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The Later Wittgenstein and Contemporary Theories of Meaning: A Dialectical Analysis

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University

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Except as otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own original work.
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Abstract

In this study I expose, in part I, the semantic core of the later philosophy. It emerges as the result of the intersection of two extremely powerful analytical confrontations run in tandem by Wittgenstein.

In one he overturns the following fundamental notions (which characterise what I style as 'a priorism'): that the expansion of a rule is present in advance of the rule's use; that logical inference and mathematical calculation unpacks, or otherwise brings out, what is already there in the given premises or arguments; that meaning and necessity are contained in the expression of a rule or command, the utterance of a (well-formed) sentence, the coming to hand of a canonical proof or the experience it represents, or in the (intentional) act of producing a picture or sign; that something in our brains, our physiology, a functional state, a platonist object, a clear and distinct idea, stands behind and gives 'life' to our creation and reproduction of language.

In the other arm of his fundamental analytical pincer movement, Wittgenstein crushes what I style as 'cognitivism'. In philosophy of language, the 'cognitivist impulse' manifests as the fundamental idea that, somehow, meaning, understanding and modality, proof and certainty, are objects of knowledge, or at least, functions of a theory, a grasp or apprehension of which is attributed to the language-user. The epistemic relation of theory to use so envisaged ipso facto secures linguistic competence. In critically rejecting this semantic Weltanschauung, Wittgenstein thus rejects the very idea of any truth-conditional
treatment of meaning: the dissolution of the cognitivist impulse shows that sense and necessity cannot be constituted or reconstructed by or from veridical functions; it shows that the True - False logical calculus is semantically impotent such that whatever it is that logicians have been, and are, doing, it cannot be semantics.

The way is thus opened to grasp Wittgenstein's crucial insight that use, as the moment of making the world meaningful, is non-cognitive constitutive praxis. This means that taking use seriously — once we are cured of the cognitivist impulse — in fact requires the rejection of verificationism, intuitionism, anti-realism and the attendant idealist legacy, as well as the eschewing of the poverty of behaviourism and empiricistic materialism. The result for philosophy of language is an unprecedented semantic-analytical position. It lies in a radical — anti-a priorist — 'rehabilitation' of the concept of analyticity combined with the equally radical — non-cognitivist — realisation of the determination of sense independently of and prior to truth and falsity, facticity and theory, science and reflection. Consequently, content — the 'world' understood by the language-game player — is an achievement of linguistic labour, which labour is directed at (and seeks to dominate, master and transform) the pre-linguistic material world. The result, in stark contrast to the resistances we address in part II of this study, is an anti-metaphysics that is distinctly materialist and fundamentally naturalistic, but which, above all, is 'realism without empiricism'.
Notes on Symbols Used in Formalisations

Due to both logistical and financial restrictions a measure of improvisation has been necessary in the production of formalisations in this text:

\[ \exists \] constitutes the sign for existential generality

\( \forall \) constitutes the sign for universality

\(-\) is the (handwritten) sign for negation

\( \vee \) is the (over-printed) sign for disjunction

\( \land \) is the (handwritten) sign for conjunction

\( \rightarrow \) stands, in formalisations, for implication, as does \( \Rightarrow \). (Both these signs are hand-drawn.) In informal contexts however, \( \rightarrow \) (usually with reference to samples) represents (the act of) pointing to, or otherwise indicating, the sample/object/paradigm case, etc.

\( \leftrightarrow \) symbolises intersubstitutability, usually in the form of sign-object, or name-object, intersubstitutability. (This sign is handwritten.)

\( \leq \) indicates 'co-extensionality' or 'contingent identity', and is handwritten.

\( \psi, \phi \) and \( \varphi \) are handwritten Greek letters

With three exceptions, all the diagrams in the text are hand-drawn reproductions or originals.

Colour samples are intended to represent colour types (e.g., red, black), not particular shades of a colour type.
Part 1: Analysis

"It is not my intention to drive anyone out of paradise; but when you see it for what it is, you will want to go of your own accord."

- Wittgenstein circa, 1939
  (in a lecture on the foundations of mathematics)
Chapter 1: The Real Rule-Following Paradox Dialectic.

I

After around fifteen years of widespread neglect the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein is once more a focus of serious philosophical interest and debate. One reason for this has been the appropriation of the later Wittgenstein for the purposes of advancing the cause of anti-realism. This is a cause and an appropriation with which this study takes issue in the strongest of terms. Particularly though, the publication, in 1981, of Saul Kripke's substantial paper "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition" has marked as considerable a watershed in the study of Wittgenstein's philosophy as the level of sheer understatement in the paper's sub-title. Little in Kripke's paper is elementary; but its radical conclusion is mistaken and seriously misrepresents Wittgenstein's own analysis of rule-following praxis. Nevertheless, Kripke has presently brought Wittgenstein back into the limelight.

During the late fifties and the sixties, when Wittgenstein's thought was championed as a major force in the rise of ordinary language philosophy, very little of real substance was brought to light concerning his fundamental semantic outlook. The notion of 'meaning-as-use' championed at the time was weak, conservative and thoroughly unsophisticated. This was especially so by comparison with the power of the semantic theories being produced by the burgeoning industry of logical semantics, which 'industry' now utterly dominates philosophy of language. It is against this background that the recent resurgence of interest in and debate about the later philosophy must be seen. The Wittgenstein appropriated by Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright, and
spoken through by Saul Kripke, is a 'Wittgenstein' who has been brought back from the cold only to be revived in the heat generated by fires which, as this study shows at length, Wittgenstein himself would have forcefully extinguished.

One may be quite blunt about why Wittgenstein has been, and substantially remains, a philosophers' victim: his later philosophy (for a variety of reasons) simply has not been adequately studied; it has not been deeply examined as the completely dialectical construct which it is. For the later Wittgenstein, the content of his texts and lectures is ever the product of his analytical confrontations with philosophical theories and various non-philosophers' conceptual confusions. In short, to know why Wittgenstein says what he does, and to see how he goes about it, we must pay close attention to the interrelated issues of who he is arguing with and what is the conceptual confusion he is seeking to analyse. If there is no proponent of a metaphysical theory, there is no stuff for philosophical analysis: as with psychoanalysis, where the analyst and the analytical method are there only to cure patients, so the texts of the later philosophy are case histories of philosophical analysis; documentations of the application of Wittgenstein's analytical method.

Whatever else it may be, to understand the later philosophy is to reconstruct, and employ, the method at work: to understand Wittgenstein is to do his philosophy, his method. In this study this is the project we will undertake in accord with the two interrelated exigetical principles outlined above. As an integral part of this approach, and because Wittgenstein remains a real kink in the chain of modern philosophy, especially analytical philosophy, I will seek here to bring various developments which have had major post-Wittgensteinian impact,
into dialectic with Wittgenstein's analyses. This is because the direction of analytic philosophy has been to pass around -- and often well clear of -- the later Wittgenstein. Where he has been caught up in this or that flood of new ideas it is not his philosophy, but some other, that has (momentarily) moved him into the mainstream current. This study overturns this trend: it channels mainstream current philosophy through the Wittgensteinian domain and documents the analytical results in detail.

II

The first two chapters of this study are analyses and dialectical reconstructions of the semantic position at the heart of Wittgenstein's mature philosophy. One of the principal virtues of Saul Kripke's paper on Wittgenstein is that it exposes crucial aspects of the negative side of the later philosophy's essential -- 'meaning-as-use' -- semantic thrust. My intention in this opening chapter is to further this exposition considerably, but to do so in a way that unburdens it from the seriously mistaken conclusions drawn by Kripke.

I argue that what Kripke has done is to gain through his analysis a brilliant, but dangerously flawed, entrée to the focus of the later Wittgenstein's fundamental semantic-analytical concerns: the logic of the relationship between meaning and mental (especially, intentional) 'states', (language-users') behaviour, and states of affairs in the world (however, ontologically, that may cash out). It goes without saying that concern with this interrelated quartet characterises most, if not all, philosophy of language. But what makes for the uniqueness and the radical nature of Wittgenstein's analysis, and what is released in Kripke's exposition, is the mature philosophy's particular approach to
and treatment of the structure and constitution of the interconnectedness which obtains between the four elements of the semantic nexus (meaning, mind, behaviour, world).

One extremely potent way to picture the structuring of the quartet is a way that comes to us very naturally and which is most metaphysically seductive. The apposite example here is the way this picture presents itself in and through our reflections on the logic of following a rule; rules and rule-following being through-and-through concerned with the structuring of the nexus 'meaning – mind – behaviour – world'. The notion is, first and foremost, that when we are shown a rule so as to learn to follow it, to understand it, the rule is complete: it contains its use: to understand the rule is to grasp this vital content. As we will see below, this fundamental notion feeds into two principal subsequent positions:

A) that the rule (somehow) 'contains' each and every instance of its compliance conditions as well as determining, of itself, its complete extension;

B) that the rule's compliance conditions (or content, or 'extension') are indeed determined and secured in advance, but (pace 'A') are realised and constituted in the flow of experience, reasoning, intuition, etc., such that the rule does not itself (somehow) 'contain' each and every compliance condition, but rather, whilst still completely determining them, must mesh with the content of our reasoning or of our experience.

As we will see below, position 'A', with its view of the rule as self-contained and complete-in-itself, correlates, e.g. with what, post-Dummett, we can style as a platonist outlook. Position 'A' correspondingly treats the semantics for any expression or statement of a
rule as analytic a priori. Position 'B' treats the relevant semantic issues along not analytic, but synthetic a priori lines, and correlates, inter alia, with intuitionist and anti-realist views, though there are, as again we see below, numerous other (and, by Dummett's standards, 'realist' or 'much-more-realist') positions which are just as substantially at home in the vicinity of position 'B'. It goes without saying that there are plenty of 'middle-ground' and 'hybrid' views also to be found between the extremes of 'A' and 'B'.

For the present moment, however, our concern is with this fundamental notion out of which spring the two competing general positions. In particular, and as I contend the focus of Kripke's rulesceptical argument shows, the present metaphysical icon — the picture of the rule (somehow) containing its use — turns on the treatment of following a rule as the grasping of the rule's content (be that content either, as in 'A', integral to the rule itself, or, as in 'B', the result of the expressed rule's determining how, e.g., any given connection with experience, intuition, rational insight, etc. is to be classified). What one must grasp if one is to follow the rule is its content; if there is no content there to be scrutinised and grasped, there is no stuff of rule-governance. Most typically therefore, that which the rule presents to us — its use — must on this basic line of thought, constitute for the rule-follower an intentional object: that which is to be done is (somehow) there in the rule and awaits your comprehension. The expression of the rule by symbols, gestures etc., is thus seen as a vehicle for the presentation of the rule's content before the reception committee of your mind: once you grasp, recognise, acknowledge the content, you have taken on board that which secures your understanding, your compliance, your linguistic (or cultural, or whatever) competence.
Understanding is thus essentially a state, an order of things 'in', and bearing upon, the inducted rule-follower, into which order s/he 'enters', or which s/he 'acquires', in virtue of now (somehow) 'having (taken) on board' the stuff of, and given by, the apprehended rule. The rule, to cast an analogy, thus is like a key for opening door after door of a particular palace: gain the key and the palatial interior unfolds before you with each further use of the key. (How one interprets this 'unfolding' determines of course where, on this model, one comes down in terms of the Dummettian realist - anti-realist division. Rejecting the model, naturally, suggests the dissolutive rejection of Dummett's problematic, but, again, more on this below).

The broad and fundamental position thus outlined is that which I will style here as a priorism: to subscribe to the above general manifesto (in whatever of its particular forms) is to be an a priorist; to conceive of rules as (somehow) containing their use, and to conceive of the expression of a rule as (ipso facto) a vehicle for content (that content being precisely 'what is to be done', 'what is meant', 'what is valid', 'what is necessitated', etc.), is the essence of a priorism as it principally and overwhelmingly concerns us here.

In Kripke's paper, a priorism's Achilles heel is profoundly exposed — and in this, Kripke releases (more or less for the first time since Wittgenstein's death) the fundamental negative dialectic of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Alas, once loose, Wittgenstein's chief anti-metaphysical force runs amok across the territory Kripke otherwise so superbly opens up.

This outcome notwithstanding, we must not resile from paying Kripke his dues for services which aid the cause of Wittgensteinian philosophy.
At bottom, Kripke's rule-sceptical argument turns on a deep analytical insight, which insight, when it is acknowledged, shatters the a priorist metaphysical compulsion. Succinctly put, Kripke shows that whilst it is definitive that the relationship between rule and compliance is a non-necessary connection, the securing of that connection, and so the (normative) role of the content of the expressed rule, inescapably involves further rule-governance (in the sense of 'rules for the cashing of the content of the rule'). Such is this requirement for rules' operation, that no constraint on compliance and/or deviance can be secured because every constraint, every regulation and meta-regulation, itself requires further, prior, rule-governance: every instruction is, viciously yet unavoidably, subject to the caveat that it itself comes with instructions; instructions the grasp of which is itself contingent upon meta-instructions, ad infinitum. Kripke drives home this crushing blow to a priorism's utter reliance on the (myth of the) logical sufficiency of content, by showing, in the mode of the rule-sceptic, that nothing that can be crammed into the rule (qua further and further fleshing out of its content) removes the problem of how to take -- 'interpret' -- that or any other piece of what the rule is presenting as its normative demand(s).

One of the deep, and yet underplayed, key consequences of this (as I am at pains to show at length below) is that the Wittgenstein-Kripke negative dialectic utterly disposes of the idea (central to a priorism's fundamental view of understanding) that one follows a rule in virtue of grasping its content. Concomitantly, and at a more general level, we are confronted by a radical break away from the notion of the rule offering any intentional object of or for rule-following praxis, of or for understanding. There is no content in the stuff of rule-following which
we can look to, in as much as, modulo the fundamental *a priorist* vision, this supposed content is and must be what one goes by in following the rule. It is this latter realisation that is so deeply disturbing: the Kripke-Wittgenstein negative dialectic disposes of the very idea of there being anything 'in' the (expression of the) rule which constitutes its 'containment' of its use; from which point we jump (as Kripke exhorts) to the conclusion that no substance is left in the notion of rule-governance save a stark, synthetic *a posteriori*, conclusion: 'following the rule' (and, by implication, 'understanding the meaning of a word' etc.) is that behaviour, and co-ordination of behaviour, which one is (empirically) constrained to manifest after exposure to an instance of the expression of the rule (*qua* mere contentless semantic form). (This is a viewpoint discussed at length below — with regard to Kripke's argument — as well as in wider terms in Chapter II and Chapter IV.)

Lest this opening chapter's close concerns with these potent aspects of Kripkean rule-scepticism be gravely misunderstood, I emphasise once more that my argument herein acknowledges, and seeks to further considerably, not the conclusions drawn in Kripke's brilliant paper (under the head 'the sceptical solution') but rather Kripke's releasing of Wittgenstein's *negative* dialectic. To get to Wittgenstein's mature philosophical-semantic position so as to comprehend it for the profound and radical anti-metaphysical analysis which it is, we must first here dispose of the *a priorist* impulse right to its deepest levels; this is where we will follow Kripke's trail (though not uncritically) because of its service to Wittgenstein's negative dialectic. Once this point is reached, the concluding sections of this chapter will assess Kripke's positive 'solution', and, in dialectic with this truly 'sceptical outcome', will sketch the outline of a radical, and positive, counter-
position. It is a position (as Chapter II details) which, like the rule-sceptical solution, springs through-and-through from the destruction of the a priorist picture of rule-following. But we will see in this chapter that and why the rule-sceptical and the a priorist remain locked into a common commitment to the deep metaphysical view that the essential and fundamental demand upon any rule-follower is that s/he deal with and trade in the currency of the (deeply metaphysically-loaded) question 'How, and in virtue of what, do you know how to go on (to follow the rule at each step)'. A priorism demands, and believes it has, the answers to this question; rule-scepticism shares that demand and is predicated, like a priorism, upon taking the question as utterly valid, though the rule-sceptic shows — nihilistically — that there are and cannot be any answers to hand. In the final and concluding sections of this Chapter I will show (in 'sketch form' until Chapter II) that the later Wittgenstein's philosophical position and its semantic analysis, is predicated upon a decisive and radical rejection of the question and with it the rejection of the very idea that the linguistic condition is either fundamentally or essentially any kind of cognitive condition. This is how to dispose of a priorism and rule-scepticism. Out of this extends the essential thesis of this study, through Chapters II to V (and through the appendix).

For the moment though, we must begin the task of critically re-treading the path of the Kripke-Wittgenstein negative dialectic. We must move to address its formative and potent engagement with a priorism as taken through the notion of rules (somehow) containing their use, and proceed from there to examine this picture's concomitant reliance on taking understanding, intentionality and content as a conceptual nexus, particularly as is seen in the notion of there being something 'in' the
expressed rule that (once grasped) shows me how to go on. Whilst doing this, we must also, from the outset, establish access to the crucial points of distinction and disagreement between Wittgenstein and Kripke so that we can see the eventual emergence of the quite disparate and opposed ways they exploit and develop the fruits of their common attack on a priorism.

III

It is central to Kripke's treatment of Wittgenstein -- to what Kripke speaks (and does not speak) 'through Wittgenstein's mouth' -- that Philosophical Investigations' remarks 198-202 puts the case for 'rule-scepticism'. Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, in their book Scepticism, Rules and Language, marshal overwhelming textual evidence (taken from unpublished material out of which the Investigations' text was finalised) to show convincingly that Kripke's attribution is utterly incorrect: Wittgenstein is not a 'rule sceptic'. It is significant nonetheless that Baker and Hacker concentrate their exigetical argument around Investigations 201 and 202. To be sure, they are, I intend to show, right to argue that Kripke seriously misunderstands the remark 201 paradox, and that he ignores the remark's immediately-subsequent paragraph where Wittgenstein rejects the rule-sceptical problem as based on "a misunderstanding". Nonetheless, because Baker and Hacker concentrate on Investigations 201, they fail to closely explicate the dialectical context into which fits the trigger of the rule-following paradox dialectic, viz., the opening paragraph of Investigations 198:

"But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accordance with the rule." --- That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any
support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning.

Careful reflection upon the dialogic-analytical structure of the text here shows that the interlocutory first sentence puts an objection directed squarely at what has taken place in, or via, remark 197:

"It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash." --- And that is just what we say we do. That is to say: we sometimes describe what we do in these words. But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what happens. It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present. --- For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other hand its meaning lies in its use. There is no doubt that I now want to play chess, but chess is the game it is in virtue of all its rules (and so on). Don't I know, then, which game I want to play until I have played it? or are all the rules contained in my act of intending? Is it experience that tells me that this sort of game is the usual consequence of such an act of intending? so is it impossible for me to be certain what I am intending to do? And if that is nonsense --- what kind of super-strong connection exists between the act of intending and the thing intended? --- Where is the connection effected between the sense of the expression "Let's play a game of chess" and all the rules of the game? --- Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing.

What we have read here is an argument-dialectic that, through at least the first half of the remark, attacks head-on the definitive a priorist position, viz.: that a rule's "future development" has to somehow "already be present in the act of grasping the rule". Wittgenstein draws attention to the way this position is seductive but also puzzling, because we can see that whilst the rule demands our compliance with its (a priori) complete use, this very demand means its use is, in a further but connected sense, not yet "present" but relies on our compliance. And so the remark's critical thrust preys upon this point of metaphysical concern and presses it home by focussing on on the a prioristic approach to intentionality (in both the wide and narrow senses of that term).
Finally, Wittgenstein cuts across the tangle of conceptual difficulties he has exposed by starkly insisting that, in essence, the puzzle's dissolution lies in acknowledging the practice that is 'playing the language-game'. This reply, though in itself far from perspicuous, is at least a firm and positive answer -- except for the fact that it is immediately rejected as unsatisfactory by the voice which opens the very next remark: plainly, the 'rule-sceptic' and Wittgenstein do not accept the same conclusion in their critique of a priorism.

There is thus clearly a wider, and further, analytical dispute in progress around remark 197. It is this deeper aspect of the text which ensures and demonstrates that the remark 198 interlocutor's objection is not rhetorical; it bespeaks the presence of a crucial dialectical context. Its provenance lies some fifty remarks back in the text. There, an interlocutor's voice introduces the following fundamental issue with which Wittgenstein subsequently grapples at length:

But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time! 5

At remark 198 we can of course arguably take the text as turning from dealing with the concept of understanding to addressing the concept of following a rule, and then at remark 243 the private language argument begins. But significantly, the issue that is raised by remark 138 explicitly finds its dissolutive reprise in remarks 318-326. As such, we need to realise that the theme of remark 138 sustains across at least one hundred and eighty subsequent remarks. Investigations 203 is surely the hermeneutic key here:

Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one
side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.

The interjection of the rule-following paradox dialectic immediately following remark 197 is thus not an interjection at all: it is the continuation of the fundamental line of analysis begun at remark 138 and now (to echo Clausewitz' famous remark about diplomacy and war) 'continued by other means'. The same deep problem is approached from yet another side -- and, as the seductive force of Kripkean rule-scepticism shows, we can very easily find here that we do not know our way about.

The difficulty I want immediately to focus on is that arising from the fact that neither Kripke nor the important rebuttals of his rule-scepticism in Baker and Hacker's *Scepticism, Rules and Language* and in John McDowell's *Wittgenstein on Following a Rule*6, adequately identifies the deep problem whose analysis is triggered by *Investigations* 138 and which is, *inter alia*, brought so potently to a head through the voice of the rule-sceptic in remark 198. Notably, there is a most revealing parity between the interlocutor's claim in *Investigations* 138 -- that understanding is grasping meaning "in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!" -- and the pointed objection which opens *Investigations* 198: "But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point?". The emphasis on "this" in "at this point" is precisely required to promote the argument that there is a real problem with being sure you do the same now, then, always, when understanding is use "extended in time". The conflict with which the remark 138 and 198 objectors are making such potent play thus turns on the notion of 'getting the rule to rule', *i.e.*, of getting it to yield *the same again*
-- and again and again. Let the expression of the rule be, e.g., 

\[(x^2+3x) - 4 = a\]: we can readily see that this formula holds over and constrains a 'atemporally' whilst, by (troubling) contrast, the yielding of the rule's extension by the person calculating is surely "something ... extended in time". Still more, and vital, flesh is put on the bones of this reading by Investigations 215:

But isn't the same at least the same? We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with itself. I feel like saying: "Here at any rate there can't be a variety of interpretations. If you are seeing a thing you are seeing identity too."

What this remark makes clear is that the rule-sceptical appeal to the concept of interpretation of a(ny) rule calls into question, and threatens comprehensively to undermine, the quintessential intension 'the same again'.

Kripke makes no bones about the damage rule-scepticism threatens to wreak here: quite early in his paper he tells us that

... ultimately, if the sceptic is right, the concepts of meaning and of intending one function rather than another will make no sense. For the sceptic holds that no fact about my past history -- nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behaviour -- establishes that I meant plus rather than quus.

In short, as Kripke frames the fundamental issue, the dialectic (to which he contends Wittgenstein is committed) in the rule-following paradox analysis is this: either there is some fact about the rule-follower which determines the identity of the rule s/he is following -- e.g., 'plus' versus the deviant 'quus' as the mode of addition -- or there is no such fact and "the concepts of meaning and of intending one function rather than another ... make no sense."
It is this reading of Wittgenstein's overall analytical intent that I reject here. I say this without seeking to disavow the service Kripke does to the exposition of the negative side of Wittgenstein's dialectic through, e.g., the way he impressively canvasses a wide range of candidates for the post of 'identity-conferring fact'. But what Kripke's treatment of Wittgenstein never considers is this thought, which is central to the counter-analysis I will advance here: it is the thought that we should radically question the view that either there is an identity-determining, content-constituting fact about the rule-follower, or that, at the expense of any substantial notions of meaning and understanding, there is not.

The key factor here, and behind it the deep metaphysical resistance which Kripke's paper thoroughlygoingly maintains, is the fact that it is never called into question, by the sceptic or her/his Kripkean-sponsored respondent(s), that it is coherent to demand that there must be something in the expression of the rule that secures its identity. That is why, if we are to see the deep point of this issue, it is so crucial to get clear as to the real context of Wittgenstein's overall dialectic. If we do not look closely at the wider chain of argument (starting from remark 138) that links up to the emergence (in 198) of the rule-sceptic, we mistake a fresh step in Wittgenstein's dialectic for what otherwise looks like a complete, new, argument. After all, look at what the sceptical interlocutor says, and thus how -- in the absence of seeing a wider context at work -- s/he sets the scenario which Kripke accepts: in the very first line of *Investigations* 198's opening of the rule-following paradox argument the rule-sceptic asks "But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point?". This is the demand: 'show me, for the thing (to be done) is already in existence, or somehow present, or presented,
in the rule and to go on I need now -- "at this point" -- to have that content to hand'. What the interlocutor wants to be shown is (generically speaking) the crucial intentional object: the content of the rule. The foundations of Kripke's dialectic are thus now set rock solid: either there is content there and I am, ipso facto, able to obey the rule; or, there is no content, and rule-governance is empty.

IV

We see then why it is most important to acknowledge the provenance, in Investigations 138, of the sceptical objection which opens remark 198: this approach allows the crucial 'wide-focus' view of the sceptical attack on the nexus formed (through a priorist thinking) between understanding, intentionality and content. No sooner does remark 138 canvass the 'grasped in a flash versus used over time' conflict, than Wittgenstein, in the very next remark, makes a very deliberate and key move in addressing the question of what could be the semantically-determinative factor which is, ex-hypothesi (to be) grasped in a flash: "What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?---Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture?". This appeal to the concept of pictoriality brims over with implications, but principally they have in common the identification of the factor 'grasped in a flash' as an intentional object. Thereafter this basic notion is subjected to persistent critical investigation.

In the first, most general, instance, the very idea of pictoriality is utterly consonant with the hallmarks of intentionality: the exemplary and definitive Husserlian phenomenological slogan 'All consciousness is consciousness-of' is precisely paralleled in the logical requirement that all pictures are ipso facto pictures of something, just as to be a
thought is, so it goes, to be a thought (necessarily) of something, as being a sign is to be a sign of ..., an expression is an expression of ..., and so on.

More obviously and more specifically though, a very substantial connection must be acknowledged between the *Tractatus*’ picture theory of propositions and *Investigations* 139’s appeal to pictoriality. Indeed, the remark goes on specifically to open what the next two remarks turn into a crushing attack on the central picture-theoretic notion of picturing’s intentionality operating as "a method of projection"¹⁰, as "lines of projection"¹¹, connecting picture and portrayed content.

There are several aspects to the involvement of the critique and dissolution of the picture theory of propositions in the *Investigations* remarks 138-197 'understanding-in-use' dialectic, and in the remarks 198-202 rule-following paradox argument. They all underscore the need to see 138-197 as establishing the context for 198-202. In the first instance, there is the obvious concern of the author of the *Investigations* to dissolve the errors of both the *Tractatus* and his subsequent (1929-33) efforts to keep revised versions of the picture theory alive. But this narrow, though important, concern opens out into a broader use of the critique of the (original and revised) picture theory. It takes on the role of an heuristic device for the analysis, in numerous remarks from *Investigations* 142 to 326, of a whole body of mistaken views about (the connections between) intentionality, understanding and meaning.

First though, let me deal in this section with the narrower issue: Wittgenstein's specific concerns with the picture theory of propositions and the crucial formative influence these concerns have on the development of, and textual context set for, the dialectic of the rule-
following paradox. To do this we need to divine from the dialectical thread running through *Investigations* 138-141, the formative, pre-*Investigations*, influences and concerns at work here.

As we have noted, *Investigations* 139 takes "a picture" as the candidate for the item that, by analogy at least, "comes before our mind when we understand a word ....". Wittgenstein then quickly seizes upon the problem of how a picture portrays its content; how to understand the picture's "method of projection". His fundamental question here is: 'What (if anything) determines the pictorial content of the picture?; what determines my taking the picture to portray this, viz., ..., not something else?'. Remarks 140 and 141 press this issue very potently.

Remark 140 is, at bottom, an exemplary instance of Wittgenstein's attack on the crucial *a priorist* dogma of the logical sufficiency of content. Throughout the remark he presses the point that we are misled if we think that, as he puts it in the remark's opening paragraph, "there is such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces a particular application on us". We can (as Kripke's argument itself so superbly shows) always take the picture in more than one way. The remark's conclusion tells us then that the *a priorists' insistence that the picture, the intentional object, is the 'determinant of meaning' is overturned once we

... see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word [or see the picture] and the application still be different. Has it the *same* meaning both times? I think we shall say not.

From here, remark 141 tightens the screws in a way that quite distinctly betokens Wittgenstein's attacking his own picture-theoretic
views of meaning (which of course he is now utterly abandoning). The following idea — to which, as we are about to see, Wittgenstein was once absolutely committed — is crushed in remark 141: what makes the intentionality of picturing work as it does, what secures the content, meaning, etc., is the picture's having a particular "method of projection"; its possessing not just content per se but its having practical guides to its realisation, to the picture's correct use. For a moment the general notion of the intentional object coming with a sort of user's manual (or instruction video?), may make it look as though we can now successfully explicate the securing of the step from instruction, order, rule etc., to obedience, understanding, and so on: the picture works because it comes with a guide to its use. But remark 141, having entertained this thought for a few lines in its opening paragraph, now disposes of it by astutely pointing out that the all-important 'practical guide', the accompanying 'method of projection', is itself another set of rules, pictures, symbols — another schema standing in need of 'interpretation'. And so Wittgenstein, dammingly, asks "Can't I now imagine different applications of this schema too?". Once again, the inevitable casualty is the a priorist dogma of the logical sufficiency of content: the illusion of the sovereign power of the intentional object (which the presented picture/rule seeks to put before the mind of the rule-follower).

The narrow intent of remarks 140 and 141, so far as their negative dialectic is concerned, is thus unmistakably the (self-critical) destruction of the picture theory; a fact even more starkly exposed if we turn to a corresponding, but more detailed, fragment of pre-Investigations text written circa 1936, and included in the appendix to Philosophical Grammar.12 This fragment clearly shows how and why the
initial analysis from *Investigations* 138 to 141 (inclusive) is set out in terms of an attack on 'picturing theories': Wittgenstein's first intention is to fuel his *Investigations* analysis from the fires of his former views. The fragment opens by critically addressing the *Tractatus* notion of the "pictorial character" of propositions, and then the most germane conjoint fourth and fifth paragraphs run as follows:

*We may say: a blueprint serves as a picture of the object which the workman is to make from it.*

*And here we might call the way in which the workman turns such a drawing into an artifact "the method of projection". We might now express ourselves thus: the method of projection mediates between the drawing and the object, it reaches from the drawing to the artifact. Here we are comparing the method of projection with projection lines which go from one figure to another. — But if the method of projection is the bridge, it is a bridge which isn't built until the application is made. — This comparison [of method of projection with projection lines reaching from one figure to another] conceals the fact that the picture plus the projection lines leaves open various methods of application; it makes it look as if what is depicted, even if it does not exist in fact, is determined by the picture and projection lines in an ethereal manner; every bit as determined, that is to say, as if it did exist. (It is 'determined give or take a yes or no'.) In that case [i.e., on this line] what we may call 'picture' is the blueprint plus the method of its application. And we now imagine the method as something which is attached to the blueprint whether or not it is used. (One can "describe" an application even if it doesn't exist.)* 13

Despite the currency in certain circles of the view that the spirit of the picture theory of propositions survives the development of Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, the above 1936 analysis utterly disposes of the foundations for any such theory. As with the later analysis in *Investigations* 140-141, the compelling point of the argument is that, as the fragment baldly states, "the picture plus the projection lines" which are supposed to determine how the pictorial content is to be taken, "leaves open various methods of application". What seduces us
here, what "conceals" this fact, is precisely the essential a priorist illusion of rules containing their use and the consequent myth about the logical sufficiency of (their normative) content: the fragment tells us that the a priorist approach, definitively

...makes it look as if what is depicted, even if it does not exist in fact, is determined by the picture and the projection lines in an ethereal manner; every bit as determined, that is to say, as if it did exist. (It is 'determined give or take a yes or no'.)

Thus, modulo Wittgenstein's own 'plurality of applications' critique (which, of course, is only just starting in Investigations 140-141) or the critique canvassed by Kripke's rule-sceptic, we see the logical insufficiency of "what is depicted" through the picture and projection lines nexus, in respect of determining meaning, necessity, etc.

Presently, because we are at this stage reconstructing the evolution of the textual context for the Investigations 198-202 rule-following paradox dialectic, it is crucially instructive to observe Wittgenstein's great struggle in coming to the position of this fragment. For it marks the emergence of his mature, anti-a priorist, semantic analysis. The essential idea of a picture theory held him captive right throughout his first substantial attempt to produce a book presenting his post-Tractatus philosophy. I refer here of course to the text we know as Philosophical Remarks.14

Section III of this 'transitional' text opens by addressing none other than the relationship between pictoriality, intentionality, content and meaning. Three of the section's initial remarks are these:

You can draw up a plan from a description. You can translate a description into a plan.
The rules of translation here are not essentially different from the rules for translating from one verbal language into another.

If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then collapses.

What is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended. 15

What we plainly see here is that after the Tractatus, but before the writing of either the Blue Book16 (circa. 1933-34) or the subsequent major text which has been published as Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein clung to an amended version of the picture theory of propositions.17 The essence of the revised theory is its treatment of intentionality.

Gone is the Tractatus notion that the 'method, or lines, of projection' reach from the proposition-as-picture through the presentation of its content, to 'touch reality' and await thereafter merely a 'yes' or 'no'. In the collapse of the Tractatus, principally at the hands of the colour-exclusion problem, the 'projection lines' machinery is abandoned and its task is taken over by the potent notion of the verificationist agency of the language-user.

A very important remark which implicitly casts this revised picture-theoretic approach into stark relief against the Tractatus theory, comes shortly after the above-cited opening moves in Philosophical Remarks:

How is a picture meant? The intention never resides in the picture itself, since, no matter how the picture is formed, it can always be meant in different ways. But that doesn't mean that the way the picture is meant only emerges when it elicits a certain reaction, for the intention is already expressed in the way I now compare the picture with reality. 18
Note, first, the crucial observation that "no matter how the picture is formed, it can always be meant in different ways." The very least that this says is that, pace the thrust of the Tractatus picture theory, pictures (or perhaps better still, 'picturings') do not operate sui generis. Indeed, Wittgenstein's point about pictures "always" being able to be "meant in different ways" opens precisely the can of worms that, around six years later, he would, inter alia, confront via the pieces of text(s) that became the dialectic of the Investigations' rule-following paradox. But crucially, in Philosophical Remarks he thinks he has a solution to this so significantly formative post-Tractatus recognition of the problem of the sufficiency of content. This, as I indicated above, is the essential reason why he invented verificationism and its famous theory of meaning.

This solution, boldly canvassed in the above remark, turns on the idea that the determinant of meaning and content is verification as the intention "expressed in the way I now compare the picture with reality." The word 'now' is emphasised because, as we have just been told in the preceding sentence, "[t]he intention" -- and thus the meaning-determinative factor -- "never resides in the picture itself"; it 'resides' in the moment of the act of verification.

Note then the way that the verificationist line supersedes, and yet nonetheless is really just a clever mutation of, the Tractatus approach where, as Wittgenstein summarises the 'old' picture theory in the first paragraph of the appendicised fragment on pictorial character in Philosophical Grammar,

... the difference between proposition and reality is ironed out by the lines of projection belonging to the picture, the thought, and ... no further room is left for a method of
application, but only for agreement and disagreement [between the proposition's content and reality]. 19

Mutatis mutandis, Kripke's 'rule-sceptic' could have written this, because, of course, the tone of this critical reflection upon the picture theory is that of an acknowledgement of its being a wholly unsustainable theory of the determination of meaning: the rule-sceptic shows that there is always "room left for a method of application" — though of course s/he concludes, nihilistically, that the picture — application gap can never be bridged. But of course for the verificationist Wittgenstein the blast of this potent assault on intentionality was not yet being felt. This was because, as his deliberate invention and championing of the verification principle shows, he thought (between 1929 and 1933) that his treatment of intentionality was immune to the problem that pictures themselves can always be meant in different ways.

Wittgenstein thought this because, inter alia, his views about what constitutes recourse to psychologism, are at this time weak and shallow. Frege's certain admonition that the new champion of 'intentionalised meaning' had sold his soul to psychologism, is, for example, turned aside thus:

It may look as if, in introducing intention, we were introducing an uncheckable, a so-to-speak metaphysical element into our discussion. But the essential difference between the picture conception and the conception of Russell, Ogden and Richards, is that it regards recognition as seeing an internal relation, whereas in their view this is an external relation. 20

In short, what Wittgenstein is saying here is this: "No, it's not me that is embracing the evils of psychologism in the face of your warnings and criticisms Frege; it's Russell, Ogden and Richards". This trio are picked on here because they represent the (empiricistic) view that not a
grasp of 'the (logical) grammar of the language', but an a posteriori movement within experience, secures meaning. It is this dependence on experience to determine sense that is supposed to mark psychologism here. For Wittgenstein between 1929 and 1933 insists that sense is an a priori language-internal determination ipso facto 'contained' in the method of verifying a proposition, not in any experience which follows the thought, the hearing of the command, etc. Thus he treats sense as produced "in the way I now compare the picture with reality",21 that 'way' being a priori decided by the (logical) 'grammar/syntax' of the language. Consequently, and pace Russell, Ogden and Richards, the...

... comparison doesn't consist in confronting the representation with what it represents and through this confrontation experiencing a phenomenon, which ... itself could not be described in advance [because on such a view its identity is external to the representational nexus and is not therefore laid down a priori in the 'grammar/syntax' of the language].

(Experience decides whether a proposition is true or false, but not its sense.)22

This then is the line of thinking advocated by Wittgenstein in his verificationist revision of the picture theory of propositions. His theory turns on the treatment of meaning as through-and-through a particular kind of intentional act: 'meaning' is, e.g., analogous to 'scoring a home-run' because it is the effected consequence of an intentional act carried out in a rule-governed context; as he puts the nub of this view in an unpublished manuscript circa. 1930-31, "A person need only mean something by what he says, then everything essential is given".23 Other similarly revealing remarks from unpublished verificationist period (1929-33) manuscripts are cited by Garth Hallett:

Someone says, 'I want to see a red piece of paper.' He is shown pieces of different colours, white, green, finally a
red one; he says, 'That is what I meant'. How could he mean the red without seeing it? --- For even if he had an image, this is not what he then was shown (otherwise he would not have expected anything); so he first had somehow to mean this image too. --- Isn't this how it is: he is able to compare this image with the present --- not expected --- visual impression and does compare it and thus as it were fixes the interpretation of this image. 24

For me to be able to mean something, it must be there and if it is there, then it belongs to the thought (for it is a condition for the existence of this thought). 25

Because, as the Philosophical Remarks attack on Russell, Ogden and Richards shows, Wittgenstein insisted that the relationship between content and understanding (through the intentional act of verification) was internal, he thought he had both satisfactorily eschewed psychologism and the problem that any sign can be 'meant' in a multiplicity of ways. He is yet to realise that the 'act of intending to mean M' is itself open to the problem he wants to use it to solve. But moreover still, by retaining the ambit of the picture theory, he has remained as committed as he was in the Tractatus to the fundamental source of the problem of which he is struggling to be free.

Wittgenstein in his verificationist phase remained bonded to the idea that what is to be understood is presented in the 'thought' (or, in his verificationist theory's case, the thought as taken up in the intentional moment of verification):

Grey must already be conceived as being in lighter/darker space if I want to talk of its being possible for it to get darker or lighter.

So you might perhaps also say: the yardstick must already be applied, I cannot apply it how I like, I can only pick out a point on it.

....

You cannot compare a picture with reality, unless you can set it against it as a yardstick.
You must be able to fit the proposition on to reality.

The reality that is perceived takes the place of the picture. 26

... Understanding a command before you obey it has an affinity with willing an action before you perform it. 27

If I expect an event and that which fulfills my expectation occurs, does it then make sense to ask whether that really is the event I expected? i.e. how would a proposition that asserted this be verified? It is clear that the only source of knowledge I have here is a comparison of the expression of my expectation with the event that has occurred. 28

If I wish that \( p \) were the case, then of course \( p \) is not the case and there must be a surrogate for \( p \) in the state of wishing, just as, of course, in the expression of the wish. 29

This is definitively a priorism. To be sure, the 1929-33 verificationist reconstruction of the picture theory of propositions is a strange a prioristic hybrid cutting across the two extremes I outlined in section II above: (logical) grammar/syntax is treated as analytic a priori; yet Wittgenstein's verificationist version of the role of intentionality has a profoundly synthetic a priori, phenomenological, flavour in its insistence that meaning is forged when the subject saddles verifying experience onto the grammatical/syntactical system and in so doing determines what counts as sense and nonsense. This is however no solution to Wittgenstein's fundamental problematic, though as we have observed, he has yet to realise this potently formative truth. The picture theory, Tractarian or post-Tractarian, cannot escape the objection canvassed in the (above-cited) appendicised Philosophical Grammar critique, and which is so pointedly at work in opening the play of the dialectic that starts at Investigations 138. The verificationist picture theory stands and falls upon the adequacy of the notion that intentional action is
constitutive of the picture's 'method of projection'. But on the theory in question — because it is an a prioristic theory — the intention, on pain of damning inconsistency, must itself have just the problematic form of intentional object and mode of interpretation or application: there is more than one possible way to take the presented intentional object, and that is all the rule-sceptic needs.

In turn therefore, we can conclude this section by sounding this crucial note in respect of Investigations 139 answering the question 'what could secure understanding in a flash, at the instant we hear or see the words?'. For the answer the remark canvasses — "a picture" — is a very deliberate and potent answer, as we now have good reason to be aware: the 'grasped in a flash' side of the paradigmatic conflict introduced in Investigations 138 is the side Wittgenstein himself had once so influentially and brilliantly championed; it is, more generally though, the side that represents and embraces a priorism about intentionality, content, meaning, understanding, rules, and the nexes formed between these key semantic functions. So it is the idea of determination of meaning and content by factors obtaining in advance of use that is really both at once widely and narrowly rejected when Investigations 139 ends with the observation that "[t]he picture of the cube" whose 'fitting' the use of the word 'cube' is discussed as an example in the remark's preceding paragraph, "did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."

The direction and form of the content for the rule-following paradox dialectic of Investigations 198-202 is now established, and the formative self-critical analysis exemplified in remarks 139-141 thus now opens the way for a full blooded attack on a priorism in general.
Between *Investigations* remarks 143 and 197 Wittgenstein takes a new tack which is marked in particular by an extended critical analysis of the idea of understanding being some kind of state. Detailed analytical exigesis of this dialectic would take us too far afield here (though this is not in any way to deny the great importance of the *Investigations* analysis of the concept of understanding). In effect, our concern is with the — prior — issue of the logic of the formation and/or acquisition of understanding. Nevertheless, it is very important for what follows that we recognise that the notion that understanding is some kind of state (e.g., and principally, a disposition) is through and through an a priorist notion: the state (however it is ontologically construed) contains the use of the object of understanding. *Investigations* 146 expresses this succinctly, thus: "[t]he understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use." We thus commit ourselves to the kind of metaphysical picture of 'knowing the rules, the meaning, etc.' where the "[k]nowledge is the hypothesised reservoir out of which the visible water flows." Kripke's brilliant critique of dispositionalism shows how anti-a priorist analysis shatters such notions, and needs no reiteration here. The fallacy of dispositionalism is definitively that of the synthetic a priori approach, which it particularly typifies in its running together the notion of 'being shown (or 'given') the rule' and the notion of one's '(being in the state of) understanding the rule'. Both Kripke and Wittgenstein show that and how these two concepts cannot be amalgamated.

It is of course the very problem of just this amalgamation that is expressed in the 'grasped in a flash' versus 'used over time' conflict.
So let us now turn to the crucial re-statement of this clash of images in *Investigations* 197, and so to the wide focus of this dialectic (having covered the narrow focus in the previous section's examination of Wittgenstein's formative struggle with the picture theory of propositions). We can now readily unpack the 'condensed' riposte to a priorism which Wittgenstein himself asserts in remark 197:

"It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash." --- And that is what we say we do. That is to say: we sometimes describe what we do in these words. But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what happens. It becomes queer when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present. --- For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other hand its meaning lies in its use. ....

Compare the notion "that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present" with, e.g., the notion that a river is somehow already present in the spring which is its source, or that the wine in the bottles in my cellar was somehow already present when the vineyards were planted. There is a blatantly reificatory metaphor at work in these metaphysical images; a metaphor which treats possibility, ability, capability, capacity, production, as if, to take a more perspicuous form of the metaphor, they are like "objects which are already lying in a drawer and which we then take out." It is by imposing such notions into our thinking that a priorism forces itself upon us.

But having launched his condensed critical reply to a priorism, by way of opening *Investigations* 197, it is the converse metaphysical response — not the Wittgensteinian 'analytical cure' — which next appears in the continuation of the remark:
Don't I know, then, which game I want to play until I have played it? or are all the rules contained in my act of intending? Is it experience that tells me that this sort of game is the usual consequence of such an act of intending? so is it impossible for me to be certain what I am intending to do? ....

The principal viewpoint canvassed here — empiricism — forms its position in this dialectic more or less in this fashion: as there is (modulo rule-scepticism) nothing that determines what is to be done, what is to 'rule', there is merely autonomous correspondence of assents and dissents of individuals whose linguistic status is constituted in nothing but the accident that as "he does what he is inclined to do"32 so, per chance, do his fellows: from chance concordance to linguistic community in a state of non-determined activity. Wittgenstein canvasses this outlook in remark 197 through the rhetorical questions cited above. It is a position where one feels compelled to insist that "until I have played" the game, there can be no guarantee as to my behaviour, as to how I go on; it is only "experience that tells me that this sort of game is the usual consequence of such" a state of mind, for 'mind' is simply no more nor less than the ongoing pattern of observable behaviour under such-and-such stimulus-producing conditions; the idea of a guiding, ruling, 'inner state' is an unempiricistic nonsense, a fiction. Thus there is nothing more to language than contingent correspondence of conditioned responses, and rules are theoretical expressions of the empirical frequency of these 'linguistic' behaviours.

A misguided, strong, sense of the novelty and metaphysical charm of the 'Wittgenstein-as-rule-sceptic' reading of Investigations 198-202, induces Kripke's failure to realise that rule-scepticism and thoroughgoing empiricism are one and the same phenomenon. Kripke touches upon the possibility of, e.g., Quine - Wittgenstein concordance (given
that, ex-hypothesi, Wittgenstein is cast as the rule-sceptic), but concludes that Quine's position is "distinct from Wittgenstein's" — which is (see in particular, Chapter IV) utterly correct, but not at all in the sense Kripke means. After all, it is most indicative in this regard that Kripke fails to make explicit the fact that a priorism, and with it the intentionality—content nexus, is the target of rule-scepticism. And moreover, he simply does not realise that his exposition of Wittgenstein is entirely partial, such that the sceptic's complete dialectic is an anti-a priorism which, unlike Wittgenstein's, secures what is, I intend to show, a strictly extensional view of language and a corresponding utterly formalist account of rule-following praxis. All this contributes to Kripke's mistaken overall view of rule-scepticism and its consequences.

The key to realising this, and so to our overcoming Kripke's distortion of the outcome of the 197-202 rule-following dialectic, now lies in our correctly grasping the pivotal role played by the particular notion of interpretation which the rule-sceptic injects into the 197-202 debate. I refer of course to the sceptic's potent objection—and-reply to Wittgenstein's own position succinctly stated in the final sentence of remark 197: Wittgenstein there asserts that the connection between the sense of the concept 'playing a game' and the rules of the game is effected "in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing." The sceptical response that opens Investigations 198 is aimed at the notion of there being any kind of rule—praxis connection. Thus in the sceptic's eyes, Wittgenstein's concluding assertion in remark 197 is guilty of accepting the view that, somehow, the rule can show me what to do. The motivation and entree for this criticism thus springs from the assumption that in asserting any
kind of rule – praxis connection, one is ipso facto committed to the view that there is, and must be, something 'in' the apprehended rule which once grasped gives you the use, the understanding, of the rule.

Clearly therefore, the sceptical interlocutor misunderstands Wittgenstein's position (and in particular here, its 'condensation' into the conclusion of remark 197, with its appeal to praxis). Wittgenstein's anti-dispositionalism, exhibited throughout the Investigations 143-196 analysis of the concept of understanding, and, in particular, made explicit in the dialectic of remarks 146-149, leads to an analytical conclusion (stated ever-so-succinctly at the end of remark 197) which the rule-sceptic cannot grasp. Specifically focussing upon Investigations 149, where dispositions are explicitly cited as inadequate to logically secure or constitute understanding, we see therefore how it is only the negative dialectic — the attack on a priorism — that Wittgenstein and the rule-sceptic share:

If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does. .... 34

The 'two different criteria' objection on which this remark's attack on dispositionalism turns is, of course, a particular version of the prosecution of the fallacy of synthetic a priorism which I touched upon at the beginning of this section, viz.: the fallacy of running together the concept of 'being shown the rule' (or otherwise 'apprehending' it) with the concept of '(being in the state of) understanding the rule'. However, when the rule-sceptical interlocutor speaks the crucial
objection that opens *Investigations* 198, s/he does so by responding to one fallacy (that of the synthetic *a priori* state—manifestation, dispositional approach) with another fallacy. To expose this latter error, and thus to allow us to see what turns upon both the sceptical interlocutor's and Wittgenstein's exploitation of the notion of 'interpreting the rule', we need to make explicit here the fundamental semantic commitments and/or assumptions of the parties involved in the dialectic now in play.

The rule-sceptical position is fundamentally informed by two interconnected semantic assumptions. The first is that in the dispute now before us there are only three basic positions available. (These are, of course, the two, competing, forms of *a priorism* which we outlined in section II, and the anti-*a priorist* 'sceptical solution'.) The second assumption is that which is drawn by the sceptic from reflection upon the (valid) insight that any *bona fide* form of either the analytic *a priori* approach (despite certain contrary claims), or of the sceptical solution, commits one to rejecting the conception of following a rule as grasping the rule's content *qua* 'object of and for understanding'. The sceptic here wrongly concludes that the very idea of rules guiding, and meshing, with praxis resides *only* in the synthetic *a priori* approach. That is why, notwithstanding Wittgenstein's manifest anti-dispositionalism and its severely critical implications for synthetic *a priori* theories of rule-following, the rule-sceptic takes umbrage at Wittgenstein's statement in the conclusion of remark 197. For Wittgenstein there says that there *is* a rule-praxis connection; that rules *do* mesh with the way we play the game.

The second of the rule-sceptic's fundamental assumptions is thus the one we need to deal with first. As noted, it falls into two parts. First
there is the crucial valid insight (shared by Wittgenstein and the rule-sceptic) which, though clear for all to see in the case of the 'sceptical solution', requires explication here as regards bona fide analytic a priorism's rejection of the idea of following a rule as a cognitive, content apprehending procedure. This is the issue I will concentrate upon in the section immediately following. Out of this analysis we will, inter alia, expose Kripke's failure to see just how substantial is the Wittgenstein - Quine concordance touched upon earlier (and discussed in detail below). More broadly, our examination of the analytic a priorist position will prove most heuristic as regards the crucial role played by the notion of 'interpretation' as it appears in the sceptical interlocution which opens Investigations 198. We will see the use of this notion shared by Wittgenstein and the rule-sceptic in their negative dialectic.

But thereafter — and crucially for correcting Kripke's errors — we will see how and why Wittgenstein (as his reply to the sceptic in remark 198, and again in 201, shows) escapes the interpretation dialectic. He does this by showing, contrary to the rule-sceptic's primary assumption, that there is a radical and independent semantic position and analysis which transcends and dissolves the trio of approaches embroiled in the rule-sceptic's version of the rule-following problematic. The nihilistic 'positive' side of rule-scepticism — the 'sceptical solution' — rests, as Wittgenstein states in Investigations 201, upon a "misunderstanding", which misunderstanding is the cause of the rule-sceptic's two inter-related false assumptions identified above. The Wittgensteinian 'positive solution' sketched in subsequent sections, reveals exactly the nature of this misunderstanding and its connection with the sceptic's pair of erroneous fundamental semantic assumptions. Chapter II will thereafter
fully develop this positive semantic outcome.

VI

For the prosecution of the case now before us, probably the best example of the bona fide analytic a priori position is the platonist approach to rules, meaning, necessity, etc. The essence of this position in its genuine form is such that there is no place nor demand for, e.g., mathematical rules governing the affairs of any would-be rule-follower: the laws of mathematics and the truths they generate obtain quite independently of whether or not anyone ever grasps them; it is irrelevant to a rule's being a rule, to meaning and to necessity, that anyone's practical life and/or thought should actually conform to the platonistic dictates. True platonism cares not a fig for the understandability of rules; their necessity and their constitution of semantic determinacy is self-contained. As such, there are no epistemic liens upon modal or semantic concepts, and their content — the rules' complete extensions — is self-definitive.

This constitutes a most uncongenial position for those who demand or expect meaning and rules to be expressible in a way that is explanatory of and/or for these functions: the first paragraph of Investigations 461 astutely sums up this semantic consequence:

In what sense does an order anticipate its execution? By ordering just that which later on is carried out? — But one would have to say "which later on is carried out, or again is not carried out." And that is to say nothing.

Recoiling from the realisation that any strictly analytic semantics ends up with each would-be definition 'saying nothing', we feel compelled to insist that rules must be supplemented by some device which puts
cognitive content, information, reference, into explications of rules, meanings, concepts. Here the demand (so boldly exhibited in Dummett's championing of the anti-realist cause), is that language must be able to be opened up so that we can have it convey, represent, present, show, refer to, name, describe or symbolise anything at all. The bona fide analytic a priori treatment of the semantics for the expression of rules simply cannot be sustained in the face of this demand, so that the synthetic a priori position emerges as the champion of the concept of understanding — and thus as the remark 198 sceptic's absolute bête noire. (Thus, as we will see, the clash of the two fundamental schools of a priori semantics paves the way for the entry of the rule-sceptic.)

The development of Frege's philosophy is apodictic as regards this vital analytic-into-synthetic movement within a priorism. For although Frege avowed (except in some of his views about geometry) analytic a priorism, his formulation of the sense – reference distinction was precisely required to rescue his developing semantics from the embarrassments and poverty of his original more or less strictly analytic a priori approach. As Michael Dummett tells us, in Frege's early work, circa 1879-1883,

[t]here is not yet, of course, the distinction between sense and reference, and, notoriously, the account of identity given in Begriffsschrift is not in accord with Frege's mature views, identity being said to be a relation between expressions: but at least the problem which Frege later took as the starting point for the sense – reference distinction, how true identity-statements can be informative, had been posed. 35

By treating identity as "a relation between expressions", the early Frege was being utterly faithful to analytic a priorism. But as the semantic consequences, and motivations for the development, of the sense –
reference distinction so clearly show, Frege realised that the price for analytic a priorist purity was utter inability not just to explain how true identity statements can be informative, but also inability to explicate the nature of content, reference, representation, naming, description, propositionality, etc.

Frege thus had little choice but to abandon bona fide analytic a priorism, and that is why, in the present context, the development of his thought through the formulation of the sense – reference distinction, is so apodictic for us here. He makes that crucial move within a priorism which, as we will see, Wittgenstein and the rule-sceptic unmask as nought but a shift from frying pan to fire. The formulation and embracing of the sense – reference distinction is, in reality, a stark testament to the fact that Frege's post-Begriffsschrift semantics effectively turns on being synthetic a priorist under an analytic a priorist mask.

Michael Dummett is culpable in this regard for seriously failing to acknowledge the true nature of Frege's move. (But as the sense – reference distinction is crucial to, and perfectly fits, his own, synthetic a priori, semantic project, the reasons for his blindness are fairly plain.) Thus, in continuing his account of the evolution of Frege's thought in Frege: Philosophy of Language, Dummett insistently, and rightly enough, tells us that

... for Frege, sense is a cognitive notion: the distinction between sense and reference is introduced precisely in order to explain how certain sentences have a cognitive value (can be informative), and we can find no place for the notion of sense, as distinct from that of reference, save as embodying the manner common to speakers of a language in which they apprehend the semantic roles of the expressions of the language. Analyticity and a priority are, for Frege, cognitive notions also: the status of a sentence, as analytic, synthetic a priori or a posteriori, relates to the means that exist whereby the sentence may be known to be true
(though not to the means whereby we happen, in practice, to know that it is true, if we know this at all). 36

Note particularly how Dummett, notwithstanding his failure to see that Frege has, in truth, abandoned analyticity, points up the central notion of sense a la Frege, and a la the sense—reference distinction, as being a function of "the manner" in which language-users "apprehend the semantic roles of the expressions of the language". 'Apprehend' is such a key term here because, short of collapsing back into what is, ipso facto, the non-cognitivity of genuinely analytic expressions of semantic functions, a priorism cannot but have it that rules, definitions, true thoughts, etc. must so 'address' the language-user that they "show me what I have to do at this point". 37 For this is a demand that the expression of the rule must, to cite Dummett above, "have a cognitive value".

Moreover though, Frege's construal of sense (as precisely an intensional function whose role is to constitutively secure knowledge of, as Dummett variously has it above, "the semantic roles of the expressions of the language" and of "the means that exist whereby the sentence may be known to be true") is a construal which gives us a crucial clue to what Wittgenstein (via the rule-sceptic) writes into his dialectical use of the notion of interpretation as the determinant of rule-following praxis. 'Interpretation' connotes, through and through, the synthetic a priori approach to rule following, and can now be clearly seen as a term used in a sort of 'catch-all', 'essence of the position', role by Wittgenstein. For "interpretation" we can read, most especially, 'apprehension of content'; 'interpretation' can be taken as standing generically for whatever is posited on any synthetic a priori theory as that procedure which effects the supplementation of the bare rule, the definition or
thought or sign (etc.) *per se*, so as it can possess cognitive content, can be informative, can refer.

With this in mind, and given also its connection with Wittgenstein's, at least implicit, critique of Frege's sense-reference distinction (as an implication of the rule-following paradox dialectic), it is salient to bring back into play a crucial issue which was raised in section III. Recall that I pointed out there that the rule-sceptic fundamentally targets the quintessential intension 'the same again' in the use s/he makes of the 'grasped in a flash' *versus* 'used over time' conflict: the ultimate point of attack is the procedure of getting the rule to yield the same again, and again, and again; whatever else 'use over time' may be, it surely embraces the ambit of this replicative function. Now as we know, Frege effectively staked his semantics around the likes of his treatment of 'the same again' facilitated *via* the sense-reference distinction and, for our immediate purposes, more importantly still, *via* his notion 'criterion of identity'. Moreover, for reasons which are now both plain and highly apposite, Frege, as Dummett tells us, explicated 'criterion of identity' through the "vivid phrase, 'to recognise the object as the same again': we must, that is, know under what conditions some other term will stand for the same object." 38 Definitively, Frege's notion 'criterion of identity' cashes out in the epistemic procedure 'recognition of the same again'; *the same again* is cast here in an epistemic mould.

But that mould is flawed to the core, and for Wittgenstein one of the key roles of the rule-following paradox dialectic is the demonstration of this fact.

As a case in point, to illustrate the emergent — indeed, immanent
dilemma of a priorism, take this case and its accompanying dialectic from part I of Philosophical Grammar:

Suppose the order to square a series of numbers is written in the form of a table, thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems to us as if by understanding the order we add something to it, something that fills the gap between command and execution. So that if someone said, "You understand it, don't you, so it is not incomplete", we could reply "Yes, I understand it, but only because I add something to it, namely the interpretation." — But what makes you give just this interpretation? Is it the order? In that case it was already unambiguous, since it demanded this interpretation. Or did you attach the interpretation arbitrarily? In that case what you understood was not the command, but only what you made of it. 39

The 'interpretation' is the epistemic movement that is the motive force in the synthetic a priorist view of rule-governance; it is the source of 'energy' in the required 'state' out of which the manifestation of understanding flows. It turns and depends on there being precisely a determinative factor which "makes you give just this interpretation", and which factor is apprehended (one way or another) in the cognitive relationship constitutive of one's 'understanding the rule'. What Wittgenstein seeks to do here is to show (as would the rule-sceptic) that there cannot be a semantically (or logically) determining factor which is also an object of knowledge, cognition, 'interpretation'.

The determination, if it is held to consist or reside in the rule or order, ipso facto leaves both no "gap" to bridge "between command and execution", and no requirement that something outside the ('compleat') rule engages with it for its operation. That is (at least) bona fide platonism. Kripke, uncharacteristically, only half captures the sheer
inadequacy and emptiness of this position when he states that "[p]latonic objects may be self-interpreting, or rather, they may need no interpretation; but ultimately there must be some mental entity involved that raises the sceptical problem." As we have already observed, the fact is that pace Kripke, a tough-minded platonist can insist that s/he gives not a fraction of a damn for the possibility that there be any engagement between "some mental entity" and the domain of platonic objects. That does mean s/he sidesteps "the sceptical problem", but Kripke has let his side down here because he fails to reflect that he has, some pages earlier, clearly shown that the absolute platonist (analytic a priorist) position self-destructs in just that move by which it insists its "objects" are "self-interpreting, or rather, ... need no interpretation".

It is Kripke's critical analysis of the notion of an idealised dispositional mechanism — a perfect, immutable and unfailing 'machine'; 'God as the ultimate robot' (?) — that hits the nail right on the head:

...if the dispositionalist attempts to define which function I meant as the function determined by the answer I am supposed to give for arbitrarily large arguments, he ignores the fact that my dispositions extend to only finitely many cases. If he tries to appeal to my responses under idealised conditions that overcome this finiteness, he will succeed only if the idealisation includes a specification that I will still respond, under these idealised conditions, according to the infinite table of the function I actually meant. But then the circularity of the procedure is evident. The idealised dispositions are determinate only because it is already settled which function I meant.

Precisely because "it is already settled which function I meant", where the "I" must really mean 'I, the perfect computational entity', the idealised dispositional mechanism is indeed left with nothing to do; with there being nothing for it to do; nothing it can do — because in its
very Being, so everything licensed by the ideal so instantiated is at once realised, defined, laid out, secured. The result is, of course, the archetypal 'wheel turning idly'. What Kripke so astutely identifies as "the circularity of the procedure" is thus equally describable as the collapse of the absolute analytic a priorist vision of rules as self-defining, self-ruling, self-realising, self-contained, at their genetic moment when, semantically speaking, they engage in 'defining' themselves through unashamed self-predication.

Of course, what this realisation does is to lock the a priorist into just the 'frying-pan or fire' dilemma which I mentioned a little earlier. Which is to say that the real causative move in both the Wittgensteinian and rule-sceptical destruction of synthetic a priorism is, as the above-cited Philosophical Grammar remark showed, the forcing of a crushing dilemma into the internal movement within a priorism from the analytic to the synthetic category. We have seen in some detail why a priorists feel compelled to make the 'pro-synthetic' move (even if, a la Frege, they systematically misunderstand and/or mis-label the reality of their shift). Nevertheless, explicating the attack on analytic a priorism is indispensible. For to arrive at the rule-following paradox stated in Investigations 201 — "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" — one must first secure the 'because clause' of the paradox. One must dispose of those positions within the argument's target area which have no truck with the idea that 'interpretation' is required to make rules rule. In effecting this disposal, Wittgenstein and Kripke exploit the synthetic a priorist's worries about the emptiness of bona fide analytic semantic explications, but Kripke and Wittgenstein — as anti-a priorists — hold all the aces in this game.
The complete dialectic within the first paragraph of *Investigations* 198 can now be seen to unfold as follows. First, the sceptical interlocutor places her/his critical demand upon the notion of interpretation — which notion we know the author of the *Investigations* is using in a particular generic, catch-all, role here. This opening move establishes the analysis' agenda as proceeding out of the investigation of what, with a much more positive intonation than the rule-sceptic employs, is embraced in the definitive synthetic *a priorist* notion that a rule, symbol, order, etc. means what it does, and is understood as it is (if it is), "because I add something to it, namely the interpretation".43 This established, Wittgenstein, in his own 'voice', now replies. The reply serves, however, both a positive and a negative dialectical role. So far as the negative aspect goes, I want now to show that it is a reply which, pace Kripke, reveals a striking Quine-Wittgenstein concordance in this aspect of the dialectic with *a priorism*, and which, in turn, clearly shows (as foreshadowed) that the rule-sceptical outcome implies thoroughgoing semantic empiricism. The key to our realising this lies in our explicating the logic (and intent) of Wittgenstein's reply to the remark 198 interlocutor, viz.: that "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning."

The first, and very important, thing to note is that this response is predicated upon Wittgenstein's accepting that there is something to the synthetic *a priorist* appeal to interpretation, but not what synthetic *a priorism* takes it to be. After all, Wittgenstein could have rejected
outright the notion that there is any merit whatsoever in 'interpretation'—which is what the rule-sceptic ultimately does—but he is instead seeking to explore, analytically, the force behind the synthetic a priori metaphysical impulse.

In the *Investigations* 197–202 text, however, the exploration is both largely tacit and, where it does occur (e.g., in the third paragraph of remark 201), extremely condensed. But in at least two places in the *Blue Book*, one of them explicitly concerned with what we might style as interpretational theories of rule-following, there are arguments which bring out the reasoning behind, and point of, Wittgenstein's reply that interpretations can do no more than 'hang in the air along with what they interpret'. In the case of the explicit *Blue Book* reference to the issue of the connection between interpretation and rules, Wittgenstein's analysis develops into the following crucial stage:

... [T]here are pictures of which we should say that we interpret them, that is, translate them into a different kind of picture, in order to understand them; and pictures of which we should say that we understand them immediately, without any further interpretation. If you see a telegram written in cipher, and you know the key to this cipher, you will, in general, not say that you understand the telegram before you have translated it into ordinary language. Of course you have only replaced one kind of symbols by another; and yet if now you read the telegram in your language no further process of interpretation will take place. --- Or rather, you may now, in certain cases, again translate this telegram, say into a picture; but then too you have only replaced one set of symbols by another. 44

The immediate force of this argument is to show that meaning and understanding cannot derive from the 'replacement of one set of symbols by another'. In particular, the point is made here that intersubstitutability of symbols does not entail corresponding retention of understanding. Indeed, the very basis of cryptography, as well as
explanation of meanings, is this dissonance between intersubstitutability of symbols and the maintenance and/or 'availability' of understanding. And of course that realisation is what leads a priorists, as, e.g., the development of Frege's semantics showed, to embrace an epistemic, or cognitive, view of understanding and meaning so as to secure the central article of any a priorist theory of understanding — the intentionality–content nexus; the dogma that understanding must have an intentional object.

But of course, as was outlined in the preceding section, the very idea of any epistemic derivation of content, of the rule 'showing' the rule-follower the 'object' constitutive of 'how s/he is to go on', stumbles and then crashes at its very first step when the supposedly 'in-need-of-interpretation'-rule is looked to for the apprehension of its content, its a priori determined extension. The synthetic a priorist thinks s/he has got an independent 'handle' on the rule precisely by treating it as presenting an intentional object for a 'knowing ('rule-following'/interpreting')-subject'. (This being so irrespective of how the 'object' and 'subject' cash out ontologically: e.g., they can be construed as verifying experience and intuiting creative subject, or, at the other end of the scale, as programme and computer.) But the truth here is that, on pain of otherwise being saddled with the entirely un-a prioristic outcome that "what you understood was not the command" or rule, etc., "but only what you made of it"45, the a priorist cannot escape (but nonetheless fails to see) the fact that each "interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one".46

It is here that striking parallels are to be found between just this move — which sews up the point that the a priorist is stuck with the
fact that "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets" — and Quine's seminal attack on analyticity in his famous paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". In his book, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, Bernard Harrison gives an explication of the argument of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" which almost ideally fits our requirements for bringing out the Quine — Wittgenstein concordance. Narrating the Quinean argument, Harrison says

[p]erhaps ... the synonymy of two linguistic expressions consists in the possibility of substituting them for one another in any sentential context without changing the truth value of the sentence: in what Leibniz called interchangeability salva veritate. Quine's argument at this point takes the form of a dilemma. If we are to extract a criterion of synonymy from Leibniz' criterion, we have to consider not merely the criterion itself, but also the language to which it is to be applied, and, in particular, whether the language in question is an extensional ... or an intensional language.

In the former case, any two predicates which happen to be true of exactly the same objects will be interchangeable salva veritate. Thus, if all creatures with hearts, and only creatures with hearts, happen to have kidneys, then the general terms 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with kidneys' will, in an extensional language, be interchangeable salva veritate. But, clearly, 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with kidneys' are not, in the ordinary sense, synonyms: they merely, in Quine's phrase, agree extensionally. The trouble is, now, that it is merely contingent ... that all creatures with hearts have kidneys and vice versa. Synonymy requires not merely interchangeability salva veritate, but that the interchangeability in question should not be merely contingently feasible, but necessarily so. Now, provided we are working not with an extensional language, but with a language containing, as Quine says, 'An intensional adverb "necessarily"', we can easily build this requirement into the definition of synonymy .... But it is only in so far as we already understand the notion of analyticity that we can make sense of the idea of an intensional language ....

In short, the attempt to define the notion of analyticity ... lead[s] into a closed circle. 48

Note how, as Harrison points out, Quine's argument takes the form of a dilemma. That dilemma is merely Quine's version of the same basic dilemma that generates the rule-following paradox. The dilemma forces the
proponents of the view that definitions, explications of rules, etc., 'show' us how to proceed, to either take meaning as genuinely analytic a priori, with nought thereby yielded but circularity, or to take it as synthetic a posteriori, with the abandonment of the very idea that intentionality and its supposed content-apprehending semantic role is at all sustainable. Because the genuinely analytic a priori position (as exposed here) offers no hope for semantic analysis, Quine, famously, argues that we have no option left but to face the realisation that extensional factors alone survive the immanent dialectic at work here in the midst of our received semantic Weltanschaung.

To be sure, Quine's demonstration that interchangeability salva veritate does not yield synonymy but only co-extensionality, turns upon showing how a plurality of predicates only ever contingently can have the same extension, whereas the way Wittgenstein frames the causative clause of the rule-following paradox in Investigations 201 — "every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" — puts the point in terms of a plurality of extensions standing in relation to any single rule. (I owe this point to Peter Rüheper.) However, Quine's dilemma and Wittgenstein's are, so to speak, minted on opposite sides of the same coin: to carry on the numismatic analogy, the point is that they have an identical cash-value: they bankrupt a priorism; their attack reveals the utter poverty of the theory of the logical sufficiency of content, and thus beggars its efforts to secure the quintessential intension 'the same again' and concomitantly effects the ruin of the synthetic a priorist notion of sense (as the apprehension of content presented in intensional devices). Mutatis mutandis, Investigations 200 can be seen in this light as deliberately concerning itself with just the dilemmas of translation etc. which Quine, subsequent to "Two Dogmas", has shown to follow from
the empiricistic appropriation of this outcome. (See Chapters III and IV.) In particular though, the rule-sceptical outcome precisely licences the Quinean conclusion regarding indeterminacy of translation: any given extension always can be 'interpreted' as the extension of a plurality of rules (and vice versa) such that the idea of any kind of determinacy of understanding and securing of content in language collapses. A fortiori, Quine's position and that of the rule-sceptic pass into and imply each other; the difference is simply one of expression. Both of them drive home the same semantic viewpoint: the a priorist enterprise collapses and we have nothing to go by but a posteriori knowledge of purely contingent behaviour: that is all there is to understanding rules, grasping meaning, applying concepts.

Plainly then, the only way by which anyone operating within the three fundamental semantic positions (outlined in the two previous sections) can avoid the damning problem that each "interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one" such that "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support," is by conceding absolutely that all any 'interpretation' can apprehend is (as Quine's semantics make so very clear) extensional functions; there is no other stuff of or for understanding. With the forcing of this crushing realisation -- be it at the hands of Wittgenstein, the rule-sceptic, or Quine -- a priorism is destroyed, and immanently so at that. Obviously the rule-following paradox is now upon us, because it is spawned in the collapse of the definitive a priorist enterprise of taking semantic and logical determination, meaning and necessity, as functions (somehow) 'given in advance' (and either standing thus and so in their own self-sufficient right, or as 'givens' awaiting 'apprehension' by the language-user, calculator, thinker). This, then,
is the fruit of the immanent collapse of *a priorism*: "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule."\textsuperscript{51}

It is now quite straightforward to identify the answer, or *a la* Kripke, the 'sceptical solution', to the paradox that arises out of *Investigations 198* and which, of course, is made explicit in remark 201. The medium which puts the conclusion that, as remark 201 has it,

... if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here

can be undistortedly heard as, if not the voice, then at least the clarion call, of Willard van Orman Quine. The (real) rule-sceptic is an outright empiricist, and the (real) 'sceptical solution' is no more nor less than thoroughgoing empiricistic semantics.

VIII

Given that, in contrast to Kripke's culpable failure to do so, we have identified exactly the position constituted by the sceptical solution, we can now move from here to conclude this chapter by sketching in the remaining sections the basis of Wittgenstein's radical prophylactic response to what otherwise must be the nihilistic outcome of the rule-following paradox dialectic. To begin this task we must look once more at Wittgenstein's reply to the rule-sceptical interlocutor in the first paragraph of *Investigations 198*, only we must now pay close heed to the positive aspects of the reply's dialectic. It is crucial, therefore, to note that Wittgenstein concludes his response to the demand the rule-sceptical interlocutor has placed upon 'interpretation', in a
quite particularly corrective manner: "Interpretations themselves do not determine meaning"; not 'Interpretations do not and cannot determine meaning', but, rather, they do not and cannot do it by "themselves". (There is therefore -- as Chapter II shows in detail -- a crucial role for intersubstitutability of symbols after all, though not one which a priorism can ever grasp.) But if we look at the reply just thereby concluded, we should note also how it begins. Speaking to the demand articulated by the rule-sceptic — that, surely "[w]hatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule" — Wittgenstein frames his reply, again, correctly, by arguing that "[t]hat is not what we ought to say, but rather ...".

What is going on here is that Wittgenstein is responding to the rule-sceptic in the manner 'right line of critique; wrong conclusion'. (As I show in detail in the latter sections of Chapter II, this is where Wittgensteinian and Quinean anti-a priorism part company: Quine takes the fall of a priorism to be isomorphic with the fall of analyticity; Wittgenstein does not.) The rule-sceptic depends for the operation and sustenance of his/her critique, upon his/her opponents being committed to some version or other of the (synthetic a priorist) view that the rule must "show me what I have to do at this point", i.e., at each and every point when I confront the rule so as to follow it here, there, elsewhere, etc. We have seen in some detail what is the metaphysical impulse that so commits a priorists to the synthetic category, and so to treating meaning and understanding as cognitive functions: analytic a priorism collapses meaning into circularity, if not vacuity, and thus cannot possibly explicate the nature of content, reference, description, propositionality, representation, information, etc. (and its 'psychological' correlate is logical privacy of the mental). Without
question, Wittgenstein and the rule-sceptic are as one in bringing out these damning indictments of genuine analytic a priorism. They are also, obviously enough, as one in showing that the would-be synthetic a priorist alternative is totally unsustainable.

That is the 'right critique' part of Wittgenstein's corrective reply to the rule-sceptic. But from there on, Wittgenstein eschews what the rule-sceptic embraces through the fundamental dependence of the sceptical position on the contrary metaphysical response to the collapse of a priorism. For all along the sceptic, definitively, has it that questions like "how do I know that I do hold ... [the rule] fast, that I do not lose it?"52 are in order, are germane; the sceptic insists that such epistemic questions touch upon what is fundamental to following a rule.

Indeed, it is precisely because rule-scepticism flourishes in, and locks us into, the metaphysical conviction that the predicament of the rule-follower, the mathematician, language-user, thinker, game-player, is ever an epistemic predicament, that Kripke advocates what he does as, ipso facto, the sceptical solution. Having set, rock-solid, the insistence that whatever is the basis of language-use, and however that basis operates, it must and, ex-hypothesi, can only, be an epistemic function, the sceptic's sceptical outcome naturally finds expression in the fundamental view that the behaviour of one 'language-user' stands to another 'language-user' as the object of the requisite 'linguistic knowledge'. For to be a 'rule-follower' under the sceptical solution is to be so constituted in virtue of it being known by another/others that your behaviour accords with theirs.

This view has to be, at least by implication, 'communitarian' in precisely the sense that as, e.g., one cannot make one's own act of
judgement judge itself (any more than a yardstick can measure itself of itself), so one must, ex-hypothesi, have the status of 'rule-follower/language-user' ascribed to oneself by another who so judges you. At work here is a form of the cognitivistic semantic constraints archetypical of the kind of verificationism we find so superbly developed in, e.g., Quine's writings. But, as we know, Kripke misses that connection. Nonetheless, he extensively underscores the definitive reliance of the sceptical solution upon the view that what, ex-hypothesi, grounds language-use and rule-following is, and only can be, the epistemic procedure of having one's behaviour judged to accord with that of one's fellow(s): as Kripke's 'communitarian solution' goes,

... what I [-- Kripke --] mean when I say that the teacher judges that, for certain cases, the pupil must give the 'right' answer ... [is] that the teacher judges that the child has given the same answer that he himself would give. Similarly, when I said that the teacher, in order to judge that the child is adding, must judge that, for a problem with larger numbers, he is applying the 'right' procedure even if he comes out with a mistaken result, I mean that he judges that the child is applying the procedure he himself is inclined to apply. 53

In the midst of all this foundational judging — this constitutive epistemic scenario by which anyone so judged passes muster as a language-user — what the 'judges' go by, indeed, all there is for anyone to go by to count (or not) as a 'language-user' is, strictly, and solely, behaviour:

When we pronounce that a child has mastered the rule of addition, we mean that we can entrust him to react as we do in interactions ... [of the (above-outlined) 'communitarianistic' kind]. Our entire lives depend on countless such interactions, and on the 'game' of attributing to others the mastery of certain concepts or rules, thereby showing that we expect them to behave as we do.

This expectation is not infallibly fulfilled. It places a substantive restriction on the behaviour of each individual, and is not compatible with just any behaviour he
may choose. (Contrast this with the case where we considered one person alone.) A deviant individual whose responses do not accord with those of the community in enough cases will not be judged, by the community, to be following its rules; he may even be judged to be a madman, following no coherent rule at all. When the community denies of someone that he is following certain rules, it excludes him from various transactions.... It indicates that it cannot rely on his behaviour in such transactions. 54

How right that "it cannot rely on his behaviour": in its deviance it fails to fit their semantically constitutive empirical theory — their "expectation" — out of which theory's instances of confirmation is derived "the life of the community, and ... communication."55 No meeting of minds is to be found here: "when we play this game" — that semantically seminal, foundational game in which "the community attributes a concept to an individual so long as he exhibits sufficient conformity, under test circumstances"56 — "we depict no special 'state' of their minds"57; for it is not 'mind' but strict behaviour a la behaviourism that is the currency of this semantic market-place.

In a most germane trio of remarks from section VII of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein puts paid to at least two of the central elements of this Kripkean-sponsored sceptical solution. Here he dismisses with some precise reflection, the notion of 'the community' being the deciding factor in determining whether something is 'the same again'. Moreover, in these remarks he radically eschews the fundamental rule-sceptical dogma that rule-following praxis is ever, and constitutively, embedded in an epistemic predicament:

A language-game: to bring something else; to bring the same. Now, we can imagine how it is played. --- But how can I explain it to anyone? I can give him this training. --- But then how does he know what he is to bring the next time as 'the same' --- with what justice can I say that he has brought the right thing or the wrong? --- Of course I know very well that in certain cases people would turn on me with
signs of opposition. And does this mean e.g. that the definition of "same" would be this: same is what all or most human beings with one voice take for the same? --- Of course not.

For of course I don't make use of the agreement of human beings to affirm identity. What criterion do you use, then? None at all.

To use the word without a justification does not mean to use it wrongly. 58

Note in the first of these remarks the connection to which Wittgenstein is implicitly, but most critically, alluding: we set up a language-game of bringing 'something else' and 'the same', and we confront the players with the question 'How do you know what you are to bring the next time?; with what justice can you decide that a player has brought the right thing?'. Any kind of synthetic theory of language-use, or rule-following, not only must hold these questions to be both fundamental and utterly to the point, but does so because it insists that 'something else' and 'the same again' must be constituted in and as cognitive functions. What e.g. comes to mind here again is Frege's treatment of 'the same again' in terms of being able "to recognise the object as the same again"59 such that what, semantically speaking, effects this recognition is the use of a "criterion of identity".60 As I point out in some detail in the next chapter, this contrasts starkly with Wittgenstein's analysis of 'criteria' and 'criterion of identity'. The Wittgensteinian analysis shows that these concepts' semantic and logical basis can only be non-synthetic, non-cognitive and so, inter alia, it reverses what Frege thought was a major and necessary semantic advance. But then Wittgenstein is very blunt in the above RFM remarks themselves about the idea of some, or any, 'criterion of identity' being engaged as the ground on which we constitutively "affirm identity". He bluntly states that no use of a criterion of identity, no cognitive determination
of 'the same again', grounds the playing of the 'something else versus same again' language-game. This reply is both radical and disturbing because we think — in the grip of precisely the metaphysical impulse which generates synthetic a priorism and terminates in rule-scepticism (and empiricism) — that surely we must go by something; the ground — surely(?!?) — must be the making of a judgement, the application of a criterion, the testing of a theory, the recognition of the obtaining (in principle or in fact) of such-and-such truth-conditions (or 'assertability conditions').

But what is behind this insistence upon the cognitivist manifesto?; these 'musts' and 'surelys' with which, almost as if with the force of physical reflex, we seek to rebut the blunt claim that one uses no criterion of identity "at all" in the constitution of the language-game 'something else versus the same'? The fundamental answer is (as is so precisely indicated in the corrective tone of the Investigations reply to the rule-sceptical demand placed upon 'interpretation') that we have not stopped to reflect on how and why it is that the rule-following paradox is set loose; the question has not been asked why we should look for or expect content in the rule. As I pointed out in section III, the deep metaphysical resistance which Kripke's paper utterly maintains, lies in its never being called into question by the sceptic or his/her Kripkean-sponsored respondents, that it is coherent to demand that there be something in the rule for us to apprehend so as to secure and/or constitute identity, content, extensionality, etc., in and through this cognitive relationship. For it is quintessential that the remark 198 rule-sceptical interlocutor wants to be shown what, as we have seen, is (generically speaking) the (rule's) intentional object, the extension presented through this intension, the content of the rule. And as I
said, this unquestioned demand — unquestioned, that is, by all but the real voice of Wittgenstein (and not the one Kripke puts in his mouth) — sets rock-solid the foundations and the essence of Kripke's dialectic: either there is content there and I am able, ipso facto, to follow the rule; or there is no content, and rule-governance is empty and only the residue (strict extensionality) remains to meet the rule-sceptic's epistemic demands.

Writing about the age-old problem of mind-body dualism and its interconnections with scepticism, John McDowell makes a brilliantly insightful observation that almost perfectly captures the overlooked issue here:

... What Wittgenstein does is not to propose an alteration of detail within the sceptic's position, but to reject the assumption that generates the sceptic's problem. The sceptic's picture involves a corpus of 'bodily' and 'behavioural' information, unproblematically available to us in a pictured cognitive predicament in which we are holding in suspense all attributions of psychological properties to others. One way of approaching Wittgenstein's response is to remark that such a picture is attainable only by displacing the concept of a human being from its focal position in an account of our experience of our fellows, and replacing it with a philosophically generated concept of a human body. ... Wittgenstein's response to the sceptic is to restore the concept of a human being to its proper place, not as something laboriously reconstituted [. . . if at all], out of the fragments to which the sceptic reduces it, by a subtle epistemological and metaphysical construction, but as a seamless whole of whose unity we ought not to have allowed ourselves to lose sight in the first place. 61

Before it is objected that this is spurious because scepticism about other minds is a whole different kettle of fish from rule-scepticism, I say look again. Throughout this chapter we have nowhere been so crude as to assume that there is no such difference. Instead, we have been implicitly moving toward the realisation that there is a fundamental underlying metaphysical outlook at work here which generates the various
bifurcations that each separate kind of sceptic takes as his/her subject matter. The essence of this outlook is dualism: not just mind-body dualism, but the corresponding rule-praxis dualism. In each case, as McDowell’s superbly insightful observations reveal when taken against the background of the analysis developed here, the source of the dualistic impulse is dogmatic insistence that the object of metaphysical puzzlement — mind, meaning, necessity, rule-governance, etc. — must be "available to us in a pictured cognitive predicament". Yet if we reject the cognitive predicament, we are released from this (quintessential) metaphysical impulse; the impulse that generates the sceptic’s problem; that spawns, and locks us into our conceptual puzzles.

Semantically speaking, the way to effect the required rejection of the epistemic scenario lies in coming to terms, philosophically, with the dual realisations that there is no content in the rule (per se) and that the technique of following the rule consists in the non-cognitive, a posteriori, construction of content under normative (semantically ‘analytic’) constraints. The sceptical fallacy against which Wittgenstein implicitly gives warning in his corrective reply to the rule-sceptic in the opening paragraph of Investigations 198, is the fallacy of inferring from the collapse of a priorist semantics the conclusion that, as definitions, rules, essences, etc., are contentless, so they come to nothing, and extensionality is the only ‘something’ we have to ‘know’ in ‘knowing how to go on’.62 For the ‘rule-sceptical’ dogma is that we (need to) know, judge, interpret, cognise as the bedrock condition of following a rule, understanding a language — as the basis for living as we do.
The warning against the sceptical fallacy — the fallacy that has it that the collapse of a priorism leaves only, and forces us into, empiricism, behaviourism, etc. — is of course the warning behind the escape from the sceptical paradox which Wittgenstein encapsulates in the latter two paragraphs of Investigations 201. The paradoxical outcome exalted by the sceptic is "a misunderstanding", because the sceptical dogma — the insistence upon the epistemic predicament — leads us to disastrously misunderstand the lesson and the essential truth contained in the immanent collapse of a priorism. What is unavailable in the epistemic predicament foisted upon us by the demands of the rule-sceptic is the realisation that what the sceptically-demanded shuffle through the regressive pack of...

...one interpretation after another [really shows]...is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. 63

What we must recognise here is the force of 'actual' in "actual cases": there is a crucial contrast involved here between actual and merely possible cases, and, more deeply still, between both actual and indeterminable (or, more extremely, 'empty') cases, and between actual ('real life-world') cases and either merely mentalistic, or platonistically conceived, cases which are, ipso facto, utterly divorced from all contact with material life conditions. In other words, we must recognise actual, not metaphysical, rule-following praxis; a clear, reflective, conceptual analysis, not the production of a metaphysical theory, is what is demanded.

So it is that, taken against this backdrop, Wittgenstein's corrective remarks in Investigations 198, and especially in
Investigations 201, show up the fact that the dualistic disavowal of, and alienation from, the concrete, actual, playing of the language-game, has a very particular point of origin: our setting our faces against the human 'linguistic' condition. Indeed, metaphysics' abstractionism especially arises from recoil against acknowledgement of language-using humanity as engaged in a constitutive activity where there are in the first, genetic, instance, no objects of cognition because we have (yet) to make the pre-linguistic world's resources into such ('cognised') 'objects', 'truth-conditions', 'evidence', 'facts', etc. Seduced (if not 'diseased') by the cognitive impulse which is the essence of dualism, we would rather acknowledge metaphysical abstractions than ourselves, our fellow men and women, our life-praxis. As McDowell points out regarding mind - body dualism, the sceptic trades with all those who do not reject her/his blandishments, in the currency of "a philosophically [i.e., metaphysically] generated concept of a human body". Profound alienation and self-misunderstanding, not deep insight into the 'real nature' of the human condition, is what confronts us in the sceptic's Weltanschaung.

So, paragraph three of Investigations 201, in quelling the impulse turned loose by the appeal to 'interpretation', at bottom says: 'Do not think that the actual (or 'genuine') case of following, or going against, the rule involves something that lies outside concrete human life-praxis.' For the road to rule-scepticism begins at the thought that there must be something that stands behind our act of following the rule; otherwise (modulo the 'sceptical solution!') it is all just empty behaviour.

Prophylaxis against the 'trigger-move' to a priorism (which,
immanently, as we have seen, must collapse into empiricism) is offered once more in Investigations 202:

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.

Obeying a rule is a practice: it is, as Investigations 199 reminds us, 'a custom, a use, an institution'; in fundamental terms it "relates to a way of living", and thus is not and cannot be an epistemic, cognitive, function because cognition, judgement, theory, investigation, etc., presuppose and are predicated upon the way of living, the praxis, which is the basis, the source of and for these activities. The sceptic's insistence upon the epistemic predicament precisely overburdens and metaphysically construes this realisation as to the primacy of praxis and so dismembers the "unity" of understanding and action that is the essence of the actual playing of our language-games. For it is Wittgenstein's analytical contention that understanding a rule is not and cannot be the product of any search, any epistemic recourse; the sceptical argument and the utter poverty of the sceptical solution can only underscore this insight. Thus rule-following is exposed as ways of acting constitutive of understanding, of use, such that, as Wittgenstein puts it, a "rule that can be applied in practice is always in order." The modality of 'can' here is that of 'can as a matter of fact, in concrete, material, life-world conditions' (not 'in some possible world'). This is required because in the light of Wittgenstein's manifest anti-a priorism, the connection between meaning and praxis must be closely analogous to the relationship of labour to production; we are confronted by the argument that we are making meaning; this is the
insight at the heart of the aphorism "Words are also deeds."\textsuperscript{68}

If, as I intend to show in detail in the next chapter, Wittgenstein is indeed advancing this radical view of praxis as our (non-cognitively) 'making' meaning and understanding, then to understand the rules of a language-game with which you are confronted, cannot be to 'join in' with the playing of the language-game. The radical analysis would demand that we eschew the very idea that there is a semantic-linguistic core (of whatever kind) which core (somehow) is an ongoing part of your would-be language-user's world, only fenced off epistemically until understanding 'opens the gate'. Rather, given that Wittgenstein's anti-a priorism shows that there is no content there in advance, we would have to develop from his work an analysis of the constitutive deed as the act by which we make content under the material conditions of life-praxis. On such an analysis, understanding a rule would be to achieve a completely new 'state' vis-a-vis the relevant parts of the 'pre-linguistic', 'pre-understood' world.

In contradistinction to the stark extensional semantic outcome of rule-scepticism, we would have to hand in this state of 'immersion in the ongoing practice',\textsuperscript{69} the moment Wittgenstein describes, in an otherwise rather opaque remark, as that where "the intension" is "described --- or presented --- by means of certain extensions which are yielded by it then and there."\textsuperscript{70} What metaphysical puzzlement breaks up is the semantically-constitutive moment --- the 'yielding then and there' --- that is the actuality of "our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."\textsuperscript{71} If the action is \textit{successful}\textsuperscript{72} then, on the line of analysis we are sketching here, the 'acted-upon' piece of the pre-linguistic world would thereby be forged into the actuality we \textit{understand} in our life-
world; rule-following praxis makes the pre-linguistic world meaningful. By way of contrast with this successful conclusion of linguistic endeavour, we should nevertheless always bear in mind (as is perhaps the key purpose of On Certainty so to remind us) that our language-game-playing can be usurped by changes in our ability to forge the pre-linguistic raw materials. For the requirement that we acknowledge actual rule-following praxis strongly implies that (at least) the success of the language-game's 'ambit' is predicated upon naturalistic 'below bedrock' interaction between nature and language-users. Such an analysis requires the (materialistic) insight that we must be able to 'extract' or to 'win', through the nature of our pre-linguistic responses to nature, our 'freedom' to make, institute and use cultural artifacts, specifically here, the conventions of logical grammar. Wittgenstein will therfore have to be recognised as analytically vindicating the 'old fashioned' (e.g., Marxian) materialist philosophical view of the relationship between humanity and nature. For example, the following (archetypal) remark shows aspects of this requirement:

.... If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples, --- that he then proceeds like this and not like that in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the 'natural' continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature. 73

The fundamental notion in this remark — that of natural reactions as the basis of language — must be dovetailed with the view that language-users, and, more broadly, rule-followers, metamorphose their life-world in accord with the exigencies (not necessities) which determine the actual usefulness, the concrete applicability, of the rules of their (language-)games. This would be integral to the argument that they make content.
So it is that this blueprint of the implications of the rule-following paradox analysis suggests a broad, thoroughly radical, semantic analysis behind Wittgenstein's statement that the ability "[t]o understand a language means to be master of a technique"\textsuperscript{76} -- this 'technique' being the technique of obeying a rule, which, as \textit{Investigations} 292 reminds us, ever, "is a practice". In the chapter which follows, I will seek to develop this philosophical-semantic sketch into a detailed picture of Wittgenstein's mature philosophy; a 'picture' which offers radical analytical insights which, once grasped, should indeed have us leave of our own accord the alleged paradise of formal semantics for natural languages, and abandon the search for its Holy Grail, 'the theory of meaning'.
Footnotes


5. Ibid., remark 138. The sentence that opens remark 197 runs thus: "It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash."


7. The notion of identity as 'the same again' is here of course deliberately resonant of Frege. See: Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973), p.73.

8. op.cit., p. 245.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., remark 141.


15. *loc.cit.*, remarks 20a, c, 21a.


17. *Philosophical Grammar* was worked up between 1933 and 1935 as part of what is often now called 'The Big Typescript'. On this see Anthony Kenny, "From the Big Typescript to the *Philosophical Grammar*" in his *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 24-37.


21. *Ibid.*, section III, remark 24a. I have added the emphasis to "the way" and removed it from "now" in this passage.


26. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, section IV, remarks 42a, 43g, h.
27. Ibid., section II, remark 13b.

28. Ibid., section II, remark 16a.

29. Ibid., section III, remark 26c.


33. Ibid., p.266.


36. Ibid., p.632.


41. The affinity between *bona fide* platonism and solipsism, between genuine analytic *a priorism* and private language, is a further factor that comes out here and yet nonetheless is most overlooked in contemporary philosophy of language (except in Dummett's work). I explicate the platonism - solipsism - analytic *a priorism* - private language link in detail in the appendix to this study.


44. Loc.cit., p. 36.


51. Ibid., remark 201.


54. Ibid., p. 287. Emphasis in last sentence mine.

55. Ibid., p. 286.

56. Ibid., p. 289.

57. Ibid., p. 288.

58. Loc.cit., remarks 40a, b, c.
59. Dummett (in fact citing Frege), *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, p. 73.

60. *Ibid.* (Again, Dummett is directly citing Frege—though, also again, he gives no reference.)


62. The allusion here is of course to *Investigations*, remark 304.


64. McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge", p. 469.


66. McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge", p. 470. McDowell is specifically of course speaking of this "unity" in respect of the constitution of the human being; I have appropriated the usage for the parallel case of the constitution of the rule-follower.


69. "Immersion in the ongoing practice" here echoes John McDowell's use of this notion in his "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding", in *Meaning and Understanding*, ed. J. Bouveresse and H. Parret (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1981), at p. 248. In fact, McDowell and I are not as close as it may seem concerning the nature of the "immersion", but I take this up at length in the next chapter.

70. Wittgenstein, *RFM*, section V, remark 39d.

72. Cf., for example, the reference to 'success' -- but not in the pragmatist (and ipso facto, cognitivist) sense of 'success of our theory in working out so far' -- in *Investigations* remark 324, and the follow-on to this in remarks 325, 326.


CHAPTER II: The Failure of Formal Semantics for Natural Languages

In order to understand further the radical implications of Chapter I's analysis of the rule-following paradox dialectic, this chapter seeks to effect a parallel reconstruction of Wittgenstein's critique of the central ideas of formal semantic analysis. Many of the central aspects of this critique are at their most explicit in the 1933-6 text we know as Philosophical Grammar, and in corresponding lectures from the period 1934-1935. In Philosophical Investigations much of the dialectic we will reconstruct here (particularly as regards quantificational analysis) is presented in a way that leaves submerged the 1934-6 material's systematic detailing of the faults of formal semantics. This fact has led to a grave and widespread misconception of the later philosophy.

Aside from the recent — and seriously distorting — adoption of the later philosophy into the cause of anti-realist semantics, it is widely accepted that there is little direct dialectic between the later philosophy's approach to analysis and that of the dominant streams in contemporary semantics. This view is utterly mistaken, as the survey of the 1934-6 material explicated in the first half of this chapter demonstrates. Indeed, central to the concerns of this chapter will be (more or less in this order) a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's critique of a priori quantificational analysis, the exposing of the fallaciousness of the so-called 'thesis of extensionality', an extended dialectical analysis of Wittgenstein's mature treatment of the notion of content, and a radical 'rehabilitation' of the concepts of analyticity and synonymy. The ongoing product of this will be an exposition of the failure of the project of constructing a formal semantics for natural
languages; a failure shown by Wittgenstein's analysis to be both inevitable and terminal.

II

In her paper "Wittgenstein and the Theory of Types"\textsuperscript{4}, Hide Ishiguro voices in her concluding remarks a widespread misconception about Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Addressing Wittgenstein's views about quantification, she tells us that in his later philosophy,

... Wittgenstein came to think that it was a mistake to identify general propositions like '(x)fx', or '(\exists x)fx', with logical sums or logical products, if the domain of 'fx' was infinite. \textsuperscript{5}

Ishiguro explicitly connects this development with her claim that "when Wittgenstein did write about the foundations of mathematics, he took an extremely constructivist position."\textsuperscript{6} This treatment of Wittgenstein as a kind of anti-realist, produces the expectation that Wittgenstein's critique of the Frege-Russell-\textit{Tractatus} treatment of generality condemns not the very idea of quantificational analysis, but just those which infringe against anti-realist strictures.

Let us consider this view of Wittgenstein further by reflecting on its implications for the likely content of his views about semantic analysis. What we should expect is well expressed in the following passage from Crispin Wright's book, \textit{Wittgenstein on the Foundation of Mathematics}:

Classically the meaning of compound statements is construed as a function of the (possibly transcendent) truth-conditions of their constituent clauses; and in the special case where the compound is achieved through linking clauses by means of the logical constants, its actual truth-value is taken to be determined by those of its constituents. In particular, the quantifiers are conceived as possibly
infinite such truth-functions. Suppose, however, that we reject the classical truth-conditions conception of declarative sentence meaning in favour of a conception that views conditions of warranted assertion as the fundamental notion; how are the logical constants then to be viewed? It seems inevitable that we should take them as precisely assertability-functions; that is, as determining the assertability-conditions of compound statements in which they are the principal connectives as functions of those of the constituent clauses which they therein connect. 7

In short, given the alleged anti-realism of the later philosophy, we should expect that Wittgenstein continues to accept the soundness of quantificational analysis, the thesis of extensionality and its concomitant truth-tabular treatments of the logical constants etc., though strictly from the perspective of some kind of intuitionistic reconstruction.

The orthodoxy Wittgenstein would, supposedly, be rejecting is that established by Frege and extended by Russell and the _Tractatus_. It was Frege who predicated his invention of quantificational analysis on the view that the sense of a generality or universality is a semantic construct of the truth-conditions of each individual sentence in the quantifier's semantic domain. As Michael Dummett tells us in his explication of Frege's breakthrough,

> [o]nce we know the [semantic] constructional history of a sentence involving multiple generality, [...] we can from these simple rules [of Fregean semantic analysis] determine the truth-conditions of that sentence, provided only that we already know the truth-conditions of every sentence containing proper names in the places where the signs of generality stand. 9

It is very important to note how the changes Wright canvasses above in his account of the intuitionistic response to the Fregean mode of semantics leaves untouched what Dummett identifies here as Frege's
fundamental contribution: the semantic-constructional approach and its overturning of subject-predicate analysis.

Against this established background, and by way of coming to grips with Wittgenstein's position vis-à-vis formal semantics, it is more than instructive to actually examine in detail what the later Wittgenstein himself said about quantificational analysis, because neither the anti-realist nor orthodox approaches in fact remain unexamined and untouched by the sweep of Wittgenstein's mature philosophy. Indeed, what we are going to see is that Wittgenstein in fact investigated most critically what Frege and Russell (and the Tractatus) laid down as the backbone of semantic analysis and onto which intuitionism etc., merely grafts flesh of a different kind.

For Wittgenstein, the investigation is unashamedly a radical one, as the following indicative remarks show:

I would like to say: a general picture like [O] does not have the same metric as a particular one. [O]

In the general sign "[O]", the distances [between the lines and the circle] play no greater part than they do in the sign "arb".

The drawing [O] can be looked on as a representation of the "general case". It is as if it were not in measurable space: the distance between the circle and the lines are of no consequence. The picture, taken thus, is not seen as occurring in the same system as when one sees it as the representation of a particular position of the circle between the lines. Or rather, taken thus, it is a part of a different calculus. The rules that govern variables are not the same as those that govern their particular values. 10

This latter point radically resists the tradition of semantic analysis which began with Frege-Russell-Tractatus semantics. For if, e.g., a "general case" of a circle's being in a square (or other bounded space) is not on the same logico-grammatical level as showing a particular
position of a circle vis-à-vis boundaries, the relationship of generality to particular instances will not fit a constructional semantic model, from which, of course, it follows that that model itself is called into grave question.

The key to grasping Wittgenstein's argument lies in recognising the radical implications behind the above remark's claim that the circle in the square, as the expression of a generality, does not lie "in measurable space". On the constructional semantic line taken in Frege-Russell-Tractatus quantificational analysis, the generality is taken as the presentation of a disjunction of all the possible positions of the circle in the square: to give the generality is ipso facto to give a disjunction ranging over, and definitive of the domain of, the space in the square. The generality is thus treated as 'shorthand' for the (truth-functionally-determined) state of the totality of individual positions in the domain, much as 'This wall' is (ex-hypothesi) shorthand for 'This brick, this brick, this brick, this line of mortar, etc.'. But this is what Wittgenstein rejects. His argument is that the generality here is one semantic function (with its own rules for its variables); the disjunction is a further, distinct function. The following string of remarks thus further illustrates this radical attack on the disjunctional analysis:

Let us take the particular case of the general state of affairs of the cross being between the end-lines.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{X} & \text{X} & \text{X} & \text{X} & \text{X} \\
\end{array}
\]

Each of these cases, for instance, has its own individuality. Is there any way in which this individuality enters into the sense of the general sentence? Obviously not.

....
There is one calculus [— i.e., set of logic-grammatical rules —] containing our general characterisation and another containing the disjunction. If we say that the cross is between the lines we don't have any disjunction ready to take the place of the general proposition. 11

If we do not allow ourselves to be sufficiently struck by the implicit appeal to the notion of rule-governance in the remarks above, we can easily come to think that a claim like "we don't have any disjunction ready to take the place of the general proposition" is suggestive of Wittgenstein's canvassing views akin to those of Quinean empiricism. A Quinean would argue that the vicissitudes of empirical underdetermination cast generalities asunder from any kind of conclusive semantic determination by sets of particular observation sentences. Generalities are thereby merely expressions of an empirical theory about 'what there is' and how things are within the theory's domain. Particular non-recalcitrant cases merely contribute to the plausibility and practical success of the theory and cannot decide or determine its correctness; there is no such determination.

The parallels with Quine sketched here are important. But a moment's reflection on the arguments developed in the previous chapter should help to keep them in perspective: we should expect a measure of such parallels because Quine and Wittgenstein are both thoroughgoing critics of a priorist semantics. In particular, it is very important for this chapter's reconstruction of Wittgenstein's critique of formal semantics that we explore in detail the crucial issues (including the Quinean counter-response) which arise out of a priorism's dogma that (existential) generalities constitute disjunctions of cases, and universalities conjunctions. For this dogma is of course a corollary (and a central one at that) of the a priorist's views about semantic
determinacy, and it is via the continuation of our reconstruction of Wittgenstein's detailed critique of these views that we will proceed here toward further confrontation with the Quinean counter-position (in the latter sections of this chapter).

III

In material from the period circa 1931-2, included in the appendix to *Philosophical Grammar*, there is a section of remarks headed "Concept and Object, Property and Substrate". In this section Wittgenstein strongly attacks the foundations of Frege's, and Russell's, semantics. Toward the middle of the text, the following two crucial paragraphs profoundly take to task Frege-Russell quantificational analysis:

If we turn to the form of expression "(j-x).fx", it's clear that this is a sublimation of the form of expression of our language: "There are human beings on this island" "there are stars that we do not see". To every proposition of the form "(j-x).fx" there is supposed to correspond a proposition "fa", and "a" is supposed to be a name. So one must be able to say "(j-x).fx, namely a and b", ("There are some values of x, which satisfy fx, namely a and b"), or "(j-x).fx, e.g. a", etc. And this is indeed possible in a case like "There are human beings on this island, namely, Messrs A, B, C, D." But then is it essential to the sense of the sentence "There are men on this island" that we should be able to name them, and fix a particular criterion for their identification? That is only so in the case where the proposition "(j-x).fx" is defined as a disjunction of propositions of the form "fx", if e.g. it is laid down that "There are men on this island" means "Either Mr. A or Mr. B or Mr. C or Mr. D or Mr. E is on this island" --- if, that is, one determines the concept "man" extensionally (which of course is quite contrary to the normal use of this word.) (On the other hand the concept "primary colour" really is determined extensionally.)

So it doesn't always make sense when presented with a proposition "(j-x).fx" to ask "Which xs satisfy f?" "Which red circle a centimetre across is in the middle of this square?" --- One mustn't confuse the question "which object satisfies f?" with the question "what sort of object ... etc?" The first question would have to be answered by a name, and so the answer would have to be able to take the form "f(a)"; the question "what sort of ...?" is answered by "(j-x).fx,φx" [i.e., by a specification of criteria]. So it may be senseless to ask "which spot do you see?" and yet make
sense to ask "what kind of red spot do you see (a round one, a square one, etc.)?" 12

The material here is particularly useful for showing how, around two years after this analysis was written, Wittgenstein came to his radical conclusion that the rules governing variables are not those governing their particular values. In the above analysis the variables in \((\exists x)fx\) are (orthodoxly enough) employed to express criterial functions. But the wedge Wittgenstein's dialectic drives between the role of \((\exists x)fx\) in addressing the question 'What sort of thing is x?' and the role of \(fx'/fa'\) in addressing the (different) question 'Which xs are arguments of f?\', is intended to resist the way Frege–Russell analysis unquestioningly treats the variables in \((\exists x)fx\) as expressions referring to particulars. Thus Wittgenstein's objection that 'man/men' is not either necessarily or usually 'an extensionally determined concept' should not be taken as, at least as far as Frege is concerned, either or both misrepresented and/or erroneous. By 'extensionally determined' Wittgenstein means that the variables in the quantifying sentence are (to be understood as) *ipso facto* signs standing for definite particulars (which particulars logically constitute the domain of quantification). His broad anti-Frege–Russell point is that quantifying expressions do not necessarily operate on this 'extensional determination' basis because there is a crucial logical difference between talking about 'men' by way of characterising some 'objects' falling into that category/class, and the far more specific mode of talking about 'men' as shorthand for a list of males (Mr. A, Mr. B, Mr. C, etc.), which list can be substituted for the word 'men' in the quantifying sentence without affecting its sense (or its truth-value). Wittgenstein's case is that the sense of many generalities and universalities is distorted and/or destroyed if, with
Frege and Russell, we insist that the variables (the x, y, z, etc.) in quantifying sentences are intersubstitutable with a list (finite or not) of (named) particulars.

It is very important however to keep in mind that this (1932) analysis' motivation and content, given the time of its formulation, is through-and-through bound up with Wittgenstein's commitment to his version of verificationism. In particular, given what we will see in detail and at length in subsequent sections of this chapter, we need to look clearly at the concession made in the above remarks — that, e.g., "the concept "primary colour" really is determined extensionally", such that it (and its likes) indeed fits the Frege-Russell theory. In 1932, in a consecutive pair of lectures, a significant part of whose content very closely parallels that of the above-cited material appended to Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein amplified his point with the example of the class of primary colours:

Where the class defined by \( f \) can be given by an enumeration, i.e., by a list, \((x)fx\) is [as, e.g., the Tractatus had it] simply a logical product and \((\forall x)fx\) a logical sum. E.g., \((x)fx = \alpha.f_a \beta.f_b \gamma.f_c\), and \((\forall x)fx = \alpha.v.f_a \beta.v.f_b \gamma.v.f_c\). Examples are the class of primary colours and the class of tones of the octave. In such cases it is not necessary to add "and \( a, b, c, \ldots \) are the only \( f \)'s". 13

These then are what Wittgenstein styles in the critique appended to Philosophical Grammar, as "extensionally determined" cases: if you understand the concept of such a class, you ipso facto grasp its complete extension 'at the very same time'.

The line of thought that is at work here is that if, e.g., the intension/concept 'primary colours' or 'notes in the C major scale' is treated 'sans determinate reference' in an analysis of '(\(\forall x)fx\): All the
primary colours occur in this picture' or '(\(\forall x\)fx: All the notes of the C major scale occur in this theme', this employment of either intension/concept collapses. Thus the intersubstitutability of denoted particulars for their intension is (ex-hypothesi) indispensable here; the (explicative) context so involved must be extensional. What I first want to call attention to as regards Wittgenstein's holding to this analysis during his post-\textit{Tractatus} 1929-33 verificationist period, is the fact that the way he treats the intersubstitutability of, e.g., 'primary colour' with a sample or instance of a primary colour, plainly commits him to a \textit{priorism} and so to the treatment of samples, examples, etc. as extensions presented in (generalised or universalised) intensions. As we will see, and as Chapter I foreshadowed, he comes to radically question this.

Meanwhile however, we need also to get clear as to exactly what it is that motivates Wittgenstein's appeal, against Frege and Russell, to cases which exhibit no such intersubstitutability. As Wittgenstein points out in his lecture,

[w]here a general proposition is a shorthand for a product, deduction of the special proposition \(fa\) from \((\forall x)fx\) is straightforward. But where it is not, [as, e.g., in the above-cited 'Men on this island' case,] how does \(fa\) follow? "Following" is [in these such cases] of a special sort, just as the logical product is of a special sort. And although \((\forall x)fx, fa = \forall f, fa\) is analogous to \(p \lor \neg p = \neg p, fa\) "follows" in a different way in the two cases where \((\forall x)fx\) is a shorthand for a logical sum and where it is not. We have a different \[logico-grammatical\] calculus where \((\forall x)fx\) is not a logical sum, \(fa\) is not deduced as \(p\) is deduced in the calculus of T's and F's from \(p \lor \neg p\). I once made a calculus [, i.e., in the \textit{Tractatus},] in which following was the same in all cases. But this was a mistake.

Note that the dots in the disjunction \(fa \lor fb \lor fc \lor \ldots\) have different grammars (1) "and so on" indicates laziness when the disjunction is a shorthand for a logical sum, the class being given by an enumeration, (2) "and so on" is an entirely different sign with new rules when it does not correspond to any enumeration, e.g., "2 is even \& 4 is even \&
6 is even ...", (3) "and so on" refers to positions in visual space as contrasted with positions correlated with the numbers of the mathematical continuum. ... [T]here is no number of positions in visual space, any more than there is a number of drops of rain which you see. The proper answer to the question, "How many drops did you see?", is many, not that there was a number but you didn't know how many. 14

This lecture's important remarks about the two different kinds of 'following' in the deduction of 'fa' from '(exists x)fx' and about the different logical grammars of types of disjunctions, turn on Wittgenstein's bringing to bear epistemic considerations against both his former Tractarian, and the Frege-Russell, positions. It is of course just such considerations that are exalted by Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus devising and use of the verification principle as the central pillar of his 1929-33 attempts to resurrect the picture theory of propositions.

..."the Men on this island' case canvassed so strongly in the above-cited appended material in Philosophical Grammar, turns on Wittgenstein's particular verificationist, and hence epistemic, treatment of the notion of the determination of extensionality under quantification: when, e.g., one is speaking of the heavy fall of rain (so very) visible outside, as there is no feasibility to one's actually counting, or enumerating, each drop of rain, so the extension of '(exists x)fx: There is a heavy fall of rain outside' is not reducible to or intersubstitutable with the extension of a list of particulars (ipso facto constitutive of a disjunction). The disjunction-forming question 'Which drops of rain? is thus ruled out of court because the relevant extension is, given Wittgenstein's present, verificationist, commitments, a function of what he insists in the above-cited lecture is the non-denumerability "of positions in visual space", such that "there is" no "number of drops of rain which you see"; "the proper answer" is that you
see "many" drops, and that both rules out the disjunction-formative question 'Which drops?: drop a v drop b v drop c v drop d v ...', and concomitantly brings in in its stead, the corrective question Wittgenstein styles as 'What sort?'. As we are soon to see, once Wittgenstein abandons his verificationist position, the promising 'Which ones?' versus 'What sort/kind?' distinction is not abandoned, but rather it takes on a radical new content and role.

It is the remarks about 'following' in the lecture that we have been examining here that in fact provide the most apposite demonstration of how and why Wittgenstein drastically alters his 1929-33 post-Tractarian views about quantificational analysis so as to come, circa. 1934-35, to the position which marks his mature, highly critical, analysis of formal semantics. Recall that Wittgenstein argues in the 1932 lecture that 'fa' follows from '(\exists x)fx' "in a different way in the two cases where (\exists x)fx is a shorthand for a logic sum and where it is not." To be sure, the distinction thus drawn is his chief concern, but I want to call attention to the fact that the drawing of the distinction nonetheless leaves untouched the fundamental notion that, one way or another, 'fa' follows from '(\exists x)fx' etc.

In the first instance, I want to bring out the details of how Wittgenstein treated this kind of implication in the context of his 1929-33 verificationism so we can see just what is involved here in the matter of 'fa' following. To this end I have compiled, from Philosophical Remarks, the following string of remarks. Taken from one to the next, they show that Wittgenstein regarded the then-crucial notion of verification with which he constructed his own semantics (and spawned logical positivism) as a movement of analysis:
The meaning of a question is the method of answering it.

Tell me how you are searching, and I will tell you what you are searching for. 15

Every proposition is the signpost for a verification. 16

You can only search within a system [of logico-grammatical rules]: And so there is necessarily something you can't search for. 17

... Of course you may find something even by random groping. But in that case you haven't searched for it, and, from a logical point of view, the process was synthetic; whereas searching is a process of analysis. 18

So we see then that for the verificationist Wittgenstein of 1928-1933, verification is "a process of analysis": a movement conducted within the logical space laid out by the system of (analytic a priori) logico-grammatical rules. In turn, this means that the distinction Wittgenstein identifies in the 1932 lecture between the two ways 'fa' follows from e.g., '(\exists x)fx', simply cashes out as two distinct modes of conducting verification, according to the kind of proposition being verified.

Now what makes this so germane to our present concerns is the fact that it is out of the critique and abandonment of this analytic-verificationist theory that both the mature meaning-as-use analysis emerges and with it Wittgenstein's mature, radical, analysis of quantification theory and formal semantics. We can pretty-much accurately identify this crucial evolutionary point as occurring circa 1934. Indeed, as concerns quantification theory and its constructional-semantic implications and commitments, we can be as precise as the Michaelmas Term of 1934. In his sixth lecture of that term Wittgenstein opens with the following statement of what is now, for him, a highly significant and formative problematic:
One of the chief difficulties we have with the notion of a general idea or with understanding a word is that we want it to be something present at some definite time, say when the word is understood, and the idea we have is supposed to have consequences and to act as time goes on. For example, the idea of a plant is supposed to enable me to identify something as a plant, bring a plant when ordered to, define "plant", etc.; and these phenomena are taken to agree or disagree with the idea.

In raising this problem about understanding, particularly as regards 'general ideas', Wittgenstein is clearly critically addressing, along with similar such views, his 1929-33 verificationist-analytical theory and its attendant treatment of quantificational semantics etc. Moreover, these issues form an important connection between his above-cited verificationist remarks about 'searching within a system' and the peculiar psychological theory of understanding which he espoused during his verificationist period and which we touched on in Chapter I. Two related remarks from Philosophical Remarks make more or less explicit the otherwise submerged connections between the notion of having 'general ideas', the constructional semantic treatment of existential generality and universality, and this psychological theory:

... The difficult mathematical problems are those for whose solution we don't yet possess a written system. The mathematician who is looking for a solution then has a system in some sort of psychic symbolism, in images, 'in his head', and endeavours to get them down on paper. Once that's done, the rest is easy, ....

A schoolboy, equipped with the armoury of elementary trigonometry and asked to test the equation \( \sin x = x \) etc., simply wouldn't find what he needs to tackle the problem. If the teacher nevertheless expects a solution from him, he's assuming that the multiplicity of the [logical] syntax which such a solution presupposes is in some way or other present in a different form in the schoolboy's head --- present in such a way that the schoolboy sees the symbolism of elementary trigonometry as a part of this unwritten symbolism and now translates the rest from an unwritten into a written form.
So for the verificationist Wittgenstein, understanding-as-verification simply unfolded in an analytical fashion the use of concepts as licenced by the logico-syntactic calculus 'in the head'. Which is, crucially, to say that the 'general ideas', grasped examples, rules and axioms by which the schoolboy/girl and every other language-user proceeds, were semantically analysable in Wittgenstein's verificationist theory through the facility of his version of quantificational analysis. Thus, to put it quite bluntly, the 1929-33 verificationist Wittgenstein was a devotee of that mode of (constructional or logical) semantic analysis which we know today as 'the theory of meaning'.

On this semantic project's fundamental line, constructional quantification theory — as laid out originally by Frege, Russell and the author of the Tractatus — is crucial to explaining semantically the extrapolative development of natural language-users' uttering of increasingly complex and novel sentences. By corollary, the project purports to explain rule-following praxis by treating rules and their use in the language-game along the constructional lines given in the semantics of truth-conditional (or analogous) quantification theory. Anyone familiar with the formal semantics for natural languages project — e.g., a la Davidson or Dummett — will hardly need reminding of these points. The 1929-33 verificationist Wittgenstein simply held to a quite particular, and perhaps by the standards of modern counterparts, psychologically crude, version of this project.

Moreover though, the notion of 'fa' following from, e.g., '(∃x)fx', is, as with any version of this definitively logical-semantic project, absolutely fundamental. This is because, ex-hypothesi, it shows that a logical theory that adequately captures this pattern of implication —
the kind of 'following' exemplified in \((\forall x) fx \rightarrow fa\) — ipso facto explicates the semantic structure of the entire language. This is because (again, ex-hypothesi) such structure 'follows' constructionally from a grasp of the language's semantic primitives. Of course, if this whole basic logical-constructional notion of 'following' is profoundly mistaken — and the modern project of formal semantics for natural languages shows the contemporary commitment to precisely the contrary view — then philosophy of language (and logic and mathematics) from Frege onwards, is shaken, and broken open, to its very foundations.

In the sixth 1934 Michaelmas lecture, by raising as problematic the idea that there must "be something present at some definite time, say when the word is understood", which thing "is supposed to have consequences and to act as time goes on", Wittgenstein thus in fact does much more than merely disavow his verificationist-analytical theory. The analysis of understanding which he now advances, and which marks the birth of the mature Wittgensteinian philosophy, is predicated upon the realisation that

... the rules do not follow from the [general] idea. They are not got by analysis of the idea; they constitute it. They show the use of the word.

What idea do we have of the king of chess, and what is its relation to the rules of chess? The chess player has an idea of what the king will do. But what the king can do is laid down in the rules. Do these rules follow from the idea? Can I deduce the rules once I get hold of the idea in the chess player's mind? No. The rules are not something contained in the idea and got by analysing it. They constitute it. I can give all the rules of chess in the form of a diagram illustrating the moves of the different pieces. Everything a piece does can be deduced from this, and an illegal move will disagree with this. The rules constitute the "freedom" of the pieces.

It seems at first sight that the rules for the use of a symbol are deducible from the idea connected with it. The idea always seems to be something containing its whole use, the use being something already there which we find by analysis. But the idea connected with the symbol is only
another symbol. The rules are rules for the use of that symbol. The idea and the rules stand in the relation of a symbol and the rules for its use. 21

On this, the mature, constitutive use, analysis of meaning and rule-following, Wittgenstein can — and, as I am about to show, did — ground a thoroughgoing radical critique and dissolutive analysis of the very idea of a formal semantics for natural languages. The emergent, absolutely crucial, insight that "the rules do not follow from" the general idea, but that rather, pace the very idea of formal logical analysis, "they constitute" what goes into and shows "the use of the word", demands a whole new approach in philosophy of language, logic, mathematics and psychology. Use, not logic, becomes the focal point of analysis, and rules and rule-following praxis must be analysed in a way radically at odds with the logical-semantic truth-conditionally-constructional tradition established by Frege, Russell and the author of the Tractatus and merely re-packaged by the revisionist ambits of intuitionism and anti-realism.

In what follows I will seek to make good in detail this riposte to formal semantic analysis as part of the overall reconstruction of the dialectic we are focusing upon here.

IV

What we exposed as a central point of Wittgenstein's verificationist-period critique of Frege-Russell quantification theory was, recall, the following claim: for very many cases, concepts, criteria and domains of quantification are not (to use Wittgenstein's terminology) 'extensionally determined'; these intensional devices, under certain (common) circumstances, simply are not intersubstitutable with some list
of names of particulars. The 'Men on this island' case from the appended material in *Philosophical Grammar*, where Wittgenstein cites this as a common usage of the concept 'man/men', stands in this regard as an importantly revealing case in point. I quite deliberately say 'importantly revealing' because in the course of his 1935 Lent Term lectures, Wittgenstein prosecuted his post-verificationist, constitutive-use-analysis attack on Frege-Russell quantificational analysis by, at a key stage in his argument, turning in detail to none other than the case of 'man/men', and in a way that perfectly shows up the massive and radical contrast between his pre- and post-1934 positions. But to bring out the importance of this case we need first to take careful note of the context in which it enters into Wittgenstein's new attack on the fallacy of extensionality (i.e., the theory that wherever a quantifying expression, or any intension for that matter, is used, it is semantically intersubstitutable with the list of particulars (ex-hypothesi) constitutive of its extension). I want to explicate this analytical context, which considerably develops the line of radical critique which appears as a mere hatchling in the above-cited sixth Michaelmas Term lecture of 1934, by employing material both from Wittgenstein's 1935 Lent Term lectures and from a substantial series of corresponding (though slightly earlier-written) remarks (circa 1934) in part II of *Philosophical Grammar*.

It is the topic of negation which, half way through his second 1935 Lent Term lecture, leads Wittgenstein into his new, constitutive-use-based, attack on Frege-Russell quantificational analysis. He notes that...

... there really are cases where negation and disjunction are the same game, for example, the order "Write one of the permutations of a, b, c, but not c b a". Within the grammar of our language we have a rule to replace this by a
disjunction. But in the case of the order "Write down a cardinal number that is not 5", negation and disjunction are not the same game. We might be inclined to say it is equivalent to "Write down 1 v 2 v 3 v 4 v 6 ... etc." But "etc." is not a cardinal number, nor is 1 v 2 v 3 v 4 ... ad infinitum, a disjunction. 22

The first point made here is a replication of the form, but a radical revision of the content, of the concession Wittgenstein made to Frege-Russell-Tractatus quantification theory in his verificationist critique which we examined in the preceding section. It is (as I indicated in footnote 13) very important to realise that the verificationist-period analysis, despite its errors, opened the way for Wittgenstein to expose to critical analysis more and more of the implications of Frege-Russell-Tractatus semantics. In particular, the highly important critique of the notion that, e.g., '(\exists x)fx' always cashes out as a disjunction, though wrongly grounded in the 1929-33 theory, nonetheless takes its place in the post-1933/4 mature philosophy because of the ground-breaking nature of Wittgenstein's verificationism and his own self-critical concern to radically revise and correct the lines of critique established in the 1929-33 post-Tractatus period. Consequently, the 1935 statement of the concession that "there really are cases where negation and disjunction are the same game" arises out of, and belongs to, an analytical context which shows that the reasoning by which both the Frege-Russell-Tractatus approach and that of Wittgenstein's 1929-33 period arrived at this insight, was seriously flawed. In short, the 1935 concession says: 'Right point (for some cases at least); wrong context of analysis'. Thereafter, as we are about to see, Wittgenstein goes on to lay out what is the right line of analysis. As this proceeds, we will see just how very far he has moved both from his Tractarian views and from his verificationist theory. In particular,
we are about to see in detail that, pace both Frege-Russell-Tractatus and verificationist-Wittgensteinian theory, even where, e.g., \((\exists x)fx\) does cash out as a disjunction, this provides no aid or comfort for the project of formal semantic analysis of natural languages.

The next point I want to make about the argument in the above-cited segment from the 1935 lectures, concerns Wittgenstein's making the distinction between the case of the order "Write one of the permutations of \(a, b, c\), but not \(c \, b \, a\)" and the case of the order "Write down a cardinal number that is not 5". The distinction is made because in the latter case, as opposed to the former, "negation and disjunction are not the same game". Now once again, the 'form' of this sort of approach (specifically, to mathematical infinitude) is present in the 1929-33 verificationist writings. However, there its motivation is of course epistemic and the argument as such is shot-through with finitist affinities (even though Wittgenstein may well have denied this at that time). But now in the 1935 constitutive-use analysis, Wittgenstein in no way has any truck with those who would impose finitistic constraints on quantificational analysis. A finitist, or an intuitionist for that matter, would not accept the way Wittgenstein employs the point that 'etc.' is not a cardinal number in 'Write down 1 v 2 v 3 ... etc...'. This is because the finitistic view is that 'etc.' is acceptable here provided it is restricted to meaning 'and all the rest of the finite extension', whereas Wittgenstein is rejecting the semantic revisionism involved in this approach. He does this by pointing out that there are two, perfectly sound but simply distinct, language-games involved here. The game with the intension 'permutations of \(a, b, c\), excluding \(c \, b \, a\)' involves using a form of 'all' and 'some' and a particular negation – disjunction relation that is importantly distinct from that involved in
the game with the intension 'cardinal number that is not 5'. (Indeed, in
terms of the generalisation of this point against the failure of semantic
theories to acknowledge the vast diversity in the use of the same word(s)
in ordinary language, finitism and intuitionism share this fault with
Frege and Russell and the Tractatus. For they all insist that only one
game is being played — though, obviously, they disagree about the
semantic and epistemic constitution of its rules.)

A little further on in the same lecture, Wittgenstein's concern with
exposing the multifinality of negation-disjunction relations becomes quite
explicit:

Questions about disjunction and negation are connected
with questions about the different meanings of "all" and
"any", the different kinds of generality, illustrated, for
example, by "Draw any circle except this" and "Write any
number except 4". Is the multiplicity of circles the
multiplicity of what one calls real numbers? Not if one is
ordered to draw circles. We might come to a queer
conclusion, that since only a finite number of circles is
distinguishable we have here a finite disjunction. Now is
this so? No. We do not even have a disjunction here, for
there are no distinguishing marks in the language for the
various circles. 23

The compliance-conditions for the order 'Draw any circle except this
\( \rightarrow \bigcirc \) as it is meant here by way of contrast with 'Write any number
except 4', amount to those of the order 'Draw any circle that is not
numerically identical with this circle\( \rightarrow \bigcirc \)'. It is true that this is a
silly way to command a particular person to draw circles, but within the
context of the deep analysis Wittgenstein is now conducting it helps to
bring out the difference in logical grammar between the use of 'any' in
the circle case, and its use in the numbers case. 'Not this circle
does not here pick out an instance of 'circle': the 'negated' class which results from compliance with 'Draw circles' (or its variant ways of being expressed) is the class of all non-circle-drawing deeds open to the recipient of the order, and no circles whatsoever are, ipso facto, members of that class. As we will see in detail below, the distinction is between the logical grammar of quantification in the case 'Not this kind of thing: \( \neg \forall F(t) \)' and that different logical grammar involved in the case 'Not this circle: \( \neg \exists F(a) \)'. The order 'Draw any circle except this: \( \bigcirc \)' taken as Wittgenstein means it in his lecture, thus is synonymous with 'Do not not draw any circle', or 'Do not not draw any of this kind of thing: \( \bigcirc \)', but is antonymous with 'Draw this particular circle'. This provides the specific contrast with the case of 'Write any number except 4', where the negation ranges over a particular, not over a kind.

A closely analogous case is that involved in the distinction between 'Find somebody -- anybody -- else' and 'Find Albert Q.Z. Jones of 44 Ratbag Place, Rose Bay, Sydney, N.S.W., Australia': given that neither the speaker nor the hearer is that Mr Jones, we have the situation where, extensionally speaking, 'finding some person' and 'finding Mr Jones' can overlap, but where only the latter order states anything more than a disjunction of speaker + hearer versus everyone else. Which is to say that in the case of the former order, it is nonsense to deny that turning up with Mr Jones fails to comply with the order because you did not order the finding of Mr Jones: it is nonsense because the order is not synonymous with the order to comply with the disjunction 'Mr Jones vs
everyone else (except you and I'). In effect it is the difference between, on the one hand, being ordered to produce an example of a genre, and on the other hand either being ordered to produce a particular instance of the genre, or being ordered to produce any other instance of the genre except this instance ⇒ 'ε'/\'4'/\'you + me'/Mr Jones. For an example of the genre is not constitutive of the extension, or even a part of the extension, of the genre, whereas particular instances are. We want, nonetheless, to counter this with the objection: 'But surely, if I bring you an example of the genre, I ipso facto bring an instance of its extension.' But Wittgenstein's reply is that examples are examples of the kind, whereas instances are what we want of you when we want not to be shown the kind, but particular specific members of it.

The 'example of the kind/genre/class/genus (etc.)' versus 'instance of the kind/genre/class/genus (etc.)' distinction, is central to Wittgenstein's earlier-cited, and fundamental, claim that the rules governing variables are not isomorphic with those governing their particular values.25 The dissonances we have exposed in both the 'circles versus cardinal numbers, but not 4' case, and in the 'find somebody else versus find Mr Jones' case, simply drive home the lesson that "though you can give as instances of a generalisation different particular cases, you can't give different variables because the variables ... don't differ in their meaning."26

To further consolidate this argument, take once more the case where we are ordered to find somebody — anybody — else (but ourselves and the commandant), and we bring back Mr Jones. As I said, the commandant can't sensibly respond to this with the objection that she ordered us to find anybody, not a particular person (here, Mr Jones). Mr Jones is brought
in response to the order, but he appears, as it were, not qua Mr Jones — the argument of 'f(a)' — but qua example of the genre: 'f(\frac{1}{2})'. And this means, as Wittgenstein points out, that our commandant can't object that we have misinterpreted the order as 'f(\frac{1}{2}) v f(a)'; that is, she

... can't say: that [our understanding of the order] just means that \( f(\frac{1}{2}) \) is a disjunction with \( f(a) \) as one of its terms; for if that is so, the disjunction must be capable of being stated, and \( f(\frac{1}{2}) \) must be defined as a disjunction. There would be no difficulty in giving such a definition, but it wouldn't correspond to the use of \( f(\frac{1}{2}) \) that we have in mind. It isn't that the disjunction always leaves something over; it is that it just doesn't touch the essential thing in generality, and even if it is added to it, it depends on the general proposition for its justification. 27

Let me emphasise again that, as the above remark indicates, the disjunction's being "capable of being stated" is not ruled out here on epistemic grounds (a la, e.g., finitism and intuitionism). The point is that the order to bring an example of the genre — 'Bring somebody!' — is not of the same logical kind as either the order 'Bring this primary colour but not these ones' or the order 'Bring some number of things, but not four things'. 28 An order like 'Bring somebody!' or 'Bring a plant' or 'Bring a fish' or 'Bring a manufactured foodstuff', means what it does in virtue of the use of the particular rule of logical grammar thereby operative. And the particular rule in question, as so used, determines that here a disjunction "just doesn't touch the essential thing" in the expressed generality. This is the reason why the commandant cannot object that she ordered '\( f(\frac{1}{2})! \)', not '\( f(\frac{1}{2}) v f(a)! \)': when we obey the order and turn up with Mr Jones, we do not pervert '\( f(\frac{1}{2})! \)' into the alleged disjunction '\( f(\frac{1}{2}) v f(a)! \)'; Jones is not presented nor 'constituted' here under the disjunction-forming rules governing '\( f(a)! \)', but under the (different) rules for '\( f(\frac{1}{2})! \)'; he is not here as an individuated argument of 'f', but as an exemplar of \( \frac{1}{2} \). So, speaking as a rational commandant,
Wittgenstein makes it quite plain that

... I can't even say that I first gave the command \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \) and only later realised that \( f(a) \) was a case of \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \); at all events my order was and remained \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \) and I added \( f(a) \) to it in the knowledge that \( f(a) \) was in accordance with \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \) [in \( 'f(\frac{1}{x}) \lor f(a)' \)]. And the stipulation that \( f(a) \) is in accordance with \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \) presupposes the sense that belongs to the proposition \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \) if it is taken as an independent unit and not defined as replacable by a disjunction. And my proposition "at all events my order was and remained \( f(\frac{1}{x}) \) etc." only means that I didn't replace the general order by a disjunction. 29

Running parallel to this argument are two others which Wittgenstein canvasses in Philosophical Grammar, and which serve to reveal that a further key aspect of the confusions we are sorting out here (in the face of their exaltation by semanticians from Frege and Russell onwards) concerns a particular modal fallacy involving the relationship between \( '\text{any } x \text{ (can be } f)\)' and \( '\text{all } x \text{ (can be } f)\)'. The two problem cases are canvassed thus by Wittgenstein:

It makes sense to say "write down any cardinal number" but not "write down all cardinal numbers". "There is a circle in the square" \( (\exists x)fx \) makes sense, but not \( \forall x \neg fx \): "all circles are in the square." 30

The commands 'Write down \text{any} cardinal number' and 'Write down \text{all} cardinal numbers', if their use of 'any' and 'all' is construed on the model of, e.g., 'Any brick in this wall is red; thus all bricks in this wall are red', makes it look like what is at issue is our dealing with an infinite and \text{'a priori-given'} extension such that, to echo the point rightly rejected in Investigations 208, it is merely "a human shortcoming" that we cannot follow the latter order. But pace intuitionism and finitism, the disparity between the coherence of the two commands, and its implications for quantificational analysis, predicate calculus, model theory et al., is not overcome by our (somehow)
cutting the cloth of our order's extensions to fit the finite recognitionnal and intellectual capacities of our intension-spending resources. Such a move is exposed in Wittgenstein's analysis as failing to address the fundamental flaw in the dogmas that wherever sentences in the form '($A x)fx$' or '($\exists x)fx$' are employed, they are merely shorthand for, respectively, $f(a A \ldots)$ or $f(a v \ldots)$. As such, the only difference of concern here between intuitionism or finitism and Frege or Russell, is that concerning the ways in which they hold all extensionality to be a priori determined.

It is with regard to this fact (to which I will return in a later section) that Wittgenstein uses his follow-up to the 'Write down any cardinal number' versus 'Write down all cardinal numbers' point, to rope in the finitists and intuitionists. Recall that the second move runs thus: 'There is a circle in the square' makes sense, but not so 'All circles are in the square'. The point against the notion of 'all' here meaning 'infinitely many' is easy enough to grasp. But the anti-finitistic side of the argument is more subtle. In line with Wittgenstein's distinguishing between "logically bounded" and "logically unbounded" classes, we could point out to any finitist that a further circle can always be drawn outside the square if (ex-hypothesi) all extant circles really were otherwise inside it. Yet on the face of it, this must strike the finitist (and, mutatis mutandis, the intuitionist) as an easy objection to overturn: s/he simply points out that 'All circles ...' is, a la finitism, cashed-out in the set (here constituted by containment in a square) containing the extension of the ('finitised') concept 'All circles that x (— individual, or population —) will ever draw'.
But this way of treating \((\forall x)fx\) as a (synthetic) construction of \(f(\forall)\) is downright question-begging. To understand, and to decide the truth of, the ('finitised') proposition \((\forall x)fx\): All the circles so-and-so will ever draw (or has ever drawn) are in this square', laying out the circles — showing 'F(a)' — is germane only if we already know what, criterially, constitutes a circle's being part of the extension of 'a circle drawn by so-and-so'. In short, it is only the general proposition's own logical grammar — not 'F(a)' — that justifies the placing of any particular circle in the square. Our understanding of the intension 'circle drawn by so-and-so' is thus logically responsible for any ability we have to close, or contemplate closure of, the set whose extension is now presented. On pain of begging the question, the finitist cannot present an extension and say of it 'and that's all'. For if that — F(a) per se — is 'all', our reply must be 'All what?'. (There is more to be said in this line of critique of synthetic — intuitionistic or empiricistic — semantic analysis, and I pursue this expansion in subsequent sections of this chapter.)

The case of finitism as a way of dealing with ('open-ended') intensions points up the grave shortcomings of taking extensional approaches to the semantics of logical categories. It does not matter how explicitly or how thoroughly you present extensions, 'f(a)' itself only constitutes a string of entities and allied properties, and thus shows that the question 'What kind of thing is an argument of f(\(\forall\)), or f(\(\forall\))? is manifestly not a request for, nor is logically answerable by, exposure to a parade, no matter how explicit, of particular instances of x (as in 'F(x)'). Explication of this claim takes us to the heart of Wittgenstein's objections to constructional-logical semantics and the attendant tradition of quantificational analysis established by Frege,
Russell and the author of *Tractatus*.

In the 1935 Lent Term Lectures, the enthralling Wittgenstein employs so as to bring out the heart of his analysis is this one:

Suppose I asked you to paint a circle inside a square, and that you did this:

![Diagram of a square with a circle inside](image)

Suppose I then argued: "Every circle in this square fulfills my order. This circle is in the square. Therefore this circle does." What sort of proposition is "This circle is in the square"? 33

The standard answer is that the sort of proposition involved here is the sort 'f(x)': 'There is an x, such that fx' thus seems to flow out of this as naturally as water out of a burst dam; is it not then plain that 'this circle is in the square' is (the informal expression of) 'f(a)'?

But Wittgenstein's question here is at once both enormously incisive and yet thoroughly subtle. It involves our seeing right to the bottom of the sort of 'All what?' logical categories problem we have begun to expose here. For quantificational analysis is dashed on the rocks of conceptual confusion unless, so to speak, the 'x' in 'f(x)' is 'category-sensitive'; unless, indeed, it is logico-grammatically consistent with internal relations' laying out all the valid counterfactual inferences permitted within the given 'natural' language.

A potent example of the need for a category-sensitive, internal-relations-governed, analysis of bound variables is this case, as cited by Wittgenstein: 'There is a red circle on a background of a different
colour' -- '(∃x)fx' -- makes sense, but not so the negation 'There isn't a background colour other than red that doesn't have a red circle on it': '¬(∃x)fx'.\(^{34}\) The semantic definitions of the quantifiers and the sentential connectives etc., on which predicate calculus, model theory and so on, rely, require that as a condition of the sense of any quantifying proposition (as with any other proposition) its various truth-functionally-constructed counterfactual correlates make sense. Failing this, received predicate calculus, model theory etc., is in big trouble because, e.g., it is taken as definitive that if '(∃x)fx' is well-formed for whatever values of its quantification, bound variable and predicate, then so are the corresponding counterfactual correlates '¬(∃x)fx', '(∃x)¬fx', and '¬(∃x)¬fx'. Yet a sentence such as 'There is a red circle on a background of a different colour' just will not jump through the received semantic circus' hoops. Indeed, adequate formalisation of the propositions derivable from 'f(x)' where 'f' means 'is a red circle' and 'x' is a non-red background colour (and we mean here 'pure colour'), is not possible, despite our ability to state the nexus of propositions informally, viz.:

'x is a non-red background to a red circle'

'wx is not a background colour for a red circle'

'There is a red circle on a differently-coloured background'

'There isn't a red circle on a differently-coloured background'

'There is a red circle on an identically-coloured background'

'There isn't a red circle standing on a non-red background'

The negation of 'There isn't a red circle standing on a non-red background' as it appears here, is not 'There is a red circle on a
differently coloured background', nor is it 'There is a red circle on an identically-coloured background', nor can it be 'There isn't a red circle on a differently-coloured background': all these constructions misconstrue the sentence they are supposed to negate. This failure nonetheless does not arise because the negation operations cannot be performed so as to show the truth-functional constructional relationship between the four quantifying expressions. Rather it is because an extensionally-constructive, T-F semantic calculus cannot do the job here. There is a manifest dissonance between our analysis' exposing the semantic determinants of sense, and the received truth-conditional model-theoretic definitions of the quantifiers and the concomitant analyses of the rules for the construction of counterfactual propositions for any of the four quantifying-sentence logical forms. Bluntly (and leaving aside, the deep problems of ensuring correct construction), despite the wellformedness of \( \forall x \neg f(x) \), if we tender it as the formalisation of 'There is not a background colour other than red that doesn't (or can't) have a red circle on it', the result in the case before us is nonsense — well formed nonsense — because red cannot (as it is meant here) stand to itself as a background colour. Similarly, imposition of the formalisation \( (\exists x) \neg f(x) \) is a nonsense here also (questions of constructional adequacy again notwithstanding), because 'There is a red circle not standing on any background colour' is just a category mistake: negation won't, so to speak, 'fit in' in the way demanded of it here. The basic propositional form, \( p \lor \neg p \), as well as the rules \( \neg \neg p = p \) and (more obliquely) \( \neg (p \land \neg p) \), and with them the very idea of truth-conditional semantic constructability, are shown by such (easily, and dammingly, multipliable) cases as clearly not the building blocks, nor the touchstones, of coherent semantic analysis. The propositional forms licenced by a T-F
calculus such as Fregean, Russellian and Tractatus semantics exalt, and as have been embellished upon many-fold to this day in the name of logical semantics, are damningly promiscuous in their dealings with sense and nonsense.

Rules like 'p v ~np', and 'np = p', and 'n(p\land wp)' give us propositional forms. Propositional sense is, however, not determined in accordance with these rules. The standard truth-functional semantic definitions of the quantifiers and connectives also give only forms, and as the case of 'There is a red circle standing on a differently coloured background' shows, logical form is not the guarantor or determinant of sense. And this has two radical implications. First, the theory of the ability of logical form to deal with sense and content, which theory is yielded up by received predicate calculus, is a failure because the reality of our language(s) is that there is no unitary general propositional form, no unitary form of universal or existential quantification, no unitary rule for variable-value intersubstitutability, and no unitary role for the sentence connectives. Second, and in turn, this failure substantially arises out of the inadequacies of the extensional treatment of generalities as disjunctions and universalities as conjunctions, upon which analysis Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein founded modern philosophical semantics.

Wittgenstein makes an important illustrative point about this foundational movement's errors in part II of Philosophical Grammar:

The way in which (\forall x).\forall x behaves like a logical sum is expressed by its following from \forall a and from \forall a v \forall b, i.e. in the rules

(\forall x).\forall x; \forall a = \forall a
and
(\forall x).\forall x; \forall a v \forall b = \forall a v \forall b
From these rules Russell's fundamental laws follow as tautologies:
\[ \forall x, \forall y, \forall z \]
\[ \forall x \lor \forall y, \forall z \]

For \( \forall x, \exists x \) we need also the rules:
\[ \exists x \lor \exists y =. \exists x \lor \exists y \]
\[ \exists x, \exists y \exists z =. \exists z \exists y \exists z \]

Every such rule is an expression of the analogy between \( \exists x \).

We know the analogy is far more complicated than Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein allowed, but the two additional rules Wittgenstein brings down after Russell's fundamental laws, are bombshells here. The first is a rule for breaking up spuriously connected propositions like, e.g., 'There is a turkey on the lawn or this clock is expensive', by way of distinguishing it from relevantly connected propositions like 'There is a turkey on the lawn or it is a remarkable imitation'. In *Principia Mathematica*, no allowance was made for this need to deal with relevance: the use in propositional calculus of 'p, therefore p v q' looks utterly sound, but 'This bird is red, therefore this bird is red or Ronald Reagan eats large breakfasts' is semantically defective; well-formed, but utterly defective. Concomitantly, the second supplementary rule allows for the likes of colour-exclusion inferences and a whole host of related semantic features indigenous to the employment of internally related concepts. It will not in itself clean up the mess caused by the inability of received predicate calculus to deal with the exemplary problem case of 'There is a red circle on a differently-coloured background', but it goes a long way.

What Wittgenstein's supplementary rules indicate is, at bottom, the dissonance between propositional logic and *bona fide* logical grammar.
For it is only by there being distinct rules governing what can and cannot be the categorically-determined role of any variable, that the T-F rules for particular values of variables can — subsequently — come into play. And that means that the idea that 'fa' truth-functionally constitutes '(\exists x)fx' or '(\forall x)fx' must be rejected. For take Russell's fundamental law '0x v 0y = (\exists z)0z', and assign the informal expression of the function-predicative variables as follows: 'x is a red circle on a transparent background: 0x' and 'y is a transparent circle on a transparent background: 0y' implies 'There are some circles on transparent backgrounds'. This is a truth-preserving inference, and so gives a valid transformation rule of propositional logical form, but it is (to put it mildly) a very very poor semantic rule, because the sentence form 'y is a transparent circle on a transparent background' is neither true nor false, but nonsense. The cases brought out by Wittgenstein's supplementary rules considerably amplify the damning inability of the truth-functional treatment of logical forms (which characterises propositional logic from the likes of Principia onwards) to accommodate bonafide logical grammar. Indeed, the logical system laid out in Principia Mathematica, because of its utter inability to explicate the constitutive semantic rules of logical categories, bequeathed the colour exclusion problem to the Tractatus; Wittgenstein's adding of the rule '(\exists x,y)0x : y v (\exists x)0x : y = (\exists x)0x : (\exists x)z x y' is not without its element of bitter irony.

To be sure, Frege, because of his insistence on the sense-reference distinction, and on the view that sense determined reference, made no bones about the need to make extensionality hostage to ordering by logical categories. But, as we will see in detail below, the a priorist semantic theory into which he injected these principles utterly
obscured his view of their application. For after all, it was Frege who invented quantificational analysis as an expression of Dirichlet's function—argument mode, and who sought to show—regardless of his treatment of reference/extensionality as determined by sense/intensionality—that, as far as possible, the correct approach in semantics lies in the notion that wherever an intension is used in a sentence, its extension is semantically intersubstitutable. By forging this vision into the icon of quantificational analysis 'the new logic' sought to deal with the profligate legacy of the old 'subject—predicate' mode.

But it is nonetheless the inability of function—argument analysis to deal with the legacy of the subject—predicate mode that is exposed by Wittgenstein as the ultimate source of the profound errors in Frege-Russell quantificational analysis. For recall Wittgenstein's innocent-looking question in his 1935 lecture: what sort of proposition is 'This circle is in the square', uttered in respect of our drawing

![Diagram of a circle in a square]

in obedience to the command 'Draw a circle in the square'. We have seen above that, on a whole series of related grounds, there is good reason to reject the orthodoxy that our compliance with the order ipso facto constitutes 'f(a)'.

It is at this point in his lecture that Wittgenstein amplifies the case he is prosecuting by turning to his new analysis of the use of 'man/men' and its treatment under Frege-Russell analysis. He intends now
to show conclusively what is the fundamental nature of the error we make in analysing our drawing of the circle as the production of \( f(a) \) such that \( (\exists x)fx \). As the radical new argument from 'man/men' unfolds, the crucial problem of logical categories will come more and more out into the light until the very idea of persisting with quantificational analysis is utterly eclipsed.

V

Wittgenstein opens the most crucial stage in his dialectic with the acknowledgement that Russell's analysis of, e.g., 'I met a man' (as 'There is an x such that I met x, \( \exists x \text{ is a man} \)') "did have the virtue of calling attention to the distinction between "I met a man" and "I met Smith", but in other ways ... is enormously misleading."36 This condemnatory claim is amplified by first pointing out that "Russell uses "man" as a predicate, although we practically never use it" thus. And if we now recall the 1932-formulated 'men on this island case', we can see that and how the idea behind the stigmatised assumption that the generality implies a disjunction ('Mr A v Mr B v Mr C, etc.) is, in the 1935 analysis, being identified with this imposition of a predicative role for 'men' (\( \text{vis-\(a\)-} \text{vis the members of the disjunction} \)).37 And developing this point, Wittgenstein remarks next in the lecture that Logicians use examples which no one would ever think of using in any other connection. Whoever says "Socrates is a man"? I am not criticising this because it does not occur in practical life. What I am criticising is the fact that logicians do not give these examples any life. We must invent a surrounding for our examples. We might use "man" as a predicate if we wanted to distinguish whether someone dressed as a woman was a man or woman. We thus would have invented a surrounding for the word, a game in which its use is a move. It does not matter whether in practice the word has a place in a game, but what matters is that we have a game, that a life is given for it. 38
This gives us a vital clue to what it is that Wittgenstein seeks to put in the place of propositional logic and truth-conditional semantics: the notion of 'making a move in the language-game'. But we have some way to go yet before this idea emerges out of the conclusion of the dialectic at work here. For the moment, Wittgenstein fleshes out the predicative-use issue by noting that it requires that "the subject is a proper name". As we have seen from a number of cases, assigning a proper name to an instance ranged over by a quantifying expression, and thus treating the 'instance' as an instance — f(a) — is far from universally correct or appropriate.

It is the attack launched in the next lecture however, that well and truly sinks the Frege–Russell semantic fleet. Wittgenstein opens with the crucial observation that the

... term "man" when used as predicate can be sensibly asserted, or sensibly denied, of certain things. It is an "external property", and in this respect the predicate "red" is the same. 39

Now note, to bring in several aspects of one of our principal problem cases, that one cannot sensibly deny or assert the property of having a shape of any instance of colour, nor can possession of a background, or of no background, be regarded as an "external property" of any geometrical diagram, nor can the ability to either be drawn in, or not in, a (larger) geometrical shape — e.g., a square — be an "external property" of any circle. And so Wittgenstein moves to play his trump card: we must consider

... the distinction between red, and man as properties. A table can be the bearer of the property red, but the case with man is different. What is the bearer of this property? The sentence "I see a man" is not explained by "(\(\exists x\)) I see \(x\) is a man". For the latter leaves the use of \(x\)
unexplained. It might be an explanation of saying "I see a man" if this were said of a dark patch in [a] fog, or of a human-looking figure which behaved like a man, or of a roll of carpet with a man in it. Consider Russell's notation for "There is no man in this room": \( \exists(x \ x \text{is a man in this room}) \). This notation suggests one's having gone through the things in the room and found that none were men. The \( (\exists x) fn \) notation is built on the model in which \( x \) is such a word as "box" or other generic name. [But the word "thing" as in 'the thing 'x' stands in for'] is not a generic name.

Suppose I translate "There is a painted box in this room", one obvious translation being one from which Russell's notation is taken, in which \( x \) is "box". Russell would not translate it in this way, but rather as "There is an \( x \) [-- a 'thing' --] which is a box and is in this room". What is the \( x \) here? 40

The \( x \) here is guilty in the first degree of leading semantic analysis down the garden path and over an enormous precipice.

Zettel 704 makes a very apposite point regarding the fallout from the attack Wittgenstein has just made:

Russell and Frege take concepts as, as it were, properties of things. But it is very unnatural to take the words "man", "tree", "treatise", "circle", as properties of a substrate.

If we think that language is a form of systematic 'atoms into simple molecules into complex molecules' logico-semantic construction, the idea naturally arises (and strikes us as appealing) that the atomic sentences are propositions like 'This is a man', 'This is a tree', 'This is a treatise'. The 'old', subject - predicate, logic was entrapped in the jungle which springs from this notion. But so is the 'new', function - argument, Frege-Russell, quantificationally-analytical, logic:

The real difficulty lies in the concept of "(\(\exists n\))" and in general of "(\(\exists x\))". The original source of this notation is the expression of our word language: "There is a ... with such and such properties". And here what replaces the dots is something like "book from my library" or "thing (body) in this room", "word in this letter", etc. We think of objects that we can go through one after another. As so often
happens a process of sublimation turned this form into "there is an object such that ..." and here too people imagined originally the objects of the world as like 'objects' in the room (the tables, chairs, books, etc.), although it is clear that in many cases the grammar of this "(\exists x), etc." is not at all the same as the grammar of the primitive case which serves as a paradigm.\textsuperscript{41}

The 'success' of quantifier-variable notation in dealing with sentences involving multiple generality created a metaphysical euphoria which — to this day — dupes us into believing that we have received from Frege, Russell and the \textit{Tractatus}, the touchstones of semantic analysis.

The moment we move to any one of the utter multitude of sentences where concepts are, \textit{pace} Frege's express claims in the \textit{Grundlagen} and the \textit{Grundgesetze}, not essentially, or even significantly, predicates, quantifier-variable analysis is a semantic disaster. This is, at bottom, because the x in 'f(x) etc., as a \textit{de facto} metaphysical substratum, is category neutral: even despite Frege's contrary intentions, the role is inescapable once the function-argument schema and quantifier-variable notation is imposed. We can see this point's implications developed right through Wittgenstein's third 1935 Lent Term lecture.

Short of indulgence in the laying of metaphysical smokescreens, just what is, \textit{modulo} Russell, the x that is the bearer of manhood?: are we seriously to believe that reporting that, having peeped around the corner, one saw a man, coherently translates as 'I saw an x — a thing; a bit of substrata — and it happens to be a man'? As 'man' is an external property of the x here (for all concept-application is forced by Russell's analysis to submit to the yoke of expressing mere external properties), x could just as readily be something else instead. But what?: a bulldozer?; an aircraft carrier?; a wet Tuesday afternoon?;
Cantor's diagonal proof?; a large power bill? As Wittgenstein notes, doubtless trying to be as kind as possible here (to Russell in particular), we can find a use for Russell's \( (\forall x) \text{I see } x \land x \text{ is a man} \):

It might be an explanation of saying "I see a man" if this were said of a dark patch in [a] fog, or of a human-looking figure which behaved like a man, or of a roll of carpet with a man in it. 42

At least here the \( x \) is the sort of thing that can meet the criteria for being a man. But then, consider the implications of the Frege-Russell insistence on treating existential generalities as disjunctions, when, in broad daylight, Inspector Clouseau announces: 'There is no man in this room': \( \forall x (\exists x) x \text{ is a man in this room} \). What, aside from the extension of some list of men, is constitutive of the disjunction supposedly entailed here? For as Wittgenstein says, "This notation suggests one's having gone through the things in the room and found that none were men."43 To be sure, even Clouseau could perform the task, but in Russell's case at least, and so if Clouseau is a Russelian, the room should be searched from its sub-atomic particles to its walls, roof and floor, by way of deciding the supposedly generality-constitutive proposition 'For this particular thing in this room, this thing is a man'.

In turn, the '\( x = \text{thing} \)' approach, as we have already seen, forces \( x \) into the role of a substrate composed of particulars, or individuals. This is why Wittgenstein points to the paradoxicality of the \( (\exists x)fx \) notation being built on the model of \( x \) being a generic name; a term for the genera, the genre, the nom de classe. On Frege-Russell analysis, \( (\exists x)fx \) comes out as if we have a molecularly-conceived aggregation making a lump of clay that is now modelling this, now that, now something
else. But once we bring the case of internally related concepts to bear on the x-substrate, this easy metaphysical picture turns as foggy as can be:

If a table is painted brown, then it's easy to think of the wood as bearer of the property brown and you can imagine what remains the same when the colour changes. Even in the case of one particular circle which appears now red, now blue. It is thus easy to imagine what is red, but difficult to imagine what is circular. What remains in this case if form and colour alter? For position is part of the form and it is arbitrary for me to lay down that the centre should stay fixed and the only changes in form be changes in the radius.

We must once more adhere to ordinary language and say that a patch is circular.

It is clear that here the phrase "bearer of a property" in this context conveys a completely wrong — an impossible — picture. If I have a lump of clay, I can consider it as the bearer of a form, and that, roughly, is where this picture comes from.

"The patch changes its form" and "the lump of clay changes its form" are different forms of propositions. 44

There is no problem with the alliance of the notions of 'molecular aggregation' and 'transformation of form' when we take the icon of a lump of clay as our paradigm. But the alliance collapses when we are talking about a circular patch changing its form and colour. We must press the point here that we are not predicating a shape — circularity — of some, ipso facto amorphous x that logically stands to circularity as, say, being a five dollar note stands to being on fire: it is symptomatic of five dollar notes that they can be burned, but 'x is on fire' does not express a criterion of 'five-dollar-notehood'. Yet the expression '(\exists x)(\forall x)(x \rightarrow \neg \neg g(x))': There is a purplish Australian banknote, and it is on fire', casts both 'f' and 'g' here in the role of mere predicates, and so in an 'external property' relation to x. This ignores and distorts the fact that the intension 'a purplish Australian banknote' effectively
defines 'A5 currency unit', whereas the intension 'on fire' does no such thing.

With the criteria-symptoms distinction in mind, we can follow through the second part of the third 1935 lecture's attack:

Consider the notations $(\exists x)fx$, $\forall(\exists x)fx$, $(\exists x)\forall fx$, together with the example, "There is a patch in this square".

Put in Russell's way it would read: $(\exists x)x$ is in the square: $x$ is a patch. What is it of which one says it is a patch? In contrast to $(\exists x)fx$, read in Russell's way, look at the notation $\forall(\exists x)fx$. This is sensible since it can be read as "There is no patch in the square". But consider $(\exists x)\forall fx$. This notation is sensible if the $x$ is interpreted as "a patch in the square", and $\forall f$ as the predicate "not-red". But what would it be like for there to be an $x$ which is not a patch [and] in the square? Equally absurd is: "There is not a thing which is not a patch in the square".

How do we find out that there is no thing in this square which is a circle? Here there is no way, though here there is:

For in the latter figure we have a case of something's being a circle or not being a circle. The proposition "There is nothing in the square which is a circle", is utterly different in the two cases. In the second case it makes sense to say either that there is or is not a circle in the square. 45

In the first of the two cases — that of the empty square — there is not some patch in the square which ipso facto could, e.g., be the subject of the inquiry 'Is the patch in the square circular?' Consequently, the
intension 'empty square' is here logically connected to the proposition 'The square does not contain a circular patch' in a crucially different way from the connection between 'The square does not contain a circular patch' and the intension 'square with patches in it'. A host of crucial points follow from this.

First, note that the orders 'Show me a square' and 'Show me a square with no circles in it', share as compliance-condition, the extension

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{square} \\
\hline
\end{array}\] (or even \[\begin{array}{c}
\text{triangle} \\
\hline
\end{array}\] will do).

The intensions 'square' and 'square with no circles in it' are nonetheless not synonymous or isomorphic. Indeed, confronted with the proposition

'\text{There's a square drawn here}'

we do not 'find out' that there is no thing in the square that is circular, unless the subsequent or over-riding question is brought to bear: 'Are there any circular patches in the square?'. For when we understand the use of the intension 'square drawn here' in the proposition 'There is a square drawn here', the proposition 'There is not a thing that is a circle in this square', is not logically contiguous with the bedrock conceptual grasp we have of the proposition 'There is a square drawn here'. Whether or not \(x\) has patches, let alone circular patches, in it, is not a criterion (under usual circumstances) for \(x\) being a square; but being thus and so on a page, is:
So what, with Wittgenstein, is being rejected here is the idea that the grasp we have on the use of the intension 'square drawn here' in the proposition 'There is a square drawn here', is in any way semantically constituted as a disjunction, or series of disjunctions such as, e.g., are borne out of the idea that we grasp the proposition by a (cognitivistic) decision-procedure 'square here v square there v square in this part of New York v square in this Martian desert v ... etc.', or 'square with patches in v square without patches' or 'square with no patches inside v square with circular patches inside v square with triangular patches inside v ... etc'.

Here again we must emphasise that our semantically bedrock and constitutive grasp of (the criteria for) being a square (in such-and-such a place on a page), is a grasp of what is required by 'f(\bar{a})', such that

... the stipulation that f(a) is a case of f(\bar{a}) is not an incomplete definition of f(\bar{a}); it is not a definition of f(\bar{a}) at all. That means that I don't approximate to the sense of f(\bar{a}) by multiplying the number of cases in the disjunction; though the disjunction of the cases v f(\bar{a}) is equivalent to f(\bar{a}), it is never equivalent to the disjunction of the cases alone [i.e., to f(a) v f(b) v f(c) ... etc.]; it is a totally different proposition. 46

If f(\bar{a}) — the criterion/criteria for, in this case, being a square (in such-and-such a place on a page) — were defined, or constituted, by the disjunction here, the definitive psychologistic dogma that the basis of understanding is the grasping of propositions, 'the having of a thought', would be both inescapable and triumphant. 47 Much of what I will say in the rest of this chapter amplifies this point. But, for the moment, let me lead further toward it here by developing my explication of what is required by (the use/understanding) of 'f(\bar{a})' such that
concept-application is freed of its being misconstrued as essentially predication.

We see how 'f(j.)' has the crucial role of imposing criterial determination, if we reflect that the intension 'square with nothing in it' is as good as synonymous with the intension 'square shape drawn on paper' given that the usage of the intension(s) is constitutive of what we would amplify as 'Here is an exemplar of the genre/class/genera/kind/concept; take this x as representative of such-and-such a logical category'. As we know, the commitment of Frege-Russell analysis to treating intensions as shorthand for (ipso facto, a priori determined) extensions, forces the construal of f - x relations into a property-substrate mould such that the dogma is born that one simply cannot teach someone to use f(j.) without ipso facto employing and presenting f(x); f(x) seems indispensable, and entailed, because (inter alia) properties cannot be (occurrent as) 'things in themselves'. It is heresy therefore to insist that, pace Frege, Russell and a host of truth-conditional semanticians thereafter, there is no extensional component entailed in 'f(j.)': how can you say, in the way Wittgenstein wants to, 'Grasping the rule and grasping the extension are two logically separate things?; surely when you lay down or give a rule or a sense, you ipso facto establish, lay down and/or give, reference?'.

Here is a case in point to illustrate Wittgenstein's counter-analysis:

The equation 4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples is a substitution rule which I use if instead of substituting the sign "8" for the sign "4 + 4", I substitute the sign "8 apples" for the sign "4 + 4 apples". But [pace a priorism] we must beware of thinking that "4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples" is the concrete equation and 4 + 4 = 8 the abstract proposition of which the former is only
a special case, so that the arithmetic of apples, though much less general than the truly general arithmetic, is valid in its own restricted domain (for apples). There isn't any "arithmetic of apples", because the equation 4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples is not a proposition about apples. We may say in this equation the word "apples" has no reference. (And we can always say this about a sign in a rule which helps to determine its meaning.)

If you follow the a priorist impulse and insist 'But four plus four what?', you are in the grip of metaphysics through-and-through: you are perverting the demonstration of rules into talk about extensional connections between properties and some substratum.

The questions 'four plus four what?' and 'What — except f(x) — can possibly be an exemplar of the genera/genre/class/concept etc.?', have behind them a fundamental metaphysical impulse which blinds its sufferers to the realisation...

... that in an ostensive definition [— which ought to be the archetypal case of the necessity that f(\(\frac{1}{2}\)) is, at least, shorthand for f(x) —] I do not state anything about the paradigm (sample); I only use it to make a statement. It belongs to the symbolism and is not one of the objects to which I apply the symbolism.

When a paradigm or sample is produced and we say, e.g., 'Here is a circle in a square', we are not predicating circlehood and squarehood (of some substratumesque x). Moreover, as I will explain in more detail very shortly, it is by no means just in teaching the language that the criterially-constitutive (as opposed to merely predicative) role of concepts is involved. For wherever the basis of the language-game is, so to speak, (apparently) 'its being the case that f(x)', 'f(x)' is not 'f(x)' at all: we are involved with a criterially-constituted x such that, on pain of having either no idea, or an ongoing dispute, about what
kind of things we are talking about, the game's basis is the paradigm \( f(t) \); 'this, e.g., \[
\begin{array}{c}
\end{array}
\], is what we're talking about'.

It follows, moreover, that one cannot construct the disjunction \( f_a \lor f_b \lor f_c \ldots \) without a logically prior grasp of what can and cannot be a case of \( f(x) \). And that is laid out by the criterial expression \( f(t) \).

So the very idea of, e.g., describing the contents of some square, requires that

'\text{There is a square drawn here} \rightarrow \[
\begin{array}{c}
\end{array}
\]

contributes to the language-game of describing the square's contents (if any), by acting as a (de facto) rule or convention. It is essential to the playing of the language-game here that the statement

'\text{There is a square drawn here} \rightarrow \[
\begin{array}{c}
\end{array}
\]

appears not in a predicative, symptomatic, external-property-assigning role (like a five dollar note's being on fire stands to 'being a five dollar note'), but (at least) in the role of logical category determinant. If it is not allowed or granted or agreed or accepted that here there is a square drawn on the paper, the language-game of describing — or at least asking about — the square's contents (if any), is, ipso facto, subverted. So it is that 'There is a square drawn here' has a clear-cut criterially-constitutive role in the use of the proposition '\((\exists x)x \text{ is a square, and } x \text{ has patches in it}\) in the language-
game played by asking of that square, 'What shape are the patches?; are any circular?'. It follows that what we would otherwise incline to express as (the 'bi-polarity functions') 'f(x): x has patches in it' and 'w(f(x): x doesn't have patches in it', do not play propositional roles in this language-game: the latter sentence rules 'x' out here as an appropriate, or relevant, token with which to play the game; whereas the former is definitive of x being the right kind of thing. And so the notation should not be the extensional 'f(x)w(f(x))' at all, but the 'intensional' '(\exists x)fx v (\exists x)nf(x)', only this persists in misleading us because external relations are not in question here: we are talking about criteria. So in the end, the imperatival mode expressible as 'f(\exists x)!' and 'w(f(\exists x))' gets far nearer to the mark: 'It is here deemed that: here there is a square with patches in it' as opposed to 'It is here deemed that: here there is a square with no patches in it'. We are given and/or accept these two rules and then and only then can we go on to pass our judgements. This is why the fundamental basis of our grasp of the sense and/or the 'truth-conditions' of 'There is a square drawn here' is not "extensionally determined" but, rather, serves, in the moment of use, to determine extensions.

The idea that 'f(a)' or 'f(x)' determines, defines or implies '(\exists x)fx' -- that, in any genetic sense, '(\exists x)fx' follows from 'fa' -- is nonsense: you cannot get behind intensions by demanding to know what are arguments of f; 'f(\exists)' doesn't present or 'have' arguments, values, particulars; it is a rule, a definitive, 'criteria' requirement, for (subsequently) constituting, constructing, deciding, or determining particular values. You cannot go by f(x) but only to it; we do not and cannot start with it, but rather it is the product of our rule-following praxis. Extensions are only ever the end of what only (the
employment of) intensions can start, and the very idea of systematic and/or universal (and/or a priori) intension – extension semantic intersubstitutability is a massive error.

VI

Notwithstanding the above section's introduction of the notion of 'criterial constitution', our anti-Fregean case against concepts essentially being predicates, and our related critique of Russell (and the Tractatus), now brings to the foreground the question of how the membership of a class -- extensionality -- really is determined. (Not just coincidentally) paralleling Quine's fundamental line of approach, I see this as, at bottom, an issue turning upon the semantics of definitions and the utter failure of a priorism to clarify this crucial issue. In a priorist semantics, be they Fregean, Russellian, Tractarian, Carnapian, Lewisian, Montaguean, Kripkean, or whatever, it is gospel that the essence of definition is the laying down of reference. Referring is for a priorism, the motive force in the engine-room of language because, ex-hypothesi, it secures the content of our talk. This notion is, as we have seen, exalted in Frege-Russell semantics: concepts pick out (or predicate) properties of (in principle, at least) individually-nameable objects which existential generalities and universalities range over as 'shorthand' for the member objects and their predicated properties.

More broadly, the a priorist view of definitions and how they function is the vision at the heart of the so-called 'Augustinian picture' of language which the Investigations draws into a long dialectical engagement right from its opening remarks. But the particular aspect of Wittgenstein's attack on a priorism which we presently need to address -- the question (also touched upon in Chapter I) of how we should
analyse the relationship between rules, concepts, criteria and their
extensions if we reject a priorism -- begins to be answered by
Wittgenstein in material written, ironically enough, well before the
Investigations. For we can go back to at least 1929, when he was just
beginning to realise the magnitude of the errors of Tractarian semantics,
to find him formulating his post-Tractatus position in a way that
questions at least the property - substrate, 'understanding = grasping
(particulate) reference(s)', model upon which the semantics of Frege,
Russell, and the Tractatus depend. The 1929 formulation, as we would by
now fully expect, subsequently undergoes a major recontextualisation in
Wittgenstein's post-1933 philosophy, but its attack on (a priorist
treatments of) reference establishes a critique which persists right
through the later philosophy. (The above-cited '4 apples + 4 apples = 8
apples' remark is an exemplary case in point.)

The 1929 formulation arose in a conversation with Friedrich
Waismann. Wittgenstein said:

The essential thing is that syntax [i.e., logical
grammar] cannot be justified by means of language. When I am
painting a portrait of you [meaning here, Friedrich Waismann]
and I paint a black moustache, then I can answer to your
question as to why I am doing it: Have a look! There you can
see a black moustache. But if you ask me why I use a syntax,
i cannot point at anything as a justification. You cannot
give reasons for syntax. Hence it is arbitrary. Detached
from its application and considered by itself it is a game.
just like chess.

This is where formalism is right. [Yet on the other
hand] Frege was right in objecting to the conception that
the numbers of arithmetic are signs. The sign '0', after
all, does not have the property of yielding the sign '1' when
it is added to the sign '1'. Frege was right in this
criticism. Only he did not see the other, justified side of
formalism, that the symbols of mathematics, although they are
not signs, lack a reference [-- the text has 'meaning', but
this is misleading here as although the German is
'Bedeutung', it is 'Bedeutung' à la Frege, i.e., 'reference'
-- G.A.]. For Frege the alternative was this: either we deal
with strokes of ink on paper or these strokes of ink are
signs of something and their meaning ['Bedeutung'] is what they go proxy for. The game of chess itself shows that these alternatives are wrongly conceived — although it is not the wooden chessmen we are dealing with, the figures do not go proxy for anything, they have no meaning ['Bedeutung'] in Frege's sense. There is still a third possibility, the signs can be used the way they are in the game. If here (in chess) you wanted to talk of 'meaning', the most natural thing to say would be that the meaning of chess [sic.] is what all games of chess have in common. 53

At the time of his making these remarks to Waismann, and until circa 1934, Wittgenstein had, as we know, not at all consistently or adequately formulated the crucial notion of 'use in a game' which he brings into play here. One of the chief reasons for this was (as I noted in Chapter I) his shallow understanding of what constituted psychology in semantics and his concomitant serious failure to see the connection between any kind of a priorist position and the problem of explaining the connection between logical syntax/grammar and the playing of the language-game. Here again then, as the 'third possibility' point made to Waismann shows, Wittgenstein in his post-Tractatus 1929-33 thought was in possession of the seeds of a crucial and fundamental insight which, nonetheless, he sought to propagate in what only later (i.e., from 1934 onwards) he realised were desert conditions.

In the light of the introduction in 1934 of the radical breakthrough of the constitutive-use analysis, Wittgenstein effected the relocation, and revision of the role, of the crucial 'third way' (between Frege and formalism). For the idea now, in Philosophical Grammar (and so circa 1934), emerges as a third way between on the one hand the formalists' outright rejection of content and on the other hand any kind of a priorism. So along with the highly important and pointedly anti-a priorist '4 apples plus 4 apples' remark cited a little earlier, the by far clearest-cut expression of the position taken up in Philosophical
In logic the same thing keeps happening as happened in the dispute about the nature of definition. If someone says that a definition is concerned only with signs and does no more than substitute one sign for another, people resist and say that that isn't all a definition does, or that there are different kinds of definition and the interesting and important ones aren't the mere "verbal definitions". They think, that is, that if you make definition out to be a mere substitution rule for signs you take away its significance and importance. But the significance of a definition lies in its application, in its importance for life. The same thing is happening today in the dispute between formalism and intuitionism, etc. People cannot separate the importance, the consequences, the application of a fact from the fact itself; they can't separate the description of a thing from the description of its importance.

The fundamental source of the metaphysical revulsion we have for the analytical claim that "a definition is concerned only with signs and does no more than substitute one sign for another", is a deeply foundationalist and anti-constructivist impulse. One of its principal strongholds is the conceptually confused view we have of samples, baptised objects, type-specimens, paradigms, etc. as definitive 'pieces of reality' onto which we affix names and definitions. Hence, to return to the '4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples' case, we impulsively think the use of the apples to illustrate this rule exposes, in some sense or other, properties of reality — properties applicable, inter alia, to the bits of reality we call 'apples'. As regards the language-reality connection thus centering on these objects and their properties, language qua 'mere talk, symbols, gestures, marks on the blackboard and on paper, sounds in the air', basically goes proxy for the objects, such that 'understanding a definition, name, etc.' means 'grasping the object here (somehow) signified'.

A classic case in point is the way this line of thinking treats
of colour concepts and their 'connection(s) with reality'. We think that here there can be no question that when, e.g., we say 'This is black', the definition fixes (onto) a referent. Indeed, and further, from the point of view of black being one of the primary colours, we want to add the point that the definition stands vis-à-vis the concept 'the primary colours' as entailing a disjunction for which 'F(\overline{\text{f}})\colon \text{These are the primary colours, except black}' is isomorphic with 'F(\text{red, green, blue, white, yellow})', and 'F(\text{all})\colon \text{These are all the primary colours}' = 'F(\text{red, green, blue, white, yellow, black})'. Moreover, even Wittgenstein concedes that concrete colour patches of the correct kind can most certainly replace each colour name here employed — indeed, how else do we (can we) define colour names, colour concepts? But that being so, we think that only a fool could argue that all we have here is "a mere substitution rule for signs": we want to insist that pace Wittgenstein, when we show you the primary colours we may use some signs, but what is fundamental to the definition is your being confronted with colours and their properties, not "a definition ... concerned only with signs".56 And moreover, post-Wittgenstein, we want also to add the caveat that the (alleged) Wittgensteinian reply that 'any ostensive definition can be misunderstood' is beside the point: we can concede the possibility of misunderstanding, but it will — we want to insist — be misunderstanding of colours and their properties, not 'mere signs'.

Such is the grip of the metaphysical revulsion we so readily feel in the face of the 'mere substitution rule for signs' analysis. But then (as
we are about to see further in the next few sections and beyond), we are
plagued here by is a deep misconception of what constitutes, and what is
the role of, signs, and of affirmation and negation and the rest of the
logical connectives. We deeply misunderstand concept formation: we think
that explaining 'blue' or 'pain' or 'gaudy' or 'bitter' etc., etc.,
and/or explaining 'Richard Nixon', 'Moses', 'St Anne', etc., consists in
giving a semantic rule that, in respect of each such semantic function,
"correlates it to a reality or gives it a reality that it did not have
before." 57

It is here, despite the huge amount of print which has been
particularly devoted to analyses of Wittgenstein's investigation of the
semantics of ostension, that the deepest aspects of the likes of his
dialectic with the 'Augustinian' picture of language remain very largely
unacknowledged. In particular, this is because the formalist dimensions
of Wittgenstein's concept of logical grammar have not been recognised.
Neither, from the point of view of understanding the formation of his
analysis, has the extent to which Wittgenstein constructs his 'no
reference; just a substitution rule for signs' analysis of naming,
ostension and laying down samples (etc.) through a particular dialectic
which he conducts within the parameters of Frege's own semantics.

A key text in both of these respects is Investigations 49, and in
particular its concluding points, viz., that

... naming and describing do not stand on the same level:
naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far
not a move in the language-game — any more than putting a
piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may
say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been
named. It has not even got a name except in the language-
game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a
word had meaning only as part of a sentence.
The tribute to Frege in this remark could not be more ironical. It is produced out of the formalistically-derived point that naming per se "is not a move in the language-game": the assignment of a name to an object is no more than preparation for the use of a name; a rule is laid down (in just the sense of our giving a 'name - object substitution rule'), but thereafter its use is another step altogether. So far as meaning is concerned "nothing has so far been done" that constitutes meaning: we have so far only established the permission of a semantic substitution between 'name and named'. In appealing to Frege's celebrated contextual dictum Wittgenstein thus not only makes this crucial point — that meaning (as the further step; the use of the rule) is constitutive use — but does so by rejecting just that move by which Frege, having gained a crucial insight, disastrously misplaces and misapplies the vital realisation that is encapsulated in the contextual dictum. For by Wittgenstein's lights the Fregean argument that a word has meaning only as part of a sentence, points us in the right direction — the direction of recognising use — even though (and here is the rub) it is set by Frege in cognitivist and a prioristic foundations.

As a case in point, look closely at the running together of the insight of the contextual dictum with cognitivism (as mediated by the sense - reference distinction) in this explication of Frege's analysis of proper names: Michael Dummett tells us that for Frege, should it be the case that, 
...
I am told, 'This is the River Windrush', and I have no idea how to determine whether it would be right, at some other place or other time or both, to say once more, 'This is the River Windrush', then I know nothing about the expression 'the River Windrush' save the bare fact that it was right to say, 'This is the River Windrush', at that very place and time: I thus do not know what object was being named, or, indeed, that the expression used was being employed as a name...
of an object at all. It could have meant, 'This is beautiful', or anything .... 58

Because, as I pointed out in Chapter I, Frege developed and employed the sense-reference distinction to secure content for definitions — on pain of the vacuity problem that bedevils true analytic a priorism — he (as does Dummett also) insists that having the requisite "idea how to determine whether it would be right, at some other place or ... time ... to say once more, 'This is the River Windrush'", is a cognitive function.

We know what total havoc the 'rule-sceptic' wreaks upon this whole line of theory and also just how severely Wittgenstein's analysis rejects the idea of rules, definitions, senses, as cognitive functions. As I indicated in Chapter I, the 'rule-sceptic' and the empiricist conclude that as rules and definitions etc. cannot be objects of knowledge (will not pass muster as synthetic functions), so 'knowing a language, the meaning of a word, etc.' must just and only mean 'knowing extensions'. By crucial contrast however, Wittgenstein utterly rejects this conclusion. Instead, he agrees with Frege that we cannot dispense with and disavow intensions — and so, e.g., that the semantic constitution of the name — object relationship cannot be swallowed up into the extension of the name (and so into the existence of the object and its empirical properties). But, as the rule-following paradox analysis so potently shows, we cannot treat rules, definitions, explanations of meanings (including senses a la Frege), as having content, as synthetic (let alone synthetic a priori) factors; as 'showing' us what to do, what is meant by, 'presenting' for cognition what ipso facto must be such-and-such (binding) referents.
The way out of this paradoxical situation is of course to eschew the sense-reference distinction and its poisoned synthetic a priori legacy, whilst concomitantly acknowledging that, e.g., the act of naming an object lays down only a semantic rule and no more than that, of itself. Thus, the 'baptismal' or 'ostensively-definitive' moment is as Investigations 49 tells us "not a move in the language-game": it is our establishing, in a definitional convention operating between name and object, "a substitution rule", which, as such, "has no reference", irrespective of its involving the appropriation of an object. So it is just the same here as with the rule-demonstration '4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples':

... the equation 4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples is not a proposition about apples. We may say that in this equation the word "apples" has no reference. (And we can always say this about a sign in a rule which helps to determine its meaning.)

Because "nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named" or otherwise set into the logical grammar of the language, in the sense, that is, in which, e.g., "[n]aming is not so far a move in the language-game", then the thing we have so far just named or defined stands not as a referent, but rather "belongs to the symbolism and is not one of the objects to which I apply the symbolism."61

Indeed, and crucially, it is only because you apply the symbolism as you do that this 'object' constitutes an instance of such-and-such, the further continuation of the life of this particular person, the downstream part of the River Windrush, etc. etc.: logical grammars are neither self-applying nor (therefore) either a priori contentful or bearers of reference. Rather, they are — be they 'composed' of baptised objects, symbols, sounds, type-specimens, or whatever stuff of our
material worldly condition — signs. As such, they stand in need of use, and the existential-material 'Being' of samples etc. is not in and of itself of one whit of semantic significance. So it is that the "sample is an instrument of the language" such that, ipso facto, "it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation."62

We must allow ourselves to be struck here by this crucial analytical notion of our taking, or appropriating, a piece of the material world for the purposes of our establishing by this action the semantic basis (logical grammar) of our language-game(s). For in so setting up "a means of representation", and so in the fact that "this language like any other is founded on convention"63 we testify to the fact that, as Wittgenstein explained in his ninth Lent Term lecture in 1935,

[t]he need is for a sample, a paradigm, which is ... part of the [logical grammar of the] language, not part of the application [thereof]. Samples play the role played by the Greenwich foot, the existence of which does not prove that anything is a foot long. The Greenwich foot itself is not a foot long [i.e., is not 'F(fx)']. To say [to take another example] "Here is an instance of people being in love" is to take a sample into our language. And this is to make a decision, not to discover anything. 64

We 'decide' in at least the sense that we make conventions. But it is not until we secure and realise their application that, a posteriori, we derive meaning and content: we react in certain ways to these expressions (of 'logical form') qua rules for signs, and the product of this is sense and content — if the reaction 'follows the rule'. Concomitantly, as we generate a new piece of mathematics or logic, or as we (more generally speaking) make a new step in following a rule (and all steps are new once at least!), the direct-deed construction involved is not 'construction' a la intuitionist, idealist constructivism; it is "not that intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every
stage." Whether and how you go on is decisive.

Similarly, generality that is not mere shorthand for a specific disjunction of cases ('f(a) v f(b) v f(c) v f(d)'), and which is hence not already cashed out extensionally, presents us with a further illustration of the sample/rule - decision - use constructive nexus. The highly apposite metaphor which Wittgenstein uses is that of there being a kind of freedom involved here:

I want to say that the patch seems to have a relation to the edge that is independent of its distance. --- Almost as if I were using a geometry in which there is no such thing as distance, but only inside and outside. Looked at in this way, there is no doubt that the two pictures

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{O} \\
\text{O}
\end{array}
\]

are the same.

By itself the proposition "The patch is in the square" does no more than hold the patch in the square, as it were: it is only in this way that it limits the patch's freedom; within the square it allows complete freedom. The proposition constructs a frame that limits the freedom of the patch but within the frame it leaves it free, that is, it has nothing to do with its position. For that to be so the proposition must have the logical nature of the frame (like a box enclosing the patch). And so it has, because I could explain the proposition to someone and set out the possibilities, quite independently of whether such a proposition is true or not, independently of a fact. 66

To have "the logical nature of the frame (like a box enclosing the patch)", the sentence 'The patch is in the square', taken in and by itself, only stands as the expression of a concept in respect of 'the patch', and the step to determining where in the square is the patch (and how it stands proportionally to the square) only follows from the use of the expressed concept: in "itself the proposition 'The patch is in the square' does no more than hold the patch in the square as it were". The
issue of truth and falsity, empirical location and proportion, is a posteriori, use-constructed; it is an achievement realised in the successful application of the rule-explicative example 'F(t)'. Hence, Wittgenstein boldly concludes that as we are concerned with the expression of the concept, with 'F(t)' here,

[t]he correct expression of this sort of generality is... the expression of ordinary language "There is a circle in the square", which simply leaves the position of the circle open (leaves it undecided). ("Undecided" is a correct expression [here], since there just has not been any decision.) 67

Obviously, there is a stark contrast here with, e.g., the platonism Frege (despite the synthetic a priori implications of the sense-reference distinction) wove into his a priori position and its treatment of the workings of rules, definitions, concepts. Thus, as Michael Dummett tells us, for Frege:

... once we have specified the domain of quantification by means of a condition of membership of that domain, no more work remains for us to do, in order to guarantee that the sentence has a definite truth-value: all the rest is, as it were, accomplished independently of us by objective reality itself. 68

For Frege, arguing that certain decisions made by language-users are the source of the determination of sense and truth-value would be held up as tantamount to embracing psychologism. Thus, and irrespective of the real implications (and, perhaps, even some of the explicit commitments) of the sense-reference distinction, Frege insisted on treating concepts platonistically. As platonised 'thoughts', they metaphysically determined extensionality, and he treated truth and falsity as platomic objects so that the vicissitudes of actual language-use could not interfere with the logical and semantic relationships between sense and
the determination of truth-value. The concomitant of this approach in Frege's quantificational analysis is the view which we could surely express in the slogan 'Give the essence (or the criterion) and you ipso facto give the membership of the whole domain'. This slogan seeks to capture the way the Fregean treatment of the relationship of extension to criteria is analogous to the notion expressed in, e.g., the sentence 'Buy the deed to the house and get every brick in every of its walls'.

If we turn to the (supposedly) constructivist approach offered by intuitionists and anti-realists, we find that their complaints about the platonism that drives the Fregean criterial machinery just outlined, are of course not complaints about a priorism; they are complaints about what Frege and platonism bind to it and do with it. For the intuitionists et al., and to borrow Dummett's own words from what is in fact part of one of his criticisms of Frege's 'realism', the recognition of verifying experience, or its logical proxy, a canonically formulated proof, thrusts the necessity upon us, viz., that "no more work remains for us to do, in order to guarantee that the sentence has a definite truth-value." For the intuitionist or anti-realist the "work" which, pace Frege and all other 'realists', "remains for us to do" once, e.g., the criteria for membership of a class are laid out, is the 'work' of 'recognising' truths when and where they obtain. This (openly cognitivist picture) is the quintessence of 'construction' at the hands of the 'creative subject', intuitionistically construed or anti-realistically interpreted. It also powerfully underscores the realisation that 'use a la intuitionism/anti-realism is far removed from the Wittgensteinian notion. To make a contrast with the slogan-summation of Frege's approach which I proffered just above, the intuitionists et al. are distinguished from their 'realist' bêtes noir by their demand that they be able to read the deed
to the house and sight each brick (rather than, a la 'realism', take their property investment 'on trust alone').

If then we draw together the threads of the extended dialectic we have reconstructed thus far, we can see how Wittgenstein is seeking to advance the following radical philosophical semantics. In the first or 'genetic' instance, his analysis has it that definitions — conventions of logical grammar — constitute in themselves no more than substitution rules for signs; a logico-grammatical rule per se does not yield sense or content, and its formalisation, paradigmatic exemplification, or extended definitional expression, is strictly a series of symbols (standing in need of use) and not a sign of something; logical grammar does not denote, or refer to, anything. Second, and subsequently, understanding a sign or variable, e.g., in a quantifying sentence, involves one in taking the signs and using or applying them: the signs themselves do not yield their use; life-praxis is (as the preceding chapter's conclusion argued) the medium and motivator of signs' use; and as the signs do not refer, there are no objects for which they stand so as to cause, via their symbolic proxy, either reference/referring, or understanding (as opposed to objects' causation of all sorts of mere behaviour). (These two conditions constitute the so-called 'autonomy of (logical) grammar'.)

Third, the role of a variable in a quantifying proposition — i.e., in an empirical quantifying statement — is not necessarily intersubstitutable with (some list/class/set of) particular values or entities; it is a question decided in and by use: at one end of the spectrum one may assert a generality (or universality) as mere shorthand for speaking of specifically this, this, this and this; whilst at the other end of the spectrum, one's act of assertion uses a generality (or universality) as no more than an outright generalisation (e.g., and notoriously, 'All
Chinese waiters look alike to me'). Fourthly, in the example-giving role

generalities and universalities play in the constitution, or 'semantic
bedrock', of the language-game, the 'variables' which formal analysis
would have us pick out (when, e.g., we say 'There are some ... ' or 'These
are all ... '), are operating in the status of constituting genera: 'x, y,
z', are so used to criterially constitute 'such-and-such a thing
generically, or categorically speaking'; the criterially-constitutive
usage of variables is not translatable into usage of variables as mere
shorthand for particular (specific or non-specific) values. Fifth, grasp
of a rule or concept is (therefore) not tantamount to grasp of any
extension: a priorism of any kind is to be rejected; a rule or concept's
extension is an achievement; content is realised a posteriori.

In short then, Wittgenstein's essential point is that the way to
deal with rules, concepts, definitions, explanations of sense, is to (try
to) use them. And of course this succinctly exposes his analysis' view
of the genetic pattern of concept-formation and language-use:
1) establish rules; lay down concepts; define and name 'things'
2) apply/use the rules/concepts/definitions/names/samples/paradigms, so
as to
3) yield their extensions, constitute content; make the 'meaningful
   stuff of the life-world

Wittgenstein, as Investigations 49 clearly shows, recognised that in
the formulation of the contextual dictum, Frege had made what should have
been a major semantic advance. But it was an advance quite unrealisable
in the a priorist context into which Frege, both as a platonist devotee
and as the instigator of the sense - reference distinction, insistently
cast his philosophy of language. Frege had nevertheless rightly seen
that denotation, acquaintance with objects, entities, etc., simply could not be the basis of meaning. Thus, despite, e.g., the crushing overall criticisms Wittgenstein made against Fregean quantificational analysis, Frege's approach (unlike that of, say, Russell) is exposed by Wittgenstein's dialectic as having one major valid insight to it. It is suppressed of course not least by the fact that in both Fregean and Russellian analysis, the content of a domain of quantification was identified via the semantic artifice of assigning a proper name to each member of the domain. This move overwhelmingly motivates the notion that what we must do with concepts and other intensional devices (or failing that, with just definite descriptions a la Russell) is look for objects for which (ex-hypothesi) they are merely going proxy. However, Frege's approach has its one outstanding merit. It comes to light if we focus on the point (which is, inter alia, behind the dialectic of Investigations 49) that, e.g., in a case like 'There are men on this island', the mere substitution 'Mr A' → Mr A, 'Mr B' → Mr B, does not effect 'a move in the language-game'. That is, the mere presentation of the extensions Messers A and B on a small body of land surrounded by water, in no way determines the meaning of 'There are men on this island' even where we treat 'men' as shorthand for the implication \((\exists x)fx \rightarrow f(a)\).

Frege -- and here we see still more (I suspect) of what is behind Wittgenstein's ironic, but deliberate, acknowledgement in Investigations 49 -- was well aware of this problem with extensionality and its 'getting in front of the grasping of concepts'. As Dummett tells us, in Frege's view

... it would be impossible to know what it was that some expression stands for in advance of knowing what sort of
thing it was (where 'sort' means 'logical category'). .... Thus it is essential for Frege to be able to maintain that each expression may be recognised as belonging to its logical category or type from a knowledge of the way in which it is employed in the language. [So, e.g., t]he distinction between proper names and expressions of other types must be one that can be drawn in wholly linguistic terms, without the necessity for any scrutiny of the things for which the respective expressions stand. 69

This view — that knowing what sort of thing x (in the case in question, a man) is, must be logically prior to knowing that the entity ('f(a)'), presented here under the proper name 'Mr A', is a man on this island — correctly overturns the 'mere presentation of objects' problem canvassed above. And (correctly analysed) it does it via the very crucial distinction Wittgenstein develops in the course of the analysis reconstructed in the preceding sections: the distinction between the critical conceptual question 'What sort of thing is x?' and the answer 'F(\exists\overline{x})', and the question 'Which thing (out of these) is x?', which is an extensional consideration, and requires the use-constituted answer 'f(a)'. Frege nonetheless failed to realise this crucial analytical insight because, as we have seen, he treats the relationship between extensionality and logical categories a prioristically so that for him definitions and names yield their extensions and content 'automatically' and constitute meaning sui generis.

We can see then that by way of his conducting a crucial part of his dialectic within the agenda of Frege's semantics, Wittgenstein drives a wedge between logical grammar and both meaning and content whilst retaining Frege's insight that extensional functions cannot constitute semantic bedrock: if you want f(x), you are going to have to follow the rule — to make a move in the language-game — or put up with being confronted by mere signs (and, perhaps, the presently alien culture that
has put them there as marks of their rules, signs of their logical grammar).

VII

From the foregoing dialectic we can discern that, albeit in a radically revisionary, if not revolutionary way, Wittgenstein actually retains the Fregean view that 'sense determines reference'. Of course, he strips all a priorist trappings from the concepts 'reference' and 'referent', and he concomitantly exposes sense (qua meaning) as being use. But as I pointed out in the previous section, he agrees entirely with Frege that we cannot dispense with intensional considerations, and in particular the requirement that logical categories must be grasped before there can be any question of grasping extensions. Nonetheless, we have to free ourselves from a prioristic metaphysical encumbrances upon our analysis of logical grammar and the move from grasping categories — for Wittgenstein, f(1) or f(∀) — to grasping instances — f(x). We know that the synthetic a priorist device that is the sense–reference distinction must fall as part and parcel or our acknowledging this analytical realisation. In turn, this forces us to confront the role analyticity plays in the Wittgensteinian analysis of the (constitutive) move: concepts/rules → use → extensions'. For Wittgenstein converts Frege's avowal of the priority of the determination of logical categories into a radical semantic analysis of content and understanding as analytic a posteriori: rules, being contentless, compel merely because of their semantic and logical form and its place in normatively governing the making of moves in the language-game; in making these moves, using the rules we realise — construct — sense and content.

This Wittgensteinian parallel to Marx's turning Hegel's dialectic
the right way up, cuts what, for the purposes of this chapter's further analysis, is an extremely instructive radical contrast with the contrary, conservative, corrections of Fregean semantics advocated by Michael Dummett. For Dummett what is bankrupting about the price Frege's semantics pays for (what Dummett holds to be) the profound insights offered through the contextual dictum and the insistence of the semantic priority of (the determination of) logical categories, is Frege's holding to the view that rules and definitions must be analytic semantic functions (notwithstanding Frege's watering 'analyticity' down to make it a 'cognitive' function for his theory). So by Dummett's synthetic a priorist intuitionist/anti-realist lights, Frege's insistence that, as Dummett's earlier-cited exigesis of Frege's treatment of logical categories tells us, "the distinction between [e.g.] proper names and expressions of other types must be one that can be drawn in wholly linguistic terms" (my emphasis), forces damning circularity into the very foundations of Fregean semantics: one bit of language is used to explain another; no way out of the 'linguistic circle' is ever forthcoming.

Dummett has made much of this (not-incorrect) realisation, but (unlike Wittgenstein), it has all been directed against Frege's treatment of rules and definitions as analytic, rather than in the Wittgensteinian vein of stripping out a priorism and cognitivism from Frege's treatment of analyticity so as to expose its semantic role as constituted by its form alone. Dummett, in condemning Frege's error as he takes its implications and causes, tells us:

Frege is never tired of pointing out that it is impossible that all the expressions of a language should be defined. But since we need to learn the senses of all the expressions of the language, including those that are not introduced to us by means of definitions, and since Frege's theory of meaning requires that the sense of an expression be
something objective, grasped by all the speakers of the language, the notion of sense, and the whole theory of meaning in which it is embedded, would be much illuminated by an account of the other means that exist, besides definition, for conveying to someone what the sense of an expression is, [these] means [being] other than [the use of] definition for introducing expressions into the language. 70

By seizing on the lesson of this critical riposte to Frege's 'wholly language-internal' definitional treatment of logical categories, truth, domains of quantification, sense, etc., Dummett has developed in the context of his anti-realism, the demand that any 'theory of meaning' must be a 'full-blooded' such theory. That is

... it must not, in its completed form, make use of notions specifically related to the use of language (for instance, the notion of assertion or that of communication) which it leaves unexplained .... 71

Frege of course — in both Dummett's eyes and Wittgenstein's — falls foul of this requirement, though — and here is the highly instructive point I want to focus upon — Dummett and Wittgenstein are utterly at odds about how one avoids and/or overcomes Frege's error.

For Dummett (as John McDowell has frequently pointed out), a full-blooded theory of meaning must and can only be one wherein the content of the symbols or 'linguistic tokens' we use in playing the language-game is treated as accessible language-independently. On the Dummettian line, definitions establish and constitute sense and generate content through their laying down of the reference of each symbol or token. This 'sense determines reference' model is faithful to Frege except in the crucial respect that what is, ex-hypothesi, shown, given and proved in rules and definitions etc. must be surveyable by and accessible to a pre- (or non-) linguistic observer; the rules of the language-game must be able to yield their content for non-participant onlookers and are thus epistemically
constrained; they must be not analytic, but synthetic.

Now it is very interesting that Dummett has explicitly lauded the way the Tractatus' saying — showing distinction fits just this bill. In his recent paper "Frege and Wittgenstein", he points out that

[the distinction between saying and showing is not only consonant with Frege's ideas, but almost required for a coherent statement of them. Indeed, had Frege had this distinction at his command, a great deal of misunderstanding of his doctrine of sense would surely have been avoided. Not only, in laying down the reference of a term, do we not state, but only show, its sense; but surely, we ought to add, we cannot state the sense of an expression, save as being the same as that of some other expression, something which, within one language, there is no reason to suppose can always be done. That does not mean, in my view, that a theory of sense is mute, that a theory of sense can only be shown, not stated, since while we cannot state the sense of an expression, we can state what it is to grasp that sense and attach it to that expression. 72

The saying — showing distinction was of course crucial to at least two central ambiets of the Tractatus: the rejection of the idea that the logical constants 'and', 'or', 'not', etc. denote objects of any kind at all; and the dissolution of Russell's paradox. As regards this latter claim, I follow Hidê Ishiguro who has elegantly argued that

... the way in which predicates are identified in the Tractatus makes it impossible for the same word to function both as a subject and a predicate in the same sentence, or as predicates of different orders in the same sentence. This combines with the view that logical categories or logical forms cannot be described by predicates of our language, and with the view that '∈' does not express a relation proper [i.e. -- an internal relation (as is explained below) -- Q.A.] but is to be contextually eliminated. These points, together, block the formation of Russell's paradox. 73

Dummett's appeal to the saying — showing distinction is not contingent upon his carrying with it these particular concerns of the early Wittgenstein. However, whether or not an appropriation of the saying —
showing distinction for the securing of a full-blooded theory of meaning exactly fits the Tractatus' intentions, I leave to one side.

Instead, I want to engage with Dummett's counter-approach to the correction of Frege's treatment of rules and definitions, by way of bringing it into dialectic with, in the first instance, some material from one of Wittgenstein's 1931 Lent Term lectures. The lecture is germane despite its belonging to Wittgenstein's verificationist period, because in it Wittgenstein presses his case by critically addressing the circularity in Frege's definition of the logical connectives:

Frege explained such truth-functions (\(\land\), or, and, etc.) by propositions containing the words true and false; and this explanation is itself a notation which can be substituted for them. (Every explanation can be substituted for what it explains.) It is not a statement of an external or 'E' relation between e.g. \(\neg p\) and \(p\) is false but a definition.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
 p & & \\
 T & F & = \neg p \\
 F & T &
\end{array}
\]

But not "If 'p is T[true]' is F[false], and 'p is F[false]' is T[true], then \(\neg p\)". It is a definition not an expression of an external relation. 74

The relation of \(\neg p\) to 'p is false' is thus, on Wittgenstein's counter-analysis an internal relation; this is what the definition versus external relation distinction made here indicates. (I shall return to this shortly.)

Now of course both Frege and Russell in their different ways embraced views quite contrary to this. Frege thought the sign \(\neg p\)
denoted some platonic entity: The False. Platonisation of the content of logical connectives (as 'p' denoted 'The True'), is central to the truth-tabular explications of 'p', '¬p', 'A', 'v', etc., which Frege used to define these crucial terms. Russell, during his own 'platonistic' period, treated logical connectives and logical forms as objects of acquaintance. (His acquaintance with Wittgenstein from October 1911 onwards, came, in time, to cause him to question this, but he never resolved the issue.)

In 1935, in the seventh of his Lent Term lectures, Wittgenstein again raised this issue, and again pressed his claim that the truth-functions and logical connectives do not denote, but only constitute internal relations — thus showing that here, he held to this view throughout his entire philosophical career (though 'internal relations' etc. were not at all satisfactorily understood by Wittgenstein until he developed, post-1933, the constitutive-use analysis). So, in the seventh 1935 lecture, he told the class:

Frege had the idea that every sign, proposition as well as descriptive phrase, had a sense and a meaning [— by which Wittgenstein means 'Bedeutung', i.e., reference a la Frege — G.A.]. Two signs might have the same meaning [i.e., reference] but different senses. And he went on to say that a proposition has one of two meanings [i.e., references], the true and the false. "p" means [i.e., denotes] the true if "¬p" means [i.e., denotes] the false. The function ¬p was treated as a coordination of the two values, the true and the false, and a table could be written for it:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
 p & f(p) = \neg p \\
 T & F \\
 F & T \\
\end{array}
\]

Frege did not see that this table can itself be taken as a symbol for the function, though it looks as though it says something about the function. Frege had instead only given a translation: "¬p" translates as
This schema does not say anything about $\neg p$; it is another way of writing it.

Frege explained the notions of "or" and "not" by the notions of "true" and "false". That $p \lor q$ is false only if both $p$ and $q$ are false states a rule, and is embodied in the truth-function symbolism as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... It is important to see that this table, like the table for $\neg p$, says nothing about $p \lor q$, but is another way of writing it. When Frege explained such functions by listing the truth-values of the arguments in columns on one side and the function on the other, it looked as though he had said something about the function. But instead he had defined it, given another notation for it. 76

Wittgenstein's argument here is a straightforward corollary of his overall 'no reference or content; merely a substitution rule for signs' analysis. This could not be more at odds with the way Dummett conceives an adequate, full-blooded, theory of meaning, where the logical connectives and logical forms must be constructable from what, ipso facto, will be 'observer-accessible' rules and definitions which 'present' the content of, e.g., $\neg p$, 'p', 'F', 'V', 'N', 'V', and so on. If, however, things are as Wittgenstein held them to be in either his post-1933 period from which the above lecture comes as part of his mature philosophy where meaning is analysed as constitutive use, and 'p is false $\neg p$' is a mere substitution rule for signs and has logically/normatively compelling form but no content, or, mutatis mutandis, as in his verificationist period, as in the earlier-cited lecture, or even, perhaps as in the Tractatus, then Dummett's attempt to salvage the a priorist
riches of Fregean semantics is in serious trouble.

In his paper "The Justification of Deduction", Dummett's commitment to the crucial notion of the logic-and-language-independent accessibility of the (alleged) sense and content of the logical connectives and logical forms gains lengthy and impressive expression. As he draws to his antirealist intuitionistic conclusion, he does so by arguing that the "original fragment" of a natural language, which he defines as, inter alia, "logic free", is such that there is "no need to invoke a notion of truth going beyond the recognition of truth"; "two valued" classical "semantics ... is ... not required for the original fragment."77 The upshot of this is that this intuitionistic condition rules "the linguistic practices which existed before the logical constants were introduced"78, such that the constants when introduced are intuitionistically constrained just in virtue of their definitional presentation of their constructed content having to be, on Dummett's model, independently apprehensible.

But what are the conditions of independent apprehension here; these conditions of Dummett-style full-bloodedness? Manifestly (and unsurprisingly) they are a priorist conditions. But much more importantly to our present concerns, they must be conditions where, to repeat my earlier point, a fully language-external survey of rules and definitions grants (constructive) access to the (a priori) content of each symbol or token: the a priori bedrock represented by the signs 'p', 'np', 'A', 'v', etc. must be surveyable by and accessible to a pre- (or non-) linguistic (or at least, for the present case of the logical connectives, "logic free") observer.

But let us look at this Dummettian notion in the light of
Wittgenstein's critical points made in his lectures cited above. (The 'mature', post-1933, version of the argument also appears in (inter alia) both part I of *Philosophical Grammar*, in remark-series 79, and in the *Investigations*, at remarks 134 to 137 inclusive; so the common thread from *Tractatus* to *Investigations* shows analytical evolution, not anachronism, here.) Wittgenstein puts his 1931 lecture's conclusion rather opaquely in the sentences "But not 'If 'p is T' is F, and 'p is F' is T, then \( \neg p \). It is a definition not an expression of an external relation." But we can reconstruct this point to fit his mature understanding of the argument (as in the 1935 lecture) thus: to get the truth-table to do what is required of it by a *priorism* and its parallel treatment of rules, definitions and content, the table must be 'read' not as expressing an internal, merely intra-linguistic sign-substituting (analytic), relationship between the relevant terms (here: 'T', 'F', 'p', '\( \neg p \)'); it must be read as somehow 'presenting' its (*a priori*) content; as (to specifically take up Dummett's synthetic *a priori* approach), 'pre-logically' presenting the content of the rules and definitions in use, apprehension of which *ipso facto* establishes understanding of them.

But this produces a damning paradox. For not only must the sense and (*a priori*) content of, e.g., \( \neg p \) be (at least) 'pre-logically' available to the observer, but a clear condition of this is that \( \neg p \) qua expression of (the concept of) negation, stands to its content in an external — 'E' — relation: as Dummett himself insists, it cannot stand in the internal '=' relation, as that subverts its being 'available for understanding from without'. And indeed, we are forced into this \( \neg p \neg p \) is false' construal by the realisation that (ex-hypothesi) we must treat the truth-table just so, as a condition of reading the inferences it shows/refers to. In reading the table out loud we would say 'If' 'p is
true' is false, and/or if 'p is false' is true, then not-p' — and now the paradox bites, because this reading, a la Dummett's demands, must treat the expressions thus read as non-necessary and thus as bona fide propositions. (For what else is the 'if' and its counterfactual inferential role doing in our reading?). Yet how can we treat the expressions as mere propositions, and in so doing make counterfactual inferences, when we are in a definitively "logic free" state? If the expressions are not (yet) logic for us, how are they supposed to give us this? For it is precisely the grasp of propositionality and inference that we lack — that we are 'outside of' — and which we are supposedly being given here (in the truth table) even though, manifestly, we are, as 'aliens', in absolutely no position to 'recognise' it as such!

Dummett's profound misgivings about Frege's commitment to an analytic treatment of rules and definitions are thus utterly misplaced. For analyticity is only a problem for a priorists. Anti-a priorists (of whatever kind) have no need to either condemn themselves to circularity in their treatment of meaning or to instead cultivate mythologies about logical necessity and semantic determinacy being sui generis spawned out of the flow of experience. So in fact from an anti-a priorist point of view (be it Quinean or Wittgensteinian; it makes no difference here), Dummett is right to object to Frege's expectation that an analytic treatment of rules and definitions can, somehow, say something — anything — about meaning, logical connectives, rules, etc.; there is nothing 'in' the rules, the definitions, to 'say' anything about. But he is damningly wrong in his attempts to correct Frege by insisting that rules and definitions must be construed as synthetic functions which can and must not 'say' but 'show' their content to the pre- (or non-) linguistic onlooker: rules and definitions have no content, only form, to
show. Dummett's idea that viewing what he calls 'linguistic practices' is tantamount to 'viewing the logical grammar of the language', either collapses into empiricism's candid (post-Quinean) admission that 'there is nothing to scrut', (as Quine famously put it), or it lapses into the circularity Dummett himself condemns just because, if it is bona fide praxis we are seeing, then this is because we are, thereby, in the midst of the language-game already, and not in a position of reflection upon its logical and semantic constitution. Note however — for this is the next issue I want to develop here — Wittgenstein embraces neither of these contra-Dummettian outcomes.

VIII

Wittgenstein's analysis, through its exploitation of formalism in exposing the analytic-but-contentless constitution of all bona fide definitions and explications of rules, criteria, meanings, clearly steals an overwhelming march over those (be they, e.g., Frege, or Grice and Strawson) who champion the orthodoxy that analytic sentences are contentful. But there are a number of more recent philosophers who disavow analyticity but exalt the content-bound nature of all explications of meaning and understanding. Which is to say that they favour the second of the two (non-Wittgensteinian) contra-Dummettian outcomes canvassed at the end of the last section: in conducting semantic analysis, as it is bona fide linguistic praxis which we must examine, we must and cannot but find ourselves in the midst of the language-game (qua genera) already, thus subverting the very idea of externalistic examination of its logico-semantic constitution. This sort of position is particularly championed by John McDowell who, as an unashamed internalist with openly Wittgensteinian commitments, offers (inter alia)
an analysis of rule-following praxis and a critique of Dummett and externalism that, in certain key respects, is strikingly close to that which I proffer here.

McDowell characterises the Dumettian externalist view as treating a grasp of language as if the language-game (or any practice)

... can be described, in such a way as to reveal its point or significance, from the perspective of a cosmic exile — a perspective, that is, which is not to any extent coloured or affected by the occupant's own involvement in a form of life; for the capacity of the description to make the activity comprehensible is not to depend on any such involvement. 79

What should be 'available' to the Dumettian cosmic exile — behaviour which is the manifestation of understanding, as well as the practical situation in which the 'manifestation of understanding' occurs — is what takes the place, in Dummett's theory, of, e.g., Fregean 'thoughts' que platonic entities (or of Russellian 'objects of acquaintance', and so on). McDowell, paralleling the argument developed in the last section above, points out against the cosmic exile perspective that from this alien position

... there is no reason to suppose that any point or significance, of the sort which human activities have, would be discernible in anything. ... What seems plausible is, rather this: if we insist on eliminating dependence upon prior involvement in forms of life, then we eliminate the very possibility of understanding. ... [T]he sense which, from our participant perspective, we see in our linguistic behaviour would be invisible from the cosmic exile's perspective. 80

The Wittgensteinian position we have thus far reconstructed is, on the face of it, entirely consonant with this insightful riposte to Dummett and externalism. However, Wittgenstein's anti-externalism is part and parcel of his analysis of the expression of a rule, the explication
of a sense, the introduction of a paradigm, as no more — in itself —
than the production of a semantic form strictly constitutive "of a
symbol", or string of symbols, "and the rules for its use." Now this
whole analytical line and its strategically crucial concession to
formalism, raises serious questions about the way McDowell uses the
above-cited (and thoroughly incisive) criticisms of externalistic
theories. For he insists that

... in theorising [sic.] about the relation of our language
to the world, we must start in the middle, already equipped
with a command of language; we cannot refrain from exploiting
that prior equipment, in thinking about the practice, without
losing our hold on the sense which the practice makes. 82

But if this argument holds in the way McDowell takes it, it entails the
prohibition of Wittgenstein's strategic concession to formalism whereby
he makes good the crucial distinction between a rule and the application
of the rule.

The rule-versus-application-of-the-rule distinction is, I want to
argue, unsustainable and unacknowledgeable on the McDowellian internalist
line. Indeed, Dummett has got far nearer to the point that marks the
necessity of this distinction in his insistence that, at least, what is
mistaken in Frege's platonisation of concepts, rules, senses etc., shows
itself most distinctly in the serious difficulties Fregean semantics has
in accounting for actual language-use, concrete understanding of rules,
etc. To be sure, as we have seen, Dummett expresses this insight in an
unworkable semantic-theoretic context. But introducing considerations
about the need for sense and truth to be recognisable, usable by, and for
counterlanguage-users, is nonetheless exactly the fundamental
corrective move to make (as I argue in more detail in my engagement with
Dummett and anti-realism in Chapter V). Dummett's problem is that he sees
no other way to take use seriously than by embracing verificationism, synthetic analyses of logical grammar, and the metaphysics of a priorism. So with one hand — the one holding firm to use — he points the way to Heaven whilst, with the other, he simultaneously covers over his disciples' eyes.

McDowell meanwhile is doing the same sort of thing, though for clearly different reasons. Two central aspects of his theory prominently secure this pyrrhic outcome: he treats the grasp of meaning as propositional knowledge (in a modified Davidsonian, T-sentence, formulation); and he insists that internalism is made consistent strictly by, and as a condition of, outright rejection of the very idea of a "full-blooded" analysis of meaning. The upshot of this second constraint is that

... a modest theory of meaning [as opposed to a 'full-blooded' one], by design, starts off in the midst of content; so it cannot contribute to the task of representing content as an achievement. This makes it seem that recognition of the task reinstates the obligation of full-bloodedness; but that is a bad thought. It is in fact quite unclear how the problematic idea of acquiring the ability to put one's mind into one's words might even seem to be illuminated by being glossed in terms of acquiring implicit knowledge of a theory of meaning for a language 'as from outside' content; and in any case, ... the gloss cannot be kept pure of psychologism. A better thought is that it is precisely because full-bloodedness is impossible ... that the task of representing content as an achievement is so difficult. 83

As McDowell thus constructs the modest-theories-of-meaning-versus-full-blooded-theories dispute, there seems to be no third way: we are seemingly bound to fall in with one or the other camp — and, if this is how things really are, Wittgensteinian semantics clearly comes down on, and close to, the side of McDowellian internalism. (some version of) modesty, etc. But as I have foreshadowed, no such choice and commitment
to its perspective is forced upon us: Wittgenstein's dialectic and analysis transcends the dichotomy McDowell has (via the Davidson-Dummett debate) laid out.\textsuperscript{84}

I question the ability of McDowell's theory to take on board the insight and intent behind Wittgenstein's contention that "nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named."\textsuperscript{85} Surely McDowell would have to confess utter mystification here because Wittgenstein's point is through-and-through about the (laying down of) logical grammar for naming and denotation, and yet it is a point framed, as we know, in terms of these factors being analysed as prior to, and as preparation for, the achievement of content.\textsuperscript{86} Via Davidson, McDowell commits himself to the view that 'interpretation' has as its fountainhead the grasping of (internalistically construed) connections between 'belief-expressions' and extensions: by looking to the things (qua content) which the native is talking about, we break into her/his language.\textsuperscript{87}

The idea of solving for sense by way of grasping the extension(s) of native talk is, of course, empiricistic in motivation. But what I find remarkable and utterly ameliorating about McDowell's views is the extent to which he is determined to mitigate this by his insistence (partly via Davidson) that -- pace any bona fide empiricism — we not only cannot dispense with, but must concentrate our philosophical analyses upon, taking content seriously. Alas, he cannot achieve this end in the way he contends, and this for the two principal reasons outlined a few pages ago (viz.: treatment of the grasp of meaning (and content) as propositional knowledge; and his rejection of any kind of 'full-blooded' analysis of meaning).

To see how McDowell goes utterly astray through his commitment to
the T-sentence style treatment of understanding and meaning as propositional knowledge, and his strict 'modest theory' insistence that content cannot be analysed constitutively, i.e., as an achievement, consider the way Wittgenstein makes a number of crucial internalist points in the following series of remarks:

The construction of a proof begins with some signs or other, and among these some, the 'constants', must already have meaning in the language. In this way it is essential that 'ν' and 'μ' already possess a familiar application, and the construction of a proof in *Principia Mathematica* gets its importance, its sense, from this. But the signs of the proof do not enable us to see this meaning.

The 'employment' of the proof has of course to do with that employment of its signs.

To repeat, in a certain sense even Russell's primitive propositions convince me.

Thus the conviction produced by a proof cannot simply arise from the proof-construction.

If I were to see the standard metre in Paris, but were not acquainted with the institution of measuring and its connection with the standard metre --- could I say, that I was acquainted with the concept of the standard metre?

Is a proof not also part of an institution in this way?

....

What I always do seems to be --- to emphasise a distinction between the determination of a sense and the employment of a sense. 88

Until we are struck by this last remark, McDowell's "modest theory" *(sic)* brand of internalism seems vindicated by Wittgenstein's critique here of Russell and *Principia*. For recall how we saw McDowell insist that analysis ("theorising" in his terms) "must start in the middle" 89 of content/language. To be sure, as Wittgenstein puts it above, it is only from within "the institution of measuring and its connection with the standard metre" that one can be "acquainted with the concept of the standard metre", but this crucial internalist point is quite differently
treated by McDowell and Wittgenstein.

McDowell, under the (frankly, pernicious) influence of Davidsonian semantic theory, treats a grasp of 'institutions' as a grasp of certain kinds of propositions: propositions which express internalistically-construed truths; semantic-cum-anthropological truths which 'truth-conditionally' correlate utterances with strictly internalistically-available contexts, events, phenomena, etc. Thus he tells us, most appositely, that

... Frege's notion of sense belongs with the notion of understanding, and we can get at what is involved in understanding a language by careful employment of the notion of knowledge. [Thus, what we need is explication of] ... the nature of a theory knowledge of which would suffice for understanding a language. We can think of a theory of sense as a component of a total theory of that kind: a component which, in the context of principles adequate to determine the force ... with which particular utterances are issued, serves ... to determine the content of speech-acts performed in issuing those utterances. Semantically simple expressions would be mentioned in axioms of such a theory, designed so that knowledge of the truths they express -- in the context of knowledge of enough of the rest of the theory -- would suffice for understanding utterances containing those expressions. The hypothetical knowledge involved here, then, is knowledge of truths (French 'savoir', German 'wissen'). The reference (Bedeutung) of a name, on the other hand, is, in Frege's usage, its bearer -- an object. To know the reference of a name, would be, failing an unpardonable equivocation, to know that object: acquaintance, perhaps, but in any case not knowledge of truths but, what is grammatically distinct, knowledge of things (French 'connaitre', German 'kennen'). It is not, then, the sort of knowledge which it would make sense to state in clauses of a theory.

Now without pre-empting the detailed arguments of the next few sections, what is wrong with this Davidsonian-inspired treatment of sense (albeit a treatment of sense as 'institution-internal') is that a T-sentence like, e.g.:
'This object is one metre long' is true if and only if the object is as long as the standard metre expresses mere propositional knowledge, which, ipso facto, does not constitute the knowledge which consists in mastery of the technique(s) of metric measurement. Thus the T-sentence does not address the crucial issue of how the 'truth-yielding' relationship between the standard metre and the result of the measurement is achieved; it just takes this for granted. It is, at bottom, an anthropological account of a practice: it describes the practice; it does not tell us 'the how' of doing it; how the game comes to be so played — as opposed to the fact that it is thus and so played — is not dealt with here. The difference in question is the difference between the use and content of a coaching manual, and the use and content of a commentary on a game (or series of games). McDowell's internalism thus secures no more than commentator-on-the-match status for us. In contradistinction, Wittgenstein shows that what we must have is an internalist analysis which (via conceptually-analytic reflection) explicates the moment of (to coin a bad phrase) 'doing praxis' — the 'how' in 'how it's done'; praxis as living life this or that way — not commenting on and description of the manifestations and outcomes of life, as if one is forever anthropologist, never native.

IX

We are now very close to the heart of Wittgenstein's critique of the very idea of a formal semantics for natural language. For Wittgenstein, taking praxis seriously means doing just what McDowellian analysis cannot, despite the great merits of its commitment to taking content seriously. Even if we can (as internalists) confront a life-world on the basis of acknowledging it as a domain of praxis constitutive of its own
content (rather than, as a priorism has it, as a domain of praxis hostage
to some metaphysical reality for its content) it is one thing to
acknowledge it as a domain of praxis and thus of content, and yet another
again to actually enter into — 'become as one with' — the constituted
content of the life-world. Simply put (by way of laying out the
fundamental point we are pursuing here), it is one thing to see (and/or
describe the sight) that here is a game and these are moves being made
therein, and another — if Wittgenstein is right — to understand, to
share the content, to have a meeting of minds, with the players of the
game.

Despite their utterly different views about what is the right
position from which to view language-games (externally/‘full-bloodedly’,
or internally/‘modestly’), both Dummett and McDowell are committed to the
view that meaning and content must be accessible by a logical process
that yields descriptions of the practice(s): pictures and reports of the
game are (when taken with a grasp of the aim of the moves in the game)
held to logically suffice for its being understood. By way of
clarificatory contrast, Frege — because he insists that all explication
of rules, senses, concepts, is (certius paribus) analytic — would have
pointed out that bona fide prescriptions, qua 'giving of the rules', are
essential to understanding the game. This is a crucial point
Wittgenstein indeed (as we know) appropriates from Frege's semantics —
though as we have seen, he has, inter alia, to lever it off from the
legacy of a priorism so as to cash Frege's insight into anything of
value.

If we look for a common thread between Frege, Dummett and McDowell
in terms of what prevents them, each in their own different way, from
realising the distinction between, on the one hand, confronting a practice and explicating it on that basis, and on the other hand, explicating a practice from the point of view of those doing it, the crucial common thread is, I suggest, their (unsurprising) commitment to theory construction, particularly in the guise of what I want to call 'logicism' in semantic analysis. In their own way, each insists that if we lay out the formal, rule-governed structure of the practice — on a prescriptive or, instead, a descriptive basis — we ipso facto explicate, unpack, 'rationally reconstruct' the practice such that the now expressed formalised structure is what the language-user grasps that constitutes her/him as a language-user (in concert with the formalisation's relationship to content).

Wittgenstein's crucial construction of the rule-use distinction is the result of his complete critical rejection of this vision of philosophical-semantic analysis. And thus his fundamental objection to the project of giving a formal semantics for natural languages is that semantic formalisation (cum theory construction) systematically and definitively abstracts itself from the constitutive deeds that are the use, the application, of signs, 'thoughts', sentences, etc. In short, the push to 'theoreticise' and logicise semantics is predicated upon alienation from the essence of the techniques, the concrete constitutive deeds, that construct sense, implication, inference, inuendo, understanding, intent and the rest of the content of the language-game. Formalised semantics can at best seek to give rules and/or descriptions of games, but the whole idea of so proceeding collapses like the all-too-attractive house of cards it is, once we acknowledge the gap between rule and application, between saying that this is, or must be, done, and doing the thing. Surely it was with precisely this in mind that (as we saw
above) Wittgenstein wrote, in the context of one of his sustained attacks on logicism in philosophy of mathematics, "What I always do seems to me to be --- to emphasise a distinction between the determination of a sense and the employment of a sense."92

X

I want now to canvass on two principal fronts the dialectic out of which arises Wittgenstein's insistence on the rule-application distinction: first, by examining his critique of logicism; and then by engaging with the dialectic and analysis of a number of remarks (principally from Remarks on Colour) in which Wittgenstein expressly develops his argument that content is only accessible through constitutive praxis; through and in deeds, not descriptions (or prescriptions).

To grasp the extremely radical position at the bottom of Wittgenstein's attack on (semantic-analytical) logicisation of the proceedings of language-games, we must first reflect on the fact that the massive advances Frege and Russell made in logic substantially dismissed or ignored the question of the extent to which systematic formalisation, with its proofs of completeness, well-formedness, consistency, etc., is content preserving. Today, particularly if we hearken to the echoes of Frege's attacks on the psychologisation of logic, raising this issue strikes us as utterly unsophisticated and primitively retrograde in its implications. But arch-opponent of psychology that he was, the later Wittgenstein nevertheless pursues the content-preservation issue at length and in depth against the logicised mode of analysis developed by Frege and Russell and now so dominant.
The following two remarks from the lengthy critique of Russell's *Principia Mathematica* treatment of proofs in section III of *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, will serve to open our exposé of this radical line of critique:

The consideration of [the problem of] long unsurveyable logical proofs is only a means of showing how this technique — which is based on the geometry of proving — may collapse, and new techniques become necessary. 93

Recursive definition introduces a new sign-technique. It must therefore make the transition to a new 'geometry'. We are taught a new method of recognising signs. A new criterion for the identity of signs is introduced. 94

'Geometry' here means 'formalised symbolic structure', and clearly Wittgenstein is pressing the point that 'new geometries' are introduced because the old ones are too difficult to actually use, such that they are subject to failure to deliver content.

Now at first blush, this objection against the surveyability of, e.g., long complex *Principia*-endorsed 1-1 correlation proofs, seems tantamount to an absurd attempt to make all well-formed expressions or symbolisations hostage to the vicissitudes of limited eyesight, memory, intelligence, hearing, etc. But what motivates this dismissive and pejorative response is a particular metaphysical impulse that obscures our view of what it is that generates (and enforces) logical compulsion, inference, necessity, and so on. For suppose that we transform a proof into alternative expressions — just as we might explain the meaning of a prolix sentence in 'Haig-speak' by 'translating' it into perspicuous prose. Why should perspicuity be anything but a mere psychological consideration here? If we generate, say, two transformations of a proof, surely we can say 'Why worry if one of them is enormously obscure, for
... can't one prove logically that both transformations must lead to the same result?" — But what is in question here is surely the result of transformations of signs! How can logic decide this? 95

If we say that transformation of signs according to such-and-such patterns is mere packaging which leaves the validity and compulsion of logical implication untouched, then it becomes increasingly difficult, outside of (say) the psychology of aesthetics, to explain why we bother to (systematically) use signs. The moment we reply that we need signs to 'show' validity etc., the further issue arises of what logic has to do with any interest we have in 'showing validity'; why not just ignore the perspicuity factor in formalising it? Logic and its validity is, after all, (ex-hypothesi) self-contained, such that its being symbolised this way or that has no effect upon it; validity is (ex-hypothesi) validity regardless of how you formally symbolise it.

But if symbols cannot be more than (inert) packaging, and logic goes on independently of them in at least the sense that whatever symbolisation you care to use, validity, well-formedness, necessity, completeness etc. are unaffected, then the connection between logic and giving meaningful expressions, producing understanding, proving, calculating — between there being rules of a game and the game's being actually playable and played — collapses. And now, surely, the following problem arises: suppose we have, e.g., the complete rules of cricket but that the game has never yet been played and no facilities or equipment yet exist for its playing: why, from the rules and the rules alone, can we not deduce the particular events, scores and results of all future cricket matches? Or, to take another (inverse) case, imagine a tribe of beings who have no interest of any kind in logical or mathematical reasoning. We come upon them, realise their complete
ignorance of and lack of even the slightest interest in, logic and mathematics, yet we find they spend a lot of time drawing on huge canvasses. They draw in what is for us notation used by mathematical logicians, and when we so 'read' one of their huge artworks, we recognise that here — to us — is a proof of Fermat's last theorem: how are these beings brilliant mathematicians? For that matter, why is Jackson Pollock's "Blue Poles" not a proof of Golbach's conjecture?; or of Fermat's last theorem?; or a translation of Cantor's diagonal proof?

If logic is not bound, or bindable, to signs by practical-use considerations, then the idea that we can, e.g., prove that dual transformations of a proof lead to the same result, collapses. And this shows that the idea of logic in abstractum -- which idea Russell and Frege definitively bequeathed to us -- cannot decide the result of transformations of signs. It is only for those with a quite particular kind of interest in and response to systematic sign transformation, such as characterises (the production of) 'the geometry' of formal notation, that there is therein any compulsion, validity, significance. Otherwise, anything can be 'interpreted' as a sign of or for anything; -- and that is just a cryptic way of saying that here nothing can symbolise anything. So any logic that avows indifference to its perspicuity of expression does so on pain of lapsing into complete otioseness. And what then of its claims to compel, prove, necessitate?; compel, prove and necessitate what, how, and to whom?

Let us remember that it is not enough that two proofs meet in the same propositional sign. For how do we know that this sign says the same thing both times? That must proceed from other connections. 96

As these crucial 'other connections' have been sketched thus far,
the notion of 'being interested in and responding to the use of signs' of

\textit{course} strongly implies anthropologism. And this brings back into focus, \textit{inter alia}, the issues raised in our rebuttal of the validity of the

Dummett-McDowell dispute's basic premise: that, one way or another, an 'anthropological', praxis-describing, mode of semantic analysis is the

key to explicating the logic of the concepts of meaning and understanding. For despite their differences, Dummett and McDowell suppose that (externalism \textit{versus} internalism aside) an adequate 'theory' of meaning is one that describes practices (and supplements this with an account of their point, aim or purpose) sufficiently well so as to uncover their logical rules and their connections with the life-world

content of the language-users' described activities.

In \textit{Remarks on Colour} there are a number of series of remarks which, taken together, arguably constitute Wittgenstein's definitive rebuttal of the very idea of a semantics that uses descriptions of praxis to break into content. But by way of leading into these crucial pieces of text, let us note that Wittgenstein himself made no bones about the \textit{prima facie} 'anthropologising of logic' which flows, in particular, out of his critique of \textit{Principia Mathematica} logicism. In the course of his \textit{RFM} attack on Russell, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
What if we said that mathematical propositions were prophecies in this sense: they predict what result members of a society who have learnt this technique will get in agreement with other members of the society? '25 x 25 = 625' would thus mean that men, if we judge them to obey the rules of multiplication, will reach the result 625 when they multiply 25 x 25. --- That this is a correct prediction is beyond doubt; and also that calculating is in essence founded on such predictions. That is to say, we should not call something 'calculating' if we could not make such a prophecy with certainty. This really means: calculating is a technique. And what we have said pertains to the essence of a technique. 97
\end{quote}
Essential to "a technique" is its being a piece of life-praxis and not, e.g., an empty ceremony. And anthropologists can and do indeed study mathematical practices. But is it anthropology — or psychology — that shows us how to understand, that teaches us the use of signs that is (in this case) mathematics?

XI

The case of the relationship between the sighted and the blind raises the anthroposophism issue in what is, for our present purposes, a particularly perspicuous context (though the fundamental issue behind the problem of distinguishing the grasp of a proof — or any part of logic — as the grasping of a 'geometry' of symbolisation, as opposed to grasping content, remains):

Can one describe to a blind person what it's like for someone to see? — Certainly. The blind learn a great deal about the difference between the blind and the sighted. But the question was badly put; as though seeing were an activity and there were a description of it. 98

We can be sure, given what we have already seen in Chapter I and in this chapter so far, that the thrust of this remark is in no way directed toward embracing the likes of the Tractatus treatment of content as ineffable: the issue raised here is utterly consonant with the view that genuine intersubjectivity obtains when you and I play the same language-game. As such, the the problem Wittgenstein is addressing is that of the relationship between 'players' and people who, e.g., live with those players but cannot themselves join in the game. The blind stand thus to the sighted, and Wittgenstein's point in the above remark is directed against the idea that what, from a semantically relevant point of view, is lacking in the blind person's grasp of the life-world of the sighted,
is something whose 'essence' is expressible in propositions: in descriptions of (ex-hypothesi) the "activity" that is seeing.

If, e.g. (and to take the hardest case), a sighted person is suddenly blinded for some time, neither her/his memory of colours nor his/her residual grasp of visual concepts, is, I want to argue, constituted by or grounded in propositional knowledge. That is, knowledge characterisable as propositional knowledge of a language by its being expressible in, e.g., a T-sentence like

'Grass is green' is true (in English) if and only if grass is green.

For even if a blinded person has 'green visual experiences', say because s/he remembers colours via colour images, the intersubstitutability of that experience for the word 'green' on the right hand side of the T-sentence, in itself just and only gives her/him a piece of propositional knowledge about what English speakers say is the colour of grass: they say this is the colour of grass. What earthly difference propositional knowledge of the colour of grass can otherwise make to this person's utterly visually-impaired life-praxis, is either not considered or is gravely misrepresented on this, descriptivistic, kind of analysis. Or, at least, we could put the matter this way, i.e., as if there is a step (to be taken to get) from propositional knowledge to praxis, if -- as is not the case -- the T-sentence formulation or its host of semantic-analytical analogues, could do requisite justice to the idea of content as something grasped in a 'propositional medium'.

Indeed, if it were the case that what gives the formerly-sighted person her/his residual colour memory and understanding of 'colour talk' were propositional knowledge such as e.g., the theory behind the above-
explicated T-sentence formula suggests, a dammingly intractable dualistic metaphysical problem would arise. For if things were as descriptivistic analysis supposes, then blindness in general would be explicable by the (metaphysical) hypothesis that all the blind (formerly-sighted or not) have the same experiences as the sighted, only the blind are unable to (or just do not) respond to them as the sighted do. (Life-long blindness would be distinguishable on this theory from the blindness of the formerly-sighted, by a further distinction between the limits of responses in the two blind populations.) 'Content' can still be kept as a viable notion here, and on a more 'orthodox' descriptivistic theory of blindness as well, by insisting that it is a function of moving from the 'propositionally mediated' grasp of, e.g., 'green', to actually making assertions (and so on) about things in the world.

The acid test for descriptivistic analysis on the semantic front (which is our chief concern here) comes about when we reflect that the viability of the theory turns upon the following requirement, viz.: that the negation-expression in the following sentence makes sense in a way consistent with the crucial 'green' \( \equiv \) green intersubstitutability canvassed above (in respect of the right-hand side of the T-sentence):

\[
\text{'This } \equiv \text{ what you/I can't see'.}
\]

For the T-sentence given earlier is just a fancy way of treating the content of the avowal of experience 'I see green grass', as an expression of propositional knowledge. But when you consider the semantics of propositions for so much as a moment, it becomes manifest that the 'proposition's' negation -- 'This is what I don't see', or perhaps better still 'This is what is not seen', or 'This is what you don't see' -- is nonsense. As Wittgenstein puts
it: "If someone didn't find it to be this way, it wouldn't be that he had experienced the contrary [— here, seeing what s/he her/himself can't see —], but rather that we wouldn't understand him."100 And a corollary of this is that pace the 'content via descriptions' mode of analysis, the semantic point made above shows that, e.g., the "statement, "I see a red circle" and the statement "I see (am not blind)" are not logically of the same sort."101

The difference comes out if we consider a language-game where 'I see (am not blind)' is genuinely employed to make an assertion (and is not, e.g., used as an exclamation uttered at the instance of the bandages being taken from your once-blind eyes which have now been given successful microsurgical treatment). So suppose, as Wittgenstein does, that by chance the first people the Martians encounter on Earth are all blind. Later the Martians meet a sighted person. S/he clearly uses 'I see (am not blind)' as an assertion here, because the Martians have wrongly induced (a priori) that s/he too is blind. But note well, the Martians themselves could be blind — though familiar with other beings who are sighted, just as is the case for our blind people vis-à-vis the sighted. And so, as Wittgenstein notes, a "blind man could easily find out if I am blind too; by, for example, making a certain gesture with his hand, and asking me what he did."102. On this basis, the blind — not blind distinction can be made good by the blind, and we can imagine very much more sophisticated tests being available in Martian technology. So there is no far problem about blind people and blind Martians understanding the assertion 'I see (am not blind)'; indeed, here the sighted and the blind can, given the sophisticated machinery available to the Martians and, say, lent to our blind people, match each other's ability to play the language-game of distinguishing people on a 'blind — not blind'
basis. But the show-stopper — or rather the game-stopper — comes when
they all go over to both applying the blind — not blind distinction in,
and to the playing of, the language-game with the avowal 'I see a red
circle': (by definition) you can show the blind a red circle as much as
you like and they are still not going to be able, regardless of their
successes with the blind — not blind distinction, to play the language-
game of expressing and 'speaking to' the content of a visual experience.
(Do not forget either, that 'I see a red circle' could be substituted
here with the 'public' explication 'I see this colour'.

So, if by 'content' we mean 'life-worldly experience' as in 'how it
is for the natives', then content's medium cannot be descriptions of (or
empirical tests conducted on) native life-praxis. Propositions saying
that they do such-and-such in so-and-so circumstances and not others, are
mere anthropology or psychology (or physiology, etc.). Content's medium
— and the source, thereby, of any understanding that there is anything
more to a form of life-praxis than mere behaviour — is ways of living
qua living those ways. The life of the blind is a form of life (-praxis)
where visual engagement with nature is, because, e.g., of damage to their
eyes, optic nerve, brain etc., not possible. And 'not possible' means
here not just that they cannot do — merely cannot behave in the world
'qua doing' — what the sighted can do; 'not possible' means here that
because the blind cannot engage visually with nature, then if certain
practices using/relying upon visual discrimination are invented, they
cannot play those games: they cannot enter into the constituted domain
brought about by the application of this vision-dependent technique to
nature.

What the sighted, in their sight-dependent language-game, can make
out of the bits of nature to which they (successfully) apply their sight-dependent technique, is something not accessible in that form (i.e., as it is from within the game) to the blind. And this is an instance of what the distinction between a rule and its use is intended by Wittgenstein to bring home to us: the blind can know — propositionally — that this game is played thus and so, but they cannot enter into what is brought about by the playing of the game, viz.: the content of our talk about visual experience. For it is only use of the rules that achieves and realises content, and if we insist on conducting semantic analysis in abstraction from use — in abstraction from considering logic as through-and-through a function of a technique for doing such-and-such things — we are doomed to blindness about our very own linguistic praxis. Yet it is that very praxis which determines the way by which we 'see' the world and each other as we do, and which constructs the reality of our seeing in things therein the host of meanings that we, through our praxis, create out of otherwise meaningless nature.

What the blind -- our people or Martians -- can know about sight-dependent praxis, and about the visual concepts used therein is, I want to suggest, very closely analogous to the notion of treating of proofs, calculations etc. in terms of what Wittgenstein called their 'geometry'. In orthodox semantic terms, concentrating analysis upon the yielding of 'geometry', is what yields logical form and semantic structure, and these factors are held by orthodox analysis to constitute the meaning of any sentence: if we lay out a sentence's logical form and semantic structure, we expose its sense. Use of this product of form and structure yields the force of the sentence; logico-semantic functions have already determined its sense. But our examination of the case of the blind's knowledge of sight-dependent language-games and their being played, shows
how logicism in semantics (upon which the sense – force distinction is predicated) cannot but fail to explicate content. For even if we move from descriptivistic analysis of praxis to a prescriptivistic approach (which is a move in the right direction) the orthodoxy here (e.g., Frege's semantics) has it that the only viable approach is a prioristic, externalistic, and exalting of the sense – force distinction.

McDowellian internalism (and in its different, intuitionistically-constructivist, way, Dummett's externalism) at least has the merit vis-à-vis Fregean platonist logical semantics, of treating logical form and semantic structure as a going concern within praxis. But this is done, as we have seen, in a way that inevitably reduces rules to anthropological descriptions of what rule-followers do, with what, and when. And the Wittgensteinian case is that only by recognising rules as rules, not as descriptions of things being done thus and so, can we even begin to enter into the domain of 'native' language-games. What, by comparison, blocks Frege here is that as a platonist he treats rules as rules for and unto themselves; he treats rules in an utterly abstractive way. Hence Frege remains an arch-logicist in both semantics and philosophy of mathematics.

The solvent for the disease of abstractionism in either its many prescriptivistic or, now even more various, descriptivistic guises, is a very simple thing which when, e.g., we consider the blind versus sighted distinction, is far too readily overlooked. It is analysis of the relationship between confronting a practice (or being, oneself, confronted by it) and being taught — learning to engage in — the practice. Wittgenstein concentrates on this at a considerable number of points in Remarks on Colour as, e.g., this remark-series illustrates:
There may be mental defectives who cannot be taught the concept 'tomorrow' or the concept 'I', nor to tell time. Such would not learn the use of the word 'tomorrow' etc.

Now to whom can I communicate what this mental defective cannot learn? Just to who has learned it himself? Can't I tell someone that so-and-so cannot learn higher mathematics, even if this person himself hasn't mastered it? And yet: doesn't the person who has learned higher mathematics know more precisely what I mean? Doesn't the person who has learned the game understand the word 'chess' differently from someone who doesn't know it? What do we call "describing a technique"?

Or: Do normally sighted people and colour-blind people have the same concept of colour-blindness?
And yet the colour-blind person understands the statement "I am colour-blind", and its negation as well.
A colour-blind person not merely can't learn to use colour words, he can't learn to use the word "colour-blind" exactly as a normal person does. He cannot for example always determine colour blindness where the normal sighted can.

And to whom can I describe all the things we normal people can learn?
Understanding the description itself already presupposes that he has learned something.

How can I describe to someone how we use the word "tomorrow"? I can teach it to a child; but this does not mean I'm describing it to him.
But can't I describe the practice of people who have a concept, e.g. 'redish-green', that we don't possess? --- In any case I certainly can't teach this practice to anyone. 103

The idea of describing a practice into which one cannot enter is both curious and important. We can invent a game whose rules are impossible for us to apply. Wittgenstein considered that in Principia Mathematica Russell did just this in his insistence that all proofs are conductible and expressible in a calculus which employs 1 to 1 correlation:

It is not logic --- I should like to say --- that compels me to accept a proposition of the form ($\exists \exists \exists \exists \exists \exists$), when there are a million variables in the first two pairs of brackets and two million in the third. I want to say: logic would not compel me to accept any proposition at all in this case. Something else compels me to accept such a proposition
as in accord with logic. 104

Logic fails to compel in this case in just the sense in which an inaudible order, or a written order given to a blind person, fails. But we do not thereby reject logical compulsion. Rather, we extrapolate from concrete, accessible, successful uses of logical notation (thus expressing 'logical rules') to systematic 'geometrical' constructs of great complexity. But in conceding to the complexity this de facto status, we use, and must use, a concept of validity and well-formedness — a conception of the structure (or 'archetypal form') of a rule — grounded in concretely accessible, successfully usable, cases. So it is crucial to see that because use is hostage to perspicuity — whereas mere form is not — a "shortened procedure tells me what ought to come out with the unshortened one. (Instead of the other way round.)"105 By keeping this vital lesson before us, we can keep our grip on the notion of rules that we can't follow, and concomitantly we can make good the rule-use distinction. For if we want to express the distinction genetically, it must be written 'use → rule': by reflection on language-game playing, we derive the concept of rules in the abstract. The damning error of logicism in semantics is that it proceeds by disavowing the use-bound origins, or source, of the (ipso facto, posterior) notion of rules-in-the-abstract. Similarly, Russell entirely failed to see that his Principia theory of mathematical proof was a disaster from the crucial point of view of the requirement that proofs (and the rest of the applications of logic) be content-preserving.

We see then that even to recognise a practice as a practice — irrespective of whether or not we can also enter into it — we must already understand, and thus have mastered the particular technique, of
an analogous practice. 'Analogous' means here that the exotic practice
is, as it were, (recognisable as) an 'extension' or 'permutation' of a
practice we ourselves have mastered; there must at least be that much
contact, just as we can say of the earlier-cited case involving a two
million variable inference that it can (de facto) be logically sound and
correct. I say that we 'can', as opposed to 'must', concede validity to
unsurveyable proofs, and so rule-status to utterly abstraction-bound
rules, because nothing forces us to do so; we can write everything off
after a certain level of difficulty and complexity. And the same goes
for exotic colour concepts:

'The colours' are not things that have definite
properties, so that one could straight off look for or
imagine colours that we don't yet know, or imagine someone
who knows different ones than we do. It is quite possible
that, under certain circumstances, we would say that people
know colours that we don't know, but we are not forced to say
this, for there is no indication as to what we should regard
as adequate analogies to our colours, in order to be able to
say it. This is like the case in which we speak of infra-red
'light'; there is a good reason for doing it, but we can also
call it a misuse.

And something quite similar is true with my concept
'having pain in someone else's body'. 106

The connection between being able to use and/or to teach the use of
a concept, and the invention or recognition of 'recastings' or 'off-
shoots' or 'relatives' of that concept is thus only analysable in
internalist terms. In this sense, Dummett's demand that 'theories' of
meaning be 'full-blooded' is outstandingly well and rightly condemned by
McDowell. We cannot (without wishing to be unkind) start off in the
position of, e.g., the mental defectives Wittgenstein talked about in a
previous remark-series; we have to be the sort of creatures and have the
right sort of instincts, reactions and mode(s) of engagement with the
pre-linguistic world, such that we can do what is required in each case
to get understanding 'off the ground' so as to acknowledge that here is an expression of content. And that says no more nor less than that the essential truth of internalism is that we cannot justify, or act as alien observers towards, our being the kind of creatures we are. Everything we do is predicated upon our form of life. As McDowell put it in his root and branch rejection of Dummett's definitive externalist notion, it is sheer folly to hold that

... any intelligible human activity can be described, in such a way as to reveal its point or significance, from the perspective of a cosmic exile -- a perspective, that is, which is not to any extent coloured or affected by the occupant's own involvement in a form of life .... 107

But internalism is, nonetheless, utterly unworkable if it commits itself to descriptivistic analysis of praxis. It cannot, e.g., overturn the dualistic, though unorthodox, metaphysical problem I raised earlier concerning the relationship between experience and praxis: why should not, e.g., all the blind (formerly-sighted or not) have the same experiences as the sighted, only the blind do not respond to them, whereas the sighted do? Failure to strip away the force of this metaphysical conjecture (which is, e.g., untouched, as a theory of content, by the riposte that 'blind-experience' is (to cite a Kantian-style point) otiose) arises, I suggest, out of one of the most profound of conceptual confusions: the confusion which manifests itself as our inability to

... make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts -- which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please. 108

The descriptivistic approach -- and, ironically, Frege's brand of prescriptivism as well (though not, I think, for consistent reasons) --
treats content as given through and in 'thoughts' and their expressibility. 'Having a thought' thus is treated as the trigger of language-use. But, as *Investigations* 317 warns us in its following up of remark 304 (above), we have here a

> [m]isleading parallel: the expression of pain is a cry — the expression of thought, a proposition.

As if the purpose of the proposition were to convey to one person how it is with another: only, so to speak, in his thinking part and not in his stomach.

So if this parallel were sound, understanding would be the (epistemic) procedure of grasping propositions: to grasp meaning would be to grasp (certain 'meaning-mediative') propositions; and so to have understanding would consist in having propositional knowledge — "about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please".

To make our radical break from the grip of the 'conveyance of thoughts *qua* propositions' image of language-use, and so to get ourselves to a position where we can see clearly the logic of contentfulness, the realisation that constitutive — 'proposition-independent' — praxis is bedrock, must be concomitant with a radical overturning of our received views of what makes logic logic. We have been engaging in this project here, but the conclusion to which Wittgenstein's dialectic leads requires that we combine what we have found in the notion of constitutive use, with the following crucial realisation:

> Sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the empirical, so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience.

(For it is certainly not an accompanying mental phenomenon — this is how we imagine 'thoughts' — but the use, which distinguishes the logical proposition from the empirical one.) 109
'Working the borderline' here — shifting from norm to proposition and vice versa — is what one learns (to do) when one learns/knows how to play the language-game. Empirical propositions do not determine content; they are determined by the achievement of content; by the successful use of rules. So the mere describing of a practice, a la descriptive analysis, cannot yield up its content. Indeed, just to describe a rule as 'a rule' is paradoxical for descriptivism, because it is the grasp of rules, not facts, that makes describing — of anything you please — possible; descriptivism puts the cart before the horse.

A work of anthropology nevertheless can be used to allow us to 'break into native content', but in so using it, it ceases to be treated as or to constitute, propositions about native praxis; we now use it as an expression of rules. (And remember always that to write his/her book, the anthropologist had to be a rule-follower in the first place.) We go from merely recognising the fact that here is some practice, to participation in the practice — and the fundamental condition for doing this (i.e., for going from merely 'seeing that' to the content-internal situation where one 'sees what'), is that we have mastered the technique of following a rule; we must be trainable, and we must have mastered the lessons of the training.

This analysis dissolves the (metaphysical) puzzlement we all-too-frequently have when we come upon quite exotic or unorthodox practices, cultures or institutions. For instance, Azande witchcraft makes use of 'chicken oracles' in a practice where questions are decided by feeding a chicken a strychnine-like poison. If the chicken dies, the answer is 'no'; if it lives, 'yes'. Westerners find this bizarre for all sorts of reasons, e.g.: no account is taken of differing sizes between chickens.
used to decide internally-related questions; nor is an equal, or consistent, amount of poison given to each and every chicken; and systematic failure of the oracle to yield true predictions is always written-off as due to intervening variables, never to the sheer ineffectiveness of this decision procedure. But what all this comes to is that the Azande apply to the constituents of the chicken oracle practice, the technique of following a rule, being commanded and compelled by inferences, of taking 'a' as necessitating 'b', and so on. Westerners, in contradistinction, do not. For them Azande chicken oracles are no basis for decision-making praxis, are no 'symbolic expressions' of a bona fide form of logic, etc. Westerners thus treat the chicken oracle practice as a series of empirical, anthropological, facts about Azande life. The Azande, meanwhile, live by these types of practices, and so they treat the phenomenon of, e.g., a chicken's surviving the administering of poison, not as an empirical phenomenon, but in just the same way as, e.g., we treat a demonstration of modus ponens: as a logically compelling artifact; symbol as rule — not (as for Western onlookers vis-à-vis the Azande) symbol as mere fact (about Azande behaviour).

And the difference? — We conduct our life-praxis, and treat as 'logic' and 'logically compelling', different things (in certain areas at least) from the Azande. Where they employ the fundamental technique of following a rule, we, in our lives, do not; we employ it elsewhere. And this explains the crucial philosophical significance of the issues raised by, e.g., the fact that

[t]here could very easily be a tribe of people who are all colour-blind and who nonetheless live very well; but would they have developed all our colour names, and how would their nomenclature correspond to ours? What would their
natural language be like?? Do we know? Would they perhaps have three primary colours: blue, yellow and a third which takes the place of red and green? --- What if we were to encounter such a tribe and wanted to learn their language? We would no doubt run into certain difficulties. 110

If we overcome these difficulties and if we thus grasp the content that is sought by the questions Wittgenstein canvasses here, we must and can only do it by grasping the logic of these people's colour concepts. And we have seen here that logic yields content only by means of engaging in the technique of following the rule(s).

Wittgenstein's reflection in On Certainty 501 perfectly concludes this issue:

Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.

XII

It remains now only for us to fulfil two residual obligations arising out of the analysis and dialectic this chapter reconstructs. The first, which I will deal with in this section, concerns the explication of the analytic a posteriori analysis of constitutive praxis, and so of content etc., which we have developed here. This rounds off the issue of the nature of definitions which we first canvassed several sections ago. As I have foreshadowed for some time, it is here that we can (and are about to) most profitably engage with the basic semantic line that arises out of the Quinean treatment of translation and the analytic - synthetic distinction.

There can be no question -- because of their common and thoroughgoing anti-a priorist concerns -- that there are significant
parallels between quite a number of aspects of the Wittgensteinian position here explicated and that of W.V.O. Quine. (And, of course, Chapter I has foreshadowed this.) Nonetheless, Quine severely — and brilliantly — attacks the notion of analyticity as a fundamental part of his anti-a priorism, whereas Wittgenstein throws his full weight behind a radical 'rehabilitation' of the notion.

From "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" onwards, Quine has, I suggest, treated not just analyticity, but any kind of intensional function, as inevitably wedded to a priorism. Which is to say, inter alia, that (in concert with the unreflective complicity of his opponents and critics) he has so defined the resultant debate that it has been most insufficiently considered whether analyticity (in particular) can be sustained independently of a prioristic semantics. The tide of philosophic concern has instead overwhelmingly run in the direction of what one might style as 'synthetic semantics'; analyticity has been widely abandoned as unsustainable because unempirical and semantically regressive. Concomitant with this movement has been the drive to either entirely eschew, or at least seek to 'extensionally reconstruct', intensionality. For his part, Quine has marshalled a host of powerful arguments for the conclusion that intensionality is entirely dispensable and incapable of systematic reconstruction in any way that avoids his attacks: thoroughgoing empiricism is semantics' only recourse.

It is, nonetheless, instructive to reflect that Quine's naturalistic anti-psychologism, just as with Wittgenstein's, is predicated at the semantic level upon a thoroughgoing series of attacks on the (definitely a priorist) idea that the essence of language is the conveyance of thoughts, the entertaining and apprehending of
propositions. To be sure, Quine's attack on propositionality is part and parcel with his anti-intensionalism; Wittgenstein's attack is otherwise motivated. But in the first instance — as anti-priorists — Quine and Wittgenstein are as one in exposing the myth of the contentfulness of analyticity, and of explanations and definitions of senses in general: definitions' role cannot be that of 'putting ('true') ideas/thoughts into heads'; and the same goes for expressions of belief, knowledge, expectation, judgement, etc., etc.

The contrast between Quine-Wittgenstein anti-a priorist anti-psychologism and Frege-Dummett avowed-but-a priorist anti-psychologism. is of course not only utterly stark, but (for now-obvious reasons) reflects most extremely ill upon the latter partnership. Like Frege, Dummett champions the utter rejection of psychologism whilst concomitantly happily upholding the mythology that the purpose of language is the conveyance of thoughts; it is held to be enough to escape psychologism that the 'thoughts' are 'public' and/or 'objectively apprehensible', for the Frege-Dummett conflict is, when all said and done, merely a complex debate about how this publicity and apprehensibility is (to be) achieved. The a priorist's definitive concepts - thoughts - 'mental stuff' nexus is thus exalted: Frege merely platonises, and so 'disembodies', the (real) psychologistic icon; Dummett re-embodies it in a 'de-privatised', 'verificationistic', Weltanschauung where actions and events are 'warrants' for the expression of thoughts and the grasping of concepts, and mind is swallowed up in (its alleged) 'manifestation conditions'.

Modal realists with strong scientistic leanings — e.g., David Lewis — and various Putnamesque conjectures, from 'deceivers' to brains in
vats, admittedly seem to be a priorist mavericks here. But their secret lies in the way they deceptively package their theories' 'mental stuff', whilst their weakness remains their overwhelming inability to coherently deal with the whole category of self-reflection. Sentences like 'I am thinking about myself', 'What am I?' and 'Where am I?' notoriously drive them into the most contorted and unconvincing metaphysical poses. (These a priorist problems with the inescapable indexicality of self-reflection are almost certainly inbuilt, and are effectively the revised modern manifestations of Descartes' malignant demon neurosis.)

The fundamental a priorist mistake, semantically speaking, is made at the very instance that we insist upon importing content as one with definitions, identity, thought, entailment and inference. The error also comes with taking content with intentionality and/or intensionality, as well as holding it to be part and parcel of 'self-reference', logic and mathematics, let alone our taking it as intrinsic to rules, norms, signs, pictures and symbols. Formalism is absolutely right to treat all these as (per se) non-referring, non-contentful semantic functions. At best, and to echo Wittgenstein's own verdict on this crucial issue, the only sound semantic judgement here is and must be that definitions, explanations of semantic functions etc., are through-and-through no more nor less than 'substitution rules for signs'. It does not matter whether the projected semantic relationship is that of mental image to printed word, name to sensation, functional state to 'trans-world designated' token mental term, intuition to proof-facilitated inference, clear and distinct idea to 'thinking substance', or whatever: the a priorist semantic relation idly hangs in the air and (to deliberately employ a pun) cannot bring any object to life.
All these things are brought to our attention again and again by Quine and Wittgenstein, and yet their respective philosophies are nonetheless fundamentally at loggerheads (as Chapter IV shows in detail). This must alert us to the crucial realisation that here we have two fundamentally opposed anti-a priorist positions. In turn this conflict can only be, at the semantic level at least, a conflict concerning just that crucial issue which, as I noted above, Quine and his contemporary, and a priorist, opponents have (by and large, most unreflectively) excluded from the philosophical-semantic agenda. By ignoring or, alternately, distorting, Wittgenstein's unique mature philosophical position, analytic philosophy has stalled, and in many quarters severely regressed, since the publication in the fifties and sixties of the works of the two most radical and systematic major anti-a priorists in our entire philosophical tradition.

Once we awake from the ruling dogmatic slumbers thus instituted, and look closely at the real force and content of the meaning-as-use analysis vis-a-vis the way the Quinean line runs together its attack on intensionality with its overall attack on a priorism, the crunch issue is at last brought to centre stage: Quine cannot do justice to the use of the notion of rules in 'substitution rules for signs'; he takes it for granted (as, e.g., his philosophy of mathematics makes crystal clear) that formalism, and, thereafter, its attendant empiricistic Weltanschauung, is the terminal point in the collapse of a priorism. And that means that his fundamental mistake here has been to accept that content is what the a priorists say it is: some kind of intentional object or referent behind the signs, the utterances, the marks on paper, the 'linguistic behaviour', etc. We saw in a preceding section here how Frege and Dummett propagate this myth in their accounts of logic etc.
But Quine is gravely mistaken in holding that once these kinds of a priorist illusions are exposed we can nevertheless take over the empty shell that is left behind.

If, as we have seen, there can be no content, no 'thoughts', involved in the semantically fundamental grasp we must have of the truth-values, the propositional connectives — indeed, of any concept — it simply does not follow that, a la Quine, the life activity that produces, uses, intelligently confronts and responds to signs, is mere behaviour: an entirely affected organic, physiological, response to stimuli; a response which, if Quine is right, is of a singular kind with the beating of the heart, the digesting of food, the 'firing' of cortical fibres, etc. For consider once more the crucial point made in Investigation 317:

Misleading parallel: the expression of pain is a cry — the expression of thought, a proposition.

As if the purpose of the proposition were to convey to one person how it is with another: only, so to speak, in his thinking part and not in his stomach.

Quine (as I show in detail in Chapter IV) has not escaped the essential source of the misleading parallel here. He has rightly spurned psychologism and its (a priorist) thought—proposition nexus, but he has not escaped the fundamental error of thinking that the 'stuff' of language's dealings is 'the stuff' of the 'linguistic organism': a priorism's basic icon is that the 'linguistic stuff' is the 'stuff of thoughts', whereas Quine's language-users are confronted by the radical translator by way of her/his seeing (qua 'theorising') how it is with the natives' behavioural responses to such-and-such stimuli; it is like the doctor's examining you to see how it is with your body, given its responding to this drug, or this infection, or whatever.
But compare that kind of view of 'linguistic behaviour' under thoroughgoing anti-psychologism, with Wittgenstein's position as it arises from his way of overturning the 'language-as-conveyor-of-thoughts' icon so crucial to a priorism:

So is each judgement a judgement about the one who is judging? No, it is not inasmuch as I don't want the main consequences that are drawn to be ones about myself, I want them rather, to be about the subject matter of the judgement. If I say, "It's raining", I don't in general want to be answered: "So that's how it seems to you." "We're talking about the weather", I might say, "not about me".

To be sure, we have to adapt this point to cover the case of avowals, for there I am talking about me, e.g., when I say 'That really interests me!': here the point is that the avowal is not about the utterer's body qua strictly material entity; that is not how the language-game with avowals — as opposed to reports on someone's physiological responses — is played.

We can only understand the 'aboutness' of talk if, short of lapsing into a priorism and its wealth of psychologistic morasses, we recognise that the response with which, e.g., we confront the signs in the utterer's sentence, and in which we understand the signs, is essentially a (particular) constitutive way of reacting. It is a form of reaction whereby the marks on the paper or sounds in the air are made an object of mastery of a technique: the reaction is one that makes something (of a particular kind) out of the presented phenomenon. Birds make nests out of twigs; chimpanzees make a tool, for extracting termites from termite nests, by using small narrow sticks in a certain way; language-users make signs and use them as their (linguistic) way of mastering (various parts of) nature. It is this (at bottom, instinctive) productive activity that creates content, meaning, understanding, and which ensures that
understanding a language consists in the addressing of content, not (as with Quine, et al) in the empirical examination of physiological states and gross bodily movements. Practices apply techniques to master, and to make things out of the world; mere behaviours merely replicate the order of, and the order given to them by, the world. (Compare, e.g., the practice — if not the institution — of making and consuming bread, and the behaviour of digesting it.)

If we are to prosecute the case against a priorism by confronting analyticity and the other intensional functions with close formalist scrutiny, we must, pace Quine, recognise that our dialectic cannot end in the conflict of the idea of language being the sum of the signs and a prioristic 'somethings' versus language as signs plus formalistic/behaviouristic 'nothings'. We can only resolve this dispute if and when we utterly reject its dualistic picture, and with it the logical "grammar which tries to force itself upon us here." And as I indicated in Chapter I, that comes to saying that the constitutive factor in meaning and understanding stands outside such an easy, seductive dichotomy: it is neither 'thought' nor 'mere behaviour'.

Once we see this, we can see how Quine is very much trapped, despite the magnitude of his anti-a priorism, within an inherited dialectic; one whose parameters were, in analytic philosophy at least, effectively laid out by Frege in his contemporary locus classicus origini, "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung".

Rightly enough, Frege saw that there is more to identity than mere co-extensionality, because 'A = A' and 'A = B' have distinct modal and semantic roles. But as an a priorist, he gravely misunderstood the concept of understanding a rule and so construed the expression of
identity which constitutes a rule's archetypal rule-governance imperative — 'This \[\ldots\] is what you must do' or 'This \[\ldots\] is the kind of thing you must produce' — as an explication of extension or content. That is, although, to be sure, Frege insisted that understanding was 'the grasping of thoughts', the point and role of the thought's presenting the sense of a proposition, was the grasping of its a priori referentially-construed content: by grasping the utterer's thought, one logically secures the understanding that 'S is talking about/referring to x in asserting that p'; you now have the ('presented content' of the) utterer's thought. So to explain the crucial role of rules' expressions of identity — 'This \[\ldots\] — Frege treats the \[\ldots\] segment as a priori content. The result is that he systematically fudged the distinction between giving a definition or semantic explication and grasping the content of the defined or explicated concept/term, by way of treating synonymous expressions as 'the presentation — by a sense/true thought — of (its) reference'. This as opposed to giving a mere substitution rule for signs, which rule (per se) now stands in need of use if it is to yield content (a posteriori). What confronts us here on Frege's part is no more nor less than the fallacy of, e.g., using the standard metre to 'measure' itself so as to 'identify' the standard metre. Wittgenstein's earlier-cited remark about ostensive definition is surely worth repeating here:

This problem is connected with the fact that in an ostensive definition I do not state anything about the paradigm (sample); I only use it to make a statement. It belongs to the symbolism and is not one of the objects to which I apply the symbolism. 113

If we apply this crucial point to the use of the sentence 'Morning Star is Evening Star; they're both the planet Venus', the profound
confusion which entrapped Frege in "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung" falls away. For in the light of Wittgenstein's critical analysis, one can see that Frege was quite unable to recognise how an astronomical discovery can be employed as a paradigm for the symbolic expression of a rule. Another way of putting this is to say that he operated within a framework which, by conflating expressions of content with rules' giving identity, left him incapable of adequately distinguishing between predication and concept formation. In "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung" he recognises that there must be a natural-worldly -- 'realistic' -- component to the sentence 'Morning Star is Evening Star', but he cannot see (because of his a priorism) that the semantic role of, e.g., such-and-such astronomical phenomena, is not and cannot be that of being the subject of the predication of a certain identity. Strictly speaking, but very very crucially nonetheless, identity is not a predicable semantic function: laying down identity and describing, even where they come to the application of the same words to the same object/event, are not akin. Frege failed to distinguish between the appropriation of a bit of nature for the purposes of establishing, illustrating, exemplifying, teaching or addressing a concept -- for giving 'F(\xi)' to your audience -- and the predication of the concept whereby, ipso facto, a bit of nature is described -- presented as instance 'F(a)' -- such that it instances the extension of the concept we constitute in our appropriating such-and-such bits of nature in illustrating or exemplifying 'F(\xi)'.

In 'F(\xi)' as bona fide expression of identity, what appears to be content -- e.g., the heavenly body we call 'Venus' -- is nothing of the sort: it is not the intentional object for some (definitive) 'thought'; it is not (somehow) 'contained' in the synonymic expression 'A = B; Morning Star is Evening Star'; its role is to symbolise that identity in
(in this case) 100% concrete terms. There aren't any true or false thoughts 'that p' yet. Rather, we are appropriating this mere (astronomical) phenomenon to make it (concretely) possible, within the constructive context of a particular technique's being 'worked' on this phenomenon of nature, that we actually bring it about that we 'think' that p or that not-p in respect of (what we have taken over as) this thing of this kind and with this particular identity. And if, therefore, you want to know what thing and what kind is in question, we don't give you, and (anyway) it's no use having, 'true thoughts'. We must (seek to) induct you into mastery of a technique where you use this object in this way so as to do these (astronomical-scientific) things with these phenomena: you must make the content. It cannot be thought! That is what it comes down to when you are confronted with rules' expressions of identity qua 'This → ... is the kind of thing you must produce'.

Wittgenstein's use of formalism's attack on a priorism, and in particular his exploitation of the Frege—formalism dialectic, thus reveals Frege's refusal to bite the bullet in his championing of the cause of analyticity. For the semantics of the relationship of, e.g., 'Morning Star/Evening Star' to Venus, must be acknowledged as embedded in an internal relationship where, therefore, the intersubstitutability of 'Evening Star' with 'Morning Star' is logico-grammatically on the same level as that of '4' for '(2+2)'. We are addressing intersubstitutability of (mundane astronomical) symbols — which are not meanings, and do not refer, but which instead are use-dependent devices for the constitution of meaning and the construction of extensionality. So the 'Morning Star = Evening Star' identity is not an astronomical datum, but a constructed rule for the conduct of (a certain bit of) astronomy: we are dealing with symbolism and its technique(s) here, not
with (thoughts/propositions about) heavenly bodies.

Now it is here that Quine and his followers make their definitively empiricist mistake. For the thrust of Quine's attack on a priorism is to excise analyticity and synonymy in a way that can only proceed if the role of constitutive use in separating (the idleness of) tautology from (the significance of) synonymy is ignored. Quine proceeds by, in effect, pointing out that the a priorist cannot have it both ways: either language/meaning is empty because explanations of sense like 'Bachelors are unmarried males' are (really) tautologies (— and the tautology—synonym distinction is relied upon by the a priorist to rescue intensional semantics from this awful outcome —); or, synonymy is nothing more than (disguised) co-extensionality (— as in 'creature with kidneys' and its relationship to 'creature with a heart'). But — and here is the Quinean mistake in its semantic guise — the construal of synonymy as co-extensionality, and so the construal of the semantics for all explanations of symbols/rules as a function of the semantics for coextensionality, does not follow from the collapse of semantic a priorism. All that follows (in the first instance, at least), is that symbols/rules, including, most importantly, synonymic (explanations of) meaning, are not about entities; are not proxies for objects; are not denotative functions; are not stand-ins for facts or possibilia, or for 'true thoughts', or for 'manifestations of understanding'.

All we are (semantically speaking) forced to give up by the destruction of a priorism is: (a) the (fallacious) binding of definitions etc. to their possessing determinate and a priori reference, so that a fallacious theory about reference (and its connection to thought, content and meaning) is exposed; and (b) the fallacious manoeuvre of treating the
semantics of tautologies as distinguishable from the semantics of synonymy by appeal to notions of reference, content, etc. (and so by ignoring constitutive use).

Quine and Wittgenstein are, of course, as one in condemning the way a priorism, particularly a la Frege and his fellows, keeps tautology (which is admitted to be vacuous) apart from synonymy. For the illusion surrounding a prioristic derivations of the tautology-synonym bifurcation is readily exposed if we first reflect that a synonymic expression like 'Bachelors are unmarried males', only is 'informative' as compared with the tautology 'Bachelors are bachelors', in virtue of the hearer's/pupil's already knowing the meaning of 'unmarried male(s)'. The question clearly therefore is 'How did s/he learn or come to know, the meaning of 'unmarried male'?'? surely the bedrock of semantics must be extensional?

But this definitive empiricistic manoeuvre goes too far and too fast. It does not satisfactorily disambiguate the semantics of sentences like 'Morning Star is Evening Star': it only shows that explications of meanings are vacuous (as in the formalistic treatment of identity statements) and that, consequently, only strictly extensional semantics appear to remain viable.

Quine's supposedly conclusive manoeuvre is illicit on at least two (related) semantic grounds. First, by way of getting rid of meaning, it treats meaning as an intensional function. But it is only a priorism that forces us to correlate meanings with intensions — unless one is an empiricist aiming to write off intensions altogether by forcing synonymic expressions like 'Morning Star is Evening Star' into the domain of strict extensionalist semantics. For then it pays to leave the semantics of the
'is' or 'are' in synonymic expressions in just the confused state forced upon them by a priorism. That way, the realisation that, e.g., the fall of analyticity is not entailed in the fall of a priorism, is obscured. For the empiricist tries to shut out the following sort of crucial question about, e.g., the sentence 'Morning Star is Evening Star', viz.: 'Do you mean that sentence to be understood astronomically -- as one which is about objects — or semantically — as one about, or relating to, symbols?'.

We can see that empiricism cannot pass the acid test here if we remind ourselves of what is the logico-semantic basis of any language-game, e.g., the one played with 'Evening Star is Morning Star'. For the point of emphasising the validity and reality of the astronomical-use versus semantic-use distinction concerning 'Evening Star is Morning Star', is to remind ourselves that a fundamental logical condition for the expression of the astronomical discovery is not just that the astronomer sees such-and-such astronomical phenomena, but that s/he understands that this is what they are. It is not enough to see such-and-such phenomena; to be confronted by these experiences. One must first understand what it would be for -- what 'counts as' -- its being the case that (lo and behold) 'Evening Star is Morning Star'.

The contentlessness of rules' expressions of identity — indeed of definitions per se — simply does not licence the nihilistic collapsing of understanding into mere experiencing (à la empiricism). That licence would only be to hand if experiential responses were never more than the mere replicators-of-the-given-world-order upon which empiricism dogmatically insists. The moment an organism responds to the world by imposing a constructive technique upon it — by building, signifying,
dominating, appropriating 'things for and unto itself' out of nature's resources, the creature-nature relation is logically transformed, and transformed in a way that is incomprehensible to the devotees of the empiricistic Weltanschauung.

The well known, but widely misunderstood 'limits of empiricism' remarks in Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics succinctly make the point I am driving at here:

The limit of the empirical --- is concept-formation. 114

"The limits of empiricism." --- (Do we live because it is practical to live? Do we think because thinking is practical?) 115

The limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct; they are ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act. 116

The second of these remarks is particularly apposite because it as good as presages Quine's linking of pragmatism with empiricism. In pragmatism, praxis is construed as if its essence were experimentation: life-praxis as the testing of theories about what works; the 'intelligent' creature's trying to fit in with the given world-order; and the 'fit' is justified and/or explicable in virtue of the theory having (thus far) survived at the hands of praxis-qua-experiment. Compare this thoroughgoing cognitivistic (and scientistic) vision of the human (and linguistic) condition, with the one that naturally, and coherently, arises if we ask whether fish swim, calves drink milk, and human babies learn to talk, walk and play games, because they have found it practical to do so; because they are pragmatically testing out a theory, and its 'fit' with nature.
Our dissolution of the problem of analyticity and synonymy can thus be put as follows: 'Bachelors are unmarried males', uttered in its mundane, everyday, ordinary, concrete role as an explanation of the meaning of 'bachelor', is not (pace Frege and the rest of the a priorists) an explanation in virtue of, and/or secured by, its (implicitly or explicitly) giving or 'presenting' the reference of bachelor; but neither is it the articulation of a bit of theory about the empirical frequency of the correspondence between (assent to the presence of an instance of) bachelorhood and unmarried males. The synonym is integral to the employment of a technique whose constituted products are, in that praxis, able to be produced in a plurality of ways. Our use of, e.g., 'Bachelors are unmarried males' is thus closely analogous to the instruction that the use of a solid metre rule can here be interchanged for that of a metric tape measure: here are parallel ways of doing the one thing (metric measurement), just as a trench is a trench whether you dig it with a spade, a shovel, a bucket, bare hands or explosives.

The cognitive significance of 'A = B' in contrast to the vacuous 'A = A' thus is so potent and vital a factor in natural language because it facilitates a sort of 'meta-mastery' of the game/praxis: it is extremely useful and thus very significantly productive, to be master of the technique of, e.g., interchanging the use of a solid metre rule for the use of a metric tape-measure: try precisely measuring the inside length of this archway with a solid ruler:
I am not arguing that all synonymic expressions of concepts are generated by concrete practical considerations like this; the cultural and/or idiosyncratic origins of synonyms are utterly multifarious. Their use to constitute a unitary product nevertheless is the key, be such use deliberately introduced, or be it merely the result of historical accident where the one game is plurally invented and only later do the respective players come into contact. By contrast, what makes 'A=A' a candidate for vacuity is the fact that if one is not thereby just insisting upon or demanding 'A', one is certainly not presenting any (essential) 'content' that supposedly makes A 'identical with itself'. All you are doing if you are doing something semantic with 'A = A', is laying down the 'identify-form' for A; the content of talk about (cases of) A only follows if the rule/form is now followed; if it is used. Only then does it make sense to talk about what A is. (I will return to this point shortly.)
Note further, that, e.g., solid ruler measurement and tape-measure measurement are not innocently reducible to some universal and unitary factor, any more than is the case for the use of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried male'. Tape-measurement can exist as a practice in its own right; solid rulers need never have been invented. If, by way of constructing a parallel, we find an isolated island where males who are disliked and systematically ostracised and rejected by their tribe are left stranded against their will, the term 'unmarried male' may be useful to describe some of the men, but 'bachelor' will be much less appropriate — if at all. Yet a case like 'ponamu' = 'nephrite jade' = 'New Zealand greenstone' is different again, because these are as good as different symbolisations of the same conceptualisation come what may — provided one knows this 'substitution rule for signs', and is not, e.g., embarrassed to use a Maori word in (say) a highly technical geological report, thereby putting cultural differences aside in concept-use: an uncommon event.

We should not deny that synonymy is a diverse semantic function. But its definitive core is the use of substitution rules for signs in the bringing about of the ongoing playing of the language-game. Its use effects the bridge between, on the one hand, different particular symbols and examples and styles/ways of proceeding, and on the other hand, the unitary product of the use of those particular symbols, examples and particular styles/ways of proceeding: many ways, one end. The 'problems' of translation are thus, at bottom, problems of grasping the vicissitudes of employing techniques in an often very diverse and complex life-world.

Finally in this section then, we can conclude by noting that use-identity, and/or concept identity, is realised only as a function of the
concrete productivity of concept-application. For the proponents of a priorism it is held to be enough that there are thoughts, intentions, possibilia, basic intuitions, clear and distinct ideas, phenomenal qualities, forms, or whatever device(s) standing (reflexively) behind the production of the sign, the deed, the utterance. In a Marxist mood, one rightly can observe that, one and all, these views are nought but idealism: 'never mind concrete life conditions, it's the thought that counts'. In section VI of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein, in fact precisely addressing the fundamental psychologistic/idealistic impulse behind all a priorism, tells us plainly:

Language, I should say, relates to a way of living.

In order to describe the phenomenon of language, one must describe a practice, not something that happens once, no matter of what kind. 117

These remarks, which closely parallel the likes of Investigations 199, 202, and 204-205, remain opaque, if not mysterious, until we realise that whatever the unicity, its semantic expression is the self-predicative ostension 'This is this'. This self-supporting, sui generis, 'one off' is vacuous: a means of determinacy reduced to an abstract form ipso facto devoid of content, wanting for any 'object', and thus impoverished of all identity. What is needed here is the practice, the use, whereby we produce the same content again and again; so far all we have is a (very) compelling form. Without the history of the (re-) production of this content '→ ...', there is just 'a wheel turning idly', for it is only by 'making the same again' that the rule is realised as this rule, the norm for the production of this '→ ...', not some other thing, something else, anything ... nothing. The rule, the concept, is
always **this** rule, **this** concept only in and because of the material historical production and reproduction of the particular content that makes it, realises it, achieves it, as *this* rule, *this* concept. The crucial notion of 'the same (- again)' simply cannot — logically cannot — operate for uniques. The a priorist myth is that the rule, the thought, the defining relationship, is what it is unto itself and irrespective of the material conditions of life-praxis. For the rule to be a rule, a definition a definition, the 'form' certainly must be compelling upon us. But such compulsion without the material 'natural-worldly' conditions and actualisation that is demanded by and for constitutive use is not, and cannot be, the stuff of language (as opposed, e.g., to the stuff of metaphysics, neurosis, obsession, etc., etc.).

Empiricism, by contrast, sees only material and cannot grasp life-praxis as that way of living in the world that makes (parts of) nature objects of constitution, significance, value and meaning for and unto the practitioner(s). Empiricists are not 'idealists', but their 'materialism' is 'dead matter materialism' because they cannot see that content, whilst it is not of the world, is nonetheless made out of it, by us.

XIII

It remains only to specify, very briefly, the nature, and fundamental semantic implications, of the use of the concept 'decision' in Wittgenstein's analysis of constitutive use as 'decision'. In section VI of RFM, he directly addresses this issue:

"I have a particular concept of the rule. If in this sense one follows it, then from that number one can only arrive at this one." That is a spontaneous decision.
But why do I say "I must" if it is my decision? Well, may it not be that I must decide?

Doesn't its being a spontaneous decision merely mean: that's how I act; do not ask for a reason.

....

When I say "I decide spontaneously", naturally that does not mean: I consider which number would really be the best one here and then plump for ...

We are too used by half to taking an intellectualistic — as opposed to a (mundanely, not 'scientifically') naturalistic — view of decision. Wittgenstein's point is that nature and convention meet in rule-following praxis: instinctive responses to our ongoing life-practical confrontations with nature feed into the absolutely fundamental dependence of our life praxis upon our following the rule. If we fail to reflectively grasp this point about the 'essence' of rule-following, conceptual confusion is almost unavoidable: it will either remain quite unclear why and how any rule should or can compel us, or the source and nature of the compulsion will be metaphysically construed and thus unavoidably alienated from its life-practical context and source.

The 'semantics for natural language' project thus systematically blinds us to the fundamental role of what I want to call 'direct deed', in constituting meaning, content and understanding. To break the spell that this blindness has cast over us, we need to embrace a far more radical and innovative view of language-use; one that is not blind to use as decision. With a 'Kuhnian hat' on, one might say we (very badly) need a new paradigm. Certainly, a radical new perspective on what it is to be a practitioner, a language-user, is essential.

Let me finish then by suggesting a particular way of looking at rule-following praxis — a way that captures the fundamental points
Wittgenstein brings to our attention, not least by way of his radical appeal to 'decision'. It involves taking the notion of improvisational composition on board as central to our thinking about the way we construct and extend rules and derive meaning and understanding from their use. In the far-and-away most improvisational musical discipline of contemporary jazz, its most outstanding musicians are just such because, notwithstanding their profound grasp of the rules of compositional theory and the technicalities of their instruments, they constantly go beyond such established convention and theory and received techniques, to indeed make 'the art which is creation'. Writing about this when modern jazz was in its birthing moments, Bill Evans made the following observations:

There is a Japanese visual art in which the artist is forced to be spontaneous. He must paint on a thin stretched parchment with a special brush and black water paint in such a way that an unnatural or interrupted stroke will destroy the line or break through the parchment. Erasures or changes are impossible. These artists must practice a particular discipline, that of allowing the idea to express itself in communication with their hands in such a direct way that deliberation cannot interfere.

The resulting pictures lack the complex composition and textures of ordinary painting, but it is said that those who see well find something captured that escapes explanation.

This conviction that direct deed is the most meaningful reflection, I believe, has prompted the evolution of the extremely severe and unique disciplines of the jazz or improvising musician.

The 'direct deed' — 'die Tat' — should not therefore be seen as an anarchical, formless reaction that could not possibly constitute the basis for the whole host of complexities and structures characteristic of natural language. That point of view is the one taken by those who are unable to break away from the dogma that the composition, if there is to be any, must be given first, and then the discipline of performance is
that of faithfully following the given score. The task of theory is thus exalted because its role is (here) to describe and catalogue the scores behind, and which are required for, each and any performance. Once we reflect both that the score originates as a creative outcome, and that score and performance are one in the compositional direct deed, the theorists' illusion (which, in its semantic-theoretic form, currently blinds philosophy of language) falls away. Freed of the blinkers of theoreticism we can at last see that the improvisation-performance is both direct deed and yet constitutive, determinate, decisive. (That is why understanding another's talk is, as Wittgenstein liked to observe, very significantly analogous to understanding a piece of music; to going on the same way, together, within the one medium. How you 'go on' is decisive. That we do so go on, and that we can and do do it together, is one of the most crucial and fundamental 'very general facts of nature' upon which linguistic life-praxis depends.)

The utterance is the making of the thought; our understanding is the achievement of intersubjectivity and the validation of subjectivity. "Words are also deeds" — constitutively, primarily, essentially.
Footnotes

1. Though some of the relevant material has its origins in Philosophical Remarks, and other parts of the text (notably several of those in the appendix) are from the period 1931-32. Further, there is (fragmentary) evidence that Wittgenstein re-worked some of the text as late as 1945, though his intent was to insert remarks from it into work in which he was then engaged.


3. By 'a priorist' quantificational analysis, I mean, e.g., that kind of analysis — stigmatised, e.g., by Quine — where the domain of quantification is defined (or definable) in terms of possible worlds, classes of possibilia, etc. I also mean this term to apply to purely synthetic a priori theories where, e.g., the relationship of 'fa, fb, fc' to the quantifying proposition is defined (typically) as a logical function of the truth-value of the quantification as decided or determined by having to hand knowledge or experience or proof of the truth-value(s) of the membership of the domain of quantification. In short, on the a priorist view, the relationship between a quantifying sentence and its extension is such that (a grasp of) the extension determines the sense of the quantifying sentence; to know what objects are ranged over by the quantifier semantically determines knowledge of what the quantifying sentence says; membership of a domain of quantification thus involves objects in some kind of intensional relationship to the expression of the domain. — I will further explicate these notions as this chapter proceeds, contrasting them at various points with the alternative, anti-a priorist Wittgensteinian and Quinean views (though note well that Wittgenstein and Quine share only opposition to a priorism here).


5. Ibid., p. 58.

6. Ibid.


8. This is not meant, however, to overlook the differences involved here, particularly between Frege and Russell.


11. Ibid., part II, p. 257f.


13. [Wittgenstein, as recorded in the notes of] Ambrose and MacDonald "Lecture 5. 1932-33", in Ambrose (ed.), op.cit., p. 5. (This portion of the lecture parallels some material in sub-section 8 of section II of part II of Philosophical Grammar, notably where Wittgenstein again discusses the case of 'primary colours' and 'notes in the C major scale'. The discussion is subject to the use of qualifications like, e.g., "in some ways", but things become awkward when Wittgenstein says that "indeed for one use of [the] words "all" and "some" my old explanation [, i.e., as in the Tractatus] is correct, — for instance for "all the primary colours occur in this picture" or "all the notes of the C major scale occur in this theme". But for cases like "all men die before they are 200 years old" my explanation is not correct." — What at first disturbed me somewhat here is the overwhelming evidence (because of the correspondence with the material in the fifth 1932-33 lecture) that the provenance of this fragment of text is that of Wittgenstein's verificationist period circa 1932, and that as such the concession to the former view retains the underlying analytical error which I expose below, and which Wittgenstein uncovers and overturns in his work, circa 1934-35. In turn, I have been caused at first to wonder if the same provenance applies to the entirety of (at least) sections I and II of part II of Philosophical Grammar — where logical inference and generality are, respectively, the topics under analysis, and from which sections I draw important textual data for use in this chapter's explication of Wittgenstein's mature, post-verificationist position. However, further examination of the text quells these doubts. My close and lengthy study of the material throughout sections I and II of part II leads me to the strong opinion that: (A) they are post-verificationist transitional analyses wherein the mature analysis circa 1935 (and explicated in considerable detail below) is 'worked up'; and (B) the analysis clearly shows itself to be an ongoing analysis where sub-section 1 of section I starts Wittgenstein's investigation, and slowly, sub-section by sub-section, he more and more precisely develops his analytical conclusion. In particular, the final two sub-sections of section II clearly lead into the ideas expressed in the finalised 1935 analysis and contain (especially in sub-section 9) statements that are notably and boldly anti-a priorist and sharply incompatible with the semantics of the 1929-33 verificationist period. But moreover, the sub-section 9 analysis of "The explanation of generality by examples", following as it does immediately upon the heels of the problematic sub-section 8 reference to 'primary colours' and 'the notes of the C major scale', simply contradicts.
any reading of the 'salvaged' 1932-derived material in sub-section 8 that so reads that material as to show anything more than, at worst, a slight lack of caution and precision of expression by Wittgenstein in his 'cut and paste' construction of sub-section 8. — I conclude then that the material in part II of Philosophical Grammar (on which I draw quite frequently in several sections of this chapter) is not prejudiced by the error I am seeking presently to expose in Wittgenstein's (1929-) 1932-1933 analysis of quantification theory; rather, the material in part II is crucial to the transition from, and overturning of, the pre-1933/4 theory. I return to this matter below, in the text.)

15. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, section II, remarks 27a, b.
16. Ibid., section XIII, remark 150j.
17. Ibid., section XIII, remark 150o.
18. Ibid., section XIII, remark 151h.
20. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, section XIII, remarks 151h, 152h.
24. Note therefore how this 1935 analysis is purely 'language-analytical' and thus stands at odds with the verificationist Wittgenstein's employment of synthetic (a priori) considerations so as to conduct his analysis of the negation - disjunction connection(s). Also, note that the correct model here for 'Draw this particular circle' is that of, e.g., 'Draw this particular man'; as Wittgenstein points out in the lecture, "there are no
distinguishing marks in the language for the various circles" — as opposed to those (individual's names) for distinguishing people.


27. Ibid., part II, p. 277.

28. The case of 'the primary colours' is, at this point in the development of our analysis, difficult here because we have yet to see (as we will shortly, below) precisely how that intension can be used either as \( f(\{\}) \) or, in its non-generic role, as the bona fide disjunction \( f(a \lor b \lor c \lor \ldots) \). I ask the reader to bear with me on this point. Indeed, I have so constructed the 'primary colours' case used at this juncture to fit the disjunctive role, and also so as not either to merely duck the issue involved here, should the reader have already noted it.

29. Ibid., part II, p. 278.

30. Ibid., part II, p. 266. I have amended the writing of the second generality in the last sentence, as the text leaves out the brackets.

31. Ibid., part II, p. 271.

32. Cf., Ibid., part II, p. 277, where the same point is made, though in a slightly different context.


34. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, part II, p. 266.

35. Ibid., part II, p. 268.


37. In 1932, Wittgenstein also objected to the 'predicative' use, but not, of course, along the deeply penetrative and radical lines he is now pursuing.


40. Ibid.


42. "Lecture III", op. cit., p. 125.

43. Ibid.

44. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, appendix 2, pp. 205-206. The provenance of this material is the 1929 text *Philosophical Remarks*, but its argument holds up (as its virtual re-appearance in, e.g., Wittgenstein's 1934-35 lectures shows) even with its being 'cut and pasted' into the context of the post-1933, mature, Wittgensteinian analysis.


47. The use of "psychologistic" here may strike some readers as rather over-strong, but in point of fact the Wittgensteinian attack on psychologism is both deep and radical in a way that fully justifies the usage here. See below, and also Chapters III and IV, especially Chapter III.

48. Although Frege did, as I understand it, err in this direction by treating the reference of, e.g., the intension/sense 'silver coloured fish' or 'tree' or 'tropical island' as a concept; I will not however pursue this qualification as it is not entirely germane to my argument other than by way of fairness to the complexity of Frege's semantics which nonetheless do not allow any convincing escape from the present critique.


50. Ibid., part II, p. 346.

51. Cf., e.g., *On Certainty*, remarks 240 and 370 where this same point is forcefully made.
52. The notion of being "extensionally determined" is of course taken here from Wittgenstein's use of this phrase in the earlier-cited, 1932, appendicised material in Philosophical Grammar, p. 204. As we have seen, this notion contains a grave and deep error -- running through the Frege-Russell-Tractatus legacy to this very day.


55. Note however that by "anti-constructivist" I do not mean here to use the concept 'construction' in the sense employed by anti-realists. I use the term — as will be most evident in the text below, and in subsequent chapters — in a sense of 'realist' constructivism: 'construction', on this view, is not an idealist movement (within 'experience') at all, but is our 'labouring' upon the material life-conditions that obtain in the pre-linguistic natural world, so as to make 'the-world-as-we-understand-it'. (The suggestion of the Marxian use of 'material conditions' is deliberate and most apposite here.)


57. Ibid., part II, p. 311.

58. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 73.


60. Ibid. My emphasis.

61. Ibid., part II, p. 346. The earlier citations here are, of course, from Investigations 49.


63. Ibid., remark 355.


75. In this regard see Kenneth Blackwell, "The Early Wittgenstein and the Middle Russell", in Block (ed.), *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, pp. 1-30, especially pp. 19ff.


81. [Wittgenstein, as recorded in the notes of] Ambrose and MacDonald, "Lecture VI, Michaelmas Term, 1934", in Ambrose (ed.), op.cit., p. 86.


83. John McDowell, "In Defence of Modesty", unpublished. My emphasis in the second clause of the first sentence. (An edited version of this paper has now been published.)

84. It should be noted that the debate, in its published form at least, is rather one-sided. Davidson has been nowhere near as keen to address Dummettian semantics as Dummett has been to publish his attack on Davidson's theory.


88. Wittgenstein, RFM, section III, remarks 34a, b, 35, 36a, b, and 37.


90. McDowell, "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name", pp. 143-144.

91. Here I follow Peter Winch in his outstanding paper "Im Anfang war die Tat", in Block (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, pp. 159-178, especially at pp. 161-162.


94. *Loc.cit.*, remark 54d.


99. Remember that we are treating the 'referent' here as *strictly and solely* visually accessible; this is a constraint I impose merely for the sake of simplicity, as alternative sensory access to the referent is of course possible, but my point is directed against the idea that whatever the sensory access, it yields content on the basis, or via the fundamental medium, of *propositional knowledge*.


117. *Loc.cit.*, remarks 34a, b.

118. *Loc.cit.*, remarks 24a, b, c, f. I have amended the (ambiguous) translation of the final clause of 24c (though a certain ambiguity persists if one is determined to seek it out).


"A mathematician is bound to be horrified by my mathematical comments, since he has always been trained to avoid indulging in thoughts and doubts of the kind I develop. He has learned to regard them as something contemptible and, to use an analogy from psycho-analysis (this paragraph is reminiscent of Freud), he has acquired a revulsion from them as infantile. That is to say, I trot out all the problems that a child learning arithmetic, etc., finds difficult, the problems that education represses without solving. I say to those repressed doubts: you are quite correct, go on asking, demand clarification!"


This chapter and the next two concern themselves with significant 'resistances' to Wittgensteinian analysis. They represent case studies wherein the force of Wittgenstein's thought is brought to bear against several of the most influential recent movements in philosophy of language. In particular, and most importantly for the ambit of this study, the extant secondary literature lacks any explicit and thoroughgoing confrontation between Wittgenstein's position and either that of the so-called 'theorists of communication intention',\(^1\) or the brilliant, and highly influential, semantic behaviourism of W.V.O. Quine. These next two chapters inter alia seek to end this striking silence on the part of Wittgensteinians. Thereafter, in this study's final chapter, we will address ourselves to the most exciting contemporary resistance to non-cognitivism in the analysis of understanding and proof, viz.: the highly important Dummettian anti-realist programme which has been responsible for keeping alive verificationist thought long after its chief Twentieth Century instigator — Ludwig Wittgenstein — systematically abandoned it.

As its title indicates, this chapter concerns itself with (neo-)psychologism in semantics, including, especially, the influential (e.g., Gricean) view that meaning and communication have an ineliminable intentional component. In setting the scene for the problematic we must confront here, I want to consider the following three remarks from section VI of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. The remarks in question focus on the view that following a rule is, logically speaking,
something which is (somehow) observable from the outside:

Let us imagine a god creating a country instantaneously in the middle of the wilderness, which exists for two minutes and is an exact reproduction of a part of England, with everything that is going on there in two minutes. Just like those in England, the people are pursuing a variety of occupations. Children are in school. Some people are doing mathematics. Now let us contemplate the activity of some human being during these two minutes. One of these people is doing exactly what a mathematician in England is doing, who is just doing a calculation. --- Ought we to say that this two-minute-man is calculating? Could we for example not imagine a past and a continuation of these two minutes, which would make us call the processes something quite different?

Suppose that these beings did not speak English but apparently communicated with one another in a language that we are not acquainted with. What reason should we have to say that they were speaking a language? And yet could one not conceive what they were doing as that?

And suppose that they were doing something that we were inclined to call "calculating"; perhaps because its outward appearance was similar. --- But is it calculating; and do (say) the people who are doing it know, though we do not? 2

Now, of course, bona fide calculation (as opposed to merely accidental 'behaving as-if') is a rule-governed activity. But the obvious thrust of these three remarks is to raise the question of the 'location' of the logico-grammatical determinant(s) -- criteria -- which decide what is here going on. Thus, in very broad terms, the remarks may be taken as (opaquely) putting the view that, in effect, the sight of some familiar thing or activity precisely makes sense to us as being just that familiar thing or activity, because we take to it, and/or can locate in it, a whole body of background knowledge. This, in turn, implies that it is an issue for epistemology that rules do not (ex-hypothesi) bear their identity as rules 'on their followers' faces'.

By analogy, and as concerns the matter of 'background knowledge', the lack of this facility is a not uncommon problem for anthropologists
and archaeologists. For example, a documentary series screened on A.B.C.
television a while ago, featured in its publicity trailers a multi-horned
bronze object which looked not unlike a peculiar kind of hat-stand. Its
physical composition -- it is made of bronze -- had been determined.
Nevertheless, in a thoroughly significant sense the object still lacks
(for us) a satisfactory identity. Although in a physical sense we know
what it is, in the semantically relevant, cultural, institutional, sense
of 'identity', we do not know the identity of the object. The culture in
which it was made and employed no longer exists and we have few if any
independent sources of information to help fill in the gap in our
knowledge.

There follow several possible relevant ways of taking the thrust of
Wittgenstein's two-minute-man remarks. In the first instance we can
regard the two minute segment as insufficient to provide us with criteria
to determine what rule is being followed. The point of the example, if
taken this way, might even be thought to lead us in the direction of
taking Wittgenstein as alluding to the inductivistic problem of
underdetermination of facts by data. And from this we could infer that a
still broader point is in fact being made. The problem being drawn to
our attention is not that of determining what rule is being followed,
but, rather, that of determining whether, in the first place, any rule is
being followed by the two-minute man.

Such an approach, though of course developed in a far more
sophisticated fashion, is exemplified in the empiricistic semantics so
brilliantly developed by W.V.O. Quine. His position takes the view that
whilst, indeed, the problem is epistemological and in principle demands
an epistemological resolution, its depth is such that it implies at
least, but yet especially, this radical ontological conclusion, viz.,
that

[i]t makes no real difference [even] that the linguist will
turn bilingual and come to think as the natives do ---
whatever that means. For the arbitrariness of reading our
objectifications into the heathen speech reflects not so much
this inscrutability of the heathen mind, as that there is
nothing to scrute. 3

Here the epistemological motivation for behaviourist semantics ultimately
secures an ontological justification for its programme: as psychological
phenomena qua 'inner events' etc., are empirically scandalous and so
cannot feature, even half-way, as values of variables in a respectable
empirical theory, then, ex-hypothesi, no such ('inner') phenomena exist.
(We also have seen how, mutatis mutandis, this way of 'emptying' the
(language-user's) mind is closely paralleled by the semantically
nihilistic outcome of the, Kripkean-exalted, rule-sceptical argument.)

Of course, through the developments we have realised in the previous
two chapters, we know that the epistemological scenario in semantic
analysis is rejected in all its forms by Wittgenstein. Consequently the
two-minute-man problem is hardly canvassed by way of his embracing the
view that, as we put it earlier, "it is an issue for epistemology"
whether rules are being followed, language is being spoken, mathematics
is being done, 'other minds' are present, etc.

Yet this is a thoroughly counterintuitive claim. For surely the
case of the two-minute man demands of us a judgement, viz.: that
concerning the question whether here we have someone doing mathematics.
And moreover, is this (ex-hypothesi) not merely just a more difficult
epistemic problem, but an epistemic problem nevertheless, than, e.g.,
determining whether there are cars in the street outside, or whether
It is here that the deep implications of the two-minute-man example begin to come to light. For the underlying thrust of the three remarks in question concerns the logical grammar of the concept 'understanding' vis-a-vis that of 'judging', 'investigating', etc. Cognitivism conflates understanding with judging precisely because it sees concept application as grounded in epistemic functions — e.g., in a theory of interpretation or an (empirically well-supported) scientific theory. Against this, as we know, Wittgenstein seeks to demonstrate that not only cannot judgement etc. be the basis, and/or the essence, of understanding, but also, and moreover, that understanding of the (relevant aspects of) the object(s) of judgement is a logical pre-condition for judgement-making: our (grasp of) logical grammar is logico-genetically independent of and prior to (our grasp of) facts, propositions, truths, theories. And further still, objects of judgement are, on Wittgenstein's constitutive-use analysis, shown to be not pre-given in their role as such objects (as opposed to the 'pre-giveness' of their merely existing); rather, they are constituted (as 'understood as being/meaning ...') in and through the bedrock level of understanding qua the direct deed of following a rule.

Given such an analysis, we can see that rather than taking the (sceptic's) blunt-instruments of would-be nihilism to epistemological matters, Wittgenstein instead aims to have us restore epistemic considerations to their right and proper parish. To be sure, this parish is not the wonderland of philosophers' touchstones which the history of philosophy shows us we should expect. But far more important than our giving way to such disappointments, is the fact that this restoration
demands of us a radical reassessment of the metaphysical Weltanschauung we so easily bring to bear on the likes of the two-minute-man example.

In the midst of this Weltanschauung is the deep-seated metaphysical impulse to take the position that, in some sense or other, if only somehow, per impossible we could 'get inside the mind' of the two-minute-man, the 'heathen' native, the extra-terrestrial visitor, our friends, our lovers -- whoever -- then we would, without question, truly understand them. Indeed, I have heard it not argued, but taken as an unquestionable logical truth, by otherwise sophisticated intelligent 'philosophers', that 'the self' and 'that of which one has most intimate knowledge' are logically-isomorphic terms. It follows on this reasoning that if, per impossible, my self and yours could somehow be united, we would, ipso facto, perfectly understand each other. -- Now it is not my intention as a Wittgensteinian to deny this claim. Rather, Wittgensteinian philosophising demands of us that we 'metaphysically de-confuse' it. For it puts to us not a plain truth, an 'undeniable truth of logic', etc., but (through the metaphysically motivated circumstances of its assertion) an expression of grave conceptual confusion.

In this confusion's vicious embrace, anyone whose semantics would 'empty the mind' is at least held up as a behaviourist. And so, to cite a notable and highly germane case in point, many would-be empiricist philosophers of language have come to find solace in Donald Davidson's refusal to follow Quine in 'behaviourising' belief. One is supposedly thereby still able to bask in the fabulous open-air of the Quinean tropics whilst, thanks to Davidson, avoiding the heat-stroke that otherwise would deprive one of one's mentality. In this chapter, we shall severely put to the test the Davidsonian claims to have achieved
and secured requisite psychological salvation. We will do this by examining closely the deep implications of the Davidsonians' resistance to the idea of semantics' emptying of the mind. For Quine, as we have seen above, not only accepts, but holds up as a virtue, that 'mind emptying' is what his semantic programme (inter alia) achieves.

II

It is crucial to ask what is this 'mind' so virtuously -- or so shockingly -- emptied; is it mind at all? When Quine insists that "there is nothing to scrutate" (sic.), the 'mind' his radical programme thereby has emptied is, at bottom, 'the mind' as exalted by, e.g., Descartes. For obviously, without dualist metaphysics, behaviourism, let alone its sophisticated materialist and/or functionalist-cognitive-scientific contemporary superordinates, could not be formulated. By corollary, neither could the numerous positions of those who would reject the emptying of such 'mind'.

For our purposes though, we need most of all to bear in mind that when, e.g., Davidson resists Quine's radical 'behaviourisation' of belief, his motivation is not that of defending the (classical) dualist contention that 'mental stuff' is ontologically distinct from 'material/corporeal stuff'. Davidson, famously, rejects the classical dualist conception of 'mental stuff' and concedes that mind and brain are a unity, but insists that epistemological and concomitant logical factors make the realisation of any description of this isomorphy impossible. Further, but in the same overall vein, Davidson's semantics (apparently) spurns the dualist position by insisting that belief and its content (and that of other mental phenomena) is causally determined by and re-
expressible in terms of objective, empirical, 'worldly' circumstances: given that the language-user is rational, s/he will have these beliefs in these specified empirical circumstances. Speech act theorists are, to take our other target case, similarly anti-dualistic as regards 'mental stuff'. This is so in as much as (at least after recognising the errors and dangers in, e.g., Grice's original position\(^5\)) they argue that illocutionary acts -- the key moments of 'communication-intention' -- are inescapably rule-governed, social-conventional functions.\(^6\)

In general then, at least since Wittgenstein, few influential philosophical semanticians have treated psychological functions' role(s) in their semantic theories as determinative in virtue of their (somehow) being 'ethereal', self-contained, 'world-independent' 'mind stuff'. As a consequence, full-blooded, classical, semantic psychologism not only presently has a very low standing, but also is perceived as something of a dead issue. Disputes instead now focus upon the degree to which semantic theory and analysis must acknowledge any distinct psychological realm. And, as foreshadowed via my remarks on Davidson, the question is overwhelmingly taken to turn upon epistemic considerations concerning the empirical and logical adequacy of, e.g., purely behavioural approaches to belief, intent, deceit, understanding, action, etc., etc.

III

The Wittgensteinian should welcome this contemporary movement away from classical psychologism, but not without pointing out (as is the intent of this chapter) the new trend's ongoing errors and dangers. For the sharp decline in the value of the dualist's stock of 'mind stuff' this century, has not arisen from a concomitant decline in philosophers' commitment to the overall dualistically-derived metaphysical
Weltanschauung. Consequently, the above-acknowledged contemporary disputes about the logical, semantic, and epistemological status of psychological concepts (and/or psychological data) still centre around a fundamental conceptually-confused vision. I tacitly referred to this vision when, in remarking about the possible thrust of the two-minute-man example, I pointed out (not as truistically as it otherwise would have been) that *bona fide* calculation is a rule-governed activity, as opposed to the accident of just behaving *as if* a rule is being followed. (It is not unimportant to note of course that deliberate pretence is itself a family of language-games, but both behaviourism and neo-psychologism have ways of explicating pretence too.) I was, *inter alia*, making a point against behaviourism when I draw the *bona fide* versus *merely behaving as if* distinction. But what is most important here is the way philosophers of language divide around this sort of issue. The division remains dualistic, though the self-understanding of the parties so bifurcated often explicitly disavows this realisation.

One can side with Quine or Hartry Field and insist that, e.g., the 'is really linguistically competent' versus 'just behaves as if' distinction, once all empirically available data about the subject's brain states and/or behaviour is 'in', is a non-distinction. Alternately, one can resist any so-radically empirical-materialistic a dissolution, and make good both the distinction and a commitment to the notion of content, by distinguishing possession of beliefs articulated by an utterance from replicating the utterance without possessing (relevant) beliefs. This is how Davidson replies to Quine's version of paratactic analysis.

For Quine, as Davidson tells us,
... when a speaker attributes an attitude to a person, what he does is ape or mimic an actual or possible speech act of that person. ....

We could take this line, but unfortunately there seems no clear reason why we have to. .... The paratactic analysis of the logical form of attributions of attitude can get along without the mimic-theory of utterances. When I say, 'Jones believes that snow is white' I describe Jones's state of mind directly: it is indeed the state of mind someone is in who could honestly assert 'Snow is white' if he spoke English, but that may be a state a languageless creature could also be in. .... [To overcome this problem, we need to acknowledge] .... that a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to have the concept of belief. And given the dependence of other attitudes on belief, we can say more generally that only a creature that can interpret speech can have the concept of a thought.

Can a creature have a belief if it does not have the concept of belief? It seems to me it cannot, and for this reason. Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken, and this requires grasping the contrast between truth and error — true and false belief. But this contrast ... can emerge only in the context of interpretation, which alone forces us to the idea of an objective, public truth. .... For the notion of a true belief depends on the notion of a true utterance, and this in turn there cannot be without shared language. 7

What is going on here is that Davidson is resisting Quine's semantic formalism, and thus his content-destructive 'mimic theory' of paratactic analysis, by linking content to self-consciousness in a way that supposedly nevertheless escapes the psychologisation of this reflective state.

But I do not accept this. Rather, my contention is that tacitly here, Davidson (pace the received understandings) embraces what I want to show is a strong (but not 'classical') psychologistic position through his insistence that only creatures capable of self-reflection can have beliefs. This is because, very basically, for Davidson 'possession of a belief' is taken as implying the reflective mental act of comparing a thought with reality to derive the belief content vis a vis "public
truth". In other words, for Davidson, having bona fide beliefs implies, inter alia, the applicability of interpretation to one's own thoughts: that is what 'understanding the possibility of being mistaken' and "grasping the contrast between truth and error" are taken as on Davidsonian theory; one must, qua language-user, be able to 'cognise' one's own and others' 'cognising' and thus apprehend content thereby. This stands in sharp contrast to Quine's insistence that all there is to belief is the facts of cognition and not, as well as that, content as a function of the relationship between worldly facts and some cognising self-reflective subject. Quine eliminates the subject, and what is left is not therefore content, but just 'formalistic' facts.

For its part, speech act theory equally and similarly employs the reflexivity of self-consciousness in its resistance to the Quinean, formalistic and behaviouristic, Weltanschauung and its semantic commitments. Thus John Searle has insisted that

... reduction of the illocutionary to the perlocutionary and the consequent elimination of rules probably [sic.] cannot be carried out. It is at this point that what might be called institutional theories of communication, like Austin's, mine, and I think Wittgenstein's, part company with what might be called naturalistic theories of meaning, such as, e.g., those which rely on a stimulus-response account of meaning. 9

In good measure, Searle's point is well taken here as an insight into the logical and semantic requirements for resistance to semantic behaviourism. But most germane to this chapter's concerns is the issue whether the speech-act theorists' resistance to the likes of Quine's semantic vision does not, along with Davidson, constitute their embracing — albeit, perhaps, implicitly or unawares — the other side of the dualistic dichotomising of the language-user, even if it is not the 'classical' psychologistic side.
Having briefly canvassed two of the most influential contemporary responses to the problem of securing the distinction between language-use and language-use-imitation, and having concomitantly raised the issue of the role irreducible psychological concepts play in these theories seeking to make good this distinction, let us turn once more to consider the intent of Wittgenstein's two-minute-man problematic. (I leave the pursuit of the Quinean dissolution of the distinction until the next chapter.)

The principal dialectical point I want to advance here can now be brought to the fore. It is the radical contention, implied in, inter alia, the two-minute-man example, that the distinction between 'using a language' and 'behaving as if' cannot be made good by appealing to (irreducible or otherwise hypostatised) mental 'accompaniments'/'events' which must be present in language-using but which are, ipso facto, absent in mere imitative behaviour. Positively stated then, this chapter has as a central concern the prosecution of the argument that even if the 'behaving as if' is converted so as to include all the supposedly required mental 'accompaniments' it still, logically, fails to be language-use; tacking 'mental accompaniments' onto the behaviour is not the answer. This being so, the sense in which psychological concepts — e.g., Davidson's 'beliefs', Grice, Searle and Strawson's 'intentions' — can play any semantically relevant role, is radically forced into question. I shall argue that on the Wittgensteinian analysis this grave difficulty can only be avoided by radically disavowing the implicit dualist perspective against which the 'real use' versus 'behaving as if' distinction is framed, and out of which the neo-psychologistic
'solutions' we have canvassed emerge. *Inter alia*, this critique will both further explicate the detail of this study's attack on Davidsonian semantics, and will expose grave difficulties for the nature and ambit of speech-act theory.

V

On the analysis to be developed here, the deep implications of the two-minute-man example lie in Wittgenstein's explicitly (and deliberately) stating that "[o]ne of these people" — the 'two-minute-man' — "is doing exactly what a mathematician in England is doing, who is just doing a calculation", and then concluding his dialectic by asking of what is being done "do (say) the people who are doing it know, though we do not?". This pointed question is informed by Wittgenstein's contention that even if the calculating-like-behaviour is fleshed-out with all appropriate psychological accompaniments (beliefs, etc.), still this logically cannot determine that here is someone who is doing mathematics.

A most fruitful way to bring out this fundamental aspect of the two-minute-man example is by drawing attention to the similarity between its content and that of the enigmatic dialectic in *Investigations* 200. For there, in the midst of his efforts to have us escape the legacy of cognitivistic approaches to the concept of following a rule, Wittgenstein strategically inserts this otherwise spurious-looking, apparently tangential, remark:

It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and with all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they were playing chess. But now imagine a [particular] game of chess translated according to
certain rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a game—say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose these two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say so?

We see here, in direct parallel with the two-minute-man case, questions raised about what is logically required to grasp the particular rules, if any, which the natives are following. Indeed, the tie-in with the case of the two-minute man goes straight to the issue of neo-psychologism. For any advocate of such a position (e.g., Davidson), would want to say that if we gain suitable access to the reflective knowledge, beliefs, intentions, etc., possessed by the natives, we would thereby secure access (given the constraints of indeterminacy of radical interpretation) to the rules, semantic principles, meanings (if any) being employed.

In responding to this point it becomes very important to consider what were Wittgenstein's motives in saying that if we were to see the natives "we should say they were playing chess." (My emphasis.) Given the points we have already taken into account, we need to recognise that whatever Wittgenstein meant by the natives even having "all the appropriate mental accompaniments", these can be taken as including (though not necessarily) reflective knowledge of games and, thus, of the game of chess. The key difference between us and them is, however, that we do, whereas the natives do not, participate in the "customs (uses, institutions)" which constitute the milieu of the game of chess. It is therefore Wittgenstein's implicit point that it is this milieu which (in a sense yet to be explicated) we have 'brought with us' when we stumble across the natives. Thus, vis-à-vis the psychologistic perspective, Wittgenstein challenges us to say that, under the specified, 'native'
conditions, the natives are playing chess. Indeed, in case we are slow off the mark, the challenge is turned into a rhetorical move by Wittgenstein saying, in effect, 'Of course, if we just came across this scene we would say they were playing chess'. His dialectical intention is, of course, to have us see how dangerous an error we have made.

It is of the essence of Wittgenstein's point that the two-minute-man case and the Investigations case share the situation where there is all requisite behaviour and mentality but (I want to argue) lack of institutionality. Moreover, such institutionality obviously, from both examples (quite aside from our analysis of the concept and its relatives in the second half of Chapter II), does not amount to social structure, community etc., if we take by these concepts something like the mere presence of co-ordinated regulated behaviour and mental 'states' involving a plurality of actors.

I make this point with particular respect to Davidson because his conception of linguistic community turns upon the notion of sharing of beliefs (in the particular reflective, neo-psychologistic sense of 'belief' we have already outlined). For Davidson argues that membership of a "speech community" is defined by possession

... of a method of interpretation ... that ... puts the interpreter in general agreement with the speaker: according to the method, the speaker holds a sentence true under specified conditions, and these conditions obtain, in the opinion of the interpreter, just when the speaker holds the sentence to be true. 12

This is a thoroughgoing cognitivist conception of agreement-in-language. It treats intersubjectivity, or shared understanding, as constituted by, and grounded in, epistemic factors (as Davidson, as we have also seen, treats all understanding as cognitive and reflective, i.e., as
It is here therefore that we must directly confront the key neo-psychologistic assumption that what secures the irreducibility and central semantic role of psychological factors is their reflexivity, i.e., their being able to be reflected upon by their possessors. As we saw, Davidson insists that non-language-using creatures cannot have beliefs (and, by implication, other 'intentional states'); they (presumably) just 'behave as if'. Similarly, speech-act theorists avow the reflexivity requirement as central to their insights into the 'communication-intentional' aspects of language. For instance, speaking to Austin's treatment of this matter, Strawson has noted that

Given that we know (in Austin's sense) the meaning of an utterance, there may still be a further question as to how what was said was meant by the speaker, or as to how the words spoken were used, or as to how the utterance was to be taken or ought to have been taken. In order to know the illocutionary force of the utterance, we must know the answer to this further question.

It is a sufficient, though not, I think, a necessary, condition of a verb's being the name of a kind of illocutionary act that it can figure, in the first person present indicative, as what Austin calls an explicit performative.

The way this general approach cashes out in detail is clearly exhibited in e.g., the following account where Strawson outlines the basic Gricean position:

S nonnaturally means something by an utterance x if S intends \( i_1 \) to produce by uttering x a certain response \( r \) in an audience A and intends \( i_2 \) that A shall recognise S's intention \( i_1 \) and intends \( i_3 \) that this recognition on the part of A of S's intention \( i_1 \) shall function as A's reason, or a part of his reason, for his response, \( r \). (The word
'response', though more convenient in some ways than Grice's 'effect', is not ideal. It is intended to cover cognitive and affective states or attitudes as well as actions.) It is, evidently, an important feature of this definition that the securing of the response $r$ is intended to be mediated by the securing of another (and always cognitive) effect in A; namely, recognition of $S$'s intention to secure response $r$. 15

It seems plain to me that we can take 'reason for his response' and 'recognition of $S$'s intention' as cognitive, epistemic, functions here.

Take then the following case: "A dog might learn to run to $N$ at the call "N", and to $M$ at the call "M", — but would that mean he knows what these people are called?". 16 For Davidson, the answer is in the negative, as it is (though for quite opposed reasons) for Wittgenstein. By arguable contrast, and without (surely) expressing a claim to own an exceptional canine, John Searle tells us that his

... dog can perform certain simple illocutionary acts. He can express pleasure and he can ask (request) that he be let out. But his range is very limited, and even for the types he can perform, one feels it is partly metaphorical to describe them as illocutionary acts at all. 17

Just how far one can infer from this that Searle wants to treat understanding as some kind of illocutionary function (e.g., it can appear in 'I understand that you said ...', 'Now understand this!: — ...', 'You must understand that ...') is not quite clear. But several pages later in *Speech Acts*, this inference is made explicit when he concludes, using the illocutionary act of uttering the greeting 'Hello' as a case in point, that the utterer's "intentions will be achieved in general if the hearer understands the sentence "Hello", i.e. understands its meaning ...." 18 The problem here, for Searle at least, is that the dog does not have any reflective grasp of illocutionary functions, nor, in Wittgenstein's example, of names.
It is here that we need to explicate a crucial contrast concerning senses of intentionality; a contrast about which the speech-act theorists are seriously confused. Consider the situation in a chess game: player A makes a move and her (bemused) opponent asks 'Did you intend to make that move — or was that a mistake, an accident? — Did you just fluke that?'; shortly afterwards, B's move bemuses A, and she asks him 'Why did you do that?'. Now there is room for various ambiguities in these questions. One that is not presently relevant concerns Stichian or Davidsonian (or similar) arguments about the validity of moves to collapse reasons into causes. Instead, I want to call attention to the way a certain logical hierarchy of intentionality is discriminable through the above two cases of bemusing moves.

In the case of A's bemusing move, let us say that such was that move that B seriously doubted whether A was paying attention to what she was doing; and, indeed, B's doubt was entirely justified. By logical contrast, B's bemusing move was (obviously) calculated but counterintuitive, and A (being insistent, contrary to the spirit of the game, on knowing her opponent's plans at all stages!) asks what are B's intentions in so moving. Now this distinction shows that the question 'What did you intend?', not only tacitly confuses two senses in which intention enters into actions, but also at least concomitantly supposes that the agent, as someone intentionally doing something, ipso facto can reflexively account for his/her action(s).

Put succinctly, my point is that all sorts of intentional, deliberate actions can be performed which do not arise out of
'possession' of reasons, plans, deliberations, forethought, etc.; one just intentionally acts -- but not on the basis of any reflective process. *A fortiori*, one could (probably somewhat dangerously) say one acts in such cases, intentionally, but with an 'empty mind'. And this is precisely what is done by Searle and Wittgenstein's dogs, and (without wishing to make unfair comparisons), it is extremely characteristic both, *e.g.*, of 'lightning-chess' players and, more to the point (for our concerns) of language-users.

Speech-act theory's post-factum re-constructive 'communication-intentional' perspective dangerously implies that we 'pick our words', ratiocinate, deliberate, plot, plan and premeditate. On the contrary however, at bottom, and (empirically) most often, we just act; we just speak — albeit *intentionally*.

By stark contrast, an example of the way speech-act theorists embrace psychologistic mind-filling is to hand in the following observations made by Strawson:

... [I]n general a man can speak of his intention in performing an action with a kind of authority which he cannot command in predicting its outcome. What he intends in doing something is up to him in a way in which the results of his doing it are not, or not only, up to him. .... The speaker ... *[inter alia]* has the general authority on the subject of his intention. 19

Here the ruling assumption is that the 'speaker authority', which is crucial for "the general suitability of an illocutionary act for performance"20, is a function of reflexivity of intention: the speaker is taken as being able to, *e.g.*, say (*ipso facto*, reflexively) 'By that utterance I meant that ...' or 'By that utterance I intended you to understand that ...'. And this can be a perfectly sound route to
understanding, provided we do not conceive of it as having its logical
basis either in any 'mental state' of the dualistically-conceived,
introspectible cum Cartesian ('reified') 'mind-filling' sort, or in any
cognitive/epistemic relationship between the speaker and any meaning, or
other semantic function, or any 'fact (in the mind or the world)'. For
the logical bedrock of linguistic competence and praxis is not some
'thought' or cognition (qua apprehension of a fact secured by judging,
investigating, doubting, etc.); the bedrock is the (non-cognitive)
direct-deed. What Searle so aptly calls "[t]he Gricean reflexive
intention" falls foul of this crucial Wittgensteinian insight.

VIII

To be sure, I have here just implicitly 'tipped my hand' as regards
Wittgenstein's analysis of assertion: all (bona fide) assertion is, pace
the received, dualistically-derived metaphysical traditions, assertion
from and with 'an empty mind'. But I put this to one side as Chapter V
deals with the detail of this issue (particularly as regards Dummett and
Frege). Instead we can settle for the more general point here, viz.,
that such is the radical nature of the ambit of Wittgenstein's anti-
psychologism that it not only seeks to dissolve the entire 'inner-
outer', mind-body, metaphysical Weltanschauung, but concomitantly to
recover the concreteness of 'mind' as a 'life-world-endemic' function.

Let me explain this appeal to the 'lebensform'-constitutive analysis
here by pointing out where, e.g., Searle's explicit treatment of the
relationship between psychological concepts and utterances falls down.
Searle, prima facie most commendably, puts the following proposal (among
several) about illocutionary acts:
Wherever there is a psychological state specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act counts as an expression of that psychological state. This law holds whether the act is sincere or insincere, that is whether the speaker actually has the specified psychological state or not. Thus to assert, affirm, state (that \(p\)) counts as an expression of belief (that \(p\)). To request, ask, order, entreat, enjoin, pray, or command (that \(A\) be done) counts as an expression of a wish or desire (that \(A\) be done). To promise, vow, threaten or pledge (that \(A\)) counts as an expression of intention (to do \(A\)). To thank, welcome or congratulate counts as an expression of gratitude, pleasure at (\(H\)'s arrival), or pleasure (at \(H\)'s good fortune). 22

Let me say, this is not a totally false analysis; but it most certainly tends toward a serious conceptual confusion. For the Searlean hypothetical/tentative analysis is in order — provided we understand the logical grammar of the language/expression — psychological 'state' relationship. But because of their reliance upon a cognitivist semantic perspective and moreover their commitment to "Gricean reflexive intention", the speech act theorists do not correctly grasp this aspect of our logical grammar.

At bottom, speech-act theorists take the 'mind-filling', ipso facto psychologicistic, view, that such 'expression' as Searle so appositely identifies, is, as it were, the 'inner', the 'already extant mental item', making itself manifest. It is put into the 'communicative arena' thereby confronting the "audience", who, it is intended, should "recognise what we are trying to do", i.e., they achieve the act of "understanding the utterance of the speaker". 23

The driving metaphysical impulse at work here is that which forms the (definitely a prioristic) picture of the role of language being that of the taking of an irreducible thought, belief, idea, 'mental item', from the speaker's mind and delivering it into the hearer's. This is surely the fundamental, if tacit, image behind (inter alia)
'communication-intentional' semantics. And the point where the dialectical thrust of Wittgenstein's radical anti-psychologism attacks this vision is in the fundamental idea it embraces of mind and object (intention/meaning and content/truth-conditions) as primitive, logically prior functions vis-a-vis the constitutive moment of the playing of the language-game; just as if first you have a thought, then you play the language-game.

As Peter Winch most astutely has observed about Strawson's metaphysical outlook (albeit as regards the concept of the expression of pain rather than of the expression of 'mental states' in general), Strawson's starting point is the statement in which a predicate is ascribed to an identified subject; Wittgenstein's is the primitive reaction. Not, of course, that Wittgenstein denies that we can make true and false assertions about persons: his point is that these assertions make use of a concept which is the creation of a mode of acting to which the true-false bipolarity does not apply. 24

For Strawson, applying the predicate is the (fallible, and cognitivistically/epistemically mediated) way we, the 'audience', acknowledge cum understand the prior, and now communicated/expressed, extant state of mind. Modus Strawson, our statement, e.g., 'S/he is in pain', or 'S/he means we should leave', is a linguistic re-presentation of how it independently is, and, if the statement is true, how it independently must be, for the utterer: s/he was (and may still be) in this state, and then her/his utterance merely appraised us, 'communication-intentionally', of this truth.

This is a classically a prioristic — 'language as conveyor of thoughts' — vision of the kind which we have already, in Chapters I and II, unmasked as utterly flawed. It effectively hypostatises the
'psychological state' as independently, or 'self-sufficiently', semantically determined, as well as (more correctly) independently present vis-a-vis the cognitive vicissitudes of confronting any given audience. What is wrong here is due to the failure to recognise that it is one thing, logically, for some event, object, or state of (inter alia, psychological) affairs to happen to exist independently of our knowing it, but it is quite another — and a nonsense — for it to have identity, sense, a(ny) semantic role, for us whilst it continues to be thus utterly independent. Strawson has therefore got the cart before the horse: the 'starting point' cannot be the statement; cannot be any grasping or cognising of independently-/self-determining 'semantic-fact' functions. The starting point is the direct deed which constructs the 'true-false polarity' in respect of relevant 'pre-given', otherwise semantically indeterminate, states of affairs. We make sense and identity out of the objects of the language-game; they are not (somehow) possessors of any semantic role or status beforehand.

Winch's use of the word "creation" is thus most well taken in his arguing, entirely correctly (and most astutely) that "... assertions make use of a concept" -- 'truth' -- "which is the creation of a mode of acting to which the true-false bipolarity does not apply". It is, however, not quite so plain (though I may well do him an injustice here) that he is thereby aware that what he has identified as the 'creative' deed is, as the direct deed that is fundamental to the playing of the language-game, the constitutor of (the relevant 'state(s)' of) mind. (That is, the deed is semantically constitutive -- and not, of course, 'ontologically-metaphysically' constructive; neither Winch nor I, nor Wittgenstein, for one moment embrace idealism about mind or anything
It is therefore a consequence of the application of Wittgensteinian analysis to, inter alia, speech act, 'communication-intentional', semantics (I will return to the case of Davidson shortly) that we see (as is the intention of this chapter) just how crucial is the previously identified 'institutionality factor'. To be sure, Grice, Searle, Austin and Strawson explicitly acknowledge the institutionality of linguistic conventions/rules as having a crucial semantic role. But they singularly and collectively misrepresent and misunderstand that role. The deep thrust of Wittgenstein's two-minute-man and 'chess-playing' natives remarks brings this realisation to the fore. For the speech act theorists cannot have it both ways: either they must reject the psychologistic inference(s) Wittgenstein, through the two-minute-man and native chess remarks, invites his dialectical 'targets' to draw, and so must see that all the semantically relevant work, including that involving ('irreducible') mental concepts, is done in the life-world, institutional, context of the constitutive ('empty-minded') playing of the language-game; or, they must abandon themselves to the damning errors of full-blooded, classical, 'mind-filling' semantic psychologism and insist that, e.g., intentions alone, and qua classic (Cartesian) 'irreducibly mental objects', determine sense.

Put another way, and to pick up once more the example we left suspended somewhat earlier, what precisely damn speech act theory is that Searle's dog and Wittgenstein's, indeed are rule-followers -- have (presumably) been trained (or otherwise have learned) successfully to master a certain (ipso facto, rule-governed) technique. Neither dog,
despite their 'life-form-determined' limited linguistic repertoire, lacks the ability to play (certain) language-games despite their lacking reflexive grasp of illocutionary functions — or, pace Davidson, their lacking reflexive ('propositional') knowledge of various (semantically relevant) 'concepts'. (Indeed, against Davidson, one might just bluntly say here: 'You don't have to be a (reflexive) believer to be a rule-follower.'!) 

X

In their various employments of the psychologistic view that linguistic competence consists in having, and communication consists in sharing, 'mind-filling' reflective knowledge of meanings/truth-conditions/intentions/beliefs, both Davidson and the speech act theorists conflate the logical grammar of 'meaning' with that of '(reflectively accessible) experience'. Indeed, this is one of the trademarks of the new psychologism wherever it seeks to resist physicalistically-reductionist empiricism: at bottom, the old — e.g., Lockean — empiricist psychologistic fallacy is embraced: viz., to know how to speak and/or understand a language is to know/have (reflectively) such-and-such experiences (even if language is prone imperfectly to 'fit' experience). (I should add, to be fair to the Davidsonians and the speech act theorists, that the very idea of a phenomenology of meaning, understanding, communication or the use of language-in-general, is predicated upon the same psychologistic, 'mind-filling', fallacy.)

Giving warning against the metaphysical impulse to 'fill' the (ipso facto dualistically-derived and conceived) 'mind', Wittgenstein explicitly reminds us that the
... question ... "Did you intend to say such-and-such to him on your way to meet him?" ... refers to a definite time (the time of walking ...) — but not to an experience during that time. Meaning is as little an experience as intending.

But what distinguishes them from experience? — They have no experience-content. For the contents (images for instance) which accompany and illustrate them are not the meaning or intending.

The intention with which one acts does not 'accompany' the action any more than the thought 'accompanies' speech. Thought and intention are neither 'articulated' nor 'non-articulated'; to be compared neither with a single note which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with a tune.

....

If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of. 26

Both Davidson and the speech-act theorists insist that 'God' — the ultimate interpreter/audience! — must be able to see who/what we mean. So, they seek recourse to neo-psychologism to get content into linguistic behaviour. But they treat that content (e.g., Davidsonian truth-conditions) not just as something that must be there independently of the ('expressive') behaviour, but as something whose semantic status or role is independently effected in a suitably conceived mind — object, reflective, relationship. As such, whilst their appeal to the content — behaviour distinction, if it really arises as a function of, e.g., acknowledging the dissonance between 'possession' of a mental 'state' and expressive behaviour, is acceptable (and challenges behaviourism etc.), their metaphysical reification of 'mind-content', and its attendant semantic outcome, is not.

For Davidson, a T-sentence, suitably relativised to speaker, time and location, provides, theoretically, the requisite (belief-)content: T-sentences (seek to) identify the conditions under which the utterer holds her/his utterance to be true; they give us access to what the speaker
'has in mind'. As a consequence, this hybrid of Tarski, Quine and anti-reductionistic (neo-psychologistic) empiricism, purchases meaning at the store of (reflectively-mediated) experience. Instead of old-fashioned 'image-content', Davidson gives us new-fashioned 'truth-conditions-reflexively-apprehended-content'. Empiricistically, but non-reductionalistically-conceived belief qua cognitive, reflexively-apprehended experience of the world, is wheeled in to fill the mind which Davidson is convinced must be so filled on pain of inability to distinguish bona fide language-users/interpreters from mere behavioural facsimiles thereof.

But Davidson 'wheels in' a myth of mind. The trap Wittgenstein lays in the case of the chess-playing natives engulfs Davidson utterly—for we surely could, modus Davidson, suitably interpret/translate their actions into empiricistically-conceived, non-physicalistically reductionist, chess playing. But we can only do this by ignoring the 'institutionality of mind' qua mind's logically being a life-praxis-constituted function.

The natives do not have in their life-praxis the ongoing, institutional, milieu into which the (concrete) game of chess — the life and use of our concept 'the game of chess' — fits as a product thereof. They just have, as it were, an hypostatised (i.e., non-praxis-constituted) state of being wherein, in this fossilised artifice, they "sit at a chess board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments." 27

A good radical interpreter could produce T-sentences which yield impressive empirical confirmation here (as there is, as we have made plain, no shortage of experiential data!). For Davidson, s/he has, ipso
facto, set her/himself up in linguistic communion with these 'native chess players' (vicissitudes of radical interpretation notwithstanding):

Membership in a language community depends on the ability to interpret the utterances of members of the group, and a method is at hand if one has, and knows one has, a theory which provides truth conditions, more or less in Tarski's style, for all sentences (relativised, as always, to time and speaker). The theory is correct as long as it entails, by finitely stated means, theorems of the familiar form: 'It is raining' is true for a speaker \( x \) at time \( t \) if and only if it is raining (near \( x \)) at \( t \). The evidential basis for such a theory concerns sentences held true, facts like the following: 'It is raining' is held true by Smith at 8 a.m. on 26 August and it did rain near Smith at that time.' It would be possible to generate a correct theory simply by considering sentences to be true when held true, provided (1) there was a theory which satisfied the formal constraints and was consistent in this way with the evidence, and (2) all speakers held a sentence to be true just when that sentence was true — provided, that is, all beliefs, at least as far as they could be expressed, were correct. 28

*Mutatis mutandis*, the above argument is easily employed for the case of the *Investigations* 200 'chess players'. Indeed, if we think about it, the transition Wittgenstein canvasses in the second part of the remark, to stamping and yelling, need not make things harder for the radical interpreter, but could just give her/him more overtly 'linguistic-experiential' data (as chess players often are a silent lot except for exclamations of 'check!', etc.). But no matter; this 'native chess', as a thoroughly regularised, suitably mental-state-accompanied activity, should yield highly respectable and confirmable T-sentences.

So according to Davidson, the natives are playing chess, have beliefs, etc., and this because we can suitably interpret their utterances; for I say again, all the Davidson-required experiential data are on hand.

But, as the Wittgensteinian analysis allows us to see, and thus as
both the two-minute-man and 'chess playing' natives examples so superbly and insightfully show, the Davidsonians' successful radical interpretation is the interpretation of a facsimile of language, and the linguistic communion thereby achieved is communion with facsimiles; communion with (animated) 'dummy' chess players; ersatz, 'dead', 'fossilised', 'communication'. For the Davidsonian theory's guarantee to deliver up, as far as the data permit, the cases of 'filled minds', need not be, and has not been, called into question: we do not deny that the natives have "all the appropriate mental accompaniments"; all the grasp of meaning-purchased-at-the-store-of-experience. But the minds so filled are ersatz minds. Their beliefs are ersatz beliefs; their thoughts are ersatz thoughts; their talk, with "all the appropriate mental accompaniments", is ersatz talk. This ersatz life-world of 'all requisite experiences', fossilised, and cut away from constitutive praxis, is what Davidson delivers to us, and equally shows what he unwittingly holds us to be as language-users: ersatz speakers in an ersatz life-world with ersatz hearers/interpreters. Empiricism, even with neo-psychologistic resistance to physicalist reductionism, is ever just another form of blindness to the constitutivity of life-praxis. Having a mind, understanding a language, meaning M by saying that p, is not an accompaniment to behaviour.

XI

In the face of this damning realisation we might recoil, not — as we should — to abandon the metaphysical Weltanschauung of dualism, with its compulsion either to 'fill the mind' or abandon it as a lost cause. We might, instead, recoil to just the state of abandon — behaviouristic reductionism — which Davidson's reflexively constructed self-conscious-
mind-filling 'beliefs' etc., set out to resist when, as we saw, he offered up his version of paratactic analysis against that of Quine. But Davidson's prophylactic to Quine is a means of exchanging one fallacy for another. The radical view that there is "nothing to scrutue" is resisted by hypostatising mental concepts as extensions of a passive, epistemic, relationship between an empirical world and the world-reflecting 'mind' of the suitably hypostatised language-user.

Neither does speech-act theory get far beyond this pseudo-prophylaxis to behaviourism, semantic or otherwise.

We nevertheless are offered a choice in the confrontation between Quine and the 'new psychologism' of Davidson, or Searle, Strawson, Grice, et al. It is a choice between, on the one hand, bodies and their movements and correlated sounds, and on the other hand, the supposedly more 'humanistic' vision of bodies which accompany their movements and correlated sounds with "all the appropriate mental accompaniments"; should we take our machines with or without their ghost?

If this is our choice, Quine at least makes no pretence of what his option offers. By contrast, the reception Davidson, and previously Searle, Strawson, Grice and Austin, have been accorded hails them as recoverers of a 'humanity' and 'mentality' we now can see they never can lead philosophical analysis to realise.

Quine's honest empty cup beckons us where Davidson et al offer only ersatz. It is this bare-faced 'honest broker' that we now must confront.

But we turn to this dialectical confrontation with the knowledge that the alternative he offers is still the offer of a poisoned cup —
albeit an empty one. And the antidote lies, as Wittgenstein shows us, in
discarding all such cups — 'empty' or 'full'.

For the mind Davidson et al 'fill', and which Quine empties is, of
course, not mind at all; it is a metaphysical illusion; the poisonous
fruit of conceptual confusion.
Footnotes

1. Indeed, Wittgenstein has long-since been appropriated by these theorists as one of their own. E.g., this is by-and-large Strawson’s view of Wittgenstein.


5. See H.P. Grice, "Meaning", in *Philosophical Review*, 66 (1957), 377-88, where Grice most dangerously leaves it entirely up to intentions and recognition thereof, to secure meaning.


8. It is interesting and instructive to note that there is a close parallel here with Wittgenstein’s thinking during his ‘verificationist’ period. But I cannot detail this significant similarity further here, as it goes beyond our present concerns.


12. Davidson, "Thought and Talk", p. 21, cf. his "Radical Interpretation", passim, where the same point is developed at length.

13. In: J.L. Austin, How to do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). I have used the second edition of this text -- published in 1975, rpt. 1978, where various editorial amendments have been made.

14. P.F. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts", in The Philosophy of Language, p. 24, here reprinted from The Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 439–60. Note also (presently, en passant), how Strawson here demonstrates for us the absolute reliance of speech-act theory on the (Fregean-inspired) sense-force distinction. This commitment itself seemingly removes speech-act theory from the classical, 'old-fashioned' psychologistic position whereby speakers' 'states of mind' alone determine meaning and understanding. But if, as is Wittgenstein's strongly held view, the sense-force distinction is an abstractionist sematician's fallacy, the motivation in favour of neo-psychologism at work in this crucial aspect of speech-act theory is rendered highly questionable.

15. Ibid., p. 28.


18. Ibid., p. 49.


20. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 65.

23. Ibid., p. 47.

24. Peter Winch, "Im Anfang war die Tat", op.cit., p. 177.

25. Ibid., pp. 216f.

27. Ibid., remark 200.

Chapter IV — Linguistic Behaviour Versus Linguistic Praxis: Quine and Wittgenstein

I

The elimination of the most likely neo-psychologistic analyses of the issues put to us by the two-minute man, and by the chess-players of the first half of *Investigations* 200, opens at least as many doors as it closes. If we resolve that the gaining of access to the 'psychologised' mind of a rule-follower is the sort of blind-alley Wittgenstein shows it to be, we can of course turn to the view that we should correct our understanding of mental concepts along either materialistic or functionalistic lines. Alternatively, we may not need to go even that far. If the arguments of Willard Van Orman Quine are accepted, we can settle the matter with the invocation of behaviouristic analyses. On this line 'following a rule' and 'playing a language-game' would be concepts to be analysed in terms of regular observable behaviour and its causally mediated interaction with the environment in which the behaving 'rule-follower' carries out the relevant activities.

With such an approach in mind, let us turn once more to the case of the two-minute man and the chess-playing natives, the details of the positive solutions to which we have left somewhat hanging in mid-air (or so it may seem). In particular, the second case of native chess-playing outlined in *Investigations* 200 serves well to indicate the possibility of a major change of analytical focus away from all psychologism:

But now imagine a [particular] game of chess translated according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a *game* —— say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose these two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is
translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say so?

The talk of 'translation' raises the important issues here.

First, there is an unsettling ring to this second case of native chess-playing. Certainly, it is reasonable to infer that the issues surrounding the questions 'How do we know what the natives are doing?; what rules, if any, are they following?' are being canvassed further. But, coming to this remark with awareness of Quinean arguments about the indeterminacy of radical translation, one can hardly be blamed for thinking that Wittgenstein too is now addressing this topic. I think this intuition is absolutely correct (though when the remark was written Wittgenstein could hardly have had Quine in mind). So I suggest it is fruitful to see the above-quoted part of Investigations 200 as if we are first taken through a 'loaded' case of translation. That is, I want to argue that Wittgenstein starts by appealing to an instance where we know full-well that as strange as the 'translated' chess game may seem, it is nevertheless a bona fide projection of the playing of some particular chess game. It is not then just that we can make up rules to facilitate the 'translation'; we have done so.

This should alert us to the fact that Wittgenstein is implicitly seeking here, inter alia, to come to grips with the empiricistic view that translation is a regularity identifying, regularity 'preserving' procedure, which makes alien language(s) available to us by matching an appropriate translating-theory/manual to the observable data. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that we are taken in the latter part of Investigations 200 from the 'loaded' translation -- an actual translation -- to the implied candidate case where, e.g., we simply
stumble across the yelling and stamping natives in the course of anthropological studies. For we are, prima facie, thereby confronted by the realisation that given the 'loaded' translation’s results, here too there could be a game of chess in progress: the loaded case preserves all requisite regularities (including, e.g., brain and all other 'psychological' processes), so surely the candidate case is only a problem for us qua unresolved empirical question.¹

II

We have abandoned psychologistic measures to deal with this problem, so how is it to be tackled? Quine certainly has an answer for us here. He would say that our problem will remain insoluble, despite our abandoning psychologism, as long as we cling to such un-empiricistic security blankets as intensional concepts like 'rules', 'meanings', etc. In the place of this outmoded baggage, we must adopt a totally extensional analysis of our problem cases. Talk about 'the meaning' of native yells and stampings is to be supplanted by talk about the overall net of empirical conditions which elicit assent and denial when we try to communicate with the natives. The preferred semantics, being behaviouristic, talks not of 'meaning' in the traditional empiricist sense arising from what Quine exposes as the question-begging analytic–synthetic distinction. Rather, given that semantic explications involving intensions take one around within a closed linguistic circle, intensions are consigned, in effect, to Hume's bonfire. Quine thus introduces in his behaviouristic semantics the extensional concept 'stimulus meaning'. This is the extension of a term taken as the relation between the ordered-pair of assent- and dissent-prompting situations.
The concepts of 'assent-' and 'dissent-prompting situations' are of course derivative from Skinnerian behaviourism. Quine thinks their content is clear enough. These situations and their connections with behavioural responses are the only data available to a radical translator (such as the one we can imagine coming upon the stamping and yelling natives) for the purposes of resolving the questions whether the natives use language and, if so, what they are given to talking about when they make such-and-such utterances and/or gestures. Quine holds that there is no real problem in at least grasping the native assents and dissents because by simple empirical investigation we can detect native responses indicative of their being flatly contradicted. From these responses we gain access to the native words for 'yes' and 'no', and thereby to native assent and dissent.

Note, as foreshadowed, that this is taken to entail that the radical translator has solely an extensionalistic template to apply to the native's language. Quine insists that this is all the radical translator can have.

S/he cannot even be licensed to go beyond repeated and consistent receipt of assents and dissents to assign an extension to any individual native sentence. This is because assent and dissent cut across information relevant to grasping the (stimulus) 'meaning' of a sentence and overlap into other information about the extension in question. As Bernard Harrison points out, this is...

... the problem of analyticity again. Perhaps we can at least say that knowing a certain piece of information cannot be essential to knowing a language if not all the speakers of the language assent to it. But all speakers of a language possess in common an enormous amount of general information about the world. This Quine calls generally shared collateral information. The problem of analyticity arises
anew as the problem of distinguishing between information relevant to meaning and generally shared collateral information. 2

The solution Quine tenders is, famously, his linguistic holism. In effect Quine says we must, as radical translators, cast our nets over all the data available through the observation of the whole of the natives' patterns of stimulus assent and stimulus dissent. For the whole of the natives' language, though not all of it in equal degrees, confronts the natives' experience of the world. (This theory is sometimes referred to as the 'web of belief'.)

III

Naturally, this account of Quinean semantics is little else but a very brief sketch. For the moment however it will suffice. For in it we have to hand a prototype solution to the problem which so troubled us in Chapter III when we considered the cases of the two-minute man and the 'chess-playing' natives. But how does this behaviouristic solution compare with the way Wittgenstein analyses this matter? An apparent indication is given in Investigations 206-207:

Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?

Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, rebelled against them, and so on?

The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.

Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the usual human activities and in the course of them employed, apparently, an articulate language. If we watch their behavior we find it intelligible, it seems 'logical'. But when we try to learn their language we find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connection between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still
these sounds are not superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us; without the sounds their actions fall into confusion — as I feel like putting it.

Are we to say that these people have a language: orders, reports, and the rest?

There is not enough regularity for us to call it "language".

Prima facie, the Quinean should concur almost entirely with the argument of these two remarks. We start off reading what seems to be an appeal to operant conditioning as the source of linguistic competence, and then in the next paragraph or two the argument seemingly endorses the validity of Quinean appeals to stimulus assent and stimulus dissent as the touchstones of translation. (One might, in a generous mood, even suppose that Investigations 207 implicitly endorses Quine's linguistic holism!)

On this sort of (deliberately tendentious) reading of Investigations 206-7, it is a very real question as to what is to be made of the contrast between the fundamental views of Wittgenstein and those of Quine. Indeed, once the magnitude of Wittgenstein's anti-psychologism is acknowledged, and given the explicit statement in Investigations 206, that "the common behaviour of mankind" is the solvent of translation, how much of a contrast is there? In this chapter I will address this issue as a part of our overall case study here of Quine's semantics.

IV

Let us then continue with some of the issues raised in Investigations 206-207 by way of ultimately coming to grips with the anti-empiricistic/anti-behaviouristic content of the dialectic of Investigations 200 and the RFM two-minute man case. One point we can take from Investigations 206 is that recognition of the connection between training and the normativity of language-use is a key thread in
the 206–207 dialectic. Where then does Quine come out on this topic? He is, prima facie, certainly not silent about it; it would be highly unusual for any proponent of behaviourism to be silent on the logic of operant conditioning. However, Wittgenstein's appeal to operant conditioning qua training, is significantly at variance with the behaviourists' in both content and implications. In particular, it involves an analysis of the formation and teaching of rules, concepts, etc., which (as we would by now expect) embraces a radically un-empiricistic view of these bedrock factors in our language-games. Let us then begin here by exploring this line vis-à-vis Quine's behaviouristic semantics.

There is no shortage of places in Quine's writings where he gives account of what his theory would see as the role of normativity in securing language-acquisition. In Word and Object, to provide an example, he says the use of 'ouch',

... like the correct use of language generally, is inculcated in the individual by training on the part of society; and society achieves this despite not sharing the individual's pain. Society's method is in principle that of rewarding the utterance of 'Ouch' when the speaker shows some further evidence of sudden discomfort, say a wince, or is actually seen to suffer violence, and of penalising the utterance of 'Ouch' when the speaker is visibly untouched and his countenance unruffled. 3

So far so good. Elsewhere, Quine has suggested that the motivation behind our rewarding certain verbal and behavioural responses and not others, may well be evolutionary and thus built around the pragmatics of species survival. 4 Again (for reasons to be articulated later in this chapter) I see no immediate cause here for Wittgensteinians to disagree with Quine's speculation.
Moving on, Quine sees the drive behind language as a drive toward objectivity such that "objective usage is, by its very intersubjectivity, what we tend to be exposed to and encouraged in". This is a potentially very powerful and interesting observation. Quine amplifies it by arguing that the pull toward objectivity is thus a strong pull away from the subjectively simplest rule of association in the case of [e.g.] 'square', and much less so in the case of 'red'. Hence our readiness to think of colour as more subjective than physical shape. But some pull of the same kind occurs even in the case of 'red', insofar as reflections from the environment cause the red object to cast somewhat different tints to different points of view. The objective pull will regiment all the responses still as 'red', by activating myriad corrective cues. These corrective cues are used unconsciously, such is the perfection of our socialisation; a painter has even to school himself to set them aside when he tries to reproduce his true retinal intake.

Now the interesting point here is the underlying thesis which stands behind the talk of "the perfection of our socialisation". It is of course an empirical thesis and its consequence is to proffer the analysis of the normative dimension (pertaining to the 'myriad corrective cues') in language-use, through causal explanation.

Quine divides into two parts the prompting of 'correct' responses. The division is between 'verbal stimulation' and 'non-verbal stimulation'. This entails that the normative component in language-socialisation as outlined above, operates initially through either "learning sentences as a whole by direct conditioning of them to appropriate non-verbal situations", or "producing further sentences from the foregoing ones by analogical substitution". However, in the face of the second case's limitations, further...
the use of new sentences without tying them, even derivatively, to fixed ranges of non-verbal stimuli.

The most obvious case of the verbal stimulation of verbal response is interrogation. 'Red' as a one-word sentence usually needs a question for its elicitation. The question may be simply 'What colour is this?' In this case the stimulus eliciting 'Red' is a compound one: the red light assails the eye and the question the ear. Or the question may be 'What colour will you have?' or 'What colour did it used to be?' In such a case, the stimulus eliciting 'Red' is the verbal one accompanied by red light; though its power to elicit 'Red' depends, of course, on an earlier association of 'Red' with red light. 8

The 'paradigm case' or 'standard' which ultimately stands behind the verbal stimulus presented in this interrogation is therefore taken to be a function, or product, of the causal nexus of operant conditioning laid down in the learning of 'Red'.

So it is also with non-verbal stimulation, even though in our everyday use of language "the power of a non-verbal stimulus to elicit a given sentence commonly depends on earlier associations of sentences with sentences". 9 This in turn involves the use of theory to elicit sentences from non-verbal stimuli:

The theory as a whole ... is a fabric of sentences variously associated to one another and to non-verbal stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response.

Theory may be deliberate, as in a chapter of chemistry, or it may be second nature, as in the immemorial doctrine of ordinary enduring middle-size physical objects. In either case, theory causes a sharing, by sentences, of sensory supports. 10

Concept formation — e.g., the laying down of paradigms and standards — is thus theory formation for Quine, and being trained in the use of a concept or rule is the keying of the overall theory to conditioned responses.

As a straightforward corollary of this, Quine has consistently
argued that language must be understood dispositionally and that understanding a sentence comes down to (behaviouristically construed) possession of practical knowledge of its truth conditions. We see the upshot of this in the following:

In what behavioural disposition then does a man's knowledge of the truth conditions of the sentence 'This is red' consist? Not, certainly, in a disposition to affirm the sentence on every occasion of observing a red object, and to deny it on all other occasions; it is the disposition to assent or dissent when asked in the presence or absence of red. Query and assent, query and dissent — here is the solvent that reduces understanding to verbal disposition. Without this device there would be no hope of handing language down the generations, nor any hope of breaking into newly discovered languages. It is primarily by querying sentences for assent and dissent that we tap the reservoirs of verbal disposition. 11

This dispositional theory of understanding is, I suggest, closely analogous to a use of 'understanding' employed in scientific-analytical investigation where the analogue of asking a question is the conducting of a test, such that we say that given these empirical test results, 'we better understand this body of phenomena': e.g., 'is this copper?' — 'To find out, expose it to sulphuric and hydrochloric acids and look for a blue sulphate salt and a light-green chloride salt, then you will better understand the chemical nature of copper and its salts'. Certainly, there is understanding involved (and constructed) here, but it embraces a constitutive, transformative, relationship between grasping facts and grasping concepts, which relationship (as I indicated in the second-to-last section of Chapter II) is ultimately distorted by Quine strictly in favour of 'grasping facts/theory' alone.

I want however to explore this matter with a more perspicuous example, that of a clock as a dispositional mechanism: when wound up, set and regulated, it tells the time and chimes (say) every hour. By
corollary, in the case of Quine's conception of language, the relevant "dispositions to behaviour ... are physiological states or traits of mechanisms. In citing them dispositionally we are singling them out by behavioural symptoms, behavioural tests". By analogy again, we can single out the clock's dispositions by 'tests' such as seeing if it is keeping the right time, checking that it chimes once for each hour passed, and so on. The operant conditioning part of this analogy is the imposition of the relevant dispositions by means, as we noted, of setting the clock and winding it up. So, where then does the Wittgensteinian contrast with Quine come in? To see this we must consider the logic of the key concepts involved in teaching or 'causing' dispositions and testing for them.

Take the question of whether or not, in looking at the clock, we are conducting an experiment with the clock as the experimental subject, or are just telling the time. To get the Wittgensteinian answer off the ground it first needs to be established that these two treatments of the clock are not logically isomorphic. (In due course we will see why this is so important.) To this end, we need to see that in the case where the clock is the subject of an experiment concerning its dispositions, the clock, ipso facto, cannot be the authority to which we appeal in judging that it is e.g. running five minutes slow; the thing measured cannot be the measuring yardstick also:

When somebody makes an experiment repeatedly 'always with the same result', has he at the same time made an experiment which tells him what he will call 'the same result', i.e. how he uses the word "the same"? If you measure a table with a yardstick, are you also measuring the yardstick? If you are measuring the yardstick, then you cannot be measuring the table at the same time. 13
Prima facie there is no problem here for Quinean theory, as the role of the Quinean appeal to the so-called 'web of belief' is to secure the yardsticks requisite for sentences to confront 'the tribunal of experience'. But things are in fact far from that simple for the Quinean model. Certainly it makes out some version of what might be taken to be the point of Wittgenstein's above remark. This is done in terms of the distinction

...between occasion sentences like 'There was copper in it', true anew for each of various experimental occasions ... and eternal sentences like 'Copper oxide is green', true for good .... The occasion sentence is elicited from the practising chemist time and again. The eternal sentence may well be elicited from him just once, in his youth, by the university examiner. The eternal ones tend most of all to drop out under the transitivity of conditioning, leaving no trace except implicitly in the patterning of social conditioning of residual sentences.

What comes of the association of sentences with sentences is a vast verbal structure which, primarily as a whole, is multifariously linked to non-verbal stimulation. 

... The firmness of association to non-verbal stimuli, the power of such association to withstand the contrary pull of a body of theory, grades off from one sentence to another. 14

How far does this go against Wittgenstein's point? It is well enough known that the Quinean treatment of a sentence as an 'eternal sentence' is justified on broadly pragmatist grounds. And this seems to meet the requirements put by the case of measuring the table. But that that is so is mere appearance surreptitiously served up in Quinean theory as reality. For the correct way to understand Wittgenstein's point is genetically. By corollary, the key question therefore is 'Can we, logically speaking, begin by treating the clock as the subject of the experiment (vis-a-vis its 'dispositions')?'.

Turning to Quine's texts again, we can see how this genetic problem runs right into the very midst of his theory. Language is, we have
already seen him contend, grounded in learning what at least start out as observation sentences. These have three chief characteristics: their

... truth value varies with the circumstances prevailing at the time of utterance. It is a sentence like 'This is red' or 'It is raining', which is true on one occasion and false on another; unlike 'Sugar is sweet', whose truth value endures regardless of occasion of utterance.

[Secondly:] Not only must the truth value of an observation sentence depend on the circumstances of its utterance; it must depend on intersubjectively observable circumstances.

An observation sentence, then, is an occasion sentence whose occasion is intersubjectively observable. But this is still not enough. After all, the sentence 'There goes John's old tutor' meets these requirements; it is an occasion sentence, and all present witnesses can see the old tutor plodding by. But the sentence fails of a third requirement: the witnesses must in general be able to appreciate that the observation which they are sharing is one that verifies the sentence. They must have been in a position, equally with the speaker, to have assented to the sentence on their own in the circumstances.

These sentences ... are keyed directly to the observation. But how keyed, now — what is the nature of the connection? It is a case of conditioned response. So, conditioned response — and hence the causally construed 'normative' level — indeed secures for Quine the starting point for what Wittgenstein was implicitly calling 'yardsticks of judgement'.

But Quine then underscores this contention with his account of the conversion of occasion sentences into yardsticks qua 'standing sentences'. Thus the

... observation sentence 'Rain' or 'It is raining' will not do; we must put the information into a standing sentence [if scientific research is to be possible]: 'Rain at Heathrow 1600 G.M.T., 23 February 1974.' This report is ready for filing in the archives of science. It still reports an observation, but it is a standing report rather than an occasion sentence. How do we get from the passing observation of rain to the standing report?
This can be explained by a cluster of observation sentences, having to do with other matters besides the rain. Thus take the term 'Heathrow'. Proper names of persons, buildings, and localities are best treated as observation terms, on a par with 'red' or 'rain'. All such terms can be learned by ostension, repeated sufficiently to suggest the intended scope and limit of application. 'Here is Heathrow', then, is an observation sentence on a par with 'It is raining'; and their conjunction 'Raining at Heathrow' is an observation sentence as well. It is an occasion sentence still, of course, and not a standing report of observation. But now the two further needed ingredients, hour and date, can be added as pointer readings: 'The clock reads 1600' and 'The calendar reads 23 February 1974' are further observation sentences. Taking the conjunction of all four, we still have an observation sentence with this curious trait: it gives lasting information, dependent no longer on the vicissitudes of tense or of indicator words like 'here' and 'now'. It is suitable for filing. 16

Now we have our yardstick -- but only now. True, as Quine reveals elsewhere in "The Nature of Natural Knowledge", the case just examined is not the primitive case. But it parallels the primitive case:

The utility of science, from a practical point of view, lies in fulfilled expectation: true prediction. This is true not only of sophisticated science, but of its primitive progenitor as well; and it may be good strategy on our part to think first of the most primitive case. This case is simple induction. It is the expectation, when some past event recurs, that the sequel of the past event will recur too. People are prone to this, and so are other animals. 17

But there are other ways of conceiving, and analysing the logic, of regular animal behaviour. For Quine is simply wrong here. Induction is no model for the vast majority of (regular) animal behaviour: it only applies where the behaviour is, logically speaking, to be understood as the result of the formation of propositional attitudes. This in turn, as taken in the Quinean vein, casts the animal in the role of a primitive gatherer of facts -- a kind of primitive scientist. But when a squirrel gathers nuts in autumn, is this, logically speaking, because it believes...
that nuts store better in winter than flowers or fruits? Is it because it has 'worked out', has 'calculated', that this activity pays? Does it believe that winter will see a shortage of food? Has it conducted experiments to determine if this is so? It might be 'evolutionarily sound' to do these things, but from that fact it does not follow that the life-praxis of animals is to be understood as the result of, to use Quine's above-quoted words, "the expectation, when some past event recurs, that the sequel of that past event will recur too".

What is wrong with the Quinean picture here is a direct inheritance from its wholesale embracing of the world-view of behaviourism. This is, of course, a world-view utterly congenial to empiricism. But it is grossly overloaded in favour of the view that an animal brings to its life-world a set of dispositions allowing it to be 'programmed'/conditioned in various ways, and that what it does and what it becomes are simply and (more or less) solely a function of the impinging of the creature's environment upon the creature. Mutatis mutandis the same goes of course for the creature's use (if any) of language, and hence Quine's behaviouristic semantics: language, like the rest of our activities, is a function solely of "external things" causing "impacts at our nerve endings".

Two things in particular require comment here. The first is that Quine's behaviouristic world-view and the kind of naturalism it espouses (i.e. empiricistic/scientistic naturalism) is utterly at odds with Wittgenstein's naturalistic view of the (logical) bedrock of language. This is because Wittgenstein's 'naturalistic bedrock' is instinct, not environmentally-sourced conditioning; the conditioning or 'training' is second-order in being a result of the interaction of nature and instinct.
(I shall return to this point in detail, below.) Secondly, and more to
the point of our immediate concerns, Quine's view of the primitive basis
of language as the formation of propositional attitudes (notably, of
'expectation'), leaves up in the air the question of the logical genesis
of 'yardsticks of judgement' for the formation of inductively grounded
beliefs, etc.

We have seen that in the case of language-users, Quine holds that
what the language-user must grasp are truth-conditions qua functions,
taking the grasp of 'red' as an example, of "the disposition to assent or
dissent when asked in the presence or absence of red". So, in short,
what is elicited in linguistic interaction are propositional-attitude-
based conditioned responses. Quine takes this cognitivistic basis for
language as a primitive or animalistic/naturalistic factor. So, he says
that, e.g.,

'He believes there is a rabbit there' is plausibly interpreted as 'He would, if asked, assent to some sentence
that has for him the stimulus meaning that 'There's a rabbit' has for us.' This in turn, by our definition of stimulus
meaning, amounts to saying two things: that he has just had a stimulation belonging to the stimulus meaning of 'There's a
rabbit' for us, and that he knows the use of a sentence whose stimulus meaning for him is the same. If in place of this
latter requirement we will settle for some non-linguistic
discriminatory disposition toward rabbits, we may even make
sense of 'The dog believes there is a rabbit there'.

So, to tie up the immediate point being pursued, one could say that
whether we look either at Quine's account of scientific activity as
(allegedly) the fundamental and general human mode of being in the world,
or at his account of the primitive naturalistic basis of language and
science, the genetic source is, so to speak, the empiricist's
touchstone: it is an 'attitude' of the human creature that motivates
questioning, fact-seeking, curiosity, the making of judgements; the
'scientific attitude' is, for Quine, our (and all creatures') most basic modus operandi.

Armed with these realisations we can return to the case of the clock and see that the Quinean response to this analogical case must be that our approach to telling the time by looking at the clock is to treat the clock qua subject of an experiment. Yet from our above examination it is now surely plain as daylight that Quinean naturalism does not deliver any satisfactory account of how the logical bedrock of our way of being in the world can consist in the forming of beliefs, making of judgements, development of expectations, etc. The fundamental issue raised through the clock analogy shows this: if the 'dispositions' of the clock are what we are investigating, then, ipso facto, there must be some established 'yardstick' involved in testing for these, which yardstick, as we saw Wittgenstein strongly implying, cannot itself on pain of instigation of a vicious regress, be also the subject of investigation. But then the 'yardstick' cannot be any (empirical) product of empirical investigation in the sense of the construction, a la Quine, of 'eternal sentences'. Derivation of eternal sentences requires 'yardsticks' (even if, ex-hypothesi, they are just a nexus of theory and dispositions) which, again, on pain of vicious regress, cannot be empirical (or otherwise cognitive) functions; for we cannot have meta-theories and meta-dispositions which embrace them ad infinitum. Quine has simply therefore left us suspended in mid-air, and this bespeaks the fundamental — cognitivist — error at the heart of his definitive empiricism.

V

For the time being, I want however to put to one side the very
serious difficulty Quine has in the cognitive regress problem, so as to expose a crucial connection between that issue and his fundamental commitment to behaviourism. For I want now to bring out the key error of the dispositional theory of meaning and understanding favoured by Quine, by contrasting it with the conventionalist approach inherent in Wittgenstein's constitutive-use analysis.

We will see now that this involves the case of the yardsticks problem returning in a new guise. The key to this is the fact that the outputs of a dispositional mechanism, being causally determined, are in themselves logically incapable of defining or otherwise constituting consistency, and in particular therefore, they fail in respect of the key notion of 'behaving in consistency with a rule'. Most notably, a clock can chime wrongly, run down, break down and otherwise go haywire, but one logically cannot distinguish these deviations from the norm/rule merely and solely by appeal to functions of the contingencies and vicissitudes of causal determination qua (for example) the effects of physical constraint, the action of laws of mechanics, and so on. By direct corollary therefore, what is logically required here is a bona fide rule; an empirical theory is logically inadequate.

To develop this argument, let me turn to Friedrich Waismann's version\textsuperscript{22} of Wittgenstein's treatment of the dispositional-causal analysis of language, for there the matter of convention eventually comes most centrally into play. The case in question in Waismann's (pirated) text centres on a dog who responds to signs by walking in accordance with the directions the signs give. As Wittgenstein/Waismann rightly note,

... it is here we come up against the root of the causal view of language. The train of thought is as follows: the dog carried out the corresponding movement, \textit{therefore} he obeyed
Wittgenstein/Waismann next rehearse the causal theorist's account of how this process comes about and in doing so give a treatment of training that fits (*inter alia*) the Quinean operant conditioning theory perfectly. Then the text says:

Instead of the dog, we might equally well imagine a machine which could be made to move in consonance to signs in ... [a] four-letter language. (It is clear that this substitution makes no difference from the causal point of view.) Let us now compare the two propositions:

(i) The letter 'a' means the command to move in such and such a way.

(ii) The machine is so arranged that the appearance of the letter 'a' brings about such and such a movement.

The first proposition refers to a command, the second to a causal nexus. The causal interpretation of language can best be characterised by saying: What it comes to is the proposal that the second proposition should be regarded as a translation of the first one. 24

Again, this fits the Quinean position perfectly. Moreover, it now facilitates the making of the strong and critical contrast between Quine's linguistic dispositionalism and Wittgenstein's conventionalist 'constitutivistic' analysis of rules.

As Waismann/Wittgenstein note, the proposed translation outlined above depends on whether the two sentences "are really equal in significance". 25 We know Quine thinks they are, and later here I will address this view in terms of its implications for his theory of translation. But in the Waismann-Wittgenstein reply, a very interesting negative turn is forthcoming. It is noted that observation tells us how the machine is arranged so that its mechanism's mechanical-dispositional states (*vis-a-vis* the sign 'a') determine that it actually does respond to 'a'. This is a non-necessary fact about the machine's composition
however: "Closer inspection of the machine might have shown us that something quite other than the sign 'a' was causing the movement in question". Machines, as I noted earlier, need to be regarded as inherently at risk vis-à-vis malfunction affecting their consistency of output. (This is a logical possibility mechanics are always grappling with by way of decreasing the empirical likelihood of its instantiation.) But now Waismann/Wittgenstein go(es) on to consider the first case where the relation between 'a' and the response is framed in terms of command and obedience. Here they say:

How are we to tell whether 'a' really is the command to move in a certain way? Only because we have laid down a convention as to what 'a' should mean. This has nothing to do with [i.e., is not based on our observations of] the machine. The two propositions [i.e., in the remark cited just previously here] are entirely independent. Either can be true when the other is false. Even if the machine never obeyed it, 'a' would be the command to move in a certain direction. (ii) says that the machine will move in a certain way, (i) does not say that it is moving or will move in that way. 27

The highly interesting move made here is one that is going to see the Quinean quickly responding. For the contrast appealed to is that between (semantic) determination by convention, and determination in virtue of empirical facts, and as Quine set out on his philosophical career by attacking convention, so, prima facie, the above move looks thoroughly dubious as a reply to his views. Moreover, the Waismann-Wittgenstein argument will doubtless be taken by Quineans to constitute an implicit appeal to the analytic–synthetic distinction, against which the Quinean has powerful criticisms in hand.

The matter is, however, far from being that easy for the Quinean. True enough, Quine's empiricism set about establishing its version of an empiricist criterion of meaning by attacking the logical positivist
analysis of analyticity as 'truth by convention'. But there are concepts of convention and concepts of convention, and, as John Canfield has pointed out, Quine's critique does not undermine them all. For Canfield observes that

One form of Quine's argument against a view of language as based on convention seems to work by saddling his opponent with the task of conceiving a certain inconceivability. The task in question is to conceive of men convening to agree on the conventions of language, where this convening results, for the first time, in there being language. But why should one have to conceive this particular inconceivability in order to be able to maintain language is founded on convention? If it could be indicated how customs can develop, among a group of primates, say, and if it could be indicated, in addition, how one can similarly conceive of customs that involve the use of words to develop in such a group, then apparently Quine's objection would be obviated. It is no difficult task to conceive of such development in detail. "No convention without convening" is a false principle. The principle "No language based on convention without the conceivability of that language being introduced by a convening" is also false. 28

Now it is easy enough as I will shortly show, to find passages in his writings where Wittgenstein precisely delivers the requisite naturalistic constructional account of the (logically-reconstructed) origins of convention. But on a broader perspective, what needs to be recognised here is that naturalism need not draw one into abandoning convention — unless the conception of naturalism in question is empiricistically motivated (notably in, as the prime example of Quine's own views shows, the mode or vein of behaviourism).

To be sure, the behaviourist has, prima facie, a very definite line of anti-conventionalistic response to the key issue of the nature (and role) of the normativity of training. For one of his/her central implicit interests — which Quine's own views, and those of B.F. Skinner (in particular in Walden II and Beyond Freedom and Dignity), reflect most
notably -- is how and to what extent one can extract or bring about community in the face, otherwise, of naturally occurring disorderliness of behaviour and similar such 'disagreement'. Quine's talk of the 'objective pull', which, as I noted earlier, is a powerful and most significant concept for him to appeal to, testifies to the way he sees the interconnectedness of intersubjectivity of language-use, concomitant intersubjectivity of verification, and the overall structure of socialisation-as-operant-conditioning.

In more strict philosophic terms, Skinner's and Quine's rejection of innatism, structuralism, etc., flows out of their utterly valid demand that language (and the rest of our practices) be acknowledged, studied and logically analysed as an emergent phenomenon — not as a 'given' (even if, a la Chomsky et al., the 'given' is the structural essence, and the rest of language is thereafter constructed from the essence). But as is indicated in Canfield's observations that 'No convention without convening' and 'No language based on convention without the conceivable of that language being introduced by a convening' are both fallacies, Quine, most erroneously, takes any conventionalism as entailing or otherwise implying innatism or some other kind of a priorism. Against all such conventionalism a la a priorism, empiricism is certainly a genuine and thoroughly effective prophylactic. But so, I want to show, is any non-behaviouristic, non-innatist naturalism predicated, in contradistinction to empiricistic-behaviouristic naturalism, upon the analytical realisation that instinctive behaviour is naturally orderly and/or organising (of its objects) but nonetheless contentless — unlike 'naturally' orderly behaviour as construed by innatism and its cognate a priorist partners.
Let me explain the point I seek to make here by quoting from Doris Lessing's short story "The Sun Between Their Feet". This is a lovely story about her observing two dung-beetles at work, and for our purposes it superbly illustrates the point that instinctive behaviour -- and I make this as a conceptual point -- is both naturally organising in its confrontation with its objects and yet is of itself contentless (in the standard a priorist sense of 'content' as an a priori intentional object). As Lessing's story unfolds she observes that

[the book] says that dung beetles form a ball of dung, lay their eggs in it, search for a gentle slope, roll the ball up it, and then allow it to roll down again so that in the process of rolling 'the pellet becomes compacted'.

Why must the pellet be compacted? Presumably so that the blows of sun and rain do not beat it to fragments. Why this complicated business of rolling up and rolling down?

Well, it is not for us to criticise the process of nature; so I sat on top of the jutting rock, and watched the beetles rolling the ball towards it. In a few minutes of work they had reached it, and had hurled themselves and the dung-ball at its foot. Their momentum took them a few inches up the slope, then they slipped, and ball and beetles rolled back to the flat again. 29

As the story now further unfolds, the beetles persist in their efforts: instinct -- not induction, experiment, belief, etc. -- made them search for this slope, makes them try, and keep trying to roll their dung ball up, to roll it back down, and all this because, as Lessing's reference book tells us in the story:

'The slope is chosen', says the book, 'by a beautiful instinct, so that the ball of dung comes to rest in a spot suitable for the hatching of the new generation of sacred insect' [--- the dung-beetle having of course been sacred to the ancient Egyptians as, mythically, the mover of the sun across the heavens --- G.A.]. 30

The 'beautiful instinct' is definitive of the non-a prioristic 'logic' of instinct precisely in that its object -- the items in the beetles'
practical milieu: the slope, the laid egg, the dung and its being rolled up around the egg -- is not given with the instinct. The instinct, as constituted in the beetles' labour, acquires, seizes, works upon, makes, its object(s) -- provided, of course, nature is suitably kind in providing the requisite raw materials.

But nature is recalcitrant in the face of these dung-beetles' ongoing, repeated efforts to realise the instinctive drive of their labours: rain falls as they struggle on, and their efforts are increasingly hindered by the resultant mud, moisture and slipperiness. Our narrator intervenes:

At the fourth attempt, when the ball rolled down to the starting point and the beetles bundled after it, it was past midday, my head ached with heat, and I took a large leaf, slipped it under the ball of dung and the beetles, and lifted this unit away to one side, away from the impossible and destructive mountain.

But when I slid the leaf from under them, they rested a moment in the new patch of territory, scouted this way and that among the grass stems, found their position, and at once rolled their ball back to the foot of the mountain where they prepared another ascent.

The beetles again got the ball up into the ravine, and this time it rolled down, not into a marsh, but into a damp bed of leaves. There they rested awhile in a steam of heat.

Again I lifted them, dung and beetles, away from the precipice, to a clear space where they had the choice of a dozen suitable gentle slopes, but they rolled their ball patiently back to the mountain's foot.

'The slope is chosen', says the book, 'by a beautiful instinct so that the ball of dung comes to rest in a spot suitable for the hatching of the new generation of sacred insect.'

They continued to roll the dung up the mountain, rescue it from the dried bed of the mountain lake, and force it up to the exposed dry shoulder. It rolled down and they plunged after it. Again and again and again, while the ball became a ragged drying structure of fragmented grass clotted with dung. The afternoon passed. The sun was low in my eyes. I could hardly see the beetles or the dung because of the glare from a black pack of clouds which were red-rimmed from the lowering sun behind. The red steaming rays came down and the
black beetles and their dung-ball on the mountain-side seemed dissolved in sizzling light.

It was raining on the far hills. The drumming of the rain and the drumming of the thunder came closer. I could see the skirmishing side-lances of an army of rain pass half a mile away beyond the rocks. A few great shining drops fell here, and hissed on burning sand and on the burning mountain-side. The beetles laboured on.

The sun dropped behind the piled boulders and now this glade rested in a cool, spent light, the black trees and black boulders standing around it, waiting for the rain and for the night. The beetles were again on the mountain. They had the ball tight between their legs, they clung on to the lichens, they clung on to the rock-wall and their treasure with the desperation of stupidity. 31

— But then instinct is not rational; nor is it irrational; it is arational. Equally, its bedrock or 'essence' — as this story so well illustrates — is definitively non-cognitive, non-epistemic, and its object(s) are ever object(s) and drive-satisfactions realised a posteriori as the achievements — nature permitting — of instinctive labour, instinctual drives and the vicissitudes of their 'compelled' interaction with the creature's environment. This compulsion, as a profoundly non-cognitive, non-theoretic, non-pragmatic drive, resides — in contradistinction to the tenets of the empiricistic-behaviouristic Weltanschauung — in the creature and is directed, once the drive is triggered, at and onto nature. This, as I will shortly explain in more detail, radically reverses the logico-genetic order of the creature—nature relation as envisaged and analysed by empiricism/behaviourism.

But then there is here of course also a thoroughly disarming empirical point which is relevant (as a crucial reminder), but whose realisation is simply obscured and ignored by behaviourism: to repeat an earlier example, the organisation and domination of objects (in the environment) constituted by the nut-gathering engaged in by squirrels in autumn, is not grounded in, modus Quine/Skinner, the induction of
propositional attitudes or in operant conditioning: it is instinctive. The same goes for birds when, e.g., in the northern hemisphere they form flocks and fly south for the winter. Almost all animal mating behaviour, sexual and courtship, is instinctive. So is almost every last instance of animal communication be it by gesture, posture, colour display, pheromones, making sounds, or whatever. But the behaviourists, as I say, ignore and/or obscure these facts.

Let me emphasise, of course, that whilst it is singularly non-cognitive, it is equally the case that instinctive behaviour is certainly not conventional. But I seek here only to identify a naturalistic and non-a prioristic source for the construction of conventions. My point is, moreover, logical, not merely natural-historical: I am talking about how we conceptually classify the (ex-hypothesi) 'genetically relevant' animal behaviour in question. We recognise and readily acknowledge it as fundamentally instinctive and not the outcome of an orderliness learned or similarly acquired — whereas precisely the opposite, is the case for operantly-conditioned behaviour. As such, where Quine takes operant conditioning as the bedrock of language and the genesis of the human condition (in terms of our life-praxis), Wittgenstein's view is that it can only be a second-order, if naturalistically derived, feature. For as the genetic problem with empiricism warns us, and as I want to show below now in more detail, logically prior to training there must be instinct and natural capacities to yield up the (non-cognitively derived) orderly and ordering responses which it implies, invokes, drives and demonstrates.

Thus, the Wittgensteinian analysis of conventions and conventionalism sees the power to create agreement or
ordering/structuring of responses, as characteristic of the life-praxis of the relevant creatures. This active view of the responding creature is the reason why instinctualistic naturalism readily accommodates non-question-begging, non-a prioristic, conventionalism. So the kind of primitive formation of conventions Canfield appealed to must be understood as an achievement of the interaction between natural conditions and the instincts of a non-passively-responding - 'kicking-back' - creature. For it is through this active, non-cognitively driven part of its nature that it can create conventions and so provide the example we need to turn aside Quine's 'no convention(s) without convening' argument, and its corollary in the empiricistic reduction of rule following to dispositions, and the behaviourists' fallacious reduction of the normativity of training to mere 'nomological regularisation'.

It is important to see then that unlike Quine, Wittgenstein's naturalistically grounded appeal to behaviour does not reduce language-game playing to the primitive, below-bedrock level of (dispositional) behaviour (instinctive or otherwise), but treats it as a (particular) development out of the more primitive level. Wittgenstein makes this explicit when, for example, he talks about our concept of pain:

Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.)

(Instinct.) 32

Now it is a very long way here from what Wittgenstein means in asserting that (logically speaking) our language-game "is behaviour" to what Quine means by language being (verbal) behaviour. And a key part of what makes
the Wittgensteinian side of the disjunction so distinctive is the logical content of the 'auxiliary' or 'extension' relation that holds between the natural origins of our language-games and the formation, and use, of concepts. Hence, against the reductionism of the Quinean view, the Wittgensteinian position recognises that the connection between the normativity of operant conditioning and the learning and use of language, must be understood as an internal function of the use of conventions, of the application of concrete rules, not as a mere effect of the 'below bedrock' and merely externally-related obtaining of causal conditions empirically sufficient to, as it happens, induce some reaction in the creature. For what, logically speaking, is involved and demanded here is not 'some reaction or other' but a specific reaction whose individuation and identification is constituted by us: this is the achievement of the crucial, first, concept-formative, and subsequently concept-applying, drive — albeit a naturalistic, non-cognitivistic, non-a prioristic drive. Its achievement consists in the imposition of conventions upon nature, which imposition precisely shows that it is indeed convention on which, as Investigations 355 notes, language "is founded". To go 'below' convention-formation is to go outside the bedrock of praxis. So the instincts which generate the bedrock level, whatever their physical nature, are not functions into which we can reduce the conventions, let alone the language-game. Rather, the instincts, through the achievements of their interactions with nature, feed into and construct, constitute, the conventions and thus create and help to maintain language's semantic-practical foundations.

Let me then, by way of recapitulation, put the matter succinctly: when Wittgenstein talks, as e.g. we saw him doing in Investigations 206,
of following a rule being a function of training which induces us to "react to an order" or rule "in a particular way", the behaviour being spoken of — Investigations 206's "common behaviour of mankind" — is not 'behaviour' in anything like Quine's sense of the word.

Indeed, note well that the impinging of natural phenomena 'on our nerve endings' can just as readily serve to drive each of us into a state which, when taken in terms of its comparability to everyone else's reactions, conduces not to order, community and consistency, but to sheer unadulterated chaos. So conceived (i.e. with the (instinct-derived) constituted normativity of the process pushed out of the picture), operant conditioning (alone) does not, logically speaking, serve to secure the consistency of use, or the 'objective pull' or the intersubjectivity Quine claims it does. For it can just as well serve to account for utter chaos, discord and anarchy. (This again is a key point of Investigations 206-7.) The mere causality of operant conditioning the constituted normative aspect of which has been 'silenced', is, logically, indifferent to its outcomes: — this is the truth about dispositionalism. Hence we are returned to the vital realisation that the instinctive, naturalistic, formation of rules, conventions, norms — even at a quite elementary level (as is evident in much primate behaviour) — simply is obscured by the empiricist/behaviourist. If we are silent about and/or blind to the achievement of the supervenience of normativity on mere causality, on mere dispositions, reflection upon the fact that training secures patterns of responses in organisms will inevitably fail to reveal why and how 'agreement' is a crucial, defining, concept in the logical constitution of language: agreement of one move in the game with another vis-a-vis a rule, or intersubjective agreement where, e.g., you and I learn to play the same language-game. The
agreement is the mark of the language-game and the mark of its subordination of mere disposition to the deed that is the following of the rule.

My overall point, then, is that operant conditioning must be seen here as the servant of agreement (and ultimately of instinct-derived, praxis-constituted convention, practices, rules, customs). Its having any logical role (at least) in language-acquisition and language-use, only makes sense against the background of its serving according to the (instinctively driven) dictates of some active, self-constituting, would-be nature-dominating creature(s). Otherwise, the ability of operant conditioning to deliver utter chaos across the pattern of an individual's behaviour or across some group of organisms collectively considered, should in no way be played down when we appeal to dispositions' efficacy in analysing the logic of the genesis and constitution of language.

It is therefore clear that Canfield's remark about the ready imaginability of a group of primates coming to form conventions (albeit, of course, in a primitive sense or way) suggests a powerful rebuttal of Quine's position. In section VI of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, we find a parallel of Canfield's idea articulated by Wittgenstein:

If one of a pair of chimpanzees once scratched the figure [-|--] in the earth and thereupon the other the series [|--|-] etc., the first would not have given a rule nor would the other be following it, whatever else went on at the same time in the mind of the two of them. If however there were observed, e.g., the phenomenon of a kind of instruction, of showing how and of imitation, of lucky and misfiring attempts, of reward and punishment and the like: if at length the one who had been so trained put figures which he had never seen before one after another in sequence as in the first example, then we should probably say that the one chimpanzee was writing rules down, and the other
was following them. 33

The key thing about this case vis-a-vis Quine's theory, is that (as I show below) his views ultimately belong on the side of the first case of copying mentioned by Wittgenstein except that Quine, of course, emphasises the role of operant conditioning (which is how he would construe the second case). But cutting the Quinean view of the chimpanzees' activities to its barest empiricistically-conceived bones, we are talking nonetheless strictly about the causal efficacy of the creatures' environment in impinging upon their nerve endings. A fortiori, when Quine claims that expectations cum induction are naturalistically primitive, he is endorsing the view that an empirical/dispositional account of what caused the chimpanzee in the first (and, ultimately, the second) example to copy the marks, tells us all there is of relevance concerning the logic of rule-following, language-learning, etc.

It is the beauty of Wittgenstein's argument above that it starkly exposes the deep inadequacy of this move. Quine's view is that via the appropriate causal nexus, the chimpanzee grasps certain empirical facts, viz, 'the facts about the serial production of the marks', and expresses this in its behaviour. But it could just as well have been caused by the marks to behave in a myriad of other ways. What is missing from the Quinean account, because it is silent about the supervenience of constituted normativity on mere causal/dispositional efficacy, is recognition that what logically distinguishes the two cases canvassed by Wittgenstein is that the marks in the first case are, logically speaking, just and only (brute) objects in the world, whereas those in the second are constituted as a standard, convention, paradigm, or rule. It just
does not matter that, e.g., the 'wiring' of one chimp's brain (ex-
hypothesis) causes it to treat the marks as a norm. The point is that the
marks are servicing the praxis-constituted logical role of a norm.
Consequently, the training the one chimp gives the other testifies, in
its logical role, to the (logical) transformation of the marks and the
trainee chimp's behaviour, respectively, from mere contingent states of
affairs qua empirical 'facts', and mere disposed responses, to the
constituted status of, respectively, a norm, and rule-following praxis.
(Recall, as Chapter II argued at length, that looking at rules and
practices as mere anthropological/psychological facts is logically
incompatible with grasping meaning, understanding and content.)

It is important then to see also that it would be a serious mistake
to construe the gulf between Wittgenstein's naturalism and Quine's as a
function of an empirical disagreement; they are not (merely) in dispute
about facts (about primitive animal behaviour). The major difference
must be acknowledged as analytical and as centering on the logical
adequacy of a strictly empiricistic-causal-dispositional-behaviouristic
view of the constitution and structure of linguistic activity and the
linguistic-condition. So if it can be shown empirically — i.e., by some
experiment — that the vicissitudes of our environment weed out
inconsistent or chaotic, anarchical, responses and dispositions within a
community of creatures of a certain kind, this in no way secures the
Quinean vision at the expense of the Wittgensteinian. This is not least
of which because both views recognise in their naturalism a connection
between utility or instrumentality and successful language-use. But more
to the point still is the fact that even if one grants the validity of
talking (e.g., modus pragmatism) about language simply as if it comes
down to a mechanism of species evolutionary success, the empiricists'
insistence that the impact of the world on our nerve-endings is the quintessence of language's bedrock, and theory-testing the essence of its use, is grossly mistaken.

For this is where the image of language-using species both as fundamentally and inherently 'fact gathering' in their approach to, and as 'programmed' by, the world, ignores the obvious truth that the 'formative potential' inherent in the world impacting on our nerve-endings in no (logically, or empirically, necessary) way is a unidirectional function. As opposed to the myth, which Quine's empiricism virtually fetishises, that we are just what the world makes us into (and that language reflects and reproduces this fact), it is of the utmost importance to recognise that in instinct (even if 'the world' created/creates this phenomenon) we see a mechanism whereby, blindly, creatures can set out to make the world into a world for them. (Conceptualisation, in Wittgensteinian-analytical terms at least, is through and through to be understood in this basic, primitively-rooted, constitutivistic way.) By contradistinction, empiricism treats language-use — indeed, praxis in general — as passive. That is, for empiricism, even though the world causes responses in us, those responses are taken merely as evidence of our enslavement by our environment; they are not (even partly) seen as 'kicking-back', 'retaliatory', responses. A fortiori, it is through this passive vision of the language-user (as 'world-reflector') that the empiricistic tradition, from Locke to Quine, insists that we are to understand the (naturalistic) role of language in terms of behaviour, dispositions, reactions, responses, etc.
The case of the chimpanzees now also allows us to turn our attention back to the original concern of this and the preceding chapter as developed through our engagement with the case of the RFM two-minute man, and the Investigations 'tribe chess' dialectic. For note that it is highly significant that Wittgenstein insists explicitly that the mental content in the chimps' imitative responses is logically spurious. Recall that he says:

If one of a pair of chimpanzees once scratched the figure \[|-
-| \] in the earth and thereupon the other the series \[|-
-| |-
-| \] etc., the first would not have given a rule nor would the other be following it, whatever else went on at the same time in the mind of the two of them. 34

This insistence that mental content is spurious turns up perhaps the most startling of the major contrasts between Wittgenstein and Quine. For Quine has never abandoned the classic empiricist view that the mind significantly mediates between the world and our linguistic responses to it; he has just behaviouristically and extensionalistically interpreted this view. For Quine, we eliminatively read mentality and meaning etc., 'off' from behaviour, and so make mentality et al as a separate category, utterly redundant. But we have already seen how Quine places massive importance on both the view that the formation of expectations and inductively derived beliefs etc. is fundamental — is the bedrock — for language, and that query and assent, query and dissent, interface with and reveal the structure of, these verbal dispositions qua language. So at bedrock level, from the impinging of the world on our nerve-endings, beliefs and other propositional attitudes are formed, and as operant conditioning is effectively such 'impinging', training causes beliefs etc. — albeit beliefs, etc., construed as behaviours. What this shows
however is that Wittgensteinian anti-psychologism is poles apart from Quinean anti-psychologism. In the remainder of this chapter we will pursue this point and its implications in detail, both in respect of the issue of the logic of the mind-language relationship, and the still outstanding matter of the logic of radical translation.

Recall that in an earlier quotation from *Word and Object*, we saw an outline of Quine's treatment of propositional attitudes in terms of the prompting of assents and dissents, in which he concluded the quoted segment by saying that if "we will settle for some non-linguistic discriminatory disposition toward rabbits, we may even make sense of 'The dog believes there is a rabbit there'."35 Now this "non-linguistic discriminatory disposition" is, for Quine, a cognitive, propositional attitude function. By critical contrast, we know from the analysis developed in Chapter III that Wittgenstein rejects any cognitivist analysis of propositional attitudes: the particular 'discriminatory disposition' of the dog, logically does not consist in the supposedly 'given-fact-reflecting' belief it has (no matter how far one reduces this to a relationship between an object and a behavioural disposition).36 Consequently for Wittgenstein the purely practical and formative logical basis for propositional attitude content dove-tails with his anti-psychologism in a way radically different from Quine's. For Quine treats the 'object' of the propositional attitude as a cognitively derived 'fact' reflected in the propositional attitude qua assenting and dissenting, which is (manifested as?) behaviour; 'manifested' most certainly when the subject is questioned about and in the presence of the supposedly cognitively-given object.

To further develop the implications of this contrast, consider the
following argument in which Wittgenstein develops his anti-psychologistic analysis of the relationship between mind and object, here concerning the 'object' of training:

But couldn't we imagine that someone without any training should see a sum that was set to do, and straightway find himself in the mental state that in the normal course of things is only produced by training and practice? So that he knew he could calculate although he had never calculated. (One might, then, it seems, say: The training would merely be history, and merely as a matter of empirical fact would it be necessary for the production of knowledge.) --- But suppose now he is in that state of certainty and he calculates wrong? What is he supposed to say to himself? And suppose he then multiplied sometimes right, sometimes again quite wrong. --- The training may of course be overlooked as mere history, if he now always calculates right. But that he can calculate he shews, to himself as well as to others only by this, that he calculates correctly. 37

The way I think best to regard this argument for the purposes presently in hand, is to treat the mental state in question as some ultimately physiological entity such as Quine would find acceptable because it can be studied empirically.38 Quine of course sees physiological explanation of language as a scientific ideal not yet actually to hand:

[U]ntil we can aspire to actual physiological explanation of linguistic activity in physiological terms, the level at which to work is the middle one; that of dispositions to overt behaviour. Its virtue is not that it affords causal explanations but that it is less likely than the mentalistic level to engender an illusion of being more explanatory than it is. The easy familiarity of mentalistic talk is not to be trusted. 39

The trouble is that what we have here is the mistaken idea that this (empirically construed) 'mental' level — the 'material form' of a propositional attitude — is constitutive of some or any grasp of meaning.

For note the force of Wittgenstein's conjecture in RFM, VI, 33a:
But suppose now he is in that state of certainty and he calculates wrong? What is he supposed to say to himself? And suppose he then multiplied sometimes right, sometimes quite wrong.

Is there not something very odd here when we think — or try to think — this possibility through in Quinean dispositional terms? After all, the point of Wittgenstein's argument is that the rule and thence its use in constituting the meaning, is (so to speak) 'objective' and/or 'external' in its relation to (at least) intentional mental states such as Quine captures under the head 'propositional attitudes'. But on the Quinean model we are driven into the arms of the illusion that having the mental state caused when some object/event suitably impinges on our nerve-endings is having 'the meaning' of that object/event. In very simple terms, there is no room here for being mistaken about a rule or a meaning in the way Wittgenstein's example shows there logically readily can be: for Quine, the nexus formed by what the event/object causes in your brain is ('possession' of) the meaning. (Here again therefore, the dispositional fallacy shows itself.)

The point I am advancing then is this: if training/operant conditioning sets up a disposition, and that disposition is a mental state (here, a propositional attitude) whose form is material (either in physiological or gross-behavioural terms), then nevertheless this material 'mental' state does not logically entail or otherwise constitute accordance or agreement with the training. As Wittgenstein points out, the

... training may of course be overlooked as mere history, if he now always calculates right. But that he can calculate he shows, to himself as well as to others only by this, that he calculates correctly. 40
So the having of some mental state qua propositional attitude is spurious precisely because it in no way guarantees, or 'secures the fact', that the training has been successful and thus that the pupil understands. To put it another way, one does not calculate correctly in virtue of having a belief, be it true or not; the point/role of training is to inculcate a constitutive technique — and one can carry out that technique with accurate, inaccurate or no accompanying (relevant or any other) propositional attitudes. As Investigations 202 has it:

... 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.

Pace the Quinean 'objectivistic' vision, the view that 'obeying the rule' = 'having the physiological state caused by the order' is not only vacuous in terms of defining empirically or otherwise, 'obeying the order', but also, despite the otherwise anti-a priorist thrust of Quinean empiricism, sets us on a return trip back along the road which ultimately terminates at the locale of the private linguist's damning error! For it is the very idea of meaning and understanding being 'mental' — however one construes the ontology of 'mind' — that is the trap here.

Such a radical claim as this is bound to have a distinct shock value here because, at bottom, we are readily taken in by the appearance of Quine's treatment of mentality in terms of overt behaviour. But it must be recognised that in confronting Quinean empiricism we are nonetheless dealing with an error which echoes the perspective which dualism has bequeathed to our philosophical tradition and which, as we have previously pointed out, entraps either side of the resultant dichotomy. It is vital then to recall always that radical behaviouristic empiricism
is (probably the ultimate) fruit of one side of this dialectic.

For let us not forget here that Quinean empiricism is still empiricism: regardless of its thoroughgoing physicalism, it still construes the genetic relation between language and the world as mediated by a mental dimension (notably in the form of propositional attitudes). This means there is a logic to the order of this relation which places mental factors second, after the world and its causal efficacy vis-a-vis our sensory structures, and language as the final outcome.

This view contrasts starkly with the radical view held by Wittgenstein, viz.: that the empiricists (et al) are seriously confused and mistaken because a correct analysis of the bedrock of language shows that out of the interaction of our (active) behaviour with the world, the logical second state for the linguistic creature is (blind) — potentially 'creative' —- reactions and responses. This analysis is radical precisely in that it insists that the empiricistic (and, indeed, the currently de rigeur 'realist') order of the logico-genetic relation of mind to linguistic responses, is incoherent and back-to-front. The Wittgensteinian analysis, centred on its emphasis on language being grounded in a rule-governed technique — in praxis, practices, customs, conventions — shows that belief, expectation, doubt, thought, desire, etc., (and their 'objects') are constructs derived (logico-genetically speaking) out of successful 'nature-dominating' responses and reactions; at bottom, out of more or less instinctive acts whose 'blind' drive is the agent's forging the world into a life-world for and of her/his constituting.

If one must talk of language being connected with attitudes, then, pace Quine, those attitudes are not 'propositional'. Indeed, at bottom
only one broad 'attitude' is required of the language-using creature. This attitude quintessentially is active: at bottom language-users do not leave it up to fate or the history of evolutionary success to determine for them what serves their life-practical interests, what has to be accepted, what counts as following a rule or grasping a meaning or a concept; language is their successful seizing of the initiative.

VII

Having thus canvassed the basis of my attack on Quinean crypto-psychologism, I want, as foreshadowed, to now run the development of this critique in tandem with the examination of the contrast between Wittgenstein's views on translation (and intersubjective understanding), and those of Quine. For the 'scientific attitude' -- 'let the facts/the world determine how it is' -- which Quine sees as central to translation, is of course the root of his (brilliantly) erroneous view of aliens' relationship to native linguistic praxis. By way of now conclusively proceeding to explicate the details of this extended error, we can fruitfully return to the previously-canvassed issue of the relation between social praxis, normativity and language-use. Consider then the way Wittgenstein explicates this relationship in the following most germane remarks:

Our children are not only given practice in calculation but also trained to adopt a particular attitude towards a mistake in calculating. [Variant (indicated by the editors): ... towards a departure from the norm.]

What I am saying comes to this, that mathematics is normative. But "norm" does not mean the same thing as "ideal". 41

We say: "If you really follow the rule in multiplying, you must all get the same result." Now if this is only the somewhat hysterical way of putting things that you get in university talk, it need not interest us overmuch.
It is however the expression of an attitude towards the technique of calculation, which comes out everywhere in our life. The emphasis of the must corresponds only to the inexorableness of this attitude both to the technique of calculating and to a host of related techniques.

The mathematical Must is only another expression of the fact that mathematics forms concepts.

And concepts help us to comprehend things. They correspond to a particular way of dealing with situations.

Mathematics forms a network of norms.

From the point of view of the logic of translation, these are very powerful remarks. It is plain that any 'translator' (who I will treat here so that s/he can be anyone setting out to understand any language, including their own) must, on this view of Wittgenstein's, grasp the language's rules. Moreover, this interfaces with recognising concrete concepts as 'nature-dominating' instrumentalities ipso facto geared to the dictates "of an attitude towards the technique of calculation" (or whatever technique, depending on what practice the translator is grappling with) "which comes out everywhere in" the language-users' life-praxis. A translator must, for Wittgenstein, be alert to the connection between the native speakers' 'attitude' to the regulating of their activities — what they permit, encourage, frown upon, re-inforce, proscribe, act indifferently toward, etc. — and the (constitutive) role that activity has in the life-praxis of the natives. In other words, for Wittgenstein there is a lot to be said for seeing translation (inter alia) as grasping the 'mode of constitution' endemic to rule-following forms of life-praxis.

Quine, on the other hand famously takes a very problematic view. His major contention is that

... manuals for translating one language into another can be
set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In countless places they will diverge in giving, as their respective translations of a sentence of the one language, sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no plausible sort of equivalence however loose. The firmer the direct links of a sentence with non-verbal stimulation, of course, the less drastically its translations can diverge from another from manual to manual. 43

Of course, what Quine is insisting here is that the translator is effectively engaged in the struggle of extracting from the language of the natives the source of its 'meaning' — viz.: the objects/events which stimulate their nerve-endings and thus structure and determine their verbal dispositions. As we saw much earlier, Quine holds that a plethora of these patterns of stimulations and resultant verbal dispositions become, in effect, 'buried' in merely verbal linguistic structures (in contrast to those whose structure is determined by their acting as 'observation sentences').

Elsewhere Quine has explained this view as follows: in translation/understanding of a language

... we can usefully narrow our problem by focussing on truth conditions and so exploiting a method of query and assent. And here, of course, ... the sentences that prove reasonably amenable are the occasion sentences, especially the observation sentences. What relates such a sentence to its equivalent is simply a co-inciding of dispositions: we are disposed to assent to both sentences in the same circumstances.

Moreover, in a technical behavioural account of equivalence, just as in a behavioural account of understanding, we encounter difficulty when we move to standing sentences. Since man is apt to assent to a standing sentence, if asked, in all sorts of circumstances or in none, the co-inciding of dispositions to assent to two standing sentences gives no basis for equating them. 44

According to Quine then, the translator can have to hand only such "objective data" as are provided by observation of "the forces he" or she
"sees impinging on the native's" sensory "surfaces and the observable behaviour, vocal and otherwise, of the native".45

Immediately therefore one major, and by now obvious, contrast between this view and Wittgenstein's shows itself. Quine is simply following through his assumption that causal interaction between an object/event and the natives' nerve-endings secures the 'meaning' of their words (qua dispositions to assent and dissent). By contrast, as the following remarks further show, Wittgenstein sees no merit whatsoever in the 'translator go forth and seek the causes of native assents and dissents' policy propagated by Quine:

You must ask yourself: under what special circumstances do we say that someone has "made a mere slip of the pen" or "he could perfectly well have gone on, but on purpose did not do so" or "he had meant to repeat the figure that he drew, but he happened not to do it". 46

How about the following: You aren't calculating if, when you get now this, now that result, and cannot find a mistake, you accept this and say: this simply shows that certain circumstances which are still unknown have an influence on the result.

This might be expressed: if calculation reveals a causal connection to you, then you are not calculating. 47

There are no causal connections in a calculation, only the connections of the pattern. And it makes no difference to this that we work over the proof in order to accept it. That we are therefore tempted to say that it arose as the result of a psychological experiment. For the psychical course of events is not psychologically investigated when we calculate. 48

Again, what we see here is a radical rejection of the idea Quine exalts: the translator treating language as a natural phenomenon to be subjected strictly to empirical investigation. In particular, the last-quoted remark strikes a telling blow against the Quinean position by emphasising that calculation does not have the logical nature of the carrying out of
a psychological investigation.

When, e.g., someone says 'I believe (or think) that the answer to the calculation is 625', we do not and cannot look to the subject's state of mind (his/her state of conviction or certainty, say) to determine the mathematical content and status of this claim. Apprehension of the mathematical content, like the meaning-content, truth-value content, logical status, is determined by looking to and grasping the use of the rules and/or the relevant paradigms employed in the language-game and not by scrutinising some person's mental state(s). But, in the case of a psychological investigation, things are quite the other way around. Our concern here is with (the causes and empirical correlates of) the subject's mental state(s), not with the content constructed (in this language-game, culture, etc.,) by the use of the rule '620 + 5 = 625'.

From the Wittgensteinian point of view, the empirical-scientific approach to language is therefore utterly wrongheaded as a means of grasping meanings etc. (not to mention, mutatis mutandis, as a way of understanding the logical constitution of what is 'in' anyone's mind!). Take the case of a 'translator' observing a native working over a mathematical proof:

The spectator sees the whole impressive procedure. And he becomes convinced of something; that is the special impression he gets. He goes away from the performance convinced of something. Convinced that (for example) he will end up the same way with similar numbers. He will be ready to express what he is convinced of in such-and-such a way. Convinced of what? Of a psychological fact? —
He will say that he has drawn a conclusion from what he has seen. — Not, however as one does from an experiment. (Think of periodic division.)

Could he say: "What I have seen was very impressive. I have drawn a conclusion from it. In future I shall ..."?
(E.g.: In future I shall always calculate like this.) He tells us: 'I saw that it must be like that'.

"I realised that it must be like that" — that is his report.

But he does not say: I realised that this happens. Rather: that it must be like that. This "must" shows what kind of lesson he has drawn from the scene. The "must" shows that he has gone in a circle.

... 'It must be so' means that this outcome has been defined to be essential to this process.

This must shows that he has adopted a concept.

This must signifies that he has gone in a circle.

He has read off from the process, not a proposition of natural science but, instead of that, the determination of a concept.

In a nutshell, the 'translator' has not treated the proof as a psychological experiment, but as the demonstration of a rule. So her/his interest cannot, modus Quine, be turned to 'the (empirical -- i.e. causal) forces seen impinging on the native's sensory surfaces and the observable behaviour, vocal and otherwise, of the native'. As the Waismann-Wittgenstein text has it, rule-following

... proceeds no matter what are the causes which determine its separate steps. If someone on hearing the command 'Red!' paints a surface red, he acts upon a rule. The actual performance may be brought about by all sorts of causes.

Quine's view, clearly, does not adequately comprehend the implications of the logical realisation that "the actual performance may be brought about by all sorts of causes". This is shown when Quine explicates his contention that in his model of translation "the utterances first and most surely translated ... are ones keyed to present
events that are conspicuous to the linguist and his informant." The point is that the observable empirical content of these kinds of utterances is relatively maximal so that they permit the linguist to correlate sentences with the particular objects/events that stimulate those sentences' being dissented/assented to. Thus, ideally, we are supposed to consider the matter here in a maximally

... causal vein [in terms] of stimulations that will prompt the native to assent or dissent to the queried sentence. For suppose the queried sentence were one rather to the effect that someone is away tracking a giraffe. All day long the native will assent to it whenever asked, under all manner of irrelevant attendant stimulations; and on another day he will dissent from it under the same irrelevant stimulations. It is important to know that in the case of 'Gavagai?' the rabbit-presenting stimulations actually prompt the assent, and that the others actually prompt the dissent. 52

If Quine's linguist's ideal world were, per impossible, to come into existence, it would therefore be one in which every sentence in the natives' language would feature as an observation sentence and would thus reveal to him/her the exact object/event which causes/stimulates the natives' verbal responses qua assents and dissents. Crucially however, Quine, very famously, points out that the (I take it to be pragmatic) structure of language is always at significant variance with this (empiricistic) ideal. Ipso facto, indeterminacy of (radical) translation is an ongoing fact of life for each and every translator. Note, nevertheless, that in throwing herself/himself into the fray against this stark limitation, the one ray of hope the translator must cling to is that provided by the language's occasion sentences because of their 'out in the open' empirical content.

But Wittgensteinian analysis shows that this 'ray of hope' casts a very dim light indeed. It is, as foreshadowed, the assumption that in
being fortunate, clever or lucky enough to observe the particular object/event which is the cause of native assents/dissents \textit{vis-à-vis} some tendered sentence, the linguist is observing the (extensionalised) 'meaning' — the 'truth-conditions' — of that sentence.

To be sure the Quinean version of the scenario just outlined looks, at first, quite sound. Quine gives some examples of occasion sentences in \textit{Word and Object} "such as 'Gavagai', 'Red', 'It hurts', 'His face is dirty' .... "\textsuperscript{53} Let us take 'Red' -- it seems to suit his case perfectly. In the ideal Quinean linguist's world, \textit{per impossible}, the linguist's empirical investigations of the correlation of native sentence(s) with assents and dissents \textit{vis-à-vis} a sample of red, would licence the conclusion that the stimulus meaning of the relevant native sentence correlates or equates to our 'red'. Another way of putting this is to say that the object which stimulates the relevant assent – dissent pattern and which elicits the relevant stimulus meaning for our sentence 'red', is (the same as) that which stimulates the corresponding verbal behaviour on the part of the natives. And within the significant limitations imposed when we try to go beyond this easy case of an occasion sentence such as 'red' to the radically-indetermined case of native standing sentences, this is, says Quine, the stuff of which translation is made.

But by now the stark error of this view should be plain. For as the above Waismann-Wittgenstein quotation reminded us, \textit{all sorts of causes and (thus) objects/events, can lead to the use of a word and/or be 'involved in' the following of a rule}. And this, as we know, is why anybody who assumed that, \textit{e.g.}, the essence of a rule is the object, event, or state of affairs which \textit{causes} the rule-follower to go by the
rule, or that the meaning of a word is what causes its use, is hopelessly mistaken.

Thus, the trouble with the case of a red object's causing assent to the native equivalent of the inquiry 'red?' -- and thus a key problem with the whole Quinean account of translation -- is that mere empirical observation of this 'linguistic interaction' cannot determine whether, so to speak, the red object is or is not essential to the meaning of 'red'. For a blow to the head might cause assent to 'red?' in the presence of all manner of objects/events/states of affairs -- including the blow to the head. This raises at least two questions, one empirical, the other, logical: what object/event/state of affairs, given that a whole range were presently stimulating the subject's nerve-endings, caused the assent/the verbal response?; and, given, as Quine's account of the linguist's/translator's methodology outlines, that this empirical question is answered, how can or does it follow that the causally responsible object/event is the 'meaning' of 'red'?

A drug could be administered to the subject, after which s/he assents to the inquiry 'red?'. Suppose we determine (somehow) empirically that the drug caused this assent. What possible sense could be made of the claim that the drug is the 'meaning'/extension of 'red'? An obvious (neo-Lockean?) reply is (say) that the drug causes the subject to have visions of redness. All that is required is, after all, the relevant phenomenal or physical property's presence: in Quine's terms, the presence of a stimulation that causes assent to 'red?'. As such, and as we have seen, the extension of 'red' could be taken here as a whole causal nexus 'boiled down', in the end, to the material state in the subject's physiology which causes assent to 'red?'.
In *Word and Object* Quine himself is rather cagey about such a move. He says:

> It is important to think of what prompts the native's assent to 'Gavagai?' as stimulations and not rabbits. Stimulation can remain the same though the rabbit can be supplanted by a counterfeit. ... In experimentally equating the uses of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' it is stimulations that must be made to match, not animals.

A visual stimulation is perhaps best identified, for present purposes, with the pattern of chromatic irradiation of the eye. To look deeper into the subject's head would be inappropriate even if feasible, for we want to keep clear of his idiosyncratic neural routings or private history of habit formation. 54

But, by the time of his writing "Mind and Verbal Dispositions" *(circa 1974, and thus at least 14-15 years after writing Word and Object)*, Quine has taken a much bolder and uncompromising stand, whereby he holds that

... mind consists in dispositions to behaviour, and these are physiological states. We recall that John B. Watson did not claim that quite all thought was incipient speech; it was incipient twitching of the muscles, and mostly speech muscles. Just so I would not identify mind quite wholly with verbal disposition; with Ryle and Sellars I would identify it with behavioural disposition, and mostly verbal. And then, having construed behavioural dispositions, in turn as physiological states, I end up with the so-called identity theory of mind: mental states are states of the body.

However, a word of caution is in order regarding the so-called identity theory. .... .... [I]nstead of saying that mental states are identical with physiological ones, we could repudiate them; we could claim that they can be dispensed with, in all our theorising, in favour of physiological states, these being specified usually not in actual physiological terms but in the idiom of behavioural dispositions.

... Still, among the dispositions to behaviour, some are more explanatory than others. The ones that we should favour, in explanations, are the ones whose physiological mechanisms seem likeliest to be detected in the foreseeable future. To cite a behavioural disposition is to posit an unexplained neural mechanism, and such posits should be made in the hope of their submitting some day to a physical explanation. 55

So, we see once more that for Quine, as the content of the concept of
(extensionalised-) meaning is to be understood in terms of behavioural
dispositions, and these in turn as mere physiological mechanisms,
(extensionalised-) meaning cashes out as a physiological mechanism:
effectively, what a (sophisticated?) translator seeks out in seeking a
word's meaning is the causally relevant brain-state (seen in the context
of Quine's overall empirical theory).

This admission, extracted on Quine's behalf, obviously reinforces
this chapter's exposing of his account of language not as bona fide anti-
psychologistic, but as psychologism extensionally, neuro-physiologically
and radical-empiricistically re-interpreted. It also vindicates my
concomitant claim that Quine's anti-psychologistic stance is a very
clever illusion (given, that is, the way it turns out vis-a-vis the
radical analytical thrust of Wittgenstein's anti-psychologism).56

But having got this matter right out into the open (and down to its
bare bones), it follows even more so that the whole Quinean edifice built
around the thesis of indeterminacy of radical translation and its
behaviouristic semantics is, to its core, shot to pieces by
Wittgensteinian analysis. For 'boiling meaning down' to a
physiologically interpreted state whose relations are causal, is a
demonstrably hopeless move. This is particularly so because such a
strictly physical variable is, in its logical status, no more than a
contingency among an undeterminable set of contingencies. Thus, what
goest at the gross physical level where, e.g., a drug, a blow to the head,
a red object, a virus attack, being stabbed in the throat, and so on
through a vast — if not 'infinite' — range of contingencies, may
(somehow come to) cause assent to 'red?', so, because the logical form
and content of micro-level physiological contingencies is no different in
any relevant sense, the same goes for the physiological level.

To put it bluntly, it is logically possible for virtually any causal process to be 'hooked-up' to cause assent to 'red'.
Quine insists that "only by taking the initiative and querying combinations of native sentences and stimulus situations so as to narrow down his guesses to his eventual satisfaction" can the linguist proceed. And it is utterly plain by now that this method of "query and assent, query and dissent" which "is the solvent that reduces understanding to verbal disposition," boils down to none other than the linguist's seeking to gain access to the native's propositional attitudes or other relevant mental states. In the face of this, the requisite reply to Quine is by now well to hand. Recall in particular that in Chapter III, in the context of addressing the case of the two-minute man and that of the chess-playing tribespeople, we came to consider cases whose rule-following subjects had both no reflective knowledge of, and no cognitive relation to, the content of their activity. Quine's views offer no way out of the deliberately anti-psychologistic structure of the dialectic contained in these problem cases. Quinean semantic behaviourism therefore is condemned by the same dialectic that secures Wittgenstein's exposing of the fallacies of orthodox (and neo-)psychologism. For Quine has insisted about his account of translational method that such is its reliance on query and assent/dissent that

[without this device there would be no hope of handing language down the generations, nor any hope of breaking into newly discovered languages. It is primarily by querying sentences for assent and dissent that we tap the reservoirs of verbal disposition. 60

But this methodology is designed to uncover native propositional attitudes, and any connection between such mental states — regardless of how far one 'physicalises' them — and the technique of language-use, the constitution of language's rules, or its meanings, is entirely
incidental, if not (in many cases) just downright spurious. Indeed, the relation can be so spurious that, as I pointed out in Chapter III, there can be no relevant propositional attitudes and/or reflective knowledge present in the mind/brain/functional-state-mechanism of someone even though s/he is a perfectly competent rule-follower or speaker. Rule-following and the achievement of content is not a propositional attitude function.

The lesson behind this analysis, though radical, is plain: 'looking into the heads' of the natives or looking at their gross behaviour (as Quine favours in Word and Object), is no way to determine the meaning of their talk, gestures, etc. Pace Quine, the methodology of query and assent/dissent geared along any kind of (crypto-)psychologistic premises is, to use Wittgenstein's own words, sure here to produce "nothing that is not completely wrong". 61

The empiricistic outlook Quine has fostered, fundamentally confuses what (allegedly) empirically conditions meaningful states of affairs (e.g., events, behaviours, objects) with 'meaningful conditions', i.e., with the rule-governed achievements of praxis. 62 The essence of this confusion comes from treating conceptual problems about the constitution of language as if they are empirical difficulties solvable by empirical theory and research. But it is one of the key lessons of Wittgenstein's later philosophy that psychological and other empirical analyses of language are not a solution to conceptual confusions: rather they frequently are a major form and source of our conceptual confusion(s).

By corollary, and so far as 'radical translation' is concerned, the natives' responses must, if we are to understand their language, deliver not propositional-attitude-information, but the logical grammar of their
language. The 'responses' must express and, moreover, must teach the rules by which their language-games proceed. For the translator stands to the natives as someone who seeks to learn and enter into (what it is) to play a (particular) game by watching competent players as they play the game. (Here I echo one of Chapter II's central points.)

We are therefore not talking here about detachedly treating language as the object of a scientific study: we are talking about learning and understanding 'by doing'. The role served by assents and dissents on the part of competent players — i.e. 'the natives' — thus is utterly distorted if described, inter alia, as the exhibiting of truth-conditions. 'True' and 'false' can carry the requisite pragmatic and, especially, normative, force to serve the role of 'right' and 'wrong', but this is a second-order and 'mufti' (and 'non-extensional') role for them. The correct way to see the matter is to recognise that the assents and dissents which serve the logical role of teaching a language and/or bringing about understanding and/or translation, have as their definitive role the constituting of the pupil/translator/reader/hearer as master of the technique(s) in and through which the 'native' talk has its meaning.

Dissent to the empirical proposition 'Napoleon was a Greek' does not operate on just the same level, or set up the same semantic functions, as dissent to 'Napoleon was Tuesday afternoon's triangle'. That the latter sentence lacks extension is not, pace Quine, the point. Rather, the crux of the matter is that we constitutively grant to it no extension under any conditions and give it no intensional status (except 'nonsense'). The 'dissent' operative here is therefore of the kind 'That is not a permitted move in our language-game(s)'; 'Don't do that.'
This sets up a quite different logical relation for the determining of sense, from that applying to the relation of verisimilitude which obtains between a proposition and its truth-conditions.

If you like, there is a shift from 'is' to 'ought' here. But it is a constitutional shift, both typical — if not definitive — of the use of any rule, and indicative of the distinction between merely looking at a concept or language-game from without, and being involved in using it. What logically connects the anthropological fact that the natives do not engage in such-and-such (sanctioned) actions and the rules the natives follow, is a 'bridge' to which the dualistic basis of the 'is - ought' distinction utterly blinds us. It is a logically transformative, constitutive, 'bridge'. Only philosophical analysis that recognises this can escape both the quagmire Weltanschauung of the 'inner - outer' and 'ought - is' dualities, and the empiricists' nihilistic, dehumanising, reduction of concrete human (and animal) life-praxis to object-object causal relations in a 'scientifically respectable' 'value free' 'world'. — For that is the unconscious but real agenda and legacy bequeathed to us from Locke to Hume, and so brilliantly brought to its zenith by Quine.

In one of the most important anti-behaviouristic, anti-physicalistic, and anti-reductionistic — because anti-dualistic — remarks in the Investigations, Wittgenstein borrows from Marx a most apposite way of expressing this 'shift':

What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?

....

Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains.

For one has to say it of a body, or if you like of a soul which some body has. And how can a body have a soul?

....
And so, too, a corpse seems to us quite inaccessible to pain. — Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not quite the same. All our reactions are different. — If anyone says: 'That cannot simply come from the fact that a living thing moves about in such-and-such a way and a dead one not', then I want to intimate to him that this is a case of the transition from quantity to quality. 64

That Wittgenstein here adopts this key Marxian notion of the transition from quantity to quality is no accident and no small thing. It testifies to the location of his later philosophy in the only truly significant self-reflective development in the history of Western philosophy: the radical, and philosophically revolutionary, anti-dualistic stream instigated by Hegel, developed by Marx, and then largely abandoned until its reappearance in Wittgenstein's mature thought.

It is a stream of thought whose touchstone is thoroughgoing recognition of concrete life-praxis, and the constitutive unity of such praxis with the intellecctions of (so-called) 'theory'. With all its profoundly radical implications, this historically most recent movement puts to us a view of, and insight into, the nature of human behaviour that is at the absolute opposite end of the materialist 'behavioural spectrum' from that of the tradition which finds its exaltation in the writings of Willard Van Orman Quine.
Footnotes

1. This echoes the previous chapter's opening focus on the issue whether it is a matter for epistemology what rules, if any, the natives are following.


6. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

7. Ibid., p. 9.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 11.


12. Ibid., pp. 93-94.


16. Ibid., p. 75. Emphasis mine.

17. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

18. Quine, Word and Object, p. 2.


22. Friedrich Waismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. R. Harré (London, Melbourne, Toronto: Macmillan; New York: St. Martins Press, 1965). This is rightly a controversial text in terms of its standing in Wittgensteinian circles. I believe I have been reliably told that Waismann claimed its contents were largely his. Yet there is little or no question that this is not so. Some of the book is Wittgenstein more or less verbatim, especially in respect of material in Philosophical Grammar, and in his lectures circa. 1934-1936. The almost certain truth is that Waismann's book is his edited and somewhat confused version of material whose source was (and probably only could have been) the author of the Philosophical Investigations. For further and detailed support for this view see Gordon P. Baker, "Verehrung und Verkehrung: Waismann and Wittgenstein", in Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, ed. C.G. Luckhardt (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 243-285.


25. Ibid., p. 115.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. My emphasis.


30. Ibid., p. 164.

31. Ibid., pp. 164f.

32. Wittgenstein, Zettel, remark 545.

33. Wittgenstein, RFM, section VI, remark 42b.

34. Ibid. Emphasis mine.

35. Quine, Word and Object, p. 217.

36. Briefly, this is, of course, because the dog's non-cognitive response has (and must have) a primitive -- pre-conceptual -- constructive role. That is: there are no rabbits qua 'rabbits-for-dogs', if, as Quine has it, the dog's 'discriminatory disposition' is a passive function. Just what a rabbit is for a dog depends, logically, on the life-praxis of the dog as well as its instincts etc. My point is simply that even for the dog, the (putative) belief that 'there is a rabbit' is not analysable as the passive apprehension of a pre-given or otherwise 'autonomous', fact: how rabbits 'strike' dogs is a question of how dogs constructively react to rabbits; the empiricist's key notion of passive experience is rejected here.

37. Wittgenstein, RFM, section VI, remark 33a.

38. See for instance Quine, "Mind and Verbal Dispositions", pp. 94–95.

39. Ibid., p. 95.

40. Wittgenstein, RFM, section VI, remark 33a.

41. Ibid., section VII, remarks 61j, k.

42. Ibid., section VII, remarks 67a, b, c, d. Emphasis in the first sentence of 67b is mine.
43. Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 27.

44. Quine, "Mind and Verbal Dispositions", p. 90.

45. Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 28.


47. Ibid., section VIII, remarks 61h, i.

48. Ibid., section VII, remark 18g.

49. Ibid., section VI, remarks 7a, b, c, d, e, g, j, and 8a, b, c. The emphasis in 8c is mine.


52. Ibid., p. 30.

53. Ibid., p. 35.

54. Ibid., p. 31. Emphasis mine.

55. Quine, "Mind and Verbal Dispositions", pp. 94 f.

56. This is in no way intended to mean (disrespectfully *vis a vis* Quine) that the illusion is deliberate.

57. It is important here to recognise that this argument blocks any functionalist's likely attempt to rescue the physiological-materialistic thesis. The functionalist will doubtless try to argue that the meaning of 'red' is delivered by whatever causal nexus turns out to be responsible for the appropriate assent-dissent pattern. (David Lewis espouses such arguments, for example.) But what this argument delivers for its confused proponent is an open-ended set of extensions -- i.e. an unquantifiable or, at least, infinite, class of extensions which, *ipso facto* could not possibly 'determine' the meaning of 'red'. For to say 'The meaning is 'Red' is whatever (functional-state-variable) causes the appropriate
assent-dissent outputs', is to say nothing about what 'Red' means
(let alone the content of the concept 'Red'); it is just to proffer
a theory about hypothetical correlates of an understanding of 'Red'
and is thus, e.g., armchair physiology — not logical semantics.

58. Quine, Word and Object, p. 29.


60. Quine, "Mind and Verbal Disposition", p. 88.

61. Wittgenstein, Zettel, remark 121.

62. I owe the source of this particular succinct point to my supervisor,
Kim Lycos.


64. Wittgenstein, Investigations, remark 283, 284.
Chapter V — Plus ça Change en Logique: Non-Cognitivism and the Anti-Realist Critique of Realism.

In his insightful paper "Wittgenstein on Moore's Paradox", Kent Linville makes the following observation:

The reading of "I believe" suggested by the cogito is subject to a form of criticism which Moore himself has made in another connection: namely, that on such an interpretation one is unable to account for interpersonal disagreement. If, for example, "I believe that Alpha Centauri is the closest star" were about the speaker, then an interlocutor saying that he did not believe it to be the closest star would not contradict what I say (the truth I claim), since we would not be talking about the same thing. In which case, when two people discovered they had different beliefs this would merely mark a contrast between them ("I feel anxious" — "I don't"), not thrust them upon a point of disagreement. When such discoveries occur in ordinary discourse, however, there is disagreement. And the resolution of such conflicts is achieved by determining the truth or falsity of "Alpha Centauri is the closest star." Thus, prefixing "I believe" to the simple assertion does not transform it into a truth claim exclusively about the assertor.

From this Moorean observation we see that the content of a belief logically is a function of states of affairs that are (in some sense) objective in their relationship to the asserting and/or believing subject. In turn, this subjective — objective dissonance implies, inter alia, the following logical possibility: 'p, and I believe that not-p'. That is to say that what actually is the case, what is true, is, on the construal Linville outlines above against the radical subjectivist position, only externally related to a subject's beliefs: 'I believe that p' does not imply either 'p' or 'p is true'.

The dispute between realism and anti-realism flows out of this, very basic, analysis of assertion, truth, belief and objectivity. For the
realist, the content of a coherent belief may in principle always exceed the cognitive capacities of the believing and/or asserting subject: \( p \neq \)
the conditions under which (at least in principle) one can recognise that \( p \). For the anti-realist, the content of a coherent belief only can be a function of the recognitional capacities of the believing/asserting subject: \( p = \) the conditions under which (at least in principle) one can recognise that \( p \). In metaphysical terms the dispute comes to this: realism holds existence to exceed the parameters of experience of existence; anti-realism insists that the parameters of experience (including that given 'indirectly' via canonical proofs in mathematics, etc.) constitute 'what there is'. In semantic terms we can say: realism insists that what determines the sense of '\( p \) is true' is not restricted to our understanding of the class of possible experiences and/or knowledge of \( p \); anti-realism holds the converse view. In the philosophy of Michael Dummett, these and the multifarious other aspects of the realism – anti-realism dispute have (basically speaking) been shown to turn on the issue of the logical nature and content of truth: in essence, whether the law of excluded middle is sound, coherent, defensible, once we take the notion of the 'use-conditions' of language seriously.

The concern of Wittgenstein with Moore's paradox is entirely germane here because that paradox concerns the logical possibility — '\( p \), and I don't believe that \( p \)' — which, despite their great differences, realists and anti-realists both insist is entirely sound. Their dispute concerns the question as to how cognitive, epistemic, considerations constrain and/or determine the domain over which the content of '\( p \)' and that of the belief that 'not-\( p \)' ranges, given their common ground that assertion and belief are fundamentally cognitive functions. Neither the realist nor the anti-realist (nor Wittgenstein, for that matter) wants to deny that
people can make mistakes; that we can (and do) have false (as well as true) beliefs. Of course, both the realist and the (at least, sophisticated, Dumettian, 'objective') anti-realist insist that whilst 'p, and I don't believe that p' is a well-formed expression of a (highly important) logical possibility, actually asserting that sentence would be absurd. (Hence the paradoxicality of 'p, and I don't believe that p'.) But then the realist and the anti-realist are as one in holding that any well-formed proposition (though they naturally disagree about what, semantically, that amounts to) ipso facto has sense, and that its actually being asserted, or at least, assertable, is a secondary factor concerning the degree to which considerations in pragmatics and/or a theory of force influence those in semantics. — This (inter alia) is a view which is rejected in the analysis I advance here.

In the first instance though, I want to employ the considerations raised by 'p and I believe that not-p' as a background on which to focus upon the fundamental common ground between realists and anti-realists — at least as this constitutes what, via Dummett, has been laid out as the accepted and (in Dummett's writings) well explicated basis of this major contemporary dispute in semantics and metaphysics. Here is a typical case in point, taken from the context of Dummett's contrasting platonist and intuitionist philosophies of mathematics in his important paper "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic":

If we have decided upon a model of the meanings of mathematical statements according to which we have to repudiate a notion of truth considered as determinately attaching, or failing to attach, to such statements independently of whether we can now, or ever will be able to, prove or disprove them, then we shall be unable to use the picture of mathematical reality as external to us and waiting to be discovered. Instead, we shall inevitably adopt the picture of that reality as being the product of our thought, or, at least, as coming into existence only as it is thought.
Conversely, if we admit a notion of truth attaching objectively to our mathematical statements independently of our knowledge, then, likewise, the picture of mathematical reality as existing, like the galaxies, independently of our observation of it will force itself on us in an equally irresistible manner. 

...[W]hen we approach the matter in this way, there is no puzzle over the interpretation of these metaphors: psychologically inescapable as they may be, their non-metaphorical content will consist entirely in the two contrasting models of the meanings of mathematical statements, and the issue between them will become simply the issue as to which of these two models is correct. 2

Dummett's remarking that the above-outlined dichotomy is "psychologically inescapable" is both most significant and bitingly ironical — though he does not intend it to be so understood. I want to argue in this concluding chapter that the realism — anti-realism debate is, for its participants, indeed "psychologically inescapable", but in the sense, pace Dummett's intentions, in which prior to successful analysis, a neurotic compulsion — the philosophic equivalent being metaphysical impulse — strikes us as inescapable.

The fundamental metaphysical impulse that spawns the theories propounded by realists and anti-realists and which perpetuates the debate between them, is cognitivism. Neither the metaphysical realist (as characterised by the criteria laid out by Dummett) nor the anti-realist calls into question the notion that a statement expressing any 'grasp of truth' that we may have — and thus the expression of 'what we know' — is fundamentally an epistemic, cognitive, consequence. Both parties are committed to the notion that where we correctly and veridically assert truths we do so on the basis of (veridical) cognition. The question whether there can be more to truth than knowledge of truth — and so the core of the realism — anti-realism dispute — simply does not question, but rather is predicated upon acceptance of, this metaphysical notion: that whatever facts or truths we may know or believe, are facts and/or
truths apprehended — if not, a la anti-realism, constituted — by and in a cognitive medium.

One of the most important corollaries of this fundamental metaphysical outlook is the notion that if there is a 'mind-independently-extant reality', then (ipso facto) there must be more to truth than knowledge of truth or, at least, more to truth than is contained in our use of veridical concepts (including, if you like, the concept 'undecided'). Dummett's commitment to both defending the completeness and adequacy of this corollary's conception of use — the anti-realist conception — and to the view that the later Wittgenstein developed and championed this conception, is explicit throughout his writings and has proved highly influential as a reading of the post-
Tractatus Wittgenstein.

Significantly however, Dummett and Wittgenstein are very severely at odds regarding analysis of the concepts 'true' and 'false' and of the language-game(s) of assertion — Dummett having both acknowledged and debated this in a number of his papers and in his book Frege: Philosophy of Language. This is the first issue I will address in this chapter by reconstructing Wittgenstein's championing, in both Philosophical Grammar and Philosophical Investigations, the formulation 'p is true = p; p is false = not-p'. In examining this matter, my analysis will explicate the non-circularity of the Wittgensteinian version of the so-called 'redundancy theory (or analysis) of truth'. From there I want to expose the connection between the analysis of assertion thus yielded and the (very real) ability of the Wittgensteinian analysis to, pace Dummett, both explicitly espouse the 'p is true = p' formulation and yet also meet Dummett's rightful demand that any adequate analysis of meaning and
understanding

... must not, in its completed form, make use of notions specifically related to the use of language (for instance, the notion of assertion or that of communication) which it leaves unexplained. 3

Whilst meeting Dummett's demand, the Wittgensteinian analysis of veridical concepts and assertability, and their relationship with the logic of meaning, understanding and proof(s), concomitantly dissolves the realism--anti-realism dispute by driving a radical wedge between logical possibility -- realistically or anti-realistically construed -- and the trio of assertability, meaningfulness and understandability. I will argue that realism and anti-realism jointly and severally cannot come to grips with the conditions for our making assertions about, and/or understanding, phenomena (in the non-metaphysical, mundane, sense of 'phenomena'). This is precisely because, at the semantic level at least, they run together the logical semantics for 'possibly p', 'possibly not-p', and as required, endorsed or permitted, 'undecided with respect to p', and the separate issue of our being able either or both to assert and/or understand those propositional signs given their content from case to case, instance to instance. At bottom, both realism and anti-realism cannot but fail to expose this vital philosophic insight: that whilst, indeed, the conditions for assertion and understanding of p (and judgement as to its truth-value) are ever 'objective' conditions -- so that merely saying, believing, thinking that p does, indeed, not make it the case that p -- nonetheless those conditions are not, semantically speaking, veridical functions of any kind; they are not some logico-semantic relationship between a well-formed proposition, thought, theory or analogue thereof and the state of the world (however that is held to cash out).
The Wittgensteinian analysis advanced in this concluding chapter shows that the conditions for assertion, understanding, judgement and knowledge are, in line with the central thesis of this study, the material conditions for and of the successful -- actually constitutive -- playing of the language-game (in this case, the 'generic' language-game of assertion). These conditions are the objective material conditions of constitutive use wherein we make the 'pre-linguistic' natural -- and very real -- world into the world as we understand it. Subsequently -- because veridical judgement is logically posterior to understanding -- we 'realise' the world as we hold it to be in respect of our asserted views. I thus argue here that anti-realism radically misunderstands the notion of use. In so doing it pays the damning price of being unable to acknowledge, and to divine the import of, the distinction between experiencing some 'phenomenon' and either, or both, understanding the phenomenon and the logic of the relationship between 'p' and 'phenomena'. (Here again, I use 'phenomenon' and 'phenomena' in their mundane, non-philosophical, sense.) Anti-realism is, I will argue, nonetheless right to insist upon the constraining of all conceptualisation by the limits of use and thus by the capacities of the concrete language-user, but its proponents are gravely wrong to hold that this entails idealism and that the relevant 'limiting capacities' are cognitive, 'truth-grasping', synthetic functions. This latter error is fundamental to intuitionism's reduction of the semantics involved in understanding a mathematical sentence to a unit in common with those of empirical sentences; an error I condemn here.

Finally, I will argue that given the radical wedge Wittgenstein's analysis drives between logical possibility and the trio of assertability, meaning, and understanding, the basis and implications of
Wittgenstein's very deep interest in Moore's paradox is revealed. What is fundamentally wrong with 'p and I don't believe that p' is precisely a function of its lacking (in all but bizarre circumstances) assertability. Consequently it is a fundamental condition of the both the assertability and the meaning and understandability of 'p' that there can be no role nor place there -- in the 'semantic foundations' -- for belief, cognition, veridical functions, doubt, epistemic error or apprehended truth, theory or science. These rejected factors are all second- (and subsequent-) order achievements of a way of living -- praxis -- that is neither cognitive nor representational in its fundamental, language-generative interaction with nature. This realisation is the essential anti-metaphysical lesson of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein.

II

One of the most important recent critiques of the Wittgenstein-as-anti-realist myth is to be found in Peter Winch's outstanding paper "Im Anfang war die Tat". Winch gives an exigetical analysis of Wittgenstein's mature views on propositionality, truth and assertability, in the context of, inter alia, advancing as central aspects of his analysis the following three claims: (1) that "we mistakenly think we have some independent grasp of truth and falsity enabling us to determine what is and is not a proposition"; the truth instead being that, the popular view to the contrary,

[our understanding of how these terms are to be applied varies pari passu with our understanding of the propositions to which we apply them, and they cannot be used as points of reference for fixing the sense of propositions [in, e.g., the mode of the hugely-influential slogan 'Give the truth-conditions and you give the meaning']. 4
And (2) that, in contradistinction to (at least) the anti-realist position, Wittgenstein's mature analysis involves and endorses "no departure from classical logic, no rejection of forms of argument [which Dummett characterises as] "valid on a ... two-valued interpretation of the logical constants"."\(^5\) And finally (3) that, in respect of the logical basis of assertion, Wittgenstein's "point is that ... assertions make use of a concept which is the creation of a mode of acting to which the true-false bipolarity does not apply."\(^6\) Any one of these three claims, let alone their being taken together, suffices to contradict the semantic position Dummett maps out as anti-realism. However, it is also crucially the case that Dummett's orthodox realist — 'realist' a la Dummett — opponents can take no comfort from this fact; they too are casualties of the analytical thrust behind the trio of claims I have extracted here from Winch's paper.

Take the following crucial 'test case' for separating realists from anti-realists: we ask of a semantic theory in what kind of thing — 'mind-dependent' or 'mind-independent' — resides or consists the content of, to use Winch's apposite phrase, the "independent grasp of truth and falsity enabling us to determine what is and is not a proposition". To be sure, some semantic theories will not fit onto this ('independent grasp') template despite their avowing either realism or anti-realism, and that because — as is notably the case in Frege's semantics — they make the damning error of treating 'true' and 'false' etc. as wholly language internal semantic constructions ipso facto incapable of non-circular explication. Dummett, Evans and McDowell, Quine, Davidson and a host of others have condemned and/or eschewed this kind of approach, and rightly so. We have touched upon it in Chapter II, and I will not pursue the matter further here. Our concern is to take with utmost seriousness
the philosophical-analytical need to explicate the nature and construction of our coming to grasp, and/or our subsequently using, the concepts of truth and falsity and the practice of assertion. The realist - anti-realist debate insists, as a condition of its conduct, that having eschewed circularity in our analytical explication, we can (somehow) exploit the independence of, e.g., 'S believes that p' and the 'reality' which determines the truth or falsity (or undecidability) of the belief that p, such that, to once more use one of Winch's phrases, we thereby give ourselves "points of reference for fixing the sense of propositions". In precisely this movement of thought we see how the foundational cognitivist semantic icon is generated, because the fundamental solvent for semantic analysis is posited here on the meta-model

Following Winch, I will show here that and how the mature Wittgensteinian analysis of veridical concepts and assertion destroys this metaphysical picture. Central to this is the exposing of the cognitivist meta-model's illusion that the language - reality connection is primarily and essentially representational. The notion of representation enters in the very basic sense in which the meta-model treats of the ambit of the application of the truth-functions, and so of the act of assertion and the concomitant use of veridical concepts like 'true', 'false', 'undecided' etc. This notion is that these factors fundamentally serve to reflect, represent, convey, deliver, show, how 'reality' is (within the limits of the representational device).
To see how Winch's analysis attacks this view and to develop further the implications of his critique, as well as to expose several points Winch overlooks, we need of course to look at the piece of Wittgenstein text Winch addresses — viz.: remark series 79 in Part I of Philosophical Grammar, and in particular remarks 79b and c. These latter two remarks run thus:

"p" is true = p
"p" is false = \neg p
What he says is true = Things are as he says.

One might say: the words "true" and "false" are only items in a particular notation for truth-functions.
So is it correct to write "'p' is true", "'p' is false"; mustn't it be "p is true" (or false)? The ink mark is after all not true; in the way in which it's black and curved.

Does "'p' is true", state anything about the sign "p" then? "Yes, it says that 'p' agrees with reality." Instead of a sentence of our word language consider a drawing that can be compared with reality according to exact projection rules. This surely must show as clearly as possible what "'p' is true" states about the picture "p". The proposition "'p' is true" can thus be compared with the proposition "this object is as long as this metre rule" and "p" to the proposition "this object is one metre long". But the comparison is incorrect, because "this metre rule" is a description, whereas "metre rule" is the determination of a concept. On the other hand in "'p' is true" the ruler enters immediately into the proposition. "p" represents here simply the length and not the metre rule. For the representing drawing is also not 'true' except in accordance with a particular method of projection which makes the ruler a purely geometrical appendage of the measured line.

The first matter I want to address concerning this piece of argument concerns a crucial aspect of Wittgenstein's dialectic which Winch largely overlooks. Our first clue to its presence comes in the observation that we may as well simply say that "the words "true" and "false" are only items in a particular notation for truth-functions." It is the use of the term "notation" that is highly significant. The framing of the equivalence formulations in the immediately preceding remark is taken and
glossed not in the fashion of Frege's original use of such equivalence, where 'p is true = p' refers to The True and 'p is false = not-p' refers to The False. Rather, as the next two, and possibly three, sentences underscore, what Wittgenstein is doing with his appropriation of the equivalence formulations is part and parcel of his mature formalistic analysis of explanations of rules, definitions, etc.: they are shown as constituting in themselves mere substitution rules for signs (as was explicated in detail in Chapter II).

Fundamental to Wittgenstein's making this dialectical move with the equivalence formulations is the question of what is the propositional sign and how it is constituted as such. That is why Wittgenstein immediately canvasses the question "is it correct to write "'p' is true", "'p' is false"; mustn't it be "p is true" (or false)?". An apposite way of glossing this expression of the problem is via the question 'Is truth/falsity a feature of the sign itself, or does it refer to a property of that which the sign conveys or represents -- its content?' How we answer this will, ex-hypothesi, affect our decision as to whether or not to write p in shock quotes or to let it stand without them. Thus, Wittgenstein's very next sentence makes it plain that he is engaging here with the debate between formalists and a priorists about signs and content: "The ink mark is after all not true; in the way in which it's black and curved." And yet, this argument is put to us, let us not forget, by someone who but two sentences previously has stated that "the words "true" and "false" are only items in a particular notation for truth-functions." Clearly, we see once more that the dialectic Wittgenstein is setting up is aimed at exploiting the formalists versus a priorists dispute -- here as concerns their major differences regarding the concept of truth. Out of this clash
Wittgenstein intends to secure the dispute's dissolution through the emergence of the constitutive-use analysis.

It is then worth recapitulating here several parts of the crucial '4 apples + 4 apples' remark in *Philosophical Grammar*, where Wittgenstein's 'substitution rule for signs' analysis is first explicated:

The equation 4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples is a substitution rule which I use if instead of substituting the sign "8" for the sign "4 + 4", I substitute the sign "8 apples" for the sign "4 + 4 apples."

.... There isn't any "arithmetic of apples", because the 4 apples + 4 apples = 8 apples is not a proposition about apples. We may say that in this equation the word "apples" has no reference. (And we can always say this about a sign in a rule which helps to determine its meaning.)

In the period 1942-1944, Wittgenstein had returned to developing this line of analysis in his work on philosophy of mathematics, though the role of use in constituting meaning for signs *a posteriori* is now made quite a deal more explicit:

I want to say: it is essential to mathematics that its signs are also employed in multi.

It is the use outside mathematics, and so the meaning of the signs, that makes the sign-game [a la formalism] into mathematics.

Just as it is not logical inference either, for me to make a change from one formation to another (say from one arrangement of chairs to another) if these arrangements have not a linguistic function apart from this transformation. 8

These remarks' concern with apples-as-signs and arrangements-of-furniture-as-symbols, intimately parallels the thrust of the *Philosophical Grammar* remark that 'true' and 'false' are "only items in a particular notation for truth-functions", whilst reminding us -- crucially -- that the step from a mere "sign-game" to "the meaning of the signs" is secured
in the use of the signs for the actual playing of the language-games. Consequently, when, first in part I of Philosophical Grammar (circa 1933-35), and then, both in material now appendixed to section I of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (from circa 1937), and in remark 136 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein employs the equivalence formulations 'p is true = p', 'p is false = not-p', he is citing a logico-grammatical 'substitution rule for signs' in the context of applying his mature constitutive-use analysis to truth concepts and assertion.

Having thus acknowledged the crucial role and presence of this dialectical move, if we look at the opening of the principal paragraph of Philosophical Grammar remark 79c -- where an interlocutor asks "Does " 'p' is true" state anything about the sign "p" then?" -- we can immediately grasp the acuity of the question. And from thereon, Winch's exigetical analysis of this key paragraph brings out most of the key, and deeply insightful, points developed here by Wittgenstein. Thus, in addressing Wittgenstein's reply to the interlocutor's question whether 'p is true' states anything about the sign 'p' -- "Yes, it says that 'p' agrees with reality" -- Winch hits the nail right on the head. For Winch tells us that the role of this reply (which in fact represents, inter alia, the view embraced by both the Tractatus and 'verificationist-period' picture theories) is to address the question "If we say that a Satz "agrees with reality", of what are we saying this?"

Certainly, as I observed above, the formalism versus a priorism dispute needs to be recognised as the fundamental dialectical target here, but notwithstanding Winch's overlooking this, he is otherwise right up with the moves Wittgenstein now makes in the rest of the remark-paragraph. For recall that after the opening interlocutory question and
Instead of a sentence of our word language consider a drawing that can be compared with reality according to exact projection-rules. This surely must show as clearly as possible what "'p' is true" states about the picture "p". The proposition "'p' is true" can thus be compared with the proposition "this object is as long as this metre rule" and "p" to the proposition "this object is one metre long". 11

Responding to this proffered line of theory, Winch now develops the following analysis so as to bring out both the intent and results of Wittgenstein's dialectic:

Let us say

\[ p = \text{This object is one metre long} \]

and

\[ "'p' is true" = \text{This object has the length of this metre rule.} \]

The second equation makes explicit the comparison of one thing with another which is supposed to be involved in the use of "true". The ruler must be taken here as standing in for the Satz "p"; it "agrees with reality" if its ends coincide with those of the object. To operate that analogy we should have to say the ruler "says" that this object is one metre long; and that the correspondence of the ends of the ruler with those of the object "says" that it is true that the object is one metre long. It's important that we're already in trouble here in trying to make the ruler and the correspondence of the ends "say" anything. We have to imagine perhaps that I simply produce the ruler and approach the object with it; and perhaps to interpret this as my saying that the object is one metre long. 12

It is absolutely crucial to realise the impact and depth of the problem that, as Winch so astutely puts it "we're already in trouble here in trying to make the ruler and the correspondence of the ends "say" anything." Take as an initial case in point the radically formalist response championed by various physicalists, viz.: that contrary to the
very idea (virtually definitive of a priorist theories) that the ruler’s correspondence to the ends of the object must be effected or conducted in or via some kind of intentional medium, all that is needed is the causal efficacy of the ruler – object juxtaposition; it is metaphysical twaddle to insist that the juxtaposition be subject to and the result of, some kind of intentionality. Theorists like Michael Devitt and Hartry Field take this sort of line, the intent of which is of course the prosecution of the case for global physicalism.

But this extreme brand of empirical realism has, from the Wittgensteinian point of view, a correspondingly extreme — and, indeed, insurmountable — problem with its insistence that causal efficacy is the life-source for all things semantic. In the first instance, this Weltanschauung is totally dispositionalistic, and we have seen in detail in a number of places in this study (especially in the preceding chapter) just how far dispositionalist semantics gets us: nowhere. But in the light of the depth of Winch’s problematic, we can here push even further into the depths of the dispositionalist fallacy and the futility of its appeal to causation. To do this we must pursue the question why the causal properties of the ruler – object juxtaposition do not stand on exactly the same level as the rest of the physical phenomena that, ex hypothesi, make up the juxtaposition. For our concern (and let us have it first without prejudice), is with the striking thought that as the mere physical juxtaposition per se ‘says’ nothing, something must as it were ‘bring it to life’. For here we are confronted with the mere physical juxtaposition of ruler and object, and our deep puzzlement is about how any (kind of) merely physical phenomenon can be meaningful, can ‘say anything’, can thereby be a ‘propositional sign’.
The physicalist acknowledges the, at least *prima facie*, difficulty here for his/her brand of formalism, and thus appeals to the causal properties of certain phenomena in respect of their inducing 'linguistic behaviour'. But the physicalist's answer is no answer to our concern. This is because, *modulo* physicalism, causal properties are themselves further physical phenomena, and given that our deep concern is with the question how any such phenomena can (be made to) 'say anything', can be of semantic consequence, no appeal to a(ny) sub-set of physical phenomena — here, causal relations and powers — can, logically speaking, be one whit more illuminating than our original confrontation with the mute juxtaposition of ruler and object. A puzzlement — deep puzzlement — about how to get semantic significance from such-and-such stuff is not quelled by the presentation of, or appeals to, yet more of the same kind of stuff. The physical phenomenon of the juxtaposition of ruler and object is on the same level with the physical phenomenon of the juxtaposition's having causal powers *vis a vis* 'linguistic behaviour'.

The clear implication is that Winch's problematic is only solved once we see that what is logically required to quell our deep puzzlement about the constitution of propositional signs, is the realisation that the relationship of the phenomenon of the juxtaposition to its (happening to have) semantic significance involves *transformation* from the level of mere (physical) phenomenon to that of 'propositional sign'. For I say again that we cannot quell our deep puzzlement here by being given *more of the same* — puzzling — phenomenon as a (would-be) solvent.

Before we go on to examine and further develop the way Winch's exigetical analysis brings out and develops this crucial point, we need however to also (briefly) address the way the Winchian problematic
equally overturns the a priorists' fundamental, intentionalistic, approach to the constitution of the propositional sign. Basically, we need only to re-tread the path laid in Chapters I, II and III, though now in the shoes of the Winchian problematic. And so when confronted with the response that -- 'surely!' -- it is the intentionality, or absence thereof, in the juxtaposing of ruler and object that constitutes that juxtaposition as a 'propositional sign', we must reply that this mode of answer will no more suffice than that of the physicalists': the intentional device and/or mode of intentionality are just as much under scrutiny through the Winchian problematic as any other candidate(s) for constituent(s) of the propositional sign.

As a case in point, Wittgenstein's engagement with the question "What makes my image of him into an image of him?" in section iii of part II of the Investigations, is most illustrative here:

What makes my image of him into an image of him? Not its looking like him. The same question applies to the expression [Außerung] "I see him now vividly before me" as to the image. What makes this utterance [Außerung] into an utterance [Außerung] about him? -- Nothing in it or simultaneous with it ('behind it'). If you want to know whom he meant, ask him.

Wittgenstein's negative contention is clearly that what makes this phenomenon mean, or refer to, this is "[n]othing in" the 'intentional object', "... or simultaneous with it ('behind it')." The corresponding positive side of this analysis is manifest in the following remarks:

"At that word we both thought of him." Let us assume that each of us said the same words to himself --- and how can it mean MORE than that? --- But wouldn't even those words be only a germ. They must surely belong to a language and to a context, in order really to be the expression of the
thought of that man. 14

... An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. 15

Intentionalist semanticians read, import, and 'freeload' into their accounts of the constituents of the propositional sign all the formative groundwork that makes such-and-such engagements with phenomena intentional. They do not, and, qua a priorists, cannot, acknowledge that intentionality (and any intentional device) is the achievement of a transformative technique which thereby as much involves and demands a 'shift of levels' as that which is demonstrated in our examination of the way the Winchian problematic confronts physicalism. The basic difference between the physicalist formalist and the intentionalist is of course that the latter treats intentionality as, ultimately, a kind of logico-semantically 'primitive' notion, whereas the former rightly baulks at this dogmatic and unperspicuous manoeuvre, but does so by seeking to reductively eliminate intentionality and in so doing leaves it as much un-reconstructively analysed as her/his intentionalist opponents. Neither side of the formalist versus a priorist-intentionalist dualism thus comes to grips with and resolves the Winchian problematic because they cannot explicate the constitution of 'the propositional sign' as a practical transformation constituted in and through the use of the sign.

The task of providing the explication thus falls to Wittgenstein's analysis. As he puts it in his critical reply to the 'p agrees with reality' theory (helpfully glossed by Winch as "p = This object is one metre long" and "p" is true = This object has the length of this metre rule),
... the comparison is incorrect, because "this metre rule" is a description, whereas "metre rule" is the determination of a concept. On the other hand in "p is true" the ruler enters immediately into the proposition. "p" represents here simply the length and not the metre rule. For the representing drawing is also not 'true' except in accordance with a particular method of projection which makes the ruler a purely geometrical appendage of the measured line. 16

Winch's gloss of this deeply insightful argument is superb and we can now most profitably cite it in full:

It's important that we're already in trouble here in trying to make the ruler and correspondence of ends "say" anything. We have to imagine perhaps that I simply produce the ruler and approach the object with it; and perhaps to interpret this as my saying that the object is one metre long. But it is apparent that this interpretation already presupposes a background of technique and standards; and this is what Wittgenstein is getting at when he says the whole comparison is wrong because the phrase "this metre rule" is a description and the phrase "metre rule" the determination of a concept. In other words my laying this piece of metal against this object is no more than just that, not a case of measuring the object, except in so far as the piece of metal is being seen as a metre rule, which is possible only within the whole context of the practice of metric measurement. This context determines the concept, metre rule, and thus provides the possibility of describing the piece of metal as "a metre rule".

I put the ruler and the object together and their ends coincide. That is (within the context of metric measurement) I can say that the object is as long as the metre rule; which, in terms of the comparison under examination, corresponds to the proposition "This object is one metre long" is true". Wittgenstein's comment is:

in "p is true" the ruler enters immediately into the proposition. "p" represents here simply the length and not the metre rule.

In other words, the piece of metal (which I describe as a metre rule) belongs to the method of applying the concept one metre long; it enters the picture simply as a standard of length. The ruler — Wittgenstein says — is here "a purely geometrical appendage of the measured line". We might say that I am measuring the object against the concept one metre long, not against the piece of metal, though the latter plays a role, as "a purely geometrical appendage", in this application of the concept. 17
Winch's remark that "my laying the piece of metal against this object is no more than just that" unless "the piece of metal is being seen as a metre rule" is somewhat ill-advised, despite the overall power and depth of this exigetical analysis. Whether intended or not, it has distinctly perceptual resonances which (not least for reasons canvassed throughout our confrontation with anti-realism in the subsequent sections of this chapter) suggest that the shift from 'piece of metal against an object' to 'metre rule against object of/for measurement' is essentially (or worse still, entirely) a perceptual shift. Because Winch goes on — in fact, throughout his paper — to develop the notion of concept-application as mastery of a technique, my criticism here is intended merely to explicitly free his emphatic use of "seen as" from the resonances of perceptual (let alone idealist) (mis)construals. This dovetails also with the development I want to make of his final remark above that "We might say that I am measuring the object against the concept one metre long, not against the piece of metal...". This is a (potentially) brilliant insight except that once more the crucial contrast Winch is explicating — concept versus (mere) object — is liable to immaterialist construals by those who think that "not against the piece of metal" implies that the concept 'one metre long' is some non-material factor.

To clear up both these points, consider to begin with, this remark of Wittgenstein's from part III of Remarks on Colour:

I observe this patch. "Now it's like so" --- and simultaneously I point to e.g. a picture. I may constantly observe [beobachten] the same thing and what I see [sehen] may then remain the same, or it may change. What I observe [beobachte] and what I see [sehen] do not have the same kind of identity. Yet the words "this patch", for example, do not allow us to recognise the (kind of) identity I mean. 18
Mystification as to how, e.g., what is acknowledged as a piece of metal — and so (let us say without ontological prejudice) a 'material object' — can also be constitutive of the concept 'one metre long', precisely arises out of the confusion in respect of "(kind of) identity" which Wittgenstein succinctly tackles here. Those who insist on looking at these issues extensionally are blinding themselves to the crucial, materialist, insight that the same 'brute' or 'pre-conceptually-extant' object or phenomenon can have a plurality of identities and/or meanings across a plurality of language-games. There is no deep metaphysical mystery about how, e.g., the bearer of the name 'Sir Lawrence Olivier' can be at once Hamlet, an Englishman, a man of the Twentieth Century, and grey-haired, despite the fact of logical grammar that 'Hamlet', 'Englishman', 'man of the Twentieth Century' and 'grey-haired person' are not isomorphic intensions. We only run into the metaphysical mire here when we succumb to one or the other of a duality of temptations: either to extract the identities and meanings constituted by roles in the language-game by reifying these results as 'properties' which inhere in the 'object' with which the language-game is played so that, e.g., essentialist metaphysics overwhelms us; or, alternately, we become infected by some brand of 'conceptualism' and forget and/or deny that the roles of the objects in the language-game secure constructions, products, achievements ipso facto made out of something 'pre-conceptually-extant' viz.: the material conditions in and with which we play the language-game. Either way, we are ignoring constitutive use.

This point, taken against the background of our use and development here of Winch's exegetical analysis of Wittgenstein's 'p is true = p' dialectic, brings us back to the issue of the cognitivist meta-model
common to realist and anti-realist theories. Recall that I described this meta-model —

\[
\text{thought; belief; theory} \xrightarrow{\text{truth-functional relation}} \text{reality}
\]

— as treating the language-reality connection as being primarily and essentially representational: the meta-model insists that the ambit of the application of the truth-functions, of the constitution of the 'propositional sign', and so of the development and conduct of assertion, is to reflect, represent, convey, picture, show, how 'reality' is. We can see now that this cornerstone of cognitivism cannot survive nor accommodate the Wittgensteinian dialectic we have developed here via Winch's exegetical analysis of the Philosophical Grammar remark 79 argument. The cognitivist meta-model is destroyed the moment we realise that the fundamental notion of 'getting the ruler-object juxtaposition to say anything' demands "a background of technique and standards" such that "the possibility of describing the piece of metal as "a metre rule"" is founded upon and yields a result that is made in the constitutive deed that is "the method of applying the concept one metre long." Pace cognitivism, we are not reflecting some bit of reality, or seeing any (mode of) agreement between thought, belief, theory and reality, as if we are comparing and contrasting some given order of things; we are making a veridical order out of the pre-conceptual presence of what, as and because we succeed in playing this language-game, we constitute as, e.g., the metric measurement of this or that object (of measurement). 'Truth' is the product of certain, linguistic, labour.

The cognitivist meta-model is thus predicated upon radical failure
to see that before we can talk about the belief–reality veridical relationship, about evidence, truth and falsity,

... we must first determine the role of deciding for or against a proposition.

The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here.

Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

....

What prevents me from supposing that this table either vanishes or alters its shape and colour when no one is observing it, and then when someone looks at it again changes back to its old condition? — "But who is going to suppose such a thing!" — one would feel like saying.

Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application. 20

On the cognitivist meta-model, it suffices to be able to think that p for it to make sense to seek or require the application of the truth-functions to that thought. The very idea that the instantiation of a whole host of (bizarre) logical possibilities — realistically or anti-realistically constituted — would usurp the practice, the use, of veridical concepts, indeed that such phenomena would, so to speak, usurp the truth-functions, is beyond the ken of cognitivism. But the principle that whatever can be thought, whatever is logically possible, can be asserted, is a myth. It is a central piece of metaphysics that survives only so long as we ignore the fact of our language that 'true', 'false', etc. are items for use in a constitutive technique in just the sense in which, e.g., there is no 'out l.b.w.' except in the playing of games of cricket: if you usurp the playing of the game, the conditions for the
assertion of, and the application of the truth-functions to, 'S/he's out l.b.w.' are usurped.

In short then, the fundamental lesson and insight to be gleaned here concerns the absolute (logico-genetic) priority of method, technique, praxis -- constitutive use -- over truth and falsity. Because, crucially, this fundamental analytical insight is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's critique and rejection of cognitivism, there is no endorsement here for pragmatism or instrumentalism. To repeat a point I have sought to drive home frequently in this study, the ambit and essence of the playing of the language-game, of concept-application, is not to reflect, replicate or disclose the ('pre-linguistic'/'pre-conceptual') world, but to change it; to make it a 'world-for-us', 'the-world-as-we-so-understand-it'. Only with meaning and understanding in place can there be theories, thoughts, beliefs and their concomitant veridical relationship to meaningful, understood, or (at least) understandable, reality.

Belief -- animal or human -- logically is grounded in creatures not just, à la cognitivism, 'taking in information from the world', but in their seeking a certain dominance, exploitation, use, of the 'objects' of and for perception. The logico-genetic relationship of creature to object involved here is thus non-veridical: it is practical, technical, constructional. Logically speaking then, bona fide belief comes quite some way down the track. It is constituted when the success of the animal's relations, say in finding food, becomes itself an object of the animal's dominance, use, exploitation: it now 'takes stock' of the success or failure of its responses; instead of just repeating the behaviour (e.g., of striking at anything that moves within such-and-such
an area), it takes account of the efficacy of its reaction(s) and 'feeds' that account back into modification (or continuation) of the activity. Through and through, the 'logical essence' of this, the basis and development of belief, intelligence, veridical discrimination, is the creature's gaining and having control over nature (both its own and that of (at least part of) the rest of the world). 

To suppose, with any kind of cognitivism, that life-praxis, intelligence, comprehension, understanding and meaning are primarily and essentially attributes of creatures' reflecting, fitting in with, being (causally) hostage to, the natural order (whatever, ontologically, the cognitivist holds that to be) is metaphysical error par excellence. Yet the realism – anti-realism dispute is welded, bonded and bolted to this ideological Weltanschauung. This is why, semantically speaking, the participants in the debate jointly and severally insist that the nature of truth determines the constitution of meaning (and understanding) and the role of mentality in both language and ontology.

More than anyone else in contemporary philosophy, Michael Dummett has demonstrated this in his development of the case for anti-realism. But our confrontation here with the analysis of 'true' and 'false' and their 'assertion conditions', places us most strongly to turn Dummett's partisan but brilliant development of the realism – anti-realism dispute to the end of the destruction and dissolution of both sides of this utterly metaphysical conflict. The key to this, from the point of view of the final explication here of the Wittgensteinian semantic position, lies in our acknowledging the anti-realists' concerns with the excessive demands realism places upon the transcending of (the limits of) understanding, whilst rejecting the anti-realist distortion of the key
analytical notion of use. For the Wittgensteinian conception of use, and so our key anti-Dummettian weapon in the critique advanced in this chapter, flows out of the anti-cognitivist, and so anti-realist and anti-anti-realist(!) realisation that

[a] method of measurement — of length, for example — has exactly the same relation to the correctness of a statement of length as the sense of a sentence has to its truth or falsehood. 22

III

The remark of Wittgenstein's with which section II has ended expresses what Crispin Wright has styled as Wittgenstein's 'antecedence analysis' viz.: the analytical claim that the establishment and use of practices (notably, mathematical praxis in the cases Wright addresses) is antecedent to truth and falsity. Wright's critical examination of this fundamental Wittgensteinian view is virtually the only major analysis extant and is highly instructive (as we will see) in its acknowledgement that the 'antecedence analysis' is incompatible with (at least) anti-realism. The irony of this acknowledgement is that its context is Wright's anti-realist manifesto, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics; a text wherein the Wittgenstein-as-anti-realist myth is articulated from beginning to end.

A further explicit example of the troublesome position with which Wright takes issue is to hand in the following remark from the first section of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics:

Isn't it like this: so long as one thinks it can't be otherwise, one draws logical conclusions. This presumably means: so long as such-and-such is not brought in question at all.
The steps which are not brought in question are logical inferences. But the reason why they are not brought in question is not that they 'certainly correspond to the truth' — or something of the sort, — no, it is just this that is called 'thinking', 'speaking', 'inferring', 'arguing'. There is not any question at all here of some correspondence between what is said and reality; rather is logic antecedent to any such correspondence; in the same sense, that is, as that in which the establishment of a method of measurement is antecedent to the correctness or incorrectness of a statement of length. 23

From a strictly semantic viewpoint alone, this remark's argument is extremely radical. It rejects altogether the received notion of, e.g., semantically explicating logical operations by use of truth-tables: there is, in the first instance, no 'truth' for inference(s) to 'preserve' or '(re)construct' because logic is "antecedent" to "correspondence between what is said and reality". More broadly, and to repeat the concluding argument of the preceding section, Wittgenstein's point is that, e.g., the establishment of a method of measurement is logically antecedent to the truth or falsity of a statement of length in, to give a further example, just the way in which the setting up and application of the rules of soccer is logically antecedent to the scoring of goals and the winning, losing, or drawing of soccer matches. The semantic consequences of the internal relationships between the rules for soccer and the existence of areas of turf, leather balls, wooden structures stuck into the turf, the passage of the ball through a certain space set up by a certain arrangement of the wooden structures, and so on, thus come to nought unless we go beyond such existence of 'logical relations' and objects — mind-independent objects, or otherwise — and instead acknowledge use. What Wittgenstein is talking about then, is how such 'raw materials', extant independently of (at least) the playing of language-games, come, via constitutive practices, to mean such-and-such,
and, as in the case in point, to constitute the truth 'that such-and-
such'.

But this is not what Wright sees in Wittgenstein's argument. He
thinks an incoherent — virtually 'too radically conventionalist' — view
is being advanced. Even to the anti-realist constructivist, it comes
across as advocacy of near semantic anarchism to insist that logical
grammar is not bound by the dictates of some pre-linguistic order which
the semantic constitution of the given language (essentially) sets out
to re-present. So it is that Wright sets his objections in motion, in
chapter IV of his book, by attacking Wittgenstein's analogies between
measurement and the conventionality of concepts. He astutely points to
the following remark of Wittgenstein's as a crucial one in this regard:

.... "But isn't there a truth corresponding to logical
inference? Isn't it true that this follows from that?" ——
The proposition: "It is true that this follows from that"
means simply: this follows from that. And how do we use this
proposition? —— What would happen if we made a different
inference —— how should we get into conflict with truth?
How should we get into conflict with truth, if our
footruler were made of very soft rubber instead of wood and
steel? —— "Well, we shouldn't get to know the correct
measurement of the table." —— You mean: we should not get,
or could not be sure of getting, that measurement which we
got with our rigid rulers. So if you had measured the table
with the elastic rulers and said it measured five feet by our
usual way of measuring, you would be wrong; but if you say
that it measured five feet by your way of measuring, that is
correct. —— "But surely that isn't measuring at all!" —— It
is similar to our measuring and capable, in certain
circumstances, of fulfilling 'practical purposes'. (A
shopkeeper might use it to treat different customers
differently.) 24

Wittgenstein puts to us here his (forms-of-life-relative) conventionalist
view that different ways of inferring, if they are bona fide (i.e. if
they do have such a material use; if they fulfill the relevant "practical
purposes"), entail different ways of constituting truth and of giving
meaning to 'pre-linguistic', semantically undetermined, material conditions. However, it is the radical nature of the implications Wittgenstein seeks to draw by appeal to these 'different ways', that is the target of Wright's deep suspicions. He tries to provide an anti-realist counter to Wittgenstein's argument by seeking to assert the logical priority of cognitive/recognitional capacities over concept-formation and praxis.

Speaking of the above remark's dialectic, he says that he finds Wittgenstein's appeal to the similarity between 'soft ruler measurement' and our form, less than satisfactory. Wright asks

--- in what does the similarity reside, save in that someone goes through the normal motions of measuring -- only with a piece of elastic? It is a feature of the concept of measuring that an accurately measured object will yield distinct readings at distinct times only if it changes; so much is implicit in the notion that measuring is to ascertain a property of the object measured. Now, the soft-ruler method is going to produce a high degree of variability in its results. 25

This last point — about variability in results having to be the outcome of soft-ruler measurement — indicates Wright's failure to understand the radical kind of constructivistic (but materialist/anti-idealistic) point Wittgenstein is making.

According to Wright, as variability of measurement must result, two possible conclusions follow and together form a dilemma for Wittgenstein. Either it must be "conceded that it is extremely difficult to measure accurately with elastic rulers", so that, disastrously for Wittgenstein, the examples show that "the notion of correct measurement is implicitly dissociated from the means used."26 Or alternatively,
... if changes are postulated in the length of the object measured [i.e., if we accept the — here unsympathetically construed — Wittgensteinian constructivist view], then the question arises, what role is to be played in the concept of length by our rough, directly observational assessments of sameness and difference in length — the assessments which measurement is supposed not merely to supplant but to refine? For the plain fact is that it is the rulers which seem to fluctuate in length, and not the objects to be measured. 27

Of the two horns of this proposed dilemma, the second is the one I want to tackle directly so as to show in the course of the argument that in fact neither horn of Wright's dilemma catches Wittgenstein. The key to this riposte is to see the crucial bias Wright imports to the construction of the second horn of his dilemma: his talk about measurement being a "refinement" of "directly observational assessments of sameness and difference in length", is a corollary of the basic tenets of (Dummettian) anti-realism. As Dummett's focus on 'recognitional capacities' and their proposed logical connection to 'warranted assertability' shows, the fundamental anti-realist view is that our concepts ('truth' being the paramount case) are structured and limited by the a priori structuring of our cognitive or 'recognitional' capacities. Ipso facto, Wright insists in his critique of Wittgenstein, that measurement is a refinement of the primitive process of 'directly observational assessment'.

But what is this 'directly observational assessment'?; this notion absolutely central to anti-realism? In terms of Wright's appeal to 'directly observational' mensuration, this is to ask how it can be that, in advance of the establishment of the rule-governed practices of mensuration, logic, mathematics and geometry, the (re-)cognising subject suitably (if at all) can connect experience qua 'direct observation' to the (constructivist) use of 'true' and 'false' etc. For this is the
picture of concept-formation and the constitution of logical grammar as put to us by the anti-realist.

In attacking this position in its intuitionist form (for, of course, "anti-realism" is a post-Wittgensteinian metaphysical position), the later Wittgenstein frequently summarised his critique in terms of the objection that intuitionism -- contrary to its self-understanding -- amounts to the absurd and unsustainable view that in advance either of a proof or 'direct' sensory evidence, a question, conjecture, hypothesis or proposition is senseless. To develop and make good this line of blunt rebuttal, I will seek to show in detail here how and why the anti-realists' appeal to 'recognitional capacities' cannot explicate how it is that we arrive at the truth or falsity of a proposition: I shall argue that it is grossly inadequate to insist -- in the manner of the tradition from Husserl to Brouwer, Weyl and Heyting to Dummett -- that we can only, and simply just do, 'recognise' truths (that are, ipso facto, structured by the nature and limits of experience). To this end, I want particularly to concentrate my analysis upon the question whether having the experience $E$ or its indirect representation via a proof, is logically sufficient to account for the grasping of the truth of the assertion 'that $E$'. For the Wittgensteinian position is, as I intend to show, that there logically must be a semantically-determining constitutive technique involved in dealing with whatever kind of 'experience' is logically involved in verifying and understanding a proposition. Moreover, we will see that this technique and its connection (or otherwise) with 'experience' (synthetic a priori or a posteriori) is, very significantly, not univocal between empirical propositions and those of mathematics, etc.
IV

Given then that Wright's 'directly observational assessments' are representative of the kind and nature of the language-external grounds on which, according to anti-realism, concepts and concept-uses are constructed, take the following case from part I of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics:

There is a puzzle which consists in making a particular figure, e.g. a rectangle, out of given pieces. The division of the figure is such that we find it difficult to discover the right arrangement of the parts. Let it for example be this:

What do you discover when you succeed in arranging it? — You discover a position — of which you did not think before. —— Very well; but can't we also say: you find out that these triangles can be arranged like this?——But 'these triangles' are they the actual ones in the rectangle above, or are they triangles which have yet to be arranged like that?

If you say: "I should never have thought that these shapes could be arranged like that", we can't point to the solution of the puzzle and say: 'Oh, you didn't think the pieces could be arranged like that?" —— You would reply: "I mean, I didn't think of this way of arranging them at all". 28

The crucial move in these two remarks begins with the prima facie absurd, or at least spurious question "But 'these triangles': are they the actual ones in the rectangle above, or are they triangles which have yet to be arranged like that?". In the context of our concern here with anti-realism, the question so put is an analogue for one such as this: 'Is the equation for which you now have a proof, the same equation as it was
before a proof was to hand (and thus when its truth-value was undecided)'. Again, the question is prima facie absurd and implies absurd consequences like its being the case that proved conjecture 'p' cannot be the self-same conjecture we were seeking to prove up to moments ago when we found its proof.

But despite all such counterintuitivity, Wittgenstein wants to point out a crucial sense in which, independent of our simply now being able explicitly to state its truth-value (whereas before it was undecided), the proved proposition is indeed not the same as the one we set out to prove. His case is that this dissonance is a very deep one and is not, e.g., merely a function of the proved proposition having 'added onto it' either or both an explicitly stated truth-value and/or the 'coming to hand' of relevant verifying experience(s). To be sure, the proved proposition does now have (what seems most clearly to be) an explicated truth-value. But Wittgenstein's point concerns both how it got it and what such 'truth-value-possession' really, logico-semantically, constitutes. It is in this light trivial that the proposition now has a truth-value, because that is, per se, a mere end-point; it is the productive process and the value of the product, not the product per se, with which Wittgenstein's dialectic is here concerned. Indeed, Wittgenstein frequently makes this point in, e.g., his remarks that

... the proof changes the grammar of our language, changes our concepts. It makes new connections, and it creates the concept of these connections. (It does not establish that they are there; they do not exist until it makes them.) 29

....

It is not our getting this result, but its being the end of this route, that makes us accept it. 30

....
The concept which the proof creates may for example be a new concept of inference, a new concept of correctly inferring. But as for why I accept this as correct inferring, the reasons for that lie outside the proof. 31

It is very important to see just how sharply these claims contrast with those advanced by anti-realism. Dummett's fundamental view of logical compulsion is that, to put it bluntly, experience compels: in logic and mathematics proofs are proxies for experience, such that, because we cannot "grasp ... a notion of truth transcending our capacities for its recognition"32, the internal (definitive and constitutive) connection between, e.g., logical form and validity, is a synthetic a priori construction. Thus, what the intuitionistic cum anti-realist subject 'recognises' so as to construct the truth of any given proposition, is the a priori content of the verifying experience or its canonical-proof-constituted proxy. In being thus taken as lying within the proof, or within experience, the a priori content, as a synthetic, cognitive, function, marks and betokens a semantic theory that utterly contradicts the analysis Wittgenstein advances in the first remark above when he baldly states that "the proof ... makes new connections" which "do not exist until it makes them". Truth, validity and logical compulsion a la intuitionism/anti-realism are given in experience; they are not made out of, or with it.

Thus it is exemplary that in explicating this crucial idealist-constructivist vision of the provenance of logical compulsion etc., in his important paper "The Justification of Deduction", Dummett appeals to the heuristic notion of our 'pre-logical' linguistic condition and argues that

[s]o far as our use of the original, logic-free, language was concerned, there was no need to invoke a notion of truth
going beyond the recognition of truth. The [alternative, 'realist'] model in terms of truth-conditions indeed supplies a representation of the content of the [language-constructional] atomic sentences, to which the classical logical laws are faithful; but it is a representation which was not called for by the linguistic practices which existed before the logical constants were introduced. 33

In this happy intuitionistic fiction, language's semantic fountainhead is not only independent of the logical constants but, note well, the making of judgements, entertaining of propositions and thinking of thoughts, is in full (albeit primitive) swing. A fortiori, and pace Wittgenstein, the reason why such-and-such is accepted as correct inference — 'the justification of deduction' — lies in the realisation that as meaning and truth cannot transcend experience, logical compulsion just is the phenomenon that we "must accept" our experiences, or their concatenated, constructed, logical proxies, "as we find them", for "... this corresponds to the proof imposing itself on us ....". 34

Is it then that following the anti-realist, we simply come to a bedrock like this: 'one cannot doubt that one is now conscious; that one is now thinking (or otherwise having the given experience)' — ? It seems to me that, broadly speaking, this is indeed the case. When, in his famous paper "Realism", Dummett argued "that reductionism is not in general essential to anti-realism" 35, he disavowed phenomenalism, but he did not disavow the overall metaphysical Weltanschauung of which the phenomenalist enterprise is but one manifestation. His argument certainly explicitly eschews sense-data, but look at what it says about the crucial object of our present dialectic:

... a 'direct judgement' [is] one which is made with good reason, but not on independently statable grounds. An expression of intention for the future, a report of memory, of observation or of the speaker's present voluntary action[···] none of them have grounds which could be
understood and believed separately from the statement they are grounds for. 36

The motivation for this retreat of the fountainhead of modalities into the reflective, or self-conscious, subject is evident once we trace intuitionism back to its Husserlian roots. Indeed, Dummett's notion has significant parallels with Husserl's insistence upon bracketing all questions of existence in the conduct of the phenomenological *epoché*. For Husserl's motives in so doing reflected his desire to retain a respectable notion of necessity. The bracketing allows the phenomenological transcendental subject to grasp the necessities which, so to speak, 'stand between' the transcendental ego and the apprehended object(s). If Husserl had not insisted on this protocol of the *epoché*, he faced the classic dualist dilemma as to the location and nature of the transcendental ego: on the one hand, subjective idealism, and hence solipsism, beckon (an outcome Brouwer in fact happily accepted); on the other hand, as a scholar of Hume, Husserl knew most well the introspectionistically-derived arguments as to the fictionality of the self. The implications of this latter consideration are such that the phenomenological enterprise would collapse either at the hands of its own inability to account for the transcendental ego upon which the *epoché* turns, or at the hands of the phenomenologists' inability to answer the 'objectivistic' ('realist') critics who, *ad la* empirical materialism, dissolve the subject-object dichotomy in favour of total objectification of the subject. Husserl therefore had to insist — for he was certainly no fool — that phenomenology transcended the subject-object dichotomy and its concomitant pressures for resolution in favour of one side of the dichotomy engulfing the other entirely. It is the 'mechanism' of this transcendence which is directly reflected in the
Husserlian treatment of logic and mathematics as synthetic a priori, and which thus spawns intuitionism.

But in just this Husserlian light which we have presently cast upon Dummett's crucial treatment of 'direct judgement', consider Wittgenstein's blunt riposte that

"I know what I want, wish, believe, feel ......." (and so on through all the [syntactically relevant] psychological verbs) is either philosophers' nonsense, or at any rate not a judgement a priori. 37

For our present purposes, the appropriate analogue for "at any rate not a judgement a priori" is, I suggest, just this: logic and mathematics and 'necessity in general', cannot be the product of 'direct judgements' a la Husserl or Dummett: necessity (indeed all modalities) cannot be aggregated or extracted out of the flow of (self-consciously apprehended) experience. Of course, the conclusive position taken in Wittgenstein's above remark turns upon the soundness of the antecedence analysis which is, of course, just what is in dispute here. But now we can see more clearly what stands or falls with this and therefore just how deep and far reaching are the issues in question.

V

Let us thus weave together the various threads of dialectic now explicitly in play concerning the question of the coherence of the notion of directly observational assessment, by returning to the four triangles puzzle case cited above from RFM, I, remarks 42, 43. The anti-realist view of the finding of the solution to the puzzle is that we have extracted both the veridical and the modal factors which constitute the solution (qua proof), from experience: the transition from
is the actualisation of a synthetic a priori constructive relationship obtaining between the triangles and the (exercised) recognitional capacities of the problem-solving subject.

By contradistinction, Wittgenstein's analysis crucially has it that the constructive relationship, pace (at least) intuitionism/anti-realism, changes the 'pre-solution' triangles rather than merely recognises something already 'in' them:

[i]f you say: "I should never have thought that these shapes could be arranged like that", we can't point to the solution of the [four triangle] puzzle and say: "Oh, you didn't think the pieces could be arranged like that?" — You would reply: "I mean, I didn't think of this way of arranging them at all". 38

That is, Wittgenstein is arguing here that in advance of finding the solution, or, if you like, prior to its invention or construction, what one was 'looking for' (— and that is precisely the misleading metaphor here! —) was not the solution:
It was not this 'resolved', 'semantically determined' state of affairs precisely because the solution is the product, the constituted 'object of understanding', of the 'search' for the solution. I mean this in the crucial sense that in advance of the proof/solution being constructed, even if, per impossible, we had shown you the figure

![Diagram](image)

because you do not yet understand what is the proof/solution (as you have yet to construct it), the figure/'experiential object'

![Diagram](image)

has no (relevant) semantic status for you: it could be anything or nothing regardless of its existence (qua its being 'experienced' by you) prior to your solving the puzzle.

The argument ofRFM, I, remark 43, is, therefore, that the reason why we cannot "point to the solution of the puzzle and say: "Oh, you didn't think the pieces could be arranged like that?"", is that what is thereby pointed to — the arrangement that constitutes the solution — is, so to speak, only available a posteriori for comprehension as the solution, i.e., it so confronts us only once one has solved the puzzle. Before you solve the puzzle, even if you see (qua 'directly
because you do not yet have the solution, you cannot see

as the solution. You surely can have the 'visual experience' of

but the visual experience is not the solution; it is instead merely like putty awaiting your moulding or transforming it, according to the relevant rule(s), into 'an object of understanding'. In short then:

qua strictly 'visual object' ≠
And the inequality here is absolutely not ontological; and yet neither is it perceptual. It is semantic, conceptual, logical.

VI

The logical distinction so identified — between (at least) 'experience' and 'conceptually-constituted experience' — is of course precisely that to which anti-realist semantics is blind. But as this comes just as much to blindness to (the constitution of) content, so it follows that anti-realism, just like the neo-psychologistic and the Quinean theories we confronted in the preceding two chapters, cannot secure the distinction between mere appearances of understanding, mentality, rule-following etc., and the 'real phenomenon'. In the particular case of anti-realism, this grave failing — particularly grave in the light of any serious verificationist treatment of 'understanding other persons (as persons)' — carries with it a further, connected, burden. This is its inability, as an idealist position, to grasp the connection between use and the material conditions of use. Consequently, use qua praxis is construed by anti-realism as a type of 'evidence of understanding' subject to apprehension by others in the 'linguistic community'. But thereafter, nothing in the anti-realist panoply gives 'objectivity' to this consensus of mere perceptions.
Crispin Wright exalts this nexus of idealist mythology concerning use in his urging that if, as he contends we should, we accept Wittgenstein's attack on the idea of there being "ratification-independent facts" about the correctness of a community's rule-following, then

... we shall reject the idea that, in the senses requisite for investigation-independence, the community goes right or wrong in accepting a particular verdict on a decidable question; rather, it just goes. 40

Note that the analogue of "it just goes" here is 'We just (do) recognise the requisite proofs', or to take another case in point, 'We just do, pre-conceptually, recognise that this is, albeit only very roughly, longer than that'. This exemplifies once more anti-realism's vision of use as a(n 'understanding-manifesting') practical ability to recognitionally construct out of the flow of experience, the language's semantic functions (qua, at least, the rules of logical grammar).

John McDowell has superbly exposed the implicit Weltanschauung Wright is offering up here:

The picture Wright offers is, at the basic level, a picture of human beings vocalising in certain ways in response to objects, with this behaviour (no doubt) accompanied by such 'inner' phenomena as feelings of constraint, or convictions of the rightness of what they are saying. There are presumably correspondences in the propensities of fellow members of a linguistic community to vocalise, and to feel comfortable in doing so, which are unsurprising in the light of their belonging to a single species, together with similarities in the training that gave them the propensities. But at the basic level there is no question of shared commitments — of the behaviour, and the associated aspects of the streams of consciousness, being subject to the authority of anything outside themselves. ... At [such a] level of 'bedrock' (where justifications have come to an end), there is nothing but verbal behaviour and (no doubt) feelings of constraint. Presumably people's dispositions to behaviour and associated feelings match in interesting ways; but at this ground-floor level there is no question of shared
commitments--everything normative fades out of the picture. 41

It is precisely because of this 'fade out' that anti-realism cannot distinguish between 'just going' and 'just going because one understands'.

To be sure, anti-realism's 'just going' is, because of its synthetic a priori commitments, not a kind of behaviour a la behaviourism. And, in fairness to the anti-realists, the 'modest theory' account of linguistic praxis which McDowell puts up against their position is (as I pointed out in Chapter II) highly unsatisfactory as well: the McDowellian insistence that we cannot philosophically explicate content as an achievement is (as we are about to see from a further, perhaps even more perspicuous, angle) grounded in a serious misconception. Consequently, and in fairness to the anti-realist, what we need is a 'full-blooded' positive account of the shift from, e.g., 'experience' to 'conceptually-constituted experience': we need an account which recognises the validity of anti-realism's concern with the connection between use, meaning and understanding--so as to secure us from the blandishments of, inter alia, platonism, 'privileged access', psychologism and scepticism; and it must be an account which does these things in a way that explicates (as McDowell will not, and says we cannot) the use—meaning—understanding connection as central to the shift from 'experience' to 'conceptually-constituted experience'. This approach allows us to salvage from the wreckage of anti-realism the riches verificationism ought to (but ultimately cannot) deliver up in respect of the analysis of the concept of understanding (of language, ourselves, each other, experience, etc.) without having to commit ourselves to eschewing a philosophical account of the way(s) conceptualisation grapples--successfully and
unsuccessfully -- with the 'finitude' of our perceptual capacities. Central to this is, I want to show, recognition of the materialistic insight that (off our own bat, or due to the vicissitudes of our interactions with nature) we are confronted by, so to speak, demands for the conceptualisation of experience as part and parcel of the way — the 'rule-following way' — we live our lives.

VII

In an important series of remarks in section XI of part II of *Investigations*, Wittgenstein constructs a dialectic which, inter alia, contrasts the two distinct views of the experience — conceptualisation logical nexus which we are addressing here. In the relevant parts of this dialectic, Wittgenstein takes

... the figure

(\[\text{figure}\])

(which I shall call a "double cross") as a white cross on a black ground and as a black cross on a white ground.

....

....

Those two aspects of the double cross (I shall call them the aspects A) might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross. One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before it could talk.

(Thus in reporting the aspects A we point to a part of the double cross. —— The duck and rabbit aspects [of Jastrow's duck-rabbit] could not be described in an analogous way.)

You only 'see the duck and rabbit aspects' if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition for seeing the aspects A.
The contrast in play here, between the logic of the discrimination of the two aspects of

and those of

corresponds, respectively, to the contrast between the anti-realist view of the experience-constructive-praxis connection and the Wittgensteinian view.

Recall how we saw two sections ago that Dummett insists that we "must accept" our experiences "as we find them", and this enslavement to the dictates of apprehended phenomena "corresponds to ... proof imposing itself on us". As such the double cross case surely fits the picture so advanced: from what, and what alone, is 'found' in the experience of

the (pre-linguistic) 'creative subject' — in Wittgenstein's example, "a child ... before it could talk" — can, ex-hypothesi, construct the distinction
The content and the possibility of the distinction thus confronts us as synthetic a priori, e.g., in its operating in a school lesson as the demonstration cum 'constructive proof' of (say) certain 'truths' of geometry.

But of course we have seen from the case of the four triangles puzzle how this absolutely crucial anti-realist notion of logic and truth being presented, and residing a priori, in the resources of experience, is utterly unsustainable. Indeed, if one looks again, we can see in the following remark (which I cited earlier in respect of the crucial Winchian problem of the ruler-object juxtaposition) how the anti-realist, as well as the (obviously targeted) formalist, fails to grasp what is logically necessary for any transformations of signs, movement within experiences etc., to be so constituted as to be of semantic significance:

... [I]t is not logical inference either, for me to make a change from one formation to another (say from one arrangement of chairs to another) if these arrangements have not a linguistic function apart from this transformation. 44

Note well the point behind the words "apart from this transformation". According to the anti-realist (just as much, mutatis mutandis, as those at the other end of the cognitivist spectrum, the formalists) the "linguistic function" is constituted by the presented phenomenon: its resources, as presented to the cognising subject, logically constitute the 'object of understanding' qua proof, inference licence, truth, etc., etc. Yet as the four triangles case shows, the experiential resources of the 'constructed' or 'transformed' phenomenon qua (tendered) solution
compel and constitute in and of themselves nothing of requisite semantic significance -- i.e., the required proof. Indeed, it matters not that this could even amount to the 'experience' being 'presented' right before the subject's eyes as s/he puzzled away, or its being somehow 'slotted' into the flow of his/her consciousness. And this is even more so in the circumstances of our being presented with the fragmented triangles as a bona fide (geometric-constructional) problem in need of a solution: nothing in the four triangles as they then, 'problematically', stood before us, 'contained' the solution.

Thus addressing the anti-realist, Wittgenstein makes it plain that our finding the correct arrangement was not, so to speak, the recognising of some subterranean connection extant between the unsolved/'undecided' puzzle and its solution, and which the flow of experience and/or intuitionistic inference revealed to us:

Where there is no method of looking for an answer, there the question too cannot have any sense. — Only where there is a method of solution is there a question (of course that doesn't mean: "only where the solution has been found is there a question"). That is: where we can only expect the solution of the problem from some sort of revelation, there isn't even a question. To a revelation no question corresponds.

The supposition of undecidability presupposes that there is, so to speak, an underground connection between the two sides of an equation; that though the bridge cannot be built in symbols, it does exist, because otherwise the equation would lack sense. --- But the connection only exists if we have made it by symbols; the transition isn't produced by some dark speculation different in kind from what it connects. 45

The 'dark speculation different in kind from what it connects' is, of course, the classic Husserlian-inspired 'intuition' which covers the supposedly epistemic 'distance' between, e.g., a previously 'undecided' mathematical proposition and the now present experience (or its proof-
proxy) that is its verification. But against this, Wittgenstein presses in the above remarks the sheer inadequacy of the notion that the coming about of decidability for a proposition -- e.g., our constructing the solution to the four triangles puzzle -- can be logically explained in terms of the resources of pre-symbolised experience. For the achievement of decidability is no property (recognised, recognitional, synthetic property) of the 'solvent experience' à la intuitionism/anti-realism. The 'phenomenon'

only takes on the status of 'the solution' — is constitutive of (proof-facilitated) understanding — when, as Wittgenstein urges above against the intuitionists, we make the connection: "the connection only exists if we have made it by symbols ...." For it is the logic of symbolism that is the key issue here.

It is thus precisely the logic of (the construction of) language, qua 'making the connection by symbols (as opposed to having mere experiences)', which is not involved when the pre-linguistic child distinguishes the aspects of the double cross: except per accidens, this reaction of the child's is not of any constitutive semantic significance. Indeed, the very fact that the reaction required to make the distinction "might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross" shows that what we have here is not any analogue for, let alone example of, the 'recognition' of the meaning of a symbol or of anything bearing the definite stamp of language. Rather, here we have no more thus far than a discriminatory reaction such as is everyday-common-or-garden evident -- and often, nevertheless, with
thoroughgoing sophistication — in, e.g., the way dogs naturally use their sense of smell, birds of prey their visual capacities, and so on through the rest of the animal kingdom. In the terms relevant to us here, we can say that these animal responses (as opposed to any trained, rule-following, responses which may indeed be able to be 'built' upon them) come about without their either requiring or generating any resources that are not, as it were, already to hand in the 'objective' language-independent world, or in the animal's experiences thereof. (This in no way denies the fact that, of course, some animals can and do go beyond this stage to form for themselves primitive conventions and concepts — e.g., primate studies show this.) Hence, and crucially, out of no more than the resources of the double cross

and the pointing _cum_ manipulative reactions of the pre-linguistic child, the cognitive distinction between


can be made good. But there is nothing _linguistic_ here because nothing here 'goes beyond' or transforms these pre-linguistically-extant phenomena: they stand in the same non-logico-semantic situation as is
exposed in our analysis of both the mere juxtaposition of ruler/length of metal and object in Winch's problematic, and the mere 'presence before consciousness' of

\[ \text{qua strictly 'visual object'}. \]

Because one has not yet constituted the phenomena, has not yet mastered and/or applied the (requisite) concept-applicative technique for them, they are no proof, no truth-, or assertability-, conditions for anything for you (or for anyone else that, similarly, is not a master of the technique).

Of course, the crucial point of this realisation as it concerns anti-realism's treatment of the constitution of language (e.g., a la Wright's 'directly observational assessments' and 'the community's just going'), is that our cognising the resources of the-phenomenon-in-and-of-itself is supposed by anti-realism to be the bedrock of language, the touchstone of semantic analysis, etc. — as if passively awaiting the nod from the flow of experience were the stuff of living our lives.

Obviously, it is not. For as McDowell has so astutely observed, the anti-realist has dug 'below bedrock': everything normative, everything our use of rules makes of the world, has thereby faded out of the picture, reducing it, in effect, to the nexus of contingencies and dispositions out of which the bedrock of language is, or may be, constituted. (Though McDowell does not, as I have pointed out, offer, nor permit us to offer, the content-as-an-achievement line of analysis which I am presently furthering here.)
The conclusion of the double cross versus duck-rabbit dialectic thus is to hand if we note carefully the point made in Wittgenstein's observation that

... in reporting the aspects A [i.e., the aspects of the double cross] we point to a part of the double cross. — The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an analogous way ....

You only 'see the duck and rabbit aspects' if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition for seeing the aspects A. 47

Here we see how and why

are logically distinct cases: whilst the case of

is the (analogue of) the pre-linguistic phenomenon/object; the case of

is (the analogue of) 'making the connection with symbols' because the resources of
are insufficient — logically insufficient — to express the disjunction of aspects. We have to 'go beyond' what is immediately given in

and forge out of it the distinction -- 'duck v rabbit' -- which it does not yield 'off its own bat'; it is 'there' only for masters of such-and-such concepts.

Similarly, and to give a demonstration of the construction of conceptually-constituted experience and the achievement of content, a 'phenomenon' like this48 (given, that is, that the reader has not already constructed its content)
presents us not with any sense that is already, independently, there in the image 'waiting' for our 'recognising' of it; that is the synthetic a priorist myth through and through. When we demonstratively point out to someone what we make of the image, we (need to) show them how we (the 'successful', 'inducted', viewers) constitute the extant monochromatic patches. The very same distribution of patches (in the 'visual field', say) might occur as an image in a whale's dream, or in a very young child's dream, but what, if anything, can they, logically speaking, make of the phenomenon? If we could 'look into' the mind of the whale and into that of the child, and if, to confirm the experience, the whale and the child were (somehow) to pick out of a line-up of diverse images precisely the image
which image we too have before us, then we would all — you, I, the whale and the child — select from the line-up the above image. But, short of bizarre circumstances (the 'stage-setting' for which would be extremely heuristic here), the whale and the child do not make of the 'shared' image what is made by our construction of sense as effected once one masters the language-game in and through which we achieve this construction, viz.:
Here we -- 'inducted viewers' -- have well-and-truly gone beyond the mere image: it is now not what it was before in the crucial ('connected-in-and-by-symbols') semantic sense that it is now an object of our understanding: we have given it a meaning. How, if at all, the whale or the child 'understands' the very same 'image' as we have, depends on what, if anything, they do, or can do, with it, and over and above that, upon their mode of life-praxis. We can 'slot' the image (or its central state materialist, or functional, analogue) into their consciousness for all we are worth: it does not, and cannot, logically constitute the seeing of a dalmatian dog in such-and-such a place as it sniffs the ground. (And doubtless a dalmatian dog breeder could 'see' yet more in the 'image' than a mere novice in matters canine.) As Wittgenstein put it in the famous, but widely under-estimated and/or misunderstood, 'hoping dog' dialectic:

One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after tomorrow? --- And what can he not do here? --- How do I do it? --- How am I supposed to answer this?

Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.) 49

And so we can see in the light of this line of dialectic how RFM, I, 156's version of the antecedence analysis can so baldly state that for logic, mathematics -- 'grammar' -- "there is not any question at all here of some correspondence between what is said and reality". For before anything 'veridical' (or 'descriptive'/assertoric') can be said, thought or symbolised, the constitution of 'saying that' must be achieved, invented, constructed. The would-be language-user must therefore change
the world in just the way that is shown in the realisation that, e.g.,

the resources logically required to express the apprehended 'duck v

rabbit' disjunction are not available in the phenomenon

Rather, and crucially, that 'phenomenon' must be suitably mastered and so
made into the 'symbolic' duck v rabbit disjunction, which disjunction is
available only "if you are already conversant with the shapes of these
two animals."50 That is, 'already conversant' in the non-a priorist
sense that

"Now he's seeing it like this", "now like that" would only be said of someone capable of making certain applications of the figure quite freely.
The substratum of this [such] experience is the mastery of a technique.

But how queer for this to be the logical condition of someone's having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don't say that one only 'has toothache' if one is capable of doing such-and-such. — From this it follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different though related concept.

It is only of someone who can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this experience.

And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing is modified here. .... 51

The objecting interlocutor here wants to insist that the appeal to the concept of language-user agency with which Wittgenstein opens these remarks, is absurd. But what s/he is missing is the recognition both of 'full-blooded' understanding as our having ready and ongoingly successful mastery over the stuff out of which language is made, and the consequent
recognition of complete linguistic competence as our "quite freely" being able to make these applications of the figure/object. Instead, the metaphysician-interlocutor must, and can only, resort to the utter poverty of explicating semantic determination in terms of properties of the language-independent object and its supposedly beholden linguistic subject: beholden to causal properties; to psychological properties; to direct, non-inferentially available yielding of 'true' judgements; etc., etc. And that simply returns us to the hopeless situation of the metaphysician's trying to explicate meaning and content by pointing to and relying upon, the resources of the 'image'/'phenomenon'. (Here, the crushing question we must put is 'But what is it?'.)

VIII

It is now obvious that because anti-realism insists that language-users are necessarily hostage to the realm of experience, its appeal to the notion of use cannot resolve (and instead severely adds to) our conceptual confusions. In particular, anti-realism's 'hostage' notion of use is clearly responsible for its serious confusions concerning the relationship between logic (and/or mathematics) and truth. By contradistinction, the notion of use which flows out of the Wittgensteinian antecedence analysis allows us to make quite clear the correct semantics of logical and mathematical proofs and their distinction from the semantics of bona fide truth-functional sentences, i.e., assertions.

An excellent entrée to Wittgenstein's explication of this crucial distinction is to be found in the following:

The proof is now our model of correctly counting 200 apples together: that is to say, it defines a new concept:
'the counting of 200 and 200 objects together'. Or, as we could also say: "A new criterion for nothing's having been lost or added".

The proof defines 'correctly counting together'.

Let us remember that in mathematics we are convinced of grammatical propositions; so the expression, the result, of our being convinced is that we accept a rule.

The proposition proved by means of the proof serves as a rule --- and so as a paradigm. For we go by the rule. 52

In (successfully) going by the rule, we construct a new sense, so that the logico-semantic role of "the mathematical proposition is to show us what it makes SENSE to say". And thus what looks like the determination of a bona fide truth-value is nothing of the sort, as there isn't yet any question of truth or falsity here: the 'question' is a question of rule-following; of the determination of sense, not truth (for that, as we have seen, comes later). We must first make the conditions of sense — semantically constitute things thus and so — so that then we can engage in asserting 'that such-and-such'.

The intuitionists and anti-realists fail to see this. They fallaciously hold that one cannot question the proof of a mathematical proposition or some other 'indirect verification', without ipso facto raising a question of veridicality; without raising an epistemic issue; without ipso facto questioning for the grasp of appropriate, verificationistic, experience (or its proof-proxy).

But pace Dummett, the mathematical or logical 'indirect verification' is a logically quite distinct kind of 'verification' and is quite differently involved with experience, as compared with the 'direct'
form. The logic of a proof and of any other piece of logical grammar is not the logic of empirical verification. Indeed, in terms of the clash between realist and anti-realist semantics, and to repeat one of my fundamental points made in opening this chapter, the underlying strictly semantic fallacy behind the debate Dummett has spawned, is demonstrated utterly in the fact that along with their metaphysical-realist opponents, anti-realists profoundly fail to see the otioseness of any semantics that tries to explicate meaning by appeal to veridical notions. Severally and jointly, they fail to see the very deep implication of the (common-or-garden) fact that

... the concepts true and false do not need to occur in every language-game. On the contrary, it is important that we can imagine primitive languages, made up out of many separate games, to which the concepts true and false are entirely foreign. Such languages might, for instance, consist entirely of commands .... Perhaps it will be said [in objection] that 'true' and 'false' enter a language as soon as it is developed to a certain point, namely as soon as negation occurs in it. [But this is incorrect, as in, e.g., the above-posited 'all commands' language-games] ... a variety of logical constants such as negation, disjunction, etc., can play a part, without the concepts true and false occurring. It is therefore impossible to define true and false by means of negation, disjunction, etc. 54

Adherence to the sense-force distinction is the fundamental factor in formal semantic theory typically appealed to so as to obscure utterly the crucial realisation outlined here -- viz.: the realisation of the distinction between the normative use of negation (as in 'That is not permitted') to effect the constitution of sense-conditions, and the descriptive use of negation (e.g., in 'Reagan is not in Nevada today') which brings truth-value into play. But the mythology effected by recourse to the sense-force distinction is destroyed by the Wittgensteinian antecedence analysis because it exposes the language-constitutive, formative, role of praxis in a way that makes a complete
nonsense of the ideas that the semantic bedrock of language is (somehow) veridical, and that the particular circumstances of actual utterance — the playing of the language-game — are merely various ways (assertoric, interrogative, optative, etc.) of exploiting this given, sense-determining, veridical heartland. For whatever deeds, acts, gestures, expressions, contexts, tones of voice, etc., there are in a language-game, if they are relevant to the determination of what is understood, what is said, and what is meant in that game, then this is precisely so because they are part and parcel of its material constitution; vital here to its making the relevant material conditions mean what they do, by the players doing what they are doing.

It is, also, in just this light — in terms of the question 'How does it engage with and/or affect praxis?' — that we should deal with the questions 'What is the status of the law of excluded middle in Wittgensteinian semantics?' and, by plain corollary, 'Where does Wittgenstein come down on the status of the rule \( \neg\neg p = p \)?'. For I concede to the anti-realist and the realist alike, that these are important questions.

In *Zettel* 677, it seems to me we have the makings of our answer:

I assert: "If this happens, that will happen. If I am right, you pay me a shilling, if I am wrong, I pay you one, if it remains undecided, neither pays". This might also be expressed like this: The case in which the antecedent does not come true does not interest us, we aren't talking about it. Or again: we do not find it natural to use the words "yes" and "no" in the same way as in the case (and there are such cases) in which we are interested in the material implication. By "No" we mean here "p and not q", by "Yes", only "p and q". There is no law of excluded middle running: Either you win the bet or you lose it --- there is no third possibility.
Now pace intuitionism, the semantics of the undecided case here — where p (the event) does not eventuate — is, so to speak, no semantics at all. That is, the conditional here that involves there being no law of excluded middle in operation, is (given that we extract Wittgenstein's fundamental 'grammatical' point in the remark) an analogue of the situation where, e.g., either we have failed in our efforts to extend the ambit of our rules into this particular part or domain of our interactions with nature (so that nature cannot, as it happens, be mastered by us here), or we simply haven't made the effort yet. In either case we are resisting the semantically reificatory moves which are precisely characteristic of those trapped within the realism — anti-realism debate. The anti-realist reifies the conditional as an undecided truth-value thus effecting what we have previously seen Wittgenstein describe as "a subterranean connection" between the proposition's (alleged) 'a priori' sense and its 'synthetic' extension. The realist typically reifies the conditional explicitly as a function across possible worlds, or as a theory about the empirical or 'essential' properties of objects. But by now in this study we have seen from numerous angles how utterly fallacious are these reificatory modes of semantic analysis. The 'connection' — achieving the sense and truth-value of a sentence — is not there until we make it in symbols, even though 'the stuff of the making' is very much extant before we make it into 'the stuff of language'.

The Zettel 677 argument is taken up again in Zettel 681 in a way that further explicates the Wittgensteinian analysis of undecidability and undecidedness in logic and mathematics:

"If p occurs, then q occurs" might be called a conditional prediction. That is, I make no prediction for
case not-\( p \). But for that reason what I say also remains unverified by "not-\( p \) and not-\( q \)."

Or even: there are conditional predictions and "\( p \) implies \( q \)" is not one.

The metaphysical impulse that makes us commit the fallacy of treating '\( p \rightarrow q \)' as a conditional prediction arises out of the 'surface grammar' of '\( p \rightarrow q \)' when read as 'if \( p \), then \( q \)': this makes it look as though here is a 'prediction' dependent, so to speak, on 'the determination of \( p \)', where 'determination' amounts to '\( p \)' being hostage to some independent, further factor which instantiates \( p \). But '\( p \rightarrow q \)' is a rule. Thus the correlate of \( \neg p \) in the case of the 'negation' of the rule '\( p \rightarrow q \)', is not therefore to be modelled on the analogue of \( \neg p \) in the negation of an empirical proposition, e.g., 'It's not dead; it's still moving'. And moreover, the rule therefore does not deal with, e.g., the (supposedly) 'modal semantics' of causal connections (\textit{a la} David Lewis et al). The 'absence' of '\( p \)' in the case of the rule '\( p \rightarrow q \)' is no more nor less than there being no rule governing \( \neg p \): as Wittgenstein analogously has it, "I make no prediction for case not-\( p \)." In short, if \( \neg p \) occurs -- 'if \( \neg p \)' -- then the game doesn't even get started. And the game's not being operable -- because \( \neg p \) -- amounts to there being no semantic determinacy at work here and now. This is quite different from, e.g., the case of causal connections: 'It happened' and 'It did not happen' are both semantically determined here.

One can say therefore that (in a thoroughly barbed sense) Wittgenstein grants the intuitionist the notion of rejection of the law of excluded middle, but it is a thoroughly non-intuitionistic rejection that absolutely baulks at rejecting \( \neg(\neg p) \) = \( p \) if by that the anti-realist really does mean that this applies when the language-game is operable, is underway! For undecidability is not a matter of or for
veridical determination: if the language-game of asserting 'that-p' is indeed playable for, and/or in play with, the given case, then the conditions for the assertion having a truth-value are, ipso facto, in place. Winch formulates this neatly as follows:

(1) p is true = p
(2) to understand the use of "true" and "false" in connection with a given "p", we should ask in what circumstances "p" is asserted.
(3) One feature of this use is the application to "p" of the truth-functional calculus.

Applying this to Dummett's case we have:

(1) "p or q is true" = "p or q"
(2) "p or q" can be asserted when we can't assert "p" or assert "q"
(3) The truth-functional calculus has already been applied in the construction of "p or q".

If someone convinces me that not p and not q, then I withdraw my original assertion. If he confirms that p (and/or that q) he confirms my original assertion. This is, as it were, part of the logical space to which my assertion belongs; there is certainly no departure from classical logic, no rejection of forms of argument [which Dummett describes as] "valid on a ... two-valued interpretation of the logical constants". 55

The key notion here is that governing clause 2, viz: we can only understand the use of 'true' and 'false', and 'p or q', if we understand the logical constitution of the language-game of assertion; we have to have mastered the technique that employs the rules governing the use of the logical constants. Clause 2 thus drives home the fundamental realisation that the playability and/or the actual playing of the (generic) language-game of assertion is, absolutely and constitutively, logically prior to there being any role for the functions 'T', 'F', 'A', 'V', etc. As such, Winch's dissolution of the anti-realist notion of undecidable assertions can be summarily expressed in the observation that an anti-realist and/or intuitionistic 'assertion' governed and formed
by rejection of the law of excluded middle, is and can only be no assertion at all.

The problem cases from mathematics etc., with which the intuitionists make such great play are only problematic because, like their metaphysical realist opponents, the intuitionists think that what confronts us here are veridical questions -- 'p v ~p?' -- and that our confrontation with them is conducted within the language-game of assertion. But the playing of this language-game is not even present here. The law of excluded middle is usurped by these problem cases -- e.g., Golbach's conjecture -- precisely because we cannot, and/or so far have made no moves to, get the language-game of assertion, of inference, of calculation, to work here. Thus the problem is with getting our rules to work, not with (one of) the outcomes of such successful praxis, viz.: veridicality, assertion, etc.

Reminding us of this, Wittgenstein superbly counters the intuitionists with this succinct and thoroughly insightful remark:

If [in 'Either you get this answer or you don't, when you do the calculation'] "you do it" means: you must do it, and "you do not do it" means: you must not do it --- then "Either you do it, or you do not" is not the law of the excluded middle. 56

So pace intuitionism, undecidability as to whether, e.g., Golbach's conjecture is or is not valid, expresses no more (nor less) than, so to speak, a gap in the conductability of our game; a gap of which, to be sure, we are aware; but a gap for which we have yet to invent the (further) instruments of rule-governance to install our control, our constituted order, in that 'space'. As Wittgenstein so appositely puts it:
What if someone were to reply to a question: 'So far there is no such thing as an answer to this question'?

So, e.g., the poet might reply when asked whether the hero of his poem has a sister or not --- when, that is, he has not yet decided anything about it.

The question --- I want to say --- changes its status, when it becomes decidable. For a connection is made then, which formerly was not there.

....

However queer it sounds, the further expansion of an irrational number is a further expansion of mathematics.

....

I want to say: it looks as if a ground for the decision were already there; and it has yet to be invented. 57

What gives us an awareness of the need for invention, and concomitantly therefore, of the gap in the conductability of our game here, is at bottom our animal nature; our instinctive awareness that here we come up against a part of nature which we have yet to master (in this game, at least). It is this self-same primitive, animal, awareness that instinctively drives us to create, and concomitantly to use, rules, concepts, practices, paradigms, proofs, etc., etc. Also, it equally as much thereby turns this drive, in the context of the language-game, to the end of our being compelled by our rules, inferences, proofs. For without these methods we cannot enter the realms of nature in anything remotely resembling the systematic, purposive, productive ways in which we conduct our life-praxis.

The semantic significance of undecidability thus turns on recognising the radical implications of the dissonance between what there can be that confronts us in nature, and what we make in that confrontation for the ends of our form of life-praxis: the vicissitudes of the 'natural' condition versus the determination of the 'linguistic'
form. Thus where an undecided 'proposition' of mathematics is a gap in the domination of part of nature by our rules, an undecided empirical proposition, e.g., in science, is a gap in our knowledge of facts derived from 'the world of meaning' we construct through our domination of nature. In 'the linguistic order of things' we must first have our concepts, and with them states of logical and mathematical affairs are determined, so now we can go on from here to pass some judgements — 'do some cataloguing' — concerning what is got for us by our successfully making this means of production:

We say: "First the calculations must be done right, and then it will be possible to pass some judgements on the facts of nature." 58

If you know a mathematical proposition, that's not to say you yet know anything. If there is confusion in our operations, if everyone calculates differently, and each one differently at different times, then there isn't any calculating yet; if we agree, then we have only set our watches, but not yet measured any time.

If you know a mathematical proposition, that's not to say you yet know anything.
I.e., the mathematical proposition is only supposed to supply a framework for description. 59

IX

To conclude this chapter, let me at last bring back in Moore's Paradox. For we are now well placed to see how the supposedly well-formed proposition 'p, and I believe that not-p', turns out to be not just nonsense when asserted, but the indicative germ of the whole metaphysical problematic of the relationship between sense, error and verification. And of course it is this problematic which spawns the impotent realism - anti-realism dispute. For we can now clearly see that 'p and I believe that not-p' only stands up as the expression of a coherent, meaningful logical possibility if it meets appropriate use
conditions. Now both realists and anti-realists, as I noted in section II of this chapter, seek (as victims of the cognitivist metaphysical impulse) to give an account of veridical concepts by exploiting the independence of 'S believes that p' and the 'reality' which determines the truth-value of 'p'. This independence is supposed to give us an independent reference point for fixing the sense of propositions because, ex-hypothesi, we can grasp 'true' and 'false' independently of the language-game of assertion. But against this, consider the following development of the Moore's Paradox scenario:

How would it be, if a soldier produced military communiques which were justified on grounds of observation; but he adds that he believes they are incorrect. --- Let us ask ourselves, not what may be going on in the mind of one who speaks this way, but rather whether others can do anything with this report, and what they can do.

The communique is a language-game with these words. It would produce confusion if we were to say: the words of the communique --- the proposition communicated --- have a definite sense, and the giving of it, the 'assertion' supplies something additional. As if the sentence, spoken by a gramophone, belonged to pure logic; as if here it had the pure logical sense; as if here we had before us the object which logicians get hold of and consider --- while the sentence as asserted, communicated, is what it is in business. As one may say: the botanist considers a rose as a plant, not as an ornament for a dress or room, or as a delicate attention. The sentence, I want to say, has no sense outside the language-game.

Resistance to Wittgenstein's antecedence analysis, such as fundamentally characterises the realism-anti-realism dispute, is predicated upon the logical-semanticians' myth that sentences can -- nay, must -- have their sense constituted outside the language-game. As we have seen, the idea that language is fundamentally hostage to a 'veridical charter' whereby it (somehow) re-presents whatever is 'reality', is at the heart of this metaphysical impulse. A fortiori, the sentence 'p and I don't believe that p' is treated as expressing a coherent possibility -- 'one can
always make mistakes' — but its assertion is held to be aberrant, typically via the use of sense-force, semantics—pragmatics distinctions. But we can now see that such so-called 'pragmatic aberrance' is virtually a guarantor that here we have a metaphysical proposition: a conceptual confusion — regardless of appeals to its 'soundness' of semantic structure, etc.

The language-game of assertion, like all our other language-games, works only if the 'p and I don't believe that p' scenario is allowed for in the language-game as an 'employable' move in the game. And if we look (reflectively) at its place in the language-game of assertion, we see it has its employment strictly 'post-hoc'. Which is to say that there is sense to the crucial notion that I'm right or wrong about, e.g., there being rain falling outside, only because this language-game — assertion — is played. The possibility of error, of being mistaken as to how things are, gets its sense therefore from within the practice of language: it is not one of its bedrock elements, but an outcome — 'achievement' — of what is built upon the bedrock. We may thus more generally say that there is no sense to any possibility except inasmuch as it meshes with the successful playing of the language-game; if you can't play the language-game with it, it is senseless. As such we must recognise that it is utter nonsense to suppose that if 'p' can be thought, then it has sense, and whether or not it is assertable (according to the dictates of a theory of force) is a peripheral matter. The test of 'p' is its use, not its thinkability, its possibility, its 'logical form'. (Whatever it is that the logicians are doing, and arguing about, it therefore is not semantics.)

Certainly, as regards idealism and 'possibilities', there are some
very concrete ones the anti-realist ought to be profoundly troubled by.

For instance: experiments in hypnosis have been successfully conducted where subjects have been hypnotised to accept deviant mathematics. Without question, the subjects can be induced to enter what is, inter alia, an experiential/phenomenological state where the conditions for the 'warranted assertability' of e.g., \(2 + 2 = 5\), so convincingly -- 'naturally' -- obtain for them, that they insist upon the validity of \(2 + 2 = 5\) with just the same vehemence as we insist that \(2 + 2 = 4\). But when asked to carry out various life-world activities, the hypnotic subjects soon find their utter conviction that \(2 + 2 = 5\) falls not foul of 'truth', but foul of use in the life practices founded upon the use of mathematics: all sorts of mundane activities go wrong for them. To be sure, so convincing can be the scenario of the hypnotic trance, that left to their own devices the subjects may never be able to comprehend the failure of their 'system of rules'. Instead of finding their lives falling into disarray, they could (if the hypnotist was sufficiently unscrupulous, and if the instinct for self-preservation did not break the trance) simply 'reason', with utter conviction, their own 'blind', utterly 'rational', self-annihilation. Of course to them, exactly the opposite -- the flourishing of their life-praxis -- would, with total conviction, strike them as the certain end or goal of this annihilative 'rationality'. But they nevertheless run up against not facts -- for pace metaphysical realism, they surely do apprehend 'facts' in the typical realists' theory-laden sense of 'facts' -- but against nature. We could imagine a whole 'community' of such people being brought into existence. But pace anti-realism, this would be no true 'linguistic community'. Their having experiences and/or their apprehending 'facts' as functions of theories, beliefs and even, perhaps, sciences, does not
suffice for them to have \textit{bona fide} concepts: what they have is ersatz, empty, a \textit{shell} without the living creature within, because by being hypnotically 'sealed-off' from successful engagement with nature, they simply are not engaged in constitutive praxis, but, as it were, in a mere dream of it. (Well might they be brains in vats.)

The metaphysical \textbf{realist} vision wherein the determinants of sense and/or truth exist independently of the use of language, always, in its darkest metaphysical moods, 'frightens' itself with the thought that, indeed, we ourselves may very well be victims of such an 'evil hypnotist'. For the hypnotist equates with the holder of the 'real truth' which is, \textit{pace} the spirit of any verificationism, out of our hands. But it is here that what \textbf{is} valid in verificationism must not be cast aside just because the anti-realist assault on metaphysical realism fails the acid test as a(n any-the-more-sound) counter-position. For the myth of metaphysical realism is that, so to speak, everything we do, think, see, write, or hear is subject to this caveat, this deeply troublesome thought, \textit{viz.}: wherever a doubt logically possibly \textbf{can} creep in, then, precisely there, our concepts — our grasp of reality — are, or can ever be, \textit{lacking}.

It is here that Wittgenstein comes, in a certain (strictly limited) sense, close to existentialism and, more broadly, reaffirms the validity of the \textbf{spirit} of verificationism. He does this in, for example, his observation that meaning, understanding, logical necessity and possibility, are concepts whose constitutive language-games "are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing".\footnote{A fortiori, it is not to the point that we might be duped, that our 'best theory' might yet be falsified: \textbf{we are not in the business of testing a}
theory (— something not even the pragmatists could bring themselves to realise); we are in the business of living our lives, and that is an ongoing moment of self-constitution and re-constitution; of species production and reproduction. At bottom therefore, we must act; must decide: that is logical necessity. It is compelling because if we abandon praxis to the alleged 'real truths' which lie beyond us, it is not 'the truth' that prevails but our annihilation.

A 'useless', typically metaphysical, proposition is therefore a siren-song calling us to give up precisely that which the metaphysical proposition not only cannot deliver but seeks to destroy (as if it were death-wish). The metaphysical impulse, if, per impossible, we abandoned ourselves to it utterly, would have us abandon our self-constitutive praxis — the use of rules, the constitution of language, logic, etc. Yet every ongoing moment of use testifies to metaphysics as a 'diseased' form of thought which nihilistically attacks our language in the face of what Wittgenstein in On Certainty 370 so appositely describes as our standing "before the abyss". Consequently, and pace the essence of metaphysics, the constitution of language does not blandly admit the sort of isomorphy between logical possibility and sense which metaphysics demands through and through. We must ask instead: 'What use has this proposition?'. For it is of the semantic essence of metaphysical propositions that they are (often most deceptively packaged) useless expressions of logical possibilities. And thus the connection between use, logical grammar, sense and what, from case to case, we count as an assertion's verification, is made clear once we free our understanding of ourselves qua language-users, from all metaphysics. Hence the otherwise enigmatic point of Investigations 353:
Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How d'you mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.

The answers tendered by the parties trapped within the realism-anti-realism dispute make no such contribution.
Footnotes


5. Ibid., p. 170.

6. Ibid., p. 177.


8. Wittgenstein, RFM, section V, remarks 2c, d.


10. Winch, "Im Anfang war die Tat", p. 161.


15. Ibid., remark 337.

17. Winch, op.cit., pp. 161-162. Emphasis mine in the first clause (up to the semi-colon) of the third sentence of the first paragraph.

18. Loc.cit., remark 318. The translation of the last sentence of this remark is surely unsatisfactory: I have 'liberalised' "Denn die Worte ... " as "Yet the words ... " instead of "Because the words ... ".


21. This brief analysis of the logic and logical genesis of belief is, inter alia, intended here as a final riposte to the Davidsonian position outlined in Chapter III (and touched on in Chapter II). What naturalism there is in Davidson (and which now rather plagues John McDowell's views about 'animal belief') is empiricistic naturalism hybridised with a crypto-a priorist treatment of belief as an exclusive function of self-reflection. Thus Davidsonians cannot possibly accommodate or grasp the crucial notion of praxis as a creature's gaining/achieving dominance of nature.


23. Wittgenstein, RFM, section I, remark 156.

24. Ibid., section I, remark 5.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid., part III, remark 31.

30. Ibid., part III, remark 39h.

31. Ibid., part III, remark 41h.

33. Ibid., p. 317.

34. Michael Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", in his Truth and Other Enigmas, op.cit., p. 185.

35. Michael Dummett, "Realism", in his Truth and Other Enigmas, op.cit., p. 158.

36. Ibid.


38. Wittgenstein, RFM, section I, remark 43.


40. Ibid., p. 220.

41. McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", pp. 336, 341. There are resonances here, in this stark consequence of the anti-realist Weltanschauung, of the later Husserl's severe dissatisfaction with his earlier phenomenology: it too stripped away the constitutive 'essence' of human interaction and so could not explicate the basis — and the reality — of intersubjectivity.


44. Wittgenstein, RFM, section V, remark 2d.


47. Ibid.


55. Winch, "Im Anfang War die Tat", p. 170.


57. *Ibid.*, section V, remarks 9d, e, f, h, j.

58. *Ibid.*, section VI, remark 24g.


Appendix

The Private Language Argument Re-examined

I

In his paper "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", John McDowell has put forward a most evocative and challenging analysis of the concept of linguistic community, certain key aspects of which I want to develop here in the context of a close re-examination of Wittgenstein's famed private language argument. McDowell's argument is that

... shared membership in a linguistic community is not just a matter of matching in aspects of an exterior that we present to anyone whatever, but equips us to make our minds available to one another, by confronting one another with a different exterior from that which we present to outsiders.

.... [On this analysis]... a linguistic community is conceived as bound together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to just anyone [no matter whether they are alien to the linguistic community]), but by a capacity for a meeting of minds. 1

II

To get as far — and it is no small distance — as the explication of any linguistic community in terms of what McDowell describes as our "confronting each other with a different exterior from that which we present to outsiders", we must first dissolve the problem of the privacy of experience. McDowell's treatment of linguistic communality in the above quotation is astutely constructed in this regard. It eschews (albeit implicitly) the crude post-Wittgensteinian error of denying the possibility of the asocial, or non-social, formation of language. The thought that, logically, language must be a communal artifact, and its cohort, the fallacious 'language = communication' equation has,
Unfortunately, a very substantial putative Wittgensteinian pedigree. Such repute will not however stand close scrutiny; it is a grave distortion (shot through with the legacy of verificationism). The private language argument in fact begins with Wittgenstein, in *Investigations* 242, obliquely defending the view that one can make valid judgements, and thus (*inter alia*) applications of a rule or concept, independently of actual agreement with others: the requirement for intersubjective agreement in judgements is a condition for communication, not for language *per se*. In the face of this, what is required to ensure that we do not thereby "abolish logic" (because we have made a strong concession to subjectivity here), is that the particular use of the rule or concept is only *contingently subjective*. The very next remark, *Investigations* 243, makes this (notably counter-Fregean) defence of the soundness of such subjective language-use explicit. It points out that there

... could even [be] ... human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. — An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)

This remark has long troubled those who mistakenly hold that for Wittgenstein language necessarily is a social phenomenon. It offers no such problems for this study, as unlike those who find the monologue-language case so disturbing, the analysis I will develop here distinguishes between subjective or otherwise 'private' use of language, and private language.

So it is that one of the concerns of this re-examination of the private language argument is to explore the logic of the relationship
between our conception of 'the mental' and subjective and intersubjective language-use. For a close reading of *Investigations* 243 raises the related questions whether the monologic language-users could be self-conscious or 'self-reflective', and correspondingly on what basis — by overhearing first-person avowals, or by noting utterance — action connections — the explorer translates their language. For the analysis to be advanced here, these questions are highly germane. This is because I want to argue, *inter alia*, that much of the treatment of psychological concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy turns on his exposing the extent of the constitutive connection between communicative (and thus intersubjective) language-use and the use and the content of very many of our mental concepts. (Such language-use is, of course, ruled out *tout court* by the very idea of logical privacy.)

One of the radical implications of this analysis is that the sense in which non-linguistic creatures experience, *e.g.*, pain, is in certain respects quite different from the sense applicable to you and me and our communicative-language-using fellows. If, as I have contended throughout this study, successful concept application changes nature, then, *e.g.*, cultural practices in the treatment of mental illness, pain, dreaming, *etc.*, would have a crucial *constitutive* role. Such a role, *inter alia*, places an insurmountable logical obstacle in the way not only of central state materialism and functionalism but also in the way of the present cognitive sciences programmes which are gaining increasing vogue in certain 'scientific' psychological and 'philosophical' circles. These programmes are an increasingly very real manifestation of the 'alien observer' approach to language and life-praxis; technical blindness to what makes personal interaction an interaction of *persons*. The essential problem here is the legacy of empiricism in its current 'scientistic'
forms. In resisting this metaphysical (and ideological) tide, we must acknowledge that we certainly are talking sense when we ascribe mental life to animals and other non-reflective beings: empiricism's attack on the excesses of psychologism, Cartesianism and phenomenology is not to be eschewed. But, this conceded, it must be pointed out that whilst we can learn much about the empirical aspects of the mind by studying animal and human physiology and behaviour, neither of these factors explicates the logic of the sense and understandability of language-users' mental life. Nor do they address the nature of the content of experience as it is for language-users or non-users (such as non-human animals).

At the centre of the major confusions in the empiricist-scientistic movement is, almost certainly, that of construing mind as a substance of some kind. It cannot be over-emphasised how common and how very deeply entrenched is this logico-grammatical confusion. As Wittgenstein put it in the Blue Book:

The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a sign [,word, concept, sentence, name, etc.], but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of the reasons for this mistake is ... that we are looking for a "thing corresponding to a substantive.")

This warning juxtaposes superbly with, e.g., David Armstrong's recent observation that his views of mind and those of Descartes are not so radically opposed, for the relevant "similarity is not a complete accident. Descartes holds that mind is a spiritual substance. I [,Armstrong,] hold that it is a material substance."

If we are to adequately counter these views (and I can only sketch the requisite broad analytical approach here), our counter must be dialectically structured so as to avoid combatting one confused icon with
another. Consequently, the path leading away from the mind-substance morass must treat of problems in philosophical psychology as conceptual problems like any others which arise out of reflection upon our language. Wittgenstein was, after all, adamant that his method of analysis left everything — except conceptual confusion — as it is. In the present context this means that we can grant the tendered physiological evidence and the introspective indubitabilities championed by either side of the body-mind dualist dichotomy: these considerations are not the real issue. Rather, the commission handed to us by Wittgenstein is to show that no matter how the dualist Weltanschauung is reduced, interactively construed or shamelessly embraced, it remains a conceptual quagmire. In this regard, without wishing to endorse the view in advance of the articulation of the present dialectic, Anthony Kenny's claim that "[t]he mind is the capacity to acquire intellectual skills"4, whilst too intellectualistic cum rationalistic (and Thomistic?) for this writer's comfort, expresses a crucial insight. For the notions of capacity, ability and technique, offer — in Wittgensteinian analysis at least — crucial prophylaxis against the motley of (nonetheless powerful) forces of mind-substance metaphysics.

III

Let us turn then to the so-widely misunderstood and mis-represented 'private language argument'. The groundwork for the roughly thirty remarks in the Investigations which more or less make up the the private language argument proper, is laid in remark 257. In this remark Wittgenstein seeks, albeit preliminarily, to bring out certain of the implications of remark 243's introductory account of private language. Thus, in the first two sentences of 257, Wittgenstein canvasses the claim
that a consequence of the disconnection of expressive behaviour from the experience it expresses, would be that the use of sensation words could not be taught. In reply to this contention, the possibility of private language is proposed:

"What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'toothache'”. Well, let’s assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation!

On the surface, this initial exchange sees Wittgenstein setting out to oppose his criterial analysis of the relation between sensations and behaviour to the private linguist's rejection of any such connection of mind and body. However, to read remark 257 in this way is seriously to misunderstand both the particular dialectic it embodies and thereby also the more general way in which Wittgenstein conducts his attack on private language. For it is of considerable importance that the text of 257 shows the private linguist to be replying to a piece of dialogue—presented, therefore, in quotation marks. That is to say that the tendered connection between the expression of an experience and the experience itself appears here as a claim presented for the sake of argument; it is given mention, not use (nor, least of all, any real defence).

The manner of the dispute being thus defined, i.e., as beginning from an hypothetical counter to the private linguist, Wittgenstein makes his initial analytical thrust via his opponent's account of the relation between a sensation and its name. Of the child genius who has allegedly invented a name for his pain, he asks

... does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone? —— But what does it mean to
A great deal is packed into these four questions. The first, in focusing on the connection between understanding a name and the logical possibility of explaining to someone what one thereby understands, points to the ongoing presence of the debate that began in remark 242 and its implicit reply to Frege. The issue is what is the relationship, if any, between objectivity of sense and subjective understanding?; in particular, as regards the concerns which motivate Frege’s criticisms, is understanding logically possible if one secures it in functions ‘logically unique’ to oneself alone? The second and third of the questions explicitly put in 257 follow from the implicit thrust of the first question, whilst extending the range of its implications. For even to allow the private linguist the possibility of tendering a name for a sensation may be to go too far too soon. Here the issue of private ostensive definition becomes explicit as Wittgenstein gives notice that we require an account of the procedure by which sensation and name are connected. Consider, for instance, the everyday case of writing one’s name at the end of a letter or a note. What makes it the case than in so doing I have identified myself as the document’s author, rather than that I have named the document “Gerald Atkinson”? It is but a short step from grappling with such problems as this, to the last of Wittgenstein’s four explicit questions, namely that of the purpose of naming a sensation in the style of the private linguist. Obviously, in the case of letters, notes, and so forth, one will say that the point of writing one’s name on the page is to tell the reader who is the author — not to name the page. But it remains to be seen how far appeals to the kind of application the private linguist makes of sensation names, will rescue his/her case from
the objection, central of course to the private language argument, that such private naming is nought but an idle and barren ceremony.

IV

Having thus set the scene for the examination of the private linguist's case, Wittgenstein proceeds, in the context of the fourteen remarks following 257 (i.e., 258-271), to develop the famous and controversial 'diary argument'.

The first thing to be noted about this diary where I write down "S" each day that the associated sensation occurs, is, as Wittgenstein points out, that "a definition of the sign cannot be formulated". Now this is very important for a number of reasons. The most obvious is that the logical impossibility of 'S' being (intersubjectively) definable, is entailed of course in 'S' being an instance of logically private language. But note also that the relation between 'S' and the sensation it names via ostensive definition, is one of direct and necessary sign-object correspondence. Of course, this logical form of connection is a corollary of the use the private linguist makes of the impossibility of doubting the existence of one's immediate experiences. Further, it is crucial that the recording of 'S' in the private linguist's diary should not be thought of as establishing even a private connection between behaviour and a sensation. The connection between 'S' and S, even in the writing of it in the diary, is radically different from the way that, e.g., my taking an aspirin every three hours can be connected with my having a headache. For it is all too easy to see the private linguist's diary as if some private, but nevertheless somehow expressive, connection subsists in its pages between the behaviour of the diarist — i.e., recording 'S' every so often — and the experience in question. But
looking at the diary this way seriously misleads us regarding the connection of 'S' and the sensation. This is so for two reasons. First, to the mere onlooker, the recording of 'S' is necessarily random and incoherent; this is definitive of its logical 'privacy'. Second, and as we shall see in due course, most importantly, the very issue in question is whether there is in fact any logico-semantic connection between the logically private object and its attendant sign.

The diary-keeping in question is then something of an altogether alien nature to even the most cryptic of normal diaries; here we do not have a new kind of Samuel Pepys. However, this is not to say that, all the same, the diary-writing still comes to 'something'. For it is precisely yet to be determined whether the private linguist can disclaim all that s/he does about the writing of 'S' (i.e., disclaiming absolutely its having 'public status'), and still make good the powerful semantic and metaphysical claims that the alleged diary supposedly secures. So the best we can thus far say of the connection between 'S' and its object, as embodied in the logically private diary canvassed in remark 258, is what sets it apart from normal diaries. Whether there is anything relevant remaining — and thus whether a positive account of the semantics of the relation of 'S' to its object can be given — remains to be seen.

The constitution of the meaning of 'S' as the private linguist intends it, thus turns entirely upon the logical adequacy of private ostensive definition. So Wittgenstein asks how this private ostension is carried out and, thus, how it can serve to define 'S':
Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak or write the sign down, and at the same I concentrate my attention on the sensation — and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. —— But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. —— Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. —— But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.

The vast majority of commentators have taken this text — the 'body' of 258 — to be concerned with the possibility, and adequacy, of the private linguist's remembering the connection between 'S' and the sensation it names.

In some quarters this has taken the form of conceding — particularly in the face of (what are now longstanding) telling criticisms (by, e.g., A.J. Ayer) — that there is no logical ground for granting an unworkable memory to the private linguist, and arguing, instead, that no connection has been secured between 'S' and the sensation it names.

Such a move is indeed most propitious, as Ayer has, famously and quite correctly, argued that scepticism about the mnemonic capacities of private linguists in fact paves the way, ipso facto, for scepticism about anyone's ability to correctly remember the rules and connections intrinsic to any language — private or public. As Ayer put it:

... [U]nless there is something that one is allowed to recognise, no test can ever be completed: there will be no justification for the use of any sign at all. I check my memory of the time at which ... [my] train is due to leave by visualising a page of the timetable; and I am required to check this in turn by looking up the page. But unless I can trust my eyesight at this point, unless I can recognise the
figures that I see written down, I am still no better off. It is true that if I distrust my eyesight I have the resource of consulting other people; but then I have to understand their testimony, I have correctly to identify the signs that they make. Let the object to which I am attempting to refer be as public as you please, let the word which I use for this purpose belong to some common language, my assurance that I am using the word correctly, that I am using it to refer to the 'right' object, must in the end rest on the testimony of my senses.

Ayer thus puts forward a strong argument that unless I am allowed to rely on my own judgement as regards the connections between what my senses (especially, in everyday interaction, my eyes and ears) tell me and my concomitant use of language, my standing as a competent (or, even, possible) speaker dissolves.

Even where I accede to the judgement of others — e.g., when someone corrects my use of a word or explains a new concept to me — I must in fact commit myself to accepting that my uptake of the received advice is reliable. I must also accept that the authority I have looked to — the other person — is a competent speaker. This is a point Ayer himself does not bring out, though his view implies it. For even if I disavow my own judgements regarding some matter, appeal to others secures nothing for me unless such authorities are not themselves victims of incapacitated judgement. As Richard Grandy has argued, the orthodox view that public language is secured against the (alleged) Wittgensteinian appeal to scepticism about the private linguist's memory (because, in a 'public' language, there is the possibility of regulating and checking linguistic usage) is an illusion. For Grandy asks

Does a second speaker help? ... I think not. If one speaker can be wrong about the public object that was baptised 'T', then two can also be wrong. Public languages seem to be possible only if we attach labels firmly to the objects, firmly enough that it is logically impossible that they come off. And we'd better write them in indelible ink.
If Grandy were serious about these proffered conditions for "public languages", the "labels" attached so "firmly" that it is "logically impossible that they come off" would in fact yield precisely the general mode of rigorous name-object semantics sought by the private linguist. Indeed, there is a deep irony involved here. For we should note well that it is also archetypical of the semantic demands of a platonist, as much as those of private linguist semanticists, that the logical possibility of error or misapplication in the use of a term is ruled out so as to secure (the foundations of) sense. We are surely all of us well familiar with Frege's platonistic views in this regard. It was ever his opinion that sense had to be objectively determined in the strongest possible sense of 'objective'. For Frege, only semantic platonism gave prophylaxis against what he saw as the quagmire of subjective language-use, error, opinion, illusion and psychologism. But, and here is the rub, the logical constitution of a platonised sense is essentially, in terms of its form, just the same as that of the private linguist's psychologised meaning: both are constructed as logically necessary thought-symbol-object connections, and both are located in a realm from which error is entirely barred.

In bringing out this important similarity between platonism and private language, I am however getting slightly ahead of the developments in the *Investigations* text as we have examined it so far. But because the remark 258 memory scepticism argument is still so widely misunderstood, the explication of its real targets is surely well justified at this stage. For I want to show that the argument from memory scepticism is without question directed against a fundamental view about sense and necessity which is common to, and the key to revealing the impotence of, the parties involved in the platonism—psychologism
dialectic. As such, Frege's polemic against the forces of subjective idealism and psychologism is one of the memory argument's key targets and not, e.g., (as even critics like Grandy imply) 'individualistic' treatments of rule-following; we must ask very precisely just whose errors Wittgenstein would have been engaging with here; and Frege is, surely, one of his targets.

Returning to the text of Investigations 258, the issue at hand in the remark does not therefore turn on the reliability of memory. Rather it concerns the resolution of the issues concerning the allying of 'S' with its relevant sensation in the face of Wittgenstein's contention that the private linguist cannot secure and use such an alliance because s/he has no criterion for its correctness. For in remark 258, the connection between 'S' and the sensation it denotes is explicitly problematicised by the observation that

"I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness.

Which is to say, the question concerns not memory, but the notion of correctness of identification qua correctly applying criteria for identifying the given phenomenon. The problem is not: 'can you remember it?'; it is 'is there anything that you have to remember?'.

I am therefore in substantial agreement with Steward Candlish's observation that

... almost everyone I know of [who has written on the private language argument] has assumed that ... in the circumstances of the 'private language' there is actually an application of a sign to a sensation by a private linguist, and that the problem is one of later remembering this earlier application
in order that 'S' should have meaning (or possibly be known to have meaning). The question then seems to be whether our admittedly fallible memory is adequate for the securing or maintenance of (possible knowledge of) meaning. 11

Candlish argues, quite correctly, that the argument from scepticism about memory is not Wittgenstein's. It is an offspring of the misunderstandings and errors found in the secondary literature and the pseudo-private language argument it has generated.

However, whilst it is clear that Candlish's interpretation shows Wittgenstein's case to be secure from the line characterised by Ayer's objections, there is a clear need for us to go beyond the sketch provided in Candlish's corrective approach and give a full blown account of the diary argument. The key to this, not developed by Candlish, is the realisation that there is no role for 'remembering a/the connection' in the sense demanded by the private linguist; the demanded mnemonic factors are shown by Wittgenstein to be idle.

To see this we need to get clear as to the fundamental target, and semantic implications, of the famous but misunderstood dictum:

Always get rid of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you. 12

Rather than endorsing the infamous argument from scepticism about memory, Wittgenstein is here pointing out that if we take seriously the idea of a constantly changing private object whose changes we don't notice (because of mnemonic failure), the logically private definition of the object shows itself to have no consequences which would show the object to have changed. Thus Wittgenstein's contention is that if the private linguist takes his/her characteristic ostensive definition to fix the identity of
the sensation, s/he in fact establishes no identity for it, as, at any
given time, the 'identity' of the object will be logically irrelevant to
what s/he calls it. The move at work here is, as we are about to see,
indicative of both Wittgenstein's attack on a priorist (and most
particularly, analytic a priori) treatments of rules, and of his critique
of the notion of numerical identity which flows out of this basic
semantic and metaphysical approach.

V

If we consider the following (ficticious — or hopefully ficticious)

If we consider the following (ficticious — or hopefully ficticious)
case involving the one-time standard metre in Paris, the real nature and
targets of the argument from the constantly changing private object can
be made manifest in detail. Suppose then that some time ago someone
stole the standard metre and replaced it with a sardine. Further, let us
allow that whatever occupies the glass case labeled "Le Metre" is
accepted by all, and without question, as the standard metre length.

Of course, this latter condition seems to ask too much of us. For
surely, it will be objected, we would all have to be quite mad not to
notice the substitution of a sardine for the strip of platinum which was
the standard metre. However, it is here that Wittgenstein's supposition
that, for the sake of the argument, we allow that everyone forgets what
(in this case) the 'old' metre looked like, comes into play. For he
wishes us to consider the substitution seriously by 'letting it ride' so
that we can look to the consequences which result. If we rule out the
argument right from the start, by disallowing the supposed lapse of our
memories, we will fail utterly ever to reap the fruits which the memory
argument in fact yields.
Thus if we allow the successful substitution of the sardine for the platinum strip, we must next ask how and if the consequences of our accepting the 'sardine standard' could call into question the (real) identity of the so-called standard metre: what difference would it make?

Well, for instance, as the sardine dried out and putrefied its length would vary. Comparison over time of calculations based on the 'sardine measure' would show significant errors (within even twenty four hour periods perhaps) — let alone comparison of calculations based on the platinum standard and those based on the sardine. Moreover, science and technology (assuming that there was, meanwhile, constancy in the relevant very general facts of nature) would be thrown into chaos and, indubitably, architecture and engineering would yield horrendous results. Physics and chemistry would fall into disarray, buildings and bridges would almost certainly collapse. Virtually every language-game of measuring metric length, if not all of them, would cease to function. The consequences of the employment of the 'sardine standard' (where, eo ipso, we have held the platinum standard and the sardine to be identical) would swiftly demonstrate, use-constitutively, that the so-called standard metre was not what it purported to be. The constitutive life-practical outcomes of using a reliable and ultra-precise standard, would be utterly usurped by the 'sardine standard'. So it would be that as a matter of practical breakdown, the failure of the sardine to meet the use-requirements of the standard metre concept (qua embodied paradigm) would unmask it as (at the very least) an inadequate determinant of the sense of our metric measurement talk and calculations.

Of course, on the other hand, and remembering what we said about our memory of the standard metre's appearance, if the sardine had, in all
relevant, semantically constitutive, use-relative respects, met the demands of usefulness and thus secured all the relevant sense-constitutive practices that are integral to the institution of metric measurement, then supposing us to be wrong about the identity of the standard metre would make little or no sense (given, again, the requisite memory failure element); the standard length cannot have changed without any relevant practical effects.

The supposition of memory failure certainly therefore attacks the implications of the (typically, analytic a priorist) treatment of identity as a function of logically unique properties of an object or other suitably construed ontological function; as if identity inheres in ('essential properties' of) the object, and its role in use is irrelevant. When we forget what the standard metre looked like and thus accept (given the miracle of preservation and continuity of practical implications) the sardine standard, the logical kind of the substitution is that exhibited in, e.g., the substitution of a two gramme and eight grammé weight for a single ten grammé standard. Weighing based on the ten grammé standard will be unaffected. But 'the ten grammé standard' qua unique, individual object, will no longer be employed: we will (unwittingly, let us say) be using some other object(s). The constitutive practical role of the standard nonetheless persists. This alone shows that it is not the object, but its role in use that is the determinant of the content of any identification we make (given that we grasp that this 'object' is a, or the, 'standard ...' or a, or the, type-specimen, or simply 'a, or the, defining and/or definitive ...').

Consider therefore the implications of Investigations 264, given the considerations we have now brought into play. In the remark Wittgenstein
canvasses this idea: "Once you know what the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use." Thus the private linguist insists that his/her 'having' the sensation $S$ (which s/he points to 'inwardly') thereby secures the content and the sense of the utterance 'I am experiencing $S$'. The thought at work here is that somehow — and this is what is nevertheless very much in question — the object can be used to identify itself; its logically unique characteristics ('phenomenal essence', say) constitute the sense and content of the sign-object relation which expresses its identity. On such a theory, use is irrelevant; everything is swallowed up in having the experience (and reflecting upon it via private ostension).

VI

In the memory argument remark quoted above from p. 207 of Part II of the *Investigations*, there is a crucial preceding sentence: "(The temptation to say "I see it like this", pointing to the same thing for "it" and "this")." This is a reference to the relationship between the fallacy of private ostension and the concept of numerical identity. In his 1936 lectures recently published as "The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience", Wittgenstein is recorded in Rush Rhees' notes as emphasising the source of the fallacy of private ostension as being the confusion of samples and descriptions. This confusion is, I suggest, precisely that referred to above in the remark about 'I see it like this': a grave misunderstanding of the concept of numerical identity is being pointed to.

Take, for example, this argument from lecture XVII of the 1936 lectures:
"Because he sees this colour he knows what it is." --- What sort of argument is this? He may see the colour without knowing what it is, if, say, he does not point to a sample [when we test his knowledge] and say "it is this colour". The deception consists in saying: He says "it is this colour" in pointing to what he sees. It is like: "I see it, therefore I must know what it is."

What we have here is: taking the same thing as a sample and as what is described by the sample. Like the game of trying to catch your own thumb. 13

Note Wittgenstein's rebuttal of the notion of private ostension here: he attacks the crucial ideal that when, e.g., the introspecting subject 'inwardly' points to the colour s/he sees, s/he "says" (my emphasis) that this '→' is what is seen. Two (very important) logico-gramatically distinct functions are run together in this moment of private ostension, and it is in this confusion that the private language "deception consists". One way of expressing it is to point out (harking back to the argument of Chapter II) that a drastic shift of quantificational roles is disguised and obscured in the private ostension. The 'indication' of the sample colour experience 'F(\xi)' is being concomitantly treated as description -- '(\exists x)fx' -- of the instancing of the experience. This is precisely the confusion Wittgenstein is pointing out when he says in the lecture-portion cited above that "[w]hat we have here is: taking the same thing as a sample" -- 'F(\xi)' -- "and as what is described" -- as '(\exists x)fx' -- "by the sample". The truth is that even if the 'inward definitional pointing' were to define the colour, this act qua definitional 'expression' does not constitute one's saying or asserting anything about the colour, and if, instead, the 'inward expression' is (somehow) a judgement (a priori -- ?) it cannot be a definition. The establishment of a rule for identity (by, e.g., placing a sample metre length of platinum in a box under highly controlled conditions) is not the same as an act of identification (where an
instance of length is measured and we utter the description of its length thereby obtained). The essence of private language semantics is thus the use of one and the same expressive device (e.g., the 'inner pointing') as (simultaneous) subject and predicate. As Wittgenstein explains:

Think of the state of mind in which I stare and say "This equals this" (pointing twice to the same object), or "This colour is this colour". This would be like uttering the sentence "This is here". It is like comparing something with itself. — It is natural to make sentences for which we have no use at all. 16

VII

Our excursus into the fundamental semantic distortions and illusions behind private language semantics, and our 'sardine standard' explication of the real memory argument, doubly arms us to assert the validity of Wittgenstein's critical riposte to the private linguist in Investigations 258:

A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. — Well, that is done precisely by the concentration of my attention [on the sensation]; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.

The talk about 'right' and the 'criterion of correctness' points to the fact that the definitional rule effected by private ostensive definition is, ipso facto, cut off from practical application, from use. The 'sardine standard' argument makes the consequences of this split of rule from praxis, easy for us to pursue through the further steps in Wittgenstein's 'diary argument'. This we can do by turning to address
Investigations 270 and 271. In 270, Wittgenstein seeks to contrast 'S' in the hands of the private linguist with 'S' employed in a bona fide language. He says

Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign "S" in my diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shows that my blood pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognised the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shows that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show.

The aim of this remark's complex dialectic is to show how the concept of regularly identifying the sensation wrong — in the same way as we might have proposed that the metre standard has been substituted for something else — is otiose where no practical, use-related, consequences follow from the hypothesised mis-identification. So Wittgenstein is arguing therefore that the role for the concept of identifying sensations cannot inhere in the logical requirement, or 'truth', that only I can have my sensations. The concept of correctly recognising one's sensations (and, then, its logical correlative — incorrectly recognising them) thus makes no sense. And with recognition out of the question, the idea of (a role for) private identification goes by the board. This being so, there is no sense to the notion of a(ny) logically private (or 'inner') means of identifying, defining, giving sense-conditions to, one's own experiences.

What logically secures the connection between one's giving expression to the sensation and its being the expression of this experience, as it is not some hypostatised property of self-consciousness, must be the way the expression of sensation is used in the language game. The radical implication of this is that, e.g., the meaning of, say, the avowal 'I have a terrible pain in my chest' is
constituted as a function of practices where, *inter alia*, people aid each other when one of them is acknowledged as in pain, and that there are also and consequent on this constitutive practice, hospitals, doctors, nurses, and medicines, *etc.* which we administer to the suffering. Consequently, the identity of a sensation -- and thus the logical conditions for its having a role in a language-game, rather than its just being 'had' by someone -- is determined by the role it plays in our life praxis: we give it its identity and its expression its meaning; it does not have these *sui generis*. This is so in the same way as the identity of the metre standard, and the meaningfulness of assertions expressing the results of metric measurement, are constituted functions integral to the institutionalised activity, the practice, of using such-and-such samples/paradigms to yield metricated measurement.

The person described in *Investigations* 271, who constantly calls "different things" by the name 'pain' because s/he cannot remember what the word 'pain' means, but who nonetheless uses the word 'pain' as we all do, is therefore a *reductio ad absurdum* of the private linguist. S/he is like someone who insists that regardless of the successful ongoing use of metric measurement, we cannot proceed in that practice unless first we prove and affirm the identity of the standard metre. (There are resonances here of, e.g., the metaphysical conjectures Descartes launched through his malignant demon hypothesis.) To such a person, if we lack proof of identity, we could be forever duped; -- forever talking nonsense when we utter the results of even the most careful and consistent measurements. The fact that the practices of the use of metric measurement and the use of the expression of sensation proceed unhindered meanwhile, is ignored.
When someone insists that one's (indubitable) apprehension of pain shows and determines the sense and content of 'I am in pain', our reply must therefore be that we have in this ironclad act of self-reflection nought in itself but the distortative and idle repetition of a rule of logical grammar. For it is thus that the Cartesian tradition, phenomenology, etc., spawn their metaphysics from their particular efforts to apply the use of predicates licenced by rule, paradigm, sample, etc., to the rule, paradigm, sample, itself. We most certainly can get no proof, nor any test, of the identity of the 'defining criterion' by applying it to itself, because such a manoeuvre cannot distinguish a substituted sardine from the standard metre, or quale 'A' from quale 'B'. For as we can see in the standard metre versus sardine metre case, whatever is in the box labelled 'Le Metre' will, ipso facto, be identical with itself and if this is what we must rely upon, we are lead to the absurdity that whatever is in the box is definitive (just in being there) of the concept 'one metre long'. We only escape this failacy if we take into account as being definitive of the concept, the praxis-relative functions of the box contents as thus used in the domain outside the box: that establishes whether here is a concept or a mere 'vaccuity'; and it secures the sense of 'the same length as before'. Confined simply to considerations based on what, and only what, is within the box, the 'identification' of the contents with 'Le Metre' is, as Investigations 49 so appositely has it "not a move in the language-game — any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess." Indeed, as the remark goes on to explicitly remind us, "nothing has so far been done" that is of semantic significance: we don't deny that you have something; but we do deny that 'having it' is the same as its having an identity, let alone its being an 'object' of and/or for
meaningful discourse.

One can see therefore the illusion involved in the private linguist's insisting that, e.g., her/his having pains and being reflectively aware of them, determines the meaning of pain talk, and the identity of pain. S/he could do well to reflect on the fate of the standard metre length. The platinum strip proved unreliable for the delivering of suitably constant and micro-accurate measurements: never mind that it was still 'the same strip as before'; it was inadequate in use and has been replaced by a paradigm based, I believe, on the wavelength of light emitted by Helium under certain well defined circumstances. The object -- the platinum strip -- was the same as ever, and could be expected to stay that way (for how is it to become different from itself?), but it was done away with all the same. Such conceptual revision is incomprehensible both to platonists and private linguists, and thus precisely indicates how far both their metaphysical semantic theories are from grasping the real determinants of conceptual status and meaning. It also shows how impotent was Frege's platonist reaction to psychologism.

VIII

To bring about the requisite conclusion to our re-examination of the private language argument, it is important that we recognise that, and why, just having an experience is not logically equivalent to what we 'make' of our sensations in the playing of the language-game of expressing our mental states 'into the public arena'. This concerns the crucial notion of the use of concepts as changing nature, and thus of, e.g., mental content being a 'cultural' construction.
Investigations 290 is an important preliminary remark in this regard:

What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensation by criteria: but to repeat an expression. But this is not the end of the language-game: it is the beginning. But isn't the beginning the sensation --- which I describe? --- Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the differences between the language-games.

If we think that 'describing' the dream one had last night is logico-grammatically like describing the room one is in, our error is that of confusing sample and description; confusing the 'issuing' of 'F(ʃ)' with that of '(ʃx)ʃʃx'. A sample, and by corollary, the expression of experience, is not used to identify itself, but to give criteria for us to use in the language-game. Being asked 'Who is that in the corner with the bottle of scotch in his hand?', is being asked to identify a state of affairs. Being asked 'How does it feel now that the pressure is off?' is not a logically analogous request for you to identify some ('inner') phenomenon. There is no identification of the feeling; no (e.g.) 'judging of oneself' that one is having pain, so as to have the pain of which one is aware; it is not analogous to what is involved in your achievement of correctly identifying the scotch-drinker in the corner. There is, rather, your expression of the feeling and the subsequent constitutive use which your fellows in this intersubjective language-game make of the now 'publicly available' experience.

Deny this, and say with the introspectionists that regardless of what others do with, and understand by, your expressions of sensation, it remains the case that what you feel is what you feel, and I will not deny that. For all you have really said is "I have some experience"; and the
Wittgensteinian analysis certainly does not deny that people (and animals) have experiences! What is denied is that just having an experience can secure the meaning of 'I have this experience' and 'S/he is (or 'you are') experiencing such-and-such a mental state'.

Someone's having pain as much constitutes in itself the stuff of the concept 'pain' as there just being an object in the box labelled 'Le Metre' constitutes the concept 'one metre long'. The requisite, constitutive, institutional factors — the engagement with the language-game — is not to hand here. The 'thing' in the box/in the being's mind is, qua thing unto itself, and thus taken as cut off from the playing of the language-game, or, at least, cut off from practical engagement with the creature's life, otiose. This is why Wittgenstein says that

... the sensation itself is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion [of the private language argument] was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. 18

This is surely the force of the substance — substantive metaphysical impulse which has us construe sensation names on the model of the grammar of object and designation. For Investigations 304 should be read in concert with Investigations 293 and its famed beetle in the box argument:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means —— must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalise the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! —— Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. —— Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. —— But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? —— If so it would not be used as the name of a
thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language­
game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even
be empty. — No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in
the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the
expression of sensation on the model of 'object and
designation' the object drops out of consideration as
irrelevant.

If, in uttering sincerely the avowal 'I am feeling a bit tired', the
role of this utterance is, as the semantics of private language insist,
of the form of my 'privately' identifying some inner object as being that
designated by 'tiredness', the connection between 'tiredness' and the
referent of 'tiredness' collapses into otioseness: the meaning of 'I am
tired' is subverted. The result is, of course, the collapse of the
notion of content, and the triumph of behaviourism (as only 'outward',
(tired-)behaviour, is left for linguistic currency). A fortiori, here
indeed "a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which
nothing could be said." (My emphasis.)

\[ \text{This} \quad \text{... is this} \]

says nothing about (the referent of) 'this'. 'Beetle' is whatever I
have in my (private) box', says nothing about (the referent of) 'beetle'.
The model is all wrong. But above all, it says nothing, and can only say
nothing, about what it is to be in a position to share one's personal
experience with another person. It is nevertheless, pace empiricistic
materialism's response to this problem, certainly not sufficient for the
other(s) to 'have' whatever 'states' you have so as to constitute
understanding. Shared membership of a linguistic community — a meeting of minds — is jointly making the stuff at hand into that very moment of intersubjectivity; plural agency achieving a singular mutual recognition and constitution of each other as persons for, and with, another person (or persons). This is a very far cry from just 'having an experience'. 
Footnotes


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., remark 258.

8. Ibid.


15. Wittgenstein makes this more or less explicit in a lecture recorded in Rhees' notes in 1938. See Rhees, "Notes taken during Wittgenstein's lecture (c), Cambridge 1938", included in Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness", *Philosophia*, 6 (1976), 442-445, especially at p. 442.


17. Note how the series of remarks from 265 to 269 all develop aspects of the argument that private ostensive definition lacks, and is doomed because it lacks, practical consequences. As we are about to see, this means the crucial notion of 'recognising (the same) S again' is otiose.

I: Works by Wittgenstein


II: Derivative Primary Sources


III: Secondary Sources (Material either cited in the text or which significantly influenced its content.)


John V. Canfield, "Wittgenstein and Zen", in *Philosophy*, 50 (1975), 383-408.


__________, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in *Philosophical Review*, 60 (1951), 20-43.


