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BAD FAITH AND AUTHENTICITY

by

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In Sartre's chapter on bad faith in *Being and Nothingness* the coquette woman is familiar to us all, symbolizing our intermittent need to abdicate the role of moral agent, to become passive, to cease to choose.

The uneasy woman is meeting with her would-be lover, assessing his approach. She fears the implications of his flattery not because she does not wish to be flattered, but because she is afraid of being the kind of woman who allows herself to be so charmed. To admit reciprocal desire for the man would terrify her. She cannot afford to stand naked before herself; consent must be clothed; she must feel she has no choice.

To achieve self-deception the woman ignores the implications implicit in the man's behaviour, his attempts at seduction. Instead, when he expresses admiration for her she disregards this as the "first approach", and pretends that the man is admiring her personality (her "true self"), divorced from its body. This dualistic fantasy allows the woman to identify with her "soul" and deny ownership of the physical.

So, when the man takes her hand she need not withdraw. She is not her hand; she is beyond it. It remains still. What else can unowned hands do? Thus the resting hand replies in the affirmative for its distant owner. In retrospect consent will masquerade as ignorance. She will say: "Fancy his having taken advantage of my innocence." In this way the forbidden apple can be tasted without ever having been picked.

At the moment when decision is called for, procrastination allows events to fall into their desired places. Whilst the hand rests inert the woman, says Sartre, "draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect, a personality, a consciousness." (1) The woman must imagine herself qua disembodied consciousness in order to dissolve her spiritual ties to physical bondage.

Whilst the coquette is thus engaged we might consider the "waiter" Sartre draws our attention to in the same chapter; (2) this man pretends that he is wholly and solely a waiter at heart, just as much as he is a featherless biped. He is compelled to come to work each morning, to be polite to his customers whose needs are parasitic upon his. After all, they are the big fish; he is merely their bait. This is the way life has been ordained. The waiter is happy because he admits his station, his raison d'être. "Waiter" is his middle name, more than a vocation and

1. Sartre, op.cit., p. 56
2. Ibid., p. 59
less pretentious, for he does not embrace it and cannot refuse it; he
is merely attracted, as if by magnet, to his own identity in the mirror.
The round peg slipping into the round hole. He will tell us that the
trouble with the world is lack of self-knowledge, of knowing one's
place, of accepting reality. The evil doers dreaming grandiose
dreams...

Whilst the coquette performs and the waiter serves the
mighty unmortified, the child Jean Genet (studied extensively by
Sartre), (1) also attempts to manipulate consciousness. At a tender
age when Genet has no concept of his social status that is not a negative
concept (for his illegitimacy implies that he has no rights conferred from
father to son in his pastoral peasant surroundings) Genet is persecuted
into the role of a criminal. He steals to possess something of his own
which is not a gift of charity. His foster parents catch him. They name
his act; he is called a thief. Yet the child realizes intuitively that he
is free to make a decision about his life style. So he decides to become
the person he has been described as. For all his future he will be a thief,
a sinner, their vagabond.

The coquette, the waiter and the child Genet are all in a
form of Sartrian bad faith. Why?

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All of these characteristics are trying to be somebody and to bathe in that image for a while, for an hour like the coquette, or maybe the length of a career like the waiter, or for a lifetime like the child Genet. In Sartre’s opinion such a project is ontologically doomed. Existence precedes essence and therefore, although man desires to become self-coincidental, he can never achieve this ambition. For man has no pre-determined nature and cannot determine one for himself, either through his habits or his decisions. At each moment of his life he is free to abandon any project he is involved in and initiate a new one. Moreover, he is responsible for so doing or not so doing, the onus being on him every moment until death. He cannot become a certain kind of man whose acts are predictable on the basis of his nature. For he has no such nature.

On Sartre’s account, all knowing consciousness is said to be necessarily intentional and implicitly self-conscious (aware unreflectively of its awareness of intentional objects.) In this way, the subject of consciousness arises by way of contrast to its objects; he is separate from them; he is not them. The knower realizes implicitly that he is not the known. Sartre thus holds that the subject of consciousness is nothing in relation to the world he grasps. He says;

"The for-itself (consciousness) has no reality save that of being the nihilation of being ... the for-itself is not nothingness in
general but a particular privation; it constitutes itself as being the privation of this being"(1) (the intentional object of the moment).

The world is seen by Sartre as plentitude. It is what it is; it can be described, labelled and categorized. But without man, of course, the world would be sheer mass. It is man who gives the world meaning, who does the labelling, the categorizing.

Without man, negation would not exist, because it is man who is capable of asking questions, making negative judgements and understanding (or creating) the concept of absence. And man has imagination and can pretend things are not what they are when he so chooses. So not only is man conscious of the world but conscious that he is at a distance from his intentional objects, that there is a "lack" at the heart of consciousness, a lack of self-coincidence. For man realizes that he cannot reflect upon himself and find a noumenal ego, realizes that objectification of himself does not reveal a self that is not nullified qua self in the sense that it is no longer the subject of consciousness, no longer spontaneous.

In this sense although self-reflection leads us to an ego, this ego is not the subject of consciousness but its object pole.

The realization of the spontaneity of consciousness is the realization that we are continually freed from ourselves (who we could be said to be up until this moment.) Sartre says:

1. Sartre, J.P. Being and Nothingness. p. 618
"Transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo... At this level man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, or overlapping himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpected." (1)

Because consciousness is spontaneous it is free from any psychic compulsions and thus in another sense is free. Each act is thus described by Sartre as a choice, because no act is determined in the sense of being compelled by my nature or character or whatever. Conscious life must keep on choosing as a way of life in order to perpetuate human freedom. And consciousness is necessarily free because of its spontaneity, its continual upsurge towards possible projects, its inability to become something solid, passive and non-active.

In fact it is consciousness, or man (I will often use the latter term (although Sartre prefers the former) in order to avoid dualistic sounding discussion), as a person who acts that is crucial to Sartre's analysis, to create human beings who are continually creating themselves. It is because we are always choosing freely (ways of being-in-the-world, intentional objects and so on) that "who I am" currently cannot be contemplated. And Sartre does not hold that who I was yesterday is identical with who I am today, for it is the activity of doing (or choosing as Sartre calls it) that identifies the current "I". Yet whilst we cannot "pin down" the "I" to its past, its future is just as separate from it. Sartre says; "...I am not the self which I will be. First, I am not that self because time separates me from it. Secondly, I am not that..." .

self because what I am is not the foundation of what I will be."

And yet Sartre goes on to say that I am what I will be in the sense that my future involves my possibilities. The stress on the separation of consciousness from its past and future is the stress on undetermined activity.

Certainly Sartre admits that there are certain brute facts pertaining to each of us, our parentage, nationality, physical appearance, past life and so on. But this material is only raw material, the basic data from which we act. Man confers meaning on this "facticity" and decides for instance whether he finds it pleasant, intolerable, maddening or whatever. For on Sartre's analysis we choose our reactions, how we see the world, the light in which we see our lives. If a man does find his situation intolerable he may use his negative powers of imagination to envisage the situation differently. This vision (the end in view) thus motivates him to act to change his current position. In this way Sartre avoids even the everyday quasi-deterministic description of motives. For in his analysis motives are goals in the imagined future rather than forces from ones past!

Sartre holds that we choose our emotions. Emotion is an outlet for us when we cannot see our way to changing a situation. We are able to change ourselves, make ourselves sad, angry, fearful and so on so that we "change in the form in which we see things". He calls emotion thus an attempt at magic. He says:

1. Sartre, J.P. Being and Nothingness. pp. 31 - 32
"Emotion is a phenomenon of belief. Consciousness does not limit itself to the projection of affective meanings upon the world around it; it lives the new world it has thereby constituted — lives it directly, commits itself to it, and suffers from the qualities that the concomitant behaviour has assigned to it. This means that, all ways out being barred, the consciousness leaps into the magical world of emotion, plunges wholly into it by debasing itself."

"...In any case, it must be noted that emotion is not the accidental modification of a subject who is surrounded by an unchanged world. It is easy to see that no emotional apprehension of an object as frightening, irritating, saddening, etc., can arise except against the background of a complete alteration of the world." (1)

Thus on Sartre's analysis men's emotions do not in any way offer an explanation of "who they are" because these emotions are only perpetrated within the magical world.

Thus if men choose what to do and are not determined in their actions by either external causes or internal causes, they are as far as Sartre is concerned, totally free. Let us review this freedom:

Firstly man is described as lacking an essence in the sense in which the world is full of one. This sense of essence seems to be roughly the sense in which the world is seen as being able to be described accurately in terms of enduring characteristics. Consciousness is seen as a form of activity which is not comparable with any form of passivity. Men are continually choosing and even if they are involved in a long-term project are re-choosing this way of life each day. Their future is always uncertain because they are free to change their minds. Their past only offers an explanation of what they were (which has no influence on their current activity which they do not choose it to have), and the present subject is indescribable in the sense that his spontaneous activity is described in terms of his "flight" from past to future, the present being for consciousness what it is not (the past it leaves) and not what it is (the future it moves towards). One has an image of suspended animation. What Sartre wants to say, I think, is that one cannot contemplate the present and therefore one cannot describe it properly until after it is over when it is in some sense dead. But his thesis of negation, (as perhaps I may call it), seems to be the basis for his thesis of freedom. It is because human beings are empty of defining characteristics, are not what they were, are not determined, that man's basic activity is described as choosing.
Nevertheless, Sartre claims that anxiety is bound to result from our ontological insecurity if we reflect upon who and what we are. Orestes says to Zeus in "The Flies" that he (Orestes) is "outside nature, without excuse, beyond remedy, except what remedy I find within myself... and human life begins on the far side of despair." (1)

Anguish is not encountered if one does not reflect, if one merely does the deeds one chooses without thinking of one's ontological status. But once man reflects he becomes dissatisfied with his lot; the fact that he must choose his values, his reactions, whether he will change his situation through rational action or whether he will change the light in which he sees the situation (adapt an emotion) or whether he will continue his way of life or change it. The onus on him appears as a burden. Anguish results, anguish at responsibility "without justification and without excuse". We are tempted to abandon such reflections and to pretend that we have characters, that causal laws govern us and moreover that we are "getting somewhere" through actions rather than returning to the ever present empty characterlessness of our conscious lives. Instead we pretend we are becoming certain sorts of people, that we are safe.

As far as Sartre is concerned this reaction of "bad faith" is the kind of reaction one must expect in the face of anguish. After all, our ontological situation could easily be found difficult. And many people choose to find it so.

However, seeing oneself as "thingish", or pretending that one is passive can be quite a complicated procedure. Let us look again at Sartre's coquette: On the one hand she sees herself as completely determined (a body subject to suitable causal laws), and on the other hand she sees herself as beyond any human description, (a pure soul), beyond the present and out of this world, and therefore completely determined in the sense of no longer being active but passive.

She also imagines the man's actions as representing no more than what they represent on the surface: "What a respectful man, telling me how admirable I am..." She pretends that his actions are not human actions, that they are not oriented towards future expectations. Both she and he are pretended to be immobilised like Newtonian particles. Her conscious life has disappeared into her soulfulness. Describing this latter aspect of this phenomenon, Sartre says:

"If I were only what I am, I could for example, seriously consider an adverse criticism which someone makes of me, question myself scrupulously, and perhaps be compelled to recognise the truth in it. But thanks to transcendence I am not subject to all that I am... I affirm here that I am my transcendence in the mode of being a thing." (1)

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness, p. 57
Imagination is, of course, the tool of bad faith, but in another way imagination ensures that I eventually become aware of my pretence. Let us return to Sartre's waiter.

He imagines himself as a "being for others" and attempts to lose his freedom in this imaginary life. However, because consciousness is always conscious of the separateness lying between it and its objects, the knower implicitly knows he is not the known. Sartre says of the waiter role:

"... I can only be he in representation. But if I represent myself as him I am not he; I am separated from as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, and this nothing isolates me from him." (1)

Thus I can only live the bad faith whilst I remain engaged in the imaginary life — whilst I refuse to confront the "waiter" as an imaginary representation. But since human beings are aware (implicitly) of the freedom of consciousness and its ability to be anything that can be contemplated in toto, like the "waiter" living out his part in life, I am responsible for perpetuating the lie of bad faith because at any time I am capable of breaking the spell.

As I have said, anxiety makes bad faith tempting — men wish to be rid of the human condition, Sartre feels. And yet, according

to him the very possibility of bad faith arises through men's power of negation and their peculiar ontological status: through imagination men can pretend that what is the case is not the case, but moreover, it is because human beings have no unchanging characteristics that it is so easy for them to enter the bad faith state.

Any characterisation of a person is half-lie in that in being one thing a person is not that, au fond, because au fond, he cannot be accurately described because any objectification robs him of his subjective status. Sartre speaks of the man in bad faith, pretending to be courageous when (ordinarily speaking) we would say this to be untrue. Sartre says:

"If it were not on principle impossible for me to coincide with my not being courageous as well as my being courageous, then any project of bad faith would be prohibited me. Thus in order for bad faith to be possible sincerity itself must be in bad faith...the intra-structure of the pre-reflective cogito must be what it is not, and not be what it is..."\(^{(1)}\)

The concept of flight from the past towards the future and the allied concept of negativity are so built in to the Sartrian system that persons are seen as ever vacillating between seemingly possible characterisations none of which ever attach to them. Freedom

1. Sartre, J.P.: op.cit. p.67
necessitates perpetual choice and therefore one's past stretches behind one and is no longer part of the current conscious life (although one decides what meaning it has for one and thus carries a chosen reaction to it with one), and one's future stretches interminably before one and one is not identifiable even with the choices one is making for it, for the possibility of changing one's mind always threatens. There is nothing to induce one to pursue one course of activity once it is chosen. It is no more absurd to opt out.

Thus the bad faith lie is only the half lie. The coquette is as much not a coquette as a coquette, for it would not be true to give an explanation of her as either. The same applies to the waiter. This is why the child Genet's project of sincerity is doomed, because sincerity is, as far as Sartre is concerned, impossible. Genet cannot decide to be a vagabond for no sooner will he have made his choice than will he be free to choose anew what he will do. And throughout life the drama of responsibility will keep repeating itself. Sartre says:-

"If Genet is a "nature", everything is comprised in that nature, including laying claim to it. If Genet has the power to claim his essence then he also has the power to reject it, to change it. He is free and his nature is only a myth or decoy...Unable to choose he evokes two incompatible world systems: substance and will, soul and consciousness, magic and freedom, concept and judgement. If he is free each of his acts
contributes to the drawing of his figure but one cannot say that he is evil before the moment of his death. If he is not free he is totally evil at every moment of his life, but he is no longer guilty. 

To sum up the Sartrian picture, I might say:- We have no human nature and we are unlike the massive world of objects beyond us in that we have no definitive characteristics. In being self conscious beings, we realize that we are not our objects of apprehension. On reflection we also realize that we introduce the concept of negation into the world in another way, too:- by the power of consciousness to understand absence, negative answers to question; its power to imagine things differently from what they are, to transform the world through the "magic" of emotion. These powers to understand the negative enable us to realize the facts of our ontological situation - that we are not (any longer) what we were and that we are not (yet) what we will be, that the spontaneity of our subjectivity cannot be known, but only lived through continual free action. Reflection leads to anguish and anguish in turn leads us to seek refuge in the pretence that we are not responsible for what we are, that conscious life need not move, but can remain static, engulfed in a present moment, unchanging.

However, bad faith is not something the evil sink to and which we can avoid by seeking sincerity, for sincerity is not the opposite of bad faith, but only its ultimate form.

1. Sartre, J.P.: Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr p. 61
To say that we are making a choice for life is one of the greatest lies, for our perpetual freedom makes us responsible for every act as if it were a new choice (whether it is or not), responsible for every value (and every day for continuing to hold it), responsible for every emotion (and every day for sustaining it). This is why it is so easy to slip into bad faith because to pretend a deed is not what it is (cowardly for instance) is to make use of the fact that the deed can give no enduring account, and thus no adequate explanation of one (qua coward). This is not to say that in bad faith I am not lying at all, for I am responsible for the deed of cowardice as it stands, but if is easy to imagine the deed differently when, as the moment in which it is performed is crystallized and reflected upon, the deed is already taking up no part in my current conscious life.

I should now like to examine Sartre's position in an attempt to clarify his aims and see to what extent his theory is viable.

One thing Sartre clearly wants to refute is determinism but his basis for this refutation lies in his thesis about man's "nothingness" in contrast with the world. There can be no psychic causes on his analysis because the present is separated from its past. Let us look for a moment at Sartre's basis: anti-essentialism and the concept of nothingness.
Sartre's anti-essentialism seems to imply that he takes an extreme view of what an essentialist thesis would be. An extreme essentialist might claim that man has certain characteristics which determine his actions to the extent that the having of these characteristics, (let us call them "C" characteristics) makes it impossible for him not to perform these actions. Given characteristic "C" he cannot but perform action "A". But this is only one side of essentialism. It would be just as possible to give a non-deterministic explanation. An essentialist might simply state that everything has a generic essence in so far as it belongs to a species and cannot change from belonging to that species without ceasing to exist. If one belongs to the human species one's specific essence can be taken to be that of rationality and animality. No inductive claims would be made about "C" characteristics at all. Facts about one that were outside one's choice, like having been born in the twentieth century or having Jewish ancestry would remain contingently related to one (as on Sartre's analysis of our facticity). One's rationality and animality would be all that was essential to one. Sartre's philosophy would be in agreement, basically, with this as he says:

"To be sure, Adam chose to take the apple but he did not choose to be Adam." (1) If "essence" is reduced to "a specific form of existence" Sartre can have no quarrel with us.

Therefore do we need Sartre's concept of "nothingness", consciousness in contrast to the world? Perhaps not. I feel that the epistemological relation between man and the world, at the moment of apprehension, cannot involve self-consciousness of being diametrically opposed to the world on the ontological plane, which in turn leads to the reflective realization that the world is plentitude, and man sheer possibility. As far as I can see the knower's implicit realization that he is separate from the known (his intentional object), does not entail anything negative about the subject. For man is not a member of the same species as mountains, rocks, or whatever, are members. Therefore his essence or lack thereof cannot be comparable to theirs. And being not of the same species as man only gives them a different essence. It would seem that there would be nothing incompatible about man's being and the world's being. The basis for negation that Sartre uses seems extreme.

The "nothingness" concept also has difficulties when we think about its application. Consciousness of our "emptiness", of "not being what we are", could easily lead, I imagine, to what Ronald Laing calls ontological insecurity which paves the way to psychoses - the belief that we are the privation of all that is real that leads to psychiatric implosion - the fear of reality as our persecutor, thieving our beings. Laing describes this as:-
"The experience of the world as liable at any moment to crash in and obliterate all identity... the individual feels that, like the vacuum, he is empty. But this emptiness is him. Although in other ways he longs for the emptiness to be filled he dreads the possibility of this happening because he has come to feel that all he can be is the awful nothingness of just this very vacuum. Any contact with reality is then in itself experienced as a dreadful threat because reality, as experienced from this position, is necessarily implosive, and in itself a threat to what identity the individual is able to suppose himself to have."(1)

Thus it seems to me that man could not really carry about the belief in his own nothingness without losing the desire to contact the world in case it swallowed him. In Sartre's Nausea Roquentin says:-

"Objects ought not to touch since they are not alive. You use them, you put them back in place, you live among them; they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it's unbearable. I am afraid of entering into contact with them, just as if they were living animals."(2)

If the world and consciousness are ontologically contrasted, man will probably feel that the world has the kind of plentitude he lacks.

This seems to be one of the pitfalls of the concept of emptiness. For it is not as though man (on Sartre's analysis) is empty in the same way as the world (on Sartre's analysis) is full. For man's desire for enduring characteristics is not for enduring characteristics that the world has by way of its analytic definition. Rather man desires to remain conscious and at the same time give himself enduring characteristics. This is, of course, as far as Sartre is concerned, a desire to be a contradiction in terms - a man and a god. And yet Sartre admits that man values this desire:

"Man fundamentally is the desire to be God." (1)

If man desires to be conscious as well as to have enduring characteristics his feeling of emptiness will be one of lacking the kind of characteristics which could be attributed to consciousness. Seeing oneself as a certain kind of man is in this sense only superficially similar to seeing oneself as thingish. Being able to live out what one is, is entirely different from continuing to exist qua mountain or qua rock. Even if one were not acting in the broadest sense of initiating new choices one would be conscious of doing something, even if only "living out" one's assigned role in life.

This then seems to mean that if one saw oneself as lacking the attributes the world had, one could easily (through ontological insecurity)

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness, p. 566
become deluded about the nature of things and see them as somehow active in relationship to one as if they were conscious: (Roquentin's problem to some extent).

If Sartre's negative concepts produce difficulties, are there ways around these concepts?

Stuart Hampshire, who like Sartre stresses the importance of freedom of mind has a quite different way of describing mental activity from Sartre. For instance Hampshire feels the recent past cannot be "cut off" from the present. When we reflect on our intentional acts we do not nullify the qua present acts because once crystallized they are past tense and are outside our current subjectivity. Rather reflection on intentional acts elucidates their content. Hampshire says:—

"...It is a common characteristic of the higher mental states and all the intentional states that the subject's belief about the explanation and therefore about the nature of his contemporary state of mind is always one of the factors which determines what his state of mind is (1)...My changing beliefs about the presence or absence of an infection in my bloodstream will not change the chemical situation; but my changing beliefs about the origins and nature of my sentiments will change the sentiments themselves.”(2)


2. Ibid. p.256
If Hampshire is right, reflecting on what I am doing can alter what I am doing. There is no clear cut distinction between doing and contemplating in the sense that contemplation of my acts does not mean that those acts are over, behind me. I could not be said to be escaping from them but only to be "in the middle" of them.

Gilbert Ryle in his paper "A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking" mentions that when we interrogate a man about his thoughts the man can often be brought to acknowledge that he had had in mind things which, at the start, it had not occurred to him to mention. (1) If conscious acts unfold themselves through future acts we certainly cannot make a clear-cut distinction between the recent past and the present, and moreover one certainly cannot restrict subjectivity to the current unreflective act. Otherwise nothing that is known about me could be strictly said to be true.

Of course Sartre is committed to this latter statement but he also says that I give the past what meaning I choose to give it. In other words I can use the values I choose to confer on my past, to guide me in future choices, or indeed I can choose to act in the same way as I have been acting so long as I see this choice as motivated by the future end in view and not by my past. Sartre's main point is that the past exerts no determining influence over the present. I am free to choose and am responsible for choosing. Can we maintain this aspect of Sartre's thesis.

in *Being and Nothingness* without keeping his thesis of negation? The answer seems to me to be "yes" we can.

If consciousness is not "nothingness" in comparison with things in the world but rather has a different specific essence, or form of existence, and if the present cannot be said to be the "nihilation" of the past, because the unreflective act of the present awareness of an intentional object cannot be "cut off" from the prior unreflective act, without the concept of meaningful action being greatly truncated, it may be possible to look at Sartre's thesis differently. If the present is in any sense the continuation of the past, and if human beings are not empty of any true characterization, we could draw the picture of Sartrian freedom differently.

Does this follow from the supposed fact I am introducing that the present act does not negate the past, that human beings can be accurately described in some instances? I think it does. For if present consciousness, of the current subject is not restricted to the act of "flight" from the past into the future, he may well be involved, currently, in a similar act to which he was involved in six weeks ago, and we would then be allowed to say, not "oh look he is choosing to beat his wife again", but "that chap is a wife beater. He is dispositionally inclined towards being one."
I should like to examine the possibilities of this example and see if, keeping the non-deterministic model of human action we could allow dispositions to be ascribed to human beings as one form of characteristic they could be said to possess.

Let me take the example of a man going into the confessional, weighed down by his sins. The priest, in his closed compartment does not see the man but recognises his identity as the familiar story (oft repeated by the man in confession), unravels. The penitent (if he may be called that), is an habitual drunkard and wife beater. The confessor listens to the story about Saturday night and by a slip of the tongue, refers, in his answer, to the man's weekly sins which he does not make enough effort to overcome. For if he did, with the help of grace, he would have mended his ways and reformed. The man asks forgiveness and resolves to change; the priest absolves.

But what if we entered that confessional and took the pair unawares? We ask what basis they have for believing the penitent able to change. The priest, believing in grace but probably doubtful about the man's will power, would most likely tell us that he must give the man the benefit of the doubt. What would the penitent have to say for himself? Would he say he tries to mend his ways? Very likely. For the man must be conscious of his freedom even to be talking about change.
He does not consider his habits as part of his fixed nature even though he readily admits that they are his habits and that he is dispositionally inclined towards them. He tells us about the difficulty involved in his attempts to leave the hotel, not to strike his wife. He has a problem. He is attempting to overcome a disposition. He needs to be able to present to himself the end he aims for (a happy home or whatever) as so attractive that he can force himself to go through "the cure" to achieve it.

This is one kind of description one can give of long term behaviour which is partly an explanation of the kind of person behind the behaviour, and yet is not a predictive explanation in any way that would limit the Sartrian concept of free-will. In his paper on "Disposition" Hampshire claims:

"To attribute a disposition to someone is never to preclude that he may on some occasion act, or have acted, in some way contrary to his general tendency or disposition. That this is always possible is part of the force of calling statements of disposition summarising statements; statements describing what in general tends to happen are in this respect very unlike universal statements." (1) Hampshire is careful to keep talk

about dispositions separate from "descriptions of the causal properties of things." In this way, it appears that one may be able to talk about a person being a certain "kind of man" within limits. One cannot make inductive statements about future acts, but one's description of a person need no longer be a bare description that does not involve explanation of a person. One must merely be careful to remain non-deterministic.

I am postulating at this point the thesis that man can be completely free (as Sartre sees him) and yet concurrently be a creature to whom we can ascribe some characteristics, indeed, to whom it is essential to do so lest man be at a loss for ontological security.

Before we move on and I explore this concept of man, it must be remembered that Sartre's belief in the "bad faith" state and its facilitation for man, is based on his beliefs about negativity. Let us remember the coward pretending he is not a coward—Sartre saying:

"I can try to apprehend myself as 'not being cowardly' when I am so, only on the condition that the being cowardly is itself in question—that the very moment when I wish to apprehend it, it escapes me on all sides and annihilates itself."

If we change the concept of negativity the bad faith project will need re-description.

If we are not featureless creatures but creatures with characteristics, the next step will be to discover at what point these
characteristics can be altered. For if we cast them off as we would a piece of apparel from our bodies, without giving them a second thought, they can hardly be said to be ours at all. If on the other hand we are engulfed in them and cannot throw them off at all they are part of us to the point of giving us an extreme form of essence. The first view of what we call "characteristics" is Sartre's, and we have rejected for the time being, the second view we are not for the moment even considering to be true. Is there a mean?

In asking to what degree dispositions and habits attach to us we might think about every day discussion relating to this subject and to change within our habits.

One way of proffering excuses for reforms not yet effected is to claim that they are too difficult for us, more than we could tackle, too much for us. And all these ways of speaking seem to allude to our feeling that the phenomenological concept of force is somehow reducible to its mechanistic counterpart, as if our troubles presented a physically insurmountable barrier of enormous magnitude. And when people tell us that we ought overcome these barriers because they are not insurmountable we resort to telling stories about our problems: "You don't know how we suffer," "How can you know how hard it is!" We accuse. Tears may even flow at the thought of our hardships. We pity ourselves for having to suffer so.
So that although we are theoretically aware of our freedom we find it difficult not only to face up to the responsibility of exercising it, but just to the hardship involved in certain cases where we want to choose our future in terms of dispositional change but cannot bring ourselves, to do so. This is where we come to terms with the problem of frustration pain. It is difficult to cease being a drunkard and wife beater on the grounds that we are to some extent addicted to our dispositions. We say that we will go "out of our minds" if we discontinue our habits, in that even when we want to change and know that this is possible, we feel we will lose our sense of "who" we are. Our identity will be relinquished together with our old ways. And secondly we feel we will thus lack confidence and be unable to cope. Radical change can, if chosen as a course of action, be almost akin to a self-inflicted nervous breakdown. The change must to some extent be already effected before we can feel comfortable instead of as if we are sustaining a difficult part in a play.

Laing describes the agony of the schizophrenic when he abandons his real self (which he feels to be empty) and shows a false self which he feels others require him to play at. His self-alienation cripples him.

Although this is an extreme example of change it indicates that dispositional change is probably difficult too. To choose not to get drunk or beat one's wife on Saturday, and to carry out this decision will
probably cause suffering firstly in giving up the habits, and secondly
in terms of feelings like:— "This isn't me," "what possessed me,"
"I'm not myself," feelings which may well result when the other men
goad me to drink and my wife provokes me to fight. These feelings
of self-doubt will probably arise despite my decision.

Now it seems natural to shy away from pain— to feel its
force as if it were a mechanistic force— because self-preservation steps
in. Therefore it appears that if we are bent on undertaking major
dispositional change that will involve the relinquishing of old habits,
we will have to go through unpleasant times.

Now the telos of our choice cannot be merely the painful
situation that will result from our decisions (for instance: I, seeing
myself in abstinence from drinking and wife beating, a sober— (God
help me!)— man), but the ultimate desired goal (for instance: I, seeing
myself in command of my senses and maintaining a peaceful marriage).

Aristotle says that the temperate man finds abstinence
pleasant. If it is unpleasant for him he is still intemperate. (Let us
presume for the moment that I have chosen temperance as valuable and
as my future choice of myself). If this is the case, pain will be transitory;
once I have established a new way of life, a life which I value as better
than my "old life," the pain will cease.
If we maintain this thesis about suffering we are saying something like that it is the case that some major dispositional changes require us to break between past and present and that this can be an extremely difficult exercise. At this point Sartre is maintaining just the opposite: that this break is a natural occurrence because man is not now what he was, that the only effort required here is the effort to live up to the responsibilities of choosing anew. All one has to do as far as Sartre is concerned is "wake up" to his freedom. When I do so I know I am effecting a break between my past and my present in the sense that I know I am wholly responsible for this new act whether it appears to be a continuation of old acts or not.

My point is that this assumption of responsibility for every act does not entail that acts may not follow on from one another as natural sequels to each other. Of course for Sartre to speak of man pursuing a fundamental project to which other projects are only secondary, he must in practice hold that one act cannot always "nihilate" its predecessor.

Yet it is only if the negativity thesis is retained that we cannot introduce the notion of enduring characteristics and the notion of unavoidable suffering in some instances of major dispositional change. I should like now to see if this suffering itself produces sufficient evidence to back the concept of enduring characteristics and strengthen my points against negativity.
It is of course possible that some major dispositional charges will not cause suffering but a flood of release. If one is living within a stereo-typed life style, afraid to move, because one is uncertain about one's steps, the new life style once adopted may afford one with a sense of release from prison, or it may fail to live up to expectations and so on. The main point about this kind of change is that the break from who we are now into who we want to be is in itself desirable. In the other kind of change I described the end in view was desirable but the process of changing dreaded.

For my argument to have weight we must retain only those changes where the telos is desired but the means difficult. Examples of change which indicate that the change itself (the shedding of our old skins), is desired, do not fit my model and are not meant to. For indeed, I agree with Sartre that there are many instances when the only thing that prevents us from pursuing various courses of action we would like to pursue is the reluctance to act, the reluctance to own up to the fact that we could do these things, that there is nothing holding us back.

However there do seem to be many instances when difficulty is encountered and the change is painful because our habits seem to die hard. For Anna Karenina the choice of going with her lover and abandoning her child is a painful choice because she agonizes over relinquishing her mother role, despite the fact that the call of her lover is stronger.
Sartre holds of course, as I mentioned at the beginning, that we choose to adopt the emotions we adopt, that emotion is a way in which we transform ourselves and transform the situation we are, in, by choosing to see it in an emotional light, rather than a strictly rational light. As far as he is concerned we choose to suffer (emotionally, not physically, of course), to be in the world as sufferers, to see events as painful to us. He admits that emotions tend to be perpetuated easily once adopted, but claims that at any moment, we can have recourse to our freedom and cease to be involved in the magical pretence. The onus is on us. After all, we know we are responsible for our acts.

But it seems intuitively and empirically that some emotions are bare "givens". We do suffer frustration pain both in attempting to effect certain changes in ourselves and also in many other situations. Take something we are attached to (like a child, a dog, or our material possessions for instance) and we feel at a loss, in pain, not because we want pain but because we cannot make it leave us until a certain period of recuperation has passed. Sartre says that although a man says he suffering, he can shake off this pain if something diverts his attention. But this is not to say that the man chose to suffer. Indeed if a person chose suffering as a way of being, in the way in which engulfed his whole existence, it would require quite a jolt to divert him. In my opinion it is because pain as a mere given affects us only when we evoke certain memories or images and so on, that we can easily be diverted from it.
Anna Karenin does not miss her son when she and Vronsky are in ecstasy with each other. It is only in the reflective moments that pain of this type is felt, and felt keenly.

The Christian belief in the buffer power of grace is an interesting one here, for the concept of grace assumes the existence of human difficulties. (For the moment I shall not break these difficulties up into difficulties concerning dispositional change and the relinquishing of habits, difficulties concerning the loss of people, things, and so on that we treasure, and difficulties concerning temptations not to change. I shall discuss these categories of "given" pain later). Grace is there to help one overcome the misery of the world by fortifying one against it through added spiritual strength. But this is not to say that the notion of suffering as unavoidable, is in any way belittled; indeed it is highlighted.

If we remember Milton's epic of *Paradise Lost* and the desire of Adam and Eve, after they had sinned, to restore themselves into the kind of people whom God could accept again, Milton says:-

"...Thus they in lowliest plight repentant stood praying; far from the mercy seat above prevenient grace descending had removed the stony from their hearts."(1)

The pain image is strong. Adam can change but not without both the agony of Christ (death on the cross) and his (Adam's) own agony.

of shame. Paradise is difficult to leave despite the fact that is the
seat of abhorred memories, but nevertheless, through grace and resolve
Adam will be able to reach his new goals. His freedom is not impaired.

As the angel leads Adam and Eve from Paradise:

"Some natural tears they dropped but wiped them soon.
The world was all before them, where to choose their place of rest,
and providence their guide." (1)

I am not forgetting here that Adam is also seeking mercy
from God as well as the grace to be helped to become a new man. However
the idea of the necessity of grace strongly points to the idea of Adam's
needing fortitude to help him fight difficulties. There is a battle to
be fought against human suffering. Aristotle would agree with this notion
of winning a battle. For him virtue is involved in finding pleasure in
what is described by another as pain. The virtuous man has overcome this.

So I started off by saying that dispositions attach to us, and
by giving the example of pain at relinquishing them to illustrate my point.
Now the argument can easily turn around: if man suffers identity pain
when he changes he cannot be a featureless person without enduring
characteristics.

Sartre, of course, would not admit this to be the case because
he would not admit to seeing these enduring characteristics because his
ontological beliefs could not allow him to do so. Yet Sartre has the concept

1. Ibid. Book XII, p. 304
of anguish, anguish which arises when we contemplate our inner emptiness, anguish which leads us to pretend this emptiness non-existent, to seek bad faith. Now anguish for Sartre is not chosen (as the emotions are), and therefore is strictly different from any emotion. The next move I shall like to take is to examine anguish more fully.

But before I do so, I should like to say that I am using the concept of disposition as one which facilitates the description of man which cannot be the description of a "neant". I think that one normally speaks of a person possessing a certain disposition when one presumes that in a certain situation he will act in a standard fashion unless he makes an effort not to do so or is prevented from doing so by external forces.

I feel that Sartre's notion of freedom at our fingertips, takes into account the human being's ability to liberate himself from what he was, but not the human being's frustration pain at so doing. Sartre says:

"The suffering which I experience...is never adequate suffering, due to that fact that it nihilates itself as in-itself by the very act by which it founds itself...I find only myself, myself who moans, myself who wails, myself who, in order to realize this suffering which I am, must play without respite the drama of suffering...My suffering suffers from being what it is not from not being what it is."(1)

It seems to be that the negativity thesis is incorrect, incorrect because people do experience ontological security. One form this security

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness, p. 92
takes is expressed by our everyday belief in the possibilities of ascribing characteristics to persons.

For Sartre emotions like suffering are means of being-in-the-world in certain ways, of transforming the light in which we see things. Thus suffering is, for him, an activity which we actively choose and then one which we carry out unreflectively in our dealings with the world. If we reflect upon ourselves qua sufferers we can "wake up" to this magical transformation and realize our pretence.

Yet Sartre holds that when we reflect on the human condition, we experience anguish, a term which describes our state of mind when we contemplate our featurelessness and our responsibility to act anew. Anguish, then, results from our supposed negativity. To what extent would my concept of suffering (viable only if the negativity thesis is incorrect), affect Sartre's concept of "given" anguish?

Perhaps it would be worth looking at Osborne's "Look Back In Anger," a play in which both the Sartrian concept of intellectual anguish and my type of concept of frustration pain are used widely.

Jimmy, the sadistic hero is disgusted with the world and the status quo and wants both his passive wife Allison and his mate Cliff to experience his agony. His means is the attempt to destroy their concept of the world as livable. Cruelty is his method. Jimmy continually pours out abuse at his companions' background's, personalities and so on, hoping
for angry retaliation and at least discussion and questioning of the status quo as a result. However, all he can squeeze out of them are painful and hurt expressions as they nurse their wounds.

Jimmy: "You see, I learnt at an early age what it is to be angry - angry and helpless. And I can never forget it."

Allison: "All I want is a little peace."

Jimmy: "Peace, God, she wants peace! My heart is so full, I feel ill, and all she wants is peace."(1)

Allison refuses to challenge Jimmy, and remains oppressed. After they have parted their reunion is built out of her physical suffering (a miscarriage) and loss of identity as a passive person. Her pain has brought her “down” to the level he desired to see her at:-

Allison: "Don’t you see! I’m in the mud at last! I’m grovelling... I don’t want to be neutral. I don’t want to be a saint. I want to be a lost cause. I want to be corrupt and futile."(2)

She is no longer able to endure life without suffering from it, therefore she can experience Jimmy’s pain. He thus attempts to save them both from the unlivable world. She is a little squirrel in the forest, he a large bear. He will take care of her. Once she accepts despair he need no longer abuse her. Instead, they will huddle in the forest against the contingencies of life.


2. Ibid.: Act 3. p. 95
Suffering has been experienced. She has been forced to change from a passive woman into one actively aware of the problems of existence because her own physical loss, the brutalisation of her flesh has occurred. Pain has brought change; change has brought pain. She has become a new woman. Now she no longer looks on Jimmy as a sadist (in an otherwise peaceful world) but a protection (in an otherwise threatening world).

If men are ontologically secure for the most part (as I previously asserted), suffering may provide them with grounds for a traumatic experience. Whilst suffering affront to their personalities, possessions, bodies (many things which could loosely be said to belong to them), people feel "at a loss" just as they do when undergoing some types of dispositional change. Their niche in the world is uncertain. Who am I, anyway? Where am I going? What has life got to offer, anyhow?, are frequent rhetorical questions.

Do they occur if we do not suffer? I feel that without the concept of frustration pain the concept of anxiety becomes questionable. If I suffer no identity losses, why anxiety?

Sartre's answer is perhaps a complicated one. Sartre's man feels anxiety when faced with his own negative status, because he longs to be fullness, featured, conscious but god-like, possessing ever-enduring conscious characteristics. Therefore he does "suffer" a loss
when he realizes he is not the mere continuation of what he was but must choose himself anew, for somehow what he has built up, (his personality) is shown to be without force. If he were only to experience distaste for choosing anew (the responsible activity) without any feeling of loss at his emptiness, what could he be said to be anxious about? Having to be bothered? But surely that would be only boredom. Not knowing which path to take? But surely that would be only indecision. If anxiety occurs, what is its source? I feel that Sartre's answer would be "nothingness in particular", that is, the realization of personal emptiness. This would be to say that man feels his emptiness and cannot help so doing, for Sartre claims angst to be a "given", if we reflect on our human condition. . . .

And if man cannot help but be disturbed by his featurelessness, does it not seem that he thinks he has some reason to be featured or characterized? If there is nothing about his acts which endows them with some quasi-permanent meaning, why the disturbance? If there is nothing to murder surely there is nothing to lose, no source for Sartrian anxiety.

But Sartre admits to human anxiety, defining it as:

"The reflective apprehension of the Self as freedom, the realization that a nothingness slips in between my Self and my past and future so that nothing relieves me from the necessity of continually choosing myself and nothing guarantees the validity of the values which I choose. Fear is something in the world. Anguish is anguish before myself." (1)

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness p. 628
It is obviously self-annihilation which is so horrifying.
In this case it seems that men do experience a sense of selfhood.

Part of the reason for this seems to be not only in the thesis I have examined, (that we do have enduring characteristics), but also in the concept of investment in the past. It is not only that we were somebody but that we were doing things involving commitment to our futures. So many human activities like studying, marrying, procreating, and so on, commit us in varying ways to a future. If they are not long term projects to some extent at least, they cease to be projects. To start a university course without intending to pursue it, to initiate a marriage without intending to perpetuate it (for some time), to have children without intending to rear them, would indeed be unusual. In such cases the student is described as only a "layabout" the marriage as "never a marriage" and the procreator as "never a mother." Without commitment concepts, such role concepts are, in many instances, meaningless.

To tell a person that any one of these fundamental projects which he may be pursuing is continually threatened, for there is no reason for perpetuation as opposed to annihilation is, in my opinion, to frighten such a person. The idea that nothing he can do today will make his project any more valuable to him tomorrow than he will choose to find it tomorrow is a startling thought. People would not believe it. Their concept of investment in their pasts is too strong an intuitive concept to be easily overthrown.
Besides, the negativity thesis just does not seem to be viable here. Valuing for today only, is senseless and it just seems that we do not do it. So Sartre's concept of anxiety does seem to indicate that he realizes people would find the idea of their negative status disturbing. I say painful, the pain of frustration, because the hypothetical situation he describes as our ontological lot is, as far as I can see, the corollary to situations where we either decide to undergo major personality or life style change (that we know will be difficult to effect), or where we have these changes forced on us (like Allison) and suffer because of it.

All this seems to point to human beings having ascribable characteristics qua particular conscious persons. (Another problem with the negativity thesis would be human uniqueness. For there would be nothing to distinguish one mental life from another. But this is an aside.)

To return to the mainstream of the argument: I appear to be at a point where I am saying:— People are not only afraid of acting anew in terms of new responsibility, but they are afraid of relinquishing old responsibilities. People are attached to their own self-images. To think the mirror would crack each time one looked at it, and that one would have to put it "back together again" before an image could emerge would petrify us— the eternal Humpty Dumpty.
This amounts to saying that the amount of ontological insecurity Sartre perceives would be too burdensome to allow any man to retain his sanity. Purpose would be obliterated. To claim that men can act in the face of such insecurity, and act with values and goals, is breathtaking. Self-crucifixion without the promise of heaven.

If we accept that persons are dispositionally inclined, attached to all that can be called theirs, creatures who invest in their past for their future, and creatures who suffer at losses, are we rejecting Sartre's anxiety thesis? I think so. For Sartre's own belief in the power of the anxiety he describes leads us to see that if this anxiety did exist it would be strong enough to kill men. That is, if the negativity thesis were correct and we were able, in reflection, to understand this, our anxiety would overwhelm us.

Perhaps the concept of attachment to our dispositions, deeds, habits and possessions, could be further elucidated by looking, for the moment, at the concept of love, a strong attachment concept.

If a man claims today to love a woman there are certain demands on his future, understood the moment he uses the word love as opposed to "like", "find attractive", and so on. To say that he loves the woman at least until tomorrow is senseless. If tomorrow he leaves, the woman will say: "Ah, he didn't love me anyway." Loving seems to involve certain commitments because of the type of attachment it speaks for;
An attachment to a person despite certain time changes, character changes, and changes in bodily appearance and circumstances. Yet on the other hand love can cease to be meaningful, and the once-loved object become unloved or even despised. The attachment can be broken, disenchantment can set in. Love is neither momentary nor eternal.

Perhaps this example fits the line of concepts I have been discussing: We mostly care about what is ours (otherwise we would not experience frustration pain and loss) and yet at the same time the loss can be slight if we become disenchanted with ourselves, in the sense that we no longer feel any attachment to the dispositions or possessions in question, or the loss can be slight if we are strongly convinced that we want to forfeit even a basic habit or cherished possession for an end we see as more desirable. On the other hand the loss can be agonizing, frustrating pain, if we decide to make a change that we feel strongly opposed to make, on the one hand, but strongly inclined to make on the other (the drunk "knowing" sobriety will be preferable to his life style; Anna Karenin, mother, "knowing" that her life would be empty without her lover). Or at the extreme, the loss can be tragic and even more agonizing if it is forced upon us externally.

I imagine these degrees of detachment from, and attachment to, "who we are" are roughly equivalent to the degrees of loss experienced at the end of love for a person.
Iris Murdoch comments that in Sartre's novels the characters feel empty and yet feel this ought not be so, that life should be meaningful.

Sartre's explanation, of course, is to say that we long for an integrated world of consciousness in that we long to be as our transcendent objects in the world.

Sartre says: "Thus this perpetually absent being which haunts the for-itself is itself fixed in the in-itself. It is the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself, it would be its own foundation not as nothingness but as being and would preserve within it the necessary translucency of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself of being-in-itself. It would preserve in it that turning back upon the self which conditions every necessity and every foundation. But this return to the self would be without distance; it would be not presence to itself, but identity with itself. In short, this being would be exactly the self which we have shown can exist only as a perpetually evanescent relation, but it would be this self as substantial being." (1) For Sartre, the impossible dream of godhead.

Yet why is it that consciousness desires to be as the world? So that it can become "at one" with its objects, Sarte would say. Yet consciousness as subject knows implicitly that it is not its objects, otherwise it cannot be a subject, cannot have objects. And secondly, man realizes

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness, p. 90
that when he contemplates himself he is separable from that self, now past. So how could he as a conscious being seek essential being of the type ascribed by Sartre to the world? For as far as I can see his desire would be the desire for suicide, for total annihilation. I cannot agree with Sartre that godhead would arise at the point of conscious self-coincidence and that this is the godhead man dreams of. For one thing, the concept is a contradiction in terms. (Sartre admits this). Why would man long for it? How could he? Man, on the Sartrian thesis can pretend to be what he is not through imagination, yet cannot retain the false image of himself once he looks at himself. Remember how the waiter role pretence fails through once the waiter attempts to watch himself? So it would be if man imagined himself in any thingish way. Looking at himself would cause the sham to collapse, this is surely because the essence Sartre claims men to desire is a non-human essence, the essence of the type possessed by inanimate objects. I have said earlier that I can see no justification for comparison between the "being" or "essence" of a man and that of tables and chairs. Therefore I cannot be convinced that man is conscious of not being in the way they are, therefore I cannot see men desiring to swap the human condition with that of the inanimate condition.

Of course Sartre says that man also wishes to retain consciousness, but then we would have a man desiring to be both conscious and non-conscious. If Sartre means by this that man would like to have
a determined self (devoid of future possibilities) which he could then be conscious of, what would be man's conscious role? Surely it would be reduced to watching (since doing would have been robbed of it in any but the sense of performing its 'natural' tasks.) And if watching were the prerogative of this man fulfilled, he would, in remaining conscious, realize that the watcher was not the watched. In this way we would be back to man's feeling of conscious separation from his objects, despite the fact that the object in question were himself! Sartre says of the relationship between consciousness and the world:

"...in knowledge, taken as a bond of ontological being, the being which I am not represents the absolute plentitude of the in-itself. And I, on the contrary, am the nothingness, the absence which determines itself in existence from the standpoint of this fullness. This means that in that type of being which we call knowing, the only being which can be encountered and which is perpetually there is the known. The knower is not; he is not apprehensible."(1)

So becoming thingish and retaining consciousness could not improve man's plight. Therefore I cannot see this project as a basic ontological desire. Therefore it does not seem that it is the longing for self-coincidence which lies at the heart of man's discontent and anguish.

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness. p.177
I cannot see any way in which anguish arises out of the thwarted project to be a god (one with Sartrian given attributes, that is). For this project with its self-contradictory end in view (conscious non-consciousness), would either mean that man would be conscious of being non-conscious, and thus of being separated from himself (the watcher from the watched) or would have to forgo consciousness altogether, and thus commit suicide qua rational animal. If he does the first man only changes himself from the "knower" to the "watcher" and that transformation will certainly not improve his ontological lot. If he does the latter this only reflects the death wish, or if it is a desire for god-head it must be a desire to be the god of pantheism. In the poem "The Garden" by James Shirley, a Caroline dramatist, we find the death wish:—

"But I would see my self appear
Within the Violets drooping head,
On which a melancholy tear
The discontented Morne hath shed.

. . . . .

1' th' Center of my ground compose
Of Bayes and Ewe my Summer room,
Which may so oft as I repose,
Present by arbour, and my tombe." (1)

So either we have the death-wish or the wish to become mere watchers. The former implies suicide and the latter implies that man, who, we must remember, gives meaning to the world which would otherwise be sheer mass (as far as Sartre is concerned), would, as observer, have to choose the concepts under which he saw his self (as he chooses the concepts under which he sees his world) lest he be robbed even of the proper title of observer. And if man (or consciousness), were still able to organise the concepts under which he saw the inanimate, nothing could guarantee the endurance of any one concept (if consciousness is free). Therefore his self would be transphenomenal (as the world is said to be), "surpassing the knowledge we have of it".  

There is, I think, one further point that indicates that anguish is not derived from the thwarted desire to be a man-god, being for-itself in-itself, and this is that in describing one aspect of the bad faith phenomenon (the supposed palliative to anguish) where, instead of seeing oneself as essentially characterized (as is more typical of bad faith) one sees oneself as beyond characterization, freedom abstract. Sartre says:—

"... But thanks to transcendence... I do not even have to discuss the justice of the reproach. As Suzanne says to Figaro, 'to prove that I am right would be to recognise that I can be wrong.'" I am on a

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness. p.634
plane where no reproach can touch me since what I really am is
my transcendence. I flee from myself, I escape myself, I leave my
tattered garment in the hands of the fault finder... \(^{(1)}\)

For Sartre, this above-mentioned self-deception is a means
of solidifying oneself as "all soul". I agree, but I feel that if one accepted
Sartre's explanation of the genesis of anxiety, one would find
the above image anxiety-ridden! For if anguish results from reflective
discovery of featurelessness, surely the concept of being "pure soul"
beyond anything that could be said of one, would only perpetuate the
feeling of anguish.

So, all in all, it appears that anguish does not arise because
of human negativity (as the ontological "lot" of man described by Sartre).
But already, even if the view I am taking is correct, there are indications
that negativity exists to a limited degree, as far as human beings are
concerned, and that this feeling of loss is somehow connected with
anxiety.

So far, on my analysis, I have the concept of persons who
cannot be featureless lest they be a community of persons without sufficient
concepts of self identity. (This is presuming that people do reflect on their
ontological situation. Sartre feels that people retain their foothold through
ignoring their "negative" status, and living, for the most part,
unreflectively). I have attempted to enforce my thesis that persons can be

1. op.cit. p.57
accurately described dispositionally by drawing attention to the difficulties which persons suffer when they attempt to change their characteristics. I have therefore said that the degree to which persons suffer loss of identity when attempting some major dispositional changes, is indicative of their addiction to their habits.

Of course, this consequence of change is only one example of frustration pain. As I have said, this loss can be felt just as keenly when we are robbed of the things which belong to the class of that which could be said to be "ours" (for instance, our beloved possessions). For it does seem that our beliefs about that which constitutes "who" we are involves fairly extended concepts. Thus, "motherhood" forms an integral part of Anna Karenin's self-image; she finds it difficult to change it. And I have also said that this loss of identity is felt perhaps even more keenly when external circumstances force one to view oneself differently - for example, Allison's enforced physical suffering which almost ensures that her image of man's accessibility to peace on earth must crumble. And so, with the concept of loss, we are faced with the concept of emptiness, and we come face-to-face with Sartre's idea, although refuting its basis. For it seems that the feeling of being "néant" is a feeling which human beings experience at various times in their lives when their sense of identity is threatened. Ronald Laing describes our ordinary concept of ontological security and the way in which its opposite can present itself:
"The individual may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated from the rest of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy are never in question. ... This, however, may not be the case. The individual, in the ordinary circumstances of living may feel more unreal than real; in a literal sense, more dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the rest of the world so that his identity and autonomy are in question. ... The ontologically insecure person is pre-occupied with preserving, rather than gratifying, himself." (1)

There seems to be an analogy between depersonalization and death, becoming separated from one's aims and passions.

So I am, perhaps, now in a position to say suffering or frustration pain exists as a bare given. It facilitates the experience of emptiness, but exactly how does it do this?

Let us return to "Look Back in Anger" and the agony of Allison. Her self-image is of a passive person, she does not wish to relinquish it, believing that Jimmy is wrong in holding the belief that external circumstances can wound us. Yet when suffering is forced upon her, she can see herself uprooted by misery; the universe is hostile. Her self-image crumbles; she has only two alternatives - to erase the memory of what has happened (and thus lie), or to erase her own self-image of passivity and peace, and admit that she no longer feels "safe".

1. Laing, R.: The Divided Self pp. 41 - 42
This dilemma produces anxiety ("How can I cope?"). Allison, of course, chooses to go through the trauma of seeing herself changed, recognising the death of her old aspirations. But, if she chose, she could attempt to erase the brutalization of her flesh from her memory, and retain her old view of the world through lying and pretence. One way to deal with anxiety is thus to embrace "bad faith."

It seems that the dilemma of whether or not to accept change in self-image is at the centre of the anxiety experience of the sort I am talking about. And furthermore, it seems that this dilemma arises because human beings are capable of imagination (as Sartre says) and therefore capable of dealing with their experience of emptiness by either admitting that they are no longer who they were (which is to accept more suffering, in that the new self-image will be uncomfortable for a time), or by lying, pretending that the trauma never occurred, that it did not touch them.

How is the lie effected? What it seems would most easily constitute the reason for the feasibility of the bad faith model would be a conscious person who could decide; "This is the situation - unpleasant in that light, isn't it? Let's forget that interpretation", and who would then forget the true interpretation and adopt a false line. But, of course, there are faults in the model - firstly, in the ready access to the unconscious, and secondly, in the ability (whilst the truth resides at the unconscious level), to look against the facts and discover a false conclusion this time -
as if one could shut off the ability to perceive the truth by hiding the same in an ante-compartment secluded in one's mind. 

What other sort of model could we use? Hopefully one where the mind is sufficiently manipulative to attain self-deception without recourse to an "unconscious." Mounce, in his paper on self-deception, talks of not making explicit to ourselves that which we "know" implicitly. (1) His claim is that the rules for private knowledge being the same as those for public knowledge, we must make facts which we know, explicit to ourselves in order to be able to say that we really know them. Mounce sees the bad faith-type situation as a case of our having implicit knowledge of a state of affairs, seeing the path to the logical conclusion, but not following it.

Demos, in his paper "Lying to Oneself" takes a similar approach to self-deception. (2) He claims that knowledge can be unactualised or latent. One must formulate its truth before it is actual. Moreover, his claim is that one can easily "put things out of mind" through not attending to, or not noticing them; through pre-occupation with another matter. In this way, one can possess incompatible pieces of "knowledge" without allowing the incongruity to become apparent.

John King-Farlow, in his paper, "Self Deceivers and Sartrian Seducers" describes human consciousness as a "large, loose sort of committee; there is a most irregularly rotating chairmanship. The members question, warn, praise and deceive each other...some fall half-asleep from time to time, and many more are caught off-guard by various factions within the committee."

and driven outside into the corridor to stamp their feet or moan
distractedly through the keyhole...the deceiver and the deceived are
not the same simpliciter." 

I think that for the most part, Sartre would agree with this. He describes consciousness which has both
transcendence (the necessity to move on from one pursuit towards
another), and facticity (the brute facts pertaining to it contingently -
past, parentage, physical attributes and so on), and the attempt of the
person to pretend that one is the other - the coquette telling herself
her body is beyond her control because she is pure soul. So I think
Sartre would ascribe to these notions of self deception in which a person
simply turns from the conclusions to which the facts he sees points. The
coquette knows the man's intentions, or she would not pretend them to
be otherwise; the waiter knows he need not be a waiter, and it is just
because such nagging doubts haunt him that he tries to convince himself
to the contrary; the drunkard knows he can become sober, which is why
he thinks of so many excuses for claiming dependence on inebriation.

Because men want to suppress certain judgements, they replace these with
other judgements about their situation - judgements which they find more
palatable.

So it now appears that truncated knowledge of the truth is
essential to bad faith and that the method is one of subtle manipulation of
concentration on judgements or ideas one chooses to hold to the exclusion
of other such judgements. Lying is involved.

1. King-Farlow, J. Self Deceivers and Sartrian Seducers,
Analysis Vol. 23 1962 - 63
Now, why would one lie to oneself about who one is or what one is doing. What is the point? The point may be to avoid the unpleasantness of having to see one's self-image differently from the way in which one now sees it. For if one finds the truth pleasant, why lie? If the coquette was happy (i.e., glad, as contrasted to the utilitarian concept of happiness), to see herself committed to her would-be lover; or the waiter was glad to see himself as free to be a busman; or the drunk was glad to see himself as potentially sober, bad faith would not exist.

So we have "unpleasantness" and we avoid it. Sometimes, of course, the unpleasantness is only intuited ("If I admit, that, I will feel ridiculous" - intuition as in "if I eat that repulsive food, I will vomit.") Perhaps we realise through experience that frustration pain is formidable and thus seek to shy away from it by avoiding any change in our self-image or life-style that we do not find palatable, and moreover, pretend that any such changes would be outside our power. We are not free, thus we will not change and therefore cannot suffer. The self-perpetuated illusion of complacency which we can shatter when we allow ourselves to do so, or which may well be shattered by external circumstances, forcing us to forfeit what we pretended to be essentially ours - being sacked from being a waiter, being robbed of whisky money, and so on.

But what if the image is not shattered - if complacency reigns? How is this effected? How do we keep the web spinning?
Perhaps the best answer might be to say that we avoid good faith through a paralysis of the will which we effect through our treatment of anxiety. Let us take a situation in which a man knows he is a drunk (and knows that he is free to cease being one). He has days on which he realises that he could change, and would like (half-heartedly) to change, but days on which he also realises the hardship and frustration pain involved. And yet he is disappointed in himself for not "making the effort". In the effort to fight the battle between his conflicting desires (to change and not to change), he finds himself torn in two directions - his soul a divided house. His sense of identity wobbles. Of course, one way out of the dilemma is to look at the situation and attempt to discover which of the two life-styles is most valued and to thenceforth pursue it. However, our man does not do that. Instead, he decides to forget about the battle through ceasing to fight it, in procrastination, akrasia. He desires to be rid of anguish and so he blunts his will to the point where it is (he thinks), no longer sharp enough to cut deep into his self-doubt. He anaesthetises himself.

But, this passivity has to take a particular form. Seeing that he now is "thingish," he will have to decide on the nature of that thing. He will, for instance, have to decide whether he is a drunk by nature (and therefore not guilty) or that he is not a drunk at all. ("Why, I only drink to be sociable, I'm in no way addicted", he might say in indignation!)
In this way there is nothing to be guilty of. Perhaps there are more characterizations of the lies he might enter into—I have merely given an example of two aspects which are in no way interchangeable. And herein lies the problem with bad faith. He cannot have the lie both ways, for remember that he has become passive and cannot change his characterization. But, just because he is conscious, (and therefore active rather than passive) his doubts may return to nag him in such a way that a little voice will prompt—"...but you're free to become sober—that's what you wanted", and if, for instance his lie has been to say to himself that he is a drunk by nature, he might find it more convenient to swap to the other lie—that he is not addicted. Or alternatively he may have adopted this lie and feel himself doubting, "but look how you can't leave an unopened bottle; are you really a non-addict?" And so the lie of drunkardness by nature would have been more appropriate. His vacillation between characterizations will then of course cause him more suffering, for it will possibly awaken him to his own game. "Even my deceit is ineffective," he may complain. He will know that rather than having alleviated pain by treating anguish with akrasia, he has perpetuated the agony. As soon as he has any doubts about the efficacy of his sham it is likely to fall to the ground. For he will see himself playing a part. Thus no longer will the house of his soul be divided on two counts, the two conflicting values, but on a third count as well. Now there is an assumed
lie (that this conflict is non-existent) to add to his troubles: Suffering again.

Sartre would agree with the concept of deception used here: The attempt to see oneself as characterized in such a way that one appeared to be condemned to one's fate:- A fate which could be to be so essentially constituted that one was powerless to alter, or a fate which could be to be essentially free, beyond characterization. Instead of seeing the facts about one (for instance the disposition to drunkardness), as contingently related to one to the extent that one could alter them, a person may see these facts as the determination of his whole being. Or to the contrary, one can pretend to be beyond reproach - freedom abstract - by pretending that one could cease drinking at any time, ignoring the cumulative evidence of one's daily habits as evidence about oneself.

In the example of Allison we have a picture of the way in which a person deals with suffering that is forced upon her. In the example of the drunkard we have a picture of a man who half-heartedly would like to change his self-image. In both instances we have pinpointed the feeling of loss of identity involved in change to the moment which the person senses a dilemma and thus feels anxious. For if the frustration pain of changing one's self-image was not intuited as a hardship which one could shelve (through bad faith) one would not be anxious about what to do, because there would be nothing to do except accept the frustration pain in the above mentioned cases where external destruction of self-image had been attempted, or where self-doubt about one's self-image had been initiated.
Anxiety exists because human beings are in a position of being able to choose between good faith and bad faith, because the dilemma of choosing between acceptance of emotional pain of this type, and rejection of it, presents itself. At this point one can either reject the change outright (for example in a case where external forces have changed one's place in society, one can deny to oneself that this happened.) Or, for example in a case where one both wants and doesn't want to change dispositionally, one can deny that the conflict itself exists. In both cases the will "suffers" paralysis. Pretence allows one to opt out of decisions about true self-image.

Perhaps to say that the will "suffers" is to say something more than apt. For, as I have said, men cannot remain in the bad faith state without undergoing at least occasional nagging doubts. Conscious life re-asserts itself. And in this way one finds oneself amid even more confusion than one started with. For now there is a lie to face, a lie that has been introduced into one's conceptual framework.

In this part of the analysis I am totally in agreement with Sartre: It is the ability to pretend which both propels and destroys the bad faith mechanism. For as Sartre says, I cannot play the part of being "thingish" or "all soul", or "being-for-others" (the waiter) forever without at some point watching myself playing that part. And this watching separates me (qua active being) from my part (qua passive being). Thus the mask cracks.
I then have the option of reviewing the situation (looking at my situation, aims and so on again), or of becoming cynical and saying: "Yes, I know I'm not being honest, but honesty is impossible for me - I haven't the strength - so I'll go on shamming. Sincerity is above my price." Thus bad faith can turn into cynicism.

To return to the anxiety dilemma after having fled from it, escaped it for a time, must be a trauma par excellence. I imagine that, once having indulged in bad faith, good faith would become an extremely difficult goal. Let us remember that temporarily the lie provided a comfortable self-image. In the re-attempt at soul-searching, the re-adoption of the lie will remain as one option that is open. Let us return to our drunkard. He both wanted and didn't want to reform. He has pretended that the conflict was non-existent. Let us say he has done this by pretending that he was only a social drinker (and only that to a limited extent). Suddenly doubts set in when he is drinking alone at 2 a.m. The facade falls and his anguish returns. Is it worth suffering 'the cure'? Or would he be better to remain a drunk. Which alternative is hardest? Which can he endure? Now before his mind's eye will be a picture of himself qua drunk, and an image of himself deprived of drink, (sober, but in pain). But there will also be a third picture - the picture he has been painting these last weeks whilst in bad faith - the picture of himself as a social drinker. Thus the easiest thing to do will be to say "why did I have any doubts; of course I'm only having a nightcap now that the guests are gone - this is only the conclusion to a
social evening." So that, once the pretence has been inaugurated it will be easy to fall back on because one will be used to it. Thus bad faith is almost self-perpetuating.

The coquette, who chooses not to see herself as anything but an innocent girl will have the same experience. Once she has convinced herself that there is no conflict in her desires, (to be loved solely for her soul and loved for her body), it will be difficult to go to the point of re-questioning herself about her aims. And so will the waiter. He wants to be a waiter "by nature." Perhaps at times anguish rears its ugly head and he asks himself: "Wouldn't it be nice to think I was vocationally free? But then I'd rather stay tied to my own apron (or napkin) strings, wouldn't I? The legion possibilities that would present themselves if I thought I were free would only disturb me." Slipping back into bad faith, the lie might well begin by the self-reproach: "Well of course you've never doubted your role in life, what do you take yourself for, a rebel?"

And so bad faith goes on. Each time anguish sets in the possibility of escape from bad faith presents itself, but by this time the bad faith pattern has given one such ontological security that the rejection of it will cause frustration pain. We are back to suffering.
At this point it seems that I need to work out just how far the "bad faith" concept can be extended. Is the anguish experience (the feeling of dilemma at choice, loss of foothold) related in any particular way to the concept?

I feel that without a certain type of anguish, bad faith is not likely to take place. Let us explore the relationship.

Sartre’s study of Genet is a fascinating one. It starts, as I mentioned at the beginning, with the child deciding to become a thief, to live up to the name that has been labelled on his back. Genet decides to be who he is. The child realizes that he is free to the extent that he realizes he can choose. But he does not understand what choice involves - its legion possibilities. For the child its scope is restricted; he can see no further than his eyes lead him; he is at "home", a foster child, a "nothing" with no identity unless he grasps the one that is being offered; The title "thief".

Is Sartre right in claiming such a decision to be unenlightened? In some ways I think not. Surely the child (although restricted in his reasoning powers and imaginative scope) is making a valid choice. It cannot be valid for Sartre in that it cannot be long-term without Genet’s being responsible for re-newing it at every point in his life. And yet if my previous arguments are correct, choice can be long term. Indeed life-
style choices are choices which once undertaken commit us to further actions and so on. This is not to say that we are not free to change and responsible for so doing or not so doing but to say that one choice can often commit us to a certain future, not in the sense that it causes that future to be, but in the sense that if we do not enter that future the choice is somehow nullified (e.g. choosing to be a student and then not taking up a course of study.) That is, a choice says something about "who" we are, it is not an isolated event.

Of course Sartre holds that we have basic projects and that our choices link up to one another. But he does not see this as necessary. To break with one's past is just as logical. This is the point at which I have introduced the idea of "given" frustration pain.

And so on this analysis there seems to be no reason why Genet cannot make a valid choice of himself. After all this choice in the child only, at this point, has the force of a prediction. And if people have characteristics it is fair to say (as Hampshire does) that they can be predictable to a limited extent - the extent to which it is more likely that they will act in accordance with their dispositions than not, despite the possibility of the latter course of action.

So the child decides in the sense that he predicts of himself what he himself will be. To this extent he resolves to pursue the life of a thief steadfastly; as far as I can see this is a completely viable resolve.
And in fact Genet carries it out, roaming Europe and prisons as a vagabond, seeking out his destiny. He sees himself as the negation of the "good" man; he sees himself as evil, a lost cause.

Sartre does not judge Genet, but Genet's childish decision to "be who he is" is said to be an impossible project. This is why I mentioned at the beginning that the child is in a form of Sartrian bad faith, for his state of mind fulfills all the prerequisites for bad faith according to Sartre's description. Genet suffers from ontological insecurity. The feeling of being a "néant". He attempts to overcome this by attempting, (on Sartre's view), to be a man-god, free and yet solidified:

"In short Genet wants both to make himself evil because he does Evil and to do Evil because he is evil. This contradictory attitude is obviously the effect of his price. People heap abuse upon him because he has stolen and because he is bad. He replies, 'Yes, I'm bad and proud of it,' and at the same time, 'Yes, I've stolen. And I'll steal again.' Nevertheless, the fact remains that he wants everything at the same time: to generate Evil, ex nihilo by a sovereign decision and to produce it by natural necessity."

And yet is this the way (or the only way) in which the phenomenon should be described? We are dealing here with a child. Isn't it likely that the child is not attempting to do the impossible but merely forming a project and building a self-image out of the picture of himself involved in the project? Let us explore the possibilities.

First of all it seems that the child has experienced ontological security. (This has been in the form of fantasy, pretending that he "owns" the fruit cake he steals.) Once he is robbed of it by the accusing world, the ground slips away from under his feet. Who is he? In terms of his society "nothing." What can he do? "Be somebody." The child does not pretend that he is still a "good little boy"; he accepts the change in his self-image in much the same way as Allison does. Thus the dilemma of anguish is not as much a dilemma as it is for my drunkard, or the coquette, or the waiter. For Genet does not appear to seriously consider the alternative to accepting the new self-image that is "forced" upon him, that is the possibility of pretending that he was never caught, never called evil.

"He had to achieve self-mastery, autonomy of will, lest he go mad, and to find a sanctuary in which the Other had not already installed himself. To affirm his sovereignty was to save his mental integrity," (1) says Sartre.

1. op.cit. p.61
This quote is crucial, for it indicates that the option of pretending the trauma of being caught had not occurred, would be an option which would somehow rob the child of his sanity. For other people caught him and other people will remind him of this daily. To obliterate it from his self-image is almost impossible. Therefore, although the theoretical possibility of obliteration is there, the practical possibility is small. Thus although the child is faced with alternatives, (to see himself as thief or see himself as a "good boy" (which he knows in his heart he is no longer)), both of which are unpleasant, his alternatives are not equally viable, as, for instance, are those of our drunkard.

All the drunkard has to cope with are self-doubts and inner monologue. He has not the "other" to cope with. And his attempt is on attempt to change himself. Change has been forced upon Genet, and forced by the "other". The other is their to verify the happening - there is no escaping him. Thus acceptance of the happening is the only alternative which will enable him to maintain sanity. It is the only open path. (This, of course, also applies to Allison in that any attempt to obliterate from memory her miscarriage and subsequent sterility will be interrupted by other people's recollections. And she will not be able to say she is fertile when she is sterile without losing credibility).

Thus the experience of anguish is different for Genet than it would be for the drunkard, the coquette and the waiter. For the latter
three both alternatives open to them are viable, because only their self-image is at stake. If accused by someone else of bad faith they will have more difficulty in retaining their stands.

To get back to Genet: It seems that so far the child's project is in good faith. Like Allison he deals with his problem honestly. He is accused and accepts the change involved in the description of his character. To this extent it seems that his subsequent "project" to be "who he is" is the most rational project. For to look on his particular character as a project is to look on it as something contingently related to his being a featherless biped. To this extent he retains his freedom. He intuits that there are other characterizations that he could give himself although he knows of none in particular.

We must remember he is a child, a deprived child who knows little yet.

What of Sartre's thesis that Genet cannot be both essentially a thief and freely a thief? First of all what is the context of "essentially" here? I said before that we would use it to denote characteristics which so constituted one that one could not act outside of their context. That is, if a person is essentially a thief he must thieve, his inner nature compels him to thieve; he has no option. And yet Genet asserts that he freely chooses to be the kind of person who thieves. This aspect of his decision seems to indicate that he does not interpret "essential" in the
way in which we are interpreting it. Perhaps all he is saying is that he is applying the same kind of resolution to his decision to be a thief as a student applies to his decision to study, a resolution not to waver from his aims.

Let us look at the example of a man who becomes very bored with his society and decides that he needs to get a kick out of life. He initiates a black magic cult including sadistic orgies. But he decides to live this life not because he feels compelled to do so, but simply because he wants to do so. There may come a point at which he becomes pretty well hooked on this lifestyle, the point at which it pervades his self-image to such an extent that a break with this lifestyle would cause pain. At this point the man may feel his orgies are to some extent getting "out of hand". He would like to curb himself but, on the other hand, would like to continue with his habits, just because they are his habits. He feels at a loss in that he feels undecided. He intuits frustration pain: "If I end the orgies I will suffer dispositional loss; if I continue them I will feel disgusted with myself". Anguish besets him... And now the man may well enter into bad faith by pretending that he is not dispositionally bound to his habits and could give them up if he liked, (but is not going to do so just at the moment), or by pretending that he is essentially bound to them, compelled to be an orgiast. Let us say he chooses the latter alternative. He is convinced, for the time being,
that his life style must continue. In this way we might well say that
the man entered bad faith but we may not say that his original choice
was one of bad faith, for it was not. The man was merely attracted of
a project which he then decided to inaugurate.

He cannot be said to be in bad faith initially unless one
can indicate that his initial project was itself formed out of anguish.
Now there does not seem to be any grounds for saying this, firstly
unless we accept the Sartrian concept of anguish, (that man reflectively
realizes his negativity and therefore attempts to give himself the god-like
qualities of being both free and essentially characterized,) I have said
that the foundation of this concept seems incorrect; secondly I have
said that the supposed reaction to anxiety cannot be the reaction Sartre
envisages, for it would be a reaction that set man on the path of an ideal
that could not improve his ontological situation in any way. Besides there
seems no reason to say that our man suffered even anguish of the type I
describe. For his original project was not the product of an emotional
dilemma, but a product of his boredom and his inclinations. Therefore
there is no reason to say that his intention to be a certain kind of person
was in any way an "essentialist" project. One must be careful to
distinguish between the resolutions to adopt a certain life style and the
phenomenon of becoming "hooked" on that life style to the extent to
which bad faith tempts one to see oneself as powerless to change, and
thus provides the rationale for bad faith. The stages of involvement must
be clearly distinguished.

It is possible to say of course, that the man's inclinations towards this lifestyle themselves indicate that he is dispositionally inclined towards lecherous cravings. Sartre might say that the fiat "I will be who I am, I will set up a society to satiate my cravings," is indicative of the man's attempting to become "thingish", but this would be too much of an extension of the Sartrian concept of bad faith. (Let us remember that with the coquette and with the waiter bad faith involves their dissociating themselves with their knowledge of themselves (the coquette knows that her image of herself as an "innocent young girl" can be changed, and needs to be, just as the waiter knows that his image of himself as eternally tied to the waiter role is in need of changing)). So, our man's strict association of his self-image with what he knows to be true of himself could hardly be said to be in bad faith.

And yet, on Sartre's account such a man must be said to be in bad faith through his initial project to "be himself". Sartre says:-

"Who cannot see that the sincere man constitutes himself as a thing in order to escape the condition of a thing by the same act of sincerity? The man who confesses that he is evil has exchanged his disturbing "freedom-for-evil" for an inanimate character of evil; he is evil, he clings to himself, he is what he is. But by the same stroke he escapes from that thing, since it is he who contemplates it, since it depends on him to maintain it under his glance or let it collapse in an infinity of particular acts. He derives a merit from his sincerity, and the deserving man is not the evil man as he is evil, but as he is beyond his
evilness. At the same time the evil is disarmed since it is nothing, save on the plane of determinism. . . . . "(1)

Here Sartre is asserting that in being sincere a person pursues the god-man project, attempting to be who he is and yet at the same time separate himself from who he is. According to Sartre, once the man sees himself as "thingish" he can contemplate that thing and thus separate his current conscious life from it. To this extent he escapes from responsibility for his acts as free acts. . . . And, of course for Sartre it appears that in this way the man excuses himself. He is an evil man and not responsible for what he does. . . . And yet of course "evil" means nothing, it is only a term applied to men in a deterministic fashion.

Such is Sartre's account. And so, for him, sincerity represents a project wherein freedom is sold, the abdication from the throne of human agency. In this way Sartre would be committed to saying that our man of orgies was in bad faith. For the very concept of identifying oneself with one's aims and desires is a concept of sincerity. When our man says: "I want orgies because I am attracted to them in being an orgiast", he is thus, according to Sartre, putting his human freedom "out of mind." And "out of mind" will here need to be interpreted in a strictly Sartrian way in which human consciousness is said "not to be what it is". Freedom is here equated with continual transcendence, the supposed fact that as soon as an act is completed it falls into the past, for consciousness, at this moment, is

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness, p. 65
moving towards a new goal. Even if this goal is the same as the last it is only the "same" in so far as its features are identical; it is "new" in so far as one is completely responsible for choosing or re-choosing, it.

Thus it seems that Sartre's negativity thesis disallows identification with oneself. I have tried to illustrate, earlier on in the thesis, that this negativity concept was not viable, and that mens\textsuperscript{\textdegree} ontological security was based on their possessing some degree of self-identification. It is at this point that the gap between total freedom and total determinacy must be bridged with the concept of dispositions, a concept which does not make total freedom any less free but only less easy to attain.

There seems no reason why we cannot say that our orgiast is dispositionally so inclined, no reason why we cannot say that although he is free to cease his activities he will find it difficult to do so once he has become accustomed to them and their rites. This is not to say that the man cannot enter into bad faith at some stage (when he is half-inclined, for instance, to cease his activities and convinces himself that this would be possible.) But there is no reason to say he enters bad faith initially in inaugurating the project. Firstly he displays no signs of Sartrian anguish. (Realization of the supposed negativity of human consciousness and desire to be both conscious and self-coincidential). He is not hankering after an essence when he says (perhaps), that he will be "true to himself" and
fulfil his longings. Neither is he suffering from what I have called anguish (dilemma over self-image.) Therefore, to all intents and purposes he is in good faith when he says he will be who he is. For let us remember that part of his motivation was boredom, probably boredom from the society in which he lived, boredom from pretending to identify himself with the longings of others (e.g. to go to the A.B.C. celebrity concerts.)

So his "emptiness" feeling arises not because he feels he lacks character, but because he is not living as if that character existed.

How much further does this enlighten our study of Genet? Firstly it seems to indicate that Genet's decision, the fiat: "I will be who I am" is no longer a decision to become "thingish" as well as a god. Instead it indicates that Genet realizes he is dispositionally inclined towards thieving. He is summing up his desires and appetites. Remember his previous self-image of himself as "a good little boy" has been stolen from him. They expect him to steal. His ontological security has been threatened. To accept the label he is being offered is the only possible solution which will allow him to retain security. The fiat "I will" seems to me to stress his insistence that it is he who is master still, who accepts the label. He must make sure it has not been pinned upon him without his looking, that they have not murdered him. He must fight for his life, but in the way they least expect.
He cannot suffer from the kind of anguish which my drunkard, or the coquette, or the waiter suffer because the dilemma about self-image which descends upon him does so, as I have said, with force; it is not self-initiated. Only one alternative is viable; to choose it is a matter of "life" or "death."

To maintain the pretense that he was not called a thief over again, it would be necessary to cease communicating with those who accused him; it would be necessary to adopt a kind of dream state, (which could easily become a psychotic state and lead to his mental "death"). This bad faith option is thus less than an option than its good faith counterpart anyone longing for ontological security. (Just as Allison's supposed bad faith option is to some extent out of the question.) This is because this kind of pretense would not provide a palliative to anguish.

The anguish of the coquette, the waiter, or my drunkard would be quite another matter. In the hypothetical cases for each which I discussed, these people shun both their current self-image (which they "half-know" is no longer true of them) and a new self-image (which they would half-heartedly like to adopt) because they intuit hardship involved in both cases. (If they retain their old self-image they will feel less than honest, but if they change their image they will either find living up to it difficult (involving dispositional change) or the sight of themselves abhorrent (as the coquette might find a "loose woman" abhorrent). Thus the dilemma
is not met; pretence takes over, the will is blunted, bad faith is entered into.

It seems now that the bad faith concept thus described cannot be extended to cover cases of the type of project the child Genet is involved in. For we no longer have the type of anguish which is usually involved in bad faith. The anguish suffered by Genet is that involving self-image certainly, but it is the kind of anguish that must be met face to face. Therefore, although pretence may occur it does so only if one cannot build one’s ontological security on the viable alternative offered (if, for instance, Genet could feel nothing in himself akin to thieving), and cannot produce another alternative (if Genet were an adolescent he may have been able to say: "How wrong you are! I'm not thieving your stupid possessions, I'm showing you that they belong to me as well as to you. I'm a revolutionary!") However, Genet is capable of building his security on being a thief, he is able to feel proud of himself qua thief. This seems to indicate that he feels capable of identification with his "disposition" to steal. Thus Genet ceases to suffer ontological insecurity the moment he makes his decision.

Thus it seems that he does not suffer the type of anguish (which I have described), which on my view leads easily to bad faith. Nor does he suffer from what Sartre calls anguish (reflective realisation of emptiness), for Genet does not feel empty. Rather, he feels full; full of the evil the others ascribe to him. It is because he feels dispositionally identifiable
in terms of "tendency to wrong doing", that he is able to resolve not to change. If he were ontologically insecure about his evilness he would surely attempt to sink into the part (like our waiter), until he could cease watching himself and become immersed in his part, truly "thingish".

Because Genet exerts conscious resolve to be who he is, it seems that he is prepared to be responsible for this. (This is not to say that at some later stage he does not enter bad faith).

My reasons for saying this are twofold:

Firstly, Genet does not attempt to renounce consciousness and become a mere part in a play. Secondly, Genet accepts change in his self-image. Thus there is no attempt to sham (as there is in the bad faith examples).

If the negativity thesis is wrong, there is no reason to say that Genet, in being someone, is trying to pretend to have an essential nature. All he is doing is acting out his passions. He has a passion to be evil, so he says he is evil. "Is evil," here only has the strength of the dispositional statement, for in saying he "will be", Genet indicates both future intentions, a resolve to act in an evil fashion, and prediction that he will remain evil.

(His concept of his disposition to steal as a disposition (reflecting a passion), is, of course, somewhat premature, for he is not even an adolescent. But the others have called him a thief so often,
and he knows few other words to describe his acts (he does not, for instance, yet have the concept for rebellion).

Evil, for him, is a descriptive term which sums up his findings that he is the "negation" of all that which the "good men" in his peasant pastoral surroundings, stand for. If Genet wills to be evil, admits that he is freely evil, his admission must entail that he is free to cease being evil. For once "evil" is the description of habitual acts rather than the analytic definition of a lost and blackened soul, it ceases to have extreme essentialist connotations.

As in the case of our orgiast, Genet initiates his project in good faith. Bad faith may come later, and seems to do so.

Thus without the Sartrian model, sincerity appears quite viable. It seems that because Sartre's concept of anguish is what it is, bad faith could too easily become a more extended concept that it really should be.

Sartre's analysis allows bad faith to cover both sincerity and what we ordinarily call bad faith. I think the quote I mentioned in relation to the Sartrian concept of sincerity indicates that for Sartre, sincerity is one of the forms of bad faith. He also says:

"To be sincere, we said, is to be what one is. That supposes that I am not originally what I am. But here naturally Kant's "You ought, therefore you can" is implicitly understood. I can become sincere; this is what my duty and my effort to achieve sincerity imply. But we definitely
establish that the original structure of 'not being what one is' renders impossible in advance all movement toward being in itself or 'being what one is'. And this impossibility is not hidden from consciousness; on the contrary, it is the very stuff of consciousness; it is the embarrassing constraint which we constantly experience; it is our very incapacity to recognize ourselves, to constitute ourselves as being what we are. It is this necessity which means that, as soon as we posit ourselves as a certain being, by a legitimate judgement, we surpass this being... towards emptiness, towards nothing." (1)

And emptiness leads to anguish (for Sartre). Thus man pursues godhead, treats the "thingishness" of his self as an object for him. He is no longer responsible.

Thus it is only if the negativity thesis were correct that sincerity would be impossible. If the negativity thesis, and thus Sartre's concept of anguish, are incorrect, sincerity remains a viable concept.

This is not to say that one can know oneself in any thorough sense of "know", but only to say that one can identify oneself with one's aims and purposes insofar as one understands them. That is, although an outsider might well class the child Genet's behaviour as indicative of the disposition to rebel, Genet himself classes it as the disposition to steal. This is not to say that either one is incorrect, but only to say that the "truth" here will be evasive. It is not being true to the facts which will be important,

1. op.cit. p.62
but being true to what one takes to be the facts. This is because "honesty" here is not related to an empiricist theory of truth, but to a theory of good faith (as opposed to shamming).

Before I leave the subject of sincerity I would like to make a few remarks about it in the light of Sartre's comments - for his comments seem to have some interesting consequences. I have already said that I found Sartre's idea - that the basic human desire is to be conscious unconsciousness - incorrect. I said this firstly because this desire was not, (contrary to what Sartre maintains), built out of knowing one is featureless (anxiety), because people are featured and therefore this type of description of angst is not correct. I also said that being conscious unconscious would not help man's ontological situation even if that situation were as Sartre describes it. For I said that man would either have to forfeit conscious life altogether and "die to his essence" in becoming essentially featured, or would have to reduce his conscious life to that of watching his self.

Now it seems interesting to note that Sartre himself comments that the watcher separates himself (qua conscious being) from the watched. This is the way bad faith can fall through. (In suddenly watching myself acting out a part as if I were essentially determined.) And yet, according to Sartre, it is this attempt to become watcher of the watched that the sincere man attempts. In pretending that he can separate himself (free consciousness), from the fixed nature he gives himself, the sincere man
abdicates from the throne of responsibility. But is this possible? If the sincere man sees himself as essentially an orgiast, or essentially a thief (in the sense that "essential" entails "cannot act outside the context of so being"), and desires to thus watch himself (as Sartre maintains), he must thus dissociate himself from the self he has created. Certainly "it" is no longer a moral agent (and therefore not responsible for what "it" does) but neither is "it" he any longer, for he is separate from "it". He is still responsible qua consciousness for his conscious life. His situation has not improved.

In this way this project would fail utterly in a way in which the bad faith project succeeds (at least temporarily). The waiter, the coquette and the drunkard all blunt their wills, cease decision making through an imaginary pretence that they are essentially featured in some way. The pretence works whilst they live it, act it out, whilst they can keep their wills blunted. The pretence falls through when consciousness (as active watcher, if you like), reasserts itself in the form of self-doubt, ("Am I only shamming?" for instance). So, in order for bad faith to work, the blind must be drawn so that one cannot peep in on oneself. Thus the sincere man Sartre describes does not fit the bad faith model, for he supposedly attempts to be both active and passive.

I think this indicates again that no-one attempts this. Not only would it not render man any more ontologically secure, but neither
would it absolve man from responsibility for himself. If the sincere man is not thus trying to opt out of responsibility through talking about his characteristics, he must be trying to do one of two other things – either attempting to pretend these features are essentially his (and thus get himself into an imaginary state, the bad faith state), or attempting to be honest, to describe himself. It will soon become obvious which of the two he is involved in, for, if we ask the man:

"Why don't you stop being what you are (an orgiast or a thief)?", he will either reply:

"Because I don't want to", "Because it would be hard to", or "Because I can't." And only the latter reply will be the reply of bad faith.

Thus there is no reason to suppose that Sartre's concept of sincerity is correct, to suppose that sincerity is in bad faith. For it does not seem that there is any way in which sincerity could successfully corrupt itself (by fleeing responsibility) without becoming bad faith (pretending it was essentially featured), and so ceasing to be sincerity.

Thus sincerity is not a form of bad faith. Until the man who describes himself (our orgiast, or Genet, for example), says that he is no longer free to change himself, he remains a sincere man (given that his description is "honest" – as honest as it can be (remembering that we are not looking for "the whole truth" but only the relative mirror image truth)).
In short, sincerity cannot be part of the bad faith project in the way Sartre envisages, because if the "sincere" man attempts to discard his responsibility for evil in the evil "thingishness" of a solidified self, he is, at once, separated from this "thing" and therefore is still responsible for his current act. If his current act is defined in Sartrian terms (as flight from who he could be said to be up to now), he is responsible for his current deeds (of evil, for instance), and the creation of a "thingish" self has not helped him opt out of responsibility. If his current act is defined in terms of "watching" his thingish self, he is watching a pretence (and must know it is so), and so is separated from that pretence. Thus the pretence loses its efficacy.

Thus sincerity cannot be a means of deserting free responsibility. Thus it seems that there is a difference between bad faith (living a pretence) and good faith (attempting to be honest about one's aims, passions and dispositions). This is not to say that it is easy for anyone to say of anyone else: "he is in bad faith", and indeed, many of us will probably be in bad faith regarding certain aspects of our self-image, and good faith regarding others. It is hard to face the changing face of our self-images, to say nothing of the fact that it is difficult to understand some of our aims and so on in relation to other such aims, much of the time. But this is not to say that our sincerity is not quite different from our self-deception.
Therefore the project to be "who I am" need only express the intention not to alter my present aims, purposes and dispositions. Thus the child Genet is not involved in an impossible project.

I have been concentrating on such states of mind as self-deception and sincerity, bad faith and good faith and their relation to anguish. I have said that at a certain extreme, bad faith can become cynicism (a person can admit to bad faith pretence by seeing the pretence fall through and yet still claiming - "well, I can't do any better because I'm not prepared to face the hardships involved in attempting good faith."
(For instance, the hardship in admitting that I have certain aims which I would either find abhorrent (to my current self-image or values) or difficult to effect.)

Thus cynicism may admit that I am free but deny the power to exercise this freedom. It is at this point, of course, that we return to the concept of strength: the force of pain and the fortitude of courage. "Fortitude" being the concept which is the phenomenological counterpart to the concept of hardship.

Cynicism is one way of opting out of moral responsibility in that cynicism perpetuates bad faith by refusing to see the pretence as irresponsible, and by insisting that one would need to be a god to do any better.
At the other end of the scale we have what might be called an abuse of sincerity. "Complacency" is the only word I can think of to describe it, but not in the sense that it applies to such characters as Sartre's waiter, living in bad faith. Perhaps I would do better to describe this phenomenon:

The kind of person I have in mind has already been described for me by Thomas Mann in his book, "The Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man". For indeed Felix Krull is the perfect subject for my discussion. Krull is hilarious; he makes me laugh. Why? Because he is larger than life, because his ontological security carries with it emergency reinforcements. Like Genet, Krull roams Europe but without "mea culpa" apologies to the world. Of course Krull is a fictitious character, but one does meet his type. Krull is left penniless but he steals and has fun at it (orgies into the bargain by stealing from middle aged ladies!) He has to be a waiter by day but manages to be a gentleman by night, ensuring that he is so completely identifiable with his legion purposes that he will never be in danger of seeing himself with an extreme essentialist "nature". He says:

"...Until my departure from Frankfurt, I was on intimate terms with Rozsa, often stayed with her, secretly superintended the conquests she made on the street with those slanted, shimmering eyes... and did not disdain to

accept a reasonable share of the proceeds. One might well be tempted to apply a short, ugly word to my way of life at that time and to lump me summarily with those dark gallants about whom I was talking above (Rozsa's customers). Whoever thinks that actions make people equal may go ahead and take refuge in this simple procedure. For my own part, I am in agreement with folk wisdom which holds that when two persons do the same thing it is no longer the same; yet, I go further and maintain that labels such as 'drunkard', 'gambler', or even 'wastrel', not only do not embrace and define the living case, but in some instances do not even touch it. "(1)

Krull is able to see his self-image as a kind of joke. He is more aware that his projects overflow each other, than he is aware of any enduring characteristics. To this extent he is more than honest one might say: He is in good faith and in it up to his neck. To him the difficulties involved in other men's changing their self-image, are non-existent. Why? Because he has never suffered anguish and therefore does not feel or intuit frustration pain. He cannot suffer anguish because he will not let any force undermine his self-esteem. His ego is larger than his life. He feels so adaptable, so easily acclimatized that what would normally be called a trauma is only an interesting experience for him. He does not need to look on himself as a man of any particular disposition or habit.

1. op. cit. p. 127
for he feels equally at home in any circumstances. He is a hedonist, seeking pleasure, and he finds it everywhere.

To this extent he is the proud doer of his deeds to a remarkable extent. Instead of pretending to feel powerless, like the cynic, Krull feels omnipotent, nothing can destroy his ontological security.

Thus we are back with the concept of a man-god, a concept so crucial to Sartre's philosophy. I have said that Sartre is wrong in claiming man's basic desire to be that of being conscious — unconsciousness, a man-god; free, but with fixed characteristics, for I have said that if man attained this state he would either be found dead (and thus with fixed characteristics) or to be only a watcher, watching his "essential nature," unfold itself. And yet the cynic complains that he lacks the strength to conquer bad faith in such statements as: "After all, I'm only a man," whilst the indestructible man possesses an armour of steel because of his belief in the magnitude of his strength. He has no need for bad faith — he is beyond suffering, beyond frustration pain, and thus beyond angst.

So on the one hand we have man complaining that he is not god, and on the other hand we have man, at the least, imitating a god. But here "godhead" is not to be equated with "fixed characteristics in combination with free will" but with the concept of power, to shed
human weakness. In the attitude of the cynic (who says the path from bad faith to good faith is too steep for his constitution) we thus have a rebellion against nature in the form of human weakness, just as in the case of the over-confident, or complacent man, we have rebellion, but here the rebellion is treated as a fait accompli. Thus man rebels against good faith in that he rebels against the human condition, and pain as a "given", necessary evil. To counteract this we have, as I said, the concept of fortitude. But fortitude is not another bare given. Instead fortitude is difficult; courage is said to be a virtue. Aristotle says:

"All men have not the same views about what is to be feared, although there are some terrors which are admitted to be more than human nature can face. Terrors of that order are experienced, of course, by every sane person. But there are great diversities in the extent and degree of the dangers that are humanly tolerable; and there is the same variety in the objects which instil courage. What characterizes the brave man is his unshaken courage wherever courage is humanly possible... Yet it is possible to feel such dangers too much and possible to fear them too little, and possible also to fear things that are not fearful as much as if they were."(1)

Thus we have an indication of how various men, at various times will react to the possibility of impending frustration pain. Fortitude is required, but at the same time men can pretend that they do not need courage because there is no impending pain, a pretence which is the opposite pretence to that of cynicism, perhaps a pride that is the antithesis of despair. Perhaps Felix Krull and the Jean Genet of "Our Lady of the Flowers" could be diametrically opposed if Felix Krull were not meant to be comic.

Genet says that he found in his heart the presence of every sin of which others accused him. His soul was a treasure of monstrosities. There was nothing he would not own up to. (Perhaps at this stage of his life Genet needed courage, the courage which was later inspired by his creative endeavours).

Felix Krull has no use for such courage, for his soul is whiter than white, stain resistant and bullet proof.

As I said previously, it is men like these that seem to have a god-man concept, the concept Sartre talks about so much. But the concept is one strength rather than ontological security. It is strength against pain that Genet has claimed to lack; it is strength above pain of which Krull has boasted.
Yet at no point in these extremes is there a feeling that these persons lack ontological security. Genet (at this stage as a prisoner) has security, for he has given himself an imaginary nature. Krull has an over-abundance of security afforded by the pretence that he is omnipotent. Neither are realists; both are rebels.

At this point, the man of self-despair is saying: "But I can't stop being - a thief, a drunk or a wife-beater - because the strength to fight these things is not possessed by me. I'm only a man." And our man of confidence is saying: "Me, Just a Man? Nonsense! I've put myself above petty characterizations, I can be one and all." The complacent man plays at being god, the despairing man rebels against suffering by claiming that only god is fit to withstand such abuse.

And so, both lives present behind their facades, a rebellion against the existence of frustration, and a denial of the existence of fortitude. For them the mere human condition is an affront to man.

With the denial of fortitude as a human aspiration, we come full circle back to Sartre: For Sartre, the negativity thesis ensures that man is not addicted to "who he is" or what can be said to be his, in any sense over and above the sense of attachment that he chooses to take upon himself. For man is not what he is (his past), and is what he is not (his
imminent future). Thus, despite his fundamental projects, man's negativity exists:

"Since the upsurge of voluntary decision finds its motive in the fundamental free choice of my ends... I can be 'freed' from (say) my inferiority complex only by a radical modification of my project. Thus as long as I am 'in' the inferiority complex, I cannot conceive of the possibility of getting out of it. Even if I dream of getting out of it, the precise function of this dream is to make me experience even further, the abjection of my state... Yet at each moment I apprehend this initial choice as contingent and unjustifiable; at each moment, therefore, I am on the site to suddenly consider it objectively and consequently to surpass it and make it past by causing the liberating instant to arise. Hence my anguish, the fear which I have of being suddenly exorized (i.e. of becoming radically other)." (1)

The "instant", the moment of abrupt change is an expression of the denial of frustration pain, for Sartre would not hold with my talk of character and disposition any further than as descriptions of states of mind we keep maintaining. The difficulties involved in changing are therefore not difficulties. And therefore we have no need of courage. If we choose it, it is because we choose to see ourselves addicted to our habits. Such is Sartre's thesis.

1. Sartre, J.P.: Being and Nothingness, p.475
And yet it seems that the existence of the 'god' value, the dissatisfaction with the human condition, represent, as far as Sartre is concerned, a rebellion against negativity. It is interesting to note that within my thesis the 'god' value represents a rebellion against human inadequacy also. But the inadequacy is not to be seen in terms of existence but in terms of endurance. Negativity would require ontological stability; pain would require staying power!

And yet surely Sartrian negativity would require staying power as well as positive ontological status. I have said that I thought that if the negativity thesis were correct and we realised this, the threat to our sanity would be great. Free, for what? At the end of "The Age of Reason" when Sartre's Mathieu is finished with his mistress he muses: "A lot of fuss for nothing...for nothing: this life had been given him for nothing". (1) The probability of lethargy seems high. Why act? And so I feel that if Sartre were correct, action would become problematical until reflection became rare and bad faith inevitable.

And thus although the level of human responsibility for human agency is escalated the practical possibility of this responsibility's being shouldered is reduced. Is this not to admit that the project is too much for man; that he is too weak to bear us under its weight? Is it not to admit to human frailty?

That the frailty is wholly ontological does not seem to be true, for anguish, for Sartre results from apprehension of our ontological lot. Therefore man trembles before himself sensing his weakness as the child trembles before the bully. Thus, is not the "given anguish" within the Sartrian system, very nearly "akin" to a given pain?

Hannah Arendt says: "Pain is the only inner sense found by introspection which can rival in independence from experienced objects the self-evident certainty of logical and arithmetical reasoning." (1)

I started this thesis by looking at Sartre's description of bad faith, and the ontological presuppositions upon which it is based. I have attempted to discover why man enters bad faith and have drawn the conclusion that man does this to avoid pain and suffering. For man suffers frustration pain, a sense of 'loss' of identity when he attempt (or is forced) to change his self image (if he suffers any conflict desires to do so and not to do so). Thus man can find dispositional change difficult, he can find the admission to himself of the existence of a dispositional difficult, and he can find the admission of certain traumas agonizing, if those traumas have effected a radical change in his circumstances, have undermined his previous foothold in the world and thus his previously secure self-image.

I have described the dilemma man faces: whether to change his self-image or not (in all the above mentioned circumstances), as the dilemma of anguish, anguish before the intuition of suffering.

For in such circumstances as those I have described man either both wants and does not want to change his image (for instance when he is considering self-initiated character change but is reluctant), or knows that to be honest he needs to look at his image in a new light but is afraid to do so (for instance when he has come to "realize" that he is a waiter by choice, but "knows that recognition of this fact will disturb him.") Or he realizes he must change his self-image in order to retain his credibility (as in the case where his image has been brutalised), but does not feel inclined to do so. In all these circumstances a man can quiet anguish about frustration pain through the pretence of bad faith.

He can put himself into an imaginary part, pretending that he cannot make decisions, is not actively involved in responsibility because his nature is prefabricated by circumstances out of his control. Or alternatively, a man can accept frustration pain, bear with anguish and seek to reconcile his concept of himself with what knowledge he has about himself.
But it appears that some types of anguish are more conducive to bad faith than others: For instance, if a man is merely thinking of initiating a reform within his own habits, it will be quite easy for him to deceive himself (if anguish arises out of a dilemma concerning this change), if there is no-one else to verify facts about his habits and so on. On the other hand a person whose image has been brutalised by others will feel that it is necessary for him to change his self-image in order to retain credibility within the world of communication. For this reason the anguish suffered by such a person is not as conducive to bad faith as is the former form of anguish.

I have said that the existence of frustration pain points to the existence of enduring human characteristics of disposition being ascribable to individual human beings. For the existence of unavoidable suffering indicates that ontological security is connected with feelings of identity in relation to our concepts of "who" we are.

It seems that we must be careful not to confuse the bad faith concept with decisions a person may make about who he is going to be. For the bad faith pretence "I am a waiter as much as I am a featherless biped," and the good faith resolve "I am going to be a waiter and remain a waiter all my life", may, on the surface, be difficult to distinguish unless they are spelt out in this way. For both may simply be stated as:
"I am a waiter, that is who I am." It is not unless we ask, "why?" that we can start to understand the nature of the resolve.

I have already said that as the basis for resolve is not the same as the basis for bad faith, we must be careful to take into account the legion motivations for self-prediction included in many resolves (that bear superficial resemblance to bad faith patterns).

For instance, the concept of rebellion is interesting. A child may say he is going to be a thief because he is a thief. And yet, if we question him closely we may find the rationale for this statement does not lie in his belief that he cannot change, but in feelings of rebellion, together with beliefs about his appetites. Stendahl says of Don Juan that his lecherous nature is a myth because it is only a means of seeking the wrath of God; so the "natures" of many hardened criminals could be said to be mythical in that they simply express a revolt against society. Far from being in bad faith, many such persons may well be aware of steadfastly pursuing resolves, (even if these are not described as rebellious resolves), rather than living out pre-determined "natures". They know that they will not be completely hardened sinners until rigor mortis sets in.

And yet, to say that a resolve is made in good faith is not to say that the temptation to enter bad faith does not arise, not
to say that the child Genet who resolves to do evil will not at some later time be tempted to think of himself as irretrievably evil, not to say that the man who initiates sadist orgies "for kicks" will not get hooked on them. And, as I have said, bad faith will easily be perpetuated once initiated, for the truth will have become largely obscured.

The matter of the "truth" will itself always remain a problem of judgement. For the "truth", the "facts" about our aims, passions, dispositions and so on, will not be easy to discover. I am not saying that we need soul-searching of a frantic order, but only suggesting that "good faith", the preparedness to look at the facts about ourselves as best we see them, must be distinguishable from bad faith, the refusal to do this.

To this extent, my conception of bad faith is very different from Sartre's. His concept is based upon his belief in mankind's general ontological insecurity and subsequent anguish at this insecurity. To this extent he sees the bad faith project as a palliative to anguish (as I do), but his anguish is very different from mine, for his is based upon his negativity thesis! On the contrary, my concept of anguish, which also centres around a person's feelings of being lost is based on my belief that persons generally feel...
ontologically secure.

I have said that I do not think bad faith would be a palliative to Sartrian anguish, for it seems that bad faith could not fulfill the longing of such anguish (to be a man–god). Bad faith maintains itself only pretence reigns, the will is numb and decision making seemingly impossible. Thus, whilst bad faith can provide man with respite into unconscious living, it cannot provide him with any feeling of being conscious of being unconscious, for as soon as man attempts this feat he finds himself no longer a zombie and certainly not a god, but merely a man again.

For in watching his life in bad faith he watches himself playing a part and thus the sham falls through. He has no more tricks up his sleeve; he has caught himself out.

Thus sincerity does not seem to be in bad faith as Sartre holds it to be. For Sartre claims that the sincere man seeks to flee responsibility for himself by admitting his acts to be the acts of a person with a certain unchangeable nature and then seeing himself separated from that character. But, of course, if this is the case, the man is responsible for his present act, his current conscious life, for as watcher, he must realize that he is separate from the watched. Thus, his project to avoid responsibility for himself would fail. He
either must enter bad faith (by pretending to be that man of eternally "fixed" nature) or remain conscious of himself qua agent.

I have thus said that I feel that the "conscious-unconsciousness" project does not represent the basic human value.

It seems that if we look at the extremes of bad faith - despair and overconfidence - we find man both claiming a lack of godhead and claiming possession of it. But this god is the god of power. And so it seems as if the emptiness that man feels when he cynically despairs of eluding bad faith, is the lack of strength to endure hardship - hardship as a bare, factual given. And it also seems that the elation of walking on air that a man feels when his ego has been unexpectedly boosted is the feeling of reaching the pinnacle of power. "I could tackle anything today," he says.

And thus, perhaps, fortitude or courage is the main requirement for good faith. But then recourse to this courage will be another matter. Therefore, the standard of behaviour expected of mankind in relation to bad faith will need to be applied with compassion.

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