USE OF THESES

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HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNT OF TRUTH AS "ALETHEIA"

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Chapter One.

The Challenge to The Traditional Conception of Truth.

P. 2 Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche challenged the traditional conception of truth and reason.

P. 3 Kierkegaard's view that contra Hegel philosophy was the concern of the individual human being is seen in his account of Socratic Irony,

P. 4 Which led to his concept of truth as subjectivity/inwardness,

P. 5-6 Resulting not in positive doctrine, but in the formation of personality.

P. 7-8 He held human existence to be a life-long striving for self-accomplishment. A view reflected in his categories which in eschewing logical mediation in favour of passion prefigured Heidegger's account of moods. But this influence was mediated by Nietzsche,

P. 9-10 Who saw the world as existing in a tension between Dionysian and Appollonian instincts best seen in classical Greek drama, and that with the advent of Socratic reflection the Appollonian instinct was victorious over the Dionysian, yielding a new shallower drama,

P. 11 To be overcome in the advent of a musical Socrates. The difference between the two accounts of Socrates lies in Nietzsche's genealogical method,

P. 12 Which sees truth as illusion ... tracing belief and knowledge to their origin in the will to power,

P. 13-14 So the truth of a doctrine is not seen in what it espouses, but in what it denies in its attempt to exact revenge against time.

P. 15 We must ask then how, if at all, Nietzsche's work escapes relativism?

P. 16-20 And see the key to his work in the doctrine of the Eternal Return,

P. 21 An account of which reveals it to be a teaching presented in symbol and metaphor of self-overcoming in the absence of the Divine,

P. 22 A teaching that mediates Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger, who in his account of truth as aletheia developed an account of self-accomplishment and time in the absence of an Absolute.

Chapter Two.

Aletheia and the Hermeneutic Circle:

P. 23 Heidegger's response to both Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's challenge can be seen in his account of truth as aletheia,
P.24-25 One he anticipated in his account of his Phenomenology,

P.26 As seeking to show the inter-relation of revelation and concealment.

P.27-29 But his project would seem circular. His defence against this problem rests on his ascription of his problematic as transcendental ... a term usually taken as indicative of Kant's Deduction,

P.30 Interpreted nowadays as an attempt to answer scepticism.

P.31-32 But Heidegger's concern with the Transcendental Deduction arose out of his concern with human finitude...

P.33-36 As is shown where he clarifies Kant's guiding insight showing that Intuition, Understanding and Practical Reason are all aspects of the Transcendental Imagination.

P.37-39 And that the Synthesis of Apprehension, Reproduction and Recognition each in turn are an aspect of time,

P.40 And that considered apriori all three syntheses are the work of the Transcendental Imagination interpreted as original time.

P.41 Here his analysis has overthrown the Kantian problematic and...

P.42 Historicized understanding.

P.43-44 This interpretation differs from contemporary literature on Transcendental arguments.

P.45-48 In accepting the circularity of Kants arguments Rudiger Bubner is one modern author whose view is close to Heidegger's here, but differs in that Heidegger took Transcendental Knowledge as the same as Phenomenological Truth ...

P.49-51 A view broader than Kant's ... which worked out fully in Seing and Time shows the historical nature of Dasein as reflecting the polarity of un/truth at the centre of Heidegger's Phenomenological program.

P.50 Bubner's account sees the circularity in transcendental reflection but does not consider the nature of truth,

P.51-55 The historization of which leads to the insight that all knowledge is dependent on the revealing - concealing of Being itself, and limited to where the individual stands in relation to his or her more encompassing tradition.

Chapter Three.

Aletheia: Truth as Inwardness in the Absence of an Absolute.

P.56-58 Kant worked out of the Cartesian subject/object epistemology.

P.59 In contrast, Heidegger avoided an epistemological stance seeing the Transcendental Subject as already embracing the entire field of enquiry ... through the Transcendental Ego's self-affection as the temporalizing of time ... an investigation into which ...

P.60 Would have to show both the inter-relation of the truth and untruth in Dasein's transcendence, and that the correspondence theory of truth is derivative of aletheia.

P.62-63 To show this Heidegger set up an example of a person making an
assertion and then confirming it ...

P.64-67 The truth of which lies in assertion being one way of access for Dasein to entities, uncovering them as they are, made possible by Dasein's transcendental self-affection ... given in mood as self-understanding ... exemplified in Dasein's anxiety about its own Being-in-the-world,

P.68 Which in the absence of an Eternal (God) is given as the understood certainty of its mortality,

P.69-70 Giving Dasein an "earth-bound" teleology in the pursuit of a potentiality for existence that preserves self-respect. This understanding can be a disowning/untruth or owning/truth of the self.

P.71-74 For us the prime untruth is the correspondence theory of truth; underlying which is an inadequate account of language; which sees entities as primarily present-at-hand, and the self in a way which Heidegger calls "falling".

P.75-76 The latter being overcome in Dasein's call of conscience,

P.77-80 As a call to what is possible for Dasein in its given historical situation seeing entities as firstly ready-to-hand. With this account truth interpreted as aletheia is seen as more original than the correspondence theory. We can also observe that Dasein uncovers both itself and other entities and that like Kant, Heidegger developed an account of Transcendental Illusion ... and an account of self-knowledge not dissimilar to Kierkegaard's.

P.81-82 Unlike Kierkegaard's view though, Heidegger's account does not point to an endless tension between the finite and the infinite good ... as under Nietzsche's influence he saw self-discovery and intelligibility as given not in the death of God but in the mortality of its own being ...

P.85-90 Which interpreted as the temporality of care is the way Dasein is both inside and outside of itself ... either authentically or inauthentically,

P.91 Which in turn reveals that time can be thought of either in itself or as a series of moments, thereby providing a clue to Eternal Return ...

P.92 As a release from the usual experience of time as a series of fleeting moments ... to cling to which is the yearning of the spirit of revenge.

P.93 On reflection the two ways of interpreting time mirror Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic time.

P.94-95 We can now see how Heidegger's account of aletheia answered both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in conceiving truth as inwardness in the absence of an absolute. This account escapes relativism in pointing to the conditions of intelligibility,

P.96-97 And of shared and genuine knowledge,

P.98- A view denied by Sartre ... but his account falls into subjective relativism. In contrast Heidegger's account is distinctly non-relativist showing understanding as held open to possible review in the face of new insights.
Chapter Four.

Heidegger and Sartre.

P. 102-4 Heidegger and Sartre seem to be pursuing the same question ... but they differ in their accounts of what a phenomenon is ... and of what Phenomenology was to achieve.

P. 105 Heidegger's inquiry as hermeneutic is marked by self-referential circularity. Sartre's is fundamentally a dualism,

P. 106-108 Developing a dyadic relation between being-in-itself and being-for-itself... an account having counter intuitive consequences,

P. 109 Such as belief never being fully attained, and suffering as occurring in the presence of a full and total but absent suffering in-itself.

P. 110 This difference between the two authors is reflected in Heidegger's analysis of everyday being in the world,

P. 111-113 Where equipmental break-down reveals the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand not as a split, but a unity between two modes of being.

P. 114-116 Whilst Heidegger's account seems little different to Sartre's it does not collapse Nothing and What-is into a Sartrean dialectical duality.

P. 117 This difference is reflected in their accounts of temporality,

P. 118 Of which Sartre's is strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche's view of the perpetual flight of the revengeful spirit,

P. 119 Whilst Heidegger's analysis shows not a flight from but towards a unity of self.

P. 120 Sartre sought an ethical resolution to the goal of unity via a "radical conversion",

P. 121 A possibility given in conceiving the structure of the for-itself as value.

P. 122-129 But this account is untenable and plummets into bad faith.

P. 130 But for the possibility of interpreting Dasein as human being abandoned to the realm of history,

P. 131 And historicity as the process of self-making.

P. 132 Herein lies the point of entry for the existentialist interpretation of the early Heidegger.

P. 133 For a different conception to emerge the limitations of the traditional influences on Heidegger's thought had to be identified and expunged.

Chapter Five.

The Turn from Dasien to Being.

P. 134-5 The evolution of Heidegger's thought termed the reversal is not unproblematic.

P. 136-8 It can be demonstrated and interpreted using Idhe's analogy of
the field of vision as the relation of ground-to-figure and figure-to-ground; as an evolution occurring in definite stages on the way to a mature conception of truth as aletheia.

P.139 - The lecture "On the Essence of Truth" can be transposed into the idiom of Being and Time and illustrated as the ground-figure relation,

P.145-7 Where beings are manifest only in the concealment/mystery of Being ... and attempt to understand Being as it is in itself can be interpreted via the figure-ground relation, as the forgetfullness of this concealment.

P.148- Supplementing the analysis of Being and Time the lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art", points to the earth as sustaining Dasein and to the uncovering - aletheia - of the world in the 'miracle of art'.

P.154-5 But as the earth is the withholding of insight in the midst of revelation, it is a relation characterized as strife ...

P.156 In this sense art is seen as the origin of Being-there; of existence marked by the revealing and concealing contrariety of world and earth,

P.157 Which read as the ground-figure relation is a widening of the original account of aletheia.

P.158-168 This is seen in An Introduction to Metaphysics in which can be found a unified account of the horizons phenomenon given in the analogy of the visual field when it is read simultaneously from outside in, and inside out, showing Dasein and Being as mutually and integrally related.

Chapter Six.

Heidegger's Break with Nietzsche.

P.169- We have seen Nietzsche's influence in Being and Time reflected in the account of truth as aletheia ... in the analysis of moods, historicity, temporality and in the confounding of the Dasein analysis with subjective voluntarism ... an interpretation arising from an ambiguity and inadequacy in his thinking gradually eliminated,

P.173-5 By broadening the realm of truth and error beyond the limits of the transcendental hermeneutic of Being and Time ... signalled in An Introduction to Metaphysics in the idea of waiting for the right moment ... as an appropriate response for resolute Dasein in the face of Being's manifestation as will to power.

P.176 Heidegger interpreted the Eternal Return and the Will to Power as the essence and existence of reality per se, as the securing and increasing preservation and enhancement conditions".

P.177 And Nietzsche's overman is interpreted as the self thought of as self-grounding,

P.178- A result Heidegger interprets not as the reversal but the perfection of the Cartesian ego-centrism ... placing Nietzsche in the Cartesian tradition ... the anthropocentrism of which is seen in Descartes' conception of method as mathematical ...
which contrasts with the original broader Greek sense,

So that an entity is understood in terms of mere extension, as calculable and so quantifiable in nature ... A view Nietzsche extended to its limit in the concept of will to power which Heidegger's analysis points to as valutative thinking ... the essence of modern technology ... as the non-essence or withdrawal of Being ... not only as the mystery of Being in its withdrawal in the manifestation of an entity,

But also as nihilism in Dasein's forgetfulness of that mystery ... seeing entities as "standing reserve" for exploitation. Heidegger's counter examples point not to the cultivation of pretechnological skills ... which would be tantamount to will to power ... but a step back from metaphysical thinking ... from the wilful effort to manipulate the disclosure of Being.

Chapter Seven.

The Turn in History.

Heidegger's concern to articulate the relation between Being and human being through non-representational thinking is seen to necessitate a leap away from traditional thinking ... leading to the problem of how to think non-wilfully ... and of what can be so thought.

The problem as illustrated by the analogy of the field of vision gives us an insight into the shortcomings of Being and Time by endeavouring to think the background in terms of what it does in respect of the rest of the field ... resulting in a reinterpretation of resolve as the willess waiting in openness to Being.

Such thinking is as thankful devoted remembrance, a return to one's abode in the truth of Being ... a reinterpretation of temporality ... attested in being the result of Heidegger's original problematic.

In particular the attestation is shown in his search for a non-scientific way of thinking in Being and Time as shown in his definition of Logos as talk, the call of conscience and discourse.

This search is furthered in later lectures where the Dasein analysis is replaced by the poet ... who responds to the call of the gods ... a relation that exercised Heidegger's remaining career.

A relation pursued in the context of Holderlin's poetic vision ... wherein poetic utterance has priority over everyday speech, and attention is focussed on the return of God in another beginning ... as presented in his account of the fourfold.

In this account the Being of entities is seen to lie in their usefulness given from out of the inter-relation of the earth, the sky, the divine and mortals,
A fourfold now disimulated in the face of the will to power. To respond to the call of the Gods is the hearing of the fourfold as a mortal ... and saying as primal logos is the gathering of the fourfold into their mutual inter-play.

This attempt to think the nature of logos affords an insight into the continuity of Heidegger's thought ... so the major characteristic of the turn can be seen as his idea of a new beginning to history through poetical hearing and saying.

A view which revises the earlier account of the circle of understanding ... by indicating the essential difference between speaking in response to Being, and speaking about language.

But Heidegger's position here is disingenuous ... a position accentuated by his criticism of Junger ... revealing the perhaps final influence of Nietzsche.

This is a criticism supported by Gadamer, who sees that as Heidegger's work calls on tradition to communicate his findings, his account of the total oblivion of Being, and of a radically new beginning to history must be sidestepped.

This criticism implies that Being may reveal more of itself than at present, and that the fullness and absence of Being point to the possibilities between which human existence wavers. In accord with this view Heidegger's lectures indicate not a new beginning, but the possibility of a greater awareness of the mystery of Being. In terms of Heidegger's account of truth as aletheia such an interpretation restores the reciprocity of Being and human existence to historicity in the handing down of tradition.

Leaving philosophy the task of respecting the mystery in plumbing the "what" and "how" of Being's historical disclosure.
CHAPTER 1

THE CHALLENGE TO THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH

The philosophical genius of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is nowadays widely acknowledged. Central to the originality of both thinkers is their relentless critique of the received traditional conception of truth and reason, a critique reflected in not only the content but also the authorial style which they employed. It is the contention of this thesis that following in their footsteps, Heidegger took over the leading insights of each of these thinkers translating them into his own idiom. In respect of Kierkegaard it shall be shown that the key to his critical stance to his received tradition lay in his concept of truth as inwardness, a view he developed in his early work on Socrates.

It shall be argued in subsequent chapters that whilst this view of truth can be seen as having a formative influence on Heidegger's work, it is one that has been mediated by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. In respect of this influence it is the purpose of this chapter to sketch out Nietzsche's critical stance towards the traditional concept of truth wherein his influence on Heidegger can be seen to have issued. In this respect we shall see that contrary to Kierkegaard's work, Nietzsche's critique is one that is problematic from the outset. The purpose of the account of his work is then to simply indicate the task for thinking that Nietzsche's problematic genealogy set for his successors. In chapters two and three an account will be given showing how Heidegger's thought can be seen to have taken up the challenge set by both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in formulating his account of truth as aletheia - as inwardness in the absence of an absolute.
Kierkegaard's break with the then fashionable and traditional philosophy, that of Hegelianism, was already evident with the production of his first work, *The Concept of Irony*. It is in this work that the basis is laid for his own unique style of writing, that of indirect communication. The importance of *The Concept of Irony* for this study lies in the two major impulses that inform it. The first such impulse was Kierkegaard's endeavour to establish the priority of the individual person in philosophical problematics. He pursued this view by setting out to show that considered in his historical person, Socrates was a much less dogmatic philosopher than the Platonic reports (dialogues) would have him be. It is this less polished more vulnerable human being as the philosopher par excellence, whom Kierkegaard sought to contrast with Hegel's conception of philosophy as the progress of the universal Idea. In effect he sought to show that contra Hegel, philosophy was not concerned with a Universal Spirit, but with the existing individual human being. From this point follows his second major objection to the received (Hegelian) tradition: If philosophy was the concern of the living individual, not of a universal spirit, then this would be reflected in the 'tools of trade'. Hence he pointed to Socrates' major philosophical weapon as being ironic discourse, this in contrast to the Hegelian dialectic of the Idea. This preference for ironic discourse over the Hegelian dialectic of the Universal was rooted in the main thesis of the book - that philosophy is essentially an endeavour to awaken the individual person to a responsible and reflective self-awareness characteristic of Socratic irony.

To establish this thesis with respect to Socrates, in the first part of his book Kierkegaard set out to disentangle the historical

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2 Kierkegaard was well aware that Hegel saw irony as but a moment in the history of the Idea, indeed it is against this conception of irony being surpassed [overcome] that he rebelled. See esp. *The Concept of Irony* p. 279 ff.
Socrates from the embellishments of the received accounts given by his contemporaries, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes. In so doing he sought to discover the person Socrates as one who displayed a mastery of irony in the conduct of his conversations and of his person. In the course of the inquiry the seeming enigmatic conduct of Socrates was seen to lie in this mastery of irony; a self-mastery which Kierkegaard saw as his thoughtful response to the decaying social milieu of Athens as it was at that time.\(^3\)

Through the course of his inquiry Kierkegaard established the essential elements of irony as being a biting infinite negativity, that relentlessly questions not only the accepted conventions of social morality, but also the efforts of the Sophists of that time to prop up their ailing state. As a constant interlocutor, Socrates is portrayed as one who constantly revealed the inadequacies of conventional and Sophistic wisdom. Yet even in the face of the constant demand for immediate and satisfying answers, he touted his own ignorance so consistently that, as Kierkegaard notes, a good many of the early dialogues, and the first part of The Republic, end up not only with no result, but in negativity.\(^4\) One cannot conclude from this however that Kierkegaard's view of Socratic Irony is that it is essentially nihilistic. In his book Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics, George Stack shows an awareness of the tendency to draw such a conclusion, but points to the thrust of Kierkegaard's understanding and appreciation of Socrates as the philosopher of cultivated inwardness, or subjectivity.\(^5\)

Truth as Inwardness

In his discussion of Socrates' demon\(^6\) Kierkegaard sought to illustrate his view that the necessary termination of ironic discourse is not to be found in positive doctrine, for such would contradict

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\(^3\) Ibid p.234.
\(^4\) Ibid p.91, 148.
\(^5\) Published by University of Alabama Press 1977 This ref: p.4
\(^6\) Ibid p.185 ff.
Socrates' claim to be ignorant, but in the formation of the personality of the individual. At the heart of this view is his interpretation of the nature of the demon, of Socrates "divine sign" that "warns restrains and urges him to abstain from something".\(^7\) He held that it was this demon that allowed Socrates to distance himself from the customary gods - a practice which was to bring the charge of impiety against him. Thus Kierkegaard saw that with the demon, Socrates seemed sufficient unto himself; he had no need of the oracle, nor of customary wisdom. Of course the mere presence of the demon was of itself not sufficient to determine Socrates' wisdom, it had also to be a prompter, a pointer to something that whilst external to Socrates' self, was still determinative for his inner life - the life of his soul. Constituted as such, Kierkegaard wrote of it that ...\(^8\)

The demonic was sufficient for Socrates, with this he could manage for himself; it is therefore a determination of personality, though naturally only the egotistical satisfaction of a particular personality. Here again Socrates appears as one who stands poised ready to leap into something, yet at every moment instead of leaping into this 'other', he leaps aside and back into himself.

Thus rather than leap into the realm of the Good as Plato was to develop it from out of his own Socratic discipleship, Kierkegaard saw Socrates leap back into himself. We can interpret this leap inwards as his recognition that there is an underlying rationality in all things, but as the essence of his irony shows, he did not know what that reason was. Of this awareness of the ultimate reasonableness of reality Kierkegaard wrote:\(^9\)

He was conscious of it and yet not conscious of it, since the only thing he could predicate of it was that he knew nothing about it. But this is to say no more than ... Socrates had the Idea as a limit.

Here the individual enters history not as one who knows what is Good, but as one who can indicate what it is not.

\(^{7}\) Ibid p.186.
\(^{8}\) Ibid p.192
\(^{9}\) Ibid p.195
Socrates' self-sufficiency amidst the impending fall of Hellenic culture, a fall which he would seem to have assisted with dexterity, holds within it the clue to Kierkegaard's admiration for him. This clue is found in Socrates not looking outward to an absolute objective realm for his certainty, but rather looking inward. For this reason Kierkegaard pointed to Socrates as the philosopher who was concerned with the birth of the individual person rather than with Universal Ideas. Clearly then, what Kierkegaard was concerned to establish here, was the possibility of interpreting Socrates' philosophical genius as one arising from a concern with the individual, as one who can be tutored into an explicit reflective self-awareness issuing in the mastery of irony as a way of conduct. Here Kierkegaard's view irony conflicts with his contemporaries against whom he inveighed - the Hegelian and Romantic philosophical thinkers of his time. In contrast to their estimations of irony, he saw that mastered irony could not be a moment in the history of the Idea, nor an infinite striving in the here and now for the eternal and unattainable. Rather, self mastery in irony, was a reflective self awareness that "...limits, renders finite, defines and thereby yields truth, actuality and content: it chastens and punishes and thereby imparts stability, character and consistency." Without irony authentic life would be as impossible as philosophy in the absence of doubt.

It is against the background of Kierkegaard's view of irony that his style of writing via indirection must be seen. Thus as Lee Capel wrote in his historical introduction to The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard's conception of indirect discourse where the truth content, the 'what it is' of truth ..., may not be asserted from without but only enacted from within; for with the finite man the word must come after the deed and that is its truth. Here it may be seen that the art of indirect discourse as conceived by Kierkegaard, aspires to nothing so much as to create something out of nothing.

10 Ibid p.287
12 Ibid p.32
Given that the notion of indirect communication is founded on Kierkegaard's account of truth as inwardness, as subjectivity, let us look closer at this notion. The fact that Kierkegaard wrote in polemic against the Hegelian philosophy of his time is now commonplace, but it is nonetheless one that is of central importance to the interpretation of his philosophy. To Kierkegaard the Hegelian dialecticians inexhaustable ability to view things sub specie aeternitatis seemed superhuman, especially in their ability to render human existence intelligible in a few paragraphs. To achieve this goal the Hegelian analysis of reality proceeds to its goal of achieving the Idea as Being in and for itself through an inexorable logic of necessity. In contrast to this type of philosophical inquiry, Kierkegaard held human existence to be a life-long striving for self-accomplishment, a life lived literally as an open question forever being asked, and in being answered, asked again and thus deepened. Thus in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript he wrote of an either/or: Either the thinker (in this case the speculative philosopher) can become a comic figure by forgetting the fact that he exists in his contemplation of the World Spirit; "or he can concentrate his entire energies upon the fact that he is an existing individual". 13

In his own account of the "or" Kierkegaard sought to uncover the categories relevant to human existence. As such rather than eternal Ideas open to metaphysical contemplation, he conceived the inwardness of subjectivity; not the necessity of logical determination, but the passion of choice; not the intellectual ability to engage in and overcome doubt, but the personal engagement found in and through despair. 14 The consistency in Kierkegaard's choice of categories can be seen in that in contrast to doubt, passion and despair pertain to the individual, and so in contrast to logical categories, are the categories relevant to human existence as it is lived. As such it must be seen that despair in the absence of doubt is a real possibility. For Kierkegaard saw that given the different nature of the categories

13 op.cit. p.109
14 Either/Or Vol 2 p.178.
of human existence, the only way to overcome despair was to own it as a mark of one's freedom (from necessity). To make such a decision would be to recognize oneself as existing as a tension between the finite and the infinite. In such a decision not only is the self founded, it also marks the birth of this self as an ethical personality, and so is the founding of a true awareness of the distinction between good and evil. Doubt on the other hand must be seen as potentially eradicable in knowledge.

Kierkegaard's eschewing of the intelligibility of logical mediation in favour of passion as in despair, clearly prefigures Heidegger's analysis of the role of moods in the realization of true selfhood. For both authors, the factual occurrence of despair pointed to the possibility rather than the necessity of self-transformation. Here the intelligibility of logical categories is traded for the dark pathos of mood/passion. For Kierkegaard then, self-transformation as the attainment of subjective truth as reflective self-awareness, occurs not through logical nicety, which takes talent, but through despair; something that takes no talent, is known to all and yet is far more profound than logic could ever be of itself. This view of the nature of truth is reflected in his works such as Either/Or, where he adopts a story-telling style to communicate his own philosophical insights. In a way similar to parables, such a style was employed in order that the reader might reflect on the moral of the story at a level suited to his or her own level of understanding. Through such reflection, Kierkegaard clearly hoped that his work might help others attain to the insight characteristic of self-mastery found in true Socratic ignorance. Herein lies Kierkegaard's challenge to the traditional conception of truth. In subsequent chapters I shall indicate how Heidegger can be seen to have responded to this challenge in the formulation of his concept of resolute authentic existence. As noted earlier however, his appropriation of Kierkegaard's insight is neither straight-forward nor uncritical, for it was mediated by the insights of Nietzsche's genealogical inquiry.

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15 Ibid p.179.
Nietzsche's Break With Tradition.

Contrary to Kierkegaard Nietzsche saw the world to be justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon – as one which in his early work he portrayed as an awful tension between what he diagnosed as the Dionysian and the Apollonian instincts.\textsuperscript{16} In his estimation the great age of Greek tragedy was the expression of just this tension where both instincts were reconciled rather than one dominating the other. With the downfall of Hellenism, however, Nietzsche saw this tension to have been resolved in favour of the Apollonian instincts. This resolution was one he saw reflected in the way the drama of the time was characteristically a self-conscious reflective creation. The epitome of such self-conscious creation was one Nietzsche saw to be personified in Socrates; whose influence on drama via. his companion dramaturge Euripides, resulted in tragic art being imbued with the Socratic proposition that knowledge is virtue, and the beautiful is the intelligible. Prior to Euripides' own self-conscious creation of drama, Nietzsche insists that tragedy was created unconsciously, from out of noble suffering.\textsuperscript{17} According to this view the wisdom of Aeschylus and Sophocles was precisely not the result of a conscious construction of questions and answers to the problems of human existence. It was the adequacy of such 'wisdom' that Euripides, no doubt under the sway of his companion in Socrates, was to question, for he saw a failure in the preceding tragic plays' ability to resolve questions such as the nature of justice, and of interpretations of myth and fate.\textsuperscript{18} In his efforts to consciously confront and resolve these failures, Nietzsche saw that the works of Euripides transformed his art as Socrates transformed philosophy. With this transformation the self-conscious critical (Apollonian) instinct triumphed over the possible balance with the instinct for unity, the Dionysian instinct. Hence Socrates' demon was seen to work its presence in the tragic arts as well as in philosophy. Nietzsche characterized this demon voice as

\textsuperscript{16} The Birth of Tragedy vol 3 of The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche ed. Dr. O. Levy 2nd. ed. (Morrison and Gibb Edinburgh 1910)
\textsuperscript{17} The Birth of Tragedy p.35.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid p.93.
This voice, whenever it comes always dissuades... While in all productive men it is instinct which is the creatively affirmative force, consciousness only comporting itself critically and dissuasively; with Socrates it is instinct which becomes critic, it is consciousness which becomes creator — a perfect monstrosity PER DEFECTUM!

With the advent of Socratic self-reflection in tragedy, Nietzsche saw the triumph of self-consciousness as a victory for shallowness, for such drama excluded the demonic as embodied in the Dionysian. Yet he did not seek to have his countrymen return in nostalgia to the ancient tragedy of Aeschylus or Sophocles. Rather, grasping the thorn of fate in his hands, he pointed to the possibility of a new era, fully contemporary in its marriage of the Socratic and the Dionysian. In this he saw that the triumph of the Apollonian elements of tragedy over the Dionysian had to be accepted for what it was. As such unable to go back to the 'golden age', the only direction was forward, or to give up in the resignation characteristic of modern nihilism. In his reflections on the form of a future drama, Nietzsche foresaw the possibility of renewal to lie in a new music which once again combined the Apollonian to the Dionysian. The possibility of such a new music is seen in his conception of a new Socrates who in contrast to the historical Socrates, heeds the warning beckon of his demon, and practices music. Clearly at the time of writing The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche saw such a Socrates in Wagner — a honeymoon that was to be as shortlived as it was surely mistaken.

Nietzsche's error of judgment concerning Wagner was to exercise his heart and pen long after The Birth of Tragedy. Even so, as he pointed out in Ecce Homo, this error did not detract from his basic psychological insight into the writings of the great tragedians. The greatness of such writings being seen to lie not in the purification of the self through the discharge of dangerous emotion, a doctrine traditionally attributed to Aristotle, but in the pathos of the dynamic

\[19\] Ibid p.105
\[20\] Ibid p.112
tension between the Dionysian and the Apollonian instincts in an affirmation of becoming as the 'essence' of existence. The Dionysian is then as Nietzsche was to express it, a "philosophical pathos", a "tragic wisdom". In The Birth of Tragedy his view that the antagonism between the two instincts of unity and separation is potentially reconcilable in the advent of a musical Socrates, is portentous for all his later writings - especially for his thought on the nature of truth and error. He pursued this antagonism through the genealogical vivisection of the West's most hallowed beliefs, a method he was to develop explicitly as genealogy.

We can see then that there is a major difference between Kierkegaard's estimate of the importance of Socrates and that of Nietzsche. Both authors see his influence to be of major historical significance, but for different reasons. The difference lies in the suspicion that under-writes Nietzsche's genealogical method, the suspicion that what seems to be the case from surface appearances is invariably not so. By further investigating Nietzsche's method and the problems it gives rise to, we will be better able to see how his thought mediated any direct influence that Kierkegaard had on Heidegger's work.

The Genealogy at Work

As an historical investigation, genealogy is concerned with the descendancies and origins of the object of investigation. Coupled with the insight that existence is essentially pathos, that is, tragic, Nietzsche's genealogy displays a specifically psychological touch. However the essence of his method did not lie in simply tracing beliefs back to their origin in history, even psychological history, for his whole concern with the origin of belief and knowledge claims arose from out of his insight into the original antagonism between Apollonian and Dionysian instincts, as one that is formative of knowledge and belief. As a concern for origins and not simply the chronology of belief, Nietzsche's genealogy is therefore one effected in the spirit

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21 Published by (Penguin Classics 1982) trans. R.J. Holingdale This ref: p.80-81
22 The Birth of Tragedy p.108.
of the suspicion that what appears on the surface is not the full meaning of either belief or knowledge claims. Genealogy so conceived is an investigation concerned to show belief as forged from out of pain, the pathos of existence; created as a means to make life bearable. As such, different beliefs are interpreted as but different beguilements put on by a mind seeking to escape the pain of existence. This pain was one he portrayed in The Birth of Tragedy as lying in the antagonism between the Dionysian and Apollonian instincts, resolved either in a fine balance or in the dominance of one instinct over the other. In his later works this conflict was interpreted as the manifestation of the Will to Power.

In the light of this account of existence, the task of genealogy as Nietzsche was to develop it was to trace beliefs/knowledge back to their origin in the Will to Power. The purpose of this task was not to show that the origin of the belief as that which gives it meaning, as in the case of revelation, but rather to show that the meaning of the belief does not reflect its origin.23

As a corollary to this distinction between the origin and the meaning of belief, Nietzsche developed his conception of truth as being illusion, as a useful error.24 Accordingly he developed an all embracing phenomenalism that attacked every conception of truth which presupposed a reality above and beyond that with which we are familiar through our senses. (Not that the senses escaped the genealogist's eye either). Thus through the eyes of genealogical suspicion, language, logic and mathematics were not seen as keys to an eternal world of metaphysical truth such as Plato, Nietzsche's arch rival would have it, and this for two reasons. First, he saw that none of these disciplines was ontologically founded on anything in the world. Thus though language in picking out objects in the world would seem to have an

23 Debbra Bergoffin develops this point in her article "Why a Genealogy of Morals? in Man and World 16, 1983 pp.129-138
essential relation to them, just as the success of mathematics would seem to suggest that nature itself is mathematical, Nietzsche thought the contrary. The very most that he would allow was that language, mathematics and logic were simply useful tools, and insofar as useful they were deemed true. He saw the success in their application as lying at the root of the belief that they in some way touch upon the essence of the world.\(^{25}\) Secondly, whilst an all embracing phenomenalism regarding language, logic and mathematics would seem radical enough, the real fruit of Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry lay in the diagnosis of the dominant morality in the West for over the past two thousand years, as being a subtle form of revenge against time—a noble illusion entertained in an effort to make the pain of shortlived life more bearable. Through the separation of the purpose of the doctrines of metaphysics and religion from their content, his genealogical inquiry cast a cynical eye over the doctrines of metaphysicians and priests, revealing them to be far from a self effacing disinterested truth. As he saw them, they were on the contrary an attempt to exercise power over others and reality in general, through the deprecation of this world by yearning for a Real a-temporal world. Impotent in the actual world, the high priests of culture sought an a-temporal world where all would be in order; where pain/pathos would cease.\(^{26}\)

The lynch pin in Nietzsche’s mature genealogy is found in the view that all past morality arose from out of the efforts of mankind to justify itself in the face of its impotence against time which “eats its children”. With this radical claim Nietzsche in effect swept aside the claims that previous philosophy and religion had made in regard to truth, interpreting them to be doctrines which, regardless of what they say, are perverse attempts to control their author’s destiny by denigrating the actual. From the perspective of this genealogy the truth of any doctrine whether religious or philosophical is, therefore, not one to be found in what the doctrine espouses, but in what it

\(^{25}\) e.g. *The Gay Science* #110, #111, #112.

\(^{26}\) thus *Spoke Zarathustra* (Penguin Classics 1977) trans. R.J. Holingdale
denies - in its attempt to overcome what Nietzsche diagnosed as a form of revenge against time:27

'It was': that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and times desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction... It is sullenly wrathful that time does not run back; 'That which was' -that is what the stone which it cannot roll away is called. And so, out of wrath and ill temper, the will rolls stones about and takes revenge upon him who does not, like it, feel wrath and ill-temper. Thus the will, the liberator, becomes a malefactor: and upon all that can suffer it takes revenge for its inability to go backwards. This, yes, this alone is revenge itself: the will's antipathy towards time and time's 'It was'...The spirit of revenge: my friends, that up to now, has been man's chief concern...

This insight, that the spirit of revenge has been determinative for the meaning of the past and present culture is the core of Nietzsche's philosophical/genealogical inquiries. He did not concern himself with a purely negative diagnosis however, for he remained intimately concerned to overcome such revenge by pointing a way to redemption. The key to this redemption as a way of transforming every agonized 'it was' into "I wanted it thus ", lies in his conception of the Eternal Return of the Same. In both The Gay Science and in Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche presented the doctrine of the Eternal Return as a way of affirming what is and has been in a way free from revenge. Before exploring how the rather problematic notion of the Eternal Return can be interpreted in this way, let us pause and note that genealogy, at least as Nietzsche employed it, would seem to render not only the truth of the traditional accounts of reality problematic, but also Nietzsche's own standpoint would seem threatened. For if Nietzsche understood all knowledge to be the manifestation of the Will which given the abolition of the transcendent can only be apprehended from one of many possible points of view, how can any one point of view be more authoritative than any other? How in effect, given the loss of a transcendent perspective, can Nietzsche's own inquiry not be swallowed up in a sea of an all-embracing relativism?

Even if for the sole purpose of achieving a better understanding of his work we concur with Nietzsche in his abolition of the real world and also of the corresponding apparent world - we must still inquire into what remains. If, however, we are to be fair here, then it must be admitted that it is not possible to read Nietzsche's work without feeling at least a hint of the anguish that he himself felt in the face of his own investigations. In view of this anguish, the only joy to be found looking from within his work is in the possibility it showed of human-kind being able to create themselves through conscious insight into reality. That is, in the possibility he saw in the modern manifestation of the Will to Power as giving the chance that consciousness, the weakest of human abilities, might play a leading and creatively affirmative role in self-creation.28

This new and affirmative role for consciousness is one that can be seen presented in his doctrine of the Eternal Return of the Same. Of all of Nietzsche's enigmatic thought, the interpretation of the Eternal Return is surely that which has most exercised his interpreters, and this for two reasons. Firstly what Nietzsche wrote about it does not amount to a singular unambiguous account of what it may mean. Secondly, in the light of the lack of a singular and agreed upon interpretation of the doctrine, the role that it has to play in his thought as a whole remains problematic. Even given these obstacles to interpreting the doctrine, it is the contention of this thesis that it holds the key to Nietzsche's influence on Heidegger's thought, especially in Being and Time.29

The following interpretation of the doctrine is one which shall show it to be essentially enigmatic. The reasons for doing so are two-fold. Firstly it is this characteristic of the doctrine that is seen to render it so difficult to interpret. Second and more importantly it is the enigmatic aspect of Nietzsche's thought here that Heidegger can be seen to have subsequently taken up. The following account has therefore the purpose of throwing a light on the doctrine in such a way as to begin to reveal those aspects of it that can be seen to have influenced

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28 The Gay Science #110.
central concepts of Being and Time. (It should be noted that even this limited aim is not fully met in this chapter alone, indeed it is not until chapter seven that the full extent of Nietzsche's influence on Heidegger is able to be surveyed as a whole.)

The Enigma of the Eternal Return

In Nietzsche's first communication of the idea of the Eternal Recurrence in the The Gay Science he wrote: 30

... What if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more....' Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you experienced a moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god and I have never heard anything more divine.' If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are, or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing! 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?' would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

It should be noted here, that whilst it is tempting to consider the demon's proposition as merely experimental, Nietzsche allows only two possible responses to its provocation neither of which allows it to be merely shrugged off. That is, in no sense does Nietzsche allow the demon to be seen as a mere pest or joker, a temptation he would surely have had to allow for if he had seen the thought to be merely an experimental one. The reason for Nietzsche's deadly earnest here lies in the fact that whilst his work lacks the logical unity of for example the Hegelian system, it still developed in a unity, the two main pillars of which may be interpreted as the thought of the Eternal Return and of revenge against time. A hint of the way these two insights are interrelated can be glimpsed in his more extended treatment of the Eternal Return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Whilst his account of the thought in the The Gay Science allows of two possible responses, that of being a burden or of rejoicing, it is 30 op.cit. #341 p.273-274
possible to see them to be but two moments of the one affirmative response. Indeed it is just this response that Zarathustra has to the thought - one in which he overcomes his own revenge against time. There is, however, an important difference between the two accounts of the doctrine which is decisive for Nietzsche's thought as a whole, and it is this. Following the demon's challenge in the *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche wrote a further aphorism telling of Zarathustra's going down from the mountains with his ripened wisdom as the beginning of tragedy - "Incipit tragoeda". It is with this going down that the book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* begins. What awaits him however is his disappointment, for his teachings are not received by others, so he once again returns to his mountain. It is on the way back to his cave that he tells of his vision and riddle - his story of the Eternal Return. That Nietzsche puts his doctrine to his readership as not only a vision but also a riddle, is, I think symptomatic of a difficulty which he became more aware of in his later work, and first presented in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. With this point in mind let us look at what Nietzsche tells us of the Eternal Return.

In the first section of "Of The Vision and The Riddle" Zarathustra tells of his slow and painful ascent up a mountainside, which we must presume to be a metaphor for the painful acquisition of his wisdom. His ascent is especially difficult, as he finds himself weighed down by a dwarf, whom he calls the spirit of gravity. This dwarf would appear to symbolize the thinking that lies at the heart of revenge, for it mockingly challenges Zarathustra's wisdom as self defeating. 31

'O Zarathustra, you stone of wisdom, you projectile, you star-destroyer! You have thrown yourself high, but every stone that is thrown - must fall! Condemned by yourself and to your own stone throwing: O Zarathustra, far indeed have you thrown your stone, but it will fall back on you.

That the dwarf is not merely taunting Zarathustra, but is really tormenting him by such mockery, is made plain by Zarathustra's calling him "my devil and arch enemy", one who can be overcome only through an

31 op.cit. p.177
affirmation of the abyss — and what is the abyss here but what remains of reality given the death of God! We can see then that the dwarf's challenge is in effect the challenge posed for Nietzsche by the traditional conception of truth, which paradoxically, his genealogy violates. This paradox is symbolized in the figure of the pestering Dwarf who is in effect challenging Zarathustra, the proclaimer of the death of God, wearing him down with the burden of his proclamation; with the burden of torment of one who recognises that in the event of the abolition of the real world, the apparent world vanishes too — and what then is left? Has not Zarathustra's bold proclamation swept the ground from under his own feet? What then via Zarathustra is Nietzsche's reply to this problem?

To shake off the burdensome dwarf Zarathustra challenges him, thereby creating a distance out of which the issue under contention can be sketched out showing exactly wherein they differ:

Behold this gateway, dwarf! I went on: 'it has two aspects. Two paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end. This long lane behind us: it goes on for an eternity. And that long lane ahead of us - that is another eternity. They are in opposition to one another, these paths; they abut one another: and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is written above it: "Moment". But if one were to follow them further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal opposition?'

The dwarf's response to Zarathustra that "Everything straight lies, all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle" is correct, but inadequate for Zarathustra, for it is uttered in contempt. Herein for Nietzsche lies the nature of the spirit of gravity, and so one might add of philosophy hitherto, it is basically a contemptuous way of living and thinking, it is a form of revenge against that which it cannot control. Zarathustra on the other hand is seeking to affirm life, yet such affirmation is not easily accomplished, hence as one returning to the mountains, in a sense defeated, he speaks of a vision and of a riddle.

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32 Ibid
33 Ibid p.178
34 Ibid
Zarathustra's story of his encounter with the dwarf tells only part of his vision, a part in which the riddle is not yet fully posed. What then is this riddle? An indication is found in Zarathustra's telling of his having fallen out of conversation with the dwarf, then being distracted by the howling of a dog, upon the hearing of which he found himself immediately transported alone to a spot amongst cliffs, lit by moonlight. There he sees the cause of the dog's howling to be its distress over the agony of a young shepherd who is writhing in agony, choking on a black snake. Going to the shepherd's aid Zarathustra tells us that he tried to pull the serpent from out of his mouth, but failed.35

My hands tugged and tugged at the snake - in vain! they could not tug the snake out of the shepherd's throat. Then a voice cried out to me: 'Bite! Bite its head off! Bite - thus a voice cried from me, my horror, my hate, my disgust, my pity, all my good and evil cried out of me with a single cry. The shepherd ...bit as my cry advised him; he bit with a good bite! He spat away the snake's head - and sprang up. No longer a shepherd, no longer a man - a transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing. Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed.

The question Zarathustra leaves his audience with is "What did I see in allegory? And who is it that must come one day? And who is the shepherd? Is this then the full extent of the vision and the riddle?" I suggest this question remains.

In the section "The Convalescent"36 Nietzsche returns to these very same themes again. In this section he leaves no doubt that it is Zarathustra himself who was the suffering shepherd. In contrast to his early account however, this account here is not of a vision, but of a real struggle which Zarathustra undertakes in the solitude of his cave.37 Here the black snake is identified as Zarathustra's disgust

35 Ibid p.180
36 op.cit. p.232 ff
37 The symbolism of the solitude of the cave is one not to be overlooked. As a reworking of the foundations of Western Philosophy, that is Platonism, Zarathustra's return to his cave is clearly a play on Plato's account of knowledge. In the light of Kierkegaard's insistence on truth as inwardness, Zarathustra's solitude is also interesting.
The great disgust at mankind - it choked me and had crept into my throat: and what the prophet prophesied: It is all one, nothing is worthwhile, knowledge chokes.

As David Krell notes, Zarathustra's struggle is one against the pessimism and revulsion against life, for if under the searching eye and deft scalpel of the genealogist he was yet to affirm life - even in the face of the death of God, then to do so he had to affirm the Eternal Return of the Same. To do so however, meant that Zarathustra had to overcome his own self, his disgust at what he called the little man symbolized in the figure of the dwarf. Indeed it must be seen that should Zarathustra fail to do so, then he would in effect have succumbed to the taunting of the dwarf! Speaking as a convalescent however, he has somehow managed to overcome his own self, his own contempt of the world; he has somehow overcome revenge. But it must be noted that as his readers, we do not know how he has been thus transformed, nor do we ever find out. For even when his animals, those closest to Zarathustra entice him to come out of his cave, he responds with a gentle rebuke, bidding them nonetheless to continue chatting to him. Such chatter far from annoying him actually pleases him, even though as with all words and music hitherto, Zarathustra sees it as but an apparent bridge "between things eternally separated". Thus when the animals try to speak to Zarathustra of their own understanding of the struggle they have seen him undergo, Zarathustra rebukes them again saying...

'O you buffoons and barrel-organs! ... how well you know what had to be fulfilled in seven days: and how that monster crept into my throat and choked me! But I bit its head off and spat it away. And you - have already made a hurdy-gurdy song of it? I, however, lie here now, still weary from this biting and spitting away, still sick with my own redemption.'

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38 Ibid p.235
39 Nietzsche and The Task of Thinking: Martin Heidegger's Reading of Nietzsche (University Microfilms International Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A. 1971) This ref: p.149,150
40 Ibid p.234.
41 Ibid p.234-235
It would seem that the animals miss the point of Zarathustra's struggle, yet they are not far from grasping and expressing it, for they entreat him again that as a convalescent, he must go into the garden of the world and learn new singing from song-birds there. Only from out of such new singing do they see that he will be able to recuperate and sing in an even stronger healthier way. Yet Zarathustra again rebuked them, asking them if they want to reduce the comfort of his health and the experience of his convalescence to a mere hurdy gurdy song. To this rebuke his animals reply:

'Speak no further... rather first prepare yourself a lyre, convalescent, a new lyre! For behold, O Zarathustra! New lyres are needed for your new songs. Sing and bubble over, O Zarathustra, heal your soul with new songs, so that you may bear the destiny your great destiny, that never was the destiny of any man! For your animals well know, O Zarathustra, who you are and must become: Behold you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence, that now is your destiny.'

The enigmatic nature of this reply cannot escape notice. It is the root of the riddle at the heart of Nietzsche's work, for where words and music are but "seeming bridges between things eternally separated" how and what is such a teacher to teach? The riddle surely remains.

The teaching of the Eternal Return as the teaching of Zarathustra's self overcoming is presented in symbol and metaphor. It is the story of the overcoming of his own pity and disgust at human-kind, the story of his struggle to affirm the circle of time in the face of the death of the transcendent realm of ahistoric truth. The height of the riddle's perplexity, and it must be seen that the riddle remains, is reached when it is seen that the event of such an overman requires, as the animals knew, the fashioning of a new lyre (music) and the singing of a new song; one sung first from out of the blessing of convalescence, and then from out of the robustness of health and strength of self creation - even a god was a creator.44 Who then is this new man? This musical Socrates? This question remains

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42 Ibid p.236.
43 Ibid p.236-237
44 The Will to Power #1037 also D.F. Krell Nietzsche and the Task of Thinking p.155
today as it did for Nietzsche who, through symbol and metaphor and, not least through genealogical attack on truth, presented the teaching of the eternal return in the figure of Zarathustra. In Nietzsche's work then what "truth" means must be seen as problematic; for given the death of God and the absence of the overman, truth is denied not only a transcendent realm or grounding, but also the purely historical actuality demanded by the logic of the genealogy. It shall be contended that Heidegger's work especially in Being and Time can be seen as a response to this challenge for thought. In the first instance, his concept of authentic existence which is indisputably central to his work, can be seen to belie the influence of Kierkegaard's concept of truth as inwardness. This influence is however one that must be seen as mediated by Nietzsche, for it is an account of truth in the absence of an absolute. Herein it shall be contended lies Heidegger's answer to the enigma posed by Nietzsche's genealogical inquiries.
CHAPTER 2

ALETHEIA AND THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE

In the light of the two preceding radical interpretations of truth, both of which not only challenge the received tradition, but are also in one important respect incompatible with each other, the task of the thinker following in their stead can be seen as follows. Following Kierkegaard, truth can no longer be interpreted solely as a dispassionate affair, but as the concern of the existing living individual. Following Nietzsche, the task facing philosophy is how to interpret "truth" when the absolute is abolished by the genealogist. It shall be contended that Heidegger's response to this two-fold challenge is to be found in his conception of aletheia, as the revealing and concealing of Being. To see how this is possible it will be useful first of all to clarify Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutic, the method he employs in Being & Time, for it is only from out of the movement within the hermeneutic circle of Being and Time, that the nature of aletheia comes to the fore. The aim of this chapter is therefore to give an account of Heidegger's methodological procedure revealing the essence of its circular movement as resting in the temporal self-affection that ontologically constitutes Dasein's selfhood. To this end Heidegger's critique of Kant in his Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics\(^1\) gives the occasion for an investigation into both the circularity lying at the basis of Heidegger's analysis as a Transcendental hermeneutic, and of the way in which this analysis based as it is on the concept of aletheia, differs from traditional transcendental philosophy. On the grounds of this account subsequent

\(^1\)Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics trans:J.S.Churchhill (Indiana Press, London 1975) (This text consists of a set of lectures delivered in 1925-26, that is prior to the publication of Being and Time in 1927. Hence forth this book shall be referred to as the Kant Buch.)
as it is, or as it seems to be but really is not, then there must be an interconnection between the phenomenon that shows itself as it is, and the phenomenon that only seems to do so. The former Heidegger called a pure phenomenon, the latter semblance. He conceived their interconnection to be such that of the two ways in which a phenomenon may be manifest, the pure phenomenon is the more fundamental, semblance being defined as the privation of the pure phenomenon.

By going back to greek origins Heidegger defined "logos" as discourse - this as opposed to being a signification for judgment as more traditionally defined. As such logos is letting something be seen in talk about the thing under consideration. Such discourse can be either true or false in so far as it either lets the thing be seen as it is, or passes it off as something that it is not. Discourse then, can either reveal or conceal that which is talked about. Let us note here that in defining "logos" as talk there were to be far reaching consequences. For the implied focus on talk or discourse rather than on judgment, points to a shift from the conception of truth as the agreement of knowledge with its object, to a conception of truth as a more primordial/original revealing and concealing of phenomena in discourse - chatter included. Here talk is given weight not as knowledge claims, but in a way that will become clearer later, as an ontological event.

The point at which there is a shift away from the traditional interpretation of truth as a relation between an object and knowledge about that object, is occasioned by the inter-relation of the definitions of "phenomenon" and "logos" insofar as logos can either reveal or conceal. Thus the meaning of the two words are related in each of their aspects: pure phenomenon - revealing, semblance - concealing. The result of the definition is therefore that logos, to the extent that it is true or false, is the uncovering or the covering.

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4 Ibid H29 p.51  
5 Ibid  
6 Ibid H32 p.56
up of the pure phenomenon, either by accident or of necessity. For Heidegger then, talk not only as specialized discourse, but in its everyday manifestation, is set to play a central role in phenomenological analysis. He formally defined such an analysis as one which deliberately set out "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." 

Clearly what follows from the above formal definition of phenomenology, is that any study which describes its objects just as they are given, is phenomenological. Heidegger pointed to the distinction between such a study and Phenomenology as a philosophical discipline, or rather as ontology, as resting in its concern with that which is not given along with that which shows itself, but which lies concealed as its basis or 'ground'; the Being of the entity. Here the dual aspect of "logos" and "phenomenon" as previously defined can be seen to come into play. The Being of the entity is conceived as the concealed or hidden ontological basis of the entity as it is encountered and interpreted in everyday discourse. The phenomenological program seeks to grasp this pure phenomenon, that is Being, in its relation to its privation/manifestation as semblance. It therefore seeks to show the inter-relation of revelation and concealment in the manifestation of phenomena. Thus Heidegger's conception of phenomenology is deeply committed to his conception of truth as aletheia which he defined as "uncovering", a definition that presupposes a prior covering over of that which is now subsequently revealed.

It can therefore be seen that Heidegger built his conception of aletheia into his phenomenological program. What is not clear at this point is how this original conception of "truth" and "phenomenology" was to be deployed in his investigation into the meaning of Being. For such an inquiry is so broad as to include whatever is, has been, or will be, insofar as to be in any of these senses is to participate in

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7 Ibid H36 p.60
8 Ibid H34 p.58
Being. The problem here is to understand how Heidegger was able to find the right place or entity with which to begin his investigation into the meaning of Being. The difficulty is that such an investigation in accord with his conception of phenomenology would be one seeking the basis or "ground" of all entities. In this sense his investigation is one that is a search that is philosophically speaking, a transcendental concern.

Heidegger's solution to the problem of where to begin is not only disarming; it is as rigorous as it is simple. It is a solution which as Jacques Derrida recognized, is a statement of protocol and of a program for its execution. As such I shall quote the relevant passage from Being and Time at length.

If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it...requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for the choosing of the right entity for our example, and to work out the genuine way of access to it. Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing access to it - all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we the inquirers are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity - the inquirer - transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from that which is inquired about - namely, Being.

In the above quote Heidegger points to Dasein (human being) as that being which as the enquirer into the meaning of Being, is the being that is itself to be investigated. The possibility, even the necessity that Dasein be the entity investigated rests on Heidegger's defence against the following charge which he anticipated would be raised against his project.

If we must first define an entity in its Being and if we

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9 "The Ends of Man" in Margins of Philosophy (University of Chicago 1982) This ref: p.126
10 Being and Time H7 p.26-27
11 Ibid H7 p.27
want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle? In working out our question, have we not "presupposed" something which only the answer can bring?

A defence of Heidegger here would I believe be two-fold. Firstly it must be granted that if one is to be able to ask "What is Being?", then one must exist, that is to have Being. Furthermore it is to have Being or to exist as a questioner who is seeking the meaning of Being; for questioning is a mode of one's Being. Asking a question is then a mode of Being which gets its essential character from that inquired about - namely Being. If the inquiry is to proceed then the meaning of the "is" which is only vaguely understood, can then be pursued as an investigation into the Being of the questioner as questioner.

Given then that the inquiry is not formally flawed, the justification of its results can only be found in the light which they throw on the question of the meaning of Being - that is whether the question is as far as possible, rendered in conceptual clarity. This concern is the express purpose underlying the phenomenological method: To reveal or make explicit, what which is not given along with that which shows itself as an entity, but which lies implicit or concealed as its basis or 'ground'.

This exposition of Heidegger's procedure does not however dispose of the very evident circularity in his reasoning: to make explicit what is implicit, is always to betray some insight into that which is implicit, for how else would one know how to begin to render it explicit? One might well invoke the wrong method and end up with a distorted problematic. This is a charge which we will see Heidegger put to those philosophers who, following Descartes, interpret Being as substance or as representation. Heidegger's only defence against the manifest circularity of his problematic is to point out that such circularity is involved in the very way in which all understanding works.

If we are to understand the nature of Heidegger's defence here, it is necessary to more fully understand his general problematic. In particular, let us look at the possibility of understanding it as one
that is transcendental. The previous ascription of this problematic as transcendental (p.1) rested on the fact that he explicitly stated the task of Phenomenology to be the revealing of "that which is not given along with that which shows itself, but lies concealed as its basis or ground: The Being of the entity." Strictly speaking this statement is not that of a transcendental method, but a description of what Heidegger would seek to establish, and so is simply a statement that shows his concern is a transcendental one. If however his procedure was to be one that was transcendental how then would this be understood? Let us pursue this question in an endeavor to understand both the nature of the circularity that Heidegger embraced in the formulation of his leading question into the meaning of Being, and also the circularity of his problematic as a whole.

The Nature of a Transcendental Method

In contemporary philosophy, the transcendental method is usually taken as synonymous with Kant's deduction in his Critique of Pure Reason. Yet as is evident from the growing literature on the matter, contemporary philosophers find the concept of a transcendental deduction problematic. What is of particular concern in this literature is how to understand the Kantian Transcendental Deduction when it is interpreted as a concern to demonstrate the apriori validity of a given set of categories, which guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. This is taken as Kant's concern when he wrote of the Deduction being a" quaestio juris", a matter of justification as opposed to "quaestio facti". Thus for example in his article "Transcendental Arguments" Barry Stroud wrote of Kant's intention in the Critique as follows:

Kant recognised two distinct questions that can be asked about concepts. The first - the question of fact - amounts to "How do we come to have this concept... But even if we know what experiences or mental operations had been required for us

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to have the concepts we do, Kant's second question - the "question of right" - would still not have been answered, since we would not have established our right to ... those concepts. Although concepts can be derived from experience by various means, they might still lack "objective validity", and to show that this was not so is the task of the transcendental deduction.

Furthermore Stroud sees this task of the deduction to be one that will solve the "scandal of philosophy", in that it will answer the sceptic's question about the reality of "the existence of things outside of us." Thus he concludes that "We can therefore get some understanding of Kant's question of justification by looking at the challenge presented by the epistemological sceptics"\(^\text{14}\) i.e. by interpreting the Transcendental Deduction as an address to the problem of scepticism.

This construal of Kant's concern in the Critique to be one of refuting the sceptic is the main theme of the contemporary debate. As such the central concern of this literature is to define the nature of a transcendental deduction per se, in an effort to show not only how they work, but also whether they succeed or fail to answer the sceptic. This way of interpreting the Critique would seem not unreasonable, especially given Kant's following description of the nature of a 'quaestio juris' as opposed to a 'quaestio facti' which he recognised Locke and Hume to have been involved in.\(^\text{15}\)

While the former of these two illustrious men opened a wide door to enthusiasm ... the other gave himself over entirely to scepticism, having, as he believed, discovered that what had been hitherto regarded as reason was but an all-prevalent illusion infecting our faculty of knowledge. We now propose to make trial whether it be not possible to find for human reason safe conduct between these two rocks, assigning her determinate limits, and yet keeping open for her the whole field of her appropriate activities.

Clearly then, at least one of Kant's concerns was to give a decisive answer to the sceptic. The way contemporary authors on Transcendental Arguments interpret the Transcendental Deduction in the

\(^{14}\) Ibid p.242
\(^{15}\) Critique B 128 p.128
Critique is therefore, to this extent, justifiable. However this is not
the way that Heidegger interprets Kant's main concern in the Critique,
and that it is not important for our conception of his thought.
This is not to say that Heidegger was oblivious to Kant's attempt to
limit the use of dogmatic reason in such a way as to also answer the
questions posed by the epistemological sceptic. Rather, it is to say
that what is essential to Heidegger's reading of the Critique, is not
an interpretation of the nature of transcendental deductions as another
form of logical deduction. For what he was concerned with was to
elucidate the nature of the categories only insofar as they were seen
as necessary in the constitution of ontological knowledge.

Such an elucidation would not be concerned with the clarification
and extension of any given category or set of categories. This usual
concern would instead be over-shadowed by an effort to see how the
objective reality of any categories per se, was to be found in the
essential unity of "ontological knowledge as that which 'produces'
[forms] the transcendence of a finite being". Of course this
clarification is not exclusive to the "Transcendental Deduction"
itself, but is carried over to the Schematism. As the following quote
shows, such an interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction is of
course not entirely out of sympathy with Kant's concern. This
following quote arose in the context of a discussion involving the
Schematism, there Heidegger gave his clearest indication of what he
understood by "quaesto juris" when he wrote of the nature of the
Transcendental Deduction as being,

...a legal action within traditional metaphysics. This
action being decided by the proof that the notions must be
categories, i.e. that they must belong essentially to
transcendence itself if they are capable of the determination
apriori of the essents which are empirically accessible. At
the same time the conditions of the "use" of these concepts is
fixed...The use of pure concepts as transcendental
determinations of time apriori, i.e. the achievement of pure
knowledge, is what takes place in the schematism.

16 Kant Buch p.92
17 Ibid .113-114
At first sight this interpretation of the Critique may seem only trivially different from that of other contemporary writers. There is however a fine but important distinction between this interpretation of the meaning of Kant's Critique, and of the import of his "quaestio juris" in particular, and other contemporary interpretations of it. This distinction may be best captured as one resting on different emphases due to different concerns. Contemporary work focuses on the Transcendental Deduction as a way of logically validating a set of categories, and in so doing concentrates on the supposed logical form of the deduction. Heidegger's concern with the Transcendental Deduction on the other hand, was one motivated by an interest in the access it provided into an inquiry into the nature of the finitude of human existence. As we shall see, this interest leads to the eventual undermining of the Kantian problematic, and so also of the Transcendental Deduction as Kant conceived and executed it.

Putting aside our fore-knowledge that Heidegger undermined the Critique, it may be useful to consider that from the standpoint of contemporary analytic philosophy, Heidegger's lack of concern with the question of the logical validity of transcendental deductions may well seem naive. If for instance a transcendental deduction can be shown to be an invalid form of argument, then Kant's work no matter what one sees as his intent, will be judged a failure. The question is of course, whether Heidegger was naive in this sense; it is believed not: in fact it seems that the very opposite was the case.

Whilst at no stage in his Kant Buch does Heidegger raise and set out to answer any objections to the concept of a Transcendental Deduction as such, he does however explicitly refuse to consider them as attempts to supply logical validation for judgment. Only in a later publication, What is a Thing? does he explicitly state the necessity for Kant's proofs (of principles/categories) to be a circular "propositions which ground their ground of proof and transfer this

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18 Kant Buch p.92
19 What is a Thing trans.W.B.Barton and V.Deutsch. (Regenery/Gateway Inc. Indiana 1967)
grounding to the ground of proof. But as Heidegger recognized, this statement is a reiteration of Kant's formulation of the principle of synthetic a priori judgments, i.e. that - 'the conditions of experience in general are the conditions of the objects of experience'. Here as in *Being & Time* there is an obvious circularity in reasoning, yet it is one which though problematic to other writers, Heidegger embraced, and this for a particular reason which gradually becomes clearer through a reading of his *Kant Buch*. Let us then look at Heidegger's analysis of the *Critique* in this text, in particular at the results of his exegesis in so far as they throw light on his apparent complacent acceptance of the circularity of transcendental argumentation.

It is in the third section of the *Kant Buch* that Heidegger fully revealed the motif behind his exegesis of the *Critique* in the two preceding sections. Seeing his task in this third section to be "The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics in its Basic Originality" by clarifying the preliminary insight that guided Kant, his concern in the entire chapter is to show the relation that holds between intuition, understanding and imagination; for it is just this inter-relation that he sees as central to the *Critique* and this for one particular reason. His view of the inter-relation of these faculties is that they are reducible to the third faculty, the Transcendental Imagination understood as an essentially productive, unifying ability characteristic of transcendence. This view follows on from Kant's view in the first edition of the *Critique*, that understanding and intuition are but two stems growing from out of a common root. Given the direction of the two preceding sections of exegesis, Heidegger's thesis here is not surprising. To establish it however, he had to show that intuition and understanding were but different aspects of the Transcendental Imagination.

Stated in a nutshell, Heidegger's view that intuition is but an aspect of the Imagination can be seen as follows. If in pure intuition

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20 *op.cit.* p.242  
21 *Critique* A158 B197 p.114  
22 *op.cit.* p.133
"...there is indeed something intuited...in such a way that it is given only in and through the corresponding act of intuition itself", and that if such intuition is a productive springing forth of a whole that gives itself in its parts,\textsuperscript{23} then such a faculty could only be the Transcendental Imagination as the productive and unifying faculty of transcendence.

To be able to account for the Understanding as being an aspect of the Transcendental Imagination would seem less than likely if one conceived of their nature as too dissimilar. However Heidegger avoided any tendency to dichotomise the two 'faculties' by insisting that as shown in the Deduction and Schematism, they are not essentially separate, but linked in a synthetic unity that "forms" transcendence. It is therefore in the nature of understanding to be reliant on intuition, and vice versa, for it is only in the interrelation of the two that they are what they are, even when, for reasons of analysis, they are individually considered. Furthermore, if the Understanding is what it is only as a relation in the synthetic unity that constitutes transcendence, then it is in this unity, Heidegger suggests, that its essence is to be sought – rather than in logic, as Kant can be seen to interpret it in the second edition of the Critique. Thus Kant's conception of the Understanding as a faculty of rules, is accepted by Heidegger, but only insofar as such an ascription led Kant to the recognition of the necessity of pure apperception as the a priori unity of the rules necessary for their use as rules of proposed unification. Heidegger therefore put prime emphasis not on the logic of judgment, but on the role of the Transcendental Ego as providing the clue to the nature of pure self apperception as the "I" that accompanies every "I think"; the Being of the self as a self-constituted unity. Such self-consciousness is not yet judgment, but the projection of a unifying unity of the rules of affinity by pure apperception; it is therefore inclusive of the schematism of the rules (categories), and as such involves the Transcendental Imagination. The identity of the Imagination and the Understanding can be seen when the spontaneous

\textsuperscript{23}Kant Buch p.51 also 148-152
(and therefore imaginative) nature of the rules is recognized and interpreted as but the product of the Understanding determining its very structure.

The Understanding can therefore be seen as productive, and so necessarily an aspect of the Imagination. What remains to be shown before this identification is complete, is how the understanding can be interpreted as in any way receptive. Heidegger's answer is unequivocal:24

The rules which are represented in the understanding, taken as the faculty of rules, but are not apprehended as actually given "in consciousness", but as rules of connection (synthesis) which compel as they connect. If a rule exercises its function only in the receptive act which lets it rule, then the "idea" as the representation of rules can represent itself only in the mode of receptivity.)

In this sense, pure thought is in itself - not merely accessorially - pure intuition.

Heidegger's conclusion here appears unquestionable. He has thus been able to indicate a way of seeing how both intuition and understanding are as both creative and receptive, but different aspects of the Transcendental Imagination. Of course his inquiry into the basis of the Kantian problematic does not end here, for he was obviously not interested in straight exegesis, but in a reappropriation and so a relaying of the basis of that problematic. He furthered this interest in section thirty of the Kant Buch. There he shows the Transcendental Imagination to be the basis of not simply intuition and understanding and therefore as formative of pure (theoretical) reason, but also of practical reason. As in his effort to show the Transcendental Imagination to be the basis of theoretical reason, here in respect to practical reason, he sought to show that considered apriori, it was as both receptive and formative, similarly rooted in the Transcendental Imagination. Whilst his analysis to this end is brief, it is nonetheless momentous, for it points to the dissolution of Kant's problem of how a temporal and an a-temporal moral self are related. In effect in this section thirty Heidegger points to a way of unifying

24 Kant Buch p.161
practical and theoretical reason by identifying the Transcendental Imagination as the common basis that not only unifies, but also in a limited way creates, both theoretical and practical reason.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant sought to show respect for the moral law as that which constitutes the a priori possibility of a moral act. Heidegger interprets this task as an effort to show that the law is not what it is because we have a feeling of respect for it but conversely: this feeling of respect for the law and, hence, the way in which the law is made manifest through it, determines the manner in which the law is as such capable of affecting us.

Heidegger's point in this and related passages is that respect for the moral law as determining the way the law affects one, necessarily presupposes the law as such, and yet in allowing the law to be operative only through respect, the individual in effect submits to its strictures. For this to occur Heidegger points out, it is necessary that one become aware of oneself as an acting self free from self-conceit and self-love: respect as the way the law affects one, is as self-respect for oneself as a person (in contrast to a thing). In this sense, by having respect for the law, one essentially submits to one's self, and in so doing, raises oneself to oneself "as a free being capable of self-determination." It is this acceptance of self-determination, one affected apriori, as an expression of one's freedom as the inability to despise oneself, which Heidegger interprets as the essence of the self, and so of practical reason. As a self-submission to one's own nature, respect is Heidegger suggests, receptive; whilst such submission is also a self-imposition (of the law), it is also a creative spontaneity. Heidegger therefore suggests that practical reason as a respect for the law that arises out of both a spontaneity and receptivity of the self, is rooted in the

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25 Critique of Practical Reason and other Writings in Moral Philosophy by L.W. Beck (University Of Chicago Press Chicago 1959)
26 *Kant* Buch p.161
27 *Kant* Buch p.165
28 Ibid
Whilst it is not our task here to investigate the status of Heidegger's interpretation of practical reason, it must be noted how very brief and cursory Heidegger's examination here of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is. Given the importance of his interpretation this dearth of material is to be protested. Such protest must be voiced in view of the fact that Heidegger's own critique of Kant did not stop at showing the Transcendental Imagination to be the root basis for intuitive understanding and moral action, but went on to show the essential nature of the Imagination as time.

To show that time as the essence of the Transcendental Imagination is the heart of theoretical reason, he took as his clue, Kant's remarks on the nature of the imagination just prior to launching into the Transcendental Deduction. There Kant set out to show the necessity of the synthetic character of the imagination in all three aspects of finite knowledge: In the Synthesis of apprehension in Intuition, of Reproduction in the Imagination, and of Recognition in concepts. Whereas Kant was concerned with each of these functions of synthesis as they occurred empirically, Heidegger pointed to this concern as preliminary to the clarification of the synthetic function that a priori constitutes transcendence. In his analysis of each of these functions, Heidegger remained concerned to show that each in its turn constituted one aspect of time - of the present, the past and the future. His concern here was not with the temporal order but the nature of each synthesis as being essentially temporal.

In working through the first of Kant's "Preliminary Remarks" entitled the "Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition", Heidegger noted that:

> Empirical intuition as the immediate reception of a "this-here" (dies-da) always reveals something of a manifold.

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29 Ibid p.166  
30 Ibid p.184  
31 Ibid p.184-5
Therefore the aspect obtained by this intuition "contains" a manifold. This manifold can be "represented" as a manifold only insofar as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression on another. In distinguishing time, the mind must constantly and in advance say "now and now and now" in order to be able to encounter "now this" and "now that" and "now this all at once". Only by distinguishing the nows in this way is it possible to "run through" the impressions and hold them together."

We can see then that empirical intuition as the apprehension of a "this" in a moment of time as a "this-now", is directly dependent on pure intuition as the form of time. Pure intuition as this form of time is therefore that which in forming the "now" sequence in the synthesis of apprehension, underlies apprehension as its (creative) possibility. As a receiving of what it allows to come forward or to present itself in the moment of time, apprehension is as intuition, receptive. Considered purely apriori rather than empirically, the synthesis of apprehension can therefore be seen to be productive apprehension of the "now" sequence, and so formative of the present in general, as the "field" in which all possible objects of intuition are apprehended. Whereas Kant saw that the imagination was the faculty that produced the synthesis of any empirical manifold, Heidegger went further than he in identifying the apriori synthesis of apprehension as the Transcendental Imagination. In this way Heidegger identified the "present in general" as the work of the Transcendental Imagination.32

Heidegger analysed Kant's second section, "The synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination" in a way similar to his above analysis of the synthesis of apprehension. His central concern was to show that since empirical intuition takes place in time, there must be a power of the mind that allows the retention of any "now" along with other "nows". This retention must occur so that with the addition of each moment of time as the succession of "nows" grows, the preceding "now" is not lost. For this to happen, what is required is that the moment which was considered as "the no-longer-now" as such must, in advance and before all experience, be capable of being brought back to the

32 Ibid p.185
Given that the retention of any actual moment arises through the synthesis of reproduction in the empirical imagination, then according to Kant's own problematic, there must be a similar such synthesis in the Pure Imagination. The nature of such a synthesis would not lie in the reproduction of past moments as such, but in providing the ontological possibility of such a reproduction by the empirical imagination. Heidegger's conclusion regarding the nature of the pure imagination considered from this perspective, is that in the mode of reproduction it is as time forming, not because it literally reproduces images, but because it "discloses the horizon of a possible looking-back-to" in which images can be re-presented. As an act of synthesis, this formation of the horizon of the "no-longer-now" is united to the "now" of "the present in general", by being apprehended in the present "now" as the "no-longer-now" - or differently stated, in every present there is also given a glance back to the no longer present. Considered purely a priori, the synthesis of reproduction can therefore be seen to be an aspect of the Transcendental Imagination. Furthermore, the nature of the Transcendental Imagination is emerging as time itself - thus far as formative of both the past and the present as dimensions of time in which objects are known.

Heidegger's analysis of "The Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts" as Kant's third and last section of his "Preliminary Remarks", is his final coup over Kant's formalism. His point is as follows: if the synthesis of apprehension intuits an object now in the present, and if in the synthesis of reproduction an object is represented in its continuity between the past "now" and the present "now-moment", then these syntheses are possible only given the identity of the object through time. The faculty which gives such identity can only be the Understanding as that which proposes the unity of the object as a synthesis in concepts. As the synthesis which originally gives unity to intuition and reproduction such that what is intuited and reproduced

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33 Ibid p.186
34 Ibid p.187
is the synthesis of an object, the Understanding must precede them, in an ontological rather than temporal sense, as the synthesis of identification.

Considered apriori, the synthesis given in Understanding is not concerned with an actual object which it can give as a unity, but with the possibility of the presentation of an object in general. As such this synthesis can be thought of as one that runs ahead of all empirical understanding, defining the field within which the understanding of actual objects may occur. (This "running ahead of" is therefore to be thought of in an ontological rather than temporal sense.) Heidegger captured this ontological nature by characterizing it as a "prospecting" of the way any possible object may be thought. This characterization neatly points out his central concern, for as the prospecting of a possible object the understanding can be seen to be intimately tied up with temporality. As "possibility" refers to an openness to what the future 'holds in store', this relation can be seen to be one that involved essentially with the nature of the future tense or sense of time. Heidegger neatly pinpointed this relation as follows;\textsuperscript{35}

As pure, its prospecting is the pure formation of that which makes all projection (vorhaften) possible, that is, the future. Thus the third mode of synthesis also proves to be essentially time forming. And in as much as Kant attributes the modes of forming, reproducing, and preforming... images to the empirical imagination, the act of forming the prospective horizon as such, pure pre-formation, is an act of pure imagination.

With this result Heidegger has shown that when considered a priori, all three synthesis can be interpreted to be the work of the Transcendental Imagination understood as primordial time. With this conclusion we are of course well down the road to his thought in \textit{Being and Time}. In retrospect it can be seen that he has in effect succeeded in showing that intuition, understanding and practical reason are not separate faculties, but aspects of the activity of the Transcendental Imagination - which he has shown in turn to be the origin of time.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid p.191
Considered as such, time is the essence of the original unity which "proposes" the unity of all possible objects of finite knowledge. The Transcendental Ego as that which accompanies every "I think" as the projection of this unifying unity is as such, primordial time temporalizing (emerging) as the self-affectation of the self. Out of this self-affectation time arises as the apriori unity that holds the present moment in union with the horizon of a possible "looking back to" the past, and a looking forward as the projection of a future horizon. The question that arises now is that having shown time to be the original ground and hence possibility of moral, empirical and apriori knowledge, Heidegger's spade has struck rock bottom and turned, but with what implications?

It is clear that Heidegger's sustained analysis has overthrown the Kantian problematic. In particular he undermined Kant's presupposition of the primacy of logic in the laying of the foundations of Metaphysics. (For Kant logic was Traditional Aristotelian Logic, but this can be widened in the contemporary context to all logic.) That which has taken its place is the Transcendental Imagination understood as the temporalizing of time, in this case, as that of the understanding of the future. But what is the result of this subversion here? As we have seen, in his interpretation of the Critique, Heidegger did not concern himself with the problem of the formal validity of Kant's Deduction per se. This lack of concern here is in direct contrast to the approach of contemporary literature on Kant's Transcendental Deduction. To understand Heidegger's apparent diffidence to this question, let us reflect on the implications of his temporalization of Kant's problematic.

If it is the case, and Heidegger is convincing, that the Transcendental Imagination interpreted as time, is the original basis of ontological knowledge, what effect does this have on the conception of intuition and thought? Clearly these conceptions become problematic, for not only would no absolute distinction such as talk of "faculties" would seem to indicate, remain possible, but time as temporality will be determinative of whatever way thought and intuition are subsequently conceived. When considered a priori, the nett result
of this temporalization was seen in Heidegger's conception of the self as a self-affection. This self-affection was interpreted as the temporalization of the horizons of time yielding the field in which objects could be encountered. In his book *Heidegger and Kant and Time*, Charles Sherover describes this self-affection in the following way:

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Time-projecting, as the formation of a temporal field, is ... an enabling act for the knower to be affected by the cognitive experience of what is to be found within that field. As instrumental to that possibility, it is an act by the knower-subject to be affected, to have a new experience. Insofar as this act is requisite to that possibility of being-affected and is undertaken for this (even preconceptually understood) end-in-view, it is the essential enabling act whereby the knower affects himself by virtue of the experience whose possibility he has thereby created.

From within the context of the *Critique* as Kant intended it, this conception of the self may at first seem less radical than it really is. Indeed to consider it as a mere modification of Kant's conception of the self, is surely to miscomprehend this radicality. Heidegger must be seen to have subverted the Kantian problematic, not simply altered it cosmetically. He has interpreted the transcendental subject as in essence temporality itself. The question to be asked is, what does this do to the conception of the categories which Kant saw to constitute the understanding? Are they not now rendered historically relative as ways in which the self has come to understand itself through its encounters with actual objects and other persons in time? Whilst leaving the exact nature of this relativity in undefined terms, I think that this conclusion is inevitable. For the fact that the historicization of understanding is one outcome of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's work, is whilst not expressed in detail, nonetheless undeniable. This fact alone would seem good reason for Heidegger to have interpreted the Transcendental Deduction not as the validation of a conceptual scheme, but purely as an attempt to show the possibility of the unity of the elements of finite knowledge.

36 Published by (Indiana Press Bloomington 1971) This ref: p. 205
By interpreting the Critique in this way, the question of the validity of the logical form of the Transcendental Deduction and so the status of the conceptual schemes generally was not a problem Heidegger had to face. In fact the outcome of his interpretation precluded his having to deal with this problem within the strictures of Kant's own formulation of human knowledge, for he effectively undermined this account. By so doing Heidegger in effect shifted the focus away from the apriori possibility of knowledge of objects encountered at hand, to the ontological possibility of any knowledge whatsoever, a project he was to pursue in Being and Time.

It is crucial to Heidegger's work that his conclusion about the nature of finite knowledge are not seen as cosmetic dress to Kant's work. For even if Kant did not deliberately pull back from developing the full account of the Transcendental Imagination in the subjective deduction of Edition A of the Critique as Heidegger claimed, it is undeniable that he was clearly convinced that he had in his possession, the categories of thought that constitute the a-temporal structure of the understanding. If this is accepted, and if Kant is seen as concerned to legitimate these categories as being necessary to all finite knowledge, then there arises a whole mass of problems to which the contemporary literature on Transcendental arguments is witness. Questions for instance, about how transcendental deductions work, are they a new and valid form of argument, how they are related to the verification principle and so on. All these problems are very real if Kant is interpreted as formulating an epistemology which will guarantee objectivity to thought whilst avoiding both Idealism and Materialism. 37 These questions would seem to indicate that there is a problem with the notion of a transcendental deduction if it is seen in this way, that is, as an attempt to logically validate one particular set of categories or conceptual scheme to the exclusion of any other.

Heidegger however, did not, nor indeed did he have to, raise and answer the questions exercising contemporary authors in respect of the nature of Kant's Transcendental Deduction. For in following through

37 Critique B 420 p.376
the implications of the subjective deduction to their conclusion, he
in effect undermined Kant's schema-intuition distinction, and in so
doing historicized and so dramatically altered the original problematic
from the way Kant had worked it out. This critique as one that in
effect undermined Kant's own problematic points the reader not back
to Kant, but forward to *Being and Time* which he referred to in his *Kant
Buch* as a work of Fundamental Ontology, that is, as an ontology that
lays the basis for all other lesser regional ontologies. From Heidegger's
point of view, Kant's *Critique* is one attempt to work out one such
regional ontology - that of "the Being called Nature". The distinc-
tion between the two works does not however rest exclusively on the
greater generality of a fundamental as compared to regional ontology.
A greater difference lies in Heidegger's taking the historicality of
thought as basic, in effect giving it an ontological footage. Kant's
work on the other hand is one that whilst marked by the historicity
of thought, in for instance his use of Newtonian science as the paradigm
of all theoretical knowledge, fails to recognize this historicity for
what it is. It must be seen therefore that Heidegger has truly over-
turned Kant's philosophy. Given that this is so, in what way can
Heidegger's method in *Being and Time* be considered as Transcendental?

Clearly any consideration of Heidegger's method in the light of
his work in the *Kant Bach*, must henceforth keep in mind that the result
of his critique there lies in his historicization of the Transcendental
Ego, and therefore of knowledge itself. Not forgetting this as our
point of focus, let us consider what both Kant and Heidegger saw as
characteristic of a Transcendental inquiry. In the *Critique of Pure
Reason* Kant gave the following account of what he meant by the term
"transcendental" in the context of his own inquiry:

> I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied
not so much with objects, as with the mode of our knowledge
of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is possible
apriori.

Earlier in this chapter we saw that Kant developed this concern

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38 *Being and Time* H10-11 p.31
39 *Critique* A 12 p.59
with transcendental knowledge into a project that sought to answer the problem of scepticism by demonstrating the legitimacy, and therefore the right to what he took to be the categories of pure thought. This concern was one we saw to be reflected in his characterization of his transcendental deduction as a "quaestio juris." The way Kant was to develop this concern is aptly captured in the following quote the Transcendental Deduction: 40

The apriori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. Now I maintain that the categories... are nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience, just as space and time are the conditions of intuition for that same experience. They are fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for experiences, and have therefore apriori objective validity.

As we have seen Heidegger's estimate of this project is one that clearly recognised a circularity of reasoning in Kant's method here. Writing of Kant's proof of the principles and postulates of reason, Heidegger explicitly recognized that these proofs are, and indeed can only be given as circular: 41

The principles are to be proved as those propositions which establish the possibility of an experience of objects. How are these propositions proven? It is done by showing that these propositions themselves are possible only on the ground of the unity of the agreement of the pure conceptions of the understanding with the forms of intuition, with space and time. The unity of thought and intuition is itself the essence of experience. The proof consists in showing that the principles of pure understanding are possible through that which they themselves make possible, through the nature of experience. This is an obvious circle, and indeed a necessary one.

One contemporary writer whose estimate of the nature of Kant's transcendental project would seem to be in agreement with Heidegger's view here is that of Rudiger Bubner. The central thesis of his article "Kant, Transcendental Arguments..." in which he develops this view is

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40 Ibid A 111 p.138
41 What is a Thing? p.241-242
According to Kant, only that knowledge is transcendental in which knowledge is thematised according to its specific possibilities. If this is true, then that knowledge which is called transcendental, takes as its object, together with the general conditions of knowledge, the conditions of its own genesis and functioning. Self referentiality characterizes the transcendental argument.

Here the circularity that Heidegger notes to be characteristic of Kant's proofs, would seem to be aptly captured as being "self-referential". Before we can claim that the two views are in essential agreement here, we must however explore Bubner's position in more detail.

As a participant in the contemporary debate about the nature of transcendental arguments, Bubner is concerned with the way such an argument can be considered as a way of legitimating our form of knowledge. If, as he claims however, all transcendental arguments are marked by self-referentiality in the sense of the above quote, then the question arises as to how such legitimation is possible. As Bubner points out, to endeavour to establish the legitimacy of one form of knowledge, or indeed one might add, one conceptual scheme, by comparison with another, is doomed to failure. For if an alternative is presented, such as Kant endeavoured to do via his conception of an intellectus archetypus, then the very fact of its presentation as an alternative, compromises the supposed different form of such knowledge. This compromise can be seen in that any attempt to conceive of any one form of knowledge or even conceptual scheme supposedly radically different from one's own, will necessitate the use of one's own form of knowledge or schema in the effort to conceive of the other.

Yet Bubner insists that all is not lost, for even though an alternative cannot be logically demonstrated as conceivable, this need not leave the philosopher stranded with the mere contingent factual demonstration of the way understanding works; there remains the

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42 Kant, Transcendental Arguments And The Problem of Deduction in Review of Metaphysics Vol. 28 1974-75 pp. 453-467. This ref: p. 462
The self-referentiality of transcendental arguments.\textsuperscript{43}

If it becomes apparent that even reasoning about factual forms of knowledge and the clarification of their preconditions is not possible without making use of certain elements of that form, then it is not a merely factual state of affairs which is demonstrated. Rather, it is a logical structure that shows the validity of the form of knowledge in question...The transcendental argumentation recognizes something about the understanding in general... .

Following through the consequences of this line of interpretation, Bubner sees Kant's concern in the Transcendental Deduction to be one of "pursuing the complex program of self-referential reasoning on a meta-level between factual knowledge and pure principles of reason."\textsuperscript{44} Given this Bubner then concludes that the expectation that a transcendental deduction derives its compulsion from a strict "logically compelling deduction is groundless."\textsuperscript{45}

Bubner's account of transcendental argumentation thus far would seem to be in full agreement with Heidegger's account of the necessary circularity he finds in Kant's \textit{Critique}. Furthermore it would seem to reflect Heidegger's characterization of his own hermeneutic methodology as he outlined it in \textit{Being and Time}. Earlier in this chapter this method was characterized as the making explicit that which is already, though only implicitly, given. In reference to Heidegger's concern in \textit{Being and Time} this method takes on the form of rendering into conceptual clarity that understanding of Being which is disclosed in human existence. As Heidegger himself was to note, his concern here if put in Kantian language, was "to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject."\textsuperscript{46} In the present context it must be noted that as a fundamental ontology as distinct from a regional ontology, this project would lead him to give an account of the possibility of any understanding whatsoever to be constituted by Dasein's openness to Being: or differently stated, Heidegger's account

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid p.464-465
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Being and Time} H24 p.45
of Dasein's understanding of Being is in effect an attempt to exhibit the intelligibility of whatever is. As such his inquiry into the "subjectivity of the subject" would lead him to a consideration of the nature of understanding in general. With this point in mind, and reflecting back over Heidegger's critique of Kant, it would seem that both he and Bubner would agree that not only are transcendental arguments circular, and so not strictly a logical deduction, but also that such arguments are concerned with the structure of understanding in general.

There remains however at least one implication in Heidegger's conception of transcendental philosophy that is absent from Bubner's account, and that is the historicity of human understanding. With this point in mind let us consider how Heidegger conceived his own work in *Being and Time* to be transcendental. From our analysis of Heidegger's critique of Kant, we have seen that he saw the necessity to undertake a fundamental ontological investigation that would lay the foundations of all regional, and therefore lesser ontologies. This necessity arose from out of his having widened the problem of metaphysics beyond the question of the constitution of either practical or theoretical reason as Kant conceived them to be, to the problem within the strictures of Kant's own formulation of the constitution of the understanding of any entity that is insofar as it is (has Being). As the following quote shows, it is this concern with Being that Heidegger took to mark the transcendental character of his investigation.47

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every unity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is transcends pure and simple.... Every disclosure of Being as the transcends is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosure of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.

This quote is of particular interest here, insofar as it points to transcendental knowledge as being one and the same with

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47 Ibid H38 p.62
phenomenological truth. It is interesting to note that the radical difference between Kant and Heidegger notwithstanding, this conception of transcendental truth would seem to closely reflect Kant's view which he outlined in regard to the unity of apperception as follows:

All our knowledge falls within the bounds of possible experience, and just in this universal relation to all possible experience consists that transcendental truth which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible.

And yet again though in a different context Kant wrote the following regarding pure concepts:

Only through the fact that these concepts express a priori the relations of perceptions in every experience, do we know their objective reality, that is, their transcendental truth, and this indeed, independently of all relation to the form of an experience in general, and to the synthetic unity in which alone objects are empirically known.

Here in these quotes we can see that the unity of self apperception interpreted (elsewhere) as the unity of the categories as rules of synthesis, constitute in themselves a unity the knowledge of which Kant called "transcendental truth". What then is the difference between Kant's conception of transcendental truth and that of Heidegger?

Kant's view of truth might seem at first sight to be the same as Heidegger's. But by now we should be wary about hasty judgment. To begin with then, let us note the apparent similarity between the two conceptions as stated. Kant's project yielded, as he sought, insight into the structure of the Transcendental Ego revealing the ontological possibility of empirical knowledge. His concern with transcendental structures here would seem to be reflected in Heidegger's project in *Being and Time*, but it must be remembered how differently the project is conceived there. Heidegger as we have seen, is not primarily concerned with the being of entities as this is traditionally thought, for he drew a distinction between the being of entities and Being itself. The latter is his primary concern. This distinction not
withstanding however, it must be noted that he pursued this concern in a way which is very Kantian; by an analysis of the "subjectivity of the subject". Wherein then does Heidegger's difference from Kant lie?

We know that there are at least two major differences between Kant's problematic and that of Heidegger. Firstly, as shown in the analysis of his Kant Buch, Heidegger undermined the Kantian problematic in revealing time as essentially the Transcendental Imagination, to be the origin of not only intuition and understanding, but also of practical reason. In so doing he pointed towards a different and more encompassing foundation for ontology, one which was in fact worked out in Being and Time. The result of this reappropriation of Kant's work can be seen in the following quote, where Heidegger is formulating the nature of the structures of Dasein's being which he contrasts to a thing as positively being no-thing at all. This conception of Dasein is reflected in definition of the existentiale and existentiell structuring of human existence, a structuring he contrasts with the categorical structure of things. He describes these two concepts as follows:

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself ... The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call "existentiell". The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'. This does not require that the ontological structures of existence should be theoretically transparent. The context of such structures we call "existentiality". Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather existential.

Here in the distinction between existentiale and existentiell understanding, the specifically historical nature of Heidegger's conception of Dasein begins to emerge. It is just such an interpretation of human nature that Kant's distinction between intuition and understanding, and the a-temporal self free from causation, sought to avoid.

50 In the light of the previous chapter, I interpret "Dasein" as the historicized Transcendental Ego
51 Being and Time H56-57 p.82-83
52 Being and Time H12 p.33
The second major difference between Kant and Heidegger lies in Heidegger's conception of the essential relation he saw to hold between truth and untruth. This relation is one we have seen to be reflected in his phenomenological program as the relation between Being as seen in itself, and Being as semblance. (It will also be recalled that the latter, semblance, was seen as always possible only on the basis of the former, that is on Being as truth.) We must conclude therefore that if as transcendentaly constituted, Dasein's being is in both truth and untruth, then any knowledge of Dasein's being will be one that reflects this polarity of its being. Such a reflection can be seen in two ways, both of which rest on Dasein's historicality/temporality.

Both of the ways in which truth and untruth are inextricably intertwined in the existence of Dasein can be seen from a consideration of the nett result of its finitude: for as finite Dasein can never attain to an absolute knowledge in the sense of an a-temporal final knowledge of either itself, its world, or entities in the world. The most it can attain is a historically conditioned knowledge. The nature of this "historical conditioning" can be seen to be concomitant with Heidegger's temporalizing of the Transcendental Ego. This temporalizing effectively underlies the historicity of all of Dasein's knowledge about entities in the world as well as knowledge of its own being, for it effectively renders all understanding as 'circular'. In regard to knowledge of being, that is, to transcendental knowledge, we have seen Bubner's characterization of this circularity as one of the self-referentiality of understanding in general.

Whilst Bubner's characterization of transcendental arguments and knowledge has the merit of going beyond the usual interpretation of Kant's transcendental method, for our purposes even his interpretation does not go far enough. The shortcoming in his account can be seen when it is noted that nowhere in his account does he allude to what is for us, the main focus of Heidegger's problematic - the historicity of thought. Whilst his characterization of transcendental arguments is one that recognizes the necessity for such arguments to consider the nature of understanding in general, an account which would appear to signal his agreement with Heidegger's call to develop a fundamental
ontology, the lack of any allusion to the historicity of thought in his article, is I think ominous, for it is historicity that lies at the basis of Heidegger's method being a phenomenological hermeneutic rather than transcendental in the traditional Kantian sense. Given Bubner's silence on this point, I believe that any tendency to conflate Bubner's view of what constitutes a transcendental argument to Heidegger's hermeneutic as has been suggested to me, is over hasty. All that can be concluded from the article is that his view of a transcendental argument lies somewhere between the usual interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction and Heidegger's hermeneutic in *Being and Time*.

The fundamentally historical nature of Heidegger's hermeneutic can be seen captured in the following line of reasoning. Taking his characterization of Dasein as a being that is both in truth and untruth, and given that Dasein is its existence, the untruth and truth of its being will therefore be the untruth and truth of its existing. Transcendental knowledge of Dasein's Being turns out then to be a knowledge not distinct from existing Dasein's understanding of its own existence. The truth and untruth of Dasein's Being, that is Transcendental knowledge, is therefore only given in and through the existing of Dasein.

It may seem that even this characterization of transcendental knowledge would be acceptable to Bubner, for it does not deny the possibility of self-referential reflection that could reveal the conditions for the possibility of understanding in general. And indeed it could not if Heidegger's project was to be a success. Where this account does proceed beyond Bubner's characterization is not in the denial of the possibility of insight into the conditions for the possibility of understanding, but in the account of what these conditions are, and hence of the nature of the self-referentiality of transcendental knowledge. For whilst on Bubner's account, the possibility of an insight into the transcendental structure of understanding is seen to rest on circularity in transcendental reflection, the effect of this circularity on the nature of the truth of understanding does not enter into his account. It is this failure to reflect or even allude to the result of his interpretation of
Transcendental arguments on the traditional conception of truth, that raises the suspicion that he does not challenge the received conception of such truth as a-historic. In Heidegger's work however, the temporalization of Kant's problematic leads to a view of truth that is central to his phenomenological hermeneutic of Dasein as a historical Being.

As we have seen, Heidegger defined his phenomenological hermeneutic as a method that sought to uncover the purity of Dasein's Being as it is given hidden in the semblance of everyday existence. The axis of this definition turns on the nature of a phenomenon defined as that which shows itself either as it is, that is in truth, or as it is not, that is in untruth. The task of this hermeneutic as a phenomenology was in accord with the notion of "logos" as discourse, seen to be, to give an explication of the phenomenon of Dasein's Being. Considered purely in terms of "phenomenon" and "logos" as Heidegger defined them, the problematic that is yielded does not necessarily point to the historicality of the analysis as a whole. But taken in the broader context of Heidegger's preliminary conception of Dasein's Being as in essence historical, there can be no doubt that the entire problematic is historicized in the way we have seen from our analysis of Heidegger's critique of Kant.

The consequences of this historicization of the problematic are far reaching indeed. For what is affected is not only the way phenomena under investigation are conceived to be such as to exist in history. It also affects the way the phenomenon is conceived either to show or to conceal itself, not only in its existence, but also reflexively. This reflexivity is given not only from out of the way the historicality of understanding reacts back upon the understanding itself, but also in the way the phenomenon either reveals or conceals itself from the pen of the philosopher.

These two consequences point to the two ways in which Dasein's finitude leads to the historical conditioning of any transcendental knowledge it acquires. Firstly, Dasein's insight into its own existence is dependent not simply on its own will to know what is, but also on
whether it has access to what is as it shows itself. In this way Heidegger's conceptualization of Dasein as historical in the sense of never being able to attain an a-historic point of view, renders Dasein in an admittedly obscure way, dependent on the way that which is shows or conceals itself from Dasein as it encounters what is in and through its temporal existence. In bold terms the implication here is that all Transcendental knowledge Being and Time included, is dependent on the revealing or concealing of Being itself - on the uncovering or covering over of Being itself. This implication can be seen to issue out of the mutual relation of "aletheia" and "phenomenon" as Heidegger defined them.\(^5\) In yet a further twist to Dasein's finitude here, it has to be recognized that if Being reveals itself in history, then in different 'historical revelations' Being may well reveal different aspects of itself. Given this limitation on the way Being shows itself to Dasein, there can be no guarantee that any one account of Being will be the final one. Being may reveal itself differently in a subsequent self-showing or self-concealment. This implication will come to light most forcefully in the context of Heidegger's later work.

The second implication of Heidegger's historicization of Dasein as it is reflected in transcendental knowledge being rendered historically conditioned, arises from the account of the historicity of the individual Dasein's understanding. This conditioning is such that all understanding is limited to where the individual stands in relation to his or her more encompassing tradition, in which Dasein as historical must participate.\(^5\) Whereas Being shows or withholds itself in all traditions of thought, the way that this showing or withholding is conceptualized will necessarily differ from tradition to tradition. Heidegger can be seen to recognize the effect of this historical conditioning on his own thought when in his Kant Buch he wrote:\(^5\)

\[\ldots\]there is reason to believe that the explication of the

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\(^5\) See page 26 herein.

\(^5\) See Ch.3 p.

\(^5\) op.cit. p.245
essence of finitude required for the establishment of metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never absolute. It follows that this reflection on finitude, which is always to be renewed, cannot succeed by exchanging and adjusting various points of view in order finally and in spite of everything, to give us an absolute knowledge which is surreptitiously posited as being "true in itself". It remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic of finitude as such. Finitude becomes manifest to us in its intrinsic essence if we approach it in the light of the fundamental question of metaphysics as primordially conceived, A METHOD OF APPROACH WHICH, TO BE SURE, CANNOT CLAIM TO BE THE ONLY ONE.

Given that Heidegger set out to formulate a fundamental ontology in Being and Time, his point here that his work is not the only possible approach may seem over generous. It must however be taken at face value, for it is a view that arises out of the result of his own work. In concluding this chapter, let us note that whilst it is not clear whether either of these two consequences that flow from Heidegger's work would be acceptable to Bubner, they are results that flow from his analysis of Kant's Critique. As such they capture the view of the essential historicity of thought pointed to in the Kant Buch and underlying the circularity of the transcendental hermeneutic in Being and Time. This account of transcendental knowledge and the nature of truth that underlies it is clearly at odds with the more traditional (Kantian) conception. The effect of rendering truth and so all thought, as essentially historical in this way will be considered in the course of an account of Heidegger's Dasein analysis in the following chapter.
In the course of investigating the nature of the circularity underlying Heidegger's problematic we have seen that Heidegger conceived the Kantian problematic as unsatisfactory. At the centre of the difference between the two philosophical positions is Heidegger's temporalization of Kant's concept of the Transcendental Ego which effectively historicizes all understanding. One consequence of Heidegger's critical reappropriation of Kant's philosophy was seen in his extending the 'reach' of metaphysics as conceived by Kant to what he called a "fundamental ontology". The criticism of Kant's work implicit in Heidegger's stance here, is that the Critique was an ontology limited only to the consideration of entities encountered in the way that Heidegger characterized as present-at-hand. The primary concern in this first part of chapter three, is to see how from the perspective of Being and Time, Kant's limitation of the field of ontology is not simply a matter of having mistakenly conceived the ontological field too narrowly. It is a result buttressed by the traditional (Cartesian) epistemological stance within which the whole problematic was pursued.

Heidegger's Position vis a vis Kant

The traditional Cartesian context out of which Kant worked was one from which he was able to accept and express satisfaction with the traditional conception of truth as a relation of correspondence. Of this acceptance there can be no doubt for he wrote:¹

The question, famed of old ... is the question: What is truth? The nominal definition of truth,

¹Critique A58 p.97
that it is an agreement of knowledge with its object is assumed as granted;

This conception of truth, taken together with the idea of the Copernican revolution as an attempt to show that the objectivity of knowledge does not rest in our knowledge conforming to objects, but vice versa, reinforced the epistemological stance within which Kant worked. This framework is unquestionably one cast into a dualism of subject and object, even given that the original priority of the object over the mind is reversed.

At first glance, Kant's account of knowledge may seem to preclude an account of error. Given that his effort to show how our objective knowledge of things is possible, issued in a study which showed that objects are always understood according to the forms of intuition and understanding, how indeed is the contemplation of error even possible here? It would seem that no matter what is thought and intuited, it must on Kant's account be given according to invariable (because reliable) intuition and rules of understanding. Wherein then lies the possibility of error? His answer here is twofold.

First he indicated that the source of all error in the empirical understanding of objects was to be found in the imagination, that is, in the synthesis of that given in intuition and thought according to the categories. Whilst he did not expand on the nature of such error, it can be seen from his insistence that "no natural force can of itself deviate from its own laws", and that "neither the understanding by itself (uninfluenced by another cause) nor the senses by themselves, would fall into error", that the nature of the error under discussion is restricted only to the likeness of optical illusion. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to say that given the law-like nature of the understanding and the consistency of intuition, the origin and nature of such error can be accounted for.

Error considered only as, for instance, optical illusion, seems a satisfactory conception for those cases of invariable error in

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2Critique of Pure Reason A294 p.297
empirical judgment about objects. But what of other errors often endured by human beings, such as for example, misjudging the speed of an approaching car? Or less prosaically, the failure of philosophers prior to Kant to formulate a 'copernican' answer to the epistemological sceptic? Here there is no illusion in the objects as intuited and thought, rather the misjudgement lies elsewhere. Of such error Kant says nothing, nor is his analysis of understanding suggestive of how such an account might be formulated. His silence here points to a shortcoming in his account, a lacuna in his analysis of understanding - for he cannot account for his own happy success in finding the categories of thought, nor point to the origin of his own philosophical concepts and thus his own conception of the Copernican revolution, except by chance, or as Hegel was later to do, by the cunning of reason. Neither solution would I suggest be acceptable to Kant. His thought thus remains in the peculiar position of offering an account of reason as constituted by a-historic categories, which of themselves, were accessible to him only given the remarkable historical growth of the physics of his day.

The second way in which Kant saw error rise was of course in relation to ontological knowledge in the sense of transcendental (speculative) metaphysics. He saw such metaphysics in contrast to his own as carrying the thinker "beyond the empirical employment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive extension of pure understanding". It was of course his own self appointed task in the "Transcendental Dialectic" to expose such errors, which he saw as... arising from a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason ... one inseparable from human reason, and which even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into momentary aberrations ever and again calling for correction.

In his work in Being and Time Heidegger surpassed not only Kant's conception of truth, but also his conception of error, both transcendental and empirical. He did so through the elaboration of his

3 Ibid B 352 p.298
4 Ibid A 298 p.300, also A642/B 670 p.523
conception of truth as "aletheia". In the course of this chapter we shall see not only how he was able to achieve this coup, but also how in his doing so through the analysis of the transcendental structure of Dasein, he was able to answer the challenge of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

In contrast to Kant, Heidegger completely avoided casting his thought within an epistemological framework. For in taking time as the form of both intuition and understanding, he effectively widened the realm of the Transcendental Subject so that in an ontological sense, it already embraced the entire field in which any entity may appear in its intelligibility. It is the nature and constitution of this widened realm that lies at the basis of Heidegger's hermeneutic methodology; a method which is not only circular but also historical. This historicality rests on Heidegger's complete temporalization of the Transcendental Ego, and hence not only of the realm of pure, but also of practical reason. Thus not only is time, as the Kantian form of inner sense, seen to be both 'inside' and 'outside' the 'subject', but it is also in this wider all-encompassing realm, a moral self. Conceived in this way the Transcendental Subject must be seen to be familiar with both the inner and the outer 'realms'. As such whatever it encounters 'inside' can only be itself, so too, whatever it discovers in the world 'outside' itself will also be encountered from out of an understanding of itself. This point ought not be surprising given Heidegger's characterization of the Transcendental Ego in his Kant Buch as constituted from out of its own self-affection. In view of this characterization his analysis of the constitution of the Transcendental Ego in Being and Time can be expected to reveal the details of the ontological possibility of this circle of transcendental awareness, not merely as a mute awareness, but as self-understanding. This understanding, occurring as it does in the widened realm of both the 'inner' and 'outer' self, will be one from out of which not only oneself, but also entities in the world are encountered and understood.

Even though the analysis of this self-understanding in Being and Time is cast in a non-epistemological mould, it is interesting to note the way the entities are still seen to be both encountered and
understood by a subject in whose light they are comprehended. Here it can be seen that Heidegger remains a Kantian philosopher. In a way similar to Kant, he interpreted the intelligibility of an entity to rest in the way it is encountered and understood by the Transcendental Ego - a way of understanding arising from the ontological constitution of the Transcendental Ego itself. Heidegger conceived of this encounter as the ontological comportment of the Transcendental Ego which in understanding entities, uncovers them, sets them free from their hiddenness. This conception of ontological truth spells out more explicitly what Kant's conception of the principle of synthetic reason implied, restrained as it was within his dualistic epistemological framework.\(^5\) Heidegger expressed the relation between Dasein's self-understanding and its encounter with entities in the world as follows:\(^6\)

But what does it mean to say that...that for which entities within-the-world are proximally freed must have been previously disclosed? To Dasein's Being an understanding of Being belongs. Any understanding has its Being in an act of understanding. If Being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being. The previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed amounts to nothing else than understanding the world - that world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself.

This understanding of the world is not that of an entity, nor the totality of all the things in the world, but of the world as the place wherein Dasein finds itself existing. In Kantian terminology this world is the field of the Transcendental Ego's self-affection as the temporalizing of time. It was Heidegger's task in *Being and Time* to show in detail how Dasein is ontologically constituted so that this self-affection is possible. According to his phenomenological conception, it would need to be an investigation into the Being of Dasein, one seeking to make explicit what is already known though only implicitly. The task which Heidegger set himself here, is one which we have seen him conceive as being a transcendental inquiry that sought

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\(^{5}\) *What is a Thing?* p.241-242

\(^{6}\) *Being and Time* H85-86 p.118
to make explicit that phenomenon which proximally and for the most part, does not show itself at all, but which constitutes the meaning of that which is seen— that is Being.7

His inquiry in Being and Time is therefore one which sought to yield the truth of Dasein's Being as an understanding of Being that is implicitly held by Dasein, but is always covered over in the course of everyday comportment in the world. It is an inquiry that as an investigation into the ontological structure of Dasein's Being, would have to show the inter-relation between the truth, as the uncovering, and untruth as the covering over of its own Being. This Being seen as constitutive of Dasein's transcendence, is in turn interpreted as Dasein's self-understanding of its being in the world.

In the course of this investigation Heidegger was able to show that there are two possible ways in which this self-understanding is interpreted, both ways being a foundation for a different conception of Truth. The first, arising from Dasein's everyday understanding of itself, lies at the root of the traditional correspondence theory, whilst the second, Heidegger's own conception of truth as aletheia, is he insists, rooted in a more fundamental understanding of the world covered over by everyday comportment. Concomitant with this claim that "truth" interpreted as aletheia is more fundamental than as correspondence, is his interest in showing the correspondence theory to be one derived from the more original conception of truth as aletheia.

To succeed in showing the traditional correspondence theory of truth to be derivative he had to show Dasein's Being to be not simply the root, but the structure of truth as aletheia itself. That is, Dasein's Being had to be exhibited as the Being wherein and out of which uncovering occurred. To do so, he had to displace the Kantian ontological framework which, working with the traditional theory of truth, conceived the Transcendental Ego's structure to be the source of the objectivity of objects (considered as present-at-hand). Heidegger's endeavour here was one which he pursued within the widened

7 Ibid H35 p.59
scope of the temporalized and so historicized Transcendental Ego; one
in which he sought to show that entities encountered as present-at-hand
were encountered as such, only from out of an alteration in the way in
which they are encountered first and foremost - that is as
ready-to-hand.

In the context of an investigation into a being, Dasein, whose
Being he conceived as its existence, the broadened scope of Heidegger's
inquiry can be seen reflected in his characterization of Dasein's
understanding of its Being-in-the-world, as one immediately concerned
with the achievement of ends or goals which satisfy the Ego's demand
for self respect. In the context of an investigation into a being, Dasein, whose
Being he conceived as its existence, the broadened scope of Heidegger's
inquiry can be seen reflected in his characterization of Dasein's
understanding of its Being-in-the-world, as one immediately concerned
with the achievement of ends or goals which satisfy the Ego's demand
for self respect. The conclusion attendant with this broader active
conception of Dasein's being, is that when Dasein encounters entities
in the most ontologically original way, it does so with an
understanding of it as something ready-to-hand, that is, as something
that will enable it to achieve a desired end or goal in its existence.
To establish this conception of Dasein's being, would therefore enable
Heidegger to show not only that it is structured so as to enable it to
uncover entities, but also the way in which the conception of truth as
correspondence, taking its stance in regard to objects present-at-hand,
is derived or secondary in respect to truth as aletheia. In section
forty four of Being and Time he briefly sketched out the way in which
he thought such an attempt could be shown as justified. Let us then
look at what he achieved there before passing on to a consideration of
the more detailed analysis which backs up the analysis there.

In the course of a discussion of the way he saw the traditional
interpretation of truth to differ from his own, Heidegger cryptically

8 Kant Buch p. 165
summarized the traditional theory of truth into three theses:

(1) That the locus of truth is assertion, judgment; (2) That the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement of the judgment' with its object; (3) That Aristotle, the father of logic, not only assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of "truth" as 'agreement'.

Taken together these three theses point to the unsolved problem that has both inspired and dogged philosophy for centuries - the constitution of the supposed relation of agreement between subject and thing in the judgment. His own proposed solution to this problem could well be characterized as a Wittgensteinian attempt to show the way out of the fly bottle; for it is an attempt to show the solution to lie in identifying a mistake in the way the entire problematic is set up. In yet a further Wittgensteinian twist, we shall see Heidegger identify this mistake as one arising from out of the seduction of language insofar as it has been interpreted essentially as assertion. Let us examine his proposed solution.

To show a way out of the traditional problematic Heidegger set up an example of a person making an assertion and then confirming it. He then endeavoured to show how it is possible to interpret the assertion and its confirmation as true without recourse to the epistemological problematic embodying the traditional correspondence theory of truth. Let us then look at this example which he sets up as follows: There is first of all a person who with his back to a wall makes a true assertion to the effect that a picture is hanging askew on the wall to which his back is turned. The person then turns around, and confirms his preceding assertion by seeing the picture in fact to be hanging askew, just as he first asserted it to be. Heidegger then asks, "What

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9 op.cit. H214 p.257 it is important to note that this account of the traditional interpretation of truth is not Heidegger's own view of either truth or the traditional interpretation of it, this applies especially to the way Aristotle's work has been taken up in a way that he does not agree with. See for example H269 p.226 where this point is made. Even where Heidegger would seem to be under the influence of this traditional view of truth, as for instance in his account of assertion, this account must be seen in the full context of Being and Time, and so I suggest as an attempted transformation of that view.
is the meaning of affirming such an assertion?"10 The two disclaimers that follow could have been written just as easily by Wittgenstein as by Heidegger:11

Do we, let us say, ascertain some agreement between our knowledge of 'what is known' and the thing on the wall. Yes and no, depending upon whether our interpretation of the expression 'what is known' is phenomenally appropriate. If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but 'merely represents it' to himself, to what is he related? To representations shall we say? Certainly not, if "representation" is here supposed to signify representing as a physical process. Nor is he related to "representations" in the sense of what is thus "represented" if what we have in mind here is a 'picture' of that real thing which is on the wall.

Heidegger is here denying any attempt to view the relation of the assertion to that which the assertion was about, as a relation between the object considered as either a picture in one's mind of the picture of the wall, or as a series of representations in one's mind related to other representations of the actual picture of the wall. He is clearly seeking to avoid any talk of pictures of pictures, or representations of representations here, for he wants to show that, "What one has in mind is the Real picture, and nothing else. "12 What he must demonstrate then is that even with his back turned to the picture, the truth of that person's assertion about the picture, is itself ontologically explicable without recourse to "pictures" or "representations" in the mind. To remain consistent, his account of the nature of the affirmation of the original assertion, will also have to be one without similar recourse to such 'mental phenomenon'. He achieved this purpose by conceiving both the assertion and its confirmation quite literally as ontological comportment:13

Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. And what does one's perceiving of it demonstrate? Nothing else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one's assertion. What comes up for confirmation is that this entity is pointed out by the Being in which the

10 Being and Time H217 p.260
11 Ibid
12 Ibid
13 Ibid H218 p.261
assertion is made - which is Being towards what is put forward in the assertion. In carrying out such a demonstration, the knowing remains related solely to the entity itself. In this entity the confirmation, as it were, gets enacted. The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it in its self sameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being - just as it gets uncovered.

Here Heidegger has spelt out the implications of his own conception of truth as it applies to both assertion and its confirmation. Indeed the relation of the true assertion to its object is here couched in terms directly reflecting his conception of both a phenomenon as that which shows itself from itself, and true logos as talk that uncovers an entity as it is (as it shows itself to be). For what counts as the truth of the assertion here, is not a subject's conception of an object being in agreement with the object itself, nor for that matter what these 'subjective conceptions' may be interpreted to consist of. Rather the truth and so the Being-true of assertion lies in the assertions uncovering an entity as it is. Considered as such, assertion constitutes one way of access for Dasein to entities.

Assertion is of course a way of access to entities only as a mode of Dasein's comportment in the world. Considered transcendentally, that is in its ontological possibility, this mode of access must be seen both to have its place in and so arise from, Dasein's own ontological structure. This structure is one which following our analysis of Heidegger's critique of Kant, we have seen to lie in Dasein's own self-understanding, arising out of the temporal self-affection of the Transcendental Ego. The nature of such self-affection was seen in turn to be the way in which entities are encountered and understood in the historical-empirical world. Let us then explore the nature of this self-understanding/affection in relation to truth in more detail by following through and picking out what are for us, the main conclusions Heidegger drew from his existentiale analysis in Being and Time. To do so we will concentrate on three constant points of focus: (1) The way individual existentiales are self-reflexive, that is have an 'intentional' structure in relation either to Dasein's self or to other entities; (2) and/or the role that each existentiale has to play in Dasein's fully
articulated self in its capacity as a being that exists from out of its own self-understanding, and (3), the way any existential either in itself, or in a unity with others, allows this self understanding to be the basis for either Heidegger's account, or the traditional correspondence theory of truth.

Disclosure and Understanding in States-of-mind

Having seen that Heidegger's critique of Kant led to a collapsing of Kant's distinction between intuition and understanding, we have cleared and prepared the ground for his analysis and characterization of state-of-mind as an 'intuitive understanding', one that cannot be factored out into the two (Kantian-like) components. What exactly a state of mind is, Heidegger does not make clear, except for generally equating them with that which "is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned."¹⁴ This general ascription would seem to indicate that by "state-of-mind" he is not making any effort to distinguish between moods considered as either emotions or affects, passions or simply feelings; For all such states are in colloquial usage, moods, the way one is "tuned into things at the present moment." There is an advantage to the looseness of Heidegger's ascription however, for it allows him to characterize any states-of-mind whatsoever as a mode of Dasein's self-reflexive awareness. This awareness has two aspects. Firstly, not only do moods reveal to Dasein how it is "getting along" in the world, but also and of fundamental importance for Heidegger's analysis, moods reveal to Dasein that it is in the world. Here mood is seen as the way in which Dasein becomes aware of itself as being in the world; an awareness that the self has as existing in a world which matters to it, and so affects it in its being there where it finds itself.

The second aspect is encompassed in the first, for in finding itself in a world that matters to it, Dasein thus encounters entities in the world discovering them in the way they affect it. Such an encounter is of course not one simply confined to Dasein's 'psychic'

¹⁴Ibid H134 p.172
state, but also includes its encounter with entities through its senses, for this sensual encounter rests on Dasein's ontological constitution as an affective being.\footnote{Ibid H137 p.177}

Only because the 'senses' belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of being is Being-in-the-world with a state of mind, can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' something in such a way that they are what touches them shows itself as an affect.

Here mood, like Kantian intuition, is the way in which Dasein encounters entities in the world, itself included. Moods in this sense are a way in which Dasein goes beyond itself into the world in which it once again discovers itself. In this sense moods are a way in which the historicized transcendental ego undergoes self affection.\footnote{Much later in his career in a lecture series he gave on Nietzsche, Heidegger pointed out more explicitly the way in which moods are a way of being outside of oneself. This lecture is of further interest to us here, for in it he spelt out more clearly the way affects, passions and feeling differ as states of mind. In order to see the difference between an affect and a passion, Heidegger pointed to a distinction between anger and hate. The former, as an affect, is a "sudden and turbulent" seizure, which may leave one as quickly as it came. The latter, hate, in contrast to anger, is a passion not an affect because it is something which is cultivated, and so pursued with definite purpose. (Nietzsche Vol. I p.47ff) In contrast to both passion and affect, Heidegger defined "feeling" as the general openness to things in the world of which passion and affect are occurrences: a definition that points to "feeling" being a synonym for the earlier concept of "state of mind". In any event, the state-of-mind of central importance to Being and time, anxiety, must in view of this distinction between a passion and an affect, be seen as an example of the former, as would Kierkegaard's conception of despair.}

It must however, be noted that whereas it is possible to conceive of Kantian intuition as an openness similar to states-of-mind, in contrast to Kant's view, what is encountered in this way does not stand in need of organization according to categories of the understanding. For what is given in a state-of-mind is given with self-reflexive understanding, the 'content' of which is given in the temporalization of practical reason. It is in this way that Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's self-understanding as a potentiality for being can be understood. We can see then that as revealing both the self and other entities, moods are part of Dasein's being as uncovering. That is, moods are partly constitutive of Dasein's being as and in truth.
In both *Being and Time* and in *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger revealed anxiety to be a mood sharply contrasted with every other. The essence of this contrast lay in the way anxiety is a mood in which no entity is taken up into a use, or seen to be involved in an ongoing use context, but one in which all entities recede from such understanding becoming bereft of any meaning.\(^{17}\) Lacking any entities with which to immerse itself in an involvement, the anxious Dasein is therefore faced with its own being as a Being-in-the-world. What is given in anxiety in this way is as such a fundamental self-disclosure of the self.

What is revealed in this self-encounter is the key to what Heidegger saw as the defining nature of human existence in the absence of an eternal, in the event of the death of god: the death of Dasein itself.\(^{18}\) That is, Heidegger interpreted Dasein's anxious self-understanding to be that of its own certainty of its mortality.

In his analysis of this understanding Heidegger distinguishes its certainty from any deduction or conclusion of any sort drawn from actual encounters with instances of others dying. It is a certainty that he sees peculiar to the kind of being from which it arises. Thus for Dasein, there can be no question of the certainty of its death. There is only the question of how to adequately interpret that certainty. Here "certainty" and "uncertainty" refer not to two different ways in which Dasein understands its Being such that it may equivocate about the fact that it dies; rather any equivocation and thus uncertainty lies in how the fact is to be interpreted. Uncertainty as a way of Being in the face of one's mortality can only therefore lie in the avoidance of facing up to death as a certainty by interpreting it as an event that will occur sometime ... but not now. Death seen as a certainty on the other hand, involves the recognition of its being a constant possibility for one's being. Such a certainty cannot be taken away from oneself by another; death, when squarely faced, distills the individual's self-understanding by confronting it

\(^{17}\)Being and Time H186 p.230 "What is Metaphysics?" p.336

\(^{18}\)David Krell makes this point in his Thesis *Nietzsche and The Task of Thinking* p.256 ff
with the ever possible moment of its extinction.\textsuperscript{19}

Considered as such, Dasein's self-certainty of its death as the certainty of the possibility of its not being, involves understanding its being as one that is given as a potentiality for existing: a potentiality not only actually limited but constituted by its anticipation of death.\textsuperscript{20} Heidegger's analysis and conclusion here seems not unreasonable, for a being that is aware of its mortality is clearly one that is aware of not only its eventual death, but also the possibility of its dying at any moment. Such a being is clearly aware of itself in its anticipation of different possible outcomes in regard to its being in the world. By conceiving Dasein's death as the catalyst that quickens its self-understanding precipitating it into a focussed unity, Heidegger was not only able to give its Being a teleology that is entirely "earth bound", but one which also gives it a unity of purpose through the pursuit of potentiality for its existence which preserves its own self-respect.

This understanding of oneself as a potentiality for being, as the way in which Dasein conducts itself in the world, is then, that which is revealed in Dasein's anxious self-encounter with itself. This revelation is of course more than just an introspective glance of little importance. It reveals the way Dasein as a historical Being is open to other entities in the world, understanding them from out of its own concern to achieve those possibilities which are not only given in its situation, but which also accord with the preservation of its self-integrity. Heidegger encapsulates this understanding by calling it not only projective, but like mood, also interpretative, having an intentional structure.

Considered in its most general aspects, and not therefore only in relation to Dasein's self, Heidegger outlined all understanding as having a threefold fore-structure such that every understanding necessarily proceeds according to presuppositions. This fore-structure

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Being and Time} H250-251 p.293-294
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid
is one which includes a fore-having, a fore-conception and a fore-sight. Having seen the self-reflexivity of Dasein's self-understanding in broad outline, let us fill in outstanding essential detail according to this more general structure of understanding. In so doing what will come to attention will not only be the way in which Dasein can understand itself in its truth, but also how it is possible that it can and constantly does fail to do so.

Already in the analysis thus far, in the distinction between Dasein's certainty or uncertainty of its death, there is the makings of such a distinction between two such ways in which Dasein can understand itself. Firstly in a way most fitting to the nature of its ownmost Being, Dasein could understand its death as the outstanding possibility of its extinction. This understanding Heidegger called authentic; an owning of one's ownmost self as it exists in the world. The fore-structure of this understanding can be sketched out as follows: (1) Dasein's fore-having; the certainty of its death, (2) Dasein's fore-conception; the every imminent possibility of this death, (3) Dasein's fore-sight operative here; that it is as a being whose mode of being is non-thingly, or more precisely, one that is as a finite potentiality for its own historical existence.

As we have seen, Heidegger contrasted this authentic self-understanding against Dasein's constant tendency to interpret the certainty of its death in terms of an event that will happen at one time or another, being of no more significance than the ripening of a piece of fruit or the demise of an animal. In this way of understanding the self is seen as a thing which eventually suffers to die. By not allowing Dasein's uniqueness as a mortal being to come to light, such an understanding in effect covers over its ownmost being. As a disowning of its true self, Heidegger called such a self-understanding inauthentic. The fore-structure of this understanding can be broadly characterized in the following manner: (1) Dasein's fore-having; the uncertainty of its death, (2) Dasein's fore-conception; the conception of its death as a one time event, (3)

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21 Ibid H243ff p.278ff
Dasein's fore-sight that its being is no different from anything else, that dies "when its time is up."

This change in the fore-structure of Dasein's self-understanding is of no small moment; as a way in which Dasein understands itself to be in the world, it colours its entire existence. The original possibility of such a mis-understanding arising in the first place can be seen from the nature of Dasein's being as one that is both 'inside' and 'outside' in the world in which it has constant commerce with other entities. For Dasein to understand itself in a thingly manner is the result of it interpreting itself in terms of the things with which it deals. Heidegger insists that Dasein's constant tendency to do this belies an inherent temptation which he encapsulates as Dasein's falling into the world. Where this falling is in full command, where it permeates Dasein's self-understanding so that it mistakes the nature of its own Being, its being inauthentic results: a way of self-awareness Heidegger characterized as the "they".

Whereas Heidegger's descriptive analysis of the "they" as "idle-talk", "curiosity" and "ambiguity"23 would seem to indicate that only in less than serious moments does Dasein fall into the "they". This impression is as superficial as it is misleading, for to begin with these ways of being in the "they" are not exhaustive of Dasein's fallerness. For our purposes the prime example of a fallen but nonetheless serious attempt to understand the world, is none other than the correspondence theory of truth. Let us then pause in our account of Heidegger's Dasein analysis and consider this point in more detail.

It will be recalled that Heidegger cryptically summarized the traditional theory of truth into three theses. What will be of primary concern to us now is the first two of these theses: that the locus of truth is assertion, and that the essence of truth lies in the agreement of the judgment with its object. What underlies these theses about truth is a view not only of language but also of human being

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22 Ibid H166ff p.210ff
23 Ibid
which, from the standpoint of fundamental ontology arise from an inauthentic self-understanding, \textsuperscript{24} i.e. from an understanding which covers over Dasein's being as it is in itself. There are two moves that must be made to show that this is so. First the traditional view of language must be shown to be inadequate. Then in the light of this inadequacy, the attempts to show what the agreement consists of must be clarified and seen to be inadequate from the standpoint of fundamental ontology.

Heidegger's attempt to show the inadequacy of the traditional conception of language embodied in the correspondence theory of truth is a critique undertaken from out of his own conception of language outlined in section thirty four of \textit{Being and Time}. There he defined talk or discourse as the expression in language and so in words, of the intelligibility of something given in mood and understanding - though as he noted, not all discourse involves such utterances. Interpreted in this way, discourse and so through it language also, ranges over Dasein's entire intelligibility. \textsuperscript{25} As such it will include not only the expression of an understanding of entities as in assertion, but also of an understanding given in the whole gamut of linguistic expression - in assenting, refusing, warning, promising, consulting, interceding and so on. One is here tempted to think of Wittgenstein's protest against the traditional view of language embodied in his \textit{Tractatus} as being too narrow, excluding the whole array of less formal expression. \textsuperscript{26} As a way of articulating the understanding disclosure of one's being in the world, assertion does not have an obvious priority. It is only one way in which Dasein articulates and so shares its disclosive understanding with others. Heidegger's point here, is that an expression in the form of a command or an intercession, is no less an articulation of a disclosure of an understanding, and so of an

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid H224 p.267

\textsuperscript{25}This statement stands in need of qualification in respect to the silent <wordless> call of conscience which if it is to be considered as language, must be so only in the broadest sense of an expression of logos in silent discourse.

\textsuperscript{26}See for example his \textit{Philosophical Investigations} (Basil Blackwell Oxford 1978) trans. G.E.M. Anscombe This ref: #23
uncovering of entities and situations in the world than is assertion. Why then, we may ask, is assertion traditionally interpreted as the locus of truth, when there would seem to be nothing exceptional about it as a way of expressing an understanding? Heidegger's answer in which he defines assertion as "a pointing out which gives something a definite character and communicates," allows him to show that as traditionally considered, assertion is ontologically parasitic on a more original understanding of being arising, from out of Dasein's own self-understanding.

As an illustrative example of assertion as a modification of Dasein's circumspective understanding of entities, Heidegger chose as a case in point, the way a hammer may be interpreted differently in assertion, than in using it to make something. Discovered in the first instance as ready-to-hand, that is as a tool, the hammer is encountered in its being used. The operative fore-having here is the understanding of the hammer in its use. Thus in the context of the discovery of the hammer as a tool, anything said of it, is an expression of an interpretation of it that arises directly from the (circumspective) use context. e.g. "this is too heavy - it is useless for me." However should the hammer become an object about which an assertion is made, then the circumspective fore-having is altered from an understanding of something in its use to an understanding of it as a mere present at hand object, about which something is said. With this modification, there is a corresponding change in fore-sight, with the result that in what is communicated, the original pragmatic equipmental context out of which the tool was first discovered is lost. With this loss of the original context, it then becomes possible to interpret the original assertion about the heaviness of the hammer to mean "this thing - a hammer - has the property of heaviness." 28

It is important to note that Heidegger is not saying that assertion is always a mistaken way of interpreting entities as present-at-hand. He is only pointing to its ontologically derivative nature,

27 Ibid H156 p.199
28 Ibid H157 p.200
that it rests on a more original disclosure of entities in the world. Any error here lies not in making assertions, but in the way assertion as a way of expression, has been interpreted ontologically. Spoken in words, an assertion is a way in which a given understanding of an entity as either ready-to or present-at-hand is preserved. As such it is an understanding which may be taken up by others and used again, its veracity taken on authority. Even the anonymous authority of the "they" is not to be disregarded in this context. In this way the assertion itself is taken as ready-to-hand, but in what way is the relation between the entity and the assertion to be thought? Heidegger's answer here is unequivocal; the relation is one of readiness-to-hand. Traditionally however, the relation has been conceived as one between two present-at-hand entities: the assertion as somehow present-at-hand, as word meanings or things on the one hand, and the entity as the object of the assertion on the other. The relation between the two entities is in turn conceived as one that is also present-at-hand — a relation between the representations or pictures of the subject and the object of the assertion.

From the point of view of Fundamental Ontology then, the traditional interpretation of truth is not one that is simply inadequate, it positively errs in failing to have an adequate grasp of the derivative nature of assertion. That this does not preclude correspondence in the sense of correctness from being an adequate account within a lesser ambit, is a point to which we shall return in the context of a discussion of relativism later in this chapter.

In his analysis of the "they", Heidegger made it clear that the error committed in the traditional account of truth, is not one due merely to the seduction of the subject-predicate structure of our language. It arises more generally through Dasein's constant temptation to surrender to the influence of the "they", a temptation in effect to turn away from, and disown one's responsibility for one's being, by understanding it in terms of a mode of being which it is not, e.g.

29 Ibid H224 p.266
30 Ibid H224 p.266-267
to understand oneself as a higher form of ape, living intelligent matter etc. Or in much the same vein, to live in a merely average way of understanding the nature of one's own existence. This seduction of the "they" as reflected in discourse issues in an ambiguity in what the discourse discloses to others and to one's self so that:

Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, yet at bottom it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is. Ambiguity not only affects the way we avail ourselves of what is accessible for use and enjoyment, and the way we manage it; ambiguity has already established itself in the understanding as a potentiality-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects itself in its understanding as a potentiality-for-Being.

The full effect of this ambiguity is that Dasein finds it difficult to stand on its own feet, to orient itself in the world in a genuine way. In his analysis of Dasein's falling into this ambiguity, Heidegger further characterized it as a way in which Dasein positively lives "away from itself" as its being torn away from authenticity, constantly "sucked into the turbulence of the they's inauthenticity". Falling into inauthenticity has therefore, not only its own 'logic', but as the ever constant tendency for Dasein to understand itself in terms of the entities with which it deals in its everyday activities, it is also an understanding which exacerbates itself. As a result, Dasein's self-understanding moves into ever increasing circles, colouring more and more of its being in the world.

Given the insinuating nature of inauthentic understanding, how can a break out of its circle of influence be made? The answer to this question is one given in Heidegger's analysis of the Transcendental Subject showing it to be equally practical as well as theoretical reason through its own self-affection. Let us then investigate his analysis here. It must be seen that whilst Heidegger clearly revolutionized Kant's original problematic, he did not question his insistence that the essence of practical reason lies in respect for the law, though he did point to the possibility of such respect to lie in

31 Ibid H173 p.217
32 Ibid H178 p.223
Dasein's own respect for itself. Such respect was interpreted as Dasein's inability to despise itself, that is, in its inability not to 'look out for itself' and in so doing preserve its own integrity. As Heidegger characterized Dasein's falling into the "they" as a way of "living away from itself", as misunderstanding itself as it is in itself, this way of understanding/existing is clearly one running counter to the demand of self respect. It is therefore, a way of existing in which Dasein is in a constant tension with itself. Conceived in terms appropriate to the Subject's practical/moral nature, the tension arising from "living away from itself" is expressed by the genuine self as a call from this self to the falling self. A call to the falling self to recognise its true genuine 'nature'. This call Heidegger interpreted as Dasein's (ontological) conscience. The way the call is conceived is such that it escapes the ambiguity present in the spoken word in the sense of everyday shared discourse or talk, for as with an actual prick of conscience that reminds one of a debt or failure of duty, the call is a silent address to oneself, an indictment of ontological guilt.

In the context of Dasein's ontological structure, both the call and the response, point not to an instance of an actual failure of duty, but to Dasein's failure to be fully responsible for its existence from the 'ground up'.\(^33\) It is as such, a call to Dasein to exist not in the "they", but from out of its ownmost understanding of itself, as a potentiality for existence in the world.\(^34\) As an utterance, though it be a silent one, the call of conscience and Dasein's response to it, point to an understanding or underlying intelligibility which is articulated in the silent discourse. In this context, Dasein's conscience and guilt point to its genuine self as an openness to its own historical being in the world - an openness given in and through both understanding and mood.

As a call for Dasein to exist from out of its own genuine self-understanding as it finds itself in the world, Heidegger

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\(^33\) Ibid H283ff p.328ff
\(^34\) Ibid
characterized the call of conscience as one to resolve existence. What is existentially disclosed in this call is Dasein's ownmost possibility for existence in the given situation in which it finds itself. As what is disclosed in the authentic resolve is Dasein's factual situation, the resolution must therefore be one that is always open for constant reassessment in view of ongoing and changing circumstances. This openness Heidegger somewhat paradoxically called Dasein's resolute certainty: 

The certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back - a possibility which is factically necessary. However, such holding-for-true in resoluteness (as the truth of existence) by no means lets us fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-ones-free for taking back, is authentic resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself.

This certainty is clearly of the same mode as is evidenced in Dasein's genuine certainty of its death - a certainty which points to Dasein's being as a possibility for existence. Here in respect of Dasein's existence this certainty is shown to include, not merely an introspective insight on Dasein's part into its own inner self, but in conformity with Heidegger's temporalization of Dasein's understanding, the understanding is inclusive of the outside world as well. It is a certainty therefore from out of which Dasein understands entities and situations in the historical world. As a genuine certainty that owns its own mortality, Dasein's resoluteness is a way of discovering what is possible for a being such as itself to achieve in its given historical and therefore changing situation.

With the achievement of the conception of Dasein's being as given in authentic resolve, Heidegger vindicated the claim that his own conception of truth is more original than the traditional correspondence theory. For in doing so he had shown that ontologically speaking, Dasein considered as it is in its ownmost way of being, first understands itself as a being that must realize its own potentiality for existence in the world. Consequently Dasein therefore also

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35 Ibid H308 p.355
understands entities it encounters in the world in terms of this self understanding. This way of understanding entities (as ready-to-hand) is as such ontologically more original than considering them as present-at-hand as in the traditional theory of truth.

From the standpoint of Fundamental Ontology, we have also seen that even though the correspondence theory of truth is less than primary in an ontological sense, the reason for its being as influential as it is, lies in the structure of Dasein's own self understanding. Specifically, it is rooted in Dasein's constant tendency to interpret itself in terms of the entities, with which it is involved in its everyday world. This understanding as inauthentic, has been characterized as Dasein's disowning of its own unique way of being.

Here we can observe two points. First we should note the way truth defined as "aletheia" reflects Dasein's own ability to uncover itself in the call of conscience. In the light of this point, we can understand Heidegger's insistence that Dasein exists in untruth and truth equiprimordially, and this, because it is ontologically constituted as a being that uncovers both itself and in the light of this, also other entities in the world.

The second point to observe is that like Kant, Heidegger also developed a conception of transcendental illusion. One furthermore "which even after its deceptions have been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into momentary aberrations ever again calling for corrections".36

The source of such illusion, which from Heidegger's standpoint must be seen as more than merely momentary lapses, is of course the "they". The nature of transcendental illusion in his own account, if we may again borrow Kantian terminology here, is as such more broadly conceived than Kant foresaw. Given his emphasis on the finitude of

36 Critique of Pure Reason A 298 p.300 Heidegger of course is not concerned with reason in the same way that Kant was; in this context "understanding" rather than "reason" being entrapped is more to the point.
Dasein's understanding, it would seem reasonable to think that Heidegger would not object to Kant's view, that it is an invalid use of reason, to use finite human understanding to contemplate a reality divorced from the empirical realm to which it is ontologically suited. From the standpoint of his Dasein analysis however, it must be recognized that for Heidegger, transcendental illusion must also include all philosophy that proceeds from an inappropriate self-understanding, Kant's included.

In the light of these two summary points we can conclude that our investigation into Heidegger's Dasein analysis has shown how he was able not only to surpass Kant's traditional conception of truth, but also to develop a conception of transcendental illusion more comprehensive than Kant's.

The Circle of Inwardness and the Death of God

From the fore-going account of Heidegger's Dasein analysis, the formative influence that Kierkegaard had on Heidegger's thought is undeniably clear. As John Caputo has pointed out in his article "Hermeneutics As The Recovery of Man"37 the singular most profound such influence can be seen in Heidegger's formulation of the authentic Dasein's self-remembrance in authentic resolve as repetition; for Kierkegaard saw repetition in just these terms. This indebtedness on Heidegger's part is one that runs near to the heart of his analysis of Dasein. This can be seen when it is recognized that the body of his analysis, of which repetition is but the summit, points to Dasein's achievement of an authentic existentiell self-understanding to arise in a way not dissimilar to Kierkegaard's conception of the attainment of self knowledge, namely through the 'inner logic' of pathos. In contrast to concentrating on despair as Kierkegaard did however, Heidegger wrote of Dasein's being essentially anxious about its potentiality for existence; an anxiety which when owned and cultivated renders Dasein's being in the world as one that is truthful.38 This

37 "Hermeneutics as the Recovery of Man" in Man and World Vol.15 1982 pp.342-367 This ref: p.352ff
38 Being and Time H296 p.342
anxious concern with itself, is one we have seen to arise from out of Dasein's original respect for itself, the self imposed restraint concomitant with any self that is not to self-destruct - the need to preserve the self's dignity as the self that it is. Yet even given the two authors' different choice of mood, this anxious concern clearly echoes the influence of Kierkegaard's conception of despair as the inner pathos through which the self finds itself, first in the knowledge of good and evil, then in faith. Here anxiety and despair, both passionate moods, can be said to be the inner logic of the individual's self-discovery and affirmation in repetition.

There is however, a major difference between Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's conception of what is 'found' in the individual's self-discovery. For Kierkegaard, and equally for Heidegger, it could be said that the truth of existence is to be found not in what the individual affirms, but in how it is affirmed. Yet there is a major difference between the two thinkers' accounts of both the "how" of this inward appropriation, and of the "what" upon which appropriation resolves.

In interpreting Kierkegaard, the distinction which he drew between the "what" and the "how" of existentiell affirmation as it is inwardly appropriated may well seem to lead to a highly volatile relativity of values, unless that is, one is aware of the presupposition that underlies the entire corpus of his work: the view that the individual exists in a tension between the finite, (the temporal) and the infinite, (the eternally good). In this sense the following characterization of the existentialist's predicament fits Kierkegaard's writings just as much as in a different way it fits Sartre's: 40

I raise myself in thought to the Absolute ... thus being infinite consciousness; yet at the same time I am finite consciousness ... Both aspects seek each other and flee each other ... . I am the struggle between them.

For Sartre the individual for-itself is portrayed as straining to be the absolute in the sense of being an in-itself-for-itself, a tension that in *Being and Nothingness* he finally suggests as ontologically but perhaps not ethically unsolvable. He conceived the tension to be one between the eternally good and the temporally delimited struggle to attain that goodness. He resolved this struggle in faith. Yet the resolution is not final. A tension always remains, announced in the despair that the individual endures in the face of its inevitable failure to ever attain the eternal good.

Despair, is then, the inner pathos of the attempt to appropriate the good temporally. Thus passion, and in this case despair, could literally be said to be the 'inner logic' of the finite individual's longing for the eternal. Providing the whole personality is involved in the passion of its existence, Kierkegaard could therefore assume that it would, by a process of self-correction, come to a knowledge of good and evil; that is, transform itself into an ethical and possibly religious existence.

Conceived as such, the inner transformation of the despairing self would however, be one attained only in constant striving, for a relaxing of the tension would be a forgetting and hence a loss of the ethical or religious self. Hence the need for repetition as the constant repeating of the self attainment through the passing of time. Such repetition being the re-appropriation of the eternal in every instant of time that temporally passes. In this Kierkegaard is affirming what he held from his very first publication to be the answer to the needs of his age: to remember existence as opposed to pure essence, to favour the historical Socrates over the abstractions of Plato and Hegel. Whereas Heidegger's conception of repetition clearly owes a debt to this conception of human existence, his account of self-discovery in repetition is not one that points to an endless tension between the finite person and an infinite eternal good. For here one can see the influence of the madman's proclamation of the death of God.

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41 This point will be discussed in chapter four
42 *The Gay Science* #125 p.181-182
this influence Heidegger's account of that which is revealed in repetition (the "what") also bears a corresponding difference from Kierkegaard's view.

If then, under Nietzsche's influence, Heidegger was to affirm genuine human existence given in resolute repetition then he would have to conceive of the circle of self-discovery and affirmation to be one effected in the absence of an absolute.\textsuperscript{43} Just such a possibility is to be found in Nietzsche's concept of the Eternal Return of the Same. In this conception, as in Kierkegaard's account of repetition, there is a view of self-discovery expounded in the context of a theory about the nature of time. In chapter one we saw however that Nietzsche's philosophy was problematic, both in itself and in the challenge it presents to the contemporary thinker. Let us briefly review the nature of this challenge so that we can understand more clearly how Heidegger's own work may be seen as a response to it.

It will be recalled that as considered in itself, we concluded that Nietzsche's teaching of the Eternal Return is one that remained shrouded in mystery in the sense that is simply not clear what he saw his doctrine to mean. In chapter one we pointed to and traced out the singular importance of this doctrine, seeing it as intimately linked with Nietzsche's genealogical method. This method was interpreted in turn as not simply tracing beliefs back to their origin in time, but to their origin in the pathos of life. As such they were then interpreted as beliefs forged from out of and, as far as possible, in avoidance of the tragic painfuyfulness of life. Belief, no matter how noble, was therefore seen from the genealogical standpoint as a form of cheating life of its full tragic fury through subtle lies. It was seen that

\textsuperscript{43}Furthermore, given the absence of an absolute what would be revealed in such a self understanding would therefore differ from Kierkegaard's account. In effect Heidegger interpreted that which is disclosed in resolute repetition to be not the subjective truth as Kierkegaard saw it, but as we have seen, an understanding that frees itself for its possibilities of existing in the world from out of a genuine self encounter with entities through its senses, for this sensual encounter rests understanding. Here inwardness is preserved in the maintenance of self respect within the given historical situation in which the individual finds itself.
this cheating against pain was interpreted by Nietzsche as a revenge against time; for it is time over which there is no exercise of human power, and therefore no chance to undo what has been done. Time as it passes, taking with it fleeting human existence, delimits human finitude and weakness. Out of this impotence alone has issued all noble and base philosophy and religious practices. Humankind's yearning for and so belief in the eternal as free from the vicissitudes of time is for Nietzsche then, but a subtle form of revenge against its time-bound existence.

In the face of these stark revelations we saw Nietzsche to have developed his doctrine of Eternal Return in both the *The Gay Science* and in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, as a way in which existence in the absence of revenge against time, and so in the absence of the fictitious eternal, is possible. However, even from reading the more detailed account in the latter book, we found the central question namely, just how the experience of the eternal return does cure revenge, unanswered. Even in following through Zarathustra's own struggle to overcome his own revenge against time, we found this self-overcoming as a conquest of his disgust at humankind, to be one which neither he nor his animal soul-mates were capable of expressing. The enigma, the question of how to adequately interpret the meaning of the Eternal Return therefore remains. Not only this, but in the absence of a full insight into Nietzsche's much maligned doctrine of the overman, remains both a mystery and an unfulfilled promise. With the death of God then, and the absence of the overman, the nature of truth interpreted in this light becomes highly problematic. In what way then, is it possible to see Heidegger's analysis as answering this challenge?

The Death of God and the Death of Dasein.

There will always be one major obstacle to any sympathetic interpretation of Nietzsche's thought; that is, how any interpretation of it can avoid concluding that his genealogy resulted in anything else

44 Is this perhaps Nietzsche's own conception of transcendental illusion?
than a self-destructive relativism. How, in effect is it possible to maintain any sense or intelligibility in the world, once one abandons the Platonic or the Christian eternal realm to the ravages of time; after one banishes all knowledge of the real to the realm of fiction, placing in its stead an all-embracing phenomenalism? Heidegger's answer is clear and unequivocal. He ignored Nietzsche's phenomenalism presumably as a metaphysical error similar to that which he identified in Nietzsche's casting much of his inquiry in terms of psychology. He did however take the thought of the death of God to the heart of his own phenomenological program. His analysis of Dasein reflects this influence in being an analysis of human existence that remains in all its aspects, an existence that is intelligible (and tolerable) not in the light of a transcendent world, but in terms of life itself as finite; that is, as temporal. But this analysis goes one step further than Nietzsche's, for Heidegger restored intelligibility to human existence by conceiving the essence of Dasein to be given not in the death of God, but in the death of its own being. For it is in the face of this understanding of itself as mortal, that we have seen Dasein to be aware of its own being as one defined by its potentiality for existence.

Thus, whereas Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God threatened to wipe out the horizon of the intelligibility of human existence, Heidegger's own proclamation of the death of Dasein restores intelligibility to this existence by once again giving it a horizon within which to understand both itself and the entities it encounters. The self understanding that Dasein has of itself as a potentiality for existence can therefore be seen as Heidegger's reply to Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God. This reply can be seen to answer Nietzsche's perspectivism with an account of human existence that allows everyone a perspective of their own from which to understand the world, but one which is nonetheless given from within a world in which others are not only encountered, but also understood. Whether and how this account can avoid relativism will be considered in the final...

45 Nietzsche vol 1 p.50
sections of this chapter. Here we will content ourselves with but one observation: Heidegger himself was later to express dissatisfaction with his analysis in *Being and Time*, one that can be linked to the influence of Nietzsche's thought there.

We can see then that Heidegger both acknowledged and possibly surpassed Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God. He acknowledged it in conceiving his analysis of Dasein as one of its essential mortal finitude; he pointed to a way of surpassing Nietzsche's entanglement in relativism by conceiving the intelligibility of Dasein to be given in the light of its own mortality. How then is this related to the thought of the Eternal Return conceived as a doctrine about the nature of time which would allow humankind to avoid falling into revenge?

The Temporality of Care and the Eternal Return.

In chapter two Heidegger's conception of Dasein was seen to be in effect a temporalization of the Kantian Transcendental Ego. Throughout this chapter thus far this temporalization has always been alluded to, but not fully spelt out. If however we are to understand how Heidegger's Dasein analysis is a response to Nietzsche's challenging thought of Eternal Return as a doctrine about time, then an outline of Heidegger's concept of temporality is clearly now needed. For the sake of brevity we shall content ourselves with an economical sketch that will yield only the bare essentials needed for our task here.

Through Heidegger's temporalization of the Transcendental Ego in the *Kant Buch*, it was seen that the realm of the Ego, that is of Dasein, extended not only within itself, but through time taking priority over space, also "outside" of itself. This "outside" of itself understood in the terminology of *Being and Time*, is Dasein's always being in the world in which it encounters things and others. The way this occurs was one we saw Heidegger characterize existentially, as Dasein's mood or state of mind. The understanding concomitant with moods was seen in the analysis of Dasein's anxious certainty of its mortality to be one which in general embodies an already established understanding in its anticipatory fore-structure. In
chapter two the fore-structure of all understanding was discussed in relation to Kant's account of the synthesis of recognition in concepts. In this discussion the nature of the synthesis was seen to lie in the understanding already prospecting or projecting a field in which all possible objects of knowledge may appear. Again, such a characterization points to the preformative structure of understanding. In the sense that it is preformative, that is always bringing an understanding into any encounter with that which it meets, understanding is as always anticipating possible interpretations of objects it encounters.

These three basic ways in which Dasein finds itself in a world, as both inside and outside, and as always in an attuned understanding with that which it encounters, is a way of being which Heidegger captured in a structural unity through his definition of Dasein's being as Care. 46

The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-[the world] as Being-alongside [entities encountered within-the-world]. This being fills in the signification of the term "care"[sorge], which is used in a purely ontological manner.

Each part of this threefold definition of Dasein's being can be seen as consonant with a way in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in the following manner: Dasein's being "ahead-of-itself" is its understanding characterized by its fore-structure. Dasein's "being-already-in-the-world " is the way it discovers and understands its factual situation in the world, that is, as mood. Finally, Dasein's "being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world" is concomitant with its being both inside and outside of itself, and so discovering itself amongst entities in the world. What then of the temporality of this structure?

As in chapter two where each aspect of Kant's threefold synthesis in apprehension, intuition and reproduction was shown each to be one tense or sense of time, so too each structure in the definition of

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46 Being and Time H192 p.237
"Care" can be seen to be possible on the basis of its essential temporality. The clearest example of this is that of understanding - Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself. In chapter two we saw this understanding to consist in Dasein's prospecting a field in which any object of knowledge may be encountered, as in effect being Dasein's openness to possibility, and therefore to a future horizon within which what is possible may come forward. As the future temporal horizon, it is the way Dasein exists out of and beyond its self. In this sense it is an ek-stasis of temporality.

Dasein's finding itself already being in the world as a disclosure given in mood points to its understanding of itself as a being that has a past in the sense of already having been existing in the world. This possible disclosure points to Dasein's mood as an openness to a horizon within which it can 'look back' with understanding and recall what has been. As a horizon of a possible looking back to, the past is as a fundamental way of Dasein's being outside of itself, also along with the future, intelligible as an ecstasis of temporality.

The final aspect of temporality, the present, is given as Dasein's always finding itself alongside entities in the world. It is the horizon within whatever that which is, can be presented and so encountered within understanding. Taken in their unity then, the three ecstases constitute the possibility of Dasein's encountering any entity with intelligibility, itself included - indeed itself first and foremost, since as we have seen, it is in the light of its own self understanding that Dasein encounters and understands entities in the world. Given that Dasein's self understanding is one of itself as potentiality for existence, the temporal constitution of its being can be interpreted in the following manner. The ecstasis of the future is that in which Dasein discloses the future as the realm of the possibilities for its own potentiality for existence. The ecstasis of the past is that in which Dasein discloses to itself that, and how, it

47 The way "ek-stasis" is written with a hyphen here simply emphasizes the way Dasein is 'outside of itself' as a temporal being. The same meaning is intended by "ecstasis" which is used interchangeably with the more emphatic "ek-stasis".
has already been in the world from out of which its possibilities for existence arise. The present is that exstasis in which seizing upon a possibility in the world in which it discovers itself, Dasein encounters entities with an understanding of them. This encounter, one which Heidegger called "making present",⁴⁸ is one which in accord with Dasein either losing itself in the "they", or remembering itself in its genuine being, may be either authentic or inauthentic. Before looking at either of these two ways of encountering entities, let us however, first look at the phenomenon of "making present" in its undifferentiated character.

The defining characteristic of "making present" lies in its being the temporal presenting through which Dasein encounters entities in the world in the light of its own self. It is therefore an encounter which understands entities as something useful "in-order-to" accomplish a possible end which it foresees. What is peculiar to making present is that in using something to accomplish a task Dasein necessarily loses itself in the manipulative practice. The temporal structure underlying this absorption in the task is one Heidegger called making present as an awaiting on, and a retention of, what is encountered. The temporality of making present is therefore given in the inter-relation of the future as awaiting, with the past as the continued retention of the entity in its present use. In this context the meaning of "awaiting" would appear to refer to Dasein's understanding of the usefulness of the entity from out of the way the entity shows itself. In this sense the future possibilities of its existence always proceed from out of the situation into which it is thrown. The "retention" of the entity would in a similar vein, appear to refer to Dasein's seizing upon and holding onto an understanding of the potentiality for its existence that it encounters in its on-going existence in the given situation.

The pivotal aspect of making present which allows Dasein to exist either authentically or not, lies in Dasein's always forgetting itself

⁴⁸ see H328 and H338 pages 376 and 338 respectively
as it becomes involved in its ongoing endeavours. Where this forgetting takes hold, Dasein comes to understand itself in terms of the entities with which it is involved. This understanding is one we have seen Heidegger characterize as the "they". In this understanding Dasein awaits its own potentiality for existence which it understands "in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern". Thus Dasein comes toward itself from out of that with which it concerns itself. Accordingly Dasein's being-alongside-itself is not as in anticipation such as is characteristic of its genuine certainty of its death, but in expectation, as in the disowning of its death as a possibility, interpreting it as an expected event yet to come.

Concomitant with this change of fore-structure in Dasein's understanding of its future, there is a change in the way it understands the present so that it overlooks its own self, seeing it only in terms of the objects with which it is involved. In this "sight" that which is held onto is the ongoing scenario, in and out of which, Dasein understands itself. The past as Dasein's own, is therefore forgotten as is its ownmost future in favour of what is happening in the present.

In contrast to Dasein's becoming lost in this manner, Heidegger described authentic resolve as a resolute rapture in which it is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation as possible objects of concern, a rapture which is held in resoluteness. In such resoluteness Dasein encounters and continues to understand entities in the world by the light of its own being, not vice versa. The end "towards which" it understands things as present, is one given as a potentiality for existence conceived in conjunction and continuous with its own past. In the light of this understanding, Dasein's present factual situation is given. Heidegger characterized the temporality of this

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49 Ibid H354 p.405
50 Ibid H337 p.386
51 Ibid H338 p.387
52 Ibid H298, p. 345
understanding as one which in ... 53

coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" [or better, which "is in the process of having been"] releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality"

In contrast to this authentic temporality, we have seen inauthenticity to involve a closing off of Dasein's own possibilities for existence through an immersion in its environment. In this immersion not only is the authentic future lost, so too does Dasein lose its ownmost past and present situation. Inauthenticity and authenticity are then the two ways in which Dasein's temporality can be affected through its own self understanding. Of the two ways of being, Heidegger's analysis demands that authentic temporality be the more ontologically original. This demand is met in his analysis of the moment of vision where he wrote: 54

That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which is thus authentic itself, we call the "moment of vision". This term must be understood in the active sense of an exstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness. The moment of vision is a phenomenon which in principle cannot be clarified in terms of the "now" [dem jetzt]. The "now" is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-time-ness: the "now" 'in which' something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. 'In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.

This characterization of primordial temporality as underlying the usual interpretation of time as a 'now' sequence of moments given as the arising and passing of moments in which entities are encountered, is a thesis Heidegger developed further in his analysis of the nature of public or world time. Whilst this thesis is not of immediate

53 lbid H326 p.374
54 lbid H338 p.387-388
concern here, let us note that as Joan Stambaugh suggests in her *Nietzsche's Thought of the Eternal Return* Heidegger's view that temporality can be thought of either in terms of the primal phenomenon itself, or as a series of "now" moments, provides a fertile clue to interpreting Nietzsche's thought of the Eternal Return. (Furthermore the ensuing interpretation avoids seeing it as either a cosmological theory, or as an existential imperative, the two poles between which many contemporary accounts waver.) Let us then look at her interpretation here.

At the heart of Stambaugh's analysis is the challenge to think of how to interpret what would remain of time conceived stripped of its horizontal dimension - such as the structure of Newtonian time is conceived to be. Her conclusion is that according to such a view, time would lose any possibility of holding within itself a telos, a purposeful direction, a beginning, a middle or an end. It could therefore only be thought of as instantaneous. As an instant, time would then become all there is, that is eternity (in the absence of the a-temporal); this Stambaugh suggests is radical experience that Nietzsche points to where he has Zarathustra ask:

> What happened to me: listen! Did time not fly away? Am I not falling? Did I not fall - listen into the well of eternity? Still ... When well of eternity, you serene terrible abyss of midday, when will you drink my soul back into yourself?

In this passage Stambaugh remarks that Nietzsche (via Zarathustra) can be understood to have undergone the experience of a release from time as it is usually experienced, that is as a series of moments. In this experience of what she calls vertical as opposed to horizontal time, she sees the possibility of understanding the moment as it is presented in "Of the Vision and the Riddle". The success of this venture lies

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55 Published by (John Hopkins Uni. Press Baltimore and London 1972)
56 op.cit. p.105
57 op.cit. p.106 quoted from Zarathustra, IV, "Midday"
58 Thus Spoke Zarathustra p.176ff
in her conception of vertical time. Such time as can be conceived to be only as an instant or instantaneity, not in the sense of a series of disparate instants, not the flux from out of which things emerge, but rather as "the arising and perishing anew of the instant". Of itself instantaneity points not to a full account of time, but of the way time arises, the way it "times" or originally gives itself as what it is.

If it is granted that time can be conceived as instantaneous arising and perishing of the instant, the question to be asked is how do the modes of the past the present and the future arise? If time is not of a durational nature, then the present can only be understood as the moment (of time) that is, insofar as it is the arising of the future and the ending of the past. Time then is not a sheer succession of moments, but is the present moment arising from out of the factoring of the past and the future.

The nub of Stambaugh's interpretation here is that the way in which time is factored, that is whether with an emphasis on any of its factors (ecstasis) rather than on another is all important here, for where that occurs time is solidified into a characteristic duration, rather than occurring as an instant.

An example of such a solidification of time is the way, in the instantaneous arising and passing away that is time, there is always an experiencing of its irreversibility, if it is thought of in a directional manner. Such an experience is touched on in the feeling of deprivation that one has with the usual feeling of the "passing of time". To cling to that which one has, to yearn for that which was, Stambaugh suggests results in a rigidification of the factoring of time so that time itself is experienced only in the burdensome yearning to escape from the passing of moments. And what is such yearning but the spirit of revenge against time and its "it was"!

That time is factorable in this and other ways is taken by

59 op. cit. p.117
Stambaugh as indicative of its essential neutrality. Time itself is then the pure neutral givenness of possibility, as will to power. The dynamic aspect of the thought of the Eternal Return lies in the fact that as participating in the will to power, human beings are literally 'possible beings'. They have the capacity via consciousness not only to be free from immediate immersion in their environment in a way animals are not, but to grasp this freedom as granted by the will, and in so doing to transform their own being. As a self-conscious act, the attainment of such freedom is in effect a conscious and, one must add, transformative appropriation of that which always already was. It is to be as a self-conscious self creation in the absence of the spirit of revenge against time.

Here eternity, rather than meaning a freedom from time as change, is interpreted as temporality, as the giving of the arising and the ending moment. The Eternal Return of the Same is then according to this interpretation, the arising and the ending of the moment in the present of the same (of the will to power). Thus the past and the future contradict each other when seen as directions of time. Where they do so is in the gateway of the "moment" when it is seen as the fleeting of the present in the unstoppable flow of time into the past. However if time is experienced as eternity, the moment as that which gives time, as that from out of which the future and the past arise, is not a contradiction, but a freedom for possibilities.

I suggest that these two different ways which Stambaugh sees as possible to interpret the 'moment', can, on reflection, be seen to mirror Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and an inauthentic understanding of time. This interpretation is bolstered by Heidegger's explicit reference to Nietzsche's threelfold classification of history in the course of his analysis of Dasein's historicality. In this analysis he points to Nietzsche's classification of history as monumental, antiquitarian and critical as characteristic of Dasein's

60 op.cit. p.120
61 "Of the Vision and the Riddle" Zarathustra p.178
62 Beinga and Time H396ff p.448ff
authentic historicity. Thus when authentic, historical Dasein comes "back resolutely to itself" in repetition, it does so in an openness for the "monumental possibilities of human existence". In making the possibilities one's own in repetition, authentic Dasein also preserves "the existence that has-been-there, in which the possibility seized upon has become manifest". In this way authentic existence (as with authentic historiology), is antiquarian. As authenticity is rooted in the moment of vision, both the monumental and the antiquarian possibilities are taken up into the present free from illusion. In this way authentic Dasein's historicity (and historiology) is also critical of the past. In this account Heidegger can be seen to have reappropriated Nietzsche's thought of the Eternal Return in a highly original way.

This suggestive interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence is not put forward as the one that accords with the original Nietzsche, but as one that is suggestive of the influence that Nietzsche might be seen to have had on the thought of Heidegger in Being and Time. We can see now that Heidegger's response to the enigma of Nietzsche's work is one that took over and transformed the thought of the death of God and of Eternal Return into the temporality of Dasein, as a being that is aware of its mortally finite existence as one that is as a potentiality to be in the world. This awareness is one we have also likened to Kierkegaard's conception of the pathos of human existence as the key to the self discovery of the individual's true inner self. We are, therefore, now in a position to understand how Heidegger can be seen to have answered both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche's challenge in conceiving of truth as inwardness, in the absence of an absolute.

Dasein as un-covering and Relativism.

From the foregoing interpretation of Heidegger's Dasein analysis we have seen his answer to the question about what remains in the absence of an eternal absolute - it is mortal finite Dasein who can exist either authentically or inauthentically. His answer to what

63Ibid H391 p.443
remains when eternity is denied relevance to human existence is formulated in the second section of *Being and Time* as temporality, conceived not as the passing of moments of time, nor as the paradoxical embodiment of eternity in time, but as the ontological basis for finite Dasein's existence. The question that arises immediately in the light of Heidegger's analysis is, does not the temporalization of human understanding, especially given that it is executed in the absence of an eternal realm, render all knowledge relative to the perspective of the individual Dasein?

That Heidegger's analysis teeters close to relativism seems all the more possible when it is viewed in relation to the analysis in chapter two. There Heidegger's method as a hermeneutic phenomenology was contrasted to Kant's transcendental deduction. At the centre of this contrast was the realization that in temporalizing Kant's conception of the Transcendental Ego, Heidegger effectively historicized the categories of the understanding. In the light of this historicization two ways in which knowledge is historically conditioned were discussed. Firstly it was seen that given the phenomenological method, the philosopher must in some way be dependent on Being's self-revelation in and through history. This dependency would suggest that transcendental knowledge is relative to the way Being either shows or covers itself over in history. In this sense the historical conditioning of knowledge, must be seen to deny any promise that humankind will ever know more than what is given to it in its finite historical situation.

It must be recognized however that this limitation on thought is not one that necessarily leads to despair. Contrary to the popular image of Heidegger being an existentialist philosopher of anguish, lost in despair about the futility of human existence, we have seen that in *Being and Time* he developed an insight into human existence as one that is both intelligible and purposeful. In the light of this analysis the fact that Dasein can only know what is given to it in its historical situation, does not point to the loss of, but to the very conditions of its intelligibility.
Still it might be objected that just as Nietzsche's account of the death of God appeared to throw a new light on human understanding but in effect collapsed into a relativism of perspectives, so too does Heidegger's account. For whilst Heidegger restores a horizon to human existence, the way he does so, namely, through the individual's anxious anticipation of its death, which reveals its ownmost potentiality to exist, effectively renders understanding as once again given only through the perspective of the individual's striving for its own always outstanding potentiality to be. The same objection put in less Heideggerian terms might run as follows: if all knowledge is given only from out of the individual's historically defined perspective, then given that the historical world is one of constant change, no two perspectives are going to be alike. In view of this fact, knowledge is therefore rendered relative to the individual's historically conditioned perspective. This sort of conclusion is, as I shall show, one which Heidegger astutely avoids.

In defending Heidegger's work against the charge of relativism there are two important and inter-related points to make. The first is that as outlined in Being and Time, the individual Dasein is, to be sure, the only one who can confront and own its own death. Concomitant with this point is the fact that it is the individual alone who can understand its own situation in the world. Far from rendering knowledge relative to the individual however, this account offers the possibility of shared and genuine knowledge - for the individual is always finding itself in a world in which others are not only encountered but also understood as being in the same way as oneself. In this way others are encountered and understood in what must be seen to be in a sense a common world. It is a world common to all in as much as the way every individual encounters and understands others is through a characteristic common to all individuals - the understanding of the world in the everyday concern for their own existence. Out of this understanding others are encountered as being there with oneself. Here the same hermeneutic relation which binds Dasein to entities that it discovers in the world also binds Dasein into a mutual relationship with others.
That the authentic individual is not absorbed in an egotistical striving to satisfy its selfish demands, follows from the consideration of the nature of authenticity itself - it is a way of existing in the world which preserves the dignity of the self given out of Dasein's understanding of its mortal finitude. If such a concern is to be consistent then it must be reflected in the dealings the individual has with others. Heidegger defined this mutual consideration of others as "solicitude". In this way his analysis can be said to avoid subjective relativism.

Let us pause to note that it is with this point in Heidegger's analysis of death that Sartre insisted on finding fault with his phenomenology. Given that Sartre's work is often favourably compared to Heidegger's early work, this point is an important one, for it allows insight into the basic difference between the philosophical positions of the authors. Sartre's point is that the individual's mortality does not round out its existence into a unity. In his own analysis of human existence death always remains external to the essence of human being. To see it as otherwise as did Heidegger, is he insists, to confuse human being's temporality and hence finitude with its mortality, whereas in fact even if human beings were immortal, they would still as temporal beings be as finite. Thus in *Being and Nothingness* he wrote

Ordinarily it seems to be that it is death which constitutes our finitude and which reveals it to us. From this combination it results that death takes on the shape of an ontological necessity and that finitude, on the other hand, borrows from death its contingent character. Heidegger in particular seems to have based his whole theory of Sein-zum-tode on the strict identification of death and finitude. ... But if we consider the matter little more closely, we detect this error: death is a contingent fact which belongs to facticity: finitude is an ontological structure of the for-itself which determines freedom and exists only in and through the free project of the end which marks my being known to me.

For Sartre in other words, human reality would remain finite even if it were immortal, because it makes itself finite by choosing itself.

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64 *Being and Time* H121ff p.157ff

What is at issue between Heidegger and Sartre here is the nature of temporality. On the face of it, Sartre's final conclusion, that even as immortal human existence would be finite, seems not unreasonable. But then we must ask whether it is literally true of human being that it is defined by its temporality in this way. We shall not attempt a conclusive answer to this question here, but instead point to the following problem which results from Sartre's view. If being-onto-death is denied as Dasein's self understanding of its finitude, what then can give unity to its existence? Sartre's answer to this question is one that threatens his whole project and consequently his conception of human being. It can be briefly summarized as follows.

Sartre's problematic sets out the self as being a unity or a totality only in an unresolved tension between what he defined as the for-itself and the in-itself. Seen as a tension between these two modes of being, human existence must fail to be as a unity. - It arises in the presence of its own self as a totality only as the lack of its given totality. Given this lack of unity within itself in this sense, the individual always fails to find itself in a fundamental accord with others such as Heidegger saw being-with to ensure. In this sense the individual is doubly homeless - it finds no rest in itself nor in relations with others - it is totally alone in its innermost being. Such a conception of human being that sees it dominated by its contingency - its being thrust into existence in which it constantly fails to achieve a totality before being thrust out of existence into existinction - has little ground on which it can stand to ward off subjective relativism. Suffice for the moment to say that Sartre's objection to Heidegger's analysis of death is not a minor issue as it may appear at first sight. Furthermore the subjective relativism that issues directly out of Sartre's denial of Heidegger's analysis of death revealing Dasein's Being as a genuine unity, points to the fundamental importance of this analysis to Heidegger's work. It is this insight into the fundamental unity of human being with its

66 Being and Nothingness p.90
world and those others encountered in it, that allows his analysis to avoid the pitfalls of relativism and egoism. As the way both Heidegger and Sartre conceptualize death is rooted in their broader conception of human existence, an investigation into these differences would involve a consideration of their whole phenomenological programs. We shall therefore leave any further observations and remarks comparing the two authors to the next chapter. There we shall explore the differences between them, and in so doing outline more fully the nature of Sartre's subjectivism. Let us then turn to consider the second of the two points that must be borne in mind if Heidegger's work is to be seen to avoid relativism.

The second point, intimately related to the first, is that as existing in a world with others is clearly not a mute relation, it is one that involves the mutual sharing in discourse of one's understanding about events, things and self in the world. Combined with Heidegger's account of the fore-structure of understanding as interpretation, this mutuality lends itself to a distinctly non-relativist account of understanding. Let us interpret this possibility more closely.

It will be recalled that this account pointed to all interpretation as necessarily proceeding according to a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception. This structure points to all understanding as proceeding according to presuppositions. Given that Dasein is as a historical being, the presuppositions present in its understanding would, when considered in relation to knowledge about entities in the world, appear to point to the core of the objection to Heidegger's work as being the foundation for a strident relativism. How for instance, can the individual's fore-structures of interpretation be filled out, except through the individual's singular and so unique understanding of the world. And as such, given the variance between every individual's situation and understanding, how could any interpretation be wrong? That understanding is achieved through the individuals singular and in this sense unique view is, from Heidegger's

67 That Sartre's own analysis collapses into subjective relativism is a point I develop further in chapter four.
account, undeniable. But the conclusion that relativism results does not follow, for precisely where one individual’s understanding of something or event seems at variance with others, this account points to the way in which interpretation can, and often is, modified in the light of more evidence. Such evidence may be brought forward not only by others with whom the individual interacts and talks, so sharing its understanding with them, but also in the absence of others, in the event of the individual’s own discovery of new evidence that forces the old presuppositions to be revised, allowing new knowledge to be reached.

In the first section of this chapter it was pointed out that Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* gave an account both of transcendental error and of error as illusion such as optical illusion, but failed to indicate the source and nature of the far more common error, such as misjudging the speed of a car, or adding an example of a different sort here, simply misunderstanding one’s partner in a conversation. Given the nature of such errors as highly subjective in the sense that they arise from out of an incompetence in the individual’s employment of his ‘faculties’, Kant’s failure to consider such error is perhaps to be expected, given that he was concerned with ontology not empirical knowledge per se. However even as a Fundamental Ontology and so a consideration of understanding in general, Heidegger’s account is a fertile ground for the consideration of such knowledge.

First let us note that given Dasein as a historical being, the fore-structures of its understanding of any historical situation or encounter with any entities will be filled from out of its own understanding, given in its past experiences. This point clearly does not preclude the acquisition of new knowledge, for the fore-structuring and hence presupposing nature of understanding can, and often does, stand rebuffed by the object it seeks to comprehend. In the face of such recalcitrance, the presuppositions of the operative understanding must be revised. This possibility is given in Dasein’s understanding being that of a circle of openness both to itself and to what it encounters; not a closed circle that would allow of no renewed assessment of either oneself or of the objects of its knowledge. This openness in respect of knowledge of objects has the same temporal basis
as is characteristic of Dasein's self understanding. It is an openness that projects a possible field of understanding (i.e. is futural), which is held in a unity with the past understanding of the object in the present (as the presentation of the object). Held out in resoluteness, here in fidelity not simply to the self but to the object of its knowledge, the understanding of the object is one which is always held open to possible revision in the face of changing circumstances yielding new insights. ⁶⁸

Resulting in an account of understanding, that points to its always occurring in a shared world, which is given in and through Dasein's temporality, Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology based as it is on the concept of truth as aletheia, directs the reader's thought not to the contemplation of an ego-centric relativism, but to a consideration of the essential place in human affairs for genuine conversation conducted from out of an openness to both the self and its worldly situation. From the brief review of Sartre's objection to Heidegger it can be seen that this interpretation of his work would not be universally accepted. Given the apparent affinity between the two thinkers the fact that this objection arises is all the more important. Delimiting the nature and the extent of this affinity is the concern of chapter four.

⁶⁸ An ontology which considers an interpretation of the historicity of thought in this manner is developed in detail by H-G. Gadamer in his Truth and Method (Continuum Publishing Corp. New York, 1975)
CHAPTER 4

HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE

In the popular mind Heidegger and Sartre are often seen as German and French versions of the same existentialist conception of human existence. This general view is reflected in the inclusion of both authors in various collections of essays presented in books about "existentialism". The best of these books note however that in Heidegger's Letter on Humanism, he explicitly refused the epithet "existentialism" as appropriate to his thought. That Heidegger's stand against existentialism in this text is one that occurs within the context of his "later thought" is, however, a point not lost on such authors; for from this fact it is usually implied that his "earlier work" at least was much more akin to existentialism than perhaps Heidegger himself would admit.

The concern of this chapter is to trace the source in which the existentialist interpretation of his early work is rooted. As a way of locating the specifically existentialist themes in Heidegger's early work, I shall compare his analysis there with Sartre, a writer who not only clearly and uncontroversially fits the title of "existentialist", but who also owes an obvious debt to Heidegger's early work. In this comparison a disparity between the two authors in respect of their method and conclusions about the ontological constitution of human existence will be explicitly pointed out, revealing the very different conceptions of truth underlying their respective works. In effect, Sartre's dialectical method of analysis as reflected in his conception of human being will be seen to remain firmly within the traditional Cartesian epistemological tradition. This fact plays a central role in

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1 Published in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings ed. D.F. Krell (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henly 1978)
the collapse of his thinking into a subjective relativism. This collapse will be sketched out allowing insight into how Heidegger’s hermeneutic, based on his conception of truth as aletheia, escapes this fate—only to fall victim to another problem which results in his work being interpreted in a similar way to Sartre’s. This problem will be identified as arising from an ambiguity in his analysis that results in a failure to be able to articulate a sufficient distinction between Dasein and Being. Without such a distinction it is possible to interpret their relation as one of literal identity. The result of this interpretation is that it is not clear whether truth originates in Dasein as Being, or in Being for which Dasein is the “there”, the place of Being’s revelation. It is this failure which threatens to reduce the highly original phenomenological hermeneutic in Being and Time to a Sartrean-like existentialism. The conclusion towards which this analysis works is that not only the existentialist reading of Being and Time generally, but also Sartre’s work can be seen as arising from an identification of Being with Dasein. Thus Sartre’s own existentialism is seen as an example of this inadequacy in Heidegger’s thought when its results are explicitly taken up and developed. To facilitate this analysis this chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with the different (methodological) assumptions underlying the two authors’ works. The second points out the inadequacies in their respective analyses.

The Question of Method

From the very beginning Sartre seems to be pursuing the same question that concerns Heidegger: the question of the meaning of Being. Furthermore both authors state their program as being phenomenological, and both, in taking human being as their starting point, then proceed to explicate that being in terms of temporality. Broadly speaking then the two projects seem very similar to each other. However from the very beginning there are major differences between them which in the final analysis result in very different accounts of human existence. This difference is no more evident than in their respective accounts of what a “phenomenon” is, and in the light of these definitions what each thinker saw as the task his
phenomenology was to achieve. Let us then compare these two respective definitions.

As we have seen Heidegger defined a phenomenon as "that which shows itself in itself" in a way which either covered over or revealed the Being of the manifest entity. In either case, that is whether the entity was or was not seen in its true being, the phenomenon was always in Being. Semblance, as the way a phenomenon showed itself as that which in itself it was not, was therefore no less in being than an entity showing itself as it is in itself. Tying this definition to phenomenology as a philosophic inquiry, Heidegger saw his task to be to reveal a phenomenon in its distinguished sense, that is, to reveal that which belongs to an entity "so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground". This elusive phenomenon is, of course, the being of the entities, overlooked in everyday life. Heidegger's task in Being and Time was therefore to show this Being in its truth. In chapter two we saw that as his starting point he undertook an inquiry into Dasein's everyday understanding of Being. This inquiry as a phenomenological hermeneutic was one we saw to be similar to, but distinguishable from a transcendental deduction.

At the heart of Heidegger's inquiry there is the view that a being in either semblance or in truth is not only equally in Being, but essentially related. In respect of Dasein's being, this inter-relation was seen to be constituted as a unity between its authentic and its inauthentic way of existing in the world. In the light of his analysis of Dasein in its authentic and so truthful mode, Heidegger was able to point to its understanding of Being as one given from out of the temporality of its being. Lying at the root of this temporality is Dasein's being always already outside in the world, originally understanding what it encounters there according to its potentiality to be, in a way which maintains the integrity of its selfhood. We can therefore say that Dasein discovers itself and its world in an ontological unity, one which we have seen to be the basis for

2 Being and Time H28 p.51
3 Ibid
Heidegger's inquiry being a hermeneutic, that is, one marked by a self-referential circularity revealing Dasein's Being to be ontologically constituted as un-covering — aletheia — of both itself and other entities.

In contrast to the fundamental unity between entities in the world and Dasein's being in the world that Heidegger saw to lie at the basis of its understanding of Being, Sartre set forth a fundamentally dualistic interpretation of Being. On the one hand he conceived of Being in-itself, as a replete self sufficiency. On the other hand and in direct contrast to this conception, he conceived of being for itself, which apart from reflecting the in-itself, is a mere nullity, an emptiness. In Nausea, earlier, and more literary work than Being and Nothingness, he described these two different conceptions of Being as they were experienced by the leading character of the novel, one Antione Roquentin. In his diary Roquentin recorded his having repeated experiences of what he called "nausea". He struggled with the experience until he at last understood it: He came to see that he was in fact experiencing the true nature of existence. He realized this when in a park the experience once again swept over him:

It took my breath away. Never until these last few days, had I suspected what it meant to 'exist'. I was like the others, like those who walk along the sea-shore in their spring clothes. I used to say the sea IS green; that white speck up there IS a seagull', but I didn't feel that it existed, that the seagull was an existing seagull'; usually existence hides itself.

In his experience however, existence was precisely what was being confronted.

And then, all of a sudden, there it was, as clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost its harmless appearance as an abstract category: it was the very stuff of things, that root was steeped in existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass on the lawn, all had vanished; the diversity of things, their

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4 Published by (Penguin Modern Classics 1973) trans. R. Baldick This ref: p.182
5 Ibid p. 183
6 Ibid p.192
individuality, was only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, in disorder—naked, with a frightening, obscene nakedness.

Such naked existence as this is one that Roquentin finds indicative of the lack of any justification for anything to exist.

Did I dream it up, that huge presence? It is there, installed in the park, tumbled into the trees, gumming everything up, all thick, a jelly. And I was inside with the whole park? I was frightened, but above all else I was furious, I thought I was so stupid, so out of place, I hated that ignoble jelly ... I was not surprised, I knew perfectly well that it was the world, the world in all its nakedness which was suddenly revealing itself and I choked with fury at that huge absurd being.

In this experience of the contingency of existence, Roquentin became aware of the gratuity of existence when it is seen for what it truly is. It is an existence that denies reason to all the usual everyday meanings the texture of normal life. Such texture is reduced to a mere veneer on top of a somehow more real yet raw being. These two different ways of being—the grotesque meaningless existence of the world, and the flimsy individuated yet superficial everyday world—parallel what in Being and Nothingness Sartre defined as being in-itself and being for-itself respectively.

Beginning with this dichotomy between two different sorts of Being at the start of Being and Nothingness Sartre's problem there was to bridge the gap between them. On the one hand, he recognized that in so far as something manifests itself to someone, it has Being. On the other, in so far as Being is apprehended as in Nausea, as being in-itself, it also is. The question therefore arises as to how raw being so intuited participates in the being of something that appears to someone i.e. how does the phenomenon of being, the intuited raw in-itself, relate to the being of the phenomenon, as that which appears to a for-itself? Here the meaning of Being has become problematic not because it has been forgotten as Heidegger insisted, but because the dyadic relation between the two ways of being is not clear.

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7 op.cit. p.xxiv ff
Sartre’s concern is then to define a being that allows the plenum of the in-itself to be apprehended as determinate things. He identified the possibility of such a Being as that which is of itself nothing but pure negativity; this Being he called the for-itself. Taking his cue from Heidegger, he saw this for-itself to characterize the nature of human existence. His justification for doing so is that it is only human being who can ask questions in the expectation of a negative reply. That is, it only makes sense to ask a question where there is a lack of knowledge, an uncertainty to be straightened out by a "yea" or a "nay". Where there is such a possibility, Sartre insisted, there is necessarily a lack of being. Being in-itself asks no questions — for it lacks the necessary distance from itself from which it could interrogate itself. For questioning to arise therefore requires a lack of Being, a lack that allows the distance from the self to arise. This distance from the in-itself Sartre sees as given in human being which as such is the being that remains yet to be given in its fullness — it is always in question as to its essence. According to this view, if human being was not always a question continually outstanding in this way, then, it would lose its distance from itself and collapse into the fullness of the in-itself. ⁸

Thus like Heidegger, Sartre found reason to take human being as the focus of his investigation. But it should be noted that even though he drew on what could be loosely called everyday experiences in his analyses, as for instance the experience of finding one's friend to be absent, ⁹ this willingness to use such examples in support of his project is not the same as Heidegger’s reliance on the everyday. In this particular instance, Sartre used the anecdote of looking for an absent friend in order to illustrate that it is through human reality that negation/nothingness comes into the world. From this point on he remained concerned to show that the structure of human reality is precisely to be as its own nothingness in direct contrast to the fullness of the in-itself. His problem was therefore to show how these

⁸ Being and Nothingness p.23
⁹ Ibid p.27
two modes of being are related by what he called the transphenomenality of Being. 10

He did this by taking over and modifying Husserl's notion of intentionality, introducing into it a pre-self-conscious element. Thus he insisted that prior to any positional or self-conscious awareness of an object, there must be a non-positional awareness of it. This non-positional awareness he understood to be an inner unity of the object and consciousness by way of a negative dialectic, whereby that of which consciousness is aware is precisely that which consciousness is not - i.e. something. Sartre's justification for positing a non-reflective consciousness lies in his already having interpreted the nature of the for-itself as being consciousness. Thus in order to avoid an infinite regress of consciousness being aware of an awareness, that is in turn an awareness of an awareness and so on, he posited the prereflective consciousness as a witness for its reflective consciousness. Yet putting the ingenuity of Sartre's position here aside, it must be noted that when it is coupled with the in-itself/for-itself dichotomy then his position as a whole has counter intuitive consequences.

Consider for example his exposition of the possibility of belief. Here he insists that whatever is apprehended by reflective consciousness has already been constituted in its apprehension by pre-reflective consciousness. There is no such "thing" then as belief pure and simple which is not also belief as consciousness. Yet in so far as belief is as a pre-reflective consciousness of belief, Sartre claims that it will never coincide with itself in perfect identity, for consciousness modifies its objects. Thus: 11

On no account can we say that consciousness is consciousness or that belief is belief. Each term refers to the other and passes into the other, and yet each in turn is different from the other... Belief owing to the fact that it can exist only as troubled, exists from the start escaping from itself, as shattering the unity of all concepts in which one wants to enclose it.

10 Ibid p.xxvi
11 Ibid p.75
Thus consciousness defines itself as not being that of which it is aware. Consciousness of a table, for instance, is an awareness of one's difference from the table as it is in-itself. Just so, consciousness of belief is awareness of belief and is never total and sufficient, but rather troubled as belief - belief never fully attained - for the fullness of being escapes the for-itself by the intrusion of nothingness as the distance between belief and its apprehension in consciousness.

In positing the for-itself (human reality) as consciousness, and furthermore as firstly pre-reflective consciousness, which by definition cannot coincide with its objects, Sartre committed himself to a view that the in-itself is related to the for-itself by a negative dialectic. This view includes the structure of the for-itself as well. Thus the for-itself as the foundation of itself can only be this as the negation of not only the in-itself, but also of itself as a complete and necessary being; as being in-itself-for-itself. Thus;12

... in coming into existence human reality grasps itself as an incomplete being. It apprehends itself as being insofar as it is not, in the presence of the particular totality which it lacks and which it is in the form of not being it and which is what it is. Human reality is the perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence with itself which is never given...

Human reality arises then in the presence of its own totality or self as a lack of that totality.13 The prereflective cogito is therefore not merely an awareness of things which it is not; it is a self, but only as a lack of self, a lack which it would fulfill if it was in-itself-for-itself.

Again let us note that Sartre's doctrine here leads to strange conclusions. For instance, suffering as a relation of the self to itself, must on this account be considered as a lack of true suffering - one suffers from never suffering enough. Every expression of suffering, as in the previous example of belief, is a suffering in the presence of a full and total but absent suffering in-itself. Thus one

12 Ibid p.89
13 Ibid p90
suffers in the presence of a norm; the fullness of suffering which would vainly be what it is. The for-itself as this lack in the face of a desired but unobtainable totality is characterized by Sartre as the being of value. Thus the for-itself is the being of value as an unconditioned norm or totality towards which it flees in seeking to be its own foundation and justification. The for-itself as prereflective consciousness, is as the being of value, a differentiation of the for-itself into its consciousness of not being the very totality it seeks to be.

Thus Sartre cast the for-itself in the role of a consciousness revealing Being in-itself as that which it is not. The Being of the phenomenon is then related to the phenomenon of being by a consciousness mediated by a nothingness as the distance between the two modes of being. Transphenomenal being as the bridge between the in-itself and the for-itself is therefore defined subsequent to Sartre’s determination of the for-itself, as prereflective consciousness, that is, as consciousness in a dialectically negative relation both to itself and to the in-itself.

Sartre’s conception of a phenomenon would therefore appear to have little in common with Heidegger’s, even though they both claim to be phenomenologists. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein is not a dialectical one in the sense in which Sartre defines the for-itself; nor did he conceive of Dasein’s everyday existence as a lack of being, or of the pure phenomenon of being to be a greater plenitude of being such as Sartre interpreted the in-itself to be. Rather he assigned being equally both to semblance and to the pure phenomenon.

This major difference between Heidegger and Sartre can be seen to be reflected in Heidegger’s analysis of everyday being in the world, in particular where he analysed the insight into being that can be gleaned in the event of equipmental breakdown. This analysis in section fifteen and sixteen of Being and Time is of particular importance here, as it can be seen to illustrate usefully the two authors different conceptions of the nature of the preconceptual understanding embedded in human reality. In particular, by following through Heidegger’s
account here, let us note how he avoided Sartre's dualistic interpretation of Being by conceiving "negativities" to be possible without interpreting Dasein's being as dialectical.

Heidegger's main concern in these sections of *Being and Time* was to show the understanding that Dasein has of entities it encounters in the everyday world. In his definition of this understanding as that of readiness-to-hand of equipment, we should note the following peculiarity about such understanding. Given that an entity as ready-to-hand has its being in its use as something used in-order-to accomplish something or some particular end in view, then in accord with the phenomenological method of investigation as a method that involves letting entities show themselves as they are, the being of equipment will be seen as it is in itself only in its being used. That is to say, equipment is not encountered as equipment merely by looking at it, but rather by using it in one's everyday dealings. Thus...

the less we just stare at the hammer-thing and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment.

It must be noted however that in the seizing of the instrument in its use, it in a sense withdraws in order to be utilized. In hammering for instance, the worker is less aware of the being of the hammer than when he or she simply replaces it back in the tool box or rack. What over shadows the readiness to hand of the tool is the underlying concern pursued within the referential totality of the workaday world. Thus what is of particular concern to Dasein when it is involved in a pragmatic undertaking or concern is the final product aimed at through the use of the equipment. The being of the equipment in use towards this end is always swallowed up in the immediacy of its use covering over any explicit awareness of the equipment used at the very moment. This covering over is, Heidegger insists, endemic to the genuine nature of the ready-to-hand. If the being of the ready-to-hand is all the more authentic the more it recedes from view in the immediacy of its use, how then is this being rendered accessible to analysis?

14 *Being and Time* H69 p.98
Whereas equipment encountered in its positive mode recedes from explicit view in its use, where something is discovered as needed but not to be found, or as not needed and yet as in the way, then the readiness to hand of the entity is denied. This denial takes place through the withdrawal of the readiness to hand in favour of the entity being purely present-at-hand, or a lack of presence at hand as the case may be. In this way the entity rather than withdrawing from explicit view in use, explicitly 'announces' itself. Heidegger outlined three such ways in which it may be brought into explicit sight as: 1) Conspicuousness, 2) Obstinacy and 3) Obtrusiveness. Let us briefly look at each in turn.

An entity becomes conspicuous in the discovery of its uselessness for the purpose for which it was intended. As such the equipment is seen in its being unready-to-hand. A broken instrument is for instance encountered as not simply an instrument, but rather as an instrument which also has a thingly essence about it, in contrast to its being ready-to-hand as exhibited in the immediacy of use. Yet as a contrast, the thingly essence which Heidegger called the object's pure presence-at-hand, is encountered as an announcing of something that is always there in the ready-to-hand, yet it is covered over in a purely equipmental context. Thus in the repair of broken equipment the presence at hand of the object announced with the breakdown of the use context through equipmental failure recedes again in favour of the readiness-to-hand of it use.

An entity becomes obstinate when it is encountered as neither unusable nor missing, but as in the way of the on-going project. As something that is in the way, the object is seen explicitly as unready-to-hand, that is as present-at-hand. Here yet again as in the event of equipment's becoming conspicuous in breaking, the presence-at-hand of the object is not seen as a way of being totally distinct from being as ready-to-hand. As obstinate, it is something that must be 'seen to' before getting on with the job at hand. It is therefore encountered from out of an ongoing equipmental context, but as something which brings this context to a halt in view of its "obstinity".
For an entity to be encountered as obtrusive requires that it should press in on Dasein in such a way that its thingly being is encountered rather than its readiness-to-hand. This occurs, Heidegger suggests, in the situation where Dasein comes across something as missing, and in this way as unready-to-hand. In this context, the more Dasein needs but cannot find the missing item, all the more does that which is ready-to-hand become obstinately present-at-hand as "... something that cannot be budged without the thing that is missing." 15

In all three instances in which the readiness to hand of an entity withdraws in favour of its being present-at-hand, there is no suggestion that the entity is something sufficient unto itself in contrast to which Dasein finds itself superfluous and contingent. Rather the two ways of being of the entities are related as the presence-at-hand of the ready-to-hand.16 In this encounter there is not a split, but a unity between the two modes of being. This ontologically original way in which all entities are first given as ready-to-hand is a point we have seen Heidegger putting forward to support his case for aletheia as being the more original sense of truth than that of correspondence. It is as such, a view that is intimately tied up with his analysis of Dasein's being, as one that can achieve authenticity (true existence), by owning its mortal finitude in the recognition of the situation in which it must exist. This recognition was seen as one always given in and by Dasein's self-understanding. In this recognition the circle of understanding is completed, Dasein finds itself in an intelligible world in which it encounters itself and others and entities out of the integrity of its own being. Not even when Dasein is faced with that which is missing, in the way or simply as failing to function, does this circle of understanding break.

Heidegger's view of the unity of Dasein's world and that encountered in it sharply contrasts with Sartre's conception of human being as that which constitutes the necessary distance from the

15 Being and Time H73 p.103
16 In a similar vein see J.P. Fell Heidegger and Sartre an Essay on Being and Place (Columbia Un. Press 1979)
in-itself, so that the phenomenon can be manifest in contradistinction to itself. By contrasting the in-itself to the for-itself Sartre is forced to conceive of the for-itself never to be what it reflects - the in-itself of its own self included. Here, from the perspective of Heidegger's analysis, the ontological circle that he defined as constituting Dasein's authentic understanding as being-in-the-world, is broken not only into a dyad, but into a dualistic relation between two incompatible modes of being - the in-itself and the for-itself.

As Sartre rightfully recognised, given his formulation of the problematic, the "circuit of selfness" is one that will never be able to be completed. As such, his analysis points to human existence as one characterized as an always outstanding question, because it is never able to achieve an integral selfhood. For Heidegger, it is one always in question because it is constantly falling away from itself, and so must always be called back to its integral selfhood.

These two conceptions of what is given in the preconceptual understanding of human reality are clearly at odds. The fundamental differences can be insisted upon, even in places where Heidegger's work most nearly reflects Sartre's, for instance in his analysis of anxiety and dread in both Being and Time and in What is Metaphysics?. Let us look briefly at both of these cases.

In the analysis of section forty of Being and Time, Heidegger pointed to the ontologically distinctive nature of anxiety as a mood which in contrast to every other, brought Dasein face to face with itself in the absence of other entities. Thus, he saw that what is given as the 'object' of anxiety is not particular entities in the world, but in their absence the bare world as the when of Dasein's own Being. He described this encounter as one in which...

...nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself;

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}Being and Time H187 p.231}\]
the world has the character of completely lacking significance.

As Fell suggests, the withdrawal of entities in their worldly significance would seem to rend asunder the supposed original temporal unity between Dasein and entities in the world. On the one hand there would seem to be Dasein and its temporality as that about which it is anxious, and on the other, a-temporal entities that participate in the world. Here one would seem to have an account of human being, and of entities, that is scarcely different from Sartre's account of the experience of the nullity of the for-itself in its nauseous encounter with the in-itself.

I suggest however that any equation between the analysis of the two authors is superficial. For Heidegger saw that what was revealed in anxiety was the world as that Dasein exists as a potentiality to be. Entities other than Dasein melt into insignificance in comparison with what the mood reveals about Dasein's self. In anxiety the withdrawal of Dasein from out of an engagement with entities into one which embraces only itself, will therefore be one in which entities in the world are left lacking significance. This experience is not therefore, one of the a-temporality of entities such that they are neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, but of their failure to count in the experience of anxiety; which by its very nature, does not reveal entities as such - only Dasein's world.

This interpretation of the distinction between entities and the world as revealed in anxiety, is particularly important if the result of Heidegger's analysis is to be seen as distinctively different from from Sartre's conception of human existence. In the experience of nausea for instance, what is encountered is the sickening fullness of entities other than the for-itself: existence is revealed as insignificant in comparison to the fullness of the in-itself. In anxiety as outlined in Being and Nothingness, the same distinction between the two modes of

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18 op.cit. p.110-112
19 Being and Time p.186 p.231
20 Fell op.cit. p159ff
being applies; that in the face of which the for-itself is anxious are the possibilities that it has as opposed to the fullness of the in-itself.21 That Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety does differ from Sartre’s in this way can be seen in the following quote:22

That in the face of which Dasein is anxious is nothing ready-to-hand within the world. But this “nothing ready-to-hand”, which only our everyday circumspective discourse understands, is not totally nothing. The “nothing” of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial “something”-in-the-world. Ontologically, however, the world belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. So if the “nothing”-that is, the world as such-exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.

Heidegger’s use of “nothing” here as equivalent to “world” is indicative of the way it is to be interpreted in What is Metaphysics?, the most existentialist sounding of all texts. A text furthermore, which clearly points to the origin of Sartre’s thought in both Nausea and Being and Nothingness. There he wrote:23

Only on the basis of the original manifestness of Nothing can our human Da-sein advance towards and enter into what-is. But insofar as Da-sein naturally relates to what-is, as that which it is not and which itself is, Dasein qua Da-sein always proceeds from Nothing as manifest.

Here, tempting as it is to collapse nothing and what-is into a dialectical duality between the reflection of what is by what it is not, such an interpretation can, and I believe, must be avoided if Heidegger’s project is not to be distorted. If “nothing” is here seen as equivalent to what, in Being and Time, Heidegger called the “world”, then the particularly Sartrean sounding edge to what he is saying here is blunted. For then the nihilating of nothingness in dread, reveals the inner unity between what-is and nothing, that is the relation between entities and the world is revealed in that,”... nothing shows itself as essentially belonging to what is while this is slipping away

21 op.cit.p.29
22 Ibid
23 op.cit. p.370
in totality." What is revealed in dread is then the original mutuality between nothingness and what is given through it. This mutuality was explored in *Being and Time* as the temporal presentation of entities either as present-at-hand or as ready-to-hand.

What appears to be new in *What in Metaphysics?* is however, Heidegger's contrasting entities encountered in the world as completely other than the world, or nothingness, from out of which they are encountered. But even this characterization is not entirely new, for it points to what in *Being and Time* he defined as Dasein's facticity, that is, its throwness into the world amidst entities which it encounters there. According to this conception the completely "other" is fully captured in Heidegger's insistence on Dasein's ontological difference from entities in the world, a difference which led him to formulate its structural definition as existentiale rather than categorical. Thus not even these most Sartrean sounding passages will force the hermeneutic circle to break into a negative dialectic.

The fundamental difference between Heidegger's and Sartre's conception of what is revealed in anxiety is reflected in their accounts of temporality. These accounts can be seen as arising from different conceptions, not only of what the ontological difference between human being and other entities is, but also how it is effected. As is clear from his conception of the dialectical interplay between the in-itself and the for-itself, Sartre sought to bridge the ontological difference via a dialectical tension wrought in the existence of what he called transphenomenal being. The existence of this transphenomenal being was conceived to be a sheer nothingness, reflecting in its own emptiness the fullness of the in-itself. This relation held for not only the in-itself of things, but also of the self of the reflecting consciousness. Sartre conceived of this reflective tension as the temporal being of the transphenomenal subject, a being which allowed not only presence to self, but also to other entities.

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24 op. cit. p.368
25 *Being and Nothingness* p.177
Clearly indebted to Heidegger, Sartre's analysis of the temporality of the for-itself is one which takes the past, present and future, as ek-stasis of the for-itself, that is, as ways in which the for-itself goes 'beyond' itself. Let us then briefly look at, and compare the two authors account of the temporality of the subject. In a way strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche's view of the revengeful spirit, Sartre conceived of the past as a consumed possibility for existence, for which one must assume total responsibility without being able to change it. The past is the for-itself become in-itself.\(^{26}\)

If I cannot re-enter into the past, it is not because some magical power puts it beyond my realm but simply because it is in-itself and because I am for-myself. The past is what I am without being able to live it. The past is substance.

The past is then the contingent unalterable fact that one was as one was. It is the for-itself transformed and fixed into an in-itself that is therefore forever beyond the reach of the for-itself. As a transformed way of being for itself, the past points to the present as a way of being in which the for-itself is aware of the in-itself - but again just as it encounters other entities, it is as present to the past only as that which it is not.\(^{27}\)

The For-itself constitutes itself outside in terms of the thing as the negation of that thing; thus its first relation with being-in-itself is negation. It "is" in the mode of the For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it reveals itself as not being being ... The present is precisely this negation of being ... The For-itself is present to being in the form of flight; the Present is a perpetual flight in the face of being. Thus we have precisely defined the fundamental meaning of the present: the Present is not.

The conception of the present as a perpetual flight from what is presented to the subject, both from out of the past and in the given situation, leaves the future to be interpreted as that towards which the for-itself flees. This flight has then two impelling "forces". First, the explosion/repulsion of the for-itself from its possible ways of being as they congeal into the actuality of the present, as that to

\(^{26}\)Ibid p.119  
\(^{27}\)Ibid p.123
which the for-itself is privy only by not being that presented as such. The present is found in the solidification of this present into the in-itself of the past, combining to compel the For-itself to 'prospect' into the future toward a unity with itself, denied in the given past and present. Such a unity, as one denied but ever sought for, is that which Sartre saw to animate the dialectical tension of transphenomenal being.

In contrast to Sartre's account, Heidegger's conception of the temporality of Dasein is one which does not conceive of such insoluble tensions as Sartre's dialectic displays. The difference lies in the conceived unity not only between each exstasis of time, but also in what is given in them. For as has been shown, Heidegger took the past, and shook it free from its tyrannical influence over existence by interpreting it not as a congealed and fixed field of past, and therefore exhausted possibilities, but as a field of ever new ways of understanding the present. The resolute Dasein was not one which found itself locked out of, but having access to the past by taking it up into its present existence. In his interpretation of the past Heidegger also differed from Sartre. He saw it as arising not from out of negation, but from Dasein's understanding of its situation as one in which it can accomplish possibilities for its existence. The present is given in the presentation of Dasein's current situation which it both understands and in which it pursues possible ends. The nature of the possible, as that given to Dasein through its awareness of its mortal finitude, contrasts to Sartre's open ended desperate flight of the for-itself towards the never achievable for-itself-in-itself. Concomitant with this view of the present, Heidegger's analysis of the future reveals it to be manifest as the prospecting of possible ways of existing in a given situation, and hence not as a flight away from, but towards a unity with what it discovers, and takes up in the past and in present. In his account then, time does not congeal into the past nor into the 'other' as it presents itself via opposition to Dasein as that

\[28\text{This for instance is the light in which his Kant Buch can be interpreted: In accord with his outline of historicity in Being and Time esp.H396-397 p.448-449}\]
which it is not. Historicity therefore, as the taking up and repeating of these repeatable possibilities for existence given from out of the past as future that is possible, and so as an achievable way of existing, which bridges the chasm of Sartre's dualism; the ontological difference is articulated not by dialectics, but by historicity. This then is the major difference between the two accounts of human being, reflected as it is in the different conceptions of what constitutes a phenomenon.

Some Results and Inadequacies in both Heidegger's and Sartre's Philosophical Positions

In the earlier sections of Being and Nothingness Sartre conceived of the for-itself as structured in such a way as always to be seeking the ultimate goal of being as an in-itself-for-itself. Such a way of being would be its own foundation and justification. However as this resolution is impossible, human reality is a constant struggle for the unobtainable. Yet whilst Sartre's philosophical analysis is unable to foresee any resolution of this struggle, he does offer two alternative possibilities. The struggle can be if not overcome, then at least understood metaphysically, or it could be resolved ethically. History shows Sartre to have adopted the latter strategy.29

The possibility of an ethical resolution involves what in a footnote he called a "radical conversion".30 The crux of the conversion is that human reality be recognized for what it is - as a struggle for the unobtainable - and thereby be modified by the choice of an obtainable goal that is deliberately chosen. But given Sartre's previous analysis of the for-itself, it is necessary to ask what if any goal is obtainable? Are not all values precluded from full concrete instantiation by the very structure of the for-itself as the very being that brought them into existence in the first place? Consider for instance, the way Sartre defined value early on in Being and Nothingness31:

29 Being and Nothingness p.625ff. And also Existentialism and Humanism trans. P. Mairret (Eyre Methuen London 1975)
30 Being and Nothingness p.412 footnote
31 op. cit. p.92-93
Value is affected with the double character, which moralists have very inadequately explained, of being both unconditionally and not being. Qua value indeed, value has being, but this normative existent does not have to be precisely as reality. Its being is to be value, that is, not to be being ... Yet ... we must recognize that this being which is beyond being must possess being in some way at least. These considerations suffice to make us admit that the human reality is that by which values arrive in the world.

What concerns us here is the implication of Sartre's conclusion, for just prior to this passage, he defined the for-itself as the being of value in the sense of being (existing) as an unconditioned totality towards which it flees, in an effort to be its own justification and foundation. If therefore, as Sartre indicates, the structure of the for-itself is conceived as value, then value will be infected with the internal negation that is characteristic of the for-itself. Thus the for-itself as value will be separated from itself by nothingness. Hence he can argue the double aspect of value is due to the nature of the for-itself, which is such as to structurally inhibit the full attainment of any value in itself - for the being of value as unconditioned rests on the fact that nothingness separates the for-itself from the in-itself preventing the attainment of an in-itself-for-itself unity.

In the light of this view of the nature of value, any value would seem to be one that is intrinsically unobtainable, in the sense of being realized only to an unsatisfactory degree. This is a point which Thomas Anderson in his book, The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics\(^\text{32}\) seems to overlook. For though he recognizes value per se to arise out of human freedom, he seems willing to accept the possibility that the deliberate pursuit of lesser goals may provide a solution to the fruitless pursuit of the ever-unattainable greater goal of total self-hood. Thus he draws a distinction between the ultimate goal of god-hood, and the lesser values that this goal may spawn if pursued indirectly; for example through the accumulation of wealth, power, status etc.\(^\text{33}\) It is this deliberate pursuit of lesser goals which

\[^{32}\text{Published by (The Regents Press Kansas 1979)}\]

\[^{33}\text{op.cit. p.23ff esp. p.33}\]
Anderson sees as the essence of authentic existence. Such existence enabled by a radical conversion involves the explicit recognition given in what Sartre called pure reflection, that one's self is the source of all value. The untenability of Anderson's view here is one that I see to be reflected in Sartre's problematic generally. To understand this point more clearly let us pursue the 'logic' of Sartre's position more fully.

In **Being and Nothingness** Sartre contrasted the awareness given in pure reflection to that of impure reflection, which either through bad faith, either as in emotion or through deliberate choice, fails to recognize the individual's responsibility for its own existence. The self-awareness given in pure reflection is then, an owning up to the essential nature of one's being. This nature is one we have seen defined as existence, as one made possible by the freedom of the for-itself. An insight into the nature of authentic existence is found in Sartre's notion of play as opposed to the spirit of seriousness. Early in **Being and Nothingness** Sartre gave as an example of bad faith, the luckless waiter who balances a tray a little too well, and walks a little too stiffly to be believed - he is playing at being a waiter, but he is playing in the spirit of seriousness, trying to be a waiter in an impossible sense. In contrast to inauthentic play, an authentic playing would be one, in which the waiter accepted the impossibility of ever actually attaining to be a waiter as an in-itself-for-itself actuality, and also accepts that he/she non-the-less cannot escape the compulsion to try to be just that. This reflective acceptance presumably brings with it the realization that one's waiting on customers is but the result of one's own choice, and furthermore, has no other meaning than that which one gives it oneself. The suggestion here is that to look for meaning and roles other than those which one creates in choosing them, is to lapse into bad faith - to look for a justification beyond one's having freely chosen to undertake them. The source and justification of all values lies therefore in the freedom from out of which they arose, the freedom of the for-itself.

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34 **Being and Nothingness** P. 59
The whole of Being and Nothingness can be seen as a panegyric to this freedom of the for-itself; and so too can Sartre's ethical thought. The results of Sartre's analysis of the for-itself showed it to be structured as freedom. Indeed only as such is it possible to conceive of the for-itself as a flight towards the elusive goal of being the ground for its own being. But how elusive would this goal be, if it is conceived as the effort to ground one's being in the very freedom out of which it arises, by successively removing restrictions on that freedom? Such restrictions as political repression, hunger and squalor, are conditions that seem to bind human freedom. Remove these restrictions, and freedom as the ground of one's being is facilitated; such is the kernel of Sartre's thinking on ethics in his lecture on humanism. Let us look at how he developed this position.

In accord with Being and Nothingness Sartre states in his lecture than man has no universal nature. "Man" he states, is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only insofar as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.

In the light of this conception, Sartre pointed two universal aspects of human existence that are true apriori, the universality of the human condition - the necessity to labour, and to die. Conceiving these necessities as a limitation on freedom, Sartre went on to assert that all human purpose is of universal value in being an attempt to surpass or widen these limitations. We can see then, that Sartre is pedalling an ethic of liberation from any restriction that binds the deliberate exercise of freedom. Such oppression as arises from social and physical obstacles to the exercise of the free choice of what one wants to be are, therefore, to be overcome, as is self-deception. What is the basis for Sartre's stand?

If as was shown in Being and Nothingness, freedom alone is the

35 Existentialism and Humanism trans. P. Mairet (Eyre Methuen London 1975) see esp. p.51
36 op.cit. p.41
37 Ibid p.46
basis not only of human choice, but also of existence, then it is also the original source of value. Thus, just as the choice of finding something to be of value depends on my being free to choose, I must also therefore value freedom, or vitiate my choice. Thus Sartre is arguing that since one finds some things to be of value, and value rests in freedom, then one should value freedom. The choice to value freedom is best because it is consistent with the way things are, it is as such a coherent choice. That is, insofar as one sees that it is only through the exercise of one's freedom that values arise in the first place, then one will see a consistency in valuing that freedom.

Sartre takes the demand for consistency as not only the mark of sound reasoning, but in the context of his ontology of the for-itself, also of authenticity/good faith. That is, to exist authentically is to recognize the role of freedom in one's existence, and consequently to value it above all else.

Sartre sought to avoid his theory's implying any egotistical subjectivism by pointing to if not the communal other, then to the existence of others per se. In Being and Nothingness, the pre-reflective cogito was seen to be the basis for subsequent self-reflective awareness of oneself, as distinct from things and from others. This view is repeated in simplified form in the lecture:

... the subjectivity which we postulate as the standard of truth is no narrow individual subjectivism ... it is not only one's self that one discovers in the cogito, but those of others too. ... Thus man who directly discovers himself in the cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence.

Thus it is in the moment of self-discovery, that one is confronted with the freedom of the other which is either in conflict or complicity with

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38 Ibid p.51
39 Anderson op.cit. p.46
40 R.J. Bernstein makes this point in his book Praxis and Action (Contemporary Philosophies of Human action (Uni. of Pennysylvania Press Philadelphia 1971) This ref: p.155
41 Existentialism and Humanism p.51
42 op.cit. p.45
In identifying the other in this way Sartre hoped to escape solipsism, a hope incidentally, that has not gone unchallenged. On the basis of this inter-subjectivity founded and experienced through freedom, Sartre sought to logically argue for the acclamation of an ethic of universal freedom that avoided the peril of subjective relativism. That he saw his ethic to avoid such a relativism is clear. His reasoning runs as follows. As was noted earlier, if on reflection it is seen that only through the exercise of one's freedom do values arise in the world, then it would logically be consistent to value that freedom, so too must one value the other's freedom to the extent that one's identity is dependent on him or her. That is, "... it is in this world (of inter-subjectivity) that man has to decide what he is, and what others are." In this sense Sartre's apparently grotesque claim in the opening pages of the lecture, that in choosing one chooses for all mankind, can be seen to have logical cogency provided of course, that one accepts his ontological arguments for inter-subjectivity.

Sartre's argument for his ethic has therefore a logic to it, one that is based on the ontological structure of the for-itself, with the added premise that one ought to be consistent. It is this final premise which seeks to bridge the ontological abyss between the in-itself and the for-itself. That this is indeed Sartre's intention cannot be doubted; whether it succeeds is another point, for in the light of the preceding analysis of his work, it would seem that in effect it does not succeed.

43 In his book The Problem of Embodiment (Martinus Nijhof/The Hague 1971) p.123-124 Richard Zaner for example, challenges Sartre's account of relations with others in Being and Nothingness, asserting that it assumes what it sets out to demonstrate. Namely he sees that one is aware of being an object in the sight of another, and of one's viewing another as an object, but one is not aware of the experience of the other in his apprehension of his-self being seen as an object. To be aware of this experience requires taking up an external position as an observer outside the concrete situation, whilst also being part of it. Given that this is impossible, Zaner sees Sartre's account to fail, leaving the purported communality of human existence there as unfounded.

44 Existentialism and Humanism p.45
45 Ibid p.29
There are, I think, at least three major objections to Sartre's attempt to vault the ontological abyss using ethics as his pole. In developing these objections, I shall show that his analysis amounts to an attempt by human being to plug the ontological gap purely of its own accord, an effort in short, that tries to force what is into its own unjustifiable conception of what ought to be. This criticism in effect amounts to showing his ethics to fall prey to a voluntaristic subjectivism, wherein not only is there only historical man, but he is without justification for his existence no matter how he resolves to be. Let us then look at these objections.

The first objection to note is as Bernstein in his book Theory and Praxis has pointed out, it seems nonsensical to exhort human beings to choose freedom as outlined in Being and Nothingness, for man is only by virtue of being free, and this whether he chooses to recognize it or not.46 This objection is one which seems irrefutable, but it is not the most telling one.

The second objection to Sartre's proposed ethic is, that it necessarily fails to avoid subjectivism. For as Anderson recognizes, 47 the only justification Sartre can give for his championing of freedom, is that in so doing he is being logically consistent. But as Bernstein objects,48 Sartre's insistence on consistency here is baseless. There is simply no evidence for, but all too much against consistency being a choice that escapes bad faith. This can be seen if the nature of Sartre's project is kept in mind. It will be recalled, that unlike Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time, that sees Dasein to be both in the truth and in untruth in an ontological sense, Sartre's attempted resolution of the duality between the in-itself and the for-itself is a moral one that seeks to surmount an abyss that has been constructed ontologically. Sartre's solution is to accept the abyss on the one hand and to argue for its moral closure on the other. If Bernstein is correct however, then rather than vaulting the abyss,

46 op.cit. p.152
47 The Structure and Foundation of Sartrean Ethics p.46
48 Praxis and Action foote note p.54-55
Sartre plummets into it; for having constructed the abyss and identified any attempt to overcome it as bad faith, as for example the luckless waiter did in seeking to be a waiter in-itself-for-itself, Sartre then constructs an ethic that needs be, attempts to do just that. Even good faith, based on the recognition of the fact that there is no justification (ground) for being what one is, still seeks justification by being consistent in pursuing and further enabling the exercise of the very freedom that is as the groundlessness of one's being: So too, good faith must founder. Neither the lecture on humanism nor Being and Nothingness, can give any reason why one should choose one value over another in the ever ongoing pursuit for full self-hood. In neither text can Sartre therefore defend his account against a charge of engendering a vicious subjective relativism.

The third objection I want to raise against Sartre's account of ethics is related to the second, in that it points to his confusion of two realms of analysis; the ontico-historical and the apriori ontological. This confusion can be seen in his effort to close an ontological abyss by an ethical imperative.49 Ironically this charge brings to notice that, contrary to his insistence in Being and Nothingness, it is he, Sartre himself, not Heidegger, who is guilty of mixing ethics and ontology together.50 Whilst it may be objected that both authors are guilty of this charge, let us consider the differences between what each author thought to be the nature of authenticity.

According to Sartre's account the following description would seem characteristic of good faith. It is a recognition by the individual, of its necessary perpetual failure ever to be able to achieve complete self-unity. It is furthermore, a conscious choice, the deliberate choosing of which is necessitated by one's constant confrontation with one's alienation not only from one's-self, but from both other human beings as well as things in the world. Heidegger's analysis of authenticity on the other hand, pointed to Dasein's recognizing its own completeness as already given in the world; it recognizes both things

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49 op.cit. p.153-154
50 Being and Nothingness p.80
and others out of a mutuality. Here there is no ontological gap to be bridged, there is only the question of how Dasein is to act existentially, that is of what it will resolve to do. This, as Heidegger insisted, is an existentiell question, one that is existentially, that is ontologically constituted by Dasein's being as a potentiality for existence. In this context it is important to note that this potentiality as authentic, is one ontologically given with regard to the integrity of self and others. Heidegger's view of authenticity is therefore one which emerges from out of his analysis of Dasein's being as a unity. If ethical considerations are buried in his ontology, as we must of course acknowledge, then they are there in and as part of the ontologically prior unity of its being. This is in contrast to Sartre's effort to super-impose an ethical solution to a traditionally conceived ontology.

This difference between the two projects is one that arises from the heart of their different conceptions of human existence. This contrast is one we saw reflected in the two differing views of what and how a phenomenon is. This difference can be boldly stated as grounded in the contrast between a dialectical and a hermeneutic conception of the transcendental subject of human reality. Sartre's dialectical method, as reflected in his conception of the transphenomenality of being via the negative dialectic between the for-itself and the in-itself, is a method and a view of being that arises from out of an intuition of the duality of being, as consisting of being in-itself on one hand, and being for-itself on the other. His effort to bridge this duality by the transphenomenality of the for-itself, is therefore, an effort to heal a broken self in a broken world into a unity that embraces both.

Regardless of its success, his proposed solution must be seen to rely on the purely logical consistency of his arguments. For Heidegger

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51 This acknowledgment flows out of Heidegger's temporalizing of Kant's Transcendental Ego; see Chapter two.

52 Traditional in the sense that it works from out of what is effectively a Cartesian subject/object epistemological standpoint.
on the other hand, the givenness of the world in its original unity with entities encountered in it, is always prior to the logical splitting of the unity via negation: 53

The Not does not come into being through negation, but negation through the Not, which derives from the nihilation of Nothing. Nor is negation only a mode of Nihilating behaviour, that is, behaviour based on the nihilation of Nothing. If this breaks the sovereignty of reason in the field of inquiry into Nothing and Being then the fate of the rule of "logic" in philosophy is also decided. Nothing is the source of negation, not the other way about ... the very idea of "logic" disintegrates in the vortex of a more original questioning.

To the extent that Sartre's thought about the nature of human existence remained one that was cast into a dualism, which he sought to heal into a dyadic unity via dialectic, from the standpoint of fundamental ontology his work will always lack originality in the sense of not returning to the hermeneutic unity at the basis of human reality. 54

The distance between Heidegger and Sartre could not seem greater. We have seen that Sartre's method reflects a difference from Heidegger's conception of human being, a view we have seen as possibly developed out of Heidegger's own account of anxiety in Being and Time and "What Is Metaphysics?" Sartre's conception of temporality, and finally his attempt to heal the ontological rift between the in-itself and the for-itself ethically, was seen to differ from Heidegger's analysis. Wherein then can their similarity lie but in the one point about which they both broadly agreed - that the meaning of Being was accessible through an analysis of human existence. A methodological conception of philosophy which we have seen to belie Kant's influence over Heidegger, and here we must add, subsequently Sartre's work also.

In chapter two, this influence was seen to lie in Heidegger's execution of his investigation into the meaning of Being, via an analysis of Dasein's subjectivity in a way akin to Kant's analysis of

53 "What is Metaphysics?" trans. R.F.C. Hull and A. Crick in Existence and Being p.353ff This ref: p.372
54 J. Fell develops this point at length in his Heidegger and Sartre Ch.7
the transcendental subjectivity of the subject. In fact Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time* was one which sought to exhibit the horizon of the meaning of Being as time.\(^{55}\) That is, to the extent that Being was intelligible, Heidegger saw this intelligibility to be given as time itself. In effect the analysis of Dasein was therefore, an explication of this intelligibility of Being given in and through Dasein's being as temporality. As we saw in chapter three, this analysis yielded the conception of Dasein as a temporal being, capable of existing either authentically or inauthentically. Of these two ways of existing, his analysis showed that authenticity conceived as the moment of vision is ontologically constitutive of whatever can be in a time.\(^{56}\) It is here, at the pinnacle of his Dasein analysis, that both an inadequacy and an ambiguity emerges from out of his work — namely, wherein, if at all, does Dasein constituted as temporality differ from Being itself? Or as asked from the point of view of fundamental ontology, what exactly is revealed in the moment of vision? Is it seen that Dasein is literally man abandoned to his own devices in the realm of history? Or does the "moment" reveal that in any situation, man is never alone, but in the constant presence of Being revealing itself through his own Dasein?

From a consideration of the historical evolution of Heidegger's thought it is clear that he saw the second answer as the one he was pursuing. It is equally clear however that this is not the only way his analysis can be interpreted. It is possible for instance, to see that his analysis has shown that it is Dasein alone, who as far as it is possible for it to do so, reveals or conceals entities, itself included. From this point of view, as the being that discovers entities in the situation it reveals itself to be in through its temporal projection of the world, Dasein would seem to be fully autonomous in the historical field in which it must exist. Whilst this autonomy clearly does not extend to being able to decide whether or not it could be as Dasein, except in the case of contemplated suicide, (but

\(^{55}\) op.cit. H1 p.19

\(^{56}\) Ibid H338 p.387-388
even here (though this after the fact of its existence), it must be admitted to extend to decisions about the extent to which Dasein reveals entities, and takes over its own tradition. In these two important senses at least, the exercise of Dasein's own volition clearly determines what and how situations and entities are encountered, and so how they participate in Being, i.e. in the world. In this sense Being would seem to be limited to providing Dasein the where-withal of its ontological constitution, and beyond that nothing else; Dasein being in effect free for its own accidents and its own self-chosen fate.

Here we can detect the results of the second major influence of tradition in Heidegger's thought, that of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. His debt to both of these thinkers for his conception of temporality underlying the concept of the truth of Dasein's existence as given in authentic resolve has already been discussed in chapter three. In the course of Heidegger's analysis, however, the unity between Being in its intelligibility, and Dasein's own self-understanding in authentic resolve, tends to conflate into what is given in Dasein's present situation to which it is resolved. In the light of this conflation, Dasein's historicity can be interpreted as a process of self-making in the lesser sense of autonomy outlined above. Such a conception is bolstered by passages such as the following in The Essence of Reasons:

As the totality of what exists for the sake of a Dasein at any given time, the world is brought by Dasein before Dasein itself. This "bringing itself before itself" of the world is the primordial project of the possibilities of Dasein, insofar as Dasein can relate itself to being from within the midst of being. The project of the world, though it does not grasp what is projected explicitly, does throw the projected world over being. This, in turn, allows being to manifest itself. The happening of the projecting "throwing the world over being" we call Being-in-the-world.

Here Dasein's "throwing the world over being", sounds very Sartrean, in that according to such a conception, the significance of entities would seem to rest primarily in the projecting of Dasein within which Being

57 op.cit. (Northwestern Uni Press Evanston 1969) This ref: p.89
is constrained. If significance is rooted in Dasein in this way, what then is there to deny the conclusion that, as historical, it is a self-making or a self-creation in a similar sense that Nietzsche concluded human existence to be?

Whilst "authenticity" never meant "self-creation" for Heidegger, at least not in Nietzsche's radical sense, he still conceived Dasein to have its own "superior power".\(^{58}\)

If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own superior power, the power of its finite freedom, which 'is' only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over its powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and can thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed.

What then is this superior power of finite freedom? Is it a self-making within the boundary of a given situation and if it is, how are the limits of such a situation to be known when there are no absolutes to curtail the flight of the imagination. Indeed if Dasein is alone, then the limits of the situation are boundaries which given time will be pushed further back as more and more of the world falls under its command, eg. as science cures disease, food shortages, political conflicts and so on, these 'barriers' to human finitude will fall, and so no longer take part in forming the limits of any situation that Dasein finds itself in. But is this not precisely Sartre's point - that humankind is alone; all that remains is that this be recognised and the limitations on its freedom be removed?\(^{59}\)

The apparent conflation of Dasein with Being, where Being is known only as the limit, given as temporal Dasein who exists within existentiale but not existentiell limitations, can therefore, be seen as the point of entry for the existentialist interpretation of the early Heidegger. It is an interpretation of Heidegger's work which Sartre's analysis in Being and Nothingness, rooted as it is in a different conception of what is given in anxiety, nonetheless develops to its

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\(^{58}\) *Being and Time* H384 p.436

\(^{59}\) *Existentialism and Humanism* p.34
extreme limit. As I have intimated earlier, however, this interpretation of Heidegger's work as one that in effect conflates Being with Dasein, and Dasein with man, is not the only one. There still remains the possibility of seeing a difference between Being, Dasein and man such that as the "there" of Being, the Dasein in man never allows him to be alone, but always in the presence of Being. For such a conception to emerge, however, the limitations of the traditional influences on Heidegger's thought had first to be identified and then expunged. This process of immanent critique was one which exercised Heidegger throughout his career. In fact it was not until the early forties, where the distinguishing marks of his "later thought" begin to show their full consequences, that the influences of Kant, Kierkegaard and most important of all, finally Nietzsche, fall away. To see the beginning of this long process of critique however, we need look only as far as his essay "On The Essence of Truth" published in 1930. In the next chapter we shall investigate how this essay and two other central texts which followed, can be seen as successive stages in the evolution of his thought, which gradually eliminated all the voluntaristic elements in the conception of truth as aletheia.

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It cannot pass without notice that the evolution in Heidegger's thought is one which, following his own cue has been termed "the reversal", or "Kehre". Different interpreters offer diverse accounts of the place and nature of this change in Heidegger's thought, all accounts having a modicum of success. The most authoritative and comprehensive account is, however, that given by Heidegger himself, not only in his scattered remarks on the inadequacies of his early thinking, but also in his account of the unity of his entire thought given in the foreword to Richardson's Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought. In this foreword he pointed to the inception of the turn to be ten years prior to his Letter on Humanism, presented in a lecture series in 1937-38. He outlines the exact nature of the turn as one in which ...

Man comes into question ... in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective; man in his relation to Being — seen in the reversal: and its truth in relation to Man.

This fundamental consideration is one which he stresses does not abandon but continues the central concern of Being and Time. We must

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1. Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought (Martinus Nijhof/The Hague 1963)
2. This letter is published translated by F. Capuzzi in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings ( Routledge and Kegan Paul 1979) pp. 189ff
3. These lectures are to my knowledge not yet available in translation.
4. Quoted in Richardson p. xx.
5. This continuity of his early and later thought is one he formulated as follows: "Only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But (the thought of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II." (Richardson xxii)
beware however, lest this formulation of the nature of the reversal, or even Heidegger's insistence on dating it so precisely, lead us to consider the turn as unproblematic in either its inception or its conception, for it is neither; both have a long period of evolution in the author's thought as his description of Being and Time as non-subjectivist testifies.6 This ascription of Being and Time, one most likely elicited in response to interpreters who insist that the reversal in his thought implies an abandonment of his original early work, is interesting for two reasons. Firstly it points to a conception of reversal already at work in Being and Time. It is a conception which must however, be deemed inadequate for it is not the one to which Heidegger pointed as the explicit reversal itself as it occurred in his writings. Secondly, given that this early reversal was inadequately conceived and executed, there must be one or more reasons for this failure.

Heidegger's own view, that language failed the latter portions of Being and Time, hence its remaining a shortened torso of its original ambitious plan, must be recognized as at least an indication of the nature of this failure. Given that there is a gap in time between the early attempt, and the later more successful analysis of the relation between Dasein and Being, we can safely assume that if, in the intervening period, Heidegger remained pre-occupied with the problem of this relation, then his successive writings will show the evolving intermediate stages of this conception as we move from his early to his later works. As such, each successive text could be interpreted as an attempt to formulate the relation of Dasein to Being and so of aletheia, in a way that would eliminate the shortcomings of previous attempts. Interpreted in this way, each inquiry would, as a further probing of the Being - Dasein relation, be yet a further turn in the hermeneutic spiral of interpretation, a turn that lessens its gyre. To give such

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6 Ibid p.XVIII
an account of his work is the task of this chapter. The concern of this chapter will therefore be to deal with this evolution in Heidegger's thought as it occurred in his three main essays, "On The Essence of Truth", "The Origin of the Work of Art" and An Introduction to Metaphysics. These three essays will each in turn be interpreted as representing successive stages on the way to Heidegger's mature conception of truth, which, as we shall see in chapters six and seven, is one which avoids all traces of voluntarism.

To help demonstrate the evolution of Heidegger's thought in this way, we will employ Don Idhe's analogy of the field of vision. This analogy is one which he developed in his article "Phenomenology and the Later Heidegger" for the purpose of interpreting Heidegger's essay "Conversation on a Country Path". This analogy has been chosen as its central purpose, that of displaying the intelligibility of "horizons - phenomenon" as Idhe employs it, consonant with the Dasein - Being relationship that we have taken as Heidegger's continuing concern. In contrast to Idhe however, the analogy will be employed here, not as an aid to interpreting Heidegger's work "Conversation on a Country Path", but first the essay "On the Essence of Truth", and subsequently "The Origin of the Work of Art" and An Introduction to Metaphysics.

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7 It is in this sense that I interpret Richardson's imputation that the "Kehre" occurred in "On the Essence of Truth". Conceived as it was, well before the elimination of all strains of voluntarism from Heidegger's thought, this essay can be seen to take a step beyond the Dasein - Being relation outlined in Being and Time.


10 Philosophy Today Spring 1974 p.19-31

11 in Discourse on Thinking (Harper and Row New York 1966)
The Literal Description of the Field of Vision.

Idhe began his phenomenological description of the field of vision with the following illustration and characterization.

(A): Centre of visual field.

(B): Expanse of visual field.

(C): Limit or boundary of visual field.

(D): Beyond the visual field - nothing.

"The visual field is", he writes, 12 first the totality of or expanse of, what is visually present "before me". It may be thought of as a visual "opening" to the world. It lies before me and within it there comes into being whatever visual presences I may discern.

The field of vision is therefore a structured one; it has a centre of focus as that upon which I am focussing my attention (when my attention is focussed as it not always is). What my sight is focussed on, area (A), is on reflection, seen to be situated from out of the context of a larger expanse of the visual field seen as background, that is as area (B). Taking this background into account one can see that there is a limit to it, a boundary (C), beyond which one literally sees nothing; this area which surrounds but is excluded from the visual field is area (D). 13

The horizons-phenomenon of interest to Idhe is given as the inter-relation of each of these areas as they flicker and fade one into the other. This interrelation is one that he sees occurring in two dimensions. The first dimension is encountered from out of the transcendence of every entity seen at the centre of the field of

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12 op.cit. p.24
13 Ibid p.25
vision. By "transcendence" what is meant here is that the possible profiles in which the entity may be seen, is always greater than the aspect from out of which it is given; the presence of one profile implies the actual absence of another. In this sense the entity transcends the way it is given in any one profile. 14

The second dimension of the horizons-phenomenon is manifest in two ways. Normally they can be understood as the relation of the figure to its ground, and vice versa. In the context of using the visual field as an analogy, however, this relation will be interpreted in respect of that given in the entire visual field as the figure in respect to what it does, in relation to that which surrounds and situates it. In effect this amounts to a shift in both the focus and the sight or place (there!) of the viewer. The shift in focus results in areas (A), (B) and (C) rather than (A) alone being included in what is thought of as the figure, and area (D) is to be thought of as the ground. The shift in site places the viewer within the realm of the visual field. This change will become clearer when the analogy is used to engage Heidegger's work.

The two ways in which the ground and figure relation can be thought are but two possible ways of reading the visual analogy. In the first instance it can be read by looking from the inside areas (A), (B) and (C), considering them in respect of what they 'do' to area (D) which surrounds them. Just as in the first dimension where an object is seen to exceed the perspective from which it is sighted, so too, in this reading, the areas (A), (B) and (C) can be interpreted as a limited view of the greater area (D). In this sense areas (A), (B) and (C) can be interpreted as seen only against a more encompassing unintelligible background, area (D), as in the more usual interpretation of the figure to ground relation.

The other way in which the horizons-phenomenon is manifest, is as a reversal of the figure-to-ground relation. It can be understood as a change of emphasis from what is given in the figure, to what can be

14 Ibid
said the ground does in respect to the figure. According to such an emphasis, it is possible to see that area (D) can be said to situate the field of vision which it surrounds, that is, area (C) inwards. In this sense, area (D) can be seen to be that which situates and allows the field of vision to be what it is in the same way that (B) situates (A), as in the more usual interpretation of the ground to figure relation.

These then are the (slightly amended) main features of Idhe's analysis of the visual field that are of concern to us. Before embarking on its use in interpreting the main themes presented in "On the Essence of Truth", let us first explore the differences between this lecture and Being and Time.\(^{15}\) To accomplish this, as many as possible of the essential terms in the later lecture will be cast into concepts with which we are already familiar in Being and Time. In so doing not only will the similarity of the lessons in the lecture to those of Being and Time become clear, but also their more advanced formulation.

**Similarities in Terminology**

As in his explicit account of truth in section forty four of Being and Time, the lecture begins with a consideration of the usual conception of truth conceived as the correspondence between thought and thing, or between a statement and the thing about which the statement is made. In both texts Heidegger is concerned to inquire into the 'inner possibility of accordance' so conceived. Such an inquiry is concerned to know how a statement can be in accordance with that about which it is made. The question is then, "How is the statement able to correspond to something else, the thing, precisely by persisting in its own essence?"\(^{16}\) Heidegger's answer, as in Being and Time, questions the origin and thus primordiality of the correspondence theory of truth, and is couched in terms of comportment (and in a later chapter also in moods). Thus he writes of the possibility of the correspondence

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\(^{15}\) Throughout this chapter, this text will be referred to either by its title or more simply as "the lecture".

\(^{16}\) Ibid p.123
... the statement regarding the coin relates 'itself' to this thing in that it presents it and says of the presented thing how, according to the particular perspective that guides it, it is disposed ... to present here means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As thus placed, what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding. This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of which is not created by the presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. The relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the accomplishment of that bearing which originally and always comes to prevail as a comportment. But all comportment is distinguished by the fact that, standing in the open region, it adheres to something opened up as such ... All working and achieving, all action and calculation, keep within an open region, within which beings, with regard to what and how they are, can properly take their stand and become capable of being said. This can occur if beings present themselves along with the presentative statement so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speaks of beings such as they are. In following such a directive the statement conforms to beings.

There is in this quote as in *Being and Time* new terminology that must be mastered if the point that Heidegger is making is to be seen. Even given this newness however, there is a similarity between the idiom of *Being and Time* and that in the lecture. When the different terminologies are traded meaning for meaning the following similarities in what is said can be seen: Here in the lecture, rather than write of Dasein's transcendence, (as the worldhood of the world), Heidegger writes of standing in the open region: Rather than entities being set apart from one another from within a referential totality, here he writes of a thing appearing through its traversing a field of opposedness; Rather than concern, here Heidegger writes of comportment; Rather than letting beings be, here he writes of a subordination to a directive.

To support my contention that the above terminological congruencies do hold between the two works, we can see how they can be interchanged by giving a precis of the above quote in which they are

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17 Ibid p.123-124
juxta-posed in the following manner: Thus the presentative statement says what it does of the thing presented by letting the thing stand opposed as object, (by discovering it from out of its referential context). As placed, what stands must traverse an open field of opposedness, (so what is discovered is so discovered from out of the referential totality as constituted by significance). This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region, (this discovering of an entity from out of the context of a referential totality takes place within the world); the openness of which is not created by the presenting, but rather is only entered into and taken over a domain of relatedness, (the worldhood of which is not created by the discovering, but rather is only entered into and taken over as a referential totality).

In this transposition of terminology all the new terms have been cashed out into the idiom of Being and Time. It is no shock then when Heidegger concludes section two of the lecture noting that:18

A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence. Open comportment must let itself be assigned this standard.

Hence if the correctness or truth of statements is possible only given the openness of comportment, then "the traditional assignment of truth exclusively to statements as the sole possible locus of truth falls away. Truth does not reside in the proposition".19 If then, as Heidegger asserted, propositional truth is possible only through the openness of comportment which gives it a directive or standard, then any investigation into the essence of truth must therefore inquire into the possibility of such a pregiven directive.

The Second Dimension Of the Horizons-Phenomenon - the Mystery of Being - Ground to Figure

Whereas in Being and Time, the possibility of propositional truth

18 op.cit. p.124
19 op.cit. p.125
was seen to lie in the self-disclosure of Dasein as a being free both for and to possibilities of existence, so too in the same way in the lecture, freedom is the ground for propositional truth (correctness). For to be able to present beings just as they are, and to speak of them just as they show themselves to be, implies that one is free in the sense of open to the way that the beings are in themselves. This openness in both Being and Time and in the lecture, is seen as possible for Dasein as an ek-static being, which as temporal reveals entities by letting them be. In the idiom of the lecture...  

...to let be – that is, to let the beings be as the beings that they are – means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness as it were, along with itself. Western thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as ta aletheia – the unconcealed.

Freedom then, understood in the sense of letting beings be as bringing them into unconcealment, is as the original and fundamental sense of 'truth', the 'ground possibility' of the correctness of propositions.

In the lecture then the three following aspects to aletheia as unconcealment come to light; the Open, openness and beings. All these three aspects are furthermore seen to be interrelated, so that that the Open is given through Dasein, who is an openness for the disclosure of beings (the opened). Neither one of these aspects is possible (intelligible) without the other two. As the openness to the open region that allows beings to be as and what they are, Dasein is seen to be something other than an origin itself. Ecstatic Dasein is rather that wherein the original Open region is as an openness; that is, in the 'DA' of Dasein the open region is preserved. What is given in Dasein, is then, not simply the beings with which man must engage himself, but in the openness in which such beings stand, there is also given the open region itself. This open region is as opened in the revealing of a being, the unconcealed.

It is this third relation in the event of truth that is here

20 Ibid p.127
21 Ibid p.128
developed beyond the account of truth in Being and Time. To show how this is so, we can now utilize the illustration of the field of vision as an analogy of the interrelation of the three aspects to aid the interpretation of the main themes of the essay. The interrelation of the Open, openness, and the opened entities, will therefore be pursued according to this analogy, as manifestations of what Idhe has called the horizons-phenomenon, in particular, that of the second dimension. To accomplish this, it is necessary to translate the different areas of the analogy into terms that are consonant with Heidegger's analysis.

Let us then consider the following illustration of the field of vision differing from Idhe's origin, only, in that it has been labelled according to both the literal and the Heideggerian phenomenologies respectively.

(A): Centre of visual field (A): A being as the opened.

(B): Expanse of visual field. (B): The domain of relatedness - the inner-worldly.

(C): Limit or boundary of the visual field (C): The ecstatic horizon of Dasein's world.

(D): Beyond the visual field - nothing. (D): Beyond the ecstatic horizon - ?

Here we have both a literal and a Heideggerian label for the first dimension, that is, in the sense that an object transcends the aspect in which it is given, would not seem pertinent to our concern here, except insofar as this transcendence points not merely to other aspects of the entity, but to its obscured origin, but this sense is as we shall see that given in the second dimension. For this reason, the first dimension will not feature in our use of the analogy.
three areas of the field, but as yet lack a Heideggerian equivalent to the area (D) as that which is literally beyond the visual field. This lack can be met by consideration of what Heidegger called the mystery—the 'concealing of the concealed'. By way of bringing this consideration into the play of the analogy let us see how it now stands.

It will be recalled that early in the lecture Heidegger characterized all Daseins' comportment, that is, activities, as taking place within an open region in which it encounters what is present. Dasein's ability to do this lay in its being as an openness to this open region—existence being interpreted as Dasein's freely entering into "an open region for something opened up which prevails there and which binds every presenting".23 Ek-sistence as Dasein's freedom to encounter what is opened up such that it can let it be what it is, is then an openness to what is disclosed in the open region.24 If this interrelation between Dasein, entities, and the open region is to be read correctly from the illustrative analogy, then its dynamic nature must be held foremost in mind. The origin of this dynamism is to be found in the nature of Dasein's ek-sistence given in the illustration as the horizon of its world, that is, as the temporalization of temporality. Bearing this point in mind, Heidegger's ascription of Dasein's comportment as occurring in an open region is to be taken literally; for comportment is not only to be considered in its onticity, that is, in everyday actions, but also ontologically as the way Dasein is existentially constituted as a temporal being.

However, as Dasein's openness to the open region is given in the dynamic sense of comportment, Heidegger points to this openness as one that is also as attuned, also a closedness— one that conceals "beings as a whole." This concealment is not the hiding of a numberless quantity of entities that may be disclosed as present in the open region through the disclosure of a few in a necessarily selective 'focus', though to be sure such concealment always occurs. Rather what Heidegger is intimating here is the failure of attuned comportment to

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23 Ibid p.125
24 Ibid p.127
reveal the whole of beings, that is, to reveal beings in the fullness of their Being. 25

Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of Da-sein a concealing of being as a whole comes to pass (ereignet sich). Here there is concealment.

What is given in the openness of Dasein's attuned comportment, line (C) of the illustration, is then, not simply beings (A) in the world (B), but also the concealment of being as a whole. From the analogy it can be seen that this concealment is not one due to an error on Dasein's part, it can only be entered into and taken over by Dasein; for the concealing of being occurs in the manifestation of beings given through Dasein's attuned comportment. This concealment of being in favour of given beings as manifest which Heidegger called the "mystery" is, I suggest, the appropriate fourth label on our illustrative analogy. With this fourth label we can now read the analogy according to the second dimension of the horizons-phenomenon, in the sense of the relation of ground to figure.

What is required for such a reading is that the entire field be seen as area (D), within which there are two subset areas, (B) and (A). This entire field can then be read from outside-in as follows: (D) as being as a whole is concealed in that it is given only in area (B), as the domain of relatedness or world through (C), Dasein's ek-static being, the horizon of temporality. What lies outside of (B), the area circumscribed by the horizon of temporality (C), can only be known through that disclosed within the horizon as a being/beings, that is as an (A). The manifest being/beings as encountered within the domain of relatedness are encountered from out of attuned comportment. This phenomenon, the concealedness of area (D), can be interpreted as what in Being and Time was seen to be Dasein's falling into the world. As such, (A), given as a subset of (D), is manifest only as the concealment of this more embracing area; this concealment is as the

25 Ibid p. 132
mystery of Being. It can be thought of as the relation of ground, area (D), to figure: areas (A), (B) and (C).

The Second Dimension of the Horizons-phenomenon as Forgetfulness - Fore-ground - Background.

As has been shown, mystery is the concealing and hence the concealment of Being through Dasein's revealing of beings in its attuned comportment. As a being that is constituted by its self understanding, a point taken for granted in the lecture, Dasein can comport itself as either authentic or inauthentic, or in the terminology of the essay as resolute or insistent. In Being and Time irresoluteness was characterized as a forgetfulness of one's being as a potentiality to be achieved through the absorption and understanding of self in terms of entities in the world. In the lecture Heidegger characterized the same phenomenon as insistence - as forgetfulness, but here forgetfulness of the mystery of being. This interpretation involves less a change from than a deepening of the inquiry in Being and Time. For as in Being and Time here in the lecture, forgetfulness results in an understanding of things only within the parameters of what is calculable and measurable i.e. the way in which a thing is manifest in everydayness, as an instrument is taken as the entire being of the thing.

Using our analogy here, it can be seen that in this radical forgetfulness the area (B) can be interpreted as the world of entities already present-at-hand. These entities are encountered only by a being such as Dasein, who is also in some way or other, seen to be present at hand. From this perspective then, area (D) as being in totality includes all that is not yet, but may at some later time be, present-at-hand. Here the concealing of being as a whole is forgotten (overlooked) with the consequence that Dasein finds itself in a world populated by mere things. This Heidegger called "erring", and is what in Being and Time was called inauthenticity. So interpreted errancy is not the concealing of being as a whole, but the forgetfulness of this concealment through fascination with that which is revealed, (things). To use our analogy here, errancy is a failure to understand those areas surrounding (A), in any other sense than the way in
which the thing is manifest - when it is seen as something present-at-hand.

Staying with the analogy, we can also interpret Heidegger's view that even as forgotten the concealment of being as a whole still pervades Dasein and oppresses him as follows.26 This can be seen in that just as what exceeds the literal field of vision has been interpreted as situating that given in it, so too Dasein represented as (C), is always situated by that which is concealed, and is thus constrained by the mystery. As such, if Dasein was to forget the mystery it would in effect be denying an aspect of itself, for as we have seen, mystery is constitutive of Dasein's being. That oppression should issue from such a denial is only consistent with the nature of self-respect.

Yet where there is forgetfulness, there is also the possibility of remembrance, and therefore of recalling the mystery. Given that mystery is partly constitutive of Dasein, such a recalling could not be a dissolution of the mystery, but rather a meditation on it as it is. This remembrance occurs, Heidegger states, from out of the oppression of error which turns Dasein towards the mystery, meditation on which is he suggests the essential nature of philosophy and metaphysics.27

We have, then, illustrated the major themes of the essay using the analogy of the field of vision. We have also seen that for every new term in this essay, there is an equivalent in Being and Time. Thus for example, the words "mystery" and "erring" in the lecture, were seen to be terms pointing to the same phenomenon as "falling" and "inauthenticity" in Being and Time. Wherein therefore lies the advance of the essay over Being and Time? I suggest that any advance is to be seen not so much in the introduction of entirely new material, but in the different emphasis which is placed on familiar themes. This change of emphasis can be seen as one moving from understanding Being by inquiring into the being of human existence in Being and Time, to an attempt to understand Being as it is in itself.

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26 Ibid p.136
27 Ibid p.137
Even given that there is a change in the emphasis of themes in each text, it is possible to see that there is no radical change in the impetus of each inquiry - but for one point. In Being and Time the concept of Dasein's resolute authenticity was seen to constitute the truth of its existence, and from the perspective of the inquiry in Being and Time this truth would seem to be not only the truth of Dasein's existence, but also of Being itself. In the later essay however, this possible equation of the truth of existence and of Being is called into question; for authentic existence is but remembrance of mystery. Here existentialism with its subjectivistic conception of truth, a literal equation of Dasein's existence with Being, is seriously called into question. The question of the truth of Being has here been further developed than in Being and Time, though it is a development based upon what was achieved there, in particular the conception of Dasein's "falling into the world". As illustrated in the analogy of the visual field, this further development of themes from Being and Time can also be seen to illustrate the conflict between the world and earth that constitutes the central point of the lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art". However before we can show the nature of this conflict in this way, we must give an account not only of the terms themselves, but also of the continuity of the lecture with the analysis in Being and Time. To this we now turn.

The Visual Analogy and the Work of Art

Even given that there is a seven year break between the lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art" and the two earlier works, Being and Time and the lecture "On the Essence of Truth", there are clear continuities between them. For instance there is a continuity between the two lectures in the sense that the lecture on art is an application and elaboration of the themes developed in the preceding lecture to the traditional field of aesthetics. In the second instance the lecture on the origin of art can be seen as supplementing the analysis of Being and Time. The necessity for such a supplement lies, as Gadamer points out, in the less than exhaustive nature of the Dasein analysis. For from its perspective...

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the unconscious, the number, the dream, the sway of nature, the miracle of art—all these seemed to exist on the periphery of Dasein, which knows itself historically in terms of itself. They seem to be comprehensible only as limiting concepts.

In the lecture on art where both "the miracle of art" and "the sway of nature" come to centre stage, Heidegger can therefore be seen to be filling in two such lacunae left in the wake of Being and Time. By way of preparation for the analysis of this lecture, let us first consider the paucity of comment on the "sway of nature" in Being and Time.

In Being and Time entities in the world were seen to be discovered in either their readiness-to or presence-at-hand. This ascription invariably held for both authentic and inauthentic Dasein, for the latter distinction pointed to a difference in Dasein's own self-understanding, rather than to a different way of interpreting that which it encounters in the world. Even nature is seen to be encountered in the first instance as a resource, and in reflection, as present-at-hand, conceived as having extension and qualities. There is however, another dimension to entities: one that remains implicit in all the analysis in Being and Time, that of the autonomy of nature. This autonomy is implied in the conception of Dasein as thrown into a world in which it must take up its own potentiality for existence. Whereas Dasein can achieve its potentiality for existence, it cannot in doing so refashion entities or situations, completely constituting them anew. As finite Dasein can discover but not create entities, can only participate in and not create tradition anew. In this sense, as thrown, Dasein can be seen to meet the resistance not only of things, but also of its tradition. Heidegger however deals with this phenomenon only in the context of criticism of Scheler's ontology, and in particular of his conception of the world. Nowhere does he take up and fully develop the nature of this resistance as a theme within his own thought. He did however, recognize its role in determining the

29 Being and Time p.130
31 Ibid p.252
extent and the direction in which entities are discovered in the world.\textsuperscript{32}

Even in the account of the breakdown of instruments, Heidegger's analysis remained within the ambit of things as ready-to, or present-at-hand. Thus his account is one of the ready-to-hand complex breaking down revealing not the Real,\textsuperscript{33} but something that is always present-at-hand in being ready-to-hand. Here, presence at hand, is the presence of the ready-to-hand in its failure to be capable of use as the thing it is seen to be. In this way, sheer presence at hand is interpreted in a perspective that looks in the direction from out of which the entity was originally encountered. If the perspective is reversed, however, then the strangeness of the Real can be encountered counterfactually - here the relation between the world, the inner worldly entities and the Real is a problem for thought. Heidegger alludes to this problem when he states that 'Nature' as that which surrounds Dasein, is an entity within the world; but the kind of Being which it shows, belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as "things of Nature".\textsuperscript{34} In this sense 'Nature' is not fully accounted for when seen as only the rain bearing winds, the wood to be chopped, the hide to be tanned, or the earth to be ploughed. It stands for more than the totality of the readiness or presence-at-hand of instruments or things encountered in the world. What more is not clear, and apart from being seen as accessible through Dasein's world, is not pursued.

In this way then, the Dasein analysis in \textit{Being and Time} pointed towards a conception of inner worldly being which was not explicitly followed up. In his account of things in the lecture on art Heidegger can be seen to extend this conception of "things" so as to begin to account for this limitation in his earlier analysis.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid H211 p.254
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid H212 p.255
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid H211 p.254
In this lecture there are two sorts of "things" that he is interested in, things considered as equipment or utensils, and things as works of art. Furthermore he is concerned to give an interpretation of equipmental things from out of his account of the work of art. The paradigm example of this is his analysis of Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasants' shoes. In this account he again recognizes, as in *Being and Time*, that equipment becomes inconspicuous in its use. But here he points to its being highly conspicuous when presented in a work of art - in this instance in a painting. Whereas the account of instrumentality in *Being and Time* pointed to Dasein's being as one which had to be achieved in historical existence, here Heidegger pushes the analysis further revealing a work of art to be an event just like the breaking of a tool. It brings Dasein from out of its immediate immersion in the ongoing activity, thus allowing the context in which the action is taking place to emerge into view. It does so of course, without in fact being a piece of broken equipment. In the following quote it can be seen that in a work of art, that aspect of equipment which was implicit yet overlooked in *Being and Time* is explicitly taken up, and it should be noted, in very literal language:

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.... This equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.

Here in contrast to *Being and Time*, the otherness of equipment is

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35 Macomber op.cit. develops his entire account of Heidegger's concept of truth loosely around the idea of equipmental breakage as giving a flash of insight into the truth of Being. see esp. p.46

36 This is not to deny that broken equipment or indeed equipment simpliciter may not be seen as works of art should they be presented as such. But these questions are not our concern here and so will not be pursued.

37 "The Origin of the Work of Art" p.33-34
acknowledged in its belonging to the earth, interpreted not simply metaphorically but in a very literal sense. As such equipment is considered not only in its use context, narrowly conceived, but also in a more encompassing context corresponding more nearly to what in Being and Time was called Care. Yet this wider context is not exhausted by "Care" as defined in Being and Time, for it encompasses not only worldhood, but also points to the earth as that which sustains the careful Dasein, and is as such manifest as equipment. In this way Heidegger interpreted the being of equipment in a way consonant with yet more inclusive than Being and Time. Thus equipment was seen as not only conducive to use,38 but also as reliable. This further ascription points to the manifestation of the earth as a pervasive 'support' which much like the Lockean conception of substance, gives the essential character to both the equipment and the world in and through which it is manifest. As such a support the earth is that which sustains the temporal world. The comparison between the earth and Lockean substance here, is only used to highlight the way in which the earth can be said to be the source of the equipmental characteristic of reliability, just as for Locke, substance was that in which primary and secondary qualities were founded. Clearly the earth is a far broader conception than that of substance in this sense, for it is the giver and with-holder of fruits and life as well as being literally that from out of which equipment is forged. (In this context that which in idiomatic speech is often referred to as "Mother Nature", is probably what comes nearest to this conception of the earth.) Here 'nature' as that which was seen in Being and Time as neither present nor ready-to-hand is given further clarity. This conception is even further developed in consideration of "the miracle of art".

Insofar as in the work of art there is a revelation of the being of equipment, there is the event of aletheia - the uncovering of beings. It is this uncovering peculiar to art that points directly to "the miracle of art". Heidegger's analysis shows it to be an event most nearly approximated to in the event of equipmental failure as seen

38 Being and Time H69 p.98
in Being and Time. That is, just as in the breaking of a piece of equipment, there is given a glimpse of the being of the tool covered over in normal use, so too in a work of art, equipment is seen from a distance rather than in the immediacy of use. In this way the equipment is not seen as divorced from its equipmental context. On the contrary, it is Heidegger's contention that the context in which the equipment is as equipment can then be seen as a whole. Thus his description of the peasant's shoes presented in Van Gogh's painting is one of the world of the peasant as it is revealed in and through the shoes.

Those for whom the work of art does reveal a world, see it in its contemporary appeal significance. In this sense Heidegger saw a work of art to open up a world. The way this opening is met is one he recognised as dependent on the situation of the viewer, a point consonant with his account in Being and Time, where he saw that what is resolved upon is dependent on the authentic Dasein's understanding of its situation. World is of course but one aspect of a work of art - Earth the other. 'Earth' here refers to the self-sufficiency of the material aspects of entities: a sufficiency manifest differently in a work of art than in instrumentality. Here again Heidegger usefully contrasts equipment to art. In this context, the contrast was seen to lie in the fact that in instrumental practice, the entity considered in its material aspect recedes from explicit view (consideration). By contrast in a work of art, the materiality of entities is explicitly and deliberately emphasized as the way in which the world is set forward (set up) in the work. In 'setting up a world', different work materials ...

...come forth for the very first time ... into the open of the work. The rock comes to bear and rest and so becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to sing and words to speak.

The material aspects of entities are therefore manifest differently in

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39 "The Origin of the Work of Art" p.44
40 Ibid p.68
41 Ibid p.46
instrumentality than as part of a work of art. However, the coming forth of these aspects in a work occurs against the background of an opacity. The stone from which a temple is made is for instance, encountered as that on which the temple rests for support, and as that which endures amidst the violence of storms; here the stone is encountered from out of its massiveness and heaviness. Likewise the glitter and glimmer of metal is encountered from out of the undisclosed hardness and lustre of the metal.

This undisclosed opacity characteristic of the materiality of entities that embody works of art, is what Heidegger called the earth. It is manifest in the work as a "setting back" of what is "set forth" as a world. In a work then, the earth is disclosed in a world, but not without opacity: the "earth" defined as a characteristic of entities points to a withholding of insight, a seclusion in the midst of the revelation of a world.

The relation of the disclosure (of a world) and the seclusion (of the earth) is characterized by Heidegger as a struggle or strife. It is from out of this struggle that he saw the truth event of a work to emerge: here "truth event" refers to the emergence of that which is in it entirety, to the emergence of the world and earth in a counterplay attaining to unconcealedness.

To bring this discussion of the central lesson of the lecture to a point where that lesson can be illustrated by the analogy of the visual field, one final distinction Heidegger makes must be grasped - that between an artist and a craftsman.

Heidegger recognizes that the artist is indeed a technician (technites), but not because he is just a craftsman, but because in both the setting forth of works and of equipment, there occurs a bringing forth and presenting of beings. What looks like craft in

42 Ibid p.42
43 Ibid
44 Ibid p.70
45 Ibid p.49
artistic creation is not simply just that, for "to create is to cause something to emerge as a thing that has been brought forth". This in contrast to equipment which is made to be used, and so dismissed beyond itself. A work is distinguished (in the phenomenological sense) in that its createdness lets it stand out as the entity that it is. The 'that it is' does not disappear in use, but is encountered as the work 'that it is'; and so is encountered in its self-sufficiency. The work is as such encountered as an openness to beings, and so as something 'out of the ordinary'. Those who in encountering the work are addressed by it, stand in this openness as it occurs in the work - to so stand is to be resolute, as in Being and Time. It is in this difference between the artist and the craftsman, that Heidegger's characterization of art as essentially poetic finds its place.

All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of beings, is as such, essentially poetry ... It is due to arts' poetic essence that, in the midst of what is, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual.

As a consequence of this view, Heidegger pointed to the privileged place of poesy as an art form. Poesy, not merely as language as usually interpreted, but language in its original or elemental sense that "logos" was seen to point to in Being and Time - as uncovering or indeed covering over beings in discourse. In the context of this lecture, the uncovering and covering over of language/saying is clearly intended in respect of the Being of beings as such. What is uncovered is therefore, the being in its unconcealedness, and along with this, there is also a co-original covering over of that aspect of the being that is as unsayable; this covering over in fact preserved for what it is in what is said. Thus the earth as the closure of Being is held in its withdrawal by what is disclosed as the intelligibility of the world per se. Thus Heidegger wrote of the distinction between language as poetry (which we have interpreted as primal logos), and

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46 Ibid p.60
47 Ibid p.60
48 "The Origin of the Work of Art" p.72
49 Ibid p.74
Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. But since language is the happening in which for man, beings first disclose themselves to him each time as beings, poesy - or poetry in the narrower sense - is the most original form of poetry in the essential sense. Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather poesy takes place in language because language preserves the original nature of poetry.

Here the radically dynamic nature of Heidegger's conception of poetical truth can be seen - poetry in its original ontological sense, is literally the founding of the conflict between world and earth from out of which humankind discovers its historical being-there. Here "authenticity" does not refer, for instance, to what one ought to do today before retiring in the evening. That is, it does not refer to an existentiell possibility in its ontic importance in relation to one's ownmost self, as it may be interpreted to mean in Being and Time. In this context "authenticity" refers to an original confrontation of the world and earth in human Dasein - a confrontation from out of which emerges a new beginning in Dasein's historical being:51

Whenever art happens ... a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts over again ... Art lets truth originate. Art, founding, preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the works. To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap - this is what the word origin (German Ursprung, literally, primal leap) means.

It is in this dynamic sense of founding history as such that Heidegger intends the word "origin" in the title of his lecture, The Origin of the Work of Art, to be thought. Interpreted in this sense, art is the origin of being-there, given both in the work and its preservation by its beholders, it is a founding and continuation of history. In this sense Heidegger concludes that "a people's historical existence is art",52 that is, an existence marked by the revealing-concealing contrariety of the world and earth.

50 Ibid
51 Ibid p.77-78
52 Ibid P78
Turning now to our analogy, the conflicting interrelation of the world and earth can be read from out of the illustration as a variation on the ground to figure relation as follows: Area (D) as the sustaining ground of all other areas, is the region which is not only concealed, but is self-concealing in giving itself only through Dasein's world. Here both Dasein as (C) and its world (B) are given by (D) as the extent to which it is revealed. According to such a reading, area (D) previously labelled as "mystery", is now seen as the opacity of Being which Heidegger called "earth". The latter is, therefore, a deepening of the meaning of "mystery". The truly dynamic and non-subjectivist import of this reading must not go unnoticed: it can be seen most clearly in that even as self-concealing, the earth gives to Dasein its world. That is area (D) is encountered by Dasein as that which gives itself as the world. In *Being and Time*, this self-giving was seen to constitute Dasein's being as temporality in that the horizon of the meaning of Being was interpreted as temporality. As finite this temporality was seen, as constitutive of the worldhood of the world, to hold an opacity at the centre of its being - namely that Dasein's being was defined by a "not". This "not", as an opacity blocking its total self-perspicuity, pointed to Dasein's Being as thrown into a world. Here in the lecture on art, this opacity is interpreted as the self-concealment of Being, that is, as earth.

In summary then, according to the conception of truth as aletheia, Being as a whole, that is area (D), (C), (B) and (A), is given from out of the revealing and concealing of Being itself. Area (D) as the concealment of Being is given in and through areas (C), (B) and (A), and so as through the world (intelligibility) as the co-original self-concealing of Being in the manifestation of a being. Also the self-concealing of area (D) occurring through (D) only giving itself through the self-understanding of Dasein which constitutes the worldhood of the world, is a concealing of both the origin of Dasein and of the fullness of Being - for as thrown, Dasein is also given from

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53 *Being and Time* H284-285 p.329-330
out of the self-revealing of the earth as mystery. Here, area (D) as that which situates the field of vision can be interpreted as situating/throwing Dasein in the more literal meaning of these verbs.

The concealment of Being as a whole is therefore one which can be read from our analogy as the ground to figure relation. The manifestation of this relation in a work of art, as the conflict between world and earth encountered resolutely as the revelation of 'what is' in its facticity, can also be read from the analogy as the relation of figure to ground, where the mystery of the conflict is held open to remembrance, not passed over in business. It can be seen that in addition the account in the essay "On the Essence of Truth" the mystery and its remembrance have been given another way of being fulfilled, that is, it has been shown to be possible to enter into the event of truth not only through philosophical - metaphysical reflection, but also (possibly) through an encounter with works of art. This further possible way in which authenticity may occur is clearly a widening of the original scope for not only authenticity, but also the conception of aletheia.

An Introduction to Metaphysics

As has been shown by the use of the analogy of the visual field, the results of Heidegger's further inquiry into truth defined as "aletheia" in his lectures both on truth and art, moved far beyond the conception of truth and Being presented in Being and Time. It has also been seen that in doing so, what was accomplished in Being and Time was not abandoned, but rather taken up to be both broadened and deepened. One text which seems to capture the movement of both lectures yet go beyond them, is Heidegger's An Introduction to Metaphysics. 54 In the

54 There is of course a major difference between the two sets of texts in that An Introduction to Metaphysics is clearly more concerned with the interpretation of historical texts. As such the concern of the entire book, to show the possibilities for Dasein's existence that are held within traditional philosophical texts can be seen to be a further step along the path first trodden in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: A further development of this traditional problematic in an effort to reappropriate Dasein's Being by re-interpreting its origin anew. Interpreted as a work of destructive retrieve however, it does not so much point back to Being and Time as did the Kant-Buch but stand on its shoulders, using and further developing it problematic.
remainder of this chapter, I shall use the visual field analogy to present an interpretation of the main theses put forward in the two preceding lectures as they are reflected in this text. First, in order to gain orientation, let us look again at the findings from the reading of the two previous texts.

Mystery

\[(A): \text{ A being/entity} \]
\[(B): \text{ World} \]
\[(C): \text{ Ecstatic horizon} \]
\[(D): \text{ Mystery, earth} \]

Using the visual field as an analogy for the way in which entities are manifest, it was seen that for an entity \((A)\) to be manifest it had to be seen (or encountered) against the background of \((B)\). Area \((B)\) in turn was seen to be given (understood) only through the ecstatic horizon \((C)\); which was the way region \((D)\) was manifest to the extent that it was at all. The nett result of this chain of interrelations was seen to be that \((A)\) as a manifest entity, was in fact the partial revelation, and therefore also partial covering over of Being as a whole represented by area \((D)\). That is \((A)\), as an entity, was a concealment of Being as a whole as much as it was also a revelation of it. In this way, the revealing-concealing that is executed by Dasein's attuned comportment, was seen to be constitutive of the mystery of Being. This revealing-concealing event was seen to be the essence of the event of truth in a work of art - the conflict between earth \((D)\), and the world, \((A), (B)\) and \((C)\).
Forgetfulness

(A): A being/entity
(B): World
(C): Ecstatic horizon
(D): Earth, mystery

Forgetfulness was seen to be intimately related to the mystery of Being, in that it is essentially the overlooking of this mystery itself. The 'logic' of forgetfulness was seen to be given out of a reversal of the order of reading the regions in the analogy. Thus, instead of reading from (B) to (A) as constitutes mystery, forgetfulness reads the analogy from (A) to (D). Accordingly (A) is seen as given through Dasein's fascination with the entities it discovers in the world. This fascination - that through which Dasein as inauthentic falls into the world - leads to the overlooking of the mystery. According to this interpretation, an accent is placed on Dasein's role in the revelation of entities and so of Being - for Dasein not only forgets but it also remembers what is forgotten and so possibly may recall the mystery. This was seen in the event where confronted with the work of art, the creator and preserver were seen to be borne out of everyday forgetfulness in the vision of things, as they are presented in the conflict of earth and world that constitutes the work of art.

In An Introduction to Metaphysics one finds a unified account of both manifestations of the horizons-phenomenon in Heidegger's explication of the distinction between Being and appearance.\(^{55}\) In interpreting this distinction as not one of opposition, Heidegger drew on his insight that lay at the basis of Being and Time, that in semblance, an entity is just as much in Being as one that is phenomenologically distinguished. In so doing he pointed to three senses of "appearance": (1) appearance as radiance and glow; (2)

\(^{55}\text{op.cit. p.98ff}\)
appearance as appearing in the sense of 'coming to light'; (3) appearance as mere appearance—semblance. 56

Of all these three senses Heidegger took the second as the most basic, interpreting it as self-manifestation, as a standing there or presence—as aletheia. 57 That which appears as emerging and abiding from concealedness is, Heidegger asserts, that which the Greeks understood as "physis". "Physis" and "aletheia" are then mutually related: 58

On the strength of the unique and essential relationship between physis and aletheia the Greeks would have said: The being is true insofar as it is. The true as such is Being. This means: The power that manifests itself stands in unconcealment. In showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand.

Where Being is accomplished as an emergence into presence, there is however, also a withdrawal of Being as Being in the presentation of a being. This withdrawal of Being (beings as a whole) leads Heidegger to assert that "Being is dispersed among the manifold beings", each of which "in appearing (it) gives itself an aspect dokei, Doxa means aspect, regard /Ansehen/, namely the regard in which one stands." 59

Heidegger distinguished four meanings that "doxa" so interpreted may have. Firstly, "regard as glory"—a meaning directly related to the emergence of a being as it is. Secondly, "regard as sheer vision that offers something"—the aspect that something offers of itself. Thirdly, "regard as mere looking-so: "appearance as mere semblance"—this meaning implies the concealment of the being as it genuinely is. Finally "Doxa" may mean a "view that a man forms", an opinion.

That individuals form opinions is Heidegger asserts, inevitable given the dispersal of Being in beings, each of which can be seen from

56 Ibid p.100
57 Ibid
58 Ibid p. 102 In this and other quotes from the same source I have replaced "essent" with "being", and "being" where Being itself in its difference from entities is clearly meant with "Being", a usage that remains consistent with preceding renditions of Heidegger's terminology
59 Ibid p.102
this or that view. The point of importance here is that Heidegger sees all four meanings to be related to both Physis and Aletheia.  

Because Being, physis, consists in appearing, in an offering of appearance and views, it stands, essentially and hence necessarily and permanently, in the possibility of an appearance which precisely covers over what the being in truth, that is, in unconcealment, is. This regard in which the being now comes to stand is Schein in the sense of Anschein (semblance.) Where there is unconcealment of the being, there is a possibility of Schein and conversely: where the being stands and has stood uncoveringly in Schein the appearance Schein can shatter and fall away.

In this passage Heidegger is writing in an ontico-ontological sense. For the possibility that a being may appear as genuine or as semblance is an ontological one - but one against which the thinker must strive - and hence is an ontic possibility as well. Just this struggle, to wrest Being from appearance (as semblance), was for Heidegger the essence, or rather task of ancient Greek thought. As an example of such thought he cited the Sophoclean tragedy, Oedipus Rex.

In defining "appearance" in its fundamental sense as "physis", as emergent Being dispersed amongst beings, Heidegger is clearly working over the same ground that "The Essence of Truth" covered in its analysis of mystery. In his discussion of the way beings are encountered from out of different aspects, Heidegger is also covering the same ground as that given in his analysis of forgetfulness of Being. Where doxa as the opinionatedness of an uninformed viewpoint dominates the way a being is encountered, there is an inevitable forgetfulness of the mystery of Being. The endeavour to overcome this forgetfulness is as the task of his own work, taken by Heidegger to be reflected in the Greek's struggle against semblance - a struggle exemplified in the tragic art of Sophocles.

The possibility of opinionatedness was seen to lie in the dispersal of Being amongst beings, such that all beings could be seen

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60 An Introduction to Metaphysics p. 104
61 Also in Being and Time H 222 p. 265
62 Ibid p. 106
from many different aspects — and so deceive. The lesson here is the
by now familiar one, that Being transcends its manifestation in any
given being. That Dasein can be deceived by entities as they are given
in their appearance from out of their given aspect, points to what in
"The Essence of Truth" Heidegger called the realm of error or untruth
that is equiprimordial with truth in which Dasein exists. Again we are
confronted with the startling thesis, that not only is Dasein in truth,
and so not its author, but also in untruth which it likewise has not
authored. Though already conceived as such in *Being and Time*, Dasein's
being in both truth and untruth is shown in these later texts to be a
fact that points to a primacy of Being over man. For reading the
visual space diagram from the outside — in, one can see the fundamental
place of the open region as the encompassing origin not only of Dasein
(as thrown), but of beings other than Dasein as well. However, even
given that the region (D) has a priority over Dasein and the revealed
entity (A), there is still an essential indispensable relation between
Dasein and this region, which points to a sense in which this priority
is reversed. This reversal is most obviously seen when the regions of
visual space are read from the inside-out — although of course it is
present in any reading. In the explication of the third (traditionally
conceived) opposition — between Being and thinking — it is on this
essential relation between Being and Dasein that Heidegger meditates.

He began his discussion on the nature of the supposed opposition,
by challenging the traditional interpretation of "logos" as "logic"
which he took to be the modern attempt to understand the nature of
thought. 63 (In the light of his analysis of the "not" experienced by
Dasein as being more fundamental than the "not" of negation in both
*Being and Time* and "What is Metaphysics?", this challenge is hardly
unexpected. ) In his search for a more fundamental interpretation for
the meaning of "logos" through an interpretation of various passages
from both Parmenides and Hericlitus, Heidegger at first appears to
contradict his analysis of "logos" and discourse in *Being and Time*
where he covered much the same ground. This apparent contradiction

63 Ibid p.120
between the two texts can be seen as follows. In *Being and Time* he defined "logos" as 'letting be seen', and discourse as the articulated intelligibility of a prior understanding. He saw the interrelation of the two as given in the expression of this intelligibility in language. In an apparent contradiction of this view, he wrote in the much later text under discussion that: 64

... originally logos did not mean speech, discourse. Its fundamental meaning stands in no direct relation to language, discourse.

But as we shall see, the apparently contradictory standpoints are just that - apparent. For on further analysis Heraclitus' fragments (1 and 2) shows that "physis" as "the power that emerges", is intimately related to "logos", interpreted as "the primal gathering principle", the "intrinsic togetherness of the essent, that is Being". 65 "Physis" and "logos" according to this interpretation mean the same - emergent Being. Interpreted as such, "logos" means far more than discourse as mere talk or speaking. However, Heidegger's interpretation of these fragments from Heraclitus (especially p. 50) points to an interrelation between the two as fore-shadowed in *Being and Time*. Resisting the equation of speaking (as discourse) and hearing with what logos names, Heidegger interprets the saying from fragment 50; "If you have heard not me but the logos, then it is wise to say accordingly: "All is one" - as pointing to a more fundamental speaking and hearing that underlies and underwrites normal discourse.

This more fundamental origin from which language and hearing arise, was seen in *Being and Time* to lie in discourse as the (prior) articulation of the intelligibility and so meaning that was expressed in language. Here in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger is concentrating on just this aspect of meaning which is always prior to any expression in language. In seeking to avoid interpreting logos exhaustively as spoken language, he is making the same move here as in the analysis in *Being and Time* where conscience is interpreted as the

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64 op. cit. p. 124
65 Ibid p. 130
silent caller understood by a reticent hearing. The struggle we saw finite Dasein to be caught up in through wanting to have a conscience, but as constantly falling, as the struggle for authenticity over and above inauthenticity, is here reflected in what Heidegger calls the Polemos (strife) between either, or both, Doxa (as opinionatedness) and the lack of comprehension (axynetoi) of logos by man, and the collectedness of logos (syntemi) itself. Here, as in "The Essence of Truth" and the lecture on the origin of art, Heidegger conceived of this strife as the essence of beauty:66

The conflict of the opposites is a gathering, rooted in togetherness, it is logos. The Being of the being is the supreme radiance, that is, the greatest beauty, that which is most permanent in itself. What the Greeks called beauty was restraint. The gathering of the supreme antagonism is polemos, struggle ...

Whereas this struggle was portrayed in the lecture on the origin of art as one between world and earth, here the struggle is that of attaining to truth in the face of lack of comprehension of Being (logos). Here in contrast to Being and Time, however the emphasis is on logos as Being rather than on the intelligibility of Dasein. As a change of emphasis the former concern still of course remains vital to the overall project. In both his interpretation of Parmenides fragment five as saying, "There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and Being", rather than the usual reading of it as "Thinking and Being are the same",67 and his interpretation of the Antigone chorus,68 this change as one of emphasis is most apparent.

In the saying of Parmenides, Heidegger sees a way of conceiving the relation between thinking and Being as one neither of opposition nor of synonymity. For the reciprocal bond which he sees between the two lies in apprehension's being "the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests itself."69 This is the very

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66 Ibid p.131
67 Ibid p.136ff
68 Ibid p.146ff
69 Ibid p.139
same event which we have seen Heidegger define as the appearing or entering into unconcealment of Being, that is, "physis". For human being as the thinking being ... 70

to participate in this appearing and apprehension, he himself must be, he must belong to Being. But then the essence and the mode of being - human can only be determined by the essence of Being.

But if appearing belongs to Being as physis, then man as a being must belong to this appearing. Since being-human amid the essent as a whole is evidently a particular mode of Being, the particularity of being-human will grow from the particularity of its belonging to Being as dominant appearing. And since apprehension-accepting apprehension of what shows itself-belongs to such appearing, it may be presumed that this is precisely what determines the essence of being-human.

Considered as such, apprehension cannot of course be a faculty of man, but rather as his essence, the way man is both beyond and at the basis of whatever he might strive to accomplish. "Apprehension is not a function that man has as an attribute, but rather the other way around: apprehension is the happening that has man." 71 This interpretation is not radically different from that put forward in the rhetorical question in Being and Time - "Has Dasein as itself ever decided freely whether it wants to come into 'Dasein' or not, and will it ever be able to make such a decision?" 72

In his exegesis of the first chorus in "Antigone", Heidegger drew out the nature of the relation between Dasein as the being that apprehends, and Being itself as one that is essentially violent - where "violent" or rather "violence" is understood as "polemos", and this in two ways. Firstly in the sense of the above quote, where man as essent belongs to appearing, to emerging power (physis) as Being: 73

Here deinon is the terrible in the sense of overpowering power which compels- panic fear: and in equal measure it is the collected silent awe that vibrates with its own rhythm.

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70 Ibid p.139-140
71 Ibid p.141
72 Being and Time H228 p.271
73 Introduction to Metaphysics p.149
As violent in the second sense however, "deinon" points to man as the one who uses power, who not only disposes power, /Gewalt/ but is violent /gewalt-tätig/insofar as the use of power is the basic trait not only of his action but also of his being-there.

Considering what "deinon" is interpreted to mean in both contexts, Heidegger concludes that man is twice deinon: he is the one who uses power to overcome the powerful in which he stands. He does so as one who ventures upon the high seas, and as the one who "disturbs the tranquility of growth, the nurturing and maturing of the goddess who lives without effort" - the earth.

On the one hand there is then "physis", as "disruption and upheaval", and on the other, through Dasein, "capture and restraint"; both are parts of an intimate relation which Heidegger characterizes as one of disaster, not only for the twice violent one, but it should also be noted, for Being. The relation is disastrous, because Dasein as the "twice deinon" must "shatter against Being, if Being rules in its essence, as physis, emerging power." Yet as has been noted, Dasein does not choose its own being, rather it is as thrown into its there. Hence Heidegger writes of the disastrous relation between Being and Dasein:

But this necessity of disasters can only subsist insofar as what must shatter is driven into such a being-there. Man is forced into such a being-there, hurled into the affliction /Not/ of such Being, because the overpowering as such, in order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure. The essence of human-being opens up to us only when understood through the need compelled by Being itself. The being-there of historical man means: to be posited as the breach into which the preponderant power of Being bursts in its appearing, in order that this breach itself should shatter against Being.

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74 Ibid p. 149-150
75 Ibid p. 150
76 Ibid p. 154
77 Ibid p. 163
78 Ibid p. 162-163
As the one who must shatter (in death) Dasein is here seen to be needed by Being. This relation points not only to Dasein's mortal finitude, but also to the finitude of Being; for it stands in the need of Dasein. This relation is one which as in his analysis of the essence of art, he sees to be poetic in the sense of a conflicting strife between world (Dasein) and earth (Physis) from out of which "how it stands with Being" is encountered.79

If we were to use the analogy of the visual field here to illustrate the results of Heidegger's analysis, then it would be necessary to read it in a way which proceeds simultaneously from inside-out and from outside-in. According to such a reading Dasein and Being will then be seen to be mutually and integrally related.

Even given the continued advance of Heidegger's work in the three texts we have considered, we cannot claim that the position he defined in An Introduction to Metaphysics is his final one. Though this text points to a mutual relation between Dasein and Being in the listening response of Dasein to Being as logos, the exact nature of this relation still stands largely unexplored. In his search for further clarification of this relationship Heidegger turned to poetry itself. In particular, the poetry of Holderlin, the "poet's poet" was to engage his attention as he sought to define the nature of resolute human existence. Before giving an account of his final view of the nature of such existence, Heidegger's analysis of the situation of the modern world will be investigated via an interpretation of his relation to Nietzsche. Being far more that mere stage setting, this investigation will provide a view of how Heidegger as resolute thinker saw the modern situation. This account will therefore enable us to see what he was resolved to accomplish, and so what he saw the role of the thinker to be in such times as ours. On the basis of this account, it will be possible to see how his final position on the nature of authentic resolve, is reflected in his final insight into the essential nature of the event of truth.

79 Ibid p.159ff
CHAPTER 6

HEIDEGGER'S BREAK WITH NIETZSCHE

In the preceding chapter, the turn in Heidegger's thought was interpreted broadly as the change in the way the relation between Dasein and Being was presented in his works from 1930 onwards. Essentially, this change was interpreted as a widening of the scope of this relation from that given in the analysis of Dasein's existential constitution in *Being and Time*, where the meaning of Being was seen as revealed in Dasein's temporality, to a conception of a mutual conflict between Being per se and Dasein as its 'there' outlined in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Broadly conceived as it is, this interpretation of the turn still preserves what is essential to the notion of the "turn" as a change in the direction in Heidegger's inquiry, for it points to the increasingly prominent place that Being plays in the Dasein-Being relation. This evolution of Heidegger's inquiry into the Dasein-Being relationship was one characterized as a continuous probing, in which each successive inquiry was, as a further turn in the hermeneutic spiral, a lessening of its gyre. If we can once again employ this figure of speech, then the concern of this chapter can be said to be to identify the point at which the gyre of interpretation reaches a limit and ceases to lessen. This point is the place where the Being-Dasein relation is expressed in terms free from all strains of voluntarism. Here, where the Dasein-Being relation is expressed in terms free from all strains of voluntarism, the meaning of "the turn" in Heidegger's work comes into maturity. It is a reversal of the relation between Dasein and Being from one in which Dasein wilfully seeks to overcome Being, an extreme voluntarism, to one in which Dasein recognizes its subordinate role in respect of Being.

This reversal is one seen not only in Heidegger's analysis of the current world-wide situation with respect to Being, but also as a
metamorphosis in his own thought about the meaning of "aletheia". To trace out both of these changes and their results in his thinking about "aletheia", a substantial part of the analysis in this chapter will reflect on his relation to Nietzsche, for it is in this changing relationship that the full effect of both senses of the turn is expressed. As such what will concern us is not only Nietzsche's influence on Heidegger, but also Heidegger's break with Nietzsche.

It may seem that a reasonable starting point for such an account would be Heidegger's own interpretation of Nietzsche's work as found in his essay "The Word of Nietzsche". Lucid and concise as this essay is, it can however be misleading, for it is not, as it may appear, simply a statement of one thinker's position in regard to another as if this relationship was unchanging. Nor, on the other hand, is it an essay in which Heidegger simply reinterpreted his position vis a vis Nietzsche anew, though he was to be sure involved in doing something like that. As I see it, the crux of his concern lay in his effort to understand the role that Nietzsche has already played in the arena of his own thought and in modernity generally, in order that this influence might be exorcised. In this essay Heidegger can therefore be seen to be endeavouring to "lose Nietzsche", to place him behind his own thinking in the tradition which since Being and Time he had been determined to overcome.

To understand the distance Heidegger endeavoured to create between his own work and that of Nietzsche, it is of course necessary to see the influence that Nietzsche had already exerted in his work prior to the attempted "break". To account for this influence on Heidegger's thought, this chapter will comprise three parts. In the first part entitled "The Original Heidegger", those influences that we have already seen Nietzsche to have exerted on Heidegger will be briefly reviewed. Subsequent to this section an account will be given of the significant changes in the Heidegger-Nietzsche relationship seen in the

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essay "The Word of Nietzsche". This section will be titled "Interpretation at a Greater Distance". The results of this change will then be investigated in the final section under the heading "Technology as Will to Power". In this section the concern will be to look at Heidegger's final relationship to Nietzsche's thought as it is reflected in his analysis of modernity.

The Original Heidegger

We have already seen that Nietzsche's influence in *Being and Time* is reflected in the central motif of that work - the conception of truth as aletheia. I have suggested that this interpretation of truth can be understood as a response to Nietzsche's, if not ironic, then contradictory thought that "truth is error we live by". It is however, clear that in taking up Nietzsche's challenge, Heidegger did so without being a "Nietzschean", for he took it up from within the context of a phenomenological rather than a genealogical analysis. Here there is already both influence and distance.

Of course Nietzsche's stimulus to Heidegger's thought was not limited to the challenge to rethink the meaning of truth, for we have seen there to be other major influences at work in *Being and Time*. First, along with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche was seen as a possible source for Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as essentially mood full. Second, Nietzsche's threefold classification of history in his essay *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life* was seen to have been taken up and transformed in Heidegger's formulation of Dasein's historicity. We also saw how the conception of temporality as the ontological basis of Dasein's historicity may be interpreted as a radicalization of Nietzsche's thought of the Eternal Return.

The above influences aside, however, we have also seen that apart from his challenge to think truth anew, Nietzsche's major influence on Heidegger's early thought emerged as the confounding of his Dasein analysis with subjectivistic voluntarism. In Chapter four it was this

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2 *The Will to Power* #493
influence that was seen to lie at the basis of the existentialist interpretation of Heidegger's early work. Whereas Sartre's existentialism in *Being and Nothingness* was shown to be at variance with Heidegger's methodological procedure in *Being and Time*, his own particular brand of existentialism was, nonetheless, seen to draw the same conclusions indicated by a subjectivist interpretation of *Being and Time*, namely that Dasein is a being that creates its own meaning.

Contrary to those authors intent on interpreting the early Heidegger as an existentialist, we saw that the tendency for his thought to gravitate towards such a way of interpreting human existence arose from an ambiguity and inadequacy in his thinking. This point was explored in relation to Heidegger's own disastrous support for Nazism in the early thirties. At the close of Chapter four, it was suggested that in the evolution of his thought in the decade from the early thirties on, both the ambiguity and the inadequacies of his early thought were gradually eliminated. In Chapter five this evolution was traced out through an analysis of the three works "On the Essence of Truth", "The Origin of the Work of Art" and *An Introduction to Metaphysics*.

Even though it was written prior to Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis, the essay *On the Essence of Truth* was seen to indicate a shift in his thought which signalled a change of emphasis from the primacy of Dasein to that of Being. Crucial to this shift is the development of the concept of the mystery of Being as the concealment of the Being itself in the manifestation of a being through Dasein's attuned comportment. This failure of Being to be manifest except as a being discovered by Dasein, was seen as a further development of the notion of Falling as put forward in *Being and Time*. In the later essay however, Dasein's fall is given a much stronger emphasis than in *Being and Time*, as a consequence, its existing in truth and untruth equiprimordially is seen to lie more in Dasein's relation to an encompassing realm of Being (in its truth) and error, than in the personal failure by an individual to exist resolutely.³

³"On the Essence of Truth" p.136
The concealment of the concealed beings as a whole holds sway in that disclosure of specific beings, which, as forgetfulness of concealment becomes errancy.

Errancy is the essential counter-essence to the primordial essence of truth. Errancy opens up as the open region for every opposite of essential truth. Errancy is the open sight for and ground of error. Error is not just an isolated mistake but rather the realm, the domain of the history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring get inter-woven.

Error then not only pervades Dasein's existence; it has an equal place alongside the truth of Being. Extending far beyond the individual Dasein, error would seem to be something to which Dasein inevitably submits. In contrast to Being and Time, both error and the truth of Being are here explicitly seen to be beyond the grasp of Dasein's self-understanding, resting in an inscrutably indefinable way with Being itself. It was seen that the inscrutability of this relation as resting in the mystery of Being, is a furthering of the insight that Dasein's authentic resolve is not an "exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they', but rather one which is an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential existentiale. As such, it was suggested that the lecture "On the Essence of Truth", is a deepening of the insights in Being and Time in a direction other than the voluntarism taken up and developed by Sartre in Being and Nothingness.

The lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art" was interpreted as further developing the conception of nature in Being and Time. The result of this lecture was seen to lie in a broadening of the realm of truth and error beyond the limits of the transcendental hermeneutic of Being and Time.

Clearly Heidegger's conception of the relation between Dasein and Being was one undergoing constant revision and development, with the result that the ambiguous equivocation in the term "authentic resolve" was gradually eroded. His final and complete break with voluntarism was signalled in An Introduction to Metaphysics where apart from his

\textsuperscript{4}Being and Time H130 p.168
Der Spiegel interview in 1966, he wrote what are, so far as I know, his only reflections on National Socialism to be published in translation. There he wrote of his understanding of this massive political tide as "an encounter between global technology and modern man." Against this view he contrasted those "works that are being pedalled nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism" which fail to come to grips with its true essence, having "all been written by men fishing in the 'troubled water of "values" and "totalities"."  

Written in response to Nietzsche's thought that Being is just a vapour, An Introduction to Metaphysics is a text that still smacks of voluntarism; of Dasein striving against overwhelming Being wrenching it out of concealment into the light of its there. Yet even given this voluntaristic streak in this work, the relation between Dasein and Being is one which, conceived in a more reciprocal manner than in Being and Time, allowed Heidegger to close his analysis with the following observation:

To know how to question means to know how to wait, even a whole lifetime. But an age which regards as real only what goes fast and can be clutched with both hands looks on questioningly as "remote from reality" and as something that does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbered. But the essential is not number; the essential is the right time, that is, the right moment, and the right perseverance. "For" as Hölderlin said "the mindful God abhors untimely growth" ["Aus dem Motivkries der Titanen", Gesamtliche Werke, 4, 218.]

This conception of waiting for the right moment may well appear out of context, given that in the main body of the lecture series comprising the book, Dasein is conceived as the violent one, striving against Being. However the reciprocity of this strife clearly leaves room for the possibility that one 'partner' in the relation might respond to the other most appropriately by waiting in this manner. Indeed waiting is

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5 Published in Philosophy Today 1976, 20 (4-4) p.26-84 trans. M. Alter and J.D. Caputo
6 op.cit. p.199
7 Ibid
8 op.cit. See p.149 ff for example.
9 op.cit p.206
the response Heidegger was to formulate in Nietzsche Vol. IV, as the appropriate response for resolute Dasein in the face of Being's self-concealment in the manifestation of technology, as essentially the will to power. As David Krell notes in his "analysis" of Nietzsche Vol. IV, at this point in his career, Heidegger is finally able to identify human self-assertion as essentially the same valuative thinking against which he was battling. It is here that Heidegger finally, and explicitly, identified the nature of technology as essentially one with Nietzsche's insight into the Eternal Return and of the Will to Power, as the essence and existence of the modern world. In achieving this insight he explicitly broke from Nietzsche's long productive influence.

Interpretation at a Greater Distance

Heidegger's essay "The Word of Nietzsche" is not of course simply an exegesis of Nietzsche's work. It is rather an interpretation that goes beyond him to say more than he ever could have said, whilst yet still remaining an address to him as a thinker. In this respect the essay is like the Kant-Buch. It is an exercise of destructive retrieve exercised on a near contemporary, in the effort to achieve further self-definition against the back-drop of a thinker very close to Heidegger's own thought. As such, it is an account that brings to light not only similarities, but also differences between the two philosophers. Here in this essay, the accent is squarely on differences which, once brought to light, enable further insight into the contemporary malaise of the West as nihilism.

Nietzsche's thought that "God is dead" is the guiding notion that Heidegger took up in the essay, interpreting it as signifying that not only is the God of Christendom dead, but that the realm of the eternally true has lost its value, so that it no longer has any relation to life. This great event, which was to occupy Nietzsche himself till the end of his creative life, was one he saw the history of the West to

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11 op. cit. p. 275
have engendered from its inception. Heidegger saw this view as captured in his second aphorism in *The Will to Power*: 12

"What does Nihilism mean?" That the highest values are devaluing themselves. The aim is lacking, "Why?" finds no answer.

Heidegger's formulation of what he saw to be Nietzsche's response to this event, is probably the most systematic account of Nietzsche's work to date. In any event, it is clearly more systematic than Nietzsche himself ever was. At the heart of this interpretation, and probably the most contentious aspect of it, is the view that Nietzsche's two ideas, those of the Eternal Return and the Will to Power respectively, are in the parlance of traditional thought, the existence and the essence of reality per se. Given this fact any account of his interpretation of Nietzsche here must include the following central points which he raises.

From the perspective of Nietzsche's genealogy the 'logic' of history is seen to be that of the devaluation and subsequent revaluation of values. As such, valuation is the essence of history, arising as the securing of the "preservation - enhancement" conditions of life within becoming (within the will to power). 13 In this way, Heidegger interprets the Will to Power as the essence of all that is, 14 as the will to increase the conditions of power and enhancement. 15 In this vein he quotes Nietzsche's aphorism 675 from the *The Will to Power*:

To will at all is the same thing as to will to become stronger, to grow - and, in addition; to will means thereto.

As a will to more, the will is always reaching out beyond itself, and so Heidegger observes, "it continually comes as the self same back upon itself as the same": in this sense it is, Heidegger asserts, the

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12 quoted in "The Word of Nietzsche" p.66
13 Ibid p.74
14 Ibid p.71
15 Ibid p.79
"eternal recurrence of the same". From this point of view, the truly revolutionary nature of Nietzsche's work is found in the will to power being consciously recognized and taken up by humankind into a self-conscious pursuit of the conditions for preservation and enhancement. In this sense, Nietzsche's exhortation to 'become what you already are', is interpreted as the recognition of the self as that which continually comes back upon itself, thereby providing its own grounding. It is in this sense that Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's thought of the overman.

With the identification of the overman as self-grounding human being, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's works becomes highly critical. This critical stance does not consist of pointing to errors in Nietzsche's thought, showing where he did not think clearly or consistently. On the contrary, Heidegger recognized that Nietzsche thought his problematic through to the outermost point at which it was then possible for him to achieve. 17

Nietzsche's thought that thinks the overman arises from the thinking that thinks whatever is ontologically as what is in being, and it thus accommodates itself to the essence of metaphysics, yet without being able to experience that essence from within metaphysics. For this reason the respect in which the essence of man is determined from out of the essence of Being remains concealed for Nietzsche, just as it does in all metaphysics before him.

Implicit in this view that Nietzsche could have gone no further in his thinking, is a telos that Heidegger is claiming he, given the temporal distance between himself and Nietzsche, is privy to see, whilst Nietzsche, given his situation in the history of Being, could not see. The nature of this telos, evidenced in perhaps the most contentious aspect of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, one in which his break with Nietzsche is most decisively seen, arises from his contention that Nietzsche's attempted reversal of Platonic Metaphysics failed: 18

16 Ibid p. 81
17 Ibid p. 97
18 Ibid p. 61
Nietzsche's countermovement against metaphysics is, as a mere turning upside down of metaphysics, an inextricable entanglement in metaphysics, in such a way indeed, that metaphysics is cut off from its essence and, as metaphysics, is never able to think its own essence.

In this criticism of Nietzsche's work Heidegger is not intimating that it ought to be passed over as an aberration. Rather, if Nietzsche's thought is to be understood for what it is, then Heidegger insists that it must be placed in the history of Being as the place in which metaphysics, enmeshed in its own self-entanglement, heralds the uttermost withdrawal of Being.

This self-entanglement is interpreted as Nietzsche's failure to understand his own thought as the ultimate expression of the very Platonic thought that he sought to overcome. Heidegger sees this failure to lie in his inability to foresee that the most his thought could accomplish, would not be the radically new human being anticipated as the overman, but the perfection of the Cartesian ego-centrism into the subjectivist will to power - as the will to certitude through the controlled, calculated exploitation and domination of the Earth. 19 We can see then that Heidegger's break with Nietzsche can be understood as unavoidable. For where the supreme moment in history when the overman as the self-conscious embodiment of the will to power was, according to Nietzsche's hope, to have engendered a new beginning, in Heidegger's view it was in fact the disastrous obliteration of Being, in the face of the Cartesian self-conscious will to certitude through domination. This result is burgeoned in Nietzsche's emphatic and methodological insistence on the priority of value over truth. In this sense, considered from out of the aspect of Heidegger's interpretation, the true result of Nietzsche's thought lies not in what his genealogy discovered, but in what it covered over - namely Being. To understand Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's work more fully here, and in particular the nature of the telos he saw exhibited in his work, let us explore his identification of Nietzsche's thought with that of Descartes.

19 If the "Earth" is here thought as it should be, in its full Heideggerian context, then the will to certitude can be seen as a will to power over all Being. See "The Word of Nietzsche" p.100ff
Whilst he freely admitted that his interpretation of Descartes' metaphysical position, bypassed "a great deal that a thematic discussion of the fundamental metaphysical position of this thinker would not dare overlook", Heidegger nonetheless did not flinch from identifying his thought as the origin of modern valuative thinking. In so doing he not only effectively placed Nietzsche in the Cartesian tradition, but also, in a more round-about way, revealed Descartes to be a necessary fore-runner to Nietzsche's thought.

The root and originality of Descartes' thought, as it arose from out of his effort to set philosophy on new non-dogmatic, non-theological grounds through breaking with the Medieval philosophy that preceded him, is of course found in the dictum, "Cogito ergo sum". In what can be seen as the vintage Heideggerian 'twist', Heidegger interpreted this dictum in a way that avoids the traditional dispute over whether it is or is not a syllogism.

... Cogito sum does not merely say that I think, nor merely that I am, nor that my existence follows from the fact of my thinking. The principle speaks of a connection between cogito and sum. It says that I am as the one representing, that not only is my Being essentially determined through such representing, but that my representing, as definitive repraesentatio, decides about the being present of everything that is represented; that is to say, about the presence of what is meant in it; that is, about its Being as a being. The principle says that representation, which is essentially represented to itself, posits Being as represented - referred back as to an unshakeable ground is the full essence of representation itself, insofar as the essence of Being and truth is determined by it, as well as the essence of man, as the one representing, and the nature of the definitive standard as such.

In this rather extensive quote, there lie the points of Descartes' metaphysics, which Heidegger sees Nietzsche to have picked up and in taking them over, to have extended to their limit. They are the self, the "I" who as subject is thinking, representing - not only objects, but in an unobstrusive way and along with represented objects, also oneself as the one before whom objects are represented. Second, the

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20 Nietzsche Vol. IV p.104
21 Nietzsche Vol. IV p.114
Being of beings is interpreted as "representedness". Third, truth is seen as certitude, which Heidegger elsewhere described as not so much the lack of doubt subsequent to all doubts being cleared away, but the doubtlessness of the being as represented.\(^{22}\) That is, here Heidegger interpreted Cartesian doubt in an ontological rather than ontic everyday sense. Finally, representation in its full essence, which Heidegger elsewhere saw as captured in Descartes' concept of "method", as ego-anthropocentric, grants man the presumption of being the measure of all beings.\(^{23}\) In the following discussion we shall deal with each of these points (though not in the given order), in an endeavour to give a brief sketch showing how, from Heidegger's point of view, Nietzsche can be seen to have taken them over into his own work.

That Nietzsche took human being as the centre of his work, more particularly the human body, as the basis for his revaluation of values, is indisputable, but for Heidegger most significant. For in placing bodily desires and passions at the centre of his thought, Nietzsche remained for all his differences, as anthropocentric as Descartes was in placing the "I" at the center of his metaphysics.

That both Descartes' and Nietzsche's thought is essentially anthropocentric in this way, did not lie simply in their having seen that human being was central to any account of the intelligibility of all that is, but in the significant role they portrayed it to play in such an account. Thus, for Descartes, the role of the human being as set forward in his conception of method embodied the essential nature of his break with the scholastic tradition:\(^{24}\)

\[\ldots\] "Method" is no longer simply a sequence arranged somehow into various stages of observation, proof, exposition and summary of knowledge and teachings, in the manner of a Scholastic Summa, which has its own regular and repetitive structure. "Method" is now the name for securing, conquering and proceeding against beings, in order to capture them as objects for the subject.

\(^{22}\) Ibid p.106  
\(^{23}\) Ibid p.137  
\(^{24}\) Ibid p.120
In an earlier discussion on the nature of the certitude given in the 'Cogito sum', Heidegger identified the essence of such certitude as that given in mathematical knowledge.\(^{25}\) The new method is then one that is mathematical - but not in the sense in which the Scholastics understood "mathematics".\(^{26}\) In the earlier text, *What is a Thing*, Heidegger investigated this change in the meaning of "mathematical" by sketching out what it meant to the Greeks, (Aristotle and Plato) as compared to the "moderns", (Newton, Galileo and Descartes). The essential differences that he pointed to are as follows.

In its original Greek sense, "mathematics" did not mean what it does today - mathematic computation, geometry etc. Rather it meant both study and learning, and that which was taught.\(^{27}\) Here learning and the teaching are intimately related so that the "(t)eaching is a giving, an offering; but what is offered in the teaching is not the learnable, for the student is merely instructed to take for himself what he already has."\(^{28}\) The mathematical is then, "that evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and according to which we experience them as things at all, and as such things."\(^{29}\)

Where "mathematical" is interpreted in this sense, Plato's sign over the entrance to his Academy - "Let no one who has not grasped the mathematical enter here", is the admonition to all prospective members to think of the "fundamental condition for the proper possibility of knowing", recognizing it to be "the knowledge of the fundamental presuppositions of all knowledge, and the position we take based on such knowledge."\(^{30}\)

With the dawning of modernity, however, this broader conception of "mathematical", which in Plato's case was seen to be remembrance of always pre-existing forms, was transformed into the narrower sense of

\(^{25}\) Ibid p.116  
\(^{26}\) Ibid p.114  
\(^{27}\) Op. cit p.69  
\(^{28}\) Op. cit. p.73  
\(^{29}\) Op. cit. p.75  
\(^{30}\) Op. cit. p.75, 76
the numerical as calculable. In this transformation there was also heralded a change in the meaning of the traditional conceptions of nature, man and knowledge.

Thought metaphysically, Descartes' method can be seen as radically new in the way in which the world is seen in advance, so that it is only known in a way which secures knowledge of objects set over against, and so on the grounds of, the representing subject. In this way Nature can now be thought of as an object, and human being as the representing subject. As an object, nature is understood as mere extension, calculable and so quantifiable in the narrow sense of mathematics as the numerical. As the subject, human being is thought only according to the demands of representation.

The numerical, as but a part of the broader original sense of "mathematical", has with Descartes become its predominant sense, so that Kant could declare of modern science, the exemplar for all knowledge, that its advance as a science occurred when... a light broke in on all investigators of nature. They learned that reason only gains insight into which it produces of itself according to its own projects ... that it must go before with principles of judgement according to constant laws, and constrain nature to reply to its questions, not content to merely follow her leading-strings.

Understood metaphysically, then, Descarte's new method was mathematical in the narrow sense, and only that as a transformation of the original meaning of "mathematical" in the broader Aristotelian-Platonic sense. With this change, knowledge is no longer conceived as Plato would have it, as the remembrance of eternal forms, but the representation and securement of a being in its certitude through the thinking, re-presenting ego.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, Nietzsche not only took over this Cartesian problematic, but in the conception of Will to Power, extended it to its utmost possibility. In accord with this interpretation as one that places Nietzsche well within the ambit of

31 Critique of Pure Reason XIII p.20
modern metaphysics, his two leading concepts, Will to Power and the Eternal Return are interpreted as the essence and existence of reality respectively. The inter-relation between these two concepts, is, as we have seen, interpreted as the preservation and enhancement of the willing human being. Enhancement as an increase in power can however only be seen when gauged or viewed from a particular standpoint, a particular standard.\(^3\)\(^2\) Just such a standard are values which, as embodied in the will, give it the stability (for preservation) it requires to be able to reach-out-beyond itself to more power - to further enhancement.\(^3\)\(^3\)

Values then, are the aspect or point-of-view from which the will to power promotes its stability and growth. It is the way reality is represented through the will centred in the body. Here, as for Descartes, reality is known only as calculatively represented in the one case to the thinking, and in the other, to the passionate drives of the subject.

Nietzsche's most astonishing thesis, that truth is error in the service of life, would seem to be the least likely part of his thought that could be seen as his own form of Cartesianism. However Heidegger points out that when thought essentially, it is in effect his most thoroughly "Cartesian principle". For if Descartes' thought of the "cogito sum" involves a metaphysics grounded not in faith, but in truth, as the certainty of self-givenness of the self, then the truth, rooted in the certitude of the subject as the ground for objects given in representation, does not seem far from what Nietzsche saw truth to be - a holding for true, a value establishing the stability as opposed to the enhancement of the will. For Nietzsche, "truth" so interpreted as the securing of certitude for this Will, is not however the most fundamental aspect of reality, for the true is held thus only as a value;\(^3\)\(^4\) values being more fundamental than truth. For Nietzsche then, truth as the certitude of a given configuration of the will to power is

\(^3\)\(^2\) Nietzsche Vol. IV p. 62, 63
\(^3\)\(^3\) "The Word of Nietzsche" p. 64
\(^3\)\(^4\) "The Word of Nietzsche" p. 83ff
of 'limited value', thus in the drive for more power and enhancement, one value constantly displaces another. What is more valuable than truth is therefore art, which Nietzsche saw as the creation of the new from out of an excess of strength. Just such a creation would be the conscious self-creation of the new man, the Overman.

It is Heidegger's claim however, that, far from being a new man, the overman is simply the perfection of the 'old' Cartesian subjectivity into a self conscious striving for domination over all that is. Thus he interprets Nietzsche's cry that 'God is dead' as the cry of the spokesman for an age that along with Nietzsche, has 'blood on its hands'; an age that has itself committed the deed which it now must recognize. In Heidegger's view therefore, the death of God has been effected by "doing away with that which is in itself..."35

...through the domination and exploitation of the earth by seeing it only as a resource for the making secure of the constant reserve by means of which man secures for himself material, bodily, psychic and spiritual resources, and this for the sake of his own security, which wills domination over whatever is.

The killing of God is, in short, the thinking of all that is - only according to its value in the search for dominion and security. Such thinking fails to think what for Heidegger is the chief concern for all thought - to think Being as it is in itself:36

Thinking in terms of values precludes in advance, that Being itself will attain to a coming to presence in its truth.

We can see then that Heidegger's analysis points to Nietzsche's work as transforming Descartes' metaphysics into valuative thinking. As the essence of modernity, such thought is seen as evidenced in humankind's self-conscious drive for dominion over the earth. This drive is one Heidegger explicitly identified in a later work as the essence of

35 Ibid p.107
36 Ibid p.108
technology. This then is the essential insight that Heidegger works through in his reappropriation of Nietzsche, the insight he establishes to place Nietzsche 'behind' his own thought and so, in the tradition that both he and Nietzsche sought to overcome.

The Telos Underlying Heidegger's Interpretation of Nietzsche

That there is an underlying 'logic' of a sort in Heidegger's assessment of Nietzsche's place in the history of modernity, is undeniable. To identify its exact nature is, however, not so straightforward. On the one hand there is in Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche the recognition of his insight into the nature of reality being manifest in modern times as valuative thought. We have also seen from our analysis of earlier texts, that Heidegger agreed with Nietzsche's identification of the need for a new beginning to Western history. Here there would seem to be broad agreement, until it is seen on the other hand, that Heidegger identified Nietzsche's work as far less an overcoming of Nihilism, than its most radical expression.

Given that Nietzsche's method was that of genealogy, Heidegger's conclusion that it was itself but part of the problem seems fore-gone, for he identified nihilism to have arisen from out of the valuative thinking, which is precisely the essence of Nietzsche's genealogical method. Yet insofar as Nietzsche's thought penetrated to the heart of modernity, he thought it as it is, as the will to power. In recognizing what is, he would seem to have pointed to the essence of Being; for what is has Being if anything has! Yet Heidegger's claim is that Nietzsche completely failed to think Being at all. To think of will to power as the essence of modernity, can then only be to think of what is as the total failure to think Being. Thus if the essence of modernity is will to power, as Nietzsche proclaimed, then it is this only as the non-essence or withdrawal of Being, for what is has Being, but as will to power, only as an absenting withdrawal. Heidegger explicitly identified this withdrawal of Being in the manifestation of

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37 "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays trans. W. Lovitt (Harper and Row) This ref: p.17ff
the will to power as a failure to let Being be, a stricture consonant with the demands of a phenomenological as opposed to a genealogical inquiry.

To grasp the full import of Heidegger's analysis, it is necessary to see both his and Nietzsche's work, not simply as the results of highly imaginative individual philosophers working in splendid isolation from nitty-gritty life, but on the contrary, as expressions of the spirit of not only their own, but also of future times. Taken seriously, this consideration has the consequence that each thinker must in effect be considered as the spokesman for his time. In this sense, and from the perspective of Heidegger's work, Being either reveals or conceals itself not simply in the work of the philosopher, but in the greater milieu from out of which the philosopher works. Bearing this point in mind, Nietzsche's choice of genealogy was not unfortuitous, but from Heidegger's perspective the only truly adequate response to the spirit of his times. In short it was the only adequate response to the way Being was showing itself in its withdrawal.

In the preceding chapter we had the occasion to consider the way in which Being can be seen to withdraw, firstly in the mysterious manifestation of beings, and second in the face of human forgetfulness of this mystery. Let us then once again use the analogy of the field of vision to further interpret the way Heidegger saw Nietzsche to stand in the tradition of metaphysics and, in so doing, see how this interpretation reveals a further evolution in his own thought.

It will be recalled that using the analogy of the visual field, the mystery of Being was interpreted in the following manner: Area (D), understood as Being in itself was only to be glimpsed as that given through the ecstatic horizon of human being (C), as an entity (A) encountered within the horizon as an entity within the world, area (B). Interpreted in this light, the analogy gives some insight into the possible meaning of the mystery of Being as its withdrawal or concealment in the event of the manifestation of a being/entity. As a

38"The Word of Nietzsche" p.108ff
self-concealment of Being in this manner, the mystery can be seen to be beyond the control of human being. In point of fact, as the analogy illustrates, human being is inextricably part of the self-concealment of Being by virtue of its very nature as the locale\textsuperscript{39} or world in which Being simultaneously reveals and conceals itself in the manifestation of beings. This self-concealment of Being is one side of what in Nietzsche Vol IV Heidegger called the default of Being; a default, be it once again noted, from out of which the essence of human being is given as the there of Being, that is, as Da-sein.\textsuperscript{40} As the thinking being where "thinking" is meant in the sense of the polemos as portrayed in An Introduction to Metaphysics, Dasein thinks and so exists in this default of Being.

There is of course another way in which the analogy can be 'read', that is, starting not from the outside areas and proceeding in, but vice versa. In our earlier analysis in Chapter four, this reading was seen as illustrative of what Heidegger called Dasein's forgetfulness of the mystery of Being. In our present interpretation this reading of the analogy is one which points to Dasein as the place of the default of Being, and that as the being who forgets about Being owing to its own fascination with beings. As a result of this fascination, if Being is thought at all, then it is as a being, that is, metaphysically. Such thinking Heidegger wrote\textsuperscript{41}

... does not repudiate Being itself, but neither does it keep to the default of Being as such. Of itself, thinking does not correspond to the withdrawal of Being. However, the twofold omission of repudiation and correspondence is not nothing. Rather, it happens not only that Being as such stays away, but that its default is thoughtlessly misplaced and suppressed by thinking. The more exclusively metaphysics gains control of the being as such and secures itself in and by the being as the truth "of being", the more decisively has it already dispensed with Beings as such, and as this condition is one value among others.

This then, in Heidegger's view, is the essence of metaphysics; it

\textsuperscript{39} Nietzsche Vol IV p.216ff
\textsuperscript{40} Nietzsche Vol IV p.217-218
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid p.219
is an ever increasing forgetfulness of the mystery in the default of Being yeilding a forgetfulness of the difference between Being and beings. From out of this increasing forgetfulness issues Nihilism as the oblivion of Being, where all that is (has Being) is understood only according to its value. Such an oblivion, is one which Heidegger saw as threatening to rend not only the entire world into a resource for exploitation and domination, but also constantly to endanger the very essence of human being as Da-sein. This threat arises out of the possibility that in the most extreme fit of will to power in technological madness, the truth of Da-sein may be completely forgotten, and Dasein subsequently be viewed as something available for exploitation and domination in a way no different from other things. In fact in his essay "The Question Concerning Technology", Heidegger pointed to evidence that just such an event is underway.42

For the modern world as one that is essentially technological, entities are no longer conceived as objects standing opposed to and so represented by a subject. Rather through the Nietzschean radicalization of the basis of Cartesian thought, entities are seen as a "standing reserve", as resources for exploitation in the pursuit of the security and comfort of the existence of the most sensitive of beings - humankind. In contrast to such an exploitative understanding, Heidegger pointed to the use of things which preserve rather than overpower the environment in and out of which they are made. Bridges, for example, which span the banks of a river without challenging the course of the river itself,43 windmills which turn when the wind blows, using the air without storing it, and peasant farming methods that cultivate rather than merely exploit the soil.44

Such counter examples to the exploitative essence of modern technology might seem to indicate that all that is needed to overcome Nihilism, is for everyone suddenly to decide to cultivate

42 op.cit. p. 26-27
44 "The Question Concerning Technology" p.14, 15
pre-technological skills and ways of life generally. This however is not Heidegger's point. For the contemporary manifestation of technology as will to power, thought essentially as Da-sein's failure to remember the mystery of Being, is not an event that can be overcome by active efforts of social and political reform. In fact Heidegger's analysis points to such efforts as but a further entanglement in the very Nihilism it seeks to overcome. This point marks the explicit emergence of the mature "later Heidegger" where a priority of Being over Da-sein is recognized.

The priority of Being over its 'there' points to the ontological placement of human being as one within Being such that it cannot stand in a commanding position over what-is in totality. Thus, if Dasein should from out of its place within Being, endeavour to "turn the tide" against the oblivion of Being by forcing it to reveal itself as it is, then the endeavour would simply be tantamount to will to power. As such it would only reinforce the oblivion of Being. That Da-sein would necessarily fail in such an endeavour, which in the terminological ambit of Being and Time must be seen as an authentic resolve, points to the nature of the evolution in Heidegger's thought. In Being and Time the distinction between the truth of Dasein's resolve, and the revelation of Being was blurred so that it was difficult to distinguish between the two. This difficulty was seen to lie at the basis of existentialist (subjectivist and voluntaristic) readings of Heidegger's early works. Here in his analysis of the will to power, however, quite the contrary seems to be the case. Dasein cannot resolve to disclose Being free from its oblivion because this oblivion is not founded on Dasein's own volition. It is not that humankind discovered technological thought, but that such thinking lays claim on humankind. 45 Such a claim, Heidegger avers, is a destining, a granting by Being of the essence of human being as Da-sein: a granting, be it noted, that in the presenting of technology, threatens to overwhelm that very essence. 46

45 Ibid p.19ff
46 Ibid p.31ff
From the perspective of the analogy, Heidegger's position here can be seen as an insistence on giving a priority to area (D), as that which not only encompasses all the other areas, but also actively supports them as both their source and their essential nature. In this sense area (D) is suffused throughout the entire diagram revealing itself as and in all the other areas. As a change in the way the analogy was previously employed, this reading necessitates a change in the way the key terms of forgetfulness and remembrance are employed. If we carry out these necessary adjustments the telos underlying Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche will become clear. Let us then look at each key concept in turn.

In the preceding use of the analogy, the conception of the mystery of Being was seen as Being's (D) self-concealment in the event of the manifestation of an entity (A). This interpretation of the analogy remains the same here apart from the explicit recognition that Being, area (D), suffuses itself throughout the entire field. In keeping with this change, the earlier reading of the analogy illustrating Dasein's forgetfulness of Being is also altered so that it is not due simply to Dasein's fascination with entities, but is the result of Being (D) defaulting or withdrawing into oblivion. Thus when the analogy is interpreted in terms of what each area does in respect to the others, area (D)'s suffusion throughout (A), (B) and (C), results in an interpretation of forgetfulness as an event issuing from out of Being's default rather than from Dasein's (C) action alone. The result of this default is that, at the most, Dasein thinks of Being (D) as a being (A), that is, metaphysically.

Given the pervasive sway of the default of Being throughout the entire realm of what is areas (A), (B), (C) and (D), the only way the default can be recognised as what it is, lies in what Heidegger called a stepping back out of metaphysical thinking. This step back, as a refrain from any attempt to force Being out of its oblivion, is a stance similar to that which we saw him counsel as "waiting" in the closing passage of An Introduction to Metaphysics. What is absent here in contrast to those earlier lectures is, however, the conception of Dasein as the being that must, as the violent wilful one, strive
against Being. Such a conception of human existence is now clearly seen as the essence of the will to power, in contrast to which he now counsels an openness to Being that is free from such wilfulness.

From the outset, the idea that Da-sein should do nothing but wait for a turn in Being's self-effacement, would seem the direct opposite of authentic resolve as presented in Heidegger's early work, especially Being and Time. The difference between the two conceptions is clear, not only in that our analysis of the texts from Being and Time onwards revealed the gradual changes in Heidegger's thought, but also from Heidegger's own public actions and statements. Even given this metamorphosis of his thought we have seen that Heidegger clearly wanted the entire corpus of his work to be considered as a unity. In Nietzsche Vol.IV for instance he wrote the following observation about Being and Time:47

In Being and Time, on the basis of the question of the truth of being, no longer the question of the truth of beings, an attempt is made to determine the essence of man solely in terms of his relationship to Being. That essence was described in a firmly delineated sense as Da-sein. In spite of a simultaneous development of a more original concept of truth [since that was required by the matter at hand], the past thirteen years have not in the least succeeded in awakening even a preliminary understanding of the question that was posed.

The reasons for the failure of Being and Time to effect the result Heidegger had expected are, he observed, twofold. On the one hand, the work was received as a philosophical anthropology of human existence. The second reason, of particular interest to us is one he expressed as follows:48

On the other hand however, the reason for such non-comprehension lies in the attempt itself, which, perhaps because it really is something historically organic and not anything "contrived", evolves from what has been heretofore; in

47 op.cit. p.140 In a footnote Krell observes that these reflections were not part of the original 1940 lectures, but were inserted at a later date. He notes, however, that given the fact that neither when not where the passage was written is known, the phrase "for the past thirteen years" should best be interpreted as a reference back to Being and Time from 1940 when the lectures were originally presented. 48 Ibid p.141
struggling loose from it, it necessarily and continually refers back to the course of the past and even calls on it for assistance, in the effort to say something different. Above all, however, the path taken terminates abruptly at a decisive point. The reason for the disruption is that the attempt and the path it chose confront the danger of unwillingly becoming merely another entrenchment of subjectivity; that the attempt itself hinders the decisive steps; that is, hinders an adequate exposition of them in their real execution.

This passage is particularly useful here as it points to what has been described earlier as the ambiguity inherent in Being and Time. This ambiguity, namely the failure of the Dasein analysis to adequately express the relation between Dasein and Being so that the two became virtually indistinguishable, was seen as the source of the existentialist interpretation of Being and Time. Heidegger's reference to the role that the influence of tradition played in this failure, is one we can pin down explicitly to the inadequacy of the Dasein analysis conceived as a hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein's subjectivity. Such a methodological conception is clearly under the influence not only of Kant, but also, as we have seen, of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The power of these traditional influences is testified in the fact that it is not until 1940 that the full reach of Nietzsche's thought is finally plumbed and countered.

Given the distance between the early works and Heidegger's position in Nietzsche Vol IV, it would seem difficult to point to this later work as the result of working consistently on one aspect of the ambiguity in Being and Time. However, in his Nietzsche and the Task of Thinking David Krell makes just this point in his analysis of "authenticity".49 We have seen that it is possible to interpret the account of resolute Dasein in Being and Time in an existentialist manner. According to such a view, resolute and therefore authentic Dasein discloses to itself, out of its own resources, both the situation in which it exists, and how it can take over that situation according to its own ends. Here being "resolute" differs little if at all from the wilful exercise of a limited but autonomous self. In contrast to this interpretation, Krell points to the possibility of

49 op.cit. p.293ff
interpreting "resoluteness" as "opened-ness" or "un-closedness". According to this interpretation, the resoluteness of Dasein as for example given in the "moment of vision" in which "nothing can occur", but which "permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time'", is not due to the machinations of the individuals willful analysis of its existentiell situation. Rather, it is simply the openness of Dasein as a being who, given that it is ontologically constituted as temporality, can only encounter entities out of the field of its own temporal 'openness' to them. The deliberate cultivation of such resoluteness, far from being a willful effort to manipulate the disclosure of its own Being, is, Krell points out, found in Dasein's effort to recognize and "support the weight" of guilt given in its anxiety. As Krell acknowledges, the source of this interpretation of "resoluteness" is Heidegger's work "Conversation on a Country Path" where he endeavoured to point to the possibility of a non-willful way of thinking which would allow the truth of Being to announce itself in its truth. Heidegger's concern with this possibility lies in his preceding analysis in which, as we have seen, he came to see the nature of modernity as essentially the will to power: that is as the oblivion of Being. To give an account of this and other related texts representative of his mature thinking, is the concern of the next chapter.

50 Being and Time H338-339 p.387-388
51 op.cit. p.249
52 Published in Discourse on Thinking trans. J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund (Harper and Rowe New York 1966) This ref: p.81
In concert with the increasing emphasis on the role of Being over Da-sein evident in the evolution of Heidegger's thought, there is also an ever increasing emphasis on the historical, understood in the grand style of the history of nations. This change of emphasis is such that in comparison the historicity of the individual as outlined in Being and Time seems rather parochial. The point at which the different emphasis is most marked, is in the works written in 1935 where the historical is interpreted in terms of the globally hegemonic history of the West. Concomitant with the emphasis, art is considered only insofar as it is great art, politics only in the sense of grand politics. With this shift in emphasis from the daily round of the individual Dasein to events of world importance, there lay a corresponding change in what a reappropriation of history would involve, particularly the way it would come about. The nature of this change as portrayed in his later work, particularly in Identity and Difference and in the text "Conversation on a Country Path" will be our concern in this final chapter.

In Identity and Difference, Heidegger was concerned not only to articulate the relation between Being and human being, but to do so through a non-representational way of thinking which, whilst respecting their difference, would preserve their mutual inter-relation. This concern arose out of his identification of representational (metaphysical) thinking with that of the will to power, that is, with the essence of modern technology. Such a way of articulating the

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1 "The Origin of the Work of Art" p.40
2 in Discourse on Thinking p.58-90
relation however, ultimately eludes the essay. The closest Heidegger can get to it, is seeing that its accomplishment requires a transformation of thought, one necessitating "a leap" away from both the traditional way of thinking of man as the rational animal, and of Being as the ground (reason) for all that is. He characterized such a leap as...3

...the sudden return into the realm where Man and Being have already found together in their essence, because both were assigned to each other in a sufficiency.

The nature of such a leap is the central problem of the text "Conversation on a Country Path". There, effort was expended in an endeavour not to simply point to, but to experience the possibility of a non-representational way of thinking. As an alternative to the will to power characteristic of representational thought, such a new way of thinking would be "a non-willing in the sense of a renouncing of willing".4 Given the essential relation between will to power and representational thought, this endeavour to renounce willing inevitably leads to the problem of not only how to think non-wilfully but also of what can be thought in this way.

Heidegger's answer to this problem, in which he poses the challenge to mankind to simply abide in non-willing, is the subject of Idhe's own interpretive use of the analogy of the field of vision.5 As Idhē acknowledges, this analogy is in fact one which Heidegger himself employed in seeking both to delimit the nature of representational thinking, and to point to an alternative way of thought.6 In the text of what is essentially a dialogue between a scientist, a scholar and a teacher, such thinking is introduced at a point where the scientist identifies the nature of representational thought as "transcendental - horizontal re-presenting". In turn, the scholar further embellishes this conception interpreting it in a primitive Kantian-like fashion.

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3 op.cit. p.23-24
4 op.cit. p.59
5 "Phenomenology and the Later Heidegger" esp.p.29 ff
6 "Conversation on a Country Path" p.63ff
This re-presenting, for instance, places before us what is typical of a tree...as that view into which we look when one thing confronts us in the appearance of a true (etc)..."

Scientist: you describe, once again, the horizon which encircles the view of a thing - the field of vision.

Teacher: It goes beyond the appearance of the objects.

If we illustrate what the scientist and teacher have said here, the following familiar diagram results:

A: thing seen
B: horizon of the field of vision
C: the limit of the horizon encircling the viewed thing.
D: Beyond the visual field - nothing

From what the scientist has said, area (B) in this analogy is interpreted not simply as an amorphous background, but a horizon which when looked into, allows "what is typical" of a thing to be seen. Considered as such it is not merely structured background either. For it actually structures the thing seen; much as Kant's categories and Heidegger's existentiales 'structure' that encountered by finite human being. The limitation of such philosophy is apparent when in a further rejoinder between the teacher and the scholar about the nature of the horizon, he says of the horizon that...

...it goes beyond the appearance of the objects.

Scholar: Just as transcendence passes beyond the perception of objects.

Teacher: Thus we determine what is called horizon and transcendence by means of this going beyond and passing beyond...

Scholar:...which refer back to objects and our representing of objects.

7 Ibid p.63
8 Ibid p.63-64
Teacher: Horizon and transcendency thus, are experienced and determined only 'relative' to objects and our representing them.

We have here in the words of the teacher, the glory and the bane of Transcendental philosophy: the essence of the horizon, and so also of transcendence, is only thought relative to the apriori possibility of objects actually appearing as a result of being encountered within its ambit. As such, what makes the horizon itself possible is not put into question. We must ask however whether this criticism of transcendental philosophy also applies to Being and Time? For as we have seen, as opposed to a regional ontology, Being and Time endeavoured to be more fundamental in seeking that which allowed any understanding whatsoever to be. This distinctive concern leads to a concerted effort to focus on the horizon itself, that is, it leads to an investigation into the constitution of the temporality of Dasein's being as forming the horizon of the meaning of Being. With this concern at its centre, Being and Time would seem exempt from criticism here. However, even given this more radical concern of Being and Time, we have seen its analysis to have faltered. In the present context this faltering can be interpreted as due to the constraint of transcendental philosophy, for in Being and Time the horizon was conceived only in terms of that being which has ontological priority - Dasein alone; hence the existentialist flavour in the notions of, for example, resoluteness and authenticity. This interpretation can be summarily encapsulated in the conception of Dasein as the being that throws the world over being.

By way of contrast to the results of Being and Time, we can compare the interchange between the three interlocutors on the country path. We rejoin them at the point where the teacher considers interpreting the horizon as something other than that which is determined solely in relation to objects encountered within it.

Teacher: We say that we look into the horizon. Therefore the

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9 Ibid
10 The Essence of Reasons p.89
11 "Conversation on a Country Path" p.64
field of vision is something open, but its openness is not due to our looking.

Scholar: Likewise we do not place the appearance of objects, which the view within the field of vision offers us, into this openness...

Scientist: ...rather that comes out of this to meet us.

Teacher: What is evident of the horizon, then, is but the side facing us of an openness which surrounds us; an openness which is filled with the views of the appearances of what to our re-presenting are objects.

This description of the horizon appears to be similar to that given in our previous account of the mystery of Being in Chapter four. It was illustrated as follows:

A: an entity
B: the world
C: the ecstatic horizon
D: the totality of Being.

The reading of this analogy which yielded an interpretation of the mystery of Being, was one which considered the entire illustration in terms of the relation of figure to ground. Thus, (A) as an entity was seen to be but a partial revelation of area (D), which partially withdrew in the event of (A)'s manifestation.

What is new to Heidegger's endeffort here is, however, the explicit effort to think of area (D) free from restrictions of transcendental philosophy, especially as evidenced in Being and Time. As such it is an attempt to reveal the other-side of the transcendental horizon, as the side which 'faces' not the centre of the field, but outward towards the open area (D). 12 It is in short a renewed effort to think Being as it reveals (a-lethe) itself as it is in itself. 13 To think Being in this way would seem a hopeless affair, unless following Idhe's suggestion it is interpreted as a pursuit that concentrates on the open

12 Ibid. p.64
13 In the "Conversation ..." (see page 66) this effort results in the naming of area (D) as the "region".
region, area (D), thinking about it only in terms of what it does in respect of the rest of the field. In this sense, the symmetry in the relations of the different areas of the field as seen in remembrance of the mystery of Being\(^\text{14}\) is disrupted. In its stead, area (D) is seen as actively delimiting the area it surrounds, (that is area (C) inward). This delimitation occurs in the same way that area (B), the world, was seen to delimit structurally the way an entity (A) could be manifest. As Idhe suggests, Heidegger's description of the way the Open is seen from this perspective is very literal. Just as area (B) can be said to "gather" that within its ambit into a field within which the entities are manifest, so too, Heidegger sees the Open Region as "gathering" that within its ambit.\(^\text{15}\)

The literal nature of the description is not limited to the analysis of the Open Region. It carries over to consideration of the appropriate comportment for such thinking as one which remains steadfastly non-willful.\(^\text{16}\) The necessity of this demand can be understood when it is realized that the Open Region is that which literally gives to human being both its very essence as its 'there', and that which it encounters in the world. In this sense, the requisite for entering into non-presentational thinking involves doing nothing in the usual understanding of undertaking action. Rather, in the sense of the cultivated inwardness of the ethical and religious person in Kierkegaard's thought, Heidegger points to the cultivation of a will-less waiting in an openness to Being as the only appropriate response. It is in this sense, that the full context of his re-interpretation of the meaning of "resolve" in *Being and Time*, as "openness", as seen in the quote at the end of chapter six becomes

\(^{14}\)See Chapter 4

\(^{15}\)Heidegger's description here is a clear reference to his then contemporary lectures "Logos" and "Aletheia". In these lectures Being as Logos was interpreted as the primal gathering and assembling - the letting-lie-before - of that which human speech subsequently let be as it dis-covered it. The only major difference in the accounts here is that in the "Conversation..." this letting-lie-before oneself of discovery is explicitly contrasted to representational thought as such.

\(^{16}\)Idhe op.cit. p.28
clear: that is...17

one needs to understand "resolve" as it is understood in Being and Time as the opening of man/Dasein for openness...

which we think of as that-which-regions.

In accord with this interpretation of "resolve", one is tempted to see a parallel reinterpretation of the inwardness characteristic of subjective truth in Being and Time, to the cultivation of non-representational thinking in his later works.

It is in What is Called Thinking? 18 that the full extent of Heidegger's reinterpretation of "inwardness" becomes fully evident. In the analysis of thinking in the second section of this text,19 Heidegger drew a picture of genuine non-willful thought as literally a thanking, or a thankful return to one's proper abode in the truth of Being. He accomplished this interpretation via an etymological 'story' in which he traced the word "think", to the Old English "thane", which he saw in turn to signify "memory", not merely in the sense of recalling the past, but also a concomitant retention of the present and future in "devotion". In this sense the "thane" as a "thinking" that comes from the heart, points to the essence of human being as literally being a devoted thanksgiving. As non-representational thinking, such devotion is literally a thanking by human being for the gift of its own being, a gift through which Being itself is manifest. In keeping with the nature of the gift, the adequate expression of such thankfulness is, Heidegger suggests, the exercise of the gift, that is, steadfast openness to Being.

In the word play from "thinking" to "thane" as "devotion", which is finally interpreted as the recall or "gathering" of past, present and future,20 Heidegger is clearly reinterpreting his earlier account of temporality in Being and Time. This re-interpretation is one in

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17 "Conversation..." p.81
19 op.cit. p.144ff
20 op.cit. p.144ff
keeping with his meditation on poetry in the early fifties which reached not only into the essence of human comportment, but also, of necessity, to the way entities are encountered and understood in that comportment. Out of these meditations was born the conception of the fourfold as indicative of the way humankind could dwell in the fullness of Being. In this context however, it is a reformulation which lacks the attestation that resolve found in conscience in the analysis of Being and Time. Thus as Gadamer notes: 21

(T)he objection is often made that the basic concepts of Heidegger's later work cannot be verified. What Heidegger intends, for example, when he speaks of being in the verbal sense of the word, of the advent of being, the clearing of being, the revealment of being, the forgetfulness of being, cannot be fulfilled by an intentional act of our subjectivity. The concepts that dominate Heidegger's later philosophical works are clearly closed to subjective demonstration, just as Hegel's dialectical process is closed to what Hegel called representational thinking.

In the light of this fact the question immediately arises as to how, if at all, are his later investigations to be attested?

From the preceding account of Heidegger's work, it is clear that the way of answering this question chosen here, lies in showing his final position in the later work to be the result of the full development of his original problematic. (This is a viewpoint to which authors such as W.J. Richardson, J.P. Fell and D. Krell would also be sympathetic). 22 However if we are to understand not only Heidegger's

21 "Heidegger's Later Philosophy" in Philosophical Hermeneutics p.224
22 Richardson's Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought is standing proof of the hermeneutic nature of interpretation. For as a 'straight' commentary it is nonetheless riddled with incisive insights that shows the author to have striven to make the text "his own". Fell's Heidegger and Sartre on Being and Place, traces the development of Heidegger's thought as one which successively perfects the hermeneutic circle to a final finished state in the four-fold. In this formulation where Dasein is only one of four members of the circle, the subjectivism of Being and Time is seen as most convincingly overcome. My only reservation about his account is where he sees the account of Dasein's anxiety in Being and Time to rend the hermeneutic circle into a potential dualism. see Fell p.110. In his thesis and both of the analyses accompanying the english translations of Nietzsche Vol. I and Nietzsche Vol. IV, Krell's leaning towards the view that Heidegger's work should be viewed as a conitiuity unbroken by the "reversal" is both clear and convincing.
conception of Being in its relation to human existence as poetical, but also his intensive use of poetic works in the fifties, then this preceding interpretation must be further developed. In particular, attention must be paid to the development of his account of the poetic nature of authentic speech.

It may seem that the point at which Heidegger's attention turned towards poetic utterance as an alternative to metaphysical thought, is in his lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art". Strictly speaking this observation is correct, but is should not cause us to overlook his search for a non-scientific way of thinking that is evident not only in "What is Metaphysics?", but also in Being and Time. In the latter work it will be recalled that scientific thought was interpreted as a "founded mode" of knowledge. That is, it was interpreted as a way of understanding entities as present-at-hand rather than the ontologically more original way of readiness-to-hand.23 In accord with the definition of "logos" as discourse or talk in which the way something in itself is either uncovered or covered over, the lack of the ontological originality of scientific discourse was established through an analysis of the experience of anxiety. Interpreted as Dasein's guilt-ridden response to the silent unambiguous call of conscience, Heidegger's analysis of anxiety was in effect, an attempt to show the true nature of discourse as the logos of the true phenomenon of Being in the only way he saw possible, that is, via a phenomenological analysis. With the evolution of his thought in the nineteen thirties, we can therefore see Heidegger's concern with the poetic as a continuation of the effort to make the nature of discourse clear.

In the light of the central place of discourse in Being and Time,

23It is interesting to note that his subsequent identification of modern science as essentially technology, that is as the manifestation of the will to power, can be interpreted as the full conception of authentic scientific resolve left undeveloped in Being and Time. With this development, science is seen as only too well an authentic understanding of entities as ready-to-hand in the oblivion of Being. Here Heidegger's later analysis usurps his former. The key to this change lies in his increasing insight into the oblivion of Being, such that Dasein's resolve does not reveal Being as thought in Being and Time, but its oblivion.
Heidegger's view in "The Origin of the Work of Art" that "language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the open for the first time", is not an entirely new viewpoint. It does, however, mark a considerable and in the context of our present concern, important development over his position in his earlier position in Being and Time. This development is one concomitant with the change of emphasis in his analysis from Dasein's temporality in its everydayness, to the concern for a radical new beginning to the whole of world history. This more radical concept of a new beginning was first announced in the lecture on the origin of art. With this change of concern, the centre stage is no longer occupied by authentic Dasein as existentially and existentially revealing genuine Being. What takes its place is the authentic poet, who responds not to the call of conscience, but to the call of the gods, the messengers of the holy. In keeping with this contrast, the poet's response as the naming of the gods, is an event from out of which issues not the individual's situation, which it can take over in resolute anticipation, but literally the world, the gods and historical humankind.

The change of focus from the individual Dasein in everyone, to the authentic poet as a privileged human being, can be understood in the light of Heidegger's analysis of art as the original composure of world and earth. In the lecture "On the Origin of the Work of Art", this composure of two essentially conflicting 'elements', is seen as the nature of poetry - of the emergence ("physis") of Being from out of concealment in the event of truth ("aletheia"). When Heidegger's earlier concern with discourse as the uncovering (or covering over) of something in talk is translated into this problematic, then language as poetic utterance or poesy, emerges as the privileged mode of the poetic utterance, through which Being emerges in the establishment of the Open in which it shows itself.

24 op.cit. p.73
26 op.cit.p.59
In his essay "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry\(^{27}\), the role of the poet as the privileged human being addressed by the gods, was considered in relation to the thinker to be a relation of creator to preserver-cum-interpreter. Hence both the poet and the thinker are seen to have privileged roles in the event of the manifestation of the truth of Being. With the change of focus from "logos" as "discourse" in *Being and Time*, to poetic utterance in his commentaries on Hölderlin's work, there remained a lacuna in Heidegger's thought. In *Being and Time*, the relation between discourse generally and language as the spoken word, was seen as one in which language was the expression of an understanding of something already articulated in the more general realm of discourse. Though this relation was largely unexplored in *Being and Time*, it is possible to see the priority of the more general discourse over language to be given in the role that tradition plays in performing any given understanding. This, however, is not the only way in which the priority can be understood. For the more general and essentially prior aspect of discourse can be seen in Dasein's pre-thematic, but nonetheless, ontological understanding of itself and its world. This understanding is evidenced not only in the call of conscience, but also in Dasein's reticent answer in resoluteness. As the call of conscience is not linguistic in the same sense as everyday language, discourse in this sense still stands in need of a further analysis that explicitly relates it to such utterance - if indeed such an account is possible without lapsing into ineffability! Even given this as a possible outcome of such an inquiry, the fact that the call of conscience is attested by the call of Dasein's existentiell conscience, this account of the relation between Being and Dasein, is still clearer than the relation between the poet's utterance as the naming of the gods and the more original call of the gods.

The lack of clarity in the relation between poetic utterance and the call of the gods, was one which continued to exercise Heidegger through the entire course of his remaining career. It was one, be it

\(^{27}\)op.cit. p.311
noted, that he pursued within the context of Hölderlin's poetic vision wherein poetic utterance is deemed to have a priority over everyday speech. In his earlier essay "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" the eminence of Hölderlin's poetry was seen to lie in two factors. First, his poetry was one exercised from out of a concern to understand the poet's vocation. Second, this concern was explored in the face of a clear recognition of the absence of gods:

Hölderlin in the act of establishing the essence of poetry, first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is coming. It is the time of need, because it lies under a double lack: the no-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the God that is coming.

This view of the poet's vocation is further developed in "What are Poets For?" where the poet is seen to "reach sooner into the abyss", that is, into the absence of the holy.

In contrast to his earlier reflections on the nature of the poetic, Heidegger's later commentaries on Hölderlin point out the specifically positive side of the poet's vocation. In these works, attention is therefore focussed on the heralded return of God, whose essence is thought via negativa the absent gods.

As James Perotti notes, the dynamics of Heidegger's account of the gods and God, rests on his having "over come" the metaphysical conception of God as first cause, and also one might add, as rational ground. As such, the death of God as heralded by Nietzsche marks not the actual demise of the deity, but of its withdrawal from humankind. In this light, the "death of God" is interpreted not simply as the unmasking of illusion, but the dawning recognition of the total

28 James Perotti makes a similar point in his book Heidegger and the Divine. <Ohio Uni press 1974>. His observation that Heidegger's essays on Holderlin's poetry are commentaries is also apt here. Though in seeing this commentary as simply an "affirmation" and "comment" on the poetic words, [p.100] he decidedly under-estimates the creativity immanent in Heidegger's interpretation of Holderlin's work.

29 op.cit. p.311
30 op.cit.p.312
31 in Poetry, Language, Thought p.89ff esp. p.91 - 95
withdrawal of the holy - that is, of Being. The difference between Nietzsche's original utterance and Heidegger's reappropriation of it, can be seen to lie in the different methods of the two thinkers. As has been noted, Nietzsche's genealogy thinks the reality according to a value schema. It is just such a schema that Heidegger's phenomenology unmasked as the essence of the will to power, and this as the very heart of modern nihilism. We can therefore see why from Heidegger's standpoint, Nietzsche could never think of the death of God as the withdrawal of the holy in the sense that Heidegger interprets it to be in his Hölderlin essays. In this way, from a 'Heideggerian' perspective it can be seen that Heidegger is free from the tradition in a way Nietzsche was not.

In view of the distance between the traditional view of the nature of God and Heidegger's thought, Heidegger was able to interpret "the time" of the gods in an other than linear way. The gods may "live and die", but only in the sense of their recurrent presence and absence to human beings; a coming and going which marks the founding and descent of historical human existence. In his lecture on art, Heidegger saw there to have been three such history-founding events, the first occurring in Greece, again in the Middle Ages, and finally in the beginning of modernity. In his writing of the revelation of Being as turn out of oblivion, anticipated in the resolve to think non-representationally, Heidegger is of course pointing towards the event of yet another beginning to history. This new beginning would be one accomplished through the "leap" into the realm of the truth of Being. Whether this conception of a leap out of the will to power is as completely free from traditional influences as at first it appears, is however, a question that we will presently have cause to raise. Before we can do so, it is necessary that we at least, sketch out the main features of the conception of the account of Being developed in the literal absence of the gods. This account is found in the conception of the four-fold inter-relation of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals.

32 op.cit. p.76-77
33 "The Turning" p.41 In The Question Concerning Technology
In his analysis of the "thingness" of a jug in his essay "The Thing"\(^{34}\) Heidegger pointed to the "thingness" of a thing (in this case a jug) as lying in its encompassing of the fourfold. Briefly he saw this to literally occur in the following way. The jug is a container the use of which is not exhausted solely in its being a utensil, least of all one used to decant liquids, nor as a vessel of a scientifically determined volume. Rather, the full extent of its usefulness lies in the way it manifests each member of the four-fold. Thus, the jug is a container by virtue of its "taking and keeping of liquid", and of its pouring of the same. The liquid, which Heidegger takes in this case as either water or wine, can be seen to originate from both the earth out of which the water is drawn and as rain, from the sky. As such the jug literally holds within it both the earth and sky. As a pouring of the liquid, that which is poured Heidegger called a gift. This gift can be received either as a drink or libation to the gods. In this way Heidegger effected what is essentially a reinterpretation of letting-be.\(^{35}\) That is, he came to reflect explicitly on the relation between "useful" and "letting-be" outlined in *Being and Time.*\(^{36}\) There, he saw "letting be", to arise from out of Dasein's interpretative encounter with entities in which they were understood as ready-to or present-at-hand. This understanding was given from out of the context of Dasein's pursuit of possible ends or goals. In this way "letting-be" was interpreted as rooted in Dasein's understanding of itself as a potentiality to be. In contrast to this earlier account, the being of entities is seen to lie in their usefulness as given from out of the inter-relation of the earth, the sky, the divine and mortals.

As Fell points out,\(^{37}\) it is interesting to note the very literal meaning of each member of the fourfold. Thus the "earth" and the "sky" literally refer to the earth and the sky, just as "mortals" refers to human beings who live within the knowledge that they will die. But

\(^{34}\) in *Poetry, Language, Thought* Trans. A. Hofstadter This ref:169ff
\(^{35}\) *What is Called Thinking?* p.189ff
\(^{36}\) *Being and Time* 84ff p.116ff
\(^{37}\) op.cit. p.215ff
what of the divinities? How given that they are absent, is Heidegger’s reference to them to be understood? In the essay “Poetically Man Dwells”\(^{38}\) Heidegger pointed to the poet’s experience of this absence as being no less literal than the experience of the other members of the four-fold unity. There, as in all his commentaries on Holderlin, the essence of human being is seen to reside less in the execution of necessary but nonetheless prosaic tasks of everyday life, than in the event of the naming of the gods.\(^{39}\)

Only in the realm of sheer toil does man toil for 'merits'. There he obtains them for himself in abundance. But at the same time, in this realm, man is allowed to look up, out of it, through it, toward the divinities. The upward glance passes aloft toward the sky, and yet it remains below on earth. The upward glance spans the between of earth and sky. This between is measured out for the dwelling of man. We now call the span thus metered out the dimension... We leave the nature of the dimension without a name. According to Holderlin’s words, man spans the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly. Man does not undertake this spanning just now and then; rather, man is man at all only in such spanning.

It is, then, out of the “spanning” of the distance between the earth and the sky that mortal humankind exists. In modernity however, the most that is discerned in the mortal's glance “aloft”, is the absence of the deity: "the god who remains unknown, must by showing himself as the one he is, appear as the one who remains unknown.”\(^{40}\) The only way he can appear thus, is as the sky:\(^{41}\)

The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky... Thus the unknown god appears as unknown by way of the sky's manifestness.

Given that modernity is the time of the oblivion of Being, one heralded by the absence of the deity, the namelessness of God is reflected in the whole unity of the four-fold. Rather than showing the presence of Being in its truth, the four-fold shows its dissimulation in the face of the will to power. This same dissimulation thought in relation to

\(^{38}\) In Poetry, Language, Thought pp.212-229

\(^{39}\) op.cit. p.220 - 221

\(^{40}\) Ibid. p.228

\(^{41}\) Ibid p.221
human being rather than beings, points to the undiminished power of metaphysical ratiocenation. Even given this dissimulation, Heidegger's account of the four-fold, points to a unique relation between poetic utterance, and the call of primal logos given in the faint traces of the gods.

In "The Way to Language" Heidegger continued to explore the relation between primal logos and mortal speech. His conclusion there harks back to his previous essays "Logos" and "Aletheia", and forms a unity with his reflections on both the nature of the four-fold, and of non-representational thinking. In "Logos", Heidegger elaborated on the relation between hearing and speaking within the context not of the call of conscience, as in Being and Time, but of the thinker's hearing of the "Saying of Logos" as primal "gathering". In response to this hearing, the thinker speaks, naming the gods, and hence the fate of what is. Speech in this sense is "a letting lie before" of that already gathered by primal logos. Saying as primal logos, is then the gathering together of the four-fold into the unity of their mutual inter-play. To respond to the call of the gods is, then, the hearing and the saying of the four-fold as a mortal. It is to hear and respond to the holy. In "The Way to Language" this response is as one not yet fully prepared for, seen as one which, when appropriately taken up literally says Being. It should be noted that in this context here, this "appropriate" response as an appropriation of Being in this genuine saying, can be thought of as the way of thinking /existing that would ensue in the event of moving beyond line (C) in the analogy; a move from out of metaphysical thinking into non-representational thinking /existing.

44 in Early Greek Thinking p.102ff
45"Logos" p.60 ff. "What is Called Thinking? " p.67
46 Also see the Postscript to What is Metaphysics? p.391
47 op.cit. p.127
Brief as the above sketch of the development of Heidegger's concern with the poetic is, it still affords us an insight of its essential continuity throughout his whole career. The heart of this continuity lies in his attempt to think the nature of "logos" as the revealing/concealing of Being, as Being rather than as "logic" as it has been traditionally interpreted. It has been suggested to me that the major difference between the early and the later Heidegger lies in the fact that, the later Heidegger focusses not on the being of beings, as he did in his early work, but on Being per se. That there is an element of truth in this view, is evidenced in the account of the turn in chapter four, titled "The Turn From Dasein to Being". However in the light of the account of the turn there, seen for instance in the lecture "On the Essence of Truth", the view that Being per se rather than the being of beings is the sole focus of Heidegger's thought in the turn, must be seen as a gross overstatement. For as it was shown in the analysis of this lecture, there are substantial continuities between Being and Time and the thought presented there.

Even if the supposed shift of focus is seen to occur much later, such as in the "Discourse on Thinking", where Heidegger clearly endeavours to think Being free from the restrictions of the horizon of transcendental metaphysics, it must still be seen as a partial truth. Even in this text I suggest that the result of such thinking is not the dismissal of beings in favour of Being, but the ability to see Being in beings. This result as seen in Heidegger's analysis of things and the fourfold is, as has been previously suggested, an extended critique of the concept of letting-be presented in Being and Time where beings were characterized simply as ready-to or present-at-hand. Even in this early view, however, it must be recognized that beings were only so interpreted from out of Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being. So, as in his later work, the being of beings ultimately rested on Being as given through Dasein's intelligibility. As such it must be recognized that there is less a change and more of a continuity in Heidegger's thinking on this matter.

On the basis of the foregoing interpretation the major characteristic of the turn in Heidegger's thinking must be seen to lie
in his conception of a radically new beginning to history, initiated not by human beings, but in the way Being manifests itself. In this sense, the turn in his thinking implies a growing awareness of the restrictions placed on his project by the transcendental hermeneutic in *Being and Time*. Whilst this hermeneutic was firmly built on an interpretation of Logos as talk rather than logic, the final result of the Dasein analysis, conceived as a hermeneutic of the subjectivity of the transcendental subject (Dasein), threatened to collapse into a subjectivism. The turn from Dasein to Being can clearly be understood as an attempt on Heidegger's part to eliminate this threat.

An interesting point to note at this juncture is that we must beware lest confusion occurs between the turn in Heidegger's own thinking, as the inception of his search for a new beginning, and the turn in the history of Being as an event about which the later Heidegger wrote. Whilst the latter is not possible without the former turn in Heidegger's own thinking, the two are not "the same" — or are they? Perhaps in the final analysis they are, for if the concept of a new beginning is dismissed, as indeed it shall presently be argued that it should, then it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish one turn from the other. This point has the interesting repercussion that with the dismissal of the concept of a new beginning, and so of any effort to distinguish the one turn from the other in his thought, the only alternative place to see any turn at all in his thinking is to see it as a characteristic of his entire work, as a turn in the tradition in which he was working. We shall have recourse to this interesting point later. Let us consider for the moment what end result issues from his later thought, in respect of his earlier account of the hermeneutic nature of human understanding.

It will be recalled that the ontological basis of human understanding, was seen to be given in the temporality that constituted Dasein's transcendental subjectivity. The essentially circular nature of this understanding as interpretive, that is, as hermeneutic, was the subject of our investigation in chapter two. The result of this investigation pointed to the analysis in *Being and Time*, as a phenomenological investigation into the transcendental subjectivity
of Dasein as a historical-temporal being. The result of this investigation would not only lay bare Dasein's ontological constitution as essentially interpretative, but would also show that this understanding is given as a self-understanding. This self understanding, seen as arising from out of Dasein's self-affection as a temporal being, would in turn, reveal the "horizon of the intelligibility of Being" as temporality itself. This identification of Dasein's temporal being with the horizon for the intelligibility of Being resulted, as we have seen, in an ambiguity. This ambiguity led to existentialist readings of Heidegger's early work on the one hand, and his own later researches on the other.

At the root of the analysis in Being and Time are the sections on the call of conscience. This call as one to the fallen inauthentic Dasein from its genuine self, is effectively a self-affectation occurring through discourse. According to Heidegger's definition of "phenomenology" it is a call that reveals to Dasein its genuine self. It is a "logos" (call) showing Dasein to itself in its un-concealment — (a-lethe) — that is, free from the covering over of its Being, as occurs in its falling into inauthentic everydayness. Here "logos" is interpreted as an address from every Dasein to itself. As the explicit focus of an ontological investigation, this call is one seen as possible only on the basis of Dasein's temporality interpreted as the way Being reveals itself in history; that is, as a call to genuine historical existence. The full analysis of this temporality established Dasein as the very being who is ontologically constituted as un-covering (a-lethe), both of itself and other beings. Such un-covering as a revealing of a being as it is in itself, was here interpreted as a showing of the being in its truth.

In Heidegger's later work, however, the call of conscience is displaced in favour of Being's address to the poet, who responds by naming or not naming the gods as the case may be. Here the hermeneutic circle has shifted from self-affecting Dasein to that of the relation between the gods and the poet, and the poet and his audience. (In the first instance the poet is seen as the interpreter of the gods, then as expressly attended to by others, the poet's work in turn becomes an
address (hermeneuein) to those who listen to it. In accord with this shift, "logos" is interpreted as primal Being, identical with, yet differing from human being; an identity in difference.

It must not pass unnoticed that concomitant with Heidegger's later work on the nature of poetry he developed a critique of modernity showing it to be essentially will to power. This essence was one he found embodied in representational thinking as the essential nature of traditional metaphysics. This critique plays an important part in the ensuing account of the nature of the hermeneutic circle. It results for instance in Heidegger's insistence that there must be a "leap" away from representational thinking, if the nature of the identity and difference between Being and Dasein is to be thought as it is in itself. As this leap is one Heidegger saw as yet to occur, happening only in the turn of Being from out of its self-imposed oblivion, the hermeneutic circle is in this sense an event into which contemporary Dasein is yet to enter. This view implies an abandonment of the earlier account of the circle of understanding in Being and Time; a view which in "A Dialogue on Language" Heidegger saw to be superficial. This superficiality lay in "...talk of a circle being talk about understanding" rather than entering into it. Thus, when asked how he would "present the hermeneutic circle today?" Heidegger replied that he would "avoid a presentation as resolutely as I would avoid speaking about language."

Concomitant with this shift in the meaning of the hermeneutic circle there is also a change in the meaning of "aletheia". Whilst Heidegger retained the meaning of "aletheia" as "un-covering", in accord with his later view of there occurring a turn of Being from out of its oblivion, the meaning of "un-covering" is however, here thought only in respect of the new beginning. Interpreted in this way,

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48 "A Dialogue On Language" in On the Way to Language p.29
49 Identity and Difference (Philosophical Library Inc. New York 1960) p.21ff
50 op.cit. p.51
51 op.cit. p.51
"aletheia" means not the uncovering of beings through Dasein's understanding encounter with them, but the event in which the place or opening of Being is granted. This original event is one which, whilst passed over in the oblivion of Being, will, in the event of a new beginning, be explicitly entered into and so thought as the event that it is. This change in the meaning of "aletheia" is, therefore, one which refrains from interpreting the uncovering of entities as the event of truth; for in the oblivion of Being all entities are encountered precisely in the absenting withdrawal of Being that results in the forgetfulness of the identity in difference between Dasein and Being. From the foregoing interpretation of the turn of Being it must be seen that only in the event of this turn will thought and language be equal to the granting of the opening that is, to the contemplation of the truth of Being as it reveals itself in its opening.

Heidegger's endeavour in his later work can therefore be seen as an effort to indicate essential difference between speaking language in response to Being, and simply speaking about language. By placing prime importance on the former way of speaking, he can be seen to displace his original conception of hermeneutics and truth, given in his account of the historicity of human thinking in Being and Time. Given that Heidegger recognized that human beings do not yet speak language in his preferred sense, this displacement is one that occurs in the face of a promise of a future, and so not yet actual, turn into a radical new beginning. But if we note that this event is yet to occur, what sense can be made of Heidegger's analysis here? Given that Heidegger himself spoke and wrote of the four-fold, of the role of the poet, of the nature of primal Being as Saying, and even of the identity and difference between Dasein and Being, one cannot help but see his position here as, if not disingenuous, then as lacking in sensitivity to what his own thought had achieved. For on the one hand, his work points in anticipation towards a possible, and therefore not yet actual

52 "The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking" trans. J. Stambaugh, in Martin Heidegger Basic Writings p.369ff This ref: p. 388-390
53 "The Turning" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays p.42
new way of understanding Being. While on the other hand his own presentation of this possibility, including as it does both analyses of poetic utterances as authentic speech and of authentic "thinghood", points to this new way of thinking as already at least partly accomplished.

It would seem that in seeing the turn as issuing only in the event of a new beginning, Heidegger has underplayed the achievement of his own work which has successfully indicated the nature of authentic things and speech. If this achievement is recognized then it becomes questionable whether the turn is as radical as he thought it to be. The same situation is seen where Heidegger intimates that it is possible, not only to draw a boundary around and so delimit metaphysical thinking, but that it is possible to move beyond this boundary (my metaphor), by a "leap" into a non-metaphysical way of thinking. Surely in telling such a story, and not only this, but also putting forward an account of the fullness of Being on the other side of the boundary as in the fourfold, the "leap" must have been accomplished - or is it that the boundary is not one that can be drawn so hard and fast? Maybe a leap is not necessary here? Considered on its own terms, it is surely pertinent to ask whether Heidegger's own analysis of Hölderlin's work does not betray the accomplishment of non-representational thinking precisely both in the poetry itself, as well as in his own commentaries?

In Heidegger's defence it must be noted that his own work, and so that of the poet, is interpreted as presaging, as anticipating, as waiting for, and as meditating only on "hints" given of what may be accomplished in the event of Being turning out of its oblivion. But are we not entitled to insist that given Heidegger's own analysis of this event, this new beginning cannot be as radical as he claims. If this is so then the words which a thinker employs, borrowed as they are from the tradition he so ardently sought to found anew, must be seen to be already sufficient to such a new beginning! Let us further consider

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54 "Conversation on a Country Path" in Discourse on Thinking p.79
55 "A Dialogue on Language" p.24 -26
his position here. The radical newness that Heidegger saw as possibly ensuing out of the turn of Being is no more clearly announced and insisted upon than in his essay *The Question of Being*. The main concern of this essay is to counter the suggestion by Junger, one of Heidegger's associates, that according to a typography he has sketched out the line marking the overcoming of Nihilism has to be crossed. His main objection rests on Junger's use of traditional philosophical language to point to the nature not only of the crossing, but also of what is after traversing such a line.

Heidegger's objection to Junger's work here, is one which must be seen as also applying to the use of the analogy of the field of vision which has not only been extensively employed here, but is also one which Heidegger himself used in the *Discourse on Thinking*.

In particular he objects to Junger's attempt to use concepts as mere tools, attempting to dismiss them in the very moment of their use, allowing the reader to think beyond the language to that which it points. His objection lies with the view that the reader need not be concerned with the concepts he uses for:

> They can be forgotten or set aside without further ado after they have been used as magnitudes of work for the grasping of a definite reality which exists in spite of and beyond every concept; the reader has to see through the description as through an optical system.

This interpretation of concepts is one Heidegger sees to be naive. Language, in his view, far from being a mere "optical system", determines the essence of that which it names. According to this interpretation, the use of concepts, even as an attempted "nota bene" pointing beyond themselves, inescapably renders all thinking conceptual.

He therefore suggests that far from enabling a crossing of the line, even as "notabene", conceptual thinking is a barrier which

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56 published by (College and University Presses Newtown Conn. 1958)
57 Quoted in *The Question of Being* p.65
58 Ibid.
actually forbids such a crossing. 59

In a further elaboration of the meaning of crossing the line, and in particular of the line itself, Heidegger questions the adequacy of Junger's conception not only of language, but also of what is involved in overcoming Nihilism. His point is that Junger's typography belies an inadequate topology of the "place which gathers Being and nothingness into its essence." 60 Such a topology as spelt out in, for example, his essays in The Discourse on Thinking and Identity and Difference, points to human being as the site of Nihilism, that is as the place where the oblivion of Being is manifest. In consequence of this view, talk of crossing the line as a movement from out of Nihilism into the truth of Being must be inadequate for... 61

The essence of man itself belongs to the essence of Nihilism and thereby to the phase of its completion... Man does not only stand in the critical zone of the line. He himself, but not he for himself and particularly not through himself alone, is the zone and thus the line. In no case is the line thought of as a symbol of the zone of complete nihilism, like something impassable lying before man. Then the possibility of a translineam and its crossing also vanishes.

Heidegger's objection here, his dismissal of talk of a line and its crossing, need not however be so swift, for as noted his own analysis points us back to his previous use of the field of vision to name the Open. Indeed his naming of human being as the line itself, and so as the zone of Nihilism, corroborates our rendition of the analogy of the field of vision where line (C) was labelled as representing Dasein's temporal being, the transcendental horizon of the world. In view of this labelling, the endeavour to leap into non-representational thinking was seen as one seeking literally to think of the obverse side of horizon (C), to think of the side of the visual field and by analogy the transcendental horizon of representational thought, that is facing away from us.

59 Ibid. p.71
60 Ibid. p.85
61 Ibid p.81
As Idhe noted, Heidegger's own effort to think Being in this way is one in which he skirts perilously close to the metaphysics he sought to overcome.\(^62\) In any event, from the topology of the analogy, the "leap" into non-representation thinking can be thought of as a leap from one side of line (C) to the other. Thought of in this way, and so as an exercise in representational thinking, the analogy must of course bear the brunt of Heidegger's criticism of Junger's use of conceptual thinking. But then how could his own use of the example be defined? Idhe suggests that the description follows the demands of a strict and pure phenomenology of vision.\(^63\) That may be so, but wherein does the rightfulness of Heidegger's extrapolation of that phenomenology to an analysis metaphysical and non-willful thinking rest? We must conclude that it is a right founded only in the suggestiveness of the analogy.

That Heidegger's objection to Junger's use of conceptual thinking is one which rebounds on his own work in the "Discourse..." is a point that ought to cause a pause for thought. Here, once again, Heidegger's debt to the tradition which he sought to see begin anew is only too evident. One cannot help but wonder whether in the final analysis, his own search for a radically new beginning was one which he pursued not only in the shadow of Nietzsche,\(^64\) but still as yet firmly under his influence!

To consider that even the later Heidegger remained under Nietzsche's influence may seem a far-fetched hypothesis, especially in the light of his Nietzsche lectures. There is nonetheless, a striking similarity between the two thinkers' efforts to begin history anew through an analysis of the origin of the prevailing tradition as

\(^{62}\)Idhe p.29 In point of fact Idhe's own interpretation of the "Discourse" breaks off precisely at a point where Heidegger indicates the power of metaphysics to still hold sway. That is, by interpreting the horizon, [C], as the open region coming towards one. See "Discourse..." p.65-67, and Idhe p.29. He wants to say that the open "withdraws", rather than as "coming to meet us", for the latter is concomitant with objective thought in which objects are encountered as standing opposite one, rather than as lying gathered. I can see no reason for Idhe's premature termination of his analysis here.

\(^{63}\)Idhe p.19 - 20

\(^{64}\)The Question of Being p.107
holding within it an as yet hidden meaning. Thus Heidegger's phenomenology is clearly an effort to show that the origin of Western thinking lies not in what metaphysical doctrines say, but in what lies unsaid in them, in what they cover over. His solution to the recovery of the 'unsaid' as the deliverance from the oblivion of Being, lay of course in resolute waiting for the new beginning, one already, and we insist, problematically glimpsed through his philosophical (meditative) commentaries, especially those on Holderlin.

In a way similar to Heidegger's phenomenology, Nietzsche's concern in the exercise of his genealogy was to point to the difference between what a doctrine espoused, and what it in fact effected - as a flight from the agony of existence experienced as the passing of time. In this way he interpreted all metaphysical and religious doctrines as "revenge against time." Nietzsche's own response to this flight was, as we have seen, his communication of his enigmatic doctrine of the Overman and the Eternal Return. Let us pause to note that the enigma in Nietzsche's thought lay in his conception of the Overman as the new type of human being who would not only be a "Caesar with the soul of Christ", but as such, a musical Socrates. Such a new "type", would however, be one in need of a new lyre with which to sing new songs, dance and laugh as no man has yet done (See Chapter One ). But what would such music, dancing and laughter be likened to? We cannot say. One cannot help but notice similarity here between Nietzsche's impasse and that of Heidegger's search for a transformed way of thinking in a new beginning. Could it be then that even the later Heidegger is still under the sway of Nietzsche and if so, how, if at all, can this final (?) influence be shaken?

In his book Reason in the Age of Science Gadamer points to a way in which it is possible to disentangle Heidegger's search for a radical new beginning from the valuable insights this search has afforded. In particular, he points to the inadequacy of Heidegger's view of the necessity of a "leap" into a non-representational way of thinking.

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65 Published by (The M.I.T. Press Cambriàge, Massachusetts, London 1983) trans. F.G. Lawrence
Thus he saw that in the context of the search for a new beginning that the "newness" sought in ...66

... posing the question of being anew and of overcoming the secular answer of metaphysics as well as the language of metaphysics that this new element belongs inextricably with the old. "Overcoming" presupposes the status of metaphysics for Heidegger's own thought not as something that lies beyond him but as a partner against which he could be profiled. Metaphysics is just as much a presupposition for the overcoming of metaphysics and for Heidegger's "step back" as is the total "oblivion of being" of the technological thought of our time.

At the basis of this insight lies his own hermeneutic ontology of human being in Truth and Method. This ontology is one based both on the insight in Being and Time into the historicity of thought, as well as on the central place of language in the understanding of being indicated in Heidegger's later thought. As such it is not unsympathetic to either Heidegger's or Nietzsche's work. It does however, as this quote reveals, develop a less extreme account of the relation of the old to the new.

Gadamer's ontology avoids Heidegger's conception of the need both for a leap into a new way of thinking, and of the necessity for a radically new beginning. He accomplishes this by interpreting the transition of human history as occurring not in sudden dramatic breaks, but through its more gradual transformation in what he defined as the "fusion of horizons."67 In such an event, understanding embedded in tradition is both taken up and transformed into an understanding of the present. His account of how this occurs acknowledges a fundamental debt to Heidegger's analysis of historicity in Being and Time. Where the two accounts differ however, is in the role that language is seen to play in the respective analyses.

We have seen that in Being and Time Heidegger limited the role of language to the expression of a prior articulation of intelligibility, By limiting language in this way he was in effect emphasizing that the prethematic understanding of Being that human Dasein has as the most

66 op.cit.p.63
67op.cit. p.273ff
original or elemental sense of discourse. Gadamer on the other hand takes up and develops the notion that it is precisely in language that the understanding of Being is preserved, and so also revealed. Given Heidegger's analysis of the circle of understanding in *Being and Time*, this is surely a point which he would have to concede. It is furthermore, one which he must concede from the perspective of his later work as well, for his exercises of retrieve, whether by etymological 'stories' or by commentary on poets and thinkers, are all in effect investigations into the revelation of Being given in the language of the tradition. Even as probing suggestive explorations into what is unsaid in traditional metaphysics, Heidegger's later work must still call on the tradition to communicate his findings.

It is in view of this ever continuing debt that Gadamer comes to the conclusion that the idea of either a radically new beginning, or conversely, of the total oblivion of Being, must be side-stepped. What takes its place, is the role of language, which as always taken up by human beings, mediates the old and the new through the more gradual movement and growth or indeed one must add, decline of tradition. In the forward to the second edition of *Truth and Method* Gadamer pointed to the main difference between himself and Heidegger. Writing in a rather poetic turn of phrase he asked... 68

What does the end of metaphysics as a science mean? What does its ending in science mean? When science expands into a total technocracy and thus brings on the 'cosmic night' of the 'forgetfulness of Being', the Nihilism that Nietzsche prophesied, then may one look at the last fading light of the sun that is set in the evening sky, instead of turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?

Whilst this quote neatly points out the differences between the two thinkers it can be misleading, for this difference does not lie simply in a matter of emphasis. Thus it is not as Theodore Keisel suggests in his article, "Gadamer and Heidegger on the Happening of Tradition", 69 that Heidegger's analysis is simply more extreme than

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68 op.cit.XXV  
69 in *Man and World* 2,3(1969) pp.358-385
Gadamer's, focussing on the uttermost possibilities, such as on death and on the emphasis Heidegger placed on possibility over actuality. Gadamer, on the other hand, in focusing not on the 'other side' of tradition but on what always falls within the ambit of received tradition, is therefore seen by Kiesel as not so extreme. Whilst there is an element of truth in this contrast, it overlooks Gadamer's critique of Heidegger, one furthermore which answers our questions of the propriety of Heidegger's writing about an event which, strictly speaking on the terms of his own work, he should not have been able to express.

This criticism of Heidegger holds within it the interesting implication previously noted. Namely if the concept of a "turn" is to be retained, only interpreted less radically as the possibility that Being may some time yet reveal more of its self (its truth) than at present, wherein is this turn to be located but in the entire corpus of Heidegger's work? From this point of view the turn in Being would be in the thought of Being and Time, where tradition is seen to hold within it the truth of Being which can be taken up in destructive retrieve. In effect this is in fact the way Heidegger's own thought has in spite of itself, proceeded. But then of course if the turn was interpreted in this way, Being and Time would also have to be interpreted as having arisen from out of tradition, and so as having fore-runners who also participated in the turning, e.g. thinkers such as Dilthey, Hegel, Kant, and not least of all Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In this respect the gradual rather than abrupt nature of historical change is emphasized. (This does not of course preclude history moving swiftly, such as in the industrial revolution, but it does point to such change as both a long time in the making, and as proceeding from out of, rather than in complete difference to, the preceding times.)

From the perspective of Gadamer's work then, the insights of Heidegger's later thought can be interpreted not as indicative of a new beginning, but as the making explicit of a forehaving (as per Being and Time), in view of the foresight of the possibility of a more original disclosure of Being in history. As given through historicity (as per Being and Time) this disclosure is one given from out of the wealth of
tradition. In this sense, traditional philosophy is never entirely bankrupt. And indeed, as must be the case, given Holderlin's poetizing, there is always a trace of the fleeing gods, and so all is not entirely in the oblivion of Being. Being is preserved, even if just barely so, in the face of the threat posed by technology. In effect just as Heidegger's work issues from out of "hints" and intimations of a greater fullness of Being than is the case of modernity, his own work not only issues from out of tradition, but has always been firmly part of it. From the perspective of an ontology such as Gadamer's, neither the oblivion nor the promise of the fullness of Being points to the total loss of the truth of Being, nor to the necessity for a radically new beginning; rather as Heidegger's work betrays, it points to the possibilities between which human existence wavers.

From the foregoing account of Heidegger's work, Gadamer's less radical ontology, can be seen to free Heidegger's later thinking from the necessity of interpreting the event of the truth of Being as a yet to be thought event. In accord with this view the lessons in Heidegger's lectures, such as for instance "The Origin of the Work of Art", "The Thing" and the Discourse on Thinking can be re-appropriated as indicating not a new beginning, but the possibility of a greater awareness of the mystery of Being than presently predominates in modern thinking.

In terms of Heidegger's view of truth as aletheia, such a re-appropriation of his thought can be seen to restore the reciprocity of Being and human existence to historicity, wherein the two merge in their identity, and their difference, in the handing down of the possibilities found in tradition. It rescues the insights of the hermeneutic nature of understanding both from the threatening subjectivism of Being and Time, and from the oblivion assigned to it by the later Heidegger. It thus restores two of Heidegger's most incisive and original insights in Being and Time to the centre of philosophical problematics. These insights, the interpretation of truth as the revealing and concealing of Being, aletheia, and the circularity of all thinking are thus given an amended place in the centre of a philosophical problematic, on the basis of which the threatening scientism of modernity can be thoughtfully combated.
This interpretation of Heidegger's thought points to the need to recall the mystery of Being, where this mystery is interpreted as the withdrawal of Being concomitant with its revelation in the manifestation of a being, rather than its total oblivion. Thought accordingly, the task of philosophy is not to point to a radically new beginning, but whilst respecting the mystery, plumb the "what" and "how" of that given in the historical disclosure of Being. Herein lies the task of thinking.
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