USE OF THESES

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WITTGENSTEIN'S ONTOLOGICAL VISION

by

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University

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Except where acknowledged within the text, all parts of this thesis represent my own original work.

Glenda M. Kuhl
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The greatness of what a man writes depends on everything else he writes and does.

The light work sheds is a beautiful light, which, however, only shines with real beauty if it is illuminated by yet another light.

Just let nature speak and acknowledge only one thing as higher than nature, but not what others may think.

Wittgenstein

Oh, Thou Supreme! most secret and most present, most beautiful and most strong! What shall I say...? What shall any man say when he speaks of Thee?

...And a sort of battle with words ensues, since if what is ineffable is what cannot be said, yet what can be called even ineffable is not ineffable. This battle with words is to be prevented by silence rather than stilled by speech....

St. Augustine
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The title of this thesis attributes to Wittgenstein — a vision. Yet, everyone who thinks of Wittgenstein thinks of — language. Furthermore, everyone who is familiar with the Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations has found much of Wittgenstein's language to be perplexing and aphoristic. His words may indeed be ordinary and everyday, but they are as well, so enigmatic. Perhaps the difficulty lies in our sight. As Augustine said in a different context so very long ago, "The word would not sound enigmatic if we had the power of vision."¹ It will be one contention of this thesis that Wittgenstein was concerned with enabling us to see.

This thesis is concerned with what he saw; it is concerned with that which he enables us to see. It is an underlying theme of this thesis that in order to understand Wittgenstein, not only do we need to be able to see, but also to accept the invitation he offers to participate in the vision itself, to see what he saw. In other words, there are two aspects of the matter of vision with which to contend: one is our ability to see; the other is what is seen. To see means to restructure our sight such that we attain to the lesser recognized, perhaps less common, ways of knowing. Such ways of knowing enable us to see even the surface levels of our words and the world more correctly. They do so precisely because they enable us to see the depth and the height, the total picture, a little more clearly. That whole, and the understanding of it, is the vision itself. Though it is a surprising word to use, it will not be misleading to say it is an entire ontology.

One of the most fundamental distinctions found in both the early and late writings of Wittgenstein is that of saying and showing. While philosophers standardly use the word "show," Wittgenstein had a very special meaning for it. For him it was a word which performed many functions on many levels. Accordingly, this thesis cannot be merely concerned with what Wittgenstein said; it must also be concerned to show what he showed. Insofar as it is possible to show that which is shown, this thesis attempts to display the kind or quality of this power of vision and the nature or content of the vision that is seen. With that in view, perhaps the entire

¹"Nomen quippe non sonaret enigmatis, si esset facilitas visionis." (St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, ii, n. 16. [J. P. Migne, ed., Patrologia Latina, xlii, 1069.])
As this thesis is itself a showing, the method will be essentially that of exposition, not an argument in the current, common understanding of philosophical argument. What is presented here is not what might be called an 'orthodox' reading of Wittgenstein, and its cogency as a reading must stand or fall on its faithfulness to what is the case and to the multiple levels of the texts themselves. It is an attempt to expose what lies within the texts as the purpose of the texts. The method of exposition is that of spiralling the texts themselves again and again, gradually removing, as it were, the clothes of their language which make them look so much like propositions of philosophical argument, or condemnations of metaphysics, or even an exercise in developmental psychology. This means that the approach is somewhat (though only somewhat) like that of the Tractatus itself in that it is an attempt to show that Wittgenstein shows what is the case.

The nature of Wittgenstein's writing naturally seems to elicit such a showing of what is shown. The Tractatus, for instance, is remarkably like poetry. Few discussions of the Tractatus assert seriously to the fact that it is actually seven sentences woven together by detailed and ordered exposition. The very numbering system itself suggests a certain art form. The text as a whole has about it the character of an experience resounding in the personality of the writer, which is one definition of poetry, and it communicates to the reader a sense of that same, very full experience. In its well chosen language and even in its arrangement of line and entries, it creates a response in us. Each of its seven sections are, as it were, verses. Individually and collectively these sections have many levels of meaning and display in both the deeper levels of their content and in their interrelation, an underlying ontology. At the very end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein openly states that what he has done cannot be done. This forces us to compare the text with poetry, rather than identify it as such. As an art form, poetry cannot make such an admission without negating itself as poetry; to do so is to become instead, a piece of philosophy.

The Investigations, on the other hand, never makes such an admission. While its form is less like that of poetry, it can equally be likened to a work of art. In the introduction, Wittgenstein likens it to a series of sketches and he called himself a "bad painter." This suggests that he saw his writing as an art form as well as a piece of philosophy. In both cases, the endeavour of this thesis lies in the showing of what is contained in
these texts, the pointing out of what can be seen, to whomever might be looking.

This approach perforce dictates both the style and the method of this thesis. Most noticeably it precludes much direct use and discussion of secondary source material. Reference to secondary sources have been included, primarily in footnotes, only when some point seemed to be particularly supportive or contentious vis-a-vis the exposition itself. In some footnotes brief discussions ensue with other authors, but it has been kept to a minimum as such discussion and debate is essentially beyond the scope of this thesis. It is a different sort of enterprise than that of the exposition presented here which is fundamentally descriptive. As the task set is to display and ponder Wittgenstein's vision, description seems more appropriate than extended discussion or debate.

In regard to Wittgenstein, as with most great writers, there can be many fruitful types of scholarship. One, for example, examine Wittgenstein's philosophical problems through a consideration of the historical and cultural background in which they have their roots, as do Janik and Toulmin,2 or one can undertake a detailed exegesis of each passage, as do Baker and Hacker.3 Russell took one approach to the Tractatus: the logical positivists used the text from their perspective. Someone like Bartley4 relies heavily on biography, while countless essays examine specific topics. Etc., etc. Of all such attempts, that of Janik and Toulmin is the most extensive study to emphasize the ethical nature of Wittgenstein's work. They do not, however, examine the texts in any detail and to some extent establish an opposition between the ethical interests and the ontological or metaphysical importance. Their approach is enlightening and is, perhaps, a much needed balance to some of the strictly analytic efforts, but can there be such an opposition, or are these two poles a presupposition of one another? This thesis is an attempt to stay close to the texts and to show how these two poles are interrelated and complementary.

Such a great volume of Wittgenstein's writing has been posthumously published that some selectivity is required. The Tractatus and the Phi-

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losophical Investigations are the primary considerations as these two carry
the author's final approval for distribution. Other texts are considered
imsofar as they elucidate particular themes and passages.

Given that Wittgenstein claimed that philosophy should effect a moral
change in our lives, that moral change can be said to be the test of gen-
une philosophy. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to see something, to
experience, and to participate, at least in some small way, in that 'moral
change.' (Within this thesis the 'moral change' will often be referred to
as "the mystical" or "transformation" or "enlightenment" and it will be
related to noetic knowledge.) Wittgenstein's dictum necessarily places
some constraints on how the texts are to be interpreted. To a great degree,
the compatibility of an interpretation with moral change is a mark of the
propriety of the interpretation. Not every interpretation makes room for
the indicated change in our very persons. These constraints are perhaps
not so wide as to allow substantial variations of interpretation. There is
room for growth, for deepening, for dialogue, but not for a radically dif-
ferent vision. This thesis will point out an ontological commensurability
between what we are as persons and how we see the world, as well as a com-
mensurability between the moral change and the appropriate reading of these
texts.

One might say we are already in a circle. The dictum calls for an
interpretation of the text which calls for a change which interprets the
text as prescribed by the dictum. Instead, there can be found here a pat-
tern of confirmation of the interpretation. Change and interpretation
mutually indicate, limit, complete, and confirm each other. The route is
not linear, but why should a straight line be more correct or beautiful
than an ever-returning arc? Furthermore, philosophy being so intimately
connected, as Wittgenstein saw it, with the ethical/mystical dimension means
that a reading of this sort remains firmly entrenched in the area of phil-
osophy. It is no more a sort of 'moral literature' than is the writing of
Wittgenstein himself. It is, instead, an ontological consideration appreci-
ative of genuine philosophical insight.

The questions with which I initially approached the Wittgensteinian
texts were of a very different genre from what is presented in this thesis.
The more I read the texts, the more they began to appear as an instantia-
tion of a line from Heidegger: "What is being talked about and what is
being said are not identical."

5 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, (New York: Harper & Row,
What was Wittgenstein doing? The say/show distinction loomed large. At this point I launched upon a long period of study of the Tractatus and the Investigations in an effort to think for myself what Wittgenstein might have thought, instantiating, as it were, another line from Heidegger: "To know what a thinker is thinking takes the devotion of almost a lifetime." Hegel's counsel to "tarry with" also seemed appropriate, and Wittgenstein's admonition to suspend the question 'why' seemed to apply. To see some things we must not look at others. To see other things, we must not look at all — but only listen, as in the story of the aspirant who asked his master, "Master, how is it that you see things so clearly?" to which the master replied, "I close my eyes." The articulation of this thesis is the product of that long period of suspension, tarrying, listening.

The first three chapters on the Tractatus attempt to treat the material in such a way as to permit the ontological and mystical dimensions to emerge from that material — on their own, so to speak. These sections on the world, language, and meaning, are a collection of some basic Wittgensteinian 'elements.' They are the trees of which the forest is made, but they, as all trees, change and grow. The fourth chapter displays the forest itself as found in the Tractatus. It treats of philosophy and the mystical, and portrays the meaning of the text and the philosophical task in these terms. It is a further showing of what is seen.

Part II proceeds from this position and exposes these dimensions in their more subtle and developed forms as they are found in the Investigations. Thus the exposition progresses, as do the texts themselves, from a collecting of concepts, through the attainment of the ontological vision in terms of the mystical experience, which reflexively, deepens and confirms the understanding of those concepts and the reality they represent. The mystical, as presented at the end of the Tractatus, is seen, in prospect, to be the key to the deeper levels and a more appropriate interpretation of the Investigations.

In more ways than one it is indeed the Vision whereby we understand the Word.


7 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 75
This thesis is a study of the ontological dimensions of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* of Ludwig Wittgenstein in light of the concepts of 'noetic knowledge' and 'the mystical'.

Part I is an exposition of the themes of world, language, and meaning within the *Tractatus*. It is the presentation of an ontology in which the understanding of meaning is that of being expressing itself. Philosophy is seen to be a method for the attainment of 'the mystical' which is understood to be the *raison d'être* of the *Tractatus* as a whole.

Part II is an examination of *weltanschauung* as the fundamental direction of the *Investigations* and a study of the concepts of the world, language, and meaning as the 'global solution' of philosophical problems. The predominant ontological theme is that of a 'functioning totality' and this theme emerges from the notions of 'grammar' and 'use' as they are found within the *Investigations*. The understanding of meaning here presented is that of being itself and 'the mystical' is portrayed more fully as the fruit of philosophy.

Both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* are treated as philosophical 'literature' rather than philosophical 'argument' and both are understood as speech-acts in themselves. This thesis emphasizes the compatibility and continuity between the two texts and attempts to correlate the life of Wittgenstein with the philosophy he performed and wrote.

The final chapter of the thesis considers the questions of the future of philosophy and the speaking of the unspeakable in accordance with this ontological interpretation of the Wittgensteinian enterprise.
ABBREVIATIONS AND CITATIONS

All citations in Part I refer to the *Tractatus*, except where otherwise stated, and are given by entry number in parentheses following the references themselves. All those in Part II refer to the *Investigations*, and are given in the same manner. Other citations from Wittgenstein's writings are cited according to abbreviated title and page or paragraph as appropriate. The abbreviations used are as follows:

C&V -- *Culture and Value*

L&C -- *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief*

NB -- *Notebooks, 1914-1916*

OC -- *On Certainty*

PG -- *Philosophical Grammar*

PR -- *Philosophical Remarks*

PT -- *Prototractatus*

RFM -- *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*

Z -- *Zettel*
PART I

ON WITTGENSTEIN'S

TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

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SNITILSNITI911IM NO
There are three general aspects of the Tractarian concept of world. Using Wittgenstein's own terminology these can be referred to as the world, my world, and outside the world. All that he has to say about the world falls naturally under one of these headings.

World as Fact

For Wittgenstein the world is not to be seen as a multiplicity of things in themselves nor is it to be thought of as the aggregate of all things in existence. It is, instead, a great mass of configurations. Everything that exists does so in relation to every other thing. This status of any one thing being related to other things in whatever way it is, is what Wittgenstein calls a fact. It is what is the case (2). Thus he calls all that is the case, the totality of facts -- the world (1, 1.1).

This use of totality is in no way meant to imply images of the infinite. Its usage is intended to convey quite the opposite. Constantly Wittgenstein strives to transmit a conception of the world as finite, limited. It is a whole which can always be divided into facts, specific states of affairs in which everything fits together (1.2, 2.01). The world as a whole is all existing particular situations; it is the complete set of all circumstances. But the individual situation or state of affairs -- a fact -- is, for Wittgenstein, the atomic unit of the world. Not things. Thus, the way things are is not to be seen as some particular thing standing to some other particular thing in a given relation, but that some particular thing stands to some other particular thing in the given relation (3.1432).

Hence, the state of affairs, a fact, is somewhat like a picture (2.12, 2.1411). If we could take pictures of all existing things with all other existing things from every angle, and put them together in every existing combination, and if all these combinations could then be combined into a single unit, we would have a complete picture of the world. "The totality of existing states of affairs is the world" (2.04).

Fact as Determinate

The primary feature of the world as fact is that as such it is determinate. It is fixed; it has set limits. This does not mean that given states of affairs do not change nor that the total state of affairs cannot
be other than the particular way it is. The world is accidental (6.41). But it does mean that the facts necessarily are in some particular way. Wittgenstein relies heavily upon fact being determinate, but this reliance is no more than an insistence on the (logical) attribute of existence. To exist is to be defined. If something is, then it is delineated.

This reliance on fact as determinate provides the foundation for the world as limited. The fact that the world is limited is simply due to the fact that fact is determinate. As every given state of affairs is defined, the totality of these states of affairs is likewise defined. The world as a whole is limited just as these elementary units are limited, in themselves and compositely. As the facts are, so is the world (1.11, 1.13). Each particular fact is independent (2.061). It can be or not be without affecting anything else (1.21). "The world is determined (emphasis mine) by the facts and by their being all the facts" (1.11).

Reality

Wittgenstein draws a distinction between 'world' and 'reality'. The world is the totality of existing states of affairs. As we have already seen, these states of affairs by their sheer existence are determinate. This determination has a logical correlate. In being all that is, it also determines all that is not (2.05). All that is not the case, 'is' whatever is other than what is the case. For every state of affairs there are two alternatives. These are not -- to be or not to be, but -- to be and not to be. Both alternatives are defined in the existence of the state of affairs. "The totality of facts determines both (emphasis mine) what is the case and whatever is not the case." (1.12) This existence and non-existence of states of affairs, Wittgenstein calls -- 'reality' (2.06). By calling it reality he does not wish to say either non-existence, or the non-existence of some state of affairs, is somehow real. He is not positing non-existence as some sort of metaphysical entity. Rather, he means to say that that which is not, is determined by that which is, and we take both states of affairs into account. We call one a positive fact and the other a negative fact (2.06). It is in this spirit of the world as being composed of both positives and negatives while being only what exists that he says, "The sum-total of reality is the world" (2.063). The non-existence of a state of affairs is 'in' the world by virtue of any fact being in the world. It is not part of the world. It attends the world.
This notion of reality is important for two reasons: first, it is this notion which is usually used in regard to our propositions about the world. As these propositions deal with both negative and positive facts and, as we shall see, our propositions must 'fit' the world, the notion of the world must be such that it is able to accommodate negative reflections. Second, it is important because it supports the notion of the world as a limited whole. It confines all that is to the logical correlates of existence.

Things and Objects

It is not sufficient for the world to be fact, for fact to be determined, and for reality to be both the positive and negative aspects of determined fact. Without some explanation of the constituents of the facts, Wittgenstein's portrait of the world would be obviously incomplete. Also, the possibility of mapping propositions onto the world, or if you like, scraping propositions off the world, would be in jeopardy, for we would not be able to see exactly how it is that propositions fit the world. Therefore, he does provide an explanation of the constituents of facts, and, as we shall see, to do so he resorts to an adaptation of Aristotelian metaphysics though this adaptation takes a Platonic direction in regard to epistemology. We must note, however, that this explanation proceeds on the basis of a description of the logical attributes of existence and thereby establishes this metaphysical stance as the way things are. It is not intended to be merely a way of making the way things are -- intelligible; neither is it intended to be a metaphysics per se, in the sense of positing unverifiable entities or in the sense of exploring the ultimate causes of things. It is an ontological description.1

1We might cautiously note, however, that Wittgenstein's world always includes language, and that his puzzles about the nature of the world are often generated by the functioning of language and the way in which language relates to the world. Alternatively, his understanding of the nature of the world often seems to be dependent upon what is required by his theory of language. (This notion is maintained by numerous authors and is so prevalent that Fogelin, for instance, begins his entire study with this observation. [Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein (part of the series: The Arguments of the Philosophers, edited by Ted Siderlouch) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 3.) This is evident throughout the first half of the Notebooks in which his primary concern begins with the logic in our language and then proceeds to explore the world in its relation to language. This inverse methodology is exemplified in the Tractatus in such patterns of reasoning as 2.0211: "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true." The related rhetorical assertions seem to be: the world does have substance and therefore the sense of a proposition does not depend on whether
Since things do exist in states of affairs, it is essential that it be possible for them to do so. Any and every given thing must be able to be a constituent of a state of affairs (2.011). As an essential attribute of a another proposition was true. (As we shall see, sense is dependent upon the matching of words and things according to the possibility of things combining to form facts, and hence there is no coherent theory of truth in the Tractatus.)

However, both the study of the world and of language are at times subsistent to the study of logic. In fact the Notebooks open with the statement: "Logic must take care of itself." (NS, p. 2) Because of this predominate focus, we often find that what is concluded of both language and the world is what is demanded by logic. For example, Wittgenstein's search for a "simple object" is parallel in intensity and conclusion to his search for an "elementary proposition." In both cases, Wittgenstein seems to conclude: We know they must exist because they are, in the end, that to which the complex reduces upon analysis. They are logically necessary (NB, cf. pp. 50, 60, 62, 68) but, as we shall see, the study of logic for Wittgenstein is a matter of ontology. (Some commentators are convinced that Wittgenstein's world was constructed to find the demands of logic and have noted that he later admitted "...the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement" (Philosophical Investigations, 107). Hence, someone like Fann can speak of the "a priori nature of Wittgenstein's method" and can conclude that "by a purely a priori consideration of language, Wittgenstein has arrived at an ontology." [R. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 11 and 14 respectively.] We should note, however, that this does not seem to take seriously Wittgenstein's own stated desire to reach the nature of the world and to treat more than mere existence, but being itself, as found in the Notebooks (p. 39). Furthermore, it misses the functional connection between the world and language. In Wittgenstein's words: "A statement cannot be concerned with the logical structure of the world, for in order for a statement to be possible at all, in order for a proposition to be capable of making sense, the world must already have just the logical structure that it has. The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood." (NS, p. 14) While he might indeed have received the 'clues' to the ontological structure from the nature of language and/or the functioning of a proposition, Wittgenstein clearly saw that to be the nature of the world precisely because language so functions. The ontology retains priority and cannot be an 'artificial' structure. Perhaps it is this that leads him to rearrange this thought so as to open the Tractatus with a statement on the world: "The world is all that is the case" (1). However, Wittgenstein is clearly conscious of a yet deeper level of his task. Through the study of the world and language, we are to arrive at a greater understanding of what is. "My whole task," he wrote in January of 1913, "consists in explaining the nature of the proposition. That is to say, in giving the nature of all facts, whose picture the proposition is. In giving the nature of all being. (And here being does not stand for existence -- in that case it would be nonsensical.)" (NB, p. 39) Hence, we are examining an ontological description.
thing, this kind of possibility proceeds from the nature of the thing as an existent. By the same token, it is not without limitation. The particular state of affairs of which a given thing can be a constituent is limited according to the kind of thing it is. The possibility of its occurrence in a state of affairs is "written into the thing itself" from the beginning (2.012, 2.0121); "If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given" (2.0124). From this perspective, facts are necessary, logically necessary, and proceed from the essential nature of their constituents. The only independence a thing can be said to have is that whereby it can occur in all possible situations according to the kind of thing it is. But as it is not possible that it not occur in situations, this independence is actually a form of dependence (2.0122). Only because a given thing can occur in various situations can it be said to have independence. Fact proceeds from a thing's possibility and is necessary to it. This aspect of the possibility in things is a fundamental one throughout the Tractatus not only because it is the primary attribute of existence, but also because on it, as we shall see, rests meaning.

In noting possibility as the necessary logical attribute of existents, we have used both "things" and "objects." "Things" for Wittgenstein usually means exactly what it does for us in normal, everyday English. It is the general noun referring to such individual items as books, tables, chairs, etc. "Objects," however, has a more slippery usage. As he admits, its meaning shifts (4.123). Sometimes it is equivalent to "things;" sometimes it is much more abstract and metaphysical, though not necessarily immaterial. Only if Wittgenstein's world included metaphysical entities would "objects" necessarily be immaterial. As this is not the case, it is possible to think of "objects" as undetermined matter.

2By metaphysical entity I mean something which has a separate or self-contained existence, as though, for example, we were to attribute a separate and objective reality to essence or to an act of being, or as though we were to treat an essence or an act of being apart from that which has an essence or does exist, i.e., apart from this chair or that rock.

It might also be noted here that while I emphasize the ontology involved, Wittgenstein's straightforward presentation of an ontology (though in the end the propositions presenting it were nonsense) surely stemmed from his own acceptance, ease, and interest regarding metaphysics. As Fann points out, even Carnap came to see in his later years that Wittgenstein's attitude toward metaphysics was certainly not that of the Vienna Circle. Further, as Fann suggests, neither metaphysics nor the inexpressible was nonsense for Wittgenstein; rather, the propositions and questions of many metaphysicians
This more abstract or metaphysical aspect of "objects" proceeds from the fact that objects (things, conglomerate) "contain the possibility of all situations" (2.014). There is something common to all things whereby they all have possibility. This possibility, universal to all things, is called form and is the possibility of that of which all things are, as it were, 'made', since all things have possibility. This itself is a sort of object. "Objects are just what constitute the [unalterable form] of the world" (2.023; cf. also 2.0231). And it is "objects" in this sense that is the more abstract or metaphysical usage.

Put differently, we begin with the fact that the general possibility whereby objects occur in states of affairs is called form (2.014). Now anything which has the possibility of having possibility in all situations must be totally amorphous. Objects in the abstract sense are just that way. Objects in this sense are so undifferentiated that they are perfectly simple (2.02). Concrete things can always be reduced and dissolved to simple objects. It is objects in this sense which make up the substance of the world (2.021) and are not themselves composite. Substance is that which subsists regardless of what particular way it exists, that is, regardless of the particular state of affairs which it actualizes (2.026). As that which subsists independently of what is the case, objects are unalterable, eternal, unchanging. Only "their configuration is changing and unstable" (2.0271). As substance, objects are simply form (able to be... and content (that which is able to be...) (2.025). Only in configuration as some state of affairs do objects have the determinate properties whereby they can be called "things" (2.0231, 2.0272, 2.01, 2.011).

Let us here digress for a moment to briefly consider the problem of interpreting substance. Within the Notebooks we can find Wittgenstein questioning and emphasizing the "simple" object, i.e., the more abstract or metaphysical object. He is speaking of correlating things with one another and the way in which the words of our language are used as "logically equivalent units," (NB, p. 43) and then says: "It always seems as if there were nonsense. (Fann, op. cit., pp. 25-26). However, the tendency to interpret Wittgenstein as an anti-metaphysician persists, and has received new impetus from Hacker who feels that "...Wittgenstein abolishes all metaphysics, whether transcendent or descriptive, and outlaws all traditional philosophy." (P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972], p. 23.) Opposition to this approach will become clear as this discussion progresses.
something that one can regard as a thing, and on the other hand real simple things. It is clear that neither a pencil-stroke nor a steamship is simple" (NB, p. 43). Wittgenstein realizes that to ask the question of whether there are simples is surely nonsense; it is a pseudo-sentence in that it does not picture in the ordinary way (NB, p. 45). (Here we do not have names attached to specific, independent things, which, as we shall see later, is the condition for legitimate, non-pseudo sentences.) The nearest example Wittgenstein can give of a simple is a point in the visual field (NB, p. 45), and yet even this attempted example is later refuted, for he admits he cannot mention a single simple (NB, p. 68). Wittgenstein (and all of us) is acquainted with complex objects, and this acquaintance presupposes their divisibility into simples (NB, p. 50). These simples are the "end-product" of analysis (NB, p. 50). The very "idea of the SIMPLE is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the idea of analysis" (NB, p. 60). Hence, the simple object is an a priori logical necessity (NB, p. 60). This might lead us to think that substance is to be interpreted as only a "logical"element. It is to be taken only in a very formal sense. It is, as it were, a variable as opposed to a logical constant. But at the very least, the notion of a simple object is precisely trying to attain that 'common', real thing to which our elementary propositions relate. (It is trying also to make provision for the proposition to 'work' even when, for example, the complex object or thing might not exist or has vanished, such that the complex proposition will have sense even though the state of affairs which the proposition pictures might, likewise, not exist, and hence the proposition be false.) The notational system is derived from the common elements of ordinary propositions and the notion of simple object is trying to attain to the subsistent and unchanging aspects of the real world which our ordinary propositions represent. Also, when we recall that Wittgenstein's fundamental concern

3This formal or logical interpretation of the simple object is close to another possible interpretation in which objects are thought of as "elements of representation," the 'somethings' we can speak about regardless of what might be the case. This position contends they are simply the unalterable behind what is alterable and we need learn nothing else about them. This attempt seems to take us no further than the text itself. (Gerd Brand, The Essential Wittgenstein, trans. Robert E. Innis [New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979], pp. 97-98.)

4Some commentators, for example, Stenius, would have "subsistent" mean only that which is "persistent in time." (E. Stenius, Wittgenstein's
was with describing the world completely in order to display what is not the world, this interpretation does not seem sufficient. It cannot bear the weight of this deeper or at least more mysterious level of the text; whereas, on the other hand, a more 'substantive' reading of these terms allows them to function in their appropriate capacities on both levels. It does no violence to their role in logical analysis and makes possible the role of logical analysis in ontological description.

We must be careful not to confine our thought of the simple or abstract object to the finer and finer aspects of an ordinary thing, (e.g., the wheels of a car, the tires of the wheel, etc.) for we are told that "Relations and properties, etc., are objects too" (NB, p. 61). An ordinary object can be anything. "This" is identical with the concept of the object" (NB, p. 61). But the simple object -- substance -- is far more elusive.

Ultimately, Wittgenstein examines whether simple objects are a pure chimera and the ordinary complex object is all that can be had. He notices that while the "world has a fixed structure" our determinations vascillate (NB, p. 62). Perhaps the simple object is only whatever I had in mind at the time of making a proposition, but that is certainly not subsistent or unchanging and could not be the substance of the world. So, he then tries to eliminate simple objects altogether and allow only the complex objects to be the final units. He thinks:

"Tractatus", a critical exposition of its main lines of thought, [Oxford: Basil Blackwell,] 1964, pp. 81-82) and hence would have objects be merely all the things that are in the world. "Subsistent," however, must mean more than this as we would then have a problem with the way in which a proposition picturing a state of affair with non-existent or extinct objects would make sense.

Max Black, among others, would not agree with this notion of the subsistent but on the grounds that "all we can really know about objects is that they exist" (M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", [Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1964], p. 57). He suggests that the simple object is most like Leibniz's monad:

The monad of which we shall here speak is merely a simple substance, which enters into composites; simple, that is say, without parts. And there must be simple substances, since there are composites; for the composite is only a collection or aggregation of simple substances. (Leibniz, Monadology, pars. 1, 2). (Ibid., p. 58).
When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components -- no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous -- and these are objects in the original sense.

If the complexity of an object is definitive of the sense of the proposition, then it must be portrayed in the proposition to the extent that it does determine the sense. And to the extent that its composition is not definitive of this sense, to this extent the objects of this proposition are simple. THEY cannot be further divided. --

The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense. (NB, p. 63).

Furthermore, "If there is a final sense and a proposition expressing it completely, then there are also names for simple objects" (NB, p. 64). But, we have already seen that it is impossible to give an example of a simple object and, without an example, it obviously cannot be named. "It always looks as if there were complex objects functioning as simples, and then also really simple ones..." (NB, p. 69).

In the end, Wittgenstein notes that the simplicity of a proposition is only constructed (NB, p. 69). The sense of a proposition may be determinate; it is not definitive.

To anyone that sees clearly, it is obvious that a proposition like "This watch is lying on the table" contains a lot of indefiniteness, in spite of its form's being completely clear and simple in outward appearance.

(NB, p. 69).

So, every ordinary proposition has about it an indefiniteness no matter how simple it is. The concrete object or thing answers the demand of a determinate sense, but the simple object or substance always accounts for the indefiniteness. Hence the substance of the world cannot be concrete objects. These compose the world as fact, but facts are not the subsistent and unchanging. The reading of substance as simply the permanently existing material world is a possible and not uncommon one. But if we mean

5We have already noted Stenius. Derek Bolton also interprets substance this way but does so by making "simple object" contrast to complex object wherein complex object is a "combination of things." He concludes that "there must be propositions whose meaning does not depend upon the truth
by this simply the conglomerate of things, it does not seem to satisfy all the requirements of Wittgenstein's use of the word substance. As an enduring conglomerate we have something which has matter (content) and form. This is akin to the traditional Aristotelian approach. But substance for Wittgenstein is an adaptation of this. It is form and content (2.025). Furthermore, as a conglomerate, substance could be said to have numerous properties, but the abstract objects that comprise substance are without properties. They are "colourless" (2.0232). Substance cannot determine any material properties (2.0231). Finally, as an enduring conglomerate, we have simply the world as fact, which can be described completely. If substance were this, there would be no need to insist on either elementary propositions or simple objects — and the notion of elementary propositions is intrinsic to the Tractatus.

Hence, while there can be many interpretations of substance, it would clearly seem to be not merely an aspect of formal analysis, not the mentally intended objects which we might have in mind when using a proposition, not the conglomerate materiality of the world, and certainly not objects in the usual sense. Within the ontological framework and the picture of language which Wittgenstein describes, it seems to be something akin to what might be called 'being'.

of any other propositions. They are about objects, but not complex ones. So, there must be simple objects." Propositions must be finally, completely resolved. It cannot always be about some other set of complexes. Hence it is about a simple that is simply not a combination of things. We must reach a final — something. (Derek Bolton, An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy [Atlantic Heights: Humanities Press, 1979], pp. 8-10).

Goddard and Judge make a great deal of the simple object being without properties. In trying to maintain the real nature of the simple object they run it through the sieve of the "property-particles" of physics and conclude that it might well be a "vector-particle." To do so they employ sense and perception, not found in the Tractatus, but on their terms, compatible with it. They relieve the object of all physical properties in order that it might "do some metaphysical work" (p. 69). While interesting, it seems that their interpretation achieves no more than one akin to the time-honored notion of 'being' which also allows objects to fulfill their metaphysical responsibilities while still being very "real." (...and what if we discover/conceive something more simple than the vector-particle?) (Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge, The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ed. Brian Ellis [Australian Journal of Philosophy Monograph Series; Suncoola: Australian Journal of Philosophy, 1981].)
To briefly summarize this rather complicated notion, objects in the abstract sense are substance pure and simple, which has possibility, also called form. When in a particular configuration or state of affairs, that is, a concrete sense, this substance/objects is here most easily recognized as common things which still/also have possibility still/also called form. In the state of affairs, as a thing, substance is changing and unstable, yet it is determinate and full of possibility for further combining with other things to form still other states of affairs — facts.

Though Wittgenstein uses the terms "objects," "things," "states of affairs," and "facts" in various combinations, never do we find objects as substance to be determined as fact, but only as a state of affairs, a state of things. Though in general "fact" and "state of affairs" are interchangeable, there is reason to distinguish between them vis-a-vis substance and things (2.034, 4.122). Thus Wittgenstein has accounted not only for the logical constitution of particular facts through the determination and possibility inherent in the things which constitute them, but also for the logical constitution of fact as such through the notion of substance as form and content, the utterly simple object.

There is no need to ask how objects as substance become concrete things in states of affairs. The world is fact. That is what we started with, existence. In dealing with objects as substance, Wittgenstein has simply sketched the logical background of the facts and, as we shall see, he has provided the foundation for the pictorial operation of language. Also, he has driven the pilings on which to support the world as a limited whole. What is possible to the world is limited to the form of substance and substance is no infinite entity. It is precisely limited in that it is unchanging and unalterable, eternal, fixed. As Wittgenstein says, "there must be objects (substance) if the world is to have an unalterable form" (2.026). Only if he were writing a treatise on meta-metaphysics would he need to account for some possible way whereby objects (abstract) became objects (concrete things). And this for him, as we shall see, would not only be nonsense, but double nonsense. As his concept of world is based on the logic of existence, the most he has to do is to account for whatever metaphysics that involves which is the constitution of determination and possibility. That is what 'objects' and 'things' are meant to supply.

There are two other aspects of objects and things under which determination and possibility can be considered. These are structure and property. Due to its form (possibility) an individual thing is able to
have a structure, to be the thing it is. Structure is the determinate way
the object is put together. Likewise, with a fact. Due to the structure
of the states of affairs which constitute a fact and the attendant possi-
bility (form) thereof, the fact also has a structure. Structure is the
particular connexion between the elements of the fact (2.032 - 2.034).

Properties divide roughly into internal and external. External
properties are also called material properties and refer to the specific
size, shape, colour, texture, etc., of a thing. These are determined not by
the substance of the thing (substance can only determine form) but by the
configuration of the objects (2.0231). In other words, as the world is
composed of facts, not things, the external or material properties are
produced only in the concrete situation in which things exist, for in
Wittgenstein's conception of the world no thing can exist on its own. Ex-
ternal properties, as we shall see, are represented by means of propositions
(2.0231). Internal properties are somewhat more complex. They lack all
representation and can only be shown or indicated. Internal properties are
also called formal properties, relations, and in regard to fact, structural
properties, and refer to the inherent possibilities of a thing, substance,
or state of affairs or fact. It is the internal properties, that whereby
substance 'configures' into things and things into facts, that one must know
if one is to know the object (2.01231). It is the internal properties which
make the thing what it is, determine it, and which are necessary to it instead
of accidental. It is the internal properties which are reflected or shown
in our propositions (4.122). The internal property is the relations within
the thing or object whereby it is what it is. Internal properties or re-
lations presume possibility and attend determination. These properties or
relations are an essential aspect of states of affairs or facts and as such,
of Wittgenstein's concept of world, though they can never be precisely de-
fined. They are equally essential to the function of language and the
concept of meaning.

Space and Time

For Wittgenstein space and time as well as other attributes of things,
like colour, are possibility. They are the form of objects (2.0251), possible
ways in which the objects can exist. This may seem strange, but it is, again,
simply a logical aspect of existence. As things exist, it is necessary that
there be space in which they can exist. It is within space that there can be
states of affairs and facts. It is impossible to imagine a thing without
space. The same is true of a thing's duration -- time. If a thing endures in space, then time is the possibility, the necessary possibility, that it can so endure. If a thing in its particular configuration has some colour, then being coloured is the possibility that is here actualized (cf., 2.0121, 2.013, 2.0131). This does not mean that there are such metaphysical entities as space, time and colour in which objects participate. Space, time and colour as form are of logical, not metaphysical, status. Space, time and colour are in this world. As form they are part of substance and things. This logical character of space and time can be seen from another perspective as well. We have already seen that things are limited, determined. If they were not, they would not be things. Space and time are the limits of a thing. They attend its determination. If a thing is, it is limited, it has limits, and to have limits precisely means to be surrounded by space, endure through time, be this colour and not that, etc. In this respect these forms are much like reality wherein what is not proceeds from what is. They are that whereby the thing is determined. At the same time, they are part of the thing. They are its limits, its boundaries. In a sense, they are the thing's what-the-thing-is-not, for, this possibility exceeds the thing. It spills over through and beyond the thing's determination and thereby provides its limits. Space and time are necessary, logically necessary, to a thing.

Wittgenstein often uses the term 'logical space' (e.g., 1.13, 2.11, 2.202, 3.4, 3.42, 4.463) and we may be inclined to think of this as something applied to logic which is analogous to that unfilled area between things which we normally think of as space. To do so, however, would be misleading. It is a central doctrine of the Tractatus that logic 'works' in the very space of the world, its substance and configuration. Because of the way logical form pervades the world (as well as language), it is my contention that we have to see the Tractatus as presenting a unitary, structural ontology. Logical space and the space of the world are one and the same.

There is surely little doubt that the Tractatus presents an ontology. In fact, most of the full-length expositions have chapters entirely devoted to the ontology of the Tractatus. See, for example, Wittgenstein by Robert J. Fogelin; Essays on Wittgenstein edited by E. D. Klemke; Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought by Eric Stenius, et al.

What seems to be less apparent and far less frequently acknowledged is the unified character of this ontology and its centrality to the entire corpus of Wittgensteinian thought. The reading of Wittgenstein presented throughout this thesis is intended to display both this unified character and this
World space is logical. Wittgenstein himself noted with a sense of amaze­
ment the way in which logic, logical notation, and the world interrelate:

How can logic — all-embracing logic, which mirrors
the world — use such peculiar crotchets and con­
trivances? Only because they are all connected
with one another in an infinitely fine network, the
great mirror (5.511).

Logical space necessarily proceeds from existence and is of the form or
possibility of that existence.

MY WORLD

My World and The World

What constitutes my world in the Tractatus is a reflection of the
world which man possesses by means of language. It is the world as I
know it, describe it, cope with it every day through the medium of
language. In the Tractatus, apparently, if man did not use language he
would simply be a part of the world and in no way different from any other
non-languaging part of the world. But since he does use language, he is
able to separate himself from the world. The world becomes an object to
him. "The world is my world: This is manifest in the fact that the limits
of language (of the language which alone I understand) mean the limits of
my world" (5.62). It is the world as object for man as subject, which con­
stitutes my world in the Tractatus. While my world might also be under­
stood as the world for man, it is not equivalent to what we might call the
Human World. For Wittgenstein, the world and my world are a dichotomous
schema connected through the intervention of logic, which, as we shall see,
pervades the world, man, and language. What I am here calling the Human

centrality. As to the unified character, however, it is worth noting in
passing that this ontology is strongly suggestive of later trends in
structuralism. See, for example, the search for the "deeper reality"
behind the workings of language and social life as found in the writing
of Marcel Mauss and George Balandier. But as structuralism is a movement
that developed after Wittgenstein and from very different roots, a dif­
ferent tradition, we would hardly want to say that this ontology was the
forerunner of it. Yet there are lines of thought that are similar and
outline the same basic approach. While I am trying to give a reading of
the descriptive ontology involved, it would be interesting to examine the
thought of both the Tractatus and The Philosophical Investigations in
relation to the structuralist material. While that is a project perhaps
suggested by this reading, it is indeed separate from this reading, and
possibly even dependent upon it.
World would be a dialogic schema connected through the intervention of subjective activity, primarily language.

**Limitations of My World**

Language, for Wittgenstein, presents a mirror image of the world. And it is this image which is my world. Thus he can say "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (5.6). What my language cannot or does not say is not a part of the world. This does not mean, however, that we do not really know about things in the world. It is not the case that there is more there about the objects of the world than I can say. Rather, my world is limited because my language is limited, and my language is limited because it is a reflection, and that which it reflects, the world, is limited. It is right and proper that my world should be limited since the world is limited.

There is, however, yet a deeper level through which the limits of my world and the limits of my language coextend. This is expressed in Wittgenstein's saying that the limits of the world are also the limits of logic (5.61). We have already seen that existence is limited necessarily, i.e., logically, for it is fact and fact is determined — limited. By the same token, as logic attaches to existence, we can see that it has limits, and its limits necessarily coincide with the limits of the world. It is in the world. The limits of logic and the limits of the world are one and the same. They proceed from one another; they are mutually generated. As language, likewise, is pervaded by logic, being a reflection of the world, the limits of my world, the world, language, and logic are all one and the same. They are all mutually coexistent and coextensive. As we shall see, in Wittgenstein's thought it is when we attempt to extend language beyond these limits that we revert to nonsense. So long as our language acts as a reflection, it submits to the limits of the world and we are assured of speaking sensibly. Hence, through my language, my world is limited according to the same limits as ascribe to logic.

Furthermore, my world is limited because in my language some things can be said and some things can be only shown (4.1212, 6.36 et al.). However, if I put the two together, then my world is complete. As complete it is limited — a limited whole. But to see this it is necessary to see the ways in which description constitutes my world. As Wittgenstein sees it, description is the way in which language reflects or mirrors the world. It is my description of the world which forms my understanding of it and makes...
the world what it is for me. My description tells me about the things of the world. It does not matter that I can describe the world in many different ways, or that I can have many different systems of description of the world, such as mechanics, physics, biology, etc. While these descriptions tell me about the facts of the world, they tell me nothing about the world as such. They tell me only that the world is able to be described in this way or that. The world can be reflected from this mirror or that mirror and some mirrors reflect more clearly than others (6.361 - 6.35). Thus my world is limited according to the quality of my description. It is limited according to how well my descriptions fit the world. Finally, my world is also limited from the perspective of description in that all of my descriptions have a further function. Corporately, they show me the world as such. They make manifest the limits of the world by showing or making manifest the limits of its logic. What all descriptions have in common -- that whereby they fit the world and thereby display its limits much like a thing's-being-determined displays what the thing is not -- is logic. My descriptions reveal the all-pervasive logic of the world and this manifestation of the world together with what my descriptions say about the objects of the world set limits to my world by making it a complete, and thereby limited, reflection.

Solipsism and the Self

As logic is in the world and has the same delineations as the world, and since my world is my own reflection of this state of affairs, given by my language, it is easy enough to conclude that my world is actually a solipsistic construction. It is personally mine and only mine. My world is impenetrable by any other and every other's world is impenetrable by me. The meaning of solipsism, Wittgenstein says, is quite correct (5.62).

(There is a deeper level at which solipsism is overcome, and that is at what I earlier suggested was the level of ontological unity via the logical pervasion of all things, but for now we are concerned only for what truth there is in solipsism.) The problem is, and this is one facet of the fundamental problem with which Wittgenstein is wrestling in the Tractatus, that this meaning of solipsism cannot be said. In actual fact, my world is impenetrable for me. Not only can no other enter my world; I cannot exit my world. Since I cannot transcend the limits of my world it is impossible that I be able to be in any position delineated by more expansive limits from which I can speak of my world in contrast to any other world. As my
world arises from my language and has the same limits as my language, solipsism is an undeniable, inherent result. But this can only be understood because it is shown, made manifest, by the fact that the limits of my world are the limits of my language. There is much which can be seen to be the case, but which the mutual limitations of the world, language and logic make impossible to express (5.61 - 5.62).

At this point the force of Wittgenstein's ontological structure, his unity through logic, begins to appear. "The world and life are one," he says (5.621). While a subject-object dichotomy has been produced by language in the construction of my world as a reflection of the world, on a deeper level, in that realm whereby one is a reflection of the other, there is only unity. As we proceed, it should become clear that this basic underlying unity is the key to the Tractatus. It is the foundation for the concept of the world as a limited whole. It is the nexus in which the world, meaning, and language are all united, at-oned. We could say of his statement that the world and life are one, that he means the world for me, my world, is one with my life since it comes about only through my life activity of language. And that is true. But to leave it there is to interpret these thoughts primarily as foundational statements for solipsism. While Wittgenstein was indeed sympathetic to solipsism, he also rejected it in favor of "pure realism," and hence the deeper, ontological level to be noted here.

To stop at mere solipsism is to fail to understand the way in which my world is a reflection of the world. It is by being a single structural unit, all logical, that this is the case. It is by my and the world's -- together -- forming one fact, so to speak, to which logic applies, that ~world~ bears the intimate relation of reflection to the world. Only from this level of ontological unity does Wittgenstein conclude that man is a microcosm:

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8An example of such an interpretation is to be found in Robert J. Cavalier, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 139-144. Fogelin also notices this as a possible reading. (R. Fogelin, op. cit., pp. 84-86)

9This notion of a unified coherent structure bound together by a common element is not a new one. It is as old and venerable as the Presocratics and is especially reminiscent of Heraclitus. It has been summarized by Kirk and Raven in the notion: "Men should try to comprehend the underlying coherence of things: it is expressed in the Logos, the formula or element of arrangement common to all things." Or, in translation of Fragment 50, Hippolytus Ref. IX, 9, 1: "Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one." (G.S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, A Critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge: The University Press, 1957), pp. 187-188.)
"I am my world" (5.63).

Furthermore, it is from what I am contending to be this deep ontological basis that the Tractatus denies the subject-object dichotomy within the human being. Like solipsism, the subject is something else we cannot say, we cannot speak about. It becomes evident, it makes itself manifest. It is ever-present throughout our report of our body, our will, etc., but it cannot be really be isolated. It seems to be ever-present with our knowledge of things, and yet in a very real and important sense there is no subject which "thinks and entertains ideas" which is apart from the object of our bodies (5.631). What is thought of as the subject is not part of the world (5.641, 5.632), and does not belong to the world (5.632). Rather, it is a limit of the world (5.632). We have already seen that all limits are one. The subject is not some psychological entity attached to our body, our thought, our will, etc. It is not an accompanying shadow. Rather, it is one with them. If we must think of it, we do best to do so as a limit. It is what is common to all of them by their very being, and common to the world and language and my world, as well. It is always contemporary with my body and my world. It is always at the edge of my world, with it, everything present to it and present to everything. From this perspective can Wittgenstein say that "solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it (5.64)."

10Some commentators seem to be troubled by the fact that this subject seems to be "stripped of all human qualities: it has no body, no organs of sense, no point of view in the world. Rather the subject is transcendental; it knows an absolute world, not by any kind of interaction. Regarded in this light, the Tractatus pays a high price for solving the problem of knowledge; indeed, in an important sense the problem is not solved, insofar as it was a problem for human beings, not for a transcendental subject." (Bolten, op. cit., p. 78). There would seem to be no reason to presume that this metaphysical subject is apart from the human being, for in the end, as we shall see, it is precisely in its capacity as a human being that it experiences 'the mystical', that it sees the world 'aright' and has its problems solved. Or, put otherwise, it is in the mystical, having gone to the limits of itself, as it were, that the self of philosophy (which is not the human being, human body, or human soul with which psychology deals (5.641)) and the human person are united, for it is in this experience that the world is seen "sub specie aeterni," as a "limited whole," and it is in this that the human riddles cease to exist. There, too, is a loss of the self in the ordinary sense of individual ego, whereas in the metaphysical self this is simply not found. It is, as it were, lost in the unity, in merging with the larger whole, with what is, but whether
This statement could be taken to be equivalent to the scholastic concept of the knower becoming one with the object known. It might be said that there are many degrees of awareness of oneself, one's body, actions, etc., in the act of knowing, but even in daily, common experience when involved in concentration that which is known or that upon which one is concentrating becomes the only reality present to the self. It takes over the field of conscious awareness. The self has indeed "shrunk," and for all practical purposes the knower and the object known are so united as to have become one, be that object another self, a thing, or a fact. The scholastic notion is deeper than the overtaking of the field of awareness.

In the scholastic notion, the act of knowing can in fact produce a sort of fusion of being or a degree of union of natures. For Wittgenstein neither common experience nor the scholastic notion of union through knowledge is the basis for the "shrinkage" of the self and the coordination with the reality. Rather, the basis of this being so for Wittgenstein is that their limits are the same. All that is, is one in logic.

The self is conscious and knows itself as the limit; at the same time it is not separate. Only if the notion of the self in the ego sense (which is seen by Wittgenstein as mere illusion anyway) is frightening or unpleasant is the loss "costly." The mystical will be discussed later, but it is worth noting here simply that the self is not separate from the human body; it cannot be talked about in the way psychology does (cf. 5.641), nor is it the individual, separate, and limited ego which psychology might mean by the self.

This is a high price to pay perhaps depends upon one's personal values. From some perspectives it is seen as liberation -- and this might indeed have been the case for Wittgenstein. For, here was a man who even in external ways seemed to seek a oneness with things. (Even in going to the movies he sat in the front row in order to be one with the action!) The self is conscious and knows itself as the limit; at the same time it is not separate. Only if the notion of the self in the ego sense (which is seen by Wittgenstein as mere illusion anyway) is frightening or unpleasant is the loss of the self "costly." The mystical will be discussed later, but it is worth noting here simply that the self is not separate from the human body; it cannot be talked about in the way psychology does (cf. 5.641), nor is it the individual, separate, and limited ego which psychology might mean by the self.

Gilson states this scholastic position, "to know another being is to become it immaterially." (Etienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy [New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1963], p. 261.)

There is a difference in translations of the same sentence in the Notebooks (p. 43) and the Tractatus (5.1362). The former reads: "--the connexion between knowledge and thing known is the connexion of logical necessity." The latter speaks not of "the thing known" but of "what is known" and does not emphasize "the." The Notebooks translation would seem to be more helpful in regard to this epistemological aspect of solipsism wherein logic is the unifying element.
the self is both necessary and unavoidable. "What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'... The philosophical self is...the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world — not a part of it" (5.641).

Nowhere in the Tractatus does Wittgenstein speak of consciousness, but were he to do so, it would surely be in relation to the concept of logic whereby the self is a limit. The function of logic within the world and man might be said to be parallel to 'pure' consciousness.13 It is the common

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13This is related to Maslow's idea that "Wittgenstein's 'solipsism'... points to the impossibility of stating the limits of significant language by the propositions of language itself. I feel that Wittgenstein here is very close to Kant," Maslow continues, "with the 'I' in his world playing the same role that 'Transcendental Unity of Apperception' plays in Kant's phenomenal world, namely, 'that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception...'. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearance according to concepts, that is, according to rules' (Critique of Pure Reason, A17-08). Again, 'The abiding and unchanging "I" (pure apperception) form the correlate of all our representations... ' (op. cit., A123)." (Alexander Maslow, Wittgenstein's Tractatus [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961], pp. 149-150).

Whether the self of solipsism is related to Kant's notion in this regard, or is conscious through the structure of logic and the world soul which we shall refer to later, it would seem to be through relation to logic as limit that it will be able to shrink to the extensionless point and there remain the reality coordinated with it (5.64). It is in being 'pure consciousness' as opposed to having only 'consciousness of' this or that data that the self can know itself as the limit of the world, even experience what is correct in solipsism, without at the same time being a "subject which thinks and entertains ideas," for there is no such thing (5.631). The subject is not apart from the world. "'The world is my world'" (5.641).

It is in this way, too, that there is no need to think of the metaphysical self as a "totality of propositions" as does Hintikka nor is there any need to defend Wittgenstein against overlooking "the possibility (and necessity) of a subject's direct self-consciousness." (1. Copi and R. Beard (eds.), Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus [New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966], pp. 160 and 159 respectively.) Along with logic, and ultimately ethics and aesthetics as well, consciousness could be said to pervade all things, or at least to pervade all things whose/which form is such that they are to manifest as having consciousness. The concept of consciousness goes along with the notion of the self which is logical.

Furthermore, the admission of some concept of consciousness intimately connected with logic accounts for the self being able to know, not only with the passive knowledge of acquaintance (kennen) which some (e.g., Bolten) think is the only kind of knowledge to be found in the Tractatus, but also
limit of logic which proceeds from and pervades all existence. It is that
whereby the world, my world, and life are all one (5.621, 5.63). It is
that which is so present to all my knowledge, so pervades my world, that
I cannot distinguish it either from my self or from the objects of my
world, for as an essential attribute of existence, it is in the world. It
is everywhere. And, as we should expect by now, it, too, is something of
which we cannot speak. It makes itself manifest (4.12-4.121).

This same point of the self as a limit through logic (related/paral-
lel to consciousness) can be seen in the idea that the 'experience' that
something is, is not an experience. With logic, it is prior to experience
(5.552). That something is, is tantamount to the existence of one's
self, or to consciousness, logic, limit, or being, which attends the self.

This consciousness is prior to and persists through its activity as con-
sciousness of, which is nothing more nor less than its reflecting the world
in which it is, thereby creating my world.

Both dualism and monism, as philosophical positions, are denied within
the Tractatus (4.128). In order to ascertain either dualism or monism one
would have to be outside the world, and man is very much within it. It was
dualism which seemed to cause Wittgenstein the greatest concern,14 but within
the Tractatus it is specifically denied as we have seen. It would seem in
fact that Wittgenstein's own view, while not a monism, was very much a

with the more active, objective knowledge (wissen). With it "the whole
metaphysics of the Tractatus" is "not as Bolten suggests, "deeply anti-
thetical to any coherent and valid concept of self." (Derek Bolten, op.
cit., pp. 32 and 33 respectively). Rather we need consciousness of or about
something external and a sort of pure consciousness in which consciousness
simply knows itself, knows consciousness as such, as it exists not only in
oneself but in all creation. (This notion of consciousness and the know-
ledge of itself which it implies is not preposterous, as it might first
appear. It is, rather, similar to the Logos doctrine held by the Stoics.)
Insofar as we might be reminded of consciousness by Wittgenstein's notion
of logic, we can see that it is through logic in us and the external world
that we can focus on a thing.

14 "It is the dualism, positive and negative facts, that give me no peace.
For a dualism can't exist. But how to get away from it? All this would get
solved of itself if we understood the nature of a proposition." (NB, p. 33)
We find, for example, both within the Notebooks and among the statements found with but not incorporated in the Prototractatus the following statement: "How everything stands is God. God is how everything stands." Such a statement is crucial for understanding Wittgenstein's understanding of the ontology which he presented, but such a statement could not be said from within the world and therefore was best omitted from the text. The ontology which could make manifest such an appreciation was quite another matter, and so we find emerging within the Tractatus a view far more interesting and complex than either philosophical monism or dualism. There is no monism or dualism because there is a multiplicity of facts held together by logic. There is a unitary ontology. This ontology is made intelligible by the establishment of a tripartite schema in which there exists the human body as part of fact, part of the world, together with the self or metaphysical subject which is not part of the world but a limit of it by means of the pervasion and limits of logic in all things. Diagramatically this might be expressed in the

15 This unifying tendency is noted by Bolten as the lack of dualism and given prominence in the following manner: "In the Tractatus...dualism is conspicuous by its absence. This is a fact crucial for the understanding of the place of the Tractatus in the modern tradition. The Tractatus does contain allusions to the distinction between mind and matter, for instance in the distinction between thoughts that are, and thoughts that are not, expressed in signs perceptible to the senses (3.1), and there are casual references to body and mind (e.g., in 5.641); but dualism has no central role in the metaphysics, in marked contrast with previous modern philosophy." (Bolten, op. cit., p. 53).

16 The entries immediately following the lines quoted above further support this monistic understanding: "Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion -- science -- and art. And this consciousness is life itself." (NB, p. 79)

17 See Wittgenstein's Prototractatus, p. 239

18 We also find curious and fascinating statements on the parallelism between one's spirit and the world as well as statements asserting the identity of spirit in all living things and "a will that is common to the whole world" (NB, p. 82). Furthermore: "There really is only one world soul, which I for preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive what I call the souls of others" (NB, p. 49).
following series wherein the shaded area represents logic, the triangles the objects of the world, the entire used areas the world as a limited whole, the circle the self, and the stick man the human body.

The World as Fact

My World

Ontological Structure

Logic permeates existence

My world is the reflection of the fact. Logic and the self are only made manifest. They are not seen, said.

Logic, body, and the self are the operational triad within a limited whole.

Relativity of My World

The metaphysical subject is not contingent, though as we shall see in the case of the happy man, it is relative. It is necessary, prior to, the limit of. A limit is a limit even though what is within the limits might change and the location of the limit might change. The limit is without extension within itself though it can be extended. Our concern here is both with what is within the limits and with the location of the limits. This absolute quality of the metaphysical subject is not the case for the world of the metaphysical subject. In the world nothing is a priori in its order (5.634). That things are is one thing; the way things are is another. "Whatever we see could be other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is" (5.634). Though facts are determinate, they are also contingent. Everything within the world is accidental (6.41). It could be or not be, it could be this way or that way. Its determination only means that if it is, it is some way. It is this contingency of fact which accounts in part for the relativity of my world. My reflection of the world, my world, is one of the ways things are. As we shall see in regard to language and meaning, it is only in the realm of contingency, of possibility, that my propositions reflect the world and mean anything.
It might be thought that natural law would mitigate this utter accidentality of the world but that, for Wittgenstein, cannot be the case. "There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity" (6.37). The laws of nature or causal laws are not explanations of natural phenomena. We cannot depend upon their necessity to explain anything, for they have no necessity in themselves (6.371, 6.372). As the only necessity is logical necessity, that is the only necessity which attaches to anything. Of course it will be the case that things in existence will follow set patterns of behaviour but those patterns are what proceed from logic's pervasion of the world, from the very logic involved in their existence, not from something called causal or natural laws. We, however, being within the world have no sure way of knowing this. As we shall see, we would have to be outside the world to know this. Hence, everything that happens in the world, happens accidentally (6.41). Because logic pervades the world it just so happens that what happens appears to be according to some law or other and can be so described. However, it need not be so described. As we have seen, there are many systems of description. My world is relative as it is a reflection of what happens. It is not a reflection of the logical necessity underlying those happenings. Of that I can say nothing. It is not a part of my world.

It is because of this lack of causal connection that Wittgenstein can say the world is independent of my will (6.373). There can be no causal connection between my will and the world. This, likewise, accounts for the relativity of my world. I have no internal means of controlling what happens. If something happens as I wish, it is, says Wittgenstein, "a favour granted by fate, so to speak" (6.374). One might say that anything which I might alter by means of technology must ultimately be done so by subscribing to logical necessity and/or impossibility, for it is these which permeate my language and thereby regulate my rational activity in regard to the world. But once I have changed the world by such means, the world is still accidental or relative in its altered state, just as it was while I 'worked' upon it, and hence my world is likewise still only relative, contingent, accidental.

There is, however, a deeper level on which the exercise of my will does alter my world, though not the world. That is by the good or bad exercise of the will altering me, my self, and thereby changing the limit of my world. It is in this that we find that the limit of the self is better thought of, metaphorically, as a quantitative limit rather than a
spatial one. It is more like the rim of a bucket than the boundary line of outer space. It sets the amount which my world can be. The exercise of my will does not affect the fact of the world which can be expressed by means of language and hence does not change the kind of world, reflection, which my world is, but it does change the quality of the metaphysical subject. It, so to speak, sets its limit at a different level and hence the worlds of different people differ from one another. From this perspective one's own world can also differ at different times according to the particular quality of the subject at those times. My world is relative to my own state of being as a subject or self. It is in this way that the world can "wax and wane as a whole" and that "the world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man (6.43). The condition of man and of the reflector of the world (language) changes and hence the reflection is altered. My self, remember, is utterly coordinated with my world.

Finally, my world is relative to the duration of my life. It lasts as long as I, the metaphysical subject, last, as long as I am able to use language to reflect the world. My death does not change my world, it ends it (6.431). When the limits are lifted, there is nothing left. What is, is limited, and without its limits it is not. Furthermore, just as the experience that something is, is not an experience, so, too, death is no experience. There can be no anterior to the limits; there can be no posterior to the limits. In this sense the present is eternal, timeless, and "eternal life belongs to those who live in the present" (6.431). Here again we see that for Wittgenstein the meaning of such things as life, death, time, etc., rests not on objective knowledge of them but on the deeper ontology which constitutes them, that is, on what manifests itself to be the case due to the logical pervasion of what is. Nor is my death an item about which I can have objective

19 This simile surely brings to mind the similarities between Kant and Wittgenstein. Kant speaks of our reason resembling a sphere which itself fixes the limits of what we can know (A752/B791). (Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962], pp. 607-608.) We might note that while there is much discussion on the interrelationship of these two thinkers, there is also hesitation in relating the two. An example of this is to be found in Bartley's Wittgenstein wherein the point is made that the Tractatus is actually pre-Kantian, for pre-Kantian thought "assumed that some sort of harmony existed between the human mind and the external world so that the human mind could...apprehend the nature of reality." (William Warren Bartley III, op. cit., p. 46.) It is this pre-Kantian position which most resembles Wittgenstein's ontology.
knowledge. Death seems to be the end of life. Rather, it is really the end of my world, for the world and life are one (6.431-6.4311, 5.621). All limits are one. If one goes, they all go. There is all -- or nothing. Our death changes the ontological structure. In terms of our diagram, when the limit of the self is taken away, it is not the case that my world remains, but only the world as fact.

Having just spoken of objective knowledge, it might be appropriate at this point to briefly note the types of knowledge found in the *Tractatus* as their importance will emerge later. By objective knowledge I mean knowledge about something, a knowledge directed on objects, facts, or information. Wittgenstein uses this notion (wissen) when speaking of understanding that something is the case (e.g., 3.24, 5.024, 5.156, 6.36311), when speaking of inference or reasoning (e.g., 3.05, 4.461, 5.1362, 5.5562, 6.33), and in reference to the propositions of natural science (6.3211, 6.34). Wissen refers to the rational, 'intellectual' type knowledge of analytic and scientific thought. Wissen is that type of knowledge out of which we construct frameworks and theories which in turn become 'objectified' and often misunderstood.

The knowledge of acquaintance (kennen) is that which is had by means of interaction or exposure to someone or something. It is somewhat intuitive and 'feels' almost innate. If I am well acquainted with Mr. Jones, I need not ask, when returning from lunch, who closed the windows, who stacked the books, who put out the lights. These are things that Jones would have done. I know such things by virtue of knowing him. Wittgenstein uses knowledge in this sense of acquaintance when speaking of knowing the properties and potentialities of things (2.0123, 2.01231), in the sense of recognition (4.021) and in the sense of 'firsthand' knowledge wherein things cannot be mistaken.

20This notion is reminiscent of Heidegger's "being towards death." It is clearly not grounded on the fact that all men are mortal and therefore, objectively, I know I will die.


22As Wittgenstein has us knowing forms (cf. 2.0123, 2.01231) by means of acquaintance, we might think at times that his epistemology is somewhat Platonic though we have said his metaphysics is more Aristotelian. This epistemological flavor is especially seen in the *Notebooks* citation, p. 31.
one for another because to know one is to know it is not the other (4.243, 6.2322).

The third member of the German family of words "to know," können, is not used in the Tractatus. It is knowledge of how to do something -- how to speak a language, how to ride a bicycle. It is skill. These types of knowledge are obscured in English as they are all translated simply as "know."

This distinction in types of knowledge becomes fundamental to my thesis as we approach the notion of "the mystical." In relation to this, objective knowledge is not of the fundamental sort and, as the German language has no verb for a mystical type of knowledge, both wissen and kennen will be subsumed under the Greek notion of dianoia while the cognitive aspect of "the mystical," a direct experience with cognitive content, will become noesis. Clearly this is more akin to kennen than wissen. It might be argued that mystical knowledge is a deeper, perhaps the deepest, level of acquaintance, and from some perspectives that is not untrue, but insofar as both kennen and wissen apply to our everyday, analytic, operative ways of knowing commonplace, functional things, facts, and events, they are, together, distinguished from knowledge of the mystical sort, which as we shall see is neither 'peculiar' nor 'extraordinary'.

23My difficulty surely consists in this: in all the propositions that occur to me there occur names which, however, must disappear on further analysis. I know that such a further analysis is possible, but am unable to carry it out completely. In spite of this I certainly seem to know that if the analysis were completely carried out, its result would have to be a proposition which once more contained names, relations, etc. In brief it looks as if in this way I know a form without being acquainted with any single example of it. (Emphasis mine.)

The distinction in kinds of knowledge and the implications that it ultimately holds for the experience of the mystical would seem to have been completely overlooked in some of the current treatments of the Tractatus. Hacker, for instance, concludes that Wittgenstein has only a correspondence theory of knowledge and that "This makes all knowledge rest on recognition of agreement or disagreement between elementary propositions and atomic states of affairs." (Hacker, op. cit., p. 56).

24In speaking of types of knowledge I in no way wish to suggest that the Tractatus is to be interpreted as primarily an epistemological study. Rather, its thrust is primarily ontological. As Bartley points out, Wittgenstein has not even gone so far as to say that objects must be objects of human knowledge, but only that they necessarily exist if language is to work, and
OUTSIDE THE WORLD
Appearance and Status

We have seen that reality displays the logical aspects of existence in its being both positive and negative. We have also seen that space is a logical aspect of existence. If something is, it is in space. Furthermore, we have seen many things which Wittgenstein designates as being in the world - fact, object, language, logic, limit, etc. It is not surprising then to find a concept somewhat analogous to that of reality, which displays the logical correlate of 'in the world'. Just as something's being the thing it is, also determines what it is not, so, too, if there is an 'in the world', it is logically necessary that there be an 'outside the world'. Without both aspects of the world which proceed from the logic of existence, neither aspect has any meaning. We have seen that the world as a whole, the complete fact, like every fact, is determined. It is limited. This very limitedness likewise logically necessitates the concept of 'world' having about it the feature 'outside the world'. Whatever is outside the world is whatever is not in the world. It is whatever is in no way a part of the world or my world. It is what is external to them both - beyond the limits. Of course, we can say nothing about 'outside the world', since logic does not go beyond the limits of the world (5.61). We can only understand, logically, that it is. It is logically apparent. In order to talk about 'outside the world' - meaningfully -- we would have to be outside the world, but then of course logic would not be outside the world. This logical appearance, like every logical necessity and contradiction, lacks meaning in our speech and it cannot be meaningfully discussed according to Wittgenstein.

hence, "The Tractatus is...a work in logic and ontology, not in the theory of knowledge." (William Warren Bartley III, op. cit., p. 45.)

25 Though the world is fact, I would see no reason at all to place outside the world 'whatever is not a fact,' as does Morrison. For him this includes logical and pictorial form, the subject, all linguistic meaning, and "presumably," he says, "we should also have to say this of objects." (James C. Morrison, Meaning and Truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus [The Hague: Mouton, 1968], p. 138). To draw this conclusion seems to overlook that within the facts of the world are things which make themselves manifest. They are not themselves facts as such and cannot be put into words or represented in language, but they can be known, some of them even with a priori knowledge, and it is hard to see how something like logical form could function as it does if it is outside the world.
As we shall see in regard to meaning and language, what is and what we can depict are totally in the realm of (actual) possibility. (Tautology and contradiction occupy no space in either reality or our propositions.) What is, and possibility, go together in Wittgenstein in contradistinction to our tendency to relate what is to actuality and to relate possibility to what could be but either is or may not be, i.e., potentiality. It is because of the possibility in things that our language is able to depict and have meaning. One might think that if there is an outside the world, then possibility is there, and we ought to be able to talk about it, but that is not the case as logic does not extend there, for the logic that enables meaningful language must, so to speak, pervade all involved units concomitantly. As we are not outside the world, and the limits of the self, one with the limits of logic, do not extend there, talking about 'outside the world' as opposed to understanding that it is, is impossible. There can be no objective knowledge of outside the world, though we can objectively see in this schema that it must exist.

Furthermore, we have no means of proving the truth of any of the things which make their appearance through logic, i.e., which make themselves manifest as 'outside the world', in that our propositions about them are not replicas which we can lay against reality as a measure. Nonetheless, it is impossible to doubt their existence. This is the structural force of the presence of logic. There can be doubt only where there is the possibility of error, the possibility of something's not being true. But this possibility is not present in regard to 'outside the world' both for the reason stated above, i.e., we have no 'measure', and for the reason that what logic makes manifest is necessarily, absolutely, true. The manifestation arises out of the very substance of which tautology and contradiction are made. It arises from within logic itself if we were to imagine logic as some entity. Not being some entity, however, it is part of existence. It is in this respect that 'outside the world' is more than a mere logical correlate of 'in the world'. It has ontological actuality. It is a logically essential attribute of the world. As such, it is an essential part of Wittgenstein's understanding of the world and we can now complete our series of diagrams with the following:
Outside the World

Rationale of the World

Within the world there is no rationale for the world. In the world everything simply is as it is. Everything happens as it does happen. "The sense of the world must lie outside the world" (6.41). We can ask for no purpose, no grand schema, for two reasons: there is no such thing within the world, neither the question nor the answer can depict anything; and if there is such a sense to the world, it is outside the world where we are not and for that reason also can neither ask nor answer such a question. There is no self, no logic, no limit out there to provide the possibility whereby our question or answer could have meaning.

Just as the sense of the world lies outside the world, so too, does value. There is no value within the world. If there were value of the world in the world, because it would be in the world, it would have no value. If there is value anywhere, it is outside the world, not in it where things happen and are the case (6.41). Finally, the same is true of any predestination or non-accidentality which we might expect to hold true of the world. We are forced to say that all that happens and is the case within the world is accidental. If anything were predetermined it would not be so.

26Thoughts of this sort cannot but remind us of the contemporary fact/value discussions. Fact in Wittgenstein can be known. It is in the world; it is the world. Value, on the other hand, cannot be known as it is outside the world. But "value" here is more related to the fact aspect of the discussion in that here fact is what is and value is the worth or 'goodness' of what is. Value in the sense of "ought," as we shall see, is ultimately a harmony with the structure or order of what is. Hence, there is no fact/value distinction, but from this perspective it also is difficult to say so definitively that all value lies outside the world.
for us. We could never know it and we could never say it, just as we could never know or say what it would be which would make it non-accidental. If we could know and say it, it would be in the world and therefore non-non-accidental. If there is something whereby the world is non-accidental, it must lie outside the world (6.41).

Perhaps to emphasize the word "if" (if there is value, if there is sense to the world, if there is something which makes it non-accidental) is to give Wittgenstein's view a far too Sartrean flavour. Actually, there is no hint of despair in this view. Wittgenstein never seems to doubt that there is sense and value and something which makes the world all non-accidental. This seems to be an automatic, authentic by-product, not a logical conclusion but a logical view or feeling, resulting naturally from the logical pervasion of all things. Yet, because, that whereby the world is non-accidental, sense and value, are so utterly unattainable, outside the world, some shadow of the Sartrean courage seems to remain.

The lack of despair and the lack of doubt, and hence the shadow of courage remain primarily because Wittgenstein, though unable to talk about God or any explanatory 'function' we might normally call God, is logically compelled to recognize such possibility outside the world. God does not reveal himself within the world and what happens here is of "complete indifference for what is higher" (6.432). God, too, is completely separate, completely Other. Unattainable. Even with or in logic he does not make himself manifest. Logic manifests only itself and things within the limits (and we are a necessary limit wherein the manifestation can occur). God may be that whereby the world may be non-accidental, but this can never be said to be so from our perspective within the world. There is no way of knowing whether this is so or not. Yet, the feeling or presumption that it is, is quite permissible.

If Wittgenstein were able to talk of God, his ontological view, complete as it is with an 'outside the world', would in some ways be remarkable similar to that of Descartes, for, after all, in a very real way Descartes' dualism dissolves in the Fifth Meditation into an ontological structural unity. The reason for certainty is ultimately not that we are unable to doubt even if something is seen clearly and distinctly, but that God so made all things, including the human intellect, such that what we perceive to be certain is in fact, true and certain. The structure, the way things are, because of the way God is (all good and unable to deceive us), is what makes certainty certain and truth true. In the Tractatus, if we could speak of
God, it would surely be his responsibility for the existence of things whereby they are pervaded by logic that accounts for certainties and contradictions and meaning in our thought and language as well as that whereby what we are able to say actually fits what is the case. It would be God whereby the world and my world are non-accidental. Since God-talk is prohibited, the most that can be said is that the source of sense and value and that whereby what is, is non-accidental, lies outside the world. This is not only the unspeakable though essential part of the ontological structure, it is the formative and explanatory aspect as well.

The Transcendentals

The idea of the 'transcendental' takes some peculiar twists in the Tractatus. We might normally think of "transcendental" as having to do with "transcendent" in the sense of "coming across," approaching, while at the same time being distant, different, even mighty and stupendously awesome. This notion of transcendent, particularly as it applies to God, is commonly found in most religious traditions and is perhaps most pronounced in those strains of Christian thought that emphasize the Gift of the Spirit which actually assimilates us to God. Wittgenstein's approach would seem to understand a transcendent God as completely other, non-approaching and non-approachable, in no way "coming across." He does not 'come across' into the world or my world. So, too, with everything else outside the world. For Wittgenstein that is what makes there be an outside the world. What is there stays there and what is within the world stays within the world. "Transcendental" for Wittgenstein has about it the aspect of "coming across" or "through" all things within the world. He speaks of

27 It is interesting to speculate that this notion of God as so completely unapproachable might be one reason why "to pray," for Wittgenstein, was "to think about the meaning of life" (NB, p. 73). Prayer was not to a God, it was not discursive. In fact, "The meaning of life, i.e., the meaning of the world, we can call God" (NB, p. 73) and "To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning" (NB, p. 74).

28 Here again we find similarities but no strict parallelism to Kant. For Kant the 'transcendent' can never be an object of experience and, therefore, there can be no such thing as transcendent knowledge. We can not know the transcendent. Transcendental, on the other hand, concerns "the necessary conditions of our experience," (A. C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938], pp. 25 and 68.) and transcendental knowledge is the primary theme of the Critique.
three things as being transcendental. These are logic, ethics, and aesthetics (6.13, 6.421). The most prominent of these is logic which plays a very special role in the scheme of things.

Since logic is transcendental and not outside the world, its transcendence occurs in the form of the logical pervasion of all things within the world. It comes across in all that is. Logic is in objects, abstract and concrete, including persons; it is within the facts formed by such objects; and it is within language. Logic and the whole world go together and are inseparable. We can't have one without the other. Wittgenstein seems to enjoy saying that it can be put in the following rather inverted manner: "If there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic given that there is a world" (5.5521). In short, everything is "constructed according to a common logical pattern" (4.014).

In a sense the permeation of logic in all things can be seen as the continual presence of an absolute-relative paradox within the world. This is its special and peculiar role in the scheme of things. Logic, not God, is the non-accidental aspect of existence manifested everywhere in the relative, objective world. It is the 'absolute' which permeates and subsists in the accidental and is in fact what accounts for the possibility whereby it is in fact accidental. It of course is not absolute in the sense that it does not account for itself. It is not that whereby it is within the world and therefore not that whereby the world is non-accidental. That we have seen to be God or value or something outside the world. Logic manifests itself, and only from the manifestation do we understand anything beyond or outside logic. That understanding is only that there is an outside and is of some of the things which must be there if they are anywhere at all, for they clearly cannot be inside the world. Logic does not manifest that whereby it is. ("God does not reveal himself in the world" (6.432)).

One wonders at this point, if not before, if there is not some external reason why we cannot here make the natural explanatory conclusion that God does manifest himself in the world in the presence of logic. After all, is this not equivalent in articulated form to the imperative ontological structure presented by there being an outside the world together with the presumption of Pure Reason. In the Tractatus, the transcendentalts are not conditions, they are ontological components and while we have objective knowledge of neither the transcendent nor the transcendentalts, the transcendentalts make themselves manifest.
that an explanation lies there? Yes. That was part of the point of the operational triad which is perhaps the most accurate description of what is actually going on in the ontology of the Tractatus. So we must look for the external reason why God, even God in the world manifest as logic, cannot be talked about. We will see in regard to language that the force of Wittgenstein’s model of propositions as pictures can indeed provide such a reason. Nothing about logic in itself can be put into words -- either. It is merely manifest.

From this discussion of logic, we can see why "transcendence" has not its ordinary meaning in the Tractatus. It has new criteria. The criteria for being transcendental seem to be: to be in the world; not able to be articulated; and to make itself manifest. This combination is true of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, and of nothing else. The metaphysical self might at first appear to be an exception to these criteria but ultimately it is not, for it is a limit of the world and as such is one with logic. It can be said to be individuated logic as it is found within the human person and human knowledge as opposed to logic in general as it pervades all things. It is logic as manifested in the relation between knower and the object known.29

Ethics and aesthetics do fulfill the above criteria. They are in this world and cannot be put into words (6.42, 6.421).30 "Propositions can express nothing that is higher" (6.42). Ethics is higher in the same way that logic is — it permeates all things and is present in our action just as logic is present in our knowledge and language and thought. Yet it cannot

29This is not unrelated to Wittgenstein saying that "the connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity" (5.162).

30Eddy Zemach notes in his essay "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of the Mystical" besides 6.421 (Ethics and aesthetics are one), "No other mention of aesthetics is made in the Tractatus... The author of the Tractatus presumably relied on the fact that "those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed" in the Tractatus [preface] are, no doubt, familiar also with the writings of Schopenhauer, and thus will understand the reference to the latter’s theory of art. For Schopenhauer, art, like philosophy, can bring man to see the ‘Ideas’, the eternal forms, the observation of which is the only non-frustrating occupation man can engage in. This theory of aesthetics is very close to what Wittgenstein thought to be the basic truth of ethics.... Ethics is the theory of how man’s life [the world] should be conducted, that is, how one should look at the world...if he is to be happy.” (Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.), op. cit., p. 373.) Zemach further states that "The aesthetic is the expression of the mystical, i.e. the factuality of facts. Ethics and
be the case that ethics deals only with action while logic deals only with language. Rather, they are both concomitant with the world. As Wittgenstein says in the Notebooks: "Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic" (p. 77). Ethics is that whereby an action is good or bad, reward-itive or punitive, in itself (6.422). It is, we are told, one and the same with aesthetics (6.421).

At this point we can see that within the world there is no distinction, no dichotomy, between fact and value, for within the world there is only fact. Value lies outside the world. But as ethics and aesthetics are transcendental, permeate the world, pervade it as does logic, that which we normally think of as value is manifest along with their making themselves manifest. This is not to say that the value of the world as a whole is made manifest. Again, that remains outside the world, but ethics and aesthetics manifest as value, i.e., good, beautiful, harmonious, etc.

From some perspectives it is difficult to know what to do with this notion which does not reduce both ethics and aesthetics to a matter of personal choice and decision, the basis of which is one's own cultural background. After all, one cannot argue about taste, and taste is usually determined by that to which we've grown accustomed, by our peculiar acculturation as concerns beauty and goodness. This may seem quite amenable to the author of the Philosophical Investigations but to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus who makes ethics and aesthetics transcendental along with logic — which is a matter of ontology, not acculturation — it would seem to be anything but the case. As ethics and aesthetics are conditions of the world, the thoroughly good or ethical life or action is indeed beautiful and anything of beauty is indeed ethical, for both are in accordance with the way the world is, i.e., they fulfill its conditions. Thus they are related to aesthetics are the same. They are man's expression of wonder as he, the willing I, encounters the mystical: the existence of the world....They are the infinite acceptance of that which is, as it is." (Ibid., p. 375.)

Whether Wittgenstein did actually have in mind Schopenhauer's theory of art, though probable, is hard to say but that aesthetics should be intrinsically connected with the eternal forms, or in Wittgenstein's ontology, with the unchanging and unalterable substance always manifesting as changing facts, is to say that in, like logic, also permeates the world. It is part of the eternal present, which, as we shall see, is the world of the happy man. The notions of wonder and harmony which emerge here will be treated later.

31Here again we find a Kantian flavor, for Kant contends that 'right' "is a concept in the understanding, and represents a property (the moral property) of actions, which belongs to them in themselves." (Kant, op. cit., (A44), p. 83.)
the notion of the 'happy, harmonious life' of which there can be no physical mark but 'only a metaphysical, transcendental one' (NB, p. 78). Hence ethics and aesthetics are one and the same in the way in which the good and the beautiful can be said to be one and the same, and the way in which they can be said to be their own end, their own reward, and the way in which their opposite is anything but a pleasant reward, but unpleasant and punitive in itself. Ethics and aesthetics in this sense are transcendental precisely in that they do fulfill the criteria for a transcendental. They are found everywhere in everyone in the world, regardless of culture, and cannot be articulated. They are present within the world and yet there is nothing of them in the form of object which our language can depict. They make themselves manifest.

Presumably the category of transcendals is complete with these three members and does not include such things as love and freedom, etc. These things are also in the world but they are not something which make themselves manifest to us. They are far more immediate experiences. Logic is made manifest in the way in which our propositions fit the world. Ethics and aesthetics are made manifest in the way in which our actions and our estimation of beauty, etc. are in harmony with what is, i.e., fit the world, are their own reward or punishment. There is about them an ontological quality. Such things as love and freedom do not so make themselves manifest but are instead confined to being within us alone, so to speak, not always

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32. We must always bear in mind that "ethics" for Wittgenstein had very little to do with the question of decision as to whether or not something is right or wrong. It was not a matter of moral judgement. That is why we are here emphasizing the notion of harmony. Rush Rhees cites an example in his article "Wittgenstein's View of Ethics" which points out this important difference. While the discussion took place in 1942, it clearly seems to have been Wittgenstein's notion earlier as well. Rhees suggested the question of whether Brutus's action of killing Caesar was noble or evil. Wittgenstein contended that this was not a question which could even be discussed. "You would not know for your life what went on in his mind before he decided to kill Caesar. What would he have had to feel in order that you should say that killing his friend was noble?" (Rush Rhees, Discussions of Wittgenstein [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970], p. 99.) Rhees concludes that "The Ethical, which cannot be expressed, is that whereby I am able to think of good and evil at all, even in the impure and nonsensical expressions I have to use." (Ibid., p. 102.) That whereby I am able to think of good or evil is independent of ethical systems and would seem to be ultimately a matter of 'fitting' the complex structure of reality.
fitting at all. Hence the category of transcendentals would seem to be closed, for apparently in Wittgenstein's thinking, these three alone fulfill the criteria. Instead of coming from outside the world, crossing into this world, they cross over or permeate all things within. Their role is a controlling or formative one within the total ontological structure.

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The three-fold schema of the world as the world, my world, and outside the world, is fundamental to the thought of the entire Tractatus. The place of this understanding and the use to which it is put in Tractarian thought should become clear as we proceed. Wittgenstein is striving for intelligibility, striving for an understanding of the world which accommodates language as a central force and as an inherent part of an entire ontology. This attempt is important, for it is a specific effort to study language as part of being or being as it includes language rather than to study what is as it is in itself, so to speak, that is, independent of language. Already within the Tractatus language and what is are understood to be at one in their nature. They possess a shared logical structure. Yet, in the thought of the Tractatus, they are still separate in their function. In the Investigations we will see a development of the oneness in function and the softening of logic as a rigidly controlling force. In fact, stated concepts of the world disappear. They must be derived. Logic may still permeate and structure the world. Logic is not destroyed. But the world and the operation of logic within it become more 'fluid'. The world becomes mystery in which man participates and as such need not and cannot be made so 'intelligible'. Its ontology is understood by 'noetic' means as opposed to objective knowledge. Hence, this threefold schema of the world comes to be redundant.

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CHAPTER TWO

LANGUAGE

There are two central aspects to the concept of language as found in the Tractatus. One of these is the nature of language; the other is the function of language. By the nature of language I mean simply what it is, in itself, as opposed to how it works or why and how it is used or what it does. These latter might be called the function of language and can be exposed in an examination of propositions.

Language as the Totality of Propositions

The most concise and general statement on the nature of language is simply: "The totality of propositions is language" (4.001). "Totality" is the important operative word here, for a (single) proposition with a sense is said to be a thought (4). One might be tempted to surmise that the totality of propositions would constitute thought as opposed to a thought or thoughts, but this is not the case as we shall see when examining propositions. Nor is "propositions" of greatest importance here as concerns the nature of language, for an analysis of propositions displays the function of language. So, if we are looking for the nature of language, we must think in terms of the entire lot, all, propositions — past, present, and future, possible and actual. Language has about it some specific quantity, a numerical confinement or limitation. It is not something infinite.

This aspect of the totality of language stems from two sources within the Tractatus. First of all, as language mirrors the world, and as the world is limited, naturally there must be a total number of propositions which can and do perform this function. "Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions" (5.5561). Facts are determined and there is a limited number of them. This might appear empirically false until one recalls that an infinite number can in fact constitute a finite totality in much the same manner as an infinite series can have as its limit a finite totality. Since propositions, as we shall see, are

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1In his later thought Wittgenstein might have been uneasy with this notion of a totality. Much of the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics deals with the notions of infinity and an infinite series. There he relates the relationship of these notions used in a strictly mathematical sense.
pictures of facts, the same determination and limitation hold true for them. Secondly, propositions are complexes composed of simples, the most simple of which is a name. Intermediate between a fully-fledged normal complex proposition and a name are Wittgenstein's elementary propositions which are likewise fixed in number (cf. 4.52, 5.24, 5.5561), though we do not know that number (5.55). From this it follows also that if one were given all elementary propositions then one could simply ask what propositions can be constructed from them and there one would have the totality. The limits would be fixed (4.51). All propositions are generalizations of elementary propositions (4.52) and it is this total generalization in itself which we normally call language.

**Language as a Human Construct**

Thinking of language as a total generalization must not imply that it is some amorphous bundle of statements afloat in the cosmos. Wittgenstein strives to abolish anything that has to do with such a vague notion. Hence, we are to think of language in itself not so much as a total number of statements but as a total number of actions -- tracings, duplications, depictions -- for language is ultimately a human function, albeit a very mysterious one.

Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is -- just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. (4.002).

with those used in a non-mathematical sense and through this means would probably find his earlier usage of "totality" still acceptable. (See p. 59).

²We might note that there is a way in which language as the totality of propositions in this sense is never really dropped in Wittgenstein. It did, however, undergo a change. Rhees feels that Wittgenstein's meaning of the totality of propositions meant that "all propositions must have a kind of common intelligibility or commensurability simply through being propositions or having sense" (Rhees, 1970, op. cit., p. 73) I feel that 4.002 displays a different understanding and that in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein concentrated upon all those things which 'belong' to language. He was still interested in 'human language' as such. The 'whole' was later indicated by the notion of 'form of life', rather than the totality of propositions. The parameter was so expanded as to make its contents indistinguishable from any and all other human enterprises, but to say this is to foreshadow Part II.
This biologically organic view of language is understated but very important for Wittgenstein. Being a part of the human organism, language becomes a part of the total ontological unity which the total Tractatus might be seen to present. The uniting aspect of that ontology is logic. The human organism is not exempt from logic, and language is simply a part of its logic. If language were not a part of the human organism, in an ontological sense, there would be a fissure in the total structural integrity. This accounts for the logic in our language and for the way it fits the world and, as we shall see ultimately, provides the reason why so many of our questions in philosophy are nonsense. (If we understand the way things are, such questions never arise, we see the world aright, and say only what can be said.) But language is a part of the human organism much as perception is a part of it, though there is no specific organ which performs it, as the eye sees or the ear hears. Rather, the entire organism might be said to be the 'organ' which 'languages'. Because it does other things as well, it runs and eats and sleeps, we can say that language is a part of it, like nutrition, perception, rest, and mobility are a part of it. At the same time, all of these things are what the organism as a whole does — and it does so intrinsically by its very nature. These are as voluntary as digestion or circulation. It does not matter that they happen also to be at times controlled and, in these times, involuntary. (That is what it is to have a will. [For philosophy the will is not a phenomenon (6.423).]) It is this control or involuntariness which makes language appear as something separate from the human organism and leads to confusion. Thus language is a both/and case. It is both something man does, and something that is part of him, something he is. He is able to do it and does it because of what he is.

While from one perspective one might say that all of Wittgenstein's work was an attempt to cope with the complexity or complication which language presents, from within what seems to be his ontological perspective this complicated aspect is no problem at all. The Tractatus is a description of the way things are and with this description comes a total acceptance of what it is. Grasping an ontological structure brings with it a certain peace. Complexity is no problem within harmony. The complication of the human organism is no cause for frenzy. It is just the way things are. In its complicated state it fits into the total framework of all things and gets on very well. So, too, with its language. This is all part of the force
of seeing the world as a limited whole. But we will explore all of these themes further in the future. For now, let us notice that citing language as part of the human organism and accepting its complication therein can be seen to be a way of affirming a sort of 'absolute', some uniting quality, in this case logic, within what appears to be so separate and therefore 'amazing' in its ability to 'work' so well.

Language as Logical

Wittgenstein portrays this essential aspect of the nature of language from two perspectives: the intrinsic requirement that language be logical and the impossibility that it not be so. The logical nature of language is certain and unquestionable. "... all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.

-That utterly simple thing ... is ... the truth in its entirety" (5.5563).

The reason this is the case is that the presence of logic in language is the means whereby language is able to relate to reality. It is because logic is in both language and the world that the two can be mapped onto one another, much as the shape of a triangle is in both the pattern of a triangle and the triangle which one makes from the pattern. Logic is the internal relation which holds between language and the world -- and the internal relation is the common internal property of logic. (See, e.g., 5.61, 4.12, 4.121, 4.02.) Care must be taken to emphasize that this relation is not something existing between independent things in combination, but is actually the citing of what is identical -- one and the same -- in the two separate things: language and the world. Wittgenstein uses the phrase "internal relation" synonymously with "internal property" (4.122).

The internal property is logic, but we must note:

-It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain (even within our propositions); rather this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects. (4.122).

Despite this inability to assert the case, both language and the world -- like a record, the musical idea and the sound wave, and every other thing that is in some sense one but exists in many forms -- are constructed according to a common logical pattern (4.014). The form is reality and language is the same and that form is logic (2.18, 2.182, 2.19). This
mutual presence of logic is the *sine qua non* of language saying anything about the world; it is that which makes the function of language possible. Hence, it is necessary. Like a bust in bronze and a bust in marble, the world and language are both logic in different mediums -- one in words and one in objects.

Furthermore, as logic is the essential necessity in language, it is impossible that language should not be logical. Our language is our thought in the form of expression and our thought can never be of anything illogical (3.03). "... we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like" (3.031). Of course there are two reasons for this: one, that the world is not illogical and therefore could not be reflected as such; the other, the nature of our language since it is impossible to represent in language anything that contradicts logic (3.032). Logic is the *a priori* of language because of this impossibility. If the very nature of language is logic(al) it is of course impossible to perform that of which its nature has rendered it incapable. Language, by its very nature, prevents logical mistakes (5.4731, 5.473).

So, the ontological nature of language is logic -- just as it is of everything else. The all-pervasive quality whereby all things are harmonious does not exclude itself from language. More than logical, the world, including language, might be said to be logic-full, logic-all. For Wittgenstein, *logical* is the way things are. Perhaps nowhere did Wittgenstein more clearly link the world and language through logic than in the following statement:

A statement cannot be concerned with the logical structure of the world, for in order for a statement to be possible at all, in order for a proposition to be capable of making sense, the world must already have just the logical structure that it has. The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood. (NB, p. 14)

Logic is the 'absolute' quality in which all things participate.

**Language as a Sign System**

Since language is inherently logical, and, as we shall see, since its primary function is to reflect the world, both by means of description (depiction) and by revealing what it cannot depict, it is natural to portray language as a sign system, a representational device. There must be something in which the logic inheres, namely language, and as that something
must duplicate, though in a different medium, something else in which logic inheres, namely the world, whatever the language is must be such that its elements 'stand in' for the elements of the world. The elements of language indicate, in the sense of signifying, the elements of the world; they represent them, take their place, serve as proxy, as little immaterial miniatures even. It is in this sense that language is a sign system. It is not a set of signals, but a set of representatives (3.22, 3.221). These representatives can be put to various uses (3.326) in various systems (6.341) but always it is in their character as representatives that they are able to perform their functions while being the onto-logical entities that they are. Not only is this true of individual elements of language, especially names, but it is also true of their meaningful combinations -- propositions, facts. "The very possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives" (4.0312). From this characterization of individual elements and clusters of elements (propositions) as signs we can generalize 'over' the totality of these clusters, the entire set, and call language a sign system. It is a complete, limited set of signs which, when put to use, operates according to a guiding principle--the 'system' which permeates all its parts, logic (5.5555, 5.5563).

Furthermore, it is precisely as a system of signs that language depends upon the substance of the world and has form. Signs 'relate', as it were, to substance (object abstract and concrete). Also, just as the world has substance, so signs might be thought of as the 'substance' of language and the system, the 'possibility', is the form within them whereby they are what they are and can function as they do. Again, we see the emergence of the formative ontological nature of language and the world. What one will have the other will have, for it is this like nature which accounts for the perfect and harmonious functioning of language.

Now to examine propositions in order to understand how it is that language -- this limited, logical, human sign system -- performs its function of depicting what it can about the world and manifesting that about the world which it cannot depict. The process/product of this is the formation/creation of my world, complete with knowledge that I can say, objective knowledge, and knowledge that I cannot say, short of uttering nonsense.
What a Proposition Is

A proposition within the Tractatus is the basic unit of language parallel to a state of affairs as the basic unit of the world. It is a fact (3.14) and has the same characteristics as a state of affairs: it is articulate, determinate (3.251), and in being so it states both what is the case and what is not the case (4.2, 4.1) (not p is 'contained' in p). A proposition is an expression through which it is possible to say how things are. In other words, it is an expression and as such is the mark of both form (the possibility) and content (the situation or substance) (3.31). Most importantly it has sense. About this more will be said later.

Wittgenstein also describes a proposition as a thought (3.5, 4) and yet a thought is distinct from a proposition, for a thought is that which finds its expression within a proposition (3.1) and at times is even disguised by propositions (4.002). While the language and thought process correspond due to the mutual ontology of man and the world, language and thought in themselves are considered as independent entities. In the Tractatus not only thought but also knowledge are separate from propositions except in the projected form of both thought and knowledge wherein they are propositions. Yet, "...if I understand a proposition, I know (kennen) the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me" (4.021). What thoughts are in their unprojected form is something we cannot say from the evidence presented by any given proposition, for:

...from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes (4.002).

To speak of the projected form of thought and knowledge is tantamount to speaking of their perceptual form, that way in which they are, such that they can be perceived. Such a form is as a sign. So, a proposition is a sign with which we express a thought. It can be perceived by the senses, is spoken or written, and has a projective relation to the world (3.12). It is in its projected form that a proposition 'fits' the world.

A sign with such a projective quality is to be understood in terms of the picture model. In fact, "in a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought" (3.2). A proposition is a picture of
reality (4.021), a model of reality as we imagine it; it is a picture of what it represents (4.01). Reality, as we have seen, includes both the way things are and the way they are not, both positive and negative facts. Hence, we have the possibility of false propositions and of calling a proposition an expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth possibilities or with its conditions of truth or falsity (4.4, 4.41, 4.431, 5).

What Constitutes a Proposition

In theory there are two types of propositions within the Tractatus -- elementary and complex. Actually Wittgenstein does not use the term "complex proposition." He uses the terms "elementary proposition" and "proposition." He does, however, speak of a "simple sign" and a "complex sign" and in the Notebooks he states that "Complex sign' and 'proposition' are equivalent" (p. 8). Hence, in an effort to achieve greater clarity, I shall here use the term "complex proposition" as a contrast to "elementary proposition." Our immediate reaction to this dichotomy might be that it is a very normal one. We might at first think of an elementary proposition as a 'simple' one. We are accustomed to thinking of everyday simple propositions as being the following type: "It is raining"; "Grass is green"; "All men are mortal"; etc. And normally we think of complex propositions as propositions of the simple type which we have joined together by means of logical operators such as 'and', 'not', 'either/or', 'if/then', etc. Thus our complex propositions are of the sort 'p \cdot q', 'p \lor q', 'p \Rightarrow q', etc. Wittgenstein accepts this normal dichotomy while working within the operations of logic and its notation. Yet he would seem to do so only because our formal logic is so constructed as to reflect the operations which we perform, the process which is going on within our everyday language activity. It is the trying to reflect this process, this operation, as opposed to some state of affairs within the world, which makes the propositions of formal logic lack sense (6.11). There is really nothing within

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3Elsewhere we have and will further dwell upon how logic for Wittgenstein mirrors the world and is ultimately manifestational. It might be worth noting that while I use only propositions, Wittgenstein also employed a great deal of formal notation. To display the ontological aspects of the world it does not seem necessary to deal extensively with the formal notation. The main point is that the structure of the world and of our language which reflects the world as logical. The notation is simply another means of representing this structure. Numerous systems of notation can be devised, but they all accomplish the same mirroring.
the world to which these operational signs can refer. Within the
*Tractatus*, however, for a proposition to have sense it always refers, it
always reflects. At the same time, every proposition must have sense.
That is what makes it be a proposition (cf. 3.144 and 3.3–3.31). Clearly,
then, this normal interpretation of simple and complex propositions is not
Wittgenstein’s primary meaning of elementary and complex propositions within
the *Tractatus*. As is so often the case, there is another level to which
the dichotomy primarily refers and it is this level which we must uncover
here.

Wittgenstein’s complex propositions are composed of elementary
propositions but we have, and can have, no examples of these elementary
propositions. That is why we said earlier that in theory there are two
types of propositions. In practice, however, there are only complex
propositions. An elementary proposition is simply the simplest kind of
proposition (4.21). It is one, the function of which, is to assert the
existence of a state of affairs (4.21). Being an assertion of existence,
no other elementary propositions can contradict it (4.211). All that can
contradict such an assertion is the negation of that assertion — but such
a negation: (a) is already ‘contained’ in the proposition; and (b) renders
the proposition complex. Thus, it is impossible that an elementary propo-
sition be contradicted. It is likewise impossible that any other operation
be performed on an elementary proposition for the same reason. It ceases
to be elementary and becomes complex. It is assumed into the complex
proposition. It becomes it and cannot truly be said to be part of it. It
is no longer. It is only logically, not actually, that we say that complex
propositions are composed of elementary ones. This essential fundamental
simplicity of an elementary proposition brings us to one reason we can
never have an actual example of an elementary proposition — all states of
affairs are themselves complex. Even simple objects cannot be said to be;
their existence cannot be asserted, for in doing so they are placed in a
state of affairs, they become 'complexified', they take their place in
'how things stand'.

4Wittgenstein tells us he writes "elementary propositions as functions
of names" and indicates 'them by the letters 'p', 'q', 'r'" (6.24) but this is
to demonstrate their role in formal symbolism. We are never given exam-
ple of them as propositions as such or of their composition (5.55) and
the reasons for this should become clear as we proceed. The symbolism
displays only that logically they must exist.
As said earlier, all propositions -- reflect. This is the basis of the picture theory within the Tractatus. As the world is fact, all that can be reflected is complex. It is easy to see that complex propositions reflect states of affairs. They are pictures. Furthermore, we are told that elementary propositions assert the existence of states of affairs (4.21) and that "if an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists; if an elementary proposition is false the state of affairs does not exist" (4.25). If on the one hand, in the reflection of something complex is already contained all the logical operatives, the actual existence of an elementary proposition, an instantiation of it, would seem to be logically impossible. At the same time, the world as states of affairs is already inherently complex, such that if our everyday propositions are pictures of the world, their complexity is an actual, practical necessity. As the very nature of a proposition is to reflect, to have an elementary proposition, which does not contain logical operations (else it would be complex), and which reflects nothing complex (else it would not be an elementary proposition), is to have a proposition which can only reflect something utterly 'simple' -- unalterable, subsistent. Hence, if an elementary proposition is to reflect, it can only reflect substances, objects abstract. In other words, elementary propositions reflect, if they reflect at all, the very ontological basis of that which is determined and differentiated. Either elementary propositions reflect substance or they do not reflect at all. It is at this point that the picture theory in the Tractatus

5 The entire picture theory of the Tractatus asserts the reflecting function of a complex proposition. This, however, is from the same depicting nature of an elementary proposition. "First and foremost," we find in the Notebooks, "the elementary propositional form must portray; all portrayal takes place through it" (p. 22).

6 Rush Rhees points out that elementary propositions serve the important function of tying thought to reality. "If we ask whether there are elementary propositions, we shall be asking whether there is any relation of thought to reality, or any reality in thought or in language." (Rhees, 1970, op. cit., p. 22.) If the relation between thought and reality is not arbitrary, then to say that there are elementary propositions is "not an arbitrary assumption." (Ibid., p. 22.) Rhees goes on to say: "There can be no general criteria for identifying them, except the formal one that an elementary proposition is not a truth function of any further proposition, and the 'internal' one that an elementary proposition shows its sense immediately. There is no general account of the subject matter of elementary propositions, no general account of what the elements of thinking are, nothing to tell us what is the ultimate furniture of the world. They (elementary propositions) show their sense immediately." (Ibid.)
is perhaps at the breaking point and in the face of this difficulty Wittgenstein only says that an elementary proposition asserts the 
existence of a state of affairs (4.21). This assertion must be of the 
existence of substance, for the moment a proposition asserts the exist­
ence of anything concrete, it becomes complex. Naturally, then, we cannot 
insist on the elementary propositions out of which complex propositions 
are composed. We can only know logically that they must exist (5.5562). 
These elementary propositions correspond logically and onto-logically to substance pure and simple.

One might ask why Wittgenstein bothers with either elementary 
propositions or pure substance. After all, the way things are is complex. 
The world is fact. It is because, from another perspective, both are 
necessary. This is where we see Wittgenstein's entanglement with logical 
atomism which is in tension with his world view and which he was later to 
drop. (In dropping atomism he allowed for the expansion of the world's 
complexity. Facts cease to be independent and determined. They come to 
stand in 'need' of determination. While language will still reflect the 
world, it will do so in a way which displays the lack of determination in 
what it reflects and will also display its own powers to be determinative.7 
The atomistic approach compels one to search for the most fundamental and 
basic unit of which the complex is composed. Without finding such bases 
the analysis is never complete. Within the Tractatus elementary proposi­
tions and substance are such bases. On them, ultimately, all complexes

In this consideration, however, we are exploring the way in which Wittgen­
stein so constructs an ontology that, if elementary propositions are, and 
if they have sense, then they would seem to relate to substance.

7This Investigational view is already hinted in the Tractatus. See for 
example 4.002 ("The tacit conventions on which the understanding of every­
day language depends are enormously complicated."), 6.211 ("In philosophy 
the question, 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition for?' 
repeatedly leads to valuable insights."), 3.326 ("In order to recognize a 
symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense."), 3.327 
("A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together 
with its logico-syntactical employment."), 3.328 ("If a sign is useless 
it is meaningless. ...If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, 
then it does have meaning."), and 4.063 ("But in order to be able to say 
that a point is black or white...I must have determined in what circum­ 
stances I call 'p' true, and in so doing I determine the sense of the proposition."). In all such instances the determination requires the 
inclusion of more and more factors rather than an atomistic reduction.
rest and all operations, all truth-functions, are performed (5.234). In
other words, upon them rests the entire operation of logic within our
language.

This brings us to another approach to why we can have no actual
to why we can have no actual
examples of elementary propositions though while adhering to the atomistic
examples of elementary propositions though while adhering to the atomistic
premise they are logically necessary. We cannot even give the form or forms
premise they are logically necessary. We cannot even give the form or forms
of elementary propositions (5.55). Elementary propositions are only as
of elementary propositions (5.55). Elementary propositions are only as
the basis of our complex propositions. It is complex propositions which
the basis of our complex propositions. It is complex propositions which
we ourselves construct and it is only that which we ourselves construct
we ourselves construct and it is only that which we ourselves construct
which we can foresee, not what is necessary in order that we be able to
which we can foresee, not what is necessary in order that we be able to
construct it (5.556). In fact, it makes no sense to ask what must be in
construct it (5.556). In fact, it makes no sense to ask what must be in
order that something else can be the case (5.554). Since our question
order that something else can be the case (5.554). Since our question
can have no sense, our answer can have no sense, but every proposition,
can have no sense, our answer can have no sense, but every proposition,
even an elementary one, must have sense. Furthermore, our concept of
even an elementary one, must have sense. Furthermore, our concept of
elementary propositions is independent of what logical form they have
elementary propositions is independent of what logical form they have
(5.555), for, as we shall see, just as it is impossible for a picture to
(5.555), for, as we shall see, just as it is impossible for a picture to
depict that by which it does depict, so here we can understand on logical
depict that by which it does depict, so here we can understand on logical
grounds that there must be elementary propositions (5.5562) but it is not
grounds that there must be elementary propositions (5.5562) but it is not
necessary or even possible that we should be able to understand that
necessary or even possible that we should be able to understand that
whereby they are. It is the very depicting, so to speak, the application
whereby they are. It is the very depicting, so to speak, the application
of logic that decides what elementary propositions there are, and such
of logic that decides what elementary propositions there are, and such
application we can never anticipate (5.557). It is by the application
application we can never anticipate (5.557). It is by the application
that logic 'puts' itself within, permeates, the proposition. (The order --
that logic 'puts' itself within, permeates, the proposition. (The order --
logic -- permeates all things and as Wittgenstein demonstrates in regard
logic -- permeates all things and as Wittgenstein demonstrates in regard
to sense, we must not attempt to go against that order by attempting to
to sense, we must not attempt to go against that order by attempting to
operate outside that order. To do so is 'nonsense', to adjust and har­
operate outside that order. To do so is 'nonsense', to adjust and har­
monicize perfectly in the order is 'sense'.) It applies itself such that
monicize perfectly in the order is 'sense'.) It applies itself such that
then and there and only then and there are there the elementary propositions
then and there and only then and there are there the elementary propositions
of which the actual or complex proposition is composed, but these cannot
of which the actual or complex proposition is composed, but these cannot
be given. We know that "elementary propositions consist of names" but, as
be given. We know that "elementary propositions consist of names" but, as
we cannot give the "number of names with different meanings," we cannot
we cannot give the "number of names with different meanings," we cannot
"give the composition of elementary propositions" (5.55). Our "logic is
"give the composition of elementary propositions" (5.55). Our "logic is
prior to every experience--that something is so"; the only experience
prior to every experience--that something is so"; the only experience
needed to understand logic is that something is (5.552). Hence, we cannot
needed to understand logic is that something is (5.552). Hence, we cannot
say a priori what elementary propositions there are, and the attempt to
This enigmatic position of the elementary proposition is not so problematic as it might seem. On this analysis an elementary proposition is in no more serious a plight than any time-bound statement ("now"... "today"... etc.) or, for that matter, any statement of an item we know to exist but of which no instantiation can be produced. (Wittgenstein notes an example of this in the *Investigations* (p. 191) wherein he says that it is a contradiction to say "'I believe ..., and it isn't so' " If there were a verb meaning 'to believe falsely', it would not have any significant first person present indicative" (p. 190)).

While we cannot give an example of an elementary proposition, we can see something of its constitution, and as complex propositions are composed of elementary ones, this constitution applies equally to complex propositions. In order to function as a picture, it is necessary that a proposition be composed of elements equivalent to the representations of objects within a picture. It is because objects can be represented by signs that propositions are possible (4.0312). The primitive or simple sign which represents an object is a name (3.26). Hence, "an elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names" (4.22). An immediate combination of names constitutes an elementary proposition. Names are the most basic component of a proposition, for they can be dissected no further (3.26). The meaning of a name simply is its object (3.202, 3.203). A definition cannot supply its meaning (3.261). In the case of many names for one object, there is a real name for that object, and that is what the many names have in common (3.3411). But again, this real name, although something that we know logically must exist, can never be given. Wittgenstein does call *words* simple signs (4.026) but it is names which carry the burden of representation and therefore the major role within propositions. Words, however, also occur

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8 This knowing that something must exist and even operating with it though it cannot be instantiated should not be difficult to accept. It is perhaps not unlike numerous phenomena we have experienced in modern science. It is like positing some electron before it can be isolated because known parts behave as though it has to exist, or, like attributing some effect to some unknown, distant planet because some aspect of our galaxy can only be explained in reference to the existence of such a body.
only in propositions, never by themselves (2.0122). As language depicts the world and as the world is facts, things in configuration or combination, of course it is the case that neither words nor names would ever stand alone. No thing stands alone and therefore a word alone has no sense. (If a simple word in actual usage does have sense, it does so only when it serves as a single word proposition.) It is a proposition's elements (its words) standing in a determinate relation to one another which constitute the proposition (3.14). A simple blend of words will not do (3.141). A proposition must be articulate (3.141) in the same way as the state of affairs, it must be a fact, determined as a fact (3.14). Wittgenstein sees no problem in how it is that words, and especially names, combine in immediate relation and are thereby articulate or determined. It is an obvious inevitability that they should do so just as it is an obvious inevitability that things should so combine.

Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs and every state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects, there would still have to be objects and states of affairs (4.2211).

In other words, for Wittgenstein so long as objects are named, when the names are brought together, the combination represents some state of affairs, expresses some thought or other, forms some picture of reality, either true or false. This inevitability can be seen again to relate to the ontological structure that prevails. Because logic is in names and things, in everything that is, every set of names that forms a picture forms a logical picture (2.182). It cannot fail to be so.

What Characterizes a Proposition

Combining names into propositions raises what might be called the characterization of a proposition, for, in order to be a useful proposition, an actual projection of a thought, not just any combination of names will do. They must combine to make sense (3.3, 4.221). Though Wittgenstein uses many senses of the word "sense," such as "in this sense . . .", "the usual sense of . . .", "the sense of the world . . .", "the sense of life . . .", etc., it is the sense of an expression or of a proposition which is of prime concern. First of all, we should note again that sense is something peculiar to propositions as opposed to being also characteristic of names or words. "Names are like points; propositions are like arrows -- they have sense" (3.144). Propositions are statements of facts, pictures of
how things are. Only these statements of how things are, facts, can express a sense; names cannot (3.142), at least not individual names. If a proposition does not have sense, it is because "we have failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents" (5.4733).

Furthermore, this characteristic of sense is an essential one for propositions. "It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us" (4.27). Also, those features which are necessary for the expression of sense within a proposition are essential features of the proposition (3.34) and whenever several propositions express the same sense, then what is essential to all of them is what they have in common, namely, that whereby they all have the same sense (3.341). (Wittgenstein says that "Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an expression", but a "proposition is itself an expression" (3.31). To analyze further the sense of a proposition into the sense of an expression is therefore of no avail.) Just what this essential feature is, is crucial. Ultimately, it is that whereby a proposition does in fact represent a situation, for "Instead of, 'This proposition has such and such a sense', we can simply say, 'This proposition represents such and such a situation'" (4.031). Sense, then, is a representation — of something. Propositions are pictures, and "what a picture represents is its sense" (2.221). It is not difficult to see this representative aspect of the sense of a proposition, for, as a picture, a proposition is articulate (3.141); it is determinate (3.23) just as all the situations in the world are determinate. So determinate is sense that it takes up a place in logical space (3.4).

This of course does not mean that sense is a characteristic of a proposition only when there is a state of affairs which it represents. A proposition has a sense independently of the facts and hence we are able to have false propositions (4.061). Without sense we would be left with only a "blend of words" (3.141), not a proposition capable of being either true or false. In fact, it is the sense of a proposition which we affirm or negate when deciding upon the truth or falsity of a proposition (4.064). Wittgenstein suggests that we imagine a setting of spatial objects instead of the spoken or written signs for those objects in order to see how the tables, chairs, books, etc., express the sense of the proposition (3.1431). This spatial arrangement of spatial objects clearly asserts the determination that is essential to both the configuration and the proposition depicting it. In fact, it seems to be the case that the
sense of a proposition is always parasitic upon spatial arrangements of
spatial objects, always derivative from such a configuration, for
ultimately it is only statements of natural science which do in fact have
sense and statements of natural science are always ultimately reducible
to descriptions of objects and therefore of spatial arrangements. Thus
far, then, we could say that sense is the representation of the arrange­
ment of things. Objects occur, through their proxy signs, in arrange­
ments, for they cannot not be in arrangement, given the logical nature
of things, in a proposition (cf. 4.121, 4.1211).

But to stop with this characterization of the characteristic of a
proposition would be to fail to see the role which sense plays in the
total scheme of things, and this would result in a failure to grasp the
full nature of a proposition and the role which it plays in the total
scheme of things. Constantly Wittgenstein speaks of a proposition's
having sense. But this having is precisely in the 'sense' of being
characterized by sense, for a proposition does not contain its sense (3.13).
This is also inherent in the above idea of sense as a representation.

What a proposition contains is the possibility of expressing a sense, or,
representing a sense. It "contains the form, but not the content, of
its sense" (3.13). A proposition is the mark of a content (3.31) in
being itself a picture, a model, of reality (4.01). The form which it has
is not the content of its sense. Rather, it is marked by sense.

To further grasp the sense of a proposition then, one must expand
its identity as form. We have already seen that the form of objects is
their possibilities, particularly their possibilities of being in time
and space and of combining with other objects to form states of affairs
and likewise the non-existence of states of affairs. The sense of a
proposition is that within it which reflects these possibilities or form
of the objects which occur within it and the situations in which they
occur. "The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with
possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs" (4.2,
emphasis mine). If sense were not a reflection of form instead of con­
tent, it would be impossible for a proposition to have sense independently
of what is the case and therefore impossible for a proposition to be
false. Since, due to their form, the same objects are able to combine in
many ways to constitute many situations, a false proposition simply re­
fects an unactualized form of a situation and the objects which might
constitute that situation were it actual. A true proposition reflects the
possibility that is actualized in a state of affairs. Also, it is a reflection of forms that propositions are able to communicate. We have seen that the ability to communicate sense is essential to a proposition. The ability to communicate new sense is also of the essence of a proposition (4.027) even though it uses old expressions (reflection of familiar or not new forms) to do so (4.03). The ability of a proposition to communicate a situation to us is for it to be essentially connected with a situation (4.03). Form, the very possibility of a situation, is the essential ingredient of a situation. It is that without which it could not be. In a proposition it is that without which the words would not be a logical picture. It (form) is sense. The words themselves and the propositions they form also have form, and their form happens to be a reflection, a representation, an accurate likeness of the form which is in things. It is in this way that words and propositions are connected with the world or situation (6.03). They are ontologically connected through the mutual possession of form: one (words and propositions) being the sign of the other, (objects and situations), they are so alike as to be a reflection one of the other, a duplication in a different medium. Words and propositions, have in 'sign fashion' the same form as objects and situations have in 'fact fashion', i.e., as items in spatial configuration. "One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group--like a tableau vivant--presents a state of affairs" (4.0311).

That the sense of a proposition is itself the form of that proposition such that it reflects the form of the world is likewise seen in the fact that tautologies and contradictions lack sense (4.461). There are no conditions under which either of these agree with the world (4.462). They precisely do not share in a like form. Neither of these reflect the possibilities which allow the determined configurations which constitute the world (4.463). The fact that only a proposition can be possibly true or possibly false is because only it has sense, possibility, form which reflects form -- whereas a tautology's truth is certain and a contradiction's is impossible (4.464). Neither of them reflects possibility. The only form they have is their own -- i.e., that whereby the form of their words in these particular combinations form the tautology or contradiction as opposed to being simply a "blend of words" (3.161). Tautologies and contradictions lack sense; they are not nonsense (4.4611). (There are also other 'statements' which do not have sense, such as the laws of inference
the propositions of logic (6.1, 6.11), and the rules of notation (5.15) and nonsensical pseudo-propositions such as "2+2 at 3 o'clock equals 4" (4.1272), but these for Wittgenstein are not propositions. As mentioned earlier, if ever a proposition has no sense it is not because it lacks form. It can always agree or disagree with possibilities outside itself. If a proposition lacks sense, it is because we have failed to give meaning to one or more of the signs which constitute it (5.4733).

What a Proposition Does, and How

Within the Tractatus every proposition performs two tasks. First of all, it expresses something. It projects some thought or other and our thought is always some picture which we are able to imagine (4.01). It is some situation or other which because of our own logical construction as part of the world, i.e., the logic within our senses so to speak, we are able to bring forth and hold in our attention and which when spoken or written is stated, represented, expressed by our propositions. Because our thought is itself a picture or representation of the world, our proposition is likewise a picture of the world. It states that such and such is the case, that things stand as they do so stand (4.022). It states how things are (3.221).

Just how it is that a proposition says how things are is one of the major themes of the Tractatus. We have already seen that propositions are pictures that have sense. It is by using words as the representatives of objects that propositions reconstitute states of affairs within the medium of language (cf. 4.031, 4.032). It puts the world into words, but not as things, for things as such cannot be put into words. That would require some sort of transubstantiation, and even if that were possible, the thing as thing would then no longer be and whatever it was that we were attempting to say would, in the very saying, be rendered null and void. Saying anything would be impossible. This is the force of the world not being things, but facts. In our propositions it is the world as fact, how things stand, that is put into words (3.221).

Furthermore, as it is the world as fact which is put into words, our propositions are necessarily clear and distinct or determinate. Situations of objects, configurations, have no lack of clarity. They are as they are. They stand as they do so stand. There may be question as to what an individual thing is, but there is no question of arrangement, of where things
stand in relation to each other. When put into words, these situations (propositions) likewise have no lack of clarity, just as our thought, our image of the situation, can always be clear (4.116). If what is pictured is clear, and if the picture (thought, or thought projected -- proposition) does indeed picture that, then the picture must be clear. This is to say nothing more than that our propositions reflect the determinate character of facts. They have sense. "What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate" (3.251). In order to be determinate, articulate, the proposition must have as many parts as the situation it represents (4.04) and within the proposition these parts are related to one another in the same way as the corresponding objects are related to one another in the existing state of affairs (2.13, 2.131) and/or in our thought of that state of affairs. It is in this way that our propositions truly are pictures of the world. They are reflections of it, they mirror the world. They show us how the world is. It is in showing how the world is that they do in fact say that things stand as they do so stand (4.022).

For Wittgenstein, then, it is the world which finds expression in our propositions through the mediation of our thought and its projection as propositions. To say something is to make a verbal picture of it. It is always to show some state of affairs, to (re)present them in a language display. This is the simple result of language being a sign system. In this conception, to work with propositions is really to have at one's disposal an enormously large collection of miniatures, one to correspond to every possible situation, which one is able to call forth, produce, construct, at a moment's notice and compare with the actual situation present in the world.

This saying or expressing through the presentation of pictures, the projection of propositions, might be called the operational function of our propositions. It is that about them which makes them useful in our daily activities, but it is in fact only the surface level of what is actually happening. There is a deeper level at which a proposition simultaneously operates, another task which it also performs. To understand this task it is necessary to understand further the pictorial nature of a proposition.

In a picture, the elements of the picture correspond to their representative objects and are related to one another in the same determinate way as the objects which they represent (2.13, 2.131, 2.14). Thus, a
picture has a structure, just as situations (facts) have a structure. Just as there was a possibility whereby the structure of a fact was possible, and that possibility was called form, so there is a possibility whereby the structure within the picture is possible, and that possibility is called pictorial form (2.151). The correlation of the picture's elements with things Wittgenstein calls pictorial relationship. It is that which the picture includes which makes it into a picture (2.1513, 2.1514). But this relationship, which is the 'something identical' in the picture and what it depicts, which is also that which makes it possible for it to be a picture, its form (2.161, 2.17) is not itself depicted in the picture. It is the reality, the form of which the picture has, which is depicted in the picture (2.171) and the picture does, if we look to this deeper level, display or show the presence of this form (2.172). It does not show it as it shows reality, but it shows it in its showing of reality. It shows its form by its being what it is -- a proposition, a picture. It shows a reality by being a picture of whatever it is a picture of. Both are presented within the proposition. Since the picture which the proposition is can be true or false, (i.e., its fact can be true or false; its form can be neither true nor false, it simply is) it is obvious that the picture presents a certain viewpoint or standpoint of what it represents. Otherwise, so long as it were a picture (made sense), it could in itself be nothing but correct, just as a painting in itself is not true or false, correct or incorrect, but simply is. "What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form" (2.22). It can be correct or incorrect, a good representation or a bad one, true or false, only from the standpoint of its being a representation, only from its having a standpoint. Since the picture cannot be without some representational form or other (it cannot place itself outside the world, cannot be apart from reality), and since form in a picture is that which is common to both the picture and reality, and, as we have seen, since the form of reality is logical form -- the form of logic -- the form of a picture is also logical (2.19, 2.181, 2.182).

Hence, that which every picture shows, at this deeper level, in always being a logical picture is actually the logical structure of the world. It manifests or shows or mirrors, in its very being-a-picture, the ontological nature of the world. "A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And that is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case
turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world" (3.3421). In its being able to be a picture, a proposition reveals the structural unit, the common ontology, of all things, the world, fact, language, and man who understands the world as fact and constructs his language and propositions which are of identical form.

It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain; rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant state of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects. (4.122).

Thus, our propositions mirror the world completely. They reflect both what they say, i.e., how things stand, and they also reflect how it is that they do so stand, i.e., the ontological nature of the world. This they do, not by their attempt to express thought, but in being what they are. This manifestation of ontological form was seen some time ago in noticing that our descriptions of the world not only tell us something about situations, but also that systems of description themselves tell us something about the world. These two functions of a proposition, the operational and the manifestational, are most noticeable in Wittgenstein's statement which contrasts 'saying' and 'showing'. Most simply: "What can be shown, cannot be said" (4.1212). Examples of something shown which cannot be said are the meaning of solipsism (5.62) as we have already seen, and the fact that the only way we can express laws of causality is really by saying that there are laws of nature — "But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest" (6.36). The limits of the world are something else made manifest by our propositions and by there being a totality of elementary propositions (5.5561), but these limits, likewise, cannot be said. All that can be said is how things stand, in short, statements of natural science.

We can know far more than this, but we do so because of what these statements manifest to us, not because of what they say. One might ask

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9This does not mean that Wittgenstein's notion of the world, as we saw in the last chapter, was the world of natural science. His notion of the world includes an outside the world from which the world can have value. Within the world, his view is that of reality which is both existence and non-existence. It is by showing that our propositions are confined to the statements of natural science and by showing that that is so, that Wittgenstein leads us to see that there is indeed more than what our propositions say.
whether this implies an inference from what is manifest to what can be said. To ask such a question is to forget that, within Wittgenstein, there are different types of knowledge. We can make inference from one point of objective knowledge to another and we can make inference from a point of acquaintance to objective fact (as, for example, when in knowing an object I know its possible occurrences in states of affairs (2.0123), and can cite these states of affairs in propositions as objective fact). That which is made manifest, however, cannot be stated and, though known, this knowledge is clearly not objective knowledge. Some points of knowledge can be connected by inference but not all. Furthermore, what is manifest, that which we can know though never say, is not something which cannot be depicted because it does not exist. It is knowledge of reality. But our language has limits which it cannot exceed. It cannot depict that which is outside the world. Yet it can and does make manifest realities which are there, beyond our limits. Our knowledge of the transcendentals is of this kind. Our knowledge can and does exceed our world and what exceeds our world need not be phantom. It is real. It does exist. Logic, God, and ethics exist, just as do things in the world which likewise make themselves manifest but cannot be said, things like pictorial form or internal relations. "There are, indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest" (6.522). Hence, in this reading of Wittgenstein, the world comes forth in all of our propositions; it speaks to us, it becomes 'my world' as much as do propositions approach the world, speak about it, operate upon it, represent it. The ontological structure whereby representation is possible is also the structure whereby manifestation occurs. Both happen simultaneously in every proposition, and both happen necessarily in every proposition for both are the result of the ontological attributes of existence.

It is worthwhile noting here the strong, definitive aspects of the world already inherent in its being determined fact. The world is fact and that is how it presents itself to us, or, that is how we meet it in the limits of language. While we are aware of the latter activity because our propositions are representations, we seldom grasp the former aspect: the world as fact. This is part of the fruit of the analysis of propositions as Wittgenstein performs it in the Tractatus. Propositions are analyzed functionally as well as being analyzed atomistically, i.e., into their constituent parts. These two analyses are mutual in the Tractatus, for the atomistic analysis, in order to be complete, has to arrive at that point at
which the world and language are one ontologically, i.e., where pure atomic
names name pure and simple substance or primary objects, and combine to
form elementary propositions which combine to form complex propositions.
(We have already seen that substance is form and content and is that
common, underlying element perhaps best thought of as 'being'.) These
things we know logically to be the case even though we can never instanti­
ate the real names or the elementary propositions. It is at this level
of analysis that we arrive at the one and only common form in which all
that is, participates — Being, consciousness, logic, etc. Here in sub­
stance, "that which subsists independently of what is the case" (2.024),
is both form and content (2.025). All is one. But when this form takes
on determined content, it does so as many. Many can exist only as fact,
configuration. Logically it can only be present(ed) as such. That is
reality, the world, as well as the way we find and represent it in our
language. The ontological structure is contained in the (f)actual, and
both the structure and the actual reality are understood when we fully
understand our propositions. We can analyse the logical aspects of our
world in order to understand our propositions and/or we can analyse our
propositions in order to understand the world. Both are valid because
of the ontological unity which the logic of either reveals and both are
accomplished in the Tractatus.

In this respect the total enterprise is not unlike that of Descartes' Meditations. 10 Arnauld accused Descartes of a circular argument. We have
clear and distinct ideas which are true because God is such that in his
goodness he would not deceive us, but God being good in this way is
simply a clear and distinct idea. Within the Tractatus we understand the
world in understanding the representational nature of our propositions and
we understand the representational nature of our propositions through our
understanding of the world. While such arguments may indeed seem circular,
they are far from vicious. Rather, they are simply the hallmark of an
ontological insight. If two diverse things can co-exist, be it God and
us or propositions and the world, then we must logically explain that
which they have in common whereby they can both exist, and that which

Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1968), II, p. 92. This matter is still contested among Cartesian scholars,
e.g., Willis Doney, Harry Frankfurt, Alan Gerwith, and Anthony Kenney.
they have not in common whereby they can both exist. Furthermore, if we have explained this about the two diverse things, the existence of which explains the nature of each other, then surely such an explanation is of value and its circular appearance is only the recognition of an actual relation between the two. Simply put, the logic of existence is ontology. It is that point at which all things are one, and that which is one is in all things. The one and many reflect each other. Again we see the force of the world as a limited whole.

How a Proposition is Understood

The ontological unity emerging in our examination of propositions reaches its completion with the inclusion of the human being whose role is that of link or go-between for propositions and the world. It is, after all, the human being who constructs the proposition. We therefore need some assurance that all that we have said about the world and our propositions is in fact the case. We do not need assurance of the truth of our propositions, for the truth of our propositions results from what is the case and whether or not our propositions accurately capture this particular possibility. Rather, we need some assurance concerning our thought and knowledge which is independent of our propositions though in projected form operates through them. To find this assurance in the Tractatus we must look to the ideas of “imagine” and “understand” and trace their operations in the total picture.

“A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it” (4.01). The image is prior to its projection. Our propositions spring from the foundation of our imagination. They are the projection of our thought, but our thought depends upon our ability to imagine; it is limited by this ability (cf. 2.0121). Now the limitations of the ability coincide with what we have already seen to be logic in existence.

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations. (2.0121).

It must be noted that this quotation is used to support the fact that things are a particular way, namely full of the possibility of combining to form states of affairs, not the other way around. In other words, the same logic that is in things whereby they have some possi-
bilities but not others, is likewise in us. We can imagine some things, namely the possibilities that do in fact exist, but not others, namely those 'possibilities' which contravene logic, which cannot and do not in fact exist. It is for this reason that, even if we imagine a world, which might be different from the real one, it could not be totally different from the real one. It must have something in common with it; the form, the logical possibilities which attach to existence, must be identical in both the real and the imagined world (2.022). From one perspective a false statement is nothing other than a projection of some aspect of an imagined world. The only difference is, we also thought that this particular form was actualized in the real world. Thus Wittgenstein can say, 'It is possible to imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid. It is clear, however, that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world really is like that or not' (6.1233). That question is an ontological one. It is a matter of whether the two worlds with a common form also have a common content. But what it is crucial for us to see of what is imagined, whether that be an accurate image of the possibilities of the real world, or a false image of those same possibilities, or of some possible world, is that all of them are in fact possible. It is impossible for us to imagine an impossible world. The only apparent explanation for this within the Tractatus is the logical pervasion of all things -- including man. Being in existence, we, too, are limited to and share in the common logical form of all things, even in our faculties of imagination and understanding. Logic is a priori; illogical thought is an impossibility (5.471). Though we can objectify things, we can encounter the world and distinguish it from my world, and we can see a difference between true and false — that whereby we are able to do so is by in fact being a part of the total ontological unity, part of the limited whole. Within Wittgenstein there seems to be no possibility that our language might restrict our imagination or be formative of our thought. There is no room for anything akin to the Worf-Sapir hypothesis or any suggestions of cultural relativity. The world is as it is and our language reflects that world. It can be no other way because of the common bondage within ontological form. The only slight softening of this rigidity of the structure is the possibility of false statements (but we have already seen that this very possibility emerges from this common form) and that of many systems of description (but these systems likewise are reflections of the world as it is, simply from dif-
ferent representational standpoints, not from differing ontological
possibilities).

Parallel to the role of "imagine" is that of "understand." Some
things we must learn. These are primitive signs, words, names (3.263,
4.026). They must be explained to us. Presumably they are human con­
structs in the most relative sense. As the component parts of a propo­
sition they are quite separate from that which makes a proposition to be
a proposition. There can be many names for the same thing and we have
to learn to attach the name to what it signifies. Once we have learned
this activity, then the activity itself is the understanding of the
name (4.243). Understanding this name is different from understanding the
object which it signifies, qua object. Knowing the object (kennen) is to
know its internal properties, to know what situations it can participate
in as an element of some state of affairs (2.01231, 2.0123). We are
never specifically told how this occurs but presumably it is a matter of
simply identifying the given item in numerous states of affairs and de­
ducing the internal properties from its actual occurrence in actual states
of affairs. If something is in particular states of affairs, then ob­
viously it has the possibility, the internal property, to be so. All that
is necessary to identify objects is to have a name for them, and that we
learn. We take it on as any other learned activity, as one of the many
tacit and enormously complicated conventions relied upon in understanding
everyday language (4.002).11

What needs to be explained, then, is not how we know names or objects,
but how we know situations -- either in the world or in our propositions.
These are the all-important atomic units, not individuals. What is, is
fact. Both facts and propositions involve logic. The experience needed
to understand them is that something is, and that is not an experience.

11 This statement obviously contains in seminal form much of the thought
later developed in The Philosophical Investigations. There, of course,
the notions of learning and conventions receive much more emphasis. How­
ever, the very existence of 4.002 in the Tractatus indicates that while
ontology was emphasised, the elements of learning and conventions were
likewise already present. We might then be prompted to ask why, when
greater emphasis is given to learning and conventions, do we tend to lose
sight of the underlying ontology. An emphasis on one element ought not to
obliterate the others. As we proceed with this study it should become
evident that throughout his thinking, Wittgenstein held these notions to­
gether. Where one was found it was always amidst the others.
If it is no experience and not learned, and if it is prior to every experience (5.552) then we must assume it is automatic, even innate. And this seems to be precisely what Wittgenstein intends. Our understanding of logic which is inherent in what is must precede an application of logic in which our propositions assert what is. We understand pictures, the sense of things, relations between objects which form situations automatically. "...we understand the sense of a propositional sign [a proposition in projected form] without its having been explained to us" (4.02). "...if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me!" (4.021). If I understand a proposition, I simply know what is the case if that proposition is true (4.024). I know the state of affairs represented, and I know the representation of the state of affairs. Such is the logic of depiction (4.015). All that understanding a situation in reality is, is to grasp it as a picture. When we put the situation that we have understood into words, we then have a proposition with which we make ourselves understood (4.026). We give a picture to another -- and we all automatically understand pictures. We are part of pictures. We are in the world and have within ourselves the form, the possibility, of combining with other things to form states of affairs. By understanding states of affairs and their representations, it is manifest that logic permeates all the constituents, even us. Just as a picture cannot depict its pictorial form, just as propositions cannot say the logic within them but can only make it manifest, so we can know that it is by the operation of logic within us, by our being logical existents like everything else in existence, that we do in fact take in facts, reproduce them in language and operate upon them to form new facts in language. Yet, we cannot put this knowledge into words. Again, our understanding exceeds our propositions. We understand propositions because we are one of the links in the total ontological chain. We are part of the total schema, part of the whole situation and all the pieces, all the links of a chain must fit together (cf. 4.002, 4.015-4.021). Understanding, logic in action, pervades us. It is as though we partake in elementary propositions, participate in them, and in understanding them we understand all others (4.411). It is by being what we are, this particular instantiation of logical form in which logic can operate through propositions, that we understand. We grasp 'p' and we have also grasped '~p', but we cannot know '~p', unless
we understand 'p' (5.02). In other words, we are related intrinsically, existentially, ontologically to all that is, and in all that is -- is logic -- with all its operatives. Thus, anything that is understood on logical grounds, is understood by everyone. For example, "If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalyzed form must know it" (5.5562). Common understanding is possible because common ontology is a fact. For Wittgenstein it is the fact. It is the world and we are part of it.

In conclusion, as we have seen, the functional analysis of propositions revealed the world's ontology and it is in that ontology that the imagining and understanding involved in the production and usage of propositions can take its rightful place and be understood. It is no wonder that one manipulates or uses propositions, reasons with them, performs the operations of logic with them, for that very logic -- those very operations -- adhere to or reside in, the pictured, the pictures, and the picturers. It is evident even though it can never itself be depicted. Putting pictures together in different ways and comparing the ways with one another and with represented reality is nothing more than form constantly taking on its various possible manifestations. It is simply possibility in numerous actualizations 'fitting' properly whenever sense is made and being abortive in the case of a tautology or contradiction.

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In the Investigations we will see the basic concept of language shift. We will see its function alter and its dynamic aspects develop in depth. However, it will still rely upon and reveal an entire ontology.
Against the backdrop of the ontological structure of the world and language and the atomistic and functional analysis of propositions, we might now be inclined to pose what would seem to be a simple and straightforward question: 'What is meaning?' Having seen the existential realities whereby language is able to function does not eliminate the desire to isolate meaning either in some or all linguistic components or in the functioning of those components. The attempt to do so is not an easy task, for nowhere in the Tractatus does Wittgenstein speak of the meaning of a proposition. Instead we are given numerous texts on the mechanism of a proposition. We are given descriptions of names, expressions, signs, symbols, sense, form, content, use, function, operations -- all as they mesh and interact in our everyday language. If, then, we are to discover a Tractarian 'theory of meaning' we can do so only in the examination of a proposition as a technical apparatus or mechanism. As we have already discussed the proposition as constituted by words that form expressions and as characterized by sense, some repetition is both necessary and unavoidable, for the earlier consideration was in view of the ontology involved while the present consideration is vis-a-vis the question, or, as we shall see -- the would-be question -- of meaning.

Signs

Let us begin at the beginning with those elements which make propositions possible -- namely, signs which are the representatives of objects (4.0312, 3.221). Signs are arbitrary; we could always choose different ones from those that we have (3.315, 3.322). Names are the most simple signs (3.202) and this arbitrary aspect is most clearly seen in them. By sheer convention we connect some sound or piece of script with some particular object. In so doing we have created a determinate linguistic unit with which we can create a determinate sense (3.23) and with determinate sense we can depict the world as fact which is itself always determinate. But a great deal happens in the creation of a sign and between that creation and its final functioning. In the very creation of a sign the sound or name 'latches onto' some object. It does not take the object into itself. We cannot put our objects into words (3.221). But it is now able to represent
its object. It can take up a place in logical space parallel to the one which the object is able to occupy in situational space (having seen, of course, that situational space is also logical). As a representative, a sign can say how things are 'about' some object (3.221). The sign has a form and its form duplicates that of the object. In fact, some things, like a formal concept or a formal property, cannot be expressed but are shown in the very sign for an object (4.126) and in other cases a sign is so obviously a likeness of what is signified that it even looks like the object (4.012). The logic within the sign and the object is the same. Whatever is internally possible to the object is internally possible to the representative of that object and this is why whatever is signified in itself never needs to play a role in logical syntax (3.33). It is by this means that the sign is able to say how the object stands in its relational situation.

Thus far we have been speaking about the individual form of an individual sign — and to do so without making a specific distinction between sign qua sign, and a sign in use is a fundamental mistake. A sign qua sign has no evident individual form. It has only the general form of sign: in other words, what is common to all signs, namely, that it is able to signify or to be a representative. Its individual limitation and possibilities are not apparent. In this way a sign qua sign is somewhat like pure potential — awaiting actualization. It is not nothing—in fact, as we have seen, it is the sine qua non of a proposition—but neither is it something of the sort it is when put to use. It is there, that its individual form becomes obvious in its function as a representative. It is not that it does not always have this individual form, but, as it were, that something else, namely use, is required to activate this individual form. At the same time, crudely put, in its general form it must be something connected to something else. It would be "completely arbitrary" to set up the form of a sign for something without knowing whether anything corresponds to it (5.554, 5.5542). We could not have a name or a sign for we-know-not-what. (A great deal of Wittgenstein's discussion of signs and symbols in the text applies to logical signs and symbols. But the function of signs in everyday propositions is parallel to their function in the logical system. That is how formal logic, our propositions, and the world interrelate in a mirroring/depicting fashion (cf. 4.121, 5.511-5.514, 6.13).)

Thus, while signs are arbitrary, their form is not optional. If a sign is possible, then it is capable of signifying (5.473). Any sign is
possible if its object is actual, for signs are sounds or scripts arbitrarily connected to objects. As such they have an independence. They are determinate units able to be employed, each one on numerous occasions in the expression of numerous facts. They are points which can be aligned in various ways.

**Use**

Wittgenstein tells us that a sign is a representative of an object (3.221) and that it is capable of signifying (5.473). The use of a sign can be understood from a consideration of these two points. A representative of something presents or pictures that something to the mind, in some cases even portraying a likeness of the thing. At the same time, a representative which is a sign stands for the object, takes the place so that object by means of its being a character or symbol of some sort, in this case, sound or script. To the extent that it can represent the object, it can act in the place of the object. To signify an object is to be an indication of it, to 'mean' it. It is to show or make known the object. Hence, the use of a sign is to indicate or make an object known by standing for the object and thereby presenting it to mind. Briefly put, the use of a sign is to signify by representing.

Interestingly, it is only in the actual usage of a sign that this use occurs. This is tantamount to our consideration of individual and general form. Only when used does a sign perform its function. Only then does it signify by representing. Only then does it represent, for no object occurs alone but only in a configuration, fact, and therefore, only when a sign is used and thereby not alone, can it represent an object. As Wittgenstein puts it, "A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment" (3.327). A sign is meaningless, it does not signify its object, if it is useless, never put to work (3.328). If there are units in a sign-language which are unnecessary, they indicate nothing, and, if several signs serve one purpose they are logically equivalent while those signs which serve no purpose are logically meaningless (5.47321). When a sign is used, it is put together with other signs. (As noted, a simple sign might be used independently of other signs as in a single word answer to a question or a brisk command, etc., but in such cases it does so as a contraction of a more complex set of signs. A non-contractual usage of a single sign would indicate nothing about an object or how things stand with it. It would not even assert its existence.
It would be useless.

When combined with other signs, a sign asserts its independence, it shows its form, or rather, its form shows itself. Hence, not all signs are compatible with all other signs in every conceivable combination. Just as each object has a set of internal possibilities which allows it to combine with some other objects, but not all, in some situations, but not all, so too, with the signs for those objects. Furthermore, whether or not a sign can combine with other signs is not dependent solely on its form. Each sign has a form. Not all signs can accept some particular sign though this particular sign may intrinsically be capable of accepting some or all of those which cannot accept it. At the same time, from another perspective, if some sign fails to be accepted by other signs in a given situation, it is because we have failed to attach it to something that has an appropriate form for that situation and thereby to enable the sign to have a form which can accommodate and be accommodated within the situation (i.e., we have failed to give the constituent of a proposition a meaning (5.4733)). In other words, the usage of signs is dependent upon their mutual compatibility. It is for this reason that both arguments and affixes enable us to recognize what is signified by the signs containing them (5.02). Also, it is for this reason that what signs by their very nature are unable to express, their application is able to show (3.262). It is when, and only when, a mutual compatibility occurs that individual signs do in fact signify their corresponding objects and the complex sign as a whole does in fact signify some situation that is possible to those objects involved.

Whether or not there is an actual situation in which determinate existing objects do in fact correspond to the determinate configuration of objects in the complex sign is quite a separate matter. All that is involved in its being a legitimate and useful complex sign is that it makes some possible situation known by representing that particular possibility. It expresses a truth possibility (4.431). Hence, ultimately, it is possible to "describe the world completely by means of fully generalized propositions, i.e., without first correlating any name with a particular object" (5.526). This is possible because simple signs, when used, do in fact signify those objects to which they were arbitrarily connected by showing or representing, portraying, those forms which are likewise their form qua individual sign. It is because complex signs represent possibilities that we cannot give a sign the wrong sense (5.4732). If the sign is possible, i.e., if the individual signs enjoy mutual compatibility, its
sense is correct thought it may not correspond to any actual situations. It will be necessarily correct though it will not necessarily be true. So, usage is necessary for a sign to signify an object. When we say a sign does signify an object, we are then necessarily speaking of a complex sign. An unused sign is essentially different from a used sign. In the one case the sign is able to signify its object and in the other it is not. Though sometimes two or more signs can attach to the same object (4.241) it is common practice that things essentially different have different signs (4.031). Different things are understood by different names -- and so it is for used and unused signs within the Tractatus. In its use, the sign becomes something else -- namely, a symbol. The sound or script remains, of course, but it is now simply that which can be perceived of the symbol (3.32). A sign that is working is perceptual evidence of its own reality as a symbol. Briefly, a used sign is a symbol. A symbol is the function of a sign (5.473).

**Symbols**

Within the Tractatus there are two kinds of symbols discussed. One is that of logical notation and refers to our 'p's, 'q's, 'v's, 'w's, etc. The other refers to signs combined to form an expression such as "the grass is green." Ultimately, these reduce to the latter type only, for "It must be manifest in our symbols [logical notation] that it can only be propositions [combined signs, expressions] that are combined with one another by 'v', 'w', etc." (5.515). The simple symbols of our logical notation are themselves contractions for more complex signs (3.24). Indeed, even the peculiar contrivances of 'v', 'w', 'w', etc., are actually presupposed in the symbols for complex signs such as 'p', 'q', etc. (5.515). Even they are ultimately an intrinsic part of, essential properties of, our complex signs. Hence, while there are two kinds of symbols within the Tractatus, their ultimate foundation is the same. Our logical notation is dependent for its 'sense' upon everyday propositions which are dependent upon the world for their sense and, therefore, ultimately they have the same foundation. While the logical notation is necessary for purposes of calculating (calculation upon complex signs would be extremely cumbersome), that calculating itself depends upon complexity.
If the sign 'p' in 'p v q' does not stand for a complex sign, then it cannot have sense by itself; but in that case the signs 'p v p', 'p · p', etc., which have the same sense as p, must also lack sense. But if 'p v p' has no sense, then 'p v q' cannot have a sense either. (5.515).

From this we can conclude that a symbol has the essential characteristic or property of sense. We can see that, in the use of any sign language, every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol, and every symbol, the constituent signs of which attach to appropriate objects, can express a sense (4.5). Symbols are signs that have sense; they have all the logical properties that adhere to the possible situation which they represent and, if true, to the actual situation which they represent. They are, in their logic, in harmony with reality and hence they perform the functions discussed in the last chapter of both saying something — how things stand, if they are true — and showing something — the ontological structures of both language and the world. In their notational usage, what they say, let alone what they signify, plays no role (3.317). Their saying-function, however, as we have just seen, remains essential. In their normal linguistic usage, what they say is usually of great importance and their ability to say it is seldom considered. For Wittgenstein, as we began to discover in the last chapter, and as we shall consider at greater length in the pages ahead, it is the showing-function of both usages of a symbol which is of greatest importance, for it is this function which bears the weighty burden of ontological revelation.

Meanwhile, it is worth considering the classification of symbols which occurs in the Tractatus. According to their particular forms as the particular complex signs that they are, symbols can be either tautologies, contradictions, or propositions, and as such, in other words, by simply being one of these, can and necessarily will, express certainty, impossibility, or possibility, respectively (5.525). While our signs retain about them an arbitrariness, as symbols they take on one of the three above forms and in these forms have about them a necessity which speaks for itself (6.124); some things are manifest in our symbols (5.515) and these things proceed from the non-arbitrary nature of the symbol itself. It is important to see how tautologies, contradictions, and propositions can all be classified as symbols. First of all, it is because all three are complex signs. But over and above that it is because all three essentially relate, though in different ways, to sense, which we have seen to be the essential
characteristic of a symbol. We have already seen how our propositions are
categorized by sense, and hence, recognizing them as symbols is simply
a further refinement of our understanding of them. Contradictions and
tautologies are another matter. They are recognizable precisely by their
lack of sense. They are signs combined such that the form of the com-
bined sign allows it to say nothing. As we shall see, what it shows is of
great importance. To say "the rose is red or the rose is not red" or "the
rose is red and the rose is not red" reflects no state of affairs, either
true or false, either possible or actual. It is non-sense. In order to
see or be shown this by the tautology or contradictions themselves, it is
necessary as we saw earlier that "the rose is red" does have sense (5.515).
It is in this way that it lacks sense in itself as the form of a parti-
cular symbol and yet is characterized and dependent upon sense as a symbol.
Hence, all three are symbols though, according to their particular forms,
they either lack or have sense.

Having seen how sense relates to the form of a symbol qua symbol
and having previously seen how the form of a symbol is dependent upon the
form of the signs constituting it as those signs display their individual
forms when combined and thereby account for the very creation of the symbol,
we are now in a good position for understanding how sense and the legiti-
macy of a symbol relate. The sense of a symbol is simply the name given to
what is presented by the combined signs when that particular combination
of signs portrays an ontological possibility, some possible way things
might stand. It is essential to a symbol and is what is common to all those
symbols which can serve the same purpose (3.341) for, to serve the same
purpose is to be used to express the same sense. Put another way, "it is
impossible to alter what is essential to a symbol without altering its
sense" (4.465).

The legitimacy of a symbol is something else. For Wittgenstein, any
combination of signs is a legitimate symbol (5.4733). From this perspective
every combination of signs could present some possibility, it could in fact
make some sort of sense. Whether it does or not has nothing to do with
whether the symbol is legitimate. There is no way in which it can be
illegitimate. It is necessarily always the lawful heir to the legacy of
sense and every combination of signs could be made to give it sense if the
signs are made to signify suitably. Nor will the signs fail to do their
jobs. If something is amiss, it is our fault, not that of the signs. If
we fail to comprehend the sense of some sign or fail to find it useful,
fail to find it connected to our experiences, or find that it fails to ex-
press what our imagination and understanding intended, then, again, it is because we have failed to make an appropriate connection between some one or more of the signs with the objects they signify (5.4733), or, because we have made a sign for a would-be object and used that sign as though it really did attach to an object, as in the case of metaphysical statements (6.53), or, because we have failed, for whatever reason (e.g., omission in accounting for extraordinary circumstances), to make an arbitrary determination apropos of our signs (5.473). As Wittgenstein sees it, there is nothing at fault with our signs and symbols. They work as faithfully as the sunrise. If there is fault, it is a human one. If there is a human one it is not because of some ontological flaw in our ability to understand or imagine, but it is a mistake at the level of our arbitrary activity.

This unavoidable legitimacy of a symbol of course does nothing to exempt it from being subject of our errors of recognition even when its signs do signify suitably. In fact, error in the recognition of the sense of a symbol can occur only when the signs do signify suitably but they, too, are due to fault in our sign-making of another sort. Again, we not infrequently attach the same sign to two or more objects. When such a sign is put to use it signifies in different ways (3.321) depending of course upon which object it takes as its form. The one sign can signify two or more different objects. Just which form it was intended to have can easily be mistaken. Similarly, the same sign can have different modes of signification and in that way belong to two different symbols (3.323). Or, two words with different modes of signification can be employed in superficially the same way (3.323). In such cases, the signs not only signify different objects, they are different symbols altogether (3.323). In their use they might have so different a form as that of noun and adjective (Green is green) or of copula and intransitive verb ('is' as 'identical' and 'is' as 'exist'). Superficially they look the same. The propensity for error is obvious. The avoidance of such errors is the construction of our signs in such way as to avoid the occasion of error. In other words, Wittgenstein admonishes, we should construct a "sign-language that is governed by logical grammar -- by logical syntax" (3.325). In lieu of this we can only hope to recognize the correct symbol by its sign, by observing how it is used with a sense (3.326). In some cases the correct sense of a symbol can be ascertained only by its acceptance or rejection by all the other facts surrounding it. Just as the individual
form of a sign emerges in its acceptance by surrounding signs, so the correct sense of a symbol, or, if you like, its proper individual form, emerges in its acceptance by its surroundings -- other symbols, situations, even the level of consciousness of the one combining the signs, for, as we shall later consider in regard to Wittgenstein, we must understand his reality in order to recognize his symbols. In other words, in the recognition of every symbol, a 'hermeneutic' is unavoidable.

Names and Expressions

We have seen how signs, by their use, signify and express a sense as symbols. In order to understand the mechanism of our language we have now to transfer the functioning of our signs and symbols to the constituent parts of our propositions. A name is the most primitive sign. It is the basic unit which can be dissected no further (3.26). Elsewhere, Wittgenstein calls a name a simple sign (3.202). As the most simple or primitive sign, the 'meaning' of names must be explained to us (4.026). When this explanation is done by means of elucidations which contain the primitive signs it becomes obvious that the application of the name in itself often shows what is signified (3.263, 3.252). When the explanation is not by means of elucidation it may be by means of ostensive definition or by any means that enable us to understand and use the name in question. However it is done, the fact that we must be taught the connection between a name and its object reflects the arbitrary nature of names as simple signs. We give a name to an object and use it always in its connection with the object. What a name signifies is its object; what it represents is its object (3.201, 3.22). When it does so is all-important; -- it does so "only in the nexus of a proposition" (3.3). In other words, it does so only in conjunction with other signs which form a configuration that makes sense, for as we saw in the last chapter, a proposition has the form of a fact, a configuration characterized by sense. Alone, a name has only the general form of a sign, the potential to signify. Hence, it is only when used that a name performs its function, for it is only when used that names are put together or accepted into some sort of complexity whereby they are able to signify their objects.

1There is a subtle but interesting point to be seen in carefully monitoring our characterization of the proposition in its relation to fact. It is easy to let our thought and our usage of "proposition" and "fact" 'slip'
It is important to see that this use of a name is not primarily a matter of our intentions, though of course our intentions do play a major role in the actual usage. Our intentions are important to use inasmuch as, through them, we have already accepted the name in the function of imagining and understanding. These we have seen to be components of the total ontology. What constitutes the use of a name is complex and parallels what constitutes the use of any other sign. While our arbitrary convention has served to create the name, it has done so only in its general form. That is, it has put it forth as a nomination. It has created a candidate for use. The actual usage is to put the name into office, to allow it to take up its role within the 'total organization' of all the other 'officers'. The actual usage of the name is to make it dependent upon all other things. Only in this dependence does it have the independence with which to assert its object. In this its form is like the form of its object, a true reflection of it, for as we saw in chapter one, the independence of objects is likewise a dependence, for objects occur only in facts.

From states of affairs as facts to propositions as facts. A state of affairs is a fact (2). A picture is a fact (2.141). A proposition is a picture of a state of affairs (2.11, 2.12, 2.141). Therefore Wittgenstein himself says,"A propositional sign is a fact" (3.14, 3.143). However, it is a fact only insofar as it is a sign. A sign stands for something. A name is a simple sign and a name has a bearer. Pictures only have sense and our propositions as such are pictures. Therefore, Wittgenstein goes on to say in 3.142 that "only facts can express a sense." This common 'slip' is not particularly pernicious. In fact it seems to reflect a general understanding in the Tractatus, for as Max Black points out:

Since a proposition can depict a fact and cannot refer to an object, it must differ in logical form from a name, that can stand for an object and cannot depict a fact.

It would seem to follow that it is impossible to refer to propositions, on the general principle that facts cannot be the subjects of assertions, although here and throughout Wittgenstein constantly sounds as if he were talking about propositions. (Max Black, op. cit., p. 162.)

At any rate there is a point to be made in noting that it is more accurate to reserve "fact" for the world -- as Wittgenstein himself consistently does -- and carefully say that a proposition has the form of a fact or the sense of a fact. The proposition reflects the fact, it does not express it. What is ultimately expresses itself within the proposition, but we will discuss this matter shortly.
The same is true of words and that is why "it is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions" (2.0122). So, in usage the name is incorporated; it fits into the chain, as a proper link. If it does not fit properly, if it does not work within the framework of the organization, then it cannot signify. Only if all the other words surrounding it 'accept' this particular candidate and thereby 'empower' or more precisely 'en-form' it, while it at the same time does likewise for them — can this particular name, or any other name, represent its object, signify it, retain its connection with it. In this sense, perhaps nothing is more intrinsically and necessarily communal than the words of our propositions. The logic of each word, and its syntax, i.e., the form in the name that corresponds to the form in the object and vice versa, and the form of the combination of names which correspond to the form of a possible situation or fact, must all mesh in the usage of any particular name. It is from this perspective that Wittgenstein tells us that if everything behaves as if the sign or name does in fact signify, then it does in fact do so (3.328). If everything acts as if it is the case, then it is the case. His approach is a very pragmatic one. He is also, of course, very consistent, for a name in use as a symbol, a "simple symbol" (4.26), just as any sign in use is a symbol.

In our progression along the assembly line of the mechanism of a proposition, we are now in a position to understand "sense" and "expression" in greater detail. It is not just any set of names which has or expresses sense, but only a fact (3.142). As we have seen, the names must be combined according to the mutual compatibility of the individual forms. It is by this actualized similarity of form with the form of its object that a name retains its connection with its object and thereby consistently signifies it. When the words are put together such that this can happen — we have the likeness of a situation or state of affairs, a fact. We have assembled — sense, which of course has the form of a form of a fact. It is the expression of a possible state of affairs. These need be no actual situation existing which matches this expression of sense, but it must be possible for some actual situation to exist which could match this expression of sense. Otherwise it would not be sense. Such is the ontology of the world and language. Also, were this not the case, our combination of names would have gone amiss. They would not be meshing properly; they would have lost their connections with their objects. We would be coping with nonsense, for we would have failed to make the appropriate arbitrary determinations (5.473).
Finally, were it not the case that sense had to express some possible state of affairs, or the possibility of some state of affairs, then it would not be the case that, if the actual complex reality did not exist, the proposition portraying it would not be nonsensical, but simply false (3.24).

So, again, one name stands for one thing, another for another, and they are combined with one another such that the whole group presents a state of affairs (4.0311). They have sense. When a group of names has sense, what has then been assembled is an expression. An expression is any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense; a proposition is itself an expression (3.31). It can also be called a symbol (3.31). Hence, the same development which we saw transpire via use between sign and symbol is paralleled within our language between name and expression. An expression is everything essential to their sense that propositions have in common (3.31). It is the expression which is the mark of form and content (3.31). It is in the expression that our words have and portray logical form. There they have sense and sense characterizes logical form. This can be understood from the fact that two expressions which can be substituted for one another are two expressions which have the same logical form (6.23). This form is the basis of their interchangeability. Similarly, when two or more expressions have the same sense or portray the same possibility, this can be seen from the expressions themselves (6.232). Their form shows this. Just as we cannot understand two names without knowing whether or not they signify the same thing (4.243) so, too, we cannot say whether or not two expressions present the same fact, without knowing whether the form of each is alike—in other words, without seeing whether or not their sense is the same (6.2322).

This leads us to see that an expression, like a sign, has a general form, that whereby it is such that it always has sense. This general form is necessarily the same as that of a proposition — namely, this is how things stand (4.5). By this general form, an expression is something that is able to be used in various propositions. The expression is "presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes" (3.312). At the same time, it has an individual form. It is able to stand alone as a proposition, or it is able to take part in numerous propositions. In this form it is presented by means of a variable (3.313). Surely enough, as by now we might expect, that which moves it from its general to its individual form, that which activates it and enables it to portray or present a possibility is — its employment or use. — An expression signifies only
in a proposition (3.314). It is, we might say, the minimal unit of sense, but like any sign or name, an expression on its own is not nothing. It is potential -- which is quite enough. It has, however, no real value. Like signs await symbols, names await expressions, and expressions await propositions. For Wittgenstein, only as a proposition or in a proposition is an expression a symbol, for only there does it characterize the proposition with sense. Only there does it issue forth with the sense that belongs to it. As we shall see, it is only there that it takes its place in the whole scheme of things, that it can be really what it is -- a picture or portrayal of a situation. It is only there that it can be a fact, for it is only there that in its turn is accepted by all other things. It is only there that projection occurs whereby all other things act as if it is the case, or if it is not the case, then at least acknowledge it as the possibility of some case in order to deny its truth. It is only there that the communality is so complete as to become a part of the ontological unity which is ultimately responsible for the functioning of the expression, for its being able to say anything at all, and for its being an expression, a manifestation of what cannot be said, for only there is it the expression of that ontological unity itself. This should become clear as we proceed.

While these statements foreshadow the assemblage of a proposition, they also enable us to see that an expression is not itself a name. Names are always simple. They are simple signs and simply symbols. We might say, an expression is not just a complex name, though like a name it awaits usage in order to signify and thereby be a symbol. It is instead some part of a picture of fact, or, in some cases, is itself a complete picture of fact, as when some part of a picture can be accepted as a complete picture in its own right. Then it signifies, and in that case if projected, it is already a proposition. Yet, a picture is a picture and a name is a name. We can attach names to pictures, but we do not make pictures of names. At most we could make a picture of the object of the name, but that is quite different. Also, what we understand by a 'complex name' is a situation, not an object. Situations and objects are totally different. Objects are named; situations are portrayed or described (3.221, 3.144). Nor can a description be used as a name. A description presents a possibility which may or may not correspond to an actual, concrete state of affairs. There may be no such actual situation, except of course insofar as the actual situation contains all the possible situations which might prevail vis-a-vis
its constitutive objects, for those objects have the internal structure whereby the various situations are in fact possible. (To know an object is to know its internal forms and the possible situations in which it can occur (2.01231, 2.0124). Understanding 'p' contains understanding 'not p'. Knowing an object involves knowing the possible situations in which it is not in fact occurring. These situations agree and disagree with the possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. The sense of a proposition is the reflection of form in things (cf. 4.2). Hence, it might even be said that 'p' contains 'not p', etc. (4.2) is a reflection of form in things (2.014, 2.0141.) In other words, it need not connect with an actual situation. If it does, i.e., if it is true, that is accidental to the expression itself. All that is essential to it is that it make sense, and it needs that even to be false. All it must do is reflect a possibility. A name on the other hand must connect with its object. It is only by means of its ability to connect that it is useful. It is only when it does connect that it functions. It necessarily connects with its object, even though the expressions in which it makes the connection may not connect to a situation. The connection that a name makes is to bring the form of the object, by representation, into the expression/situation. This enables the expression to represent a possible or actual situation, but that representation awaits projection. Until it has projection, though it is a combination of names, it is neither an elementary nor a complex proposition. We will examine this more carefully in the coming section.

We mentioned above the possibility that 'p' contains 'not p'. At first reading this might appear to confuse falsity and negation. While our consideration of the world did include a section on reality as one of Wittgenstein's ontological concepts, and while we shall discuss reality again as it relates to the concept of truth, it is perhaps profitable here to digress in order to consider the specific role which the concept of reality plays in relation to falsity and negation.

The problem first emerges in Wittgenstein's distinction between the world and reality. We find a curious combination of statements in the following:

2.04 "The totality of existing states of affairs is the world."

2.06 "The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality."
2.063 "The sum-total of reality is the world" (i.e., 2.063 and 2.04).

We also find, in relation to these statements:

2.05 "The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.

These statements are seemingly incompatible. The totality of existing states of affairs is in some sense the contradiction of the totality of all those states of affairs that do not exist — unless the sum-total of reality is contained in the totality of existing states of affairs. If the text is not read in this fashion it leads to a manifest contradiction within a half page, which is unthinkable. The only way to overcome the apparent contradiction is to say that the non-existent totality is not a different totality, but is already 'contained' in the first totality. The totality which contains both is that of existing states of affairs. That which makes up the states of affairs, is of course, substance. By taking substance in a very substantive sense the reading which leads to a contradiction is more likely to be avoided. While we cannot assert both 'p' and '¬p' (NB, p. 56), reality is constituted of both p and not p. It is this to which our language relates. It is in this way that our negative propositions can reflect a possible situation and our positive or negative propositions can, when wrong, be false. "The propositions 'p' and '¬p' have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality" (4.0621). This statement is far from empty — ontologically.

There is, of course, another but unsatisfactory way of avoiding this puzzle. This is to subsume 2.06 and 2.063 under 2.05 — and then proceed with 'business as usual,' i.e., what is is only positive fact and this "suffices to determine what is not the case." This is the approach taken by Max Black. Despite gliding over the ontological aspects of reality and substance, it is to Black's credit that he does present "joint negation" as the "basic logical operation" in Wittgenstein and thereby notices that at least logically there is some sense in which Wittgenstein is wanting to maintain both 'p' and 'not p' together.

Wittgenstein himself struggles a great deal with all of this. He was greatly concerned about the nature of reality and the way in which our logic

\[\text{Max Black, op. cit., p. 71.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 276.}\]
implicitly reflects it.⁴ In the end we know he concluded that our logic mirrors the internal structure of reality. In the Notebooks we find him making such statements as:

> With the class of signs of the proposition "p" the class "¬p", etc., etc. is already given. As indeed is necessary. (NB, p. 47).

> p¬p is that thing—perhaps that nothing—that p and ¬p have in common. (NB, p. 55).

> We have said: if a proposition depends on p and it asserts p then it does not negate it, and vice versa: Is this the picture of that mutual exclusion of p and ¬p? Of the fact that ¬p is what lies outside p?

> It seems so! (NB, p. 59).

These thoughts seem to find reflection in the Tractatus in such sayings as "the possibility of negation is already written into affirmation" (5.44), "...the symbol in 'p' and 'q' itself presupposes 'v', '∧', etc. (5.515), and "An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself" (5.47). It seems clear, then, that there is a very real way (no pun intended) in which we can say that 'p' contains '¬p'. In reality, ¬p is what lies outside p, but in our proposition, because of the "common boundary" (NB, p. 57), the one proposition always has with it the other. (One might think it would be more correct to say that with 'p' is always "given" '¬p', but "given" could so easily refer to information or inferences between statements only and, hence, particularly in view of the accompanying ontology, "contain" may still be the better word.)⁵

Another example of Wittgenstein trying to hold the positive and negative facts insolubly together as one unit such that existence and non-existence are reality and both are expressed in propositions 'all at once,' as it were, can be found in his insisting that "propositions must

⁴See especially pp. 42, 44, 47, 53, and 55-59 of the Notebooks.

⁵As this maintenance and denial of the standard contradiction is so unusual, it is perhaps worth citing one more treatment of the puzzle. Stenius speaks of what he calls Wittgenstein's "yes-and-no space." (Eric Stenius, op. cit., pp. 44-54). He contends that in Wittgenstein's thinking at the time of the Tractatus, "one has to infer that the possibility of regarding a logical space as a yes-and-no space exists not only for a space with two-valued dimensions, but also, in some sense, for spaces with many-valued dimensions." (Ibid., p. 47).
Hence, we might conclude if language had the same internal structures as reality, which Wittgenstein contends, then, that 'p' 'contains' 'not-p'.

The importance of polarity as a single unit in both propositions and reality is emphasized heavily in Finch's commentary on the Tractatus. The thrust of his thought can be seen in the following two quotations:

The Tractatus proceeds on the view that all representation gives equally what-may-be-there and what-may-not-be-there so that everything is settled both ways, except for yes or no. (4.023) True-or-false has no more "content" than exist-or-not-exist which is, as it were, no "content" at all. (It is not until negation appears that a separate sense can be given to what-is-not, and this has to be understood in terms of truth possibilities.)

Negation, in other words, as the Tractatus conceives it, lies concealed in all picturing, thinking, and saying, inasmuch as all picturing, thinking and saying represents reality with its polar character of existence and non-existence. And it is this same polar character of reality which furnishes the basis for generating all propositions from elementary propositions. To see the world as reality is already to see it as "containing" negation. (Ibid., p. 133)

Most importantly, Finch notices the way in which the fourfold set of logical possibilities is necessary for the formulations of the Tractarian metaphysics.

(1) p is what is the case, the world as positive facts
(2) \( \neg p \) is the world as negative facts
(3) both p and not-p is reality, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs
(4) neither p nor not-p is substance, or what the language of the Tractatus itself talks about, that which neither exists nor does not-exist.

Thus even though p and not-p appears as a contradiction once we have truth-functions, in a prior sense p and not-p is just what is meant by reality as Wittgenstein uses this term (Wirklichkeit). (2.06)
is not so peculiar after all. Indeed, "If all the positive statements about a thing are made aren't all the negative ones made too? And that is the whole point" (NB, p. 33). Once dualism is gone, once a monistic approach is taken, the compatibility of existence and non-existence is perhaps inevitable. The falsity of our everyday propositions can remain, for that depends on the concrete world. Our propositions turn out to be true or false. They are neither true nor false in themselves. We simply indicate their falsity by negation of the positive statement. Their neutrality before laying them against the world is a reflection of reality composed of both existence and non-existence.

For the purposes of our discussion, we need delve no further into the formal logic of the Tractatus in order to ascertain its many points of conjunction with the internal structure of what is. This cannot be said anyway, but can only be mirrored in the workings of our language. We must note, however, that if we are not willing to admit 'p' and 'not-p', or that 'p' in a very real way already says 'not-p' and vice-versa, then we have probably not comprehended all the dimensions of either Wittgenstein's logic or his ontology. Nor have we comprehended the way in which logic reveals the essence of the world which is whole, one, and limited, which in object, abstract, substance, consists of neither existence nor non-existence, and in reality, consists of both existence and non-existence.

Propositions

Proceeding along the assembly line of a proposition, we are now at the point of converting an expression into the finished product. All the components thus far have converged to form an expression. We have now to make the expression — work. To understand this, Wittgenstein's use of 'projection' is extremely appropriate. From one perspective, the expression is a finished product in itself; the words in it have converged in such a manner as to form sense, but this degree of completion is of no real value. It is somewhat like a box of slides. The photos have been taken, developed, and even framed for slotting into a projector. As long as they remain in the box without being viewed, they are not presented to us, not present to us. They are, and they are real, but they are of no real value. We must, then, look for what constitutes a projection which can be seen both from Wittgenstein's entries on projection and from his descriptions of what a proposition is. In these descriptions
we shall see again how all the constituent parts are still present but in the more highly evolved form brought about in their use.

A proposition, at least an elementary one, is a concatenation of names (4.22), and a complex one is a combination of elementary ones (4.51, 4.52). So propositions are composed of signs of the simplest and most primitive form. At the same time a proposition itself can be considered a sign. Being composed of signs, its general form is that of a sign. Hence, "a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world" (3.12). A proposition is also called a symbol, for looking at it from the other side, that is, from its completion back to its genesis, instead, as we have been doing, from its genesis to its completion, "a sign is what can be perceived of a symbol" (3.32). It is more fundamentally a symbol, and therefore, a sign. It is only with a symbol that we express sense (4.5) and from which we develop the precedent whereby we recognize this sense as a possibility instead of either an impossibility or certainty (5.525). Furthermore, it is as a symbol that we can calculate the properties of a proposition (6.126). Signs alone have no properties that can be calculated. Symbols do. (In logical calculation we use "rules that deal with signs" (6.126), but signs of complex form, and hence symbols.) A proposition is also described as an expression. It has the form of a fact (3.13) and a fact, as we have seen, is what an expression is. It is a configuration of individual forms such that its form is that of a possible or actual state of affairs, a fact. A proposition is also called a picture of reality, a model of reality as we imagine it (4.01). It is just such a picture which an expression, in varying degrees of completeness, re-presents. Most succinctly, "a proposition is itself an expression" (3.31). Because a proposition is an expression in itself, it is also, as such, the expression of much else. In other words, because it is an expression, numerous other things can express themselves in it or through it, namely anything that is a part of the situation or fact portrayed, such as its truth-conditions, its internal properties and relations, ultimately even the ontological unity and the source from which it springs. This aspect of expression we shall examine later in greater detail. For our present purpose we must finally note that a proposition is described as a thought (3.5, 4). It is as such that we can best understand its projective form and value. To do so, however, let us first look at Wittgenstein's explanation of projection.
The spoken and written aspects of a proposition whereby it is in fact a perceptible sign are those which project or send forth the possible situation, i.e., the sense contained in the expressions of a proposition. It is as a proposition that "a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses" (3.1). The method of projecting this possible situation as the perceptible sign that it is, is to "think of the sense of the proposition" (3.11). It is for this reason that Wittgenstein calls the sign "with which we express a thought a propositional sign. -- And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world" (3.12). We have already seen that this projective relation to the world is that whereby the possible form of a situation as it is presented in the sense of an expression occurs as it does due to the connective relation between a name and its object whereby that name carries the internal form of the object into the possible situation in which the object participates within the expression. Hence, the proposition includes all that is projected, all that is in the possible situation, but not what is projected, that is, not the actual situation if there is one nor the actual objects of which such a situation is composed (3.13). We cannot put objects or situations into words. We can only picture them. We form images of them and these representatives combine to form situations which are representatives of possible, real situations. "Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is (3.13). Besides the possibility of this sort of imagery, which is contained in the logic of depiction (4.015), we can further grasp the kind of projection which our expressions undergo as propositions in the analogy of the gramophone record. This analogy cites the principle or law according to which all projection occurs and according to which it necessarily occurs successfully -- namely logic as found in all things, or onto-logic. The analogy is as follows:

There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. (4.014).

(In this gramophone analogy Wittgenstein is making a point about signs and signification in relation to depicting, but, when we reflect
In extending Wittgenstein's analogy, it is important to note that Wittgenstein makes the point about the unity of internal structure in regard to signs and objects because signs represent objects. They represent what makes up the world. That is why this point has to be made about signs. In the Notebooks, however, there is a great deal about the human being being part of the world, though of course the self (the metaphysical subject) is not a part of the world.

The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body in particulars, is a part of the world among others, among animals, plants, stones, etc.

Whosoever realizes this will not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own body or for the human body.

He will regard humans and animals quite naively as objects which are similar and which belong together. (NB, p. 82).

Such a quotation, one might say, simply dichotomizes the human being, not according to body and soul but according to self and the body-soul unit, but Wittgenstein's comments on Life and the World (capital letters intended) situates the human being, insofar as it has life, quite differently. In 1916 he was thinking:

The World and Life are One.
Physiological life is of course not "Life." And neither is psychological life. Life is the world.

(NB, p. 77)

It was from this thought that Wittgenstein went on to realize that:

Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.
Ethics and aesthetics are one. (NB, p. 77).

These comments are situated in the middle of a consideration of the will and an attempt to understand whether there can be a connection between willing and the external reality or even between wanting and the fulfillment of desire. It is precisely because Wittgenstein sees no logical connection between these things that the identity of their nature is grasped. (The line summarizing this thought was carried over, verbatim, into the Tractatus: "The world and life are one" (5.621).

There is no doubt, then, that the human being is a part of the world, and Wittgenstein saw clearly that the very "fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal -- logical -- properties of language and the world" (6.12). As the human being is part of the world, it, too, is shot through with those same logical properties and operates accordingly.
Projection, then, is simply the activity that occurs due to the "internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world" (4.014). The expression or representation or picture that is projected, the constitutive bits of language that comprise it, even the humans which are the projectors is that it is they who think the thought (and sometimes write and speak it and they cannot imagine or speak illogically as we have seen) thereby sending forth a picture in living 'techni-sound' -- are all "constructed according to a common logical pattern...They are all in a certain sense one" (4.014). At this juncture we can again foreshadow the possibility of our language as a whole and, in its individual occurrences being the expression of something else, we can foreshadow some other thing's or things' expression of itself or themselves. Let us return now to the projection of an expression.

An expression is projected by being thought. When it is thought, whether to oneself or in some spoken or written form perceptible to others as well, it has been put to its own appropriate use. It then truly presents some situation or possibility thereof. It is the slide come out of its box and put through the projector. It is a representation or picture of real value. In this form we can act upon it or in response to it; we can make a logical symbol of it and calculate upon it; we can make inferences between it and other propositions; most importantly, we can understand situations, facts, states of affairs and make ourselves understood (4.026, 4.062). In this form it is the function of the expressions contained in it (3.318), for in this form those expressions are activated. They themselves are realized. At this point we have finally come to the end of the assembly line. Et voila! The mechanism is completed. This thought-projected expression is a full-blown, articulate, determinate, depicting proposition!

Against this backdrop of the assemblage of a proposition we can recall with greater understanding our earlier observations on its form and (lack of) content. Needless to say there are as many individual forms of propositions as there are individual propositions, i.e., as there are possible states of affairs that can be described or pictured in a proposition. The expressions present the forms of states of affairs and it is precisely these which are projected in a proposition. There is something common to all these individual forms, namely, that they are forms of states of affairs. This form that is common to all propositions regardless of their individual instantiation, Wittgenstein calls the general form of a proposition and it is, as we have
seen: "This is how things stand" (4.5). Every proposition has this general form and there cannot be a proposition for which this form is not foreseen and according to which it is not constructed (4.5). Within a given proposition the interplay between its general and individual form does not depend upon anything but its own existence as was not true of signs, names, expressions, etc., which all depended upon use to propel them from the general to the particular. This is evidence of the autonomy of a proposition. It is a fact complete in itself. It can blend in different ways with different surroundings which may make its individual form appear differently at different times, and hence make a hermeneutic necessary to a proper understanding of a given proposition, but this is no fault or flaw in the proposition as such. It is a quite perfect piece of equipment. Every proposition is legitimate. If there is a fault or flaw it reverts back to our naming convention, which as we saw earlier can lead to confusion, or to our projection itself which may be untimely or out of focus. The proposition itself is always a clear and perfect likeness — of something. What can be said can be said clearly (3.251, 4.116). For Wittgenstein at the time of the Tractatus there is no uncertainty or incompleteness or indecision in the world, in the way things stand, nor in the way things are able to stand, their possibilities, for these are all given in the very existence of things. How could the picture of this be any different? If it were different, it could not be a picture of this and if our names refer to part of this (and how could they be of anything else, for this is all we know in the world and we do not name we-know-not-what), then there is no doubt but that it purports to be a picture of this. Its general form is a reflection of this, for the form of the world is fact — this is how things stand. Its individual form is a reflection of this, for such is the form of the sense of the expressions which constitute it due to the connection between names and their objects. Yet, propositions can be false; they need not match or reflect some actual situation. When they happen to be true, this happens to be the case, but the sense that they have is independent of what is the case. It is not, however, independent of what is possible, again because of the connection between a name and its object and hence of its ability to occur or take its

In The Philosophical Investigations this view is softened. There the world is somewhat less determinate and we do more with our language than picture, more than affirm and calculate with verbal miniatures of states of affairs. Our propositions are more than statements of natural science.
place only in those expressions, situations, in which the object can occur due to its internal form. This possibility of course is common to both true (i.e., actual) and false (i.e., non-actual) situations. So, the form of a proposition is none other than and only that of onto-logical possibility.

And what of its 'content'? Having understood its form, its 'content' is easily dispensable. Propositions presuppose that names connect with objects and that expressions have sense (3.22, 3.31). A proposition has no need to concern itself with 'content'. In fact, the question itself has about it a very extraneous air. Form came along with names and expressions, but 'content' was not something we found on the assembly line. Nonetheless, we frequently do speak of the 'content of a proposition' and so we might as well see what it is all about. When we have not examined a proposition thoroughly it does seem that it contains something on its own. There seems to be something which it has, and we act as though this something is what is either true or false, and is that which we are handling, passing from one to another and thinking about when we use propositions. Sometimes we are inclined to call it a property of our language and sometimes we seem to think of it as something independent of all else which our language seems to capture as in a net and deliver to us. Whatever it is, it is the 'content of a proposition'. It is what we might otherwise call 'meaning' but on Wittgenstein's analysis, no such thing is ever encountered. (This we will explore shortly.) He is very brief and blunt about 'content'. He says, first of all, "The content of a proposition means the content of a proposition that has sense" (3.13). We saw that the very form of an expression was the expression of sense. Because of this we are told that "A proposition... does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it" (3.13). Like the expressions of which it is composed, what it 'contains' is the form or sense of fact. Its sense is in the form of form. Again, "A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense" (3.13). Clearly, there is nothing in the proposition itself.

9 It seems impossible to say much more about the content of a proposition. We can speak of the structure of a proposition, of the relations within and between propositions, etc. Some even go so far as to say that propositions are "substances" which "have qualities and relations and possess their status and their characters independently of other entities." (Gilbert Ryle, "Are There Propositions?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXX [1929-30], pp. 91-126 on p. 105) Cont'd.
either as a property or a possession, which can be its 'content' and there is nothing independent and on its own which the proposition captures which can be its 'content', no amorphous something which takes up residence within it or in which it participates. It is only (!) a reflection of a situation. This does not mean there is nothing that can rightly be called content. It means only that there is nothing in a proposition which can rightly be called content. There is just nothing there with which that name can connect. All a proposition has is form. We have simply renamed form and Wittgenstein would think we have done so to no avail except to be in danger of continuing the confusion that resides in the question in the first place; for, on the one hand, we have given two different names to the same thing, form, and on the other, we have given the same name to two very different things, namely, form and substance in either its abstract or concrete variety. There is something which is content — namely, substance. Substance is form and content (2.024, 2.025). Our expressions and hence our propositions are only the mark of a form and content (3.31). They reveal it, show that it exists. As we shall see, they are ultimately its expression of itself, its self-expression.

It is entirely possible to propose an explanation of this tendency to attribute content to our propositions. The tendency is intelligible in that we normally experience only the full-blown thought and not its assemblage, not its finer and finer states and finally its source in substance. Consequently, we never or seldom truly experience the ontological unity in substance. We do not fathom it as the source of everything. Yet, we 'feel' within our language an ontological 'gap' and seek to fill it with something, namely content, which usually takes the form of a pseudo-entity called meaning.

Hence, while the question on content is strictly a piece of nonsense, the advantage in entertaining it is that it reveals the limits of our propositions. Our propositions are clearly limited to the realm of sense, the realm of the possible within the world. But what, then, we might ask, is our question on content? 'Content' might indeed be nonsensical, but is not

In the end, most conclude that a proposition simply is, that it is somehow conceptual, and that it is truth-valued, as does Strawson. (P. F. Strawson, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar [London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1978], p. 134.) But as to the content of a proposition, Wittgenstein is definitive in denying its existence. He thus 'cuts through' the question of content which, we might say, "forces itself upon us."
our question still propositional? No, not really. Truly it was projected. It flashed upon our screen in the apparent form of a proposition. As a matter of fact, it was an imposter, a pseudo-proposition. Because we did not take care that our name connected to a concrete object, we produced something that paraded in the general form of a proposition but failed to have an individual form. It fooled us and we treated it as though it were genuine and authentic. Wittgenstein gives examples of many such impostors. A very common one stems from our inappropriate treatment of "object" (4.1272). We frequently use "thing" or "object" as something other than a variable name wherein it connects with some specific item. We try to generalize and say there are objects, but there is no such entity as 'objects'. We cannot say how objects stand. We can say only how this object stands, and that one and the other one, and, at most, how these specific ones stand together. (The world is the totality of facts, not of things.) The same difficulties apply to "complex," "fact," "function," "number," etc. (4.1272). We attempt to use them all as proper concept-words, words that do connect with something that does have content and form, something of substance. Whenever we do so we create nonsensical, pseudo-propositions — and problems. We set up our own betrayal.

There are other limitations to the sense of our propositions. These are found in tautologies and contradictions, but these are limitations inherent in sense itself and are displayed in a form different from a proposition. Hence, they do not so easily fool us. They are a very different type of revelation of the substance of the world and will be examined later. They are not another attempt to cite content where there is none. Our purpose here was to understand the mechanism of a proposition, and at this point we shall consider that accomplished.

**Meaning**

Having some knowledge of the Tractarian proposition, we can at long last ask with profit the question of Tractarian meaning — what is it? Wittgenstein does use the word within the *Tractatus*, though rather sparingly, and only in regard to names and expressions, never in regard to propositions. It is never explained as a concept and is never used as a name for some entity existing independently as some particular object like "book" or "star." As a verb, the term is always used synonymously with "to signify" and as a noun it is always synonymous with "that which is signified." Thus, 'meaning' in the *Tractatus* is always derived through the functioning
of signs, which function is always to point beyond themselves to that with which they have a connection. Hence, the use of "meaning," though always used in regard to names and expressions, always directs us away from our language, beyond our language, to the actuality of which our language is a representation -- not to our language itself as representation, nor to that representation itself. We are always thrown back to the world, to objects in configuration, ultimately to substance pure and simple, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, in the meta-function of language we are thrown even beyond this substantial aspect of the world itself. To appreciate this, let us examine the texts themselves.

"A name means an object. The object is its meaning" (3.203). A statement more direct than this would be hard to find. There is nothing which the name has which is meaning, nothing in itself nor about itself, no essential property and no accidental property, which is meaning. Nor can the connection between a name and its object be something that is called meaning. The connection is simply an arbitrary assignment on our part. Nor can the function of the name be called its meaning. Due to our convention the name takes the place of the object in linguistic configurations which are like the actual configurations in which the object is able to participate, i.e., the name of the object substitutes in the linguistic configuration for the form of the object itself. This substitution is simply the use or employment of the name. The name and its meaning are as separate as the name and its object, for the object and its meaning are one and the same. Surely this separation of name and object is the logical by-product of any theory of naming in which the assignment of names is an arbitrary convention. If a thing could be named this, or that, or something else, then there is no essential connection between name and object. Furthermore, there have been and are countless things outside our range of encounter which have existed quite successfully without being called anything by us, as well as countless things which have come into existence and passed away without ever having been named. In the ancient Indian tradition a thing, by the sheer vibrations of the energy within it, gave forth its own name which was then perceived and used. Yet, for better or for worse, contemporary Western man has so objectified his surroundings and separated himself from them, that it things do give forth their own names he is quite unable to perceive them and hence must assign them himself. This condition was Wittgenstein's starting point as can be seen from the fact that the meanings of primitive signs are explained to us (3.263, 4.026) and that he
explicitly says that our arbitrary conventions give meaning to parts of our propositions (3.315). Nonetheless, his fundamental insight is that of a logically necessary ontological unity. Regardless of the genesis of a name, its workability is due to the logic of its form which is common to that of the user of the name and that of the object named. This logic is unavoidable. Whatever exists has it, regardless of the immediate cause of that existence. Thus, while Wittgenstein may not experience a degree of harmony with the world comparable to that of the ancient Indians (he perceives facts and facts only within the realm of language and the world, not things or the names of things), he will not permit any further alienation by introduction of a medium called meaning. The strength of the ontological unity remains apparent in this direct connection between a name and its object despite their independence and separation from one another.

With such an ontological unity working so inevitably and unerringly, meaning cannot even serve as an explicand, for there is no need for one. It is useless and unnecessary, and therefore meaningless in itself. Names can only name objects (3.203). There is no object for which meaning is a name.

That a name must mean its object and that nothing else is its meaning, Wittgenstein sees as further evidenced in the fact that, if we know the meaning of two words, then we know whether they mean the same or not (4.243). If they do mean the same we can put '=' between them and use them interchangeably (4.241). If their meaning were something other than their objects, we could never be sure whether two words did mean the same or not. Also, if names had meanings other than their objects, then names would never have independence and therefore never be useful. 'Meaning' would be common to them all. We would then have to find some means of differentiating meaning, some means of 'object-ifying' it. If we did not, all words would mean the same; they would be indeterminate. In that case our combinations of signs could not be determinate and hence could not reflect a determinate logical combination of things, a fact (4.46). Our combined signs would be as uncombined signs to which absolutely any combination corresponds (4.46).

So a name means an object. An object is its meaning. There is nothing essential or even accidental to it which is meaning. There is nothing which it has which is meaning. It is only something which we have connected to an object. Furthermore, it is only when it is actually making that connection that its meaning is its object. This connection is subject to the limitations of usage. (Only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning (3.3).)
This limitation is not something arbitrarily imposed. It is, instead, the result of the fact that a name does mean an object. For Wittgenstein, no object exists independently of others. That is its form — a form of dependence. So, the only way a name can mean an object, the only way it can signify an object, display its form, serve as proxy for it, is in the same way that the object exists, i.e., in a set of circumstances, together with other objects, in the form of words. It is only under such conditions that a name can show that it signifies an object (4.126), and this of course is how it makes its connection. It displays the same form as the form of the object by being accepted by other words according to their forms just as the appropriate objects are likewise accepted by other objects in a state of affairs and by reciprocally accepting other forms in like manner.

So, we are again thrown back to the thing. It is what a name is all about. It is what sets the limitations and the possibilities of use. It is what enables the expression of fact, for it is what constitutes the fact itself. If we want to look more deeply into the object itself, as though meaning were something it contains, we can do that, too. In being thrown back to the objects we are thrown back, in turn, to substance, for substance and the subsistent (objects) are one and the same (2.027). It is through objects that form and content — substance — is instantiated in the world and finds expression in fact and in the reflection of fact in language. Though the world is fact, fact is dependent not only upon objects (connected) but, through these objects, ultimately upon their unalterable form and content — substance — which in the end is what expresses itself, manifests itself, in individual forms and in the language which corresponds to those forms. It is all that is and hence, it has to be what expresses itself in language but can never be expressed by means of language (4.121). It is embodied logic. It has to be sufficient unto itself such that it can be one thing or another or yet another in this fact or that or yet some other. In other words, it is what is common to all things and all facts. It is the one pervading its many manifestations, each of which is the expression of itself, for, at this level, there is nothing else which can account for its expression outside its own nature. It will not do to call upon God or to call this God, for God, remember, is outside the world, not in it. Substance, on the other hand, is so much in the world that it is the world, and through our language the world finds expression of itself.

So, though the naming process is different from the ancient Indian tradition, perhaps at this level the end result is not so separate as it
initially appeared. That same final substance that we found to be the referent of an elementary proposition and which constantly reveals itself in the functioning of our language is now found presenting itself to us in the place of 'meaning'. Search as we might, it is all that can be found. It is the deepest level of Wittgenstein's contention that the meaning of a name is its object, for it is the deepest level of the object, the object of the object, as it were. It is that of which it is.

If the 'meaning' of a name is nothing more than object in either its concrete or abstract form, the meaning of an expression is something else. Wittgenstein does speak of the meaning of an expression. Interestingly enough, he does so only twice: once when he tells us that an expression has meaning only in a proposition (3.314); and once when he tells us that we can see from the expressions themselves whether or not they have the same meaning (6.232). We have already discussed the significance of the statement that an expression has meaning only in a proposition. The expression awaits projection. Only in this form, projected form, can it signify some possibility. Let us notice even here, however, that the expression is pointing beyond itself. No wonder that Wittgenstein likens the projected expression, the proposition, to an arrow (3.144). It is not that it points to something real. That is necessary only if it is true. What is necessary is that it points to some possibility. That is what it is to have or make sense and that is the essential feature of the expression. We must notice again how it is that an expression in a proposition does point to some possibility. It does so precisely by showing us the possibility. The names which constitute it are put together in such a way that they form the possibility. The form of the expression is the likeness of the possible form of the situation. The form of the expression and the possible situation are essentially the same. One is a picture of the other. "A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connexion is precisely that it is its logical picture" (4.03). It is not unlike road signs of the sort or These portray the possibility of deer crossing and cars skidding. This is how an expression has meaning in a proposition. Our proposition is only a picture in a different medium. It is essentially like its predecessor, hieroglyphic script (4.016). When projected it shows us the possibility. Thus, this 'point to' is in some ways more like 'point out'. Out of all the possibilities it indicates this particular one be-
cause this is the particular form of both the reality and the expression. From this it is obvious that we can tell from the expressions themselves whether or not they 'have the same meaning', i.e., whether or not they indicate the same possibility. If the logical possibilities of the two are equivalent, they do. If the two are substitutable for one another, they do (6.23). We could draw or we could draw .

In either one the same possibility is shown. In either case, all that there is, is form. That is all a projected expression has. There is nothing else to it, or in it, or about it. "Propositions show the logical form of reality" (4.121). As we have seen, there is no content. Within the expression or proposition itself, there is even less to capture as 'meaning' than in regard to name. There at least we reached object which if nothing else, in our obstinacy, we might be able to rename. We could decide to call object "meaning," but then of course it would not 'mean' what we thought it did. Here all we have is possibility, a picture of a way things could stand. Objects x, y, and z could take this form, this configuration -- logically, ontologically. Do we want to call this possibility, "meaning"? Why? That is no better than calling object "meaning."

We have been dealing with what a projected expression shows, but there is also something it says. Perhaps what it says is meaning. Well, all that it says is that what it shows is in fact the case. "Propositions show what they say" (4.461). "A proposition shows how things stand if it is true and says that they do so stand" (4.022), but see how it says this. "A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture" (4.03). By being a picture it says, just as our road signs say something. This again is the automatic and unavoidable result of form. It is not some separate activity or function. It is part and parcel of the existence of any form. We have no doubt that an actual situation in the world is self-assertive. The two trees stand in a relation of a two-foot proximity to either side of the driveway. That it is so, says that it is the case that it is so. But here we have said that one thing is identical with itself and that is to say nothing at all (5.5303). To try to say what a situation says is to produce a tautology. (Tautologies show the logic of the world, they do not say it.) If to say a thing is identical with itself had sense, that is what we would say -- but of course that is nonsense (5.5303). The situation shows itself, asserts itself, says itself to us.
That is why we do not steer the car more than two feet from either side of the driveway. The situation doesn't have to do anything but be what it is to say that it is. So, too, with our propositions. That which is true already contains the assertive verb (4.063). What the logical form of a proposition is, is the logical form of reality. In the presentation of that form is the assertion that that reality exists. All propositions necessarily purport to be true. Not all of them can be proven true. That we must compare the proposition with reality to see whether it is true in itself shows that the proposition asserts something. What it asserts is what we compare with reality; what it asserts is what it represents. Projected expressions are the form of some possible situation and that is enough to assert that that situation is so. Unlike the actual situation, it is not necessary that it is so, but it is necessary that it say that it is so. If it were not necessary that it say it is so and unnecessary that it be so, it would be impossible for a proposition to be false. The intrinsic assertion that what is shown, is also the case, is seen from the very possibility of a 'false' proposition. Even the simplest kind of proposition asserts the existence of a state of affairs (4.21). All that assertion is, is its showing. Furthermore, it is because propositions say what they show in their very showing that we cannot assert the identity of meaning of two expressions (cf. 6.232). If they show the same thing they assert the same thing and to further assert that they do so is nonsense. If what they show is the same, I already know whether what they indicate or assert is the same. All there is is showing by means of like form; there would be no point whatsoever in calling "showing" -- "meaning."

Usually we want to say that projected expressions or propositions have some 'content' -- and that this is their meaning. They all seem to have something in common and we try to call it meaning. In our examination we find that, on Wittgenstein's presentation, this is like stalking a phantom. You think you see it. You carefully position yourself to grab it. You grab -- and find there is nothing in your grasp. There is no content, only form. This is all they have in common. All this is, as we have seen, is their construction and their use. That is all they are -- created shapes, likenesses, representatives of possibility that we make inferences between, calculate upon, and with which we generally make ourselves understood. But what does this 'to make ourselves understood' mean? This question brings us to Wittgenstein's predominant usage of "expression."
We have been treating "expression," for the most part, as a phrase with sense. Wittgenstein occasionally does the same, particularly when it is treated as part of a proposition or as a proposition. His more common usage of "expression" is in the sense of 'revealing' or 'making known by some sign' as in "joy finds expression in laughter" or "low pressure systems find expression in cyclones." The joy and low pressure system do the expressing and the laughter and the cyclone are their expressions. We normally think that we are in charge of all expressing, and insofar as we can make ourselves understood through propositions, Wittgenstein thinks so too (4.026, 4.062). But making ourselves understood is only one result of a proposition and it is mentioned only on those two occasions. We are not the heroes of the Tractatus. Rather, figuratively, by the end of the Tractatus, the human ego is unequivocally brought to its knees. It kneels in silence as one thin edge of the world before the great ontological structure. It has shrunk to a point without extension. "Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way" (5.641). The world is its world because through language it can reflect the world for its own purposes, see it one way or another, but ultimately the self remains only a small insignificant reality coordinated with its world (5.64, 5.641). It is not so strong and independent, but a seer of something strong and interdependent (cf. 5.632-5.633). In the face of this it is only a wondering onlooker. Such summary statements cast here in the midst of a consideration expression will be explored at greater length later.

If man is not the Great Expressor within the Tractatus, what is? We can find out by examining those things which do find expression within a pro-

10 These notions of a humbled ego are not at all foreign to Wittgenstein. In the Notebooks he speaks of being unable to bend the happenings of the world and acknowledges complete powerlessness (p. 73). This, however, as we noted earlier, does not actually amount to fatalism as one might think. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the whole and of one's happiness as harmonizing with it, for he also says that he can master the world "by renouncing any influence on happenings" (p. 73). He agrees with Dostoevsky's idea that "the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of existence" (p. 73) -- not his own purpose as an individual. That is, to live happily he must "be in agreement with the world" (p. 73). He experiences the sense of "being dependent on an alien will" (p. 76) and in "agreement" with that will (p. 75) which is as much as to say: "I am doing the will of God" (p. 75).
position. The most important of these are: a thought, a sense, an internal property, truth-conditions and relations, and to some extent, operations. "An operation is the expression of a relation between the structures of its results and of its bases" (5.22). We can see from this that relations and operations are expressions of one another. They proceed from the very core of propositions, i.e., from their forms, but they occur between propositions. If the forms of two propositions are different, their difference finds expression in the operations that can be performed between them. The difference is a relation between forms and it is the relation which expresses itself in the operation. These relations in which the forms of propositions stand to one another proceed from the internal relations between situations, for it is this that expresses itself in propositions by means of the internal relations between the propositions representing them (4.125). In other words, the properties internal to a situation cannot be expressed (we cannot express them) by means of a proposition, but they can and do express themselves by means of the internal properties of the propositions which represent them (4.124).

This way of speaking of expression might strike anyone familiar with contemporary philosophical discussion as quite bizarre; the Locke-ian doctrine that we use words to convey ideas has permeated ordinary language. (This is similar to the notion that while 'body and soul' are straightforwardly Platonic, the Classical Hebrew tradition would not use these terms. Yet, because Platonic thought is so prevalent, it would be difficult not to read 'body and soul' into the Classical Hebrew literature.) So, such usage either seems bizarre or the modern reader reinterprets what Wittgenstein says. It is my contention that detailed attention must be given to the precise way that Wittgenstein uses the word "express." In his basic usage it is facts rather than propositions which express something, and what they represent is their sense.

To return to our consideration of 'meaning', each proposition represents some situation. It makes sense. That is what it is to be a situation. Facts express sense (3.142), their sense, their configuration, in propositions. Every situation has a set of truth-conditions. These proceed from the very existence of the situation. Some things are possible to it and some things are not. It is both propelled and curtailed by its onto-logic. These

truth-conditions, due to sense in the expression of fact, likewise find expression in propositions. A proposition is the expression of the truth-conditions of a situation, but as such it is also the expression of its own truth-conditions or possibilities (4.431). "A proposition is an expression of agreement and disagreement with truth-possibilities of elementary propositions" (4.4). Thus, "If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds expression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another" (5.131). So, not only do propositions work because of form and the possibility therein which they hold in common with the situation, but propositions work corporately because of their form which they hold in common with related sets of situations. The connections and interconnections go on interminably because of their ontological interrelationship, since they are -- all, in a certain sense, one!

Insofar as propositions are expressions of anything (as opposed to being simply another ontological part of the ontological whole) they are the expressions of the ontological reality, and whole complex. This is what finds expression in them. This is what there is, first and foremost, primarily -- the world as fact. "Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense" (4.002), every situation, but that is only because, as we have seen, logic 'en-forms' all; it is as innate to man's imagination and understanding and, therefore, to the language he constructs as to the existence of any other thing or situation. Therefore, that which is form in all is the ultimate expressor. Yet, while form is sufficient as an express-ion, as in a proposition, it is not sufficient as an expressor. Form alone is only a reflection, an outline, a likeness, as are our propositions. A thing expressed must have content, something which shows its form such that it can be reflected or portrayed.

Within the Tractarian structure, that which is expressed also does the expressing. The proposition is its express-ion. The expressor and that which is expressed are one. The world is not possibility, form alone: it is facts, and facts are what get expressed. The world as facts has content. Its content is not only its concrete objects in configuration but objects abstract as its enduring, unalterable substance which is both form and content. It is this form and content of which an expression is a mark (3.31). Is it any wonder that our elementary propositions are ultimately the reflection of substance, pure and simple, and that as such they are only as the bases of complex propositions and as such are the bases of all the logical possibilities and operations that can be performed on those propositions? Of course
not, for this is how substance stands in relation to things and facts. It is not to be seen externally but is in them as their vital source, that of which they are. Language is an accurate picture of the reality. Substance itself is the Great Expressor and what it expresses is always itself. Its most intimate expression is in elementary propositions which combine to form complex ones. This is nothing but the parallel of its own existence as the underlying subsistent reality which takes on many individual forms and combines in many individual configurations.

We have yet to consider Wittgenstein's use of "expression" vis-a-vis thought. While the uses just considered all concerned themselves with what is expressed in a proposition as it were, independently of man, it is through thought that we can consider this act of expression as it occurs through the medium of man. We have noted several times that Wittgenstein describes a proposition as a projected thought. He also says a thought finds expression in a proposition (3.1). It is in a proposition that the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought (3.2). Thoughts are something we express and we do so through a sign that has a projective relation to the world (3.12). It is not difficult to see how we can make ourselves understood through propositions in that, in the projected form, a perceptible sign of our thought is presented to others. All the others have to do is to perceive the sign in whatever particular form it is presented and that form itself says and shows a fact. At this level, form and fact are one. To perceive the form is to understand the fact -- automatically. That is the virtue of its being a picture. It shows what it says. Whether or not we understand the 'correct' or 'intended' fact, as we have seen, is another question, but as we know what is signified by the signs constituting this projection, if those signs are arranged according to their mutual reciprocity, they know some possible situation. Given that the human mind is as pervaded by logic as is the fact with which it operates, this understanding is a very natural occurrence. Because of the ontological unity, the mutual reciprocity occurs between the natures and existences of all things, or between the existent natures of all things. Thus, in Wittgenstein's ontology the universal nature of substance impinges even upon the seemingly far-removed communication process.

But what about the thought and proposition within the projecting individual? What is expressing what, there? We normally presume that at least our thought is intimately our own, that we are truly its author, and there at least, if nowhere else, we are free, creative agents. We might even
acknowledge all sorts of cultural conditionings and Freudian forces controlling our actions and decisions, but within the realm created by these limitations, there at least we alone are responsible for our thought. We can think what we like, conjure up this image or that, if nothing else, by deliberately putting together this set of words or that. Within the Tractatus this presumption is not at all obvious, nor can it be in any viewpoint which maintains some sort of separation of thought and language. (It is not obvious in a viewpoint which identifies thought and language either, for there the problem simply occurs on another plane, namely at the source of language, but the problem at that level is more the concern of the Investigations.)

In a proposition a thought finds expression. In its expressed form it is perceived by the senses. The proposition is the evidence of the thought. So, what is this thought? and from where does it come? The thought is evidently an imaginary configuration of objects, for the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought (3.2). The thought may indeed be the image of a possible situation but what we perceive of that image or thought is a proposition. Care must be taken here, that we do not conclude that the thought is a picture of a fact 'in our heads', or somewhere, which is understood and then translated into words and in this linguistic form is then projected for others, to understand. In this case a name would signify an object of thought, not its object (but we do not name things in our heads, we name things, and that is how our language connects with the world), and an expression would signify an image in our heads, not a possible ontological form (except, of course, insofar as our images are necessarily possible ontological forms). The fact is, we do not understand the thought any more than anyone else -- until it reaches projection as a proposition. It is from this perspective that Wittgenstein can say, "A thought is a proposition with a sense" (4, emphasis mine). The images that we understand are already linguistic ones, already propositional forms. The images that we have, and the objects which constitute them, may indeed correspond to possible situations, or they may not. Their exact nature is hidden from us by the proposition. "Language disguises thought" (4.002).

To say that the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought need mean only that the projected and unprojected forms of the thought link together in some way. In projected form, in the way in which it is perceived, the image is an expression wherein names connect with objects in the world and the sense of the expression is some
configuration possible to those objects. In other words, though man is the go-between in that he is the projector, the projection itself, and reality, always correspond in like manner, that is, in like form. That is not to say that the thought in unprojected form is of a form like its projected form. Both have logical form, everything does, but their individual form may be very different. In other words, the picture theory is one that applies to propositions as pictures of reality as we imagine it wherein our imagining is forming images (pictures), likenesses, of the possible ways in which that reality can exist. It need not apply to unprojected thoughts and/or propositions. These need not be pictures. This is the force of saying that from our propositions we cannot infer the form of the thought beneath them (4.002). It would seem in fact that they are most likely not already pictures, for pictures we do understand upon contact, but our thought we understand—know objectively—only when projected and that is when it is thought propositionally, through signs that have become symbols. To project the proposition is to think it.

In either case, whether as pictures or as something else we know not what, perhaps simply as impulses of energy, thoughts proceed from something, they are some sort of movement or reality, so say the least, which we perceive propositionally and which, therefore, has some sort of direction, for our propositions are perceived in a determinate, articulate manner. They have sense. If they are the perception of something, then that which is perceived must at least be able to be perceived as full of sense, regardless of its particular form. So, if we are the one perceiving our thoughts instead of thinking our thoughts, as it were, from where do those thoughts come? Well, where indeed from any place other than that from whence all else has come? It is from substance, which is unalterable and unchanging, subsistent, in itself, and in the concrete actualization of its own inherent possibility or form, is able to move and be, in configuration (cf. 2.0271). It must necessarily do so with the direction of logic. As such it is the source of the activity of thought, the construction and projection of a proposition. It is substance of which all individual things and situations are the manifestation and expression. Thought is constituted of substance. We cannot tell from our language exactly what substance is as thought, i.e., we cannot tell its exact individual form, but we can know that it is thought, for it is what our propositions ultimately reflect. If thought exists, then substance is its underlying form and content, its unalterable constituent, its source. As a proposition is the perceptible form of a thought, it is the
perceptible form of substance as thought. As such, it is substance which finds expression in a proposition. From this perspective, too, a proposition is the express-ion of substance.

We have already noted that man is a logically permeated object, like all else within the world, and hence what he is able to understand and imagine is always logical. Furthermore, that he should in the first place, given that all that is is logical, is the result of substance finding expression in the individual logical form that is man. So, from this perspective, too, we can arrive at the conclusion that our propositions are ultimately the express-ion of substance. They are one of the many forms that emanate from it as the sheer existence of man and his language.

We need not bother with how thought comes. Wittgenstein does not do so. Yet a concrete suggestion on the possibility of how thought comes, which is compatible with this ontological framework, may serve to further elucidate this underlying theme of substance as the ultimate expressor.

We have already seen that the world as substance is inherently logical. We also know that in its actual configuration it is always changing and unstable. It is moving. It is always moving logically because all the things that move in its movement are permeated with logic through and through. According to the structure of each thing, only those changes are possible which its logic permits. We, too, are a logical 'substance', and able to think only logical thought. We can only think our world; we cannot get outside of it and cannot even know what an illogical world or an illogical thought would be like. Still, we have in us always changing 'substance' which is a manifestation of never changing substance. All that substance can do is change from one logical configuration to another and to another, and so on. Being both form and content, it could change in either, to take on new specific content. If it does so in content, of course, the form of that content correspondingly changes, and vice-versa.

12 Wittgenstein himself did not express this conclusion in this manner, but this interpretation is compatible with and proceeds from the ontological structure of the world and the nature and functioning of language. As we see, Wittgenstein did not have to ask the question of meaning. He simply portrayed the functioning of the world and language. In this interpretation we are only attempting to express what is shown by the ontology in conjunction with the proposition. While this cannot legitimately be done, the attempt to say what can be seen can often sharpen the focus of our vision.

13 Perhaps this notion of movement becomes clearest if we imagine it in the straight Newtonian sense wherein atoms are in constant motion. Everything is charged with movement and within this movement there is ultimately change.
As substance can be abstract as well as concrete and as abstract can determine only a form, not any material properties (2.0231), it may well be this aspect which we perceive and project in propositional form. This does not mean that these pictures are divorced from the concrete situations, for the concrete situations already contain all the possibilities which are inherent in them due to the structures of their constituent objects. Positives, negatives, and all alternative forms are already there. This would explain how it is possible for our thought and propositions to be separate, on one hand, and for our thought to be a proposition, on the other, which, qua proposition, always reflects some possible configuration in the world. The proposition can retain its connection with object concrete or one of its many possible forms, while the thought itself may well proceed from substance abstract in which form alone can change unendingly and independently of the material properties which our propositions represent (2.0231), but always, all, within the limits of logic, because substance itself is logical. This, too, would explain why our thought seems so intimate to us and why within our own limits we seem responsible for it. It is intimate to us as it is our perception of the possibilities manifested by substance, and we ourselves are one. Perhaps it is even our perception of substance changing its configuration in us as a field of thought, a place of its action. It is substance 'doing' in us whatever substance does in and through its human intelligent logical form. And we are responsible for it in that we can accept or reject particular thoughts, use some and not others — all according to the mutual reciprocity of all the other forms with which we work and which surround us, and also according to the particular configuration in which we participate at a given time. Yet, here again the configurations of substance which we perceive could only be in accordance with the possibilities of form within the total structure. We do not so deliberately put together this set of words or that; we are not the source of our thought. Our thought is the perception of some aspect of substance which is its source, its author. It is on these purely ontological grounds that there is no possibility of illogical thought (5.4731).

Finally, this suggestion further grounds Wittgenstein's Tractarian theme of language as a complete reflection of the world, for the very construction of a proposition, the assemblage of its parts into expressions, and their projection as propositions, would seem to be a mirror image of the movement of substance which is creation (the world as a whole), for there the forms of the configuration are assembled and reassembled together with the assemblage...
and reassemblage of its concrete content. Old forms combine to make new ones, just as in our propositions old expressions are used to communicate a new sense (4.03). The mirroring process continues.

And 'meaning'? Well, it must have been one of those curious signs to which we thought we had given meaning, but in fact had not, i.e., for which we thought there was a corresponding object to which this label attached, but in fact there was none. Hence, the question was a pseudo-question, an imposter. Look where we might, all that can be found is language attached, ultimately substance as it is reflected or expressed in our language. It is substance which reveals itself in our propositions. This is the great insight of the ontological presentation. We just mistook substance for meaning.

We simply did not recognize it in this particular manifestational form. It is the only possible content of which our propositions have only the form. Without this long and tedious ontological analysis, it looked as though there must be a content, of some sort, somewhere, that belonged peculiarly to each proposition and to every proposition. Having seen that there is not, we see that ours was not a logical mistake, but only a misnomer. We unwittingly created a phantom and pursued it. Perhaps this will not seem surprising at all if we also cite other such creations which are likewise exposed for what they are -- to wit, nothing. Wittgenstein does show us another prime imposter. It is called 'truth'.

Truth

Interestingly enough, only twice does Wittgenstein speak of truth as such in the *Tractatus*. First, in his discussion of possibility, he recounts the example of an urn containing an equal number of black and white balls which are drawn out one after another thereby establishing that the number of white balls drawn and the number of black balls drawn approximate one another as the draw continues. But this, he says, is not a mathematical truth (5.154). The second instance occurs when he says that our everyday language is in perfect logical order just as it stands, and this is not a likeness of the truth, but the truth in its entirety (5.5563). The remainder of his numerous entries on the matter speak of a proposition's being true, or of the truth of a proposition, which amounts to the same thing. This is immediately reminiscent of Wittgenstein's use of 'meaning' and it is for its parallel result that it is appropriate to give it consideration here.

When Wittgenstein mentions mathematical truth he obviously means that the fact in question is not a result of mathematical propositions nor in fact
does it have anything to do with mathematics. It is, rather, the simple
result of the actual situation. When he says that our everyday language
is in perfect logical order just as it stands, and that is the truth in its
entirety, he clearly means by "the truth," 'the fact'. It is this fact
which he wishes to present, period. Thus, neither of these cases refers to
anything that might exist which can be called "truth." So, we are left to
examine what it is for a proposition to be true. First of all, though the
proposition is said to be true, this clearly does not mean that the propo­
sition has anything about it which makes it true. It has nothing other than
what every other proposition has, including false ones. There is no priority
or hierarchy among propositions whereby in themselves they can be classified
as true or false. "All propositions are of equal value" (6.4). The truth
or falsity of propositions outside formal logic cannot be recognized from
the proposition alone (6.133). One is just like another. Hence, to say of a
proposition that it is true is immediately to direct our attention to some­
thing beyond the proposition itself. A proposition has sense and that means
that it is some picture of reality. "A proposition can be true or false only
in virtue of being a picture of reality" (4.06). It has sense, which is in­
dependent of the facts (4.061) by means of its pictorial form (2.22). This
sense, as we have seen time and again, is the construction of some possible
configuration of objects in the world, the representation of a possible
form which substance can take. Substance is the basis of the truth of a
proposition. If there were no substance we could not sketch any picture of
the world, true or false (2.0211, 2.0212). In fact, as cited before, our
propositions are so dependent on the world for 'being true' that if a god
creates a world in which some propositions are true, then by that very fact
he has also created all the objects and their configuration which those
propositions portray (5.123).

At this point let us digress slightly from what Wittgenstein specifi­
cally says about a proposition's being true or false in order to explore
the possibilities of what his statements suggest if we press them to their
ontological depths, so to speak. Just as we saw that it is somewhat peculiar
to speak of facts expressing (3.142), or of internal properties and relations
expressing themselves in propositions (4.124, 4.125), so, too, in regard to
language it seems most peculiar to speak of anything other than a proposition
as being true. (In everyday life, we do, of course, speak of "true friends,"
"true love," etc., but even in these cases the use of the word works to por­
tray the deeper meaning of the word.) But the notion that only a proposition can
be true or false might be just another philosophical doctrine that has embedded itself in our ordinary language so deeply that it is difficult to conceive of any other possibilities. To use Wittgenstein's phrase from both the Notebooks (p. 83) and the Investigations (cf. 425), "the thought forces itself upon us."

Let us recall that there can be no surprises in logic (6.1261); that all of the forms of our elementary propositions (and of our non-elementary ones as well since they are composed of the elementary ones) must be foreseeable (NB, p. 89); and that the possible forms of our propositions are in fact a priori, and because of that the general form of the proposition exists (4.5, NB, p. 89). All of these statements are indications that our propositions, in their elementary forms, relate to the unalterable, the subsistent, substance. We need also to recall that the general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand (4.5). A proposition asserts the existence of a state of affairs (4.1). States of affairs are, of course, configurations of objects, which are the subsistent. Now, 'p' already means 'is true' (4.062). The proposition by its very nature is already an assertion of a fact. It of course cannot assert that it asserts a fact (4.122). That is something that is shown in its general form (4.5). By asserting that existence, if it is indeed a representation of possibility (and it is since it has sense), it does so because that form exists. It is in objects and it is unalterable. Therefore, the sheer existence of that form, that possibility, contains or constitutes the assertion 'is true' -- for it is this which the elementary proposition represents. Thus Wittgenstein can think in July of 1917: "But in the sense in which there are, in the most general sense, such things as propositions, there is only one truth and one negation" (NB, p. 91). Though it is transgressing the limits of what we know can be said, that one truth would have, ontologically, to be substance.

If our propositions can be said to 'be true' then we might say it is substance which is the truth which they represent. Substance is the basis of sense and as such is the basis of truth. It is that which is designated. It is that which is. In its very being it 'asserts' itself. If we can not bring ourselves to say that it already contains the verb 'is true' in a 'substantial' form, as it were, we might say that the form of substance has the character of a verb rather than a noun or name; it is verbal rather than nominal. It is verbal as 'to be' and in being that is ontologically the assertion of 'is true'. As we shall suggest in a moment, it is truth that is done in substance, in its configuration, in its being what is,
both in form and content, in possibility and actuality, in existence and
non-existence, etc.\textsuperscript{14}

We might note that Wittgenstein said there was only one truth and one
negation. He did not say there was falsity. Falsity is surely something
that arises out of our usage of propositions, or more precisely, our mis-
usage of them. We assert something to be the case when, though that
possibility exists, the facts in the external world do not support it to
be so. It is, as it were, our persistence in untruth, or in infidelity to
what is as fact, that is falsity. Within what actually is is nothing that
is false in Wittgenstein’s view. Our propositions can be false, but when
that is the case we can perform the operation of negation upon them and
then they reflect the truth.

In concluding this digression, it is interesting to note another
reading of the quotation cited earlier in which Wittgenstein does mention
truth. That "all of the propositions of our everyday language, just as
they stand, are in perfect logical order" is "not a likeness of the truth,

\textsuperscript{14}This notion is perhaps not so foreign to us if we recall Hegel’s
example of animality. It must indeed sound strange to the ordinary mind
to think of an animal as being ‘true’, but substance is to all concrete
objects much as animality is to Hegel’s dog. It is that of which it is,
and in that sense asserts its truth.

Now, the animal, qua animal, cannot be shown;
nothing can be pointed out except some special
animal. Animal qua animal does not exist: it is
merely the universal nature of the individual ani-
mals, while each existing animal is a mere concretely
defined and particularized thing. ... Take away from
the dog its animality, and it becomes impossible to
say what it is. All things have a pertinent inward
nature as well as an outward existence. They live
and die, arise and pass away; but their essential
and universal part is the kind; and this means much
more than something common to them all. (C. Hegel,
Hegel’s Logic, trans. William Wallace, Encyclopedia
of the Philosophical Sciences; [Oxford: The Clarendon

Wittgenstein would surely not appreciate a reference to Hegel. He felt
that he and Hegel were doing opposite things -- Hegel always showing what
appears to be different to be the same and Wittgenstein always showing what
appears to be the same to be different. (Rush Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Witt-
genstein, Personal Recollections [Totowa, N.J.: Roman and Littlefield,
1981], p. 171.)
but the truth itself in its entirety" (5.5563) is a strange statement to make. It is tantamount to saying that when we understand the what and why and how whereby our propositions are indeed in perfect logical order, and must be so, there is nothing more on this matter to be understood. That -- is all there is to it. That may be the case, but that is indeed a great deal. This truth in its entirety means that we have understood the internal structures and properties of objects, the subsistent, and the manner in which our everyday propositions have the same internal structures and properties and are able to represent the facts of the world. Thus, on one reading, when Wittgenstein says he is formulating the truth in its entirety in the *Tractatus*, he is admitting to formulating the very structure of what is -- and this he calls "the truth." 15

Returning to our earlier considerations, then, we can see that it is only by virtue of the internal structure of reality that a proposition, as its reflection, has a truth-value (4.063). The world and its substance are the very possibility of a proposition's being true. A truth-possibility is the existence and non-existence of states of affairs (4.3). The proposition itself has only possibility. The state of affairs, or lack thereof, is the truth-possibility. If the state of affairs exists, then the proposition depicting it is said to be true; if it does not, that proposition is said to be false (4.25). The state of affairs allows us to say of the proposition that it is true or not. Calling a proposition true or false can easily make it look as though there is something called "truth" within the proposition, or elsewhere, as an independent entity, in which the proposition participates, whereas really our statements about the truth of a proposition are assertions about the existence of some configuration of substance. This is why every true statement is reducible to a tautology, for, as we saw earlier, we are then asserting something already necessarily asserted in the

15 Finch takes this sort of reading of 5.5563 in his discussion of the limits of the world.
sheer form of the proposition. We are saying it is the case that it is the
case that...; 'p' is 'p', and that has no sense. It is impossible for a
proposition to state that it itself is true (4.442). Thus, the truth of a
proposition is not something that can be said or even shown in the proposition itself. It is as separate from the proposition as the situation pictured is from the picture. So, in order to tell if a proposition is true we must compare it with reality (2.223). It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false (2.224). "There are no pictures that are true a priori" (2.223). The agreement or disagreement of the sense of a proposition with some actual state of affairs is its truth or falsity (2.222). We must lay the proposition against reality like a measure (2.1512, 2.1515) in order to see if its internal structure is the same as that of the situation. Hence, for a proposition to be true simply means that it has been measured and found to be the same. The situation is its truth. It simply connects with it, shares a common internal structure, meets it at all the appropriate points such that its sense is the same as that of the situation. Yet, we do not normally call a state of affairs, nor its ultimate constituent, substance -- "truth." There is no such thing as truth, just as there is no such thing as meaning. Just as there is nothing corresponding to brackets, or to the 't's and 'f's that comprise the truth table (4.441) -- there is nothing corresponding to truth or meaning.

From this perspective, it may be more correct to understand truth as something which is done -- both by us and by substance. It is the activity of so constructing a proposition that it does reflect an actual situation. However, if our propositions are ultimately substance's self-expression, then to make a true proposition is simply to duplicate in the medium of language the manifestation that has already occurred in the concrete objects' configuration. Having expressed that form once, it can do so again and again and again, for its possibility reeks in the logic that is common to all things and which in substance is ever-present and unalterable. It is important to understand this in order to gain the proper perspective on the kind of realism which this concept of 'being true' is likely to impose upon us. The world is as it is. The facts that are, are the facts that are. The totality of our true propositions is a picture of the world (3.01). It is also the whole of natural science (4.11). In their totality, propositions, both positive and negative, reflect the great interlocking network that exists between things due to the logic of existence, or the logic of every existent. Notice that that is a network -- fact, and those facts can change.
That they are as they are is accidental (6.41). Every fact could be every other configuration which the internal structure of its objects allows. The actual forms accept and reject one another constantly. The forms of facts that are not at the moment actualized in this configuration are still present, real. They exist within the objects. It is both the actualized and the unactualized which our language reflects. Our false propositions still reflect possibilities and our propositions are always the acceptance or rejection of the forms which might, and do if accepted, comprise them. Thus, the realism that is present is that of the world as substance, form and content, not the world as fact, which is all that is the case. There is realism afoot here -- of the very purest sort, but how different it is from what we normally call pure realism in which all that is real is what is actual and this alone is what our propositions reflect and refer to. As previously noted, this is the form of Wittgenstein’s discussion of reality vis-a-vis the world in entries 2.04, 2.06, and 2.063, wherein we are told that the world is the totality of existing states of affairs, but reality is the existence and non-existence of states of affairs and it is the world as this reality which we picture in facts (2.1).

All there is is just what is -- but that for Wittgenstein includes all that could be though it is not. All there is is the world -- ultimately as substance and we find that this is the concern of truth as well as meaning. As we shall see, he is out to show the world aright, or, perhaps even more accurately, in its own right. It is sufficient unto itself. It does not need all the bogus entities we have so unwittingly bequested it precisely by not doing the truth in our language. It now becomes apparent that it is not just 'meaning' which he is stalking in order that the world may shine forth as it really is, but 'truth' and even 'logical constants' and all such entities. He cannot consistently expel one such entity without expelling all such entities, and the fact that he seeks to expel them all is itself further verification of the expulsion of any one.

Tautologies and Contradictions

Propositions are not the only linguistic products to be found. If the function of language is to reflect the world and if language assumes forms other than propositions, then it is incumbent upon us to examine those forms as well as to ascertain how it is that they reflect the world, of what they are the expression, and whether or not there is some chance that 'meaning' may yet be alive, and well, and living in them.
The non-propositional forms which language assumes are, of course, tautologies and contradictions. Tautologies and contradictions are, first of all, determinate combinations of symbols (6.124), that is, they are not random combinations which, unlike ordinary propositions, do not make sense (4.461). At the same time, they are not nonsensical (4.4611). They are as much and as vital a part of our language as are our ordinary propositions. A tautology is that combination of symbols which is unconditionally true, and a contradiction is that combination of symbols which is true on no condition (4.461). Both of them show that they say precisely nothing (4.461). They cannot show anything as they are not pictures of reality. As tautologies admit all possible situations and contradictions admit none, neither can represent any possible situation (4.463). They are both determinate symbols, but neither of them determines reality in any way (4.463). In neither case is there any (even possible) determinate combination of objects to which these particular combinations of signs can correspond (4.466). One is the inner and one is the outer extreme to which our propositions can pass (5.143). The signs, for certain, are still combined, but the relations between the signs, their internal structures, do not mirror the relations or internal structures of any set of objects (cf. 4.462, 4.463). It is for precisely this reason that they do not have sense. They do not have the form of a fact. Yet they do have a form of their own. In the case of the tautology, that form always differs from the form of a proposition in that it must be true, whereas the form of a proposition is such that it can be true or false, and in the case of a contradiction that form always differs from the form of a proposition in that it can never be true. It is never necessary or even possible to compare either a tautology or a contradiction with reality. In a tautology the symbol itself contains all that it needs to be true and in a contradiction the very structure of the symbol itself shows that it can never be true. Not only do they not relate to reality, they do not need to relate to reality.

It follows from all of this that strictly speaking tautologies and contradictions are not propositions according to Wittgenstein's definition and description of a proposition, though of course as combinations of words which are not nonsense and which play a role in our logic in which all of the relevant word groupings involved are referred to as "propositions," they are still called propositions. It is on this basis that Wittgenstein says:
Among the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two extreme cases. In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological.

In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities: the truth-conditions are contradictory.

In the first case we call the proposition a tautology; in the second, a contradiction (4.46).

We have seen that all a proposition has is form, but this fact in regard to a proposition was not so obvious. It became apparent only upon analysis. Since tautologies and contradictions cannot even be compared with reality, it is immediately obvious that all they have is form. Nothing 'real' could possibly be in them as they both close the doors on reality, they leave no room for it. What they show is what they are. A tautology shows that it is a tautology and a contradiction shows that it is a contradiction. This fact in itself shows a great deal about the world. It shows the limits of logic and that means the limits of the world. In brief, it shows us the logic of the world (6.22). By their very forms tautologies and contradictions show us the limits of possibility for forms of possible situations. This is why they are of such great importance; in fact, they are pivotal in Wittgenstein's system. The decisive point about language and the world is contained in the following: "It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols -- whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character -- are tautologies" (6.124). Because ordinary propositions do have sense, do so connect with the world through names and their combinations in expression, these determinate combinations show us the limits beyond which that world cannot pass. Its logical form does not permit such transiting. They themselves do not transit beyond that limit, but do in fact constitute that limit in our language and reveal it in the world.

It is somewhat easier to see how our tautologies and contradictions relate to substance, pure and simple, to the underlying reality, than it was to see how our propositions did so, for tautologies and contradictions bear no semblance to actual existence, to any configuration of existents, and yet, they are not nonsense. They are part of our logical symbolism (4.4611) and the complicated network of logic represents the scaffolding of the world (6.124). We have seen how contradictions relate to reality though they cannot be asserted. Our tautologies relate to reality insofar as they consistently display all its possibilities. They "leave open to reality the whole ---
the infinite whole — of logical space" (4.463). Through the propositions of logic, tautologies show us "the logic of the world" (6.22). Thus, tautologies and contradictions relate to something, though they refer to nothing. They reflect though they do not represent. They "are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations" (4.462). These "pseudo-propositions," as Wittgenstein commonly calls them, particularly in the Notebooks, "when analysed, turn out after all only to show what they are supposed to say" (NB, p. 16). As the world is fact, if that something to which they relate is not the world, yet is, it must be substance. This is all that is. Tautologies and contradictions do not relate to existents, yet they manifest the limits of forms. The only place that forms can be found outside of existents is in substance pure and simple, in that of which the world is. That is not to say of course that substance transgresses these limits any more than existents transgress them. Substance does not contain these limits such that tautologies and contradictions reflect them, but substance is the very source of these limits. It is unalterable form and content. By its being, these limits are.

The world on the other hand is always changing, and were it not for its non-configurational aspect of substance, the unchanging, the determining, patterning agent, we would have no logical assurance that it would not transgress those limits. Substance is existence, as such, and as such logic is inherently in it. If all things are composed of substance, the nature of which is logic, then, the logical guarantee that both the limits and the realm of the possible will always be maintained is in the sheer existence of any object. So, substance has about it these limits, its limits, but the limits are not in it; from one perspective the limits are not even part of it. Substance is what is within its own limits. It is what is, and in reality this of course includes what is not. Both what is and what is not are within the limits. (Propositions are within the limits set by tautologies and contradictions.) Facts are within the limits of possibilities. What is and what is not (positive and negative) are within the limits of what can be. They are the possibilities of substance. Tautologies and contradictions show us the limits of what cannot be. Thus, by substance being and expressing itself in propositions, it shows something about itself in tautologies and contradictions. They are not the expression of substance, and yet they do relate to it. They are the revealing by-product of its expression. Only in this indirect way could they be said to be the expression of substance. Substance expresses itself in propositions, and
in their limits, expresses its own limits. Tautologies and contradictions relate to it as an outline. Again, as propositions of logic, they describe the scaffolding of the world (6.124). They show the way it is in itself. They show the limits of its form, in their form. As such they can be seen to reveal more about it than propositions do. Propositions could not represent ontological form as such, but tautologies and contradictions can reveal it. They proceed from it, but as the outline of a mass proceeds from the being of the mass, as its limits, its shape. Our tautologies and contradictions reveal not the shape of a particular thing or individual fact (propositions do that), but the shape of the whole -- substance itself.

And meaning? What we thought was meaning is noticeable here precisely by its absence. What content could we possibly give to limits? Limits are invariably what contain, not what is contained.

**Formal Logic**

What tautologies and contradictions do in themselves, however, is only part of the picture. While they are not representatives, we can make representations of them. We can cast them as well as propositions into arbitrary and sense-neutral signs. "...the propositions of logic say nothing" (6.11). But we must note that as we can achieve with contradiction what we can with tautologies and vice-versa (6.1202), and as we can ultimately reduce any proposition to a tautology -- the propositions of logic are ultimately tautologies (6.1). The propositions of logic are what we have when we have stripped our propositions of sense and laid them bare of all significance. In this condition, as propositions of logic, they all are of equal status. None is more primitive than others, none more fundamental (6.127). In formal logic, the meaning of the signs, their objects, plays no role (3.33). We merely calculate with symbols (6.126), and the number of symbols is arbitrary (6.1271). We apply operations, thereby generating tautologies, thus arriving at proofs of propositions (6.126). "...without bothering about sense or meaning, we construct the logical proposition out of others using only rules that deal with signs" (6.126; also 6.31, 5.43).

Our proofs in logic are mechanical expedients for recognizing tautologies (6.1262). Because of this lack of concern with sense and what it signifies, the general validity of logic is essential to logic itself (6.1232). Its authenticity proceeds from within itself. It is self-contained. Its process and result are equivalent and this accounts for the lack of surprise (6.1251, 6.1261). With no relation to anything outside, nothing accidental or
unforeseen can arise to make things go any way other than expected. This is why the logical proof of a proposition that has sense is different from a proof in formal logic (6.1263). In logic every proposition is the very form of a proof (6.1264) and can be construed to be its own proof (6.1265). In logic we can arbitrarily construct a sign language and watch the operations that appear as we generate propositions one out of another. We can watch logical syntax emerge. Every sign language has such a syntax and it contains all the propositions of logic (6.124). Those propositions are always the same no matter what the sign language. Thus, the propositions of logic have a unique status among all propositions (6.112), for they demonstrate the logical properties of propositions (6.121).

Previously we have always talked of logic as ontology, logic as it permeates the world. Now we are speaking of what might be called logic-elegy -- formal or symbolic logic, but this is a reflection of the logic in our language which is a reflection of the logic in the world. The system itself can be created and can operate in total isolation from the world. In fact, in logic, if we must look to the world for a proof, we know we have well and truly gone amiss (5.551, 6.1222). This isolation, however, does not preclude an identity of structure. Quite the opposite is the case. As our propositions incorporate the structure of the world and our logic incorporates the structure of our propositions, obviously our logic incorporates the structure of both language and the world and does so in a way which makes that structure visible. The propositions of logic, ultimately tautologies, show the formal -- logical -- properties of language and the world (6.12, 6.22). Logic has nothing to do with how our world really is (6.1233) but does reflect its actually being that way. It reveals the structure that makes some things possible to things and others impossible to them (6.3751). It lays bare the very scaffolding of the world (3.42, 4.023, 6.124), both as it is in itself and as it is constructed by the totality of our true propositions. It tells us nothing about how things stand but everything about how it is that they do so stand.

The scaffolding analogy is one that appears throughout the Tractatus and is worth elaborating upon. It can be both enlightening and misleading. It is our formal logic that is like the scaffolding. If we were to erect the entire scaffolding of a building and none of the actual building itself, we would have both the structural outline of the building and that which makes its erection possible. This scaffolding itself is as the outline in what is analogous to our formal logic vis-a-vis the building of our language and the
world. But it is the force of the propositions, and/or the actual existence, which reaches through the space the scaffolding creates, and fills it (3.42); and the force is the force of logic as onto-logic. Logic itself, is, as it were, the girders and joists of the building; the formal logic duplicates the shape of this basic structure. It is not what makes it possible, however. It makes only its erection by us possible. This is where the analogy breaks down. Neither the world nor language needs formal logic. It needs what we might call actual logic, logic as it pervades the world and has, not just form, but content.

Thus, the formal logic is perhaps better displayed as a two-way mirror. It is "not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world" (6.13). As such it is also a mirror-image of our language which reflects and represents that world. But this analogy also has a danger, and it is an important one. There are some things in our logic and our language which are to be found nowhere in the world. This does not keep our language or logic from being an image of the world, and even a very accurate one. Some impressionistic paintings are more truly likenesses of their topic than strictly realistic ones. The things which are not in the world but are in our logic and our language are the logical constants -- ', ', ', •', 'v', 'w', '→', '↔' -- which we combine with formal concepts expressed as variables. Our variables are traceable to the world, the world as fact. That is what makes them variables. Yet, in the world, there are no logical constants, no logical objects (5.4). Logical constants are not representatives; "there can be no representatives of the logic of facts" (4.0312). So, the way our logic mirrors is not the way our propositions mirror the world, i.e., by revealing the sense or fact of the world. It is revelational not as representation but as reflection (4.121). Its significance arises not through connective signs but through 'symbols-connected' which form an infinitely fine network, and as a network is so accurate a likeness of the very internal structures of that world as to be its mirror-image (cf. 5.511). In other words, formal logic is the reflection of logic the ontological, the transcendental (6.13). It shows, it reveals, it makes manifest, not only the nature of the world as fact, but the world as substance, for it shows us the very nature of its form. It reveals the limits of the limited whole in revealing its impossibilities. It reveals the whole of the limited whole by incorporating propositions and thereby revealing its possibilities. While logic pervades the world, our formal logic reveals the properties of that logic -- the world's limits and possibilities, as they exist in its form and content -- as it exists
unalterably, and therefore eternally, as well as in movement and configuration, in substance. Thus our formal logic is called the "theory of forms and of interference" (6.1224) and it is no wonder that we feel that, if we have it right, we have everything else right as well (4.1213).

Put differently, everything, every situation, contains within itself the positive and the negative, the possibilities and impossibilities that are shown in logic. Existence is logical. Beneath or along with existence is that whereby it is what it is -- its form or essence, which must likewise be such that the actuality is that. The incorporation of a like ingredient makes possible the extrapolation of that same ingredient. In uncovering the structure of our language, formal logic also uncovers the structure of existence and of the substance of which it is. Substance is logical, full of logic, set with limits, else its existents could have no limits, and set with possibility, else its existents could never be (f)actual. Logic is like an underwater camera. It shows us what is going on beneath the surface. It shows us the character of substance -- as the logical. Case by case it "discloses something about the essence of the world" (3.3421).

Besides these revelations, there is another service which logic performs for us. It successfully manages to silence our ever-expressive egos. In the face of formal logic we must finally admit that we are not the Great Expressors. Our signs and our symbols are arbitrary, but our formal logic shows us something else, namely, that some things are not arbitrary. In our formal logic it is only these that express. Thus it is "not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself" (6.124). That nature we have seen to be the nature of substance. Thus it is substance which here reveals itself, as in our propositions it expressed itself, and in tautologies and contradictions it told us about itself.

Just as our propositions are mechanisms involving the world, themselves, us, and substance, so we can now see that this Tractarian show-and-tell program extends beyond these to include tautologies, contradictions, and formal logic. It is all an interlocking, interfunctioning system. Nothing is excluded from it. It is all and all is one. Language and the world are co-extensive and, as we have seen, 'meaning' is co-extensive with both, for it, too, is one with them and in no way separable. It is 'them.' It is nothing in itself nor as a property of language alone. The comprehensive, interlocking description which is the Tractatus is thus itself a mirror image of the great ontological reality. It begins with
that of the world that we can see, fact, wanders incessantly back and forth between that and what we cannot see, substance and its revelations, and finally ends in what we cannot see and therefore cannot say but can indeed know (kennen) because it has been shown to us.

While the Tractatus is clearly not an argument, without reaching this deepest and substantial level, the description of the ontologico-revelational process would appear to be circular. The apparent circular argument would be: the world is fact because it can be pictured in our language (and only situations or facts can be pictured), but that our language is a picture of the world is because the world is fact. This circle is broken when the world as fact is also the world as substance so that as fact and substance it is the subject (activity) of our language. Language reflects the world as fact in what it can say and reveals the world as substance in what it can show. When we strip the fact from our language and reach its formal logic, we have there the logic of the fact as well, which emanates from substance as its source within the world, for it is logic, the transcendental permeating all things. This may still feel circular (all ontological insights do: they must, for all it one), but it is more of a spiral which in turn spirals and twists, resting again and again back upon itself, bringing us each time one step higher than before. We do climb upward since eventually we must throw away the ladder (6.54), but no chance of a linear description is even possible, for creation is a whole, a limited whole, not a limited line with a point of beginning and a point of ending. A linear description would be untrue to the matter at hand, as we are in the whole and cannot be out of it. Therefore, we can begin at any point and, following it long enough, always return in the end to that same point in our description, but not in the same manner. That point upon return is richer, deeper. We have wandered about in circles, but not in vain. As we shall see, some separate experience, which is the result of all this work but distinctly other in its character, is needed to escape the effects of this

16. Due to Wittgenstein's 'logic chopping,' the Tractatus might appear to be a very strict and narrow argument -- if we do not give appropriate emphasis to the ontological aspects. It describes the manner in which propositions represent and tautologies do not represent. In the Tractatus the element of circularity is presented -- just so, but at the same time through our understanding of the ontological aspects, we have, in the end, climbed beyond it and kicked away the ladder that it was.
circularity. That this was Wittgenstein's final goal and the end to which all else progressed will be displayed in the coming chapter.

For now, we can see that within this all-inclusive spiraling a certain primacy does emerge. We gain more solid footing. We are ultimately bound back to the primordial world of substance, for language is its expression. Surely this is the force of the picture theory of language. A picture theory necessarily involves the supremacy of the subject-matter. To say that the subject-matter expresses itself is only another way of asserting that subject-matter without which the picture would not be. If there were not something, there would not be language. Given that there is something, there can be language, and is. The possibility of language is necessary, logically necessary. It stems from the sheer existence which enables reflection. Its actuality is not necessary. The existence is necessary for the reflection but the reflection is not necessary for the existence. It is, as it were, a grace, a gift of itself to us, a revelation. It reveals itself not just in propositions but in their limits and their formal scaffolding. The whole of language is substance's revelational medium.

This discovery of substance is somewhat like the discovery of a traffic pattern. You can manufacture cars and watch each one go down the road, and that is what you see, cars going down a road. Or, you can go to the top of a skyscraper or up in a helicopter, and there from on high you can see all the cars going down all the roads in perfect order and in perfect juncture, provided of course, everyone drives 'sensibly'. You see a traffic pattern. You see traffic. You could not achieve this insight from the construction and driving of any single car or even in all the cars cars. It can only be shown to you as the underlying reality of all those cars in motion, as traffic, and it is ultimately only that reality of traffic which shows itself. And why was it never seen before? Because one kept looking for it to be something in each car going down the road. Look-

17 Wittgenstein himself advised just such a metaphorical move in attempting to understand a problem. After struggling to understand the internal similarities between a proposition and its reference, he wrote in the Notebooks:

Don't get involved in partial problems, but always take flight to where there is a free view over the whole single great problem, even if this view is still not a clear one (NB, p. 23).
ing for that 'phantom something' got in the way of our total and correct observation, just as 'meaning' got in the way of our understanding the language aright.

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Wittgenstein came to destroy that metaphysical monster, 'meaning'. We might feel that to do so he dives directly into a very deep metaphysical ocean which is perhaps no more real than the monster. Yet, that is not as he sees his task. The waters that he trolls are those of ontology, the way things are, like it or not. They are what is and what can be shown to be -- logically -- due to the necessary logical attributes of existence, as we saw in the beginning. The way in which his work is all nonsense is not that he has acknowledged substance or anything else as a metaphysical entity, but that he has repeatedly 'put into words', said, what on the very grounds that the world and language are as they are -- cannot be said. We can know (kennen) that substance exists and we can know a great deal about it, but this is the unmanifest level of the manifest and we cannot picture what is unmanifest. A picture of the unmanifest can be only a blank nothing. The only way to cope with this is silence, his own resounding silence. We can now turn our attention to this silence and its analogues -- philosophy, the riddle of life, and 'the mystical'.

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Having explored the various levels of Wittgenstein’s view of the world and language with their corresponding dethronement of meaning, we can now undertake an examination of philosophy as a method and at long last fathom what the method is ultimately a method for. The discovery of this Tractarian telos is likewise the key to its entire understanding. Once it has been perceived, all else falls into place. Conversely, if it is never recognized, parts of the Tractatus always remain a mystery. We shall see in this section how, through philosophy, Wittgenstein arrives at ‘the mystical’, not as some esoteric illumination nor as some exotic episode in clairvoyance, but as the final consequence of the patient reasoning made possible by the logic of language and the world. In ‘the mystical’, ‘meaning’ is met as sheer being, and its non-linguistic nature is all the more obvious. Also, it is in this that the final verification and validation of the many levels of the entire text are to be found. Finally, it is in the living of ‘the mystical’ that the relation between Wittgenstein’s personal life and his written philosophy appears natural and completely harmonious.

Philosophy

It is perhaps easiest to understand the Wittgensteinian notion of philosophy as something which contrasts with the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘traditional’ philosophy, i.e., philosophy other than or previous to his own. In Wittgenstein’s view, the corpus of ‘philosophy’ amounts to a monumental conflation of confusions. Fundamental confusions are produced in two ways. First, they are produced by failing to understand the modes of significa-

1Baker and Hacker have done an interesting study of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as it relates to that of Russell contending that it was primarily Russell’s notion to which Wittgenstein objected. Russell wanted philosophy to make progress, to be able to construct theories, and to be a “general science.” Wittgenstein, on the other hand, wanted to determine the bounds of sense and in so doing to clarify “which questions are intelligible and which investigations are in principle relevant or irrelevant for answering them. This view Wittgenstein held and argued for throughout his career.” (G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, op. cit., p. 457.) They notice that “The major innovation of the Tractatus relative to the preceding remarks (Russell’s notion) on the nature of philosophy is the emergence of the doctrine of the ineffability of philosophy.” (Ibid., p. 466.)
tion and symbolization of our words, which leads to conclusions of common
ground or 'meaning' of a word used in very different ways, or a lack of
common ground for different words used in the same way. This enables
philosophers to ponder erroneous 'ground' in both cases (3.22-3.24).

Second, confusions are produced by failing to understand the logic of our
language, which leads to conclusions of the reality of named entities,
when in fact, the name in use produces only the mirage of such an entity,
and is not its reflection. It is only the reflection which is permitted
by the logic of our language. This enables philosophers to ponder erro­
nuous 'reality' (4.003). The propositions and questions found in
philosophical works are usually propositions and questions based on such
confusions. Examples of such questions are long debates on internal and
external relations and on structural or formal properties (4.122). They
'take up' long after they should have 'left off'. Had the 'philosophy'
been done on the language that produced the confusions, the questions and
propositions would never have commenced in the first place. Because the
questions and propositions lack foundation, in that they fail to represent
any sort of possibility, they, like all of our pseudo-propositions are not
false, but simply nonsensical (4.003). Such questions can never be an­
swered. Our fatal mistake has already been made when we take such questions
seriously enough as to attempt an answer -- which in Wittgenstein's view
is just what pre-Tractarian traditional philosophy has done. All that
should or can be done is to "point out that they are nonsensical" (4.003). It
is in this way that all philosophy is indeed a "'critique of language"
(4.003). We must continually show that the apparent forms of our proposi­
tions are not always real ones.

From this evaluation of traditional philosophy it is natural that
Wittgenstein would see the chief and only task of philosophy as "the
clarification of thoughts" (4.112). In fact, philosophy itself is seen as
a task, an activity to be performed (4.112). It is a service to be rendered
to all thoughts, without which the thoughts are "cloudy and indistinct"
(4.112). It is the service of making them clear and giving them sharp

Wittgenstein's own example of this is: "(In the proposition, 'Green is
green' -- where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last
an adjective -- these words do not merely have different meanings: they are
different symbols.)" (3.323).

Wittgenstein's own example of this is the philosophical "question whether
the good is more or less identical than the beautiful" (4.003).
boundaries (4.112). Hence, Wittgenstein tells us, a philosophical work consists of elucidations (4.112). It throws light upon any given topic by making the statements concerning it -- precise. It has no content of its own. Rather it is something to be applied to all thoughts on all topics. In this respect it is essentially parasitic. If we never tried to make statements on other topics, we could never do philosophy, for there are no philosophical statements vis-a-vis philosophy. There is only the philosophical service rendered to other statements. For these reasons, philosophy is not a natural science (4.111), for instance, nor is it a human or social science such as psychology (4.1121). Its place is either above or below these things, but not on an equal par with them, not beside them (4.111). They have a legitimate and well defined 'content', an area or topic of investigation. Being a service to thoughts, philosophy, on the other hand, is pan-topical.

Furthermore, just as all content is off limits to philosophy, so, too, philosophy -- in both the traditional and the Tractarian sense -- is off limits to all other topics. Not only does philosophy serve to render the topical statement clear and sharp, but it also serves to render the limits or boundaries of the topic clear and sharp. It defines and protects its area of concern. As Wittgenstein claims, it "sets limits to the much disputed spheres of natural science" (4.113). It does so by making certain that the statements on any given topic do in fact reflect the subject-matter of that topic. If all the statements on any topic are sharp and clear, they accurately reflect the situation which is their concern. If they do accurately reflect some such situation, there is no way in which they can transgress those boundaries and begin to operate in the murky and unreal areas analogous or even identical with the confusions of traditional philosophy. If all the statements within the limits are kept within their boundaries, then the boundaries themselves are likewise preserved. Philosophy (as confusion) cannot re-emerge under the guise of natural science or psychology or any other field. By the same token these things cannot become philosophy -- new or traditional. They cannot perform the task that is philosophy's task, for to do so would exceed their bounds and they cannot become spurious philosophy for the same reason. There they would not only exceed their bounds but that of philosophy as well. That philosophy is out of bounds -- period. It is with these thoughts in mind that, in comparing philosophy and psychology, Wittgenstein notes that the "theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology" (4.1121). It is also
the study of philosophy as Wittgenstein sees it, for, the study of the thought-process corresponds to his study of sign language (4.1121). When we fully understand the sign language all boundaries are kept and each area of discourse functions properly.

This is not to say there do not remain dangers, but it does mean that any mistakes are identifiable and correctable. If a statement is made which exceeds the bounds, it can be seen to do so and promptly altered or rejected. The danger that always invites mistakes is the ever-present possibility of becoming entangled in what is unessential, as when the philosophy of logic has become entangled in psychological investigations (4.1121). This danger is different from that of overstepping the bounds, of trying to say something which cannot be said, different from the actual mistake. All the statements may indeed be legitimate statements and yet be unnecessary to the point at hand. There is even this danger in the study of sign language. It can become entangled in unessential logical investigations (?) and eventually even in unessential linguistic investigations (?) (4.1121). In other words, we may be able to detect this misfortune within both the Tractatus and the Investigations — if — their objective were in fact the study of sign language. If, however, the inclusions reveal something about the sign language and/or the study of sign language as a means to some other end, then the inclusion of these broader areas may be far from misfortunes, but, instead, further elucidations. That this is the case, if not clear already, should become so soon. In the meantime we can examine Wittgenstein's method of philosophy in order to see just what the activity is.

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science — i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy — and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions (6.53).

It is as clear and as simple as that. We can state facts. We can picture actual and possible actual situations. These are within the boundaries. If a proposition oversteps the boundaries, into the metaphysical, the activity of philosophy then renders its service. It shows, as indeed the whole of the Tractatus shows, that such statements are unacceptable. They signify nothing; there is nothing for them to signify — not even a possibility. They are nonsense. The result of such activity
is to "set limits to what can be thought" (4.114). As what can be thought is the same as a proposition in projected form, the boundaries of thought are simultaneously and identically set with the setting of the boundaries of a proposition. So, we begin with what can be said/thought -- the statements of fact, natural science--and proceed outward from these until the boundaries of what cannot be said/thought are reached. In this manner philosophy is able to set the boundaries of what both can and cannot be thought (4.114). In the act of presenting clearly what can be said it also signifies what cannot be said (4.115). If all that can be said is apparent, that very totality also delineates an 'outside'. Thus, it is not the case that we need actually to speak nonsense in order to discover the realm of what cannot be said, in the same way that we need to say what can be said, in order to continuously explore and reflect that realm. Philosophy keeps us within the boundaries; it does not drive us outside them. When we do transgress the boundaries, philosophy herds us home again, drives us back within the safe and the real, back to what is. At the same time, in the very allowing us to say what can be said, in the non-interference between language and the world, it defines that safe and real: it creates the space that is 'home'. Thus, if philosophy were to be likened to anything, it is perhaps most like a shepherd, or even his dog. When all is well it serves best by doing nothing, leaving us in peace. When we are in danger of wandering astray, it drives us back to safety. This method, this shepherding, Wittgenstein calls us -- though it seems unsatisfying because it does not feel as though we are doing philosophy (it feels only (!) as though we are using our language in a normal, clear and precise manner) -- is the only strictly correct one (6.53).

While this task of philosophy, performed by this method, is in many respects a monumental service in itself, it is in fact only the means to yet another end. It is, as it were, only the surface contribution of philosophy. As always within the Tractatus there is yet a deeper level. We must look to what it is which this task accomplishes, and to the consequences

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It is worth remarking that Heidegger evokes the metaphor of man as the shepherd of Being. ("Letter on Humanism," Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 221.) The metaphor occurs in a context wherein he is discussing whether the essence of man is not something more than an animal with rationality, but this is not the point being made here. Rather, this particular metaphor seems apt to describe Wittgenstein's concept of the task of philosophy.
of this. For Wittgenstein the final product of the task of philosophy is always the revelation of something beyond itself. The final goal of philosophy is always to uncover the world, to show it in its essence as well as its factual existence. Statements of natural science say the factual existence of the world, but when the task of philosophy is performed upon them, either by accepting them in leaving them alone or by rejecting or correcting their contrariness, then they can be seen to show the world in its essence. The world in its existential essence, i.e., as what it is, is ultimately that into which we are delivered in the attainment of silence, but that is the subject of the next section. The individual act of pointing out nonsense or setting a boundary is of little concern in itself. That it is done, however, shows that it can be done, and that it can be done, shows us something about the way things are. As Wittgenstein puts it, it is generally so in philosophy that "again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world" (3.3421).

We have seen the entire Tractatus to be an exposition of the ontological. It is not philosophy according to Wittgenstein's own description of the activity and method of philosophy. It is not a book on natural science. Yet, having seen the ontology that exists, the harmony and order and reciprocity and logical interfunctioning of all things, facts, and language, from the finest and most fundamental level of substance through its many forms in fact, arising in thought, and finally reaching an obvious

5Wittgenstein wrote to van Ficker that the preface and the conclusion "contain the most direct expression of the point of the book. ... The book's point is an ethical one" (PT, p. 16). "Ethics," we are told, "is a condition of the world, like logic" (NB, p. 77). Or again, we find:

My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition.
That is to say, in giving the nature of all facts, whose picture the proposition is.

In giving the nature of all being.

(And here being does not stand for existence—in that case it would be nonsensical.) (NB, p. 39.)

With statements such as these the goal of philosophy, in Wittgenstein's view, should not be surprising to us.
reflection in the projection of a proposition -- it is then possible to see that the activity and method of philosophy can in fact perform the service that they do. This service has as its final end the revelation of the world. The Tractatus itself is in no way to be taken as a legitimate work in philosophy. It is, instead, we might say, the theoretical background for the practical activity of philosophy. It is the theory of philosophy which is quite separate from its actual doing, like the theory behind a laboratory experiment which is quite separate from the experimenting itself. Nonetheless, the experiment rests upon the theory and verifies the theory. That philosophy is able to perform the task that it does -- ultimately to show the essence and existence of the world -- is due to the fact that the world is the way it is. Before this could be shown, it was necessary to have the theory that the world is that way, and that is what the Tractatus is. A theory, of course, must be logically consistent within itself. It must 'come forth' as a piece of sense, as a real possibility that is in fact verifiable. It must be somewhat self-sufficient, able to stand on its own. This is true of the Tractatus as a theory. It is within itself a well-reasoned, logical piece. It is carefully constructed, bit by bit, according to the logic of existents whereby the world is fact. In other words, each of its levels is complete in itself and the content of each level can be analysed on that level. It is the study of sign language and we can analyse it as such. It is the study of ontology and we can analyse it as such. It is the study of philosophy and we can analyse it as such, etc., etc. At the same time, only when all the levels are seen in their interrelationship, in their verification of one another, can we truly understand any given level in its fullness. It is in this way that the backdrop of ontology enables us to understand the task of philosophy and to see how its final end is in fact the end that it is. This backdrop and this understanding are not necessary for the doing of philosophy in Wittgenstein's view. The technique itself will produce the desired end whether or not we understand why and how it works as it does.

At this point we may begin to feel that spiral bending back on itself yet again and feel yet another circular motion. Does this never come to an end? Can we never be still? In our insights, no. In our silence, yes. But even silence is active in 'knowing'. We cannot get outside the world. Only there might our understanding 'freeze', for the sense of the world lies there, outside the world. Within the ontology, within the world, all things are as zillions of molecules in constant exchange with one another. The
doing of philosophy can stop. It can come to rest. This activity is not circular; it always proceeds in one direction and then stops, vanishes. It does so when it has in fact reached its final goal, when after so many corrections and so many herdings home we come to be at peace at home -- in the unrest of our world, the constant ongoing harmony of the ontology -- unchanging substance ever in factual manifestation, manifestation ever in reflection, reflection ever returning us to its source in substance, substance unalterable, never changing, ever in factual manifestation... Our imagination and thought are part of that process. Knowledge remains in motion, but philosophy as an activity stops. It stops, on the one hand, whenever the task at hand, the individual case, is completed; and, on the other, whenever it has produced the above knowledge of the ontological process -- the world -- such that we are content to say only what can be said, and in that saying to let the rest be shown. As Plato's dialectic stopped when the truth was attained, and Aristotle's distinctions ceased when his contemplation was achieved, so here Wittgenstein's philosophy rests when we 'see the world aright'. Of what use is the means to an end when the end is achieved?! Furthermore, we no longer need the theory when the experiment has proven it. Then we simply enjoy a conclusion. So, here, once we have seen the world aright, there is no need for all the elucidations that produced that vision. Only when we have thrown them away can we truly stand in the full light of the vision. This is the force of 6.54:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

When we see the world aright, the Tractarian theory is not needed. The philosophical laboratory service is not needed. All that remains is the vision, the enjoyment of the fullness of what has been shown!

Once we have seen the world aright it is obvious why Wittgenstein says the Tractatus itself is eventually recognized as nonsensical. Its

6 Finch goes so far as to suggest a specific reason why the statements are all nonsensical, namely, that Wittgenstein has given no meaning to the word "object" -- a word so central to the whole text that all the propositions are nonsensical. He failed to give a meaning to his sign and hence
propositions all try to say what, in the end, properly done philosophy would enable any and all propositions to show. It is, as it were, a philosophy of philosophy -- and there can be no such thing. There can be only statements of natural science and the activity of seeing to it that this is in fact the case. This philosophy cannot be written. It can only be done. Just as there can be no representations of the logic of facts, no pictures of the picturing, so there can be no philosophy of philosophy, no picturing of it. It is analogous to the very working out or functioning of logic itself, of the happening of picturing itself.

So, ultimately we transcend both the Tractatus and philosophy. If philosophy is properly done it leads to a vision of the world like that of the Tractatus anyway, only legitimately, whereas the Tractatus, effective as it is, is quite illegitimate on Wittgenstein's own terms of legitimacy, again, not because he has created metaphysical unrealities, but because he has attempted to explain through propositions the logic of both the world and language, and that cannot be done. That language and the world are this way can be seen from their very 'working' as they do, but to attempt to say this is to attempt to picture the picturing itself. It is the attempt to actually put the ontological into words. The ontological is what it is, all that it is, fact and substance, and words are only its factual reflection. Thus, "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest" (6.522). The internal properties and relations in the world are such things and the means whereby they make themselves manifest are "the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects" (4.122).

On first thought, it may be somewhat hard to see how philosophy as Wittgenstein describes it should produce knowledge of the world as the

his propositions are pseudo-propositions. That does not mean that what is shown is not real or that the internal structure is not as presented. But that structure precisely cannot be said, only shown -- and the pseudo-propositions "stood up" long enough to reveal this. (Finch, op. cit., p. 228.)

In this exposition, however, we have seen the way in which "object" does clearly have meaning. In fact, the various senses in which Wittgenstein uses it can be seen to have meaning. There is a concrete sense of configuration and an abstract sense of the unalterable and unchanging. That our language cannot legitimately express this metaphysical notion is surely the way in which the statements can be said to be nonsensical.
**Tractatus** describes. This difficulty disappears, however, when we do a type of Tractarian analysis of this activity of philosophy. By restricting us to factual statements, philosophy forces our knowledge to expand beyond those statements. What we can say is one thing; what we can know is another. When we have said, and said, and said, and periodically encountered the limits of what can be said, we then get the limits of the world correct, for the limits of language and the limits of the world are one and the same, as we have seen. If all these limits are correct, and they clearly do not include such things as 'meaning' or 'truth' or 'logical constants' or any other explanatory and would-be functioning unrealities which our pseudo-propositions might elicit or create, then we must conclude that what they were intended to do or explain is clearly done by something within those limits. Thus, it is to this conclusion that properly done philosophy forces us. Since all that our language reflects is the factual world, and since there is nothing in the world as fact which would explain and do what our metaphysical entities pretend to accomplish, we can clearly understand, though we cannot picture, both the existence and the functioning of what underlies fact, namely, the world as substance. There is far more to reality than can be said. It makes itself manifest. Once manifest to us it can be known by us, but not in a way that can be articulated in language. In this sense it is beyond our language. It is by means of forcing our understanding beyond our language, while confining our language to the world as fact, that philosophy produces a knowledge of the world which at one and the same time 'exceeds' language and is pure, pristine, devoid of metaphysical unrealities.

Thus, the Tractarian Wittgenstein holds not only a separation between thought and language, language being only the projected form of a thought, but a separation between knowledge and language, knowledge being all that can be understood and extending beyond fact to which language is confined. Clearly these separations do not preclude a relationship between thought and language and knowledge and language, but they do preclude an identity between them. "A logical picture of facts is a thought" (3). "The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world" (3.01). "In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses" (3.1). These statements can leave no doubt of the separation between thought and language. Furthermore, "everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly" (4.116). Wittgenstein tells us in his own preface that the thoughts
in his book are "unassailable and definitive" but that he has "fallen a long way short of what is possible" in his attempt to express them well (p. 5). This, likewise, seems to imply the separation between thought and language and even leaves room for 'thought' to exceed our language, but as such a thought cannot find a projection in a proposition, and it is perhaps best to think of such a thought as a form of knowledge. Not all forms of knowledge, however, as we noticed earlier, can be either thought or said. Our propositions, for example, cannot represent the logical form of reality (4.12, 4.111). Yet we certainly know that logical form exists; we know what it is and we recognize and work with its operations. We have a priori knowledge and a priori insights (6.33, 6.34). These cannot always be cast into propositions; they are instead, most frequently, knowledge of a form (6.32-6.34). We have knowledge of acquaintance -- in an entire continuum of degrees from mere meeting to intimate union -- and through this we know the internal properties of things (2.01231) and are able to recognize it in different situations (2.0123). It is through such knowledge that we know the situation that a proposition represents (4.021).

The separation between thought, language, and knowledge stems from the understanding of the ontological whole -- the world as substance and fact. There are still no metaphysical unrealities here. There would be so only if we failed to see that to which a picture points in being a picture, if we attributed to fact itself what logically, ontologically, can be attributed only to the world as substance, of which fact is the manifestation and language the gross reflection. In such a failure, fact would be so imbued with the metaphysical as to have no need of substance. The 'fact' would become sufficient unto itself. It would be an inviolable absolute. Noticing such an impropriety is not unlike Wittgenstein's observation that:

...people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.

And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained (6.372).

Thought as a picture in the projected form of a proposition is not enough to explain knowledge.

Wittgenstein's theory of philosophy is capable of warding off the danger of thinking that what we see on the surface can explain the depth. Limits can be set too narrowly as well as too widely. We can fail to
picture correctly by attributing more to the fact itself than what is there, as well as by attempting to picture bogus facts. When we try to put the world as substance into the world as fact, we have set the limit too narrowly, but we have done so, still, by exceeding the limit of what is and what our language can do -- i.e., state the facts as they are, as situations of natural science. By showing that there is more in our statement of fact than in the fact itself, and thereby showing that our language is producing distorted pictures, Wittgenstein's philosophy will reveal this attempted shrinkage of the world's limits as well as any attempted expansion of those limits. Thus, it can correct either extreme which prevents our seeing the world aright. Its final task is always to produce this proper vision. It is always the result of philosophy so done that staying within the boundaries, being content with or at home in the ontological harmony, we see the most, for then we see what is real -- and that is all that is. What more could we ask? In attempting to see more than everything (!!) we see only the projected phantoms of our malfunctioning language.

If there is some feeling that the knowledge-language separation is an artificial one resulting from the restrictions put on language by the picture theory— in other words, if we feel we should be able to say whatever we know—we must realize that this would catapult us out of Tractarian thought. Such a view would necessarily put 'meaning' back into our thought (as an idea, not an image) as opposed to within the world only, which (world) is then 'expressed' in our language. In other words, we would reinstate the phantom. We would necessarily uphold the theory of two kinds of reality -- physical and metaphysical. We might then have to re-examine the naming process, for that whereby physical realities are named would need a different criterion from that whereby metaphysical realities are named, the former being an arbitrary gesture in relation to one mode of acquaintance and the latter being such a gesture in relation to a different mode of acquaintance. While the lack of verifiability obtains in both instances as regards the acquaintance, the truth of solipsism being upheld in the Tractatus, this may seem to be of no great difficulty, the condition of one being no better or worse than the condition of the other.

While theoretically this is true, practically it is not. By comparison with existing states of affairs we can verify the truth of statements of physical science. There is no such happy possibility for metaphysical statements. This possibility of being 'true' is not an artificial result of the 'picture theory'. It presumably applies to every language 'theory'.
If it is not the case, surely there is nothing worthwhile even to examine in regard to our language. The important difference is, the picture theory ontologically grounds that truth. It reveals how it is that 'being true' is consistently possible for any proposition. There is no such necessary consistent possibility for a metaphysical proposition. Thus the knowledge-language separation is not an artificial restriction but an ontological limitation. It is the necessary result of what is, some of which can be pictured and some of which can only be seen. That should be enough. Why is it necessary to convert all of our assets into capital? To do so is only to set the stage for the bankruptcy of both our knowledge and our language. Not only need there be no possible actual situation backing up our propositions, but our very thought-process would be violated. Our understanding and imagination operate according to the logical, ontological process. To attempt to say what can only be seen would exceed the very logic of that thought-process. It would habituate the mind to tautologies and contradictions, for what can be seen, though immanently logical in all its manifestations, is itself other than, beyond, behind, those manifestations. It is the very source of those manifestations, and as such exceeds the properties of the manifestations. In itself it can incorporate both tautologous and contradictory realities, it can be unchanging, unalterable, necessary, and, at the same time, in manifest form. It is accidental, constantly changing, containing within itself both what is and what is not. It is difficult to see how a mind so habituated, were that even possible, for it is contrary to the ontological structure of all existents, could properly function within the bounds of language so as to be brought to see what is beyond those bounds of individual existents but still within the limits of the world. Not only would the knowledge and language of fact be destroyed, but so, too, would the very means to knowledge of substance be destroyed. Hence, in Wittgenstein's view, it remains far better to see in silence than to say and lose all sight.

The Riddle of Life and The Mystical

In his consideration of the riddle of life and the mystical -- the constitutive locus for 'non-linguistic' or 'human' 'meaning' -- we at last reach the Tractarian climax. Here, the annihilation of linguistic 'meaning' finally 'delivers the goods'. Language, herded by philosophy, has enabled us to comprehend the world as a limited (factual) whole (substance). The totality of inside the world is thus available. The entire realm of natural...
science is legitimately presented in all its purity devoid of any foreign or metaphysical matter. And yet, when we have handled all of this, there is still something 'left over', something about life and the world which is yet unpenetrated. As Wittgenstein puts it, "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched" (6.52). Our ethically good and bad acts of the will change nothing within the world but only the self as limits of the world. Thus, they radically alter my world. (Ethics, like logic, we recall, is transcendental.) So, too, death, being not an event in life and therefore not an experiential end of life, but, rather, the end of my world (and for all we know, the end of -- the world -- as well (6.431, 6.4311)), presents life as an unfathomable riddle. Life and the world are one (3.621), and life is possibly as transcendental as ethics or logic, though Wittgenstein does not specifically call it such. Even if we were to accept the idea of a temporal survival after death, the question of life would remain.

The riddle would simply be extended for all eternity, as though a lifetime provided not enough perplexity with which to cope.

Finally, since how things are in the world is purely accidental, the only necessity being logical necessity (6.375), and since the conception that the laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena is a blatant illusion (6.371, 6.372) (it is merely an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow (6.3611)), the objective world emerges as much a mystery as subjective life. We might wish to protest that how things are in the world is according to logic and therefore is not accidental, but within the limits of logic there is 'room to move'; within those limits all things could always be other than they are. Clearly, change constantly occurs, and the logic in things is simply what makes change possible. Facts could be different from the actual. The potentiality of form always exceeds in range its particular determination. It is in this way that the world is accidental. Yet, accidental or not, it is -- and this is the problem. "The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution" (6.4321). Hence, the problems of life and the world are ultimately the existential mystery. They are the riddle of existence. 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' When we have plumbed the 'logical' of all things, we have left the 'onto-' of all things -- with which we know not what to do. Whether we discover this ultimate unknown though the problem of life or the problem of the world, it matters not, for the two are one and that is existence, the 'onto-' of the ontological. In either case, we have, as it were, dis-
assembled all the sayable and seeable layers through the proper use of language, and what remains is not something separate and newly discovered like a seed surrounded by many layers of pulp and peel, nor yet another object or fact within the world. Were that the case there would still be more to say and more to see. The disassemblage would not be complete. Instead, what is left is precisely still within the pulp and peel. It is the pulp and peel. It is that of which we cannot dispose, namely, that we are. Such is the problem, the riddle that remains, when everything that can be said, has been said and we are sure that no metaphysical unrealities have crept in to complicate, or mediate, or even to conceal this stark, remarkable -- what should it be called?

What should it be called? If it is a situation or state of affairs, a fact, then it can be said as fact. It is all of these but in a way that is different from all other situations, states of affairs, facts. We might wish to call it 'knowledge', but this, too, could be misleading for all knowledge with which the Tractatus has been concerned thus far has been that which can be said or seen and concerns the way things are within the world, not that the world exists. While our thought and knowledge are always separate from our language, they are always dependent upon it and as language reflects the world this is always knowledge of the world, not knowledge that the world. This 'problem' is so separate and peculiar in its reality as to be beyond language and hence beyond our ordinary knowledge. We might wish to call it 'insight', which still carries a cognitive connotation, provided this is not simply another name for knowledge. Perhaps 'insight' can be taken to mean some very special kind of seeing, but it must be very special indeed, for normally all that can be seen is always, like all that can be said, within the limits of the world. We normally see what makes itself manifest there, unsayable 'facts' about/in the world, as though there could be such a thing. This is different. It is a new dimension in our sight which allows us to see the world qua existence.  

As we shall see, Wittgenstein likens this with the mystical and seeing to the depth of what is is a feature of this. The following quote may foreshadow our future discussions:

One must learn to see the true nature of things, disguised though they are. Ultimately, the mystic's aim is seeing—a knowing which amounts to enlightenment. The mystic, however, must first learn to see; for in the beginning he cannot.

(Margaret Lewis Furse, Mysticism: Window on a World View [Nashville: Abingdon, 1977], p. 70)
Is this that ever present deeper level of the phrase 'to see the world aright'? (6.54). Again we must take our cue from the texts themselves. Wittgenstein calls this a 'problem' and a 'riddle'. We have already seen that we are dealing here with a very subjective level, the life level. At this level problems and riddles are peculiarly 'human', that is, they are characteristically 'experiential'. Their quality is not that of the impassive reflection of language. They are beyond that. At the same time, however, neither are they impassioned, full of fiery or ardent emotion. They are likewise beyond that, for it is hard to know even what emotion could appropriately be elicited by such a problem. With what could one be angry? and why? What is there to fear? and why? One cannot even state the problem or so grasp it in any way as to be frustrated! We are in fact confronted with the incomprehensible and this in itself is a very special experience. To be confronted with the existence of the world as a limited whole is in fact to feel it as such (6.45).

(In the Investigations, the mystical experience would seem to be a more abiding state or condition corresponding to the continual ontological vision as occasioned by the everyday use of language. Because of this abiding 'knowingness' the experience in its cognitive dimensions will be referred to there as "noesis." The suggestion of "insight" here was intended to suit the more 'spasmodic' character of the experience.)

If we examine what Wittgenstein presents as the solution to this problem we can perhaps better understand the experiential nature of the problem. "The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem" (6.521). In other words, when the experience is no longer there, the problem is no longer there. Even after the fact of the experience and its cessation, the vanishing of the problem, one is unable to describe the content of that experience. (What is confronted is other than 'fact'.) Wittgenstein likens this experience and its cessation to finding, after a long period of doubt, that the sense of life becomes clear, but one is then forever unable to say what constitutes that sense (6.521). Such a one can tell you he has had the experience of the sense of life becoming clear. He can tell you that the sense of life is now clear. However, this is only tantamount to saying that he no longer doubts. His doubt has vanished. We must notice that this is not the mere cessation of a question to which an answer has been obtained. It is not like a child's wanting to know, say, if fishes can live on land, learning that they cannot, and with that information no longer having the question. It is much more
profound than the acquisition of information. Existential doubt and its removal differ from informational curiosity and its satisfaction. To be without doubt is to be differently from being with doubt. To have life have sense is for one's life (world) to be other than it was when it had no sense and different from what it is for another for whom it has no sense. In other words, this experience is one that changes the limit of the self and therefore the limits of the world. It makes a lasting difference. The problem is the experience of life in one way; the solution is the experience of life in another way.

We shall consider the effect of this experience at greater length later. It is noted here only for this distinctive character which separates the nature of doubt from the nature of question which is likewise seen in the fact that when all questions have been answered, doubt can still remain. Wittgenstein specifically distinguishes the problem or riddle from the question on grounds consistent with the representational theory of language. The answer to the problem of life and the world cannot be put into words. As we shall see, the answer lies outside the world. Because a question and answer concern the same things, since the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question (6.5). Conversely, any question that can be formed, it is also possible to answer (6.5). To the extent that this is true, the riddle does not exist (6.5). It can never be articulated. When the problem of life vanishes in the experience, the feeling and insight that the world is -- there is no riddle, no problem, no doubt, no question, no answer. Hence, it is an experience to which our language has delivered us. The problem of life is an experience; the solution is also an experience. It has, as it were, brought us to its own limits and hence to the limits of the world. Encountering the world thus, as it is in itself, in its 'isness', beyond reflection, in other words encountering the world qua existence, can never be put into language as it itself is not a fact in the world. Rather, it is the world, and the world in this way can only be felt or experienced.

Furthermore, in Wittgenstein's view a doubt can exist only where a question exists, and that again, only where an answer exists, and that, only where something can be said (6.51). Hence, the problem on these, more refined, grounds is separate from our intellectual questioning, our rational reasoning. The solution of the riddle or problem of life comes in the absence of any question, any doubt, any riddle. (This theme persists in the *Investigations*.) There are no questions and this itself is an answer in that the entire problem is thereby situated in another realm -- beyond
language and beyond the world as fact and even as substance in its many manifest forms as fact. That there can be no questions and no answers is itself the answer in that this reveals the true nature of the problem as an experience in this world, of this world vis-à-vis beyond or outside this world. Outside this world is totally beyond our logic and our language. We are not there and cannot reflect anything that might be there -- or not -- as the case may be. In the Tractatus it is only in relation to this outside that the experience of the inside qua existence can occur. If we are not face to face with, pushed up against, the beyond, then we are inside such that our language can function normally and well, questions and answers proceed turn and turn about, all the problems of natural science proceed on the level of natural science and form no contrast with the problem of life. But when we have come to the end of the inside, to the end of all the problems of natural science, such that we are face to face with the outside -- the experience of life and the world at this juncture is the existential problem or riddle. It truly is non-existent as a riddle or problem proper, but is that into which we are catapulted as the culmination of all proper riddles and problems. It is as this sort of experience that the problem vanishes qua problem -- proper or otherwise, for such an experience is not a problem or a riddle of any sort. It simply is. It is something lived, an 'isness' of 'isness', if you like, but to say that, or anything similar, is nonsense according to the Tractatus. It is to strain our language beyond its limits. The experience might be said to be that of the limit itself insofar as it is of the world but beyond the representational and manifestational aspects of that world. It is not an experience of outside the world, but is in the face of outside the world. In experience we can 'stand in this position', but language and the world cannot proceed unto their own limits. Obviously, were language able to operate at this point, this experience would not be of the limit of the world but the limit beyond that would be the limit of the world. Hence, it is both expedient and necessary that the experience remain non-linguistic. "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (7).

In order further to appreciate and understand this experience, it is important to refer back to the Tractarian concept of the self. The self was seen to be the limit of the world and as such the limit of life as well. Though related to that of which it is a limit, as limit it is precisely not a part of that of which it is a limit, as it is the limit that is experienced, it is equally correct to say that it is the self which is experienced,
not as ego but as the extensionless point outside of which is both the outside and the inside, each from, as it were, a different direction -- were it possible that an extensionless point have directions. It is precisely this self which can view the world sub specie aeterni, as a whole -- a limited whole (cf. 6.45), for it can know itself in its maximum shrinkage, that is, as the reality coordinated with itself as opposed to some external object with which it has attained such union (cf. 5.64). It is in this, again, that this experience is separate from that of the world or my world in which all the limits are one in logic. In our knowledge, the self that is necessary and unavoidable because "the world is my world" but which could never be isolated from that world, here, at and as the very limit, is isolated precisely as limit such that the limited wholeness of the world is in fact perceived along with or in contrast to the outside.

In the normal functioning within the world there is no duality within the subject because of the oneness in logic, which oneness is made intelligible by the understanding of the body as part of the world, the self as the limit of the world, and logic as the unifying element in all things. But this normal functioning is like a vehicle which delivers us to a destination and from which we then 'alight' -- having no further use for it. At this destination all the limits that are one -- life, world, self, logic -- are all limits as limits, as separate from the whole, and necessarily so since it is only from this point or locus that the sheer existence of the world as a limited whole can emerge as such for the subject. The independence of the limit is of paramount importance, and, as this is a peculiarly human-centered problem involving our own sense of life and the world, the independence of the self as limit is at the very core of the matter for we as bodies are an irrevocable part of the world which our existence is experienced as other than the limit of the self.

Finally, we must let go even of the last bit of familiar territory -- the idea of experience in any 'normal' sense of experience. We carefully chose this concept as the most expedient one available in the effort to make intelligible this climactic Tractarian conclusion. Now we must carefully qualify even this usage in order that the reality may truly stand on its own for what it is. We have said this is the experience that the world exists, but, we saw earlier that, even in the ordinary daily functioning of our language, the experience that something is is not an experience but is itself, prior to experience (5.552). Hence, if we continue to call 'this' an experience that the world exists we must review the special
grounds on which we do so. These have been the experiential quality characterizing 'problem' and 'riddle'. Having seen the dissolution of the 'problem' and 'riddle' in their proper sense, should this characteristic remain, particularly in view of Wittgenstein's explicit statement that the experience that something is is not an experience? The experiential quality could well adhere to what remains despite the dissolution of 'problem' and 'riddle'. But what does remain? -- only the self (of limits), the world inside, and an 'outside'. It would seem that we could still call whatever the self does in this 'situation', i.e., at least to be independently as a limit, an experience -- and to so be is, again, likewise to have the world be as a limited whole apart from the outside. To so be is, of course, not an experience in the ordinary sense at all. Nor is it an experience that something is in an ordinary sense which is prior to experience, for to be with the thing and for the thing to be with other things such that they can be experienced is for them to be fact and the reflection of the fact is itself the experience that it is. This is different. This is ultimately not the experience that something is, but that is is, that all that is is, that existence is -- for that is the force of seeing the world as a limited whole, i.e., as existence vis-a-vis the beyond. Insofar as this is an experience, it is the experience of being, and that is different indeed from any experience inside the world. Its locus we must remember is neither in the world nor out of the world but at the junctural limit between the two. In terms of the self, for the self to be unto itself as separate from all else is sufficient to constitute the experience of being qua being and hence of the world qua existence. The question whether or not this is still to be called an experience may remain. On the one hand it clearly should not, and on the other, if we don't hold onto this, what is left?

In continual examination of his texts, we find Wittgenstein may at times be dogmatic, at times obscure, at times infuriating, but he is never cowardly. With him we must 'let go'. Only then might we know what he knew, see something of what he saw, embrace the nothingness which is ALL. In other words, the experience of being must be understood to be not the awareness of anything, but simply awareness, consciousness, the absolute no-thing-ness which is the 'isness' of all. In the normal fact-language functioning we cope with the ontological many. At the end of that spectrum, in this no-fact, non-language instance, we cope with the ontological one. Being 'of' the absolutely unique it is only to be expected that this instance, too, be utterly unique, totally separate and other than any other
encounter. It is simply and starkly there, here, as thereness, hereness—
itself. It is being in being with being. That is all. And that is all!

The uniqueness and corresponding lack of any appropriate categorization find expression in Wittgenstein's resort to 'the mystical'. In his brief but sufficient remarks in which he characterizes this matter as 'the mystical', three components of the matter clearly emerge. First of all, what is mystical is that the world exists (6.44). It is the existential aspect of what is that is at issue here. Second, it is feeling the world as a limited whole that is mystical (6.45). In other words, we have an appreciative connection with this existential aspect. Third, "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (6.522). This last remark is made after noting that the vanishing of the problem constitutes the solution of the problem. This is to say, in effect, that the first and second aspects have merged into one. There is not the world or even the existence of the world and the human subject experiencing that. Rather, it is the limit that is, not even that is experienced in any ordinary sense, but that is. And all the limits are one. Self-consciousness has merged with what is. There is only being. Of course that is no experience nor is it a problem. If it is to be called anything, which of course is impossible, contradictory, nonsense, it is best to call it 'mystical' and by this to understand this unique union which is the normal result of our language.

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8 It has been noted that there are no adequate definitions of mysticism (Arthur Hopkinson, Mysticism: Old and New [New York: Kennikat Press, 1946], p. 27), but Evelyn Underhill's is perhaps the most accepted. Here mysticism is: "the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order; by whatever the theological formulas under which that order is understood." (Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism [New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., Publ., 1930], p. XIV.

9 This is not to say that when Wittgenstein speaks of the feeling that the world is he is meaning that the mystical is the f.i.f.* referred to by the old spirituality professors. Rather, it seems to be a combination of Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" (discussed in Margaret Lewis Furse, cit., pp. 137-142) and a joyful 'holy indifference' which is at the same time full of mystery and wonder.

*funny interior feeling!
the deliverance by language, through itself to beyond itself.10

10 William James cites four marks of the mystical experience. These are ineffability, a noetic quality, transiency, and passivity. (William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience [New York: Collier Books, 1961], p. 229.) The first is evident in Wittgenstein's silence, the second in his solution to the problem and having no questions at the very least, the third is surely evidenced in the 'feeling' aspect which suggests both that it is non-linguistic/non-conceptual and that it may well come and go (but it is also possible as more recent literature suggests to stabilize in a state of consciousness in which the experience persists through time) and the fourth in his happy surrender to the accidentality of the world, the harmony of the will with what is.

Gamiello speaks of "salient, but not necessarily the only" features of the mystical:

- A feeling of oneness or unity, variously defined.
- A strong confidence in the 'reality' or 'objectivity' of the experience, i.e. a conviction that it is somehow revelatory of 'the truth'.
- A sense of the final inapplicability to the experience of conventional language, i.e. a sense that the experience is ineffable.
- A cessation of normal intellectual operations (e.g. deduction, discrimination, ratiocination, speculation, etc.) or the substitution for them of some 'higher' or qualitatively different mode of intellect (e.g. intuition).
- A sense of the coincidence of opposites, of various kinds (paradoxicality).
- An extraordinarily strong affective tone, again of various kinds (e.g. sublime joy, utter serenity, great fear, incomparable pleasure, etc. - often an unusual combination of such as these).

In nearly all particular cases of mystical experience, these and other characteristics assume a certain 'shape' of meaning...

It is important here to note specifically the normalcy of this. Thus far, in order to understand its nature, we have stressed the 'otherness', the extraordinary and unique qualities of the matter. This could easily lead to the misconception that such an instance is exceedingly rare, even abnormal. There is no necessity for this being the case. The prevalent common sense approach to 'the mystical' is often its categorization with the lunatic fringe if not insanity. It is considered to be straightforward and benign to class it from neurotic to psychotic, but always as a mental aberration. The *Tractatus* clearly belies such an approach. It does so first of all in the natural ease and gentleness with which it concludes in such a realm. No big 'to-do' is made of the matter. It is treated as normal. It simply opens there in the presentation as subtly as this fusion or entrance into being itself. It is simply there. More importantly, the method of arrival is the normal functioning of our language as it is guarded, protected, and kept on the right path by philosophy.11 As this means of attainment is so ordinary and so universal, how can the natural result be anything but likewise? The fact that numerically the attainment may yet be relatively uncommon would surely be in Wittgenstein's innermost view

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11 Wittgenstein's method of philosophy is a very specific one but it is interesting to note that Furse insists that "something about the philosopher's quest is itself mystical," (Furse, *op. cit.*, p. 162) and William Hocking insists that the mystical "is evidently the product of an intensely philosophical spirit discontented with the mere rationality of philosophy, and of an intensely religious spirit discontented with the dogmatic systems of theology in every creed. It is inspired by the insatiable ambition of individual spirits to know reality by direct acquaintance, rather than by rumor or description." (William J. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy* [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955], p. 259.

De Lubac speaks of a "mystical impulse" and discusses its relation to philosophy. He notes that it can "animate" a metaphysical inquiry and "be stimulated by it." "And the labour of elaborating an intelligible world does not save him (the philosopher) from 'the nostalgia of Being'" (Henri De Lubac, *The Discovery of God* [New York: P. J. Kennedy and Sons, 1960], pp. 144-147) which was true even of Descartes for all of his geometrical tendencies and objectifying of the external world.

This same aspect is evident in Thomas Aquinas for whom the science of philosophy, as he called it, developed into the experience of the mystical such that he refused to continue writing.
because of the methodological failures of traditional philosophy.

We have yet to examine the 'consequences' of the 'mystical'. What happens as an aftermath? Clearly, everything -- and nothing! To have seen the world aright, to have been one with it, and all, to have grasped being by being in being with being, as a result of transcending our propositions -- that cannot pass without consequences, for in is, oneself has become something different. Such a self has lost its individuality and become, merged with, pure being. At the very least, the consequences of such 'experience', whether it is of short duration or whether it endures permanently, is an increased ontological harmony. At the very least it is to behave appropriately with our words, letting them do what they can do and not attempting to force them beyond their capacity. While this appropriateness is the result of the shepherding of philosophy before 'the mystical', afterwards, due to the better ordering in being that the subject now possesses, it can be said to be due to 'the mystical' itself. The greater degree of at-one-ment, be it only a slight enhancement due to an 'experience' of short duration, or be it a complete and permanent union due to a transfiguration of the self in being, results always in passing over in silence what we cannot say (7).

This in itself, within Wittgenstein, is far more a matter of speaking and not speaking. Both speech and silence are of ontological resonance. To so be in speech appropriately and silence appropriately, beyond the need of philosophy, is to be always, to act always, in perfect accord with the nature of oneself in relation to all else, i.e., to flow in the flow of being. It is to be in perfect ontological harmony, and that is to be beyond the laws of good and evil wherein the results of the action are intrinsic to the action itself, where ethics and aesthetics are one and both are transcendental, here, there, and everywhere, proceeding, if from anywhere, from beyond (cf. 6.422, 6.421). The limits of the world for such a one have changed indeed, and we can see that his world as that of the happy man (experienced man, wise man... ) is different from that of the unhappy man (inexperienced, ignorant) (6.43). From this perspective we can more fully understand the impossibility of speaking of the will (6.423). In such a

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12 It is interesting to note here the way in which Wittgenstein's silence and speech perform the functions of the via negativa. It is as though our propositions can all be seen to say only what God, the meaning of life, the world, etc., is not. What God, the meaning of life, the world, etc. is -- can be found only in the silence.
harmony, what is a will as the subject of ethical attributes? Beyond law, beyond the ordinary limits of the world, beyond will -- such a one is also beyond death, not only because death as an event in life is an impossibility -- we are all beyond death in that sense -- but because he already has eternal life (6.4311). His own being has become so steeped in being, has become so one with it, that he knows himself -- experientially.

13 We have discussed earlier, but let us recall again, that Wittgenstein felt the will was good or evil and penetrates the world, and "therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world" (NB, p. 73) -- and this meaning we can call God (NB, p. 73). Pondering this is to pray (NB, p. 73). The happenings of the world are accidental and independence is gained by renouncing influence on them (NB, p. 73). As there is only one world soul (NB, p. 49) and forms of life participate in it (NB, p. 85), to view the world as a limited whole from a perspective of good or evil is to see it as one large and living unit with a structure (NB, p. 62) and a purpose (NB, p. 73). It is to see that "Life is the world (NB, p. 77) and ethics is part of structure, its condition (NB, p. 77). To harmonize with its pattern and fulfill its purpose, to believe in God through seeing this meaning of life (NB, p. 74) and to surrender to his will (NB, p. 75) is certainly not fatalism. Instead, it is to "make (one) self independent of fate" (NB, p. 74). "Certainly it is correct to say: Conscience is the voice of God" (NB, p. 75). Presumably the voice of God directs the surrendered man in harmony to live according to the purpose of existence. And this will be to "Live happily!" (NB, pp. 75, 78), to make "a happy world!" (NB, p. 78). The happy life is more harmonious than the unhappy (NB, p. 78).

Hence we can see that making us see the world (which exists in an ethical condition) aright is to make us see its ontological structure, its essence, its being -- such that we are able to know our oneness with it, which is likewise God, God being how everything stands (PT, p. 239) and, to live the happy life, to be in harmony. The point of the book is an ethical one as Wittgenstein says, but the ethical life which he pictures is possible only through our ontological understanding and ontological participation in the ethical condition of the world.

Without the ontology the ethical level will reach only to the intellectual and cultural authenticity suggested by Toulmin and Janik. (See A. Janik and S. Toulmin, op. cit., 1973.) Surely Wittgenstein did abhor the thorough-going facade of the Victorian period and wanted to deepen or authenticate our scientific, architectural, literary, and musical pursuits -- but such authenticity can proceed only out of the ontological harmony. It almost seems to be a lifeless undertaking compared to the intensely personal experience of the happy life and that cognitive vision of the world which manifests in silence. On Wittgenstein's terms it would seem that the most important reason to work for intellectual and cultural authenticity is that in the effort of allowing to be said only what can be said one is engaged in doing the philosophy which can bring one to the ontological vision and hence elicit the ethical life and 'the mystical.'
to be as eternal as it is, and presently so. He need not wait for death to enter eternal life. Being is -- and so is he, its microcosm. Life and the world are one. The solution of the riddle of life lies outside space and time -- for what have space and time to do in pure being, and being there or having been there how could a riddle be anywhere? The world is accidental, facts in many forms, but just what form in what combination, just how things are, is of complete indifference from a point outside space and time, from this realm that is 'higher'. This utter Isness -- ('God' -- if you like), does not explain itself, give why for the how in the world, does not show its utter purity of is-ing in the world as portrayed in the Tractatus. Rather, by the world and language, we discover it in that purity itself as it is present to the world -- at its limits. The sense of the world, the value of the world or life? Of course it lies outside the world -- in the there, that is the here and the now, in that purity itself. -- All of this, all these things, are some of the many consequences of 'the mystical'. They are its aftermath. They all had weighty enough significance as analyzed earlier on their normal logical level, but we go from level to level. By logic in our language, we go through the ontological to the logical. The ordinary working of our language revealed the ontological level of the world itself, and by the continued practice of that language, properly serviced by proper philosophy, that level is transcended. The transcendental form pervading the ontological is arrived at in itself -- period. This silence, its silence, is then the only sound.

But then, can anyone keep silent of such a sound? Has anyone who ever heard such silence ever done so? Socrates had his visionary experiences and always spoke as a prophet. He chose his hemlock in preference to exile wherein he could not continue corrupting the youth through his incessant dialectic. Socrates couldn't. Plato could not be content until he was 'engodded' and his powerful visions proceeded to fill his many dialogues with extraordinary myths, almost supernaturally illuminous. Plato couldn't. Through all the studies of nature, Aristotle sought the end and fulfillment of man. He charted the modes of Nous and he as thinker, thinking, and thought, became one in his contemplation. From this realm of things eternal, he tried to show the less experienced what is the case in the intricate workings and many nuances of matter and form, from the body and its 'the what was it to be!' to the Unmoved Mover. Aristotle couldn't. Perhaps these three are not apt comparisons for they in themselves require colossal in-
terpretation. Who really knows what Aristotle's contemplation is? And as someone once said, interpreting Socrates is as difficult as interpreting the historical Jesus -- we have only the words of his disciples. Speaking of Jesus, there was another one who knew his self, who he was and 'what it is all about' -- and couldn't keep silent about it.

Despite these problematic cases, perhaps the suggestion suffices. Methods differ and expressions differ, but once the silence has been 'sounded', that one who heard is not the same again. He is different and compelled to be so. The silence remains silent. That can never be spoken. Yet, the Seer who has heard it knows it is not without the most dynamic activity. It is like pure potency being pure act, like God's essence being his existence, or like the absolutely ground state in physics than which nothing is more active. Once known, something of that quality permeates the knower, for the two have been one and his life can never be less than compatible with that quality again. Some who have so seen may know themselves to be only as salt or leaven -- but even that is far from being mute. Some may never write or speak of it. Not everyone is a Spinoza or Thoreau or Blake or Whitman or Dante or John of the Cross. One was a Wittgenstein. He wrote the Tractatus, proffered a new method more suited to the twentieth century 'scientific' mind, and proceeded to live the silence in the monastery gardens and the classrooms of little children -- for a time. Even so, as he grew in the sound of this silence, or as it grow in him, whichever the case may be, and as world events and personal histories have their way of locating and relocating one, he was, as we shall see, to tell the tale again. This he would tell in a new mode with a new emphasis, for no one had seemed to understand, or maybe no one really listened to his first attempt. It had been in his subtle and humble way -- the confession of his God and the Transcendental Other, but as we have discovered since Barth, not many people want a god so Other. So, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein would confess his God from the other side of the coin, as the altogether Immanent. His ontological appreciation and groundedness need not change, for any system that incorporates both the one and the many inherently contains both the Transcendent and the Immanent, but his area of exposition would shift and his method would undergo some degree of alteration.
Having reached the final level of the *Tractatus* as presented in its conclusion and before moving on to the *Investigations*, it is worth pausing -- midstream -- to consider the nature of this exposition. In many respects it may seem highly interpretative. In many respects it is. Yet, it is not as though this interpretation is without precedent. The validation and verification of 'the mystical' as both the fruit and key to philosophy are in the West as old as our earliest forefathers and are perhaps most strikingly expressed by Plotinus in his letter to Flaccus. They are as new as Marcel and Rahner, Lonergan and Marchal, but precedent is no guideline. Many can be wrong as well as one. Instead we must turn again to the text itself for justification. Wittgenstein gives us two prescriptions for his own interpretation. He tells us that "In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition for?' repeatedly leads to valuable insights" (6.211). In other words, the speech-act itself is of utmost importance. It is the hermeneutical key. Throughout our examination it has been this question of purpose which has been asked of the entire *Tractatus*. This in itself is not sufficient grounding for such an exposition, for numerous purposes could be attributed to such a work.\[14\] In fact, as we have noted, its every level of meaning exposes a different purpose to the understanding. Therefore, we need some determinative principle whereby the levels themselves can be understood in their harmonious coexistence and their totality can be comprehensively evaluated.

Such a principle is given in the second prescription in which we are exhorted to use the Tractarian propositions as steps to climb beyond (6.54). We are urged to transcend them, and then, seeing the world aright we can understand them as well. In other words, it is our own level of consciousness which must be raised to the level of the Transcendental and it is the perspective there attained which must be the ultimate determinative factor in such an exposition. This is the force of having used philosophy as a method for such attainment. From that perspective, though there may be many expressions of what is seen, they are ultimately all equivalent -- for being is being is being. Wittgenstein's expression is one. Any interpretation which his expositors justly give to it must ultimately be compatible with the reality itself. It is this which is the final and solid but unnerving criterion.

\[14\] Perhaps the most striking example of a reading, and one which was specifically repudiated by Wittgenstein, was that contained in Russell's introduction (PT, p. 24).
In conclusion, it must be noted that only such an interpretation seems to 'fit' the Tractatus. Only it attempts to do justice to all the entries of the work and to all the levels thereof. Finally, only such an interpretation is compatible in kind with the Tractarian conclusion. It naturally leaves us responding in the only appropriate way to such a sight. Being likewise engulfed in such a resounding silence, not as the result of some esoteric gift of mystical illumination, but as the natural, normal result of the gradual illumination of our language which delivers us methodically to 'the mystical', the real, the world aright, we are left as Seers to reverbate the silence.
Philosophical Investigations

On Wittgenstein’s

Part II
CHAPTER ONE

APPROACHING THE INVESTIGATIONS

Having analyzed the *Tractatus* from its ontological perspectives and having examined 'the mystical' which seemed to attend such perspectives for Wittgenstein in that 'early' period, we now turn our attention to the *Philosophical Investigations*, the only other lengthy work released for publication by the author himself. In doing so, a host of questions and difficulties immediately assail one. Simply put, if that on at least some levels, was what the *Tractatus* was all about, whatever is the meaning of the equally elusive and exasperating text called the *Philosophical Investigations*? To attempt an answer to this question, even a precursory study of the work, raises technical or procedural problems. These pages will be a spiral study of that procedural problem. We will return to it again and again from many angles. In the course of so doing, I hope to begin, likewise, to unravel a possible interpretation of the text.

The Nature of the Text

Wittgenstein describes the *Investigations* as a "number of sketches of landscapes" and "really only an album" (p.vii). But what one does with an album of sketches is simply to look at it, experience it, appreciate it. There is something intrinsically peculiar or amiss in asking for an articulation of its meaning. To try to conceptualize verbally the 'content' of a sketch is a dubious undertaking even if our experience and appreciation of it does in fact have a cognitive character. Our aesthetic understanding is largely extra-conceptual. It is dependent upon our lived experience, our education, our individual and corporate history, perhaps even our genes, our mood, and the weather. In other words, it is a deep and holistic or

1 Though I sometimes refer to the early and late Wittgenstein, I do so with reservation and hesitation. By such distinction, I wish to denote the chronology of the writing itself. I do not intend this nomenclature to denote a radical distinction between the two works as is usually the meaning of these phrases. While there are differences between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, I wish to stress the deeper ontological concern common to both texts and the mystical development that is both evidenced by this ontology and fundamental to it. Thus, I wish to deny the contention that there are, as it were, two Wittgensteins -- early and late. There is only one.
gestaltic matter. The understanding itself is an experience, perhaps partially conceptual, but certainly, also, non-conceptual. If we attempt to describe our experience or our understanding of the object, we are dealing with our experience and our understanding. We have not said what the object means. Those who would confine meaning to language only must explain our interaction with the objects of this world and particularly with 'aesthetic objects' with which our interaction is so markedly non-manipulative and non-mechanical. These objects speak to us; they say something; they are expressions. Yet their meaning is hardly linguistic nor is it conceptual.

One might even go so far as to notice that there are usually only two cases in which we even attempt -- however dangerously -- to express the 'meaning' of an aesthetic object. One is when someone or oneself 'does not understand' or has 'no experience' or has for some reason an 'unacceptable experience' in the face of a sketch -- or painting, or sculpture, or symphony, or poem, or etc. When this occurs we attempt to 'explain' the matter. That attempt usually involves giving hints or indications or promptings which are designed to produce a 'knowing' or otherwise satisfactory experience in oneself or someone else. We attempt to effect an understanding of the work of art. The other case is that of an art historian or commentator or critic whose technique of coping with the aesthetic material is usually to suggest a goal which the author, painter, composer, whoever, was trying to achieve and then to comment upon or evaluate the degree to which the various aspects of this particular work, and the work as a whole, do in fact -- at least for that critic -- achieve or fail to achieve that goal.

It might be objected that this suggests a teleological view of the arts whereas the arts are 'creation' and 'creation' as such does not have

2 Wittgenstein spoke of a musical composition expressing irony, for instance (C&V, p. 81).

3 I use the word "knowing" at this point as a forerunner of "knowingness" which will be explained later and which refers to a noetic form of knowledge as opposed to that of dianoia. It is related to the dual aspect of knowledge as wissen and kennen in Part I where noetic knowledge is understood to include what is there called "the mystical" and which covers the entire continuum of kennen from acquaintance through union with major emphasis on the unitive stages of that continuum.
an imminent telos. A work of art is not normally produced in order to achieve some particular objective. It is often thought to be pure expression qua expression. While that might sometimes be the case, it need not always be so. We can, for example, think of numerous works of art of all forms which are, and are intended to be, social commentary. That commentary itself can in turn effect or elicit change. A work of art can have a 'perlocutionary force'. That the artist sees some given change as desirable and even produces his art as a means of such change in no way denies the legitimacy of his work as art. It might even be the case that the greater a given work is as art, the more effective it will be as a means of change. With this in mind, we might say both that the artist can have a specific goal in mind which he wishes to achieve by means of his art and that the work which he produces has within it, if it is effective in this regard, this particular and identifiable 'telos'. As it is the telos of fire to produce heat, so it might be the 'telos' of a work of art to effect some specific change within those who encounter it. If, on the other hand, it is somewhat 'offensive' to speak of the telos of a work of art, we might still speak of its 'point' or 'goal' in the sense of accom-

4This is precisely Foster's notion in his discussion on similarities and differences between the notion of creation as the activity of a Demiurge and as the activity of a Christian God. "It is," he says, "notorious that the creative artist, e.g., the painter, has no clear knowledge of what he is going to achieve before he has achieved it; and the critic on his side, when confronted with a work of creative art, is indeed aware that there is 'something more' in it than the sensible material... The meaning of a painting is not intelligible in the sense in which the purpose of a wheelbarrow is." (M.B. Foster, "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science," Mind, 43 1934 , p. 462.)


6The teleological bent of Wittgenstein can be seen in noticing his dislike for Shakespeare. Shakespeare showed his reader 'how everything is'. He laid out all the elements of his work, exposed all sorts of forces and reactions. Yet, he didn't attempt to change his reader. Wittgenstein also wished to expose everything just as it is — and leave it that way, but he wanted the seeing of it to change the reader. He had an aim, a telos, to his work. Milton, on the other hand, was greatly admired by Wittgenstein. Milton painted such fantastic pictures that his readers were inevitably changed. When he said that Shakespeare is great, Wittgenstein was then convinced. (C&V, p. 48.)
We speak of a work of art as being 'effective'. It accomplishes some change or result of reaction within its observer. It is this aim, goal, accomplishment, telos -- as pertaining to a work of art -- which best seems to render an understanding of the meaning of the Investigations.

The Investigations itself is an epigrammatic and aphoristic work. While its examples are 'homely' and its language is 'plain', most of its entries are both dense and deep. In both content and examples, it is at times repetitious, and yet, each restatement displays some new aspect or deepens some fundamental insight. Furthermore, as continuous study yields an ever-growing appreciation similar to that accruing to both the fine arts and great literature, to call this unique text an 'aesthetic object' or 'work of art' in a quite literal sense, might seem to be a particularly apt description.

Reaction to the Text

As we begin to study the work, it becomes apparent that the peculiar nature of the work itself does not permit the same sort of detailed, textual, thematic examination as that of the Tractatus even though we have alluded to the Tractatus as poetry and have often treated it as allegory. There is not within the Investigations the same deliberate cohesion as in the Tractatus and the length of the text makes the same detailed approach an unwieldy and unfeasible task. Furthermore, as these sketches of landscapes are frequently of the same "wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction" (p.vii), to do so would be an unbearably repetitious task. In other words, the nature of the text itself requires an examination of an entirely different kind from that of the earlier work. Finding a suitable technique for exposition which will deliver us into a knowing relation to the text and to that which it displays is a problem.

When one has made more than a precursory study of the work, a second major set of problems emerges. One's insights and perceptions of the meaning, or, we should even like to say, the 'essence' or 'heart', of the Investigations

1Wittgenstein made an interesting observation which bears upon types and styles of philosophy. In 1931 he wrote:

It is sometimes said that a man's philosophy is a matter of temperament, and there is something in this. A preference for certain similes could be called a matter of temperament and it underlies far more disagreements than you might think (G&V, p. 20).
tions -- are difficult to maintain. They can be clear and intensely present while working with the text, and then seem to evaporate when one sets the text aside and attempts to articulate those same insights and perceptions in concise and rigorous language, or for that matter, even rambling and casual language. It is almost as though the text itself had an effect upon us when we actually confront it, which is lost when we are no longer face to face with it. This peculiar effect might be taken as another reminder that this work is exactly what its author contends it to be -- sketches, landscapes, an album of artwork to which one's response is ultimately, and perhaps most appropriately, an experiential reaction. In fact, we might state the matter conversely. The fact that our perceptions and insights do so evaporate is in itself evidence of the important extra-conceptual 'core' of the *Investigations*. Our insights and perceptions must evaporate. The residual effect of the *Investigations* is a transformation of our very person, not an intellectual understanding or conceptual knowledge. As Wittgenstein once put it: "The present day teacher of philosophy doesn't select food for his pupil with the aim of flattering his taste, but with the aim of changing it" (C&V, p. 17).

However, the problem seems to be even deeper than this. The insights gained while working with the *Investigations*, that is, as a result of those sketches or of what is said in this series of "remarks" (p.vii), which enable one to perceive what the investigations is -- its meaning, its 'essence' or 'core' -- bear a striking parallel in both content and process of perception and appreciation to the insights which we might suspect Wittgenstein himself experienced while doing philosophy. In itself it has something to say about his philosophy as a method or therapy. For both Wittgenstein while-doing-philosophy and for Wittgenstein's reader while-reading-Wittgenstein's philosophy, there is what might be called a problem of 'existentiality': while I do this, while I look in this manner, I can see; when I don't do this, when I am not looking thusly, I lose the vision. (...to see these sketches is to see the world as...) I attain an understanding. The understanding in itself is significant. At one and the same time, it proceeds from what is and reveals what is. Through such conceptual understanding I thus participate in relation. The display of this relation, here acquired through the process of Wittgensteinian philosophy, alters our concepts of meaning, language, and the world, which concomitantly alter our entire perceptual field. "Working in philosophy," as Wittgenstein says, "...is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation.
On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them)" (C&V, p. 16).

These perceptual alterations, however, alter our ontological positioning. We stand in a new relation to what is such that we can be profoundly changed. We can ultimately come to be significantly different, ontologically transformed. This effect of the *Investigations* which we shall later refer to as our 'transformation' is much deeper than a mere change in either our world view or our intellectual understanding and it remains in force perpetually. Thus there is a very real way in which the *Investigations* can be read as a moral text. To find some way of treating the *Investigations* so as to do justice to the nature of the text itself, to the concepts it contains, and to the effect it produces, as well as to attain some understanding of the manner of that production is the problem at hand. Furthermore, it is a problem well worth appreciating for such appreciation corresponds to our perception of the text in its depth dimensions and vice-versa.

Many might object that 'existentiality' allows one simply to articulate an emotional reaction, a 'feeling' which is vague, crude, and can be of no interest or value to philosophy. Worse than that, it confuses the 'hard data', the clear reasoning. Were it the case that this reaction were only an emotional one, one might agree with this objection, but as we have said, the reaction in question is one of cognitive content. It is an experience as well as an insight, but this is not to say that we are here identifying some sort of atmosphere or 'psychic air' which gives what might be said about the *Investigations* its meaning or which surrounds it with some peculiar cloud of understanding. Rather, it is to say, that our thought here is in more than words as is the case with the encountering of most aesthetic objects. Part of the insight of what the *Investigations* is 'all about' comes as a result of the effect of the *Investigations* upon one. Besides which, this work is no ordinary expression of thought. Rather, it is intended to be a process which we undergo. It is so constructed as to work upon us, to be therapeutic. This means that not only is it possible to grasp authentic insight during the therapy, but that if that therapy is successful, it will be difficult to discuss later, either in its content or

8 As late as 1931 Wittgenstein wrote, "What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather than with the intellect: (C&V, p. 17). Even to understand, we must frequently undergo a change within ourselves.
as a therapy, because in this case the content is the therapy. That is, once you grasp the content, you have undergone the therapy and that means that you will no longer interpret the content in the same way nor will you do many of the things you did before. You will not, for instance, philosophize in the ordinary discursive manner, for what can be discussed in this manner is a 'content' to which you no longer subscribe. Once you have undergone that therapy, you are different, and so you can no longer talk in the old fashion. The old subject-object discourse in which we as 'subjects' treat the world as 'object' through the construct of language which is separate from each of these, no longer seems appropriate. One begins to feel comfortable only with discourse of the most humble sort used simply as it belongs in ordinary language games in the everyday warp and weave of life. In such a case, one has internalized the content and the process. To argue about the transformation, to play the game of trying to put rigour into some insight or other in itself seems artificial, out of place, a violation of the authentic functions of language. Furthermore, one might discuss various forms of therapy, or the process or the effectiveness of various therapies, but the therapy per se which one has oneself undergone is subject neither to discussion nor argument. Such transformation is something lived. It is experience. Even if described, it can never be 'contained' in words.

(These notions reflect part of the material discussed in a coming chapter and foreshadow future ideas.)

Seeking an Approach

It is worth remembering that Wittgenstein himself could not put the work together in anything other than a series of remarks (p.vii). This is not to say that the remarks do not at times coalesce to form small arguments on specific topics, but they must be viewed differently. To take these as arguments as such will be to miss the point of the text. We must take Wittgenstein seriously in saying that philosophy is not argument but pure description. Thus, the speech-act of small arguments becomes something

9 In the final chapter I use "content" with a special meaning which is explained at that time. It is, briefly, the reality with which we are in touch through the process or therapy of Wittgensteinian philosophy. I am using it here in both its normal sense wherein it means simply those ideas contained in the text itself and in the specialized sense which will emerge later but with which we need not cope at this time.

10 ..."Forcing my thoughts into an ordered sequence is a torment for me. Is it even worth attempting now?" (C&V, p. 28).

..."The relations between these concepts form a landscape which language presents us with in countless fragments; piecing them together is too hard for me. I can make only a very imperfect job of it." (C&V, p. 78).
other than argument. It makes one see something. In itself it is pure description, but one has to look for what is being described. Wittgenstein said of his own method: "Each of the sentences I write is trying to say the whole thing, i.e. the same thing over and over again; it is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles" (C&W, p. 7). Put a different way, the treatment of specific phenomena is 'not of importance to me because I am keen on completeness. Rather because each one casts light on the correct treatment of all' (Z, 465). This notion of the whole can also be seen in "Yes, you have got to assemble bits of old material. But into a building" (C&W, p. 40). He spoke in 1948, of the danger of getting "bogged down" in philosophical work and of the need to keep the "imposing vision" clear (as Bacon was unable to do) (C&W, p. 68). So, while we have remarks that cannot be further organized, we also have a comprehensive vision. Hence, if we have thoroughly understood, it is perhaps only fitting that anything more than a series of responding remarks is difficult. Wittgenstein comments that for him this is "connected with the very nature of the investigation" (p.vii). We, however, are not simply continuing the investigation, and for that reason confront this difficulty. The problem is, that to work deeply or for too long with Wittgenstein is to run the risk of the destruction of oneself as a philosopher in the ordinary sense, i.e., one begins to employ the same methods. At best one tends to continue to examine examples which perpetuate the therapy. One continues to do what Wittgenstein did. This may, ironically, fulfill one of Wittgenstein's goals as he did indeed intend to solve problems and put an end to philosophy by changing the way we look at things, but by so doing he makes us unable to see in the old ways, unable to play the old games anymore. He says, once you have seen, there is much you will not say (79). Well, if we do not say, we fall into silence. This, as we shall see, is a very special sort of silence for Wittgenstein, but it is still silence. If we fall into silence, we do not write/do philosophy. So, if we are one of the fortunate 'unfortunates' upon whom Wittgenstein's therapy has worked -- we have either put ourselves out of business as philosophers, or, at the very least, find severe impediments to continuing. To some extent we might say that anyone who attempts to write about Wittgenstein is at most a scholar or an historian of ideas, but not a philosopher. The true thinker is one who thinks with Wittgenstein, who so enters into that thinking, as to know what he knew,
experience what he experienced, even, perhaps, to become what he was. He is, ultimately and simply, to be poet and mystic. He is to rejoice in and share, through description and through silence, the world devoid of illusion, the reality of the one in the many, the all in all. To be only a scholar of Wittgenstein, no matter how brilliant or clever, is thus to be sadly and seriously deprived. This is because "no one can think a thought for me in the way no one can don my hat for me" (C&V, p. 2). Such thinking is not without its price: "What you have achieved cannot mean more to others than it does to you. Whatever it has cost you, that's what they will pay" (C&V, p. 13).

Anselm feels that we can never do this with Wittgenstein, and that any report of this nature will be purely a report of our own experience. (Englemann, Paul, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir, trans. L. Furtmüller, ed. B. F. McGuinness [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967], p. xiv.) From the normal perspective this is true of all experience. However, we do have the volume of writing by which to be guided in the attaining of experience and against which to test our experience. Furthermore, this approach, like that of some commentators who have said that there could be numerous interpretations of Wittgenstein, all of them useless, is to forget the universal, common dimensions of the mystical experience and, if we might venture to say so, perhaps does not take seriously the point of the discussion of private language and other minds.

This total empathy, even identity, was important to Wittgenstein. He knew that, at times, only a shared experience could produce a shared understanding. An example of this can be found in the following: "Predestination: It is only permissible to write like this out of the most dreadful suffering—and then it means something quite different. But for the same reason it is not permissible for someone to assert it as a truth, unless he himself says it in torment. —It simply isn't a theory. —Or, to put it another way: If this is truth, it is not the truth that seems at first sight to be expressed by these words. It's less theory than a sigh, or a cry" (C&V, p. 30). Some people around Wittgenstein recognized the importance of such shared experience in understanding his insights. One was Fania Pascal who recalls Wittgenstein declaring a fairy tale to be profound "but was unable to share Wittgenstein's vision." (Rush Rhees (ed.), 1981, op. cit., pp. 33-34.)

Wittgenstein had a particular aversion to that which seemed to be 'clever', particularly for its own sake. "Never stay up on the barren heights of cleverness, but come down into the green valleys of silliness" (C&V, p. 76).
Comparing, not Contrasting

Therefore, both by virtue of the nature of the text itself and by virtue of its effect upon us as a peculiar type of art form and as therapy, there are difficulties in proceeding with this study of Wittgenstein's ontological perspective in his later work. One way out of the impasse is that taken by numerous scholars who have approached the Tractatus and the Investigations through an analysis of the differences between them. In fact, Wittgenstein's apparent shift in view is often used as the expository tool whereby both texts are interpreted. It is this, as much or more than the time span separating the composition and release of these two works, which accounts for the nomenclature "early" and "late." Within the Investigations, Wittgenstein himself explicitly denies his earlier position...
on some matters and says that his new thought can be "seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking" (p.viii). Some of his most pronounced shifts in thought concern:

(a) his doctrine on logic which in the Investigations is no longer a 'calculus' pervading both objects and language;\(^{14}\)

(b) his idea of the role of imagination which is no longer the logic-bound human faculty producing images parallel to objects and states of affairs which are then projected in the form of propositions;\(^{15}\)

(c) his conception of objects and their primary importance as constituents of the world and, therefore, of facts and, therefore, indirectly of propositions; (No longer is he concerned with objects in relation to substance via-e via elementary propositions nor do objects correlate numerically and configurationally to the parts of complex propositions. That which now becomes indestructible is the paradigm (55).)

(d) his parallel radical shift in the concept of a proposition; (The picture theory as such is no longer expounded, yet, interestingly, pictures still convey information (280) and a picture can still correspond to an image (301). Our pictures can be used and can have applications (PG, p. 12?). Briefly, the proposition is no longer a word-object description of facts, nor is it always the expression of a thought, nor is it any longer a complex logical mechanism composed of elementary parts which can be profitably submitted to atomistic analysis. What the proposition becomes is, in fact, 'mysterious'.)\(^{16}\)

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14Mounce notes an additional difference, in regard to logic, namely, that in the later philosophy Wittgenstein found formal logic to be of only limited value. (H. O. Mounce, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, An Introduction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 108.) This is probably because, as Rush Rhees puts it: "In 1929 he had come to see that the truth-functional calculus gives only a part of the grammar of 'and', 'or', 'not', and 'if...then'. They are used in ways which cannot be reduced to their use in logic—although such uses are not cut off from their use in logic, either." (Rush Rhees, 1970, op. cit., p. 18)

15However, in *Zettel* we still find: "Hence there is something right about saying that unimaginability is a criterion for nonsensicality." (Z, 253).

16I shall frequently characterize the Tractarian view as the word-object, subject-object, or word-referent notion in contrast to the language-game and form of life notions of the Investigations. However, in the Tractatus the dualism which the phrase implies was overcome. In this contrast it shall retain the dualistic notion as though the Tractatus had not 'worked' and the same dualism must be overcome again in the Investigations.
his natural and equally radical alteration in the view of language. (It is no longer the sum total of all possible propositions, nor need it even be confined to the functions of propositions, nor for that matter to propositions themselves. Language itself becomes equally 'mysterious'.)

To call these shifts significant is indeed an understatement and only a fool could be so rash as to deny their specificity and importance. I in no way wish to deliberately assume such a role. I would, however, like to note some similarities between the two works and to suggest that an analysis of these might likewise be a possible escape from our procedural impasse. I do not wish to look for similarities of 'doctrine', were there such a thing in Wittgenstein, nor of specific thoughts, but of foundation and direction. It is perhaps worth calling to mind that, while one's particular positions on specific issues may change, that does not mean that all of one's positions on a given issue or related issues necessarily change. Whether or not they do so depends upon inferential relationships between the matters. Also, there are many roads that lead to the same place. One might change the specific route completely and still arrive at the same destination. So, acknowledging radical differences between the two works does not necessitate concluding a radical dichotomy between them. Also, thoughts change, positions change, people change. Yet, it is perhaps em-

P.M.S. Hacker notes interestingly in his article "The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory," "In recent years there has been a justifiable reaction to the initial conception of the relationship between Wittgenstein's two masterpieces. To be sure there is profound change in his philosophy, but there is also profound continuity. But exactly what changes and what continues is no easy matter to discern. This is not surprising, for if what Wittgenstein has done is to rotate the axis of reference of his investigation 180 degrees (108), then the difference of the sameness, as it were, will be difficult to perceive.... Certainly many claims made in the Tractatus are retained in the later philosophy. One might single out the salient contentions about the nature of philosophy; or -- in a more logical vein -- the bipolarity of the proposition with the attendant rejection of a priori propositions and insistence that what makes a proposition true cannot be identical with what gives it sense. On the negative, critical, side, Wittgenstein continues to object to any theory of types, for grammar cannot be justified (although in the Tractatus grammar was, ineffably, justified by the language-independent structure of reality); similarly he never relinquishes his Grundgedanke that there are no logical objects." (Irving Block (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981], pp. 98-99.)
pirically and experientially impossible in this world that even in total change, something should not remain. The bedrock seldom shifts despite the changing edifices constructed upon it. The fundamental questions on philosophy, the inexpressible, the change in life and the mystical -- all found in the *Tractatus* -- persist in the *Investigations*. The vision was the same, but the 'style of painting' changed. The mode became a different one. While Wittgenstein may be trying to perpetrate an earthquake in our thought, in both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, it need not be the case that he experienced one himself. As Wittgenstein confessed to Drury: "'My fundamental ideas came to me very early in life'."

'The ontological' was his bedrock. Thus as we shall see, the 'essence' or 'core' of the *Tractatus* 'matured', as it were, in(to) the *Investigations*. Furthermore, the very exercise of examining the similarities between the two texts which have been obfuscated by the emphasis on the differences between them should in itself throw light upon new or at least different aspects of the text in question and hence has an advantage over continued emphasis on the difference. It may be somewhat 'novel', but hopefully productive as well.

But is it well-founded? Is it grounded? Let us suggest just a few similarities for the moment. We have contended that there is no doctrine of meaning in the *Tractatus*, but it is instead a denial of any such identifiable reality. The *Investigations* is a further attempt to expunge 'meaning'. (...Look instead for the point of a statement, for the use to which some proposition is put...) In both texts there is an inadmissibility of metaphysical statements: in the *Tractatus* because there is no fact to which such statements refer, and in the *Investigations* both because they are a misuse of our ordinary language in that the words of such statements are used out of their ordinary contextual 'home', and because the form of our language makes it look as though there were a metaphysical 'reality' to which our statements applied while in fact this is merely an illusion of that form. Later we shall explore the possible legitimacy of metaphysical, as well as theological, discussions as an authentic language game, but emphasize here the illegitimacy of metaphysical statements in our language usage.) In both texts Wittgenstein saw the possibility and desirability of dissolving entire complexes of philosophical problems through a philosophical analysis of language. He sought a means of utterly disintegrating

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the very need to 'philosophize' and hence of putting an end to philosophy in the case of the *Tractatus*, and of practising a technique of philosophizing which one could arbitrarily *cease* in the case of the *Investigations*. In both cases, as I shall contend later, Wittgenstein was using philosophy as a means of achieving not only greater insight and understanding of the phenomena he examined, but also as the means of achieving an insightful experience of a very particular sort, commonly called -- mystical.

More importantly, while Wittgenstein says that he once thought of publishing his old thoughts and new ones together, "that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking" (p.viii), this is still not to say that the nature of the entire enterprise had changed. He acknowledges that the *Tractatus* contained grave mistakes; it is not necessarily the case that it was a mistake. Nowhere does Wittgenstein speak of a radical change in his most fundamental insights or of a shift in his ultimate purpose. It is possible that Wittgenstein himself was so keenly aware of what shifts there were in his thought, and so desirous of correcting his 'mistakes', that that which remained the same escaped his reiteration and consequently escaped our attention. Just as one can be unaware of the familiarity of one's own surroundings but acutely aware of alterations in them (602), so we can have failed to notice that in the *Investigations* which is similar to that in the *Tractatus*. If, however, we missed the ontological and mystical dimensions of the *Tractatus* we will not have the required foundation for recognition of these same dimensions within the *Investigations*. Furthermore, if we failed to see the ethical dimensions of the *Tractatus* we may well miss the similar endeavor to change us and our way of looking at things which persists throughout the *Investigations*. Also, by the end of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein sees -- and says -- that that with which he is dealing, that which is his major concern, cannot be discussed at all. He must either write some enigmatic and aphoristic work like the *Investigations*, in which that concern is shown, or write a full 'explanation' which would violate the rules of language as he exposed them. This would appear to perpetuate the very

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19Drury points out that while the Sraffa remark made Wittgenstein feel like a tree with all its branches lopped off, that did not mean that the roots and trunk of the tree did not remain steadfast. "Wittgenstein chose his metaphors with great care." (Drury, op. cit., p. ix)
philosophical problems he hoped to dissolve. In a manner reminiscent of Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments*, this would have to be done under a pseudonym.

It is categorically clear that Wittgenstein did change his thinking in many regards. He admits this and there is no need to attempt to justify all the *Tractatus* in light of the *Investigations*. It is not clear that we are permitted to conclude from Wittgenstein's statements of difference a radical and total distinction between the two works. This may be a misleading assumption — and one that is easy to make when one has read the *Tractatus* on its less than ontological and mystical levels. Yet, if those levels are perceived as the very core of that work and if there can be found within the *Investigations* a similar 'resultant' or functional ontology and mysticism, then not only is it profitable to note the similarities between the two texts, but it is both feasible and interesting to explore the identity between them. It is the following of the ontological and mystical journey which was launched in the *Tractatus* and completed in the *Investigations* which I see to be both the means of overcoming the difficulties of the *Investigations* in its full peculiarity, and the means of entering into and understanding the thought of Wittgenstein himself. I wish to suggest that such levels do exist within the *Investigations* and wish to stress also that the common purpose of the two works as can be seen from Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, is in fact to show the reader these ontological levels of reality and to enable him to experience authentically the wonder and awe of what is so seen, in fact to merge with it consciously and appreciatively, i.e., to comprehend mystically. As Wittgenstein put it: "Man has to awaken to wonder — and so perhaps do peoples" (C&V, p. 5).

We might note, however, that from within the text itself there is more difficulty in describing the ontological than there was within the *Tractatus*. All the 'parts' (e.g., object) of an ontology drop away along with many aspects of the picture theory. While I will try to display the ontolo-

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20 Anthony Kenny contends that, though the atomistic aspects of the picture theory were dropped and the picture theory underwent some change, on almost all of its essential points (which he enumerates) "Wittgenstein's mind remained constant." (Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974], p. 229). It would seem more correct to say that in some language games a proposition functions as a picture and operates as such in itself, but that, by and large, a proposition continues to be a picture— from some perspectives. There are many ways of looking at things in the *Investigations*, and one way of looking at the proposition is as a picture.
tical view that is latent in the text and upon which it rests, the very use of the word "ontology" in relation to the *Investigations* is far more problematic than in relation to the *Tractatus*. By "ontology" here I do not mean a theory or anything comparable which might be developed into a metaphysical system. Rather, I mean a way of seeing, a way of looking at things, not even a set of concepts or properties, but an understanding of "the way things are." It's an understanding of 'what is' - it is not a metaphysical theory, but a vision. We are looking at "the nature of things." This is a notion which occurs with some frequency in *On Certainty* and in *Zettel*. Amidst a discussion on colour and the fact that people notice discrepancies

Engel notices that for Wittgenstein the mind is held captive not only by language but by the pictures that language tends to create. This was part of theory of the functioning of language found in the Blue Book. "It is strange that so little notice has been taken of this theory. But this is perhaps due to the fact that it is a picture-theory, and we have become accustomed to thinking that although such a theory figures prominently, indeed in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein gave it up later on. That he did give it up is, of course, true. But it is also true that although Wittgenstein gave up that picture theory, he never really gave up trying to develop a picture theory, or to explore the earlier one in other directions. This is one of the trends in Wittgenstein's thought which has a tendency to break off at certain points but which somehow never completely vanished from sight." (S. M. Engel, *Wittgenstein's doctrine of the Tyranny of Language: an historical and critical examination of his Blue Book* [The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971, p. 103.)

Frege's influence can, of course, not be discounted, particularly in regard to the picture theory. Dummett does an extensive study of Frege's influence and notes that the picture theory was intended to be a solution to the problems in Frege's theory of meaning wherein "to grasp the sense of a sentence is to know the condition for its truth -- is right at all then surely the identification of the reference of a sentence with its truth-value is correct." (Block, op. cit., p. 35.) But the picture theory does not work because "A sentence cannot be a fact because it states just one thing; and the hearer, if he understands the language, must know just what it is that it states. A diagram is not a fact, it is an object; and there are many facts about the diagram." (Ibid., p. 37.) Hence, the haunting problems presented by the 'solution' provided impetus for further work.

Perhaps the exact status of the picture theory is debatable because, as Hacker puts it, "The term 'picture' is used by Wittgenstein with great laxity." (Hacker, op. cit., p. 131.)

Tracing the continuance and discontinuance of the picture theory would be an entire study of its own, but the Blue Book and the Brown Book, together with the Lectures, 1930-1932 (ed. by Desmond Lee) and the Lectures, 1932-33 (ed. by Alice Ambrose) in contrast with the *Investigations* surely provides the material for such an enterprise. In pages 165-67 of the Brown Book especially, Wittgenstein begins to explore the ways in which the picturing aspect of language leads to broader issues.
in colour, we find the entry: "Yes, but has nature nothing to say here? Indeed she has -- but she makes herself audible in another way. 'You'll surely run up against existence and non-existence somewhere!' But that means against facts, not concepts" (Z, 364). With this and similar notions prevalent in Wittgenstein's thought at the time of the Investigations, it would seem that whatever he is doing in his numerous descriptions, it is clearly not in the same league as the solipsists, idealists, and realists (cited in 402) who do dispute matters about the world and language and the relation between them in ways which involve more traditional metaphysical positions. The 'dispute' here is about five red apples and how this phrase is used. It is about the ordinary and everyday. It does, nonetheless, encompass an awareness and appreciation for the everyday and the way in which it functions. It is in this way that the Investigations displays an understanding of "the way things are" and contains a vision of 'what is'.

Circumstantial Evidence

Before considering the best means of examining the Investigations in order to display the possibility of the ontological and mystical levels within it which display its fundamental similarity to the Tractatus, and before reflecting upon an interpretation of it along such lines, let us briefly consider a few curious items of general external or circumstantial evidence which might support such an approach. Biographically it would seem from the fact that Wittgenstein could never free himself of philosophic endeavours and was constantly worried about their contamination by the academic profession that his intent always consisted in some sort of existential search, some lived attempt to 'see the world aright', to understand, to attain truth, and through the years of restless, intense discussions and tormented teaching, thought, and writing -- to make others do likewise. The investigations which he made, appear to have been more than professional, more than academic, and even more than of great personal interest and concern. They seem instead to have been almost an agony, a calling, an obsession of his total being. Also, we are con-

21..."Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for." (C&V, p. 43.)

22'Malcolm notes "the relentless way in which he drove his intellect." (Malcolm, op. cit., p. 100.)
fronted with his continual contention that he was being misunderstood and his continual attempt to correct and prevent that misunderstanding. In fact, this misunderstanding and possible distortion of his thought so stung his vanity (p.viii) that it provided impetus for the publication of his material. As what was published is the same in content as that of the discussions and lectures, this protestation of misunderstanding is perhaps an indication of the need to look at the Investigations from a radically different perspective. If the author keeps saying we are misunderstanding, perhaps we are confronted with a work which is basically not what it seems.

Furthermore, we are confronted with some rather curious 'death bed' statements which need to be reconciled with the external picture of Wittgenstein's life as well as his work. First, when he was dying, he asked that his friends be told that he had had a wonderful life. To those studying his biography that would not seem to be the case. To reiterate, we have that picture of the very torn and tormented man, one whose philosophic work 'exercised' his mind, beset him, harassed him, and one who dared to defy or was perhaps compelled to defy, the normal patterns of both professional and personal life in a culture and time when 'dropping out' was not in vogue. Wittgenstein lived in a culture and a time of wars and 'between wars' when the experiential need to counteract chaos and absurdity might inescapably engulf a thinking man's consciousness.

No cry of torment can be greater than the cry of one man. Or, again, no torment can be greater than what a single human being may suffer. A man is capable of infinite torment therefore, and so too he can stand in need of infinite help. (C&V, p. 45).

This understanding and experience is what, as we shall see in a future chapter, makes his profession of joy all the more significant.

Wittgenstein felt at odds with both European and American culture and yearned for kindred friends "scattered throughout the corners of the globe" who would understand the spirit in which he wrote (C&V, pp. 6-7).

The stability of the ancient Austrian monarchy and the culture and civilization which had developed were rocked and the Jewish family background and partial identity were challenged. As von Wright puts it, "Wittgenstein was deeply rooted in something which became completely up-
have that setting and picture of one relentlessly in search in the deepest recesses of his being. Not a peaceful life perhaps, but by his own testimony—a wonderful one. So did that search yield hidden fruit, or was it in itself a treasure worth its price in suffering? Since Wittgenstein's life and work were one, in a manner uncommon to twentieth-century man, what was it in that work or in that working which could speak to so deep a search and lead him to bless his life as 'wonderful'? There must be something more therein than the description our language games (124), more than statements of what everyone would already admit (128) and more than the citation of examples (133). He must have found liberation from his own entrapment, his own flybottle.

Second, before dying Wittgenstein requested his well-thumbed copy of Augustine's Confessions which he had obviously studied deeply and knew thoroughly. He turned to a particular passage and read: "I cannot keep silent of Thee, O Lord." Why should he have read that passage? What kind of witness or testimony is such an action? One is almost tempted to ask if it is in fact a clue to the Investigations. Will the Investigations be always in danger of misunderstanding unless they are studied as some sort of praise or witness or testimony issuing from religious dimensions which were otherwise seldom publicly demonstrated or articulated in this man's life? Were his writings and lectures and discussions really his search for and testimony to,—his God? or at least the deeper levels of Being/being, though in accord with his Investigations he would never ex-

26 "The delight I take in my thought is a delight in my own strange life. Is this the joy of living?" (C&V, p. 22).

27 This incident is reported by G.E.M. Anscombe in the program on Wittgenstein which is a part of a series of BBC radio broadcasts on twentieth-century philosophers.

28 This is similar to Wittgenstein saying on another occasion, "Bach put at the head of his Orgelbuchlein, 'To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbour may be benefited thereby.' I would have liked to be able to say this of my work." (Drury, op. cit., p. xiv.)
press it in that way? While deathbed statements are notoriously dubious, if this statement could in some way be taken as Wittgenstein's own confession, and if the Investigations are primarily all he spoke during his later life, then it behooves us to explore them for an ontological and mystical level of which this deathbed statement might in fact be a hint.

Also, along this same line, we have to bear in mind a normal characteristic of mystical experience. It is one of the hallmarks of genuine mystical experience that it profoundly and permanently alters the subjective meaning or orientation of one's life. The experience itself may be a single occurrence or of repeated occurrence; it may be of momentary duration or of longer continuance; but its effects endure. 'Life is just not the same again' is a common comment of such an experienced individual. Furthermore, the effects that endure often ripen. They mature. The experience might or might not intensify or develop greater frequency, but it is commonly the case that the experience of the transcendent, in its maturity, becomes constant along with 'normal' perceptions of life.

Drury cites that when writing the Investigations Wittgenstein said to him: "I am not a religious man, but I can't help seeing everything from a religious point of view." (Ibid.)

In his paper delivered to The Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, Berthold Rießerter concludes: "It would argue that the similarities between the outlooks and approaches of such thinkers as Pascal, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy and those of Wittgenstein are more than merely coincidental. Wittgenstein, in effect, is a religious existentialist. The specific nature of his religiosity is, of course, ineffable. Yet acknowledging this and seeing him from this point of view might help resolve some of the difficulties that still surround the interpretation of his life and work, particularly his discussion of ethics." (Berthold Rießerter, Wittgenstein and His Impact On Contemporary Thought, Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, [ed.] E. Leinfellner, W. Leinfellner, Hal Berghel, and A. Hubner [Vienna: Holder-Pichler-TemPSky, 1978], p. 486.)

The list of possible references for such material could be endless, but for typical evidence of this lasting subject reorientation see the various accounts of mystical experience recounted by Richard Maurice Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness (New York: Causeway Books, 1974) and the discussion of peak experiences by Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1968). Also, see pp. 107-111 in Collected Papers of Evelyn Underhill, ed. Lucy Mzensias (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946).


Ibid.
When the transcendent is constantly perceived together with or in all other thought, objects, and activities, it is finally and fully realized as immanent. 'Transcendent' and 'immanent' can in this manner be experienced simultaneously and cease to be dichotomous. Ultimately, however, the study of the immanent is none other than ontology, and its full appreciation nothing more nor less than mysticism. (The import and explanation of these identifications will become clear in later sections.) In other words, given the nature of the earlier text, and given these two characteristics of such insight and experience as were evidenced there, namely, that 'the mystical' permanently alters a life and that it matures -- any discontinuity with the later text on these levels would be highly unlikely.

It is perhaps interesting to note that some uneasiness and confusion exists on the part of Wittgenstein's readers. The reader simply cannot get a foothold. This might be caused by the very revolutionary nature of Wittgenstein's work in both content and method, and/or a genuine 'aspect blindness' or severe prejudice on the part of the readers towards this content and method. This might be because the therapeutic method of the later work is initially so exasperating; without a sort of ultimate surrender to it, many people are perhaps unfit subjects for it. Also, these reactions might occur because the works themselves are actually about more than we expect. That is -- in Wittgenstein's thought, things are seldom only what they seem. If this fact is missed, we never do 'learn our way about'.

We are justifiably uneasy. Whatever understanding is achieved, profound though it might be, is indeed incomplete. Now, if our pre-understanding

33 This is not an uncommon reaction: "Like many another I was once committed to a certain type of philosophical endeavour -- a type which goes under the names of 'linguistic analysis' or 'conceptual analysis'. I thought that any of a large number of words...that required clarification could be given [clarification] by an 'analysis' of the word in question. Then I read Wittgenstein. My first reaction was to add footnotes to the things I had been writing. Then I added appendices. Finally I tore the things up; and I have been trying in various ways to overcome a state of paralysis ever since." (Frank Ebersole, "Saving and Meaning," in Ambrose, A. and Lazerowitz, H., (eds.) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophy and Language [New York: Humanities Press, 1972], p. 186.)

34 Wittgenstein himself found his method so new as to need repeating, even for himself. (C&V, p. 1).

35 ..."I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape which they cannot possibly know their way around." (C&V, p. 56.)
were pointed in that direction prior to commencing our study, our understanding might come more naturally and completely. If we had before us an introductory vision of the total package, some knowledge or at least some hint that those deeper, unexpected levels might in fact be present; our frustration and bewilderment might be largely avoided. We need to be 'hermeneutically equipped'. Our procedure of studying the text would then be analogous to the study of a complicated mathematics problem for which one already has the answer and the exercise is to find the way of attaining that answer in order to come to a greater understanding of the matter.

Of course there are objections to such an approach. It is impossible genuinely to have a philosophical problem for which one already has the answer. The search would never begin. Here again we could examine Wittgenstein's particular formula or method as solution. Like a piece of literature or art it can be studied again and again 'for itself'. In fact, most of our studies of philosophical works are of this nature. We study a given philosopher over and over and over, not to answer a problem but to attain greater insight and further appreciation of the material we might already 'know by heart'. Second, there is always the very grave danger in such a procedure that we will in fact read into the text instead of allow ourselves to be led by the text into the desired understanding. It is possible to tell a text instead of being told/taught by it. This matter is extremely problematic in regard to the Investigations wherein Wittgenstein so wanted us to see the landscapes he presented that his major concentration centered on our ability to see rather than on telling us 'what to look for.' It is indeed a matter of chance whether one finds what one is not looking for. We have here a case in which the text does not tell us anything, but shows us, if we can

36 The notion that the Investigations is an art form, that it is literature, is not new, but because it is philosophical, this is so easily forgotten. As Renford Bambrough put it in 'How to Read Wittgenstein,' 'And one thing that you know but may forget is that much of Wittgenstein, like much of Plato, is literature as well as philosophy, and so calls for kinds of reading at which philosophers do not always keep in practice.' (Godfrey Vasey (ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Copyright by the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1974], p. 118.)

Shibles concludes one of the chapters of his book with an interesting observation in regard to Wittgenstein's style: 'Poetry and philosophy are both attempts to 'learn' our language.' (Warren Shibles, Wittgenstein, Language, and Philosophy [Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Book Company, Copyright by Warren Shibles, 1969], p. 13.)
but see -- everything.\textsuperscript{37} (There are reasons Wittgenstein could not reveal the core of his material. These will be discussed later.)

And so, in the face of the common consensus of exposition stressing the radical differences between the two works and in face of the author's own admissions in the preface of the Investigations, I wish to suggest the continuity and even identity between the two works in terms of their deeper ontological and mystical insights. These levels seem to be supported by the 'external evidence' of the author's life and are consistent with it. If we simply explore the Investigations in the light of the Tractatus which is an ontological and mystical treatise, it begins to emerge as a more mature presentation of that same vision and as a fulfillment of a continued, intense, and personal mission to assist others in attaining similar insights and transformation.

Other Possibilities

This is an approach far different from most of the standard studies of Wittgenstein's Investigations. A survey of the vast secondary literature on the Investigations reveals relatively few fruitful approaches which attempt to define the enterprise as a whole. There have been very few attempts by philosophers to try to present an overall account of what it was that Wittgenstein was doing in writing the Investigations. Insofar as one could distill some overall assessment from these accounts, it might be a characterization of Wittgenstein as an anti-metaphysician.\textsuperscript{38} This would portray his position as one which maintains that we cannot be concerned with 'the meta-physical', for any such 'reality' (better still, 'illusion') is reducible to and can only be explored through the grammar of our language which likewise 'created' it.\textsuperscript{39} Such an approach can easily use the Investigations to move far beyond the Wittgensteinian position. For example, instead of uniting the body and soul, such a position can reduce the human form to body alone. The soul can be eliminated; processes take its place.

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\textsuperscript{37}"I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way, he can put it right." (OnV, p. 18).

\textsuperscript{38}This was discussed in an earlier footnote on the Tractatus.

\textsuperscript{39}Wittgenstein does say things which lead one to think in this way, but this is precisely what makes a look at the endeavour as a whole, so very important.
Likewise, since Wittgenstein fails to speak of a transcendent God in the *Investigations*, an anti-metaphysical approach can easily miss the display of God as immanent and thereby simply eliminate God completely. Those who see Wittgenstein's work in this light, see him as the rhetorician or defender of ordinary language, as one of that tradition which includes Nietzsche, Heidegger, the logical positivists, J. L. Austin, and the neo-Marxists who all agree on one thing: that philosophy is, in the present age, coming to an end. There are a few fruitful approaches to defining the enterprise as a whole in a more positive spirit, but these are just beginning to appear in published works.

Apart from the study of some particular theme or other within the *Investigations*, we need efforts to 'find a way through', efforts to see what sort of total movie the many sketches would make were they spliced together frame by frame and projected panoramically. We need efforts to make sense of the *Investigations* as a total speech-act as opposed to debating or analyzing specific points, useful though that might be at times. We need efforts to make sense of this peculiar text which is intensely suggestive in itself, and of which the individual parts are insightful and significant, but with which one cannot cope so well as a whole. We need attempts to deal with something exceedingly plastic and in need of form by Wittgenstein's own admission (cf. vii).

We can legitimately ask whether such attempts, as well as my own, are proper efforts, for Wittgenstein could not give his work such a form and said that to do so was to violate its nature as we have seen from his preface statements (p.vii). That being so, perhaps he had an advantage which we do not. He knew within himself the 'heart' or 'core' of the...

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40. Wittgenstein has begged us to see the many aspects of things. Being held captive by a single picture or a single model is part of the illness that needs therapy. There is surely a tendency in all of us in our effort to understand Wittgenstein to cast some sort of order over the vast array of entries. For example, if we are looking at the question of philosophy, we tend to collect numerous entries on philosophy, examine them on their own and in relation to the whole, and from this, prescind his notion of philosophy. (I am, of course, oversimplifying.) From some perspectives this is the only way we can work with the material. But this is quite a different effort than some recent attempt to cluster the entries into chapters, as it were, and treat these clusters from one numbered entry to another inclusively, omitting none, as units on a given topic. (See for instance the arrangement in Garth Hallett's Companion and Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning.) There is something unsettling about this latter approach, not only because Wittgenstein himself contended...
matter. No general form and no interpretative grid were needed either in lectures, discussions, or writing, for he himself knew within himself, contained within himself, the reality, the 'space' from which the work proceeded. As art, the work is a coherent statement; it signifies something, but no external form could be intelligently appropriated for it. To articulate any form at all would be to violate the tenets of the unspeakable which are part of that 'heart' or 'core' of the work itself. Again, this will be discussed more fully in later sections, but let us here recall once more that the circumstances of the Investigations included its author's history and search. Being innate to him and taken for granted, as is everyone's 'own life', this history and search would seldom if ever be articulated. Furthermore, the author was painting sketches. You cannot say a work of art. Also, as we have said and will further stress, if Wittgenstein was attempting to enable us to see, it was tactically expedient not to "spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (p.viii). In other words, it

that the nature of the material militated against such topical ordering, and, therefore, one wonders if one is missing something in such an approach, but also because it can have the effect of forcing a perspective so that the criss-crossing of the landscape is not as fresh each time, not as likely to let us see from other angles. The approach seems both helpful and harmful. As Warren Shibles points out, one of Wittgenstein's primary contributions to philosophy is his unique style and method of philosophizing. (Warren Shibles, op. cit. p. 8). This contribution begins to be obscured when we attempt to organize his own disorganization. Our effort here is to see the total, the speech-act of the whole, rather than to organize the material as such.

41Let us recall here that before the Tractatus was published, Wittgenstein wrote that his work consisted of two parts: the one presented and the more important one which was not written.(PT, p. 16). At that time as well he acknowledged a 'core' which only silence held. In 1933-34 he said, "I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition." (C&V, p. 24). At this same time he felt that "In art it is hard to say anything as good as saying nothing." (C&V, p. 23). Silence still holds the 'core'. Furthermore, Wittgenstein knew the value of his work lay not in the words themselves: "Is what I am doing really worth the effort? Yes, but only if a light shines on it from above. And if that happens — why should I concern myself that the fruits of my labours should not be stolen? If what I am writing really has some value, how could anyone steal the value from me? And if the light from above is lacking, I can't in any case be more than clever." (1947). (C&V, pp.57-58).
is possible that the truth of the Investigations, the deeper meaning, those underlying levels of the enterprise are precisely what we are to discover, to find, to see. And once we have seen, all the sketches take on new significance and depth.

In light of this all of the various approaches to the Investigations are perhaps worthwhile. It is also possible that they are all authentic responses. We cannot speak of them as being correct or incorrect, for if truth is to be discovered it is not a matter of being 'correct', but they can be 'authentic'. Also, I am not suggesting that my proposed solution to the problem is the only one but simply that it has much to recommend it and is a means of seeing the forest despite the trees without doing violence to the proposal that this material is to be seen: it is a view, a landscape. The various approaches might all fit the material as such and be like coloured lens through which it is viewed beautifully and accurately, but, as Wittgenstein might say, such glasses we can take off our noses and replace with other ones. It might be that the text is so plastic we can legitimately use it toward many ends. If our interest is in the philosophy of the mind, we can employ it as a philosophy of mind; if our interest is in positivism and contra-metaphysical, we can employ it accordingly. And one can levy the same comment upon my suggested approach. So be it. If through this study something worthwhile can be seen and said, that is legitimate. If the text is so plastic, then perhaps we are right in seeking the major clues to its interpretation in the external or circumstantial evidence and in the light of the earlier work. If this is correct, this approach might reveal deeper dimensions in the material itself, for it fits more than the material as such. It fits the material in its context. It also explains why 'perfectly intelligent' readers can be so baffled in face of the text. They have not set it in the wider context wherein what seemed to be so puzzling about it -- disappears -- and wherein what can then confront one as profound -- begins to be revealed. At any rate, just as the other approaches may yield valid insights, it might be worthwhile, to say the least, to look at the Investigations as a unitary ontology and a method for heightening consciousness or attaining to mystical appreciation.

Method of Exposition

Let us now return to the question of a suitable method by which to attempt such an approach and thereby expose these ontological and mystical levels of the text. The method must be, on the one hand, respectful of the
aesthetic nature of the text as an album of sketches, and on the other hand, cognizant of those sketches as philosophical investigations of various concepts (p.vii). In other words, we must bear in mind that these sketches are 'investigations', and that these investigations are sketches. Sketches of what? Investigations of what? Our method must enable us to answer the original question: What is the meaning of this text? What is it 'really' all about? What deeper truth can be authentically discovered within it?

If we are dealing with sketches, that means that our answer must be an interpretation. It is something suggested to us by the text, but as interpretation it explains the text by means of that suggestion. The problem is finding the best procedure for doing that. Also, we have already noted the need for a hermeneutical key. One must understand for oneself before beginning to explain. There are perhaps two tasks that can be distinguished here. One is that of exposing the manner in which the text can be interpreted along ontological and mystical lines. The other is that of showing another what one has seen oneself. It is to say, as it were, this is what the text says to me; my task is to explain it to you. Insofar as possible, I have conflated these tasks in the 'exposition' which follows.

What we have in the Investigations is no ordinary piece of philosophical writing. It is a work of art which is itself a study of -- being, reality, what is. It can be taken on many levels and likened to many forms of art. As a film, it is constantly taking us to new places of thought.

42 "a man who is not used to searching in the forest for flowers, berries, or plants will not find any because his eyes are not trained to see them and he does not know where you have to be particularly on the lookout for them." (C&V, p. 29).

43 Wittgenstein himself thought of his latter work as an art form. He speaks of philosophy as poetic composition and then admits that he was revealing himself as "someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do." (C&V, p. 24). He says that in his artistic activities he has "nothing but good manners," (C&V, p. 25) and in 1936 he notes "the queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation...and an aesthetic one." (C&V, p. 25).

"People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them -- that does not occur to them." (C&V, p. 36).

Elsewhere Wittgenstein says, "And after all a painter is basically what I am, often a very bad painter too." (C&V, p. 82).

So important is an appreciation of the peculiar style of Wittgenstein's writing that Timothy Binkley devotes an entire book to it.
and vicariously allowing us to experience new possibilities of how 'it might be', but as there is no connected sequence of events, it is perhaps better to think of it as an abstract contemporary drama which is often a presentation of a 'slice of life', not a plot. The drama has the usual philosophical characters of the protagonist and the antagonist and it has a continuous, ongoing, almost repetitious activity in which the viewpoints of one character are altered by another. Furthermore, there is a dramatic 'gimmick' involved, for as soon as one begins to view the play one finds oneself seconded as one of the actors. The viewer is drawn into the activity and finds happening to himself what happens to the main characters. The therapy begins to happen — insidiously. This is why it is difficult to achieve a panoramic view of the scenes (sketches); one is always in them, participating. So, if we are to consider this text as a work of art, we must include this action as a part of the whole. We have somehow to get outside the whole — to look on from that vantage — as observer rather than as participant-observer. But if we are dealing with an object of art, then our reactions are indeed aesthetic ones. An active, experiential involvement might be said to characterize the aesthetic as opposed to the intellectual reaction. We enter into the Investigations; we experience. And this seems appropriate. As we shall see, the Investigations is intended to involve us, to work upon us. It is a process we undergo.

Suppose we consider another art form, another way in which to consider the Investigations as producing an aesthetic reaction. From within its own internal structure it can be likened to a symphony. Its various themes arise, turn back upon themselves, interweave, emerge again in new but still familiar form. Or, let us consider this: if our suggestion that the Investigations is at base the revelation of an ontology and elicits an appreciation of it, then the text can also be seen as an art form in that it is itself a celebration, a praise, a constant song and dance which is always the seeing of the vision. This too should become more clear in later sections. The text is praise in that Wittgenstein is writing it in reaction to that which he himself sees and experiences. It is like music or dance in that it can

"A full understanding of [Wittgenstein's] philosophy will have to take into account how it is written: one cannot entirely separate a consideration of the content of what he says from a consideration of the manner in which he says it." (Timothy Binkley, Wittgenstein's Language The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973 , p. vi.) "The best way to read the Investigations is thus to read it as a scrapbook and to glean from it what lesson we can about travelling." (Ibid., p. 31).
be heard or seen only while it is being played, danced. Wittgenstein is the composer, but if the music is to be heard, it is up to us to play it again and again. Our encounter with the *Investigations* is necessarily active. There is a 'doing' which is essential. Thus, the text might be seen to be, at one and the same time, both means and end. In drawing the sketches and seeing them, or in acting out the scenes and viewing them, there is always the acceptance and transformation that occurs as in the ancient sense of a 'memorial' in which the thing remembered was not only symbolically re-enacted but actually re-constituted, or re-lived, re-actualized. The *Investigations* should be linked to *anamnesis*. It recalls. It makes present. It is operative. In this sense the text is not unlike ritual. This participation in the play, this transformation within the celebration or performance, a sort of spontaneous enactment perpetually and almost involuntarily elicited from the author and including the reader, all lie hidden or latent in the notion of therapy. By encountering this work we are made able to see, given new vision, made ready for transformation. In this sense the *Investigations*, like the *Tractatus* is a tool for deeper living. It has a profound effect upon us and that is what it was 'made for'. It must be treated accordingly.

**A Preview**

We have said the text involves and changes its viewer, reader, actor, listener (how it does so will be developed later), and that change is achieved by means of a therapy, a process, we undergo. In other words, there are specific effects which occur as the result of these particular sketches. Let us here briefly preview the development to come.

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Wittgenstein commented to Drury: "It is impossible for me to say one word in my book about all that music has meant in my life; how then can I possibly make myself understood." (Drury, op. cit., p. xiv). And his own even 'tactile' involvement in music can be seen in the following: "When I imagine a piece of music, as I do often every day, I always, so I believe, grind my upper and lower teeth together rhythmically.... Of course I can imagine music without moving my teeth too, but in that case the notes are much ghostlier, more blurred and less pronounced." (C&V, p. 28). Citations in *Culture and Value* abound which display his intense emotional and intellectual involvement with music. In 1941 he wrote: "My style is like bad musical composition." (C&V, p. 39). Hence, the comparison of the text to music and the need for our participation in it would surely be so obvious to Wittgenstein as to need no statement.
A characteristic of the sketches is that they never picture dualities. There are no body-soul episodes, no subject-object scenes in which an actor is the experiencer of his experience, be it pain or grief. There is no man-world duality, no word-referent duality, etc., etc. (We shall later examine this lack of dualities and its effect in more detail.) All the sketches are scenes of unity. They are internally complex and dynamic, but they are of 'one'. Nothing happens or has significance or even exists independently and on its own. All reality, all meaning, all concepts are interwoven, reciprocal, composite patterns and interactions. All being is co-existence and all becoming is co-evolution. The oneness, the unit, unity, is the subject of all the sketches. The effect of this readies us for transformation. It is the catalyst of change. If duality is dissolved and unity prevails, how can there be alienation or separation? A continuous, deepening self-knowledge occurs in which one can no longer perceive oneself as separate from others, or separate from things, or even separate from some deeper levels of one's own being. Estrangement and isolation yield to interrelation and a perception of wholeness. It is the presentation of wholeness and the becoming whole in the exposure and acceptance of the presentation which constitute the therapy. The presentation -- of wholeness -- constitutes an ontology. Our cognizant participation in it and appreciation of it constitute a mysticism. Put differently, it is not in that Wittgenstein engages in a descriptive metaphysic that we recognize an ontology in this work, but in his letting things be as they are, in leaving everything alone, in not dichotomizing and placing a false or misleading conceptual grid on what is. It is in presenting what is as having nothing hidden, that his ontology is displayed.

The mysticism occurs in the overcoming of the alienation, in the emergence out of dualism into unity, and in the unmediated perception and appreciation of 'what is' which are then possible. This appreciation or understanding of the pictures of unity comes about in the doing of philosophy, that is, in examining what we say instead of 'seeing' what we always presumed to be present whenever we 'said', which any sort of saying or telling would falsely (apparently) confirm as present. In other words, to do philosophy is to break out of our illusions. It is to free us from the filters our language places on reality. It alters our ability to perceive by taking off our usual pair of glasses. It destroys our illusory version of the way we think things are -- in themselves -- and awakens us to the co-evolutionary nature of all things in which we co-create, co-participate,
and thus function as a unit. Again, the lack of dualities amounts to an ontology; our appreciation of and participation in it amounts to mysticism.

Now, to go one step further. Our understanding of the pictures and the way in which we have been deceived, the destruction of our illusions, amounts to an epistemology. Through understanding the process of knowing, we are made able to know in a new way. We are made free to leave the realm of dianoia and enter the realm of noesis. It is the understanding of the knowledge accruing to our language, of the errors we commit through it, and of the freedom attained by the proper use of language, which Wittgenstein calls doing philosophy. It is doing philosophy in this manner which prepares us for transformation. It readies us for 'the mystical'.

As we come to understand why we were deceived, why we thought we were separate and estranged, our alienation is still further dissolved and our experience and appreciation of unity and the wonder and mystery of what is, is strengthened. This is part of a self-perpetuating process involved in the study of the Investigations. To revert to our earlier thought, such an ever-deepening process is also characteristic of the contemporary drama, or the symphony. It is part of the album of landscapes which constitutes the Investigations.

The Procedure

Given the peculiar nature of the text, the contextual hints for its interpretation, and the therapy which it accomplishes, we can make a final approach to the best procedure for elaborating upon or demonstrating its meaning. If the text is itself best categorized as an 'object of art' then surely the best means of 'treating' it is precisely as such. Our posture toward it would be that of a connoisseur or critic of the arts and our discursive response to it should be that of expositor, of one who 'explains' the work to another who cannot 'see' the meaning of the object. In the stance of critic, one might also evaluate the technique of the work in relation to the aim of the work. Thus, part of our procedure might appropriately resemble a review — be it a review of a book, a movie, a play, an exhibition, etc. In other words, we will not so much be doing further philosophical investigations, nor even be analyzing the content of the investigations that have been made, as examining and evaluating this collection of sketches in regard to their own internal movement and progression toward the final goal of our transformation. We will be noticing the way in which the sketches portray the ontology and the ways in which
their relationship to one another increasingly bring us to perceive that reality, not only intellectually as an assent to the content of the text, to the descriptions therein, but to the 'truth' of the sketches. 45

Finally, we will engage in a long description of the experiential results of the Investigations in terms of appreciation and participation in the mystery of 'what is'. As the medium of this art form is language, we will likewise be examining the effects of Wittgenstein's statements and of the moves which they constitute in the 'game' of ontological display. We will be looking at what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish in talking about meaning, language, the world, philosophy; but our concern will not be so much with what he says about each of these as why he talked about them, what he was doing in saying what he said. Why, for instance, did he talk about 'seeing as'? What is the function of what is presented? Thus, we will not argue through the traditional questions which deal primarily with the content of the Investigations. Our concern is not the content but the enterprise, the content being only a tool for the enterprise. It is the overview that we seek to discern through aesthetic and eventually ontological participation. We are studying not an argument, but a transaction that is performed by the presentation of a content.

In conclusion, if we ask about the implication of the concepts contained in the Investigations, if we take the fact of the content and study its force, thereby discovering what the sketches suggest ontologically and what sort of experience they stimulate in the reader, we are studying the Investigations as a speech-act. The results of the text as a speech-act, if the writer were cognizant of those results and intended those results (and it would seem that he did),46 must surely be the aim or the goal of that act, its raison d'être. As these results are, ultimately, a transformation of our very person, their production is aptly called a

45As Drury concludes: "Philosophical clarity...arises when we see that behind every scientific construction there lies the inexplicable." (Drury, op. cit., p. xii).

46Wittgenstein wanted to "help people past the danger points" (CW, p. 18) set by our language. "All we want to do is straighten you up on the track if your coach is crooked on the rails. Driving it afterwards is something we shall leave to you." (CW, p. 39). This was said after: "Writing in the right style is setting the carriage straight on its rails." (CW, p. 39). And this came at the end of a series of remarks on courage and truth! (CW, p. 39). Wittgenstein's concern with authenticity in one's own person -- in conjunction with clarity of thinking and a constant reminder that ultimately things are just as they are, in need of explanation -- is scattered throughout his reflections as found in Culture and Value.
"therapy." When we have undergone this therapy we see things differently. We see the world a little more 'aright'. If this altered world view and an experiential participation in the mystery of 'what is', an at-one-ment, are both the goal and the accomplishment of the *Investigations*, then its similarity to the *Tractatus* is astounding. The 'core' of the texts is identical. They are both aids to a new vision. The *Tractatus*, as we have seen, enables us to see the transcendent; the *Investigations*, as we shall see, enables us to see the immanent. Both are handbooks for living in depth.

In every review the critic must describe enough of the object so that his communication about it is understandable to the reader. For this reason we will again encounter the three major themes of meaning, language, and the world, which are still the media for Wittgenstein's message. It is through these themes that the unitary ontology is presented in his many sketches. This time we will examine these themes in relation to the philosophical problem as Wittgenstein understands it, for in the *Investigations* an understanding of these themes is a major part of the solution of such a problem. Before doing so, however, we will examine in greater detail the general aim or direction of the *Investigations.*
If the *Investigations* is to be taken as a treatise of ontological and mystical dimensions, as the peculiar nature of the text and the external circumstances would seem to suggest, we might well inquire as to whether there is any indication of such dimensions in the stated intentions of the author. What does Wittgenstein himself suggest as the aim or purpose of his work? Nowhere in the *Investigations* does he suggest that he is attempting to present an ontology. Not only does he not tell us he is or is not doing this, but the text itself is not a discussion of being or reality or substance or change or manifestation -- or any of the standard ontological themes. However, there are suggestions of intention within the text and it is an examination of these, particularly as a speech-act, which casts further doubt upon the 'classical' interpretation of the work as purely or even primarily an anti-metaphysical, linguistic analysis. Primarily, these suggestions are to be found in terms of the 'fly-bottle', 'reminders', and 'seeing-as'.

**The Fly-Bottle**

Wittgenstein presents his antagonist as being somewhat exasperated with the proceedings. There are times when every 'normal' or 'natural' or 'expected' response to the matters of language, meaning, understanding, knowledge, belief, private sensation, etc., have all been stifled by Wittgenstein, when every turn has been blocked, and when from time to time he has then said, as it were, "But it's all all right; you're right even when you're wrong." Examples of such instances are:

...it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them (308).

In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object (58).

The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one couldn't do. ...And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture (do it), but then investigate how the application of the picture goes (374).
It is not a something, but not a nothing either! (304).

It is no wonder that Wittgenstein is asked outright what he is trying to do: "What is your aim in philosophy?" Answer: "To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (309).

Illusion

Now what is that supposed to mean? It is apropos of nothing in the immediate discussion. One is almost tempted to dismiss the remark as flippant. Yet, experience in the study of Wittgenstein reveals that in such infuriating transactions there is always a message of substance. Presumably we, the readers, are the flies. And we are being set free. We may not even have known we were entrapped — such is the power of the illusion under which we live — but Wittgenstein knows it and has come to save us.

If we inquire as to the nature of our entrapment, it is basically that of illusion. Things are not what they seem. We will discuss "illusion" in greater detail in considering the process of Wittgenstein's philosophy. For now, let it suffice to say that the forms of our language produce concepts of our activities and of reality (of which 'language' and 'meaning' are paradigms within the Investigations) which, when contrasted with descriptions of the phenomena and compared with related grammatical forms, are seen to be erroneous. Our language leads us to believe one thing. Our investigations reveal another. That is, in Wittgenstein's perceptions of our condition, the nature of the fly-bottle in which we are entrapped is that of illusion created by our language. We are encased on all sides by grave misapprehensions and we are continually buzzing about within them.

With such an assessment of our condition it is no wonder that the aim of the work was not stated initially and even by its end was not clearly admitted. Life can go on indefinitely even inside a fly-bottle and being told we are under illusion does not persuade us of it. Only once we are free can we see we were entrapped. We are reminded here of Plato's cave wherein there were no desires concerning the external world, no questions, no need of 'salvation'. This is part of the nature of illusion. It is not a matter of limits or boundaries but of consistent, thoroughgoing misapprehension. So, the task is to set us free, not announce our entrapment, for under our illusion the entrapment cannot be ascertained. Hence, Wittgenstein simply sets about his task. It is little wonder we didn't know what he was trying to do.
This indication of his aim fits perfectly with his conception of philosophy as a therapy and serves to explain that almost disrespectful paternalism throughout the *Investigations*, in which we are never legitimated in our natural linguistic responses and are made to feel not only frustrated but humiliated and foolish by the time he is finished correcting our mistakes. At the same time it sheds light upon that indefatigability in 'doing philosophy' which so characterized Wittgenstein. His aim is a 'moral' one: his objective is our freedom. Also, this, together with changing the way we look at things -- another of his stated aims which we will consider shortly -- accounts for the peculiar presentation of the *Investigations* as a piece of theater. What he gives us is not a presentation of his own conclusions. As we have suggested, it is not a straightforward account of what he thinks on various matters, rather it is an orchestrated dialogue, a work of art, designed to have an effect upon us. It lacks a pre-determined form but has both direction and force. It assumes whatever form the dialogue of the moment requires in order to accomplish its effect. In it there is no synthesis or attempted resolution of opposing forces but the position of the antagonist is always dissolved, literally -- obliterated -- as a defensible position. In other words, the effect upon us is one of total dissolution. In this therapy the 'old' man must be destroyed that the 'new' one might arise. Not only are we totally disenchanted or disillusioned; our conceptual solidity is simply shattered. We eventually feel unable to stand. We are made to see our mistakes, and are even permitted to continue articulating those statements responsible for the genesis of our illusion -- for such is the form and functioning of our language -- but we can do so after Wittgenstein's therapy only with full awareness that the tool of language has specific limitations and, when misused, badly distorts our conceptions. Thus, the *Investigations* is very other-directed in its presentation. The work itself is a very specific tool and its presentation is very specifically directed. Its directedness is one of action.

Wittgenstein knew full well that he had this effect. "...I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself: 'I destroy, I destroy, I destroy.'" (C&V, p. 21).
Metaphysical Entities

If allusion is our entrapment and if Wittgenstein saw it as worth his life's effort to set us free, it behooves us to achieve a deeper understanding of the importance of this illusion in itself, as distinct from its genesis in the form of our language. Why is our freedom such an imperative? Apparently mankind has been living under such illusions ab initio. If we look at the sort of illusions which Wittgenstein unveils, the imperative becomes understandable. The most commonly attacked form of illusion in the Investigations is that in which we think, speak, or act as if, something objectively exists, either as some entity or as some process, when it is really only a "turn of speech" (295). Hence, metaphysical entities form one major category of our entrapment. The creation of such entities occurs when we speak of objectivity and reality of mathematical facts (254) or the indestructibility or existence of 'red' (57-58) or the length of a rod (251) or an atmosphere that accompanies a word (117). Mental processes form another common metaphysical illusion which arises when we have the impression of 'meanings' going through one's head in addition to words (329, p. 176) or think of meaning as a picture in one's head (p. 54) or speak of understanding as a process (152-154) or of thinking as an "incorporeal process" (339), etc. That a mental process may also constitute a metaphysical entity as a sort of illusory amalgam is also a possibility as in the case of memory or thought or imagination or willing which are frequently considered to be mental processes at some times and entities at others (e.g., 277 et al.). Our concept of these is commonly some sort of conflation of process and entity. We are convinced that they are but just don't know what they are. "Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them..." (308). While there are of course legitimate and actual mental processes and states (305, 308), Wittgenstein is attacking those which, together with more obvious metaphysical entities, are fictitious and constitute what he calls "grammatical fiction" (307).

Wittgenstein often cites our tendency to think we will know more in the future, particularly regarding science. He calls this "a curious attitude." (C&V, p. 40).

This is not to assert that Wittgenstein was an anti-metaphysician. Our words do force particular pictures and concepts on our minds, and we can become bewitched. This is part of the difficulty in doing metaphysics. "But Wittgenstein has no doubt put his finger on a certain difficulty here -- one peculiar, however, not so much to the metaphysician but to the student of metaphysics. For the problems which confront
This is a serious matter. For Wittgenstein, belief in such fictions is not harmless like belief in fairy tales or Santa Claus. These fictions are exceedingly pernicious. These false entities constitute, as it were, the glass of the fly-bottle. They are that-which-separates-or-alienates-us from what is. In fact, they keep us from actual contact with reality. They mediate our involvement and encounters with all things. As conceptual filters, posited screens, they interface between us and the world as it is. For so long as we are under the illusion of such fictions, the function of such illusions is to prevent our seeing 'the truth'. For example, if I believe that "being influenced" or "guided" is some "particular inner experience," if I think it involves some "ethereal, intangible influence," then I am trying, as it were, to find the real constituents of the matter as opposed to noticing the "mere simultaneity of phenomena" and the importance thereof (174-176). Similarly, if I believe that the mental process

Wittgenstein's grounding in the transcendental, that is, in an ontology or the "will to metaphysics" as Engel calls it, is what provides an important difference between Wittgenstein and many who have felt they are practicing his analysis. Engel offers a concise explanation of this which bears repeating. Being reminded of Hume in what Wittgenstein was doing, they wanted to maintain the "division of labor" entailed in proving that something exists, say God, as opposed to proving the validity or invalidity of the argument put forth to prove that something exists. This, however, was "the main source of difference between Wittgenstein's practice of analysis and theirs." It misled them into dealing with "linguistic points which no longer had any bearing on philosophy" and an "almost exclusive reliance upon formal logical techniques." Unlike Wittgenstein, they "could no longer say just why such analogies, equivocations, etc. should so inevitably mislead. That they did was for Wittgenstein guaranteed by the transcendentalism of the dialectic. They, however, no longer had anything of the kind to fall back on." For Wittgenstein, after all, metaphysics was an "important kind of nonsense." (Engel, op. cit., pp. 97, 99-100.)

Drury mentions that Wittgenstein regarded "the great metaphysical writings of the past as among the noblest production of the human mind." (Fann, op. cit., p. 70.)
of understanding involves something hidden behind its normal "occurrences" and visible "accompaniments" to the act of understanding, then I miss the force of the activity itself and of the "particular circumstances" in which understanding occurs and which are the behaviour of understanding (152-154). If I believe that "to have an opinion is a state" of my mind or my soul instead of a situation in which I simply think such and such of some given object 'x' -- "of Mr. N.N. for example," then again in the positing of some intermediary thing called a "state" I have missed the power of the force of the situation in which my opinion (or my belief, or my hope, or my expectation) -- "is imbedded" (572-581). I have been separated from what is, from the surroundings which give these "states" of mind their importance, and hence I have failed to comprehend such hope or belief or expectation or opinion as "a phenomenon of human life. (A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face.)" (583). I do not know either these "states" or the life that is in them and in which they exist. If through my metaphysical statements I think or imagine that there are such things as infinity, or some possible, "unlimited application of a rule" (218), or something that is the continuance of a series, whatever these things might be, then "my symbolical expression was really a mythological description..." (221). I might think of these things as Platonic forms or perhaps as the potentiality of substance, depending upon what philosophical dialect I choose to employ. In any case, to posit such entities is to create a set of phantoms. In such instances I have failed to understand the very human activity and behaviour involved in dealing with rules and series.

Similarly, if I think the word "red" refers to red-ness (57-58), or that 'something indestructible' somehow exists--else how can the word be used to refer to a state of affairs in which everything destructible has been destroyed (55) -- then I am missing both the reality and qualities of objects in the world. I do not recognize their sheer raw materiality in this or that state, and I am missing an understanding of what my language does. I do not comprehend what I do when I use my language in such situations. If I people the universe with such entities or forms, then I fail to see reality as it is, here and now before me. I attempt to separate things from themselves and myself from things when I think always "that [I] read off what [I] say from the facts..." (292). It is not the case that facts must be either pictures in my head or objects of some sort in the world.
We could proliferate such examples indefinitely. 'Thought' might be taken to be some "queer thing" whereas the agreement between thought and reality is expressed in a simple picture of human interaction with the world (427-429). 'Pointing to' might be taken to be "spiritual activity," missing the matter that it is simply what goes on in a given "game" in life (36-37). 'Pain' might be taken to be the name of some object or thing, whereas we do better to think of pain and talk of pain as simply part of one complex behavioural pattern (244, et al.). 'Intention' taken as something already present in one's mind fails to see that an intention is an activity or state of affairs "embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions" (337). 4

'Meaning'

All of these numerous examples in the Investigations are only the supporting cast, the similar and different instantiations, for the paramount illusion. If I think there is such a thing as meaning, I have a basic misconception of language. I might take meaning to be a mental process, a picture in my head, or a brain-process that goes by in a flash, or a thought, etc. I might think of it as a metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical entity such as an atmosphere surrounding a word or a psychical thing (454) or a something of which I have a "feeling," etc. If I do so I am adhering to a subject-object pattern of reality and a word-object idea of language which Wittgenstein wanted to refute. Such refutation was the point of opening his work with the quotation of Augustine which Wittgenstein presented as a statement of this fundamental error (1-3). If I make the mistake of thinking of meaning as something which attaches to

4In most of these instances I have cited both a positive as well as a negative aspect to be seen. This might seem contrary to many expositions of Wittgenstein which focus on how very little is actually accomplished. We are always told what things are not; never what they are. It is true that Wittgenstein stops after exposing the illusion, the way things are not, but to say how little this does would seem to miss the point. Here again, as in the Tractatus, we seem to be confronted with a Wittgensteinian version of the via negativa. By showing us what something is not we ourselves are brought to see what it is. The affirmative remains unspoken. The silence is even more thoroughgoing in the Investigations than in the Tractatus, but the whole point of the negative is to expose the positive. I have simply articulated brief statements of what the positive would seem to be, given all that we can see that it is not. This is perhaps one of the things Wittgenstein expected of us when he said, "Anything your reader can do for himself leave to him" (C&V, p. 77). This version of the via negativa is yet another reminder that the Investigations is indeed more description or display than argument.
language, on the one hand, I seem to impoverish that language and hobble it, allowing it only to describe. In making this mistake I misconceive the function of language. I fail to see it as a life-activity. On the other hand, I seem to inflate and unleash language out of all control, allowing it to create phantoms that eventually swallow me. Through the infinite generation of such things as given in the examples above, I misuse language to separate and alienate me from the world, from what is.

By positing meaning as an intermediary between our language and the world, or between ourselves-languaging5 and the world, we fail to understand both the wondrous complexity and reality of our language and the full force of facts, the circumstances, the surroundings, in which it operates. If I believe that meaning is somehow already present in words or is present as a psychical thing or a "hocus-pocus which can be performed only by the soul" (454), I have missed the simple interaction, the simple connection with things, the mere "going up to someone" (457) which occurs when we use language. In all such cases we seemed to catch reality in our net (428) when in fact, in some analogous fashion or other, we created a spirit entity. Our language made it look as though a body were present but none could be found (36).

Our illusions have well and truly created a fly-bottle but these fictions that entrap us are pernicious precisely because they entrap us, they separate us, they alienate us from what is. In seeking to free us from such alienation, Wittgenstein is seeking to put us back into harmony, into direct interaction with, communion with -- reality. Outside the fly-bottle we need not objectify all that our language treats in object form. Wittgenstein repeatedly says there is nothing hidden (435, et al.). Yet, we ourselves have been continuously hiding and covering up what is under veil after veil of mental imagery and metaphysical trappings, thereby perpetually 'solidifying' the fly-bottle. 6 Outside we can 'see' and 'touch'

5I will occasionally use the noun "language" as a verb to indicate and bring attention to the notion of language as a life-activity. It is not merely a construct, or even a tool, though it is also both of these, but is an intrinsic part of man and his life. Thus language is to be likened to other activities such as running, loving, praying. It is richer and more complex than talking and has more uses than saying, communicating, even dialoging. The import of this usage should become clear as we proceed.

6 "What is eternal and important is often hidden from a man by an impenetrable veil. He knows: there's something under there, but he cannot see it. The veil reflects the daylight." (C&W, p. 80).
and 'cope with' -- 'the real thing', which, without explanations in terms of mental processes and metaphysical entities, without deeper hidden layers posited upon it, emerges as quite startling. Everyday words and actions, circumstances, objects, activities, are revealed as strikingly significant. Where has all the 'everydayness' gone? If we can be stripped of illusions we begin to marvel not at the unpredictable and the unexpected but at the totally predictable and the fully expected.

Thus to fathom the importance of Wittgenstein's contention that his aim is to "shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (309) is to understand not only the denial of pseudo-mental processes and states, and the non-existence or at least unverifiability of metaphysical entities -- both of which for Wittgenstein are seen to be illusions created by the forms of our language -- but also the harm that is done by means of the alienation which such illusions produce and the untruth in which we are confirmed by them. In other words, to free us from the fly-bottle is to reveal reality to us or at least so to change our stance toward what is that it can reveal itself to us. We are made to see -- it.

Reminders

There are other admissions of intent which Wittgenstein makes for the Investigations and these would seem to substantiate the insights suggested by his fly-bottle remark. He tells us, for instance, that "The work of a philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (127). To fathom this 'purpose' we must ask what it is of which we are reminded. To be reminded of something is to be made to remember it. It is to make us think of something or call it to mind again. Wittgenstein has presented the Investigations as a collection of dialogues or exchanges, the effect of which, not necessarily the content of which, but the effect of which, is to call our attention to (140) things which we already know and about which we already agree (127-128). In other words, we are made to recall, not hidden or mysterious things, but those things which, given different stimuli or under different circumstances, would be perfectly obvious to us. They do not come to mind in a given instance, because the forms of our language force some other particular image or idea upon us which screens the obvious from thought. For Wittgenstein, that which is thus missed is frequently the most useful and the most truthful.

\footnote{In Wittgenstein's view, not to wonder at everyday occurrences shows that "the people of today are really the primitive ones." (C&V, p. 5).}
An instance of such a reminder of what is obvious but of which we may not think is related in entries 139 and 140 in which we see that the word "cube" calls to mind "say the drawing of a cube," but there are numerous applications of that word which Wittgenstein displays, thereby forcing us to admit or recall "the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'" (140). Thus we see that what first came to mind was only a psychological impulse and occurred to us because nothing else happened to do so. There is a different 'meaning' of the word depending upon its application (140). Wittgenstein reminds us of the obvious, the everyday, the various uses of our language, the different circumstances in which it is very sensible and absolutely normal to operate differently or to understand something different by a given expression. We are reminded of settings, scenes, life situations, our natural insertion into them, and our normal reactions therein. We are reminded of what is as and as a result of this see the way in which what is is that which determines, or perhaps more precisely constitutes, the meaning of our expressions. The meaning is in no way separate: it cannot be extracted or stored or maintained or used apart from the ongoing activities of life. We are not reminded of what is in terms of act and potency or subsistence and change, etc., i.e., of an underlying metaphysical framework, nor are we reminded of what is as 'the general form of a proposition' but of reality as meant in, "He explained his position to me, said that this was how things were, and that therefore he needed an advance'" (134). When we see such a 'scene' as the unit of meaning and its importance, we see the force of the simple and the familiar -- objects, persons, words, all related, situated. By reminding us of the various uses of our words and by preventing our positing of intermediary mental and/or metaphysical entities to explain those uses in terms of something outside the everyday, something "meta" -- we confront what is. We are brought to see (it is revealed to us), not something essentially hidden in and of itself, but the force of what is, those aspects of things which are "hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity" (129). When everything is open to view, there is nothing to be explained (126). The very foundations of an enquiry, life and the world around us as well as the illusions of our language, can finally be

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8We are not, for instance, "to treat meaning as a halo that the word carries round with it and retains in any sort of application." (C&V, p. 44).
Wittgenstein also gives an example of another type of thing about which we need to be reminded. Augustine asks in the Confessions what time is, and proceeds to answer that it is the sort of thing we know about when not asked but do not know about when called to give an account of it. This type of thing, says Wittgenstein, "is something that we need to remind ourselves of. (And it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself.)" (89). It seems in this case that what we need to remind ourselves of is not what time is, were that possible, but this condition of knowing and not knowing, or thinking we know and not being able to say. Thus we are told these philosophical Investigations are "directed not towards phenomena, but...towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena" (90). And Augustine is commended for calling to mind statements made about the duration of events. This is a reminder of our state of knowledge, of what we don't know because our language makes it look as though we do. It is a reminder that our statements appear to explain and make us feel as though we "penetrate phenomena" (90), whereas we leave the phenomena just as they are and use our language in relation to them. Thus:

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language (90).

Effect of Reminders

Thus, to sum up, this type of reminder is of our state of knowledge and the actual investigating is that of the use of our words. We are confronted with a threefold understanding: that of the force and power of our language itself, whereby we understand, misunderstand, and interact in specific ways; that of the process whereby we have misunderstood phenomena and alienated ourselves, usually by positing mental processes and metaphysical entities which are actually illusions created by the forms of our language; and, finally, this having been done, that of a direct exposure to the reality at hand, to what is, without illusory and explanatory intermediaries. In this specific instance, the reminder of our state of knowledge through the investigation of the use of our words has forced 'time' to stand alone in its naked state. It leaves it just as it is, in itself. And our awareness of it is just that, awareness. I will later discuss the non-conceptual or noetic character of such knowledge, but for now let us notice that our interaction with 'time' might still be through
the use of words, but those words are just that, the means of interaction. If 'time' cannot be penetrated by our language and/or our linguistic understanding, what this reminder does is to help us leave it alone. It prevents our attempting to do what is either impossible as such, or what is impossible with this particular tool of language. Time itself gets into the act. Our words may filter and shape some reality but not in such a way that we are cut off from that reality. Its integrity is maintained within an interactional unit.

Therefore, judging from the effects of that of which we are reminded, I suggest that the purpose of reminders is to make us see what is. Let us again recall the text as a whole, bearing in mind that it is not a well-ordered and sustained argument or even an exhaustive description or discussion of a given topic. It is an album, a series of specific cases which relate and turn back upon themselves, but each of which is also complete in itself. Thus, it becomes apparent that the entire book is a collection of reminders. All of the items treated are examples or instances of things we have covered or forgotten, and thus need to be reminded of, things we have perceived wrongly because of the illusions created by our language and thus need to encounter afresh. Argument as such could not perform such a function. The fruit of the small arguments found in the Investigations is to call our attention to a number of processes (140). What is seen provides the vision of what is. As a speech-act, the whole set of reminders alters one's way of thinking. This enables one to see things in a new way.

Other Suggestions of Purpose

There are a few other statements of intent to be found in the Investigations. In entry 132 Wittgenstein says, "We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language; an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order." And in the next entry we find:

It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear (133).

As concerns our language, the two things which Wittgenstein constantly impresses upon us are the multiplicity of the uses of our language and its
power to deceive us. This deception is to be avoided through an analysis of the differences and similarities of the uses of our language. If an order in our knowledge of the use of our language is achieved, then our philosophical problems will disappear, for, as we shall see, our problems are caused by an incorrect usage of our language and consist of the resulting illusion. If our problem no longer exists, then presumably we will have complete clarity. This notion of an absence of problem will be discussed later. Clarity for Wittgenstein is tantamount to an absence of problem. This applies to both life problems and intellectual problems. It is not so much that there is some positive knowledge or understanding which constitutes clarity, but the realisation that the problem was actually a linguistic confusion. Clarity means to be free of such confusion. With complete clarity we will ultimately be out of our fly-bottle. We will be understanding and perceiving things aright.

9 The way to solve the problems you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear. The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into life's mould. So you must change the way you live and, once your life does fit into the mould, what is problematic will disappear. (1937). (C&V, p. 27).

In the first part of his article, "The Notion of Erklärung," Takashi Fujimoto notes the family resemblance of the German words Klärung, Erklärung, Klarlegung, Klärwerden, Klarmachen, Erklärung. He then proceeds to study Erklärung (clarification). The German notion is said to subsume such concepts as definition and explanation and yet retains a sense of 'making clear'. Hence, in Wittgenstein's studies, "to clarify something is to understand the thing in question. To understand the thing in question is to understand the 'meaning' for us of the thing in question. And to understand the meaning of the thing in question is to understand the meaning of the sign, especially the symbol, the typical species of which is the language of the situation in which the thing in question is involved. Thus, in either the Tractatus or the Investigations, the theory of meaning, or the general treatise on the relation between the language and the world at large, becomes the central issue, though the author is not merely concerned with such things as the correspondence between the language and the facts of nature." (ed. Ambrose and Laserowitz, op. cit., pp. 226-227.) "Clarification or understanding is a personal event." (ibid., p. 232).

The issues which Fujimoto contends were the major ones under study by Wittgenstein might be disputed, but this clarification of the notion of Erklärung, particularly in its personal aspect, does seem helpful. It gives definitional and etymological weight to the interconnection of philosophical problems and life problems and the mutual solution in kind.
Finally, having just discussed how it is that we think we can look for something which we do not know to be 'there' or may not even exist, as when we look for the trisection of an angle (462, 463), we are told: "My aim is to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense: (464). Our illusions are the disguised nonsense. If we come to understand the genesis and maintenance of these illusions, they then become patent nonsense. Because we come to understand the workings of our language more thoroughly, we come to understand our world quite differently. We can come to understand why we looked for the trisection of an angle (our mistakes and prejudices were not stupid ones (340)), but we will not go on doing so. With the better understanding of our world, our behaviour changes. We interact more harmoniously, more in truth, and hence can understand how it is that Wittgenstein says:

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery (119).

If we translate these metaphors, we see again that the task of the Investigations is to make us understand the means whereby we misunderstand phenomena and suffer illusion, for this is what philosophy is. Our mistakes about the world and what is are the plain nonsense and the bumps. The value of such revelation or discovery is that we cease to be hurt so often. We see correctly and make fewer mistakes. The result of this task, the goal, is the clear vision of what is.

Revelation

Thus far, from our discussion of these remarks on the aim of the Investigations, a basic trend seems to have emerged. We are continually discovering something in participating in the Investigations. To state this differently: The Investigations is a technique of revelation. Wittgenstein uncovers the fact that "nothing is hidden." Through reminders, something is being uncovered. What is uncovered is the mistakes we have been making. Those mistakes were what constituted the fly-bottle. When the fly-bottle is demolished we are free. When we are free from the fly-bottle we are in a new relation to all things. We can encounter them directly; we can see them in a new way. So, the revelation is both that of our mistakes, and as a result of that, that of what is. Through investigating our language, Wittgenstein is, we should like to say, also
saying something about the world. However, to say that he is "saying something about the world" is both misleading and erroneous, for the kinds of things we come to understand about the world are not the kinds of things that can be said. Were we to attempt to articulate this understanding we would be forced to use forms of our language which would only perpetuate the illusions from which we have been freed through these investigations. So it is perhaps better to say that through investigating our language, Wittgenstein is, on the one hand, restoring our sight by freeing us from illusion, and, on the other hand, by so doing, allowing the world to be seen. This analogy of sight is an important one in the Investigations and will be explored shortly. In the meantime, let us continue to examine this notion of revelation as an understanding of the aim of the Investigations.

Another mode in which 'revelation' can be seen as the purpose of this text is that of 'epistemology'. Through these sketches by Wittgenstein we come to understand the process of our knowing, particularly that knowing which involves the formation and use of concepts, for knowledge and language are still separable in the Investigations just as they were in the Tractatus. We study the 'meaning' of words and expressions through the examination of language learning. Yet, linguistic knowledge in the Investigations is only one aspect or form of knowing, and concepts are the tools of understanding and activity which are acquired through language. Every 'reminder' is in fact a study of the nature and grounds of some particular concept. Because we come to understand the process of concept-formation and use, we are able to evaluate the knowledge content to which we subscribe in the use of these concepts. In other words, we are able to ask and determine, through the examination of the use of our language, whether in the use of some concept we are involved with an actual object or event in the outside world, or with some mental process or non-existent metaphysical entity. We can determine whether we are engaged in some form of natural, human, linguistic expression such as occurs in the case of pain wherein our pain-talk is

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10Interestingly, in 1949 we find Wittgenstein writing, "There really are cases where someone has the sense of what he wants to say much more clearly in his mind than he can express in words. (This happens to me very often.) ...As a matter of fact, for the writer (myself) it is often as though the image stays there behind the words, so that they seem to describe it to me." (C&V, p. 79).
simply part of natural pain behaviour (444), or some form of institutional, human, linguistic expression such as ritual greeting. This is not to say that any linguistic expression is not both natural and institutional, but is only to say that our language does indeed have many uses and that when we examine them the 'content' of our knowledge begins to appear to be quite different from what we might originally have thought. An example of this might be the shift in our understanding that occurs when we come to see a wish as a spontaneous expression which we are disposed by nature and training to give in certain circumstances and not as an independent mental process whereby we desire some particular object or event (444).

Thus, the aim of the Investigations might be said to be an epistemological one in that it is an expose both of the nature and ground of what we say we know, and of the change that occurs in the content of our knowledge once we have seen that nature and ground. I should like to suggest that there is a third major 'epistemological' goal in the Investigations which is to awaken or possibly reawaken in us the experience of unmediated perception, that is, an appreciation of and encounter with what is which is precisely not filtered through our linguistic concepts. Such perception is not screened through the forms of our language. It cannot be so, for the limits of that language are such as to distort perpetually the reality itself. We shall consider this when further examining the results of Wittgenstein's philosophical process. For now let us consider the emergence of one final 'aim' of the Investigations which as it were -- supports or substantiates -- the understanding of the Investigations as a revelational and/or epistemological enterprise in which what is discovered is of ontological and mystical dimensions.

A Weltanschauung

Wittgenstein has said he wants to give us reminders for a particular purpose; he wants to show us the way out of the fly-bottle; he wants to expose grammatical fictions; he wants to make us aware of the nonsense we are performing... Ultimately he wants to alter our world-view. He wants to change our way of looking at things. To find the indications of this let us turn to the analogy of "sight" and then consider the force of "seeing as." Wittgenstein often tells us to look. Don't always analyze a thing, for under both analyzed and unanalyzed form you miss something (63).
Don’t always ask ‘why’; suppress that question and then perhaps you will fine the answer (471). But look. See what is going on in all the details from “close to” (51). "Look and see," Wittgenstein shouts; "...don’t think, but look!" (66). Sometimes we are told to look at games, ball games, board games, etc. We are told to look at behaviour -- at reading. We are to look at pain, not one’s present headache, but pain behaviour. We are to look at continuing a series. We are to look at and examine everything which we are inclined to believe, even a pile of grey rags if we suppose a mouse might have come into being from them (52). But time and time again what Wittgenstein will force us to examine is the use of our words. "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that" (340). So, we are hit again with what we are to do. From our perspective, we are still asking why; not why something is or isn’t or why something is this way or that, but why do this looking. What is the purpose of it, the aim behind it?

There are instances within the text in which Wittgenstein’s technique of relentless close examination has the effect of gagging the opponent. As every scholar in the tradition of linguistic examination has all too often found, in the face of a skilled opponent he is reduced to frustrated sputtering. Every offering on his part is crushed and in the end he is completely unable to make a further move. He may not feel his objections have been fairly met or his contributions fairly rejected, but at last there is simply no further response available to him. Perhaps he has reached that point in doing this sort of philosophy when he “would like just to emit an inarticulate sound” (261). Sometimes such a one is simply muddled and confused by the time he is silenced. Perhaps he was right that his objectives and contributions were not clearly or definitively handled, but they were halted. He was disabled enough not to continue. All of this confusion and disability, from Wittgenstein’s point of view, may be precisely the desired result, part of the goal. (This silencing is not to be confused with the ultimate sort of silence in which a knowing appreciation occurs. This, however, is, as it were, a therapeutic step toward it.) In one way or another he must be silenced. It takes time to be at ease within the limits of language wherein we are free. It is part of the task of therapy gradually

11 "People who are constantly asking ‘why’ are like tourists who stand in front of a building reading Baedeker and are so busy reading the history of its construction, etc., that they are prevented from seeing the building." (C&W, p. 40).
to overcome the feeling that somehow one has been tricked, conned, duped, but cannot get to the bottom of it.\textsuperscript{12} It is difficult to rest content in the muddy waters wherein everything that you say is true and not true, and what seemed to be so certain could be at least a dozen other ways -- and all of them certain as well.\textsuperscript{13}

If one is somehow able to come to grips with all of this, then one has come to see that "we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. -- Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity" (122). To see that is to see everything about which one has ever 'languaged' in a new light -- all objects, all experience, all theory, all 'fact', oneself, others -- everything. The very subject-object or word-referent mode according to which these things were all conceptualized and perceived is now called into question. This subject-object or word-referent mode is the presumed stance of Wittgenstein's antagonist and indeed of the vast majority of persons in the 'normal' world. This mode must now be confined in legitimate usage to a particular language game or games in which such subject-object or word-referent activity is accurately applicable. It must serve some particular useful purpose, even though it might possibly be misleading. Our clarity is not in terms of tight argument or the intellectual satisfaction of generalization. There is no general pattern. To see that is to understand that "The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things" (122). And then, says Wittgenstein in parenthesis: "(Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?"") (122). Is this a question? Is this an admission? Is this an understatement? Whatever the grammatical form of the statement, it seems to be, gently put, the case.

\textsuperscript{12}Wittgenstein understands the feeling of frustration. It proceeds from a deep and legitimate urge of sorts. In noting that it is the grammar of the verb "to be" that "seduces" us into the same puzzling questions as the ancient Greeks which "no explanation seems capable of clearing up," he concludes: "And what's more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because is so far as people think they see the 'limits of understanding,' they believe of course that they can see beyond these." (C\&V, p. 15). This was written in 1931. As we shall see, in the Investigations there was no need to look beyond. The ordinary already contains the 'basis' for wonder.

\textsuperscript{13}..."When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there" (C\&V, p. 65).
In those instances wherein the close examination has a triumphant and constructive effect, as opposed to mere termination due to the sheer bewilderment of the fellow discussant, Wittgenstein gives a summation of what has occurred. After a discussion of the possibility of getting someone to understand the continuation of a series, we find the following statement:

—I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things (144).

We then find another one of those pregnant parentheses: "(Indian mathematicians: 'look at this.')" (144). Presumably we might as well have found "Indian historians: 'Look at this'" or "Indian theologians: 'Look at this'", for in any of these cases the basic conceptual framework on which an entire discipline is built is drastically different (and hence the discipline itself is different) from that which is common to Westerners. That is, the way a given thing is perceived is essentially different. It fits with everything else in an essentially different manner. The perspective is different. The world-view is different. What has transpired in the discussion is an alteration in that perspective or world-view, as well as a correlational change in operating with a given set of objects, images, persons, etc. The way they are grouped may alter (Is a glue pot one of the tools in a toolbox? (14)); what they are used for may alter (A shoe is foot apparel but it might be a hammer); what we see as essential may alter (Is a lamp primarily an instrument of light or an ornament for the room? (62)).

These might indeed be superficial examples, but when the alteration is basic enough, when it concerns 'bedrock' material, then such a shift is indeed the precipitation of a conceptual earthquake. It is a change in a Weltanschauung. Wittgenstein is somewhat tentative about the use of "Weltanschauung." This tentativeness is, as it were, a way of 'domesticating' it. As we shall see later, and have already suggested, he could only hint at the 'fact' of a world-view. He could not tell us what it was. That is a discovery each reader must make for himself. It is a discovery of
It concerns the ground of our person and of being. The material of such bedrock nature in the Investigations is our understanding of what language is and how it works and our concept of meaning. It is these which are the subject of investigation in the Investigations. All the other studies are, as it were, case studies in support of these topics. They are analogies and instances of similarities and differences. As we have already begun to see from the consideration of the fly-bottle, there is indeed a shift in the way we view the world when we are released from separation. There is a shift in the perception and treatment of the world as an external and separate object to the perception and treatment of it as a participational element in the unit of meaning, a constitutive part of circumstance which renders sense to an expression being used. More generally and more deeply, there is a shift in overall apprehension and comprehension, in attitude and approach, and it is perhaps such immeasurable and intangible states and responses which are normally understood as "world-view."

Let us consider other entries which also mention this effect. In a long discussion on "imaginability," designed to show at one level that meaning does not depend upon imagination, we find an investigation of the 'visual room' as opposed to the material room in which one might sit and walk and talk.

Wittgenstein is stressing the impossibility of private ownership of the 'visual room' and explains it to be only a form of expression parallel to that of the material room. The result of the formation of such a concept even though it be an inappropriate one is in fact, again, a new way of looking at things.

The 'visual room' seemed like a discovery, but what its discoverer really found was a new way of speaking, a new comparison; it might even be called a new sensation (400).

You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you are observing. (Think for example of the question: "Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?"

14 Getting hold of the difficulty deep down is what is hard.

Because if it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the difficulty it was. It has to be pulled out by the roots; and that involves our beginning to think about things in a new way. ..The new way of thinking is what is hard to establish. (C&V, p. 48).
But there is an objection to my saying that you have made a 'grammatical' movement. What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song (401).

In these two entries we find the connection between concepts and our vision or understanding or view of things. This connection, one might say, is a perfectly obvious one. And so it is. What might not be obvious is the process whereby those conceptions which determine the view are formed and that, as we have said, is one of the fruits of Wittgenstein's work. We see the functioning of our language through his investigations and the possibility of frequent mis-conception, through which we presume the reality of non-existent metaphysical entities and misidentify mental processes. We see the 'grammatical movements', as they are called here. What may also not be obvious is the way in which Wittgenstein's entire account is an alteration in our concepts and therefore, inevitably, a change in our world-view. He is enabling us to make new comparisons, have new sensations, use new standards -- to look upon things differently -- through the destruction or alteration of our old filters.

Wittgenstein further expounds upon this world-viewing. We might readily admit that Idealists, Solipsists, and Realists have ways of viewing the world. Disputes arise when these pictures of the world do not fit ordinary language pictures of the world and these disputes take the form of attack on normal expressions (402). Each of these gives, as it were, a new account of things, and there is no practical advantage that any of them wishes to attain by advancing his view (403). Each simply has a different order of knowledge, a different world-view. Wittgenstein admits the same thing of his own considerations. "But what should I gain from this new account? Nothing" (403). (One might object that these remarks come during the discussion on pain and follow the refutation of the idea of a private language. Furthermore, the new account refers specifically to pain. Yet, here we must notice that there is perhaps nothing in the Investigations which more profoundly changes our basic assumptions and alters our world-view than do the ideas of the public nature of pain and language which we had taken for granted to be narcissistically egocentric and absolutely private.)

This idea of no practical advantage attaching to a particular world-view is an interesting one as regards world-views in general and in the
Investigations in particular. If a world-view is connected to concepts and concepts are connected to our language, then to be a human and not to have a world-view is impossible. The world-view is inescapable and always operable. While there can be differing world-views, to consider the problem of whether or not they must be commensurable would take us far afield from the aim of the Investigations, but presumably on Wittgenstein's account they must be. On that account we can have differing language communities and can imagine differing forms of life, but there is a common biological basis of that life form, as well as the same general facts of nature. Also, there is a common, actual materiality of objects which goes into the very constitution of language in terms of life-activity and circumstance, together with the common conventional and institutional aspects of our language. These conventional and institutional aspects might be somewhat more variable, but are, for the most part, constant. Presumably the more invariable, common, natural constituents would be enough to render differing world-views commensurable. Furthermore, if they were not at least minimally so, communication between the various adherents of differing world-views would be impossible and the attempt to alter one's world-view, to enable one to see things differently, could not commence. It is this which is being proposed as the very point of the Investigations. It is the direction, the intention, the impact for which there is no practical advantage.

So, the interesting question is, why should the alteration of a world-view be a goal? If there is nothing to be gained, why bother? Why spend so many tormented years in discussion and writing trying to change the view of others? The reason for calculating the thickness of boiler walls might be because there are fewer boiler explosions when we do so (469) and the reason for using one type of calculus as opposed to another might be because some versions are just too cumbersome and make some activities unfeasible (569), but nowhere does Wittgenstein state such a practical reason for specifically changing our viewpoint. Presumably, he does it outside of the Investigations, in letters and other writings, he does state his ultimate reason. For example,

I am by no means sure that I should prefer a continuation of my work by others to a change in the way people live which would make all these questions superfluous (C&W, p. 61).

Cont'd.
to show us the way out of the fly-bottle. It is one stage of our attaining freedom and putting an end to our alienation. Also, as for a sort of material cause for such activity within Wittgenstein himself, we can refer again to the initial pages of the *Investigations*. He launches the entire work from the premise that our word-referent concept of language as stated in Augustine, and generally held, is simply inadequate. Upon close observation -- looking at the details of actual language usage -- it simply does not describe what is happening and gives a misleading impression of the world, language, and ourselves. Also, as we shall see, it enables us to philosophize in such a way as to create innumerable problems. So, the initial impetus from Wittgenstein's perspective is the promotion of truth. His view, as opposed to what is commonly held, better expresses what is uncovered. Putting these ideas together, we find that Wittgenstein would have us 'see the truth'\(^{16}\) for the 'truth will set us free.' There may

\[\text{The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and the sickness of philosophical problems could get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life. (RFM, II-6).}\]

Wittgenstein’s deep concern about the "problem of life," its meaning, the need for authenticity, can also be seen in terms of truth and courage. These issues for him constitute a deep, ethical dimension. That it was a consuming, existential matter for him is evident throughout the remarks recorded in *Culture and Value*. These remarks (1914–1951) span his entire life of writing. He deeply wished for his own work to be authentic and totally honest, and related to these matters. The correction of our faulty thinking was not to remain on the intellectual level alone. He denounced cleverness for its own sake and wrote in 1947, "Wisdom is grey. Life on the other hand and religion are full of color." (CAV, p. 62).

That philosophical activity was designed to produce personal life change, moral change, can be seen from Wittgenstein's complaint to Malcolm when this change did not transpire. "What is the use of studying philosophy" Wittgenstein once said, 'if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc. and if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions on everyday life' " (Malcolm, op. cit., p. 39.).

\(^{16}\)Ultimately, this seeing, this shift in world-view will enable us to participate knowingly in the entire functional unit, the ongoing process of what is, and that means that, as in the *Tractatus*, truth is still something that is done. This can be seen from many of Wittgenstein's remarks on truth and courage. Truth is done insofar as it is a way of being. "No one can speak the truth; if he has still not mastered himself. He cannot speak it;--but not because he is not clever enough yet. The truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by someone who still lives in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth.
be no practical advantage in promoting one world-view over another, but there can be a greater fidelity to what is.

Seeing-As

A few observations on Wittgenstein's discussion on "seeing-as" might further elucidate the meaning of a world-view and the degree to which an altered world-view is an aim of the *Investigations*. This discussion is one of the lengthiest in the text and Wittgenstein states both the content and purpose of this discussing more clearly than he does of most. He repeatedly tells us that it is a conceptual study (pp. 193, 203 et al.). It is not a study of psychological, physical, or perceptual phenomena. He is not concerned with what might transpire in our psyche, our senses, or the electro-chemical brain processes, or why it does so in the phenomenon of seeing-as. It is not a study of the causes of his happening or the experience of it (p. 201). Rather, the importance of the concept of seeing-as and of seeing an aspect lies in its connection with our concept of "Experiencing the meaning of a word" (p. 214). Wittgenstein repeatedly denies that meaning is an experience or that it is any sort of process, either psychological or physiological. He discusses the phenomenon of seeing-as as an analogy of our concept of meaning, and shows that the prerequisites of any seeing-as case which involves the identification of an object (e.g., a duck, a rabbit, a concave or convex step, etc.) includes custom and upbringing (p. 201) and the mastery of technique (p. 208), particularly the technique of language. Through this complex and necessary set of connections we are able to conclude that the matter of meaning also requires the prerequisites of custom and upbringing and the mastery of technique, specifically the general technique of language.

In those cases of seeing-as which do not require the identification of an object but are more purely perceptual, such as seeing a white or black cross in the double-cross (here one does not already have to be familiar with ducks or rabbits), the point of the discussion parallels the...

on just one occasion." (C&V, p. 35). "What I do think essential is carrying out the work of clarification with COURAGE: otherwise it becomes just a clever game." (C&V, p. 19). "Courage, not cleverness; not even inspiration,—this is the grain of mustard that grows into a great tree. To the extent that there is courage there is a link with life and death." (C&V, pp. 38-39). From what you are comes what you do which is the truth—done.
point of the private language and sensation discussions. We are to assume that the external object changes, rather than to assume that there is some sort of private object or experience which we possess when perceiving either one cross or another (p. 207). Again, this is a denial of the existence of some sort of private object which our words might mean or which might in fact be the meaning of a word. It is a denial of the word-referent theory of meaning and of the subject-object view of the world. All of reality is one unit and, as we shall eventually see, that unit is itself -- meaning. 17 Meaning is not some picture or image within us, though it is often the case that to see something as something requires imagination (as in seeing a triangle as a fallen object) (pp. 201, 207). But there are limits to what is possible in this regard and always we are told to consider the occasion and the purpose of the verbal representations of our perceptions, for what we see, like what we say, always 'goes with' other ideas and observations as well as other expressions (cf. pp. 221-222). The technique of language is a network, and the mastery of it is the ability and facility to make appropriately the synaptic connections between instances of usage. It is the ease of recognizing family resemblances, making use of similarities in different and even unique instances. Finally, recalling that Wittgenstein has said he is studying concepts, and looking at the seeing-as discussion as such a study, we find that, as a whole, it is a presentation of that process whereby we become conceptually confused. We will consider this process of conceptual confusion again in exploring the methodology of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his concept of grammar, but for now let us look at a working preview of that study.

17 In speaking of music, Wittgenstein says, "If you just look at the sequences of notes and changes of key all these entities seem to be on the same level. But if you look at the context in which they exist (and hence at their meaning), you will be inclined to say..." (C&W, p. 47). We could well use this statement on music as a preview of the notion of meaning in language wherein "context" does not mean merely conceptual or circumstantial context but 'the whole' of what is.

18 The analysis of our mistakes and the linguistic character of these mistakes are considered here in order to understand more clearly the force of those mistakes. This force emerges when that analysis is applied, as when we examine our concept of seeing-as. Conversely, if we come to understand our mistakes, our concept of seeing-as shifts. If seeing-as is considered paradigmatically in relation to the rest of the text, we can also come to see how acquiring an understanding of our mistakes facilitates an alteration in our world-view.
Wittgenstein is concerned with the ways in which we form, use, overlap, interrelate, and misuse, even abuse, our concepts -- and with the resultant, often unperceived, confusion which this causes. His method of analysis of this complicated process is the detailed examination of our actual usages of expressions. By looking at what we say, from "close to," he finds there are a number of 'slides' which are common, a number of definitive 'moves' which are made, but seldom if ever perceived. Being unperceived, they are insidious, misleading, the ongoing perpetuation of mistake and alienation.

Similarity and Difference

Among the common 'slides' which this technique of examination uncovers is the frequent assumption that a word used in one set of circumstances has the same meaning when applied in another context. This may or may not be the case. Most frequently the actual daily enactment involves some theme or concept upon which our multiple usages are all variations. In other words, we make the conceptual mistake of taking usages which are in some ways similar or related and presume they are the same. We fail to notice that our "fine shades of behaviour" (pp. 203, 204, 207), that what counts as 'criteria' for the usefulness, truthfulness, or accuracy of a usage (253, p. 203 et al.), and that the circumstances, verbal and material, which provide 'justification' for a given usage (cf. pp. 199, 201, et al.), are often evidence that the concepts being employed are in fact not the same. They are related, but different. Such a conflation causes confusion. Wittgenstein's precision in noticing even the slightest deviations between usages makes it look almost as though every usage of a word or expression were no more than analogous to every other given usage of that same word or expression. This is not a thesis which Wittgenstein is proposing. He is against theses of all sorts. That is part of the force of being unable to assimilate the multiple uses of our language into some common purpose.

Nonetheless, if we were to try to articulate the underlying view which is in Wittgenstein's examples we might say that every usage is distinct in its meaning. It is as though an act of meaning were in fact unique, new, a 'happening'. Every usage appears to be a spontaneous meaning which is related to preceding usages of the word or expression only as a child is

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19 This fits with the fact that we must see how things are; a thesis typically tries to prove something by argument. Here again, we are reminded that Wittgenstein's work is significantly unlike argument.
related to parents. It is generated by them, similar to them, dependent
upon their antecedence -- but completely independent and separate in it-
self. Furthermore, it is related to all subsequent usages in the same way
as its precedents are related to it. Wittgenstein offers us a specific
example of this 'related uniqueness':

How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic)
"Now take these things together!" or "Now these go
together"? Clearly "taking together" and "going
together" must originally have had another meaning
for him than that of seeing in this way or that.--
And this is a remark about concepts, not about
teaching methods (p. 208).

This is not to say that there is not a set of definitions which applies to
words and gives usefulness to expressions, but that the circumstances of
each usage and the nuances thereof render it unique. In fact, in Witt-
genstein's view it is questionable whether the same expression in apparent-
ly the same circumstances uttered at different times can have the same
meaning even though it achieves the same thing (61). (When everyday
someone says "Tomorrow I shall come," is he saying something different
or the same? (226)). One might be tempted to say that there can be repeti-
tion of meaning, as opposed to repetition of words and expressions, only
in strict ritual with a controlled context and the same participants. But
one can never guarantee the experience of the participants to be the same,
and, if their experience changes, the situation or circumstances will have
changed. It is then possible that the meaning will be different and the
expression be given different interpretations. Thus, the unit as a whole
is dynamic. The world is neither facts nor things. It is an evolving mass,
a 'living' complex, a continuous process which is recognized in the life-
activity of language -- as meaning. We often lose sight of this great
diversity. "We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all of
the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes
everything alike" (p. 224), but we must bear in mind that: "Something
new (spontaneous, 'specific') is always a language-game" (p. 224). Con-
versely, if our language games, if our words and expressions are effective
or useful, they are always new.

In the discussion on seeing-as, we find several instances of the
notion of conceptual-relatedness which is not to be mistaken for identity.
One of its clearest expressions is the following:
The concept of a representation of what is seen, like that of a copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen. The two are intimately connected. (Which is not to say that they are alike) (p. 198).

Or again:

There are here hugely many interrelated phenomena and possible concepts (p. 199).

And:

'Seeing-as...' is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like (p. 197).

...Is being struck looking plus thinking? No. Many of our concepts cross here (p. 211).

We might at times even have to look for the actual meaning of an expression or its interpretation in another dimension! (p. 200). At any rate, the actual usage often prevents the identity we would have presumed to be the case: "It is necessary to get down to the application, and then the concept finds a different place, one which, so to speak, one never dreamed of" (p. 201).

Paradigmatic Mistakes

Wittgenstein's close examination of expressions further reveals what is sometimes a mistake on its own behalf and sometimes a reason for the mistake described above. The use of much of our language depends upon a sample, or paradigm, or model. This is true not only of learning language, as when we might show a child shapes or colours and he then applies them to various objects, but is also true of our ongoing operation with language. In fact, Wittgenstein's opening remark already seeks to open our consciousness to this fact. The shopkeeper looks up the word "red" in a table and takes apples out of his drawer that are the same colour as those of the sample (1). But this is only the beginning. From this initial statement Wittgenstein goes on to drive the matter deeply and definitively into our awareness, so much so that our presumed word-referent approach to language and the world is genuinely undermined. If language is a matter of performing life activities in a vast set of circumstances in relation to a vast set of paradigms - be these paradigms some sort of official standards as the standard metre in Paris or a hermetically kept colour sample (50-51), or some pattern of behaviour, or of words, or even some picture in our mind
or memory -- it becomes clear that description, for which our word-referent approach is most apt, is only one of those myriad life activities. Wittgenstein shows us that time and time again the various objects which we presumed we were representing in our language are, upon close examination, actually functioning as samples or instruments in our language. They have a role in a given language activity and are actually a \textit{means} of representation rather than that which is represented (50). Thus Wittgenstein concludes: "--What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made" (50). Wittgenstein’s antagonist is looking for that which gives words their meaning even after a particular object to which a word refers has been destroyed. Wittgenstein responds: "--An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connection with the name in the language-game" (55). Conversely, when a word has lost its paradigm—for instance, when we have forgotten a colour for which we know a colour name—we are no longer able to use that word. To have lost its paradigm is to have lost its meaning (57).

Having established that paradigms are indispensable for the use of language (if not for every word, then surely for enough words that the complex system of language as a whole is inoperable without them), Wittgenstein can then proceed to demonstrate throughout the text in innumerable instances the way in which it is possible for us to make what might be called ‘paradigmatic mistakes’. These are mistakes in which we operate some small bit of our language on the basis of a particular paradigm, but one which has been inappropriately applied. Furthermore, it is possible that this mistake itself functions as yet another paradigm, for it may generate further linguistic operations according to this inappropriate pattern and thus beget an entire mistaken or illegitimate lineage.

\textsuperscript{20} It is quite possible that the paradigms do take the place, in some cases at least, of the simple objects in the \textit{Tractatus}. Besides being 'indestructible', their existence is taken for granted while language is in use. As Bogen notes: "They function as 'objects' relative to specific linguistic practices, while the objects of the \textit{Tractatus} were supposed to be simple relative to language in general—and to any possible language, at that." (James Bogen, \textit{Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language} [New York: Humanities Press, 1972], p. 80). Bogen, by the way, concludes that "the language game method does not... stand on its own as a replacement for 'traditional' methods in the philosophy of language; it presupposes them." (Ibid., p. 220).
In the discussion on seeing-as, Wittgenstein gives us an example of this inappropriate use of a paradigm and we can easily see the mistaken lineage which it generates. Here we apply a particular model to a similar but different phenomenon. The discussion at this point involves a visual impression which is not a drawing and which might seem to be something private within oneself which cannot be shown to anyone. Wittgenstein says:

—Of course it [the visual impression] is not the drawing, but neither is it anything of the same category, which I carry within myself.

The concept of the 'inner picture' is misleading, for this concept uses the 'outer picture' as a model; and yet the uses of the words for these concepts are no more like one another than the uses of 'numeral' and 'number'. (And if one chose to call numbers 'ideal numerals', one might produce a similar confusion.) (p. 196).

Here the inappropriately applied model of some sort of actual inner reality analogous to an external reality not only generates mistaken notions about sense data (e.g., visual impressions), but this model of actual inner reality, whereby the meaning of our language in regard to sense data is dependent upon a corresponding inner picture representable in words, can be extended to every usage of language. Hence, we have the concept that the meaning of our words is something interior to ourselves, a picture, an image, a feeling, or some other psychic occurrence. Wittgenstein does not want to deny that such occurrences might often, or even always, accompany a word or expression but this theory of meaning as an interior psychic occurrence is one which Wittgenstein does vigorously deny.

21Recall that Wittgenstein himself frequently had this experience as cited earlier. Also, he admits actually hearing the continuation of music "in his head" after the playing had ceased (C&W, p. 64). At another point Wittgenstein says: "The words are not a translation of something else that was there before they were" (Z, 191) and, as if to keep his thinking clear he says: "Forget, forget that you have these experiences yourself!" (Z, 179).

22Nearly the whole of Zettel is a series of examinations of the possible images, feelings, inner states, psychic occurrences, etc., which are often put forth as meaning. Each examination displays the way in which this cannot be the case. Wittgenstein notes that these problems are "deeply rooted in one language" (Z, 58). He is against meaning as "a quite impalpable fine atmosphere of the speaking and acting" (Z, 27) as well as intention, expectation, an already fully formed thought, etc. "We don't get free of the idea that the sense of a sentence accompanies the sentence: is there alongside it?" (Z, 139). "Psychological—trivial—discussions about expectations, associations, etc., always pass over what is really noteworthy and it is noticeable that they talk around, without touching, the punctum saliens" (Z, 66). Conclusion: "The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in" (Z, 16).
Apart from this use of one model in regard to a different phenomenon from that for which it was originally intended and the resulting conceptual confusion which extends over related matters, Wittgenstein also notes another aspect of this 'paradigmatic mistake'. Frequently an expression suggests itself to us. This expression operates on the presupposition of an appropriate model -- but no model in fact exists. We have seen that a paradigm is often indispensable to the proper operation of language, but in such a case this foundation is missing. The operative language is in fact an empty shell, a pseudo-function, a bit of a fraud. An example of such an instance occurs in the discussion on continuing a series according to a formula. The expression, "'It is as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash'" (191) suggests itself. And Wittgenstein retorts:

Like what e.g.? -- Can't the use -- in a certain sense -- be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not? -- The point is, that it is as if we could 'grasp it in a flash' in yet another and much more direct sense than that. -- But have you a model for this? No. It is just that this expression suggests itself to us. As the result of the crossing of different pictures (191).

Wittgenstein continues, even more emphatically: "You have no model of this superlative fact, but you are seduced into using a super-expression. (It might be called a philosophical superlative.)" (192). Wittgenstein considers this to be a frequent mistake and cites numerous instances in which a word or expression "forces itself upon us." In the discussion on seeing-as, we find a consideration of some reasons why an expression might so forcibly suggest itself. These might be psychological, as when I feel a city lies in a certain direction and discover that in a similar circumstance that had been the case (p. 215). They might be simple, everyday experiences similar to our sense impressions but in our attempt to examine them non-contextually they appear to be something very "queer" (p. 215), or, a figurative expression may occur to us, force itself upon us, but such a figurative usage may, without care, conflict with the original one (p. 215).

There is no real model for its employment in such a case. If we see a picture as a rearing animal at one time and as two hexagons at another and ask in what sense such an occurrence is a genuine visual experience, what forces itself upon one -- no matter what our answer -- is a concept, a concept of what constitutes a visual experience. Our expression of what is seen and our answers to questions of experience will automatically ensue in accordance with this concept. Yet, there may be no model whereby the concept
of this experience is that of 'seeing' as opposed to, say, 'knowing'. It is simply something which forced itself upon us -- for whatever reasons.

"This," says Wittgenstein, "is what you must not forget" (p. 204). It is something which needs to be examined.

**Misapplied Pictures**

Just as an expression can force itself upon us and function as a model which might be inappropriately applied, so too can a picture or mental image. In Wittgenstein's analysis, this appears to be a very frequent source of misunderstanding. It is one to which he seems to be extremely sensitive, perhaps because it is the mistake he fell prey to himself when comparing linguistic expressions to pictures of states of affairs. This is also a particularly seductive source of error in that we fail to realize, in the operation of our speech, without a sort of perpetual Wittgensteinian reminder, that our mental images can and do function as paradigms, samples, models. They are so subtle a part of our language activity that their function escapes unnoticed. We are so accustomed to the idea that we obtain a picture and report it that we fail to understand that the picture we obtain filters, even determines, our report. It can function so that which enables us to respond in whatever manner we do. It can make our response possible. Clearly, when we fail to realize that our pictures can function as paradigms, and therefore fail to examine them as to their appropriateness in a given situation, it is easy to see how we can habitually misconceive. We can be consistently mistaken, systematically under illusion. A picture keeps presenting itself to us. "What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure" (p. 184). Most frequently, we cast this picture in language and it proceeds to function as a concept of that to which it is applied. For example, we can articulate our picture of evolution as follows:

The evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the awakening of consciousness at a particular level. The picture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light (p. 184).

Wittgenstein contends that if we speak of evolution in such terms, we must explore the use of the picture which these terms present if we are to understand what we are saying. The problem is: "...the picture seems to spare us this work; it already points to a particular use. This is how it
takes us in" (p. 184).

The mind-set which occurs when a picture forces itself upon us prevents our understanding of a possible use of the language in which that picture is presented. This possible use may be applicable to that picture as well as several others but the original mind-set might blind us to such possibilities. It might prevent our seeing other aspects of a given reality or even other realities as such. Being blind to an aspect or even an entire 'reality' is simply a more general and possibly deeper form of that disability which Wittgenstein describes as "aspect-blindness" (p. 213). This aspect-blindness is a paradigmatic display designed to make us aware of the 'everyday' blindness in which we fail to see anything but that which our individual pictures present to us. It is also a display of a more panoramic blindness in which we fail to view the world as well as ourselves, our language, our meaning, and all that constitutes a worldview, in any way other than that presented in the usual subject-object and word-referent dichotomies. That is, our blindness makes it difficult to see ourselves, the world, and language as a single, functioning unit. We think of the world as separate from ourselves and our words as names of objects. We form dualities and triplicities. We divide and divide again and think of these numerous segments, these atoms, as independent and operative. We are blind to the whole reality. In Wittgenstein these various aspects of reality and our various forms of blindness all pun on one another and are exemplified in Wittgenstein's discussion of the cube (139-141). The picture of a cube comes to mind, but the speaker might be correctly applying it to a triangular prism, in which case a total misunderstanding could occur. "The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently" (139). Similarly, a picture representing "an old man walking up a steep path lean-

23 The entries in On Certainty are deeply concerned about our "world-picture," "the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" (OC, 94), "the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting" (OC, 162). This is "the matter-of-course foundation for [one's] research and as such also goes unmentioned" (OC, 167). We can even be "thwarted" by this kind of Weltanschaung (OC, 422). Furthermore, the world-picture to be seen there is one of a circumstance, context, life, nature, all as one unit. It is the foundation of all our acting, but this will be explored at greater length later.
ing on a stick" might "have looked just the same if he had been sliding downhill in that position" (p. 54). The point is, my picture of the old man going uphill can prevent my seeing the old man going downhill.

It is not always necessary that we begin with a picture which functions as a determining model. The picture can arise in the process of operating with various concepts and then proceed to function definitively. It can be applied as a conclusion, as when we deal with opinions, hope, expectation, etc. (573, et seq.). Because of the pictures we form, expectation, opinion, hope, each get "treated grammatically as a state" (573). It is the pictures which model them as "states" which are responsible for our misconception, for, on closer examination in Wittgenstein's manner, they appear to be dynamic, ongoing activities together with the picture which models them.

In practical matters like cubes and old men going uphill, there might occur in the course of discussion some opportunity for the correction of misconceptions, for our errors would become apparent in our proceeding to do something with our incorrect concept (e.g., choose the wrong shape, tell the wrong story about the old man, etc.). Abstract matters, however, pose greater difficulties. Wittgenstein is deeply concerned about the adoption of the wrong paradigmatic picture in our basic assumptions which underlie, stand beneath, our 'total' perception, thus giving it the wrong foundation, and preventing the formation of an adequate gestalt. It is such misconception in our basic assumptions which falsifies our worldview. Our word-referent manner of construing language is just such an underlying, false, paradigmatic picture. It and the related erroneous pictures of meaning which accrue to it are fundamental topics which carry the direction of the Investigations. Through these Wittgenstein hopes to make the general point of the entire work. Thus, let us recall again that it is significant, and of no wonder, that Wittgenstein opens his work with that accepted Augustinian picture of language which he then proceeds to dethrone. He is constantly showing us the ways in which that picture entraps us, prevents us from seeing the world and language in their richer, more ambiguous, and mysterious fullness. Wittgenstein acknowledges his own earlier entrapment in this picture and emphasizes the snaring, repetitious character of such paradigmatic pictures. In entries 114 and 115 he deals with this weighty content as well as the process of misconception:

"The general form of propositions is: This is how things are."—That is the kind of proposition that
one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it (114).

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably (115).

**Forms of Our Language**

Let us now consider the source of a further set of mistakes, involving the form of our expressions. Here we do not simply mean some sort of play or inversion of grammatical form, as when a confusion might occur due to a statement cast in the form of a question functioning as a command, or "Isn't the weather glorious to-day?", a question in form being used as a statement or even an exclamation (21). The confusion that occurs through mistakes of form are far more significant than this. In fact:

The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language (111).

These forms make us expect reality to be other than it is. We expect it to be rigid, static, whereas it has instead a limited plasticity. This will become more apparent in the future discussion of the socio-ontological unit and in other references to the 'world'. Because language sometimes correlates to reality, we expect, conversely, reality to correlate to language. We unconsciously presume that the descriptive function of language in which this correlation appears, and which happens sometimes, is the only function of language, and happens at all times. With such a presumption at work it is easy to see how metaphors and similes which assume a word-referent descriptive form in our language, yet function as figurative comparisons, can breed deep conceptual confusion. In Wittgenstein's words:

> A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us. "But this isn't how it is!"--we say. "Yet this is how it has to be!" (112).

'Reality' is not as the simile presents, but the presentation makes our expectation false. We are fooled by the form. Furthermore, if the forms
of our language are rigid and determinant, and reality is dynamic and somewhat plastic, there is no way we can 'match' the two as our word-referent model would seem to imply. We must either relax the expectations of our language, as Wittgenstein advocates in the Investigations, or continue to reify the world such that it is a representable state of affairs, as was done in the Tractatus. "Matching," however, is no longer the appropriate term. In the Investigations the relation between language and the world is more aptly spoken of in terms of "harmony," function," "compatibility." Both are more malleable, more co-evolutional than in the Tractatus.

What is the case with the simile applies also to the metaphor. Wittgenstein cites the example of 'information'. What is called "information'? "And what gives this 'information' the character of information about something?" (356). If we are speaking about the data of sense-impressions, we must understand the language of our sense-impressions (355). It is based on convention and the particular convention upon which it is based is a metaphorical one. We speak of the senses giving us information, but this metaphorical form, in such common usage and so completely acceptable, this everyday 'form of our expression' -- misleads us (356). One might even say that the matter of information being information has nothing to do with our senses or their impressions and so can be nothing which sense impressions give. What the sense impressions give is data and what makes it 'information' is our organization of it, our understanding, the circumstances, the use we make of it, the way we proceed with it -- the total functional framework of concepts and behaviour through which it is processed. This obvious matter is not only hidden in the form of our expression; it is actually disguised. The resulting concept which is formed, namely, that our senses give us information -- is both mistaken and unquestioned.

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24 "Harmony" in Wittgenstein has been essentially an ethical term. Its use here might prompt the question whether doing language becomes an ethical act. This implication is not intentional, but neither is it altogether false as we shall see.

25 Our whole use of sense-data in relation to the outer world gives an erroneous picture. This picture shows "how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation" (OC, 90).
Wittgenstein's concern with mistakes centering on the forms of our expression is mentioned in one of his clearest and strongest statements on the method of his investigation. We will consider the method aspects of the matter later, but can note here the emphasis placed on another type of mistake which occurs through the usage of particular forms of expression. It is not a mistake generated through a misinterpretation of the forms themselves, as in the cases just considered. This mistake involves substitution and analogies, again, and is, as it were, the reverse side of the earlier consideration of confusion caused by the usage of similar concepts in different situations, and different concepts in similar situations, wherein both similar concepts and similar situations were treated as 'the same', identical. In this case, we misunderstand the use of our words, and therefore, for Wittgenstein, the meaning of our words. Hence, we misuse the tools or concepts which arise in part from our language, by means of "certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. -- Some of them [misunderstandings] can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another..." (90).

An example of such a 'transferral' of form, from one region to another, which causes conceptual confusion occurs in the discussion on private images. Here the 'transferral' creates an analogy, an image, a comparison, which in popular usage is again taken to be descriptive according to the word-referent model of description. When we say we have an image, and include in the meaning of that the idea that we have got something which our neighbour has not (398) (similarly with pain, sensation, etc.) we are working with a form of expression applied to material objects, namely, that of 'possession'. Yet, as Wittgenstein points out, there is no question of possession here. One cannot even see that which one possesses. "And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it" (398). Similarly, we can use the same form of expression about a 'visual room' as about a material room, but we cannot possess or walk into or look at the visual room though our form of expression would lead us to believe that such is possible (398). Through our belief we function as though the analogy were a statement of fact but our concept is a counterfeit.

Furthermore, the forms of our language can prevent us from seeing the truth. They can be the source of our deception, for it is largely through the forms of expression that we are prevented from 'seeing.' The forms of expression are, as it were, a blockage of our 'vision'. They are a lens
through which we focus incorrectly. Wittgenstein gives an example of this
deoceptive activity of the form of expression in discussing the relationship
between logic and language, and our tendency to account for meaning in terms
of the intermediary of logic functioning between our propositions as signs
and the facts to which they refer (94). In this case the forms of expres­
sions with which we talk about both propositions and logic deceive us into
thinking that "A proposition is a queer thing!" (94). These forms send us "in
pursuit of chimeras" and "prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that
nothing out of the ordinary is involved" (94) in the functioning of our
propositions, that they are instead a normal life activity, circum­
stantially 'determinate', effective. They are both institutional (or con·
ventional) and natural (or 'organic') in character. That is, our statements
are both 'social' and 'biological'. They are an activity that is part and
 parcel of the natural history of man.27 This might be accepted as philos­
opherically unquestionable were it not that the forms of our language make
propositions, among other things, look so very 'odd'.

At other times we have a sense of deception in which deception is not
the case. This distortion or deception does not occur only when, or even
because, some form of expression has been wrongly applied. There are times
when we are dissatisfied with the expressions of our ordinary language and
...are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if,
for example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way than by that man's not
having pains (402).

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26 That logic is not such an intermediary, not a separate and distinct part
of our language game, but relates to the bedrock upon which our games are
played, can be seen in the following: 'When we say 'Certain propositions
must be excluded from doubt,' it sounds as if I ought to put these propo­
sitions—for example, that I am called L.W.—into a logic-book. For if it
belongs to the description of a language-game, it belongs to logic. But
that I am called L.W. does not belong to any such description." (OC, 628).
..."Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot
be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see
it." (OC, 501).

As Anthony Kenney notes, this statement was made just two weeks before
Wittgenstein's death and has about it "an unmistakable echo of the first
entry in his 1914 notebook: Logic must take care of itself. (Notebooks,
2)." (Kenney, op. cit., p. 218.)

27 Wittgenstein sums up a related notation most succinctly in On Certainty:
"It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something." (OC, 505).
It is as well by favor of nature that our propositions work and/or that
we work with propositions.
Here our form of expression is completely appropriate, but because it does not correspond to an image or picture which we hold (which was otherwise produced by our language), we think it deceives us. "As if the form of expression were saying something false even when the proposition faute de mieux asserted something true" (402). In either case, whether authentically or inauthentically deceived, we are prevented from seeing correctly whether by thinking we see through forms of expression (when in fact we do not) or by not seeing through the forms of our expressions.

Finally, in the seeing-as discussion Wittgenstein demonstrates how the form of our expression can describe or report a given or possible reality which may not be the case at all. It gives an impression, and that impression may be false. This is not the same as an expression cast in the form of a question being used as a command, or of a declarative form being employed as an exclamation, etc., as mentioned earlier. Rather, it has about it that quality of depth characteristic of misconceptions arising from mis-taking the forms of our expressions. To display this particular mistake we can again examine our perceptions as they occur in the event of a 'change of aspect'. How the report of 'reality' is conveyed in the form of the expression can be seen as follows: If I am shown a picture rabbit and say "'It's a rabbit'...I am reporting my perception" (p. 195). But if I say: "'Now it's a rabbit'"—I am reporting or giving the impression of a "change of aspect" (p. 195). If I continue working with something which changes its aspect and say, "'Now I am seeing this'...This has the form of a report of a new perception" (p. 195). Here, on the one hand, our form seems to attempt to do two things at once. "The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged" (p. 195). Our impressions can fall in many directions. When pressed we might say "yes" to any number of possibilities. On the other hand, this form of expression makes it look as though the object under examination changed -- and it is that alteration which our expression reports. "...the expression in one's voice and gestures is the same as if the object had altered and had ended by becoming this or that" (p. 206). Of course the actual line on paper does not move. Yet, saying something which gives such an impression is more useful, more accurate, than not giving this false impression. We might say, it is better to be wrong about the 'facts' than about the 'metaphysics'. Again we have that feeling that something deep is happening here -- and confusing. Indeed, Wittgenstein says rather than to assume that if the item does not change then it is a
private object to which our reported perception must refer, "assume that it [the item] constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you" (p. 207). In other words, our expression must be cast in some form or other, but there are times in which no form seems satisfactory upon examination. All forms are deceptive. We have no other options from which to choose; nor can we create new and satisfactory ones. The best we can do is to prevent misconception by means of understanding the functioning of our forms of expression, or, as we shall see, in some cases -- remain silent.

At times the form of an expression presents a picture to us which seems "unambiguous" while "the actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied" (426). For instance, from the form of an expression it might seem as though an infinite series were already given or completed somewhere or somehow in our very utterance of its formula, while in actual practice it is not already to be found anywhere (426). Instead, in its form of existence, it is only another mental or metaphysical myth. Whenever we are thus formally deceived it is because, Wittgenstein reminds us, that many of our forms of expression are "like pontificals which we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose" (426).

It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein precedes this remark with the words, "For us, of course..." Usually when Wittgenstein speaks of "us" he means humans in general. In fact, it is often as a term noting part of nature as such. This is markedly so in On Certainty and Zettel. For instance, Wittgenstein notes the common factors among humans in perception and even in concepts. We can have numerous examples of the ways in which concepts differ, but they do not differ fundamentally (2, 381). Hence, "us humans" is a term of mutuality and a designated part of nature, part of the whole. But in this case (426), one wonders if it cannot also mean, for Wittgenstein and company, for those who understand the functioning of the forms of expression, that these forms are like vestments one can wear but do nothing with. In that case, this group will know what it is doing

\[28\] This is reminiscent of Lao Tzu saying -- whatever I say would be untrue. This, again, is ultimately a part of the general *via negativa*, particularly when we proceed to discussion of the ontological and the mystical.
and thereby escape deception and illusion. For the average language user, however, these forms are also pontificals with which nothing can be done, but this fact is not realized. It is in this state of ignorance that one can be deceived by one's own language and suffer illusion. It is not that every statement will deceive and delude one, but those, the forms of which are misunderstood, as when one thinks the form of a question already determines some very specific answer, or that an order already 'contains' its fulfillment. So important is our understanding of this process of misconception which proceeds from the forms of our expressions, that is, from the grammatical structure of our language, at least on its surface level, that Wittgenstein scatters an analysis of such mistakes throughout the text and as already mentioned contends that his investigation is "therefore a grammatical one" (90).

Repositioning and Recapitulation

At this point, let us reposition our exploration. This somewhat lengthy examination of the causes of our conceptual confusion is not without its rationale. If these misapplications of our concepts, paradigms, and forms of expression are the chief categories of our conceptual mistakes, it takes very little thought or imagination to proliferate endless examples of their possible occurrence in our everyday speech. Failing the time or effort to conduct one's own investigation, a ready-made collection of examples is available in the Investigations. This collection is so designed as to make us cognizant of the very depth of misunderstanding which our confusion perpetuates and upon which it rests. These examples center upon our concepts of language and of meaning.

Language is presented as a human life activity. It is part of our natural history (25). Meaning can best be described as a dynamic unit of being, namely, that unit of man-'languaging'-within-circumstance. When our concepts of meaning and language have changed in this way which Wittgenstein proposes, then our dichotomies between man and the world, language and the world, language and meaning, meaning and the world, etc., etc., all disappear. While distinct in themselves, these elements merge into a perpetually active participational unit. They come to be understood as an ongoing, dynamic, state of being inherently meaning-full. This is the final result of the demolition of the word-referent picture of language and the theories of meaning which attach to it. This understanding of language
will unfold more fully as we proceed, but for now let us note that it, in fact, constitutes a fundamentally altered world-view. This is not to say that the basic view of how things are upon which rest our language games and all of our daily activity are altered. That is, as we saw earlier, some concepts result from the very nature of things as On Certainty so strikingly describes, but what changes is our understanding of that. We begin to see the world quite differently though we do not, for instance, doubt its existence, or that it has existed for a very long time, etc. (OC, 91, 411, 188-191, et al.). What changes is our whole picture of all of that. It becomes a very different understanding about *"the way things are"* from that which is commonly held by the western mind, be that Westerner a man-on-the-street or an ivory-tower-philosopher, a realist, a solopsist, or an idealist, for it is characteristic of all of these to presume an inner-outer or subject-object dichotomy linked only by means of the subject's knowledge of the object. This knowledge is usually linguistic. It is sometimes said to unite the knower with the object known, but the sharp distinction between 'myself' and what is 'out there' remains. The nature of what is 'out there' can range from gross materiality to pure idea, but it remains an object to be discovered by the subject. The possibility of interaction, even if only by means of co-existence, such that the subject and the object in a situation, with all that that situation includes and entails, are one and inseparable, hardly distinguishable even as part of a whole, is not a normally accepted viewpoint.

We have seen that Wittgenstein's collection of investigations centers upon an examination of language usage which alters our concepts of meaning and language such that it correlationally destroys our idea of 'world' as object. We must notice that any topic of such analysis, literally any one, could be employed to this end. As we will discuss more fully later, it is impossible that any topic submitted to such analysis should not result in this conclusion, for the source of our mistakes lies in the very usage of language. Furthermore, due to the complicated network of interrelationships in the natural history of man, even our non-linguistic thought and concepts, for which we have evidence in human behaviour which is not specifically linguistic, would seem to be subject to similar confusion and can hardly be immune from the influence of specifically linguistic concepts and, therefore, from the confusion they promote within us. If we consider anything, using the tool of language, we are open to the possibility of confusion and if that very possibility is exposed, which is what Witta-
stein's analysis perpetually does, that very exposure has a profound effect. This analysis of our concepts ultimately undercuts our assumption about "the way things are" as a whole. It destroys our idea of absolute certainty though a functional and not to be questioned certainty remains in our normal everyday operations with language.29 As is indicated in the *Investigations*, insofar as our philosophy is to leave everything as it is (124) (we are what is changed, not our language and 'the world'), we are to go on using our normal forms of expression and our normal pictures and paradigms. We need not doubt their accomplishments. We must simply be aware that the impressions they give, among them the impressions of separation, can be fallible. If their form and application are understood, they can then be trusted (cf. 374).

The ultimate and inescapable consequence of the analysis of the conceptual confusion, that is, a radical shift in our picture of the way things are, could not have escaped so astute a mind as that of Wittgenstein. He shows us this conceptual confusion in the picture which he gives of language and meaning, for his understanding of these can be found in his description of the possibility of confusion and in the exposure of that possibility. Though not specifically stated as a world-view in the *Investigations*, what emerges is something which functions as a world-view and in that functioning has its value.30 It has its value so forcefully and subtly that to articulate it as an insight would be to reduce the world-view to a linguistic concept which must then be open to the same sort

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29..."If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either." (OC, 114). ..."If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." (OC, 115). ..."In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind." (OC, 156). ..."The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing." (OC, 166). ..."The reasonable man does not have certain doubts." (OC, 220). ..."Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second." (OC, 354), Etc., etc., etc.

After all, were some things not to remain unquestioned, we could not change our picture at all. As should become clear, all things remain as they are, but we view them quite differently.

30 As with "ontology" (mentioned earlier), Wittgenstein never describes this world-view. He is even chary in the *Investigations* of the word "Welt," so often understood by philosophers to mean precisely a meta theory, usually of the more colorful and metaphysical sort.
of analysis as any other proposition. This would not do. A world-view can be fashioned, operative, and shown, never said! The value of a world-view, its functioning, as well as that world-view itself, is so delicate that for it to be articulated is for it to be destroyed.

In the consideration of the *Investigations* as a speech-act, one comes to assume that the alteration of our old world-view and the implementation (the actual getting of his reader to function from a new foundation) of a new one is actually the direction of the work itself. All the suggested 'aims' are those specific tasks which would and do in fact accomplish this deeper and necessarily unstated one, the results of which might also be seen to be a yet more ultimate objective, in terms of our final appreciation or 'mystical' perception. To preview this at the moment would take us too far afield of our present consideration. If this altered world-view is an inescapable consequence of Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis, it is interesting to ask whether it is also an inherent function of all analytic philosophy. It is certainly not a stated aim nor is it an historically noticed result of such philosophy. In fact, so vague and whimsical a thing as 'world-view' is not something with which most proponents of analytic thought want to be associated. Nonetheless, it is possible that it could be a hidden function of such endeavours. This might become apparent as we 'outgrow' the analytic approach and proceed to philosophize through methods and questions which are more specifically 'life-oriented'.

We are perhaps in the midst of launching on a new philosophical path the prerequisite of which is at least an openness to an integrated world-view of the Wittgensteinian sort. To ascertain an altered *Weltanschauung* as a hidden legacy of analytic thought, we would have to analyze linguistic philosophy itself as a speech-act within the overall historical dialogue known as philosophy. There is not enough historical distance from this philosophical activity to do this at present, but it is interesting to note a simple but widespread shift of interest to the more 'traditional', even 'classical', philosophical questions and a greater sympathy in the Anglo-American philosophical community to 'non-analytical' methods which are more suited to grappling with matters of ontology and *Weltanschauung*.

...Have we digressed again? Where does this leave us in regard to re-positioning our exploration of the aims of the *Investigations* vis-a-vis the causes of our conceptual confusion and the seeking to elucidate the meaning of an altered world-view through a consideration of Wittgenstein's discussion on seeing-as? It leaves us at this point: if the fundamental
aim of the *Investigations* is to implement but not articulate an altered world-view, we must, as it were, be put through a long novitiate in order that so basic an alteration might occur. A long and constant work upon and within us is required. Much preparation is needed to make us susceptible to such a radical change. Example after example, dialogue after dialogue, throughout the text must be at work upon us. Therapy is required. And finally, near the end of the text, and after we have traversed the many landscapes and have accustomed and trained the mind’s eye to perceive differently, we find the consideration of seeing-as which from this perspective might be taken as a sort of final state of preparation for the coming into function of this new framework.

"Seeing" would seem to be a straightforward and simple thing which everyone thinks he understands. We probably use the verb "to see" several times a day. We are also well aware that we use it in different ways: for example, to perceive a stop sign; to recognize a likeness or difference between two things; to acknowledge understanding of a concept or a communication; to interpret something abstract, whether verbally or non-verbally, as a painting or poem or even a concept, etc., etc. Such common usage lies behind the concept of seeing-as. In Wittgenstein’s detailed analysis of this "concept and its place among the concepts of experience" (p. 193) we find a complete display of that which generates confusion -- confusion alive and well and functioning quite unnoticed -- in this concept which we would never have suspected to be in any way problematic. The seeing-as consideration shows that something so simple as "to see" is laced with innumerable underpinnings. It is not so simple at all. 31 It shows us that to every concept there are multiple aspects and what we take every thing and every experience as, the way we interpret it and behave toward it, with it, and through it, depends largely upon our customs and upbringing (p. 201) which shape the particular technique of language of which we are the masters. 32 Also, it gives an inside look at the functioning of this language with which we operate toward things and experiences and which also constitutes these objects and experiences insofar as what they are is dependent upon a pattern of concepts. It is through a pattern of concepts

31 In *Zettel* Wittgenstein discusses the relation between seeing and knowing and even cites as "(A grammatical remark.)" that "--Seeing is not an action but a state." (Z, 208).

32 In *Zettel* one succinct remark seems to say it all. ..."How words are understood is not told by words alone." (Z, 144).
that we filter their presence to us. As Wittgenstein puts it, and as we shall consider later, prayer, grief, pretending, etc., are patterns within the weave of our lives (p. 229). Such things and experiences are also dependent upon the pictures and expressions which force themselves upon us and upon the forms of our expressions which give form to our impressions. They are also dependent upon how we use our similes and metaphors, etc. (This is not to imply that our world is purely a social construct or that on Wittgenstein’s view 'reality' is completely relative. What is, the world as such, as well as its particular arrangement which we have to some extent organized, still impinges upon us and our language as a situation or circumstance and is determinative of sense. As we shall see, it together with the language, the language user, and the language community with its natural and social history is the unit which constitutes meaning.)

The revelation of such thorough precariousness and our being forced to accept it is due to Wittgenstein's relentless refusal to allow the presumption of certainty which is based on the word-referent/subject-object model of language and the world, to stand. The study of the process and possibility of misconception throughout the text, and as exemplified in the seeing-as discussion, is an analysis of the epistemology of our unexamined and, I suggest, from Wittgenstein's point of view -- mistaken -- world-view. An understanding of this epistemology prepares the way for the acceptance of an altered framework. It renders the old one indefensible and subject to doubt. When this has happened, it becomes reasonable, rational, even natural, to function from within an altered framework even though, again, all external language and behaviour will proceed as usual.

It is easy to think, because of our common form of life, that our basic presumptions are all in order. Yet, as we have seen in considering the fly-bottle, the whole world-view, as well as the world-view of the whole or entire community -- can be amiss. As will become apparent in the pages ahead, within the more unitary ontology of Wittgenstein, in a world devoid of deep and thoroughgoing dichotomies, there is room for myriad forms of life, both social and biological, but no form of life need be subject to the separation and alienation inherent in the usual understanding of the world and language which stems from the subject-object/word-referent dualities. Also, we must notice that no matter how different the forms of life might be, on Wittgenstein's understanding there cannot be a private language. Language is part of life and the form of life is essentially
 communal. In fact, the entire private language discussion can be seen to be showing us something about meaning -- primarily, its complex, communal aspect. Once we are clear about the nature of meaning, we can then be clear about our world view. Hence, even the private language discussion is a study of the epistemology of our world-view. It exposes the error inherent in the prevailing view and suggests the shape of the altered view.

The understanding of this 'epistemology', particularly in regard to something we thought of as so clear and simple -- like 'seeing', makes us realize that other common notions are not only less than absolute, but less than definite. Our statements in given situations may function definitively, specifically, accurately, but "the way things are," "what it's all about," the framework into which our pictures are set, can be drastically altered. Our personal and intellectual preparation for an altered world-view is in fact the development within us of a total toleration of ambiguity. This we can see within the framework of the whole of the Investigations, as one of the functions of the seeing-as discussion. It undermines our drive for clarity in specific instances, for fine distinctions, for precision, and not just a precision sufficient to make our statements 'work', that is, to prevent misunderstanding and thus enable human beings to act in a co-ordinated manner thereby proceeding toward the achievement of some objective. (It does this in order to attain a clarity about -- the whole.) It destroys our illusion of an absolute precision, some final formulation which positively says it all and that no greater precision can be, not only thought, but possible. It means us away from the idea of 'truth' to be found 'out there' and forces us to make our journey through the ambiguity of everyday, 'life' material.

Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions. -- It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material object in terms of 'what is really seen'. -- What we have rather to do

32Earlier we have mentioned Wittgenstein's drive for clarity and do not want to refute that here. Rather we must note his reason for clarity: "Our civilization is...occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings." (C&V, p. 7).
is to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected (p. 200).

To see that 'seeing' is not simple, and to fathom the underlying importance of that, to see all the aspects of seeing-as, and not seeing-as, even of being blind to aspects, whether of the peculiar pictures Wittgenstein presents to us, or more generally in our daily concepts, and to see the importance of that, is to understand how the concept of 'seeing' or 'seeing-as' or 'seeing an aspect' is connected with the concept of experiencing the meaning of a word (p. 214). It is to understand the whole denial of meaning as a metaphysical or mental entity (experience, picture, atmosphere, etc.). There is nothing definite we can pin down as .... This desire to do so is what we are being trained by Wittgenstein to overcome. This will be discussed more fully later but is exemplified in the following quotation:

The concept of 'seeing' makes a tangled impression. Well, it is tangled. -- I look at the landscape, my gaze ranges over it, I see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; this impresses itself sharply on me, that is quite hazy. After all, how completely ragged what we see can appear! And now look at all that can be meant by "description of what is seen". -- But this just is what is called description of what is seen. There is not one genuine proper case of such description -- the rest being just vague, something which awaits clarification, or which must just be swept aside as rubbish (p. 200).

Of course this attempt to dethrone our certainties and accustom us to ambiguity occurs elsewhere in the text as well. We were certain our pain, and our meaning, could be private -- and it isn't (cf. 256). We thought for certain that when we gave an order or stated a formula the fulfillment of that order and/or that formula was somehow already present or contained in the statement we uttered, that somehow meaning could be present in other than the ongoing circumstantial unit -- and it isn't (458, 459, 461). We were certain we knew what reading was, unequivocally, and what we meant by 'reading', unequivocally -- but when presented with different models, we find the certainty evaporates. Reading, and meaning, happen, when everything involved is -- 'just right' -- and what we acknowledge as reading, and what occurs as meaning, are different, even unique, at different times (156-179). If you lock someone in a room and leave
only one door open, you have not done nothing as concerns locking him in the room (99). Is the time on your watch exact enough? or do you always need a laboratory clock? (88). If you describe a landscape, was just this blade of grass, there, looking just like that? and need it be? (70). If you say, "Stand roughly there" is that good enough? or must you draw a space? and with chalk or a colour edge? (88). If I say "Bring me the broom" do I really mean the stick and the brush? or is inexact "broom" sufficient? (60). Etc., etc., etc. ...and don't you miss something in the analyzed form, in the exact description, too: (63). By Part II of the Investigations and the 'seeing-as' discussion, we are accustomed to ambiguity.

Yet the sense of our statements is always definite (99). The circumstances make them so. In a given act of communication, is there any doubt? If there is we use further explanation to expunge it. Putting together these two facets—that our language is always questionable, no more than a tenuous network of customs, paradigms, forms, and that our given propositions are definitive, functional—both of which Wittgenstein displays, we can more deeply fathom the source of our mistaken world-view. From the specificity of our surface grammar, our actual language usage, we slipped into the presumption that our depth grammar, the actual ontology through which our language functions, is equally as simple and specifiable.

By being forced into surface doubt, we can begin to appreciate the depth complexity. (We will discuss surface and depth grammar in more detail later but notice here its connection with our world-view.) And so, I suggest that the 'seeing-as' consideration might be taken as an analogy and a pun, as a 'take off' on 'seeing the world aright', anew. It is a clue to, even a veiled admission of, the attempted implementation within us of an altered world-view. This basic change would seem to be a function that is performed through this comprehensive "album of sketches."

Our usual notion of words and objects forces us into a world-view that cannot actually be a world-view. It is, as it were, atomistic, not holistic. It gives the picture of the separation, the independence, of words, things, parts of things, etc. It gives us a tendency to proliferate independent entities including mental and metaphysical phantoms. And this mistaken world-view becomes radically dissonant when we do not understand the phantom nature of these entities we have created. It is in this way that we suffer not only the separation and alienation of such an 'independent', dualistic approach, but also the illusion of our own false 'creation'.

Perhaps it is only an analysis or investigation of Wittgenstein's manner, which displays our mistakes, that can also show us how 'wrong' such a world-view is.

Let us recall at this point the observation of the last chapter that the *Investigations* is best likened to a work of art. It is an artistic endeavour to which we have an aesthetic reaction. Part of that reaction is to see, to attain an insight, to encounter everything, the whole, from a new perspective. The meaning of that whole, what it is, our comprehensive interpretation can then be — fresh and different. It is all seen as something other than it was before, and that aesthetic reaction, that involvement, is part of what helps to accomplish our ultimate transformation. It puts us in a 'susceptible' relation to that whereby we are transformed. This will be fully discussed in the final pages of this study.

That which we wish to ponder now is the altered world-view resulting from the conceptual change that occurs in the understanding of the mistakes and illusion which our language can perpetrate upon us in conjunction with the subject-object/word-referent view of reality. This altered world-view is the aim, the direction, of the *Investigations*. The artist himself may have had such a goal in mind for his work, though there was no preconceived form which governed his creation. In fact, due to the dynamic nature involved in the therapy required for our change, any such preconceived form was necessarily precluded. Therapy must be responsive to client need. It was, of course, also precluded by the 'material' itself, for the concern was an ontological one and the ontology which Wittgenstein envisioned was one, whole, dynamic unit. In other words, as stated earlier, we might not want to think of an object of art as having a telos, except insofar as it does, by its very nature, produce an effect upon us, but the artist, in the creation of a work, can indeed have had an ulterior motive for his creation of it. He can set about, through his work, to generate within us a new view of 'how things are' and a sense of mystery and participation in what is.

All of this, however, is not to say that Wittgenstein does not also have other purposes in mind. The text accomplishes other effects as well. His study of reading has something to say about reading; his study of rules and of games and of pain reveals something about these phenomena in themselves; his study of imagination is concerned with what it is, etc. There are times when apart from saying what something is not, we are also told what it is, but the study of the nature of these 'individuals' accomplishes
a display of the whole and what it is. It is this which is the overriding
direction of the text. All the individual studies and themes are con-
scripted into the service of this 'direction'. And so, while saying some-
thing significant about whatever is being discussed, that discussion and its
conclusion are designed to show -- something else, namely, the whole, and
that showing is likewise designed to involve us in that whole in a new way.
Thus, the studies of reading, games, and pain show us something about lan-
guage and meaning. They are designed to change our concepts of language
and meaning. With this change comes a new world-view. With this new world-
view comes a new perception and the possibility of a radical change in the
viewing person. Hence, the Investigations as a text is extremely 'pro-
grammatic', reminiscent of a symphony or drama.

Psychology

An example of one of these 'secondary' studies, which is significant
in itself and has its own 'effect', is that of psychology. Within the
text Wittgenstein launches an attack on psychology as he encountered it in
his time. This attack exemplifies our basic conceptual confusion. It is
made primarily through the discussion on seeing-as which in turn has so
much to show about our concept of meaning, and like all of these studies,
is another 'step' in the attainment of an altered weltanschauung. Let us
consider this example of psychology.

"Psychology treats of processes in the psychical sphere, as does
physics in the physical" (571). Wittgenstein contends that this parallel
is misleading.

Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not
the subject of psychology in the same sense as that in
which the movements of bodies, the phenomena of elec-
tricity, etc., are the subject of physics. You can see
this from the fact that the physicist sees, hears,
thinks about, and informs us of these phenomena, and
the psychologist observes the external reactions (the
behaviour) of the subject (571).

The confusion occurs in many aspects of the study. The external reactions
are treated as phenomena under study, whereas the psyche is the phenomenon
under study and the external reactions are only evidence of it. The study
of psychology thinks it is examining what is whereas it is actually treating
only the symptoms of what is. Thus, psychology, Wittgenstein would say,
ever really reaches its desired objective. There is a double difficulty
here. In his discussion on what it is to point to something, Wittgenstein
say: "because we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call pointing to the shape (as opposed, for example, to the colour), we say that a spiritual activity corresponds to these words" (36).

That is, because of the pictures presented to us in the forms of our language, we are in danger of positing an object of our study where in fact there is none. On the other hand, Wittgenstein does not want to deny the reality of the psyche, but to display both its complexity and its accessibility which we would find were we to look in the right place, namely at ourselves, each other, just as we are, embodied. One does not believe one's friend to be an automaton. Thus:

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.

Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated. Now do I understand this teaching? -- Of course I understand it ---- I can imagine plenty of things in connexion with it. And haven't pictures of these things been painted? And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the spoken doctrine? Why should it not do the same service as the words? And it is the service which is the point ...

The human body is the best picture of the human soul (p. 178). 34

Here our concept of the soul, whether through pictures or words, does us the service of making us treat and understand ourselves at least somewhat correctly. For example, we do not treat one another as automatons. That does not mean our concept is complete or that our pictures or words prevent all possible misunderstanding. The application of these pictures can lead us to believe the non-disintegrated or living body and the soul are separate. Nowhere in the Investigations does Wittgenstein deny the possibility of separation between the human body and the human soul, but he warns against the dangers which the application of this concept presents. This picture is contrary to the normal experience of the human person and, regardless of its technical correctness or incorrectness, it is part of the dichotomous pattern proceeding from our word-referent model of language.

34 With Wittgenstein's emphasis on human life, we should not be surprised to find the occasional reference to soul, for, "what is presupposed by the reality of the soul underlies our identity as human beings and that to speak about a man's soul is to speak about the man, though in a certain way. The terms 'soul' and 'human being' are certainly not equivalent. A spiritual life is one dimension of human life -- and I do not mean one compartment." (Ilham Dilman in "Wittgenstein on Soul," (ed.) Godfrey Vasey, OUP, c.1975, pp. 169-170)
which goes with our subject-object model of the world. 35 In our attempt to understand the functioning of the human we posit within him a separate principle called a soul, and in our thinking, most things distinctly human proceed from this principle. For, after all, we can create the outward human form from a block of wood and are "abashed to see the stupid block which hasn't even any similarity to a living being" (430). While we can imagine a soul functioning without a body, we cannot imagine a body functioning without a soul. 36 Our understanding of a body unformed by a soul is precisely that of death. Such a body is remarkably like the block of wood with the exception of durability. If we say there is a soul, and if part of this concept includes separability from the body, and, if upon close examination this separability proves unfeasible, then we must re-examine our concept. Most especially, we must re-examine our language usage in which we perpetuate and apply that concept. Again, we must understand what we are doing with this particular picture, be it in words or in paint.

Finally, Wittgenstein shows in his own investigations as we have already noted, that 'seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, and willing' are not in themselves either states or activities of the human psyche which can be observed as independent, external reactions or phenomena but are instead complex states of affairs involving the individual, his community, his history, his customs, his concepts, his circumstances. Each of them is in fact a complete situation, a state of affairs. States of affairs are not now (as in the Tractatus) that which our propositions reflect, but are social complexes and units of meaning.

Thus, the matter which the study of psychology should be treating is one of two things: if it purports to be studying the human psyche or the soul, it should in fact be studying our language as employed in the life.

35..."The soul is said to leave the body. Then, in order to exclude any similarity to the body, any sort of idea that some gaseous thing is meant, the soul is said to be incorporeal, non-spatial; but with that word 'leave' one has already said it all. Show me how you use the word 'spiritual' and I shall see whether the soul in non-corporeal and what you understand by 'spirit.'" (Z, 127).

36 The notion of "unity" is interestingly discussed in Derek Bolton's chapter on "Being Human." (Bolton, op. cit., pp. 171-208.) The lack of a matter/spirit dualism proceeds, in this discussion, from the lack of private reality in the Investigations.
activities related to this matter, i.e., it should be studying a concept; if it purports to be studying our seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, etc., it should be studying — life, i.e., the whole man in a whole situation. But the discipline of psychology is clearly engaged in neither of these pursuits. Thus, Wittgenstein can say:

... in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion...
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by (p. 232).

The experimental method is appropriate to physiological matters, but neither the 'concept' of the psyche nor 'life' is physiological. "The psychological concept hangs out of reach of this [physiological] explanation" and this, Wittgenstein contends, "makes the nature of the problem clearer" (p. 212). The entire discipline of psychology is based upon the usage of an inappropriate model.

It might be objected that I seem to have combined 'soul' and 'psyche', translating "psyche" and "psychology," as it were, in a very literal sense. I have used the two in this closely related manner because psychology appears to be studying some phenomenon, and the soul in this widest sense— as a mindfulness, the life principle, that about the human being which is clearly not the body alone, not the outward form—would seem to be the most, and possibly the only, appropriate phenomenon. Actually, Wittgenstein rules out the study of the soul for psychology, for the study of our concept of the soul seems to be as near as we can come to this phenomenon by means of our ordinary knowledge—of, our dianoia. The study of our concepts, as they lie in our language, is the primary domain of philosophy. Furthermore, as we have seen, the best possible picture we can have of the human soul is in fact the human body. Bearing this in mind we might say that our concept of the soul is largely a non-linguistic one. Whatever we filter through our language is conceptual, but what is conceptual is more than what our language filters. At the same time, our language, in Wittgenstein's thought, is a life activity involving far more than our words. Philosophy, in its examination of our language, is, therefore, not exempt from a study of the soul. It does well to describe the use of our language in this area and probe the notion of the matter. Alternatively, if psychology is the study of our experience which cannot be segregated from the subjects and contexts in which they occur, then the appropriate phenomenon under
study, as we have said, is life itself. In this regard, psychology might not call its investigations of these experiences the studying of the psyche or the soul, but because it isolates the feeling, hearing, thinking, etc., from the whole situation, it is treating them as if they were manifestations of the psyche or soul even if they are never called that. The error lies in the grave mistake.

Upon realizing this mistake based upon the usage of an inappropriate model, the importance of the seeing-as material as an attack on psychology begins to emerge. It is not simply that Wittgenstein is an 'anti-psychologist'. Rather, to condone the discipline of psychology is to give blessing to a fundamental error. It is to accept a radical misinterpretation which typifies in kind our mistaken view of the world. The discipline of psychology is itself an example of the "bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (109). It is a systematic application of the basic paradigmatic mistake. More importantly, psychology, as a fundamental misconstruction, can be understood as a practical effect resulting from and further compounding the deep and commonplace misunderstanding of meaning from which our mistaken world-view so naturally proceeds. For psychology to presume it is studying the soul as a separable entity rests upon the assumption that there is some object, be it physical, spiritual, mental, or metaphysical, to which our words attach and which constitutes their meaning. For psychology to presume it is studying experience as such, be it thinking, feeling, or whatever, rests upon the assumption that the meaning of our words can be an experience, given that this entire family of "psychological verbs" as Wittgenstein calls them (p. 221) is taken to by experiences. Both these assumptions of meaning are consistently denied throughout the Investigations. Whether studying the soul or not, the meaning of our words is not some experience.

Thus, the attack on psychology, and the entire seeing-as section insofar as it can be used as an attack on psychology, can be taken as a discussion in support of Wittgenstein's position on meaning. In the material on seeing-as, it becomes apparent that when 'seeing' is examined conceptually there arises the difficulty of even knowing what

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37 We are using the example of psychology here as such a systematic mistake because it is more prominent in the Investigations, but in On Certainty it is by the word "know" that Wittgenstein shows we are "often bewitched" (OC, 435). The same sort of systematic mistake is displayed throughout that text.
the psychologist is to experiment upon. What is it that is called 'seeing' or 'willing' or 'feeling', etc.? Our language games have tricked us in these matters. It is no wonder what we have likewise misconceived and mislocated the more complex matter of meaning. Nor is it any wonder that we thought we had solved the problems which trouble us, whereas the problem of meaning, and our linguistic forms, pass one another by. "Meaning is as little an experience as intending" (p. 217). That we speak of the experience of the meaning of a word is simply characteristic of the language-game we play in a given situation (p. 216). We "take this expression over from that other language-game" (p. 216).

In Conclusion

What has emerged is a more fluid and functional view of meaning, a view which, once accepted, requires us to relax our rigid and dichotomous view of the world. If we do that, no longer is our basic, underlying assumption that of an order and perspicuity in our language which matches an order and perspicuity in the world. This was the simplistic sort of correlation proposed in the Tractatus. Only in some games does our language function as a replica of a state of affairs. What we now see is that our language functions as an ongoing activity which we perform in relation to our states of affairs, our total context and circumstance. Our concept of language and the world is now that both have a great, though limited, degree of plasticity. We are exposed to the mystery and ambiguity in both our language and the world which we had seen as dual. Man, his life, our language, and the world—interrelate. They function together. Such a conceptual shift within the Investigations is a logical move. If our concept of language, and the world that was revealed in it, does not deliver order and perspicuity, we are forced to accept mystery and ambiguity. The conceptual shift to mystery and ambiguity is at one with our conceptual shift in the understanding of meaning. No longer is meaning the referent or object or situation to which our words refer nor is it some kind of intermediary between our language and our world. It now amounts to the functional interrelation between all matters involved; it is the total unit of man, language and world. And I suggest, again, that to implement within his reader this altered weltanschauung is the overall 'aim' of the investigations which Wittgenstein presents to us. The consequence of this in terms of our altered perception of reality remains to be seen. We will later discuss our unmediated perception, our
"mystical" appreciation.

The amazing thing is, despite all of this, Wittgenstein is content that this philosophizing has left everything as it is (124). It has changed nothing at all on the functional, material plane. An onlooker would see no difference between one who holds the old world-view and one who holds the new. 38 But the new man is wise. He is freed from his illusions, made whole of his dichotomies. He is 'in position' for transformation. He knows the 'old way' only looked like truth due to the tricks of his language. We could end with Wittgenstein's conclusion on a discussion on "the meaning" and "meaning it," both of which are phenomena of our language game: "Call it a dream. It does not change anything" (p. 216).

38 "Then everything will be different and it will be 'no wonder' if you can do things that you cannot do now. (A man who is suspended looks the same as one who is standing, but the interplay of forces within him is nevertheless quite different, so that he can act quite differently than can a standing man.)" (C&W, p. 33).

It is interesting to note that something which gives us nothing new in itself can be so interesting. Wittgenstein always contended that philosophy is a terrible business. He even described it as 'Hell!', felt that in itself, compared to the new vistas of knowledge which science seems to bring, it was somewhat dull. This is because, as Hacker puts it, "We are concerned with examining the concepts we have, not those we do not have, and our having the concepts consists in our unarticulated knowledge of the use of words." (Hacker, op. cit., p. 119.) Yet, many of us find it exciting. Why we do in an interesting question in itself. Wittgenstein would say it is because we are involved in something deep, as deep as grammar.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

For Wittgenstein the nature of the philosophical problem is very specific and its genesis is clearly discernible. To begin to perceive the nature of a philosophical problem it is useful to see not only Wittgenstein's statements on the matter, but what is actually treated as, what counts as, a philosophical problem within the *Investigations.*

The Traditional Problem

One thing which Wittgenstein treats as a philosophical problem is whatever it is which his would-be antagonist acknowledges as a philosophical problem. That is, all the traditional philosophical questions are legitimate philosophical problems. For example, both Wittgenstein and his opponent treat metaphysical matters -- questions of essences, universals, indestructibility, etc. -- as philosophical problems. Instances of such discussions have already been cited. Others abound.

Both are willing to discuss the identity of a thing with itself (215, 216). Both accept the question of thought "--And what is thinking?" (327-332). Both wonder at the phenomenon of knowledge and in what it consists and whether it is a state or a process, etc. (148, see also *Zettel* and *On Certainty*). Besides metaphysics and epistemology, Wittgenstein takes problems of logic seriously, particularly as they apply to language (107, 108, *et al.*). He is deeply concerned about the status of logic and how it applies to language. He notes that his viewpoint on the nature of language "seems to abolish logic, but does not do so" (242).

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1 As will be noted in the second section of this chapter, the study of the mistakes made in relation to forms, pictures, paradigms, etc., which are part of our language and presented by our language -- and which are part and parcel of the philosophical problem for Wittgenstein -- has been included in the preceding chapter and will not be re-examined here.

2 "Certainly the reader of Plato and Aristotle, of Descartes and Kant, who takes up the *Investigations* for the first time finds himself in quite another world, as it were, but one that is somehow continuous with the world of traditional philosophy." (Kennick, "Philosophy as Grammar and the Reality of Universals" in Ambrose and Lazerowitz (eds.) *op. cit.*, p. 140)
While specific questions of aesthetics and ethics are not widespread within the *Investigations*, the shifting, contextual nature, the 'fluidity', of our concepts in these areas might justifiably be taken as the paradigm for all of Wittgenstein's later thought. 3 "Fluid" rather than "relative" might seem to be the more appropriate term for this approach. It is flexible and circumstantial but it has limits and is intrinsic to the nature of a given state of affairs or context, rather than being an independent 'prerequisite' which is adapted to or related to some circumstance. Furthermore, it is an all-pervasive 'approach' as opposed to a 'position' which usually applies to "relative." It is applicable to all aspects of thought and behaviour and goes along with the lack of doctrine or theory within the *Investigations*. We find it in the notions that: rules are indispensable but never absolute, for anything and nothing can be made out to comply with them (201); the purity of our logic is a requirement we impose on our language, not a find resulting from investigation (107); between our concepts "the kinship is just as undeniable as the difference" (76); and in many cases, "Anything -- and nothing -- is right" (77), etc. This approach perhaps proceeds from, and is most evident in, the shift of logic from 'regulatory' to 'normative'. Norms are characteristically 'fluid' and are appropriately 'aesthetic' and 'ethical', and it is logic which is reduced (or promoted!) to the status of a normative science (81). Thus, aesthetics and ethics and their problems and approach might be said to be normative in the thought of the *Investigations*.

The Philosophical Problem

The point at hand is this: while the traditional problems of philosophy are likewise philosophical problems for Wittgenstein, it is in the perception of the nature of these problems, and correlationally, in the appropriate method for their solution, that Wittgenstein and his antagonist radically differ. They begin at the same place, but then a shift occurs. They proceed and end very differently: the traditionalist ends with an intellectual understanding of something; Wittgenstein ends in an ontology, and, ultimately, with an unmediated perception. While the traditionalist attempts to describe and understand external phenomena which are taken to be 'the problem', Wittgenstein attempts to describe

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We have already noted from other writings the strong and very personal concern of Wittgenstein for these matters throughout his life.
and understand the functioning of our language which for him is taken to create 'the problem'. The philosophical problem is not that we do not understand the raw data 'out there', be they physical or metaphysical, logical or epistemological. That may or may not be the case. The philosophical problem is that we do not understand that there is no such problem. It is an illusion of our language. Whatever is out there is as it is. We can by all means attempt to describe and understand it, but to the extent that our problem is a philosophical one, it is simply a deception to which we have unwittingly fallen prey due to the lack of understanding of the operations of our language.

Thus, to understand the genesis of the philosophical problem is to perceive its linguistic nature. To perceive its linguistic nature is to solve completely, or more accurately, to dissolve the problem. We have already seen that the forms of our language are what led us to expect a "perspicuous representation" (122) and account for our 'demand' for an infallible order in our speech and a single and unquestionable meaning for our words and propositions. It is these same forms of language and same demands which create our philosophical problems. Hence, "...the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear" (133). The force of this statement, what Wittgenstein means by it, is that in understanding the impossibility of an absolute clarity in our language, we arrive at an absolute clarity in regard to our philosophical problem. By the acceptance of ambiguity we acquire perspicuity!5

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4 "...We are in a muddle about what can be said, and are trying to clear up that muddle. This activity of clearing up is philosophy." (Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1930-1932, (ed.) Desmond Lee, [Totowa: Roman and Littlefield, 1980] pp. 21-22.)

5 Hacker contends that the terms "Übersicht," "Übersichtlichkeit," and "Übersehen" have given translators a great deal of trouble. Usages of these words have been translated as "command a clear view," "perspicuous representation," "synoptic account," "survey," "synoptic view," "perspicuity," etc. Hacker chooses to use "the archaic term 'surview' and related terms 'to survey', 'surveyable', etc." (P.M.S. Hacker, cit., pp. 113-114.) While this does convey a single concept, or nearly so, it has the disadvantage, in my mind, of losing some of the force of the notions of clarity which seemed to be important to Wittgenstein. Too often there seems to be a substantial difference on whether we attain clarity on something, or whether we are able to survey something. I can survey much on which I may not be clear. I find it difficult to see how a surview can dispel illusion which Hacker feels is the point of giving it. (Ibid.,
It was our initial demand that was amiss; our problem was the problem. Thus Wittgenstein can say:

...philosophical problems...are solved...by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known (109).

Examine the language closely. Drop the idea that meaning is something of the same kind as the word, yet different from the word (120). Look at functions being performed. Then it can be seen that both the question (the philosophical problem) and its answer (the dissolution of the problem) lie in the language. "And your scruples are misunderstandings. Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words" (120). In the consideration of seeing—as we discussed the types of mistakes that are made and their linguistic nature. They were discussed there in order to notice the ways in which these mistakes blind us, keep us from seeing what is. But these mistakes in themselves, arising from the misunderstanding and misuse of the similarities and differences, the paradigms, the pictures, and the forms within our language, are to be identified as the philosophical problem for Wittgenstein. We will examine Wittgenstein's philosophical method and its "fruit" or results at greater length later, but will now continue to explore his conception of the philosophical problem.

Besides the traditional philosophical problems, the Investigations contains long and detailed discussions on matters which 'traditionalists' might never have expected to find in a philosophical text. We find page after page on "reading" (156-179). We find a curious description of "buying apples" (1). We find a consideration of being "guided" by an "arbitrary doodle on a bit of paper" (175), etc., etc. It begins to look as though any comment on any item is the subject matter of philosophy. Every bit of speech or every usage of language appears to be of philosophical concern. This is both true and untrue. As intimated in the last chapter, when one examines the text carefully, it can be seen that each of these 'unlikely' topics is ultimately applicable to some very 'likely' philosophical problem. For example, "reading" and "being guided" apply

p. 116.) On this matter of the survey, see also the extended discussion in G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker (op. cit., pp. 531-545).
to the problems surrounding understanding and the question of knowledge. "Buying apples" applies to the time-honoured philosophical problem of language. These questions in turn apply to our concept of meaning, etc. Yet, no matter what the subject matter, the discussion concerns our use of words. Upon close examination we find that every consideration of the use of our words is one which displays the root of some conceptual mistake (recall yet again our consideration of seeing-as) or it is a consideration of a usage which contains either a paradox or an apparent contradiction.

In regard to understanding the nature of the philosophical problem, the matter of paradox and contradiction is significant. It is the resolution of paradox and contradiction which for Wittgenstein is the concern or activity of philosophy. With this comes the dissolution of the philosophical problem. Wittgenstein's functional understanding of a paradox might be stated as follows: we have a given expectation of the 'way things are' concerning some specific matter which conflicts with either our experience of that matter, or some other expectation which we also hold concerning that matter, and both of the conflicting expectations or the conflicting expectation and experience, would appear to be true. We do not wish to deny either one. It is in this latter feature that the paradox differs from a contradiction wherein we know that our conflicting statements cannot both be true and we seek to prove one and disprove the other. A specific example of a paradox consisting of a conflict between an expectation and an experience is found in--

The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process. ...When does this feeling occur? ...It is when I, for example, turn my attention in a particular way on to my own consciousness, and, astonished, say to myself: THIS is supposed to be produced by a process in the brain! (412).

An example of conflicting expectations is found in the consideration of the rules of our language wherein we finally discover that "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (201). Of the contradiction, Wittgenstein says: it is the very "business of philosophy" to understand the means whereby a contradiction can arise (125). In fact, "The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem" (125).
While traditional philosophy is also concerned with paradox and contradiction, a consideration of these helps us to understand the nature of the philosophical problem, as Wittgenstein perceives it, only if we examine his means of resolving it. He tells us not to look at the discrepancy between our expectations (as formulated in our statements) and the external reality, the world or circumstance, experience, etc. Look instead to the source of the paradox or contradiction. Look into the usage of our language. Ascertain what action we are trying to perform with it.  

In the case of the brain-process paradox, notice that the statement "(THIS is produced by a brain-process!) has nothing paradoxical about it" (412). If it were said in the course of an experiment it would not appear paradoxical. It is only when it is uttered outside its natural surroundings that it becomes problematic (412). In the case of the rules of our language, the paradox arises only when we attempt to generalize an observation over all instances of language usage, not when we examine "actual cases" (201). We are told to look at the use of words, to understand the role they perform. "This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes" (182). In other words, the means of resolving such problems as the paradox and contradiction is to obtain a clear understanding of the state of affairs before the problem has arisen (125), not to make 'new discoveries' in the 'external world'. This latter approach to problem solving is indicative of continued entrapment in the illusions created by our language; for the world, language, and man are one functioning unit, and not at all -- 'external' or separable. If we examine the language in detail we will find the source of the problem: an entanglement in the rules or a misuse of paradigms or comparisons, etc., any of which can lead to the formation and use of a statement which seems in order so far as our language is concerned but does not mean what we have intended or foreseen (125). It does not mesh with the reality or our experience of it. Thus, the paradox or contradiction is not a 'condition' or a 'state of affairs', but is, 

The notions of action and of acting play an even more prominent role in On Certainty than in the Investigations. There it is the foundational aspect of the language game -- e.g., "As if grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting" (OC, 110); "...but the end is not certain propositions striking us as immediately true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game." (O.C. 204, at 38.)
literally, a linguistic construct, the genesis of which can be found by
detailed study of the use of our language. Once this construction is
understood, the paradox or contradiction is automatically resolved, in
fact, dissolved. It is this insight which is Wittgenstein's unique and
revolutionary contribution to the matter of philosophical problems and
philosophical method. The philosophical problem is a knot in our lan­
guage.7 If we can untie that, the problem will have disappeared.8

Thus far it has been suggested that Wittgenstein is willing to
treat of any traditional philosophical problem and finds paradox and con­
tradiction to be an area in which the peculiar nature of the philosophical
problem, and its solution, can be seen most acutely. If the nature of the
problem is actually a difficulty produced by our language, then obviously
its solution lies in perceiving the formation of that problem as lin­
guistic. When that is done, the problem loses its force. The problem
itself is seen to be an illusion and simply disappears.9 This being the

7..."Philosophy unties knots in our thinking; hence its result must be
simple, but philosophising has to be as complicated as the knots it un­
ties." (Z, 452 and PR, 2).

8This dissolving of the problem is obviously reminiscent of the solution
of the problem of life found in the Notebooks and the Tractatus. The life
problem and its solution by means of dissolution was still of paramount
importance to Wittgenstein. ..."The problems of life are insoluble on
the surface and can only be solved in depth. They are insoluble in
surface dimensions." (1968) (C&W, p. 74). ..."In former times people
went into monasteries. Were they stupid or insensitive people? -- Well,
if people like that found they needed to take such measures in order to
be able to go on living, the problem cannot be an easy one!" (1946).
(C&W, p. 69). And these problems still vanish. They do so with a change
in life often brought on by a change in our thinking.

9...We are struggling with language. We are engaged
in a struggle with language. The solution of
philosophical problems can be compared with a gift
in a fairy tale: in the magic castle it appears
enchanted and if you look at it outside in daylight
it is nothing but an ordinary bit of iron (or some­
thing of the sort). (C&W, p. 11).

...Once the new way of thinking has been established,
the old problems vanish; indeed they become hard to
recapture. For they go with our way of expressing
ourselves and, if we clothe ourselves in a new form
of expression, the old problems are discarded along
with the old garment. (C&W, p. 48).
case, one might think there is no one problem of greater philosophical significance than any other. Insofar as some matter has emerged as a philosophical problem, that is true. However, within the Investigations there is a set of problems which Wittgenstein considers to be of fundamental importance. These are the questions of meaning, language, and the world. If we can grapple with the philosophical problems surrounding these particular topics, we will have profoundly come to grips with the linguistic nature of all philosophical problems. An examination of these topics displays clearly the genesis of such problems and therefore naturally results in the adoption of a 'new' method for solving such problems. If we achieve a deeper understanding of these particular topics, we will come to understand the need to look to our language for the philosophical solutions. When we have comprehended this, we will have acquired the appropriate method for solving all philosophical problems. Wittgenstein admits that, "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (133), but his method of looking at individual cases of language usage from 'close to' has the advantage of solving problems, of eliminating difficulties, not a single problem or single difficulty (133). This method is, as it were, a global solution, and that global solution is revealed most clearly through the study of these 'master' problems of language, meaning, and the world.

MASTER PROBLEMS
World

Within the Investigations the notions of meaning and of language are openly and extensively explored. This is true of both our mistaken notions and our corrected or proper notions, according to Wittgenstein. But our concept of the world is not discussed at all. It is something that emerges and must be 'derived' within the Investigations. This is not without good reason, for the world within this text is not something that can be stated. We must instead acquire a functional understanding of it. Even to speak of an understanding of it, however, is misleading. This seems to imply that the world is separate from ourselves and from the language in which we might state our understanding of it. This is contrary to the concept of the world which Wittgenstein would seem to hold in the Investigations. It is perhaps misleading even to speak of the concept of the world for the same reason, except, of course, that
within the *Investigations* a concept is something with which we operate, with which we work. It is an instrument (569). We can speak of an instrument, but an instrument is something that is used, and the using of it does not normally involve a statement or even a consciousness of what that instrument is in itself. That in fact might well get in the way of the use of the instrument.

This is much like a matter that we shall notice again. That is, it is similar to rushing up to someone or something (456). In doing so, one cannot also be concerned about oneself in the activity of rushing (456). Also, concepts are developed, learned, and used in life. They come about 'organically', as it were. In the *Investigations* we are put through a new learning process for language and meaning. In that process, we also 'organically' develop a new concept of world. We find ourselves functioning from the foundation or with the instrument of a new understanding. This proceeds from and is intimately related to our understanding of language and meaning. Yet, just as in actual life experience it is something that is organically acquired, so too, in the *Investigations* it is something which 'organically' emerges.

If we are to speak of the world at all, we should notice that Wittgenstein does so, directly, only twice in the *Investigations*. He does so in denying that we should think of thought or of language as the "unique correlate, picture, of the world" (96). The idea that language, thought, and world "stand in line one behind the other" is an illusion that comes from "various quarters" (96). All of our propositions are in perfect order just as they stand. This is true in both the *Tractatus* (5.5563) and the *Investigations* (98). We have already seen the reason for the order in our language and the world in the *Tractatus*. This reason was the permeation of all things by logic. That same order, for the same reason, is likewise true in Wittgenstein's second mention of the world in the *Investigations*. Here we find: "...logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought" (97). Yet, that order is no longer "utterly simple" as it was in the earlier thought of the world. In fact, it is something which can be only participated in, lived, as we shall see. The world, then, still has logical structure, but not as a rigid, simple one. It can be operated, but is far too complex and 'fluid' to be stated. In the *Tractatus*, logic made itself manifest but could not be stated. Here, to a large extent, that is true of world.
Indirectly, of course, there is much that can be 'gathered'. If we were -- dangerously -- to attempt to 'filter out' some of the components of the world, we would find that we have something remaining of our world in the notions of "form of life" and "language game." We do start with given material, as it were. We have nature and the general facts of nature (Z, 355, 374). We have communities of people and their history (OC, 298). We have the technique of language. All of these are world. All of these are pliable. They are extremely plastic. What I do and how I treat things to some extent constitute what the world is. There are certain things I cannot do. The 'material' of world does provide limitation. This is part of its general fact, and "there are certain mistakes I should not make" (p. 204). The mastery of my learning and my natural behavior prevent them. Yet, how I see things and what I use them for and as make a difference. If I think of and treat a drawing as an animal pierced by an arrow or as two hexagons, it makes a difference. For all practical purposes, it will be a drawing of such an animal or two hexagons. Similarly, if a is always seen as, known as, used as "A face," that is what it is. This is so, partly because that object of an actual face is what it represents, but also, partly because that is the way we treat a (p. 204). So, we can say of the world that it is both a 'social construct' and 'natural'. It is something in itself and something we create. It is something plastic. As anything isolated, rigid, solid, it is only illusion.

Another aspect we can indirectly notice about the world is that it is 'linguistic'. Our cries and verbal expressions are part of our pain. Similarly, 

...think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering: the words "it makes me shiver" are themselves such a shuddering reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I utter them, this belongs among the rest of those sensations. Now why should the wordless shudder be the ground of the verbal one? (p. 174).

Linguistic reality in this sense is perhaps not normally thought of as part of the world. We are so caught in the idea that our language is separate from the world and describes the world. Closely related to this is the fact that concepts force themselves upon us (p. 204). In the everyday world we operate with them, in them, and through them. Concepts are part of the form of life that is man and part of the language game. They are instruments of activity as just mentioned, but they are of such paramount importance, so central and so pervasive, that any notion of the world
which emerges must include what we might go so far as to call the conceptual nature of the world. All of our "fine shades of behaviour" and even something like a "genuine visual experience" are 'fixed' in their reality by and in our concepts (p. 204).

We might also note that the world is largely pattern. This will be discussed at some length later, but man, objects, circumstances, and situations all combine to form such realities as belief, hope, grief, expectation. These are patterns. They are a way things are. To some extent they are constituted grammatically, as will be seen, but they are indispensable "modes of this complicated form of life" (p. 174) which is ultimately inseparable from material reality, and language, and so much, much more. Such a remark is unquestionably a preview of what is to come. The way of things, mode, pattern, is an essential part of world.

We might think of a pattern as resembling a state of affairs, a particular configuration of things. That is not the case. A state of affairs is, at least in a given moment, fixed. It can be reported, described, and in this manner, used as a means of calculation in our thinking. The world in pattern and as pattern in the Investigations is profoundly, essentially and existentially -- dynamic. It is always active, in motion, functioning. It is configuration and context, but it is so not only as the area of activity but as the very medium of activity. This is true not only of the activities of man and his mediating, conceptualizing, useful, game-playing activity of language, but of the activity of nature and of history as an influence, even of existence in its internal activity of being itself. Nothing is excluded. And nothing is static or pre-determined or 'given'. We are told: "...we must be on our guard against thinking that there is some totality of conditions corresponding to the nature of each case (e.g. for a person's walking) so that, as it were, he could not but walk if they were all fulfilled" (183). The world is pattern and it is context, but it is dynamic pattern, dynamic context.

These are all components or aspects of the concept of world were we able to state such a concept. There are many more. The list could be endless, yet, they are not to be in any way consolidated, put together, solidified into a given picture. We must not, by means of the creation of such a picture, give ourselves the notion of something separate, something out there apart from me or my language. Given the plasticity and the ways in which we mediate and fashion it, particularly through the operation of our language, it begins to look as though the world is essentially my
world. But then, the world appears to be separate from me, which is not the case. There is no separate world and no separate me. Also, the world and me are identical. There is only one world. All the things within that world fold back upon one another such that they constitute one dynamic, interactional unit. All there is for that world as a whole is its own functioning. And that, as we shall see, is where meaning and sense abide. 'Outside the world' has completely dropped away. The world is so complete and so full of sense and order just as it stands that we need to imagine a deity, to 'separate out' a deity, only if we want to make structural and functional changes, like making a parrot really talk (346). Sense and order might still proceed from God, but they do so now from within the world, where, as we shall suggest, God himself abides.

That the world as such does not become apparent within the investigations, that it does not appear to us, is significant and natural, as we have said. Were it to do so, it would cease to be the functioning whole -- functioning -- and become an object, separate from man as subject and serving as referent for the words and expressions of language. Our concept of it would be that of thing or combinations of things, states of affairs. As a 'reality' it would cease to be a sort of teeming, fertile medium of existence and as a 'concept' it would be able to take place in the foreground of thought and in the calculus of daily linguistic operations. We would be in the state of alienation from the world, suffering the illusion of separation, for only in this kind of 'separateness' can the world appear as object and only as object do we need a concept of it. When the world remains whole, a functioning whole, perhaps even an unlimited whole, for there is no 'outside the world', then whatever unstated notions we might carry of the world function as a weltanschauung. They remain in the background. They are the very underpinning of thoughts and of those important and subtle "fine shades of behaviour." They operate below the surface of conscious interaction and are largely effective in proportion to the extent to which they are below the surface. It is the way a thing is seen which is normative of what is done in relation to it, but that seeing is not to be articulated, examined, lest the vision of what is seen be lost. To

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10 See On Certainty, cf. 235, and especially: "If I imagine...a person, I also imagine a reality, a world that surrounds him." (395, et al.). Much of the focus of the book is on the unitary nature of things and particularly on the unity of life and language.
state a concept of the world would be to destroy our view of it and more importantly to destroy the operation, the vitally important functioning, of that view -- as weltanschauung.

It is no wonder, then, that we do not find a concept of the world stated in the Investigations. Within the thought of the Investigations, the world is unspeakable. It is unspeakable because, if spoken, its function as weltanschauung would be impaired, but it is also unspeakable because in itself the world does not have a separable structure as things, facts, processes, which we can say. The world is not things, but neither is it facts or states of affairs. It does not have an identifiable structure of its own. Rather, when we speak we structure the world. It and our language, and the logic in both, are flexible, functioning, operative. The world, man, and language all in conjunction with one another operate and interact such that the world is the way it is and is what it is. But this -- as such or in itself -- is unspeakable. We may at times be held by a picture of the world as things, component parts. This may be somewhat like thinking of the parts of a chair in which we realize that every part is composed of other bits and we can watch the whole be taken apart, destroyed while its parts remain unchanged, but all we see in all our pictures of parts are the "materials from which we construct that picture of reality" (59). We cannot state the whole even though we call it "chair"; we cannot state this functioning whole even though we might call it "world."

Furthermore, the world is unspeakable in that 'the world' is not a language game which we can play. (In our normal language games we are always doing something, performing something, acting -- building bridges, etc.) If we attempt to play such a game, our words cease to concern the world as it is. It becomes an artificial construct, in fact, a phantom. Yet, there is much we do with our language which in fact reveals the world as what it really is. The world is made manifest through the very activity of our language, through what we can see in watching and becoming aware of how that language functions.

In considering the Tractatus we spoke of the world as a monistic ontology. All the parts of the world were united in logic and there were no dualistic principles in it to be balanced. Every unit of the state of affairs was separable, distinguishable, though compositely it formed a limited whole. As that whole loses its limits in the Investigations, as
the boundaries between subject and object, word and referent, or between man and things, man and language, language and things, are all dropped and the whole becomes 'alive' as meaning, the inexpressibility emerges. The world is in fact the ontology that is manifest, shown, not said at all. It is that into which we are plunged, immersed, by the investigations which Wittgenstein performs. It is that ontological 'unfoldment' or revelation which we shall study in the next chapter, knowing all the time that what is said there is irreducible to a stated concept, picture, theme, or even a stated knowledge of, or understanding of -- the world.

It is precisely an articulation of the world which creates multiple philosophical problems, namely, all those concerning the nature of the world and all those proceeding from the mistaken notions of the nature of the world. These mistaken notions proceed primarily from the false pictures created by our language. If we simply cease this misleading application of the pictures created by our language, which we must if we are silent about the nature of the world, vast amounts of philosophical problems concerning the world never arise.

Language

Within the Investigations there is no shortage of discussion on language. The entire text deals with the topic. It does so, of course, in conjunction with the topic of meaning. As with the world, our notion of these two topics must be radically altered. When this has been done, our questions concerning them do not arise. We will not ask the same questions of meaning when meaning as an identifiable entity, along with the notion of anything as such an identifiable entity, have been totally expunged from our conceptual field. We will not ask the same questions of language when it is thoroughly comprehended as an all-embracing life-activity instead of a separable instrument of communication or merely a means of representation. That language is still the tool or the medium for the revelation of ontology should become apparent in the following chapter. The study of the functioning of our language, the way in which it means or is effective, leads into the functioning of all that is. It leads into the ontological and that is what emerges, most profoundly, as meaning.

What is necessary for us to grasp at this point is the new concept of language which Wittgenstein presents. It is in this altered conception that language can be seen to be a master problem with the Investigations.
providing 'global solutions' for philosophy in that it, too, prevents numerous 'philosophical' problems from ever arising. Also, as philosophical problems lie in the very workings of our language, it is necessary to grasp a conception of language in which the function of language is understood to be such that that very function in itself is not the source of philosophical problems. That is, if the function of language is seen to be other than basically the representation and reporting of the way things are, then we will not make the mistakes attendant on a generalization of this function of our language. We will not think that that is what our language is always doing. We will not make the mistakes which arise when 'We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike' (p. 224). If we think our words and expression always have referents and report some state of affairs, then of course we will be puzzled as to how they mean or function when we cannot find a suitable referent or when the activity in question is not that of reporting.

In order to keep these problems from arising, we must, as it were, unclothe our language. We must cease to be fooled by the deceptive 'uniform' which it wears. The unclotning of our language is performed by Wittgenstein in bringing to our attention the countless kinds of sentences and the "countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'" (23, 27 et al.). The important thing about our constantly being shown the various uses of our language is the picture of language which emerges. These uses are intricately interwoven with, they are intrinsically a part of, the human "form of life" and the natural history of which it partakes. We must not even be able to imagine a language apart from this complicated form of life (19).

The concept of the form of life within the Investigations seems to be that of both biological form and social form. It seems to mean both the human race as such and the specific culture of a given segment of the human race, even the specific lifestyle or shared interest of a given community within a specific culture.11 It is clearly biological in that

11 That 'form of life' has about it a social/cultural aspect can be seen in the following: "Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last Judgment?" (IAC, p. 58). J.F.M. Hunter considers four possible interpretations of "form of life" and likewise concludes that the 'Organic account' is the most feasible. (E. D. Klemke (ed.), Essays on Wittgenstein [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971] pp. 274-297.) Cont'd.
it is contrasted with parrots, lions, and dogs, all of which do not 'lan-
guage' as does man. If they did, we could not understand them (344, p. 223,
357). But "form of life" also means "culture" and/or even "our lifestyle,"
for this is contrasted with the biological form of life with its natural
behaviour which is the basis of understanding and interpreting the action
and even the language of a given cultural or social group (206). It is

In his article, "Following a Rule and Ethics," John McDowell seems to
disagree with Stanley Cavell that Wittgenstein's "forms of life" can lead
to a "sort of vertigo." How can it be that all that we value, from ethics
to mathematical calculations, could depend upon something so fragile as
learning and teaching words and expectations in certain contexts, and pro-
jecting this into further contexts, etc. — all the swirling, fluid, on-
going activity that is a form of life? (A notion similar to the vertigo
theory also occurs in the last chapter of David Pears: "It is Wittgen-
stein's later doctrine that outside human thought and speech there are
no independent, objective points of support, and meaning and necessity
are preserved only in the linguistic practices which embody them. They
are safe only because the practices gain a certain stability from rules.
But even the rules do not provide a fixed point of reference, because
they always allow divergent interpretations. What really gives the
practices their stability is that we agree in our interpretations of the
rules." (David Pears, Ludwig Wittgenstein [New York: The Viking
Press, 1969], p. 179.) That there should be a "vertigo, induced by the thought
that there is nothing that keeps our practices in line except the reactions
and responses we learn in learning them" (John McDowell in Wittgenstein:
to Follow a Rule, Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich (eds.) [London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) p. 149.) strikes me as both fascinating
and strange. I also disagree with it. (McDowell, however, tried to solve
the multiple pictures of certainty, the numerous examples of the way in
which we trust life going on from day to day, I find it difficult to see
how a sense of vertigo can arise from within the vast body of Wittgenstein's
writing. It seems to me that all of this goes along with what the reason-
able man cannot doubt. (...there may be a huge abyss outside my back door,
but there wasn't one there this morning, and no thought of fear will cross
my mind when I reach for the back door knob.) The vertigo can only arise
if we do not see the ontological aspects of 'form of life'. Once those
are seen, a sense of wonder is the more natural and appropriate response,
not vertigo.

12 Wittgenstein's observations on the animals as a form of life distant
from the human form of life are interesting. The limitations and capacities
of each species are important contrasts. A cat cannot be taught to retrieve
(Z, 187). "Why can a dog feel fear but not remorse? Would it be right to
say 'Because he can't talk!'" (Z, 518). "There is nothing astonishing about
certain concepts' only being applicable to a being that e.g., possesses a
language" (Z, 520).

On the other hand, the human form of life is best seen at times if we
think of ourselves as an animal, i.e., as that much a part of nature and
as so fitting into all of creation. "But that means I want to conceive
according to the shared, common behaviour as a biological form that we can interpret what we see and hear, and we can completely understand the language of a given group in proportion to our having learned that language.  

That means having learned that way of life, that culture, but in many cases, also that lifestyle or even a given profession. The "suburbs of our language" include "the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus" (18). Only if we live in these particular suburbs can we understand and function with that particular language. Pure translation does not deliver the fullness of mastery of the technique. Neither does the learning of a vocabulary or a grammar suffice. We must also learn the customs and history in which those are imbedded. This shows the degree to which there is a lack of separation between man, who cannot be separated from the life that he lives, and language which is part and parcel of that life itself.

Let us emphasize this still further. Within the Investigations language is seen to be a game, a tool, a technique, which is played or used by a community of peoples in the general course of their everyday life for the multiplicity of purposes attendant on that life. Thus a natural life circumstance and language community are both essential to the proper functioning of language. Without these it has neither sense nor meaning. In brief, language is best conceived as just another life.

13. Having learned a language-game as an activity in life is a central concept for Wittgenstein. There are numerous examples of it throughout the later work but one prominent one is that of judging as found in On Certainty. It might be summarized as: "From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging" (OC, 128). What is said of judging might be said of innumerable language games.

14. A proposition "only gets sense from the rest of our procedure..." (OC, 153). "Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings" (OC, 218). These rules alone cannot suffice to explain our propositions can be seen from the fact that a proposition is on the one hand very ordinary and on the other, very queer (93). "And one is unable simply to look and see how propositions really work" (93). This means, that our philosophy should, as Rush Rhees says, "show how rules of grammar are rules of the lives in which there is language; and show at the same time that rules have not the role of empirical statements." (Rush Rhees, 1970, OC. cit., p. 45.)
activity, as natural to man as eating, playing, moving, etc.\(^{15}\) It is as versatile as any of these. It is rule governed yet not rule bound. It is a means of thinking, yet not the only one. It is a social construct in many of its conventions and to some extent in the construction of its surface grammar, yet it is also a natural phenomenon, natural to man and natural to the world.\(^{16}\) One might well ask: "What is called 'language'?", for if we have come to understand it in the way which Wittgenstein presents in the Investigations we are inclined to suspect we have already gone amiss in attempting to isolate it for consideration. Of course we can be interested in anything from a variety of viewpoints (108) but, as with world, in this very act of isolating language as a separate phenomenon we are likely to have already fundamentally misconceived it. That is the extent to which language is inextricably interwoven with, concomitant with, part and parcel of human life. It is necessary to see that language, and

\[^{15}\text{The notion of the act had great significance for Wittgenstein. He quoted to himself, as it were, Goethe's line from Faust I:}

"...and write with confidence
In the beginning was the deed" (OC, 402).

In his article on primitive society, Mounce takes objection to the interpretation of a language game or of the activity of language as a life activity. For him a language game is a "set of concepts." (H. O. Mounce, "Understanding a Primitive Society," Philosophy, Vol. 48, p. 351.) Any detailed consideration of On Certainty makes this interpretation difficult to accept. We shall later explore the fact that our depth grammar, complete with the role of our words, the general facts of nature, plus so much more, all are such that within the stream of life our words and expressions do form concepts. It is only from within common activities that we can properly distinguish language games and notice important differences and similarities in use. As D. Z. Phillips notes in his article, "Wittgenstein's Full Stop," "Without the common practices there would be no concepts..." (Irving Block (ed.), OP. CIT., p. 186.) So strong is this view that language is a life-activity that it would be "hard to see how on this view they [the builders or any people for that matter] would ever be speaking a language." (Rhees, 1970, OP. CIT. P. 77.) Speaking a language as opposed to languaging in life becomes incomprehensible.

\[^{16}\text{"You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).}

It is there -- like our life" (OC, 559).
any instance of language usage, any expression, statement, proposition, even a greeting, an exclamation, a call of "Help!," are in reality a slice of life. We must grasp the thoroughgoing implications of the fact that "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life."

To make this point even more emphatically and at the same time accurately, it is worth noting that the other life activity within the *Investigations* with which language is perhaps best compared is that of movement. Our motions have numerous purposes, some of them very conscious and apparent, others very random and for no obvious reason. (Children chanting "ditties" is like randomly throwing a ball into the air (83).) Most if not all motions are rule governed (appropriate or inappropriate for instance), belong to a community (Aborigines squat on the ground; Europeans sit in chairs), and have a role in the course of some pattern of life (as grief, thinking, learning, cooking, prayer, etc.). Through movement we 'get on' with life; yet we are not so inclined to ask, as we are with language, what movement is, or how or why it works, or what the meaning of every motion might be. In language as in movement, the 'doing' still seems to be an "extensionless point"; it in itself "seems not to have any volume of experience" (620). When 'doing philosophy' we can look for the willing and intention behind some activity, but in life there is nothing "left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm" (621).

Furthermore, the danger of inquiring after all our movements is so obvious it has been set to children's rhyme:

*The centipede was happy, quite*
*Until the toad in fun*
*Said, "Pray, which foot comes after which?"
*This worked his mind to such a pitch,*
*He lay distracted in a ditch,*
*Considering how to run.*

It is when we 'do philosophy', in *Wittgenstein's* view, that we are like the centipede figuring our his feet. This rhyme is not unlike *Wittgenstein*’s reminders to us that our philosophical questions emerge when we take our language out of its everyday use (116, 194, p. 200 *et al.*).

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17. This statement by *Wittgenstein* is cited by Malcolm, op. cit., p. 93. The phrase also appears in *Philosophical Remarks*: "The stream of life, or the stream of the world, flows on and our propositions are so to speak verified only at instants. Then they are commensurable with the present" (48).

18. Neither are we inclined to ask "If a crocodile means something when it comes at a man with open jaws" (Z, 522) and we do not say that "By drooping its leaves, the plant means that it needs water" (Z, 521).
Philosophical problems arise when "language goes on holiday" (38), when it is "like an engine idling" (132). We ask for meaning and super-structures and identifiable, nameable essences. Yet, when language is simply performing in an un-self-conscious manner, when we are simply buying a cow or giving directions or teaching someone to play chess, we are not working our language into a pitch. We are not questioning how our language works or attempting to discern the mental or metaphysical nature of 'meaning' or 'understanding' or 'time', etc. We make whatever corrections are necessary in order to make ourselves understood, but we are not making fine distinctions or defining concepts in terms of what is really the case, etc. (p. 200). Instead, we are doing what Wittgenstein says we have to do, namely, "to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false" (p. 200). Our everyday language, like that of the primitive language games of children -- "needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected" (p. 200, and entire text of On Certainty).

When we have clearly perceived the nature of language as a life activity we will cease to be tempted to take it out of its everyday usage, we will cease to ask the same questions concerning it, and thus our philosophical problems surrounding it will not arise. It is in this way, within this conceptual and methodological context, that language can be seen to be a 'master problem' within the Investigations, one with which

19 In his article on "Philosophy as Grammar", W. E. Kennick notes that much of our philosophical talk, particularly in terms of metaphysical theories, is what Philip Hallie has called "a rootless grammatical claim disguised as an empirical one." (Philip P. Hallie, "Wittgenstein's Grammatical-Empirical Distinction," The Journal of Philosophy, LX (1963), p. 569). Rootless here means not only that "It is unsupported by convention or common practice," but that it is idle because the philosopher himself does not take it seriously, he does not put it into practice, "except when he is doing philosophy; which means that it is disengaged from the workaday world in which language is used to perform a host of vital and practical functions." (Ambrose and Lazerowitz (eds.), op. cit. pp. 150-151).

Such observations, of course, always raise the question whether 'doing philosophy' cannot be a legitimate language game in itself and that question was, as we know, a source of perpetual torment to Wittgenstein. It was because in his view language was such a life-activity that philosophy had no domain of its own but was always to examine not only the uses to which we put our speech, but more importantly, our understanding of the statements we make, for it is quite legitimate to use misleading pictures if we do in fact understand what is going on in doing so.
Wittgenstein was most concerned. Also, as we have seen in the discussion on 'seeing-as', Wittgenstein was concerned with our concepts. Our concepts, like our words and their meanings, are related to one another. The meanings of our words and our concepts lie in their use. They have similarities and differences between them, family resemblances, and networks of interconnections. 'Language', 'meaning', and 'the world' form such an interrelated network, a family. Thus, working to alter our concept of one, alters our concept of the others; working conjointly with the interrelated set alters all three simultaneously and accomplishes the complete conceptual alteration. Hence, 'meaning', 'language', and 'world' are equally such 'master problems' within the Investigations.

We might note at this point, retrospectively and prospectively, that as a conceptual study, the immediate effect of the Investigations is to change our world-view, but what the conceptual study studies, what it is about, is what is. It is necessary that Wittgenstein take us through a conceptual study in order to show us how our concepts of what is have been wrong. In this study, they are 'corrected'. When our false concepts have been corrected, we are then able to see what is correctly.

Meaning

Let us now look at Wittgenstein's untangling of the knot of 'meaning', that is, at his solution or 'dissolving' of the problem of meaning, as it both constitutes and exemplifies the 'global' solution of philosophical problems. First of all, we must notice how the Wittgensteinian concept of language eliminates the question of meaning. It precludes this question. If we look at an actual instance of language use, as Wittgenstein always recommends we do, at an actual, given 'slice of life', we find that it is not our words or our propositions or even their 'meaning' which is important. With the proper conception of language, what should flash into our awareness is the composite fact that someone, a person, is doing something, a life activity. As Wittgenstein puts it in the opening entry of the Investigations, "...one operates with words" (1). When this operation is the object of our attention, to ask what constitutes the meaning of a word or proposition, seems entirely out of place. It is an inappropriate

20..."When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meaning of words change" (OC, 65).
move'. "No such thing was in question here..." (1).

This preclusion of the question of meaning is admonished elsewhere throughout the *Investigations*. We are told not to look for the meaning, but look instead for the *use* (40, 340, p. 220). In other words, here again, as with language, we are leading ourselves astray by the very act of our 'normal' philosophical investigation. Perhaps this is even more profoundly so in the case of meaning, for in that of language there at least exists a specific and external phenomenon about which to inquire. There is speech -- oral or written. In the case of meaning, we are told not only that our search is misguided in method or direction, but that we have totally misidentified the object of our inquiry. In fact, as Wittgenstein would have us realize, we have invented a phantom which we then proceed to investigate. This becomes apparent when one considers the implications of the concept of *use*. If both the meaning and sense of our words and statements are the 'employment', the 'function', the 'operation', the 'practice', the 'application' (all words which Wittgenstein uses throughout the *Investigations* in his emphasis and amplification of the concept of *use*) to which they are put, then obviously any entity -- mental, physical, or metaphysical -- which we might isolate as meaning is illusory. This fact bears mention again and again, for there is always the danger of identifying something as *use* and calling that *meaning*. Therefore, we are not only not allowed any identification of meaning as such, but we cannot attempt to identify anything specific as this 'use', 'employment', 'function', etc., for there is nothing which can be so individuated as to account for meaning, not even a process. "Meaning is not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the consequences of meaning" (p. 218). In Wittgenstein's concept, the use of our language is much more complex even than process. We will glimpse

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21. It is interesting to note this thought in other writings, though we always attribute it to Wittgenstein. Shibles has noted that Wilbur Urban developed concepts similar to those of the *Investigations* in a volume called *Language and Reality* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939). (Shibles, op. cit., p. 1). And Merleau-Ponty has written: "The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world." (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Essential Writings* of Merleau-Ponty, ed. A. L. Fisher [New York: Harcourt 1962], p. 196.) Just as there is no private language, even apart from publishing, perhaps there is no private thought...

22. There are numerous discussions in secondary sources on the way in which meaning is not a mental process for Wittgenstein. One of the most thorough and concise among them must be that of Anthony Kenny in his chapter entitled "Understanding, Thinking and Meaning." (Kenny, op. cit., pp. 139-158.)
this greater complexity as an entire ontology shortly. The point here is
that the admonition to look not for meaning but to look instead for use,
together with frequent assertions that the use is the meaning, constitutes
the attempt to abolish the concept of meaning altogether. As in the
Tractatus, Wittgenstein is still intent upon exposing the phantom for
what it is and putting an end, once and for all, to our insistent stalking
of it.

While our attention is diverted from 'meaning' to 'use' in order to
reform our delinquent conceptualizing, we also encounter again a style of
demonstration similar to that used in the Tractatus concerning meaning.
We again come to see what meaning is not. Numerous candidates are pro-
posed and none of them is suitable. It is not mental process, not meta-
physical entities, not pictures that parade before our eyes, etc.
Wittgenstein also discusses the various components of our language and
leads us to see that an explanation of them cannot suffice to account
for meaning.

If we consider names, we discover that naming itself is just another
one of life's little games (7, 27) and in order to name a thing or learn
its name we must already be masters of this game (31). Naming a thing is
like attaching a label (15, 26). It is a preparation for the use of a word
(26, 49). In actual fact, "we call very different things 'names'; the
word 'name' is used to characterize many different kinds of use of a
word..." (38). If we ask for the meaning of a name, we find it can some-
times be explained by pointing to its bearer (43), but there is ultimately
nothing 'simple' which every name can be said to signify (39, 46). This
tendency to think there must be something simple which a name signifies or
to think that we can name only primary elements of reality (50, 59) pro-
ceeds from the forms of our language. According to the way we use the
word "name" it looks as though this ought to be the case. It is something
we are "inclined to say" (386, see also 298, 299 et al). It is the impulse
toward creation of the phantom. Even though we do attach names to objects,
these are only the means of representation (50). Nothing has yet been done
when we have only named a thing (49) and, furthermore, says Wittgenstein,
a thing has not even got a name except in use (49). It is by means of a
name that an object can then have a role in our language games (50). A
name is simply part of our interaction with things. It is part of the
tools of our language whereby our life activity vis-a-vis things is
carried out. It requires an entire 'stage setting' in itself and pre-
supposes the existence of a grammar; there needs to be a "post where the 
new word is stationed" (257).

Once the entire scene of objects, man, and language is set, we then 
find that in actual functioning our names can sometimes be more than labels 
for things.23 "It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: 
naming something is like attaching a label to a thing" (15), but naming 
"is preparatory to the use of a word" (26). It is in this way that insofar 
as names are words, names can be said to be more than merely labels, i.e., 
there are images that are more profound than that of labeling. In the 
development of use Wittgenstein moved beyond the labeling notion.24 This 
is one aspect of Wittgenstein's discussion of the beetle in the box (293). 
There may be nothing in the box, but the word "beetle" is essential to the 
functioning of the language game which Wittgenstein describes. What gram­ 
matically is a name is here not used as the name of a thing. Hence, while 
names are a means of representation, they are at times not just for pur­ 
poses of representation (50) nor are they representations of pictures in 
our heads or of our images of things. Thus the name "pain" means neither 
our image of pain, nor a picture which might correspond to that image (300, 
301), nor does it mean some bodily sensation as such, but is ultimately 
just part of our human behaviour of language which in some instances 
happens to be an expression of such a bodily sensation. The name in its 
language game is often part and parcel of the phenomenon itself, as in the 
case of pain. ("Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place -- but the 
subject of pain is the person who gives it expression (302).) In such an

23 While Fogelin concludes that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is a con­ 
structivist theory that is "radically incomplete" (Fogelin, op. cit., p. 207) 
and does not explore its ontological aspects, he does agree that in the 
Investigations Wittgenstein "continually attempts to dislodge the pre­ 
conception that words gain their meaning through standing for things." 
(Ibid., p. 206).

24 To think of a name as purely a label is to forget, as Anthony Kenny 
points out, that "when I learn my first language I have to master a 
whole complicated system of identification, classification and naming" 
(Kenny, op. cit., p. 157) if I am to be able to use the word properly. 
This is the point of entry number 32: "Augustine describes the learn­ 
ing of human language as if the child came into a strange country and 
did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it al­ 
ready had a language, only not this one."
understanding, we do not ask for the meaning of a name; we simply see its use. The use of names is a diverse activity. There are things to which a name sometimes refers, but there is no referent for the meaning of a name. It is analogous to the beetle in the box. To speak in this manner is a misleading game we play.

Similarly with other 'words'. They, too, are a means of representation and inform us (280), but are not sufficient in themselves and are, as it were, naked (349). They need circumstance and a setting. On its own, when we attempt to follow up the meaning of a word we often find that it disintegrates (163); like the artichoke divested of its leaves, it disappears (164). In fact, Wittgenstein is willing to imagine a language in which "the 'soul' of the words played no part. In which, for example, we had no objection to replacing one word by another arbitrary one of our own invention" (530). Here words would still play a part in the language and language would still function to carry out life activities, but we clearly see how far such an image takes us from the idea of a specific and identifiable 'meaning' for our words.

The indispensable thing to remember is that somehow words function when in operation, not as a part of a mechanism (559) but rather as a 'happening' in the course of our operating with them. We might recall again, that our words, according to this understanding, are best thought of as an action rather than as a phenomenon. "Words are deeds" (546 and C&V, p.46). There is not some phenomenon which we can cite as the meaning of our words. When they function effectively, this in itself is a phenomenon in action. In action this phenomenon occurs. The functioning, as a happening, is the phenomenon of our words at work. Our words perform a service (p.178) and in learning to use them, our understanding of them, that is, what might be called our knowledge of their 'meaning', includes an understanding of how to apply them and the sentences in which they occur (p.175). This application is multifold. Our words are, as it were, individual little tools within our language which is itself the instrument of multiple life-activities. It is interesting to notice "the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence" (23). We might notice, for example, how our words can function individually like a picture at times, whether in a sentence or out of it (p.215), but that does not mean that we can say a picture is the meaning of a word -- for, a picture on its own does not necessarily have any function at all. Rather, words -- in
use -- function as concepts. Again, concepts are tools or instruments of our language (569). When we are examining the use of a word, we are examining a concept (383). We can say that crying and laughter are "full of meaning" in that "much can be gathered from them" (543). They, too, can be tools, and when we comprehend this, it is easier to see how our words, on their own, have no meaning. Crying and laughter have no meaning on their own; only in context can they function or even occur. So, too, with our words. They, like names, are part of an entire complex-in-application. We have a 'feeling' that a word has "taken up its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning" but "there could be human beings to whom all this was alien" (p. 218). It is not essential. This feeling is just another tendency we have developed in the usage of our language. It makes us look everywhere for something we think must be hidden and which we call "meaning." -- But there is nothing hidden.

And so, we move on to sentences, propositions, statements. Surely there are good reasons to distinguish sharply between these three, but for the present purposes let us consider them as a unit, all three being combinations of words, or in some cases a single word which functions in the same manner as a combination of words. We might be content with the thought that names and words have no meaning on their own and yet be tempted to look for something identifiable as meaning in regard to our normal linguistic expressions. Wittgenstein is as keenly aware of the numerous types of statements as he is of the uses to which they are put and of the wide disparity in their constitution. We 'assemble' our expressions in many ways. His refusal to assimilate these types, uses, and constituency, in any way, is one of the hallmarks of his entire discussion. They are many. No reductions are permitted. We must "--make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts--which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please" (304). If we have made such assimilations and reductions we are no longer studying the everyday uses of our language but an artificial construct, and all our results will be as artificial as the object studied.

Against this important backdrop, we notice that there is nothing definitive which we can say concerning what this linguistic expression is. This in itself is important and is part of what we are eventually to see. It is an aspect of the final vision which elicits an ultimate
appreciation. It is all part of what might be called an at-homeness or an at-one-ment with the total complexity. It is contentment with the fact that there is nothing hidden and yet nothing which can be found to explain it. The implications of this will be considered later, but a consideration of the linguistic expression begins to reveal the somewhat pregnant state of affairs.

Sometimes this expression is a complex of names (48). It follows rules but has no general form (136). We cannot trace the nature of a thing but only the framework through which we ourselves look at it (114). We try to grasp an essence (113) only to discover that what we thought was an essence was "a picture [which] held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language..." (115). So, too, with our expressions. We try to grasp the essence of an expression, but there is nothing unique in itself which is common to every expression. To think there is, is not a "mistake," but a "superstition" produced by "grammatical illusions" (110). We look for an essence separate from its 'function' which we shall see to be 'functioning' and we seek a 'structure' whereby we ask "What is language?" and "What is a proposition?" — as though the "answer to these questions is to be given once for all; and independently of any future experience" (92). We try to say an expression or statement is that which engages with the notion of truth (136) but such an attempt is misleading, for ultimately both the concept 'true' and the engagement are indefinable and the sentence, its accomplishment, and our understanding of it, are, as we shall see again in the next chapter, more akin to music and our understanding and response to it (528-531). Sometimes our sentences are interchangeable and sometimes not (531).25 Sometimes they might be senseless combinations of words and accomplish something; sometimes they can look like a sentence, make sense, and accomplish nothing (512, 517, 520). No criteria for a linguistic expression can be found in terms of sense or accomplishment. Its sense is its employment (421). Our sentences are just an appropriate form of behaviour in a given situation.

25..."It may be that if it is to achieve its effect a particular word cannot be replaced by any other; just as it may be that a gesture cannot be replaced by any other. (The word has a soul and not just a meaning.) No one would believe that a poem remained essentially unaltered if its words were replaced by others in accordance with an appropriate convention." (PG, 32).
We find, too, that there are several things which we might constantly think an expression is, which it is not. It is not a mechanism (559), though it is an instrument (421). It is not a matter of description, though it sometimes describes (cf. 374). It is not a mental picture though it can describe what one imagines (367-370) and can reveal the nature of things other than itself. In fact, it can partially constitute what things are, as we have seen, for the world is partially a linguistic and conceptual construction. A sentence or statement is not to be thought of as the expression of thought (317, 501), yet it can sometimes be just that. Also, we can have thoughts that are not in language. These non-linguistic thoughts can sometimes be described. For instance, if we stop in the course of taking a measurement to check the point of the pen, and perhaps are even speaking about the measurement at the time, behaviourally that 'checking' could also be called a thought -- and that thought could be articulated or described (330). On the other hand, think of one who has never learnt to speak, as in the case of the deaf-mute, and later does learn to speak. If he tells us that before he learned to speak he had thoughts of God and the world, we simply do not know what to do with such a case. How do we know that this description in words is that of his wordless thought? (342).

From all this we can begin to see that nothing can count as the 'meaning' of an expression and that the expression itself is not identifiable as something separate, specific, separable from life functioning. Wittgenstein does say that in a great many cases in which we speak of the meaning of a word, the word "meaning" "can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (43). Similarly, with expressions. We are not to look at the combination of words, but at their application, and at the technique for that application. If we understand the use we do know how to apply the word or the expression, but whether it be the use of a word in language or the use of an expression in life, when we look at that use we again find nothing that can be expressed or stated as the meaning. We find some activity performed in some context in life. We find life lived. What defining "meaning" as "use" does is to involve us, as we shall see in the coming chapter, in an entire ontology. The expression itself is so many things, does so many things. And yet we 'understand' it. We have a perfectly good, adequate, functional technique of using it. We have the skill required to employ it. This is complex.
Furthermore, if we attempt to state the concept of a statement, about as much as we can do is to notice that "one feature of our concept of a proposition is, sounding like a proposition" (134). The best we can do is to give examples of propositions. "This is the kind of way in which we have such a concept as 'proposition'" (135). If our concept of an expression is made up of the many kinds of use to which such an expression is put (as in the case of understanding (532)) and if it is non-identifiable, perhaps even non-existent as such (sentences, propositions, statements exist, but there is no such thing as the sentence, the proposition, the statement), then it is easier to see how there is nothing on its own, or in conjunction with other things, which can be identified as its meaning, or in itself account for its meaning. We can look at individual cases, but there we can see only functioning. And that is extremely complex! Even simply to tell something is a complicated process (363). Many things are needed to help it along. Think of all that is needed to explain a poem or a theme of music. Because our experience or proficiency with non-poetic statements is greater, need we think their complexity is less? If we do, perhaps we fool ourselves.

Our use of any linguistic expression presupposes the entire language game with all its customs, community history, etc., as we have noted before. Most of all, a statement on its own, is only a useless collection of words. It requires an application in order that it might function. Its function is only in its employment. Even that there might be an application requires an entire context. We are now exploring — life, the world, the way things are.

Thus far, then, we have suggested that names and words and expressions do not have meaning of their own. There is nothing which can be identified as their meaning. Their "meaning," as we normally use the word, can often be explained and taught by pointing to objects or situations which they signify, or to the bearers of names in the case of names, but that is a matter of understanding the use of a word or name or expression, not of locating something as its meaning. We might even say that words and names and expressions have meanings. Even their own function or employment or use might be called their meanings, to follow the indications of the Investigations. But that is not their meaning as such. In showing us all of this, Wittgenstein exposes the meaning. He intends us to see the ontological. We are tempted to ask whether there is something which we can find in our grammar, or possibly in the connection between our words and the world, which can be identified as the meaning of our words and names. Again,
it is this possibility which we will explore later and which exposes being itself — as meaning.

Let us note, finally, that in Wittgenstein's earlier writing we found that words had no meaning on their own because there was nothing in the world "on its own" which these words might represent. The world was fact, not things. Yet, each word, as the atom of a proposition had a meaning corresponding to the thing which it represented in that fact within that proposition. Propositions were concatenations of names. Hence, the objects were the meanings of the words only within the proposition which had meaning only in projection — that is, ultimately only as the state of affairs, or being, expressing itself, giving forth a representation of itself which is separate from itself. In other words, it revealed itself, revealed what is, to man, through his language. This was true both on the gross level of states of affairs and on the deeper levels of ontology which became apparent, or were revealed, through our understanding of the structure and functioning of language.

In the *Investigations*, to ask for the meaning of words and names, when they are combined, is just as much a non-question as to ask for their meaning individually. If our language is functioning properly, the question arises only in learning to use a word or name, or in correcting possible misunderstandings of our usages. Furthermore, since we cannot cite a meaning for our sentences and propositions either, we cannot cite use as separate from all that is. Our sentences and propositions work at least partially by means of the connections of our words with objects, but that composite functioning of words in the constitution of our utterances does not render them significantly different in themselves from what they are on their own. Also, while the function of our propositions in the *Investigations* is far more than representation, any identification of meaning would obviously be a difficult and complex task, but in examining our propositions we must necessarily look at everything and that, as such, is to look for nothing. Furthermore, were it possible to look for nothing in the wrong place, we would be doing that as well so long as we were not looking at an entire ontology.

Clearly, 'meaning' takes its place with the 'world' and 'language' in being a master problem which provides global solutions for our philosophical puzzles. If we understand meaning along these proposed lines, then we will not be fooled by the forms of our language such that we even ask 'meaning' questions. We will automatically understand that it is simply
part and parcel of functioning in life, in and through our language. We will know that for everything we say there is not some specific phenomenon to be explored. We will cease to look in the world for that which matches those numerous dichotomies which our language presents in the course of doing our life's work. Entire gamuts of metaphysical and psychological and even logical problems will simply evaporate. They arose in the first place from our misconception of language, and in conjunction with language, from our misconception of meaning.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we see that the philosophical problem for Wittgenstein is that which arises when we fail to recognize the workings of our language. We misunderstand the multiple forms and paradigms, the similarities and differences, the pictures and their applications, which are all part of those workings. In so doing we inevitably ask language to do what it is not designed to do, like capture in words a fragrance or a sound. It can often only 'point toward', and help us appreciate. It is designed to carry us on in the stream of life. That it can always do, but not always in the way which we might expect. Language has limitations. It does not always deliver perspicuity, in itself, as we have seen. It is full of logic, but not rigidly so. When we have false expectations of it in these regards, we try to exceed its limitations and must return to an understanding of its 'workings' in the simple, humble getting-on-with-life. In that understanding, the problems which lie only in our language disappear.

Here it is wise to take a note of warning, very serious warning. We must not get the impression that Wittgenstein is concerned only with solving our philosophical problems. The solution of these problems for Wittgenstein is ultimately a means of enabling us to see what lies covered behind the curtain of these mistakes. As we delve more deeply into the matters of 'meaning', we come to discover that all of Wittgenstein's investigations can be seen as a study of ontology. The examples themselves deal with what is concrete. "Things are placed right in front of our eyes, not covered by any veil. --This is when religion and art part company" (C&V, p. 6), and we have compared Wittgenstein's writing to art. But -- to examine the use of our words in order to dissolve a philosophical problem is to display an ontology. It is, even, to involve us in it. We shall now turn our exploration in this direction.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ONTOLOGICAL

Wittgenstein's ontological display can best be seen through what might be called case studies or explorations of grammar, of what I refer to as the socio-ontological unit, and of what Wittgenstein calls deep but not hidden. These three areas are here couched in the continued study of meaning, just as they are in the Investigations. This is not without good reason, for it is our mistaken notion of 'meaning' which prevents the seeing of the ontological dimensions within these regions. 'Meaning' is the dominant illusion which we must continue to dispel. In Wittgenstein the means by which our disillusionment proceeds is always the corrective therapy of philosophy. In his considerations Wittgenstein constantly shows us; he never tells us. He presents us, time and again, with pieces of material and helps us to notice aspects and peculiarities (e.g., 12, PG 21, et al.) and apparent puzzles within them, until finally we are 'struck'; we 'see' not only the material at hand but something quite beyond it. The exposition of what we are to see and how we come to see it within the Investigations is the task at hand. We must criss-cross these 'landscapes' and the related territory several times.

Before turning our attention in that direction, however, it might be helpful to note the epistemological aspects of our exploration which begin to claim prominence as we become involved in the ontological. So long as we held a subject-object/word-referent view of 'reality', our appropriate and operative knowledge was clearly that of dianoia. Our knowledge was knowledge-of. But as we proceed to perceive and experience and consciously participate in a unitary whole, the knowledge of dianoia is no longer as applicable. The kind of knowledge that is more effective and operative is not that of our 'usual' understanding and can no longer be contained in or mediated through the conceptual grid of our language. It is an insight, a 'knowingness', which is largely 'non-articulatable', unspeakable. It is the knowledge of noesis. These epistemological aspects will emerge as we become 'immersed' in the ontological and will be displayed through grammar.
The theme of grammar is so central to the Investigations that Wittgenstein considered entitling the text itself by that name and thought of subsuming the whole of his 'later' philosophizing under this concept. Its significance can also be seen in the posthumously published volume which correlates so closely with the Investigations, namely Philosophical Grammar. This being so, can we look for meaning in the area of grammar? Can the phenomenon of grammar somehow account for meaning? explain it? identify it? yield an understanding of it? These are questions we might like to ask. They arise naturally at nearly every turn in our inclination to seek some sort of knowledge concerning the matter of meaning. They are, as it were, the mode in which the question of meaning in relation to grammar appears to present itself, and we tend to expect an answer compatible in kind. However, we should look for a moment at the nature of the question we are asking. In the Investigations this type of question is rejected. This kind of knowledge is not the goal of the study. If we seek it, we will be forever either disappointed or in a state of misunderstanding of the enterprise. Answers and information which might count as explanation are, as we shall consider later, specifically prohibited. "At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description" (OC, 189). Thus, we might say, in order to attain any comprehension of grammar through which we might arrive at a more experiential and insightful knowledge, at noesis instead of dianoia, we must note Wittgenstein's distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar. We can do this by traveling a spiral of contrasts and relations between the two.

In the use of words one might distinguish surface from depth grammar. By surface grammar is meant "the way it [a word] is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use -- one might say -- that can be taken in by the ear" (664). In general it refers to our rules of syntax and is an encapsulation of the customs of our social usage. Yet, it is not completely arbitrary. Our words can impeccably conform to the external patterns of grammar and yet not be useful: "It is not every sentence-like formation that we know how to do something with, not every technique has an application in our life (520). Hence, it is certainly
not through our surface grammar, essential as it is, that we can come to understand the use of words and names. We can attain within it a certain level of understanding, a certain degree of information about the external structures and functions of some uses of our language, but even this is limited. What those external levels yield, in both the understanding of our language and in the linguistic constructions we might create with them, is not always pertinent in the stream of life, as seen in the last quotation. In regard to meaning we cannot find in our surface grammar a *dianoia*, if we are looking for that, nor can we attain a glimpse of the display of meaning, an insight or *noesis*, if we are looking for that. We cannot find in the study of our surface grammar a knowledge that comes, not from understanding the content of a concept, but through a knowing experience and participation in the *life* of the concept. The use of our words is far more complex than the way in which our words are *used* in linguistic constructions.

The notion of depth grammar is more complex in Wittgenstein. It is obviously a profound and absolutely essential concept for him. It is invoked at crucial times throughout the text but is never specifically explained or defined. In order to understand it, one must examine his use of it; one must learn it by learning to apply it. As one does so, one begins to suspect that, having acquired the concept, having attained the tool of 'depth grammar' for one's language kit, one has at one's command something essentially indefinable, ultimately indescribable. In other words, as we shall continue to discover, we are dealing with a linguistic expression, the understanding of which functions within the *Investigations* -- and within the experience of its student -- as a nonverbal insight, or, as what I shall eventually call an unmediated perception. It is 'noetic' knowledge. It is not the knowledge of the content of a concept, for that can often be explained; it can often be 'cashed out' in synonymous phrases.

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2This is not unlike many of the things which Wittgenstein would have us understand through understanding the learning process. Wittgenstein frequently describes the learning-to-use of a concept, and it frequently constitutes, at least in part, a way of life. (This is one manner in which "form of life" is a sociological, biographical matter.) Learning ethics and religion, for instance, is constituted by a certain sort of upbringing and involves an acceptance (which constitutes a way of life) of many things. Yet, both ethics and religion are ultimately indescribable in their depth dimensions. (See the thrust of G&W, p. 81 et al.).
Here we are dealing with the very life of a concept. Life can be portrayed but never fully described. It can be experienced but not completely explained. Just as human life is in many ways essentially mystery, so, too, is the life of our language and our concepts. Our attempt to understand ultimately involves appreciation. But that is preview; let us return to grammar.

It is significant that the distinction between surface and depth grammar only emerges at the end of Part I of the text (664). This itself might lead one to believe that it is not a central theme. However, as seen in the *Tractatus*, some of what is most central can occur with Wittgenstein's presentation at the end—and that alters the understanding of all that came before. (In fact, this notion, in one form or another, is perhaps not a new one for Wittgenstein. In the *Notebooks* we find: "Words are like the film on deep water" (NB, p. 52).) What is presented here is a way of reading the rest of the text which would show the surface/depth distinction in grammar to be, as it were, a flowering of what has been going on implicitly. It helps us to notice the ways in which grammar, which is considered arbitrary in itself and not accountable to reality (PG, 82), nonetheless interacts with and incorporates our pattern of behavior which also incorporates our agreement about reality. If we were not in agreement with reality our concepts, for instance of color, not only could not exist, but would not exist (Z, 351). Our agreement stems from the 'way things are'. Our grammar may be arbitrary, but reality is not. ("The procedure of putting lumps of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no

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3 In his late writing Wittgenstein said that grammar must give the language freedom. In the 1930 Lectures, we find "But grammar is not entirely a matter of arbitrary choice. It must enable us to express the multiplicity of facts, give us the same degree of freedom as do the facts." (Lectures, ed. Lee, op.cit.p.8) And: "Grammar is a mirror of reality." (Ibid., p. 9). "Grammar is not the expression of what is the case but of what is possible." (Ibid., p. 10). "Grammar is certainly not merely the inventions of a game in this sense, the game of language." (Ibid., p. 12). These few remarks which were made when the concept of a language game were already present seem to indicate the ontological limits of the arbitrariness of grammar. In 1931 we find "Is grammar arbitrary? Yes, in the sense just mentioned, that it cannot be justified. But it is not arbitrary in so far as it is not arbitrary what rules of grammar I can make use of." (Ibid., p. 49). "To a necessity in the world there corresponds an arbitrary rule in language." (Ibid., p. 57).
Wittgenstein repeatedly speaks of the grammar of particular words and expressions. He mentions "the grammar of the words 'know' and 'mean'" (187) and the grammar of 'to obey a rule' (199). He notes that the "grammar of 'to mean' is not like that of the expression 'to imagine' and the like," for it is "only in a language that I can mean something by something" (footnote, p. 18). He notices that inventing a language is like inventing an "instrument for a particular purpose" but is also like the "invention of a game" (492). He then announced: "Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word 'language', by connecting it with the grammar of the word 'invent'" (492). He also speaks of "the grammar of the word 'think'" and that of "eat" (339). He likewise connects "I know" with "I see" (wissen and videre) (OC, 90), etc., etc. To fathom the concept of grammar indicated by these somewhat peculiar usages of the word "grammar," we must work with the contrast and distinction between surface and depth grammar. Our surface grammar would classify these examples as "verbs" and therefore prescribe particular rules for their usage in the construction of a sentence. But grammar as such (whether surface or depth) "does not tell us how our language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs" (496). Furthermore, insofar as "the rules of grammar may be called 'arbitrary',...the aim of grammar is nothing but that of language" (497). Such notions would seem to suggest that our surface grammar is an 'externalization' or a 'reflection' (not reproduction) of our depth

-- While Wittgenstein does say in Zettel that "We have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of things? How are we to put it? -- Not in the nature of things." (357), we cannot conclude from this a thoroughgoing relativism or, as Bernard Williams does, a "transcendental idealism" (G. Vesey, op. cit., pp. 76-79) For, in Wittgenstein's grammar, there is only one nature. Man is part of it. Our systems certainly do not reside in the nature of things in themselves, but in us together with things, in one common reality. To think that such systems would reside in the nature of things as such would put us back into the subject-object dichotomy.

Bolten expresses this notion as follows: "Action relies on a balance between man and what surrounds him. Certain ways of acting, certain particular actions, preserve this balance. The man who knows this takes care not to run against forces which can destroy him, so far as it is within his power, and he does not go out of his way to disrupt the activity of other living creatures, including his fellow men." (Bolten, op. cit., p. 177.)
Surface grammar cannot explain the depth of grammar. The surface grammar 'draws the space', as it were, where the 'word is stationed.' It reveals the "post" (257, 29). The actual role of the word, how it's taken by a hearer and used, moves our grammatical understanding on to a deeper level. The surface grammar of our language requires, for example, a noun in some cases. If my leg is paining and I want to tell the doctor just where, the grammatical situation requires: ___________is just below the knee. The surface grammar requires that the blank be filled by a noun. So, we've moved from the verb pain to a noun pain -- but grammar, not the doctor, required that move. It is in this sense that our surface grammar shows the post at which the word is stationed, but the depth grammar involves the actual role of the word. In fact, it is most frequently when a word is being used outside of the language game suggested by its surface grammar that it is blatantly senseless (PG, 81). Hence, surface grammar without depth grammar accomplishes very little. Surface grammar shows us how to use the word, not how to use the word in a language game, i.e., in a life activity. It shows how to use the word in utterance so as to accomplish life activity, and this -- according to or because of the depth grammar of that word. Surface grammar is at the very least, rules. These rules are the presupposition behind the usage of words and even the giving of names though naming presupposes a great deal as already seen. Just as the ostensive definition can explain the use of a word when the overall role of the word is already understood, so too, the rules of our surface grammar can mirror or display the role of words that is going on in the depth grammar (cf. 30). Our rules enact that role on the surface, in the external pattern of speech. They help us to "understand a language" and that means "to be master of a technique" (199). In this sense, the rules of surface grammar are the tools of the language trade, but to be able to use the surface grammar rules, we need to have learned and be at home with the depth grammar. Together they constitute our mastery.

The role of the word per se, that is, its use in life, the part it plays in the ongoing interaction within the language community and between that community and the world, both as fact of nature and as a social construction, is what constitutes the area of depth grammar. If we ascertain what use a word has in our life activity, if we can perceive the life ('effectiveness') of a word which its use has "breathed into it," then we are examining its depth grammar. It is, as it were, the activity and its
effect, the action, which is actually going on vis-a-vis the everyday use of our everyday language. It is what is seen when we examine how we play our games with a word or expression and what role, what part, this word or expression plays in that game. This is closely akin to what one might normally think of as "meaning," but this thought might easily lead us to conclude that there is something, either static or in process, which we might cite as the sense of the referent for "meaning" and/or "depth grammar," for such is what the surface grammar of "meaning" would lead us to suspect (664). It is precisely for this reason that Wittgenstein forces us to look more 'deeply'. The actual role of a word, its depth grammar, is often different from what the surface grammar suggests. It is 'deep' in that our words and expressions form concepts.

It is the use of our words and expressions in our life which constitutes them as concepts. It is as concepts that they have a use in life and play a part in our language games. It is the use of these concepts in our life which constitutes the life of a concept, and it is this which constitutes depth grammar. Hence, it is the operation and function, the life or role of concepts in our lives that we are actually studying when we study depth grammar. It is as concepts that our words and expressions play a role in our language games. It is the use of these concepts in our lives that constitutes depth grammar. Hence, it is the operation and function, the life or role of concepts in our lives that we are actually studying when we study depth grammar.

5 Any of Wittgenstein's examples display how much is involved in a use. What it means to obey a rule, for instance, takes up large sections of the Investigations and other later writings, e.g., Zettel, 283-298, et al. It is what is contained in the 'how much' that constitutes the depth grammar, i.e., the background, the presuppositions, the circumstances, etc.

6 We have already noted Wittgenstein's reference to Goethe's line, "In the beginning was the deed." In his article "Im Anfang war die Tat," Peter Winch uses this as the springboard for relating concepts to life's activities which are part of the depth grammar. He feels that in Wittgenstein the same notion is expressed "in the importance ascribed to certain primitive human actions and reactions for concept-formation." (Irving Block (ed.), op. cit., p. 170.) He goes on to say "The deed now fills the role taken in the Tractatus by the relation of 'name' to 'object'. One important difference is that deeds, unlike 'objects' can be described; another is that emphasis on the deed opens the door to an understanding of how new concepts can be created and to a way of grasping concepts and ways of thinking very different from our own." (Ibid., p. 177.)
things, circumstances, etc. As concepts they are an activity and have a part, play a role, in activity. If we think of our normal understanding of concepts we can better understand concepts as being the life of our words and better understand the impact of "depth grammar" for we are familiar with the ways in which a concept can have an influence and be operative even without being expressed. This notion is part of the force of Wittgenstein's idea of "family resemblances" and a "family of meanings." A concept might sometimes be a presupposition or a suppressed premise. An example of a concept being in operation, without being expressed, might occur in a discussion of the one and many, and of participation in being. Here it is quite likely that for any Christian theologies in the group, the concept of grace will be functioning, though never expressed. An everyday example might occur in a discussion of nuclear reactors or industrial safety devices or even traffic lights wherein there is operative our unexpressed concepts of life and death and their values. Such a functioning is displayed in the history of thought, in writings like that of Foucault and of Berger and Luckmann in the sociology of knowledge.

Along the same line of thought, we are also familiar with the ways in which our concepts form networks and interrelate and are at work continuously. The concept of a system was an important one for Wittgenstein. Our convictions form a system, a structure (OC, 102). A system belongs to the essence of argument (OC, 102). "...Statistical causal analysis presupposes a fundamental system" (RFM, 193). Empirical judgements form a system (OC, 137). Belief forms a system (OC, 141), etc., etc. "What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions" (OC, 225). In some cases one must say: "Only in the system has the sign any life" (Z, 146). Our systems are more profound than facts which often appear superficial once the system has been grasped (C&V, p. 26). A system can include an entire way of life, as does religion (C&V, p. 64). What we might not be familiar with, is the fact that this is an area of depth grammar in our language. It might metaphorically be called the 'spiritual life' of our language, but that, of course, is not to say that we are postulating a spirit where we cannot find a body. Also, we might not be familiar with the fact that this area has about it a pattern whereby it can be called a "grammar." Furthermore, we might never suspect that the fact that there is pattern can be discerned through the study of the workings or use of our language, and yet, that pattern itself can never be expressed. It cannot be expressed, not because the reality itself is too complicated or even inaccessible (Nothing is hidden. Wittgenstein
insists that everything is in view), but because it is part of life, part of reality, part of what is. This pattern is the structure of being. It is ontological, and essentially so.

It is in the relation between language and reality, that Wittgenstein can be said to be exploring the essence of what is. After all -- "the agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that it isn't red. And when I want to explain the word 'red' to someone, in the sentence 'That is not red,' I do it by pointing to something red." (429). What is important about the negatives in these statements is that they force us into an ontology; that the ontology ties thought and reality is shown by the use of the negatives. Furthermore, "like everything metaphysical, the harmony

On the harmony between thought and reality being in grammar, Hacker has said: "To be sure, this answer to the great problem of the harmony between language and reality seems, by comparison with the picture theory of meaning and its exciting logico-metaphysical atomism, trivial, even uninteresting. Madness is more interesting than sanity. But it is much better to be sane than to be mad." (P.M.S. Hacker, "The Rise and Fall of the Picture Theory," ed. Irving Block, op. cit., p. 107.) This is both true and not true. Since grammar is said not to be accountable to reality (PG, 133) and since it is a calculus (PG, p. 312) it looks as though it is trivial and uninteresting. But, when we recall that Wittgenstein wanted to attend to the system of language (PG, 122) which for him meant the whole phenomenon of language and the sign systems with affinities to them (PG, 137), that the capacity to use a language is the mark of a living being, that the concept of a living being and the concept of language have a very similar indeterminacy (PG, 139), that "To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistent with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game... Are the rules of chess arbitrary? Imagine that it turned out that only chess entertained and satisfied people. The rules aren't arbitrary if the purpose of the game is to be achieved. "The rules of the game are arbitrary" means: the concept 'game' is not defined by the effect the game is supposed to have on us" (PG, 140). -- Then this notion of the harmony between thought and reality being in grammar seems far from trivial and uninteresting. It is, instead, as important and as interesting as life lived in the world! The chief difference is, it is not a neat ontology, but a very complex and fluid one.
between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language" (2, 55). And the grammar of our language is a display of the life-world. It is through our study of grammar that we can see the essence of the world. As in the *Tractatus* this can never be said. The total stream of life cannot be put into words.

What belongs to the essence of the world cannot be expressed by language. For this reason, it cannot say that everything flows. Language can only say those things which we can also imagine otherwise.

That everything flows must be expressed in the application of language, and in fact not in one kind of application as opposed to another but in the application in anything we would ever call the application of language. ...

But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the propositions of language, but in rules for this language which excludes nonsensical combinations of signs (Pr, 54).

While our surface grammar was obviously rules, we shall see in regard to pattern that depth grammar likewise has a structure. Hence, in the midst

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8It is on the basis of this that Gerd Brand concludes that Wittgenstein is a "phenomenologist purely and simply." Wittgenstein's thought moves between two poles: 'such and such is the case' and 'such and such is being done.' How things are and what is being done are shown, are grasped in the activity itself, are, in the last analysis, given to us in perceptible forms of life. That on this foundation—even if only fragments which are important and elemental—there is possible a revealing description of how men understand the world and how they operate in it—therefore a phenomenology of the life-world—appears to me to be plausibility itself. Wittgenstein stands on the ground of a revelatory all-grounding (including itself) naiveté (therefore we use quite calmly the word 'transcendental'), proceeding by means of a destructive and exhibiting analysis." (Gerd Brand, op. cit., p. xxv.)

Engel, likewise, spends the last chapter of his book, *The Tyranny of Language*, making a case for Wittgenstein's philosophy, including his later philosophy, being part of the existentialist philosophic tradition. While he feels that Wittgenstein's writing has fewer implications for life and reality than does most existentialism, certainly Wittgenstein's preoccupation with these were great, and I am suggesting ways in which he was driven by and reflects this preoccupation.

9Sometimes one is almost tempted to say that "grammar" becomes another word for "phenomenon") but as Wittgenstein is studying an entire system by means of illustrating parts of the system, that phenomenon is necessarily reality itself.
of grammatical considerations we are actually sounding the ontological
depths. As we shall eventually see, this kind of inexpressible insight
is not uncommon for Wittgenstein. It is for him an appreciation of. It
is similar to his recurring experience of wonder that the world exists,
which does not ask the questions 'why' or 'what'.

Thus, the depth grammar is the structuring and functioning of the
actual life or 'effectiveness' of our language. The word "effectiveness"
denotes an employment for some purpose but as this belongs only to some
language games, I should like to use a 'word' like "effectivity" in order
to denote an activity which does have an effect, at least insofar as it
is an essential part of an ongoing process, but which may, or may not, be
unto some identifiable end. That is, "effectivity" is not necessarily (or
essentially) purposive. The activity in question may simply be part of
life-activity in general, the language behaviour characteristic of our
human form of life, achieving nothing in particular, yet always being a
transaction in concepts. If we ponder the notion of the activity of a
concept, or what we might think of as the behaviour with it (both as users
of it and responders to it), if we think of its power, its evolution, its
limited flexibility and versatility, then we perhaps have some image of
what is meant by depth grammar.

(We might notice here in passing that I now appear to be expressing
the inexpressible. I seem to be describing the life of our concepts and
will go on to speak even of being being, and all manner of such things.
Yet life and being and similar things, and our knowing of them, are all
beyond description. To attempt such description is to exceed the limits
of language. This point will be discussed more fully in the closing
chapter but we can note in passing that it would seem to be part of
the authentic description of such things as life, being, even mystical in-
sight and experience, to say that they cannot be described. However, if
we know our description is not to be taken in the usual sense of descrip-
tion, then our attempt to describe serves as a display—and all of these
things can be displayed.)

10 The assertion that something cannot be described is quite often cited
as a hallmark of 'mystical knowledge'. In fact, we might recall that
William James calls 'ineffability' the "first characteristic" of such
knowledge. (William James, op. cit., p. 371.) Surely this applies not
only to our mystical knowledge but to much of reality as well. We are
used to an ineffability concerning God but are perhaps uncomfortable with
the ineffability of things at hand.
Also, with such a notion we begin to understand Wittgenstein's peculiar usage of "the grammar of the word . . ." ("to think," "to know," "to mean," etc.) and his curious 'move' in the Investigations in connecting the grammar of one particular word with another in such a way that our seeing that connection is indeed a revelation of 'the way things are', be it something in the objective world, or more often, something in our conceptual world. (At its deepest levels this can be perceived to be the revelation of an ontology.) Frequently we had not seen the revealed 'fact' because we thought of our own language only from the level of our surface grammar. While our language is not designed only for the representation of facts, but to perform innumerable other transactions as well, on Wittgenstein's analysis, it would seem to be the case that when one of our non-representational transactions goes amiss, it does so precisely because we have not understood 'the way things are' with our concepts. We have not fathomed the depth grammar and are not operating with it according to the essential structure of the concepts formed and operated in, and by, our lives -- that is in, and by, our language, our social customs, our history, our living, etc. The corrections that we make are those designed to bring the hearer's conceptual operation into alignment with our own as evidenced by his response. In other words, they are designed to achieve a satisfactory transaction by means of a compatible participation in the depth grammar, as it is perceived and created by the language community, through the general facts of nature and social customs. We must note here that such a description is not intended to invoke either a mechanistic or a stimulus-response theory of language which would in any way detract from the totally integrated life-activity or form of life model which Wittgenstein presents. It is not separable from man and his living, though its concepts are the tools or essential apparatus of that living.

Recalling this notion of tools might further elucidate role as the 'reality' of depth grammar and display the various aspects of "role" as it applies to words and expressions. Wittgenstein emphasizes that even our material tools have multiple purposes and we should note how equally true this is of our words and expressions. Their uses cannot be subsumed under a single application. Yet, there are other differences between our material objects as tools and our words as tools. While a hammer remains objectively (as an object) a hammer and the nail continues to be a nail though it might be used as a punch, our words are more plastic. They are
a living tool. They are less separate from ourselves than other tools, less objective, and perform their functions only as a part of our lives and living. Furthermore, though words remain the same in their external appearance, they evolve over time. They play a part in our language games (21). This is the aspect of role, as it applies to our words and expressions, which is not true of our material objects. Role here means more than function. As we shall see, use is more than purpose.

The role which our words and expressions play is also that of a part in the drama, parallel to the role of an actor or singer. That is not to say they are to be thought of as parallel to the actor or singer, for that is to render them an independent power or agency. Such an image again objectifies our language instead of irrevocably incorporating it into the human form of life. It is the role we are to concentrate upon. The actor plays a part, but the role is the part he plays. This does not mean simply what he says and does in the course of the drama. It is not simply his function in the outcome of the plot. There is also a sense in which the role tells the actor what to do and how to say the lines of his script. In the case of an actor, the role is both a force and a manifestation. It directs his performance and at the same time makes that particular performance possible. The actor performs given actions according to his role. The actor is a character, a functionary, within the play, but he is also said to have character. This is in no way intended to conjure up the image of an atmosphere which might surround our words or expressions and make us feel they have a depth when uttered significantly or make us inclined to choose one particular word or expression over another. Wittgenstein specifically denies this notion of depth in regard to our words and expressions (594). This is definitely not intended to be a part of their role nor can it account for their meaning. Rather, our words and expressions have a different force. At most, this is something we are "inclined to say" when we have noticed of our words that "something different takes place when they are uttered significantly from when they are merely uttered" (594). While this is a notion we are not to hold, we are, nonetheless, to realize that one's role is in fact one's way of being. It is the being as it is at a given time. It is not merely one's function, not even one's function as such and such a character. Hence, the actor or singer whom we put on stage in order to understand "role" is, off stage, each of us as we are, as we know, think, feel, live authentically. This is the form which our reality takes in given circum-
stances and in that sense, realizing that our reality is dynamic and therefore can authentically assume multiple shapes, we can see that role applies neither to function alone nor to an assumed character. We can come to comprehend that all reality, and that of course includes the life of our words, is, likewise, dynamic. It performs many functions in its life and its life itself has many forms, many ways in which it is manifest, actualized, and effective.\footnote{It is perhaps expedient to take notice of what might be called an 'historical caution' at this point. It concerns both the concepts and words of "role" and "game." These words and ideas were once used 'innocently'. This was the case during the life of Wittgenstein. Now, however, because of popular psychology, transactional analysis, gestalt therapy, etc., etc., all of which have altered our conceptual field, that is, have altered the life of these words and concepts, they are no longer such pure and innocent analogies as they once were. They bring ideas and images to our minds which were not there for Wittgenstein. To "play a role" and to "play a game" today have numerous connotations which are by no means totally positive or even "value-free."}

Let us note here, as an aside, that if our words accomplish something they do so authentically. There is no way in which our words can be inauthentic and yet function. Perhaps this is where our words, insofar as they have roles, can speak to us of our handling of roles. They cannot be in 'bad faith' as we can, even if our 'bad faith' is explainable through complex psychological and sociological factors. This is so because they cannot escape into the world of illusion. They are ontologically grounded. Yet, ironically, it is through them, as tools, that we can escape this ontological mooring, become ungrounded, create illusion, escape the mystery of our being and the appreciation of it through explanation which appears to be possible through the surface grammar of our language. Our inauthentic living is precisely surface living as opposed to depth. Were we to understand our language in terms of depth grammar, such surface explanations would not occur. Our questions which they answer would not occur. Our life would be participation, continual doing in depth, full of wonder and the splendid insight of unknowing. We would enjoy philosophical silence even on the level of dianoia, as well as the silence of awe, at and within our participation, the silence of insight. We would dwell in noesis. Grounded, at home, in noesis, perhaps we could more easily live that silence, dwell in the stillness of being itself, the stillness that it enjoys (in our words) 'before' or along with its necessary expression or manifestation as what is, which includes the world, human life, lan-
language, etc. This is what the word "meaning" might describe if the word were able to be authentically used, that is, if we could somehow escape, which is not possible, our surface grammar which continuously makes it look as though meaning is separable from what is, and which, in our extreme state of illusion and alienation appears to be a property of our language, which, again, in our alienation appears to be separable from life and the world and the human species.

Returning now to thought of grammar as considered in the Investigations, we are to understand our words as having that complex notion of role which includes function, but is also that whereby the function is achieved. With this sort of role, we employ and apply our words and expressions, call them into play, have them take a part in our language games. This both limits and actualizes their use and usage. Though we might imagine a language in which we can substitute one word for another, once our words are in actual use, once they are functioning, according to their roles, according to what they can and do do, then they are differentiated one from another, and our arbitrary and indiscriminate substitution of one for another is thereby prevented. It is on this basis of depth grammar as role, that Wittgenstein can investigate the difference between "to know," "to understand," and "to mean." The similarity in their surface grammar leads to an assumed assimilation of their uses. We take it for granted that their 'life' is the same. We never suspect a misunderstanding of the concepts which the use of these words forms and which are the actual tools or characters which come into operation in the usage of these words. Furthermore, failing to understand this actual life and role played by the word, we fall prey to the illusory directive of the surface grammar and, working on the model of the name as a label attached to a thing which can explain the meaning of the name, we proceed again to look for some referent of our words which we then identify as their 'meaning'. Clearly, it is in the study of roles that we can break this assimilation tendency and avert such misunderstanding (29).

Furthermore, if the study of our depth grammar is to perform such an epistemological function, then the role of our words obviously does not mean some operation which they perform or are used to perform in fulfillment of an intention of the user, for that would make the meaning of a word dependent upon the intention accompanying its employment. (I use "inten-
tion" here in the medieval sense of "purpose."\textsuperscript{12} Such a notion again separates our words from the natural behaviour of man, from his particular form of life, but this is contrary to Wittgenstein's understanding of intention. For him, intention is not sufficient to account for meaning and in itself is not independent of the totality of the human form of life. Therefore, it is itself derivative in part from our language and its use. It is dependent upon individual and corporate history, specific circumstances, the general facts of nature, etc.

Finally, Wittgenstein would seem to suggest that another role which our words and expressions play is that part which they take in the external spoken and written language itself. In any given utterance, specific words take the actual place assigned to them by grammar; this is one of the 'roles' which they fulfill (38, 41, 42). Having done this they also play a part in the game in which those utterances are engaged. They play a role in the games we play by means of our language, our life games of which our language is a part. Perhaps this is most understandable if we remember that numerous things other than words also play such a 'role' in both the functioning of our language and in the games of our lives. The most prominent among these is the paradigm, but they can also include physical objects such as samples and the standard metre in Paris (50). It is indeed a composite and complex notion of role which we must understand about our words if we are to solve paradoxes (182) and reject the grammar "which tries to force itself on us..." (304).

Let us circle the spiral again. We need our surface grammar in the ordinary usage of our words. It is the blueprint according to which they are assembled, applied, made into useful tools, but this in no way tells us "how our language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such and such an effect on human beings" (496). It, together with the deeper aspects of our customs, our "uses, institutions" enables us to be masters of the technique of language (199). The uses and

\textsuperscript{12}In a discussion of intention, Anthony Kenny notes that Wittgenstein was frequently reacting to Russell's notion of intention which he thought "ignored the element of intentionality (Intention) in language. This term he appears to have taken from Husserl, who in turn took it from Brentano, and scholastic tradition..." (Anthony Kenny, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 124.) For Wittgenstein intention and expectation are closely related concepts and are "immediately connected with reality" (PR, 35).
institutions are deeper than our surface grammar. The rules of surface grammar cannot encompass the roles of our words as concepts. Surface grammar can reflect but not reveal this actual life of words and concepts, the ways in which they can accomplish and be used with effect in life activities. (No necessary purpose is suggested here), but reflections are often distorted and misleading. They are not reproductions. To be masters of the technique of language we must be adept with both the obvious and the not so obvious. We must be proficient in both the surface and depth grammar in order to use our words and expressions. While the surface and depth grammar must be compatible, Wittgenstein has warned us of the danger wherein the rules of our surface grammar can obscure the roles of the depth grammar thereby creating misunderstanding in our everyday language usage and philosophical problems in our 'self-conscious' reflection or observation of that usage. Besides being compatible, our two grammars are also complementary. They are intimately related and both are necessary and inevitable, actual aspects of our language. Furthermore, both are called "grammar." If the surface grammar is the external patterning of our language usage, but can obscure and deceive our understanding, then the role of our words can clearly be separate from it. Our surface grammar does not infallibly reflect or structure our depth grammar, as though that depth grammar had no structure or pattern in itself. Our words and expressions are not totally plastic until formed by rules. The life of their own which they have acquired in use, is forceful and somewhat independent in itself. It has structure and power. In fact, that is perhaps the reason for calling this important but abstruse phenomenon "depth grammar." Our words and expressions in themselves as concepts do have a pattern. By virtue of their use they have come to have a structure of their own which interacts with the rules of surface grammar. Thus we can say that our surface grammar and our depth grammar correlate, though they need not correspond.

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13 There is a story about Wittgenstein being challenged by some dons at Trinity to say what 'surface grammar' and 'depth grammar' have in common, and of his replying, after a few moments' thought, 'Is "Should one say 'Father, Son and Holy Ghost is one God' or 'Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one God?" a question about surface grammar or about depth grammar?' (Godfrey Vesey, "Locke and Wittgenstein on Language and Reality," Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. R. Lewis [London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976], p. 267.)
Use and Grammar

At this point it behooves us to examine briefly use in conjunction with depth grammar. Of all the ideas which Wittgenstein bequeathed to the field of philosophy, that of 'meaning as use' has perhaps received the most popular acclaim. For those who attain any degree of familiarity with the Investigations, it quickly becomes almost a hackneyed slogan. Yet, the concept itself, while extremely important, is also extremely complex. Bluntly put, there are many uses of the word "use." Also, it is part of a family of words. That immediate family includes "application," "function," "employment," "operation," and "practice." The extended family includes "service," "point," "purpose," "role." All of these are of course related to "aim," and "goal." From this list one can easily discern two branches of the family tree. One of these might be called the functional branch and the other the functioning branch. The functional branch would include "aim," "goal," "service," "purpose" and possibly the word "function" itself. These words are the somewhat teleological members of the family. They imply that our words and expressions are for some end.

These words of "aim," "goal," "purpose," etc., have a personalistic character about them and it is tempting to refer to them as the "intentional" group. However, they are meant to apply to the achievement or accomplishment of our words and expressions and we have already seen that intention is present only in some language games. Our words 'accomplish' independently of our intentions and sometimes even contrary to our intentions. In many ways this functional side of the family seems to have become predominant. We quite naturally and automatically think of human action as being conscious, deliberate, and therefore intentional, and this group, as we have just said, does have the personalistic or intentional character. Also, and more importantly, this branch of the family has probably become dominant because of the strong drive toward dianoia. We seek the intelligible, and generalize to the universal. It is easier to work with this. If we fail to look at the accomplishment of our words independently of our intention, that is, if we fail to perform a continuous hermeneutic on expressions, we are left with only the intention which is easy to handle. If we do go so far as to see the actual accomplishment independent of our intention, we are still left with only the end result, another universal, and that is equally easy to handle. In either case, when we consider the functional aspect of our use of language,
we have a product which can, as it were, be 'prised off' the actual happen­
ing or activity of language. We have an end product devoid of its historicity.

This drive for the universal in itself obscured the equally important, possibly even more important, side of the "use" family. It accounts for the tendency we have to misunderstand the whole picture, even the 'depth grammar' of "use." It is somewhat like the feeling we have that a city lies to the right when we are walking along a river, simply because on some walk along some river at some time that happened to be the case (cf. p. 215). This comparison simply brings into relief the complexity of the using of this concept. We might simply be wrong about the direction of the city. In the case of "use" such a tendency does not make us simply wrong. It is partially right, but only partially, and that degree of rightness not only condemns to obscurity the less prominent aspects of the matter, but has the effect of distorting the whole. This one-sided understand­
ing of "use" is perhaps as misleading as the generalization that Wittgenstein was perpetually trying to correct, namely, that all of our expressions have only one use, and that is to describe some state of affairs or thought.

What, then, is the less dominant side of this family? It is that which we might simply call "functioning" as opposed to "functional." We might be inclined to call it "usage" as it has about it that characteristic of the actual words and combinations of expressions which are in fact employed toward some end, but "usage" also has about it the notion of the way in which words and phrases are used in a given language community. It easily carries us into ideas of idiomatic expression, or particular com­binations and arrangements of words, which might result from nothing more than the arbitrary (though, as we have seen, not completely arbitrary) rules of a particular surface grammar of a given community. The idea of "functioning," on the other hand, has about it the notion of what actually occurs. It is the technique of language enacted and would include "application," "employment," "operation," "practice," etc. It is our actual language activity in a given set of circumstances. If we can think of the functional as telos, we might think of the functioning as praxis. It is the actual exercise of language. Functioning is the performance, the game itself, as opposed to the particular object of some particular game. It is the event of our language in the course of life which might sometimes include an intentional purpose, but frequently does not.
Here it is perhaps worthwhile to note the linkage or nexus between these two branches of the "use" family in terms of "point." This is, as it were, the locus in which we can see their interconnection. If we have the order "Bring me the broom" and the order "Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted to it," we might agree that the orders "achieve the same" (60, 61). Yet, that does not mean that their meanings are the same, for "it can be asked in what cases we say: 'These are merely two forms of the same game'" (61). Our use of these two combinations of words might occur in very different games rendering very different meanings to these expressions. Furthermore, we might say both "Yes and no" to whether or not one who carries out these orders would do the same (62). Nonetheless, we would probably agree that "the point of the two orders is the same" (62). Also, we might agree that it is not our specific words with which we are to be concerned, but their 'meaning' (which does not 'signify' something of the same sort as the word) directs our attention to that which is done with the words (120). Yet, what is done with the word and the doing of it are inseparable. That is, we cannot divorce what is done from the doing. The activity is intrinsically necessary to the accomplishment. Function and functioning are linked. Yet, as we shall soon notice, there can be times of doing in which nothing in particular seems to be done. We are moving toward a priority of the functioning.

Our normal language games usually do have a point. For this they are dependent upon regularity in behaviour, in rules, and in natural phenomena (142). These are the prerequisites of function. They are also the very substance, the material, that which does, the functioning, without which the function could not occur. Of course, care is required in citing prerequisites. There are cases in which what seems to be a prerequisite is only a characteristic accompaniment. For instance, my feeling does not give my use of the word "hope" its 'meaning'. I can use it successfully with no feeling at all, but if I say "I hope he'll come" and do have strong feeling, my feeling might give my use of the word its "special ring" and might even be the point of my statement (545). This shows only that the service to which I put my words and the life in which that service occurs are intimately related. The service is part and parcel of the living of that life. The purpose, point, service to which an expression is put is embedded in its actual application, its usage, its practice or employment. We might attempt to distinguish between what is essential and inessential in the use of our words, but the whole activity,
the whole game, "one would like to say, has not only rules [which might be distinguished as essential or inessential] but also a point" (564). The service to which our words are put is indeed the point of our words (pp. 178, 179). It depends upon the game. The game is part of the practice of life. It depends upon the enmeshing of the whole.

We can see more deeply how crucial it is to understand the use of a word or expression not only, or even primarily, as function if we locate Wittgenstein's notion of use in his general understanding of language. That the use of a word or expression is not exclusively its service or function is quite obvious when we recall that language, even as a tool, is a tool which can be used in many different ways. As noted before, what is the function of throwing a ball in the air or chanting a rhyme? We might say it is done for the sheer pleasure of it, but sometimes it is done unconsciously and not particularly enjoyed at all. It is a bit absurd to say that every action in life has a function or even a point in the normal sense of these words. Service and function, again, seem to be related to intention, but we must recall the limits of intention in our language activity. Some of the ways in which we use any tool, including the tool of language, while they can always be cast in intentional terms by an outside observer, when examined in their everyday settings, are clearly non-intentional. What intention can be found behind my linguistic act of speculating about an event, or play-acting, or cursing in exclamation? These instances are derived from Wittgenstein's list of possible language games which follow his statement that "the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (23). His italicization of "speaking" in itself emphasizes the sense of functioning as opposed to the sense of function or goal of our language. Also, all Wittgenstein's criss-crossing of the landscape is precisely the noticing of our actual, everyday language in use. He repeatedly brings the functioning to our attention from many different angles. In fact, even in the cases of intention or specific purpose, we can understand the function only through an examination of the functioning.

Furthermore, given that our purposes and intentions can be of a linguistic nature in themselves, they are as much the product or creation of our language as is our language the tool of their fulfillment. In this regard, language is, as it were, self-contained. It is a closed system, but if this were Wittgenstein's intended understanding of "use," our language could not in fact be a part of life. It could not engage outside
itself. Also, in such a notion, language could never get a 'foothold' whereby to fulfill a given purpose or intention. The concept itself is self-defeating. The entire thrust of the Investigations is that language is not self-contained. It is intrinsically dependent upon its users and their community customs and setting which includes so vast a field as "the general facts of nature!" Wittgenstein specifically denies any sort of internal coherence theory of 'truth' or 'meaning'. Language cannot work in a vacuum. There is nothing particularly desirable about an ideal language (81). In effective operation our words and the world relate. Again: "The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that, it isn't red" (429). What is, is, and must be as it is (i.e., in some way), for me to speak truly or falsely. As said before, we run up against the facts of nature. While our language is part of nature, there are other parts as well, and in the grammar of our language we can acquire a 'picture' of the networking of the parts. Having recalled Wittgenstein's emphasis on the multiplicity of the uses of our language, the many ways in which it functions, together with the relation between his concept of use and his concept of language as an activity, and the need to understand the functioning in order to understand the function, we might conclude that, while the functioning aspect of the matter of "use" was on first thought less dominant perhaps because of the tendency to seek universals, it is in fact the more important of the two.

Let us now consider the implications of this understanding of "use" for depth grammar and through depth grammar for Wittgenstein's understanding of meaning. In order to do so, let us cite just one of Wittgenstein's numerous indications of what he means by "use." He notes that we are normally inclined to say:

...the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here

14 In the Tractatus we noticed similarities between Wittgenstein and Plato, particularly in regard to form. Elizabeth Anscomb, in her article "A Theory of Language?", points out that in the Investigations also there are similarities, particularly in "the harmony between language and reality [which] is found in the false statement no less than the true. This false statement says (of what is) something that (it) is not--but something nevertheless, which is. Here we can point to that which the thing is not." (Irving Bloch (ed.), op. cit., pp. 156-157.) This comment is made as interpretation of 429 on the agreement between language and reality.
We 'employ' money in numerous ways in numerous transactions. Furthermore, it is part and parcel of the fabric of our lives. It is sometimes part of our motivation for action. It sometimes determines where we live and what we are able to have and do. It limits. It enables. All of this is part of the use of money in our lives, part of its life within our life. It is all part of what money does. And that is far more than what we might do with money. The actual transactions we perform with our money, our passing it over a counter or writing a cheque, and the purposes for which we do such things, obtaining goods or services, are both only aspects of what we call money. Also, what money 'does' is partially by virtue of what we do with it and how we do it. Furthermore, it is partially by our activity with it that it has a structure, a life, a power of its own. We in turn channel, employ and respond to that power. The entire complex is reciprocally dynamic. At the same time, it is not our activity in regard to money that is its only constitutive factor nor its only limiting or enabling one. It must interact with objects in the world, with the custom and history of the community and its supporting and opposing values. It must blend and compete with various ideologies concerning it, etc., etc. It is subject to rules and to laws, both natural and social. It is part of what is. In this light, it enjoys a set of potentials and labours under a set of limitations appropriate to it -- just as all other items of being. Our use of money, then, is not so importantly what we can buy with it, but our actual operation with it. It is all of our life activity as reciprocally related to money and as subject both to our rules for exchange, banking, and accounting (our 'surface grammar'), but also the potential and limitations of the role it plays, and of the reality which it is, whereby that role is possible (that is, our 'depth grammar').

Clearly we can substitute "words" and "expressions" for "money" in this analysis. I will not draw out the parallel by means of repetition. The point is that use in the Investigations denotes our participation, ultimately, in an entire ontology. It is an ongoing participation in the dynamics of being, part of the flow of what is as it is continually just being what it is and doing what it does, since what is includes man-using-his-language-within-the-world in all the ways he does. That use, that being and doing, is according to an actual pattern of rules and of roles

the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.) (120).
and an internal pattern of nature, reality, being, which need not be
articulated but must be understood in order for the use, the operation,
the intricate interaction, the dynamic enmeshing in activity to
occur effectively. It is this concept of the order of what is, the 'sur-
face' and the 'depth', the internal and the external, or the existential
and essential, patterns of reality which in the Investigations are denoted
by "grammar" — both surface and depth.

Pattern

The ontological implications of the concept of grammar can perhaps
be elucidated most precisely through the notion of 'pattern'. Also, in
the idea of pattern we can perhaps unite both surface and depth grammar
and thereby attain a glimmering of Wittgenstein's conception of grammar
as such. "Grammar" as we shall see, with its dual aspects and the in-
trinsic relationship between them, might be thought of as synonymous
with "ontology."

There are two general aspects of the idea of pattern: that of a
prescribed model or form to be imitated as in a mechanical design or a
style in literature, and that of a configuration as in the weave of a
tapestry or a grouping of objects (a 'state of affairs') or even the
flight path of an aircraft. It might seem at first as though we should
identify the former with surface grammar, and the latter with depth
grammar and have done with it. To do so might be both an accurate con-
ceptual move and an insightful comparison, but Wittgenstein's linkage
of pattern and grammar would seem to be richer than that. It is one of
those peculiar and seemingly profound moves in Wittgenstein which has the
effect of blocking this inclination to dichotomize, to divide and label
and atomistically analyze, as though such an exercise were to yield an
absolute understanding of the matter, forgetting entirely that we might
well have given ourselves only the parts of the reality, like the pieces
of a clock, and perhaps the directions for application or assemblage,
without having at all perceived the whole, which is so different and so
much greater than its parts, just as the clock is so different and so
much greater than its pile of pieces. Instead, in this linkage we are
compelled to struggle toward a comprehension of a dynamic gestalt.

Wittgenstein mentions that only those who have "mastered the use of
a language" can hope. "That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes
of this complicated form of life" (p. 174). He continues with a considera-
tion of grief:
"Grief" describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life. If a man's bodily expression of sorrow and of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we should not have the characteristic formation of the pattern of sorrow or of the pattern of joy (p. 174).

We are well aware of how linguistic these experiences are. They might relate to external objects and events, but our reactions to those objects and events are dependent upon our concepts and the role which those concepts play within our lives in terms of our attachments, values, etc. If hope and grief and joy are patterns of human experience, we perceive within all of them the patterns of our concepts, and hence attain an awareness of the extremely linguistic nature of human experience. Much, if not all, of our reality is patterned through, in conjunction with, and by -- our use of language. It is 'mediated'. While we are speaking here of emotions, Wittgenstein also observes the patterning in general human behaviour. Language for Wittgenstein is an intrinsic part of being human. It is, in fact, precisely that form of life which is -- human. It is patterned and our general behaviour is patterned. It is therefore of no surprise that Wittgenstein cites an example of patterning which clearly displays the interaction between our language and our activity. Even the possibility of what we are able to do, how we are able to behave, depends upon this interaction.

Pretending is, of course, only a special case of someone's producing (say) expressions of pain when he is not in pain. For if this is possible at all, why should it always be pretending that is taking place -- this very special pattern in the weave of our lives?

A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere.) (pp. 228-229).

It is of course clear that in the giving of information, the reporting of facts, we are not only involved in behavioural patterns but our replicative use of language is symbolically reproducing some "state of affairs," some pattern or configuration. Furthermore, it is obvious upon brief reflection that our other multiple uses of language, like the call for help, a morning greeting, making a joke, all depend upon -- pattern. They cannot achieve without it. This pattern is not only a matter of human custom and of recurrence or consistency in behaviour. (One man only cannot obey a rule only once in life! (199.) It is also a matter of consistency in our material objects, in what we normally call 'the world'. We could not
make reports about chairs as we do, if they occasionally vanished (80) nor as we saw could we have the activity, the pattern, of weighing cheese, if the lumps of cheese were to "suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason" (142).

Finally, in Wittgenstein's comments on pattern we receive a hint of its depth and inevitability, its limited 'fluidity' within consistency, and its ultimate order. "Even in the hypothesis the pattern is not what you think" (p. 192). It is there for us to use and abuse, regardless. Even if we read it wrongly, it is there, inevitable.

When you say "Suppose I believe..." you are presupposing the whole grammar of the word "to believe", the ordinary use, of which you are master. --You are not supposing some state of affairs which, so to speak, a picture presents unambiguously to you, so that you can tack on to this hypothetical use some assertive use other than the ordinary one. --You would not know at all what you were supposing here (i.e. what, for example, would follow from such a supposition), if you were not already familiar with the use of "believe" (p. 192).

There is not one single and unambiguous pattern which is automatically applied. Rather, there are variations that are possible. The scope for creativity is wide, but there are limits. Part of being familiar with the depth pattern, the use of..., is knowing, being master of, where it is applicable and where it is not, that is, knowing the limits of its plasticity.

Think of the expression "I say ...", for example in "I say it will rain today", which simply comes to the same thing as the assertion "It will...". "He says it will..." means approximately "He believes it will...". "Suppose I say..." does not mean: Suppose it rains today.

Different concepts touch here and coincide over a stretch. But you need not think that all lines are circles (p. 192).

There is a pattern, a network, an order, not a hopelessly confused jumble of knots and circles linked within circles.

We have seen, then, that Wittgenstein's concept of grammar predominately involves his notions of rules, roles, use, and pattern. Our surface grammar includes rules and the patterns of word usage created by such rules. Our depth grammar, on the other hand, is not so accessible to our understanding. It needs and depends upon our surface grammar, but is constituted mainly by the roles of our words and expressions, the functions
and effects, their 'life', with which we must be familiar before we can use them. It is constituted by the use of our words and expressions, that is, not only the purpose to which they are put, but also the games and playing of the games, the life-activity, one might even say our-language-as-it-is-lived or our living-as-it-includes-the-activity-of-language. While our surface grammar constitutes an external criterion for the usage of our language, which is definable and able to be exhaustively articulated, even to the point of listing the 'permissible' exceptions to our rules, our depth grammar is constituted by an internal criterion for the usage of our language, which proceeds from a conjunction of what is ontologically possible and what, within a given language community, is appropriate life practice. Hence, it is an ontological unit wherein ontology includes the 'social' as well as the 'natural'. It is subject to the possibilities and limitation of what is. It goes just so far as being permits. The surface and depth grammar combine to form the grammar of our language. In combined form it reveals the ontological dimensions of our language. It leads us to be inclined to call grammar the dynamic pattern of being. It is the rules and roles, the use, the order, and configuration of existence in action or operation. When so 'operating', and it cannot not so 'operate', it is simply — meaning. It is the world of things, man, his language, whatever is, all in enmeshing patterns of motion. Hence, we are inclined to say that for Wittgenstein meaning is simply being itself. But to say that is neither to give a theory of meaning, nor to account for meaning, nor to identify or explain it. Furthermore, if we have said that all is x, we might as well have said that nothing is. Thus Wittgenstein's refusal to allow the question of meaning to arise (ask not for its meaning but for its use) is nothing short of profound wisdom. Through such a refusal he deprives us of dianoia and forces us toward noesis.

The Socio-Ontological Unit

It is clear then, that this very fundamental concept of grammar, in both its surface and depth dimensions, at one and the same time, plunges us into enormous complexity, into the totality of being as it is.15

15 In the study of the Investigations, my use of the word "being" has obviously lost its participial form and has clearly become a noun. This usage occurs naturally in the course of working on this text. It parallels the realization that "use" in its conjunction with surface and depth
dynamic, alive, in motion -- and forces us to witness within that complexity a perfect functioning. This functioning, in turn, forces us to affirm an exquisite order. This order is intimated in rules which themselves have many roles in our language games, and by the roles of our words and expressions within those games. It is also intimated in the concept of pattern which, as we have seen, Wittgenstein displays as experience, emotion, information, etc. In order to find our way into the socio-ontological unit, let us delve again into the matter of pattern.

Despite enormous complexity, pattern exists everywhere, and where there is pattern and functioning, there is order. It is this which makes every life activity, including language, unique, fresh, and new, in every instance. That is, in every instance, no matter how repetitious a circumstance or an expression within it might be, it is always a happening, that particular happening. In that sense, it always works. It always carries us along in the stream of life. Out of the pattern that exists we can always spontaneously and ceaselessly generate some appropriate response, some motion within some context. We can act. We can play some move or other in some game or other. We might say that because there is a transference or use of some pre-existing pattern, a given expression or activity cannot be absolutely fresh. But because all in motion and we, our community, our history, our time and place, are never quite the same, even in ritual, as we have seen, each instance is new, untried, in a very real way -- fresh. This happening has never happened before. (There is something wondrous in that!) Yet it works, it accomplishes. Even if it is totally new and creative, and nothing 'remotely like it' has ever been said or done before, it is not chaotic. It can go amiss, but even in its going grammar, takes us from the level of a participial consideration to that of an ontological consideration. We move from a look at what is happening to a look at what it is which is engaged in the happening and which cannot not be so engaged. The dynamic is intrinsic to what it is. We look at what is and the happening. This likewise parallels the realization that the Investigations is not an argument against metaphysics or a piece of analytic philosophy, but an ontological display.

I will continue to use being as a noun and similar phrases as well because there is no other language with which to speak. One has here a problem similar to that which Wittgenstein encountered in the Tractatus. In many ways one is attempting to do what cannot be done, for it seems to exceed the limits of language. But this problem is endemic to writing on Wittgenstein and we will return to this point later.
amiss it finds its place within the weave of our life as part of the pattern. Mistakes, too, are part of the pattern. They issue from pattern and return into pattern. In language and in action, mistakes are corrected, altered. Through trial and error, painful, tedious, learning, we come to be understood. We flow on in that stream. All that process of mistake and correction is likewise 'perfect'. It is 'meaningful', a pattern in itself. Every sentence in our language is in perfect order just as it stands! (98) Our sentences, however, are far more than words. As we have seen, and will continue to see, they necessarily include all of life. We cannot but assume the perfect order, pattern, automatically in force, in all being. It is out of that, that each instantiation comes forth as both functional and fresh. At the same time, it is also this permeating order which makes repetition possible. It is necessary that pattern be recurrent if it is to be pattern at all. A man can invent a new game that has never been played, but if men have never played any games at all, then it is not possible that there be a new game which has never been played (204).

Order accounts for both repetition and infinite variation.

Here we are in a great difficulty. We seem to be plunged into the ongoing 'life' of everything that exists. We are plunged into all that is. We know because of the perfect function, the repetition and variation, which is either a successful accomplishment or a move to be corrected, that there is perfect order. In this last look at pattern, two aspects seem to have emerged. Pattern has about it what might be called a prescriptive force. It is that according to which we act, though it be infinitely 'flexible', allowing for infinite variation. Pattern also has about it that notion of composition or design. These would seem to be aspects or facets of pattern as opposed to different uses of the word, for the prescription has composition inherent in it and the composition is intimately related to the prescription from which it seems to proceed. At any rate, pattern in the sense of prescription issues forth as pattern in the sense of design in the weave. Enacted pattern comes forth as hope, grief, building bridges, calculating boilers, etc. It is configuration, actuality.
Yet, Wittgenstein does not discuss this order as such. He is deeply concerned with it. In fact, the object of his investigations is not just the actual phenomena that can be described, but the possibilities of phenomena particularly grammatical possibilities (90). He examines the evidence for, and basis of, these possibilities. He studies grammar, and the rules, roles, uses, institutions attendant on it. (This is not meant to imply that possibility is a 'super-structure' or 'generalisation' under which all of these investigations can be subsumed. Possibility is not meant to be a framework for perspicuous understanding within our language. Rather, possibility is exposed, laid open to view, but as what it is, namely, something deep. It is part of the life of our words -- and our dynamic functioning world.)

To ask the 'right questions', even to see grammar with its rules, roles, institutions, etc., as the evidence for and basis of possibility, that is something for which one has to "acquire a nose." It is easy enough to ask informational questions of rules and customs, but to ask of these the questions that display possibility or that display a role as a living thing, a complex interaction, even a happening, takes the skill of a master guide, for here we are in mysterious waters. We are dealing with all that is, ultimately, with being itself. To understand grammar as the study of being is no mean task. The Philosophical Investigations can be seen as an ontology -- but not of the conventional sort. It is an ontology that has reached expressional flower in "grammar." Wittgenstein has chosen to be a very masterful guide, one who enables his followers to see for themselves. If such a one endlessly describes all that is known and seen, if he explains everything in detail, as opposed to leading us to what is there and pointing out the 'grammatical' mistakes which 'blind' us (philosophy describes the use of language and leaves everything as it is (124)), the student may never see. He may never comprehend for himself. He may never be able to "go on" as in successfully completing a series of numbers or making the transition from repeating words to actual reading.

Yet a guide who gave no indications of what to see or do would be a useless guide indeed. And so we have our hints. There are
numerous indirect ones. Let us consider entry 573. Here, in the course of his discussion on our being in some state or other, opinion, expectation, etc., we find that the words we use give us a particular picture of a state. We then apply various linguistic and non-linguistic criteria to determine whether or not this picture presented by our words applies in a particular case. In the end, "The picture which the answers to these questions give us shows what gets treated grammatically as a state here" (573). In other words, again, our world is to some extent a grammatical production; but that is no more than to assert the complexity again. Our language and reality are inseparable, and that, in actuality. Yet, saying that does not commit one to a relativist position in which what is, is totally determined by its linguistic interpretation. It is helpful to see the interrelation between language and reality if we consider something like joy. A part of feeling joy is the desire to share it -- and that requires language or something comparable. (Joy in itself is not a thing, internal or external (Z, 487).) Our language is important here, but the pattern is there and depends on or comes out of circumstances and the experience of things. If one did not possess a language, what one would do with joy might be questionable, but that leads us to the question of whether one who does not possess a language or something like it can experience joy, to paraphrase page 174. The pattern, the order, the interaction and complexity are not so simple as that in the Tractatus.

There are other hints as well which involve possible and very meaningful interpretations of some of Wittgenstein's most enigmatic remarks. Insofar as they can be considered a "guiding," they are a guiding of such finesse as to appear either shocking or completely opaque. Let us consider 371 and 373. "Essence is expressed by grammar." (371) "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as
gramar."

To fathom these cryptic remarks is not easy. Essence here clearly means the nature of a thing, what it is. Commentators frequently read the phrase to mean essence is determined by grammar. In this case, as I have suggested, these phrases could appear to be statements of total relativization. That is, reality is socially constructed; what is, is what we conceive it to be, and that is a matter of intention and perspective. In his earlier writing, Wittgenstein clearly believed in an *a priori* nature of the world and language. Insofar as the rules of our language are as they are due partially to the general facts of nature, that is, due to the kind of world that surrounds us, that *a priori* nature is not totally obliterated. The concept is only mitigated in such manner as to give due emphasis to man's actions as a part of that world. Therefore, given the depth of our grammar and the all-inclusive constitution of language, such a relativistic reading, while not completely wrong, might well be only one level of Wittgenstein's understanding.

Normally the phrase "theology as grammar" is read along the classic lines as follows: "scrutiny suggests that [some] subjects, of which theology appears to be a good example, are themselves merely word systems." Along these lines, the point of this entry would be that theology is a form of grammatical inquiry. Surely theology is a grammatical activity and a grammatical investigation, but to stay at

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17In a 1932 lecture Wittgenstein said, of what later became the parenthesis, "Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word "God". I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one. For example, people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God. This would throw light on the use of the word. What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word."


To some extent the first sentence of Barth's Church Dogmatics could be taken in this vein, yet that was clearly not Barth's position. "As a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her." (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. by G. T. Thomson, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1938) Vol. I, part 1, p. 1.)
this level of relativism is to fail to ask about its deep grammar. If we relativize everything, then we lose the very form of our questions. All there is then is a social construction of reality and a coherence theory of truth. But, that which is fixed and gives form is, after all, presumptions that no reasonable man would doubt (OC, 219). These make up the scaffolding of our thought (OC, 211).

It is true that we can compare a picture that is firmly rooted in us to a superstition; but it is equally true that we always eventually have to reach some firm ground, either a picture or something else, so that a picture which is at the root of all our thinking is to be respected and not treated as a superstition. (C&V, p. 83)

Our notions are ultimately based on an incontrovertible intermeshing with what is. Rules of language reveal the essence of the world. One of the most important things about theology (or anything) as a grammatical investigation is that grammatical investigations are ontologically revealing. A thoroughgoing relativism is not inherent in Wittgenstein’s thought. The essence that is revealed in our language is more than a social construct; it is also the nature that makes herself audible to us as “facts, not concepts” (Z, 358). Therefore, the remark on theology as grammar can be explored on a deeper level, remembering always that just as we cannot put grammar into words, so too, we cannot expect to put completely the essence of God or any other reality into words. (Furthermore, “How words are understood is not told by words alone (Theology)” (Z, 144).)

So, to see theology as grammar could be to proclaim its subject matter, insights, and doctrines as purely linguistic constructions, which, nonetheless, can be used to function within a language community. But if that is the case, why is theology not called a language game? It is seen as grammar. Therefore, the remark could be seen to both extend and deepen our concept of grammar and to shed radically new light on our concept of theology. Its subject matter is precisely protected from relativization and kept pure of language ‘games’. In other words, to fathom Wittgenstein’s meaning of grammar and to connect grammar with theology and essence can indicate to us that we are in fact always functioning in an area quite sublime. Not only when we are doing theology (though for obvious reasons it is perhaps easier to be conscious of it at such a time), but whenever we engage, perform, operate — grammatically. We do not describe our grammar but function through it, with it, in it. We put it to work. Through it we carry on with and in things. We are participating in what is and, through our grammar, can see what is. This is precisely what an ontology attempts to describe and what a theology attempts to explain. So it is perhaps
right and proper to look upon theology as grammar. (On such a reading, of course, we might just as well say "grammar as theology.") On such a reading, theology as grammar appears to be just one example of the same kind as red, order, rules, states, pain, grief, etc., all of which reveal the ontological foundation as well as the conceptual, social, life-activity dimension of our language, our life, and the world. Just as it is perhaps right and proper to look upon theology as grammar, so it is also right and proper to look upon Wittgenstein's *Investigations* as an ontology, for, while not a statement or description of that grammar, it is a guided exercise, a study of grammar by examples, designed to make us fathom it and to see what it displays, even to participate in that which it displays, and -- to appreciate.

All three, theology, ontology, and grammar are concerned with the same function. While the first two attempt to explain and describe, the third is the most dynamic of the trio. It has about it, not only that which can be understood, but that by virtue of which we actually participate in that which is also the object of our understanding. Thus, to be plunged into grammar is to acquire knowledge by means of participation as opposed to explanation and description. It is in fact to be in motion. It is to mean. It is to be. It is deep. Yet, we are obviously functioning through its pattern and order. It is us and we are it. We do, but we do only what we are. When we look at our language and see that our functioning is successful, we say that we "mean," that there is "meaning." We are saying no more than that being is being. It is all in motion, and we are a part of it. "We go up to the thing we mean." (455) "Yes: meaning something is like going up to someone." (457) "When one means something, it is oneself meaning, so oneself in motion. One is rushing ahead and so cannot also observe oneself rushing ahead." (456) The meaning is what is in activity, which is part of it, an intrinsic part of it. We cannot separate meaning 'out'. What we think we have when we attempt such separation is only a phantom. We cannot get outside the 'speech-act' to understand it, just as we cannot get between an experience or sensation and its expression by means of language (245). We cannot get outside what we are and do, just as, in the previous Tractarian schema, we could not get 'outside the world'.
To study this grammar, to study this functioning throughout its depths, is not to attain an understanding of it, but to attain an appreciation that it is. It cannot be separate enough to be an object of understanding, but we participate, regardless; we function in that order and pattern and cannot not do so. We are. And, "We talk, we utter words, and only later get a picture of their life." (p.209) But doing that, getting that picture, can be the result of the investigation of grammar. We must become masters at seeing through grammar. That takes time -- and therapy. And -- it has 'reverberations'. As we shall discuss later, though our participation in itself may not be changed, it comes to be enhanced, for it comes to be done with a degree of realization of what is happening. The participation comes to be accompanied by a certain awe and wonderment. This perhaps is a qualitative change in consciousness itself; it is a change in us.

At this point let us recall that Wittgenstein's investigation of meaning in the Investigations was precisely by way of seeing what meaning was not. It was not merely the objects named, nor the bearers of names. It was not an atmosphere surrounding a word nor our experience of a word. It was not a thought which is expressed by means of language. It was not an intention nor an expectation nor a mental state or process of any sort. Nor was it something produced only by means of grammar. Nor was it something which adheres to names, to words, or to expressions. Nor in Wittgenstein's view did it properly obtain to sentences and propositions. It can be 'see' if we look at language at work. Hence we are told to study the use. Yet, if we do examine the use of language, since that does not mean intended accomplishment pertaining to a given utterance, we find that we must not only be cognizant of all these mentioned factors but of many more besides. We must bear in mind circumstances and context. We must be aware of all the social dimensions and history of the entire language community. We must be aware of the general facts of nature itself and the way in which our language can mould the limited plasticity of 'reality', but must ultimately respect those limits. Any violation of such limits, social or natural, will cause misunderstanding and mistakes. Corrections must then be made in such a way that language activity coincides with the freedom of those limits. Finally, we must be aware of man himself, of his external bodily form and of that inner life or principle whereby he is not an automaton.

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aware of his complexity within the world and of his natural behaviour, which is the final standard according to which we assess understanding and proceed with interaction. And etc., etc.

In considering the use of language, nothing is sufficient in itself and everything is necessary. We must not only be aware of "what kind of actions accompany these words...[and] in what scenes they will be used; and what for..." (489), but we must at times "imagine the psychical significance, the states of mind involved" (652), always "interpreting that situation and its antecedents" though at the time "I don't consider them and don't judge them" (637). I have to bear in mind the primitive and natural expressions which words sometimes replace (244). I have to remember that when I say something about myself I am saying something that "goes beyond what happened at that time" and that I am reporting something not "on grounds of self-observation, but by way of a response (it might also be called an intuition)" (659). To understand a sentence and to mean a sentence I must operate in and with all of these "--and similar things"!! (31) In every instance of meaning or understanding "There are...hugely many interrelated phenomena and possible concepts." (p.199)

Furthermore, I must also be aware of the whole "field of force of a word" and know that it is this "field of force of a word that is decisive." (p. 219) Just as in teaching, my examples are sometimes meant to point beyond themselves (208), so my words necessarily (in the sense of functional necessity, not logical necessity)\(^{19}\) relate to a

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\(^{19}\) The pattern of logical necessity is so exceedingly strong in contemporary thought that any use of the word "necessity" within a philosophical context is usually understood to mean logical necessity. Since the 17th century, the focus of "necessity" has been that of logical operation. In working with the Investigations this is a tendency of thought which must be strongly resisted, not only because of Wittgenstein's 'fluid' conception of logic which depletes even logical necessity of its 'hardness', but also because of the presentation of a functioning totality wherein "necessity" more appropriately means that something actually happens because of the 'way things are'. What happens could, of course, always be otherwise. There is no given condition or sum total of factors such that a given thing must happen and the only way in which "an intrinsic necessity" can have a correlate in our language is as "an arbitrary rule" (372). But something must happen. Wittgenstein's focus is always on the functioning, the happening. He is not concerned with necessity as such. "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'protophenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said:
vast beyond. Because of this interrelated, functioning whole and my own immersion in it, in understanding and meaning a sentence, it is almost as though I were naturally and continuously able to "read the darkness" (635). Every utterance can be the product only of the entire complex, and any attempt to simplify is impossible. Even to attempt to account for meaning in terms of so vast and complex a thing as human consciousness is in Wittgenstein's words -- "ludicrous." "It is, as it were, a dream of our language" (358). We should like to simplify and our language makes it look as though it should be possible, but such simplification is only gross distortion.

Nor is it even correct to call our sentences a product of this complex without involving ourselves not only in inaccuracies, but in total error, for to think of our sentences as a product is to separate them from the very complexity out of which they 'appear' to have come. Separate, they are non-functional. Non-functional, they are not sentences. To an analytic philosopher this may sound ludicrous, for he will likely be inclined to say that a sentence is, as it were, a string of words which one writes on a blackboard and can then proceed to "analyze." But sentences for Wittgenstein can be only with the "stream of life." Not only is the entire complexity, the whole socio-ontological unit, necessary that a sentence might be, but the sentence is part of the unit and the unit is part of the sentence. They are one. We can of course always use "meaning" in the ordinary, everyday language game played with that word in which we "speak of 'the meaning' and of 'meaning it'" which is, of course, "a different kind of question" (p. 216). It is this kind of question which gives the picture, makes it look, as though our philosophical question of meaning were a legitimate one. The everyday question creates the illusion of a genuine philosophical question. Apart from this everyday usage of the word "meaning," if we are to think of

this language-game is played." (654) What actually happens is always the 'distillation' as it were from myriad possibilities. And both the happening and the 'distillation' essentially or ontologically proceed from or accrue to what is -- an entire, complex, dynamic whole. By functional necessity I mean that which is intrinsically necessary for it because of what it is. There is inevitable, ontological operation. It seems almost impossible to draw too much attention to this ongoing inter-relating which is intrinsic to what is, and in that sense, "necessary" to it. One's every word points to and relates to all of this.
meaning at all -- we are best to do so in the very striking images which Wittgenstein indicates in his double parentheses: "((Meaning-body))" (559) and "((Meaning is a physiognomy.))" (568). We might see these as images designed to replace any fallacious concept of meaning we might persist in attempting to acquire.

Wittgenstein has not overlooked the difficulty of accepting such a position. It is as if he is telling us, "You may not like this, but this is the way it is. Learn to accept it. And when you have accepted it, you will see what you have never seen before and understand through a wisdom you cannot otherwise 'perform'." Time and time again he simply blocks our questions and our attempt to understand. For instance, if we try to 'know all about' what it is to "find the 'right' word" we simply look at the whole endeavour and note that it just is what it is. "...I do not always have to make judgments, give explanations; ... this is simply what searching, this is what finding, is like here " (p.218). Or, "--But as we are not interested in causes, -- we shall say: human beings do in fact think: this, for instance, is how they proceed when they make a boiler " (466). Further: "What would shew why he thinks?" (468) If one is trying to judge what time it is, one "pauses a moment, perhaps imagines a clock-face, and then says a time. -- Or one considers various possibilities, thinks first of one time, then of another, and in the end stops at one. That is the kind of way it is done " (607). Things just are the way they are. "When I raise my arm 'voluntarily' I do not use any instrument to bring the movement about. My wish is not such an instrument either " (614). "Let us not forget this: when 'I raise my arm', my arm goes up." (621). We do what we do and things are as they are.

It is no doubt true that you could not calculate with certain sorts of paper and ink, if, that is, they were subject to certain queer changes -- but still the fact that they changed could in turn only be got from memory and comparison with other means of calculation. And how are these tested in their turn? (p. 226)

If we seek to understand meaning in the *Investigations*, we must come to rest with complexity, dynamic, living complexity. If the images of "meaning-body" and "physiognomy" are too terse, too amorphous, we are given another symbol under which we might summarize the entire socio-ontological unit and the motion within it which constitutes
meaning, another analogy through which we can understand meaning as being itself as opposed to the Tractarian concept of meaning as being expressing itself. In the *Tractatus* the ontological patterns of the world were revealed through the structures of our language. Reality spoke. It expressed itself. In the *Investigations* such separation does not occur. Rather, the one dynamic reality, functioning, in motion, is meaning. Our dissecting and dichotomizing and systematizing only distorts our understanding. Paper and ink are the way they are, we are as we are, words work as words work. Hence: "What has to be accepted, the giver, is -- so one could say -- forms of life" (p.226).

**Justification and Criteria**

Besides presenting this complexity and blocking our analytic questions in order to force us to accept what is as meaning, Wittgenstein also blocks our demand for reasons for doing what we do and behaving the way we do with our language. Sometimes one can give reasons for following a particular pattern, but "my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act without reasons" (211). At other times, for doing anything, "hundred reasons present themselves, each drowning the voice of the others" (478). Or: "We expect this, and are surprised at that. But the chain of reasons has an end" (326). We might have a reason for using a particular expression in a particular case (p. 195), but ultimately that we do what we do is best described as our natural behaviour. If we have learned the technique of language we have mastered both our surface and depth grammar and participate in the motion of being quite naturally and unavoidably. It is what we do, and has and needs no reasons. "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'," (217, also OC, 110, 204, et al.)

If we look for justification or criteria or grounds whereby to attempt to understand meaning, we are again driven to the awareness of a total complexity and the impossibility of normal comprehension. Surely

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20 Garth Hallett has noted the importance in the distinction between causes and reasons in these entries. Reasons have an end "whereas causes might be traced back ad infinitum. The common supposition that every act has a cause should not be confused with the thesis that every act has a motive or justification." (Hallett, op. cit., p. 296)
we can construct elaborate criteria for the meaningfulness or at least for the 'usability' of our expressions, for, after all, we do at times not know what to do with a given utterance — at times we reject an utterance, and we frequently make corrections. Therefore we must be justified in what we do, at least by experience if nothing else, but "Justification by experience comes to an end. If it did not it would not be justification" (485). Ultimately we find ourselves, here, in the midst of everything functioning, working — without reasons. 21 One might look for the grounds upon which an utterance is based. What is the foundation upon which it is based? the soil from which it springs? Even if I ask for the grounds of a supposition underlying some utterance, I find that ultimately "one bethinks oneself of them" (475). Nothing more and nothing less. Yet, what is the verification for those grounds being the grounds? We do in practice have standards for good grounds, — "but the standard has no grounds!" (482) Finally, we must be satisfied with the fact that "A good ground is one that looks like this" (423). All we can do is describe our language games 22 and there, in those descriptions, see the importance of being justified (466) which is very different from justification as the foundation of an utterance. All we see is how we use the word "justification" (486).

The matter of criteria is somewhat more complicated. For a given utterance as we have noted, we can perhaps establish criteria for its usefulness, its acceptability, its appropriateness or effectiveness for a given language game. We can reject utterances and we can explain them. Presumably the bases for doing so should constitute criteria for their meaning. With painstaking care we can look at the rules of a specific language game, but the criteria so devised will be precisely at the level of those rules. It will be a surface criterion of meaning. It will be useful, but it cannot possibly render an understanding of meaning which

21 "If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it is upset" (2, 610).

22 "Even the language game is ultimately founded on the fact that we simply do do things — just so.

"This is how we think. This is how we act. This is how we talk about it" (2, 309).

Fogelin has called the "italicized demonstrative" the "leitmotif of Wittgenstein's later philosophy" (Fogelin, op.cit., p. 148).
can accommodate the depths which are necessary for even a specific language game to be what it is or for an utterance within that game to have meaning. Wittgenstein wants to make us aware of the very possibilities of playing any game.

This is not to say that we are generalizing or assimilating all of our language instances under one purpose or one description. That is a move prevented by noticing that our language games are not alike, that language has many functions, many uses. Even a specific individual game cannot be grasped sufficiently unless we see what makes that specific game possible. We have not come to grips with understanding our language at all unless we see that even our most trivial utterance essentially includes matter which is very deep and which criteria for meaning can never touch. This becomes obvious when we realize that whatever criteria we might devise rest upon the technique of mastery of our language. We can, as if were, rate ourselves only on the performance of our skill. This means that we are again involved in an internal circle in which the criteria for our skill in language is our skill in language. Either our language is justified by itself, or it is justified by some external evidence, for example, how the listener proceeds or responds to our particular utterance or what is done by another or even oneself as a response to an utterance. These things, however, are part of our skill in language, part of our mastery of the technique. We might look for something even more external and find that in actual language usage circumstances 'justify' one in saying some particular thing at a particular time, but these circumstances are in no way "behind or side by side" with what is said (154-155). They, too, are actually intrinsic to our language. If we think of such evidence as external to language, then we have violated Wittgenstein's understanding of language itself. We have separated it from the whole. We have again conceived of it as an instrument which works, not as an organic whole, but on the model of a mechanical object, or an assembly line, or a manual craft. It is on such a model that skill and effectiveness can be given criteria, usually in terms of a final product. On such a model we easily fall into thinking of language as the means of producing something, a picture or likeness or description of some state of affairs, but, again, that is one among many uses of our language, only one of its many accomplishments. On such a model we need the
separations involved between machine or craftsmen, the operation, and the product. We form standards and do not allow that "everything is in order just as it stands." Yet, all is in order, and such separations are dangerously misleading.

Even to attempt development of criteria in terms of skill and effectiveness on the model of a performing art is misleading. Though the dance or the music is inseparable from the dancer or the musician and the activity he performs, his being such an artist and his performing of such an art is one mode of the complicated form of life of the human. It is still separable. Language, however, is inseparable from that form of life. "...to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (19). Meaning is not the 'product' or even the 'attribute' of words and cannot be identified in relation to our skill in using them.

If it were possible to have something unrelated to meaning on Wittgenstein's view, and meaning unrelated to the whole, and not be the organic, functioning, dynamic which it is, then criteria might be possible. That, however, is not the picture we are given. Even our thinking, which sometimes linguistic, is not confined to words. Our memory can be linguistic but need not be so. The same is true of inferences: "'I draw the consequences' not only in words, but also in action" (486). We can draw conclusions in our actions as well as our words. Hence any adequate criterion of meaning would necessarily involve the whole range of human behaviour. Since our human behaviour is so inextricably interwoven with the rest of nature as to be inseparable from it, any attempted criterion of meaning only points again to the entire socio-ontological unit as meaning. Hence, while Wittgenstein says we do "judge whether it [a word or expression] was rightly employed by what [one] goes on to do" (180) we do that judging, establish and use that criterion, precisely because "This is how these words are used". (180) Similarly, "What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it" (190). At the very end of Part I of the Investigations we find the same assertion on criteria: "But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such? -- The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular
technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such criterion " (692). To say that the criterion of meaning is the mastery of a technique is to say nothing about meaning. It says no more than that if I can speak a language then I can speak a language -- which says nothing.

Hence, Wittgenstein examines the instances of language and makes us aware of what is involved in such a use. This makes it look as if we can develop a criterion of meaning, but both that which is revealed by the examination (that is, that which we become aware, namely, the totality involved), and the consistent connection of criteria with the "mastery of a technique" (which likewise points beyond itself and toward that same totality) -- turn the very search for criteria into evidence of the nature of meaning, or, rather, the identification of meaning with being. It becomes, within the Investigations, a 'move' which effectively eliminates meaning. Not only is there no theory of meaning, but the very question seems misguided. We shall soon see the way in which that question can be transformed into a quest by Wittgenstein such that his followers are bequeathed an outright gift, a vision, of immeasurable value.

Before doing so, however, it is useful at this point to notice just how inappropriate and how unsuited to the stream of life is this tendency to seek criteria, for we thereby tend to confine our understanding to the sort of knowledge which criteria can yield. At the same time, it is inappropriate to demand any sort of knowledge of our language which by its very nature can be only fallacious and distorted.

This is the force of a remark like the following: "Think of the recognition of facial expressions. Or of the description of facial expressions -- which does not consist in giving the measurements of the face! Think, too, how one can imitate a man's face without seeing one's own in a mirror " (295). Our language has limits and, though intimately interrelated to all things, not all knowledge can be accommodated by it. When we seek criteria, we are appropriating the wrong paradigm. I can weigh and measure and calculate the effect of wind on the surface of the earth, but how can I possibly calculate the love of a mother and child? Yet, my language may lead me to think that such is feasible -- and if I make the attempt I am operating in the realm of illusion. It is such a total illusion that Wittgenstein seeks to bring to mind
when he suggests that our seeking of criteria in regard to meaning is as inappropriate as it would be in the realm of music, art, or poetry. Yes, we can criticize and evaluate a piece of music, but our entire interaction with it does not lend itself to standards and rules. This is not the way we do music, art, or poetry. Our concepts in aesthetics are 'fluid'; experience is paramount. We might explain a poem to someone, but that explanation is actually an enabling of him to participate in the poem for himself, to appreciate it and 'continue on' with it. Can one ever say how one does it? "How does one lead anyone to comprehension of a poem or of a theme? The answer to this tells us how meaning is explained here." (533). That explanation is an activity. It tells us nothing of what the meaning is. Wittgenstein suggests we think of our language like music. There we do not assert criteria for meaning and know full well that our criteria for performance are a separate matter entirely.

It would be possible to imagine people who had something not quite unlike a language: a play of sounds, without vocabulary or grammar. ('Speaking with tongues.') (528)

"But what would the meaning of the sounds be in such a case?" -- What is it in music? (529)

What happens when we learn to feel the ending of a church mode as an ending? (535)

(Wittgenstein is not suggesting that we must compare this play of sounds or even our own language with music because they are alike or identical in kind, but that what the comparison itself suggests sheds light upon our language and upon meaning in such a way that our concepts of them are significantly altered.) In brief, then, if what we are studying is subject to criteria, it is not language. It is at best our distorted and illusory concept of language. We might paraphrase Wittgenstein here: to think that a criterion of meaning is applicable to language is as "wrong-headed" as calling "meaning a mental activity!" Nothing is wrong with it, unless "one is setting out to produce confusion." (693).

Before proceeding, let us focus for a moment on the presentation now before us. The study of grammar revealed the unsuspected extent of the life of our words. It indicated the profound pattern and order perpetually functioning in every instance of language. It brought us face to face with something unseen and very deep. The observation of meaning as no less than the socio-ontological unit, the totality of
being, likewise functioning in perfect pattern and order, such that each instance of meaning is the result of the functioning of the whole, and the functioning of the whole is in any given instance — meaning — is revealed by the complexity and extensiveness of that profound depth. It permeates both the seen and the unseen. Finally, Wittgenstein's refusal to allow us to diminish or distort the matter by means of any sort of explanation prevents any concept of meaning which is less than that of being being itself.

This poses a dilemma. On the one hand, we are confronted with something very deep. On the other hand, nothing is hidden.

**DEEP BUT NOT HIDDEN**

Let us first consider 'depth'. We have examined the two aspects of grammar — surface and depth. We have seen that one is easily accessible and the other we might never have suspected of even existing. While Wittgenstein has used these adjectives of "surface" and "depth," they are in fact dangerous, for the word "depth" in contrast to "surface" can make us think that whatever is deep is in fact hidden, inaccessible, unobtainable. Here we seem to be working with a matter of degree. For Wittgenstein says, "'I cannot know what is going on in him' is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible." (p.223). We have already noted the difficulty with 'reasons' but that is not to say that they are not present. They are simply difficult to obtain and, when we have obtained them, are ultimately useless. They are useful only as a specific move in a specific language game, but that is an entirely different activity.

Without having done a great deal of philosophy of the Wittgensteinian variety in order to sharpen our perception, that is without having undergone the Wittgensteinian therapy, what is deep may be missed entirely. We must be enabled to see what seems to be hidden. If something were truly hidden it would be "of no interest to us" (126). In fact, we would know nothing of it. The point is, though we might not be able to know or see all things specifically (after all, "The future is hidden from us" (p. 223)), we do not think or operate on the
basis of something's being hidden. The astronomer does not think that
the future is hidden when he calculates an eclipse (p. 223). We can
gain a view of the life of our words, a view of the functioning
totality -- if we learn to look "from close to," if we learn to see.
We must remember that the reason there is nothing to explain is because
"everything lies open to view" (126). What we must come to understand
are the ways in which we misunderstand our language such that what is
appears to be hidden. See, for instance, the way in which our pictures
'hide' what can be seen. When speaking of our belief in souls and
comparing it with a belief that a substance contains carbon rings,
Wittgenstein concludes: "In both cases there is a picture in the
foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the
application of the picture is not easy to survey" (422). This is
partly because we are not used to the total composite concept of
language which Wittgenstein presents. Consequently, we attribute
intangible realities where there are none. We continually operate on
the model that we can 'see' only what is material. If we saw the whole
of what is there to see, we might be cured of this attributional
tendency. Our problem is, "...we refuse to count what is tangible
about our state as part of the specific state which we are postulating"
(608). We insist on separations and distinctions between ourselves
and the world, and between ourselves and what we do. Yet, the
difficulty in seeing is also due to the fact that we don't ascribe
enough to what is seen. We don't recognize the fullness of what is
there, here. In our incessant drive for explanation, we fail to see
that what is, is sufficient. Wittgenstein suggests that familiarity
with our world and the functioning of our language are among
our biggest problems. We are so used to our surroundings that we
cease to see how wondrous they are. The sheer fact that it seems
impossible that what is could so function in itself, is indicative of
the degree of alienation and illusion under which we labour. It is
by overcoming the familiarity with our surroundings that we can acquire
a state of perpetual wonder which never grows old, never regresses to
more familiarity. This is a different mode of being and a different
state of consciousness, which we shall examine shortly.

It is in our state of alienation that "The deep aspect of [the]
matter readily eludes us" (387). In such a state of illusion:
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. --And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (129)

"Deep," then, means not what is hidden or inaccessible, but what, because of our condition, is difficult to see. Since, once seen, it is most striking and most powerful, what is deep is also most profound. At-hand and commonplace, the deep is 'absolutely' wondrous.23

This being the case, it is no longer surprising to find Wittgenstein continually asserting that nothing is hidden. Let us consider a few of these assertions in order to impress upon ourselves the wide range of their application ("nothing" means nothing). This is important, for the consequences of this reveal just how profound, just how deep, are the depths. Ultimately, it also says something about what can be recognised therein, that is, it says something about order and pattern -- even about immanence, God, the dynamic of the totality.

First of all, Wittgenstein's emphasis on the impossibility of a private language is in itself a strong assertion that nothing is hidden. If language were truly private, it could not function. As we have said so often and now say again, not only are the entire language community and its social institutions needed in order for language to work, but -- the whole of reality. Language is only a particular motion or pattern of the entire dynamic. Yet, we constantly seek an explanation. We try to confine that whole to some sort of comprehensible and expressible theory or formula or description or set of rules. It is in response to such repeated efforts that Wittgenstein reminds us that nothing is hidden. We are urged simply to look to what

23 "The last two bars of the 'Death of the Maiden' theme, the C
c; it's possible to understand this as first as an ordinary, conventional figure before coming to understand its deeper expression. I.e. before coming to understand that what is ordinary is here filled with significance" (C&V, p. 52).
is. We think there must be something which will explain away the mystery in what we see. With such an explanation we need never confront the mystery. If we wonder how our images and utterances apply to their objects, what makes them be about that or about him, we are told, "nothing in it or simultaneous with it ('behind it')." (p. 177) It is all there in what we see: "...if you see the expression of an expectation, you see what is being expected." (452). If we think that what is internal to us is hidden, we are wrong. Our thoughts are no more hidden than the unperceived physical proceedings (p. 223). If we look for the rules of logical structure which "appear to us as something in the background -- hidden in the medium of the understanding" (102) we hear the objection: "I already see them (even though through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something" (102). We participate in the structure of reality. If we want to see that structure, we must look at what is there, look at what we do. But notice that the whole enterprise of looking for something hidden is a strange one:

We do things quite naturally. Everything functions effectively. We "make some arbitrary doodle on a bit of paper" (175) and then make a copy next to it. We think there is something strange and special in what we have done. "Afterwards no description satisfies me. It's as if I couldn't believe that I merely looked, made such-and-such a face, and drew a line" (175). We are not satisfied with what is. Hence, we try to create the "idea of that ethereal intangible influence" (175) which serves as an explanation of what has occurred. With that accomplished, we miss the fact that what happened was special in itself and needed nothing special external to it. There is "nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what happens" (197), whether it be in intending an act, being guided in a drawing, understanding a piece of
music, or using our words to form a description or give a command. Incessantly we try for an explanation and incessantly Wittgenstein blocks our effort.

But is that all? Isn't there a deeper explanation, or mustn't at least the understanding of the explanation be deeper? --Well, have I myself a deeper understanding? Have I got more than I give in the explanation? --But then, whence the feeling that I have got more?

Is it like the case where I interpret what is not limited as a length that reaches beyond every length? (209)

With this last remark we have an example of the way in which we are 'bewitched by our language'. We apply a common model quite inappropriately. We repeat the process interminably until finally it becomes "a superstition (not a mistake)!" which has been "produced by grammatical illusions "(111). A sentence is indeed profound. But quite naturally so. What is, is wondrous. But just as it is. "How do sentences do it? -- Don't you know? For nothing is hidden " (435).

There are interesting consequences of this dual aspect of "depth" and "not hidden." As mentioned earlier, through presenting a radically different approach to language and meaning, Wittgenstein effects a transformation of our concepts of them. In the course of doing that, he unearths this dual aspect through which it is possible to achieve an even greater understanding of what is, for all of it is, as it were, displayed in the operation of our language. It is also possible to achieve a greater understanding of the many levels of activity, of 'meaning', in which a given utterance participates. Wittgenstein is always concerned with making us see what is involved in our understanding and/or meaning an utterance -- but there are many levels of that. If we come to see that which enables us 'to go on' in a particular language game, on the surface, we find implicit in that, the depths at which we are operating. Thus, not only is what is not hidden, not hidden, but it is also not not known. It is necessarily known and operated in order that the 'surface' may effectively function at all. This involves a special kind of knowledge, and our recognition of that involves a special way of being, a form of life, or a state of consciousness which we shall discuss shortly. If our operation necessarily includes these multiple levels of activity, the entire notion or dynamic of being, then it is indeed conceivable that what happens on the surface, the ability to make the next moves correctly, the ability 'to go on', is in fact only the 'tip of the iceberg'. It is quite
literally only the surface level. If we find in all of our statements that which is not hidden but deep, we have need of a mode of understanding of the sort which philosophers in other traditions would call a hermeneutic. Furthermore, since it is deep and not hidden, we have the possibility of a hermeneutic. Wittgenstein does not use this word, but in his philosophical method he has in fact given us the technique of a hermeneutic.

Textual Review

At this point, let us indulge in a sort of textual review in order to recall the ways in which Wittgenstein is making us see what understanding and/or meaning a statement involves by making us look at what is happening. In the course of this review we shall also notice some of the factors which form the raw material of a hermeneutic. We shall also see the manner in which these factors point beyond themselves to reveal to us the functioning totality, the ontology, in which we are steeped. Later we shall discuss the peculiar limitation of this vision in terms of inexpressibility and imponderability. A thorough study of any single utterance might disclose these multiple factors for our surveillance. It should at least lead us to the ontological. It should make us aware that there is a totality, but it might not disclose the functioning totality. It is also the case that some utterances more easily bring some factors into relief than others. Furthermore, there are many language games, and it is only by the study of the many that the significance of this multiplicity and the fullness of this complex network can be even inadequately displayed. Nothing is hidden but even the most widely angled lens cannot be expected to capture so immense a panorama. For these reasons, Wittgenstein does not confine
himself to a single, detailed study but is willing to display various aspects in whatever instance presents itself. He does have extended studies of specific examples. That of 'reading' is one; that of 'continuing a series' is another. But the effect which emerges from the activity of forcing us to 'become aware', and even of forcing us to become aware of the possibility of becoming aware in regard to whatever utterance we confront, is what is most striking and most true to the ultimate reality of which we are becoming aware.

Hence, a sample textual review, while not comprehensive, might be, nonetheless, a useful display. It cannot be comprehensive in that there is always more. The Investigations is itself only a sampling. Wittgenstein's philosophical method can be applied to any instance of language and can proceed forever. At the same time, this philosophical method can be ceased arbitrarily at any point by simply limiting the samples considered. As Wittgenstein himself noted, the reason for the nature of the text is intrinsic to the nature of its content (p. vii). The text itself reflects the reality itself. It is a display of its own subject matter. Hence, our short review ought to be equally as 'reflective'. It should be 'typical'.

What is happening when we say:

"The word is on the tip of my tongue." [?] What is going on in my consciousness? That is not the point at all. Whatever did go on was not what was meant by that expression. It is of more interest what went on in my behaviour. ...the verbal expression does no more than certain wordless behaviour. (p. 219)

Our normal actions and bodily movements and gestures -- our behaviour -- are as much a part of our language as is our language a part of them. Also, what we experience is a part of what is necessary to mean or understand a statement. Yet, what we experience is precisely what is happening and what is being done, as well as the result of cumulative memory or what occurred in similar situations. While such experience is essential (it is part of what was learned in the mastery of the technique of language), we must be careful that it is in fact, actual experience and not some 'phantom' created by our language which we then call "experience." Our language can present a picture, its own
forms can converge in some particular configuration, which in actual fact might apply to nothing, but we proceed to name this presentation and treat 'it' as some specific, verifiable sort of reality. Wittgenstein criticizes William James for making such a 'move':

James, in writing of this subject, is really trying to say: "What a remarkable experience! The word is not there yet, and yet in a certain sense is there, -- or something is there, which cannot grow into anything but this word." --But this is not experience at all. Interpreted as experience it does indeed look odd. As does intention, when it is interpreted as the accompaniment of action... (p. 219)

The family of concepts involved and our familiarity with them is likewise important for understanding or meaning an utterance. If "We regard a portrait as a human being," (p. 205) do we always do so? whenever we see it? (p. 205)

I might say yes to this, and that would determine the concept of regarding-as. --The question is whether yet another concept, related to this one, is also of importance to us; that, namely, of a seeing-as which only takes place while I am actually concerning myself with the picture as the object depicted. (p. 205)

We must understand which concepts are in operation and become aware of our normal behaviour with them. In some cases the essential thing to know is simply what the normal usage of a word or expression is. To "'see the sphere floating in the air'...might, for instance, simply be [a] conventional description" (p. 201). We can at times take an expression for something, or find an expression 'of taking something for something' (p. 201) but it need not be used as such at all. In all cases, we must be aware of circumstances. If a picture comes to mind, "the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture" (663). Similarly: "An expectation is imbedded in a situation, from which it arises" (581).

Nothing is hidden, not even ourselves. We must look at everything. I can often see from what another does, just what is in his head. But so, too, if I were to watch myself I could conceivably understand myself in this manner.

...how do I myself recognize my own disposition? -- Here it will have been necessary for me to take notice of myself as others do, to listen to myself talking, to be able to draw conclusions from what I say! (p. 192) That we do not normally watch ourselves in action in this manner does
not mean that we do not act as though we have in fact done so. Our own dispositions and our knowledge of them are necessary for understanding or meaning an utterance.

...one can predict one's own future action by an expression of intention.

I say of someone else "He seems to believe..." and other people say it of me. Now, why do I never say it of myself, not even when others rightly say it of me? --Do I myself not see and hear myself, then? --That can be said. (p. 191)

One could say of oneself: "my own relation to my words is wholly different from other people's" (p. 192), but if theirs is not mysterious to me, neither is mine to them, and were we able to observe ourselves, what seems so mysterious as it occurs in us, like thought and intending and expecting an answer or even expressing pain, would become apparent. When we become separate and alienated, and think of ourselves unlike others, we then miss what is deep in what is, and hide what is otherwise not hidden. Just because "one does not infer one's own conviction from one's own words; nor yet the actions which arise from that conviction" (p. 191), (for that is not what is entailed by nature in being a player in the language game though it is in playing the language game) this does not mean that the same knowledge is necessarily present though in a different form. It is there as natural endowment, as a skill, as mastery in the technique of using the language. To understand and mean an utterance, we must implicitly know of ourselves what we recognize of others. To understand this activity as that of meaning is to be involved in the understanding of an ontology, but to proceed here with that exploration would be to run ahead of ourselves in this review.

I must not only understand usage, related concepts, behaviour of myself and others, but I must be aware of similarities, of how language games borrow forms and paradigms from one another. Since conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from the expression "I believe..." -- "So there is a similarity here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc. " (p.191) in some circumstances the telos or purpose of an action or utterance might be a decisive factor in understanding or meaning it.

Let us imagine these utterances always taking this form: "I said to myself: 'if only I could stay longer!'" The purpose of such a statement might be to acquaint someone with my reactions. (557)

Without an awareness of this purpose the statement is, at best, curious.
and, at worst, useless or confusing. In other circumstances, if we are not to misunderstand our utterances, we must be aware of their symbolical character. They are not to be taken 'literally'. What they correctly do is not what they appear to do.

Suppose we expressed the fact that a man had an intention by saying "He as it were said to himself 'I will...'
"--That is the picture. And now I want to know: how does one employ the expression "as it were to say something to oneself"? For it does not mean: to say something to oneself. (658)

Similarly, if I were to say, "'All the steps are really already taken'" (219), I do not mean I have no choice in some matter. Rather, "•••my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. --I should have said: This is how it strikes me " (219). To understand our symbolical statements we most often need, again, an awareness of their purpose: "But what is the purpose of that symbolical proposition? It was [for instance] supposed to bring into prominence a difference between being causally determined and being logically determined " (220).

To be aware of the purpose is to "Look on the language-game as the primary thing. And look on the feelings, etc., as you look on a way of regarding the language-game, as interpretation " (656). The need to understand the purpose is closely related to understanding the way in which the sense of an utterance and its use are sometimes different, even apparently unrelated. We need to comprehend and operate with the interplay of description and patterns of performance.

When I say that the orders "Bring me sugar" and "Bring me milk" make sense, but not the combination "Milk me sugar", that does not mean that the utterance of this combination of words has no effect. And if its effect is that the other person stares at me and gapes, I don't on that account call it the order to stare and gape, even if that was precisely the effect that I wanted to produce. (498)

In order to understand or mean an utterance on Wittgenstein's terms, we must be aware that it is itself an action. It can be done as part of a purely linguistic action or our language can proceed in activity other than words. If within a language game we call some sentences senseless, we are not always saying something about the sense of the sentence. We are in fact performing the activity of excluding that particular combination of words from this particular language game. We are preventing that particular move, withdrawing that currency from circulation (500). On the other hand, the action
may proceed in some other form completely. We might in fact get up from a chair and move, or build a house, or feel sad or happy, as can be seen from the fact that:

An order orders its own execution. So it knows its execution, then, even before it is there? -- but that was a grammatical proposition and it means: If an order runs "Do such-and-such" then executing the order is called "doing such-and-such." (458)

Finally, we must recall in this review the need to be aware of the surface grammar of our language in order to understand or mean an utterance. Obviously, many of the factors reviewed here are a display of part of what constitutes the depth grammar of our words and expressions. They are what is involved in the life of our words wherein that life is seen to be far more extensive than what we ordinarily consider to be language as such. In order to see this we have had to look closely at what is happening.

Within this brief review, then, we have uncovered some of the elements -- telos or purpose, the force of circumstances and dispositions, concepts and our operation with them, the functioning of forms and paradigms -- which are deep but not hidden. They come to light in Wittgenstein's attempt to make us see what is involved in understanding and meaning our utterances. This attempt likewise displays what is going on in order that that understanding and meaning might occur. At this point, let us shift our focus from examples displaying what is involved in our understanding and meaning an utterance to a study of examples which display what is actually happening within that process of understanding and meaning. Whenever we understand or mean an utterance we are engaged not only in an operation of the depths, but in a hermeneutic.

Hermeneutic and Beyond

Wittgenstein's analysis is concerned about our understanding individual moves in individual games. He is concerned about particular utterances and the ability to proceed from one particular utterance to another. From what we have seen thus far, we might say that this is a matter of natural behaviour, but that natural behaviour automatically involves frequent interpretation of our statements. Seeing-as pervades all our behaviour. How we proceed depends upon how we interpret or see what is happening. There is such a frequent need for interpretation because of the activity within our language wherein we say one thing
and use it to say or accomplish something else. The matter of the
application of our expressions is by no means always straightforward.
Frequently "we have this vivid picture — and that use, apparently
contradicting the picture" (427). We seem to "fix the sense unambigu­
ously" but "the actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture,
seems like something muddied" (426). In the actual use of language, we
make detours and go by sideroads (426). Hence, we must strive to un­
derstand the application of that which we present and with which we are pre­
tended (423, 424). This complicated matter of application, of course,
simply indicates again the fact that our language is part of a dynamic
activity.

An emphasis on interpretation could be misleading, for it seems to
present the picture of human autonomy in that dynamic activity, whereas
in fact that autonomy is limited. We are, as we have seen, a part of a
larger whole, and only within that can our language function. However,
in that we do have a vital part to play, we must interpret. That is part
of understanding and meaning an utterance. That is what it means to apply
an expression or to understand an application. Whether it be visual object
or statements, we "interpret it, and see it as we interpret it" (p.423).25
Furthermore, we can usually cast our interpretation in an alternative
expression: "The proposition 'Sensations are private' is comparable to:
'one plays patience by oneself'" (428). How we interpret something, be it
a statement or an item, is how we regard it (656). It is, however, a

25 Later (p. 212) Wittgenstein says that seeing is a state and that to
interpret is to think — which is not what we do when we see something
as (nor is it always what we do in the flow of our language games). It
is, he says, "easy to reorganize cases in which we are interpreting.
When we interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove false (p. 212).
However, in common usage, interpreting does not occur only when we form
hypotheses. I am using it here as broader than forming hypotheses. I
am using it as in the following entry:

Nevertheless someone else could have said of me: "He
is seeing the figure as a picture-rabbit." It
would have made as little sense for me to say "Now
I am seeing it as..." as to say at the sight of a knife
and fork "Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork".
This expression would not be understood. — Any more than:
"Now it's a fork" or "It can be a fork too." (p. 193)

After the discussion on the numerous ways of seeing a triangle, Wittgenstein
writes: "But how is it possible to see an object according to an inter­
pretation? — The question represents it as a queer fact: as if something were
being forced into a form it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no
forcing took place here" (p. 212). In other words, as with the cutlery,
one does not first think one's interpretation. Rather, the act of inter­
preting is simply a normal part of the language game. It is nothing
queer or forced.
deeper hermeneutic which, we are suggesting, is made possible by the uncovering of what is involved in the understanding and meaning of a statement.

Wittgenstein would seem to indicate that we properly and frequently are engaged in this hermeneutic -- and must be -- whenever we understand not only the surface meaning of our statements but the actual purpose which they accomplish. In Wittgenstein’s use of the words “interpret” and “interpretation,” he provides us with a technique of hermeneutic. He wants to make us aware of what is happening in our ongoing, inevitable performance of this process of interpretation. To some extent, we are engaged in the hermeneutical activity -- and must be -- whenever we are using our language. That was, of course, the force of seeing that our grammar includes both surface and depth and both are always operative. Whenever we come to understand that depth and what issues from it, whenever we move beyond the understanding of the superficial levels of our language, we are engaged in a hermeneutic. This is different from our simple interpretation of a statement in which we merely regard-(it)-as. This deeper understanding would seem to be essential to the full and proper functioning of our language. Hence, whenever our language is functioning properly, we are engaged in a hermeneutic. It might not be apparent, but it is in fact the case.

It is not infrequent that our statements are not only used for some unapparent purpose, but actually mean something different from what they say. Here we are simply pointing out a deeper level of the “meaning as use.” What we are actually doing might be different from what looks to be the case in what we say. At its superficial level we have an example of this hermeneutical activity in the following:

--"Surely I see something different when I see the sphere floating from when I merely see it lying there." --This really means: This expression is justified! --(For taken literally it is no more than a repetition.) (p. 201)

..."This really means..." we properly are to look for what we really mean, even what we really are. As our utterances are moves in our language games, in order to understand them properly, we must always understand what they are doing within that game. Our language games are themselves life activities and our numerous games are part of the
weave of the pattern of our lives. This being so, we can presumably examine the surface and depth grammar of the language of our games as such. With this in mind we can come to understand the application of our various activities. We can understand not only whole games, but the deeper level of individual moves, even personal moves, within those games. In attempting to understand our utterances on such levels, we are doing more than normal interpretation. We can be said to be doing a hermeneutic. We understand not only this move within this game, but this game within our repertoire of games, and the individual moves of individual games in light of that. By considering these depths of what is not hidden, we can more deeply understand and know the form of life that is ours, both individually and collectively.

Nothing is hidden and everything is deep. We do have experiences, intentions, and purposes in acting, but these can be unearthed. Furthermore, we display them or at least give evidence of them in our utterances. If I say, "I can go on" this well might mean "I have an experience which I know empirically to lead to the continuation of the series" (179) and if I speak of following a rule as acting from inspiration, my comments are not reports of "my experiences of acting from inspiration and according to a rule; they are grammatical notes" (232). For these grammatical notes to mean anything at all, "They must surely belong to a language and to a context..." (p.217). If we unearth all of that, given that we are not independent of it but are a part of it, we can then more readily understand not only our statements as the next step in getting on with some moment in our lives, but as a display of the "Posture" (321) in which we are found at any given time. We can see how we are, in what configuration, what form, what reality. We can see the various shapes and changes as we participate naturally, and that includes linguistically, in life according to circumstances and history. To understand the activities in the fullness of this knowledge is to have performed upon them a hermeneutic -- but a hermeneutic is still an understanding of the meaning-of. In other words, it is to know what is -- as it means. It is to understand a given dynamic. It is still interpretation but interpretation, as it were, of the depth of each moment, as what is 'blossoms' in that particular moment as meaning. It is a deeper, fuller knowledge, but it is still a knowledge-of. It is knowledge of the life of what I do, the life of my language games and moves, knowledge of the stream of life, the total activity in which these
participate. Eventually this reaches knowledge of the whole game that is played, the cosmic game, the ontological speech-act. This, however, is an unmediated perception within the ontological. It is a new kind of knowledge and a new condition.

It is to this condition, beyond understanding and beyond hermeneutic, that we shall now turn our attention.
We have seen that Wittgenstein's investigations display 'the ontological.' But what does it mean to be able to see the ontological? What is involved and what are we seeing? What kind of experience and what kind of knowledge is this vision? We have been discussing our knowledge on the level of understanding and the level of hermeneutic, but Wittgenstein seems to be pointing beyond both of these to something else. Let us attempt, however obliquely, to uncover this. To do so it will be necessary to use terminology that is not Wittgenstein's. Many of the words and expressions in this chapter do not occur in the *Investigations*, or, if they do, they are not used in the way they will be used here. Wittgenstein wanted to leave to his readers anything they could do for themselves. This is largely one reader's 'doing for herself.' It is, however, not purely autobiographical; the direction is one toward which the reader is pointed in Wittgenstein's work. While this is, as it were, another voice, not Wittgenstein's, it is one suggested by Wittgenstein. For that reason it may shed some further light on the Wittgensteinian enterprise.

To begin, this much at least can be said: by the time we are aware that we see, we are also aware of our own intimate participation. We are taking part in the ontological and what is to be found therein -- and we know it. We know it -- experientially. We cannot not participate in this reality. That is what it is for us to be. Yet, in our state of alienation and illusion we have only the knowledge of this matter. We can talk about the world, what is in it, and the ways in which these items interrelate and function, but this knowledge relies upon the subject-object/word/referent grid. The knowledge involved in what can be called a 'vision' does not make use of that grid. In it, what is known, the object of our knowledge, and the kind of knowledge which is had, are no longer remotely of the same species as knowledge of. The presence of such knowledge signals that a transformation has occurred in the knower. We are now involved in 'the mystical.'

Let us proceed with this discussion by noting the 'discovery' or 'admission' of this transformation in relation to what might be called a "content" and a "condition."
In most cases it is perhaps impossible to say just when or how such a transformational change occurs. It is not a transition from the lack of information to the attainment of it or the lack of a skill to the acquisition of it. It is a greater change, more profound. It is a qualitative change in some ways similar to the transition from childhood to adulthood or from night to day. In these we are inclined to say there is a definite transition in kind, but it is neither possible nor of any special advantage to say just when it occurred, or just precisely how. Such changes, of course, reflect a continuum. What comes to be is not discontinuous with what was. In this transition, we too, of course, remain. However, insofar as it is possible to have a qualitative change in which the new condition is in fact discontinuous with the past, it is this type of radical change within the human person with which we are here involved. About this more will be said later.

Whether or not in a specific case the moment of transition is identifiable, the fact is that at some point we discover, we attain a sense, of what is really 'going on.'

1 This is true of both our immersion in the ontological and our immersion in the Investigations. At some point not only do we realize that the moves we make are part of a game and a game of far greater depth than we suspected, but we can begin to experience the whole. We can lose ourselves in the total functioning. We can overcome the alienation. We thought we were 'in control' and 'playing it our way,' but gradually we discover, to our own astonishment and wonder, that we are just participating in it all. We do do but not as the autonomous, independent agents we had imagined ourselves to be. We play our roles, but the control and autonomy we thought we had disappear as pure illusion. Once we have understood that meaning is being being, that the entire socio-ontological unit is necessarily and inevitably operative for any utterance, we realize that what once seemed

1 This is like and not like "grasping a system" (C&V, p. 26). It is like it insofar as it is seen; it is unlike it insofar as grasping a system can remain on the purely conceptual or knowledge-of level. The cognitive content here is of a different nature.
so simple, the act of saying anything, is infinitely complex and even wondrous. It is perfectly natural and normal, in no way hidden, but is deep and really quite amazing. We cannot say anything meaningful without the functioning totality. We cannot say something meaningless without the functioning totality. Meaningful or meaningless both depend upon the functioning of the whole and are the pattern, the order, the grammatical note, even as it were, the music, of that whole which happens to be happening at a given time and place. What is said by us cannot be said without us, but we are carried as much by the games in which we participate as we are participants in the games we play. This we saw in considering the possibility and need of hermeneutic. How we can proceed to realize that there are games we can play, anything we can do, depends upon the functioning of the totality. That realization is a sensing of what is, an experience of what is, and that is, in part, a sense of wonder that it is.2 We can wonder again and again, over and over, with each 'reminder' which our utterances provide just by their very functioning, at the way in which all that is waits upon our word in order to so be. What seemed contingent is necessary, and all of that is likewise necessary to what seemed contingent. Exactly what might happen is dependent upon many things — including what we say and do and even our decisions to say and do — but that something happens, and ultimately that what happens, happens, is what is. The functioning totality cannot not be what it is.

With this in mind it is no wonder that our fuller understanding may have moved beyond even the deepest hermeneutic. There we began to fathom the depth of our operations — the 'how we are.' Here we begin to confirm the total dimensions of ourselves and of what we do and what we are. In the understanding and the hermeneutic, the awareness of the functioning whole revealed the significance and uniqueness of the specific utterance and the specific utterance when studied, revealed its own unsuspected depths. More than that, it was seen always to point beyond itself to the whole in which it participates. It is that whole and that participation — and a possible reaction to it — which we are

2 In his paper delivered to The Heretics, a Cambridge society, in 1929 or 1930, Wittgenstein spoke of a number of experiences which he was prone to have. Of one he said "I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world." (Cited in Ambrose and Lazerowitz (ed.) op. cit., p. 108).
Our language made it look as though meaning were something separate, and as though it, itself, were something other than simply part of life, part of reality as it exists in human form. It made it look as though reality itself were actually dichotomous, numerous pairs of dualities. The body was separate from the soul. Man was separate from the world. On the one hand we seemed autonomous and in control. On the other, we seemed so small and insignificant. In the state of alienation we could not see ourselves even as part of the whole, let alone attain a sense of being as one with the whole, whole with the whole, the whole itself, as great as it is. We looked for ourselves -- too small. We failed to see that meaning, even the meaning of what is said, is always greater than whatever is said. It is a functioning far greater than the function it achieves. Yet, to so experience ourselves and our actions is to operate from a level of consciousness which might best be called that of unity. It is the experiential transcendence of our alienation. Such an undifferentiated reality and our consciousness of it, or better, our consciousness in it, are inexpressible and imponderable.

We need to bear in mind here that we are dealing with what I shall, pro tem and perhaps somewhat misleadingly, call a content and a condition. These notions are, to some extent, analogies. By "condition" I do not mean "condition for" but rather, "a state of being" or "a way we are." By "content" I do not mean "content of" but rather, "that with which we are dealing" or "that which is and which we encounter." We have here a content in that we have a functioning totality, an organic whole, displayed to us in Wittgenstein's understanding of language and of meaning, and more especially through the study of grammar and the identification of meaning as the entire socio-ontological unit. It is also made apparent in his process of philosophy whereby meaning and language are themselves displayed. That organic whole we have called simply being being itself.

It is important to notice here that it is not our knowledge of that, which constitutes our condition as such, nor does it account for our being in that condition. Having perceived Wittgenstein's ontological vision due to the study of language and meaning, we do in fact have knowledge of this organic whole. To some extent our knowledge-of is influential
in attaining the condition of which we speak, but it is quite possible to have complete information on this content and be quite unaffected by it. To attain to knowledge of does not mean to have attained to 'enlightenment'. 'Enlightenment' is a state of being, not a matter of knowledge about or knowledge of. Nor is it even to know 'it' -- this content in all its fullness -- as one knows a person. This knowledge is even more than knowledge of acquaintance, for in the case of acquaintance the knower and the known remain separately themselves. They are each there for one another to know as other. Insofar as this condition is knowledge at all, it is knowledge in the Biblical sense wherein 'to know' not only has connotations of an intimacy of sexual communion but actually denotes such an interpenetration of being. The condition of which we speak, however, exceeds even this complete joining or communion, for no matter how completely two may become one in body, mind, and spirit, they still remain, despite the living of a common (one) life -- ultimately 'solitudes'. They know themselves in communal conjunction with one another, but ultimately even that is merely the way in which they know themselves. Each knows him/herself and the other as joined to one another in a state of communion.  

Wittgenstein does not use this word in the Investigations though he does say in the preface that "it is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another..." (p. viii). One could read this to be a somewhat cynical or even despairing remark, but apart from that, "to bring light" would surely mean some sort of insight at the very least. It would mean something greater than information or our usual understanding. Otherwise, this remark would not have been 'set against' the poverty of the work and the darkness of the times.

This aside, I use the word "enlightenment" in somewhat the same sense as the medievals used the word "illumination." If Wittgenstein were to have openly discussed this matter, one suspects he might have chosen this or some very similar word for "enlightenment" which in this sense has about it a somewhat 'Eastern' character. In Eastern thought it is roughly equivalent to "illumination." And we know that Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer, whose writing quite clearly contains elements of Eastern thought, and by the poetry of the Indian writer Rabindranath Tagore.

I in no way intend "enlightenment" to connote the 18th century use of the word in which "light" meant the "natural light of reason."

It is interesting to note that in even the deepest understanding of human relationships commonly held today, the loss of self, the giving, which is involved usually reaches only, what I will later call, the 'relative' level. This relative level of course can include 'spirituality' and 'union' of bodies, hearts, spirits, etc., but is different from the
This condition, however, is one in which, insofar as one knows oneself at all, one knows oneself as all, and, insofar as one knows anything at all, one knows oneself. As the alienation was merely illusion, the actual state of being, the actuality, the condition -- is one of unity, totality, simple being in being. Therefore, to have overcome the alienation is not only to know oneself as the whole, but to be, as one has always in fact been, organically -- the all. We do not even want to say here a part of the all, for that again implies an independence and a knowledge of oneself as independent. While the experience of having overcome that alienation is one of having come home, of being reunited, rejoined, having found oneself, that very sense of return common to the newness of the condition is merely testimony to the earlier alienation. It says nothing of the condition itself.

We have here, then, a content and a condition such that the condition is to be the content. We have knowledge of the content, but our condition is not one of knowing the content as object. Rather, it is one of being it and that is a union greater than that accommodated by any of our usual forms of knowledge. Furthermore, we have knowledge of the condition, but that, too, is separate from the condition itself. The condition itself is a way of being. That way of being is what is. It is the way we have always been. So, the condition itself is one in which we have come into that way of being for ourselves, so to speak.

It is the freedom from illusion, a being at-one. To be out of illusion, to have uncovered our way of being, is to be in a new way. It is to enliven a new set of potentials -- potentials to be as we are, and to do

union attained within relationships wherein the partners have realized their own connaturality in being itself, and unite with one another in such that they enjoy a union between themselves of connaturality with one another. On the relative level the giving somehow still retains the self such that there can remain the possibility -- and perhaps even the expectation -- of receiving or claiming oneself 'back' from the other. This must always be the case as long as two attempt to become one. In the one that is formed by two, the union still remains 'set apart' and those within it still remain themselves. It is a fact, over and against other facts of various sorts. Each partner is-what-he-is-in-conjunction-with-the-other. But if there has been a 'dissolution' of the relative self, then, in the giving, there can be no reclaiming of the self. The gift is complete. The expectation is not on the relative 'level' and does not transpire in a 'locus' of reciprocity. Connaturality exceeds reciprocity. On this level, our psychology, philosophy, and experience of interpersonal relationships may call for a totally new description, understanding, and enactment.
as we are. It is to be able to be and do the Truth.

Characteristics of this Condition

If we were to cite the characteristics of this condition, this literal at-one-ment, being, we might first note an element of 'knowingness' -- not knowledge, but a state of living insight, a noetic quality. The condition of being at-one has about it the perpetual experience of being at-one. It is being with awareness, being in awareness. It is to be -- consciously. To be is to be conscious with the consciousness appropriate to the specific form of life. To be conscious in the human form of life in this condition is to be experientially aware, even existentially aware, for the way we are is vibrantly aware -- again, not with an awareness of or consciousness of, but as awareness, consciousness. We have here an embodied, ontological awareness, a cosmic consciousness that knows itself for what it is and experiences itself as what it is. It is in fact a unitive consciousness. It is a residing in a perpetual state of 'knowingness', a state of continuous, unmediated perception. Such awareness is a cognitive state of being in which, because it related through oneself, the socio-ontological unit is not object specific, but rather is a continuous unmediated perception. For lack of a better word, this awareness might be called "knowingness." It is far from our concepts which are the tools of our language and are designed for the differentiation, the dichotomization, required for coping with material objects and getting on with our life activities. It is non-linguistic and therefore unmediated. Being unmediated, it is direct. Being noetic but not conceptual, it can be called perceptual. It is to live in the vision of what is; it is to see. It is the perpetual act of seeing. It is -- most simply -- a knowingness by virtue of being which nonetheless occurs only in the condition of non-alienation. It is an enlightenment.

Such a knowingness is often called a mystical knowledge. Insofar as it is 'direct', this description might apply. It is dependent upon no evidence and no reasoning. In fact, as we have just seen, it precludes all conceptual mediation. But if 'mystical knowledge' is thought primarily to be infused from supernatural sources, it need not be so categorized,
unless of course, as we shall see, this content itself may be shot through, permeated, with that which we might call -- God.\(^5\) If God is immanent, that is, if he is within the totality -- then even this possibility cannot be discounted. Yet, insofar as man has recognized that he is that all -- then his knowingness can hardly be said to be infused from supernatural sources, for it is, in fact, the very knowingness of that very source itself, and all that it is possible to know in itself. It is being. If being is so infused, it itself is necessarily intelligent, knowing. We might say -- "Being knows," but that is dangerously suggestive of a reification of being which is a 'fall' back into the 'sin' of separation and alienation. -- Being is 'knowing'. To say, then, that it is being knowing itself, is to say that it is being being itself. (That was our understanding of meaning! Being is knowing. Being is meaning. Being is all things.) At this point, it is perhaps clear that the knowingness can hardly be characterized as mystical knowledge. If it is what is, it can hardly be characterized as 'mystical', for that qualitative adjective presumes it can be in opposition to some opposing quality whereas it is, strictly speaking, not even possible to say that it knows -- but rather that it is knowingness -- nor that it exists, but that its existence, just as it is meaning, consciousness, and awareness. These qualities are its essence and are attributable to the content only as condition, in other words, to the content as it is.

\(^5\) The matter of Wittgenstein-and-God is a somewhat curious one. On the one hand, though Wittgenstein acknowledged his religion as Roman Catholic, he did not practise any institutionalized religion and said he could not possibly believe some of the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. (See Malcolm, _op. cit._, p. 72.) On the other hand, he called himself an evangelist though not a Christian (Bartley, _op. cit._, p. 71). He told his school pupils that, if they were afraid at night in the forest, they must think only about God (ibid., p. 70). He told Waismann that his thought, unlike that of Spinoza or Kant, did not interfere with what one believes in religion (from Waismann, Fredrich, _The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy_, London: MacMillan, 1965, pp. 11-14, quoted in Bartley, _op. cit._, p. 125). And we might readily remember that Wittgenstein considered becoming -- a monk!

It is surely an understatement to say that Wittgenstein believed in God, but in the face of belief in God of this sort, which seems to have been an engrossing way of life, it is also an understatement to note that faith and the spiritual life are not always manifest or practised in either conventional or institutionalized manners. How a man relates to God and God to a man is surely a mysterious, personalized, consuming, 'individual' reality. How one expresses that reality depends in part upon its individualised form. Some may 'say': some may show.
experiences itself. If, from our normal state of alienation, we wish to describe this condition as 'mystical' -- then that is likewise an authentic characteristic. As this is actually our natural state, however, the use of the adjective in fact testifies to our state of alienation. It is not a description of the condition.

Besides a 'knowingness' and 'the mystical', there are other characteristics of this condition. It is now apparent, presumably, that nearly anything could be said of it and that whatever is said of it, is what it is -- essentially, experientially, and existentially. For the purposes of this description, however, there are other characteristics which predominate in helping us to understand the condition, perhaps because they contrast so sharply with the experience of our alienated state. One of these is connected with what cannot characterize this condition, and that is -- anything negative. Let me explain.

If we experience what is as it is, and/or as it experiences itself (for what is, is its own experience of itself), then all is necessarily positive. Since the experience is of what is, there cannot be an experience of what is not. What is, and what is experienced and known, in this condition, are not by way of distinction and contrast with what is not. Being is itself the fullness of what is, and its experience of itself cannot be of what is not, for what is not would then be what is. The consciousness, the awareness, the experience is characterized -- necessarily -- by pure positivity.

This being the case, it is no wonder that a prominent feature of this condition is that of fullness, at-easeness, at-homeness, peace, love, absolutely no fear -- perfection. Not only is this the state of

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6 This use of the word "positive" in no way refers back to the concept of negation nor to the immense care Wittgenstein took concerning this concept. This is a different usage completely, much like saying that it is wonderful that we have money and a cow and can buy a cow, which is different from a statement saying how terrible the economy is and how expensive a cow is.

7 This use of "at-homeness" is not an allusion to Heidegger's usage of the phrase. Here, "at-homeness" is meant as something very positive. Cont'd.
the content, but it is the experience in this condition. Naturally. How could it be other wise? All that is and all that happens are nothing but the perpetual dynamic of being, the various ways that being can be, that being in fact is. All the suffering in the world? -- It is suffered, positively, beautifully. All its sting is gone. Only

It is interesting to note the relation between keeping our language at home and coming to be at-home in the world in this state of unmediated perception. It is in coming to see the 'rightness' in things as they stand, in coming to see an ontological display in ordinary, everyday language, that Wittgenstein can be said to supersede the relative plane -- authentically -- and come to be at-home in the world in this condition. He is not catapulted 'beyond' 'the world' by means of an intellectual understanding occurring through the creation of a "superstructure" composed of "super-concepts." Nor will he allow us such a spurious 'illumination'. It is not some exalted dianoia, but authentic noesis, which can be achieved in the study of ordinary language.

The classification of Wittgenstein as an 'ordinary language philosopher' is surely one of the key points which the analytic tradition discovered in its linking of Wittgenstein with the Oxford philosophers of the 1950s. --But how different the final goal of much ordinary language philosophy seems to be from that of this philosopher of ordinary language.

This notion was not at all foreign to Wittgenstein. ..."My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them." (C&W, p. 2) ..."In this world (mine) there is no tragedy, nor is there that infinite variety of circumstances which give rise to tragedy (as its result) (C&W, p. 9). The Christian side of Wittgenstein seems to say,"Within Christianity it's as though God says to men: Don't act a tragedy, that's to say, don't enact heaven and hell on earth. Heaven and hell are my affair." (C&W, p. 14), and the Jewish side seems to say,"The Jew must see to it that, in a literal sense, 'all things are as nothing to him!'" (C&W, p. 19 et al.) The experience as well as the philosophy that can lead to it 'leaves everything as it is'. The equanimity with which Wittgenstein was, at least at times, able to face trouble and torments can be seen in this attitude:

Troubles are like illnesses; you have to accept them: the worst things you can do is rebel against them.

You get attacks of them too, triggered off by internal or external causes. And then you just have to tell yourself: 'Another attack.' (C&W, p. 79)
in alienation is there pain. Again, for both content and condition it is, for instance, not a matter of loving, but of being love; not a matter of being peaceful, but of being peace; not a matter of fulfillment, but of fulness itself. There is no perfectibility -- but perfection.

Finally, there is about this a characteristic of 'stillness'. There is the perpetual functioning of the entire content which one has recognized oneself to be. Existence is dynamic, superlatively so. The awareness is alive, intensely so. And yet, all of that is unendingly so -- eternal. And that eternality is experienced, not only within the motion of each moment, but within the being as it is in itself. There is no time and there is no frenzy. The present is dynamic, and however it is, is in perfect order, perfection. So there is about both content and condition -- a stillness. Amidst the most intense and powerful functioning, manifest as storms and crises and war, heartbreak and achievement and triumph -- it is all just being being with the experience of itself, and hence there remains the perfect stillness, actual and experiential. To be in such condition is to be in stillness, and experience the same.9

Immanence

At this point, let us directly confront the question of immanence, for all that we have said of being, and of our condition of oneness in it, is more than vaguely reminiscent of God. We might say, at the very least, it is God-talk by any other name. Our at-one-ment here is not in relation to the order of things being revealed to us through the duplication of that order, and all of that being made intelligible in terms of a Transcendent God outside the world, as was the case in regard to the Tractatus. If we are one with all that is, and God is not 'out there' -- though he may be there as well -- but 'in here', then we are one with God in this condition. Our participation in the mystery of being, experienced when out of alienation, is a participation in the mystery of God.9

9We noted some time ago that Wittgenstein said he could not help thinking in a religious fashion. For him "Religion is, as it were, the calm bottom of the sea at its deepest point, which remains calm however high the waves on the surface may be. --" (C&V, p. 53)
Wittgenstein doesn't talk much about God in the *Investigations*, but, as we have seen, he speaks of theology as grammar. As we have seen, that statement might well have many levels. If so, for Wittgenstein it would seem that theology might be called the study of God not in that God is taken to be the object of its 'examination'. That matter is simply part of the language game of theology, that is, the particular language game that theology is. But theology might be seen as the study of God in that we are to see theology as grammar. It is grammar that reveals the socio-ontological unit. It reveals what is. But what is, if it is indeed what is and if God is, encompasses God as immanent (and if immanent and able to be seen as immanent, then also transcendent and able to be known also in that manner). Grammar uncovers what is deep but not hidden. What is deep is in one's own "most immediate and familiar surroundings" ([C&V](#), p. 50). When we study the depths of grammar we are in fact engaging with the studying the immanence of God, though in our age it might be somewhat 'embarrassing' to say so.

Theology as a discipline or an area of inquiry is simply that grammatical 'movement' or activity, that language game, the surface grammar and vocabulary of which attempts to handle conceptually -- as its 'object' -- that which all grammar 'has' as its ontological reality. So, theology is seen as the study of God. But, we are to see theology as grammar. Grammar is constitutive of theology. It would seem, then, that grammar which displays ontology is concomitantly the display of God -- again, if only we are able to see. The study of grammar fundamentally -- in its depths -- seems to be the study of God -- and the grammar of the discipline of theology is that in which that should be most apparent, for there that which is taken to be the 'object' of study is one with the study itself. It is under the illusion of our word-referent notion of meaning that we are inclined to radically misunderstand theology -- both in its propositions and as an enterprise. Were it to be understood as grammar, its objective -- the rational expression

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10 "It is very remarkable that we would be inclined to think of civilization -- houses, trees, cars, etc. -- as separating man from his origins, from what is lofty and eternal, etc. Our civilised environment, along with its trees and plants, strikes us then as though it were cheaply wrapped in cellophane and isolated from everything great, from God, as it were. That is a remarkable picture that intrudes on us" ([C&V](#), p. 50). And one which Wittgenstein's philosophy can be seen to incessantly attempt to remove."
and understanding of God and his relation to the world—would be accomplished more successfully, for what is then pronounced as doctrine would be understood and verified as grammar. In our understanding of it as grammar we would fathom more readily the ontology of doctrine itself, for we participate in it and in that, achieve a deeper knowing of the actual content of that doctrine, the reality of which it speaks, for, again, it is this which grammar reveals. Dianoia (the rational expression) and noesis (the participational 'knowing') would, though necessarily remaining separate in themselves, function more readily—concomitantly. They would complement, support, and augment one another.

We might say, then, that if theology can be called the study of God, within the movements of the Investigations, grammar is the study of God. All that is is the 'study' of God—for that is what grammar reveals. If we do a hermeneutic of "theology as grammar," if we look at the deeper levels of this speech-act, we find that what this position amounts to is the insight: God is immanent. Therefore, part of our condition is the experience of being with God as God is in all things. We participate in God. And this is as old as the definition of the life of grace.

There were earlier points at which one was inclined to inquire about immanence. Through the study of grammar we discovered the inevitable patterning, the ever present order within the functioning totality. We also saw that, while deep, nothing is hidden. We could see everything and somehow it works. We might automatically look to structure, to this order within the dynamic, as providing an explanation of this functioning, but that can hardly serve to explain. It in turn stands in need of explanation. We are, therefore, inclined to ask if we are confronted here with the constant, conserving, ever-present presence of God. We might anticipate ourselves at this point and note that what we can say, whether or not we conclude the presence of God, is that this is just the way it is. And of course, the presence of God must be the case if what is, is really what is, if it is all as opposed to being simply a 'separated' form of being which is material, and which, as an external world functioning, is meaning. If God is immanent, is present as God in all things, material and immaterial, seen and unseen,
we cannot say why. And if he is not, we cannot say why not. If
immanence is, then being simply is this way. This is not a trivial
statement. It is instead a profound recognition and a sublime
acceptance which Wittgenstein can be seen to have laboured incessantly
to have us attain. We are to see and accept. This was the force of
the study of language, of grammar, of the socio-ontological unit as
meaning -- and of saying of all of these that nothing is hidden. We
are allowed no explanation that diminishes the mystery. We are in the
end made to confess: "it just is." In the condition of union, oneness,
at-one-ment, that confession is an appreciation and a sense of wonder,
for it is only in such activities that we can adequately respond.
Only in appreciation and wonder is it possible to proceed with the
course of our transactions no longer performed in illusion but in
this condition of knowingness, for every transaction within this
condition serves as fresh revelation, fresh stirring, of the content
and condition itself. With that as preview, let us return to the
question of immanence.

If God can be called pure being and all that is is in being in
manifest form, and largely even in material form, is God as pure being,
in being? We cannot conclude that he is so from the presence of
structure in the functioning totality, for why should pure being
require structure? Yet, again, everything that can be said of God, is
God. Everything that can be said of God, God is. It is not a matter of
having structure, if we could speak of structure in pure being at all,
but of being structure. Yet, why must there be structure, order,
pattern, at all? What we see is that the totality moves. That movement
is structured. In its linguistic instantiation it is grammatically
structured and is recognized as meaning. That is the way that it is,
and if it is manifest at all, if it is movement extended in matter, as
'the world', it must be some way. -- We call it structure, order,
pattern. It is therefore intrinsic to being -- whether as matter or
pure. It just is. 'Why' is not important nor is whether it could be
otherwise. But why should the presence of structure indicate the
presence of pure being, especially if pure being in itself need have
no structure and at the same time can be said to be structure? We might
say it is because we seek a reason why it is there, an explanation. We
do not see how structure could proceed from matter itself. Yet it
could always have been put into matter and left there to operate. Here
we are thinking on the model of our creation of a machine.

What can we say? Everything and nothing. Yet, as we saw long ago, that would not faze Wittgenstein. Our very question qua question is purely a linguistic game. It cannot be answered definitively one way or the other. Its answer cannot be proven to logical satisfaction. Therefore, we do best to search for indications of how it most likely might have been in the thought and experience of Wittgenstein. On these terms we can see what we are to see in this panoramic display. We can resort to evidence though it will not be a reason, it will not prove anything.

Wittgenstein's persistent message is that all dualities are to be spurned. We need to operate in life activities on the basis of dualities, but are not to be tricked by the illusion of our language into thinking that this picture, though applicable, is reflective of what is. If there is no separation between my body and my soul, between me and the world, we might ask why there should be one between God and the world, or God and me, especially since God is no longer needed 'outside the world' as explanation of 'the world'. Furthermore, if God is not relegated to 'beyond the world', and if Wittgenstein could not keep silent of him, but was in fact presenting his 'testimony' through his philosophy, as we discussed earlier in noting his death-bed citation of Augustine, and if we find in the Investigations the display of the functioning totality -- then we might well presume that, for Wittgenstein, that totality is alive with the presence of God, whether or not he would have gone so far as to say it is God.11 This last point is like the ease in saying "God is love" and the reservations in saying "Love is God." Furthermore, to say any of this is to exceed the limits

11... Longfellow:
   In the elder days of art,
      Builders wrought with greatest care
      Each minute and unseen part,
      For the gods are everywhere.
   (This could serve me as a motto.) (CW, p. 34)
of what can be said, in order to see, and the seeing is the crucial matter. We might conclude that Wittgenstein has attempted to show us this presence, and through the therapy of philosophy which enables us to see, makes straight the way for that presence to transform us into that condition whereby we see it, experience it, become it -- for ourselves.

Finally, we might see from this discussion that if it is the case that God is immanent, then it is, as it were, an act of love on the part of God that we cannot prove Him to be there, but only see Him there in the condition of enlightenment, for it is then possible to enact being, in manifest form, as the life of faith and love. During alienation our faith is belief  and our love is devotion; in freedom from alienation, our faith is a knowingness which cannot include the negativity of doubt and our love is the merging of being, the union, far exceeding even the Biblical image of knowledge. Through our transformation, our freedom from alienation, these two modes of being -- faith and love -- dynamically reach fulfillment. In that state of transformation we know them as perfect in both modes. They are as being is in the process of being. Faith and love are a particular pattern which being can take. The opposite pattern can also prevail, but only in the state of alienation. And there, that both can be the case, is what is -- and perfect. Also, we can know God in ways other than the proof of reason. In the same way that so much of our knowledge proceeds from experience, not reason, though it does not contradict reason, so we can know God directly with the knowingness of experience, through the unmediated perception, in the state of unity in/with being -- and in/with God. Our assurance of immanence there is as unquestionable as is our self-knowledge. From within this condition, a proof of reason for the presence of God as God in all being, were such a proof possible, would

12We might note that in the later part of his life, belief for Wittgenstein is "really a way of living" even though it's belief (C&V, p. 64). Christianity, he says, is based not on a historical truth, but a historical narrative, which is believed "through thick and thin, which you can only do as the result of a life."(C&V, p. 32) (See also L&C, esp. p. 54).
be totally useless. It would be only knowledge-of or knowledge-about, and this, compared to an unmediated perception, looks very pale indeed.

If our language is designed for the task of our normal daily living, and causes problems only when it idles or takes flight on such a 'holiday' as we now appear to be on, then our language is inevitably and subtly taking us further and further from what is. It is getting between us and the direct experience. It is therefore no wonder that Wittgenstein did not say such things as we are here attempting. Whatever we say can only mediate the matter and this is not matter fit for such mediation. Furthermore, there is a curious way in which this very predicament in itself displays the matter at hand, the matter of immanence. Since all that we can say is only knowledge-of or knowledge-about, God, though immanent, can always keep himself as Transcendent, as Other, in such a way that anything we can say on the matter — both that God is immanent and that God is transcendent — is true. And this fits our experience. For, as we have seen, insofar as God is God, we need not say that being is God in the sense of the material and mediated world of illusion, such that being is exhaustive of God as God. While what is true of God in manifest form is true of God as pure being as well, and vice versa, insofar as we speak and thus mediate the reality, we still speak of God as unmanifest as well as manifest, as immanent as well as transcendent. But insofar as God is God, God as experienced in being can be no other than God as being, both pure and in manifest form. So, not only can we still speak of God as Transcendent Other, there still is God as Transcendent Other — but that Other, insofar as it is, is the same no matter how or where it is found or experienced. We will have it both ways, and in the realm of being — both are true. Here our language, the instrument of dissection, cannot express them as together, as whole, as one. Yet that very fact itself is the revelation of what is as it is — God himself, The Mystery. It displays that mystery. It does not picture it but presents a picture of it.

13This has echo of "and when you have seen, then, there is a good deal you will not say." (79)
We must note that, in our ordinary, everyday language, we can say that God is both transcendent and immanent without violating the rules of that language or the logic within it. We can mean that he is in our world and beyond it, in things but greater than things. Yet, these notions also commonly imply that he is attainable and unattainable, accessible and inaccessible, knowable and unknowable, material and immaterial, pure being as well as manifest, etc., etc. When we say that God is both transcendent and immanent, we are implicitly generating endless paradoxes. These of course are philosophical problems, problems that lie in our language, but if all of these assertions are true of God, and can be known to be so through means other than the knowledge yielded in the concepts of our language, then this testifies to God being beyond the normal confines of logical patterns, beyond the normal configurations of language. That does not exclude his being in them as well, we might even say constraining himself to them. It does not mean that being -- including the being of God -- cannot be in this mysterious way. It is almost as though God is that 'against which' all else can be said. Here we might notice how the statements of mystics typically break all the rules of language. They attempt to say what cannot be said. Yet, in the shared experience they are able to communicate with one another. They are not playing our 'normal' language games, but share a common life and hence can make even our limited, mediating, language work in the games between themselves, knowing always that silence is the more appropriate statement. The problem here is with our language and our insistence on knowledge in order to understand. It is not with being or with our experience.

If, then, there is immanence in the content and if in our condition we have become that content, and experientially so, then that is tantamount to saying that we have become God. Our condition is one of

14 See for instance how alike are The Cloud of Unknowing or The Book of Privy Counseling and some of the Upanishads. It is at these levels that traditions so diverse, meet and merge. Meister Eckhart can speak with Heidegger and Thomas Aquinas can chat with Lao Tzu.
deification. (But again, as we have seen, in actuality, this new way of being is what we have always been. Yet, we have become that -- for ourselves -- and in this way our condition is for us discontinuous with the past. It is transformation.) What our being freed from alienation has done is to uncover, reveal, the glory of reality, all reality, including ourselves. In this sense, being is the sacrament. It is sign and symbol. It is both manifestation and the reality manifest. God is there and to be found under the appearances of the general facts of nature, of customs and institutions, of history, of form of life and language. God is there, even as meaning. The manifestation, the material form, even as illusion, is in its functioning, God's own witness, the testimony to itself, the statement of what it is, if only we could see, if only the scales of illusion were dropped from our eyes. That of course is one fruit of Wittgenstein's effort to make us see that the illusion is perpetrated by our language. Through his therapy we are enabled to break free of the illusion. Ironically, or perhaps appropriately in true sacramental fashion, that very language through which we were trapped, when understood, is in fact the revelation of the functioning totality, of the entire ontology, ultimately in the immanence there, of God himself and of our relationship, our participation, our union with him in him.

In conclusion we might say that the immanence of God seems to be an essential characteristic of the content and an experiential reality in the condition.

15 Looking at the ordinary words used in the Investigations, such language might seem extravagant, but let us not forget the intensive 'inner' life which Wittgenstein seems to have lived, nor his own mystical experience. To know oneself as absolutely safe, unable to be harmed no matter what happens (see Malcolm, op. cit., p. 70), is surely to experience not only a oneness with being such that one is ultimately 'indestructible', but a benevolence of being such that whatever happens is not only acceptable but blessed, and such that the source, the reality, of this benediction cannot but be what we might otherwise call God.

In the lecture to The Heretics, Wittgenstein commented of his experience: "It is, what one might call, the experience of being absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say, 'I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens.'" (eds. Ambrose and Lazanowicz, op. cit., p. 108).
Inexpressible and Imponderable

Let us now consider more directly how both this content and condition are inexpressible and imponderable; indeed, how they are the inexpressible and imponderable. In the course of this consideration, it can also be seen how much at ease Wittgenstein was with both of these. They are as much a part of what is as is anything else, and Wittgenstein accepted them.

It is both the content and the condition, complete with immanence, which are inexpressible. They are so, first, because as we have seen, if there is such reality, it is beyond the limits of language. Language is not designed for such 'material'. In attempting to handle such matters it can only present illusions to us. We may be correctly applying it -- for this dimension in which we are working -- but the picture we are given in the process is inevitably wrong. We have already seen the difficulties that arise in regard to such things as our talk of the soul and have examined the genesis of a philosophical problem as it occurs in relation to paradox. In regard to such content and within such condition, the use of paradox is inevitable and standard fare. The picture presented might even appear, at times, as outright contradiction. Language is not designed for this dimension, which is beyond knowledge-of or knowledge-about. It is not designed for this dimension, which is 'finer' than the life activity levels of our everyday world.

And yet, Wittgenstein encouraged us to look into other dimensions. What cannot be found in one can be found in another (p.200). He patiently helps us to grow accustomed to seeing things in a new way. Furthermore, we are not to get the idea that there is something we cannot do with the language we have (120,374). We can do whatever we need to do.  

16 The remark on dimensions was often used in regard to the math cube (See esp. Z 249), but taking our hint from Wittgenstein, and from the generalized fashion in which it occurs on p.200, we are using it here in a broader sense. ... "In philosophy one feels forced to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is to suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought." (Malcolm, op.cit., p.50) I do not mean dimensions as does Peter Winch. He uses this concept to connect the logical space of the Tractatus with the grammar of the Investigations. (Peter Winch, op.cit., p. 15).
with that language. The expression of this content and this condition
is not something we need to do. Both this content and condition are
sufficient unto themselves -- just as they are. They are there as realms
or levels of being with their own possibilities and inherent order. As
a result of having entered this condition, we may be different amidst the
everyday and ordinary -- for we know it in these deeper dimension -- but
it does not alter in itself, nor does our condition change our 'chopping
wood' and 'carrying water'. Our actual transactions, our daily language
games, go on as usual. As we have seen, we buy our five red apples,
carry slabs, calculate the walls of boilers, and express our pain.

Also, we must remember that here we are dealing with something
holistic. Both content and condition are concerned with the all that is,
just as it is -- as all. Our language is for activity. It is a form of
movement within that all. Description is only one form of movement and
the capability of language to perform this movement is limited, that is,
our ability to make such a sweeping motion as a description of such a
panorama is limited. We cannot 'do it all at once' and if we do not 'do
it all at once', if we do not capture the entirety in one motion, we have
not described this. We have grossly distorted it. I may see an entire
landscape at once, but I cannot traverse it in one move. We are dealing
with something to be seen, not 'gone up to' in words, not said. The
only way in which it can be done, can be an activity, is to be it, in
other words, not to see it as a separate object before us, but to
become one with it in such a way that our knowingness applies to all as
we in fact ourselves are all. Our coping with our environment through
language is only a motion of that environment itself. When we have
entered into that motion, when we have been freed of illusion, what we
do, and what we are are one and the same. On this ground as well,
this content and condition are inexpressible. As we have seen, we
cannot go up to ourselves going up to something. Our participation
precludes expression. The appropriate response, as we shall soon
discuss, is not expression, but appreciation.

Finally, we must sound one note of warning. It is not because of
the complexity of this functioning whole and our oneness in it that we
cannot express it. That is merely a difficulty, not an impossibility.
What is impossible to do as a legitimate move in a language game is to
say everything of something and do so all at once. Furthermore, we
have seen how everything that one can say of the content and condition
is true. Even the 'would be' negatives were positives. We might say:
whatever is not, is a way that being is. And it is true -- all at once.
This fact of something being all ways at once did not seem to bother
Wittgenstein. We found him, earlier in our study, to be content,
even in the most minute examinations of specific utterances, with
being able to 'have it all ways', wanting to deny nothing, even when
it seemed (that is, when the picture our language presented made it
appear) that things could not be that way.

Therefore, the reasons for inexpressibility of this content and
our united condition lie both within the matter itself and within the
limits of our language. Even to attempt to express the life of our
words, the deep pattern and order in language and being, or the actuality
or experience of immanence, is to engage in metaphysical statements.
It is to create philosophical problems, though we think we are ex­
plaining something. These explanations have been consistently blocked
throughout the Investigations both because they are not a legitimate
move in a language game and because they give a distorted picture which
makes the reality look as if it is in separate parts, dissected, and
manageable, whereas it is whole and beyond comprehension as knowledge-of
or knowledge-about. Furthermore, such attempted statements 'satisfy us'.
They are a pacifier in the form of explanation. With this pacification
we can continue to live quite blindly in our illusion; we never need to
look, to see, to be transformed.

We have just said that this content and condition are beyond compre­
hension. Not only are they inexpressible, they are imponderable. Even in
the examination of our ordinary statements, we find that we are often
operating on the basis of things imponderable (p.228). We are functioning
from the foundation of the whole, all that is as it bears upon this
expression, this happening as meaning. For example, we can be convinced
that someone is in a specific state of mind, that he is not pretending,
and we can have evidence of this, "But 'evidence' here includes 'impon­
derable' evidence." It includes "subtleties of glance, of gesture, of
tone " (p.228). There is evidence. Nothing is hidden. But it is
imponderable. Accept it. Operate with and through it. Think it and know it — in being. That is the way it is.

That which is inexpressible and imponderable, yet is and is experienced, is perhaps best described as mystery. We live the mystery. We are mystery.

**Appropriate Response**

Let us now consider an appropriate response to — mystery. We must note that our response refers to that which occurs in the relative field, that is, in our everyday life, in our everyday world as it continues while we enjoy our new condition.

First of all, if we truly understand both the content and condition as mystery — what we will not do is attempt a solution. Mystery is not a puzzle and not a riddle. Therefore, one appropriate response is acceptance. We stop asking 'why' and 'how'. We stop seeking information. We stop demanding explanation. We do not try to comprehend. We come to be at home in our ignorance, and only then — understand. Dianoia is not appropriate. We can still seek it for normal everyday problems, still play our usual games, but not on this matter. If we do, we will be back in the realm of illusion and the state of alienation. We will need to begin our therapy all over again. We will have lost the vision. If we have not lost the vision and do accept the mystery as mystery, this will bring forth a contentment, a peace about all things, an ease.

17..."My life consists in my being content to accept many things." (O.C. 344), i.e., we cannot investigate everything.

18By the 'relative field' I mean the realm of relations and activities which constitutes our everyday life: our waking and sleeping, our family activities and employment, our holidays and philosophizing. It includes our ordinary understanding, or dianoia, and is lived concomitantly with enlightenment.

19Thoughts at peace, of course, are what "someone who philosophizes yearns for." (C&S, p. 43) On so many levels we press for the goal.
characteristics of our condition, but within the condition they are present through being what we are. They are how what is, is. Here they come as response as well as characteristics. We are content, in (what I have called) the relative field, to live with mystery, and by mystery, and enjoy the 'effects' of that, just as in our condition we are content to live and be such mystery, and enjoy the same 'effects'.

Second, an appropriate response would seem to be appreciation. We are here presented with something intrinsically beautiful. It is perfect order, perfect pattern, perfect functioning, in pure actuality and in material form. It is brilliant. It is beautiful. That we should so participate in it as to be it-!! That at every turn, every motion, every utterance it should all be -- there, here!! When we are confronted with a work of art or a brilliantly performed symphony, we appreciate.
The more fully we 'enter into it', the greater is our appreciation. Here we have entered totally. Our response in the relative field can only be full. Our response in the relative field is quite naturally full, because that response as full is in itself part of the structure of being. It is in this way that values are grounded in being. Our response is a complete valuing of what is, an embrace of it, a continuous admiration, even a love for it all.

Another natural and appropriate response is one which Wittgenstein often exhorts us to throughout the Investigations. This is a sense of wonder, surprise, astonishment. Under Wittgenstein's coaching we know we are approaching the correct attitude to what is, and the correct understanding of our language and its functioning, when we are struck. He tells us to let ourselves be puzzled by the whole business of seeing (p.212), to be surprised that we can actually do anything at all with the language we have (120), to be amazed that novels entertain us (524), to find it surprising that we are able to tell anyone anything (363), and "Let yourself be struck by the existence of such a thing as our language-game of: confessing the motive of my action " (p.224). How astonishing, then, is this dynamic, ever-changing, eternally still, ever-new content. Correlatively, how awesome and wondrous is our condition. Out of illusion what is is constantly revealed, uncovered. It constantly

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20 Recall again that "Man has to awaken to wonder " (C&V , p. 5).
presents itself to us, even as ourselves. ... And we continually participate in being, are what is, as it is -- as wonder! In the relative field we respond in kind! We are indeed struck! At being something so totally positive as well as wondrous, the response of joy and celebration is fitting.21 Combining joy with the love, we live an 
ascape!

There are numerous other appropriate responses which we might explore. Among the most prominent might be that of a profound and genuine humility. In face of such content, we are very humbled. In face of the realization of our own condition, we are very humbled. Not humiliated, but humbled. There is nothing to be proud about and nothing to be demure about. In a state of what is, our very condition is simply truth.22 Our response is one of truthfulness. And truth is the ultimate definition of humility. Closely allied to our response of humility are the responses of trust, a sense of freedom, a profound confidence, etc., but naming these is enough to allow us to see the appropriate semantic 'family' in which we are involved. There is, of course, no 'logical reason' why these must be our responses. Again, they rise out of the structure of what is. They are natural. All that can be said is that they are in fact the pattern in which being expresses itself. Let us conclude by noticing some responses of a different variety which might otherwise be forgotten.

21"...A man who lives rightly won't experience the problem [in/of life] as sorrow, so for him it will not be a problem, but a joy rather; in other words for him it will be a bright halo round his life, not a dubious background " (CSV, p. 27).

22"We have already referred to Wittgenstein's drive for authenticity. Even "the beginnings of good originality are already there if you do not want to be something you are not" (CSV, p. 60). Hence, "the truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it," by someone who has "mastered himself " (CSV, p. 33). Such a condition relates to a genuine authenticity of the deepest sort.
Our joyous wonder and celebration, our continuous awe -- appropriately silence us. As we have seen, nothing can be said about either content or condition. In the standard sense in which saying has the structure of saying about, there is nothing to be said. Also, to do so would somehow break the awe and appreciation and even the acceptance. To speak is to mediate. Perhaps to speak is also to 'defile'. To speak is out of harmony in the face of such content and out of character in the face of such condition. Silence is the only appropriate statement.

Despite the silence, it is fitting and natural to want to share such beauty and such joy, peace, and love. As there is nothing that can be said, there can be no imparting of information, no explanation, no 'evangelization'. The only way to share is to show. One must do something to display the content to others. Since it is always there, this amounts to doing something which enables them to see it for themselves and to undergo transformation and thereby to appropriate this condition. Therefore, do philosophy. Engage in therapy. Write the Investigations if you are a Ludwig Wittgenstein. (And if you are not, perhaps write this thesis.)

On the other hand, just being in such manner, cannot but be a sharing, for the being cannot but be in perpetual giving to itself. On all levels, the fear of giving is gone, for nothing can be lost. And nothing can be received, for all already is. To so be is intrinsically to share, to show, to speak oneself in silence.

Result of Philosophy

This brings us to the consideration of this content and condition as the consequence or result of philosophy. That is, the display of this

23 "What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural." (C&V, p. 3)

We are back to the inexpressible, to the mystical. Wittgenstein discusses the inexpressibility of the experiences in that same lecture to The Heretics. The wonder and that which is known cannot be said. We are again thrust into silence. "The truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a miracle. ... And I will now describe the experience of wondering at the existence of the world by saying: It is the experience of seeing the world as a miracle. Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition in language, is the existence of language itself. ... But... all I have said is again that we cannot express what we want to express and that all we say about the absolutely miraculous remains nonsense." (eds. Ambrose and Lazerovitz, op. cit., pp. 113-114.)
content and our contact with it, and our condition, are the fruit of the Wittgensteinian philosophical method. We shall here refer to this content and condition as 'the mystical' both as a convenient nomenclature and because the *Investigations* in effect, though not in textual admission, seems to parallel the *Tractatus* in achieving 'the mystical' as a final denouement.

Philosophy for Wittgenstein is a method, a process, an activity. It is also a therapy. Let us briefly recall how both of these are true and how they interrelate. First of all, we find that the legitimate activity of philosophy according to the *Investigations* is to describe. But it is not to describe what is, or how our language operates in terms of the functioning totality. Philosophy, strictly speaking, should only describe the actual use of our language. It cannot interfere with it and "cannot give it any foundation either" (124). That this should be the only acceptable philosophical activity for Wittgenstein is to be expected when we recall that our philosophical problems are seated in our language, or more precisely in our misuse of language. Philosophical problems are linguistic in nature. They arise when we take our words out of their ordinary, everyday language 'homes' and apply them in some (usually metaphysical) manner. Our words make it look as if there is something hidden, something of great subtlety and great importance which we try to grasp as the essence of that about which we are puzzled. Typical philosophical problem-makers which perform this manoeuvre are "knowledge," "being," "object," "I," "proposition," "name," (116) etc., as well as such king problem-makers as "language," "meaning," and "world." Our language presents a picture and we proceed to describe that picture, complete with what is hidden in it and behind it. We think we are describing the way things are, the nature of things, whereas we are "merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it" (114). That which seems to be the 'real thing', the 'deep thing', the essence, as we have seen, we must leave alone. It is there to be seen. It cannot be said. Hence, it is philosophy's task to describe what we actually do with our words in our ordinary, everyday language situations.

24 "The mathematician too can wonder at the miracles (the crystal) of nature of course, but can he do so once a problem has arisen about what it actually is he is contemplating? Is it really possible as long as the object that he finds astonishing and gazes at with awe is shrouded in a philosophical fog?" (CSV, p. 57).
It is to describe their use, their application, their roles in our life activities. Through this description we come to understand the usefulness and the limits of our language. We understand its ability and suitability to perform in actual life circumstances. Correlatively, we become aware of our misuse of language, our violation of its limits, which occurs whenever we attempt metaphysical or psychological or theological explanations, all of which lead us to believe we are describing hidden 'essences' and exploring 'super-structures'.

The use of our words in any language game must be, remember, as ordinary as our use of "lamp," "table," "door" (97). 'Super-concepts' that belong to 'super-orders' apply to nothing but illusions of our language. Hence:

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery. (119)

Describing the use of words has, within Wittgenstein's philosophical method, the function of preventing would-be explanations of how things stand or why they do so stand which would serve only to block our vision. An actual process of describing the use of our words occurs in the Investigations in dialogue in which the 'antagonist' (the ordinary person suffering the illusion of language) inevitably exceeds the limits of language. He attempts some explanation of the way things appear to him. Whenever he does so, Wittgenstein proceeds to describe the everyday usage of the words he is applying and thus brings his words back to their everyday homes. This is all that philosophy as such can do.

...we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. (109)

Hence, philosophy again, as in the Tractatus, assumes the role of the watchdog of what we can say. It shepherds us, keeps us within safe

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25 We might keep in mind here that by "explanation" I do not mean what might normally be thought of as "scientific explanation". Wittgenstein does not give much consideration to natural science in the Investigations, which is perhaps understandable in someone who 'rejected' engineering in favor of philosophy. Nonetheless, natural science seems to be 'valid' in the thought of the Investigations. Its methodology fits its problems; it noticeably escapes the sort of attack levied against psychology. We are reminded in the Investigations that logic which
Therefore, we might say that Wittgenstein's philosophical method has within it two movements: one positive and one negative. Positively, it describes. Negatively, it prevents explanation. It is the effect of this dual movement which concerns us here. So long as we exceed the limits of our language, we live in the realm of illusion, not only the illusion created by our belief in metaphysical realities, including that of something called 'meaning', but also the illusion of who or what we are and of the nature of the world. Man looks different to himself, his behaviour looks different, the whole world looks different when explanation is expunged, especially the explanation proffered by metaphysical description. That description was intended to answer the question 'why', but the 'answer' which arises when the question is suspended is one that does not yield informational knowledge but is nonetheless a satisfaction of the question. The question no longer arises. It simply is not there any more. Its constitutive elements have been dissolved. It is not that the question remains but is suppressed, or that we are simply distracted or prevented from asking it. There simply is no question to be asked. When we receive a straightforward answer to a straightforward question, there no longer remains a question. It becomes at most a matter of history that a question was once asked. Likewise, in this situation, in the *Investigations*, there remains no lingering doubt, no problem, after the dissolution of the questions. In the *Tractatus*, a 'problem' remained. It took the form of a feeling that the world is, and was recognized as 'the mystical'.

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26 The solution/dissolution of the philosophical problem in the *Investigations* parallels the solution/dissolution of the life-problem in the *Tractatus*. This parallel is surely not by coincidence.
We experienced the ontological, but still felt the existential mystery. It was the riddle of life. In the Investigations we accept the mystery, become familiar and at ease in it. It is as though we are more mature in 'the mystical.' The experience of the existential mystery is stabilized. Life and the world are no longer felt as problem or riddle. We have become established in the union with being.

Yet, when a question is asked and answered, there is an enhancement of knowledge. So, too, here, when our question is prevented and dissolved, there is an enhancement of knowledge. When freed of illusion, our 'knowledge' of the world, of man, of behaviour, of all things, is, as we have already discussed, not of an informational nature, but it is, nonetheless, enhanced, and profoundly so. This enhancement comes not through the 'normal' channels of communication, experience, or learning. It is instead the result, the effect, the consequence, of describing the use of language and preventing explanation. This dual movement makes us see all things 'new'. It takes the old glasses of alienation and separation off our noses. Everything can then present itself differently. We can receive it differently. The effect of the old explanation was to block our vision and thereby bind us in the illusion. In that state we kept trying to say what is, but were totally unable to see it.

It is impossible to say just how our transformation occurs. That is, there is no logical explanation and no psychological explanation. As we saw, there is not even a time at which we can say it happens. It is simply the case that this procedure, this method of philosophy in which the use of language is described and explanation prevented, inevitably alters our vision. We might say that it does so by altering our concepts, particularly our concepts concerning language and meaning, and these being altered in the way they are, our concept of 'world' as a separate object with boundaries of its own is correlative shifted. As we saw earlier, these were master concepts, the alteration of which provided 'global' solutions to multiple philosophical problems. While our change in concepts can produce an altered world-view, that 'aim' of the Investigations differs from the result of the activity of philosophy which is the vision of content and experience of condition. It is, as we have seen, a change in our lives. Our change in concepts relates to, but does not account for, 'the mystical'. The most we can say is that
it is true that, when our concepts are 'straight', it is then possible that the phenomenon of what is displays itself, that is, that we be able to see it. The activities are the same.

Yet, we cannot say that this alteration in concepts is the cause, or the process whereby 'the mystical' occurs. If 'the mystical' has occurred, an alteration in concepts along the lines of the Investigations is inevitable, that is, some variation of this conceptual theme is an intrinsic attribute of 'the mystical', but the alteration in concepts is not necessarily prior in time or in logic to the advent of the condition. It can be simultaneous with it or even result from 'the mystical' experience itself. That is, within the condition, language, meaning, and the world would quite likely be cast in the new conceptual mould presented in the Investigations, but it is also possible that these concepts could proceed from the experience within the condition. Many things can account for a conceptual shift, but the conceptual shift cannot account for the experience. The experience in itself is non-conceptual, extra-conceptual. Yet it breaks through, as it were, to find expression as a change in concepts. The role of concepts within the Investigations is that of tools for games of life (569); they are tools for operating the relative field. Our altered concepts might be used in description in which we present language, meaning, and the world, in this manner, that is, we can linguistically express in terms of these concepts, because these concepts best portray the perceptions of meaning, language, and the world from within the condition. Yet, a conceptual change is all that we can trace -- 'materially' as it were -- from this philosophical method, which is of course synonymous with 'philosophy' for Wittgenstein.

We must say, then, that what happens through this process of philosophy -- the mystical -- cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of conceptual alteration. The transformation is to be witnessed and experienced. It is somewhat like a 'general fact of nature'. It is simply what happens.

The conceptual change, at most, involves or constitutes a seeing-as. It is interpretative. It is the development of new tools more suitable for the mediation and manipulation of our world vis-a-vis our new experience,
that is, within the condition. Our previous illusory concepts were apropos of our illusory, alienated experience. Our conceptual change occurred in the course of examining the use and/or misuse of our language. Or rather, our new concepts developed in the process of examining this use and/or misuse. Our conceptual change can be 'causally' explained. It can be traced within the activity of philosophy. Furthermore, as we saw earlier, the change in our concepts was fundamental to Wittgenstein's solution of philosophical problems. It provided 'global' dissolving of the problems themselves. From within the new conceptual framework, the problems never arise. It is also the case that the conceptual change is not the 'cause' of 'the mystical'. Yet, we have said that 'the mystical' is the result of the philosophical method. Let us look further.

Our conceptual change is in itself remarkable. It radically alters our entire world-view, but it does not, in turn, render a satisfactory, explanatory account of our transformation. And without the transformation, the vision of the content cannot possibly be complete. We might see indirectly in dianoia, 'as through a glass, darkly', as it were, but not so fully, in direct participation, as in noesis. In our transformation the content and the condition are intimately related, even intrinsically related. That is why we have called the both of them -- content and condition -- 'the mystical'. Without transformation what we have is a seeing-as as opposed to a seeing, an illumination, noesis. It is at best like hearing a symphony instead of 'entering into it'. That our vision cannot be adequate without participational experience is easy to understand. It is like seeing a form of art which is not 'our own'. There is nothing we can do with, no way 'to go on' with, foreign forms of art, though they might stand before us in full view. We cannot understand, at surface or depth levels, let alone become one with, say, Egyptian hieroglyphics and Egyptian painting. They simply look 'very odd'. We cannot choose a style of art "at pleasure" (p.230). This is true even though an explanation may be available and a deciphering code be in our hands. We must be 'Egyptian-ized', to fathom these forms. Similarly, only when we experience this condition is the content fully seen. 'The mystical' is
a gestalt. The *Lebenswelt*\(^\text{27}\) is an organ of sight.

That our conceptual change does not account for our transformation in no way negates the importance of the conceptual change. This change prepares us for transformation just as does the blockage of linguistic explanation of how things stand and the understanding of the source of our illusion and alienation, but the transformation itself cannot be explained in terms of any of these.\(^\text{28}\) Explanation of any sort, even in terms of conceptual development, remains at the level of *dianoia*. 'The mystical' is in the realm of *poiesis*. The passage from one to another is no: by transition, as in the case of conceptual alteration, but by transformation. There is nothing in the conceptual change which occurs in the process of the activity of philosophy that accounts for transformation. Not only is *dianoia* not applicable to *poiesis*, but it is not applicable to the process of its occurrence. It happens. We may be able to explain *all about* the world, but we can never explain *that* the world is. We may be able to explain the conceptual shifts that accompany 'the mystical' but we cannot explain *that* 'the mystical' is.

A second attempt at a 'causal' explanation which makes 'the mystical' an intelligible result of 'philosophy' might be rendered in terms of our coming to understand the very source of our mistake, the source of our illusion and alienation. In the course of the description of the use of our language and in the preventing of explanation, the poor unfortunate language user comes to see the erroneous

\(^{27}\) *Lebenswelt* here is not used with the usual Husserlian meaning, i.e. the world in which we live. Rather, I mean by it the 'lived world', our form of life as it incorporates all activities and all general facts of nature, all of the natural history of man.

\(^{28}\) Related to this, Wittgenstein commented in 1946 that the most important and effective change is the one in "our own attitude" which "hardly ever occurs to us..." (C&W, p. 53). Also, "one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.)" (C&W, p. 53). At the ethical and mystical levels, the changes are deeper than intellectual/conceptual.
and misleading process in which he participates in his alienated condition and which he ceaselessly generates as his natural habitat. He sees how it is that he is getting the wrong picture and mistaken concepts. By being made aware of how his language works, he can see how his illusions arise. He acquires an understanding of what it is to mean an utterance. He is able to think deeper levels, and perform a hermeneutic upon the utterance, that is, he can understand its multiple accomplishments at various levels and the numerous factors from which it proceeds.

However, understanding the problem need not in itself be a solution. There is no automatic answer to a problem contained in our knowledge of a problem. That is just what it says — knowledge of the problem. In fact, in our day this is an industry in itself. Countless search groups and study committees produce endless files and reports on all manner of -- problems. The understanding of all sorts of problems is truly phenomenal. A genuine solution is rare indeed. But Wittgenstein was concerned with philosophical problems -- and philosophical problems lie in our language, or more precisely, in our misuse of words, in our misunderstanding of what our words accomplish. It is easy to think that such an understanding would itself be a solution. The problem should disappear. We can see that it is not genuine. It is only a pattern of our words. In the case of putting our fingers into a fire, perhaps to have seen what happens is enough to 'solve the problem' of getting burned, but our language is more subtle than that. Also, there is a 'catch'. "... to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." (19) We are necessarily masters of the technique of language. We cannot escape, even for a single day, the situation in which its pictures are presented to us while their sense and application lie far in the background -- unperceived, and therefore, deceiving us. This means, in the practical state of affairs, that to be a language user is to be alienated, 'illumined', ill. For this situation, philosophy is the required therapy. But if the disease is as inescapable as our language, the therapy must be equally inescapable, constant, perpetual. The problem perpetually arises and therefore must be perpetually dissolved. If we are to be healthy, we must always be in therapy.

Is there not something intrinsically sick about such a situation?
The problem may be solved, but the patient is never cured. His disease is simply maintained in a constant state of remission.

In other words, if this technique of philosophy, with its dual movement, leaves us only at the level of understanding what it is to mean an utterance, or at the level of doing a hermeneutic of it, all by means of a description of the use of our language which enables us to see the source of our mistakes, our problems, it has done nothing but create a market for itself. It has exposed a constant need for continued philosophical investigations of our language. (This, is to some extent what seems to be done by many 'followers' of Wittgenstein, by those who seem to see themselves as forming a Wittgensteinian 'school'.) But if one must be in therapy in order to maintain one's sight -- that therapy becomes an addiction. Perhaps this last state is worse than the first. Addiction? or illusion? Pay the price and take your pick.

Surely this could not have satisfied Wittgenstein nor been his intention. No matter how vexing a personality he might have been, he was no charlatan. He agonized over the integrity of philosophy and philosophers and constantly feared the corruption of both within the setting of an academic institution. He feared the sheer proximity of a 'market'. Furthermore, as we saw in an earlier section, Wittgenstein's aim was our freedom, and we have seen that that freedom may well be deeper than an altered conceptual field and an altered world-view, though it involves, even requires, both of these. To understand the source of illusion is still not to be free at these deeper levels. It is not to be out of alienation in our experience, but only in our knowledge-of, our dianoia. It is not the experience in being, complete with knowingness. It is not noesis. Therefore, Wittgenstein's therapy must have been something more. It must have cured us more permanently, freed us more deeply. The method itself must produce more than the dissolution of the philosophical problems -- even for the problem to remain dissolved. It must be a therapy of ourselves, not just our

\[29\] The notion of a school was something abhorent to Wittgenstein. In 1947 he said he could not found a school because he did "not really want to be imitated" and because he preferred to change "the way people live." (C&V, p. 61).
concepts, not just our habits of thinking. Also, at this level of philosophical problem solving, there is no apparent connection between the philosophical method and what we have called 'the mystical', that combination of content and condition which seemed to emerge so naturally and so spontaneously in the course of our thorough study of the *Investigations*. What is there in that which is studied which 'made' this happen? Let us look again.

Wittgenstein's method describes the use of our language and prevents explanation. In the course of doing that, our concepts of language, meaning, and the world are transformed. This means we understand what it is to mean an utterance, we understand our philosophical problem as a problem, and all the blockages of explanation which prevent our seeing are withheld from us. We are made able to see. All that remains is to look. Let us consider this 'happening'. What is being done by the *Investigations*? It presents a picture, but its sense, its application, lie far in the background. What is the speech-act of the entire activity of philosophy, both as Wittgenstein sees the activity of philosophy, and as we see the *Investigations*? -- for the *Investigations* was for Wittgenstein a doing of philosophy with us. (As we have seen, each reader is, throughout the text, also an actor in the drama, playing the part of the antagonist.) What happens is that this method uncovers. It reveals what is. It is quite literally an action, like shovelling earth off a buried treasure, or removing the veil from a magnificent painting -- only here the veil which hides the painting is over our own faces. In our therapy we are made able to see; the scales of alienation and illusion are removed from our eyes. In the course of that, what we are to see was literally being unveiled. That was the unveiling. It was the presentation of the panorama. The entire functioning totality was being laid bare before our eyes -- and when we look upon it, we know ourselves as it and it as ourselves. We have become one with it. If we see, then something has happened. The change in tense is necessary and automatic. That vision is transforming. Such is the power of the content upon us.

As we have seen, after this, there is for each of us no 'me' that remains as separate. We are It. And everything is perfect. What once seemed so big and other, so threatening, is all just the perfectly functioning whole of which we are a part, not a separate part, but an aspect, a manifestation, an expression. There is only It, and It is all that is happening. We have lost ourselves and lost control. We have
There is so much doing and 'you' do not have to do anything as 'you'.

There is not even any 'you' to do anything. That was just an illusion. We are a new kind of being -- one who is just being itself. We, you, I -- am It. We have been transformed. We are the frogs who were kissed and found ourselves to be princes.

We might ask whether we were in fact 'this way' all along? or have we entered a new realm, become new creatures? Both are true. This is what we really are but could not be so long as we maintained alienation.

This is a universal experience that spans traditions and backgrounds. It seems well described in the following paragraph:

When the pilgrim reaches his goal after overcoming a great distance, he depicts that reunion as a total absence of distance -- as identity or merging. The pilgrim is ultimately absorbed in God like a drop of water in a sponge, as St. Teresa managed to say it. God is in me like a "spark" within my soul, said Eckhart. "God's is-ness (istigkeit) is my is-ness." Yet, paradoxically, he cannot speak of God, or else he reintroduces the distance he has now overcome. "How" asks Plotinus, "can we represent as different from us that which did not seem, while we were contemplating it, not other than ourselves but in perfect at-oneness with us?" "The knower and the known are one," said Eckhart. (M. Furse, op. cit., p. 188.)

There are two verses which illustrate this notion and seem to fit with Wittgenstein's thought. The first is often quoted in secondary sources in footnotes and frontispieces. It bears repeating:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T.S. Eliot
("Four Quartets")

The second is similar:

Do you aspire
to some form of beauty
you can never acquire?
I do too
I have stormed weary nights
in quest of it
torn petal apart,
desperate
then suddenly discovered
I have it already
here with me now.

An Anglican Nun.
(quoted in Furse, op.cit., p. 16)
Through therapy we altered our concepts, we began to see things as being very different from what we thought, we acquired a new world-view, we dropped our dualities, dropped our alienation, understood ourselves and the things and language all to be one functioning whole. But through our contact with this content we dropped the alienation, not just as a world-view or a seeing-as, but we dropped it existentially -- for us. We dropped it experientially and became -- It. We might say, upon contact this content takes us into itself. That, of course, is from our perspective. It would be more correct to say that we simply became what we already were. We might ask whether noesis is unifying? But that, again, is to miss the force of transformation. It is also to reduce noesis to a type of ordinary knowledge. We might say instead that noesis is union, or, even more precisely, that our union is noesis.

After such a transformation there is no longer a need of therapy as such for the transformed individual. We have already seen that it is a hallmark of this condition that one is 'never quite the same again'. This is so whether the transition has transpired suddenly or gradually. In this sense we can say that the transformation is indeed 'one off'. We could imagine that it is possible to drop the noetic life. Yet, in practice, that would hardly seem to be the case. Also, as it is a life of such preferred quality, it is impossible to think that one would choose to return to illusion. At the same time, this does not deny that there can be growth within this condition. Life remains a constant pilgrimage, an ongoing journey into the infinite. We need not fear reversal, but neither can we think of stopping. We need fear no reversal, for 'the mystical' is a natural, inevitable happening. Upon contact we are transformed. This transformation is a gift in that what is is in such a way that this transformation can and does occur. This -- what is as it is -- is gift and mystery. Our transformation is the result of philosophy in that philosophy readies us, puts us in position, for this transformation -- but we grow within it. This continual growth, however, does not imply a continual need for therapy. Once one learns to walk, one continues walking. One need not always 'begin again'. Once one is able to see, one continues seeing. One does not perpetually need one's sight 'enabled'. As we shall see, this
individual can continue to engage in the philosophical process, but it
is no longer therapy for him as it once was. It is instead a continued
expression on the level of dianoia which throws into relief his noetic
condition. It seems that Wittgenstein would likewise have thought our
therapy would be 'definitive', for he wanted to be able to stop
doing philosophy. He wanted to be able to cease the examination of
examples. He wanted to find peace from it all. There could be neither
cessation nor peace if the need were constant. Surely philosophy is
a process, not a doctrine or an argument or even a discussion, but it
is a process in itself. It is a procedure which parallels our problem,
our illusion, and which ideally comes into play only when that illusion
emerges or manifests itself. One does not 'set out' to do philosophy.
(Doing so is part of what enables philosophy to become industry, a
profession.) Once we have undergone the transformation, those illusions
which elicit philosophy will no longer 'come to light'. How could they?
They are no longer. There is continued growth beyond 'arrival' but that
in no way negates arrival. From within 'the mystical' we can make all
the appropriate external responses, and in the field of the relative we
can go on playing all our language games, but we need never again be
cought in the illusion, for we no longer are, in fact or in experience,
as 'separate' language users who think we are describing a 'separate'
reality. Both in fact and in experience we are being, blossoming
forth in each moment — as meaning. 32

32 How terribly unlike Wittgenstein's language are these words! Yet,
as we approach conclusion, it might be worth recalling again that the
inexpressible seems to be the very foundation of all that Wittgenstein
was and did. As noted at the end of the volume of letters between
Wittgenstein and Englemann:

Indeed, the transference of all metaphysical essences
to the realm of the unutterable has for the first time
created the possibility of a universal human way of life
without a denial of metaphysical beliefs...

What Wittgenstein's life and work shows is the possibility
of a new spiritual attitude. It is 'a new way of life'
which he lived, and because of which he has so far not
been understood. For a new way of life entails a new
language. His way of life is the same as that of some
great men of the past, but its special significance for
us lies in the fact that only in our epoch has this ex-
ample come to point the way to a universal new way of
life.

Cont'd.
Hence, the philosophical method is actually a displaying, a showing, and the content which it reveals is transforming. The content works the transformation. Philosophy, as it were, puts us in touch with the content. It is in this way that philosophy is a technique for 'the mystical', that philosophy results in 'the mystical'. Similarly, it is in this way that the Investigations in itself is an ontology of a most extraordinary sort. It is neither description nor explanation nor argument on what is, but is instead a display of it, a spreading of it before our eyes. More deeply, the Investigations is a delivery of what is to what is. It, too, is being being itself -- knowingly. We might almost say it is being enjoying itself, just being, knowing that it is. The Investigations is an ontology that is the ontological. That all things are the ontological is beside the point. The point is, that unless that fact has at some point struck us, to paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein, we have not seen what is most striking about the Investigations at all.

Conclusion

In conclusion, then, Wittgenstein's philosophical method has enabled us to understand, that is, to see what it means to 'mean' something, to see how it is that we operate on surface and depth levels, how we operate the whole. It has enabled us to understand the deeper levels of our moves in a language game and to understand our games in the repertoire of games, to know who and what we are and do in the relative field. In other words, it has enabled a hermeneutic. Finally, by the removal of our impediments of sight and by the display of the functioning totality, it has enabled our contact with that content which radically transforms us. In this it gives us a new condition with new potentials and a new way of knowing. It enables us to see and be the whole of being in a unitary consciousness. It bestows the freedom Wittgenstein's language is the language of wordless faith. Such an attitude adopted by other individuals of the right stature will be the source from which new forms of society will spring, forms that will need no verbal communication, because they will be lived and thus made manifest.

(Paul Englemann, op. cit., pp. 143-145.)
of being itself. As we said before, it is not simply a 'philosophical' method, but a technique for 'the mystical'. It effects our transformation, not as cause, for that transformation is a 'happening', an automatic result of the content itself in this particular movement of itself, but as catalyst. And if transformation is something best understood as 'discontinuous' with the past, then surely the word "catalyst" is the more apt expression than "cause," which seems to have, in everyday language, connotations of mere change or modification.

Usually we restrict such techniques to the realm of 'religion', but there is no reason for doing so. After all, if this condition is a perfectly natural one, if it is the way we 'really' are, why should there be only one 'revelation', only one 'method'? On Wittgenstein's terms, religions themselves would be only one particular language game. Each of them, however, attempts to speak, to say, to tell, the entire reality through some metaphor or other, any of which, as we have seen, at various levels, can be quite legitimate and 'true'. Such metaphors of the content and condition might be the story of creation, the coming of Christ, redemption, grace, rebirth, and residence in a New Jerusalem. The techniques in this tradition are prayer and sacraments, study and meditation. Or, the metaphors of content and condition might be that of the Brahman and the Atman, Krishna, instruction of Arjuna, reincarnation, ultimate samadhi. The technique in such tradition is multifold. It is that of devotion, of selfless action, of intellectual discrimination, of meditation, postures, and breathing. Etc., etc., etc. If such metaphors and practices belong to religions -- theology, on the other hand, is a matter of grammar. Revelation cannot be restricted. It is all that is revealing itself to itself (to us within itself who are it). Hence there is no reason why method and even the metaphor need be confined to the normal games. We can (it can) create new ones. In Wittgenstein's method, the metaphor is missing. Or, perhaps silence itself is the maximal metaphor, the only apt description of the displaying, that which is displayed, and our at-one-ment with it.

We must note again that through these allusions to religion we are in no way making Wittgenstein a guru nor turning philosophy into a religion. Nothing could be more incompatible with this philosopher or this philosophy. On the other hand, bearing in mind the etymology of "religion" wherein it means a binding back to our roots, we could
perhaps rightly call it religious. It is totally non-doctrinal, non-prescriptive; there is no ritual, no 'priesthood'. But there is a method whereby we are bound back to our roots, and our appropriate responses are in many ways identical to those accompanying what is normally called a religious experience. Furthermore, if it is the case that God as immanent is directly perceived within the content and condition, then that which we have called 'the mystical' could equally be called religious in the deepest sense of the word. Yet, we must remember that this experience is traditionally a legitimate domain of philosophy. As we noted at the end of our discussion on the *Tractatus*, it was the final end of philosophy for the early Greeks and it spans the field of science and art as well. Be it 'gnostic' or 'religious', it has surfaced in philosophy throughout the centuries. We have an Augustine, an Anselm, an Aquinas, a Spinoza, a Kierkegaard, a Schopenhauer, a Buber. Why not a Wittgenstein? or a you? or me?
In this study we have examined the elaborate ontological vision presented in both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. It is a vision which is displayed through the study of language and which the activity of philosophy has enabled us to see. It is a vision which is inherently part of the profound human form of life commonly called -- mystical. A study of this kind raises questions on philosophy and the philosopher, on an appropriate methodology and its effectiveness, and, most obviously, on the age-old problem of speaking the unspeakable. In closing this study, let us briefly consider these questions.

The Future of Philosophy

It might be thought: after Wittgenstein, philosophy is finished. Though Wittgenstein contends that there are many methods of philosophy, not a method (133), given his understanding of the philosophical problem it is difficult to see how any other method, with the possible exception of symbolic logic, could be anything more than a continual creation of philosophical problems. But if Wittgenstein is right in his conception of the philosophical problem, what is there left to do? Has he not done it all for us? Differently stated, is this the end, the finis, the death, of philosophy? Certainly many Wittgensteinians have written many good books since the death of Ludwig. And certainly many Wittgensteinians are very good teachers, skilled beyond measure in assisting others to see, at least at the initial levels, what Wittgenstein has shown. But why are so many Wittgensteinians -- at most -- teachers? Earlier we noted that, ideally, philosophy as therapy comes into force only when we mistake the forms and functions of our language, so that we are trapped in the fly-bottle. On these grounds, to be teacher-cum-therapist is the commendable and logical 'conclusion' of such a philosophical method, but is this 'conclusion' really satisfactory?

Well, this much at least can be said. If our transformation has occurred, there is nothing additional that philosophy can do for us. If we are already completely at-one, we cannot become more so. If we are awareness itself, we cannot become more aware. If we experience complete perfection, we cannot strive for the perfect, etc. As we have also
noticed, we do proceed to act in the relative field and that is the realm in which the activity of philosophy occurs. It is also the realm of diaphonia. It is the field of knowledge-of. The Wittgensteinian method of philosophy can always provide greater knowledge-of the specific deceptions of our language. Our knowledge-of the possible tricks of our language, the further possible 'bewitchments of intelligence' by words, can continue to grow. We can be free of its illusions and continue to see the various ways in which it is possible to be illusioned. Since the applications of language are conceivably infinite due to the history and evolution of the language community and the continually changing circumstances and varied contexts of life's activities, our knowledge-of possible specific deceptions is likewise conceivably infinite. While philosophy solves or dissolves problems, in curing us of the whole process of illusion, the specific instantiations of possible illusion might still be of interest. After all, we can be interested in a topic in a variety of ways (108). Hence, our investigations of language could in fact continue forever. Continuation on such a basis, however, would -- surely -- be somewhat sterile and lifeless. It would be parallel to the activity of collecting. There are numerous philatelists and numismatists and collectors of all sorts, but that activity is far from the vital engagement that is philosophy at its best. In fact, if philosophy has become the activity of collecting, is it still the activity of philosophy? To say that some philosophy in the Wittgensteinian vein is sterile and lifeless is of course a value judgement on my part, but insofar as one can discern trends within the discipline of philosophy, there does in fact seem to be a turning away from such a mode of 'philosophizing'.

Earlier in our study, we saw that philosophy did consist in assembling a collection of reminders of the ways in which we can be illusioned. But those reminders act as reminders only until our transformation has occurred. If we are totally free of alienation, we operate our language without danger. We respect its limits and hence, ironically, are freed of its limitations. (I will later discuss the apparently illegitimate use of language within this thesis.) If the engine of language never idles, if we keep language at home in everyday life activities -- where it belongs -- then it will never run rampant, it will never not be working. If language were never to exceed its boundaries, we would never need reminders that its place is at home. We
would be content in what is and never need the costly sort of metaphysical forays which its flight provides. If transformed, we dwell in the state of freedom and from there are always aware of the phantoms of language, the phoney offers it makes, for we are at-one with being itself and hence cannot not be attuned to the actual applications of our language, the actual way in which being presents itself. We can watch these attempted descriptions from within being.

It is in this sense that our continued doing of Wittgensteinian philosophy can be a reminder in the relative field of the contrast between this condition and the state of separation and alienation. It can remind us, call to our mind again, the process itself wherein the world is mediated by our language and wherein, without the therapy of philosophy or some alternative 'method', the average person is duped, trapped in dualities, and confined to knowledge-of. It can provide a continuous display of the formation of concepts and the filtering of reality for which they are tools. In other words, it can remind us, not therapeutically but recollectively, that our relative history is indeed relative. It can display by means of contrast, by bas relief, our own condition of unmediated perception. Within the realm of knowledge-of, it can always remind us that there is knowledge which is not knowledge-of. In the relative field, our continued doing of philosophy can, as it were, within the realm of dianoia, testify to noesis. If we maintain consciousness of the limits of language, we are reminded of what is inexpressible, beyond our language.

Closely related to this is the fact that, from within the condition, the continued doing of philosophy, Wittgensteinian style, can occasion all the appropriate responses spoken of earlier. In being a reminder, as well as being a continued display of the content and condition on the relative plane, it can stimulate our joy and stir our appreciation. In other words, to do philosophy is to enjoy the display to which it gives us continual access on the relative plane. It can enhance our gratitude and humility, for we see again and again where we 'might have been'. In other words, the doing of philosophy can be a reminder, in the relative field, of our actual participation in mystery, of our lived experience that can never be expressed, for its expression would be to say being whereas all that can be done of being is to be. It can remind us on the level of dianoia of our own
realization. It reminds us that it is; it does not describe or explain what it is. This reminder is not in words, but in the very performance of the activity of philosophy. Being unable to say, even in the activity of philosophy, our silence is highlighted; it can be heard more keenly. Through the reminder—that, even the response of silence is further occasioned.

Finally, once we have entered this condition, the doing of philosophy, besides being a means of continued celebration for us as just seen, is also appropriate therapy for others. We engage in this philosophy only in relation to our language. We must describe the use of language, which is best done in dialogue. Talking to ourselves is a language game derivative of talking to one another. Hence, even in his written display of the activity of philosophy, Wittgenstein performs the task only in dialogue. His display is usually made in response to the utterances of another. Furthermore, it can perhaps only authentically be done from the condition of enlightenment, for only then can we continually see the illusion under which the other suffers. Only then can we do those things, make those points, which will allow the other to see for himself. To continue doing philosophy—once transformed—is to be a guide for others. To continue doing philosophy—untransformed—is either to be under therapy or to be engaged in philosophy as an industry. When transformed, it is to criss-cross the landscape with another, time and time again, until he knows his way about, 'develops a nose' for the philosophical problem, and is able to perform the hermeneutic, until finally he can make contact with the functioning totality displayed before him—and thereby become a future guide himself. Thus, to continue to do philosophy, on this method, is perhaps the most appropriate way to share.

In conclusion, if the effects of philosophy remained at the level of understanding (that is, coming to know what it is to understand and mean an expression) or even of hermeneutic (that is, coming to know the various forces at work in our depth grammar and interpreting or understanding our expressions and activities in light of these) at which levels its continuation so easily degenerates into a professional industry, then its future, one might hope, would promptly end. But if the effects of philosophy progress to the level of content and condition (that is, the
encounter with and participation in what is in such manner that one is transformed and one’s knowledge is noetic), then its future is not only promising, but brilliant. Those who are really 'inducted' into philosophy on this level, find their own condition vis-à-vis philosophy likewise transformed. In this condition their intellectual grasp can be confirmed, as it were, and each in his own way and his own language can appropriate that content. It becomes the 'content' of his philosophy. Yet, as each personal state and circumstance is different, as our individual and corporate history keeps changing, that appropriation will find a different appropriate expression in each life and each age. That expression is creative philosophy. It is engagement. And, as this ultimate task of philosophy is one of appropriation, the continuation of philosophy is so appropriate that it would seem to be inevitable. It is perhaps an ontological necessity. So long as man's intellectual quest continues and his restless spirit has yet to find its rest, so long as man is man, and so long as that which is functions as meaning in itself -- there is a brilliant future for philosophy.

Future of the Philosopher

What is the future of the philosopher as distinct from the future of philosophy? The prognosis here is even brighter. Of course it is possible that, in 'embarking upon philosophy', in engaging in this activity, one might never reach this most desirable level. One might end as a 'mere' collector: or as a 'mere' teacher. It would even appear that many who were Wittgenstein's pupils were 'crippled' by this very activity of philosophy. They became entangled in the process itself rather than engaged with that to which the process delivers us. Having seen the 'tool' and having learned something from the teacher, they seem to have thought all that could be done was to assist others in becoming free of illusions. Some are even renowned as teachers, but are noticeably -- non-publishers. Though doing philosophy --creatively-- may ultimately be imperative, as we just discussed, publishing, of course, is not. Yet, one suspects the reason for this state of affairs might be that, though these 'philosophers' have seen the mechanics of illusion, they have never become free of it nor free of these mechanics. The technique works. The method is effective. Our transformation is a natural ontological happening. It is, as it were, a birthright of our very being. But, as mentioned once
before, so long as we will not leave the vehicle which delivers us to our destination, we can never arrive at that destination. We can, in fact, live forever within the vehicle. If this suspicion is correct, perhaps a mere 'forewarning' at the beginning of their studies, a mere pointing out that Wittgensteinian philosophy 'points beyond', would have been sufficient to spare these pupils such entrapment, but that is another matter. Let us glimpse the future of the philosopher who has escaped this entrapment.

The philosopher, trapped or free, lives in the same world as everyone else, despite frequent accusations to the contrary. The 'transformed Wittgensteinian philosopher' can still perform all of life's activities. Because of what he sees, his choices may be different in the future, for his sense of harmony, his sense of beauty from within being, his sense of authenticity, will be altered. There has been transformation. His altered awareness will open him to different options he did not otherwise have. After all, he is free. As a philosopher he can perhaps do better philosophy; for he does not claim for it -- too much. Philosophy leaves everything just as it is (124). This philosopher can play the games of language. The world is still the same, and he is still master of the technique of language. But, from within his condition, whatever games he plays, he will play with full awareness, full freedom, be it politics or education or business, raising a family or vacationing or reading the newspaper. He will act, and in his actions be the realized man. Could there be a brighter future?

Methodology and Effectiveness

Surely the Investigations can be considered a paradigm of Wittgenstein's philosophical method. While the method can be applied to any language game, it is only natural that entire volumes of such investigations could be produced on any particular topic. These studies would uncover our mistaken notions created by our language in the family of games related to the particular topic. Examples of such specialized investigations are Wittgenstein's own posthumously published works entitled On Certainty and Remarks on Colour. As we mentioned previously, any topic, if studied extensively enough, would eventually uncover the entire functioning totality. It would reveal also the illusory quality of our language, for that occurs
inevitably in the implementation of the method itself. It would expunge our mistaken notions of meaning, and would expose the content, enable us to see and make possible our transformation.

The *Investigations*, however, handles the master problems directly and provides an explication of the method for doing so in its remarks on philosophy. For this reason, it remains the key to understanding Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is, as it were, a foundation. Yet, one might hope that any philosophical work using this method would ultimately be a demonstration, a showing, a display, of the content. As we have seen, the *Investigations* does just that. It is a panoramic view, a landscape study. It is an aesthetic work, a performance, and should be evaluated as such. Having come to an understanding of the meaning of the *Investigations* as a statement and having performed a hermeneutic of it as a speech-act, we can now ponder its effectiveness.

Our response to the *Investigations* is most appropriately that aesthetic response appropriate to a thing of beauty, both as to the appreciation of the skill and technique involved and as to the overall presentation, the total effect, the work itself. This is like the consideration of an aesthetic presentation of something, a poem or a painting or a piece of music, as opposed to the subject of that presentation, be it a person, an emotion, a scene, or whatever. The subject in this instance is parallel to the content itself, but we are noticing here the presentation of that subject/content.

Wittgenstein’s aim was to change our world-view, and his presentation clearly gives a new vision of the world. He paints it differently. He shows it to us from a totally fresh perspective, in a radically altered conceptual framework. Language as a form of life, meaning as nothing but being itself, the world as one with us and we with it... This is a new interpretation. Whether or not we are able to appropriate and appreciate it is another matter. To some extent this presentation resonates within us or it does not; we respond or we do not. An artist cannot be totally responsible for his audience.

And yet, Wittgenstein took upon himself this responsibility. He set himself the task of enabling us to see the vision he presents — as
he himself saw it. He is willing to help us arrive at his own perspec­tive. He engages in constant dialogue and correction of our attitudes,
our responses, our 'view', until we 'are able to go on -- with him', go
on as he would go on. Seldom in one and the same work does an artist
of any sort attempt both presentation and exegesis. But that seems to
be exactly what Wittgenstein did in the Investigations. Nor has he
stopped there.

In the course of this dialogue he also unveils the content, the
subject, being itself. He exposes the very reality within the presenta­
tion. It is right there, functioning dynamically in what is going on.
The vision is not separate from the presentation; the presentation is
not separate from the reality itself. We cannot escape what is. It is
ever around us. We are it. Our words are it. Hence, Wittgenstein
forces us into direct contact with the content. He puts us in touch
with it -- possibly as we never have been before. He takes down the
barriers between us and it, and enables us to see how we, our words, our
world, all that is, is the painting, the music, the presentation itself.
And with that unitive contact comes, as we have seen, the experience,
the condition. We henceforth participate in the performance of life
without illusion.

Thus, the Investigations is everything all-in-one. It is a happening
in itself. It goes on playing itself as a symphony with all its move­
ments. It is artist, audience, score, presentation, experience,
reaction, guidance, exposition, transformation -- all happening in one
complex process. It is, as it were, a microcosm within the macrocosm
which it presents. Yet, all such verbs as "presents" can be misleading,
for they can imply a dichotomy, and it is precisely as what is that the
Investigations functions and achieves. In its being itself what is, we
recognize and accept, are experientially, 'knowingly', plunged into,
at-one-with all that is in one continuous, dynamic motion.

This, however, has only roughly described the piece of art. It has
in no way answered the question of its effectiveness. It is not critique
or evaluation. But how does one judge such a unique and comprehensive --
'thing'? One cannot even definitively categorize it's 'field'. It is
like music, like painting, like poetry, like a novel -- it is life,
mystery, being. Who evaluates being? How does one do it? What a ridiculous notion.

And yet we still have this book before us, a book which has surely sold as many or more copies than any other philosophical work of this century. Is there nothing we can say about it? Has it accomplished all that we have described? Has it fulfilled its potential? Has the 'technique' worked? There is obviously only one locus wherein to look for the answer to such questions. That answer must be in the readers themselves, those who encounter the *Investigations*, those who engage with it. Did these readers become involved with the work itself, with the content, and experience the results of this contact? or did they remain at the level of *dianoia*? Did they conclude their study only with greater understanding? or did they attain an 'enlightenment'? After the *Investigations* -- the question to be asked is simply: "How are you?" It would seem that the transformation has to have occurred in order even to perceive the *Investigations* as an ontological study, in order even to see that all of these movements in fact exist within it and that it is itself such a work of art, a living sculpture, the totality functioning. We are in a circle. If we thus experience the world, then we see the *Investigations* as a beautiful display. We will invariably say it was successful. If we do not, at the very least we will not attempt to evaluate it in such terms.

Furthermore, if it was an effective 'catalyst' (we saw that it could not be called a 'cause') the appropriate response is silence. The content and condition are inexpressible and imponderable. If it really 'worked' our knowledge could never be adequately articulated anyway; those on whom it was effective could never rightly say. They might in fact go on to do philosophy as an attempt to share, or they might not. Being is a sharing, too, the ultimate one -- *communion*, not disclosure. There are many who go on to do philosophy. Are they part of the industry? or part of the 'enlightenment'? Just as we had to look to the life of Wittgenstein to find evidence, so we might need to look to the life of the philosopher to form an opinion on this matter. We might speculate on 'where someone is.' But that is dangerous. It is better to see that the answer lies in the life of each reader. It lies in his inner life, but it is not private. We can, for example, see what a person is
'open to'. We can see his fears and his hurts, his joy, his kenosis, and even his attempt to hide them away. The inner life is intimate; it remains intimate. But it is not hidden. There is nowhere to hide. Consequently, if we look, we can see. On occasion the reader himself might 'indicate' the answer to this question but neither he, nor we, can exhaustively say. If, however, upon looking it is apparent that the level of dianoia only has been attained (and that we may say, for we have a legitimate language game which discusses our knowledge-of as knowledge-of), then we might speculate as to the reason or reasons the noetic level was not attained.

First, it is possible that Wittgenstein simply overestimated his audience. This work (the whole 'movement') was his life. Biographically, we know that he was completely consumed by it. He engaged in it constantly. The functioning whole would have been second nature, obvious. Apart from explanation of this being inexpressible, it would stand in need of no explanation. To play the flute is easy -- for William Bennett or Julius Baker or James Galway. To make a sound at all on such an instrument is impossible for others. And to learn is not easy. The master may forget this.

Second, the Investigations has an audience of 'professional' philosophers. Even students of philosophy engage in its study out of 'professional' interest. A painter is often interested in another painter's technique. It is natural. As professional philosophers we might easily become more concerned with the unveiling process than with the treasure unveiled. We are critical, and our interest often lies in inspecting for flaws, in seeing what might be 'wrong' or in examining the argument as such, or the method of argument. We can be interested in a thing in a variety of ways, and it is an occupational hazard to be interested in a philosophical work in precisely this way. But, to do so in regard to a work of this particular sort, is fatal, for that interest erects a barrier to the total involvement with the Investigations which is parallel to the barrier of the illusion of language which Wittgenstein tried so hard to demolish in order that we might see. Our 'philosophical glasses' prevent us from seeing the treasure. Wearing them, we simply 'trace the frame which holds it'. It is the treasure that transforms, but philosophically, we may never see it.
Why? And does that mean that Wittgenstein was not successful? Not necessarily, though he feared he was not an adequate teacher. If the *Investigations* is not only an ontological vision, but an ontological movement, as I have suggested, and must be seen to be such in order to be fully perceived and experienced on all of its levels, then our understanding and experience are likewise a participation, an ontological movement. We are players in the drama. We must be ready, able, to assume our role. Just as there is a reading readiness and a religion readiness, perhaps there is an ontological readiness. Through a thousand 'imponderable' means are we 'readied'. If our transformation is a movement of being itself, then being has to have brought us to a readiness for this self-presentation. We cannot place the onus on Wittgenstein alone. His actions were an emergence of meaning, of a self-presentation of being, in the *Investigations* itself. They became a display, a revelatory movement. And he himself did not seem to be concerned with success -- but only with whether or not we saw. Therefore, there was no cessation of his motion. Yes, he could stop doing philosophy at some given moment by drawing his examples to an arbitrary end. But he could never stop the activity of philosophy. To the very end of his life, he became fretful and unsettled if anything prevented its performance. Illness, environment, travel could all be disruptive. They were sources of concern if they prevented his philosophical work. Compulsive? Perhaps, or perhaps just a mode of being. Or, perhaps it was a constant source of enjoyment, of involvement with, the beauty, the being, even the immanent God, continuously unveiled in the study of our statements. Perhaps Wittgenstein's accomplishment as an artist in the *Investigations* could not have been better. Perhaps the individual role we play in response to his work, likewise,

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1. "A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils while he is teaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that, while his pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height which is not natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves the classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me; I have sometimes thought so." (C&V p. 38)

2. At the same time Wittgenstein told Drury that he could not hope to be understood as it was not possible for him to say in his book even one word about how much music meant in his life, and how he always saw every problem from a religious point of view, he said: "My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide. Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing." (Rush Rhees, 1981, *op. cit.*, p. 94.)
cannot be improved. The level on which we participate is a matter of mode, of evolution. It is ultimately the function of being itself. Wittgenstein's method is effective, even unto our transformation, and it is our birthright to 'arrive', but we do so in the 'fullness of time'.

What Wittgenstein Would Not Say

Our next question might naturally be, why did Wittgenstein not confess to these various movements of his ontological symphony? We have seen already why they might not be obvious to the reader, but why did he not tell us what he was doing? Why is there no accompanying commentary? Why must his exegesis have been so inordinately subtle? We have seen that the content and condition are intrinsically inexpressible and imponderable given what being is and what language is. But could Wittgenstein not admit the depth and complexity of his own endeavour within his text?

We are here involved in a circle similar to the one noted earlier for someone who has participated in the multiple levels of the Investigations. To have produced such a work, Wittgenstein had to have seen. He had to have experienced the mystical condition. And we know from Malcolm's Memoir, as already stated, he did in fact have the experience of wonder and marvel that what is, is, throughout his lifetime. Our description of that condition is a verbal enfleshment of that experience as it occurs in conjunction with the material and method presented in the Investigations. Though perhaps it cannot legitimately be said, and is best left unspoken, as we shall discuss later, we can assume that any individual response to the content would be commensurable with that of Wittgenstein given the general facts of nature, the lack of anything private, and the universality of the experience itself.

It seems that throughout the Investigations Wittgenstein attempted to lead us to that experience. In order to do so, in order to be such a 'guide', he had to have been intimately familiar with the content and the condition. If so, he was confronted with the problem that this (content and condition) was not something that could be said. If he was to say anything vis-à-vis his experience and to enable us to attain

Malcolm, op.cit., p. 70.
the same, the only option open was to show. What cannot be said can be shown. Though for obviously different reasons, the same limitations of language confronted Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* as had previously done so in the *Tractatus*. Similarly, the same option of showing was still available. The method was different. The *Investigations* is much more complex than the *Tractatus*, but the force and irrevocability of this distinction, and the real situation, the state of affairs which constitutes it and which it represents, is operative in both. Yet, it is likely that the maturation of the mystical experience, and its persistence over time, as well as the transition within it from a sense of the transcendent to a sense of the immanent, would render the force and irrevocability of this distinction an ever-present, living reality for the later Wittgenstein.

In the *Investigations* we are offered no explanation of how things function. Wittgenstein is not driven toward making anything intelligible. He sees and accepts -- and guides us to do the same. Even the new concepts of language, meaning, and the world we must attain for ourselves -- and the attainment is not easy. It is almost as though, if what is presented in the *Investigations* is not ours, personally, it is of no value. But this only further attests to the experiential nature of the entire endeavour. The conclusion of the *Investigations* is -- in us. It is in our 'arrival', our 'enlightenment'. Having himself confronted what could only be seen, what could Wittgenstein do but -- share. And that which shows, the *Investigations*, is itself only something that can be seen. It is the showing, the sharing. Wittgenstein brings to our attention entire philosophical problems condensed in a drop of grammar (p.222). The *Investigations* is itself such a drop of grammar, and an entire ontology is condensed in it. Once one has seen, there is much one will not say (79). Once one has seen what cannot be said, the only point of writing at all can be to show what one has seen. Yet that of which one writes can itself be only something that is seen.

But one cannot say that. There is a double showing involved here. Not only is one to see that which is presented but one is also to see that the book presents that which is presented. Paradoxically, we can see that the book is of something. This is not unusual. Think of a novel. Consider for a moment Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*. Here we are told of
the lives of a group of migrant farm workers during the depression. We are presented with detailed accounts of the work, the living conditions, the emotions, the love-making, the travels, the deaths of its major characters. Steinbeck could say all about all of this. In doing so he shows us the lives of these people. We can see it all even without a celluloid projection. But in showing us all of this, he has also shown us a dynamic portrait of injustice. What we are to see, perhaps even to act upon, to realize our own participation in, is the social system which could instigate, tolerate, and systematically perpetuate such devastating injustice toward any person or persons. But Steinbeck could not say all of that short of destroying both presentations. Within his novel he could not say, even, that the book is of something other than the story of migrant workers. Nor could he say within his novel that this injustice can only in fact be seen. If one were to attempt to talk about injustice as such, one could at most produce a set of legal definitions, or moral prescriptions, or perhaps some sort of theory of metaphysical forms. Yet, none of these would look even remotely like injustice. And the author cannot say this within the Grapes of Wrath and yet have it be what it is, though this might be said in a commentary on the Grapes of Wrath. One expects this kind of double showing, and a lack of admission thereof, in novels, poetry, drama, but not in a work of philosophy. Perhaps this in itself is the greatest 'proof' that the Investigations is in fact a work of art.

Within the Tractatus Wittgenstein admitted to us what he was doing. He did say, as it were, that injustice could only be seen but that he had tried to say it anyway and that, therefore, what he said was nonsense. Within the Tractatus there is a sort of logical space in which such verbal

5 Wittgenstein was very cognizant of this notion of a double showing. In 1937 he wrote:

--But who is to say that Scripture really is unclear: Isn't it possible that it was essential in this case to 'tell a riddle'? And that, on the other hand, giving a more direct warning would necessarily have had the wrong effect? God has four people recount the life of his incarnate Son, in each case differently and with inconsistencies -- but might we not say: It is important that this narrative should not be more than quite averagely historically plausible just so that this should not be taken as the essential, decisive thing? So that the letter should not be believed more strongly than is proper and the spirit may receive its due. I.e. what you are supposed to see cannot be communicated even by the best and most accurate historian; and therefore a mediocre account suffices, is even to be preferred. For that
hints can be given. But within the *Investigations* that space is closed. Also, as mentioned before, the full force of the matter itself was at the time of the *Tractatus* perhaps not so totally compelling. At the time of the *Investigations* there was perhaps a greater urgency about not saying that which cannot be said (even by saying that we are not saying so). This might naturally be the case when that which cannot be said is so strikingly near at hand. Furthermore, because the *Tractatus* was not so 'participational', Wittgenstein could say a little of what he was doing within it. In the *Investigations*, however, he was so engrossed that it was impossible to do what he was doing and to tell us what he was doing at the same time. We are not so central, so active, in an ontology which expresses itself as meaning, as portrayed in the *Tractatus*, as in one which is meaning, as portrayed in the *Investigations*. We are not so close to what is when our language pictures that which is, as when language is itself inseparable from that functioning totality. We are not so near a Tractarian God who is totally Other, transcendent, and outside the world, as to one who is so completely immanent that we must even imagine a deity, perform, as it were, an act of separation between ourselves and him, in order that we might imagine a structure of nature other than the one we have (346), or in order that the concept of God may function as an absolute within our language games. We and the Investigational God are too near one another for activities of implied separation, even in the realm of thought.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein could climb up a ladder -- and kick it away. In the *Investigations* there could be no ladder if the reality itself plus the limits of language were to be respected. The functioning, so close at hand, must be displayed in order that it might show itself -- even as we ourselves participate in the display which is itself the functioning. To use a 'ladder', to explain the endeavour, is too can tell you what you are supposed to be told... The Spirit puts what is essential, essential for your life, into these words. The point is precisely that you are only SUPPOSED to see clearly what appears clearly even in this representation. (C&V, pp. 31-32.)

In 1948 in regard to understanding a musical phrase and explaining it, possibly by dance, Wittgenstein wrote: "If seeing the dance is what is important, it would be better to perform that rather than the music. But that is all misunderstanding." (C&V, p. 69.) And in 1948 he spoke of allegory and wrote: 
"(On railway stations there are dials with two hands; they show when the next train leaves. They look like clocks though they aren't; but they have a use of their own.)" (C&V, p. 77.)
to betray the enterprise itself. Even to say that you cannot say, either the content or the condition or the enterprise -- says. It expresses a great deal about that of which you cannot speak. Utter restraint is required. To say in any way that the work is a display is to ruin the art itself. That, too, is to say something which can only be shown. That does not mean that it is easy to see, but only that it can only be shown. Assertion is prohibited. Even negation would indicate. Only silence is correct. Only silence can impart this vision. And it is this silence, this lack of admission, which attests to Wittgenstein's authentic possession of that vision and his integrity in guiding us to see it for ourselves. The silence is the final and necessary conclusion to the entire work. Any confirmation which we might seek must be extra-textual. It must be found in the life and deeds of the man himself. And this confirmation we have already explored.

Much earlier we alluded to a pedagogical reason for Wittgenstein's not, even if illegitimately, describing to us what we are to see as well as for his not preparing us verbally for the consequences or even compassionately assuring us when those consequences occur. Pedagogy, too, must have been a conscious consideration in the mind of such an author. What we would receive through explanation would not be the same as that received through self-attainment. If I explain reading to you, you have something you did not have before, but if through my assistance you learn to read -- that is another matter. I can read you a story, or I can teach you to read. I can tell you what I have seen, or lead you to see. But if I do the former, you may never attain the latter. You will have no need. Furthermore, if in teaching you to read, to see, I also attempt to explain the process of teaching, the entire enterprise becomes hopelessly confused. If Wittgenstein attempted to explain either the aim or the efforts to attain it, both the content itself and the activity of enabling us to see would be clouded and cluttered. Like the centipede in his ditch, we could not move for watching which leg goes after which. The whole focus of the enterprise would be self-defeating to the task at hand.

Furthermore, any admission or explanation of this ontology and its resultant mysticism would, by and large, be unintelligible. Let us spiral the circle again. Experience shows that to a large extent, only those who have already understood seem to be the ones who are able to understand.
Perhaps only those who are 'in the know' are able to know, and those of course have no need of the admission. It is almost as though there existed gnostic 'elite' to which Wittgenstein wished to admit -- everyone. The Investigations was created as the means of doing so. It was to be the means whereby anyone who underwent its therapy would automatically be a part of that 'elite'. But, again, this 'elite' is not exclusive: being is common to everyone; our transformation is a natural and expected occurrence; our condition is a state or mode of being itself. An elite so widespread as this implies, is no elite at all. It is an evolved people with a new world-view, a new vision, a new mode of knowledge, a new experiential base. To such a people, the vision of the Investigations would be apparent and obvious. An admission would simply look very 'odd'.

This intrinsic 'intellectual problem', this prerequisite of knowledge for knowledge, was compounded for Wittgenstein by the cultural ethos of his time. Wittgenstein lived in the age of 'logical positivism' and of utter faith in 'scientific inquiry'. Neither this ontological material nor this mystical result was compatible with such a prevailing intellectual climate. Without general community acceptance, any such admission would be not only unintelligible, but useless, and even worse than useless. It would naturally be met with immediate dismissal and/or outright antagonism. Its points would simply not be taken seriously. As we saw long ago, the statements on mysticism in the Tractatus were ignored or dismissed by most who espoused it. In the overall language game being played in his lifetime, only 'cranks' tried to make 'mystical' moves. It was 'politically' inexpedient to make such an admission. To do so would have been 'suicidal'. For this reason, if Wittgenstein valued the enterprise at all, his silence must become absolutely thorough. There could be no 'after-class admission', no 'late-night, fireside confessions'.

This gives the picture of a lonely existence. If anyone understood, he would also immediately comprehend the necessity of silence. This appropriate response would automatically be socially and intellectually ensured, even reinforced. Wittgenstein's loneliness appears to have been inevitable. The vision, in the relative field, is necessarily 'singular', 'solitary'. Yet, within itself, it is necessarily 'full', 'complete', demanding no external expression, for there is no separation, no duality, such that expression is required. All is all. Nor would there ever arise
a personal 'need' to share this experience. One might be compelled to share the vision, but the experience is of so personal a nature that it is precisely not the sort of thing which one is inclined to verbalize at all. It is enough -- to be. It is all. The solitude appears as loneliness only to others.

Finally, Wittgenstein did try to make a statement, albeit from a different framework, within the *Tractatus*. He did try to say what could only be shown -- and then leave, exit. No one heard. The *Tractatus* became the tool of positivists! ... grow older, grow wiser... Wittgenstein simply would not make the same mistake twice. He would not do again what he himself asserts cannot be done -- nor would he repeat the mistake of telling us what we are being shown or that we are being shown. If it was to no avail before, it would be to no avail again. It was still the case that, 'that whereof one cannot speak, one must consign to silence'.

The Reflexive Challenge

A final question remains. If I have understood Wittgenstein aright, by what right have I said all that I have? I have described an ontology and elaborated upon an experiential condition with page after page of utterances which might seem to violate the limits of language. I have allowed the language to idle, to go on holiday, to generate numerous philosophical problems -- or so it would appear.

There are several aspects which must be considered in response to such a challenge. Yes, I have clearly taken words out of their everyday homes. I have at times used them in rather extraordinary ways, not at all like our common usage of "lamp," "table," "chair." But that does not necessarily mean I have used them to create a super-structure. These usages cannot have created illusions or generated metaphysical phantoms -- unless Wittgenstein's therapy has not worked. It would be possible for them to create illusions only if they have given pictures, which are believed actually to represent the state of affairs, the way things are, when that is in fact not the way things are.

For pictures to create illusions they must be 'wrong' and yet they must be believed to be 'right'. But if the therapy has worked and we are
able to see the reality which could not previously be seen, then we can attempt, in our turn, to show what is seen or, in some manner, at least to point toward it. If we accurately portray what is seen, then the picture that is given is not 'wrong'. It must of course be properly understood. That is, we must understand its application.

We might not be able to describe accurately what is seen. That is not unusual nor is it necessarily a disadvantage. We cannot describe the aroma of coffee (610) or the sound of a clarinet (78) or the difference between a genuine loving look and a pretended one (p.228). This simply shows us something about our language and about the world. This simply is the way it is. We can in fact know something and not be able to say it (78). But that does not mean we cannot give indication about what is so seen or so known. We can do a great deal toward enabling others to see and to understand what is seen or known, but is unable to be said.

Language does have limits. Staying within them is perhaps the best way to point to what is beyond them. This has been mentioned before and will be mentioned again. If it is necessary or desirable to give some sort of indication, then it must be a 'legitimate' use of our language to do so. It may be necessary to say at least that there is something beyond these limits in order that we not think that the relative field presented in our language is all that is. That is the illusion of which we are to be freed. That is the objective of Wittgenstein's therapy.

However, in order even that that therapy might work, it may at times be helpful to give indication of what this method is a method for. In regard to the Investigations, we might profit from some indication of what is beyond the limits of our language in order that we not be trapped in thinking that this method of philosophy confines us to the everyday, surface levels of the relative plane instead of portraying the ontological vision that can be seen within that plane. To call the statements of such an indication 'illegitimate' is in itself a 'false move', as it were, in the language game. It, too, is a 'conjuring trick'. It can be 'em-bottling', for it refuses to allow this activity whereby our language 'points beyond', leads us to its own boundaries, and deposits us at the threshold of what is.

At times, in some way or other, it is desirable to speak of what is seen, however feebly, in order that another be enabled to understand, at
the very least, that he is to see more than what is obvious. And yet, in doing so, in giving such indication, we can leave in silence what belongs in silence. We do so by understanding the application of our pictures. We must be able both to speak and in our speaking to maintain a silence. We must be able to both show and point toward what is seen. Otherwise we would not be able to do the truth with our language. It is, after all, a mistake to think there is something which is to be done which we cannot do with the language we have (120,374). Despite the limits of language we can still do everything necessary with it. Keeping silence is a substantial part of the doing. At times, however, it is also necessary to highlight what is shown in that authentic silence in order that it be seen. We must give indication of it by pointing out that it is, even by pointing out, in some manner or other, what it is, what it 'says', what it is 'all about'. It is not possible that the one who is silent, speak of his own silence. He cannot give the indications. But another can. And perhaps his initial statement is not complete until someone has.

In other ways as well, we find what appears to be an illegitimate use of language performing a necessary and authentic function. This given of indication, this pointing out, is perhaps the *raison d'être* of poetry. Poetry says something; it contains a silence; and it points to something beyond the silence. It uses language, often 'illegitimately', to highlight that in life which cannot be said and yet which makes itself manifest, felt, known, seen. Though it disobeys the rules of language, it performs an essential activity in the stream of life. The poet takes words out of their everyday homes, but not as the metaphysician does, and no metaphysical monsters are created. That the rules of language are violated simply shows that we are using our language for something for which it was not designed. It works beautifully for such a matter, but was not designed for such a matter. Language is a tool of the relative field. The subject matter of poetry and of my apparently illegitimate descriptions are in a different dimension. The problem arises when that fact is not realized. But, if the therapy has worked that fact must be realized. It is only in illusion that this given picture can, on the one hand, be untrue, and on the other hand, be believed to be true when in the relative field it is not. That is, it is only in illusion that the language as I have used it can create a picture that is false and be
believed, for it will be so believed only if its application is not understood. If the therapy has worked, that application will be understood. If poetry as such is a legitimate use of language, then such description would seem likewise to be a legitimate use of language. Poetry is something which we do in life. It can produce an experience within us. It can help us to understand much that manifests itself but cannot otherwise be said. It promotes understanding on the levels of both dianoia and noesis. In all of this Wittgenstein's writing resembles poetry. I can in no way claim to elevate this thesis to the level of poetry, but its task, like that of the Investigations, is more related to that of poetry than to other uses of our language, particularly that of argument. It reports, it portrays, it describes, but not as one would report budgetary findings or describe the furnishings of a room. It is not so 'factual' as this, yet it is a matter of truth and of doing the truth.

Also, we can help another to appreciate, experience, understand a poem or a piece of music or a painting. We do many things in this helping. We make facial expressions, we move our bodies, we say, "'You have to see it like this . . . You must phrase it like this'" (p.202). We say, "It is like . . ." or "It resembles . . .". Our expressions may sound very strange indeed; they may make no sense as such. But they well might work. And they might be all that will work. They might attempt to put in words, impossible though it be, what the poem or music did not say -- in order that what it shows might indeed be seen. We understand their application and do not call them illegitimate. They facilitate an awareness of much that had not been noticed before. This assistance in understanding, this facilitating of the vision, likewise accounts for usage which in other contexts might not be thought acceptable.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that my use of language in discussing the ontological and the mystical is indeed a dangerous one. In the relative field such a use might well and truly, even inevitably, give the wrong image of such things as the 'immanence of God' or 'oneself as all', for in the relative field there is no image of these which can be right. If correctness turns on the rightness of a representation, statements of the 'negative way' are the only possibly correct ones. We must enter another dimension in order to understand these pictures and
their correct application. There these images can be correct. But in the relative field it is also possible to use language as I have done without creating illusions. If one understands that there is another dimension, then the application of the language can be understood and no problem need be created. Even according to Wittgenstein, we can use dangerous pictures harmlessly if we are aware of their danger. There is nothing wrong with speaking of the activity of butter when it rises in price, if no problems are created by this (693). We understand what we are doing. The circumstances are not such that one thinks butter is responsible for its increased value. Yet, such an admission of usage is perhaps misleading, for it is clear that such a statement on butter is a figurative one. I do not mean the statements on content and condition to be 'figurative'. They are not similes or metaphors and they create paradox only if we see the relative field exclusively in its limited, surface dimensions, only if our vision is restricted in such a manner that our language presents a picture which clashes with our experience of what is. If that vision is expanded, if that experience is altered, no paradox arises, no problem emerges.

The problem is, until one has seen what is, and attainted to this condition whereby all that I have said is TRUE -- both in itself and for us -- all that I have said must seem to be pure illusion. For the 'untransformed', it is just a picture which does not correlate with reality (reality for such a one being the surface levels of the relative field). It is only a fantasy, an elaborate, ontological fantasy.

In such a state not only can one not see the truth of what is said, but such a person cannot operate with the apparent discrepancies between the relative field and another dimension. He cannot see the activities he performs with his language and the functioning totality in which he operates. For him there is no compatibility between picture and application, between the deep and the not hidden, between the transcendent and the immanent. He cannot accept the mystery and participate in it, and hence must call it all illusion. The tragedy is, he cannot see that all that he sees is an illusion. He takes the surface level of the relative field to be all there is and all that is there, even in his statements. No wonder he seeks explanation and creates metaphysical phantoms such as 'meaning', for how could that which he sees function at all, how could
anything be said? There is no way in which what he sees could produce -- all of this. Nothing is hidden, but he cannot see the depths of what is there. His intuition is correct; his explanations are wrong. He has not lost the metaphysical illusions. He has not been stripped of the satisfying explanations which veiled the reality. He has not expunged the phantoms with which he is living, especially the grand progenitor of them all -- that of meaning as something identifiable. By this misconception in relation to language, he has missed the functioning totality and believed the word-referent pattern to be an inevitable and universally applicable description of what is, whereas what is is dynamic being, functional participation, which in some activities, some movements, operates in a subject-object/word-referent pattern, form, design.

To the degree to which he holds fast what is to be lost and (thereby) fails to appropriate what is to be gained, he perceives even the relative field erroneously. It, in his condition, is illusory, and he knows it not. He things there must be something extraordinary behind what he sees whereby it functions as it does and he feels that this must be captured in language. He must mend the spider web with his fingers (106). He misses that all that is, is what is there -- but that what is in it, what it is, is what is extraordinary. He sees only the function, not the functioning, and hence operates on the alienated word-referent basis. If in that condition he keeps his words at home, what is done may not be phantasmal, but neither is it truth. This situation is the very 'material' out of which the phantoms are generated.

This most tragic aspect of illusion at the level of our everydayness could hardly be mentioned prior to a response to a challenge to the use of language in this exposition of Wittgenstein, for such a contention has the effect of making all communication impossible. The therapy could never begin. The guide could never show (by display, not indication) what is to be seen, for instead of enabling one to see what he could not see before, after which what he initially saw is likewise differently seen, this move would blind him completely. It tells him he cannot see at all. Even what he thinks he sees is wrong. Once he has been then he will see -- that. In the meantime he must use his vision, limited though it is. He must see, even if wrongly, in order eventually, after therapy, to see correctly. If you are not allowed to walk, though
stumblingly, you cannot learn to run. It might seem ideal to expose the totality of illusion from the beginning, but as Wittgenstein suggested, we need friction in order to move, and therefore, must return to the ground that is rough (107).

Let us return to the question at hand. If what appears to be an illegitimate use of language is not allowed in working on Wittgenstein, as already mentioned, we could do no more than to continue piecemeal investigations as such. We could only go on doing what Wittgenstein did. This may be of interest and it may be therapeutic for someone, but it makes no advance on our understanding of Wittgenstein. Both the man and the philosophy remain in darkness, and unless the therapy is successful, so do we. Plumbing the depths unto enlightenment is not easy. But unless that endeavour is permitted, there is a sense in which any thesis on Wittgenstein is impermissible. Any talk about philosophy is impermissible. Any general statements about language or meaning or the world, are impermissible. We can only do the particular and determinate. We can only perform the activity. "Philosophically", we can only engage in 'work' on actual statements. Taken to extremes, nothing can be said about the Investigations at even its simplest levels, for that is to talk about the activity of philosophy and is like trying to watch ourselves go up to something. It is examining what we are doing, and that is not the doing.

On the other hand, any language game which is a life-activity in a given community, is permissible. It may be dangerous, but it is permissible. It will at least be an attempt to perform some function in the stream of life. If someone rejects a given statement within that game as legitimate, he is, as Wittgenstein would say, simply withdrawing that statement from the game itself. He is, in effect, saying, "I do not want to play the game with this equipment" or "I do not want to play the game this way." If someone rejects the entire game as a legitimate activity, that is a more serious matter. He is, in effect, saying, "I do not want to play this game." For that particular moment, the dialogue is ended. To refuse to play is always an option. But something will have been missed. And nothing will have been said to that -- which one has missed. We must notice that this analogy can be misleading here, for this thesis which I have written is not a game to be played. It, like the Investigations itself, is more like a display, like a film which
can be shown, viewed. It is a picture of a picture for the Tractatus. It is a sketch of an album of sketches for the Investigations. The invitation is to look.

Even if I am allowed to say what I have said, it might be objected that I am reporting only what I have seen. This would be as though someone were to taunt: "But you may be completely mad. Madmen see all manner of things. Their report is authentic, but it does not mean anything."
The care taken to lay out, to display, the whole process of the Investigations is intended to avert such objection. We have examined and depicted the entire 'unfoldment' of the Investigations. From within that entirety, from within that whole, such a question does not arise, just as the meaning of the number five does not arise in buying apples. From within the process of examining the Investigations, just as within the experience of the condition itself, there can be no doubt of the reality of what is seen nor the accuracy of the seeing. A person cannot doubt the fact that when he raises his arm, his arm goes up. What is, is. And seeing it, is seeing it. Just as the Investigations is a demonstration, not in the sense of argument but of display, showing, so this thesis is a demonstration of the Investigations as a showing. It is a showing of what is shown. Again, from within the endeavour itself, there can be no doubt; from within the experience itself there can be no doubt. There is certainty for which we need no ground (324). Within experience we can "see the meaning of certainty." (474) If one is 'there' and admits it, the truth of what is seen needs no more verification nor can have any better ground than can the fact that "I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire" (474).

But, if someone will not come into this space, this reality, if someone will not 'come home', if he stays 'without', if the therapy is not yet completed, then from his perspective there can always arise the 'madmen' accusation. Yes, no matter how resistant one might be, everyone who is, is necessarily, to some degree or another, in touch with the same reality. Therefore, so long as such a one is willing to dialogue, so long as there is a common language, some common material, something shared, one can begin again, and again and again, to show what can be seen through the study of language, just as Wittgenstein did time and again in the Investigations. And one can begin, time and again,
to show what the *Investigations* shows. So long as both parties are prepared to work, the multiple entries of the *Investigations* can be criss-crossed time and again from many directions. The journey is into infinity. There is always more to see, just as there is always room for development even though there has been 'arrival'. Some other word on some other entry will show a little more, a little more clearly, and sooner or later we can all be home. Only if someone will not talk must we 'shake the dust from our feet', and maybe this was the judgement Wittgenstein made concerning those whom he refused to teach, for, if nothing is hidden, we can at times perceive a lack of readiness, a lack of openness, and accept the fact that transformation, though so natural and normal, and that therapy, though so effective, are not, for all that, mechanical processes. They, too, are participational mystery. No matter how greatly one might wish to give another such condition, it is not one's own to give. The most that can be done is to help the other appropriate it for himself, and he must do his part.

The object of all our saying is to see. To seek 'proof' of what is seen is perhaps not a legitimate expectation. Proof is tantamount to saying. To insist upon it is to demand that what can be seen can be said, whereas the case is, what cannot be said can be shown. Once seen, there is a change in all that is seen, no matter where we look. That is well and good. It was, after all, Wittgenstein's general aim to change the way we see the world. But what is, is simply there, here. It is what we are, and that in which we are, and no one can in fact be outside it except in his illusion. Dropping the illusion is the unveiling. To have unveiled the unveiling as I have tried to do in this thesis does not change what is unveiled and of it there is no doubt. Our questions come to an end. We simply see. It is there for everyone. To the 'madman' accusation, one is tempted to say, "Why should my sight be questioned? If you do not see, examine your own." If we see double or cannot focus properly, we obtain spectacles, but we also obtain them for myopia and lack of depth perception. We examine the sight of one who cannot see what is there and that one does not tell the seeing one there is nothing there. Unless, of course, he is a madman.

There is yet another aspect which legitimates this seemingly illegitimate use of language. What I have done in regard to the
Investigations is somewhat parallel to Wittgenstein's move in the Tractatus. It is 'admitted' illegitimacy for the sake of sight. It is the ladder which must ultimately be kicked away. I know I am using the language dangerously. The reader knows the same. I have perhaps not articulated this vision as well as I might, but there is, nonetheless, something here to be seen. What has been said achieves something. When no longer under the illusions we can sin knowingly, and that is, in this case, perhaps less culpably. Furthermore, as often mentioned, it is the application which must be understood. This thesis, too, is a speech-act. It is designed to display the works of Wittgenstein, thereby attempting in some small way to further his own task of enabling us to see. It is also, as suggested earlier, one's own attempt to share. It, too, is response, though not so artful a one as the Investigations, in which more silence was maintained. In the doing of philosophy as Wittgenstein did in the Investigations, one can display 'it all', expose 'everything' -- without admitting anything. It is superb brinkmanship. In exposing that, such masterfulness is impossible. We need blatant admissions.

Another aspect, also, is worth exploring. If one has escaped illusion, one does rejoice in that, even to the point of seeing the source of one's illusion, the metaphysical phantom, the philosophical problem, as a *felix culpa*. As we have seen, those who never use their language illegitimately may never create a philosophical problem, but they may also remain in the everyday, dichotomous alienation of the relative plane. A philosophical problem brings our illusions to light. It opens the door for the therapy, after which all of our illusions can be dispelled, including those of everydayness. We then use our everyday language in the ordinary way, but participate in the reality that is there, appreciating that there is nothing 'ordinary' about it. We abide in the wonder, the mystery, the magic, of what is. Thus, happy is the man who can have a philosophical problem, for he can attain enlightenment. His negative moment is most important. Yet, all of this is perhaps most striking to him when he is able to have said the problematic statement under illusion, to have seen the process whereby he was freed of illusion, and is then able to see the application of his statement so that he can say it without being caught in the false picture which it presents -- and has done just that. In other words, to have spoken illegitimately without the ill effects is perhaps the final movement of the entire symphony.
It is the practice of the freedom attained and the attestation to the process, the method, whereby it was attained. All of this writing serves only to instantiate this entire procedure. Of course, what remains unsaid in all of this saying is still the most prominent. That was the force of the earlier remark that we leave in silence what belongs in silence. In any symphony there is 'space' between the notes, and the balance between sound and silence creates the music. In the practice of the freedom attained, the silence itself combines with our words to create the melody. One listens to the words and hears -- the silence.

By the way, to have called a philosophical problem a happy fault when it is fortunate enough to have been dissolved by Wittgensteinian processes in no way implies that there are not other methods of freedom as well, just as there are other methods of philosophy. It is not that if the illusioned never encounter a Wittgensteinian therapist, he can never become illumined. Were that the case, we ought to dispatch bands of roving Wittgensteinians throughout the world. That grotesque suggestion, however, would be just another version of making philosophy an industry. We have already discussed the dangers of that. Industrialization is anathema. No proselytizing is required. Being is its own best manager.

There is yet another reason for saying as much as I have (and that is only a minute fraction of the whole) of that which cannot be said, or at least, on that about which nothing can be said. We noted among the reasons for Wittgenstein's lack of admission of the multiple levels of the Investigations the intellectual climate of his time. Besides being unacceptable, we noted that any such discussion would also have sounded unintelligible. The community has to know how and be willing to play a given language game. The game has to play an authentic role in actual lives. To be truth and to mean are within this perspective the same.

Over thirty years have passed since the publication of the Investigations. These 'illegitimate statements' are my response -- three decades later. Perhaps times have changed. Perhaps the climate has changed. We are growing older. Perhaps our horizons are broadening, our repertoire of activities is increasing. Perhaps we are now entering a new age that is able to hear as well as to see, an age that is able to hear what it has
seen. This is perhaps not so mixed a metaphor as it might appear. It is in fact totally accurate and correct, for knowledge that is \textit{direct}, that is complete understanding which is not at all conceptual, not linguistically mediated but is unmediated perception, yet involves no faculty of sense and is not \textit{sense} perception, might just as well be referred to any one faculty of sense as to any other. Sight, vision, is more than seeing; it is insight. It is knowingness. It is direct comprehension, ultimately not just of what is or that it is, but it is the knowledge of communion. It is the full knowing, the personal certainty in actual being of which the Biblical expression of knowledge, complete with sexual communion, is only a pale prototype, a vague analogy.

Perhaps we are becoming more sensitive to the mystery of ourselves, of being itself, and can understand and resonate with the strangeness of language use that does not comply with the logic of our relative field. It can be understood much as music can be understood and it will communicate much as music communicates, though with greater clarity and precision. When we are at home enough with \textit{all}, we will communicate in silence. Yet, if we must speak, even our illegitimate stuttering will be a tongue well understood. All sound and silence alike comprise the total symphony.

Finally, I myself must raise an objection to all that has been said which is far more serious than any accusation of a violation of Wittgensteinian precepts or improper use of language. The danger involved in such use is not so much in the saying of what has been said, nor in the need to justify my actions to the 'philosophical community', nor even in possible antagonism with which such words might be met. The danger lies in the possibility that having said all this, or rather in the saying of all this -- \textit{something} will have been lost. One's first responsibility is to \textit{it} -- and dangers of distorting \textit{it}, even of losing something of \textit{it} in the attempt to mediate it through language are serious. The issue is a delicate one. \textit{It} calls for the utmost care. \textit{It} elicits silence. \textit{It} demands a humble use of language. And in \textit{that}, \textit{it} best presents itself, for as Wittgenstein said:

\begin{quote}
...this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then \textit{nothing} gets lost. But the unutterable will be -- unutterably -- contained in what has been uttered.\footnote{Paul Engelmann, \textit{op.cit}, pp. 84-35.}
\end{quote}
I can only hope that it has not been lost or distorted in my attempt to expose what is contained in the functioning whole and in the *Investigations* as an utterance itself.

It is safer to leave the inexpressible unexpressed. It is safer for participation in both content and condition -- never to expose that which can be found in and through the *Investigations* nor to expose the *Investigations* as that in and through which it can be found. When all is 'said and done', those who will, will see and those who are not yet ready, for the present moment, will not. Even for those who would, there remains the danger of missing something when they have been told what to see or even told what is there, for no one can say all that is seen. Yet in saying anything we do at least direct the attention of our listener (669). Speech is determinate and determining. But that which it points to is boundless, beyond all such limitations. We must beware not only that something of it will have been lost, but those who hear will have lost as well.

Besides, even in these many pages, the most we have succeeded in doing is to say that it is all there, that *all* is, there, here. No saying can exhaust it. The entire exposition or description is only a pointer. It says at most that if you have not seen this and more, in and through the *Investigations*, you have not yet engaged with the text. Like the *Investigations* itself, these utterances necessarily point beyond themselves. They, too, have many levels. They are not exempt from hermeneutic. The ontological movement is, not that I am what I do, but I do what I am. It is possible to give admissions for Wittgenstein, not for oneself. These many utterances are not all of what one would want to say. They are only some of what might be said as exposition. Though it might not seem so to the reader, to the writer they are guarded and impersonal, general and 'academic'. They point to all the rest that cannot even be given pointers. They point to all the rest that one cannot -- though given carte blanche to violate every rule of language -- even try to say, including in such way as to point. On the one hand, all of it is contained in our language, so immanent it is. On the other hand, it can never be touched by language, so transcendent it is. It cannot be said.

...Yes, it is the case that there is nothing private that cannot be made known, nothing hidden that shall not be revealed. But such knowing
is not knowledge-of. And it is all too close, all too, too intimate to ever be externalized. As we have seen, in such knowing the dissolution has been total, the dissociation so complete, that one has actually lost one's self. There is nothing, no one, to do the saying. The power to express is gone, consumed in all that is. And the loss is no loss at all. In so being there is no need of what is gone. In such intimacy and in our coming not to be, being guards itself. It will, simply, be. It is.

So, while the danger prevails and the responsibility weighs upon us, we cannot do the forbidden. It is ultimately impossible. Whether we drive our language to point as I have done, or keep it humbly at home, both linguistically and ontologically we must leave everything as it is. It cannot be otherwise. *Magnum tremendum*. That which cannot be said is within us and beyond us. It is what we are and what we do. *Magnum mysterium*. We live *necsis* as an exquisite sort of torment. There is only one thing of which we cannot keep silent, only one thing really worth saying — and that is that which cannot be said. *Magnum silentium.*
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