment."62 Obviously, to apprehend death by bringing it about is a self-defeating move. Nor, more importantly, is this apprehension anything like a brooding over death as a possibility which will be actualised: that is, as an actuality which is on its way. (And here the quantitative factor mentioned earlier is likely to enter in, in order to dramatise this 'on its way': 'in a month's time', and the like.) Here Heidegger makes the remarks quoted earlier (above, pages 190-191, 263): Being-towards death must be grasped as a
possibility in a way that resists all temptations to introduce elements of actuality into it. The attitude towards death that consists in waiting for it involves just such an interpolation, and so effectively destroys the authentic character of Being-towards-death as a possibility. The true grasping of this possibility as possibility lies in anticipation (or 'running-ahead' - Vorlaufm). And Dasein is something "whose kind of Being is running-ahead itself." When it grasps Being-towards-death as a possibility, Dasein runs ahead to its limit; and this, as I suggested before, is seen by Heidegger as a process that encompasses the whole range of possibilities that constitute Dasein's Being. This way of looking at what he is saying enables us to understand his conclusion that for Dasein, "to project itself into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being means being able to understand itself in the Being of the being thus revealed, that is, to exist." Authentic Being-towards-death is thus identified by Heidegger with authenticity itself. For what is grasped and appropriated here is Dasein as a whole; and that was, of course, precisely the problem set initially.

The various aspects of Being-towards-death already distinguished are reviewed by Heidegger with this new perspective in mind: that is, with reference to the contribution that each one makes to the grasp of authentic existence that is gained through Being-towards-death. That this possibility is the 'ownmost' possibility of Dasein means that it indicates that Dasein's whole Being is an issue for it. Its 'non-relational' character, as Heidegger explains it, "individualises Dasein down to itself."
It allows Dasein to realize that in its fundamental essence it is unrelated to others - although, as said before, it can still be 'with' others afterwards (see above, page 292). Again, the fact that this possibility is 'not to be outstripped' enables Dasein to grasp its essential finitude. "Running-ahead discloses to existence that its furthest possibility means giving itself up, and thus shatters all tenaciousness to the existence that one has attained."66

This last assertion is curiously reminiscent of an observation of Hegel on the fear of death. This occurs in the Phenomenology of Mind, in the course of Hegel's account of the life-and-death struggle for recognition between one self-consciousness and another. Hegel attaches great importance to the experience of fear of death that arises from this struggle. He says: "For this consciousness was in dread (Angst) not about this or that thing, nor for this or that moment, but for its whole Being; for it felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that experience it became inwardly unbound, it shuddered throughout its self, and everything fixed shook within it. This pure overall turmoil, this absolute dissolving of all stability, is just the simple essence of self-consciousness..."67 This striking passage has been described by one critic as "more poetically impressionistic than philosophically impressive, more of a metaphor than an argument."68 Yet there is an argument in what Hegel says here, and it is one that provides an interesting analogue to the Heideggerian treatment of Being-towards-death.

Hegel is indicating the fear of death as an experience
which, because its object is one's whole Being, and not any mere particular component part, is unique in its power to force upon the individual a recognition of his true relation to the natural world, and to disallow his everyday absorption in this sphere. This, however, is just what Heidegger is saying about Being-towards-death. Of course, there are vital differences between the contexts within which the two thinkers locate this argument. To Heidegger, anxiety in the face of death is a recognition of the essential finitude of human existence. To Hegel, however, what is essential in the human being is not finite; and the break with natural Being that is enforced by fear in the face of death is the first step towards the subject's realisation of this truth. (As he ingeniously says, 'the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom'.) When Heidegger speaks of the shattering of 'all tenaciousness to the existence that one has attained', what he seems to mean is that running-ahead to the limit somehow throws light upon the whole range of possibilities encompassed within this limit. Thus it "includes the possibility of an existentialall taking up of the whole Dasein in advance: that is, the possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being."  

Finally, Heidegger has something more to say about the closely related characteristics of certainty and indefiniteness. Once again he stresses the difference between the certainty that is in question here and the various kinds and degrees of certainty that we speak of in connection with our knowledge about things that are present-at-hand. This certainty is a more fundamental kind than either empirical certainty or even that of mathematics.
or logic. Again, the reason lies in the general scope of its reference to the whole of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, which provides the framework within which other kinds of certainty can take place. On the indefiniteness of Being-towards-death, Heidegger emphasises the necessity and appropriateness of anxiety as the state of mind which expresses the confrontation with the prospect of loss of Being. "Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety." 

A number of the points made in this exposition should be commented on further: we may do this by looking at one critic's arguments against Heidegger's doctrine of Being-towards-death, and seeing their failure to grasp the structure of this doctrine. The following passage is taken from Mary Warnock's Book Existentialist Ethics:

First of all, one may think that one has no choice but to launch oneself towards death, in any case... And if launching oneself towards death means living in the knowledge that one must die, then we all of us necessarily do this anyway. Further, it may be urged, it is a well-known absurdity to treat death as an event in one's life, still more as an event to be looked forward to as revealing oneself in this way.

There are three lines of criticism here; and all three, it seems to me, are mistaken. Let us look at them in order. Firstly, it is argued that we must necessarily 'launch ourselves' towards death: this is, in other words, not a special act arising from anticipatory resoluteness. In reply one need only remark that Heidegger himself would endorse this statement fully. It is indeed the case that each Dasein necessarily has Being-towards-death.
as something implicit in its very essence: the question is,
though, how it has Being-towards-death - whether it has it in an
authentic or an inauthentic way. Being-towards-death itself is
'neutral' as to these possibilities. The important point to
grasp, however, is that the individual whose attitude towards
the prospect of death is that of the 'they', which presents death
as merely a general 'case', is just as much a form of 'launching
oneself towards death' as the attitude of authentic Being-towards-
death. And this, I think, deprives the objection of its
intended force.

Secondly, it is suggested that we all necessarily know
that we must die in any case. A rather similar reply is
appropriate here. We are indeed 'certain' (to use Heidegger's way
of expressing this aspect of the problem) of our mortality: again,
however, the question is left open whether this is an authentic
certainty, a certainty lying in the individual's appropriation
of the truth that confronts him - or whether, on the other hand,
it is a token acknowledgement of a merely verbal kind. In the
story by Tolstoy already referred to several times we can find
a very accurate presentation of the distinction under discussion
here: 71

The syllogism he had learnt from Kiesewetter's Logic:
'Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is
mortal,' had always seemed to him correct as applied
to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself. That
Caius - man in the abstract - was mortal, was perfectly
correct, but he was not Caius, not an abstract man, but
a creature quite, quite separate from all others.

"If I had to die like Caius I should have known it..."
was so. An inner voice would have told me so, but there was nothing of the sort in me and I and all my friends felt that our case was quite different from that of Caius. And now here it is!" he said to himself. "It can't be. It's impossible! But here it is. How is this? How is one to understand it?"

Heidegger would presumably comment that the syllogistic proof is indeed incapable of giving the individual a genuine certainty of his own mortality. On this level, it must remain a merely theoretical piece of knowledge. Perhaps the 'inner voice' corresponds to the inner appropriation which is what constitutes an authentic certainty in Heidegger's sense. At any rate, the simple statement that we all know in every instance that we are mortal is inadequate as a rebuttal of Heidegger's theory.

This brings us to the third and last of the criticisms present in the quoted passage. This is, perhaps, the most instructive of the three. 'It is a well-known absurdity to treat death as an event in one's life, still more as an event to be looked forward to as revealing oneself in this way.' Heidegger, on the other hand, says: "Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life."72 There does seem, on the face of it, to be a conflict here; but we must look more closely.

The 'absurdity' of treating death as an event in one's life is certainly a well-known one, in that it has been a staple of philosophical thinkers from the Stoics onward. The standard Stoic or Epicurean line of thought is expressed in this well-known passage from Epicurus:73

So death, the most terrifying of all ills, is nothing
to us, since so long as we exist death is not with us, but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living, or the dead, since the former it is not, and the latter are no more.

Kant writes in his *Anthropology*:

No man can experience dying in himself, since having any experience involves living; rather one can observe dying only in others... The natural fear that all men, whether the unhappiest or even the wisest, have in the face of death, is thus not a fear in the face of dying, but rather, as Montaigne rightly says, in the face of the prospect of having died, i.e. being dead... (but) the thought 'I am not' cannot possibly exist; for if I am not, I cannot also be aware that I am not.

To bring this theme into the twentieth century, one need only recall the much-quoted aphorisms of Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: "Death is not an event of life. We do not live to experience death. (Den Tod erlebt man nicht.)" This is no doubt the proximate source of Mary Warnock's view as quoted earlier; but it is worth noting that the basic idea is a very old one which has been passed on in recognisably the same form through a long tradition. It would not have been difficult to cite a large number of equally similar expressions of this theme, especially from twentieth-century analytic philosophers, who are perhaps drawn to this method of argument for the same reason as Epicurus: that is, on account of its therapeutic value. The argument is specifically designed to counteract the 'natural fear in the face of dying' that Kant refers to; and it tries to do this through an analysis which reveals the incoherence of the idea implicit in this fear.

So much for the background of this objection: let us now
Heidegger asserts that death is a phenomenon of life; Wittgenstein states that death is not an event of life. Yet they are not, in fact, at cross purposes. For Heidegger, death is not an event; rather, it is an "existential phenomenon." As we saw earlier (above, pages 335-336) Heidegger's use of the word 'death' is, in fact, quite different from the use of this word in ordinary language. Heidegger insists that, if we are to understand the nature of death in terms of those concepts which are appropriate to Dasein, then we must understand it as Being-towards-death: that is, as one of Dasein's possibilities or potentialities. Only when seen in this way can my own death truly be an issue for me. For when it is conceived as a future event, something not yet actual, death is thrust away from the area of current concern. Max Scheler's interpretation of the function of the historical sciences in providing an objective knowledge of the past (above, pages 265-266) may be applied, in a suitably modified way, to an attitude of objectivity adopted towards the future. Then it would be seen that the function of such an attitude is, as in the former case, to disburden the existing human being, and to allow him a present whose links with the past and future have been broken.

As we saw, though, this whole strategy largely coincided with Heidegger's picture of the inauthentic mode of temporality, the mode which misapplied categories of things present-at-hand to Dasein. And as we have seen in the present context, Heidegger
sees an inauthentic an attitude towards the prospect of one's own
death which expects or awaits it as a future event. Correlated
with this is the conversion of genuine anxiety in the face of
death to mere fear. Heidegger's statement that "the 'they' does
not allow the courage for anxiety in the face of death to arise" is
one of the most profoundly significant remarks that occur in
Sein und Zeit. In contrast to anxiety, fear is focussed upon
some object or event in particular: this, in a sense, means that
it is less deeply disturbing to the existing individual than the
anxiety which, by virtue of its uncompromising direction towards
his entire existence, tears him completely away from the familiar
stable world of his everyday concerns. Hence the need for courage
in achieving anxiety. (Once again, we may refer to Tolstoy's
story, whose protagonist progressively moves towards the attainment
of this courage in the course of the narrative.)

Having turned anxiety into mere fear, the 'they' then
attempts to pass off this fear as a weakness which a strong
individual may suppress, thus attaining an equanimity in the face
of death: this is Heidegger's further description of the strategy
of the 'they'. My comment is that the Stoic 'therapeutic'
argument finds its place in this move. Of course, it operates
in a more sophisticated way than the relatively crude brow-beating
suggested by Heidegger. It brings a strictly logical argument
to bear on the problematic which has now been understood in
terms of events which occur and states which are present-at-hand.
There can, I think, be no question that the Stoic argument is
perfectly valid as it stands. Yet this is not enough. We must
ask whether or not its formulation fits the real problem. We have now seen that it does not direct itself towards the question of the meaning of my own death as this question arises within Heidegger's existential theory of human nature. Furthermore, we have seen that Heidegger's theory enables him to give an account of the origin and function of an inauthentic mode of conceiving one's own death - an account into which the argument in question is drawn as being a sophisticated manifestation of inauthentic Being-towards-death.

In the discussion that has been given of it in this chapter, Heidegger's theory of Being-towards-death has been defended against a number of criticisms drawn from a number of diverse sources. It is a theory which has the strength and coherence necessary to withstand such attacks. Its strength, however, is due to its grounding in a systematic conception of existential temporality, of existence itself as a kind of Being constituted by potentialities. Ironically, it was just this fundamental conception of Dasein that we saw in the last chapter to be the source of Heidegger's failure to develop an adequate theory of interpersonal relationships. Our study of these two 'test cases' of his general theory of human nature has, therefore, given rise to a result which places a strange dilemma before us. On the one hand, it offers us a powerful theory of one extremely important aspect of human existence: its finitude in the face of the future. On the other hand, it failed in the attempt to supply an account of another important aspect of human existence. What, then, are we to conclude? Perhaps only a radical solution will
remove the dilemma: that is, a solution which recognizes that no single theoretical schema can encompass the diversity of the phenomena of human existence. In that case, Heidegger's conception of human nature would appear as a one-sided account, coherent and explicable in its own terms, and yet not to be taken as the full story about the nature of human existence.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (5th unaltered edition), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1957. The original edition was subtitled "Erste Hälfte", but this was later dropped. In referring to or quoting from this work, I shall adopt the convention used by Heidegger's English translators. Thus 'H 123' means page 123 of Sein und Zeit, as above.

2. The following are the writings of the period immediately following the publication of Sein und Zeit (1927) which will be mainly drawn upon here:
   Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), Frankfurt a.M., Vittorio Klostermann, 1951 (2nd, unaltered edition); hereafter referred to as Kantbuch.
   "Was ist Metaphysik?" (1929), "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1929), and "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930, though not published until 1943); all in Wegmarken, Frankfurt a.M., Vittorio Klostermann, 1967; hereafter referred to as Wegmarken.
   Einführung in die Metaphysik (1935, though not published until 1933), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1958 (2nd edition); hereafter referred to as Einführung.


5. I have tried to avoid the term 'existentialism', for reasons to be discussed in Chapter Three.


7. M. Scheler, Philosophical Perspectives, tr. O.A. Haac, Boston, Beacon Press, 1958, p. 65. (This book was originally published in 1929 as Philosophische Weltanschauung.)

8. The most extensive of these is Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos; in English, Man's Place in Nature, tr. H. Meynhoff, Boston, Beacon Press, 1961.

9. The use of the word 'science' in non-empirical contexts is discussed in Chapter Four.


11. Scheler cites Wolfgang Töhler's experiments with apes. See


13. ibid., p. 122n.


15. Kant, op. cit., p. 120n.

16. ibid., p. 217.

17. ibid., p. 171.


20. ibid., p. 118.

21. ibid., p. 122.

22. ibid., p. 122.

23. ibid., p. 122.


26. The following remarks draw upon Heimsoeth's article, "Metaphysical Motives in the Development of Critical Idealism", in W.S. Gran (ed.), Kant: Disputed Questions, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1967. (This article originally appeared in Kant-Studien, Band 29, 1924.)


29. ibid., p. 186.


32. Kantbuch, p. 188.
33. ibid., p. 188.
34. H 107-8.
35. H 117.
36. Kantbuch, p. 188.
37. ibid., p. 189.
39. ibid., pp. 112-7.
40. H 244n, H 301n.
41. H 301n.
42. H 143ff.
44. ibid., p. 110.
45. H 45.
46. H 53.
47. Wegmarken, p. 158.
48. H 47.
49. H 114.
50. H 117.
51. H 8.
53. Any of the later works could be taken here; e.g. Wegmarken, pp. 153-5.
54. Einführung, p. 31.
55. Wegmarken, p. 146; also pp. 147-8.
56. Kantbuch, p. 199.
57. H 151.
60. Kantbuch, p. 189.
61. ibid., p. 190.
63. Werke, ed. cit., Band III, p. 545. (B 871-2)
64. Kantbuch, p. 190.
65. Wegmarken, p. 73.
66. H 52.
67. H 27. "with the subject-matter itself" = mit den Sachen selbst. This alludes to the rather untranslatable maxim of the phenomenological movement: Zu den Sachen selbst!
68. Literally "man's place in the cosmos"; but I have followed the English rendition of the title of Scheler's book.
71. Kantbuch, p. 196.
75. ibid., p. 356.
78. Kantbuch, p. 196.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. H 27.


5. A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1963, pp. 1-2. (This is a reproduction of the 7th edition of 1779.)


8. Heimsoeth, op. cit., p. 158.


11. ibid., p. 207. (B 303)

12. For example, from the Nachlass: "Ontology is the science of things in general, i.e. of the possibility of our knowledge of things a priori, i.e. independently of experience. It can teach us nothing about things in themselves, but only about the a priori conditions under which we can know things in experience generally, i.e., principles of the possibility of experience." Nachlass, 5936; Werke, Prussian Academy Edition, Band 18, p. 394.


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15. ibid., p. 44. (B 27)


21. ibid., p. 13n. (B xviin.)

22. ibid., p. 13. (B xix)

23. ibid., p. 13. (B xix)


26. ibid., p. 221.


28. H 211.

29. H 211.

30. Kant, op. cit., p. 10. (B xiii)


32. ibid., p. 66.

33. ibid., p. 74.

34. ibid., pp. 76-78, 85-88.

35. ibid., p. 93.

36. ibid., p. 121.


38. H 182.


41. See footnote 18.


45. Ibid., p. 42.


49. H 9.

50. H 10.

51. H 10.

52. H 10.


55. Ibid., p. 43.

56. Ibid., p. 44.

57. H 35.

58. *Traité des catégories*, p. 44.

59. H 16.

60. H 43.
61. H 66-76.
63. ibid., p. 224.
64. E. Husserl, Ideas, ed. cit., p. 57.
65. H 42.
67. For example, his discussion of the 'who': H 115.
68. Wegmarken, p. 156.
70. Wegmarken, p. 81.
72. H 1.
73. H 16.
74. H 17.
76. ibid., p. 70.
78. ibid., p. 15.
79. ibid., p. 107.
80. H 6. (Cf. H 9: 'Being is always the Being of a being.')
82. H 11.
83. H 11.
84. Einführung, p. 66.
85. ibid., p. 66.
86. ibid., pp. 40-56.
87. Wegmarken, p. 4.
89. Wegmarken, p. 21.
91. Einführung, p. 27.
92. ibid., p. 4.
93. Wegmarken, p. 3.
94. ibid., p. 102.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


3. ibid., p. 43n.

4. H 46.


7. This is especially evident in The Concept of Dread.


13. H 235n.

14. H 338, discussing "the moment", which is a leading topic in both The Concept of Dread and Philosophical Fragments.


16. ibid., p. 12.

17. ibid., p. 12n.

23. The Fiery Brook, p. 164.
41. ibid., p. 182.
42. ibid., p. 117.
43. ibid., p. 19.
44. ibid., p. 51.
45. ibid., p. 182.
46. ibid., p. 171.
47. ibid., pp. 177ff.
48. ibid., p. 183.
49. ibid., p. 315.
50. ibid., p. 185.
51. ibid., p. 273.
56. Wegmarken, p. 204.
57. ibid., p. 204.
58. ibid., p. 158.
60. ibid., p. 291.
62. as far as I know.
64. ibid., p. 485, 491.
66. See, e.g., Kierkegaard's treatment of the unity of thought and Being (op. cit., p. 112), or of becoming as the synthesis of Being and non-Being (ibid., p. 75).


71. See Wegmarken, pp. 155-8.

72. Ibid., p. 17.

73. H 4.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

Section 1:


3. ibid., p. 2.

4. ibid., p. 2.

5. ibid., p. 2.


7. ibid., p. 4.

8. ibid., p. 4.

9. ibid., p. 4.

10. ibid., pp. 30-37.


18. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 72.

19. ibid., p. 72.

20. ibid., p. 192.
21. ibid., p. 73.
22. ibid., p. 72, 74.
23. ibid., p. 74.
24. ibid., p. 74.
25. ibid., p. 72.
26. ibid., p. 74. Note: here and elsewhere I have made minor revisions to translated quotations after consulting the original texts.
27. ibid., p. 74-5.
31. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 73.
34. Husserl, op. cit., p. 76, 77.
35. ibid., p. 77.
36. ibid., p. 82.
37. ibid., p. 82.
38. ibid., p. 136.
39. ibid., p. 82.
40. ibid., pp. 131ff.
41. ibid., p. 144. Heidegger too is against 'profundity': H 152.
42. ibid., p. 142.


46. ibid., pp. 9-10.

47. ibid., p. 7.

48. ibid., p. 7.


55. *Einführung*, pp. 142-3.


60. *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, p. 80.


66. ibid., p. 107, 173, 281.
67. ibid., p. 70.
68. ibid., p. 339.
69. ibid., p. 287.
70. ibid., p. 321.
71. ibid., p. 320.
72. ibid., p. 286.
74. ibid., p. 134.
78. See, for example, Nicholas Berdyaev’s comments in J. Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, ed. cit., pp. 36-37.
79. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 179.
81. ibid., p. 364.
82. ibid., p. 365.
83. J. Wahl, op. cit., p. 43.
84. ibid., p. 21.
86. ibid., p. 46.
Section 2:

1. H 35.
2. H 38.
8. ibid., p. 46.

9. ibid., p. 55.


16. Wegmarken, p. 158.

17. H 41.


20. H 188.


22. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, ed. cit., p. 84.

23. ibid., p. 154.

24. ibid., p. 159.


27. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 16.

28. H 42.

31. H 34.
33. H 7.
34. H 7.
35. H 315.
37. H 315.
38. H 150.
41. H 35.
42. H 31.
44. H 64.
46. *Wegmarken*, p. 34.
47. ibid., p. 53.
48. H 364.
49. H 212.
51. ibid., p. 226e.
52. H 43–44.


59. H 89ff.

60. e.g. J. Cozling, "Emotion and Object", Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, 1965.

61. H 54.


64. H 312.


66. ibid., p. 480. (B 760) Also p. 500 (B 734).

67. ibid., p. 510. (B 810-811)

68. ibid., p. 510. (B 811)

69. ibid., p. 403. (B 765)

70. H 312.

71. H 313.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. H 324.
11. H 92.
12. H 93.
13. in the "Paralogisms" chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason.
16. H 43.
20. H 73.
21. H 73.
23. H 86.
24. H 54.
25. H 120.
27. H 7.
29. H 46.
30. H 44.
31. H 255.
32. H 116.
33. H 42.
34. H 44.
35. H 45.
36. H 259.
37. H 42.
38. H 301n.
41. ibid., p. 79.
42. The Concept of Dread, ed. cit., p. 44.
43. ibid., p. 45.
44. ibid., p. 55.
45. H 143-144.
46. H 261.
47. H 262.
49. H 178.
50. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book IX, Ch. 9, 1051a. (Translation of W.D. Ross)
51. Wegmarcken, pp. 53-56.
52. ibid., p. 54.
53. ibid., p. 55n.
54. ibid., p. 56.
56. ibid., p. 108, footnote 3.
57. ibid., p. 108.
59. ibid., p. 11.
60. ibid., p. 11.
   Note: In these quotations I have rendered *existential* and *existentiell* as 'existential' and 'existentiell' respectively, in accordance with the usage of Macquarrie and Robinson. The translator of *Myth and Christianity* has followed a different convention, one used by a number of Bultmann's translators. I quote the explanation given by one of these: "The distinction between *existentiell* and *existential*, the first meaning that which belongs to existence as such, the second that which belongs to the particular philosophical system called existentialism, is expressed by the use of 'existential' for the former, and 'existentialist' for the latter." (R.H. Fuller, in H.W. Bartsch (ed.), *Kerygma and Myth*, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1961, "Translator's Introduction"). This seems to me to be quite mistaken.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX


7. H 43.

8. H 43.

9. H 42.


11. H 114.


15. H 115.


17. H 126.


20. H 126.

22. P. Piccone and A. Delfini, "Herbert Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism", Telos, No. 6, p. 44.
24. ibid., p. 8.
27. H 129.
28. H 129.
29. H 194.
31. H 195.
34. ibid., p. 50.
35. ibid., p. 66.
36. ibid., pp. 51-52.
37. ibid., p. 53.
40. ibid., p. 149.
42. Fear and Trembling/The Sickness unto Death, ed. cit., p. 146.
43. H 129.
44. H 267.
45. H 117.
46. H 317ff.
47. H 318.
49. H 318, footnote 3.
50. H 318.
51. H 320.
53. ibid., p. 247.
54. H 321.
55. H 322.
56. H 322.
57. H 323.
58. H 50.
59. H 143.
60. H 144.
61. H 145.
63. H 363.
64. Being and Time, ed. cit., p. 419. (H 368)
65. What is a Thing?, ed. cit., p. 92.
66. ibid., p. 92.
67. Kantbuch, p. 70.

2. e.g. H 201, H 47n, referring respectively to Kant and Husserl.

3. H 216.

4. H 211.


9. e.g. Being and Nothingness, ed. cit., p. 20.

10. ibid., pp. 89-90; cf. ibid., pp. 103-104.


26. ibid., p. 22.

27. ibid., p. 23.

28. ibid., p. 23.

29. ibid., p. 23.


31. Husserl, op. cit., p. 43.


34. ibid., p. 33.

35. ibid., p. 33.

36. ibid., p. 36.

37. ibid., p. 37.

38. ibid., p. 52, p. 57.


40. e.g. *Cartesian Meditations*, ed. cit., Sect. 19ff.

41. The following discussion of James refers mainly to the *Principles of Psychology*, ed. cit., Ch. XV; also in part to Ch. IX and Ch. XVI. See also A. Schuets, "William James' Concept of the Stream of Consciousness, Phenomenologically Interpreted", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 1, 1941, pp. 442-452.

42. James, op. cit., pp. 646-647.

43. Schuets, art. cit., p. 442.

44. James, op. cit., p. 654.
45. ibid., p. 608.
46. ibid., p. 609.
47. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 62.
48. James, op. cit., 612f.
50. ibid., p. 63.
52. Husserl, op. cit., pp. 68-83.
53. ibid., p. 64.
54. ibid., p. 64.
55. ibid., p. 62.
56. ibid., p. 139.
58. H 333.
59. H 432n.
61. ibid., p. 274.
62. ibid., p. 280.
65. ibid., p. 104.
70. ibid., p. 45.
73. ibid., p. 193.
74. ibid., pp. 193-194.
75. ibid., p. 194.
76. ibid., p. 194.
77. ibid., p. 195.
78. ibid., p. 195.
79. H 326.
80. H 327.
82. H 327.
83. H 327.
84. H 327.
85. H 262.
86. H 143-144.
87. H 194-196.
88. H 262.
90. H 144.
92. H 326.
93. H 328.
94. quoted by Heidegger, H 400.
95. H 400.
96. H 339.
97. H 354.
98. H 339.
100. ibid., p. 3.
102. Repetition, p. 3.
103. ibid., p. 5.
104. H 385.
105. H 385-386.
108. ibid., p. 15.
110. ibid., p. 253.
111. Repetition, p. 4.
112. especially H 308ff.
113. H 338.
114. H 338n.
116. ibid., p. 109.
117. ibid., p. 112.
118. ibid., p. 112.
119. ibid., p. 113.
120. ibid., p. 114.
122. The Concept of Dread, ed. cit., p. 76.
123. ibid., p. 76.
124. ibid., p. 77.
125. ibid., p. 77.
126. ibid., p. 78.
127. ibid., p. 80.
128. H 326.
130. ibid., p. 36.
131. H 359.
133. H 406.
134. H 407.
135. H 421. (Referring to Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Ch. 11, 219b.)
136. H 422.
137. H 422.
138. Kantbuch, p. 158.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. H 42.
5. ibid., p. 138.
7. ibid., p. 209.
8. ibid., p. 211.
9. These observations apply equally to the treatment of the 'problem of other minds' found in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*.
11. H 118.
14. H 120.
15. Wegmarken, p. 54.
16. ibid., p. 9.
17. H 120.
18. H 120.
19. H 121.
20. H 143.
22. H 122.
29. ibid., p. 12.
33. Lukacs, op. cit., p. 256.
34. H 118.
35. H 129.
38. ibid., p. 300.
39. ibid., p. 300.
40. ibid., p. 306.
42. Sartre, op. cit., p. 305.
43. H 123-124.
45. also, in briefer form, in the Philosophische Prophäeutik and the Heidelberg and Berlin Encyclopedias.
47. ibid., p. 289.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

5. ibid., p. 215.
7. ibid., p. 158.
15. H 232.
16. H 236.
17. H 236.
19. H 236.
22. H 238.
23. H 238.
24. H 238-239.
25. H 239.
31. H 240.
32. H 41.
34. ibid., pp. 28-29.
35. H 243.
36. H 244.
37. H 244.
47. H 254.
49. H 256.
50. H 257.
51. H 258.
52. S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, ed. cit., p. 76.
53. ibid., p. 148.
54. ibid., p. 149.
55. ibid., p. 150.
56. ibid., p. 152.
58. ibid., p. 261.
59. ibid., pp. 269-270.
60. H 259.
61. H 261.
63. H 262.
64. H 262-263.
65. H 263.
66. H 264.
69. H 264.
70. H 265.
72. H 266.


76. H 240.

77. H 254.
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