I declare that this work is entirely my own and has not been carried out in collaboration with others

Signed
Kizzy Gandy
To my mum, for always believing in me and for teaching me to fight for what I believe in
Acknowledgements

This PhD began and ended as a labour of love. It would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of many people.

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Abstract

How can we close the gap between the policy commitments governments make at the international level and policy implementation at the domestic level in order to address global problems such as poverty and climate change? I integrate the constructivist perspective in international relations and self-categorization theory in social psychology to propose an identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform. Identities are context-dependent categorisations of ‘self’ and ‘other’ which help actors navigate reality. I argue that policy outputs are determined by the state’s identity whereas each citizen’s policy preferences are determined by the multiple identities which comprise their self-concept. State identities constitute cultural norms and the state’s international image relative to other states. Citizen identities constitute personal value priorities (personal identities) and group memberships (social identities).

Citizens contribute to the state identity but a state’s identity is bigger than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the aggregate preferences of individual citizens may not necessarily correspond to policy outputs. This is not undemocratic because people do not engage in policy issues unless doing so is stereotypical of their current context-dependent identity. In addition, people modify their interpretation of identity stereotypes so that their behaviours are not wildly contradictory across situations. Identities that are maintained by few people lack popular legitimacy so they become behaviourally aligned with identities that are important to the majority. This means that the state’s identity has a top-down influence on public opinion, making it difficult for radical change to catch on. However, reframing an issue can reconfigure identity stereotypes, enabling the established order to be challenged.

To test my model I focus on the commitment by developed countries to increase foreign aid. I use cross-national policy and survey data for 13 major aid donor states. I find that: (1) state identities are pro- or anti-aid in line with the justice norms that underpin their domestic welfare policies; (2) personal and social identities that are other-focused are stereotypically pro-aid and those that are self-focused are stereotypically anti-aid; (3) the degree to which people’s personal identities are pro-aid depends on the pro-aid orientation of their social identities, and the degree to which their social identities are pro-aid depends on the pro-aid orientation of the state identity; and (4) policy discourses shape identity stereotypes.
I offer four prescriptions for enhancing global governance to reduce poverty in developing countries. First, states legitimately pursue differentiated policy orientations to maintain their identities. Therefore, replacing uniform policy targets with unique performance criteria could facilitate positive synergies between states as they will be motivated to scale-up identity-congruent policies. Second, reminding citizens about their personal and social identities that are stereotypically pro-aid could activate the dormant aid constituency. Third, direct lobbying to change a state’s anti-aid policy orientation could facilitate bottom-up momentum through a realignment of legitimate citizen behaviour. Finally, discursively linking foreign aid to helping others rather than serving the national interest could expand the size of the aid constituency because supporting aid will become stereotypical of inherently other-focused identities.
# Table of Contents

Acronyms and Definitions ............................................................................................................. 1  
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 3  
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. 5  

Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 7  
1.1 Motivation and Argument ........................................................................................................ 9  
1.2 The Concept of Identity ........................................................................................................ 12  
1.3 Background to the Problem ................................................................................................. 15  
1.4 The Promise of Public Opinion ........................................................................................... 23  
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation ............................................................................................... 26  

Chapter 2. Current Understanding of Bottom-Up Policy Reform .................................................. 30  
2.1 Dissecting the Literature ....................................................................................................... 31  
2.2 The Determinants of State Behaviour in International Relations ....................................... 35  
2.3 The Determinants of Public Support for Aid in Political Science ....................................... 48  
2.4 Finding the Missing Pieces of the Puzzle ........................................................................... 55  
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 64  

Chapter 3. An Identity-Based Approach to Bottom-Up Policy Reform .......................................... 66  
3.1 Conceptualising Public Opinion in Policy Contexts ............................................................. 68  
3.2 Politics is the Point of Intersection; Identity is the Integration Mechanism ............................ 75  
3.3 A Constructivist Political Economy ..................................................................................... 82  
3.4 Application of the Identity-Based Approach to Foreign Policy .......................................... 86  
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 91  

Chapter 4. A Quantitative Research Strategy ................................................................................ 93  
4.1 Summary of the Research Strategy ....................................................................................... 94  
4.2 Individual-Level (Micro) Data and Measures ...................................................................... 97  
4.3 Country-Level (Macro) Data and Measures ....................................................................... 114  
4.4 Analytical Methods ............................................................................................................ 118  
4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 126  

Chapter 5. Establishing State Identities ....................................................................................... 128  
5.1 Knowing Who States Are By What They Do ...................................................................... 130  
5.2 Indicators of State Behaviour ............................................................................................... 135  
5.3 Distinguishing DAC Identities .............................................................................................. 140
5.4 Discerning the Justice Norms that Constitute DAC Identities ........................................ 148
5.5 Implications for Global Governance .............................................................................. 152
5.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 154

Chapter 6. Identity-Based Support for Aid ........................................................................ 156

6.1 Personal Identity-Based Support for Aid ................................................................. 157
6.2 Social Identity-Based Support for Aid ....................................................................... 167
6.3 The Independent Effects of Personal and Social Identities .................................... 171
6.4 Possible Explanations for Cross-National Variation ............................................. 177
6.5 Implications for Activating the Aid Constituency ................................................... 179
6.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 182

Chapter 7. Identity Alignment and the Strength of Conviction ...................................... 185

7.1 Recapping the Concept .............................................................................................. 186
7.2 The Effect of Personal-Social Identity Alignment .................................................... 188
7.3 The Effect of Social-State Identity Alignment ........................................................... 194
7.4 Implications for Democratic Processes and Theories ............................................. 201
7.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 204

Chapter 8. Framing the Meanings of Identities ............................................................. 207

8.1 Recapping the Concept .............................................................................................. 208
8.2 The Effect of Identity Frames in News Media Discourse ........................................ 211
8.3 The Effect of Identity Frames in Development Education Discourse ..................... 218
8.4 The Effect of Identity Frames in Aid Agency Discourse .......................................... 222
8.5 Implications for Expanding the Aid Constituency .................................................. 225
8.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 231

Chapter 9. Contribution to Knowledge and Theory ....................................................... 234

9.1 Summary of the Research Findings ........................................................................... 235
9.2 Recommendations for Campaigning and Policy ..................................................... 237
9.3 Future Research ....................................................................................................... 244
9.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 250

References ....................................................................................................................... 253
Appendix 1 ....................................................................................................................... 289
Appendix 2 ....................................................................................................................... 294
Appendix 3 ....................................................................................................................... 306
Appendix 4 ....................................................................................................................... 307
**Acronyms and Definitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>An intergovernmental organisation comprising 54 states, 52 of which were former British colonies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of eight governments from the world’s largest economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of twenty finance ministers and central bank governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global governance</td>
<td>Global public policy aimed at solving problems that affect more than one country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPG</td>
<td>global public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual agency</td>
<td>The capacity to effectively act upon the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logic of the everyday</td>
<td>Habitual experiences that configure what is understandable, thinkable and imaginable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>least developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICs</td>
<td>low income countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>policy coherence for development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>proportional representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCT</td>
<td>self-categorization theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structural determinism</td>
<td>Historical and institutional rules and conditions that determine behaviour</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welfare state regimes</td>
<td>The classification of different types of welfare states according to the role of the state, market and family in welfare provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>word-deeds gap</td>
<td>The difference between intentions and behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figure 1.1 The Stability of DAC Member States’ Official Development Assistance as a Percentage of Gross National Income Over Time ................................................................. 21
Figure 1.2 Narrowing the Dissertation Focus to Address the Problem of Global Governance ........ 22
Figure 2.1 Mean Attitudes to the Level of Aid Spending and Actual Aid Levels ......................... 40
Figure 2.2 Mean Attitudes to Paying Higher Taxes to Increase Aid and Actual Aid Levels .............. 40
Figure 2.3 The Relationship between Public Support for Increasing Aid Spending and Aid Spending the Following Year .................................................................................................. 42
Figure 2.4 Rationalist Conceptual Model of Behaviour ................................................................. 50
Figure 2.5 Moral Judgement Conceptual Model of Behaviour .................................................... 54
Figure 2.6 Self-Categorization Theory Model of Individual and Group Behaviour ....................... 62
Figure 2.7 Values-Based Model of Behaviour .............................................................................. 64
Figure 3.1 Integrating Constructivism and SCT to Balance the Structures that Promote Policy Stability with the Agency of Policy Change ................................................................. 71
Figure 3.2 The Concept of Identity Alignment from the Perspective of the International System .. 78
Figure 3.3 A Constructivist Political Economy Model of the Relationship Between Public Opinion and Foreign Policy ........................................................................................................ 82
Figure 3.4 The Identity-Based Approach to Bottom-Up Policy Reform......................................... 90
Figure 4.1 A Quantitative Research Strategy ................................................................................ 96
Figure 4.2 Schwartz’s Individual-Level Values Structure ............................................................. 109
Figure 5.1 Scree Plot ..................................................................................................................... 141
Figure 6.1 Priming Universalism Personal Identity ...................................................................... 182
Figure 7.1 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Tradition Personal Identity and Religious Social Identity ............................................................................................................................. 193
Figure 7.2 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Universalism Personal Identity and Political Social Identity .................................................................................................................. 193
Figure 7.3 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Benevolence Personal Identity and Humanitarian Social Identity ........................................................................................................ 194
Figure 7.4 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Religious Social Identity and State Identity .. 199
Figure 7.5 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Political Social Identity and State Identity .... 200
Figure 7.6 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Humanitarian Social Identity and State Identity ........................................................................................................................................ 200
Figure 8.1 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Security Personal Identity and National News Media Consumption ........................................................................................................ 215
Figure 8.2 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Self-Direction Personal Identity and National News Media Consumption ........................................................................................................ 216
Figure 8.3 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Universalism Personal Identity and Development Education Spending Per Capita ............................................................................................ 221
Figure 8.4 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Universalism Personal Identity and Aid Agency Independence ........................................................................................................ 225
Figure 8.5 US Word Cloud of Development Priorities .................................................................................. 229
Figure 8.6 Netherlands Word Cloud of Development Priorities ........................................................................ 229
Figure 2.A The Motivational Continuum of Values with Support for Aid ......................................................... 301
Figure 4.A The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Australia ........................................................................ 307
Figure 4.B The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Canada ........................................................................ 308
Figure 4.C The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Finland ........................................................................ 308
Figure 4.D The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Germany ...................................................................... 309
Figure 4.E The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Japan ......................................................................... 309
Figure 4.F The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Norway ....................................................................... 310
Figure 4.G The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Spain ......................................................................... 310
Figure 4.H The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Sweden ...................................................................... 311
Figure 4.I The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Switzerland ............................................................... 311
Figure 4.J The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in the US ....................................................................... 312
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Disciplinary Perspectives on Bottom-Up Policy Reform .......................................................... 34
Table 3.1 Summary of the Various Concepts across Constructivism and SCT in Comparison to the
   Proposed Identity-Based Approach .................................................................................................. 74
Table 4.1 Distribution of Dependent Variables and Quoted Versus Official Aid Figures ..................... 101
Table 4.2 Percentage of World Values Survey Respondents who Support Foreign Aid When
   Measured as Aid Endorsement and Willingness to Sacrifice .......................................................... 102
Table 4.3 Wording of the Schwartz Values Items in the WVS ............................................................ 110
Table 4.4 Operationalisation of Individual-Level Variables and Summary Statistics for Pooled Data
   .......................................................................................................................................................... 113
Table 5.1 Correlations Between Development Policy Indicators ............................................................ 139
Table 5.2 Factor loadings and Uniqueness Based on a Principle Factor Analysis with Orthogonal
   Rotation for 14 Policy Indicators Relevant to the PCD Doctrine (N=21) ........................................... 143
Table 5.3 Correlations Between Development Policy Indices ............................................................... 145
Table 5.4 Development Policy Regime Clusters ..................................................................................... 147
Table 5.5 Development Policy Typology Compared to Esping-Andersen’s Welfare Typology ................ 151
Table 6.1 Personal Identities Predicting Aid Endorsement Within Different Donor States Using
   Odds Ratios ........................................................................................................................................ 160
Table 6.2 Personal Identities Predicting 'Prioritise Reducing World Poverty' Within Different Donor
   States Using Linear Regression Coefficients .................................................................................. 162
Table 6.3 Personal Identities Predicting Willingness to Sacrifice Within Different Donor States
   Using Odds Ratios .......................................................................................................................... 164
Table 6.4 Personal Identities Predicting 'Willingness to Pay Higher Tax for Environment' Within
   Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios ..................................................................................... 166
Table 6.5 Social Identities Predicting Aid Endorsement Within Different Donor States Using Odds
   Ratios ................................................................................................................................................ 168
Table 6.6 Social Identities Predicting Willingness to Sacrifice Within Different Donor States Using Odds
   Ratios ................................................................................................................................................ 170
Table 6.7 Personal and Social Identities Predicting Aid Endorsement Within Different Donor States
   Using Odds Ratios .......................................................................................................................... 173
Table 6.8 Personal and Social Identities Predicting Willingness to Sacrifice Within Different Donor
   States Using Odds Ratios ................................................................................................................ 175
Table 6.9 Comparison of Personal and Social Identity Effects in Separate and Combined Models
Table 7.1 Personal and Social Identity Interactions
Table 7.2 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Sacrifice with Personal-Social Identity Interactions
Table 7.3 Social and State Identity Interactions
Table 7.4 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Sacrifice with Social-State Identity Interactions
Table 8.1 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Sacrifice with Identity Framing Interactions
Table 8.2 Correlation Coefficients for Average Circulation of Daily Newspapers Per Capita
Table 2.A The Potential for Bias in the WVS Data Due to Variation in the Mode of Data Collection
Table 2.B Pairwise Correlations Between Value Types and Demographic Variables
Table 2.C Regression Estimates for 'Life Satisfaction' (Ipsatized Values)
Table 2.D Correlation Matrix for all Dependent and Independent Variables at the Individual-Level
(Non-Ipsatized Values)
Table 2.E Mean Scores for Individual-Level Variables by Country (Non-Ipsatized Values)
Table 2.F Raw Data on Policy Discourse Proxies
Table 2.G Sources of Country-Level Data on Policy Discourses
Table 3.A Sources of Country-Level Data on State Identities
Table 5.A Variable Definitions and Sources of Data for Additional Analyses
Chapter 1. Introduction

I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals (Dahl, 1971, p. 1).

The world economy is shaped like a pyramid with approximately two billion people living in developed countries and five billion people living in developing countries. Developed countries enjoy high living standards and developing countries have medium to low living standards. Aside from moral concerns about global inequality, developed and developing countries alike would benefit from a flatter, less hierarchical world economy. This is because better health, education, opportunities for meaningful work, and a cleaner and safer environment in developing countries means increased social stability, economic growth, and food and climate security for the entire world. Yet despite this compelling reason to share their wealth (including access to markets, finance, services, technology and knowledge), the numerous commitments developed countries have made to this effect have been differentially fulfilled. In particular, whenever international agreement is reached on a policy standard to reduce global poverty, especially in relation to the provision of financial and technical assistance known as foreign aid, a few developed countries will meet or exceed the standard while the majority will fall short.¹

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Oxfam, and global governance organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), have often been successful at putting global poverty on the agenda of high-level international meetings, such as at the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles. However, they have largely failed to ensure that the promises world leaders make to address global poverty are implemented when they return home. It is widely recognised that democratically-elected leaders will only act when they feel political pressure from the citizens that they represent. However, attempts to establish a broad-based anti-poverty constituency have so far been ineffective. Even the mass public protests that took place around the world in 2005, in

¹ According to the World Bank, poverty is ‘pronounced deprivation in well-being’. Well-being may be defined as an adequate minimum level of consumption, specific types of consumption (such as housing), and key capabilities to function in society (such as education) (Haughton & Khandker, 2009, chapter 1).
response to the Make Poverty History campaign, were not sufficient to bring about substantive policy reforms in most developed democracies.

How should campaigners appeal to public opinion in order to promote bottom-up (citizen-led) policy reform? My thesis is that bottom-up policy reform requires an understanding of the cognitive connections that people make between the type of person they think they are and what they believe is important, and how these connections are constructed differently in different countries because of the institutions that govern society. ‘Institutions’ are defined here not as organisations that do things (such as the UN) but rather as political, economic and social systems that structure people’s choice and therefore generate self-reinforcing patterns of behaviour. These systems may be formal (such as laws and elections) or informal (such as markets and foreign policy norms) (North, 1991).

I argue that any analysis of the cognitive drivers of political mobilisation must be grounded in the context of the institutions that promote the status quo. Institutions create everyday experiences (such as immigration control) that become taken-for-granted and, therefore, shape society’s logic. Eventually, alternative experiences (such as open borders) may not only seem illogical, they may even be unimaginable. However, new ways of thinking and acting do sometimes take root and political change does happen. This dissertation is therefore concerned with understanding how public support for foreign aid is motivated within the context of existing aid policies. In broader terms, the dissertation seeks to extend current thinking on ways of increasing the adherence of countries to international policy agreements, thereby assisting global governance organisations in the management of problems that affect all of humanity.

Section 1.1 of this chapter sets out the motivation for the current research and outlines the argument. Section 1.2 introduces the concept of identity which underpins the theoretical model. Section 1.3 goes on to explain the problem that this dissertation seeks to address – namely the fact that many global policy commitments are never fully implemented. I narrow my focus on the unevenly met commitments of developed countries to increase spending on foreign aid. Section 1.4 gives a summarised account of existing scholarship into the determinants of cross-national aid policy variation. This section also points out that mobilising public opinion to hold donor governments to account for the quality and quantity of their aid is increasingly seen as a promising alternative to top-down (international-led) strategies. However, the evidence for doing so effectively is lacking. Finally, Section 1.5 runs through the structure of the dissertation, as it is laid out in the chapters that follow.
1.1 Motivation and Argument

The idea for this dissertation came when I was undertaking a Masters in International Public Health in 2004. I was taught that at a UN meeting in 2000, leaders from 189 countries committed to a set of eight interwoven development goals to be achieved by 2015. These so called ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) include: end poverty and hunger (Goal 1), universal education (Goal 2), gender equality (Goal 3), child health (Goal 4), maternal health (Goal 5), combat HIV/AIDS (Goal 6), environmental sustainability (Goal 7), and global partnership (Goal 8).

Developing countries agreed responsibility for achieving the first seven goals and developed countries agreed responsibility for achieving the eighth goal. Goal 8 essentially requires developed countries to support the other seven goals through increases in foreign aid, debt relief, open trade, a fairer financial system, affordable medicines, and technology transfers.

When I learnt that the MDGs were preceded by a host of similar international agreements that had all failed, it struck me that the world has long known how to end global poverty, and that there is very little disagreement about the importance of taking action, but the political will to implement international policy commitments is missing. My sentiment was later echoed in a 2007 article in 'The Economist' which reported that the UN family appears to be better at making goals than meeting them. In 1977 in Argentina, the world urged itself to provide safe water and sanitation for all by the end of the 1980s. In 1990 the UN renewed the call, extending the deadline to the end of the century. In 1978 in what is now Kazakhstan, governments promised “health for all” by 2000. In 1990 in Thailand, they called for universal primary schooling by 2000, a goal pushed back to 2015 ten years later (The Economist, 2007).

It occurred to me that a lack of political will has impeded international cooperation to solve other global problem such as climate change, fish stock depletion and financial instability. On the whole, the solutions to these problems are known, and governments have agreed in international forums to do their fair share, but sovereign states inevitably act in their own interests. Given that the decisions of democratically-elected governments are, by definition, responsive to the preferences of citizens, I became interested in the role of public opinion in shaping global public policy outputs. I discovered that scholars, policy practitioners and activists increasingly deem

\[\text{2 V.O. Key (1961, p. 14) defines public opinion as ‘those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed’}.\]
interventions in domestic politics necessary to ensure that governments fulfil their commitments to the international community. Thus far, however, an effective framework for promoting bottom-up policy reform has been lacking.

This dissertation examines why citizens do or do not support aid-giving within the context of existing aid policies. Although foreign aid is only one aspect of Goal 8 of the MDGs, the research findings are a window on how to mobilise public pressure on political elites to take action on a whole range of global problems. I argue that progress towards establishing an evidence-based framework for promoting bottom-up policy reform has hitherto been limited by philosophical idealism and descriptive (rather than explanatory) research. Indeed, within political science, theoretical models to understand how public support for aid is motivated either have weak predictive power because they assume citizens are rational, or they are absent of mechanisms to promote change because they assume citizens are slaves to cultural norms. I argue that we have reached this dead-end because mainstream definitions of democracy confuse aggregate individual preferences with collective preferences when in fact the policy preferences of citizens may be different at different ecological levels.

When it comes to abstract foreign policy issues such as international agreements to address global poverty, policy-making is far removed from the vicissitudes of election politics. Aid policy generally receives cross-party support in aid donor states so there is little policy debate for citizens to engage in, leading to mass disengagement. In addition, citizens generally do not feel personally affected by non-crisis foreign policy outputs such as foreign aid and trade so they have no way of assessing the ‘correctness’ of policy choices. However, international relations scholarship suggests that a lack of direct citizen participation in policy-making does not necessarily equate to a lack of influence. Through their experience of institutions, such as the state’s education and welfare systems, as well as the state’s foreign policy norms, citizens and political elites are equally encultured in ideas about the state in which they live. These ideas include the boundaries of citizenship and the rules regarding acceptable behaviours and practices. Foreign policy outputs are therefore legitimate because they are the instantiation of a collective logic. To this end, alternative choices would require a redefinition of the rules and practices of the state in order to be perceived as feasible.

This conceptualisation of public opinion as a broad social force represents a more realistic democratic theory than the modern ideal that the median voter decides foreign policy. However, it means that individuals cannot vary in their policy preferences. Moreover, because public opinion
and policy outputs are co-created, change cannot occur. That is, foreign policy outputs are the instantiation of a collective logic which arises from the habitual experience of foreign policy norms. Social psychology offers a useful way out of this tautology with the theory that people sometimes think of themselves as a unique individual (for example, a caring person) and at other times as a member of a group (for example, a Labor Party voter) depending on the situation at hand. This helps them to make appropriate choices even without a lot of information because they subconsciously conform to whatever stereotype they have applied to themselves at the time (for example, caring people stereotypically support foreign aid so a person who thinks of themselves as caring is likely to support foreign aid). However, stereotype constructions vary according to the cultural context. Therefore, I argue that combining international relations and social psychology creates the potential to theorise a democratic system in which citizens may implicitly contribute to collective anti-aid sentiment even when they or the social group they belong to ostensibly supports foreign aid.

Within this integrated framework, the aim for anti-poverty campaigners is to decrease the shared logic of foreign policy by encouraging people to evaluate policy choices through a more personal lens – creating a narrative about what foreign policy means for the way citizens see themselves as individuals and sub-national group members. Catalysed political pressure from individuals and social groups may force reforms that eventually remake the institutions that shape collective policy preferences, thereby sustaining the policy change in the longer term. However, increasing the perceived relevance of foreign policy to individual and group stereotypes is only half the story. People acquire tools of interpretation from institutions so institutions structure their action orientations in consistent ways (such as what it means to be caring). In other words, dissimilar actors are likely to produce similar behaviours because the existing reality has a sort of habitual power over their preferences (Sending, 2002). Therefore, I argue that campaigners also need to shift the boundaries of what counts as normal foreign policy through direct lobbying, so that over time a new reality is accepted as logical.

In pursuit of an authentic story about how campaigners can ‘anchor international cooperation at the national level’ (Kaul, 2001), this dissertation puts forward a new theoretical model of public support for foreign aid that is relevant to political science but based on insights from different disciplines. The cross-discipline perspective takes an existing theory of individual and group behaviour from social psychology that is chiefly supported by simplistic laboratory experiments, and integrates it with an international relations perspective of state behaviour that convincingly
explains the existing policy reality. Model integration is centred on the concept of identity. In simple terms, identity is defined as individual or collective self-understanding in relation to others and systems of meaning-making. The outcome of this integration is a new conceptual model of citizens interacting with their policy environment which helps to explain the dynamics of policy change and policy stability.

1.2 The Concept of Identity

The concept of identity underpins the proposed theoretical model. Identity is a contested concept that has different meanings in different contexts. Identity in everyday society usually relates to verification that a person is who they say they are. In academia, identity as a variable encompasses a range of normative views, theoretical frameworks, and analytical methods to describe and explain the behaviour of individuals, groups, organisations and states (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006). The diverse range of academic conceptualisations of identity share two common threads: (1) identities cannot meaningfully exist if they are not distinctive because they emerge from boundaries or rules that separate stimuli; and (2) the content of an identity is a function of differentiation within a system of relations. To this end, the substance (material or immaterial) that makes actors and objects recognisable (specific and unique) is an expression of the system.

Why is the concept of identity useful for establishing a framework for bottom-up policy reform? Despite the misgivings of some that identity means everything and so means nothing (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), the concept bridges the social sciences and can therefore provide new insights into the politics of international cooperation. In particular, it facilitates the integration of social psychology and international relations. These disciplines use the concept to respectively explain patterns of citizen and state behaviour. For both disciplines, identity is a source of action and a nexus of relations, creating opportunities for change and constraints on change. When analyses of citizen and state behaviour are contained within their disciplinary silos, the democratic dimension of foreign policy is no more than a philosophical ideal; when integrated, a testable model emerges of citizens shaping foreign policy as they are shaped by it. Empowerment then becomes about

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3 A Google Scholar search in December 2011 found the term ‘identity’ appeared in the title of 140,000 articles within ‘social sciences, arts and humanities’ alone. This result highlights the popularity of the concept amongst social scientists despite, or perhaps because of, its ambiguity.
more than individuals in a political struggle; the institutions that set the boundaries of those struggles are also important.⁴

Within political science, identity is vaguely defined as interdependent (shared fate) or common-interest groups. In other words, identities are narratives that the oppressed either define or fight against (Whitebrook, 2001). Hence, the term ‘identity politics’ refers to the process whereby political elites appeal to voters by raising their consciousness of divisive social categories such as race, gender and sexuality. Irrespective of whether the interests that define such groups are realistic or symbolic, identity is not conditional on attachment to the group. As such, political scientists use the concept of identity to understand relationships between the self and the political system, rather than to understand public opinion about policy issues which is explained in terms of beliefs, ideologies, values, and ideas.

Within social psychology, self-categorization theory (SCT) distinguishes between social identity and personal identity. Social identity is defined as self-awareness of a group membership combined with psychological attachment to the group. Personal identity is defined as self-awareness as an individual with certain unique characteristics.⁵ Thus, identity is seen as a cognitive concept that is dependent on a subjective sense of belonging or identification. This is thought to determine coherent collective action as conformity to group goals is driven by an empowering sense of group membership rather than the desire for group acceptance. The content and meaning of an identity is also important in SCT. For example, the ‘minority’ racial identity in the United States (US) has more political content than the ‘African American’ racial identity. However, what it means to self-identify as a minority in terms of stereotypical behaviours has changed with shifts in wider cultural practices. Indeed, the Black Power movement of the late 1960s and 1970s that sought to advance black interests and black values has largely been replaced with targeted positive discrimination programs that benefit blacks, Latinos and other minorities (Huddy, 2003).

⁴ Of course the ease of enacting political behaviour is another factor determining citizen mobilisation. However, my argument is that the desire to take action in the first place is rooted in identity. This is especially the case when taking action has no tangible personal consequence, such as pro-environmental actions (Leary, Toner, & Gan, 2011).
⁵ There are other identity theories in social psychology that are not discussed here because they are not relevant to the current research model, such as ‘identity theory’ and ‘social identity theory’. Unlike these other identity theories, SCT accounts for both private and public aspects of human life in terms of the same principle, i.e., variable self-perception (McGarty, Lala, & Douglas, 2011). It also makes a diversity of behaviour possible because identities are context-dependent (N. Hopkins & Reicher, 2011). Hence it allows me to link the analysis of citizen and state behaviour in social psychology and international relations respectively, without one-to-one correspondence.
Within international relations, where the unit of analysis is states, the constructivist perspective defines state identities as shared ideas about the ‘self’ and ‘other’ at the international level. This definition encapsulates two parallel processes. The first is mutual referencing between states. For example, the US sees itself as a democracy in relation to other democratic and authoritarian states. The second is self-referencing by political elites according to cultural norms. For example, democratic institutions in the US are the foundation for policy-makers to legitimate and make sense of foreign policy. These intersubjective and intrinsic aspects of the state identity concept make it distinct from the national identity concept in SCT which is a group identity at the state level. SCT theorists argue that collective behaviour is based on individual agents seeing themselves as group members regardless of territorial structures (such as diasporas), whereas constructivists maintain that analyses of individuals cannot explain how social forces create interests and shape society (F. B. Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Finnemore, 1996). As such, constructivist research in international relations is directed toward understanding how a state’s identity legitimates foreign policy, and how foreign policy legitimates the state’s identity. This includes identifying the values, norms and ideas that explain patterns of behaviour in the international system. Constructivists argue that these patterns are produced by, and then reproduce, state identities.

Despite the insights offered by political science, social psychology and international relations in terms of how individuals, groups and states behave, each of these disciplines suffers limitations. Political science is more adept than social psychology or international relations at understanding the convergence of cognitive processes and social structures. However, the political science concept of identity provides little guidance for formulating a framework for bottom-up policy reform because identity is ascribed rather than acquired. Equally, SCT contends that identities motivate people to make a difference through collective action but the evidence-base is largely confined to groups in laboratory experiments. Such settings are devoid of the influence of institutions which give identities political meaning. Furthermore, as few SCT scholars have been interested in the actions of voters as independent decision-makers, methods for studying personal identities (as opposed to social identities) are underdeveloped. Finally, the usefulness of the constructivist state-centric model of policy outputs is that it captures the idea that institutions recreate themselves by structuring the preferences of citizens. However, the problem with constructivism in relation to bottom-up mobilisation is that citizens cannot hold preferences outside their cultural box. Thus, identity change cannot be detected, let alone promoted (Zehfuss, 2002).
I propose to use the concept of identity as a central organising theme to establish a more holistic theoretical model from which to study the behaviour of individual voters, social groups and states than political science, social psychology or international relations offers alone. As the theoretical model that I put forward draws on established identity concepts, I refer to it as an ‘identity-based approach’. The model integrates and elaborates SCT and the constructivist perspective in international relations, which in turn brings out the relevance of both to politics. A third literature is incorporated in order to strengthen the political dimension of what is principally a psychological and sociological model of policy change and policy stability. The values literature – which is also from social psychology but typically isolated from the SCT literature – is used to operationalise individual voter identities. This is deemed necessary to apply the model to electoral processes. I argue that electoral processes are the point at which the theoretical tensions between SCT and constructivism can be overcome. Thus, the identity-based approach makes it possible to understand why citizens in wealthy democratic countries support or do not support aid-giving within the context of their government’s existing aid policies.

1.3 Background to the Problem

More than ever the world’s prosperity and security is interdependent. It is no longer the case that finance, trade, food production, disease and communications are easily contained within state borders. This was highlighted during the ‘global financial crisis’ of 2008-2009, the ‘world food crisis’ of 2007-2008, and the ‘swine flu’ pandemic of 2009. International problems that require international solutions are known as global public goods (GPGs).

Why focus on the issue of foreign aid? Foreign aid is a highly visible aspect of the MDGs and the MDGs are one of the most widely endorsed GPG to be codified by the UN. Therefore, foreign aid is an issue that is narrow enough to be manageable from a research perspective, yet it has wider relevance to draw lessons for a whole range of cooperation agreements that have not been equally implemented by the relevant parties.

In this section I explain that, in the absence of a world government that has authority over sovereign states, simply getting state leaders to pledge action during international meetings is unlikely to lead to greater international cooperation. In fact, this conventional top-down model of global governance has thus far proved ineffective, particularly in the area of foreign aid, suggesting that a deeper understanding of the determinants of policy implementation is needed for the sake of all humanity.
By definition GPGs have two core elements: (1) GPGs provide indivisible benefits to humanity as a whole; and (2) the production of GPGs depends on collective international action (Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999). A classic example of a GPG is climate change mitigation. Scientists contend that global carbon emissions must be sharply reduced in order to prevent disastrous disruptions to the planet’s climate (IPPC, 2007). However, it is not possible for a single country to maintain a safe climate within its borders simply by reducing its own emissions. The global level of atmospheric carbon is critical to the wellbeing of the entire planet. Thus, a majority of countries need to act cooperatively in order to bring down overall emissions (N. H. Stern, 2007). If such actions are successful, then no country can be excluded from enjoying a stable climate, and one country’s enjoyment cannot reduce another country’s level of enjoyment. These non-rival and non-excludable benefits distinguish public goods from private goods.

The MDGs are articulated as GPGs. The UN has stated that ‘for the billion-plus people living in extreme poverty, they [the MDGs] represent the means to a productive life, for everyone on Earth, they are a linchpin to the quest for a more secure and peaceful world’ (UN Millennium Project, 2005, p. 2). Indeed, because poverty in developing countries increases the threat of regional conflict, trade and investment insecurity, and mass migration, but also because freedom from poverty is a universal human right, there is broad agreement that eliminating global poverty in all its forms is a GPG (Sandler & Arce, 2007). To this end, a key point of difference between the MDGs and previous anti-poverty agreements is that they are formulated as a partnership between developing and developed countries. The MDGs bind both poor countries and rich countries ‘to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty’ (United Nations, 2000).

The fundamental problem with all GPGs is that the benefits each state enjoys are not proportional to their contribution. Therefore, some states may do the bulk of the heavy lifting in return for the same benefits as other states that contributed less or were ‘free-riders’. When actors know they will receive the same benefits as everyone else, regardless of whether and how much they contribute to producing a public good, they tend not to contribute. In addition to experimental evidence (Batina & Ihori, 2005), there are abundant real life examples of the ‘free-rider problem’, including in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, biodiversity protection, and universal human rights (Albin, 2003; Sampford, 2002).

The formalisation of GPGs takes place in global governance organisations such as the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and more recently the G20 (Group of twenty finance ministers and central bank governors). In these settings governments come together to negotiate the rules that will advance GPGs. ‘Global governance’ is defined here as the transnational rules and processes that regulate the behaviour of individual states and interactions between them. As mentioned previously, the global governance architecture lacks a central authority so it is largely procedural. Global governance is therefore fundamentally a political project toward greater international cooperation.\(^6\)

Apart from the WTO, global governance organisations do not have any real capacity to enforce agreed rules concerning GPGs. That is, they all lack effective mechanisms to sanction or punish states that fail to meet their obligations. Eveline Herfkens, coordinator of the UN MDGs Campaign, said at a 2005 conference held in Rome: ‘These leaders sign agreements during meetings away from home and after that they take planes back home. We at the UN have a problem with this because we cannot enforce these agreements’ (Mulama, 2005). This highlights that the main obstacle to promoting GPGs is not a lack of agreement about their necessity but rather insufficient and inconsistent policy implementation. This has been referred to as the ‘word-deeds gap’ (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009).

As with other GPGs, despite strong international agreement on the importance of achieving the MDGs, the world is now nearing the 2015 deadline and there remains a significant lack of progress across and within many poor countries. In both the scope of the goals and the number of countries that are signatories, the MDGs represent the most ‘broadly supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets the world has ever established’ (UN Millennium Project, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, at the 2005 UN World Summit, governments reaffirmed their support for the Goals (United Nations, 2005). However, notwithstanding the extremely positive results that have been seen in China and other large developing nations, the gains in many African and Pacific

\(^6\) Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, provides a useful definition of global governance in a speech he gave at the Bocconi University in Milan on 9 November 2009: ‘What do I mean by global governance? For me global governance describes the system we set up to assist human society to achieve its common purpose in a sustainable manner, that is, with equity and justice. Growing interdependence requires that our laws, our social norms and values, our mechanisms for framing human behaviour be examined, debated, understood and operated together as coherently as possible. This is what would provide the basis for effective sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions’.  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl142_e.htm
Island states have been dismal. In addition, some MDGs such as gender equality (Goal 3) have been neglected across most developing countries (UN Millennium Project, 2005).

This has prompted a number of world leaders, including the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, to point the finger at developed countries for failing to provide developing countries with the financial support that is deemed necessary to cover the capital and operating costs of MDG interventions. To a large extent, the development sector has interpreted Goal 8 as a commitment by developed countries to provide adequate and dependable supplies of foreign aid to pay for the other goals. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to addressing the broader problem of the word-deeds gap by focusing on the specific issue of foreign aid.

Developed countries have long been accused of making empty commitments to increase spending on aid. For example, a report by Oxfam International (2005) entitled ‘Paying the Price: Why Rich Countries Must Invest Now in a War on Poverty’ provides a comprehensive account of the failure of world leaders to deliver on their aid-giving rhetoric since 1970. There are many types of aid, including military aid and disaster assistance. The aid referred to throughout this dissertation is ‘Official Development Assistance’ (ODA). Formally, ODA is defined as finance for developing countries that is concessional in character, consists of a grant element worth at least 25 percent, and that is intended to promote the welfare of developing counties (OECD, 2003). In other words, ODA is long-term financial assistance that is intended to reduce global poverty.

Transferring wealth from rich countries to poor countries in the form of foreign aid is not the only way to address global poverty. In fact, some scholars argue that foreign aid impacts negatively on development (most prominently, Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). However, a majority of development experts contend that if the aid system were reformed to make it more generous and effective, aid could lift the level of health, education and infrastructure in poor countries that is necessary to produce economic growth (for example, Millennium Villages, 2010; Negin, 2010; Watkins, 2009; Whitfield, 2009).

Calls for more and better aid are predominately directed at the governments of the 22 member states of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. This is because, despite the rise of China and the Arab states in international development, over 90 percent of official aid is provided by DAC member governments (OECD, 2008d). Moreover, the DAC’s raison d’être is to

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7 On 1 January 2010 Korea joined the DAC but as a very new member it is not included in this dissertation.
lead international development best practice. This is underscored by the fact that DAC members have endorsed a host of strategies to improve the effectiveness of their aid, including the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. These aid policy ‘roadmaps’ complement the MDGs to which all DAC members are signatories. Therefore, DAC governments face continual pressure from the OECD, the UN, developing countries, NGOs, churches, and even other DAC governments, to honour their aid obligations. Nevertheless, for more than half a century DAC members have varied in their ‘aid effort’.

Aid effort is typically measured against the UN’s aid spending target. In 1970 the UN General Assembly agreed that wealthy nations should allocate 0.7 percent of their gross national income (GNI) to ODA. The target has been reaffirmed at various UN meetings since, including at the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, and at the 2002 Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey. It has also been incorporated into Goal 8 of the MDGs.

Although most development experts believe that giving more aid will not address global poverty unless it is also more effective (for example, Collier & Dollar, 2001; Thiele, Nunnenkamp, & Dreher, 2007), the 0.7 percent aid target has become the key measure by which to judge whether DAC members are contributing their fair share to the achievement of the MDGs. This is perhaps because of the aid target’s simplicity compared to some of the other MDG targets which are more open to interpretation, such as Target 12: ‘Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system’ (Millennium Project, 2002-2006). In addition, 0.7 percent of GNI for most DAC governments is extremely affordable, especially given that ‘total ODA for 2002 was only around one-quarter of what the world spent on tobacco’ (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007, p. 137). Oxfam (2008) have calculated that ‘The cost to France of meeting its aid promises is just only [sic] 127 € per person, just under half what the average citizen spends on perfume’.

Top-down pressure has made little difference to the implementation of the 0.7 percent aid target. Figure 1.1 shows marked variation in aid-giving across the DAC members at different points during the past fifteen years. What is most apparent is the rigid position each state has taken in terms of their aid-giving generosity. The two least generous donors in 2007 (Greece and the US) allocated

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8 The 0.7 percent aid target officially constitutes Indicator No. 33 under Goal 8 of the MDGs.
9 The dramatic increase in Austria’s aid effort in 2007 is explained by earlier postponements in debt forgiveness which is calculated as ODA. In the case of Luxembourg, legislation passed in 1996
only 0.16 percent of their GNI for ODA, whereas the two most generous donors (Norway and Sweden) allocated 0.95 percent and 0.93 percent respectively. Other indicators of donor commitment to eliminating global poverty similarly show significant and persistent cross-national variation (Alliance2015, 2005; Center for Global Development, 2010; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).

freed aid finance from annual budgeting constraints which allowed Luxembourg’s longstanding commitment to the 0.7% aid target to be achieved – a sentiment it continues to uphold. Irish and Spanish spending rises coincided with improvements in their capacity to give after joining the European Union but are now on the decline in response to the Euro debt crisis.
Figure 1.1 The Stability of DAC Member States’ Official Development Assistance as a Percentage of Gross National Income Over Time

Net ODA as percentage of OECD/DAC donors GNI

Source: UNdata (2009)
Given that the 0.7 percent aid target is clearly ascribed to 22 developed countries, it is longstanding, it is affordable, and performance is easily measured, it exemplifies the failure of the conventional top-down model of global governance. Closing the word-deeds gap in relation to DAC members reaching the 0.7 percent aid target therefore has wider applicability to the MDGs, as well to GPGs more generally such as climate change mitigation and nuclear non-proliferation (Refer to Figure 1.2). Moreover, the fact that some donors (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) actually exceed the 0.7 percent aid target while others (the US, Greece and Japan) fall far short suggests that the free-rider proposition is overly simplistic – something else is driving aid effort. The next section of this chapter discusses the role of public opinion in global governance.

**Figure 1.2 Narrowing the Dissertation Focus to Address the Problem of Global Governance**
1.4 The Promise of Public Opinion

During the Cold War Era almost all aid was given for political ends. Since then aid has increasingly been used to fund GPGs such as the MDGs (Sandler & Arce, 2007). However, the extent to which aid is distributed to the most needy varies from donor-to-donor (Baulch, 2006). As such, various disciplines – most notably politics, economics and international relations – have keenly sought to understand the macro determinants of variation in the quantity and quality of DAC bilateral aid.

Despite significant data limitations, a number of studies have attempted to investigate the role public opinion plays in shaping foreign aid allocations, such as Hicks, Parks, Roberts, and Tierney (2008); McDonnell, Solignac-Lecomte, and Wegimont (2003b); Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Stern (1998); and Olsen (2001). The results of these studies present a mixed picture. However, other (mostly US) studies which have looked at the impact of aggregate public preferences on foreign policies more generally, are optimistic that public opinion does matter (for example, Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006; Eichenberg & Stoll, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Shapiro & Page, 1988).

As all DAC governments are democratically-elected, public opinion has become the Holy Grail for many development experts. In fact, aid critics (Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009) and aid advocates (DEF, 2007; McDonnell et al., 2003b; Sachs, 2005) alike see public opinion as a legitimate mechanism for reforming the aid system. Moreover, as top-down pressure has proved ineffective for promoting aid policy reform, the promise of a bottom-up policy enforcement mechanism has not gone unnoticed by global governance organisations such as the UN and OECD. In fact, by setting out eight clear goals that can easily be communicated to the public, the MDGs are not only ‘framework for development’, but also ‘benchmarks against which to judge success’ (Dodd & Cassels, 2006, p. 379). In other words, citizens of both rich and poor countries are encouraged to

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10 Some authors counter that aid for development is a form of redistribution and that ‘financing for global public goods is increasingly crowding out development assistance’ (Kaul & Le Goulven, 2003, p. 331).

11 The literature points to various factors including: the ideological preferences of political parties (Noël & Thérien, 2008; Thérien & Noël, 2000); the strength of domestic lobby groups (Lahiri & Raimondos-Møller, 2000); the level of donor social capital (Knowles, 2007); displacement effects from developing country imports (Lundsgaarde, Breunig, & Prakash, 2007) and private aid donations (Schweinberger & Lahiri, 2006); the strategic (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Schraeder, Taylor, & Hook, 1998) and normative (Abrams & Lewis, 1993; Bergman, 2007; Hook, 2008; Lumsdaine, 1993; Noël & Thérien, 1995) interests of donors; the nature of donor institutions (Burall, White, & Blick, 2009; Faust, 2008; Round & Odedokun, 2004); and media attention to the needs of developing countries (A. C. Drury, Olson, & Van Belle, 2005; Potter & Van Belle, 2004).
use the MDGs to hold their governments to account. To this end, as part of the core MDG strategy, the UN initiated the Millennium Campaign in 2002 to raise public awareness of the MDGs and to facilitate citizen involvement in making the MDGs a political reality.

Despite significant uncertainty about the extent of public influence on aid policy outputs, the OECD argues that greater awareness of the MDGs by OECD citizens is critical for sustaining the political will of OECD governments to meet their international commitments. One OECD publication asserts

Citizens in OECD countries unambiguously support more solidarity and justice at the international level: if they were better educated and more informed regarding global development issues, they could provide informed, critical support to reformers in their countries, so as to foster more vigorous, more efficient and coherent development co-operation policies (Mc Donnell et al., 2003b, p. 10).

Another OECD publication makes the claim that

An important reason why public opinion and attitudes fail to influence policy making in this area is precisely that, with a few exceptions, public awareness and understanding about global development and poverty issues remains very shallow (Mc Donnell, Solignac-Lecomte, & Wegimont, 2003a, p. 14, original emphasis).

These statements reveal an implicit assumption on the part of global governance organisations that citizens are rational but poorly informed (and therefore ineffective) participants in the political economy. This assumption also permeates a majority of campaigns by anti-poverty NGOs. For example, InterAction – a coalition of US-based international development organisations – initiated a ‘Just one percent’ campaign to combat foreign aid cuts in 1994-1995. The idea was to inform the American public that government spending on aid constituted only a tiny fraction of the federal budget.

A similar awareness-raising approach is seen in advocacy efforts related to other GPGs such as climate change mitigation. An obvious example is Al Gore’s popular 2006 documentary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ which presented scientific facts about human-induced climate change. The ‘Inconvenient Truth model’ has now been adopted by an aid advocacy group named the ‘Global Poverty Project’. The Global Poverty Project is travelling the world with a 90 minute slideshow presentation on facts about extreme poverty entitled ‘1.4 billion reasons’. The objective of the
slideshow is to start an anti-poverty grassroots movement throughout the world which the Project hopes will convince all wealthy governments to spend 0.7 percent of their income on aid.\footnote{http://www.globalpovertyproject.com/}

It is not only global governance organisations and NGOs that are engaged in raising public awareness of development issues in order to close the MDGs word-deeds gap. Some donor governments are themselves concerned about shoring-up tax-payer support for their aid spending.\footnote{At a personal level, I am an employee of the Australian Government’s aid agency, AusAID, and one of our five key organisational goals is to involve the Australian community in the aid program in order to sustain tax-payer support for the government’s spending pledges.} In fact, all DAC governments allocate a proportion of their aid budget to public education about international agreements to eliminate global poverty, the need for development assistance, and aid effectiveness (Mc Donnell & Solignac-Lecomte, 2005). The belief that public scepticism about the effectiveness of aid will erode support for development assistance and force governments to cut spending is evident in a recent British parliamentary report:

> The effects of the economic downturn on donors and recipients could provide the necessary motivation to make more rapid progress on aid effectiveness. This would produce tangible benefits in the impact that existing aid levels have on poverty reduction as well as helping to maintain public support for development (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2009, p. 34).

Similarly, in 2012, a ‘Written declaration on development education and active global citizenship (0007/2012)’ was tabled in the European Parliament for members to sign.\footnote{http://citizens.concordeurope.org/} The declaration noted that ‘during periods marked by austerity, crises and the rise of nationalist and populist movements, it is particularly important to support active global citizenship’. Therefore, the declaration ‘Calls on the Commission and the Council to develop a long-term, cross-sectoral European strategy for development education, awareness-raising and active global citizenship’.

Despite genuine interest on the part of global governance organisations, anti-poverty campaigners, and some politicians in building a foreign aid constituency, few have questioned the assumptions underpinning conventional awareness-raising approaches. These are fundamental assumptions about how democracy works and about how people make choices. Given that implementing global public policies is critical to the world’s security and prosperity, if bottom-up pressure by citizens is to become an effective alternative to top-down pressure by the UN and
OECD, it is particularly important that efforts to mobilise public opinion are underpinned by empirical evidence so as to be as effective as possible. This is the starting point for the current research.

1.5 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation examines the drivers of public support for foreign aid in the context of cross-national variation in DAC members’ aid policies. ‘Support’ in this dissertation means support for increasing aid spending, and a willingness to pay higher taxes in order to increase aid levels. The dissertation is structured as follows.

In Chapter 2 I review the literature on bottom-up policy reform. I examine the reality of ‘policy reform’ processes in relation to three philosophical perspectives that are used to explain state behaviour in international relations. I examine the ‘bottom-up’ side of the ledger in relation to the two main political science approaches to understanding public attitudes to foreign aid. I conclude that the constructivist perspective in international relations offers a realistic picture of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy outputs but it is not matched to a theory of what motivates individual citizens to support foreign aid. This is because policy decisions and the state’s identity are conceptualised as two sides of the same coin – public opinion merely carries the cultural norms that contribute to, and are shaped by, the state’s identity. Therefore, I put forward self-categorization theory in social psychology to conceptualise public opinion at a different level of consciousness. SCT attributes individual and group behaviour to the personal and social identities that people create in their minds, on a context-by-context basis, in order to achieve goals and reduce anxiety about how to act and how others are likely to respond. The content of these identities depends on the characteristics that differentiate individuals from other individuals, or groups from other groups, in a given situation. However, it is because people conform to identity stereotypes that their actions are interpretable. Cultural norms determine the behaviours that are stereotypical of particular identities.

I formally integrate constructivism and SCT in Chapter 3 in order to establish a testable model of public support for foreign aid in the context of existing aid policies. The resultant identity-based approach to promoting bottom-up policy reform argues that day-to-day, public opinion does not directly influence non-crisis bipartisan foreign policy decisions such as foreign aid. Instead, policy decisions are made by political elites on the basis of cultural norms and the state’s image in the international system. However, when citizens see a link between approving or disapproving of the
state’s foreign policies and their personal and social identities, they become politically rather than culturally active in the policy-making process. This can lead to mass mobilisation and eventually policy reform. However, policy change is constrained because citizens use a process that I call ‘identity alignment’ to avoid being pulled in different directions by different identity stereotypes. I theorise that the more inclusive the identity, the more legitimate the stereotype. Therefore, because all citizens internalise the state identity through their everyday experience of state institutions, they align their personal and social identity-based policy preferences with the existing policy reality. Finally, I argue that supporting or disapproving of a policy becomes stereotypical of a particular identity when identity symbols and metaphors are repeatedly featured in policy discourses. I call this process ‘identity framing’ because it is adapted from the political science concept of ‘framing’.

Chapter 4 explains how I test the identity-based approach with a combination of survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and country-level statistics from the OECD and other sources. I compare public opinion in 13 DAC member states – each differs culturally and in aid-giving terms. Functional measures of personal and social identities are readily available in the WVS but a measure of DAC state identities does not exist. Therefore, this becomes the first empirical task. In addition, as SCT scholars have generally only been interested in studying social groups rather than individual voters, I draw on the values literature to operationalise personal identities. A quantitative research strategy is outlined, covering a variety of analyses that: firstly, establishes a measure of state identities; secondly, predicts the types of individual and group identities that support foreign aid; thirdly, tests the concept of identity alignment; and fourthly, tests the concept of identity framing. Several limitations pertaining to the methodology are discussed and addressed, paving the way for a robust cross-national comparison of the types of individuals, groups and states that support foreign aid and the factors that shape their support.

I dedicate Chapter 5 to establishing a quantitative measure of state identities which is critical to understanding interactions between the existing policy reality and public opinion. A state’s identity is defined by the normative foreign policies and practices that differentiate the state from other states in the international system. It would be tautological to infer pro- and anti-aid state identities from cross-national aid policy variation. Therefore, for as many DAC member states as data are available, I identify patterns within and between different policy domains that impact on global poverty (namely, aid, trade, debt, foreign direct investment, and migration). Fourteen policy indicators are reduced down to three distinct approaches to reducing global poverty. Nineteen out
of 21 states are found to clearly favour one kind of approach. As policy actions to reduce global poverty are ultimately about justice, I interpret the justice norms that underpin each approach. This forms a simple three category state identity variable which allows identity alignment to be analysed more easily. Overlap with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three category welfare regime typology suggests that persistent policy divergence amongst the DAC member states in regard to international cooperation on global poverty is legitimate because states pursue the same justice norms at home and abroad.

An investigation into the types of personal and social identities that are supportive of foreign aid across the 13 DAC member states is carried out in Chapter 6. I use logistic regression to analyse support for aid in each country separately. Although there is some variation in the results cross-nationally, there is a fair amount of consistency. In terms of personal identities, people who define themselves as someone who priorities universalism values (equality and solidarity) or benevolence values (caring for the community) consistently show higher levels of support for aid, whereas people who define themselves as someone who priorities security values or power values consistently show lower levels of support for aid. In terms of social identities, people who self-identify as left-wing, religious, or belonging to a humanitarian group consistently show higher levels of support for aid. In addition, the results show that personal and social identities independently impact on public support for aid which suggests that they operate at distinct levels of consciousness. Therefore, I conclude that campaigners can mobilise the existing aid reform constituency by encouraging people to focus on their pro-aid identities as this will potentially increase their stereotypical behaviour.

Chapter 7 follows by testing the effects of identity alignment on support for aid. I theorise that the multiple identities that comprise an individual’s self-concept are hierarchically aligned in their mind. Therefore, I argue that even though the three levels of identity (state, social and personal) originate from different disciplines, they should not be studied in isolation, as is commonly the case. I use logistic regression with interaction terms between different levels of identity to establish the moderation effects of higher order identities on the convictions of lower order identities. I find that when the aid-giving orientation of a lower order identity is congruent with the aid-giving orientation of a higher order identity, the conviction is stronger. Equally, when the aid-giving orientation of a lower order identity diverges from the aid-giving orientation of a higher order identity, the conviction is weaker. I argue that this process helps people to maintain a stable and coherent sense of self, which in turn helps communities to maintain common standards. For
campaigners, it suggests that encouraging a pro-aid orientation at different levels of identity can strengthen public commitment to aid-giving. Equally, bottom-up mobilisation may be constrained by the existing policy reality so direct lobbying to reform the policies that constitute an anti-aid state identity may be necessary to facilitate shifts in public opinion.

The effects of identity framing on support for aid are explored in Chapter 8. Three sources of national communication about global poverty and international development are hypothesised to contain identity frames which moderate the link between personal identities and support for aid. As news media tends to sensationalise coverage of foreign aid issues, the national consumption of news media is hypothesised to worsen the anti-aid sentiment associated with the security personal identity but the opposite is in fact found to be the case, suggesting that the media portray aid beneficiaries as weak and helpless. By comparison, government-funded development education is found to directly heighten the salience of the universalism personal identity which is normatively pro-aid. Finally, the poverty-reduction focus of aid policy under politically independent government aid agencies (versus non-independent) strengthens the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity. The findings challenge the current awareness-raising approach promoted by the UN and OECD which simply assumes that all information about global poverty and international development will have a positive impact on public support for aid. Instead, the presentation of information matters.

Although Chapters 5 through 8 discuss the implications of specific findings for mobilising public opinion, Chapter 9 reinforces the practical aspects of the research as a framework for promoting bottom-up policy reform. After placing the main findings in the context of existing knowledge and theory, I make recommendations for future work to address the research limitations. I conclude that the identity-based approach could become a new paradigm in global governance.
Chapter 2. Current Understanding of Bottom-Up Policy Reform

Man is not a rational animal, he is a rationalizing animal. Robert A. Heinlein, Assignment in Eternity, 1953

On 1 July 2012, the Australian Government introduced a tax on carbon emissions. Public opinion polls showed a majority of Australians were against the tax. Why? ‘According to Essential Research, more than half of voters believe the carbon price will increase fuel prices “a lot” when it will have no effect at all. Around 40% believe it will increase grocery prices “a lot”. Nearly a third think it will increase unemployment a lot; one in five think (contrarily) it will increase interest rates a lot’ (Keane, 2012). When interviewed by Sabra Lane on Radio Australia, Prime Minister Julie Gillard expressed confidence that her Government’s top-down reform would eventually gain bottom-up support simply though lived experience.

JULIA GILLARD: I think we will see people in the months to come working out what carbon pricing is meaning for them and working out what it is meaning for the nation.

Sabra, we've been through these kind of cycles in the past with big reforms that have been very controversial at the time, that now when people look back on them, people can't imagine that there was even ever a debate.

Medicare, universal superannuation, things that we wouldn't be without that we really identify as part of the experience of being Australian were incredibly controversial at the time. And now of course they are accepted by everyone, indeed they have become bipartisan politics because they are so accepted (Radio Australia, 2012).

According to the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’, democracy means ‘rule by the people. The term is derived from the Greek dēmokratia, which was coined from dēmos (“people”) and kratos (“rule”) in the middle of the 5th century BC’. In today’s parlance the term democracy is often used as shorthand for liberal democracy. ‘Liberal democracy’ is a particular theory of democracy that is derived from liberal philosophy. It assumes that foreign policy should be acutely responsive to changes in the preferences of the median voter and that humans are rational.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/157129/democracy
To establish an evidence-based framework for promoting bottom-up policy reform, it is critical to distinguish between democracy as a philosophical ideal, versus democracy as an analytical concept that is grounded in reality. Despite the fact that pollsters have measured levels of public support for aid-giving for around 50 years, many questions remain unanswered about the degree to which public opinion influences aid policy decisions, and how public support for aid is motivated in DAC member states. Do shifts in aid policy follow shifts in public opinion? Do beliefs about aid effectiveness drive peoples’ attitudes to aid-giving? These questions are at the heart of what we mean by democracy and the democratic dimension of foreign policy.

In this chapter I test the assumptions of liberal democracy – the responsiveness of policy-makers to public opinion and the rationality of public opinion – by reviewing the evidence on ‘bottom-up policy reform’. Section 2.1 explains that it is necessary to break down the concept into its constituent parts of ‘policy reform’ (a process) and ‘bottom-up’ (a mechanism) because the evidence is fragmented across different disciplines. In Section 2.2, I examine how policy reform happens according to the international relations literature on the determinants of state behaviour (foreign policy outputs). I then examine the ‘bottom-up’ side of the ledger in Section 2.3 according to the political science literature on the determinants of citizen support for foreign aid. When the evidence on the determinants of state behaviour and public opinion is put together, liberal democracy looks idealistic rather than realistic – citizens are not active and rational participants in the policy-making process. Therefore, I try to address the weaknesses of this picture in Section 2.4 by introducing two theories from social psychology. This sets up the next chapter which integrates the various pieces of the puzzle to formulate a testable and practical conceptual model of public support for aid in the context of existing aid policies.

2.1 Dissecting the Literature

This section outlines how the chapter parses current thinking on addressing the problem of mobilising public opinion to promote policy reform from the bottom-up. ‘Reform’ refers to the process of changing something, especially an institution or practice, in order to improve it.16 ‘Bottom-up policy’ refers to citizens as policy-makers and political elites as policy implementers. ‘Top-down policy’ operates the other way around. I review the literature on state behaviour and public opinion as if they are unrelated concepts because they are housed in analytical silos. This is

16 [http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reform](http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reform)
partly a ‘unit of analysis’ problem. For most international relations scholars the unit of analysis is states, whereas for public opinion scholars the unit of analysis is individuals.

Table 2.1 provides a visual breakdown of the literature reviewed in this chapter. I critique the three main perspectives of state behaviour in international relations, focusing on the degree to which their assumptions about the policy-making process are supported by evidence. Realism is about state survival in a state of anarchy (conflict is logical because cooperation is unreliable). Liberalism is about state survival through rational cooperation (states learn that international society can solve problems). Constructivism is about state survival in a constructed reality (logic is determined by shared meanings that are not pre-given but emerge from social interactions).  

I then critique the two main approaches to understanding public support for foreign aid in political science, focusing on their predictive power and practical usefulness in terms of offering campaigners levers for mobilising public opinion. The rationalist approach assumes that actors are motivated by self-interest and pragmatism. The moral judgement approach assumes that actors are motivated by intuitive (gut-feeling) judgements about right and wrong. By default, both approaches theoretically line up with the liberal perspective in international relations because liberalism assumes that the role of a government is to answer the rational will of its citizens. By comparison, realism favours top-down policy reform and constructivism disavows methodological individualism because it cannot capture shared meaning.

At the end of the chapter I conclude that the constructivist perspective in international relations is the most realistic conceptualisation of the determinants of state behaviour. I therefore put forward two theories from social psychology theory to fill in the bottom-up gap. This is depicted on the right hand side of Figure 2.1 with an arrow introducing self-categorization theory to the constructivist row (4). Schwartz’s theory of personal values is later used in Chapter 4 to operationalise citizens as independent voters within the proposed model. This is depicted in Figure 2.1 by the arrow extending from the bottom right hand box into the SCT row (5). The chapter concludes by recommending that the model be developed further so that it can be tested in the chapters that follow.

17 My critique of each school in Section 2.2 focuses on liberalism and constructivism because realism does not see any value in states giving aid unless it achieves power and influence over other states. ‘The question, for realists, is not “will both of us gain?” but “who will gain more?”’ (Drezner, 2008, p. 54). This is antithetical to the notion of financing GPGs.
Before proceeding, it must be noted that all references to ‘behaviour’ henceforth include both ‘attitudes’ and ‘behaviours’. In other words, attitudes are not mere verbal predispositions to perform subsequent behaviours (LaPiere, 2010). Instead, attitudes are themselves a type of behaviour. This is because behaviour can be divided into two categories: ‘what people say’ and ‘what people do other than say things’ (Sechrest, 2010).

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18 Across the social sciences, attitudes are evaluations that have three components: An affective component (feelings about the attitude object), a behavioural component (a predisposition to act toward the attitude object in a certain way), and a cognitive component (thoughts and beliefs about the attitude object). Formally, an attitude is ‘a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs, feelings, and behavioural tendencies towards socially significant objects, groups, events or symbols’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005, p. 150).
Table 2.1 Disciplinary Perspectives on Bottom-Up Policy Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY REFORM</th>
<th>BOTTOM-UP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE BEHAVIOUR</strong></td>
<td><strong>CRITIQUE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Realism (the state of nature is a state of war)</td>
<td>Material self-interest cannot account for post-Cold War aid to promote global public goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Liberalism (individuals rationally know what they want)</td>
<td>Poorly reflects the reality of disengaged citizens whose preferences are manipulated by political elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Constructivism (social interaction creates identities)</td>
<td>Change is impossible as actors define what they want with reference to existing structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Self-categorization theory (coherent theory of individual and group behaviour based on personal and social identities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Schwartz’s personal values operationalise personal identities (state identities operationalise institutional influences)</td>
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International relations
Political science
Social psychology
2.2 The Determinants of State Behaviour in International Relations

This section contrasts the determinants of state behaviour according to the three main philosophical perspectives in international relations. To distinguish these perspectives some definitions are needed. The terms ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ refer to a longstanding question in social science about whether we humans shape the world or whether the world shapes us. Agency is acting in a way that changes an outcome in order to advance one’s views of the world as an individual or as a member of a group. Structures are ‘the clusters of rules and stable meanings that result from institutional practices’ (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 25). A purely agentic approach would argue that structures such as gender, class and race are not real – they are intangible constructs. Therefore, we can only say provable things about the actions of individuals. A purely structuralist approach would argue that actors are situated so their actions are determined by social systems, not their free will. Therefore, we can predict a person’s behaviours according to the institutions that condition their life.

In brief, the structure-agency debate in international relations can be summarised as follows: realism assumes that structure precedes agency, liberalism assumes that agency precedes structure, and constructivism assumes that structure and agency are two sides of the same coin (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). Next I assess which perspective best explains aid policy variation amongst the DAC member states and what this means for conceptualising democracy, particularly the role of public opinion.

2.2.1 Realism

Realism takes a hard-headed view of the world based on Thomas Hobbes’ theory that the ‘state of nature’ is a state of war. His seminal book *Leviathan* was published in 1651. Within the international relations literature, realists perceive the international system to be anarchical. In other words, conflict is logical because cooperation is unreliable. Therefore, the best foreign policy course for state survival is one which achieves power and influence over other states.

In relation to foreign aid, realists see funding GPGs as risky because excessive economic interdependence causes countries to worry that their partners could gain more out of the

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19 Another way to understand agency is empowerment to realise one’s goals by re-making the world through reflective action.

20 Klotz and Lynch (2007) contend that ‘meanings stabilize into rules; sets of rules constitute institutions; clusters of institutions constitute structures, which in turn are the building blocks of systems’ (p. 25).
relationship than they do, leaving them vulnerable (Drezner, 2008, p. 54). Realists are also sceptical that international organisations can regulate world politics and believe that even if states justify their policies in terms of liberal ideologies, they act according to the dictates of *realpolitik*. However, if realism is indeed an accurate model, then the reality of aid policy outputs represent a significant challenge.

During the Cold War when almost all industrialised nations set up dedicated foreign aid agencies, realism was a useful lens for scholars to interpret the world. Although the earliest aid proponents felt that aid should be given out of altruistic motives (Bhagwati, 2005), Soviet and US aid flooded into poor countries to buy alliances. From the realist perspective, after the collapse of communism in the late 1980s aid-giving should have ceased. Instead, it continued to grow and take on a more ‘pro-poor’ appearance. The World Bank’s website acknowledges this fact: ‘It is true that during the Cold War years aid was politically motivated. Now however, aid is being delivered to countries most in need and to those who show they are determined to use it well’ (World Bank Group, 2009).

Realism does not see a place for public opinion in foreign policy because international politics is all about state entities maximising power and hegemony (the structure of the international system is more important than individual preferences when states decide a foreign policy course). Furthermore, realists maintain that the average citizen is too consumed by his or her daily existence to fully grasp the world of international affairs. The realist school actually sees public opinion as a barrier to effective foreign policy, and a danger to the stability of the international system, because the public’s policy preferences are emotional rather than rational, and because high-level diplomacy depends on secrecy. Although some realists would accept that domestic policy issues may be appropriately dealt with when guided by public opinion, foreign policy is a different case.

Realists also claim that the news media does not portray foreign policy accurately and, therefore, it is unrealistic to expect citizens to be informed and engaged. Research into the so-called ‘CNN effect’ supports the realist perspective (Gilboa, 2005). The CNN effect refers to the media’s effect on setting the foreign policy agenda by raising the prominence of some issues over others. For example, emotional vivid imagery of famine in Somalia aroused public attention to the crisis and changed the priorities of US foreign policy in the 1990s. By comparison, public interest in the Rwandan genocide was muted despite the fact that it was a more severe crisis because it was not well covered by news media.
As public opinion studies have become more sophisticated, the realist assumption that structure precedes agency has become harder to sustain. Page and Shapiro (1983) were the first to show that shifts in public opinion on issues of high salience lead to congruent shifts in policy. Further research confirmed that public opinion is not incoherent, nor is it entirely susceptible to elite manipulation (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath III, 1987). Nevertheless, despite this evidence, it does not automatically follow that citizens send clear policy signals to their representatives or that their preferences are carried out by the standards of liberal democracy as the next section explains.

2.2.2 Liberalism

The liberal school sees a very important and constructive role for public opinion in policy reform because it is based on the idea that government is the instantiation of individual voter preferences and voters rationally know what they want. In his book *Two Treatises of Government*, published in 1690, John Locke introduced the liberal argument that the state of nature is governed by the law of nature, which is the law of reason. Liberalism is therefore about state survival through rational cooperation. For example, liberalism argues that states give foreign aid to developing countries to expand the size of the consumer market for their manufactured goods, and to reduce the risk of global instability from disease and conflict. This is a rational cost-benefit calculation which is made by individual voters and translated into policy through electoral processes (agents create structures). In other words, when citizens are informed about policy options they are assumed to form preferences that maximise their interests. Relatedly, aggregate shifts in public opinion are assumed to lead to shifts in policy provided citizens have an opportunity to punish leaders at the ballot box.\(^{21}\)

The main criticism of liberalism is that notions such as electoral accountability look fanciful when it comes to complex foreign policy decisions. ‘Electoral accountability’ is the public’s ability to control policy-making through the electoral process; measured as the policy-component of vote losses for the incumbent party in a subsequent election (MacKuen, Stimson, & Erikson, 2003). Electoral accountability is a key principle of liberal philosophy because it operationalises the belief that individuals have the capacity to effectively bring about change in the world. However, campaigners face a number of hurdles if aid policy is to represent the median voter’s preferences.

\(^{21}\) Liberal Institutionalism is a sub-type of liberalism which maintains that people comply with social norms to gain access to material and social benefits. For example, states may give foreign aid to achieve standing in international society.
Extrapolating from the literature on electoral accountability, aid policy must become a salient public issue (Jones, 1994); aid policy must be perceived to be a major problem among voters (Wlezien, 2005); the electoral setting must be competitive (Nardulli, 2005); and there needs to be a good fit between citizen preferences and the aid policies offered by political parties (Mughan & Paxton, 2006).

Aid policy is almost never an election issue and changes in aid policy usually go unnoticed by a majority of the population because decision-making is highly centralised (Olsen, 2001). Indeed, political leaders can rapidly change their mind on aid without anyone noticing. For example, on 23 April 2010, in a foreign affairs speech at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the leader of the Australian opposition, Tony Abbott, re-affirmed that the ‘Coalition would match the Government’s commitments on overseas aid’. However, in election commitment costings submitted to Treasury on 30 July, the Coalition outlined at least $294 million in spending cuts from the aid budget (Oxfam Australia, 2010). Moreover, unlike Page and Shapiro’s (1983) landmark study which showed that aggregate American public opinion has preceded shifts in US government policy, there have never been adequate data to confirm one way or the other whether political elites are responsive to the median voter’s view of aid policy. This is despite the best efforts of scholars such as Otter (2003) who concluded that foreign aid is an elite policy area so governments can afford to ignore public opinion.

The ideals of liberal democracy may hold up in regard to local public services (James & John, 2007), but foreign policies that promote GPGs are another matter altogether. GPGs are decided amongst state leaders at international meetings before they are shared with the public in each state. In addition, there is no forum in modern political life where political elites can convey detailed information about issues such as foreign aid to the public. For most citizens, short news items and government-funded advertisements are their only source of policy information – at best impressing the ‘flavour’ of a policy. Furthermore, foreign aid, like most GPGs, has a long implementation timeframe. Research shows that public attention to non-crisis foreign policy issues falls away after the initial policy announcement (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006). Relatedly, foreign aid policy typically has bipartisan support so there is little public debate for citizens to follow. Therefore, except in times of economic recession or fiscal austerity the average citizen is unlikely to reward or punish a representative for their votes on foreign aid policy.

There are many aid and non-aid examples of where political elites implicitly acknowledge that liberal democracy may be a philosophical ideal but it is not a reality. For example, in 2007 I had a
meeting with the then Australian Secretary for International Development, Bob McMullan. He told me that throughout his many decades in Federal Parliament, aid policy decisions were made completely independent of polling or public opinion analyses. Recently, the Conservative Government in the United Kingdom (UK) has begun to implement academic research which suggests that you can ‘nudge’ people to perform good behaviours, and behaviours that are good for them, by the way you structure choices (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). This includes all sorts of choices, from checking for traffic at pedestrian crossings (encouraged by the words ‘look right’ and ‘look left’ painted on the road), to organ donation (by creating an opt-in instead of opt-out default on driver’s license applications), and paying taxes (via Tax Office letters which include the words ‘94 per cent of people pay their tax on time’) (Hickman, 2011). This demonstrates that democratically-elected governments sometimes go further than ignoring public opinion; they actively try to shape citizen preferences.

The principles of liberal democracy are also undermined by empirical data which suggests that public support for foreign aid and aid policies may be mutually-reinforcing. One of the most robust analyses of the determinants of public support for aid is a 2008 study published by the World Bank. Paxton and Knack’s (2008) multi-level analysis with 17 countries found that the coefficient for the relationship between ODA and individual support for increasing foreign aid was negative but non-significant (-0.661). Indeed, it was only when the US and Japan were removed from the analysis that the coefficient became significant (-1.41, p<.001). The authors concluded that ‘there is some evidence for the hypothesis that citizens in countries with high levels of existing aid express less support for increasing aid than citizens from other countries’ (p. 16, original emphasis). However, two simple bar graphs – which compare support for aid and actual aid levels using more recent data – reveal just how unconvincing this statement is. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that support for increasing aid is relatively higher in the most generous aid-giving countries.
Figure 2.1 Mean Attitudes to the Level of Aid Spending and Actual Aid Levels

![Support for Increasing Aid and Aid Spending]

Mean attitude to current aid spending

- Too High
- About Right
- Too Low

Official Development Assistance as % Gross National Income

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008; OECD (same year as survey)

Figure 2.2 Mean Attitudes to Paying Higher Taxes to Increase Aid and Actual Aid Levels

![Willingness to Pay More Tax for Aid and Aid Spending]

Mean willingness to pay more tax for aid

- Yes
- No

Official Development Assistance as % Gross National Income

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008; OECD (same year as survey)
These figures raise an obvious structure-agency question. Why would the average person living in a country that already exceeds the UN aid target think their aid level is too low, and why would they be willing to pay higher taxes to give more? Equally, why would the average person living in a country that gives far less than the UN aid target think their aid level is adequate, and why would they be unwilling to pay more taxes to increase their country’s contribution? Although Figures 2.1 and 2.2 do not suggest that ODA has a positive ‘dose-response’ effect on public support for aid, often the most supportive publics live in the most generous aid donor states. Could current aid policies themselves play a role in conditioning people to interpret what is appropriate? Kenworthy (2009) demonstrated that the relationship between public opinion and social policy may be bidirectional. Since foreign aid is akin to social policy in the international realm, the same may be true of the relationship between public support for aid and aid spending.

Looking at the issue specifically in terms of electoral accountability, it could be argued that aggregate public preferences do guide elite policy decisions. Figure 2.3 plots the relationship between public support for increasing the volume of aid and aid spending the following year. Although there are insufficient data points to be certain, there appears to be a weak relationship between public preferences and changes in aid spending.  

The public opinion data used in Figure 2.3 are taken from three waves of the World Values Survey conducted between 1994 and 2008 (World Values Survey, 2009). Respondents were asked whether current aid spending by their country’s government is ‘Too High’ (score=1), ‘About Right’ (score=2), or ‘Too Low’ (score=3). The graph illustrates the relationship between each country’s mean score for this question and the level of ODA the following year as budgets are usually determined 12 months in advance. Each data point is labelled with the country’s initials and year in which the survey was conducted. For example, ‘SE 99’ represents mean support for aid in

Likewise, Paxton and Knack (2009) claim in a different study to the one mentioned earlier, that there is ‘a strong and positive relationship between support for increased aid in donor countries and the share of aid that countries funnel through multilateral agencies. But where public opinion is less supportive of aid, governments are less willing to yield control to multilateral institutions over how it is spent’. It should be noted that their analysis was based on only 17 data points.

To be consistent with the three category response format to the question on aid in the 2005-2008 World Values Survey, five category responses to a similar question in earlier waves of the survey were compressed as follows: ‘Some people favour, and others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries. Do you think that this country should provide more or less economic aid to poorer countries? Would you say we should give’: a lot less=1; somewhat more/same amount/somewhat less=2; a lot more=3.
Sweden in 1999. Countries positioned closer to 1.0 on the x axis indicates that the mean response was ‘aid is too high’; countries positioned closer to 2.0 on the x axis indicates that the mean response was ‘aid is about right’; and countries positioned closer to 3.0 on the x axis indicates that the mean response was ‘aid is too low’. If a separate line were drawn for Sweden and Norway – the only two countries shown which exceed the UN aid target – then a linear relationship is detectable.24

Figure 2.3 The Relationship between Public Support for Increasing Aid Spending and Aid Spending the Following Year

![Support for Increasing Aid over ODA Following Year](image)


The problem with this rather weak showing of liberal democracy is that it is not easily reconciled with Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1. Earlier it was revealed that each donor’s aid effort has been virtually cemented for the 11 years from 1996 to 2007. This is in spite of consistently high levels of domestic support for increasing aid over this period in both generous donors like the Netherlands, and less generous donors like Australia and Spain (Mc Donnell et al., 2003b; Newspoll, 2005). The fact that throughout the Post-Cold War Era donors have maintained their widely divergent

24 The correlation between these items for all countries is .53, p<.01 (regression $R^2=.28$); for non-Scandinavian countries the correlation is .74, p<.001(regression $R^2=.54$); and for Scandinavian countries alone the correlation is .69, p>.05 (regression $R^2=.48$).
positions on foreign aid suggests that political elites are more likely to be responsive to entrenched cultural norms rather than the aggregate preferences of individual citizens.

Vertzberger (1990) contends that ‘At the core of culture, in most cases, are broad and general beliefs and attitudes about one’s own nation, about other nations, and about the relationships that actually obtain or that should obtain between the self and other actors in the international arena’ (p. 268). As culture changes very slowly, this would explain the incremental shifts in aid levels shown in Figure 1.1. Indeed, culture is shaped in the past, but it is constantly recreated through discourses and institutions (including policy norms). For example, Australia has a moderately generous aid program (relative to other DAC donors) that is strategically focused on supporting fragile states in the Asia-Pacific neighbourhood. This balance between striving for a ‘fair go for all’ and pragmatism to get useful things done is consistent with Australia’s international image which originated with the beliefs of the English settlers who created Australia’s institutions (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007). After pursuing this particular foreign policy course over a number of decades, Australians may no longer be able to imagine any other choice. This is the constructivist perspective to which I turn next.

2.2.3 Constructivism

The third major international relations school is social constructivism (referred to throughout this dissertation as simply ‘constructivism’). The term constructivism originates from the epistemological position that the observer can never be completely separated from the observed. As an ontological approach, constructivism is concerned with understanding how shared ideas become reality. In the context of international relations theory, constructivism is regarded as a new approach which began with Nicholas Onuf in the 1980s. However, constructivist thought can be traced back to the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico who wrote in the 18th century that history is not external to human affairs, rather history is the creation of men and women (R. H. Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, chapter 6).

The main thrust of constructivism in international relations is that a state’s interests, and threats to those interests, do not exist as objective facts but are instead socially constructed through processes of meaning-making and identity-formation. State identities constitute a set of shared ideas, including ideologies, principles about right and wrong, beliefs about cause and effect, and prescriptions for solving problems (R. H. Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, chapter 6). These ideas are typically summarised as ‘norms’, or more specifically, ‘constitutive norms’. Constitutive norms,
such as equality, make a state what it is. Constitutive norms are thus accepted standards of
behaviour and ways of thinking that are taken-for-granted. There are also ‘behavioural norms’,
such as giving foreign aid, that express the state’s identity. Behavioural norms are coherent
patterned behaviours that make sense precisely because of who the state is.

At this point it must be made clear that state identity is not the same as national identity. National
identity is a psychological concept. It is an individual subjective experience. For example, members
of marginalised groups or immigrants may not strongly identify as national citizens. In contrast,
state identity is a sociological concept. It is a collective experience that has objective expression in
state institutions and foreign policy outputs. Hence, stability in the international system in terms
of state-to-state interactions is better explained by who states are than the degree to which
citizens identify as nationals. However, the relationship between national identity and state
identity is analogous to the mind-body relationship (Bostock & Smith, 2001). Indeed, if a majority
of citizens did not identify with the state, the state would not be able to legitimately interact with
other states in the international arena.

To give a concrete example that highlights the difference between state identity and national
identity, consider an article in the Guardian newspaper of London (McCurry, 2011) which reported
on a campaign by environmentalists to discourage and outlaw shark fin consumption in Hong
Kong. The article states that public resistance is largely due to the fact that many people ‘regard
eating shark fin as a means of expressing their Chinese identity’. This is a reference to national
identity whereas the government’s policy position (which permits the trade) is an expression of
state identity. State and national identities are therefore mutually-dependent.

Constructivism is the non-materialist mirror of realism. That is, states are considered unitary
actors but a state’s interests are not purely material (consequential). States also have an interest
in maintaining and enhancing their identity (acting appropriately). Identities increase order,
predictability and certainty because they ‘categorize actors according to common features, making
the other’s actions intelligible and an individual’s own actions vis-à-vis them intelligible to himself’
(Hopf, 2002, p. 5). State identities therefore help decision-makers to make sense of the
international system and to know the state’s place in it. Since the end of the Cold War, research
increasingly shows that the identity of states trumps rationalist or instrumental concerns when it
comes to explaining the different foreign policy trajectories of otherwise similar states (for
example, Subotic, 2011).
Decision-makers are rewarded for maintaining the state’s identity in two ways. First, state identities reduce uncertainty about how interactions with other states will unfold, including whether allies will keep their commitments (Wendt, 1992). For example, the US is not threatened by the fact that the UK possesses nuclear weapons, but it is threatened by Iran’s attempt to do the same. The difference in perspective arises from the UK’s identity as an ally and Iran’s identity as an enemy. Second, maintaining the internal coherence of the state in relation to the external environment guarantees the loyalty of citizens to the state (Bloom, 1990). That is, individuals internalise the state identity which they become committed to in the form of a national identity.

State identities explain why states develop rigid and distinctive policy patterns. Constructivism maintains that policies that are not consistent with the state’s identity seem illogical, and may even be unimaginable (Hopf, 2002). Swedish leaders, for example, are likely to interpret their international obligations according to the social democratic norms that are conveyed by Sweden’s social democratic welfare system. Indeed, Sweden’s foreign policy centres on multilateralism in support of peace and international development (Bergman, 2007). Fulfilling these policy expectations reproduces Sweden’s social democratic identity, prescribing further congruent policies at the domestic and international levels.

Some scholars such as Katzenstein (1996) stress that a state’s identity is defined by historically-significant and institutionally-embedded domestic cultural norms that constitute the individuality of the state. When social structures (such as the education and legal systems) and their discourses routinely reinforce particular ways of thinking and acting, the community develops shared expectations about appropriate policy outputs for their state.\(^{25}\) Over time, policy choices start to reflect habits and unreflective practice rather than conscious consideration of what is ‘appropriate’ or ‘right’. Hopf (2002) calls this the ‘logic of the everyday’.

Other scholars such as Wendt (1992) argue that a state’s identity is defined by the sets of meanings that a state attributes to itself by taking the perspective of other states. In other words, interactions between states lead to interpretations about each other’s role which then creates reactions to these roles, and reactions to these reactions. For example, a state’s identity as a conqueror, explorer, trader, proselytiser, or civiliser depends on other states treating it as such, which in turn casts their identity in a corresponding counter-role. As each state adjusts its behaviour according to its understanding of the behaviour of other states, a state’s identity is

\(^{25}\) Discourses are systems of meaning production.
effectively the instantiation of its international image (for an overview, see R. H. Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). For example, if China perceives itself as a ‘hegemonic power’ because that is what its main competitors – America and India – expect of China as it grows into the world’s largest economy, China is more likely to behave like a hegemonic power rather than a ‘responsible power’. As China’s foreign policy response confers antagonistic role expectations on America and India, the process of identity construction becomes tautological (structure and agency are co-created).

Increasingly, constructivist scholars are combining the domestic norms approach and the international systems approach, arguing that a state’s identity has ‘both internal (domestic) and external (international) dimensions’ (Alexandrov, 2003, p. 39). Take America’s ‘War on Drugs’ policy, for example. It focuses on the supply side of drug trafficking (sending troops into Columbia) rather than the demand side (domestic legislation to address a public health issue). The policy makes sense when the cultural belief that government should not interfere in the lives of private citizens is combined with America’s role during the Cold War as a crusader fighting external evil (Lott, 2004).

Regardless of the domestic versus international aspects of identity, all constructivists maintain that the state’s identity is the lens through which foreign policy-makers interpret reality. This means that the foreign policy-maker is both subject to identity-conforming structures and involved as an agent in (re)constructing identities. As such, public opinion, and the median voter in particular, is not seen as having a direct effect on policy as it is with liberalism (Katz, 2004). Indeed, a state’s identity is bigger than the sum of its parts so aggregate public opinion is a weak indicator of the shared ideas that constitute the state’s identity. To this end, constructivists see a subtle relationship between public opinion and policy outputs which can perhaps not be detected by survey analysis.

In terms of the relationship between public opinion and security policy in China, for example, Callahan (2010) explains that Chinese cultural ideas about civilization and barbarism, and national pride and national humiliation, are ingrained in the Chinese population, the leaders and state institutions.

China’s identity politics is neither the party-state instrumentally brainwashing the populace, nor the spontaneous actions of an authentic grassroots community. While it is popular to see the state as the actor and the masses as the audience, here the actor is the
audience, and the audience is the actor, as Chinese nationalism is produced and consumed in an interactive and intersubjective process (Callahan, 2010, p. 25).

Constructivism explains how a disengaged citizenry (or disempowered in the case of China) influences complex foreign policy decisions. Specifically, state behaviour is a function of shared ideas (either within or between states) that are taken for granted as logically correct. Accordingly, constructivists argue that methodological individualism cannot capture the degree to which foreign policy outputs are legitimate choices with a social purpose (Payne, 2001). For example, despite polls showing high levels of support for increasing aid in most DAC countries, constructivists would contend that ODA/GNI ratios have remained stuck for decades because states behave according to their humanitarian (for example, Denmark), European (for example, Germany), Neutralist (for example, Switzerland), or some other identity to which all citizens collectively contribute.

The constructivist perspective is not necessarily undemocratic because norms arise out of the practices upheld by a community. However, a strong critique of the domestic norms approach is that it creates difficulties for capturing processes of change because individuals only matter in so far as their interactions create shared meanings which are then visible in historical and institutional structures. Constructivism cannot predict when people will sometimes overturn the social order and challenge institutionalised routines and prevailing assumptions because methodological individualism is disavowed (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). Unless constructivists recognise that historical and institutional structures are ‘created through the coaction of individual-level agents’ (Shaw, 2005, p. 8), they will be limited to explaining the status quo.

It must be said that within the constructivist literature, it is recognised that so-called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (actors with persuasive power) are sometimes able to alter a state’s policy trajectory by presenting new policy choices (to elites or to the public) as being consistent with the state’s identity (accepted cultural norms or the international image of the state). This technique, known as ‘framing’, does not change the state’s identity but rather redefines legitimate state behaviour. The main problem with framing analyses in the constructivist literature is that, like most constructivist research, there is a heavy reliance on descriptive case studies (single countries or episodes). This is because constructivist ontology subtends to anti-positivist qualitative methodologies, limiting the capacity of researchers to make predictions about other cases.
Finally, for constructivists focused on the international system, the only way for state identities to change is if an unexpected event forces a state to alter its policies, which can then have flow-on effects in terms of how other states interpret the international system and their place in it. For example, in response to the brutal crackdown on protestors by the Libyan and Syrian regimes in 2011-2012, the Arab League was forced to redefine its identity from endorsing state sovereignty to upholding new normative standards of Arab legitimacy, including that leaders should not kill their own people. Similarly, the 2008-2009 global financial crisis gave momentum to the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China to develop common policy positions on a wide range of issues simply because investors treated this disparate group of countries with a common ‘BRIC’ identity.

2.3 The Determinants of Public Support for Aid in Political Science

Having reviewed the determinants of policy outputs within international relations, I now turn to the determinants of public opinion within political science. The literature on the drivers of public support for aid-giving can be grouped into two approaches: the rationalist approach and the moral judgement approach. Although most public opinion studies incorporate elements of both approaches because both are implicitly associated with the liberal perspective in international relations, I have imposed this distinction on the research findings in order to highlight that the liberal perspective is an uncomfortable fit for the moral judgement approach (A full description of the findings covered by the literature review can be found in Appendix 1).

The term ‘opinion’ has always had two meanings in political philosophy as either a judgement of truth (belief) or a judgement of morality (approval). However, the compound ‘public opinion’ is ‘wedded to the liberal idea of an unregulated “marketplace of ideas”, with the majority view, ascertained through a free popular vote, as its operational definition’ (Price, 2008, p. 12). This idea fits with the rationalist approach to public opinion, but it is not easily reconciled with the moral judgement approach which is simply a loose collection of variables without an underlying theoretical base. Curiously, public opinion once had a more communitarian meaning in which the polity was seen as ‘the coming together of separate minds reasoning together toward a shared, common will’ (p. 12). However, since the time of utilitarian philosophers John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, the polity is typically seen as ‘a collection of individuals attempting to maximise their own interests and utilities’ (p. 12).
2.3.1 The Rationalist Approach

Rationalism is a philosophical view that maintains the world is logically ordered and therefore interpretable. Rationalism owes its roots to Renaissance artists, scientists and thinker such as Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo who sought to replace faith with reason and empiricism. In the modern field of social inquiry, rationalism assumes ‘that social subjects, from individuals and social classes to states and societies, have consistent sets of preferences that are pursued instrumentally and opportunistically (not, for example, through grounded value systems)’ (Amin & Palan, 2001, p. 562).

The mechanism that is theorised to connect rationality to predictable behaviour is ‘utility maximisation’. Utility is either defined as material advantage such as wealth and power, or psychological satisfaction such as pleasure and happiness. According to rationalist thinking, all human choices are instrumental rather than symbolic. In other words, the final outcome (material advantage or psychological satisfaction) is more important than the means of achieving it.

Therefore, donating money to a charitable organisation can have a utility return either because it resulted in the organisation accomplishing something useful, or because the act of giving resulted in the giver feeling a ‘warm glow’ sensation, not because it is the right thing to do (Kolm & Ythier, 2006, p. 1279). The notion of a warm glow implies that even when rationalists recognise that social norms are important for shaping behaviour, ‘norms are still a superstructure built on a material base: they serve a regulative function, helping actors with given interests maximise utility’ (Checkel, 1998, p. 327). Put differently, norms are just another means to an end, not an end in themselves. For example, reciprocity norms assist exchange in goods.

According to Berelson (1952), there are various definitions of individual rationality including: (1) awareness of decision consequences; (2) clear and critical observation that is free from bias; (3) openness to changing ones mind; (4) unemotional or detached decision-making; (5) consciously formulated behaviour; (6) optimal choices; and (7) self-consistent decisions. All of these definitions are incorporated in the rationalist literature on what motivates public support for aid but there is a strong emphasis on optimal choices.

The rationalist conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 2.4. It shows support for aid as a function of perceived benefits from funding a GPG such as poverty reduction. These benefits either accrue to recipients (tax-payers believe aid is effective) or donors (taxpayers believe aid serves national interest). Information dispersion and credibility are, therefore, critical to this process. If tax-payers are unaware of the unmet need for aid, or if tax-payers expect corrupt donor or recipient
governments to deviate from carrying out their preferences, the utility mechanism fails. Therefore, the rationalist literature also focuses on the knowledge citizens have about foreign aid, and the level of trust in donor governments, recipient governments, and multilateral organisations. The warm glow hypothesis has only been tested in relation to citizens making donations to charity, not in relation to tax-payers financing ODA. This may be because the effect requires a person to perform the giving act themselves whereas tax-payers are merely subject to taxation.

Figure 2.4 Rationalist Conceptual Model of Behaviour

The problem with the rationalist model is that the assumed links between ‘believe aid is effective’ and ‘willing to pay higher taxes to increase aid’ and between ‘aid serves national interest’ and ‘willing to pay higher taxes to increase aid’ are unreliable. Riddell (2007) points out that, contrary to the rationalist perspective, support for aid is not strongly dependent on effectiveness. Between 20 percent and 30 percent of respondents in DAC member states who are supportive of aid believe it is not effective (p. 116). Riddell therefore concludes: ‘If significant numbers of people do support aid-giving when they know much of it doesn’t work, we need to try to understand why. It is likely that for many, this could have something to do with their understanding of the moral case for providing aid’ (p. 117).
Kelley (1989) likewise reported that Australian survey respondents who were favourable toward aid – predominantly Christians and supporters of domestic welfare – were more optimistic about aid’s ability to help ordinary people and less pessimistic about aid creating dependency. These respondents were also more approving of the government’s performance on aid. In contrast to much of the aid advocacy literature which asserts tax-payers must be convinced of the effectiveness of aid before they will support it (ActionAid UK, 2007; McDonnell & Solignac-Lecomte, 2005), Kelley (1989) concluded that voters were motivated by ‘wishful thinking’ rather than ‘reasoned evaluation’. Indeed after taking their support for aid into account, Christians and welfare supporters were not significantly different from atheists and welfare opponents in their approval of the government’s efforts.

Comparative research by Bøås (2002) further challenges the rationalist notion of a national interest incentive. He found that support for aid is unstable in Japan and robust in Norway because historically Japanese elites have communicated aid policy in national interest terms. By comparison Norway’s ‘centre-left coalition, in combination with an enlarged “aid complex” involving civil society organisations across a broad spectrum of the Norwegian polity (from conservative Christian groups to leftist activist groups)’ have consistently backed aid on moral grounds (p. 16). Lumsdaine’s (1993) analysis of survey data reinforces this finding. He found that ‘those who thought it in the national interest to help poor countries tended to be those who thought it a moral duty’ (p. 139).

Another criticism of the rationalist model is that we know from framing research that the way a choice is presented or framed can drastically alter a person’s beliefs and preferences (D. Chong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1993). A frame is the lens through which people interpret issues, affecting ‘the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). Even when a choice is based on objective information, such as the number of lives saved from a particular treatment intervention,

26 Similar conclusions have been reported in the literature on public support for domestic welfare (Gelissen, 2000). For example, a study conducted in the Netherlands by van Oorschot (2002) found that: (1) a solidaristic attitude had the strongest direct effect on support for welfare; (2) support was not based on the way the welfare system functions; and (3) people on welfare benefits were no more supportive than those not on benefits. In other words, public support for the welfare state was mostly determined by social justice principles rather than beliefs about system abuse or personal gains. Given that welfare and international development are both public goods at the national and global levels respectively, there is a strong case for studying support for ODA as a non-instrumental attitude.
people’s support for providing the treatment may be systematically reversed when the same information is presented as the number of lives lost. This undermines the rationalist assumption that citizens make unbiased decisions. News media is an obvious source of framing manipulations in relation to foreign aid (D. Hudson & Martin, 2010; Iyengar & Simon, 1993).

Finally, the habitual nature of human behaviour presents a serious challenge to the rational model. Most of us do not consciously weigh up the pros and cons of brushing our teeth when we wake up in the morning – we just brush them. Likewise, many people have had the experience of driving home and not remembering the journey because, after performing an act regularly, it becomes automatic. Perhaps some of our policy preferences also become automatic after a period of time? There is some evidence from the welfare state literature to suggest that we are drawn to policy options that recreate our present reality. For example, it was previously mentioned that Kenworthy (2009) found that the relationship between public opinion and policy is bidirectional. Perhaps this is because our everyday experience of a system shapes our logic and therefore limits our ability to imagine legitimate alternatives. Indeed, Bolitho et al (2007) argue that growing neo-liberalism in Western democracies has led to people increasingly blaming the poor for their own poverty.

2.3.2 The Moral Judgement Approach

As the public frequently prove to be irrational when political scientists analyse public opinion data, there has been a trend towards investigating groups and individuals that support foreign aid not for material self-interest, but for notions of right and wrong (Busby, 2007; Lancaster, 2007; Lumsdaine, 1993; Saunders, 2009; Thérien, 2002). This is part of a broader academic shift away ‘from the worship of reason’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 816). For example, analyses in the field of psychology into why people perform helping and justice behaviours (commonly referred to as ‘prosocial behaviours’) increasingly incorporate notions of morality alongside theories about evolution, personality, emotion, and perceptions of personal agency (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). However, because the moral judgement approach emerged organically in political science over the past few decades, it is no more than a loose collection of non-rational independent variables such as norms and ideologies.

Advances in cognitive science suggest that most foreign policies are too complex, opaque and abstract for citizens to consciously weigh-up policy alternatives (Burdein, Lodge, & Taber, 2006; Cassino, Taber, & Lodge, 2007; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). However, people with minimal policy
information must still make political choices based on the bits and pieces of information they have available. Therefore, it is increasingly accepted that people use cognitive short-cuts or heuristics to determine their policy preferences (Fox & Farmer, 2002). In fact, Sniderman et al (1991) showed that politically-sophisticated and educated elites also use heuristics to make policy decisions. Research suggests that individuals consistently favour government policies that reflect either their personal values and principles, or the sentiment of the social group they identify with (such as an ethnic group) (Kinder, 1998). Haslam (2001) has pointed out that relying on these types of cognitive short-cuts to make complex decisions rather than thinking rationally, may actually enable people ‘to act collectively, and to go beyond the call of duty’ (p. 26).

In the context of understanding public support for foreign aid, the moral judgement approach is premised on two basic ideas: (1) it is a response to the failures of the rationalist approach; and (2) as aid-giving is often conceived as charity, redistribution, or a GPG, it naturally follows that public support for aid should be conceptualised as a prosocial behaviour. However, unlike the rationalist approach which is based on a widely shared set of assumptions and principles, the moral judgement approach is defined here as a broad spectrum of independent variables that are not theoretically coherent. The only thing these variables have in common is that the mechanism connecting them to support for aid is the intention to do ‘good’ or ‘right’, rather than a calculation about the utility of the final outcome. Thus, a testable model of this approach is lacking but Figure 2.5 attempts to represent the basic ideas; namely that support for aid is understood as a function of personal disposition (consistencies in behaviour), belief systems (mutually supporting sets of beliefs), social norms (social guidelines for behaving), and socialisation structures (institutions which facilitate social learning).
The problem with the moral judgement model is that it is entirely descriptive so anti-poverty advocates have not been able to use the research findings in their campaign strategies. Indeed, most studies ultimately see the disposition of individual citizens as the main driver of their attitudes to foreign aid. However, if the actions of citizens are predetermined, political change is contingent on intrinsic factors. Therefore, campaigners seeking to mobilise public support for aid, and aid agencies seeking to justify tax-payer expenditure on addressing poverty overseas, largely pursue actions associated with the rationalist approach, including raising public awareness of the effectiveness of foreign aid.

A number of public opinion studies have explicated a range of moral and normative attitudes that are associated with support for aid and simply asserted that a ‘moral vision’ (Lumsdaine, 1993), a ‘cooperative internationalism’ belief system (Wittkopf, 1990), or ‘altruistic foreign policy goals’ (Fite, Genest, & Wilcox, 1990) orients the individual. However, little theorising has been done on where these orientations come from and the degree to which they are relevant in different cultural contexts. For example, Diven and Constantelos (2009) find ‘evidence of a durable and substantial gap between Europeans and Americans on some measures of fundamental ideology’ in relation to support for aid, but they neglected to discuss or test potential factors that might contribute to this gap (pp. 128-129). Only Wuthnow and Lewis (2008), in their study of the way
congregations shape members’ views about foreign policy, have suggested that elite discourse could explain the relationship between moral judgements and support for aid.

Paxton and Knack (2008), Noël and Thérien (2002), and Stern (1998) point to the influence of structural factors such as domestic welfare regimes and international migration on public support for aid. Their findings suggest that state institutions socialise people to take a normative position on addressing the financial needs of poor people. For example, aggregate support for foreign aid is stronger where there is greater domestic redistribution (Noël & Thérien, 2002) and weaker where remittances are higher (M. Stern, 1998). As remittances are an important source of income for developing countries, this suggests that some countries might normatively prefer market-based substitutions for foreign aid. Again, these variables simply describe systemic constraints to mobilising public opinion. They do not empower campaigners to actively create social change.

Aid advocates not only want to understand the role of public opinion in aid policy reform, they also want to know how to boost public support for aid and then translate it into political activism. For example, the ONE campaign states on their website that ‘ONE works closely with policy experts, African leaders, and anti-poverty activists to mobilise public opinion in support of tested and proven programs to fight poverty’. Therefore, it is disappointing that for all its insights into the non-rational determinants of support for aid, the moral judgement approach cannot practically contribute to establishing a framework for bottom-up policy reform.

2.4 Finding the Missing Pieces of the Puzzle

Can a theory of public opinion be bolted on to the constructivist perspective of state behaviour in international relations? The constructivist perspective helps to explain stable aid policy differences between the DAC member states and justifies these differences as collectively legitimate. However, individual sources of legitimacy are critically under-defined in constructivist analyses (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008, chapter 6; Checkel, 1997). Given the short-comings of the two dominant approaches to understanding the determinants of support for aid, it is necessary to introduce an alternative conceptualisation of individual agency to the state-centric constructivist model. For such a theory to offer greater predictive power than the rationalist approach, and a higher level of practical usefulness than the moral judgement approach, it must be based on evidence about how individual preferences flexibly form and change. However, it should also recognise that although culture does not do anything because ‘Only people act, and by acting,

27 http://www.one.org/international/about/
they create and perpetuate their society and its culture’ (Hewitt & Shulman, 2011, p. 3), there is a mutually-reinforcing relationship between what people want and how society shapes their preferences.

If policy outputs are legitimate when they reflect the state identity, then it is also worth thinking about individuals and social groups within states as making policy judgements based on notions of identity. Moreover, given the failures of the rationalist and moral judgement approaches to explain how support for aid might be mobilised, it is significant that SCT in social psychology has been used to explain a range of prosocial behaviours. For example, the strength and salience of a person’s self-definition as a member of a protest group (social identity) significantly explains their level of political activism (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2010; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Other research in this area shows that people are more likely to help victims of a natural disaster that share their social identity (Levine & Thompson, 2004). Therefore, the concept of identity potentially provides a unifying theme to blend public opinion analyses into the constructivist perspective in international relations.

In this section I outline SCT as a theory of individual and group behaviour. However, because SCT has mostly been used to study group behaviour in laboratory settings, I also briefly introduce another social psychology theory of individual values, developed by Shalom Schwartz, which can enhance the relevance of SCT to studying the preferences of individual voters.

2.4.1 Self-Categorization Theory in Social Psychology

SCT was developed by a group of social psychologists (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) who built on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to understand inter- and intra-group processes such as discrimination and social movements. They were interested in why individual views can sometimes become shared views, and how this facilitates collective action. It has since become one of the most widely used theories in social psychology.

SCT argues that individual and group behaviour is determined by the categories people use to distinguish themselves from others in a given situation, rather than their knowledge of facts or rational self-interest. As these self-categories shift from situation-to-situation, a person’s behaviour changes accordingly. However, the degree to which a self-category guides a person’s behaviour depends on the strength of their identification with the category and the salience of the category in terms of it being ‘front-of-mind’ at a particular moment.
People apply mental categories to themselves and others – such as female versus male, student versus academic, and Australian versus American – because each category brings a particular perspective of one’s place in the world, including ideas about how one should behave, and how others are likely to respond. Self-categorisation therefore helps people to effectively navigate reality while simultaneously contributing self-esteem (Hogg, 2006). The process of self-categorisation is a personal experience based on individual perceptions of distinctiveness in a particular situation (as opposed to being imposed by society) and all self-categories make up an individual’s self-concept (self-definition) (Turner et al., 1987).

The empirical SCT literature commonly refers to social identities (self-definitions in terms of social category memberships) and personal identities (self-definitions in terms of personal or idiosyncratic attributes). However, so long as psychologically relevant contrasts can be made (‘me’ versus ‘not me’ or ‘us’ versus ‘them’), self-categories can be defined at any level of abstraction, including at the inter-species level (human identity) and even at the inter-planetary level (terrestrial identity) and beyond. Variation in how people categorise themselves is ‘a function of an interaction between the “readiness” of a perceiver to use a particular self-category (its relative accessibility) and the “fit” between category specifications and the stimulus reality to be represented’ (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994, p. 455).

According to SCT, some categories may be more accessible than others because people draw on categories ‘that are valued, important, and frequently employed aspects of the self-concept (they are chronically accessible in memory), and/or because they are self-evident and perceptually salient in the immediate situation (they are situationally accessible)’ (Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004, pp. 254-255). However, because contextual processes determine a person’s vantage point, including their ability to access cognitive, affective and motivational factors for self-categorisation, ‘perceiver readiness’ to use a category is not equated with attributes of the individual. Moreover, perceiver readiness works in conjunction with the likelihood that the category will be confirmed by reality (comparative and normative fit). Therefore, self-perception is inherently variable (Turner et al., 1994).

The content of the self-category that becomes psychologically functional in a given situation is determined by the characteristics that provide the perceiver with the greatest sense of positive category distinctiveness. That is, the values, norms, beliefs and emotions that are perceived to be most similar and positive amongst group members versus non-group members become the basis for the group’s social identity (this is known as the ‘metacontrast principle’). For example, the
content of a religious social identity versus an atheist social identity could be connection to God. Similarly, the values, norms, beliefs and emotions that are perceived to positively distinguish an individual from other individuals become the basis for that individual’s personal identity. For example, the content of an authoritarian personal identity versus an egalitarian personal identity could be values such as discipline and obeying rules. SCT refers to this aspect of self-categorisation as ‘comparative fit’.

SCT maintains that comparative fit is determined in relation to the ‘superordinate context’. The superordinate context is the shared higher order category that brings about the need for sub-group distinctiveness. Thus, the superordinate context determines the inclusiveness (scope) of the category that becomes self-defining. For example, when a lecturer stands in front of their class, they are likely to identify with the academic category versus the student category. However, at a faculty meeting, they are likely to apply a less inclusive category to their self-definition in relation to their counterparts, such as biologist versus sociologist, because the broader academic category is no longer distinctive.

The behaviours that are associated with a self-category are determined by a person’s background knowledge and theory about the world, which is another way of saying ‘cultural norms’. Hence, SCT refers to the process of ascribing practical meaning to an identity as ‘normative fit’. Norms in this sense are customary or stereotypical attitudes and behaviours rather than constitutive attitudes and behaviours. Unlike constructivism, a person’s identity and behaviours are not co-produced. Once a person identifies with a category, they are theorised to ‘self-stereotype’ – they actively adopt self-confirming traits – so their behaviours become predictable.

The concept of normative fit is severely underspecified in the literature because SCT research has mostly be confined to laboratory experiments. While it is easy to demonstrate comparative fit with simplistically constructed groups, such as blue eyes versus brown eyes, experimental conditions are not conducive to replicating the complex web of institutions that create normative links between identities and particular behaviours, even when real world groups are used. For example, a laboratory experiment can test the prediction that Chinese-American students will be more hard-working when they self-identify as Chinese versus American but it cannot explain where the hardworking Chinese stereotype comes from, or the conditions that might cause it to change. Thus, despite optimistic claims that it may be possible to establish an anti-poverty social movement by emphasising a common group identity (Thomas et al., 2010), in the absence of
knowledge about which specific structures shape the logic of agents, SCT cannot accurately predict the types of identity stereotypes that might develop in the real world.

Related to this, Reicher, Hopkins, and Condor (1997) take issue with, and see a danger in theorising identity stereotypes as dynamic social judgements because it implies that there is no source of external power to influence behaviour. They contend that category stereotypes are not self-evident but rather open to contestation as they reflect theories about how the world is and how it should be. For example, a person with a Christian religious identity might once have expressed their connection to God by living an austere life, cut off from modern technology and fashion trends. Today, however, with the rise of Mega Churches with corporate-style marketing strategies, young Christians are stereotypically entrepreneurial, active on social networking platforms, and bring their faith to rock music, surfing, and other mainstream social events. Reicher et al’s functional approach to understanding identity stereotyping (entitled ‘stereotype construction as a strategy of influence’), which sits between SCT and discourse theory, is akin to framing theory. They argue that in order to properly understand how society gives substance to identity stereotypes, it is necessary to not only examine ‘macro-social structures and ideologies but also the micro-social processes of debate and argumentation in which identities are defined’ (p. 102).

Another critique made of SCT is that little work has been done to address the question of ‘how structure and person work when multiple identities are taken into account’ (Serpe & Stryker, 2011, p. 243). Indeed, the theory does not elaborate on why people do not randomly change their mind on issues when they re-categorise themselves to fit a different comparative context (Huddy, 2001). From the political science literature, we know that people do not hold contradictory beliefs in different aspects of their lives but rather adopt coherent ideological positions. This suggests that a person’s various identities are probably linked in some way. However, from the perspective of SCT, different identities within the same person are unrelated to each other because the theory insists that identities are not fixed aspects of a person’s consciousness nor stored in their self-concept. Contradicting this, when researchers examine social identities ‘in the field’, they tend to use survey instruments that measure the strength of identification with a given social category.

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28 ‘Self-categorization theory does not deny the existence of long-term knowledge in memory (either of the world or oneself), or that such knowledge has a role to play in self-categorization; it does, however, reject the view that a particular store of long-term knowledge can be equated directly with the self-concept or some specific subset of self-concepts’ (Onorato & Turner, 2004, pp. 259-260, original emphasis).
This implicitly assumes that categories are ‘relatively enduring (“reliable”) facets of individual psychology’ (Condor, 1996, p. 288).

The concept of perceiver readiness can, in principle, partly explain why the same partisan political debates are recontested time and again within countries. That is, category constructions may be recreated across time if the social context is stable. However, it cannot explain why a person’s different identities will produce an ideological position that is consistent across situations. To date there has been no suggestion that different category constructions might be linked by internal cognitive alignment, rather than external social alignment, which is a proposition that I put forward in the next chapter. This may be because SCT ‘draws our attention to the contextual processes that determine the adoption of any one identification. However, ... the analysis of these contextual processes is still under development’ (N. Hopkins & Reicher, 2011, p. 37).

For campaigners seeking to mobilise public opinion, SCT offers two options. Deliberately increasing the salience of an identity in order to increase the probability that a person will perform identity-reinforcing behaviours is known as ‘identity priming’ (or stereotype activation) (S. W. S. Lee, Oyserman, & Bond, 2010; Oyserman & Lee, 2007). Both context (for example, an election) and stimulus cues (for example, political party symbols) can increase the salience of an identity (Forehand, Deshpandé, & Reed, 2002), which in turn affects the level of stereotypical behaviour. Alternatively, leaders may manipulate perceptions of comparative fit, by emphasising certain similarities and differences between groups, in order to encourage a particular type of self-categorisation. For example, by emphasising ethnic differences during an election, candidates may win more votes from their own ethnic group because people will interpret politics through their ethnic identity (which encourages in-group loyalty) rather than some other identity. However, because normative fit remains underspecified, SCT researchers have not examined the ways in which elites might manipulate the meanings of identities (as opposed to their content). As the meanings of identities prescribe behavioural standards, elites who control the institutions that convey cultural norms, and the public discourses that frame policy issues, can potentially control citizen behaviours across a wide range of different identity categories. Therefore, for SCT to become relevant to developing a political campaign in the real world, more work needs to be done to bring political concepts such as institutions and framing into the theory.

Finally, SCT has been remiss in operationalising personal identities compared to social identities. This is because it evolved trying to understand the way in which individuals shift their self-definition from that of a unique person to that of an interchangeable member of a social group, in
order to explain group behaviours such as discrimination and collective action (Bernd, Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Operationalising personal identities is nevertheless critical for applying SCT to politics where people weigh both personal and social motivations in their voting and protest behaviour.

An SCT model of individual and group behaviour is represented in Figure 2.6. The model depicts a person’s self-concept as the experience of numerous categories based on differentiation at various levels of abstraction. Personal identities are defined by idiosyncratic characteristics at the level of inter-personal differentiation, such as being caring and ambitious. Various social identities are defined by collective characteristics at the level of inter-group differentiation such as occupation and nationality. The model highlights that the content of identities (presented as a rectangle) is a function of horizontal differentiation (comparative fit) in relation to the superordinate context (shared higher order category). However, identity stereotypes (indicated in parentheses) are simply taken-for-granted because normative fit has never been empirically specified in a way that is relevant to understanding behaviour outside a laboratory. Relatedly, there is no vertical connection between identity stereotypes even though identity stereotypes in Germany versus Australia are likely to be systematically different and citizens typically do not perform completely contradictory behaviours in different situations. This suggests that it may be possible to reconcile the fact that states function as coherent entities, despite variation in citizen preferences within states, if relations between identities at different levels were better understood.
In order to apply SCT to political processes involving aggregate individual voter preferences, personal identity must be operationalised. A key weakness of the SCT literature is a bias towards the study of groups over individuals. As such, identity scholars discuss but have largely failed to examine personal identity – which SCT defines as idiosyncratic traits that differentiate a person from others. Hitlin (2003) asserts that ‘Individuals’ values, deeply personal but socially patterned and communicated, are essential for understanding personal identity’ (p. 119).

Schwartz’s (1992, 2007b) personal values construct will be properly explained in Chapter 4 as it will be used to operationalise personal identities. For now it is sufficient to say that values are abstract personal goals such as honesty, power or adventure that people strive to achieve across situations because they are central to their self-concept. Therefore, supporting a recycling program will trigger a positive affective response in the brain of a person who values the...
environment because doing so helps them to maintain a coherent sense of who they are. Equally, if a person acts counter to their values they will set off a negative affective response (Schwartz, 2010).

Even though the values literature does not directly equate values with identity, the use of personal values measures to operationalise personal identities can be justified on several fronts. First, according to SCT, both personal identities and social identities can involve commitment to values as an important part of their construction. Therefore, value orientations can serve as a proxy for personal identities. Second, values, like identities, are said to make up a person’s self-concept. In fact, when a person expresses their values through their attitudes and behaviours, they are demonstrating their self-concept to others (Maio & Olson, 2000). Finally, identity scholars have begun to recognise that many of the weaknesses of SCT could be addressed with greater integration of theoretically related but independent research paradigms (Serpe & Stryker, 2011).

To this end, Hitlin (2011) argues that social actions are more predictable and plausible when values are incorporated into identity commitments because ‘personal identity is intrinsically moral’ (p. 516). He cites research which shows that individuals who are considered ‘moral exemplars’, such as those who opposed the Nazis, typically say that their actions felt obligatory rather than optional.

A summary of how the values literature explains individual behaviour is depicted graphically in Figure 2.7. The model is not a strict representation of any one piece of scholarship, but rather a summary of the most important values concepts in relation to the current research. Personal values are at the core of a person’s self-concept. The strength of specific values varies at the individual-level because a person’s priorities are shaped by their life circumstances. For example, a middle-aged woman with a disabled child is likely to have stronger caring values than a 25 year old male banker. Furthermore, values are organised in a coherent system of conflicting and congruent priorities so some values may be dynamically suppressed (such as novelty) when other conflicting values are active (such as tradition).

‘Value priming’ determines which values are salient or front-of-mind in a particular situation and, therefore, which values have a greater influence over behaviour (Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 29).

29 According to Hitlin (2011), it is the intuitive choices we make between competing value priorities – such as the precedence of the mother’s or child’s autonomy in the abortion debate – that defines our morality and thus our personal identity. As these choices are socially structured, Hitlin argues that value orientations are internalised representations of group memberships.

63
2009). For example, when the mother of a disabled child goes to work in a competitive law firm, her caring values may be supplanted by her achievement values. Individuals maintain a coherent self-concept (and feel a sense of authenticity about their moral core) by expressing their salient values through value-congruent attitudes and behaviours. ‘Value frames’ which are embedded in socialisation processes and public discourses determine the application of values to particular issues (Schultz & Zelezny, 2003). For example, avoiding food wastage was once an expression of nationalism values during World War II whereas today it is an expression of environmental values. In Chapter 4 it becomes clear that operationalising personal identities with Schwartz’s (1992, 2007b) personal values construct nicely fills the gap in the SCT literature.

**Figure 2.7 Values-Based Model of Behaviour**

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to unpack what bottom-up policy reform actually means and what is currently known about it. I reviewed the literature on state behaviour in international relations and the literature on public opinion in political science. While the modern philosophical ideal of liberal democracy appears to be discredited, an alternative constructivist model must be further theorised in order to form the basis of a framework for bottom-up policy reform.

My review of the constructivist perspective in international relations suggests that the impact of public opinion on aid policy should be viewed more subtly – as a broad social force constituting shared expectations about appropriate behaviour. In particular, cultural norms and the international image of the state constitute the state identity which informs policy elites about their interests. State identities do not set physical limits on behaviour but rather change
perceptions of reality so certain options are simply not imagined (Aggestam, 1999). While this perspective helps to explain why states typically do not deviate from their differentiated policy trajectories, individual policy preferences cannot vary to promote bottom-up policy reform because structure and agency are co-produced.

The question of what motivates public support for aid was also examined. I found that attitudes to aid across the DAC member states are not driven by rational concerns. However, alternative moral explanations do not provide campaigners with any levers to mobilise public opinion. Therefore, I put forward a social psychology theory known as SCT as an alternative. It maintains that individuals and groups are motivated to support or disapprove of foreign aid because doing so is central to how they define themselves. I also briefly outlined the values literature as a way of enhancing the relevance of SCT to individual voter preferences as it has traditionally been limited to explaining group behaviours.

Although this chapter identified the relevant pieces of the bottom-up policy reform puzzle, a coherent cross-discipline approach is needed to establish a practical and testable model of public support for foreign aid in the context of existing aid policies. I maintain that the concept of identity is central to making this happen. The next chapter uses the concept of identity to integrate constructivism and SCT. This allows me to develop a full picture of the interplay between the capacity of citizens to promote policy change, and the institutions that promote policy stability.

We know that elected officials can afford to ignore public opinion about foreign aid when deciding a policy course because the public are generally inattentive, and the notion of electoral accountability constitutes an incomplete picture of foreign policy-making. However, political mobilisation during the Vietnam War, for example, demonstrates that citizens are sometimes democratically efficacious according to the theory of liberal democracy. Therefore, the challenge for campaigners is to turn aid policy reform into a potent election issue.
Chapter 3. An Identity-Based Approach to Bottom-Up Policy Reform

You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete. Buckminster Fuller

In 2005, anti-poverty campaigners in the UK established a sizable and active aid constituency. The Make Poverty History campaign saw 20,000 people listen to an address by Nelson Mandela in Trafalgar Square, 25,000 people took part in a Trade Justice vigil, and 250,000 people protested on the streets of Edinburgh to demand world leaders make poverty history. Three years after the Gleneagles Summit, at which G8 leaders pledged to increase aid and cancel Third World debt, ONE (2010) reported that ‘The UK is the indisputable overall leader’ in delivering on its commitments.

In other words, a high profile social movement was able to achieve elite responsiveness, and thereby convert an international promise into a domestic political reality.

The imperative for anti-poverty campaigners in all DAC member states is to make aid policy reform a potent election issue. However, the constructivist notion of the mutual constitution of structure and agency remains crucial because it points to the limits of bottom-up mobilisation. Constructivists maintain that normative change is inherently slow and may be resisted unless the proposed changes are ‘adjacent’ to existing norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Nevertheless, Nielson, Tierney and Weaver (2006) assert that top-down efforts can be crafted to facilitate a shift in cultural norms. To this end, the UK Prime Minister between 1997 and 2007, Tony Blair, was one of the loudest proponents of African development and helped to redefine how the UK perceives itself – from an imperial power without a clear sense of purpose after former British colonies gained independence, to an ethical interventionist. This opened up a space for the Make Poverty History campaign to legitimately mobilise public support for policy reform.

The electoral potency of 2005 is no longer required to sustain progressive aid policies in the UK as these policies now constitute the state identity. Indeed, after Britain led the world in reducing global poverty under the leadership of New Labour, normative change was evident during the

http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/theyearof/
2010 British election. All three major parties pledged to enshrine in law Britain’s commitment to meet the 0.7 percent aid target each year from 2013. Alison Evans, director of the Overseas Development Institute think tank, commented that ‘There has been a zeitgeist around international development up to this point which has made it a value issue for each of the main political parties... What is interesting going into this election is that, certainly for the three main political parties, I would say it’s almost unacceptable for them not to have a reasonably progressive stance on international development – and I think that’s different’ (Rowling, 2010).

The aim of this chapter is to integrate constructivism and SCT in order to put forward a conceptual model of public support for aid that is empirically plausible, practically useful, and consistent with actual state behaviour. The rest of the dissertation will then test the model to establish its potential validity as a new framework for bottom-up policy reform. The UK example is what success looks like. The UK example highlights that bottom-up and top-down processes simultaneously contribute to a shared understanding of state identity. Accordingly, once aid policy has become an election issue and some reform has transpired, the new policies that are in place will have a positive feedback effect. In other words, by learning and internalising new norms, the public will sustain future aid levels.

Integrating constructivism and SCT requires some enrichment, modification and elaboration of the original discipline-specific concepts. Therefore, before setting out the model, the original theories are contrasted in Section 3.1 in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, and their commonalities and differences. In Section 3.2, I argue that politics is the point at which constructivism and SCT intersect, and identity is the mechanism that facilitates their integration. When politics is absent, elites legitimately make foreign policy decisions according to the state identity. The state identity simultaneously comprises the state’s image relative to other states in the international system, and domestic cultural norms. When politics makes cultural norms contestable at the sub-national level, according to the identity-based priorities of voters and interest groups, elites respond accordingly. The policy preferences of voters and interest groups are nevertheless constrained by the state identity which all citizens internalise through their everyday experience of state institutions. In Section 3.3, I describe this tension between the sociological forces that promote policy stability and the psychological forces that promote policy change as a ‘constructivist political economy’. Section 3.4 theorises the process for promoting bottom-up policy reform within a constructivist political economy, laying the foundations for testing the proposed identity-based
approach in relation to public support for foreign aid. Accordingly, the key components of the model are articulated as general propositions before the chapter finally concludes.

3.1 Conceptualising Public Opinion in Policy Contexts

The constructivist and SCT perspectives reviewed in the previous chapter have a number of complementary strengths and weaknesses in terms of explaining state and citizen behaviour respectively. Constructivism cannot predict policy change because structure and agency are co-constituted whereas SCT cannot explain patterns of policy stability because it has not specified the structures that shape the logic of agents. In this section, I argue that the weaknesses of one theory can be addressed with the strengths of the other. In addition, there are a number of commonalities between the two which facilitates their integration.

3.1.1 Contrasting strengths and weaknesses

According to the constructivist perspective in international relations, state identities determine state behaviour by guiding elite perceptions about appropriate foreign policy choices. The domestic dimension of state identities constitutes cultural norms and the international dimension constitutes the image of the state relative to other states in the international system. The main strength of the constructivist perspective is that the cultural norms aspect helps to explain how a disengaged electorate legitimates foreign policy decisions, whereas the international system aspect helps to explain why donors maintain differentiated aid policy trajectories. The main criticism of the constructivist perspective is that it cannot predict when policy reform will occur, nor is there a mechanism to promote bottom-up policy change.

The domestic norms approach argues that state identities are defined by historically-significant and institutionally-embedded cultural norms which do not reside in individuals but in their interactions. Constructivists reject methodological individualism on the grounds that aggregate individual actions cannot capture broad social forces and shared interpretations of meaning.\textsuperscript{31} However, norms do not arrive fully formed. Moreover, without understanding the contribution individual agents make to cultural norms, constructivists cannot make predictions about future policy change. Indeed, if the standards by which people judge assertions are part of the existing social order, it will be very difficult for change to catch on (Frueh, 2003, p. 180).

\textsuperscript{31} Constructivists associate methodological individualism with rationalist materialism.
The international system approach argues that state identities are defined in relation to the behaviour of other states so state-to-state interactions reinforce the status quo. Put differently, as states are motivated to maintain their identities, they adjust their behaviour according to their understanding of external expectations which are conferred by the behaviour of other states. Therefore, state identities are over-specified by the international system and change becomes impossible. Indeed, a state’s identity can only change in response to unexpected actions by other states. However, other states have no incentive to defy their role expectations which are also conferred by the international system, so all state identities are effectively static. In order for the constructivist perspective to move beyond explaining existing foreign policies towards predicting the future, it needs to adopt a theory of agency.

Conversely, SCT is a theory of individual agency which argues that agents (individuals and groups) actively define themselves according to context-dependent category attributes, not as the established order defines them. Therefore, the main strength of SCT is that it is able to account for citizens engaging in political action to transform the established order. By the same token, SCT’s understanding of self-categorisation as a personal experience would be enriched if its analytical models captured the non-random distribution of people’s experiences in society (Stryker, 2008). Experiences are shaped by a person’s location within social structures such as class, ethnicity and gender, as well as their location in a particular country. Day-to-day experiences of state institutions (including foreign policy norms) may attach behavioural expectations to identities by creating habitual perceptions of what is normal and, therefore, logically correct. Therefore, the main weakness of SCT is its poor applicability to political decision-making in the real world which is more complex and structured (less free) than laboratory-based experiments would suggest.

There are several aspects to the political science critique of SCT (see Huddy, 2001). First, because SCT theorists insist that self-categories are not stored inside the minds of individuals to influence later behaviour (instead they are context-dependent), relations between identities cannot be (and need not be) specified. Thus, SCT struggles to account for consistent political attitudes within a person. Second, personal identity has not been adequately operationalised, limiting the ability of researchers to apply the theory to the behaviour of individuals as independent voters (as opposed to social groups). Third, because the influence of social structures (including elite-controlled institutions) on the identity-based policy preferences of citizens cannot easily be replicated in

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32 As Wendt (1999) explains, ‘In interaction states are not only trying to get what they want, but trying to sustain the conceptions of Self and Other which generate those wants’ (p. 316).
laboratory experiments, normative fit at the level of political constituencies has not been specified. Therefore, systematic differences in political attitudes across countries are not well understood. Finally, SCT recognises that group leaders can manipulate the content of an identity by emphasising certain intra/inter-group distinctions. However, it has not fully considered, and rarely examined, the fact that policy communication is controlled by powerful actors who may seek to persuade public opinion to support their agenda by manipulating the meaning of identities through framing processes. Again, this may have to do with the fact that laboratory experiments are not conducive to this type of analysis.

The key criticisms of constructivism and SCT are summarised in Figure 3.1 which tries to show (with a block arrow) how the two theoretical models could complement each other if they were integrated. In essence, the domestic side of the constructivist ledger could be filled with SCT. Doing so would introduce the individual agency of SCT to the structural determinism of constructivism. This would allow for a model of the tension between policy stability and policy change to be established and tested. It is important to point out that although SCT holds that the processes of comparative fit and normative fit occur concurrently, affecting both identity salience and meaning at once, here they are represented separately to highlight my criticisms of SCT.
Figure 3.1 Integrating Constructivism and SCT to Balance the Structures that Promote Policy Stability with the Agency of Policy Change

Policy change cannot occur because:
- Relational state identities based on state-to-state interactions are overspecified
- State identities based on historically- and institutionally-important cultural norms discounts individual variation

Poor application to politics because:
- Relations between an individual’s identities unspecified
- Personal identity not operationalised
- Normative fit (including elite-controlled institutions) unspecified
- Manipulation of identity meaning unspecified
3.1.2 Commonalities between constructivism and SCT

Integrating the two behavioural models outlined above allows for the establishment of a comprehensive picture of public opinion in the context of existing policy. However, it is first necessary to examine what these models do and do not have in common so that their integration is theoretically coherent. Having reviewed the constructivist and SCT literatures separately in Chapter 2, it is apparent that they incorporate very similar concepts. This is owed to the fact that they share the same intellectual heritage of ‘symbolic interactionism’ which was proposed by George Herbert Mead in the early 20th century. Mead’s dictum was ‘self reflects society’. More specifically, symbolic interactionism argues that the meanings humans derive from social interactions determines how they will behave. This in turn shapes society which feeds back into self (Hewitt & Shulman, 2011).

There are five key concepts that constructivism and SCT use to explain identity-based behaviour, three of which they agree on but configure differently. The fact that they assemble these shared concepts differently makes the two theories complementary. The other two concepts add further value to the proposed framework for bottom-up policy reform by providing political campaigning tools.

Differentiation among individuals, groups or states, as a determinant of identity content (or benchmark for what identity is not), is featured in both the constructivist literature and SCT. However, for constructivists, horizontal (inter-state) distinctiveness is bounded by the international system. For SCT theorists, horizontal (inter-personal and inter-group) distinctiveness is bounded by the superordinate context which can operate at various levels of inclusiveness, yet there is no account of vertical relationships between identities at different levels of abstraction. The idea that identity meanings reflect cultural norms is found in SCT whereas constructivism sees cultural norms as determining identity content. Constructivism on the other hand refers to the concept of framing as a means of manipulating identity meaning. Finally, SCT departs from constructivism by asserting that identities must be salient to produce congruent behaviour whereas the constructivist literature only looks at salient cases.

A summary of these concepts and how they are utilised in constructivism and SCT is given in Table 3.2. The last column details the specific mechanisms that are theorised to lead to identity-congruent behaviours (antecedents and consequences of identities for the actor). This column underscores that both perspectives would regard it implausible that evidence-based facts change
people’s policy preferences because this would mean that facts change their identity, whereas actually, the reverse is assumed to be true. This is the foundational feature that makes the subtle differences between the two theories complementary rather than contradictory. Finally, the last row of Table 3.2 outlines the features of an integrated approach which I have termed the ‘identity-based approach’. This approach adopts all five concepts from constructivism and SCT, and makes some modifications in order to seamlessly join up the core concepts. I explain this in detail in the next section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIFFERENTIATION DETERMINES IDENTITY CONTENT</th>
<th>RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT IDENTITIES</th>
<th>CULTURAL NORMS DETERMINE IDENTITY MEANING</th>
<th>IDENTITY SALIENCE IS A PRECONDITION FOR ACTION (ACCESSIBILITY OF IDENTITY IN A SITUATION)</th>
<th>IDENTITY FRAMES LINK IDENTITY TO BEHAVIORS (APPLICABILITY OF IDENTITY TO A SITUATION)</th>
<th>MECHANISM THAT CAUSES IDENTITY TO PRODUCE IDENTITY-CONGRUENT BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Cultural norms determine identity content]</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity creates habitual logic which alters interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Categorization Theory</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Psychological identities defined by horizontal distinction within superordinate context</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Self-categorisation alters perceptions of reality, leading to stereotypical behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity-Based Approach</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Sociological and psychological identities defined by horizontal distinction at relevant level of abstraction</td>
<td>Meanings of lower identities vertically align with higher identities</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Habitual logic determines behaviours that legitimately express identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ = concept is prominent in literature
3.2 Politics is the Point of Intersection; Identity is the Integration Mechanism

In a liberal democracy, politics is the art of compromise. In this section I argue that politics is the point of intersection where the structural determinism of constructivism can be integrated with the individual agency of SCT so that structures and agents compete for power at the same time as they are co-created. As it stands, constructivism is not clear about the conditions under which domestic norms are contested because methodological individualism is disavowed. I argue that political processes can turn stabilised (taken-for-granted) norms into contested norms because they become important at a psychological level rather than just at a sociological level. Likewise, SCT is not clear about the conditions under which individual preferences recreate (as opposed to alter) the existing policy reality because it has not examined how institutions shape identity stereotypes. I argue that powerful political actors can manipulate identity stereotypes because they control the institutions that convey cultural norms and the policy discourses that imbue policy issues with identity-based meaning.

When it comes to foreign aid, competition between structures and agents naturally favours structures. This is because aid policy typically has bipartisan support and is decided in international forums rather than in elections. However, lots of individual actions can have consequences for state behaviour which may not have been collectively intended. According to SCT, appealing to the psychological categories people use to define themselves in different situations can tip the balance in favour of agents. Working with citizens’ identities, however, calls for working with the institutions in their lives to change the habitual logic that guides the way they see themselves and the way they are seen by others. Only when citizens come to see themselves differently will new possibilities become understandable, thinkable and imaginable.

I use the concept of identity to connect the structural determinism of constructivism with the methodological individualism of SCT in an integrated rather than a conjoined fashion. According to Frueh (2003), identity labels ‘occupy an intermediate point in the process by which agents and structures co-constitute each other and social reality generally’ (p. 170). Therefore, the way in which constructivism and SCT can be integrated is by bringing the state identity – which is a sociological concept – into the minds of individuals. However, this requires an elaboration and reconceptualisation of the superordinate context in SCT. I achieve this by proposing a new concept, based on the logic of the everyday, that I have termed ‘identity alignment’.
The concept of identity alignment promotes an ecologically-valid picture of identity-based policy preferences – one that approximates real life politics and institutions. It takes the SCT idea that people have multiple identities at different levels of abstraction, and then incorporates the constructivist notion of state identity (as opposed to national identity) as a representation of the existing policy reality. Recall that state identity is not the same as national identity. A state’s identity can be externally measured, as opposed to national identity which is based on individual subjective feelings of national identification. The concept of identity alignment therefore assumes that inside the minds of individuals are both internally sought or agentic identities (personal and social identities) and externally-imposed or structural identities (state identity). Furthermore, I assume that identities at all levels of abstraction linger and interact inside a person’s head. Therefore, belonging to a state as an enduring objective legal entity may not be personally important but the state nevertheless has a cognitive and motivational influence by interacting with other psychological identities to shape their meaning. This is because citizens cannot escape being exposed to state institutions and therefore influenced by cultural norms.

The notion of identity alignment draws heavily on the SCT concept of the superordinate context (Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004) to create a vertical relationship between the meanings of identities at different levels of inclusiveness. Identity alignment also takes inspiration from Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) assertion that it is extremely difficult for individuals to hold multiple conflicting identities. Thus, identities frequently overlap within the self-concept, and the dominant identity category can inhibit alternative categories. Finally, and most importantly, identity alignment integrates the constructivist idea that repeated exposure to certain perceptions, thoughts and actions creates a habitual logic – the logic of the everyday. Accordingly, one is not receptive to, nor able to imagine, other responses or patterns of association as they seem alien or meaningless (Hopf, 2010). In bringing all of these ideas together, I propose that identities at all levels furnish certain behavioural expectations. However, the behaviours associated with higher order identities are less reflective and, therefore, impose habitual limitations on the behaviours that individuals associate with lower order identities (see Figure 3.2). This is because higher order identities are practiced by a greater number of people, making them more legitimate within the self-concept.

The process of identity alignment can be thought of as ‘habitual fit’. Habits are ready-made perceptions and responses which influence the interpretation of identity stereotypes. As different people have different habits because of past experiences, the expression of an identity category
will vary from person-to-person.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, unlike the SCT concept of normative fit which asserts that identity-based behaviours make sense according to the broader culture, identity alignment suggests that identity-based behaviours make sense according to the particular mix of identities (both agentic and structural) inside a person’s head. It is an individuated phenomenon that arises because holding conflicting attitudes is mentally challenging, and habits associated with more legitimate identities automatically delete a number of interpretations of identity stereotypes. This allows the behavioural expectations of different identities to converge, which in turn explains why the policy convictions of individual citizens are not in a constant state of flux. Furthermore, because identity stereotypes that are accepted by a greater number of people have greater legitimacy, it allows a state’s policies to remain cohesive despite preference variation amongst individuals and groups within states.\textsuperscript{34} The concept of identity alignment thus facilitates the establishment of a model of public opinion that is consistent with state behaviour.

\textsuperscript{33} This is different to the SCT concept of perceiver readiness which refers to an individual’s predisposition to categorise in a certain way based on past experiences. Here I am only talking about identity stereotypes (normative fit), not identity content (comparative fit). I am arguing that the same identity content can produce different behaviours depending on how a person instantiates the identity stereotype to minimise conflicting expectations arising from their other identities.

\textsuperscript{34} As Bloom (1990) points out, the congruence between culture and polity occurs in spite of political conflicts. Indeed, political conflicts based on culture would threaten the state itself but political conflicts based on class or intellectual disaffection only threaten governments.
Figure 3.2 The Concept of Identity Alignment from the Perspective of the International System

Figure 3.2 illustrates the concept of identity alignment from the perspective of the international system. It tries to explain why people hold stable preferences across situations and why aggregate preferences are systematically different across countries. Each state is depicted as an onion skin to show that, at every level of identity (state, social or personal), identity-reinforcing behaviours (such as supporting foreign aid) are hierarchically constrained. The external influence of the international system on state identities is represented by the horizontal arrow, contrasting the cultural norms that distinguish each state’s foreign policies from the foreign policies of other states. Inside each state are a number of social and personal identities. The top-down influence of the state identity on the expression of these identities is represented by vertical arrows from more inclusive identities to less inclusive identities.

By specifying how identities at different levels vertically relate to each other, identity alignment overcomes the inability of constructivism to specify individual sources of legitimate policy change, and the inability of SCT to specify the structural sources of policy stability. Indeed, the state identity is not reducible to the identities of social groups and individual voters. Rather, each level of identity has causal powers but higher levels of identity condition actions at lower levels. Therefore, a humanitarian social identity in Norway will probably be more pro-aid than a
humanitarian social identity in the US because redistribution is culturally more acceptable in Norway (Edlund, 1999; Lawler, 2007). However, if due to an altered perception of reality members of the US humanitarian social group believe that performing a different set of actions is necessary to maintain an authentic self-concept, the direction of the vertical arrows in Figure 3.2 could be reversed, leading to a bottom-up shift in the boundaries of the state identity. Campaigning to mobilise public opinion is therefore about claiming agency for identities not recognised as agentic by the system (Frueh, 2003).

I propose that a potential counter-force to the top-down effect of identity alignment is the susceptibility of humans to accept a particular interpretation of an issue because of the way it is discursively framed. Language frames are similar to picture frames in that a frame around a picture does not change the picture itself but rather crops information and therefore determines what is and is not important to consider.35 The concept of ‘framing’ is found in a variety of disciplines, including political science (Ross, 2000), international relations (Mintz & Redd, 2003) and social psychology (Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). Framing generally refers to communications that link pieces of information (or aspects of reality) to a receiver’s existing mental structures for organising knowledge. These mental structures (or schemata of interpretation) give meaning to life experiences (Goffman, 1974).36 For example, ‘Drilling for oil’ versus 'exploring for energy' promotes two different interpretations of the same policy (Luntz, 2007). Each interpretation (frame) comes with different inferences about ways to think or act and thus affects public opinion. For example, US public support for spending on HIV/AIDS in developing countries is lower when the survey question includes the phrase ‘foreign aid’ (Bleich, 2007).

According to the political science literature, when it comes to how the use of language shapes policy debates and justifies policy choices, the term framing captures two different processes. On the one hand, people default to predictable divisions (for and against) when policies are linked to ideological symbols, metaphors or rhetorical devices, such as ‘the free market’. On the other hand, people restrict the evaluative criteria they would otherwise apply when policies are linked to cultural norms, such as promoting fair opportunity (for example, Australians would find it difficult to disagree with a policy that was framed as giving people ‘a fair go’). In both cases, crafting the

35 According to Entman (1993) ‘Frames are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments’ (p. 52).

36 Identities can also be understood as mental structures that give meaning to life experiences (Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999).
frame through which an audience receives information may be an effective strategy for guaranteeing a particular response.

In synthesising constructivism and SCT in order to addresses the weaknesses of one with the strengths of the other, I developed the concept of ‘identity framing’. I define ‘identity frames’ as identity symbols, metaphors and rhetorical devices that are used in structured communication – including policy discourses, campaign advertising, and school education – to intentionally or unintentionally connect an issue to a particular type of identity. Crucially, I maintain that the discursive process of identity framing changes the normative connection between an identity and an issue, but not the core content of the identity. The effect on public opinion will therefore depend on the inherent nature of the identity in question. For example, if aid-giving is framed as prosocial because its stated aim is to reduce poverty, the issue will become relevant to expressing prosocial identities which are inherently caring, thereby increasing support for aid. However, if aid-giving is framed as proself because its stated aim is to reduce international terrorism, it will become relevant to expressing proself identities which are inherently selfish, thereby decreasing support for aid.

The conventional notion of framing is that the presentation of an issue manipulates the audience’s logic by changing the perceived conditions under which a policy is proposed, or the perceived likely outcome of a policy. In other words, the conventional framing hypothesis contends that people ‘rationally’ approve or disapprove of a policy according to the cognitive networks that a frame activates. By comparison, the notion of identity framing is that associating policy issues with certain identity symbols, metaphors or rhetorical devices manipulates the audience’s interpretation of identity stereotypes. Therefore, the mechanism driving the public’s policy approval or disapproval under an identity framing hypothesis is not logic, ideology or cultural acceptability, but rather the desire to maintain a particular identity by performing pro-identity behaviours. Maintaining an authentic sense of self is psychologically rewarding.

37 ‘Public discourses’ are ongoing debates, in the form of written or spoken discussion, over issues that shape the meaning of our lives, such as inequality, war, capital punishment, and immigration. Public discourses are not merely political but public. That is, they exercise the public’s moral principles and matter for the public’s self-understanding. As such, public discourses are a likely source of identity frames. A ‘policy discourse’ is a specific type of public discourse where the content is about policy ideas and values (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004). I use the terms public discourse and policy discourse interchangeably.
By applying the concept of framing to individual and group identities, I consider SCT processes in light of the powerful political forces that compete with campaigners to shape the public’s perceptions of the sorts of policies that are important to defend (Grafton & Permaloff, 2005; van der Veen, 2011). Indeed, implicit in the identity framing concept is recognition of the fact that various actors have an interest in controlling public opinion. In relation to establishing a framework for bottom-up policy reform, the concept of identity framing suggests that campaigners can actively expand the pro-reform constituency by imbuing policy issues with particular identity meanings. That is, using campaign advertising to create normative links between a wider variety of identities and support for aid policy reform may increase the number of people for whom political mobilisation is perceived to be an identity-reinforcing behaviour. However, it may not be possible to convert anti-aid identities into pro-aid identities if supporting aid is inconsistent with the general nature of the identity. For example, it would probably be impossible and undesirable to try to influence the meaning of a nihilist identity so that supporting aid becomes an identity-reinforcing behaviour because the content of the identity would define aid-giving as contrived. However, it would make sense to try to influence the meaning of an animal welfare identity, for example, because the nature of the identity is to show sympathy for the mistreatment of all life. Campaigners, of course, may also find themselves having to mitigate counter-frames promoted by competing interests.

In summary, the identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform that I am proposing is based on the following core ideas: (1) contrastive characteristics (differentiation) determine identity content; (2) the alignment of identities at different levels of abstraction (identity alignment) modifies identity meaning; (3) identity salience is a precondition for action; (4) and the use of identity symbols and metaphors in policy discourses (identity framing) determines the relevance of issues to identity expression. Together, these ideas tell a story of how public support for aid is motivated in the context of existing aid policies. That is, citizens conform to identity stereotypes in order to make sense of the world and to be accurately understood. This intrinsic motivation for self-consistency does not require external monitoring or rewards (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). In addition, the logic of the everyday constrains the ability of individuals and groups within society to imagine a different reality. Therefore, reform advocates must compete with powerful political forces to influence identity salience and identity frames in order to control public opinion.
3.3 A Constructivist Political Economy

In relation to the broader aim of promoting GPGs, the identity-based approach I am proposing is presented diagrammatically in Figure 3.3. There are two core elements to the model: the domestic context and the international context. I describe their interaction as a constructivist political economy.

Figure 3.3 A Constructivist Political Economy Model of the Relationship Between Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

According to constructivists, public opinion is a broad social force, not the aggregated preferences of individual voters. However, I have sub-divided public opinion into personal and social identities (A). By breaking public opinion up, a theory of agency is injected into the model where otherwise personal and group preferences could not vary from the state identity. However, personal and social identities do not have their own boxes. Therefore, the identity-based approach asserts that when citizens are observed at personal and social levels, their normative preferences are based on who they are as individuals and members of social groups. When citizens are observed collectively, they share the normative goals of the state because they internalise the state identity through their experience of state institutions, including foreign policy norms (C). This overcomes the problem of specifying where normative fit comes from in SCT as state institutions convey and
reinforce cultural norms. The influence of public opinion on elite foreign policy interests (B) can either be a function of personal and social identities, or it can be a function of the domestic cultural norms that constitute the state identity. The latter represents the status quo but the former occurs when an issue acquires electoral potency.

The reason different normative goals can be pursued simultaneously is because agency does not reside in the actor, but in identity labels whose meanings are socially negotiated (Frueh, 2003). In other words, people have multiple identities at different levels of abstraction which are activated in different situations. Thus, when the state identity is the basis for deciding foreign policy, personal and social identities lie dormant. At other times, a social identity might be salient so that a person’s foreign policy interests are shared with other group members. However, to account for individuals holding stable policy preferences across situations, and states pursuing stable policy behaviour over time, it is proposed that the foreign policy preferences of individuals and groups within the state cannot completely diverge from the state identity. This is due to identity alignment.

Unlike SCT which sees identities as fluid constructs, the identity-based approach argues that identities linger and interact inside the minds of individual citizens. Through the process of identity alignment, the meanings of identities converge. This helps to explain how individuals in the real world avoid being pulled in different directions as a result of conflicting behavioural expectations. It is further proposed that identity alignment occurs hierarchically because higher order identities are shared by a greater number of people than lower order identities, giving them more legitimacy. That is, the state identity constrains the meanings of social identities within the state, which in turn constrain the meanings of personal identities. This process is theorised to increase social harmony but also to perpetuate existing foreign policies. Indeed very little has changed in the overall look and feel of each donor’s policies since countries began establishing aid programs in the 1960s and 1970s (Colaço, 1973). Therefore, the model indicates that to promote policy reform, campaigners must deploy strategies that break this cycle at either point A, B or C. International diplomacy occurs at point C, direct lobbying for policy change occurs at point B and political mobilisation, which is the focus of the current research, occurs at point A.

The identity-based approach makes it theoretically possible to mobilise bottom-up policy reform within a constructivist framework because I have included a political economy mechanism. This has been done before (for example, see Seabrooke, 2007), but never in relation to public opinion.
about foreign aid. Traditionally, political economy is about material realities and the rational interests of constituencies, although some authors acknowledge that political and economic goals are also products of culture (R. F. Hopkins, 2000, pp. 329-330). A constructivist political economy is about connecting the macro and micro levels of foreign policy norms. Aside from David and Bar-Tal (2009), there have been few attempts to integrate sociological notions of identity (such as territory, culture, language, collective memory, societal beliefs) with psychological notions of identity (cognitive, emotional and motivational attachment to a social entity). The identity-based approach specifies that individuals can vary in the degree to which they support the state’s foreign policies, yet stability in the system is brought about through shared habitual logic.

To be clear, the identity-based approach I am proposing conceives of political constituencies as having personal, social and state identities. In order to make sense of the world and to be accurately understood, voters and interest groups are motivated to maintain and enhance their identities. Thus, they intuitively support policies they perceive to be consistent with their salient self. Accordingly, there are two ways to mobilise a reform constituency (A to B). The first involves making individuals and groups aware of any inactive pro-reform personal and social identities that they may have (identity priming). The second involves convincing individuals and groups that supporting a different set of policies will more effectively maintain and enhance their salient personal and social identities (identity framing). The size of the reform constituency will therefore be determined by the number of personal and social identities whose meaning is affected, while the strength of the reform constituency will be determined by the extent to which these identities are salient.

The reason why political elites will respond to vocal public pressure for policy reform is that they have an interest in maintaining and enhancing their own identities as democratically-elected officials. This may of course be different with authoritarian regimes, as we saw during the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China. However, the democratic history and institutions of the DAC member states define the identity of political elites as representatives of the people who seek public approval through policy decisions. As political elites are intrinsically motivated to maintain their political identity, they will fulfil the protest demands of voters and interest groups. However,

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38 In reviewing two books on ‘economic constructivism’, Seabrooke (2007) contends ‘that we have moved beyond asking if ideas and norms matter in political and economic change to (more fruitful) empirical investigations of when and how they matter. As such, I expect that future economic constructivist research will concentrate on specifying mechanisms of change rather than trying to assert the power of ideas or norms as independent variables’ (p. 382).
without an assertive reform constituency, maintaining and enhancing the existing state identity is the default basis for foreign policy.

Moving to the international context, from a constructivist perspective of foreign policy, there are normative boundaries that constrain the range of options available to political elites (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner, 2001). As such, the policies states pursue generate coherent patterns. What constitutes ‘normatively appropriate policy’ is state identity. State identity is conventionally defined either by domestic cultural forces (B to C) (Katzenstein, 1996) or by interactions with other states in the international system (C to B) (Wendt, 1999), but here both are made pivotal. Therefore, a state’s identity is constitutive of the cultural norms that distinguish the state’s foreign policies from the foreign policies of other states in the international system. For example, Sweden might self-identify as a humane internationalist because of its generous domestic welfare program and then express this identity by giving a relatively large amount of foreign aid (Bergman, 2007). Australia on the other hand might self-identify as a laidback internationalist because of its domestic convict history and then express this identity by giving just enough aid to maintain a mid-range position amongst the DAC members (B to C). However, Sweden’s humane internationalist identity can only be maintained because other countries like Australia have distinctly different identities (C to B). In other words, in order for states to know who they are, they must know who they are not. Therefore, enhancing their distinctiveness relative to other states is a legitimate goal of foreign policy-makers in order to effectively navigate the international system.

Returning again to the domestic context, individuals and social groups internalise the state identity (C to A) so certain beliefs become unthinkable and the same foreign policies are perpetuated. In other words, people’s foreign policy preferences are informed by what is ‘normal’ policy for the country in question – the logic of the everyday. Hopf (2002) points out that habitual action is ‘characteristically unexamined’ (p. 12). Therefore, what we habitually do limits our ability to imagine other possibilities. In the identity-based approach, I have integrated the logic of the everyday with the SCT notion of the superordinate context. As such, when the normative orientation of a higher order identity is aligned with a lower order identity, the logic of the everyday legitimates this orientation. Identity alignment therefore increases the likelihood of

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39 Former Labor MP John Langmore (2006) made the following observation about the US and Australia: ‘Crucial divergences are underlying the national purposes of the foreign policies of the two countries. Americans maintain their sense of being God’s own country with a manifest destiny to lead the world to freedom and democracy. Australia has no global ambitions, and those related to the region are for stability and economic advancement rather than dominance’.
performing certain behaviours because other behaviours are perceived to be illegitimate or unthinkable. This means that for campaigners to promote bottom-up policy reform there is a need to engage in a broader politics. Mobilisation is not just about reordering people’s priorities within a given reality. It is also about aligning people’s imagination with a new reality, potentially through direct lobbying to expand the horizon of legitimate policy options.

Ongoing reciprocal processes between identification and the social context mean that actors shape their environment as they are in turn shaped by it (David & Bar-Tal, 2009). As the international realm feeds back into the domestic realm, the state’s identity brings stability to the policy preferences of personal and social identities. The stable preferences of voters and interest groups in turn limit the potential for reform (A to B). On a more optimistic note, once an issue has become electorally potent and reforms have occurred, the legitimacy of lower order identity stereotypes will shift in line with the new ‘normal’. The reforms will thus endure so long as the new logic of the everyday prevails.

3.4 Application of the Identity-Based Approach to Foreign Policy

3.4.1 Generalised model of political mobilisation and foreign policy outcomes

From the perspective of a constructivist political economy, the protracted nature of GPGs makes perfect sense. First, because identity alignment constrains bottom-up reform and second because threats to a state’s distinctiveness constrains top-down reform. A good example of the identity alignment constraint is the long-running Israel-Palestine conflict. A peace settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians constitutes a GPG. During the 2010 peace talks, the two main sticking points were Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank, and Hamas’ refusal to acknowledge Israel’s right to existence (Byman, 2010). The Israeli leadership refused to extend a freeze on settlements because domestic groups claimed Israelis have a biblical right to occupy the land. Hamas refused to accept a two-state solution (and was left out of the talks) because of extremist elements within the organisation. However, the reason these domestic constituencies were able to obstruct the peace process is because their views are legitimated by the superordinate context. That is, Israel’s identity as a Jewish state reinforces the logic of the everyday amongst Religious-Zionist Jews. To them, construction in the West Bank maintains and enhances their identity. Likewise, Hamas’ identity is defined by opposition to Israel. This legitimates lower order extremist identities within Gaza who advocate violence.
In regard to the distinctiveness constraint, the current global governance model should be rethought when the post-MDGs agenda is decided. As a state’s identity is equally defined by state-to-state differentiation as it is by domestic forces, it must be accepted that DAC states will never all share the same identity (i.e., there will never be 21 copies of Sweden) and reform proposals will be circumscribed by the span of normatively appropriate policy for the state in question. Indeed, if the findings from SCT research are applied to states, encouraging all DAC members to act uniformly may actually stimulate behaviours that accentuate differentiation amongst sub-groups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). As actors constantly strive for distinctiveness, it is only by allowing DAC members to accentuate differences at the state level, while simultaneously reinforcing the DAC identity, that compliance with DAC goals (such as committing 0.7 percent of GNI to ODA) will improve (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Chapter 5 discusses this idea in greater detail.

If one accepts a constructivist political economy view of the world, what hope is there for enhancing international cooperation? Although the model will typically lead to stable policy trajectories, the identity-based approach I am proposing maintains that at any given time, a multiplicity of identities lie dormant, unformed or susceptible to manipulation. Thus, when unexpected outcomes or events occur, new identities are sometimes constituted. For example, Germany forged a new democratic identity following the destruction of World War II. At other times, political leaders might engage in identity framing to alter public perceptions about the appropriateness of certain policies for maintaining the state identity (Zehfuss, 2002). A classic example is when President Nixon – the most prototypically anti-communist leader – visited China in 1972. His action did not alter American identity but it did alter the way American foreign policy expressed American identity (Ross, 2000). Finally, when oppositional identities at a lower level of abstraction become salient, political mobilisation can lead to bottom-up reform (Hechter, 2004). Eventually the policy changes that are brought about may reconstitute the state identity. For example, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa (legitimised by the global anti-apartheid movement which issued condemnations and imposed sanctions) transformed the state’s identity from a ‘Western’ racist state to an African democracy distinguished by its ‘rainbow nationalism’ (Frueh, 2003).

Reforming the aid system on the basis of the identity-based approach necessitates gradually shifting donors’ boundaries of normatively appropriate policy by incrementally changing the policies themselves. In other words, mobilising a suitably powerful segment of the population (or political elite) to endorse Third World debt cancellation, or the lowering of import tariffs, could
lead to small policy changes. Gradual reforms will not distort state-to-state differentiation within the international context but they may moderate states’ policy orientations. Over time, the way in which an aid donor’s identity is constituted could be drastically altered. That is to say, the donor’s identity itself may not change, but the minimum effort made toward the realisation of the MDGs, for example, may be legitimately increased. The longevity of the new policy direction will then be near guaranteed because of the self-perpetuating interplay between public opinion and the state identity through identity realignment.

This has recently been seen with climate change mitigation as most states have now committed to doing something but the carbon-reduction leaders and laggards have retained their relative positions. I argue that in addition to foreign aid, the model could be applied to a host of foreign policies that promote GPGs. For example, only 6 out of 28 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries meet their commitment to allocate 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to fund NATO operations. As with foreign aid, NATO funding is rarely an election issue. Therefore, a NATO constituency could potentially be mobilised to push for policy changes with the identity-based approach that has been outlined here.

3.4.2 Predicting Public Support for Aid with the Identity-Based Approach

This section outlines the application of the identity-based approach to addressing the foreign aid word-deeds gap. The main argument that the identity-based approach puts forward is that, when the electorate is disengaged, aid policies will be shaped by state identities. However, bottom-up policy reform becomes possible if a sufficiently large and vocal domestic constituency can be mobilised. To understand who this constituency is, and who might come to be included, a micro-level analysis of public opinion must be contained within a macro-level analysis of institutions and policy discourses.

Figure 3.4 specifies the four key components of the conceptual model that I examine in the chapters to follow. These are: (1) state identity; (2) personal and social identities; (3) identity alignment; and (4) identity framing. The model depicts how the constructivist concepts and the SCT concepts have been brought together under the umbrella of the identity-based approach. The constructivist model (above the line) has been elaborated to allow citizen policy preferences to vary according to their personal and social identities. Thus, bottom-up policy reform is now a theoretical possibility. The SCT model (below the line) incorporates the conventional SCT notion that identity-based mobilisation requires activation of pro-aid identities by deploying identity
priming techniques. However, the model has been enhanced by the inclusion of a framing mechanism to manipulate the meaning of identities, and the replacement of the non-specific notion of cultural norms with an objective measure of state identity.

In order to validate the identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform, this dissertation examines the four key components of the conceptual model in the form of general propositions:

Component 1: A state’s identity is defined by the normative foreign policies and practices that differentiate the state from other states in the international system

Component 2: Prosocial personal and social identities drive citizen policy preferences

Component 3: The alignment of identities at different levels modifies the meaning of identities

Component 4: Identity frames modify the meaning of identities

After Chapter 4 presents the data, measures and methods that are used to model each component in relation to the issue of foreign aid, Chapters 5 to 8 derive and then test several hypotheses against each component. These hypotheses are detailed in the relevant chapters.

Chapter 5 examines Component 1 to validate the constructivist perspective of state behaviour. It also establishes a quantitative measure of state identities that can be used to test identity alignment.

Chapter 6 examines Component 2 to confirm that the basic SCT model holds when applied to public opinion about foreign aid. It also highlights the importance of personal identities which SCT has hitherto neglected to analyse.

Chapter 7 examines Component 3 to affirm the concept of identity alignment. It therefore justifies the integration of psychological and sociological notions of identity to understand the dynamics of policy reform and policy stability.

Finally, Chapter 8 examines Component 4 to lend support to the identity framing concept, which in turn, bolsters the political dimension of the identity-based approach.
Figure 3.4 The Identity-Based Approach to Bottom-Up Policy Reform

Above the line is the default constructivist scenario where policy change cannot occur because of the logic of the everyday. Individuals are not included in this picture as policy decisions are determined by elites according to the state’s sociological identity.

Below the line is a politicised version of the SCT scenario where policy change can occur because citizens within the state have psychological identities which can be manipulated by framing processes. However, the logic of the everyday constrains the scope of support for a different reality.
3.5 Conclusion

There is no single disciplinary approach that recognises top-down structural constraints on public opinion, yet points campaigners to specific mechanisms to promote bottom-up policy reform. Therefore, I used the notion of identity to bring together insights from different disciplinary perspectives in a theoretically coherent manner. The notion of state identity, according to the constructivist perspective in international relations, is a useful conceptualisation of how public opinion and state behaviour are mutually-constituted. The notion of personal and social identities, according to SCT in social psychology, is a useful conceptualisation of how individual preferences form and change to fit the social context. Integrating the structural determinism of constructivism with the methodological individualism of SCT forms the basis of a model for understanding how support for aid is motivated in the context of existing aid policies. Further insights from the values literature, also in social psychology, are added in the next chapter to enhance the applicability of the model to politics.

This chapter put forward an identity-based approach to bottom-up mobilisation. I argued that it is necessary to view public opinion at different operational levels. As policy makers respond to pressures in the international system, they do so with a collective consciousness that may not directly correspond to the views of citizens when surveyed as individuals. However, when aggregate individual preferences are activated they have the potential to demand that the boundaries of this collective consciousness be shifted, thereby expanding the horizon of possibility.

Overall, my proposal for achieving bottom-up policy reform can be summarised as follows:

1. Under normal conditions, a state’s foreign policies reflect the state’s identity rather than the aggregate preferences of individual citizens.

2. State identity is defined both internally and externally as cultural norms and the international image of the state. To this end, domestic institutions (re)create cultural norms and the international system (re)creates state identities.

3. Citizens passively internalise the state identity through their experience of state institutions. This creates support for the existing policy reality because what is habitually experienced is perceived to be normal and, therefore, logically correct.
4. Campaigners can activate and expand the pro-reform political constituency by priming and framing pro-reform personal and social identities. Priming stimulates existing identity-attitude linkages whereas framing reconfigures identity-attitude linkages.

5. Policy-makers must respond to citizens’ policy preferences by either justifying the existing policy trajectory as being consistent with their personal and social identities, or by reorienting the state’s policy trajectory within the boundaries of the state’s identity.

6. Once a policy is reformed, it incrementally shifts the boundaries of a state’s identity and citizens realign their individuated identities according to the new logic of the everyday. Thus, in the absence of ongoing political opposition, the new policy trajectory is legitimately maintained.

7. Direct lobbying to redefine the state’s identity through top-down policy reform may be an effective way for campaigners to facilitate bottom-up policy reform. That is, by shifting the logic of the everyday so that citizens can begin to imagine a new reality which is a precondition for individual and group mobilisation.

The issue of foreign aid is highly relevant to testing the identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform. This is because the 0.7 percent aid target is a constant policy commitment across DAC members, and has been for more than 40 years, yet it has been unequally implemented. This suggests that public opinion is likely to play a significant role. Having set out my conceptual model of public support for foreign aid, the rest of the dissertation tests the model and distils recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of mobilisation campaigns.
Chapter 4. A Quantitative Research Strategy

All data are guilty until proven innocent (attributed to the Scottish demographer William Brass, cited in Silver & Dowley, 2000, p. 543).

It is easy to stereotype the major aid donor states. Just the mere mention of the European debt crisis in 2011-2012 conjures up images of rule-abiding Germany and corrupt Greece. To this end, Lewis (2011) has characterised states as having personalities whereas Moïsi (2009) has characterised states by their dominant emotions. However, for campaigners interested in tracking the progress of bottom-up policy reform efforts, more precise quantifiable measures of state identities are needed. Moreover, integrating psychological conceptions of identity which are typically measured quantitatively, with constructivist conceptions of identity which are typically measured qualitatively, requires methodological consensus. As such, I employ a quantitative research strategy to test the identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform. In addition, I source data from the real world, rather than an experiment, to ensure the ecological validity of the analyses.

The research strategy can be divided into a data and measurement strategy and an analytical strategy. After summarising the complete strategy in Section 4.1 of this chapter, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the sources of data and the selection of variables at the individual-level and country-level respectively. Section 4.4 goes on to describe the various analytical methods for testing the four key components of the identity-based approach which were outlined in Chapter 3 in relation to the issue of foreign aid. These are:

Component 1: A state’s identity is defined by the normative foreign policies and practices that differentiate the state from other states in the international system

Component 2: Prosocial personal and social identities drive citizen policy preferences

Component 3: The alignment of identities at different levels modifies the meaning of identities

Component 4: Identity frames modify the meaning of identities

All four components must be interrogated to satisfactorily conclude that the identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform is supported by evidence. The aim of this chapter, therefore,
is to secure confidence in the research findings. This includes justifying the choice of data, measures and methods; providing a description of the processes that I followed to validate the dependent and independent variables; specifying the key assumptions that later govern my interpretation of the results; and acknowledging the research limitations.

4.1 Summary of the Research Strategy

The data and measurement strategy that I use to test the identity based approach, as summarised in Steps 1 and 2 of Figure 4.1, covers the selection of both individual-level data and variables and country-level data and variables. Individual-level data are needed firstly to measure support for aid as the outcome of interest or criterion measure, and secondly to measure personal and social identities as the psychological factors that are predicted to influence support for aid. Country-level data are needed firstly to differentiate each state’s identity as the sociological context in which the meanings of psychological identities are nested, and secondly to proxy aid policy discourses as the political context in which powerful actors deploy identity frames to compete for control over citizen policy preferences. In order to practically understand the constraints and opportunities for mobilising public opinion, it is critical to study representative samples of electorates in real-life policy settings. Therefore, I draw individual-level variables from the 2005-2008 World Values Survey and country-level variables from various international databases and the websites of official government aid agencies. I detail the data and measures at the individual-level and country-level respectively in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this chapter.

There are four main empirical tasks that are covered by the analytical strategy, as set out in Steps 3 to 6 of Figure 4.1. Given that the constructivist literature is dominated by qualitative methods, it is first necessary to formulate a quantitative measure of pro- and anti-aid states that recognises the cultural and relational dimensions of state identities. Therefore, the first analysis develops a typology of ‘likeminded’ states by discerning normative patterns within and between the policies they pursue to reduce global poverty (Step 3). The next empirical task is to compare across DAC member states, the personal and social identities that are pro- and anti-aid. Therefore, the second analysis involves a series of logistic regressions to measure the independent influence of personal and social identities on support for aid (Step 4). After identity as a main effect has been established for states within the international system, and for individual voters and group members within states, the question of identity alignment is explored. That is, two different interaction models are tested between personal and social identities and between social and state
identities in relation to support for foreign aid (Step 5). Finally, the potential of identity framing
techniques to expand stereotypical endorsement of aid policy reform across a greater spread of
the population is examined. That is, an interaction model is employed to test the degree to which
identity frames (assumed to be contained within aid policy discourses) modify the aid-giving
orientations of personal identities (Step 6). I detail these analytical methods in Section 4.4 of this
chapter.
### Figure 4.1 A Quantitative Research Strategy

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<th>Step 1: Selection of individual-level variables</th>
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<tr>
<td>- support for aid (DV1 and DV2)</td>
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<td>- personal and social identities (Schwartz’s personal values and group memberships)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- supporting aid is a prosocial behaviour</td>
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<td>- personal values constitute personal identities</td>
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<td>- certain social identities contain pro-aid norms</td>
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<th>Limitations</th>
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<td>- data only available for 13 DAC countries</td>
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<td>- some countries only answered DV2</td>
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<tr>
<th>Step 2: Selection of country-level variables</th>
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<td>- policies and practices that impact on global poverty (to quantitatively establish state identities in Step 3)</td>
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<td>- policy discourses (identity framing)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- national communication proxies policy discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- discourse contains single dominant identity frame, shaped by political agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- limited variable choice for cross-national comparability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 3: Comparative analysis of policy norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- create state identity typology from policy patterns (factor analysis, rank countries on policy indices, cluster likeminded states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- distinguish justice norms in typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- validate with domestic welfare regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- state identities can be measured by what states do (I use a broad selection of policy variables, not just aid policy, so analysis is not tautological)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- analysis of policy norms cannot discern the process by which actors construct institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 4: Logistic regression analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- independent effect of personal and social identities on support for aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- the meanings of identities vary between countries, not within countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- incorrect aid figures may alter support (sensitivity analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Canadian DV2 biased (sensitivity analysis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 5: Moderation (interaction) analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- effect of identity alignment on personal and social identity-based support for aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- state institutions impose the state identity on all citizens evenly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- moderation analysis not possible for DV1 (no software exists to calculate cross-level interaction for partial proportional odds)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 6: Moderation (interaction) analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- effect of policy discourses on personal identity-based support for aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- national population evenly exposed to aid policy discourses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- moderation analysis not possible for DV1 (as above)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Individual-Level (Micro) Data and Measures

4.2.1 Source of individual-level data

From the perspective of the identity-based approach, examining public support for aid with survey data is preferable to conducting an experiment. The main advantage of experiments is that they allow for causal inferences because researchers have control over the situation in which participants make decisions. However, experimental studies often rely on convenience samples of students that are fairly homogenous in terms of age, level of education and income. This limits the generalisability of the findings (Bekkers, 2010). Furthermore, experimental studies only proxy the real-world, and it is usually only possible to manipulate a limited number of conditions. This is particularly detrimental to testing the identity-based approach, a key feature of which is the proposition that identity-based behaviour is shaped by the logic of the everyday. Relatedly, survey measures of personal and social identities appropriately capture identity salience (readiness to act out an identity) and identity centrality (relative importance of alternative identities) as they relate to baseline rather than situational demands.

It would be financially and logistically prohibitive to administer a custom-made survey across more than one or two countries in which the variables of interest are crafted to specifically address the research questions. Therefore, accepting certain data limitations is a necessary trade-off for gaining wider sampling with existing and publicly-available international survey data. Detailed questions on foreign aid – such as reasons for approving or disapproving of aid-giving and personal priority areas for aid commitments – are only found in national or European polls (such as the Eurobarometer). However, basic questions about individual support for the level of aid-giving appear in a number of cross-national surveys. The field of surveys is narrowed significantly, however, when a combination of aid and identity questions is called for. In fact, the WVS is the only survey that can accommodate the current research strategy.  

40 The WVS was originally set up to investigate socio-cultural and political change at a global level. Indeed the WVS is the largest international survey to ask a representative sample of around 1000-2000 respondents per country a series of demographic and attitudinal questions covering issues such as religion, governance, the environment and foreign policy. Several questions relate to the concept of identity, including memberships of various social groups, and identification at the individual, national, regional, and global levels. A majority of countries have participated in at least one of the five waves of the survey which began in 1981, and the data can be freely downloaded from the WVS website. www.worldvaluessurvey.org
I chose to test the identity-based approach with cross-sectional data from the latest wave of the WVS, conducted between 2005 and 2008 (World Values Survey, 2005). As the identity-based approach assumes that public opinion and state behaviour have a bi-directional influence on each other, causality cannot be identified. This removes the need to analyse longitudinal public opinion data. There are also three positive reasons for analysing cross-sectional data. First, there are inconsistencies in the survey design prior to 2005-2008 which favour the latest survey wave. Second, this particular survey timeframe is uniquely suited to the current research topic. Thirdly, in order to establish a framework for bottom-up policy reform, the priority is to capture the latest picture of identity-based public opinion across a wide range of countries. These reasons are expanded below.

Design differences in the 2005-2008 survey compared to earlier waves are positive for testing the identity-based approach. Indeed, restricting the analyses to data from this single survey period enhances the credibility of the results. Of the five survey waves since 1981-1982, respondents were only asked about their level of support for foreign aid in the last three waves (conducted in 1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2008). However, the question wording in the 2005-2008 survey is an improvement on the previous two waves. The latest survey tells respondents how much foreign aid their country gives before asking whether the amount is appropriate. Thus, unlike earlier waves, one can be confident that responses to this question are not biased by incorrect estimations of aid effort.

A second positive inconsistency in the design of the 2005-2008 WVS is that, for the first time in the survey’s history, respondents were asked a battery of ten questions which simplify Schwartz’s (1992, 2007b) basic human values instrument. Later on in this chapter, I argue that Schwartz’s values inventory is highly suitable for operationalising different personal identities. It is the most comprehensive and widely used instrument for measuring individual-level values cross-nationally. It is also the most robust values structure for understanding the relationship between personal values on the one hand, and attitudes and behaviour on the other (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003).

In terms of the survey timeframe, the 2005-2008 survey captured a period in history that can only be characterised as the most conducive to producing favourable public attitudes toward aid.

41 In order to capture any rational policy evaluation effect of aid knowledge, it would have been ideal if each country had split their sample — informing half the respondents about the level of government aid and not informing the other half. This would have enhanced the robustness of the final conclusions about the extent to which aid-giving attitudes are non-rational. Unfortunately this did not occur.
worldwide. Unprecedented economic growth and prosperity around the world, just prior to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, combined with several major events that resulted in international development becoming a major focus in the media, including the Gleneagles Summit and Live Aid concerts. A cross-sectional analysis of public support for aid during this period is likely to produce stronger identity-attitude associations which can assist in the interpretation of the results.

Finally, from the perspective of applying the research findings to the task of developing a real life campaign to mobilise public opinion, it is necessary to unpack the logic of the everyday with the latest picture of support for aid in a variety DAC member states. Fifteen DAC member states participated in the latest WVS with an average sample size of 1235 (ranging from 954 in New Zealand to 2164 in Canada). Despite the fact that only 13 states participated adequately to be included in the current research, they represent the full spectrum of aid policy variation. These countries are named further on in the chapter.

All surveys also have limitations. A significant limitation of the WVS data is that different modes of data collection are accepted, reducing the cross-national comparability of the data. For example, countries which used the mail back method will likely display higher levels of prosocial behaviour than those which used face-to-face interviews. This is because ‘people who are willing to mail back questionnaires are likely to be more cooperative and to have a stronger sense of obligation’ (Heath, Martin, & Spreckelsen, 2009, p. 310). However, as the present research is interested in the relationship between identity and attitudes, rather than levels of attitudes cross-nationally, bias based on variation in the mode of data collection is not a major concern. Refer to Table 2.A in Appendix 2 for a summary of the different modes by which data were collected in the latest wave of the survey across the DAC member states, and the associated response rates.

Through the use of weighting procedures, it is possible to ensure samples are representative of the national populations from which they are drawn. With regards the 2005-2008 WVS, a weight variable was calculated by the principle investigators in some countries to adjust for sample non-representativeness. However, not all countries calculated a weight and the methodology used by
those that did was not uniform cross-nationally. Therefore, only the unweighted data are used to perform the analyses.\footnote{This decision was supported in personal correspondence by Professor Christian Welzel who is a key member of the World Values Survey Group, as well as respected colleagues familiar with the WVS project. Particular thanks go to Eric Uslaner, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, who assisted in resolving this issue. Also see Heath, Martin, and Spreckelsen (2009) who note that weighting does not necessarily remove nonobservation bias as weights need to be determined in a manner that is relevant to the research outcome of interest.}

### 4.2.2 Measuring Support for Aid (Dependent Variables)

The outcome of interest is individual support for increasing government spending on foreign aid. ‘Support for aid’ has two components: (1) aid endorsement; and (2) willingness to sacrifice.\footnote{This bifurcation of support for aid follows the lead of Kanji and Nevitte (1997) who studied environmental concern and action with similar measures.} Supporting a policy in principle is quite different from being willing to make a financial sacrifice in order to bring that policy to fruition. Indeed the commitment required to endorse aid-giving is weaker than the commitment required to forgo personal income in the form of taxes to fund additional spending. The 2005-2008 WVS asked respondents two questions which capture these distinct aspects of support for aid. These questions therefore comprise the two dependent variables.

The first dependent variable (DV1), which measures aid endorsement, was asked to WVS respondents in 11 DAC member states. New Zealand also included a question on aid endorsement but it was worded differently. In addition, New Zealand and Italy did not include the Schwartz values items so these two countries were eliminated from the dataset. Data for the first dependent variable are therefore limited to Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The exact question wording is as follows:

In 2003, this country’s government allocated [a tenth of one percent]* of the national income to foreign aid—that is, [US$ 38.05]* per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right?

[This figure was replaced with a country-specific amount]

Scores were reversed so that: 1=‘Too High’; 2=‘About Right’; 3=‘Too low’

In many cases the aid figure quoted in the WVS represented aid to least developed countries (LDCs) instead of total ODA. Aid to LDCs is a sub-category of total ODA which amounts to a tiny
fraction of the GNI of donors. While this aid has special significance as it could arguably be labelled
the most needed and least politically-motivated, the distinction between ODA and LDC aid was not
made clear to respondents except in Sweden. Finland was the only country to include the correct
ODA figure. Table 4.1 contrasts the ODA figure stated in the WVS against the official figure for
each country according to the OECD.

Table 4.1 Distribution of Dependent Variables and Quoted Versus Official Aid Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion who said current aid level is too low (DV1)</th>
<th>Proportion willing to pay higher taxes for aid (DV2)</th>
<th>Figures quoted in WVS for aid per person and % GNI</th>
<th>Official ODA/GNI ratio 2003 (OECD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.434 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.335 (0.013)</td>
<td>$16.96 (&lt;1/10th of 1%)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.361 (0.016)</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.360 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.637 (0.019)</td>
<td>$43.75 (1/10th of 1%)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.352 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.378 (0.016)</td>
<td>95 euro (0.35%)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.323 (0.015)</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.304 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.246 (0.010)</td>
<td>26 euro (1%)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.226 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.233 (0.015)</td>
<td>1,670 yen (0.1% or less)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.198 (0.013)</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.430 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.454 (0.016)</td>
<td>1300 kroner (0.4%)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.515 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.419 (0.015)</td>
<td>10 euro (&lt;1/10 of 1%)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.475 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.507 (0.016)</td>
<td>706 kronor (0.25% to the very very poorest countries)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.473 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.501 (0.015)</td>
<td>70 francs (1%)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>0.261 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.244 (0.012)</td>
<td>$38.05 (1/10th of 1%)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard error in parentheses

I assume that the incorrect aid figures made no difference to how people responded for two
reasons: (1) the true amount of aid given by each participating country is in fact significantly lower
than average respondent estimates according to previous research (Brady, Fishkin, & Luskin, 2003; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; McDonnell et al., 2003b, p. 25); and (2) the proportion of respondents in favour of increasing aid in each country is consistent with other national survey results (McDonnell et al., 2003b). Nevertheless, a sensitivity analysis in Chapter 6 addresses any uncertainty in terms of potential changes in the estimates.

Data for the second dependent variable (DV2), which measures willingness to sacrifice, were available for 13 DAC member states. These 13 states include the ten listed above plus Britain, France and the Netherlands. The exact question wording is as follows:

Would you be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase your country's foreign aid to poor countries? Yes or no?

Scores were recoded so that: 0='No'; 1='Yes'.

Although the two variables are strongly correlated (.483, p<0.001), they cannot be combined into a single measure of support for aid because not all countries asked respondents both questions. Refer to Table 4.2 for a breakdown of the percentage of respondents who endorsed aid and were willing to sacrifice for aid in 13 DAC member states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Aid Endorsement</th>
<th>% Willingness to Sacrifice</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too High</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About Right</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Low</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100 (8,901)</td>
<td>100 (4,969)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45 Please note that the following pages refer to WVS data for Britain, not the UK which includes Northern Ireland, as samples were only drawn from the island of Great Britain. However, British aid allocations are determined by DFID which is a UK government department.
As DV1 stated the amount of aid the respondent’s country gave in 2003, the fact that British, French and Dutch respondents were not asked this question suggests their responses to DV2 may be biased by incorrect beliefs about the level of aid expenditure. Therefore, comparisons with these countries must be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, given that an identity-based model is under investigation, support for aid is understood to be determined by identity rather than reasoned judgement. Thus, a lack of specificity vis-à-vis aid spending should not bias the results.

Relatedly, in the Canadian survey, only respondents who said Canada’s aid was ‘too low’ in the previous question were asked whether they would be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase aid spending. Thus, the sample which stated their willingness to pay higher taxes for aid was probably homogenous in terms of their underlying motivations. This could reduce the size of the estimates for the second dependent variable. Therefore, I conducted a sensitivity analysis which is reported in Chapter 6.

4.2.4 Measuring Personal and Social Identities (Independent Variables)

In selecting measures of personal and social identities from the WVS that are likely to influence support for aid, I assumed that public support for policies that promote GPGs constitutes prosocial behaviour. Officially, the term prosocial behaviour ‘is a generic term that encompasses any act intended to benefit another person or entity; the motivation responsible for the act is not considered’ (Penner & Orom, 2010, p. 56). Prosocial behaviour is distinguished from altruistic behaviour which is solely motivated to improve another person’s wellbeing without there being any expectation of tangible or intangible rewards. 46 Although the modern purpose of aid-giving is to improve the welfare of people in developing countries, identity-reinforcing attitudes are prosocial rather than altruistic because the motivation is to maintain one’s self-concept.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the SCT literature has shown little interest in examining the role personal identities play in shaping individual behaviour. Instead, the emphasis has largely been on the role social identities play in shaping group behaviour. This has resulted in a lack of

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46 Prosocial behaviour is often operationalised as cooperating with others which is a pre-requisite for the supply of GPGs. Hence, individual support for foreign aid (Atkinson, 2009; Lumsdaine, 1993) and individual support for pro-environmental policies (Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005) are frequently conceptualised as prosocial behaviours.
guidance for scholars interested in operationalising personal identities as a way of understanding independent voter behaviour. Therefore, I first outline the social identity measures.

Within the SCT literature, social identities are typically measured with survey questions such as:

‘How important is _________ [social category] to your self-identity, your sense of who you are? – Very important, somewhat important, slightly important, not important at all’

‘I think of myself as a/an _________.’ [checklist of social categories]

The 2005-2008 WVS included several identity measures in the latter format in relation to national, regional and world citizenship, but not in relation to sub-national group memberships. Nevertheless, WVS respondents were asked about their involvement in various social groups that have historically fought for the rights of the poor both domestically and internationally. These are political (left-wing), religious and humanitarian groups (Lumsdaine, 1993). Although it is impossible to know the precise values and norms that define a group’s identity without interviewing group members, in order to empiricise the identity-based approach with large-N comparable data, I assume that these three social categories are defined by positive aid-giving norms.

In order to capture the importance of each social category to a respondent’s self-definition, only survey items that used a scale (as opposed to a binary response category) were selected to operationalise political, religious and humanitarian social identities. The single item measures were worded as follows:

**Political Identity**

In political matters, people talk of “the left” or “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

The ten point numerical scale scored: ‘Left’=1; and ‘Right’=10.

**Religious Identity**

Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

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47 SCT argues that identities contain both values and norms. However, the WVS restricts the operationalisation of social identities to social norms only, and the operationalisation of personal identities to personal values only. Using another survey would, however, have meant sacrificing the range of countries included in the analysis which is critical to applying the research to the broader issue of global governance.
The scoring system was reversed so that: 7='More than once a week'; 6='Once a week'; 5='Once a month'; 4='Only on special holy days'; 3='Once a year'; 2='Less often'; and 1='Never, practically never'.

**Humanitarian Identity**

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian or charitable organization [The list also included: ‘Church or religious organization; Sport or recreational organization; Art, music or educational organization; Labor Union; Political party; Environmental organization; Professional association; Consumer organization; Any other’]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scores were reversed so that: 1='Don’t belong'; 2='Inactive member'; and 3='Active member'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three social identities represent the main sources of aid advocacy cross-nationally. Leftist political parties are associated with higher aid disbursements (Thérien & Noël, 2000) which comports with the Left’s advocacy of more generous international aid practices (Thérien, 2002) and collectivist solutions to inequality (Noël & Thérien, 2008). Thus, supporting foreign aid is assumed to be a normative goal for people who self-identify as left-wing. Supporting foreign aid is also assumed to be a normative goal for people who self-identify with more formal institutions that advocate for international development, particularly churches and international development NGOs (Saunders, 2009). For example, Caritas Internationalis – a confederation of Catholic charitable organisations – is one of world’s largest disaster response and development networks with a presence in over 200 countries. Similarly, NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children are internationally-recognised providers of financial assistance to developing countries (AusAID, 2009).

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49 Although the WVS does not include a specific question on membership of an international development NGO, involvement in a ‘humanitarian or charitable organisation’ serves as a suitable substitute. The term ‘humanitarian’ is generally understood within wealthy developed nations to mean international development or emergency relief provided to poor countries. In addition, when respondents were asked about their level of involvement in this type of organisation, a contrast was made with other voluntary organisations which tend to operate at the local or...
The political and religious identity measures are likely to cause controversy amongst political scientists and social psychologists alike, but for different reasons. Political scientists tend to see ideological and religious affinity as reflecting belief systems that generate patterns in attitudes, feelings and behaviour, despite the fact that these concepts have been shown to function as social identities (J. Drury & Jansen, 2007; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). For social psychologists, the WVS items do not strictly measure social identities in the SCT style – as situation-bound orientations based on fleeting emotional attachment to a social entity. However, I have criticised SCT for failing to explain politics as a stable competition for power (see Chapter 2). Specifically, purely cognitive explanations of social behaviours are limited so it is important to understand the structural sources of social psychological phenomena (Serpe & Stryker, 2011).

From the perspective of the identity-based approach, the selected measures of social group membership appropriately capture the depth of identity as a performative disposition that is deeply rooted in culture. The performative conceptualisation of identity argues that identities such as gender, for example, are not pre-given but habitually performed. In other words, people do not have the attitudes they have because of who they already are, but rather they are who they are because of the attitudes they have (Pennycook, 2010, p. 19). This helps to explain how identity and agency are related within a constructivist political economy. Stryker and Serpe (1994) have also shown that identity salience (readiness) and identity centrality (importance) predict the amount of time a person spends performing behaviours that correspond to the social roles to which those identities are linked. Therefore, the behavioural measures that I have selected are fit for purpose.

national level, including church or religious; sport or recreational; art, music or educational; Labour Union; political party; environmental; professional; and consumer.

This point is particularly relevant in regards to religious identity which I have operationalised with religious behaviour rather than religious identification. Large numbers of people in society will claim religious identification. However, without ongoing socialisation by religious institutions, identification alone is not theorised to produce pro-aid attitudes because religiosity itself is not inherently prosocial. Furthermore, Serpe and Stryker (2011) point out that ‘Cognitive identification with a category is both precursor and consequence of involvement in social networks representative of the category’ (p. 241). For example, the salience of a science student’s scientist identity is associated with high levels of interaction with other students with strong scientist identities.

Behavioural measures are also important for promoting policy reform within a constructivist political economy because identities that are chronically salient (central and pervasive) will produce stereotypical behaviour even when identification is not made salient by the specificity of the context (Serpe & Stryker, 2011).
In regard to measuring personal identities with the WVS, Taylor (2002) suggests that personal identities should be operationalised with the characteristics that orient a person to the world around them – characteristics that makes their world comprehensible and manageable. He maintains that personal identities are not merely based on characteristics but rather goals or end-states such as ‘intelligent, warm, athletic, and responsible’. He goes on to give the following example: ‘The “intelligent” component of my personal identity does not specify precisely which goals I set for myself, nor does it guarantee me any success at achieving them. What it does do is provide me with a sense of general orientation and motivation to achieve them’ (p. 36).

Taylor’s (2002) conceptualisation of personal identities is very similar to the way scholars conceptualise personal values. Although the values literature exists quite separately to the SCT literature, Hitlin (2003, 2007, 2011) and Gecas (2000) are two scholars that have argued that personal values are linked to personal identity. Hitlin (2003) asserts that ‘personal identity is produced through value commitments’ (p. 121). Gecas’ (2000) position is slightly different. He posits that it is not the value itself that leads to behaviour but rather self-definition in terms of the value. ‘Commitment to values and conceptions of oneself in terms of one’s values are the basis for value identities. Values such as “freedom” and “equality” become the value identities. “I am a person who stands for freedom and equality”’ (p. 96).

Values represent competing goals which may be different for individuals compared to societies (However, ‘sampling and individual value fluctuations can account for some of the lack of isomorphism’ argue Fischer, Vauclair, Fontaine, & Schwartz, 2010, p. 145). Accordingly, the values literature commonly distinguishes between personal values as a psychological construct and cultural values as a sociological construct. Personal values motivate the decisions that individuals make whereas cultural values motivate the decisions that societies make. Therefore, personal values are visible in individual attitudes and behaviours, and cultural values are visible in cultural structures such as institutions. The relationships between personal values, cultural values and cultural structures are nevertheless reciprocal. For example, even though cultural values determine the way institutions function, cultures are made up of individuals whose focus of attention, way of interpreting information, and nature of concerns is determined by their personal values (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007). Equally, cultural structures influence how personal values are expressed. For example, political institutions and their discourses may determine whether valuing freedom at the individual-level means supporting a universal health system versus private health insurance. Cultural structures also influence the types of cultural values that a society prioritises (Schwartz, 2006b). For example, a religious education system may engender traditional cultural values such as respect for ancient customs.

Hitlin (2007) and Gecas (2000) also link values to social identities by suggesting that strong and authentic commitment to a social group depends on group membership enacting core personal values. In other words, the experience of a social identity is satisfying to the extent that it verifies personal identity.
Values are hierarchically-ordered goals that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives (Schwartz, 2006b). They include standards by which people aspire to live (for example, a world at peace, national security), as well as desirable character traits (for example, honest, polite) (Rokeach, 1973). Similar to identities, values have both content (goals) and meaning (attitudes and behaviours). To this end, there is a large literature on the effect of values on attitudes and behaviours (for example, Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010).

I propose that Schwartz’s (1992, 2007b) personal values instrument – a simplified version of which was included in the 2005-2008 WVS – can be used to operationalise the personal identity construct in SCT. It is the gold standard measure of personal values due to the fact that it was developed empirically from more than 60,000 survey responses from all over the world. Furthermore, decades of cross-cultural research has demonstrated that the circumplex structure of ten value types, which reflects empirically congruent and conflicting desires, is universally shared to varying degrees (see Figure 4.2).$^{54}$ The ten value types are divided into two basic motivational dimensions, as shown in Figure 4.2. One dimension reflects a conflict between ‘openness to change’ and ‘conservation’ (change versus stability). The other dimension reflects a conflict between ‘self-transcendence’ and ‘self-enhancement’ (other-focus versus self-focus).

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$^{54}$ 210 samples from 67 countries supported the discrimination of ten basic values types (Schwartz, 2007b).
The WVS measured each of Schwartz’s ten value types with a single portrait of a person. The ten portraits describe persons with very different goals and aspirations. Thus, identification with each value type constitutes a different personal identity. The portraits are presented in a block checklist which nudges respondents toward thinking of each identity in relation to the others, thereby capturing identity centrality (Goyder, 2003). Respondents were asked to use a six-point Likert scale to indicate ‘how much that person is like you?’ Scores were reversed so that: 6=’Very much like me’; 5=’Like me’; 4=’Somewhat like me’; 3=’A little like me’; 2=’Not like me’; and 1=’Not at all like me’. Table 4.3 presents the exact wording of each value measure. Construct validity of the Schwartz values items included in the WVS was examined before they were used to operationalise

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55 By comparison, identity measures that are interspersed in a survey capture identity salience. This is because respondents tie consideration of each isolated identity to related factual aspects of their life (Goyder, 2003).
personal identities because measurement of the ten value types has been simplified over time. Refer to Appendix 2.

Table 4.3 Wording of the Schwartz Values Items in the WVS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>WVS Question Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s achievements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Schwartz (2007b) recommends ipsatization of the values scores before analyses to eliminate individual differences in scale use.\textsuperscript{56} He says differences in the way people use the response scale can distort findings and lead to incorrect conclusions. This is because the ten value orientations are ‘non-orthogonal’ or ‘integrated’ so that the relations among values are coherent rather than independent.\textsuperscript{57} Ipsatization with single item measures which are highly correlated can be problematic (Fischer, 2004). However, ipsatization is standard practice when using Schwartz’s value instrument because there is sound theoretical reason for doing so.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, all reported

\textsuperscript{56} Ipsatization refers to the process by which the score for each value item is centred on the individual’s average score over all values items. As such, scores are transformed into deviations from an individual’s own mean (not a grand or group mean).

\textsuperscript{57} Ipsative scores are considered within a personal frame of reference. A set of ipsative scores will always sum to a constant because there can be no gains without corresponding losses.

\textsuperscript{58} Unlike abilities such as reading and arithmetic (McDermott, Fantuzzo, Glutting, Watkins, & Baggaley, 1992), everyone holds the same value types but it is the relative emphasis of values that
results are based on ipsatized scores but non-ipsatized scores were also examined without any major discrepancies in the results.59

As values operate within a system of motivationally-integrated priorities, eight out of the ten value types are modelled. Schwartz (2007b) maintains that to avoid underestimating the influence of values, prediction of attitudes and behaviour should take account of opposing values. However, including all ten value types in a model would create a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, I examine the effects of five prosocial and proself values on support for aid but include three additional values as corresponding controls. Previous research has shown that universalism values (equality, openness and solidarity) and benevolence values (caring for others close by) increase prosocial behaviours (acts intended to benefit others) while security values (safety and stability) and power values (dominance over other people and resources) increase proself behaviours (acts intended to benefit oneself). Tradition values (subordination to cultural customs and ideas) may increase prosocial behaviours that preserve time-honoured customs, but decrease prosocial behaviours that defy traditional ideals (Schwartz, 2010).60 In addition to these five value types of interest, the three additional value types that are included to ensure that all motivational conflicts are covered are: achievement, hedonism and self-direction. The two remaining value types of stimulation and conformity are excluded from the model altogether.61

Finally, values and life circumstances have reciprocal influences. Indeed, people typically upgrade the importance they attribute to values they can readily attain (such as self-direction values when their job affords freedom of choice), and downgrade the importance of values whose pursuit is blocked. However, the reverse occurs with values that concern material well-being and security.

determines people’s attitudes and behaviour. Therefore, Schwartz recommends making each score a person-relative metric. In other words, if the importance of one value increases then the relative score of the opposing value must diminish.

59 Configural and metric invariance is not an issue with the WVS instrument because each value is measured with only one item. Scalar invariance – which arises when different countries use the response scale differently – is also not a concern here because the research is focused on comparing the relationship between values and attitudes cross-nationally, rather than comparing means levels of values or attitudes cross-nationally (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008).

60 As supporting foreign aid is considered a type of protest behaviour in many less-generous donor states, it is antithetical to accepting the customs and ideas that one’s culture provides. Furthermore, given that foreign aid aims to remake the social order so that there is more equality in the world, it clearly defies the notion of preserving the past. As such I label tradition values proself.

61 Although conformity values are also often associated with prosocial behaviour, I do not include conformity values in my analysis. This is because supporting foreign aid is a private behaviour and therefore not subject to social pressure to comply with accepted standards of behaviour.
Therefore, power and security values are more important to people who suffer economic hardship and social upheaval compared to those who live in relative comfort and safety. For this reason, it is important to control for socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, education and income (Schwartz, 2006a). Relevant indicators from the WVS are added to each analysis. The response scales for these items are as follows: Age Group (1=15-29; 2=30-49; 3=50-98), Gender (0=Male; 1=Female), Income Scale (1=Lower; 10=Upper), and Highest Level of Education (1=No Formal; 9=University Degree). These variables have no substantive interest but serve as a robustness check. Refer to Table 4.4 for variable definitions at the individual level and associated summary statistics. Refer to Table 2.D in Appendix 2 for a correlation matrix of all dependent and independent variables at the individual-level.
Table 4.4 Operationalisation of Individual-Level Variables and Summary Statistics for Pooled Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>World Values Survey Item</th>
<th>Variable Coding</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid Endorsement</td>
<td>In 2003, this country’s government allocated [a tenth of one percent]* of the national income to foreign aid—that is, [US 38.05]* per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right? *[This figure was replaced with country-specific]</td>
<td>1= high; 2=right; 3=low</td>
<td>11967</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to Sacrifice</td>
<td>Would you be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase your country’s foreign aid to poor countries? Yes or no?</td>
<td>0=no; 1=yes</td>
<td>13870</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Identities</td>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>1=not me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16362</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>1=not me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16359</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16332</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16355</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16367</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16314</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16348</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
<td>16309</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Identities</td>
<td>Political Identity</td>
<td>1=left; 10=right</td>
<td>14617</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
<td>1=never; 7=&gt;once p/week</td>
<td>16305</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian Identity</td>
<td>0=not member; 2=active</td>
<td>16302</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic Controls</td>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>1=15-29; 2=30-49; 3=50-98</td>
<td>16537</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0=male; 1=female</td>
<td>16550</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income Scale</td>
<td>1=lower; 10=upper</td>
<td>14654</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>1=no formal; 9=degree</td>
<td>16412</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed means and standard deviations for individual countries in Appendix 2 (Table 2.E)
4.3 Country-Level (Macro) Data and Measures

4.3.1 Sources of Country-Level Data

A major contribution of the current research is the development of a model to understand how the policy preferences of citizens are influenced by the existing policy reality (which is constitutive of the state identity) and sources of power that control policy discourses (which contain identity frames). The identity-based approach posits that normative alignment between citizen identities and the state identity strengthens citizens’ policy convictions. It also posits that identity frames contained in policy discourses link policy convictions to identity-expression. However, quantitative measures of state identities and policy discourses that are comparable across the DAC member states do not exist. Therefore, I use country-level data to establish a measure of state identities and proxy policy discourses.

At this point it is not possible to specify the exact data used to measure state identities because variable selection is done empirically in Chapter 5. To summarise the process, I take from international databases a broad range of policy variables that impact on global poverty for as many DAC members as possible. I discern policy patterns within and between states which I reduce down to three distinct policy orientations. As state identities affect perceptions of reality and rules of behaviour, including obligations rich countries have to poor countries, I identify the justice norms that underpin each policy orientation. I am left with a categorical measure of state identities which I validate by assessing the degree of overlap with a well known typology of OECD welfare state regimes. I look for a similar clustering of countries to confirm that states pursue the same justice norms at home and abroad, in line with their identity. Two types of data are therefore needed to establish state identities. The first includes various international policy variables which I obtain from the OECD and the Center for Global Development (CGD) think-tank. Chapter 5 has the details. The second is Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology of domestic welfare state regimes, details of which can also be found in Chapter 5 and in Section 4.4 of this chapter. Esping-Andersen’s three-pronged typology has been shown to be stable over time because social policy is ‘culturally path-dependent’ (van Oorschot, Opielka, & Pfau-Effinger, 2008). Therefore, I argue that it is comparable to the state identity measure that I develop from more recent data.

In regard to examining identity framing, unlike discourse analysis which can specify the particular identity frames contained in communication, I assume that different sources of communication about foreign aid promote different identity frames according to their political agenda. Therefore, I selected three country-level variables that proxy different discourses
about foreign aid from the OECD, the World Bank’s database of World Development Indicators, and the websites of DAC government aid agencies (Refer to Tables 2.F and 2.G in Appendix 2). I use each variable to assess the degree to which discourses about foreign aid influence the aid-giving orientations of personal identities. See Sub-Section 4.3.3 for the assumptions underpinning the use of country-level variables to proxy aid policy discourses.

The main limitation of sourcing data from international databases is the narrow choice of variables that can capture the underlying constructs. With a small sample of only 13 DAC countries, excluding cases with missing data may bias the estimates and reduce the power of the statistical analyses. Therefore, I deemed it necessary to relax the criteria for selecting country-level variables.

4.3.2 Measuring State Identities (Contextual Variables)

People live and therefore form psychological identities within cultural and political contexts. SCT scholars have thus far not examined how such contexts shape the meanings of psychological identities because their research has tended to concentrate on experimental methods and, thus, they have not had appropriate measures available to do so. Cultural measures must be theoretically relevant to the research question at hand in order to elucidate the influence of cultural context on the meanings of psychological identities (Fischer, 2009). Therefore, I propose to establish my own measure of the cultural context that is specifically relevant to understanding identity-based support for foreign aid, namely a quantitative state identity variable.

According to the identity-based approach, state identities constitute the cultural norms that differentiate states’ foreign policies in the international system. The concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘norms’ have different meanings in different disciplines. Social psychologists David and Bar-Tal (2009) argue that ‘culture constitutes a type of two-way window through which one can observe the depth of identity: namely, what defines the uniqueness of the collective and, at the same time, how this identity is reflected and concretely expressed’ (p. 368). In the international relations literature, norms are defined ‘as normal state practices’ (Thomson, 1993, cited in Björkdahl, 2002, p. 14). As I propose to determine who states are empirically, I construct a measure of state identities from a comparative analysis of the usual behaviour of DAC member states with respect to reducing global poverty. However, normal behaviour is not

the same as *normative* behaviour so ‘a feeling of obligation needs to be added’ (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 14). Therefore, I assess the level of congruence between state behaviour in the international realm and state behaviour in the domestic realm.

As mentioned in the previous section, Chapter 5 comprehensively deals with the selection of variables that are analysed to establish state identities. Section 4.4 of this chapter provides an expanded rationale for operationalising state identities using empirical methods.

4.3.3 Measuring Policy Discourses (Contextual Variables)

Political scientists typically argue that framing effects should be examined experimentally. They assume that because policy issues are contested by political players jockeying for power within a political system, it is unlikely that one side’s message spin will dominate a policy debate. However, I argue that identity framing can be examined with survey data and proxy measures of national policy discourses because national policy discourses are shaped by culturally- and historically-stable forces within a country. Thus, they are likely to contain identity frames that create system-wide identity stereotypes. In addition, actors and entities are likely to deploy identity frames that manipulate outcomes favourable to their interests. Therefore, irrespective of competing frames in the broader political context, national sources of communication about global poverty and foreign aid are assumed to represent coherent policy discourses that are dominated by a single identity frame – the nature of which depends on the political agenda of the actor or entity that controls it. The only other way identity frames at the national level could be measured is by studying each country’s media reports, parliamentary speeches, and school curricula, which would be prohibitive beyond one or two countries.

Three proxy measures of national aid policy discourses are used to test the notion that identity meanings are a function of the way issues are framed. To justify the selection of policy discourse variables, it is helpful to restate the difference between identity priming and identity framing. Identity priming occurs all around us when we are made aware of who we are. For example, upon entering a segregated public toilet we are reminded of our gender identity. This increases the likelihood that we will conform to the behavioural expectations associated with our gender identity. But where do these behavioural expectations or identity stereotypes come from? The notion of identity framing contends that identity stereotypes are determined by the identity symbols and metaphors contained in communications and discourses about issues, events or policies. Therefore, aid policy discourses that represent distinct political agendas are likely to moderate the relationships between identities and public support for aid.
News media is the first policy discourse variable to be examined as a potential source of prosel self identity frames. The sensationalist nature of news reporting on global poverty and aid policy is theorised to heighten the perception that engagement with developing countries is risky and a cause for anxiety. The strength of identity framing in news media discourse is operationalised with a country-level variable: A 2004 measure of daily newspapers per capita from the 2008 ‘World Development Indicators’. Although the WVS asked respondents about their personal use of ‘different sources [of information] to learn what is going on in their country and the world’, including daily newspaper, news broadcasts, books, internet, etc, the question had a binary response outcome: ‘used it last week’ and ‘did not use it last week’. As such, this individual-level variable does not capture the intensity of news media discourse, making it an unsuitable measure of identity framing.

The second measure of policy discourse is official spending on development education by DAC governments. This variable reflects the OECD’s push for donors to increase citizen support for aid-giving by increasing awareness of global poverty and aid effectiveness. As an ostensibly rational presentation of facts, development education is not expected to have an identity framing effect (a null hypothesis). Development education is operationalised as 2001-2002 expenditure on development education per capita. This time period was selected as the most relevant to shaping the attitudes of adult respondents surveyed between 2005 and 2008 because development education includes both community awareness-raising as well as formal education in schools. Although the OECD’s target is for donors to spend two percent of ODA on development education, spending per capita (rather than total spending) more accurately reflects the impact on public opinion. It is therefore a much better indicator of identity framing.

Finally, the third measure of policy discourse relates to government aid agencies. Aid agencies that are politically independent are a potential source of prosocial identity frames. When an aid agency is run independently of foreign affairs or trade ministries, aid policy discourse is likely to emphasise poverty-reduction over geopolitics. However, there is no standard measure of aid agency independence. Therefore, I attempted to construct a binary variable from the official websites of each DAC government’s aid agencies. Coding became problematic because of the confusing array of agency types. Thus, I operationalised aid agency independence according to practical realities in 2008, including whether or not international development had ministerial status. Countries were given a score of 1 if their main aid agency operated autonomously and a score of zero otherwise. For example, technically Sweden’s aid agency

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63 Less than 100 WVS respondents were under the age of 18.
SIDA is accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but it operates autonomously. Therefore I coded Sweden’s aid agency ‘independent’. The US is the only contentious case as there is not a secretary for international development overseeing the US’ highly fragmented aid program but the Millennium Challenge Corporation is independently administered. The raw data are provided in Table 2.F in Appendix 2.

4.4 Analytical Methods

Four analyses are used to test the identity-based approach as a conceptual model for predicting public support for aid in the context of existing aid policies. These are: (1) establishing a quantitative measure of state identities that explains the aid-giving orientations of different DAC member states; (2) examining the relationships between different psychological identities and support for aid in various aid donor states; (3) assessing the impact, on support for aid, of normative alignment between psychological identities and between psychological and state identities; and (4) determining the influence of identity frames contained in aid policy discourses on psychological identity-attitude linkages. The four chapters to follow present the methods and results of each analysis in depth. Therefore, only a basic outline of the methods is given here to justify the approaches taken.

4.4.1 Establishing State Identities (Chapter 5)

The first analysis, which is presented in Chapter 5, tests component 1 of the identity-based approach: A state’s identity is defined by the normative foreign policies and practices that differentiate the state from other states in the international system. The aim of the analysis is to establish a quantitative measure of DAC state identities that can be used to test the identity alignment concept (which predicts that normative alignment between citizen and state identities strengthens the policy convictions of citizens via the logic of the everyday). However, country means on individual-level items represent the central tendency of individuals in a state rather than the identity of the state as a collective entity. Therefore, it is necessary to measure state identities with cultural constructs that are directly aligned with the unit of analysis.

Fischer (2009) recommends using theory to ensure that the operationalisation of ‘culture as a shared meaning system’ is relevant to the research question (p. 26). From the perspective of the identity-based approach, conventional constructivist methodology is not fit to discern the identities of the major aid donor states. This is because state identities are defined both from within (cultural norms) and without (difference between state-level ‘self’ and ‘other’ states). The existence of norms and shared ideas that constitute state identities can be found in government archives, letters of key individuals, press reports, treaties and conventions.
Constructivist scholars typically analyse such texts to demonstrate general patterns that can substantiate claims that state identities influence state behaviour (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). However, there is a need to assess the distinctiveness of states relative to other states, not just their internal cultural norms. Therefore, I turn to the comparative politics literature for inspiration.⁶⁴

Within the comparative politics literature, a number of typologies have been developed to explain institutional differences amongst otherwise similarly industrialised nations. The most popular typology is that of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). Using cross-sectional data he compared 18 welfare states by measuring the degree to which different social strata benefit from social policy and the effects of government intervention on social stratification. He ranked countries by their scores on three separate indices of stratification and then clustered them into three welfare state regime types: Conservative, Liberal and Socialist (Social Democratic). The typology that emerged from the analysis reflected the different ideological and institutional directions that OECD states have taken throughout history – and continue to take according to more recent analyses (see Crepaz, 2008, p. 143). Accordingly, I argue that the constructivist notion that state identities and foreign policies are co-constituted can be validated by identifying the cultural norms that differentiate the foreign policies that states adopt to reduce global poverty.

I employ Esping-Andersen’s methodology to simplify the measurement of DAC state identities into a categorical variable. Although typologies are often accused of oversimplifying the world, that is indeed their purpose. To capture the international dimension of DAC state identities, I transform the distinct policy orientations that differentiate clusters of states in the international system into a development policy regime typology. However, so that the analysis is not tautological, I establish each policy orientation from normative patterns across a broad range of policy variables, from various policy domains that impact on global poverty, not just aid policy. To this end, the point of aid is not simply to spend money but to achieve an outcome. Ostensibly that outcome is global justice; and a number of policy choices cumulatively contribute to this end. Indeed the targets listed under the eighth MDG commit wealthy states to improve ODA, market access, debt sustainability, and technology transfers.

⁶⁴ Comparative politics is a methodological rather than a substantive literature, which focuses on ‘the how but does not specify the what of the analysis’ (Lijphart, 1971, p. 682, original emphasis). Comparative politics is useful for explaining differences, as well as similarities, among countries. It is therefore suitable for discerning the uniqueness of state identities within the international system. Furthermore, comparative politics looks for trends and patterns, particularly in political systems, and then tries to explain why those patterns exist. This provides insight into how state identities develop and change which is necessary for a proper understanding of international relations.
I use factor analysis to understand the theoretical relationships between states’ aid, trade, debt, foreign direct investment (FDI), and migration policies and practices. I argue that identifying the policy indicators that trend together makes the underlying cultural norms visible and, therefore, captures a system of reality which gives meaning to the actions of citizens within states. The analysis yields two factors from which I create three development policy indices using standardised scores (one factor has two opposing poles that are normatively incompatible). I then rank the 21 DAC member states for which data are available by their scores on each index. As each index measures a different way of ‘doing development’, I create a development policy regime typology by clustering likeminded states. Finally, I assess whether each regime type can be interpreted as reflecting (and fostering) different justice norms. Justice concerns the ‘right’ way to distribute resources and there are strong debates over what developed countries morally owe to developing countries (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003, chapter 2). Therefore, different justice norms should be a key factor in distinguishing the identities of states in the international system, and explaining their aid-giving orientations. Further details on the methodology are provided in Chapter 5.

Identifying state identities by analysing policy actions at the country-level assumes that the content of state identities can be reasonably inferred from what states do. I argue that, just as it is possible for a spectator to discern the identities of players in a football game by observing patterns in their behaviour relative to other players, by comparatively analysing a snapshot of state behaviour we can know who states are. Indeed, foreign policy scholars such as Wallace (1991) argue that ‘foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad’ (p. 65). The analysis therefore focuses on the normative coherence of each state’s actions with respect to their portfolio of development policies, and the distinctiveness of each state’s policy orientation with respect to other states in the international system.

The value of adapting Esping-Andersen’s methodology to international policies is that it allows for the external validity of the state identities variable to be tested. Thérien and Noël (2000) assert that there is an institutional connection between the provision of domestic welfare and aid effort. Accordingly, despite the fact that Esping-Andersen’s typology is based on data from a much earlier time period, the analysis should distinguish similar ‘families of nations’ in both the domestic and international realms of policy-making. In fact, I predict that states act consistently in pursuing the same justice norms at home (in the form of domestic welfare) and abroad (in the form of development policy). This is because institutions make identity constructions relatively resistant to change by reinforcing interpretations of reality and rules of behaviour. To this end, the only limitation of analysing cross-sectional policy data at the
country-level, in order to discern the cultural norms that define state identities, is that it is not possible to highlight the process by which actors construct institutions.

4.4.2 Predicting Support for Aid with Psychological Identities (Chapter 6)

The second analysis, which is presented in Chapter 6, tests component 2 of the identity-based approach: Prosocial personal and social identities drive citizen policy preferences. The aim of the analysis is to understand the relationships between psychological identities and support for aid in order to find cognitive levers to activate the existing pro-reform constituency. To this end, it is assumed that variation in the meanings of identities is greater between countries than within countries, so national campaigns can be formulated on the basis of cross-national identity-attitude linkages. The question of whether state identities have a direct influence on support for aid is not examined because this bears no relevance to an agent-oriented approach to policy reform. That is, state identities represent the logic of the everyday so they promote the status quo (see Sub-Section 4.4.3 for more on this).

For each DAC member state, I examine the extent to which personal and social identities influence aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice using logistic regression analysis. The sign, size and significance of the estimates for each identity type are then compared between countries. This provides insight into how identity campaigning should be structured to suit different audiences. It also helps to ground the identity alignment and identity framing analyses in the chapters to follow. In other words, what works to mobilise public opinion in one context may not necessarily produce the same effects in another. Therefore, the analyses presented in Chapter 6 examine where differences lie whereas the subsequent analyses of identity alignment and identity framing examine why difference exist.

I use logistic regression rather than ordinary linear regression to examine identity-based support for aid because the two dependent variables have two and three outcomes respectively. In logistic regression the variance of Y is not assumed to be constant across values of X and the predicted values represent probabilities that are bounded between zero and one.

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65 Knutsen (2009) showed that values differed by region within countries, and this difference was strongest in Germany between the Old Federal Republic and the New Länder. Therefore, in order to ensure the results for Germany are not biased by pooling data for the East and West regions, additional analyses were conducted for each region separately. These results are not reported, but they assist the interpretation of the findings from the pooled data.

66 The term ‘logit’ refers to the transformation \( \ln(1 - \pi) \) that linearises the logistic model. A key point of difference between linear and logistic regression is that in logistic models the dependent variable is regressed against the logit (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring or not). The predicted logit is then converted into a predicted probability by applying maximum likelihood estimation.
and one. The first dependent variable (aid endorsement) is examined with ordered logistic regression as it has three possible outcomes which are sequentially ordered (too high, about right, too low). The proportional odds constraint is only relaxed for those variables that violate the assumption using a partial proportional odds model. The model is executed with Richard William’s (2006) gologit2 program in Stata. The second dependent variable (willingness to sacrifice) is examined with binary logistic regression as it has two possible outcomes (yes or no). It is also executed in Stata.

As personal and social identities are hypothesised to function as distinct constructs within the self-concept, I investigate the independence of the estimates. That is, I recalculate the effects of social identities on willingness to sacrifice after controlling for personal identities. If the estimates drop, it can be concluded that there may be some commonality in the latent constructs that are manifested in these identity variables.

4.4.3 Testing the Influence of Identity Alignment on the Strength of Aid-Giving Convictions (Chapter 7)

The third analysis, which is presented in Chapter 7, tests component 3 of the identity-based approach: The alignment of identities at different levels modifies the meaning of identities. The process of identity alignment refers to the legitimating effects of a higher order identity on the aid-giving preferences of a lower order identity when they are normatively aligned. It is hypothesised that the degree to which the aid-giving orientation of a higher order identity is congruent with a lower order identity will determine the strength of the lower identity’s support for aid. When the higher order identity has the same positive aid-giving orientation as the lower order identity, support for aid will be magnified. However, when the higher order identity has a negative aid-giving orientation and the lower identity has a positive aid-giving orientation, support for aid will be weakened.

The concept of identity alignment is an example of a conditional hypothesis. ‘A conditional hypothesis is simply one in which a relationship between two or more variables depends on the value of one or more other variables’ (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006, p. 64). Interaction models are used to test conditional hypotheses. Interaction models add an interaction term to

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67 The proportional odds (or parallel lines) assumption holds that the probability curve for each category of Y only shifts to the left or right because the effects of the predictors are constant across all categories of Y. ‘That is, they are parallel as a consequence of the assumption that the βs are equal for each equation’ (Long & Freese, 2006, p. 198). If this assumption is violated then the estimates of β will be inconsistent. Borooah (2002, p. 6) suggests using multinomial logistic regression instead of relaxing the assumption but acknowledges that efficiency is lost when an ordered outcome variable is treated as non-ordered.
a standard predictive model in order to determine the multiplicative effect of two independent variables on the outcome of interest. These models can therefore test the prediction that the relationship between an identity and support for aid is conditional on the values of a higher order identity. Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) stress that the omission of one or more constitutive terms (elements that constitute the interaction term) in a multiplicative interaction model may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, I build a logistic regression model that includes terms for each separate identity, in addition to terms for interactions between identities.

Interaction terms can be created between variables at the same ecological level or at different ecological levels. To examine the effects of personal and social identity alignment on support for aid, I add an interaction term between these micro variables to the logistic regression described earlier (for example, universalism X left-wing). However, in order to test the effects of social and state identity alignment on support for aid, an interaction term between micro and macro variables is needed. Therefore, I add the interaction and constitutive terms to a multi-level logistic model to take account of the clustering of people in different countries (i.e., individual responses on the dependent variable are likely to be correlated within each country).  

A cross-level interaction model assumes that the effect of one individual-level variable (level-1) on another individual-level variable depends on a country-level variable (level-2). Fischer (2009) recommends that for ten or more cultural groups, conducting a cross-level analysis is the best way to demonstrate the effects of culture on behaviour at the individual level. He notes that when cultural dimensions are measured at the country or ecological level, agreement amongst the collective group can only be assumed (as opposed to tested) so ‘it is only necessary to show acceptable reliability and validity of the measures’ (p. 41). I do this in Chapter 5 by contrasting my empirically-derived typology of state identities with Esping-Andersen’s empirically-derived typology of domestic welfare regimes.

There are, nevertheless, theoretical reasons to justify the assumption that the state identity is passively imposed on all citizens equally by virtue of them living in the state. According to Stryker and Serpe (1994), ‘time in role is taken as a direct consequence of both identity

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68 In the current research I assume that the intercepts are unequal amongst countries and therefore allow them to vary. However, I do not allow the slopes to vary because, according to the Likelihood-ratio test, the random coefficient model typically did not improve the overall fit of the data compared to the random slopes model. This does not necessarily mean that the relationships between identities and support for aid are equal amongst countries. In fact, there may be variability between groups of countries but there is insufficient variability between individual countries to model random coefficients.
salience and psychological centrality and as the indirect consequence of affective and interactional commitment’ (p. 20). Although simply existing within the boundaries of a state is not the same thing as behaving as a citizen of a state, it could be argued that unless a person is an anarchist, they are in fact committed to fulfilling the role of a citizen of the state. Furthermore, there are personal and social costs associated with not fulfilling the role. These costs are imposed by state institutions which structure affective and interactional ties between people. For example, most citizens behave according to the work and family structures imposed by the state because there are financial and kinship costs associated with not doing so. In Australia these are an eight hour continuous shift at work and a monogamous marriage. This may however be different in a Mediterranean state like Spain where split-shifts accommodate a long break in the middle of the day, or in an African state like Nigeria where polygamy is a legal culture. Therefore, state institutions impose the state identity top-down on citizens.

Focusing on multiplicative or moderation effects does not mean that direct level-2 effects are necessarily absent, only that these effects are not relevant to the theoretical focus of this particular investigation (level-2 is the context or state identity whereas level-1 are the units or psychological identities nested within). Direct level-2 effects suggest that state identities influence people’s conceptions of who they are in a collective (rather than an individuated) fashion which closes off the possibility of bottom-up reform. Indeed, citizen commitment to the state-identity is associated with maintaining the status quo. In contrast, moderation effects suggest that individuals vary in how they understand and accept foreign policy decisions, which opens up the possibility (albeit constrained by habitual logic) that new ideas will catch on.

A cross-level interaction model can only be tested with the second dependent variable (willingness to sacrifice) which has a binary outcome. This is because it is not possible with any statistical software to run a partial proportional odds random effects model and many of the independent variables violate the proportional odds assumption of the ordered logit. Secondly, as willingness to pay higher taxes in order to increase the level of government spending on aid expresses a higher degree of support for aid than mere endorsement, it is parsimonious to test moderating effects with only one measure of support for aid. Moreover, there are more data from a wider range of countries for the second dependent variable than the first which improves the reliability of the results.
4.4.4 Testing the Influence of Identity Frames on Identity-Attitude Linkages (Chapter 8)

The fourth and final analysis, which is presented in Chapter 8, tests component 4 of the identity-based approach: Identity frames modify the meaning of identities. Prosocial identity frames contained in aid policy discourses are hypothesised to strengthen support for aid by linking aid-giving to prosocial identities. Likewise, proself identity frames contained in aid policy discourses are hypothesised to strengthen disapproval of aid by linking aid-giving to proself identities.

As previously mentioned, aid policy discourses are assumed to contain a single dominant identity frame that is decided by the political agenda of those in control of the discourse. Therefore, the first aim of the analysis is to identify the sources of aid policy communication that affect the way individual citizens interpret the meanings of their identities so that campaigners can target them directly. The second aim is to understand whether it may be possible to expand the size of the pro-reform constituency by including prosocial identity frames in anti-poverty campaigns (which would also counter proself frames included in other forms of identity communication). That is, can identity framing techniques be strategically deployed to purposively construct normative connections between a broader spectrum of prosocial identities and support for aid policy reform?

The WVS did not ask respondents about their exposure to aid policy discourses. Therefore, in order to examine identity framing effects with a nationally-representative sample of survey respondents, it must be assumed that policy discourses equally permeate all aspects of social life to shape the meanings of personal identities. It is only possible to examine identity framing at the national level in relation to personal identities and not social identities. This is because perceptions about the meanings of personal identities are individually-structured rather than inter-subjectively shared by group members.

Identity framing is examined with a cross-level interaction model, as per the model used to test identity alignment. That is, an interaction term between a micro variable (personal identity) and a macro variable (aid policy communication source) are added to the basic personal identity logistic regression model. Specifically, the interaction terms are between prosocial and proself personal identities on the one hand and proxy measures of national aid policy discourses on the other hand. Refer to Sub-Section 4.4.3 above for the rationale for using this statistical model to analyse the effects of identity framing on willingness to sacrifice.
4.5 Conclusion

This chapter specified the data, instruments and statistical methods that are used to proceed with the following analytical chapters. I put forward a quantitative research strategy for two reasons: First, quantitative research makes it is easier to map identity-based support for aid in 13 highly diverse DAC member states; and second, quantitative research provides campaigners with easily replicable metrics by which to evaluate the success of their bottom-up reform efforts going forward. In other words, the analyses could be repeated in the future with up-to-date data.

I selected the 2005-2008 WVS as the best international survey for examining cross-national attitudes to foreign aid. Indeed, its broad coverage of countries and its diverse set of survey questions are big pluses for understanding how personal and social identities influence support for aid. The WVS captured two different aspects of support for aid: aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice. As approving of higher aid levels (endorsement) reflects a lesser degree of commitment than expressing willingness to pay higher taxes to increase aid spending (sacrifice), these measures formed the two dependent variables.

I provided details on the five personal identities and three social identities that are hypothesised to predict support for aid. These are sourced from the WVS. I sourced several country-level variables from international databases which are hypothesised to shed light on the way meanings are assigned to identities. In particular, I use country-level variables to establish a measure of state identities and to proxy aid policy discourses. The combination of these micro and macro variables appropriately reflects the cross-discipline research question that I seek to answer, namely, how is public support for aid motivated in the context of existing aid policies?

Four analytical models were set out to test the four key propositions of the identity-based approach. The first model is an adaption of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) methodology to quantitatively establish state identities. The second model covers binary and ordinal logistic regression to examine personal and social identity-based support for aid in each of the 13 DAC member states separately. The third model repeats the binary logistic regression with interaction terms between personal and social identities and between social and state identities. The latter cross-level interaction takes account of within-country correlations. I use the same approach to examine the moderating effects of identity framing at the national level on the relationship between personal identities and support for aid at the individual level. My analytical strategy is therefore appropriately innovative, bringing together a mix of
quantitative methods to generate evidence from different levels of identity about the forces that promote policy stability and the forces that promote policy reform.

The overall weaknesses of this quantitative research strategy should be considered in the context of the overall strengths. In particular, analysing the drivers of support for aid with representative samples of electorates from a wide spectrum of DAC countries permits an ecologically valid analysis of the logic of the everyday. Therefore, the research findings can practically assist campaigners in the formulation of evidence-based strategies to promote bottom-up policy reform. The first task, which is the focus of the next chapter, is to establish the identities of the DAC member states. The answer to this question can in turn inform the problem of how campaigners should appeal to public opinion in order to promote bottom-up policy reform.
Chapter 5. Establishing State Identities

...the specific identities of specific states shape their perceived interests and, thereby, the pattern of international outcomes (Ruggie, 1998, p. 14)

There is growing recognition that foreign aid alone cannot address the needs of the developing world. The policies of wealthy developed countries in areas such as trade, investment, agriculture, finance, tax and migration have a profound impact on global poverty. Therefore, an international initiative known as ‘policy coherence for development’ (PCD) proposes that aid donor states should ensure that the positive effects of some policies are not undermined by the negative consequences of other policies. For example, many wealthy developed countries give aid to developing countries to assist agricultural production but at the same time reduce the competitiveness of agricultural exports from developing countries by subsidising domestic farm businesses (OECD, 2005).

The OECD concedes that DAC member states have made mixed progress on PCD – some countries score high marks on poverty reduction in some policy domains, and other countries score high marks in other policy domains. The OECD maintains that PCD could be achieved if governments: ‘generate the necessary support for sustained political commitment; establish co-ordination mechanisms to co-ordinate progress and ensure that development interests are well-represented; and invest in effective systems for monitoring and analysis, with transparent reporting on results’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 6). However, just like the 0.7 percent aid target, there has been almost no empirical work done to justify this liberal political economy model of state behaviour. Therefore, the OECD cannot be certain that PCD is an effective strategy for achieving international development and poverty reduction goals such as the MDGs.

The identity-based approach advances a constructivist political economy model of state behaviour. It predicts that the behaviour of DAC member states, within and between different policy domains that impact on global poverty, is in fact coherent according to the identity of

69 PCD ‘entails the systematic application of mutually reinforcing policies across government departments and integration of development concerns to help promote the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals along with other global and national policy objectives’. [http://www.oecd.org/faq/0,3433,en_2649_18532957_48787762_1_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/faq/0,3433,en_2649_18532957_48787762_1_1_1_1,00.html) PCD is recognised in a number of international development agreements including the Millennium Declaration, Monterrey Consensus, Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, and Doha Development Agenda.
It further predicts that social groups within states vertically align their identities with the state identity, restricting the scope for bottom-up policy reform. As the identities of all 22 DAC member states have never been systematically examined, and a method for quantifying state identities does not currently exist, the core aim of this chapter is to empirically derive a categorical measure of DAC identities that can be used to test identity alignment with pro-aid social groups. Ruggie’s (1998) quote above – that state identities shape the pattern of international outcomes – suggests that we can know who states are by analysing foreign policy patterns. To ensure that the measurement of normatively pro- and anti-aid state identities is not tautological, I examine patterns in policies that go beyond foreign aid.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 describes the process of establishing the identities of DAC member states from their behaviours. There are around 200 states in the world – each unique and individual. Therefore, when characterising more than half a dozen states, it is simpler to use a typology classification system, as is commonly done in comparative politics (for example, Hall & Soskice, 2001). Thérien and Noël (2000) built the foundations for a comparative institutional analysis of aid policy norms. I expand their framework to cover a broader set of development policies.

Section 5.2 details the policy actions (data) of 21 DAC member states that I analyse to identify distinct approaches to reducing global poverty. We can only make judgements about things through comparisons. A house is only big when compared to other houses. A car is only fast when compared to other cars. Therefore, in order to judge the degree to which the 13 DAC member states of interest are normatively pro- or anti-aid, it is necessary to compare the different ways in which all DAC member states behave (Luxembourg is excluded due to a lack of data leaving a total of 21 out of 22 DAC states under investigation).

Section 5.3 presents the results of the quantitative analyses. By analysing patterns within and between states’ aid, trade, debt, FDI and migration policies and practices, it is possible to discern the image or role that distinguishes each state within the superordinate DAC group. Three main policy patterns emerge. Therefore, although every state is unique, ‘likeminded’ states are clustered together to form a three-category development policy regime typology.

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70 Policy domains that impact on global poverty are components of the international development system organised around substantive issues (for the origins of this definition see Burstein, 1991).

71 There is not only detailed data on these policy domains, but these domains (along with environment, security and technology policy) represent the most important ways that wealthy countries can help to reduce global poverty (A. Hudson & Jonsson, 2009).
Section 5.4 interprets the justice norms that are implicit in each development policy regime type. In order to be confident that the typology can be used to indicate state identities, an investigation is undertaken to determine whether the justice norms that influence state behaviour in the international realm also influence state behaviour in the domestic realm, namely domestic welfare policies. Normative consistency confirms that states have identities that are defined by the justice norms that distinguish states from other states.

Finally, Section 5.5 recommends the typology as a suitable categorical measure of state identities to analyse identity alignment. The section then goes on to discuss the implications of the findings for international agreements to improve aid effectiveness and global governance more broadly. It is argued that because states have an interest in maintaining their unique identities, the best way to achieve international development and poverty reduction goals is to encourage states to scale-up specialisation rather than insist on common behavioural standards.

5.1 Knowing Who States Are By What They Do

Component 1 of the identity-based approach proposes that: A state’s identity is defined by the normative foreign policies and practices that differentiate the state from other states in the international system. In other words, state identities are understood both from within and without (D. M. Green, 2002). The within or intrinsic aspect of state identities includes domestic culture such as ideologies or ‘isms’ (liberalism, socialism, corporatism, etc). The without or relational aspect of state identities refers to contrasts with others such as ‘emerging market’ or ‘democracy’.

Given that state institutions continually recast the cultural norms that are constitutive of state identities, static measures of culture can be used to test identity alignment in Chapter 7. However, existing cultural distinctions – such as ‘tight versus loose’ cultures (Triandis, 1995), ‘masculine versus feminine’ cultures (Hofstede, 1980), ‘survival versus self-expression’ cultures (Inglehart, 1997) – are inadequate because they are not relevant to (and so unlikely to affect) the legitimacy of social groups’ support for foreign aid. Furthermore, for identities to have any meaning, in terms of setting behavioural standards, they must be distinctive. Put differently, each actor (or entity) must feel unique among all other actors (or entities) of the same class (or type) to know who they are and how to behave, and who others are and how they might behave. A necessary condition of distinctiveness is coherence. If states behaved erratically it would be impossible for other states to work out who they are. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to find a way of measuring the cultural norms that distinguish the anti-poverty policy portfolios of DAC member states. The focus is on global justice norms because policy
actions to reduce global poverty are ultimately about global justice (obligations rich countries have to poor countries).

5.1.1 Distinguishing Cultural Norms from Policy Patterns

Culture has two functions. It allows us to solve practical problems; and it provides us with the opportunity to express who we are. Norms are generally invisible components of culture but they become visible by observing what actors do. Therefore, by analysing the ways in which states solve practical problems (such as global poverty) we gain insight into their identities. Further, history and institutions give norms both importance and endurance. Therefore, in order to identify the cultural norms that constitute state identities, it is not sufficient to simply examine existing policies and practices. Consideration must also be given to historical factors which give meaning to policies and practices, and to the institutionalisation of policies and practices which limits the range of imaginable possibilities at any given time (Katzenstein, 1996).

The institutionalisation of social welfare (which is known as the ‘welfare state’) is partly responsible for shaping normative ideas about reducing global poverty. The welfare state is a system of government provision to ensure the economic and social security of a population ‘from the cradle to the grave’ (as Beveridge proposed for Britain in the 1940s). The welfare state expanded and became entrenched after the Second World War. The habitual experience of certain social rights legitimised the notion of giving aid to developing countries on altruistic rather than strategic grounds (Lancaster, 2007; Lumsdaine, 1993). However, not all welfare states act the same, just as not all aid donors act the same.

‘Welfare regimes’ characterise and differentiate welfare states in affluent capitalist societies (A. Hicks & Kenworthy, 2003). A regime is the politico-economic order. The most popular typology of welfare regimes was constructed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). From a comparative analysis of 18 OECD welfare states, he derived a Socialist regime, a Conservative regime, and a Liberal regime. The typology characterised the redistributive model of welfare found amongst the Scandinavian states as the Socialist regime, the corporatist model of welfare found amongst the Continental European states and Japan as the Conservative regime,

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Technically culture transcends state boundaries. However, I am interested in state identity and specifically the global justice norms that constitute state identity. As I am measuring global justice norms by what states do, it is possible to construct a ‘one-to-one relation’ between culture and state. Nevertheless, in seeking an efficient measure of state identity for examining identity alignment across 13 DAC member states, the resultant three-category typology also acknowledges that culture is not necessarily bounded by state borders.
and the free-market model of welfare found amongst the Anglo-Saxon states as the Liberal regime.  

Esping-Andersen derived the typology by comparing welfare states on two dimensions: decommodification and stratification. Decommodification refers to the extent to which social policies protect labour from the market. Stratification refers to how social policies entrench class and status differences in society. Esping-Andersen argued that all welfare states participate in the process of stratification but they do so differently. Therefore, the principal way that Esping-Andersen differentiated welfare states was by ranking countries on three separate indices of stratification: socialist, conservative and liberal stratification. As countries scored highly on one index only (and tended to score low on the other two indices), states that scored at the top of the socialist index were classified Socialist, states that scored at the top of the conservative index were classified Conservative and states that scored at the top of the liberal index were classified Liberal.

A number of scholars (Kildal & Kuhnle, 2005; Mehrtens, 2004; Révauger, 2002; Trägårdh, 1997; van Oorschot, 2007; van Oorschot et al., 2008) have argued that culture underpins the regime types (also, see Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004; Kettunen & Petersen, 2011). In countries with guild (apprenticeship) and feudal traditions, and the dominant Catholic Church in favour of charity to prevent the poor from uprising, Conservative welfare was established to reinforce the ‘natural’ social order by privileging social units such as corporations, the family, and the church. By contrast, Liberal welfare aimed to realise individual potential through free markets (it is anti-state) which is consistent with the Calvinist/Protestant preference for work over handouts. Socialist welfare evolved from Lutheran peasant egalitarianism in which liberation of the individual required a strong state to get rid of paternalistic ties and subordination. Thus,

Despite controversy in the academic literature over the number of welfare regime types, and the countries comprising each type, Esping-Andersen’s original typology remains popular. Indeed, A few scholars claim there are four regimes while a few others claim there are five, but all agree on the basic three that Esping-Andersen first proposed. For a summary of the wide-ranging criticisms levelled at Esping-Andersen’s typology see Bambra (2007b). In addition, although Scruggs and Allan (2008) concluded that their analysis with more recent data challenged the coherence of Esping-Andersen’s typology, I would argue that their results actually support the enduring pattern of clustering amongst welfare states. Indeed, despite a twenty year time difference in the data used to develop their measures, the correlation coefficient between Scruggs and Allan’s updated and corrected decommodification index and Esping-Andersen’s decommodification index ‘is .9, meaning that in terms of their direction, they are very strongly correlated’ (Crepaz, 2008, p. 143, original emphasis).

Socialist welfare is about state-based redistribution to liberate workers from market asymmetries.

Given that Esping-Andersen’s three regime types reflect very different principles of justice (hierarchical stability, individual freedom, and market protection), a number of scholars have examined the normative relationship between welfare policies and aid-giving generosity (for example, Lumsdaine, 1993). The most prominent authors in this field are Jean-Philippe Thérien and Alain Noël. They used structural equation modelling to demonstrate a causal pathway for 16 DAC countries from: (1) cumulative power of social democratic political parties, additive from 1946 onward; to (2) socialist welfare institutions; to (3) foreign aid allocations in 1980 and 1991. They argued that ‘foreign aid is closely linked to the domestic social policies that parties build over time’ because specific conceptions of justice become institutionalised (Thérien & Noël, 2000, p. 154).

In an earlier study the same authors demonstrated that three quarters of the cross-national variation in ODA was explained by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) socialist welfare regime type (adjusted $R^2$ .56) combined with the level of social transfers (adjusted $R^2$ .34) (Noël & Thérien, 1995). Again, they concluded that ‘institutional factors capture the sociological dimension of political processes because they reproduce what, in a given society, stands as the legitimate or hegemonic consensus’ (p. 548). In other words, institutions embody the normative makeup shared between all agents in society.

By suggesting an institutional connection between the provision of domestic welfare and aid effort, Thérien and Noël’s (2000) thesis is a good start to establishing a quantitative measure of state identities. However, the genius of Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) work was that it highlighted that knowing what states spend on welfare is not enough to understand why. Indeed, in order to identify pro- and anti-aid states it is necessary to also look at other policy orientations, as simply looking at aid expenditure ignores the fact that states can reduce global poverty in a variety of ways besides aid. In particular, trade, FDI, and migration policies and practices also heavily impact on poor countries. Moreover, although aid-giving is an expression of identity, aid levels may fluctuate in any particular year for reasons unrelated to

They also demonstrated a secondary pathway from (1) religious cumulative power; to (2) social spending; to (3) foreign aid allocations. However, the connection between the social spending intervening variable and foreign aid allocations was half as strong as the connection between the socialist institutions intervening variable and foreign aid allocations. In addition, when social spending was held constant, the effect of Christian democratic dominance on foreign aid was negative.

For example, on trade see Elliott (2010); on FDI see Carkovic and Levine (2005); and on migration see Clemens and Pritchett (2008).
norms. Thus, by incorporating a wider mix of policies into a cross-sectional analysis, a more robust measure of state identities can be established.

5.1.2 The Current Analysis

This chapter builds on the work of Thérien and Noël (2000) to establish a quantitative measure of state identities that is relevant to testing identity alignment with pro-aid social groups. To be relevant it must not only explain the aid-giving orientations of DAC member states as per component 1 of the identity-based approach, but it must also be simple for the practical purpose of testing identity alignment across scores of DAC member states. Therefore, I adapt Esping-Andersen’s methodology to develop a comprehensive typology of development policy regimes – condensing no less than 21 DAC identities into a short categorical variable.

Esping-Andersen characterised and differentiated welfare regimes in a liberal political economy framework in which historical class collations shaped modern welfare policies. In other words, the question he explored was what kind of regimes do different class coalitions create? He therefore used theory to develop indices that captured socialist, conservative and liberal welfare institutions. He then ranked and clustered countries that scored highly on each index. I seek to differentiate and characterise DAC state identities in a constructivist political economy framework in which cultural norms and the state’s international image shape aid policy. The question I seek to explore is who are DAC states? As I predict that different justice norms underpin states’ policy choices for reducing global poverty, I use empirical methods to develop normatively coherent policy indices. I then rank and cluster states by their scores on each index.

Although the aim of the current analysis is to determine state identities empirically, without imposing a structure on the data, I do not go into the analysis blind. Based on Esping-Andersen’s findings, I hypothesise that states’ aid, trade, debt, FDI, and migration policies and practices coherently reduce global poverty according to socialist, conservative or liberal justice norms (H1). I also hypothesise that clusters of countries with similar development policy constellations will mirror Esping-Andersen’s (1990) domestic welfare regimes typology (H2). This is because the cultural factors which gave rise to domestic welfare regimes will have similarly shaped international policies. Furthermore, the domestic and international dimensions of state identity are mutually-reinforcing. Pfau-Effinger (2005), citing Neidhard et al (1986, p. 11), defines welfare culture as ‘the relevant ideas in a given society surrounding the welfare state and the way it is embedded in society’ (p. 4). Accordingly, the institutionalisation of these cultural norms should cause a convergence of domestic and international policies to reduce poverty via the logic of the everyday.
To test the two hypotheses, I examine three aspects of normative policy coherence which I have adapted from Picciotto (2005):

1. Inter-policy coherence: normative consistency among various policies from the same policy domain.

2. Intra-country coherence: normative consistency among policy domains in terms of the government’s total contribution to development.

3. Inter-country coherence: normative consistency of several countries in terms of their aggregate contribution to development.

By examining inter-policy coherence I establish sectoral policy norms which constitute different logics for reducing global poverty. By examining intra-country coherence I establish national norms from which I interpret different justice principles. Finally, by examining inter-country coherence I establish development policy regime types. This allows me to validate my characterisation of state identities by contrasting the typology to Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare state regimes.

In the next section, I gather several different policy indicators for the five main policy domains that impact on global poverty.

5.2 Indicators of State Behaviour

According to development scholarship, aid, trade, debt, FDI and migration are among the most critical development policy domains for achieving international development goals. Aid that directly supports recipient country investments in infrastructure, agriculture and industry significantly contributes to economic growth (M. Clemens, Radelet, & Bhavnani, 2004). Similarly, trade ‘allows people to exploit their productive potential, assists economic growth, curtails arbitrary policy interventions and helps to insulate against shocks’ (Winters, 2000, p. 43). More negatively, the burden of debt owed by developing countries to developed countries hampers economic growth, in part by adversely affecting investment (Qureshi & Ali, 2010). The picture for FDI and migration is more nuanced. FDI augments domestic capital and enhances efficiency through the transfer of new technologies, skills and best practices (Adams, 2009). However, in some low income countries profit remittances surpass new inflows, and FDI is a mechanism that transfers control of corporate governance to foreign investors (Loungani & Razin, 2001). Migration from poor countries to rich countries can support development by fostering migrants’ skill formation; through remittances sent home by migrants; and by absorbing excess labour supply (OECD, 2007). However, ‘highly selective migration policies
deprive poor countries of scarce innovators and institution builders’ (Kapur & McHale, 2005, p. 1). This is known as ‘brain drain’.

A total of 14 policy indicators from these five policy domains were selected on the basis that the policy is critical to reducing global poverty, the indicator is comparable across different sized donor countries, and recent data (2007-2010) are available for at least 19 out of 22 DAC member states. Table 5.1 presents correlations between the indicators. Next, all 14 indicators are outlined in turn. However, as five indicators are later eliminated from the analysis, only the remaining nine are explained in detail. The variable labels are included in bold square brackets. Refer to Appendix 3 for the sources of data.

**Aid Indicators**

According to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, the basic principles of aid effectiveness are: untying (relaxing conditions on purchasing products and services provided by the donor), selectivity (allocating aid to countries where it is most needed), harmonisation (limiting proliferation/fragmentation of donor projects that burden recipient governments), predictability (reducing aid flow volatility to assist fiscal planning in recipient countries), and local ownership (fostering developing country institutions). Four indicators were selected to capture these five principles of aid effectiveness, with predictability and local ownership sharing an indicator. As the indicator for harmonisation (measured as the share of aid channelled through multilateral agencies) is later eliminated from the analysis [multilateral], only the remaining three indicators are described in full.

Untying is measured as the proportion of a donor’s total ODA that is untied [untied]. When a donor restricts aid recipients to using companies based in the donor’s own country for the sourcing, processing and transporting of commodities and services, it reduces the cost-efficiency and development impact of aid (Chinnock & Collinson, 1999).

Selectivity is measured as the proportion of a donor’s GNI allocated to ODA for low income countries (LICs) [LIC ODA]. LICs suffer from weak human and structural assets which makes them more vulnerable than middle income countries to shocks in the global economy, climate change, and food and fuel shortages. Accordingly, aid has a bigger poverty-reduction impact when it is allocated to LICs.

Predictability and local ownership are measured as the share of total aid disbursements recorded in recipient budgets [recorded]. Although this indicator appears to measure recipient characteristics rather than donor characteristics, in fact, recipient governments are only able to record aid flowing into their country when donors provide timely and comprehensive
information on their financial support (Birdsall, Kharas, Mahgoub, & Perakis, 2010). Uncertain cash-flow reduces the value of aid by 15 to 20 percent (Kharas, 2008). In addition, channelling aid through the budget of recipient governments strengthens institutions, improves alignment with recipient country systems, and increases domestic transparency and accountability.

**Debt Indicators**

Two debt indicators were selected for analysis: debt relief as a percentage of net ODA [debt], and export credits as a percentage of GNI [export]. Unsustainable debt can increase social conflicts from associated austerity measures, discourage private investment, reduce labour standards as developing countries try to attract foreign investment to repay foreign debt, and increase the flight of capital (Commission for Africa, 2005). Therefore, the level of debt cancellation reflects a donor’s commitment to poverty reduction. Conversely, export credits are a form of insurance provided by government-backed export credit agencies in developed countries to cover the risks domestic companies face when doing business abroad. Although there is no requirement that these companies serve a poverty reduction purpose, when developing countries cannot repay the debt that is accrued, creditor countries can write-off any non-military-related debt and report the expenses as ODA (Wiertsema, 2008). According to the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad), a Brussels-based NGO, ‘Estimates are that around one third of the total external official debt of developing countries is export credit originated debt’.\(^{77}\) Thus, export credits adversely affect poverty reduction.

**Trade Indicators**

Three trade indicators were selected to capture the level of imports from developing countries as well as barriers to these imports. However, all three are later dropped because they do not fit a coherent policy pattern that is generated by the other indicators. The three trade indicators are: the value of imports from developing countries as a percentage of the donor’s GDP [imports]; domestic agriculture support in donor countries as a percentage of GDP [agriculture]; and average preferential tariffs imposed by donor countries on agricultural products, textiles and clothing from least developed countries [tariffs].

**Investment Indicators**

Foreign direct investment is the acquisition of an ownership interest in a private enterprise by a foreign company. To separate the positive impacts of FDI in developing countries (economic growth, employment and modernisation) from the negative impacts (worsening inequality, social unrest, and pollution associated with large scale extractive industries such as oil, gas and

---

\(^{77}\) [http://www.eurodad.org/debt/?id=76](http://www.eurodad.org/debt/?id=76)
mining) (OECD, 2002), two indicators were selected. The first is direct investment in developing countries as a percentage of the donor’s GNI \( \frac{\text{FDI}}{\text{GNI}} \). The second, which is later excluded, is participation in initiatives that promote transparency in payments, taxes, receipts, and expenditures that multinationals pay to foreign governments, such as the Kimberley Process to control trade in ‘blood diamonds’ [transparency].

Migration Indicators

Three migration indicators were selected in an attempt to balance the social empowerment benefits of migration against the brain drain challenges. The indicators are: the percentage of total foreign-born doctors in donor countries from non-OECD and non-European countries [doctors]; the unemployment rate of foreign-born men to native-born men [unemployed]; and students from developing countries as a percentage of all foreign students [students]. The indicator for foreign-born doctors captures the loss of human capital in developing countries from skilled migration. The indicators for unemployment and education capture discrimination against people from developing countries that are seeking better opportunities than those available in their own country. The unemployment ratio is calculated for men only as female employment data may be distorted by the unequal status of women in some migrant societies.
## Table 5.1 Correlations Between Development Policy Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Untied</th>
<th>LIC ODA</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
<th>Debt</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Tariffs</th>
<th>FDI/GNI</th>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Doctors</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Untied</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>-0.48**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>0.56**</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.78***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.41*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariffs</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI/GNI</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.39**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.50*</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.63**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-0.52*</td>
<td>-0.62**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.42*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-0.70***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bonferroni corrected p values

* \( p < 0.10 \), ** \( p < 0.05 \), *** \( p < 0.01 \), **** \( p < 0.001 \)
5.3 Distinguishing DAC Identities

The aim of this chapter is to compare states’ policy actions to reduce global poverty so that their identities become distinguishable through the coherence of different approaches. Having set out the policy data that will be analysed, this section analyses policy coherence to establish who states are. Luxembourg is eliminated due to missing data across a number of indicators, leaving a total of 21 DAC members for inclusion in the analysis.

5.3.1 Inter-Policy Coherence

Esping-Andersen created socialist, conservative and liberal stratification indices from theoretically-related policies. Because he did not select the indicators empirically, some scholars have substituted different indicators and then arrived at a different number of regimes or different classification of countries (for example, Bambra, 2007a). However, when empirical methods such as factor analysis have been used to select the indicators the original three-regime typology has largely been confirmed (Arts & Gelissen, 2006).

I avoid this problem by going straight to factor analysis to assess inter-policy coherence. There are numerous development policies that reduce global poverty. Therefore, to understand who states are, factor analysis can shed light on the hidden latent variables (in this case cultural norms) that structure policy choices. Factor analysis is used to work out whether different state behaviours boil down to a single construct. In particular, do different cultural norms underpin different combinations of development policies that states choose to reduce global poverty?

I use exploratory factor analysis because there is no existing theory of how development policies are normatively structured. I start with the 14 policy indicators listed above and predict that they can be reduced down to three distinct policy orientations (factors). After extracting the factors I rotate them to make the data easier to interpret. As the identity-based approach posits that

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78 ‘Factor analysis is used if the purpose of the research is to understand the theoretical relationship between the variables. It is typically used when researchers want to develop (exploratory factor analysis) or test (confirmatory factor analysis) a theory about the causes of variation in scores on the variables measured: this idea is that the identified factors are viewed as causing this variation’ (Dewberry, 2004, p. 310).

79 Rotation attempts to relate the calculated factors to theoretical entities. This is done differently depending on whether the factors are believed to be correlated (oblique) or uncorrelated (orthogonal). Oblique factors can have lots of cross-loadings which makes interpretation difficult. For exploratory research orthogonal rotation makes the results easier to interpret because the loadings are more pronounced.
state identities shape policy outputs (and state identities are distinct), I do not expect the extracted factors to be related to each other. Therefore, I chose orthogonal rotation which forces the factors to be independent. Orthogonal rotation is also recommended when the researcher wants to identify variables to create indices or new variables without inter-correlated components. However, as the uniqueness of some variables is less than 30 percent, I also examined oblique rotation. The results were similar so only the orthogonal results are reported.

Two, three, four and five factor solutions were examined but I predicted a three factor solution would fit the data best, in keeping with Esping-Andersen’s three regime types. In order to decide how many factors to retain, the scree test (which plots the factors on the x axis and the corresponding eigenvalues on the y axis) requires all factors after the elbow to be dropped. The slope is flat when the factors correspond to error or random numbers. The scree plot in Figure 5.1 shows that the elbow occurs at 3 factors so two factors should be kept.

**Figure 5.1 Scree Plot**

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80 Kaiser Criterion suggests to retain those factors with eigenvalues equal or higher than 1. Another criterion is the variance explained. Some researchers simply keep enough factors to account for 90 percent (sometimes 80 percent) of the variation.
The first two factors explain a total of 56 percent of the variance (see Table 5.2). As mentioned, the uniqueness of the variables included in the analysis is rather low overall (apart from Imports and Tariffs), indicating that the set of variables are adequately related for factor analysis. Factor 1 is labelled ‘Aid and Migration’ due to the high factor loadings (> 0.7) by the following items: untied aid, LIC ODA, recorded, doctors, unemployed, and students. This first factor explains 33 percent of the variance. The second factor derived is labelled ‘Debt and Investment’. This factor is labelled as such due to the high loadings by the following variables: export credits, FDI/GNI, and debt relief. The variance explained by this factor is 23 percent. The trade indicators did not load strongly onto either factor because of insufficient variation amongst EU member states which have identical tariff protections.
Table 5.2 Factor loadings and Uniqueness Based on a Principle Factor Analysis with Orthogonal Rotation for 14 Policy Indicators Relevant to the PCD Doctrine (N=21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Loadings</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1:</td>
<td>Factor 2:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid &amp; Migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untied</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC ODA</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariffs</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI/GNI</td>
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<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Total Variance</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Factor loadings < 0.3 are suppressed to assist interpretation

Despite only yielding two factors, the indicators with factor loadings over 0.7 portray three coherent approaches to reducing global poverty. The three aid indicators all have a positive impact on global poverty and therefore countries that emphasise income support for developing countries tend to do so coherently. The debt and investment indicators have a mixed impact on global poverty but are nevertheless coherent. Debt relief ties-in with FDI because ‘debt discourages private investment, and increases the flight of capital’ (Commission for Africa, 2005, p. 59). In addition, Third World debt – which is accrued due to donor governments supporting
foreign investors via export credit agencies – threatens the viability of the international economic system. This could have negative consequences for multinational corporations and is thus logically connected to higher debt cancellation. Finally, the three migration indicators are coherent with regard to benefitting the skills and education of individual migrants from developing countries, but potentially diminishing the collective human capital of source countries as a whole.

When Hicks and Kenworthy (2003) investigated Esping-Andersen’s stratification indices, they found that an orthogonal principal components analysis yielded two factors but one factor had two opposing poles. Although they concluded that ‘Esping-Andersen’s social democratic and liberal worlds may actually represent opposing poles of a single dimension’ (p. 32), Esping-Andersen (2003) argued in his reply to Hicks and Kenworthy that ‘statistical association is one thing, sociological interpretation is another’ (p. 65). He went on to say that even though the socialist and liberal traditions have wound up battling over the frontlines of one basic policy axis, this certainly does not mean that they have become indistinguishable. Therefore, despite an inverse correlation between social democracy and liberalism, there remains two, not three, distinct regime types.

Similarly, the aid and migration items which form one factor measure conceptually different things. Indeed, these policies orientations embody very different cultural norms as I will describe in Section 5.4. Furthermore, the fact that the migration items are negatively correlated with the aid items is consistent with the notion that apparent contradictions in the pro-poor orientation of foreign policies may in fact reflect normative incompatibility. The aid variables relate to income support for developing countries, the migration relates to an open labour market, and the debt and investment variables relate to nurturing private business.

5.3.2 Intra-Donor Coherence

This section explores intra-donor patterns or the extent to which the aid, debt and investment, and migration policy orientations are normatively compatible, incompatible or unrelated. Having reduced the 14 policy indictors listed above into three basic policy approaches to reducing global poverty, I drop the policy variables that do not fit a distinct approach and create policy indices from the rest. The five items that are eliminated are: the share of multilateral aid, imports from developing countries, domestic agriculture support, tariffs on products from developing countries, and commitment to transparency initiatives.
Of the indicators left, I created a pro-business index, a pro-aid index and a pro-migration index. I used Cronbach’s alpha to assess how well the set of items for each index identifies the single unidimensional latent construct. In order to prevent ‘unjustified discontinuities in scoring’ (Scruggs & Allan, 2006, p. 58), I constructed the indices with standardised scores. The alphas are large: 0.80 for migration (3 items), 0.89 for debt and investment (3 items), and 0.82 for aid (3 items). No substantial increase in alpha could have been achieved by combining the migration and aid items (0.86).

From the correlation matrix presented in Table 5.3, it can be seen that the migration and aid indices are negatively correlated at a statistically significant level. The debt and investment index is also negatively correlated with the aid and migration indices but only weakly and not at a statistically significant level. This pattern reflects the factor analysis findings and is consistent with the welfare literature (A. Hicks & Kenworthy, 2003).

In terms of the rights policy patterns grant to people (and the underlying logic), the simple interpretation of Table 5.3 is that states give aid to improve the welfare of entire countries in the developing world, in lieu of improving the welfare of individuals from developing countries through an open migration system (and vice versa). However, neither collective welfare (aid) nor individual welfare (migration) appears to be incompatible with nurturing private business (debt and investment). Indeed, aid and migration can assist multinational corporations do business. For example, aid can improve local conditions for investment, aid can also be used to write-off debts accrued by corporations via export credit agencies, and skilled migration facilitates entry into foreign markets by breaking down cultural and language barriers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aid Coef.</th>
<th>Debt &amp; Investment Coef.</th>
<th>Migration Coef.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt &amp; Investment</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>-0.61**</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bonferroni corrected p values

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

---

81 Cronbach’s alpha ranges in value from 0 to 1. Scores at or above 0.70 demonstrates a high degree of reliability.
5.3.3 Inter-Donor Coherence

Having established policy coherence within single donor states, the third aspect of policy coherence is policy patterns between donor states. This involves ranking countries according to their intra-donor patterns and then visually identifying clusters of countries that broadly share the same policy orientation. The critical test for this step is whether countries rank at the top of only one policy index (aid, debt and investment, or migration). If this is the case, then it can be concluded that states specialise in a particular development policy approach to the detriment of other approaches. This argument is robust if a country that scores high on one index scores low (as opposed to moderate) on the other two indices. However, it should be noted that the clustering of countries into prototypical positions on the indices (strong on one, low on others) is unlikely to occur in every case because the debt and investment index is not strongly antagonistic to the aid and migration indices.

The clustering shown in Table 5.4 was discerned by ranking each country three separate times by its respective scores on the three development policy indices. Each rank order list was then divided into three sections where there is a substantively important change in scores. The pattern that emerges clearly shows that donors act to reduce global poverty in one of three discrete ways. That is, every country except Finland and New Zealand ranked high on only one development policy index. Denmark, Norway, the UK, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium specialise in highly effective income support for reducing global poverty. By comparison, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Greece, Japan and Italy prioritise private business solutions for reducing global poverty. Finally, Portugal, the US, Spain, France, Australia and Canada emphasise open borders for reducing global poverty.

As expected, the countries that scored high on the aid index scored low on the migration index and vice versa – the main exceptions are the UK (high aid, moderate migration) and France (high migration, moderate aid). In addition, the countries that scored high on the debt and investment index scored moderate or low on the aid and migration indices. Given that each development policy index comprises a coherent set of indicators, and given that states specialise in one policy approach at the expense of others, it can be concluded that the clusters of countries that are derived from the analysis represent likeminded countries. Therefore, the three clusters can be thought of as three development policy regime types – an aid regime, a business regime and a migration regime.
Table 5.4 Development Policy Regime Clusters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aid</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a constructivist framework, a regime is a constellation of policy arrangements that gives expression to a set of norms and principles, thereby reinforcing the underlying system that produced the policies to begin with (Taylor-Gooby, 1996). Although each state has a unique identity, it stands to reason that states with similar identities will share the same regime classification. For example, the cultural variation between the US and the UK is smaller than between these democratic regimes and a non-democratic regime such as China. Therefore, identifying the cultural norms that distinguish the three development policy regime types is a heuristic tool for discerning scores of individual state identities. The next section of the paper investigates whether the aid, business and migration regime types are underpinned by different justice norms.

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82 Consideration was given to dropping Austria due to concerns over the accuracy of official OECD figures which showed an eight fold increase in export credits and FDI in 2007 compared to 2006. However, as this would have reduced the number of countries included in the analysis, 2006 figures were substituted for Austria only. Despite this adjustment, Austria still ranked first or second on all three measures of debt and investment.
5.4 Discerning the Justice Norms that Constitute DAC Identities

This section interprets the justice norms that underpin the pro-aid, pro-business and pro-migration approaches to reducing global poverty. The clustering of countries by their ranking on the three development policy indices established three development policy regime types (see Table 5.5). Each regime type represents the institutional manifestation of similar state identities. Therefore, if each regime type reflects a different type of justice, it can be concluded that state identities are defined by the justice norms that distinguish states from other states. The focus on justice norms is pertinent to international development policies because it is generally agreed that it is unjust (unfair) that a person’s wellbeing, dignity and freedom are largely determined by the randomness of their place of birth. However, there are strong debates over what developed countries morally owe to developing countries (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003, chapter 2). Therefore, justice norms should be a key factor in differentiating development policy regime types, and by extension, state identities.

There are three main ways that justice is normatively understood in political philosophy: (1) equal wealth (distributive justice), as in Karl Marx; (2) equal exchange (commutative justice), as in Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas; and (3) equal participation (social justice), as in John Rawls. Distributive justice calls for the polis to allocate wealth equally amongst individual citizens. Commutative justice calls for fairness and equal treatment in all agreements and exchanges. Social justice calls for the organisation of society to enable equal participation.

Intuitively it can be argued that giving aid is an example of distributive justice because aid is the transfer of wealth from governments in developed countries to developing countries. By comparison, debt and FDI are potentially negative examples of commutative justice as debt burdens largely arise through unequal exchange in international trade and investment (Pogge, 2007). Finally, open migration is suggestive of social justice as it allows individuals from developing countries equal access to participate in the global labour market (M. A. Clemens & Pritchett, 2008). However, in order to be confident that normative understandings of distributive, commutative and social justice are not spuriously enmeshed with the empirical categorisation of development policy regime types, it must be acknowledged that a number of rival hypotheses

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83 Negative commutative justice can be described in more positive terms as ascriptivism. That is, everyone is socially-included but has a special position. According to Lippl (1998), ‘Ascriptivists are interested in preserving the status-hierarchy and the status quo. The distribution is accepted as something naturally given, whereby no possibility and no need for change is seen’ (p. 9).
might also explain the structure of regimes. For example, it could be argued that colonial links rather than social justice norms play a part in migratory patterns in Portugal, Spain and France in particular.

One way of validating the interpretation that justice norms exert a constitutive influence on policy actions for reducing global poverty, is to demonstrate that policies that are independent of a state’s foreign relations also reflect the same justice norms. In particular, justice norms that are embodied within the state (and empowered through institutionalisation) should constrain how social rights are granted both abroad and at home.

Although Esping-Andersen emphasised the political origins of welfare regimes, each regime type achieves a different type of justice according to the relationships between the state, market and family in social provision. The socialist regime crowds out the market and the risks associated with it by providing welfare through a single universal insurance system, thereby achieving distributive justice. The conservative regime upholds status differences in society by providing sector-based employment insurance to the male ‘breadwinner’, thereby undermining commutative justice (the exchange of labour for benefits is not equal across occupations). The liberal regime promotes participation in the market by providing minimal insurance benefits to the very poorest, thereby achieving social justice.

I validate the development policy regime typology by assessing the degree to which it converges with Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) domestic welfare regime typology. This is possible even though Esping-Andersen’s typology was based on data from the 1980s and the development policy regime typology is mostly based on data from 2007 because culture changes very slowly. Moreover, regimes are static by definition because regime institutions convey and legitimise cultural norms, limiting the potential for policy reform, except where it is normatively plausible (Lippl, 1998; Mau, 2004). Therefore, states that scored high on the aid index should converge with the socialist welfare states, states that scored high on the debt and investment index should converge with the conservative welfare states, and states that scored high on the migration index should converge with the liberal welfare states. Note that Finland (socialist) and New Zealand (liberal) are classified by approximation because they did not achieve a high score on any index.

Table 5.5 places the development policy regime typology and Esping-Andersen’s domestic welfare regime typology side-by-side. As the former typology covers 21 states and the latter 18, with Ireland unclassified, only 17 countries can be directly compared. On this basis, France is the only
non-convergent case because Belgium is borderline conservative/socialist, and Switzerland is borderline liberal/conservative (Bambra, 2007a). France’s classification is difficult to explain as regime typologies sacrifice nuance in order to buy parsimony. The classification of Spain and Portugal as liberal-migration regimes is nevertheless consistent with Esping-Andersen’s insistence that these are in fact weak conservative regimes. Both Spain and Portugal have large wage gaps between immigrants and native-born which is not captured by the migration index (Canal-Domínguez & Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2008; OECD, 2008c). This characteristic is consistent with negative commutative justice and the conservative welfare regime.
Table 5.5 Development Policy Typology Compared to Esping-Andersen’s Welfare Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Policy Regime Types</th>
<th>Esping-Andersen’s Welfare Regime Types&lt;sup&gt;84&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aid/Socialist</strong></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>United Kingdom (to a degree liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland&lt;sup&gt;85&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business/Conservative</strong></td>
<td>Belgium (borderline social-democratic)&lt;sup&gt;86&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan&lt;sup&gt;87&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration/Liberal</strong></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Switzerland (borderline conservative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The countries underlined and in italics are not included in Esping-Andersen’s typology. However, he argues that the Mediterranean countries are weak cases of the conservative welfare regime type. Countries in bold do not fit clearly into one regime type and are therefore approximations.

<sup>84</sup> The order in which countries are listed under Esping-Andersen’s regime types does not reflect their exact scores, only the cluster they belong to.

<sup>85</sup> Ireland was analysed by Esping-Andersen but not classified. Ireland is generally thought to fit the liberal welfare regime type but since joining the EU Ireland has become more socialist.

<sup>86</sup> Scruggs and Allan (2008) corrected an error in Belgium’s score which drops it down from the strong to the moderate cluster on the conservative index based on Esping-Andersen’s own scoring method.

<sup>87</sup> Japan is a hybrid welfare regime that has key elements of Catholic-conservative welfare states but ‘looks’ liberal because it is premature (Esping-Andersen, 1997). Therefore, it is classified conservative.
Overall, there is a sufficient degree of convergence between the granting of social rights in the domestic and international realms to conclude that justice norms coherently drive state behaviour at home and abroad. Therefore, policy decisions are cultural structures that reinforce the boundary between the state-level ‘self’ and ‘other’ states.

By condensing scores of aid donor states into three development policy regime types, the measurement of 13 DAC state identities is less nuanced but simplified. Furthermore, by examining three aspects of policy coherence, I captured the within and without aspects of state identity. I captured the within aspect of state identity by assessing the degree to which states’ policies are normatively coherent and states pursue the same justice norms at home and abroad; I captured the without aspect of state identity by establishing regime differentiation. Crucially, the fact that the development policy regimes typology is characterised by the same conservative, liberal and socialist justice norms as Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) domestic welfare regime types, confirms that the typology can be confidently used to indicate state identities. The typology is therefore employed in Chapter 7 to examine identity alignment.  

Overall, the question of who DAC states are was an empirical one and the analyses sustained both hypotheses. The final section of the chapter discusses the implications of the findings.

5.5 Implications for Global Governance

As this chapter achieved its main aim of establishing a quantitative measure of state identities, the discussion focuses on the issue of global governance which is a broader concern that this dissertation seeks to address.

Convergence between the development policy regime typology and Esping-Andersen’s domestic welfare regime typology suggests that normative policy actions in one realm are likely to reinforce the justice norms that define a state’s identity, prescribing normative policy actions in the other realm. This feedback mechanism may explain why there is persistent policy divergence amongst the DAC member states in regard to international cooperation on global poverty.

Overlap between the two typologies also suggests that the foreign policy actions of DAC states are morally defensible because they are internally coherent, determinate (there are criteria to determine what rights persons have) and compatible with domestic theory (Caney, 2005). Therefore, expectations for reform must be pragmatically balanced with the fact that states have a

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88 Each country is given a score of either 0 or 1 according to the development policy regime type they belong to.
legitimate interest in maintaining stable identities. Bourguignon, Levin and Rosenblatt (2009) measured the impact of trade restrictions and aid on international income redistribution. They concluded that ‘there is a contradiction in the set of international policies on aid and trade, where the benevolent hand of aid is somewhat countered by the malevolent hand of protectionism’ (p. 7). The results presented here demonstrate that such ‘contradictions’ are not contradictions at all if one considers the justice norms that define each state’s identity. Thus, this chapter gives credibility to the constructivist political economy theory on which the identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform is founded.

Most working definitions of global cooperation are based on states adopting uniform policy positions. For example, EU budget rules require all members to comply with a 3 percent of GDP deficit limit regardless of the unique circumstances in each country. However, the nature of development policy regimes, and by extension, state identities, underscores that expectations for reform must be consistent with the normative perspective of justice in each DAC member state. Observing states’ foreign policy patterns revealed that the OECD’s PCD initiative is not normatively appropriate in any single DAC member state. Moreover, as PCD demands that states give up their development distinctiveness, the doctrine may in fact increase resistance to accepting shared responsibility for reducing global poverty. Indeed, maintaining and accentuating their unique identities helps states to navigate reality. The findings presented in this chapter should therefore serve as a reminder to PCD advocates that the aim of international cooperation is not to achieve policy uniformity, but rather to pragmatically fast-track international development goals. In the longer term, failure to achieve global poverty targets as a result of unrealistic policy initiatives may breed cynicism about international cooperation, with life or death implications for people in developing countries.

A plausible alternative to PCD is to encourage states to scale-up policy specialisation, in line with their unique identities. Such an approach would be akin to company employees all contributing to the company’s mission, but specialising in accounting, marketing and sales, and therefore being assessed against their individual job descriptions. Social psychology research shows that differentiated performance standards amongst individuals and groups – which allow actors to strive for superiority on dimensions that are important to their own identity – encourage cooperation and professionalism (M. B. Brewer, 1999). Therefore, setting unique performance criteria for each DAC member state could facilitate positive synergies between them as each state would be motivated to scale-up the development policies that enhance their identity.
In practice, it may be that states defined by distributive justice norms should be set a higher aid target than 0.7 percent of GNI, which is currently applied to all DAC member states. Similarly, states defined by social justice norms might be expected to expand policies that facilitate employment opportunities for migrants from developing countries, such as guest worker programs, vocational training, and cultural exchange. One obvious problem with specialisation is that states defined by negative commutative justice norms do not perceive any need for change because the existing social order is seen as naturally given. However, with the scaled-up efforts of aid-giving and migrant-taking states, developing countries would be in better position to ensure investment inflows support their economic and social development priorities (rather than raising their debt burden), and to take advantage of the technologies and know-how transferred through FDI. This is because more effective aid would help to strengthen local institutions in developing countries, and greater prospects of emigration increase incentives to acquire education and skills (Stark, 2004). Thus, policy specialisation is likely to be more efficient for achieving international development goals than a one-size-fits-all approach.

5.6 Conclusion

The ultimate aim of this chapter was to establish a quantitative measure of state identities that can be used to test identity alignment. Identity alignment is the idea that the normative orientation of a higher order identity (such as the state identity) affects the legitimacy of the normative orientation of a lower order identity (such as a social identity). While some scholars have qualitatively discerned one or two state identities (for example, Bergman, 2007), I used quantitative methods to establish a development policy regime typology that captures the identities of 21 DAC members. The three-pronged typology therefore provides a crude yet robust and efficient macro measure of state identities that can be interacted with micro survey data.

DAC identities were established by investigating whether patterns within and between aid, trade, debt, FDI and migration policies and practices are, firstly coherent, secondly underpinned by specific justice norms, and thirdly consistent with domestic policy patterns. Although no two states were exactly alike (as the identity of each DAC member is utterly unique), three broad approaches to development were empirically discerned. The first approach focuses on giving highly effective aid to developing countries, the second on nurturing private business through debt relief and FDI, and the third on open migration to improve the education and employment
opportunities of individual citizens from developing countries. With the exception of Finland and New Zealand, states pursued one approach to the detriment of the others.

States with similar approaches were grouped together to form three development policy regime types. Each regime type was found to embody different justice norms. The aid regime reflects distributive justice norms, the business regime reflects negative commutative justice norms, and the migration regime reflects social justice norms. This interpretation was validated by comparing the development policy regime typology to Esping-Andersen’s domestic welfare regime typology. As a convergence was found (with the exception of France), it was confirmed that state identities are defined by the justice norms that distinguish states from each other.

The chapter ended by arguing that, as it is in the interests of states to maintain their unique identities, setting blanket policy targets for all states may weaken their commitment to reducing global poverty. Certainly the litany of international agreements which have failed to get states to shift away from their self-reinforcing policy habits indicates that it is time for a new approach.

It was suggested that differentiated performance standards could encourage positive synergies between DAC member states as they would become motivated to enhance their identities in positive directions. To this end, US aid channelled through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has a greater poverty reduction focus than traditional channels for US aid. The MCC is an independent US aid agency, segregated from US foreign policy objectives, that uses competitive selection to fund recipient-led development proposals. With a novel structure (including a chief executive officer) and an innovative approach to fighting poverty, the MCC allows US aid contributions to be recognised as unique amongst the major aid donors.

Future research might explore this idea more rigorously – that allowing states to strive for policy distinctiveness is a more efficient strategy for promoting action on global poverty. This may include systematically comparing the poverty reduction focus of a range of development initiatives that are unique to individual donors versus initiatives that all donors have signed up to. For now, the next chapter continues with testing the identity-based approach at the level of individuals and social groups.
Chapter 6. Identity-Based Support for Aid

What ought one to do? – Socrates’ ethical challenge

Red ribbons to raise awareness of AIDS, pink ribbons to raise awareness of breast cancer, white ribbons to raise awareness of violence against women... Sarah Moore’s (2008) research into ribbon wearing concluded that most wearers were poorly informed about the causes they were outwardly supporting. With a confusing array of colours, each representing a multitude of causes (for example, purple ribbons represent at least 18 causes including animal cruelty, gay-teen suicide, Lupus, Cystic Fibrosis, and Alzheimer’s disease), the ribbons themselves do not communicate anything substantive about the issues they symbolise. As such, ribbon wearing does not reflect a process of rational or moral evaluation. Rather, ribbon wearing is a way of signalling concern for others because the act of wearing a ribbon (like the Armistice Day poppy) is seen as unquestionably empathetic. Therefore, ribbon wearing is an expression of personal identity which satisfies the self-concept of someone who self-identifies as a caring person.

Is supporting foreign aid similarly an expression of identity? If it is, what types of identities does it express? Are socially-oriented identities stereotypically pro-aid and are self-interested identities stereotypically anti-aid? Many DAC governments try to portray aid-giving as being in the national interest in order to shore up public support for maintaining or increasing the level of spending on aid. If supporting aid is an expression of socially-oriented identities rather than self-interested identities this strategy could backfire. This chapter tests identity-based support for aid at the level of individuals and members of social groups. Component 2 of the identity-based approach proposes that public support for aid is not determined by rational self-interest or individual consideration of morally correct action as Socrates would have it. Rather, it is based on prosocial personal and social identities. In other words, identity informs the question ‘what ought one to do’ so that individuals ask themselves ‘what ought one to do, given that I am such a person’.

Section 6.1 of this chapter examines the impact of prosocial and proself personal identities on respondents’ level of aid endorsement within ten DAC member states using a separate regression analysis for each country. The same variables are also examined in relation to respondents’ willingness to sacrifice within 13 DAC member states using 13 separate regression analyses. Section 6.2 likewise uses separate regression analyses to examine the country-specific effects of
three social identities on aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice. The three social identities are political (left-wing), religious and humanitarian. After examining support for aid at two different levels of identity, a combined model is tested in Section 6.3. The combined model is used to validate the premise that personal and social identities are different mental constructs, so their effects on support for aid should be additive rather than overlapping. Finally, having identified several personal and social identities that are stereotypically pro-aid, in Section 6.4 of this chapter I apply the results to campaigning. SCT argues that increasing people’s awareness of certain identities increases pro-identity behaviour. Therefore, campaigners can activate the dormant aid constituency by deploying identity priming techniques that target pro-aid identities.

6.1 Personal Identity-Based Support for Aid

As aid-giving is conceptualised as a form of prosocial behaviour, it is hypothesised that prosocial personal identities will increase support for aid and proself personal identities will decrease support for aid (H3). I test this hypothesis in relation to both aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice. Personal identities are operationalised with Schwartz’s personal value priorities which form a coordinated system of congruent and conflicting value types. In this system, people can pursue competing values but only through different acts, at different times, and in different settings. For example, we see a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment during times of economic hardship when security values are heightened and universalism values are suppressed. But when living conditions are rising, the balance between security values and universalism values shifts and people prioritise tolerance.

A person would sense psychological dissonance if they prioritised competing values at the same time because actions that promote one value (for example, being accepting of immigration) may literally violate a competing value (minimising social disruption). Therefore, eight personal identity measures are modelled simultaneously: two prosocial identities (universalism and benevolence); three proself identities (power, security, and tradition); and three control identities (Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction) to capture the relative importance of prosocial and proself values to a person’s self-concept (Schwartz, 2010). Four demographic controls are also modelled as life circumstances make the pursuit or expression of different values more or less rewarding or costly. These variables are: age group, gender, income, and education level.

By regressing support for aid on the values that constitute prosocial and proself personal identities, this chapter identifies the personal identities that stereotypically support foreign aid.
With this information, aid advocates will be able to anticipate the impact of priming certain values in campaigns that call for increasing foreign aid. Currently, if say Oxfam Australia were to design a campaign to build public support for the government reaching the 0.7 percent aid target, it is unclear who it should appeal to. The theory outlined in Chapter 3 suggests that the answer depends on which personal identities are stereotypically supportive of foreign aid in Australia. If the universalism identity is important, then Oxfam’s campaign material should signal equality, correcting injustice, and tolerance of diversity.

6.1.1 Aid Endorsement

The first dependent variable, which measured aid endorsement, was asked to WVS respondents in Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the US. The exact question wording can be found in Chapter 4.

Both prosocial and proself personal identities were found to be important predictors of aid endorsement. The estimates obtained from ten ordered logistic regressions (one for each country) are presented in Table 6.1 as odds ratios (also see Appendix 4 for a series of graphs showing the predicted probabilities for each personal identity by country). The more respondents prioritised universalism and benevolence values, the stronger their support for increasing aid spending (equation 1) and the weaker their desire to see spending reduced (equation 2). The more respondents prioritised security and power values, the stronger their desire to see aid levels decreased (equation 1) and the weaker their endorsement of additional spending (equation 2). Surprisingly, the negative effects for security and power only achieved statistical significance in four and two (out of 10) countries respectively. Prioritising tradition values was also expected to have a strong negative impact on aid endorsement. However, the statistically significant effects proved mixed. In Australia and Germany tradition increased support for aid, whereas in Norway tradition decreased support.

Of all the personal identities examined, universalism had the most consistent positive influence on aid endorsement cross-nationally, and security had the most consistent negative influence. The universalism identity defines people who see themselves as striving for a more equitable society. As foreign aid aims to address the needs of the most vulnerable, the universalism personal identity was expected to be associated with greater odds of believing aid spending should be increased.

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89 An odds ratio is simply the odds of an outcome occurring in one group divided by the odds of the outcome occurring in a comparison group.
The security identity defines people who are focused on their own needs and anxieties about safety and stability, rather than the needs of others. Typically, this identity leads people to recoil from actions that might upset the status quo. This includes disapproving of policies that disrupt the ‘social pecking order’ (Schoen, 2009, p. 14). As foreign aid has the potential to reduce global inequality, having a security personal identity was expected to be associated with lower odds of believing aid spending should be increased.

Across the countries where the universalism identity was an important positive motivator of aid endorsement above the ten percent significance level, the benevolence identity was generally less important at this level of significance, and vice versa. This suggests that societies distinguish between charity (benevolence) and solidarity (universalism) when thinking about foreign aid. The only exceptions are Australia, Germany, Sweden and the US, where both benevolence and universalism positively predicted aid endorsement at p<0.05. The extent to which identity alignment and identity framing are factors is assessed in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively.
Table 6.1 Personal Identities Predicting Aid Endorsement Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of saying current aid level is 'Too Low' or 'About Right' versus 'Too High' (Equation 1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0820)</td>
<td>(0.0729)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.0900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>1.269***</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td>1.652**</td>
<td>1.215***</td>
<td>1.392***</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>1.089</td>
<td>1.323***</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>1.313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0875)</td>
<td>(0.0723)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.0761)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.0986)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0886)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>1.208*</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>1.198***</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.847*</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>1.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.0461)</td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(0.0626)</td>
<td>(0.0958)</td>
<td>(0.0662)</td>
<td>(0.0988)</td>
<td>(0.0619)</td>
<td>(0.0608)</td>
<td>(0.0640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>0.868*</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>1.063</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.894*</td>
<td>1.026</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.0555)</td>
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<td>(0.0665)</td>
<td>(0.0513)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.0783)</td>
<td>(0.0605)</td>
<td>(0.0519)</td>
<td>(0.0636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>0.852*</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>0.809*</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0673)</td>
<td>(0.0537)</td>
<td>(0.0743)</td>
<td>(0.0590)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.0959)</td>
<td>(0.0756)</td>
<td>(0.0777)</td>
<td>(0.0725)</td>
<td>(0.0705)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of saying current aid level is 'Too Low' versus 'About Right' or 'Too High' (Equation 2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.108</td>
<td>1.215***</td>
<td>1.392***</td>
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<td>1.089</td>
<td>1.323***</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>1.313***</td>
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<td>(0.124)</td>
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<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>1.035</td>
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<td>0.969</td>
<td>1.063</td>
<td>0.867*</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.894*</td>
<td>1.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0783)</td>
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<td>(0.0636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>0.852*</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>0.809*</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0673)</td>
<td>(0.0537)</td>
<td>(0.0743)</td>
<td>(0.0590)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.0959)</td>
<td>(0.0756)</td>
<td>(0.0777)</td>
<td>(0.0725)</td>
<td>(0.0705)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N. of cases    | 1234           | 1528           | 895            | 1519           | 572            | 929            | 849            | 891            | 1042           | 1123           |
| LR test Chi2 (df) | 160.8          | 124.2          | 102.8          | 235.0          | 36.2           | 147.2          | 110.9          | 59.1           | 87.9           | 55.1           |
| p-value        | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          | 0.000          |

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001

AU=Australia; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America

Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level; Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction
Finally, I conducted a sensitivity analysis to test the assumption that regardless of whether and what level of aid spending was quoted in the survey, it did not influence respondents’ support for aid because supporting aid is an identity-based behaviour. Recall from Chapter 4 that a majority of countries that participated in the WVS quoted an incorrectly low aid figure in the aid endorsement question. Therefore, it is important to confirm that supporting foreign aid is not tied to financial and budgetary evaluations much like the decision to wear an awareness-raising ribbon is not tied to knowledge about the underlying cause. Rather, the regression estimates reflect identification with pro-aid categories.

I repeated the aid endorsement model with a WVS question that measured solidarity with developing countries:

Thinking of your own country’s problems, should your country’s leaders give top priority to help reducing poverty in the world or should they give top priority to solve your own country’s problems? To indicate your position, use the scale below where 1 means ‘top priority to help reducing poverty in the world’ and 10 means ‘top priority to solve my own country’s problems’.

Response categories were reverse coded so that 1=Top priority to solve my own country’s problems and 10=Top priority to help reducing poverty in the world

Although linear regression rather than logistic regression was used to examine the influence of personal identities on solidarity with developing countries, the results (presented in Table 6.2) indicate remarkable symmetry between the aid endorsement and solidarity models in terms of the direction of the estimates (except for the tradition identity in Norway where the sign reversed). Universalism and benevolence had a positive influence on solidarity whereas tradition, security and power had a negative influence. Also, in countries where universalism had a statistically significant effect, benevolence was statistically insignificant, and vice versa. Finally, Japan is the only country for which no variables reached statistical significance – a result that is also fairly consistent with the aid endorsement model reported earlier. These findings, therefore, enhance the credibility of the aid endorsement results and the persuasiveness of the identity-based approach.
Table 6.2 Personal Identities Predicting 'Prioritise Reducing World Poverty' Within Different Donor States Using Linear Regression

| H    | AU Coef./(se) | CA Coef./(se) | FN Coef./(se) | DE Coef./(se) | JP Coef./(se) | NO Coef./(se) | ES Coef./(se) | SE Coef./(se) | CH Coef./(se) | US Coef./(se) |
|------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Universalism | +             | 0.23**        | 0.06          | 0.15          | 0.23**        | 0.14          | 0.39**        | 0.16          | 0.21*         | 0.11          | 0.10          |
|       |               | (0.09)        | (0.07)        | (0.09)        | (0.06)        | (0.10)        | (0.10)        | (0.10)        | (0.09)        | (0.09)        | (0.08)        |
| Benevolence | +             | 0.18          | 0.12          | 0.27**        | 0.02          | 0.10          | -0.08         | 0.23          | 0.14          | 0.11          | -0.01         |
|       |               | (0.08)        | (0.08)        | (0.09)        | (0.06)        | (0.11)        | (0.10)        | (0.10)        | (0.10)        | (0.09)        | (0.08)        |
| Tradition | -             | 0.06          | -0.17**       | -0.21**       | 0.02          | -0.07         | -0.25**       | 0.13          | -0.11         | -0.21**       | -0.14         |
|       |               | (0.07)        | (0.06)        | (0.08)        | (0.05)        | (0.09)        | (0.09)        | (0.09)        | (0.08)        | (0.07)        | (0.07)        |
| Security | -             | -0.07         | -0.13*        | -0.12         | -0.14**       | -0.06         | 0.06          | 0.01          | -0.13         | -0.10         | -0.18**       |
|       |               | (0.07)        | (0.06)        | (0.08)        | (0.05)        | (0.09)        | (0.08)        | (0.08)        | (0.07)        | (0.06)        | (0.07)        |
| Power  | -             | -0.07         | -0.04         | 0.12          | -0.21***      | -0.05         | -0.01         | 0.02          | -0.13         | -0.22**       | -0.13         |
|       |               | (0.09)        | (0.07)        | (0.09)        | (0.06)        | (0.11)        | (0.11)        | (0.09)        | (0.10)        | (0.08)        | (0.08)        |
| Constant |               | 2.94***       | 2.30***       | 3.55***       | 2.70***       | 2.95***       | 2.70***       | 4.77***       | 3.46***       | 3.20***       | 3.05***       |
|        |               | (0.45)        | (0.33)        | (0.36)        | (0.26)        | (0.49)        | (0.43)        | (0.37)        | (0.43)        | (0.44)        | (0.44)        |
| N. of cases | 1238         | 1725         | 905           | 1725         | 813           | 934           | 1050          | 928           | 1069          | 1121          |
| Adjusted R-Square | 0.032       | 0.037       | 0.055          | 0.094        | 0.005        | 0.139          | 0.026         | 0.035         | 0.060         | 0.028         |

H = hypothesised direction of effect


AU=Australia; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001

Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level; Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction
6.1.2 Willingness to Sacrifice

The same identity variables were used to predict respondents’ willingness to pay higher taxes in order to increase aid spending. This second dependent variable reflects a higher degree of commitment to aid-giving than aid endorsement. Willingness to sacrifice was measured in 13 DAC member states that participated in the 2005-2008 WVS. These states include the ten already mentioned, plus Britain, France and the Netherlands. Refer to Chapter 4 for the exact question wording.

As before, prosocial personal identities had a consistently positive influence on willingness to sacrifice and proself personal identities had a consistently negative influence. In fact, prosocial personal identities proved to be more important for predicting willingness to sacrifice than aid endorsement. The estimates for willingness to sacrifice are presented in Table 6.3 as odds ratios. Surprisingly, France and Spain were the only two countries where neither the universalism nor benevolence estimates reached statistical significance. However, in these countries, as well as in Australia, security was an important negative predictor of willingness to sacrifice. Four countries had a statistically significant negative effect for power: the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the US. Norway and Sweden were the only countries to record a statistically significant effect for tradition. In both countries tradition decreased willingness to sacrifice.
Table 6.3 Personal Identities Predicting Willingness to Sacrifice Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>1.315</td>
<td>1.145</td>
<td>1.087</td>
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<td>1.024</td>
<td>1.510</td>
<td>1.263</td>
<td>1.184</td>
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<td>1.181</td>
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<td>(0.0895)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.0973)</td>
<td>(0.0996)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
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<td>1.357</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>1.199</td>
<td>1.330</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>1.263</td>
<td>1.373</td>
<td>1.234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0913)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
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<td>0.938</td>
<td>1.042</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>1.177</td>
<td>1.095</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>1.027</td>
<td>1.049</td>
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<td>(0.0729)</td>
<td>(0.0916)</td>
<td>(0.0734)</td>
<td>(0.0677)</td>
<td>(0.0676)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.0621)</td>
<td>(0.0873)</td>
<td>(0.0604)</td>
<td>(0.0664)</td>
<td>(0.0808)</td>
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<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>0.903</td>
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<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.973</td>
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<td>(0.0573)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td>(0.0673)</td>
<td>(0.0650)</td>
<td>(0.0564)</td>
<td>(0.0743)</td>
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<td>0.923</td>
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<td>0.797</td>
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<td>0.891</td>
<td>0.809</td>
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<td>(0.0764)</td>
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<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.0812)</td>
<td>(0.0783)</td>
<td>(0.0711)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.0980)</td>
<td>(0.0955)</td>
<td>(0.0780)</td>
<td>(0.0737)</td>
<td>(0.0681)</td>
<td>(0.0765)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. of cases  | 1225  | 726  | 544  | 877  | 843  | 1619  | 650  | 681  | 929  | 927  | 904  | 1015  | 1122  |

LR test Chi2 (df)  | 93.6  | 45.0  | 32.9  | 83.4  | 70.4  | 228.3  | 27.8  | 59.8  | 82.4  | 98.8  | 64.4  | 86.6  | 94.2  |

p-value  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.001  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  | 0.000  |

AU=Australia; GB=Great Britain; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; FR=France; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level; Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction
I conducted a sensitivity analysis to assess the validity of the Canadian results because only respondents who said aid is ‘too low’ were included in the willingness to sacrifice sample. The analysis treated all countries ‘like Canada’ (only respondents who endorsed aid as being too low were included in the analysis and the remaining respondents were dropped). Although the estimates for personal and social identity-based support for aid changed, they did not change systematically. This suggests that the Canadian results must be considered with caution.

Another sensitivity analysis was undertaken to clarify whether the meanings of identities are based on specific rather than generalised normative links between identities and policy issues. In other words, do these personal identities motivate all prosocial behaviours equally? Development economists such as Nicholas Stern have asserted that if we fail to address climate change, we will fail to address global poverty (Aitkenhead, 2009). Therefore, it is important for campaigners to know whether pro-identity behaviour discriminates between support for foreign aid and support for addressing climate change, as well as other GPGs.

The same identity model was tested with a WVS question regarding willingness to pay higher taxes for the environment. The four point scale on the dependent variable running from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ was dichotomised to make it consistent with the willingness to sacrifice coding. The question was worded as follows:

I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution

The response scale was condensed so that Agree=1 and Disagree=0

In no country did benevolence reach statistical significance but in every country universalism was the strongest predictor of willingness to sacrifice for the environment (the logistic regression estimates can be found in Table 6.4, reported as odds ratios). This probably reflects the fact that universalism functions as two value sub-types: nature and social concern. Benevolence on the other hand provides an internal motivational base for promoting relations with in-group members. This finding confirms that paying higher taxes for aid has a different motivational base to paying higher taxes for the environment. Therefore, specific rather than generalised prosocial behaviours are meaningful to the maintenance of prosocial personal identities.
Table 6.4 Personal Identities Predicting 'Willingness to Pay Higher Tax for Environment' Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

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<td>Universalism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.445***</td>
<td>1.295***</td>
<td>1.476***</td>
<td>1.550***</td>
<td>1.318*</td>
<td>1.364***</td>
<td>1.543***</td>
<td>1.482***</td>
<td>1.429***</td>
<td>1.828***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
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<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
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<td>−</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.820***</td>
<td>0.900*</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>0.812**</td>
<td>0.873***</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>1.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0539)</td>
<td>(0.0503)</td>
<td>(0.0717)</td>
<td>(0.0578)</td>
<td>(0.0951)</td>
<td>(0.0638)</td>
<td>(0.0699)</td>
<td>(0.0697)</td>
<td>(0.0568)</td>
<td>(0.0753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.900*</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.836*</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0710)</td>
<td>(0.0545)</td>
<td>(0.0855)</td>
<td>(0.0706)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.0864)</td>
<td>(0.0798)</td>
<td>(0.0727)</td>
<td>(0.0736)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. of cases: 1233  1699  895  1690  741  933  983  919  1062  1122
LR test Chi2 (df): 122.0  162.6  62.2  214.0  67.4  69.2  65.1  75.7  64.5  127.0
p-value: 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000

H = hypothesised direction of effect
AU=Australia; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America
*p < 0.10,* **p < 0.05,** ***p < 0.01,** ****p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level; Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction
6.2 Social Identity-Based Support for Aid

Social identities are operationalised as self-identification with social groups. According to the identity-based approach, individuals who identify with social groups that advocate greater spending on foreign aid should be more supportive of aid-giving. Pro-aid social identities are hypothesised to include left-wing, religious and humanitarian identities. Understanding whether these social identities automatically generate pro-aid attitudes can assist in the formulation of a bottom-up policy reform campaign. For example, aid advocates might stimulate pro-aid behaviour by increasing the psychological salience of pro-aid social identities in campaign communications. I test the hypothesis that left-wing, religious and humanitarian social identities will increase support for aid (H4) in relation to both aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice.

All three identities were included in separate regression analysis for each DAC member state. This allowed the partial effects to be established and any cross-national variation to be illuminated. Consistent with the personal identity analyses, four demographic control variables were included: age group, gender, income, and education level.

6.2.1 Aid Endorsement

As with personal identities, ten ordered logistic regression analyses (one for each country) were used to examine the effects of the three social identities on whether respondents thought existing aid levels were too low, about right, or too high. The estimates are presented in Table 6.5 as odds ratios. All three social identities were found to be important predictors of endorsing greater aid spending, although the religious identity less so than the political and humanitarian identities. The more respondents self-identified as left-wing, religious and humanitarian, the stronger their endorsement of aid-giving. The effects for social identities were stronger than the previous effects for personal identities on aid endorsement and there was less cross-national variation, at least for political and humanitarian identities.

In every country except Japan, right-wing political identity decreased aid endorsement. Or put differently, left-wing political identity strongly increased support for aid as expected. Likewise, only in Japan did humanitarian identity not reach statistical significance for predicting aid endorsement. Religious identity reached statistical significance above the ten percent level in Australia, Germany and Japan only, and the estimates were fairly small for the other countries. When religious identity was tested on its own for Japan (with the control variables) it too lost statistical significance at the five percent level.
### Table 6.5 Social Identities Predicting Aid Endorsement Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of saying current aid level is 'Too Low' or 'About Right' versus 'Too High' (Equation 1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0.836*** (0.0271)</td>
<td>0.974 (0.0502)</td>
<td>0.988 (0.0826)</td>
<td>0.862*** (0.0259)</td>
<td>1.021 (0.0467)</td>
<td>0.743*** (0.0297)</td>
<td>0.812*** (0.0322)</td>
<td>0.638*** (0.0574)</td>
<td>0.831*** (0.0300)</td>
<td>0.870*** (0.0289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=Left; 10=Right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.327*** (0.100)</td>
<td>0.996 (0.0281)</td>
<td>1.086* (0.0540)</td>
<td>1.141*** (0.0369)</td>
<td>1.163* (0.0839)</td>
<td>1.088* (0.0508)</td>
<td>0.959 (0.0418)</td>
<td>1.055 (0.0536)</td>
<td>0.993 (0.0367)</td>
<td>1.040 (0.0277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>1.412*** (0.115)</td>
<td>1.204** (0.0846)</td>
<td>1.477** (0.181)</td>
<td>1.550*** (0.183)</td>
<td>1.319 (0.308)</td>
<td>0.890 (0.212)</td>
<td>1.320* (0.197)</td>
<td>1.401** (0.151)</td>
<td>1.360** (0.133)</td>
<td>1.298** (0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of saying current aid level is 'Too Low' versus 'About Right' or 'Too High' (Equation 2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0.836*** (0.0271)</td>
<td>0.875*** (0.0287)</td>
<td>0.800*** (0.0334)</td>
<td>0.862*** (0.0259)</td>
<td>1.021 (0.0467)</td>
<td>0.743*** (0.0297)</td>
<td>0.812*** (0.0322)</td>
<td>0.855*** (0.0281)</td>
<td>0.831*** (0.0300)</td>
<td>0.870*** (0.0289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=Left; 10=Right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.123*** (0.0375)</td>
<td>0.996 (0.0281)</td>
<td>1.086* (0.0540)</td>
<td>1.141*** (0.0369)</td>
<td>1.163* (0.0839)</td>
<td>1.088* (0.0508)</td>
<td>0.959 (0.0418)</td>
<td>1.055 (0.0536)</td>
<td>0.993 (0.0367)</td>
<td>1.040 (0.0277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>1.412*** (0.115)</td>
<td>1.204** (0.0846)</td>
<td>1.477** (0.181)</td>
<td>1.550*** (0.183)</td>
<td>1.319 (0.308)</td>
<td>1.468*** (0.156)</td>
<td>1.320* (0.197)</td>
<td>1.401** (0.151)</td>
<td>1.360** (0.133)</td>
<td>1.298** (0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. of cases</td>
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<td>823</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR test Chi2 (df)</td>
<td>181.9 (8.0)</td>
<td>71.4 (9.0)</td>
<td>104.7 (8.0)</td>
<td>163.0 (9.0)</td>
<td>19.0 (7.0)</td>
<td>194.2 (9.0)</td>
<td>64.2 (7.0)</td>
<td>76.2 (8.0)</td>
<td>90.5 (7.0)</td>
<td>54.2 (7.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AU=Australia; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level
6.2.2 Willingness to Sacrifice

Political, religious and humanitarian social identities were also investigated as determinants of respondents’ willingness to pay higher taxes in order to increase spending on foreign aid. The estimates for 13 DAC members are presented in Table 6.6 as odds ratios. Unlike aid endorsement, religious identity proved to be an important motivator of respondents’ willingness to sacrifice, along with political and humanitarian identity. Once again, the only country where political identity did not reach statistical significance was Japan. This time only Japan and Canada did not record a statistically significant effect for humanitarian identity on willingness to sacrifice.

Religious identity showed a positive and statistically significant effect on willingness to sacrifice in all countries except Canada, Norway, Spain and Sweden. As mentioned earlier, the Canadian result should be interpreted with caution due to sampling bias. With regards to Spain, a plausible explanation for the lack of religious influence is the modest correlation between religious identity and political identity (0.36, p<.001 for Spain, versus 0.16, p<.001 for all DAC members). In other words, there may be sufficient overlap between these identities in the Spanish context that the effects are not independent. This is discussed in Section 6.3. With regards to Norway and Sweden, it makes sense that religious identity did not have a positive influence on willingness to sacrifice because holding two conflicting identities requires significant cognitive resources even when they operate at different levels (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). The religious identity is positively correlated with the tradition identity (0.32, p<.001) and Norway and Sweden were the only two countries where the tradition personal identity had a statistically significant negative effect on willingness to sacrifice. A person whose personal identity disapproves of aid-giving would experience cognitive dissonance if they interpreted their social identity to be normatively pro-aid. This is discussed further in Chapter 7 when the notion of identity alignment is examined.
Table 6.6 Social Identities Predicting Willingness to Sacrifice Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of saying 'Yes' versus 'No' to the question of being willing to pay higher taxes to increase the current level of aid</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td><strong>0.835</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.835</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.846</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.803</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.840</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.823</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>1.006</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.818</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.749</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.888</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.765</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.770</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.805</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0300)</td>
<td>(0.0398)</td>
<td>(0.0456)</td>
<td>(0.0334)</td>
<td>(0.0336)</td>
<td>(0.0301)</td>
<td>(0.0551)</td>
<td>(0.0448)</td>
<td>(0.0310)</td>
<td>(0.0359)</td>
<td>(0.0267)</td>
<td>(0.0293)</td>
<td>(0.0332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.138***</td>
<td>1.181***</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>1.122**</td>
<td>1.113**</td>
<td>1.228***</td>
<td>1.234**</td>
<td>1.233***</td>
<td>1.079</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>1.069</td>
<td>1.114**</td>
<td>1.117***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0383)</td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
<td>(0.0495)</td>
<td>(0.0587)</td>
<td>(0.0521)</td>
<td>(0.0459)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.0670)</td>
<td>(0.0523)</td>
<td>(0.0414)</td>
<td>(0.0577)</td>
<td>(0.0435)</td>
<td>(0.0374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>1.325***</td>
<td>1.223*</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td>1.286*</td>
<td>1.312*</td>
<td>1.701***</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>1.696***</td>
<td>1.861***</td>
<td>1.600**</td>
<td>1.513***</td>
<td>1.335**</td>
<td>1.205*</td>
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<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. of cases</td>
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<td>460</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR test Chi2 (df)</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>185.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
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<td>69.9</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AU=Australia; GB=Great Britain; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; FR=France; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland

Standard errors in parentheses; ‘p < 0.10, ‘p < 0.05, ‘‘p < 0.01, ‘‘‘p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level

170
6.3 The Independent Effects of Personal and Social Identities

The previous section demonstrated that support for foreign aid is normatively associated with various social groups including left-wing, religious and humanitarian groups. However, people may choose to affiliate with these groups as a way of maintaining their personal identities. If the effects of personal and social identities completely overlap, there are obvious implications for organising a bottom-up reform campaign. For example, if social identities mediate the relationships between personal identities and support for aid, there would be no point trying to influence the aid-giving orientations of social groups because group members would only act in accordance with their personal identities anyway. Conversely, if personal and social identities do not entirely substitute each other in motivating support for aid, aid reformers should be aware of any normative conflicts and compatibilities between identities when targeting certain audiences.

To determine whether campaigning efforts should be singly focused on personal identities it is necessary to examine whether personal and social identities independently motivate citizen support for aid. This is the second part of H4 which states that left-wing, religious and humanitarian social identities increase support for aid independently of personal identities because they represent a different level of self-definition. Another reason for examining the independence of personal and social identity effects is to contribute to the debate over whether political ideology is an aspect of a person’s self-concept rather than a belief system as it is traditionally understood in political science. Values are sometimes seen as the mechanism coordinating political ideology. For example, Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, and Shrout (2007) claim that left-wing ideology is driven by universalism values. However, political ideology can also be understood as a social identity for promoting or resisting social change (for an overview of the concept of political ideology, see Oliver & Johnston, 2000). For example, Cohrs, Jürgen, Barbara, and Sven (2007) used structural equation modelling to demonstrate that both political ideology and values uniquely predicted attitudes to human rights, which in turn predicted relevant behaviour (such as donating money to a human rights organisation).

The aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice models were repeated for the ten and 13 DAC members respectively. This time, however, all eight personal identities (including the three control identities) and all three social identities, along with the four control variables, were modelled simultaneously. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 reveal that when personal and social identities are modelled in combination, compared to when they were modelled separately, there is very little change in the
size of the odds ratios for both aid endorsement and willingness to sacrifice. For some identities the partial effects slightly strengthened, for others they slightly decreased, but on the whole the partial effects stayed roughly the same. Therefore, the effects of personal and social identities on support for aid are largely, but not entirely, independent.
Table 6.7 Personal and Social Identities Predicting Aid Endorsement Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>AU</th>
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<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of saying current aid level is ‘Too Low’ or ‘About Right’ versus ‘Too High’ (Equation 1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>1.142***</td>
<td>1.271***</td>
<td>1.148</td>
<td>1.420***</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>1.513***</td>
<td>1.126</td>
<td>1.264**</td>
<td>1.243**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0881)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.0988)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.0917)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.0904)</td>
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<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>1.151*</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>1.547*</td>
<td>1.129*</td>
<td>1.326*</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>1.313**</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>1.263**</td>
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<td>(0.0869)</td>
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<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.0754)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.0953)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.0921)</td>
<td>(0.0997)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tradition</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>1.164**</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>1.060</td>
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<td>(0.0657)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.0714)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td>(0.0721)</td>
<td>(0.0673)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.991</td>
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<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>0.884*</td>
<td>0.884*</td>
<td>1.026</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0726)</td>
<td>(0.0545)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.0704)</td>
<td>(0.0854)</td>
<td>(0.0612)</td>
<td>(0.0559)</td>
<td>(0.0654)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td>1.066</td>
<td>0.827*</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.980</td>
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<td>(0.0835)</td>
<td>(0.0635)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.0818)</td>
<td>(0.0860)</td>
<td>(0.0818)</td>
<td>(0.0731)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0.856***</td>
<td>0.915**</td>
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<td>1.052</td>
<td>0.752***</td>
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<td>1.236***</td>
<td>1.164*</td>
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<td>1.421**</td>
<td>1.436**</td>
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<td>1.348**</td>
<td>1.245</td>
<td>1.353**</td>
<td>1.301**</td>
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<td>1.513***</td>
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<td>0.884*</td>
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<td>0.820***</td>
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<td>0.752***</td>
<td>0.858***</td>
<td>0.860***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.993</td>
<td>1.098*</td>
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<td>1.164*</td>
<td>1.143**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0409)</td>
<td>(0.0302)</td>
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<td>1.330***</td>
<td>1.165*</td>
<td>1.421**</td>
<td>1.436**</td>
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<td>1.348**</td>
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<td>1.301**</td>
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<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.0981)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N. of cases           | 1129         | 1224     | 813         | 1398        | 472         | 915         | 750         | 867         | 940         | 1086        |
| LR test Chi2 (df)     | 201.6        | 113.6    | 123.5       | 229.0       | 33.9        | 212.7       | 121.2       | 104.6       | 114.2       | 74.8        |
|                       | (16.0)       | (16.0)   | (17.0)      | (17.0)      | (15.0)      | (16.0)      | (17.0)      | (15.0)      | (15.0)      | (15.0)      |
| p-value               | 0.000        | 0.000    | 0.000       | 0.000       | 0.004       | 0.000       | 0.000       | 0.000       | 0.000       | 0.000       |

AU=Australia; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America
Standard errors in parentheses; *<p<0.10, **<p<0.05, ***<p<0.01
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level; Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction
### Table 6.8 Personal and Social Identities Predicting Willingness to Sacrifice Within Different Donor States Using Odds Ratios

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<th>GB</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
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<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
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<td><strong>Odds of saying ‘Yes’ versus ‘No’ to the question of being willing to pay higher taxes to increase the current level of aid</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universalism</strong></td>
<td>1.113</td>
<td>1.091</td>
<td>1.190</td>
<td>1.125</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td>1.442***</td>
<td>1.042</td>
<td>1.353†</td>
<td>1.168</td>
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<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
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<td>(0.134)</td>
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<td>1.161†</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td>1.051</td>
<td>1.250†</td>
<td>1.211†</td>
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<td>(0.160)</td>
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<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
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<td>(0.0972)</td>
<td>(0.0646)</td>
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<td>0.777**</td>
<td>0.937</td>
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<td>1.101</td>
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<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.0830)</td>
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<td>(0.0633)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.0721)</td>
<td>(0.0727)</td>
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<td>0.979</td>
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<td>0.840</td>
<td>1.077</td>
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<td>0.874</td>
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<td>(0.0799)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.0919)</td>
<td>(0.0817)</td>
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<td>0.992</td>
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<td>0.767***</td>
<td>0.909†</td>
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<td>0.780***</td>
<td>0.829***</td>
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<td>(1=Left; 10=Right)</td>
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<td>(0.0580)</td>
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<td>(0.0374)</td>
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<td>1.202***</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>1.128†</td>
<td>1.093†</td>
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<td>1.153</td>
<td>1.213**</td>
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<td>(0.0476)</td>
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<td>1.217†</td>
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<td>1.241</td>
<td>1.281†</td>
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<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. of cases | 1119 | 630 | 455 | 792 | 798 | 1459 | 510 | 564 | 914 | 813 | 876 | 917 | 1085 |

LR test Chi2 (df) | 118.5 | 72.3 | 41.1 | 111.3 | 90.6 | 250.5 | 23.9 | 71.3 | 166.9 | 92.1 | 133.7 | 134.6 | 125.3 |

p-value | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

AU=Australia; GB=Great Britain; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; FR=France; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NL=Netherlands NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America

Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level; Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction
Table 6.9 summarises the change in the number of statistically significant identity effects when personal and social identities are modelled in combination versus separately. There was minimal change in the number of significant effects which again suggests that for a majority of countries, there is a unique aspect to personal and social identities in terms of how people decide their aid-giving preferences. However, as social identities retained statistical significance more often than personal identities, it would seem that the relationships between personal identities and support for aid are partly mediated by social identities. This is particularly true for the universalism personal identity and the political social identity. The universalism personal identity lost significance in six countries as a predictor of willingness to sacrifice when modelled in combination with social identities. The odds ratios also slightly decreased in most countries. By comparison, the political social identity saw no change in the number of significant effects when modelled in combination with personal identities, and the odds ratios slightly increased in most countries. As equality and social solidarity are goals common to both the universalism personal identity and the left-wing social identity, this finding is hardly surprising. Furthermore, the relative strength of social identities over personal identities is consistent with my proposition that higher order identities have greater legitimacy than lower order identities (I discuss this in Chapter 7).

<table>
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<th>Hypothesis 3</th>
<th>Aid endorsement (10 DAC states)</th>
<th>Willingness to sacrifice (13 DAC states)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>No. of statistically significant effects</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>+ / –</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Power</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
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</table>
6.4 Possible Explanations for Cross-National Variation

What explains cross-national variation in the impact of identities on support for aid? Although specific hypotheses regarding identity alignment and identity framing are formally tested in the chapters to follow, by looking deeper at the political context in DAC member states it is possible to speculate on the potential direction of effects from these phenomena.

In regard to identity alignment, the statistically significant positive effects for the tradition personal identity in Australia and Germany versus the negative effects in Norway and Sweden appear to be related to the aid-giving orientation of a relevant higher order social identity, namely religious identity. Indeed, tradition values are positively correlated with church attendance (r = .30, p < .001). The identity alignment concept, which was outlined in Chapter 3, posits that individuals will reconceptualise the aid-giving orientation of a lower order identity so that it aligns with the aid-giving orientation of a higher order identity in order to minimise contradictory attitudes.

There is evidence to suggest that aid-giving norms are particularly strong amongst religious groups in Australia and Germany. Australian research has shown that religious identity (defined as attending religious services rather than simply claiming a religion) is associated with giving to non-religious charitable causes such as international aid, but not civic causes such as political parties and sporting groups (Lyons & Nivison-Smith, 2006). In Germany, religious organisations are heavily involved in international development (Glatzer, Hondrich, Noll, Stiehr, & Wörndl, 1992, p. 290). In fact, in 2005-2006 civil society organisations (CSOs) engaged in development cooperation, including Catholic and Protestant churches, ‘accounted for 7.4 percent of total German bilateral ODA (which is well above the DAC average of 5.2 percent). CSOs also play an advocacy role – involving critical monitoring of the Federal Government’s development policy – and engage in development-oriented education’ (Ashoff et al., 2008, p. 17).

If the religious social identity is more pro-aid in Australia and Germany compared to other countries, it may have weakened the anti-aid orientation of the tradition personal identity.

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90 The Church Development Service (EED) is an association of the Protestant churches in Germany involved in delivering aid and lobbying the government about development policy. EED has a number of church members who contributed €50.3 million in 2008, representing around 1 percent of church tax revenue. The total budget for EED in 2008 was €157.4 million, reflecting €106.4 million in government funding (EED, 2009). By comparison, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, one of the largest non-religious NGOs in Germany, had a budget of €143.5 million in 2009, reflecting around €101.1 million in public grants but only €19.1 came from the German Government. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe received €31.9 million in private donations (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2009).
amongst those with dual identities. Another possible explanation for the strong negative effect for the tradition identity in Norway and Sweden relates to the recent rise in anti-immigration parties across Scandinavia. These parties play on public perceptions about the loss of traditional society. They also tend to be anti-aid (Bjørklund & Andersen, 2002). Therefore, their increasing influence on the political discourse may have framed aid-giving as anti-traditionalist.

Identity framing may also explain why the power and security personal identities were less important than anticipated – certainly less important as negative predictors of support for aid than universalism and benevolence as positive predictors. The power identity defines people who see themselves as prioritising wealth and dominance over others. In the post-Cold War Era, aid is no longer framed in terms of jostling for geopolitical influence (Pearce, 2001). Indeed, only 15 percent of respondents to a Eurobarometer survey said that one of the main motivations for giving aid is to gain political allies (TNS Opinion & Social, 2007). In fact, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many DAC governments have framed aid-giving as contributing to a reduction in international security threats (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006; Woods, 2005). This is particularly true in Japan and the US where political elites have historically framed aid in strategic rather than moral terms (Lancaster, 2007; Wright-Neville, 1991). Thus, some people may actually support aid-giving as a way of expressing their security identity, albeit on a conditional or volatile basis because the security identity is inherently self-interested. Thus, it stands to reason that this type of support would not translate into positive estimates.

The security personal identity strongly predicted willingness to sacrifice in France without a counterbalancing positive effect from either of the prosocial personal identities. This result might be explained by the fact that French aid is framed by political elites as a tool for reducing migration from developing countries (Caritas Europe, 2010; Lokku & Herrgott, 2009). Indeed, 35 percent of French respondents to a 2009 special Eurobarometer survey said that one of the ‘main motivations for richer countries to provide development aid to poor countries’ is to ‘avoid citizens of these countries emigrating to rich countries’ (TNS Opinion & Social, 2009). However, African migration to France remains significant (BBC News, 2006; OECD, 2010). Therefore, those who define themselves as standing for security values are likely to feel particularly threatened by the prospect of paying higher taxes to increase foreign aid. The absence of a universalism or benevolence effect might be due to the profusion of development NGOs in France, which are largely distrusted by the public, resulting in weak and dispersed messages about the moral case for aid (Mc Donnell et al., 2003b).
The predictive power of personal and social identities was weak overall in both Japan and Britain. The only non-significant effect for political identity was in Japan. This may be explained by the fact that Japan has experienced decades of one-party rule, diminishing the relevance of aid-giving to partisanship. Japan also recorded a non-significant effect for the humanitarian identity which fits with Japan’s history as an uncharitable society (Båås, 2002). Britain on the other hand has a very active not-for-profit sector, particularly pertaining to international development. Nevertheless, the humanitarian identity estimate for willingness to sacrifice was only significant at the ten percent level. Wright (2001) points out that the bulk of UK charitable donations go to international development causes such as Oxfam and Save the Children, rather than domestic causes. Moreover, the proportion of WVS respondents who said they were active members of a humanitarian organisation was highest for Britain (21.36 percent) and lowest for Japan (1.73 percent). What then explains the rather weak results for Britain? It may be that within the context of a national consensus on increasing aid, humanitarian social groups differentiate themselves by a different set of norms (Roccas & Sagiv, 2010). For example, the British humanitarian identity may be normatively defined by more radical criticisms of trade liberalisation and globalisation (D. Green & Griffith, 2002).

6.5 Implications for Activating the Aid Constituency

The results of the analyses presented throughout this chapter demonstrate that both personal and social identities are important predictors of public support for aid. This is true when support is defined as endorsement of greater aid-giving, and as willingness to pay higher taxes to increase aid spending. The findings are therefore consistent with the notion that both personal and social identities are equally important aspects of the self-concept (Onorato & Turner, 2004).

In order to apply these findings to an actual campaign strategy, this section discusses the concept of identity priming. As outlined in Chapter 3, priming is a well-established psychological technique for encouraging specific behaviours (Morris, Carranza, & Fox, 2008). The point of identity priming is to increase the likelihood of identity-based behaviours by focusing people’s attention on identities they already possess and which are meaningfully associated with a set of behaviours. In other words, identity priming involves calling people’s attention to remembered identity-attitude associations. If an identity is not an important component of a person’s self-concept, and if that identity does not give meaning to specific behaviours, then priming the identity will not produce predictable behavioural outcomes.
Identity priming can be temporary (for example, activation in a laboratory setting) or chronic (for example, routine or habitual activation in everyday life). In either case, identity priming increases the salience or accessibility of an identity so that it becomes the operational prism through which a person sees the world (Forehand et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2007). Language has been used to prime social identities amongst people embedded in more than one culture such as Chinese-Americans. For example, asking Chinese-American students to undertake a task in English (versus Chinese) increases competitiveness and self-promotion (S. W. S. Lee et al., 2010). Other priming methods include presenting people with identity symbols. For example, a US study found that self-identified Republicans (but not Democrats) favoured financial choices labelled ‘conservative’ when political identity was primed using images of the Party logos and leaders. However, when political identity was not primed, Republican choices were no different to Democrats (Morris et al., 2008). Therefore, campaigns that amplify pro-aid identities can be expected to mobilise support for aid.

Crucially, as identity priming is not always done deliberately, campaigners should be aware of where identities are unintentionally primed with negative consequences. It is easy to think of all sorts of social practices that chronically prime anti-aid identities. For example, watchdog organisations whose purpose is to ‘crack down on welfare cheats’ and televisions programs such as ‘Who wants to be a millionaire’ are likely to prime security and power personal identities respectively. For this reason, campaigning must partly involve mitigating priming sources which on the surface have nothing to do with the reform objectives that the campaign aspires to promote, but indirectly matter in terms of affecting the salience of pro- and anti-aid personal and social identities. Indeed, the media, governments, NGOs, corporations and celebrities, as well as social systems such as the education system, tax system and legal system, all have the potential to prime various identities. Therefore, for campaigners trying to prime the ‘right’ identities and downplay the ‘wrong’ identities in order to achieve desired behavioural outcomes, engagement in a broader politics is deemed necessary.

This chapter confirmed the hypothesis (H3) that people with prosocial personal identities typically support aid-giving, and people with proself personal identities typically disapprove of aid-giving. Research suggests that as it is psychologically taxing to prioritise two competing identities,

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91 Political identity was primed by asking participants which party they identified with using images of the party logos and leaders before they completed the financial task. In the control condition participants completed these steps in reverse.
reducing the salience of proself personal identities will have a similar impact on support for aid as increasing the salience of prosocial personal identities. For example, Maio et al (2009) found that priming a value (such as security) increased behaviour relevant to that value (such as cleanliness) and decreased behaviour relevant to the opposing value (such as curiosity). In addition, priming the opposing value (self-direction) had the reverse effect (decreased cleanliness and increased curiosity). Therefore, when governments claim that aid is given in the national interest they suppress prosocial identities that are normatively pro-aid.

Bardi, Calogero, and Mullen (2008) researched the effects of identity priming at the national level. They examined the ‘values lexicon’ embedded in US newspapers over 101 years and found that value representations (words) correlated with pro-value behaviour en masse. For example, increased universalism values (measured as co-occurrences of the words unity, justice and equality) was associated with the proportion of total personal income donated to a major social justice charity (correlation = 0.47). Therefore, an identity-based campaign to mobilise support for aid should concentrate on priming universalism identities in those countries where the link between universalism and support for aid is strong, for example, Norway and the Netherlands. Equally, benevolence identities should be primed in those countries where the link between benevolence and support for aid is strong, for example, Canada and Switzerland.

Aid advocates should be cautious to ensure that anti-poverty campaign materials do not inadvertently prime anti-aid identities such as security and power. In the context of environmentalism, Maio et al (2009) made the point that although many energy-saving measures are more cost-effective, by increasing attention to this proself aspect of environmental behaviour, more comprehensive environmental behaviour is less likely to follow. Therefore, campaigns that seek to mobilise support for aid should avoid references to national security, safety, and stability of society (security values) as well as status, control, and dominance over resources (power values). Campaigns that refer to these proself identities will make it subjectively harder for people

\[92\] In relation to discrimination behaviour, the authors speculated that ‘discrimination may be reduced either by increasing the perceived importance of values promoting benevolence or by decreasing the perceived importance of values promoting achievement, because changes in either set of values have reciprocal effects on opposing values’ (Maio et al., 2009, p. 713).

\[93\] The authors were clear that the aggregate value priorities of individuals cannot be associated with the structure of society as this requires studying cultural values. However, they noted that ‘The values lexicon could be used to test the relationship between the values communicated by political leaders in their election speeches and voters’ responses to these speeches’ (Bardi et al., 2008, p. 495).
to support foreign aid even if there is no tension between supporting aid and self-interest motives such as reducing international terrorism. In the current political environment of austerity, DAC governments are increasingly concerned with making sure aid is seen as ‘value for money’. I would argue that on the basis of the findings presented here, this strategy may actually increase anti-aid sentiment by priming identities that prioritise material wealth such as the power personal identity.

A good example of campaign advertising that primes the pro-aid universalism personal identity is Shepard Fairey’s poster entitled ‘Defend Equality, Love Unites’ (see Figure 6.1). The poster was used in a November 2008 Californian campaign to overturn Proposition 8 which banned gay marriage. By invoking equality and unity, the poster appeals to people who define themselves by universalism values. Thus, the poster illustrates how the universalism personal identity might be primed so that pro-aid behaviour automatically follows.

**Figure 6.1 Priming Universalism Personal Identity**

![Defend Equality, Love Unites](http://protest8la.wordpress.com/2008/11/14/shepard-fairey-love-unites/)

**6.6 Conclusion**

This chapter set out to examine component 2 of the identity-based approach which is the basic SCT model that predicts personal and social identities matter when it comes to public support for foreign aid. It was hypothesised that people who define their personal identities by prosocial
values would be more favourable towards aid-giving, and people who define their personal identities by prosel value would be less favourable (H3). It was further hypothesised that the degree to which people identify with left-wing, religious and humanitarian social groups would determine their level of support for foreign aid (H4).

Both hypotheses were sustained by the regression analyses. It was found that people who define themselves by universalism and benevolence values typically endorsed aid-giving and were willing to pay higher taxes to increase aid spending. Conversely, people who define themselves by power and security values typically expressed the opposite sentiment. In line with the fact that prosocial behaviours are sometimes, but not always, perceived as acts of tradition, people who define themselves by tradition values were favourable to aid in some countries but unfavourable in others. Finally, people who define themselves as left-wing, religious and humanitarian strongly endorsed aid-giving and were willing to sacrifice personal income in order to raise the level of aid spending.

Although H3 and H4 were supported when personal and social identities were modelled separately, further analysis was necessary to establish these identities as discrete mental categories. Therefore, the influence of personal and social identities on support for aid was re-examined in a combined model. This allowed the partial effects to come to light. It was found that in a majority of countries both personal and social identities uniquely impacted on public attitudes to foreign aid. However, a number of the estimates weakened somewhat which suggests that these identities do overlap to a degree. This is consistent with the notion that the cognitive resources required to simultaneously recognise non-convergent identities leads people to establish identities which crossover in some way (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

The chapter ended by discussing how campaigners can use identity priming techniques to rouse the existing, but dormant, aid constituency in order to promote bottom-up policy reform. Examples of identity priming were given and the case was made for amplifying pro-aid identities (such as universalism, benevolence, left-wing, religious and humanitarian) and downplaying anti-aid identities (such as power and security). This applies to actual campaign materials, as well as to sociological factors in day-to-day life. Thus, campaigners should take a holistic approach to mobilising public opinion. It will not do to simply focus on priming pro-aid identities if the social and built environment continually primes anti-aid identities. Attention must also be paid to mitigating counter-primes through engagement with a broader politics.
A secondary objective of this chapter was to lay the foundations for the following two chapters. Indeed, by examining identity-based support for aid in each country separately, it is obvious that the meanings of identities (in behavioural terms) vary from country-to-country. Therefore, the next two chapters test the concepts of identity alignment and identity framing. Identity alignment is the notion that the meaning of an identity is reinforced or legitimated when a higher order identity shares the same normative orientation. Identity framing is the notion that presenting issues as applicable to the maintenance of an identity influences its meaning. Chapter 7 examines identity alignment and Chapter 8 examines identity framing.
Chapter 7. Identity Alignment and the Strength of Conviction

The rule of distributive justice is a statement of what ought to be, and what people say ought to be is determined, in the long run, and with some lag, by what they find in fact to be the case (Homans, 1974, pp. 249-250)

This chapter examines how interactions between identities at different levels of inclusiveness influence support for aid. In particular, the chapter is focused on examining component 3 of the identity-based approach: The alignment of identities at different levels modifies the meaning of identities. The concept of identity alignment tries to reconcile national policy coherence and stability with individual variation in people’s policy preferences. In other words, it integrates the pessimism of constructivism with the optimism of SCT in terms of mobilising bottom-up policy reform. The former says that policy trajectories are self-perpetuating because policies that make sense arise out of, and then recreate, a perceived system of reality. The latter says that citizens will demand reform of the system if they believe that the status quo threatens their sense of self. Identity alignment integrates these positions to argue that the identity-based policy convictions of citizens are moderated by the existing system so that citizens have some limited capacity to construct a different reality.

It is not that individuals and groups consciously align their convictions with the reality that they already live with. Indeed, various identities within the same person may have conflicting orientations in relation to support for foreign aid. However, imagine how much harder it would be for a person to strongly support women bishops because they self-identify with universalism values (equality), if that person also self-identifies as a member of the Catholic Church. Identity alignment predicts that the higher order Catholic identity will moderate the meaning of the lower order universalism identity because the size of the population that shares an identity category (the level of inclusiveness) determines the legitimacy (perceived correctness) of associated behaviours. That is, behaviours that are stereotypical of higher order identities become unreflective or automatic because the behaviours are more widespread in the population and, therefore, more likely to be taken-for-granted. This leads to the strengthening of congruent identity stereotypes at lower levels of abstraction and the weakening of divergent identity stereotypes at lower levels of
abstraction. Accordingly, state identities are more influential than social identities, which are more influential than personal identities.

The chapter begins in Section 7.1 by recapping the concept of identity alignment and how it is tested. Section 7.2 examines how an individual’s support for aid changes when they self-identify with a particular value priority (personal identity), and simultaneously self-identify with a particular social group (social identity). Section 7.3 examines how an individual’s support for aid changes when they self-identify with a particular social group (social identity), and are simultaneously identified as a citizen of a particular state (state identity). In both cases, I find that people adjust the aid-giving orientation of the lower order identity to align with that of the higher order identity. The implications of the findings for mobilising support for aid are discussed in Section 7.4 before the chapter concludes.

### 7.1 Recapping the Concept

The previous chapter showed that people express support for aid when they strongly identify with various personal and social identity categories that are normatively supportive of aid. However, the question of why the same identity in different countries predicted a different level of support for aid remains unanswered. Do people adjust their identity-based convictions in order to maintain consistency across different identities? The concept of identity alignment contends that cognitive interactions between identities at different levels partly explains variation in identity-based convictions. In particular, people adjust their convictions to match the convictions of the category with the greatest social recognition.

According to the identity-based approach, the perceived choices available to agents (citizens and policy elites) are constrained by routine experiences that give coherence to our daily lives. These routine experiences are identities at different levels of inclusiveness. Identity alignment is thus a correction to the dominant SCT research model which implies that political behaviours in different contexts are unconnected because identities are typically operationalised in laboratory settings as on-the-spot constructions. As Reicher et al (1997) point out, the motivation to plan for the future, and the possibility of holding people to account for crimes committed in the past, ‘depends upon some notion of the continuity of the self’ (p. 100).

Identity alignment also tries to bring history and institutions to bear on how the meanings of identities are constructed. Indeed, for the first time it quantifies the abstract SCT notion of normative fit with objective measures of political reality. This is critical to empiricising the notion
of a constructivist political economy, in which the protracted nature of GPGs makes perfect sense because foreign policies influence public opinion as much as public opinion influences foreign policies. As such, the analyses presented in this chapter provide campaigners with insights into the types of foreign policies (based on the state identity) that influence the policy preferences of citizens and interest groups (based on personal and social identities).

The process of identity alignment is posited to occur regardless of whether the higher order identity is internally sought or externally imposed. Internally sought identities reflect the SCT concept of identity, whereby individual or collective behaviour is governed by categories of self-definition. Externally imposed identities are closer to the sociological concept of identity, whereby categorical attributes, namely institutions of the state, such as class, are used analytically to define a person’s social location. The measurement of internally sought personal and social identities through survey questions implies self-conception and therefore does not presuppose that identification will result in internal sameness. By contrast, the measurement of externally imposed state identities by objectified categorisation implies the reification of cultural narratives that are assumed to be universally internalised (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).  

The distinction between internally sought and externally imposed identities is important because it allows for a symbiotic or mutually-reinforcing relationship between the policy preferences of voters and interest groups (based on their personal and social identities) and foreign policy outputs (based on the state identity). Thus, identity alignment is the mechanism that integrates SCT (an agent-oriented approach) with constructivism (a system oriented approach). More specifically, identity alignment integrates individual agency (the capacity to effectively act upon the world) with structural determinism (historical and institutional rules and conditions that determine behaviour).

This chapter tests two hypotheses:

H5. The aid-giving orientations of personal identities will be strengthened by social identities with congruent aid-giving orientations and weakened by social identities with divergent aid-giving orientations.

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94 One way of measuring state identities as internally sought categories would be to employ an item from the WVS that asks respondents how proud they are of their nationality. However, it is by integrating a constructivist perspective of state identity (domestic culture and international image) that public opinion and foreign policy can be connected.
H6. The aid-giving orientations of social identities will be strengthened by state identities with congruent aid-giving orientations and weakened by state identities with divergent aid-giving orientations.

H5 captures the importance of identity alignment between two internally sought identities, which is theorised to facilitate consistency in individual behaviour across situations. H6 captures the importance of identity alignment between an internally sought identity and an externally imposed identity, which is theorised to facilitate sub-national adherence to national standards so that each state functions as a coherent entity.

The same personal and social identity measures from the WVS that were examined in Chapter 6 are re-examined here, including the demographic controls and the values controls. In addition, the state identity measure that was developed in Chapter 5 is also examined. In Section 7.2 of this chapter, I take the basic personal identity model from Chapter 6 and introduce three interaction terms one-by-one. Each interaction is between a personal and a social identity (micro-micro interaction). In Section 7.3, I take the basic social identity model from Chapter 6 and again introduce three interactions terms one-by-one. This time each interaction is between a social and state identity (micro-macro interaction). To keep the reporting simple and parsimonious, I restrict the definition of support for aid to ‘willingness to sacrifice’ and leave out ‘aid endorsement’.

Using aggregate data for all 13 DAC members, I run three logistic regressions to separately examine the three personalXsocial identity interaction effects (with robust standard errors to control for country effects). I also run three multi-level logistic regressions to separately examine the three socialXstate identity interaction effects. A multi-level model allows cross-level (micro-macro) interaction effects to be estimated and corrects for biases resulting from clustered observations (i.e., within-country clustering) (Guo & Zhao, 2000). For the multi-level regressions, I only allow random intercepts, not random coefficients. This is because in one socialXstate model the assumption that within-group effects are equal to between-group effects is violated, and in another socialXstate model the Likelihood-Ratio Test favours the random intercepts model over the random coefficients model. For the third socialXstate model I compared the estimates after introducing a random coefficient for the social identity variable and they were roughly the same.

7.2 The Effect of Personal-Social Identity Alignment

What happens to a person’s personal policy convictions when that person belongs to a social group with a similar or different policy orientation? It is hypothesised that the aid-giving
orientation of a personal identity will be strengthened by a social identity with a congruent aid-giving orientation and weakened by a social identity with a divergent aid-giving orientation (H5). For identities at different levels to become normatively aligned, they must coexist. Therefore, I create interaction terms from the most strongly correlated personal and social identities. The interaction terms, their correlation coefficients, and the identity alignment hypotheses that relate to each interaction term are given in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Personal and Social Identity Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction Term</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Identity Alignment Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradition personal identity X Religious social identity</td>
<td>.32, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>(H5i) religious social identity weakens the negative effect of tradition personal identity on willingness to sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism personal identity X Political social identity</td>
<td>-.12, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>(H5ii) left-wing social identity strengthens the positive effect of universalism personal identity on willingness to sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence personal identity X Humanitarian social identity</td>
<td>.14, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>(H5iii) humanitarian social identity strengthens the positive effect of benevolence personal identity on willingness to sacrifice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each interaction term is used to test a different identity alignment (moderation) hypothesis. A moderator is a variable (z) that modifies the effect of a predictor (x) on a response (y). In each case, the moderator is a social identity variable and the predictor is a personal identity variable. As the religious social identity was previously found to be a positive predictor of support for aid, the first moderation hypothesis states that the religious social identity weakens the anti-aid orientation of the tradition personal identity (H5i). As the political social identity was previously found to be a negative predictor of support for aid, it is first reverse coded (1=Right; 10=Left), and then hypothesised to strengthen the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity (H5ii). Finally, as the humanitarian social identity was previously found to be a positive predictor of

95 The tradition personal identity and the political social identity have a correlation coefficient of 0.14, p<.001. However, as the tradition personal identity has a stronger correlation with the religious social identity, the political social identity was interacted with the universalism personal identity.
support for aid, it is hypothesised to strengthen the pro-aid orientation of the benevolence personal identity (H5iii).

The results of the three regressions show that only one moderation hypothesis (H5ii) is supported at a statistically significant level (see Table 7.2). Model 1 (H5i) reveals that a person with a tradition personal identity is more likely to support foreign aid if they also have a religious social identity (odds ratio 1.015), but the effect is not statistically significant. Model 2 (H5ii) shows that a person with a universalism personal identity is more likely to support foreign aid if they also have a left-wing political identity (odds ratio 1.025), and the effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. Finally, Model 3 (H5iii) indicates that a person with a benevolence personal identity is less likely to support foreign aid if they also have a humanitarian social identity (odds ratio 0.957), but the effect is not statistically significant.
Table 7.2 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Sacrifice with Personal-Social Identity Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Universalism</th>
<th>Benevolence</th>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>ReligiousXTradition</th>
<th>Political (1=Right; 10=Left)</th>
<th>PoliticalXUniversalism</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>HumanitarianXBenevolence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.281***</td>
<td>1.203***</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.884***</td>
<td>0.875***</td>
<td>1.062*</td>
<td>1.015 (0.0129)</td>
<td>1.148***</td>
<td>1.025**</td>
<td>1.441***</td>
<td>0.957 (0.0363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0615)</td>
<td>(0.0413)</td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
<td>(0.0275)</td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0289)</td>
<td>(0.0221)</td>
<td>(0.0221)</td>
<td>(0.00805)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.0363)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. of cases | 11959 | 11139 | 11907
Chi2 (p-value) | 1134.6 (0.000) | 1239.2 (0.000) | 1218.9 (0.000)

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level
Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction

Given that identity alignment is a new concept, it is worth interrogating the non-significant regression results. Figures 7.1 to 7.3 present the moderation hypotheses visually. These figures confirm the PoliticalXUniversalism result and lend support to the identity alignment patterns that were hypothesised for ReligiousXTradition and HumanitarianXBenevolence. By plotting the confidence intervals, Figures 7.1 and 7.3 highlight that the significant differences only apply to people at extreme ends of the identification scales: non-religious versus strongly religious and non-humanitarian versus humanitarian.
After collapsing the seven religious social identity response categories into three, Figure 7.1 reveals that what it means to stand for tradition values is a function of religious identity. However, this is only true when strongly religious people are compared to non religious people. That is, when a person self-identifies as strongly religious (a normatively pro-aid social identity), it undermines the legitimacy of taking an anti-aid position on the grounds of standing for tradition values (a normatively anti-aid personal identity). However, being moderate or non religious does not influence the normative orientation of the tradition personal identity (which is in fact only slightly disapproving of aid).

Moving on to Figure 7.2, after the ten point political identity scale was condensed into a three category measure, the pro-aid left-wing social identity has a clear ‘dose-response’ effect on the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity. Thus, at a similar level of universalism, a person who self-identifies as left-wing is more likely to support foreign aid compared to a person who self-identifies as centrist; and a person who self-identifies as centrist is more likely to support foreign aid compared to a person who self-identifies as right-wing.

Finally, by treating the humanitarian identity categorically rather than continuously, Figure 7.3 adds nuance to the negative odds ratio that the regression analysis produced. The graphical representation of identity alignment reveals that the moderating effect of the humanitarian identity on the relationship between the benevolence personal identity and support for aid is positive and statistically significant when non-humanitarians are compared to inactive and active humanitarians. In other words, a person with a benevolence personal identity is more likely to support foreign aid if they also have an active or inactive humanitarian social identity versus a non-humanitarian social identity (except for truly benevolent people where the confidence intervals overlap).
Figure 7.1 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Tradition Personal Identity and Religious Social Identity

Figure 7.2 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Universalism Personal Identity and Political Social Identity
7.3 The Effect of Social-State Identity Alignment

How do people construct social groups that seek to promote social change yet retain cultural resonance (R. H. Williams, 2004)? It is hypothesised that the aid-giving orientation of a social identity will be strengthened by a state identity with a congruent aid-giving orientation and weakened by a state identity with a divergent aid-giving orientation (H6).

A development policy regime typology – comprising a conservative regime, a socialist regime and a liberal regime – was established in Chapter 5. It condensed the unique identities of the 13 DAC member states into a simple three category variable. Although the identity of each state is distinct – as this differentiates states from other states in the international system – it would be analytically impractical to examine how the norms of pro-aid social groups change as a consequence of 13 different state identities. This section therefore tests the following sub-hypotheses: The conservative development policy regime type strengthens the positive effect of the religious social identity on willingness to sacrifice (H6i); the socialist development policy regime type strengthens the positive effect of the left-wing social identity on willingness to sacrifice (H6ii); and the liberal development policy regime type weakens the positive effect of the humanitarian social identity on willingness to sacrifice (H6iii). These hypotheses are summarised in
Table 7.3 along with the interaction terms that are tested in three separate regression analyses. The three interactions are again based on the most strongly correlated social and state identities. This is because social and state identities must coexist in the minds of individuals to cause identity alignment.  

Table 7.3 Social and State Identity Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction Term</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Identity Alignment Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious social identity X Conservative state identity</td>
<td>.02, p&lt;.01</td>
<td>(H6i) conservative state identity strengthens the positive effect of religious social identity on willingness to sacrifice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political social identity X Socialist state identity</td>
<td>.07, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>(H6ii) socialist state identity strengthens the positive effect of left-wing social identity on willingness to sacrifice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian social identity X Liberal state identity</td>
<td>.07, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>(H6iii) liberal state identity weakens the positive effect of humanitarian social identity on willingness to sacrifice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why are the conservative and socialist regimes hypothesised to be positive moderators and the liberal regime is hypothesised to be a negative moderator of pro-aid social identities? The simple expectation of identity alignment is that any social identity that interacts with the socialist regime will be more pro-aid, any social identity that interacts with the liberal regime will be more anti-aid, and any social identity that interacts with the conservative regime will fall somewhere in between. This is because the socialist regime is defined by strong aid-giving norms, the liberal regime is defined by weak aid-giving norms, and the conservative regime is defined by moderate aid-giving norms. However, the links between social and state identities are slightly more complicated because of the respective influence churches and left-wing social groups have had in the (re)construction of conservative and socialist institutions.

Church groups have a long tradition in the implementation of conservative conceptions of justice. The hallmark of political Catholicism is the idea that the indignity of poverty brought forth by churches has a long tradition in the implementation of conservative conceptions of justice. The hallmark of political Catholicism is the idea that the indignity of poverty brought forth by churches has a long tradition in the implementation of conservative conceptions of justice. The hallmark of political Catholicism is the idea that the indignity of poverty brought forth by

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96 The correlation between the religious social identity and the liberal state identity is 0.08, p<.001. However, this drops to 0.04, p<.001 when the US is excluded.
markets leads to social unrest, which in turn undermines the church’s authority (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Thus, historically the Catholic Church encouraged the development of conservative welfare institutions. Once these institutions were established, they entrenched negative commutative justice norms, which in turn prescribed normatively congruent foreign policies. Indeed, the normative role of foreign aid in conservative states is to balance out the social disharmony caused by conservative statecraft. In other words, aid is given to justify (and ensure loyalty to) favourable imbalances in global power. Churches are also key beneficiaries of foreign aid as faith-based organisations – which compete for influence in the developing world – are increasingly responsible for delivering government-funded development projects (Ferris, 2005; Stockman, Kranish, Canellos, & Baron, 2006). Therefore, when a conservative state identity is imposed on a person who self-identifies as religious, the higher order state identity is hypothesised to legitimate the pro-aid orientation of the lower order religious identity.

Left-wing groups have been instrumental in advancing socialist conceptions of justice. Indeed, redistribution is favoured by left-wing political parties as a way of addressing inequality. Thus, the longer the left has been in power, the greater the level of social spending in the domestic and international realms (Manow, 2009; Thérien & Noël, 2000). Crucially, left-wing parties are in government more often in states that have proportional representation (PR) electoral systems (Iversen & Soskice, 2006). Most of the DAC member states classified conservative and socialist in Chapter 5 have PR systems, yet only the socialist development policy regime type is characterised by strong distributive justice norms. The reason for this is that in post-war Europe, left-wing parties in socialist states typically formed coalitions with agrarian and middle class parties which favoured universalist, flat rate social benefits. By comparison, left-wing parties in conservative states typically formed coalitions with parties of religious defence which favoured contribution-related social benefits (Manow, 2009). Domestic welfare institutions help to (re)construct the

---

97 In majoritarian (two-party) systems, the middle class is confronted with the choice between a centre-left and a centre-right party. They more often vote right than left to avoid paying higher taxes which they fear will exclusively cater to the interests of the lower classes (Iversen & Soskice, 2006).

98 The socialist regime provides highly effective income support for developing countries while the conservative regime provides aid to nurture private businesses in the donor country.

99 PR systems dominate in Continental and Northern European countries whereas majoritarian systems dominate in Anglo-Saxon countries. Thus, both the conservative and socialist regimes give more generous welfare (and foreign aid) than the liberal regime. However, it is the dominant party of coalition that differentiates the nature of redistribution in the conservative and socialist regimes. In post-war Europe, the homogenously Protestant Nordic countries – where the nation-
state’s identity by conveying certain justice norms. However, PR systems also allow political parties of all persuasions to advocate extreme positions (whereas majoritarian systems force parties to shift their policy positions to the political centre in order to win elections). Therefore, it is hypothesised that interaction with a socialist state identity legitimates the pro-aid orientation of the left-wing social identity, whereas interaction with a conservative state identity legitimates the anti-aid orientation of the right-wing social identity.

Finally, humanitarian groups campaign globally on various development issues including debt relief, fair trade and aid. However, groups defined by strong aid-giving norms would struggle to maintain cultural resonance in states defined by liberal justice norms. The liberal development policy regime type, which was established in Chapter 5, favours market-based solutions to poverty-reduction. This means that aid is de-emphasised in favour of open migration. Therefore, when a liberal state identity is imposed on a person who self-identifies with a humanitarian social group, it is hypothesised that the higher order state identity will delegitimize the pro-aid orientation of the lower order social identity. In other words, the humanitarian identity is hypothesised to be associated with weaker support for aid in liberal states versus socialist and conservative states.

Once again, three regression analyses (presented in Table 7.4) and three graphs are used to interpret the degree to which state identities moderate the meanings of social identities. All three hypotheses are sustained. The conservative state identity strengthens the positive relationship between the religious social identity and support for aid (odds ratio 1.078), and the effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. The socialist state identity strengthens the positive relationship between the left-wing social identity (reverse coded so that 1=Right and 10=Left) and support for aid (odds ratio 1.060), and the effect is statistically significant at the five percent level. Finally, the liberal state identity weakens the positive relationship between the humanitarian state and the Lutheran Church had very close relations – formed ‘red-green’ coalitions between social democratic and agrarian parties. By comparison, the continental European countries – where the nation-state and the Catholic Church waged bitter conflicts – formed ‘red-black’ coalitions between social democrats and parties of religious defence (Christian democracy). Unlike religious parties who were in favour of contribution-related social benefits, agrarian parties preferred more universalist, flat rate benefits. This is because small landholders often did not have a steady income to make regular contributions (Manow, 2009). Thus, conservative welfare institutions promoted ascriptive norms and socialist welfare institutions promoted egalitarian norms. This normative difference is consistent with the modestly effective aid that characterises the conservative development policy regime, and the highly effective aid that characterises the socialist development policy regime.
social identity and support for aid (0.859), and the effect is statistically significant at the five percent level.

**Table 7.4 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Sacrifice with Social-State Identity Interactions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5^***</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.096***</td>
<td>1.114***</td>
<td>1.116***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0149)</td>
<td>(0.0134)</td>
<td>(0.0134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political(1=Right; 10=Left)</td>
<td>1.218***</td>
<td>1.192***</td>
<td>1.218***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0137)</td>
<td>(0.0168)</td>
<td>(0.0137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>1.393***</td>
<td>1.388***</td>
<td>1.485***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0442)</td>
<td>(0.0440)</td>
<td>(0.0624)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.598 (0.194)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConservativeXReligious</td>
<td>1.078**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0299)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>0.828 (0.256)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SocialistXPolitical</td>
<td>1.060*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0242)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1.136 (0.316)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LiberalXHumanitarian</td>
<td>0.859*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0539)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. of cases</td>
<td>11186</td>
<td>11186</td>
<td>11186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi2 (p-value)</td>
<td>407.3 (0.000)</td>
<td>399.4 (0.000)</td>
<td>409.9 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008; Development Policy Regimes (Chapter 5)
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level

Figures 7.4 to 7.6 provide a clearer picture of how the internalisation of foreign policy norms (which are constitutive of the higher order state identity) has a top-down influence on the policy preferences of social group members. Figure 7.4 shows that going from a weak to a strong religious identity has a slightly larger impact on the probability of willingness to sacrifice in conservative states than in socialist and liberal states, although the probability of willingness to sacrifice is slightly higher overall in socialist states. On the other hand, Figure 7.5 shows that the

100 Odds ratios after including political identity random coefficient: Socialist 0.864 (0.210), p>0.10; SocialistXPolitical 1.054 (0.0326), p<0.10

198
relationship between the left-wing identity and willingness to sacrifice is strongest in the socialist regime and weakest in the conservative regime as hypothesised. Finally, Figure 7.6 shows that there is not a great deal of difference in the effect of identifying with a humanitarian social group in the conservative and socialist states, but the effect is much weaker in the liberal states. These results therefore demonstrate that the alignment of identities at different levels strengthens policy convictions, whereas the divergence of identities weakens policy convictions.

Figure 7.4 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Religious Social Identity and State Identity
Figure 7.5 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Political Social Identity and State Identity

Predicted Probabilities
Willing to Sacrifice

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008; Development Policy Regimes (Chapter 5)

Figure 7.6 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Humanitarian Social Identity and State Identity

Predicted Probabilities
Willing to Sacrifice

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008; Development Policy Regimes (Chapter 5)
7.4 Implications for Democratic Processes and Theories

Overall, it can be concluded from the analyses that higher order identities serve as generalised behavioural standards for lower order identities. This suggests that every person’s interpretation of what it means to have a particular identity is subtly different depending on the particular combination of identities that comprise their self-concept. Accordingly, it cannot be the case that identities are entirely fluid or situation-based as SCT theorists claim. Identities must in fact linger within the self-concept to influence the meaning an actor attributes to other less legitimate identities.

From a political science perspective this makes perfect sense as conforming to completely opposing behavioural expectations in different situations would lead to unstable political preferences and an unstable political system. From a campaigning perspective, the findings suggest that institutions systematically bias the perception of incoming information, which then implies certain constraints and opportunities in promoting bottom-up reform. This section discusses the practical and theoretical implications of identity alignment.

7.4.1 Practical Implications of Identity Alignment

How should campaigners work with or around identity alignment effects to promote bottom-up policy reform? This section puts forward two recommendations. The first involves deploying identity priming techniques to target related personal and social identities simultaneously in order to strengthen citizens’ policy convictions. The second involves direct lobbying to reorient the state identity in order to facilitate a similar reorientation amongst social groups within the state.

The previous chapter discussed identity priming as a technique for activating the existing pro-reform constituency. However, a precondition for using identity priming to mobilise public opinion is that the identity is strongly associated with specific policy convictions. As identity alignment reinforces congruent identity-based convictions, increasing the salience of complementary identities at different levels may bolster individual commitment to policy reform. For example, if campaign A appeals to people who stand for benevolence values (a pro-aid personal identity) and campaign B appeals to people who self-identify as humanitarian (a pro-aid social identity), the cognitive interaction of these two identities within the self-concept of an individual may generate more vigorous support for foreign aid than if only one identity was made salient. Indeed, if a person is only motivated to care about an issue because of one aspect of who they are, their commitment to the issue may be overwhelmed by concerns associated with other aspects of their
self-concept. This is supported by historical examples. For example, campaigns for gender equality have generally been successful in garnering public support because the issue is important to women as workers, as mothers, as wives and as carers. Thus, if increasing aid is important to people as individuals who stand for certain values, as members of certain social groups, and as citizens of certain countries, their convictions may be bolstered.

Compared to increasing the salience of numerous social identities with a pro-aid orientation in order to mobilise public opinion, it may be more efficient to reorient the policy norms that define anti-aid state identities. A pro-aid state may strengthen positive aid-giving convictions and undermine negative aid-giving convictions associated with a variety of lower order social identities. Therefore, direct lobbying that achieves top-down policy reform can complement bottom-up reform strategies by legitimising congruent behaviours amongst interest groups within states.

On the surface, direct lobbying to reorient the state identity contradicts the notion of establishing a framework for bottom-up policy reform. However, the contradiction is less apparent from the perspective of a constructivist political economy. Indeed, the thrust of the identity-based approach is that campaigners need to recognise the limitations of electoral accountability. Therefore, if the aim of mobilising public opinion is to reconstitute the state identity so that it is more pro-aid, ironically the public will need some experience of this reality in order to move away from routine interpretations of who they are and what they believe. This may require direct lobbying to change existing aid policies, which for poorly resourced anti-poverty groups may only be successful at the margins (for lobbying techniques, see Hovland, 2005). However, once the reforms become imaginable, voters and interest groups will ensure the reforms are sustained over time (and possibly deepened) because new habits for identity expression will form across a variety of lower order identities. In Australia, this process of identity alignment has taken place in relation to racist groups shifting the focus of their hostility from Asians to Muslims as the state has increased economic cooperation with Asia and enacted anti-terrorist legislation that is directed towards Islamic extremists.

Finally, while identity alignment offers campaigners another tool to add to their tool box, it also represents a potential hazard. In order to benefit rather than suffer from identity alignment effects, when campaigners develop strategies to mobilise public support for foreign aid, it is important that they do not work at cross-purposes. Campaign coordination should be achieved both within organisations running more than one campaign, and between organisations running
different campaigns with the same objective. Currently anti-poverty organisations tend to compete with each other, so the idea of coordinating campaigns to ensure that all relevant identities are targeted in a positive way could take some getting used to. However, if advocacy rather than fund-raising is the primary objective of campaigns, there should be less resistance to sharing information and working together.

7.4.2 Theoretical Implications of Identity Alignment

The theoretical implications of identity alignment are profound as identity alignment helps to overcome some of the most important criticisms of SCT, constructivism and liberal democracy. Respectively these include: (1) the failure of SCT theorists to account for stable political attitudes across space and time because they operationalise identities as on-the-spot constructions (see Huddy, 2002); (2) the failure of constructivist theorists to account for identity change. That is, the policy preferences of nations are unitary and unchangeable because the relationship between public opinion and policy is constitutive – one cannot exist without the other – and this defines state identity (Zehfuss, 2002); and (3) the inadequacy of the standard liberal interpretation of electoral accountability when it comes to GPGs because it is underpinned by a one-directional cause-and-effect relationship from public opinion to policy outputs (whereas in reality, many global governance arrangements are agreed amongst leaders before the public has any knowledge of them).

The key reason why identity alignment can resolve all of these issues is because it blends the superordinate context with the logic of the everyday, which effectively operationalises the SCT concept of normative fit. Under SCT, normative fit is defined very vaguely as cultural logic which may explain why it is rarely empirically investigated. Identity alignment more definitively argues that higher levels of categorisation determine the normative fit of lower levels of categorisation. As categorisation becomes more inclusive (at higher levels of abstraction) more people perform the pro-identity behaviours. Thus, behaviours associated with the category become more legitimate and less reflective. This leads to a habitual or ready-made interpretation of what other identities mean in behavioural terms, providing benefits to both the individual and society (Hopf, 2010). Indeed, as habits are cognitive structures which automatically delete alternative responses (and may even constrain a person’s ability to perceive a problem in the first place), they reduce the likelihood that the various categories a person identifies with will demand conformity to conflicting behaviours. In addition, when higher identities constrain the behaviours associated with lower identities, community standards are maintained.
As the legitimacy of pro-identity behaviours is proportional to the number of people to whom the behaviours are meaningful, the foreign policies that define the state identity impose habitual limitations on the policy preferences of voters and interest groups. However, public pressure is not entirely muted by structural determinism. Indeed, the public can become motivated to demand a new reality by conforming to behavioural expectations associated with other identities. Because I have replaced normative fit with identity alignment, the construction of identity stereotypes is an individuated process based on each person’s unique alignment of identities. In other words, stereotype construction is based on individually held norms rather than broader community norms. Thus, identity expression can vary from person-to-person within a context. However, by aggregating individuals who share a higher order identity, identity expression can also vary between communities. This explains how identity-based preferences can promote either policy change or policy stability, and how individual agency can be reconciled with a community’s collective consciousness.

In broader terms, my concept of identity alignment makes an important contribution to the longstanding structure-agency debate that pervades all the social sciences. Scholar such as Anthony Giddens have managed to move the debate forward from whether structure or agency is more important to how we should best understand the interrelationship between structure and agency. However, progress has largely been at the theoretical level rather than at the empirical level. Indeed, Giddens has been heavily criticised for failing to specify ‘which structures, what agencies and what sequences’ with sufficient clarity to apply his structuration theory to empirical research (Bryant & Jary, 1991, p. 27, citing Gregor McLennan). My concept of identity alignment is fully operationalised and therefore provides a positivist account of what the dialectical relationship between structure and agency actually delivers.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined how various identities interact to shape identity stereotypes, thereby explaining within- and between-country variation in the policy convictions of voters and interest groups. The analyses found that personal identity convictions are strengthened or weakened by congruent or divergent social identity convictions respectively. Equally, social identity convictions are strengthened or weakened by congruent or divergent state identity convictions respectively.

In general, the findings affirm component 3 of the identity-based approach, and in particular, they provide qualified support for the two hypotheses that were tested. Relationships between
tradition, universalism and benevolence personal identities and willingness to sacrifice were moderated by the experience of social identities (H5). However, religious and humanitarian social identities only had a significant moderating effect when identification was extremely low versus extremely high. In addition, relationships between religious, political and humanitarian social identities and willingness to sacrifice were moderated by the experience of state identities (H6). However, the moderating effects of state identities were related to the role some social groups have played in constructing state institutions.

These identity alignment results offer important insights into the limitations of promoting bottom-up policy reform. It is true that campaigners are becoming savvy as they recognise that the rational model of public opinion is not working. They are increasingly drawing on social psychological research into prosocial behaviour to understand how to build and sustain public support for foreign aid and the environment. WWF-UK has even established a ‘Strategies for Change’ project which commissioned a report on the role of identity in motivating citizens to take action on climate change (Crompton & Kasser, 2009). However, to date there has not been any empirical investigation into the relationship between citizen identities and the existing policy reality to help campaigners understand how to apply research findings from laboratory studies to issues in the real world. Laboratory studies usually create highly simplistic situations that test the willingness of members of arbitrarily constructed groups to share a small sum of money or to work collectively. This chapter provides evidence for the first time that identities at higher levels of abstraction delimit prescribed, prohibited and desirable identity-based behaviours at lower levels of abstraction. Therefore, the existing policy reality, which is constitutive of the state identity, defines the scope of change that campaigners can hope to achieve.

The concept of identity alignment is critical to designing and implementing a bottom-up reform campaign within a constructivist political economy. The results presented here suggest that campaigners must push the boundaries of what counts as normal aid policies in order to appeal to individuals to engage in political protest. Bottom-up policy reform is therefore about understanding the connections people make between who they are and what they believe, and then opening their imagination to possibilities that are closed off by a taken-for-granted reality. This raises the question of how anti-aid identity stereotypes can be radically changed if they are habitually constrained by higher order identity stereotypes, including the aid-giving orientation of the state identity. Here I have suggested that direct lobbying for policy reform is a necessary
complement to bottom-up mobilisation. The next chapter examines the proposition that the meanings of identities are also shaped by identity frames contained in policy discourses.
Chapter 8. Framing the Meanings of Identities

The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, 1921

There is a long history of Australian political rhetoric about home ownership being the ‘Great Australian Dream’. This has connected the Australian national identity to owning a red brick suburban home on a quarter-acre block. Regardless of the changing content of the Australian identity over time (for example, the evolution from a British outpost to a multicultural society), Australians have actively aspired to home ownership. In fact, community groups such as ‘Save Our Suburbs’ claim to defend the ‘Australian way of life’ by protesting against high-density planning policies (Allon, 2006).

This chapter examines component 4 of the identity-based approach: Identity frames modify the meaning of identities. The concept of identity framing captures the process by which an identity (such as the Australian national identity) becomes associated with particular behaviours (such as home ownership). I define identity framing as communications and discourses that articulate a connection between an issue and an identity category, such that actions related to the issue become meaningful to the category in question. In terms of the Great Australian Dream, identity framing is not a matter of political leaders emphasising certain attributes of the national identity (such as egalitarian values) to reconstruct the content of the identity category (see Rapley, 1998). Rather, identity framing is about culturally- and historically-important identity stereotypes which public discourses reinforce.

The specific aims of this chapter are twofold. The first aim is to highlight how campaigners can go beyond activating dormant aid supporters (by increasing the accessibility of pro-aid identities), to also creating new aid supporters (by increasing the applicability of various prosocial categories to the issue of foreign aid). The identity-based approach contends that the issue of foreign aid becomes imbued with identity-based meaning due to identity frames contained in aid policy

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101 The Great Australian Dream dates back to Sir Robert Menzies’ famous ‘forgotten people’ speech of 1942, in which he described the middle class as ‘the strivers, the planners, the ambitious ones’. It continues to this day with bipartisan support for ‘The First Home Buyers Scheme’ (Donoghue, Tranter, & White, 2002).
discourses. Therefore, campaigners can potentially manipulate the spectrum of people for whom supporting aid affirms their sense of self by strategically incorporating identity frames in campaign communications. The second aim is to identify sources of policy discourses that account for cross-national variation in identity-attitude linkages. Naming the actors and entities that campaigners must compete with for control over public opinion enhances the political dimension of identity-based campaigning.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First the concept of identity framing and how it is tested is revisited in Section 8.1. In Sections 8.2 to 8.4, three different proxy measures of national discourses about foreign aid are analysed to understand how identity frames condition identity-attitude linkages. The concept of identity framing predicts that national public discourses moderate the expression of identities (appropriate ways to act) and not the identities themselves. Therefore, identity framing is only examined in relation to personal (not social) identities as there is less ambiguity in their content (personal values are measured directly whereas social norms are inferred). The analyses show that exposure to news media and an independent aid agency increases support for aid by strengthening prosocial identity-attitude linkages whereas exposure to development education increases support for aid directly by activating the prosocial identity itself. Finally, Section 8.5 discusses the implications of identity framing for designing and implementing a mobilisation campaign. The chapter then concludes.

8.1 Recapping the Concept

According to the identity-based approach, when an identity is salient, stereotypical behaviours are accessible and more likely to be enacted. But who decides what is stereotypical? How is the expression of an identity constructed, or what is the process though which pro- and anti-aid attitudes become meaningful to a person’s self-definition? This chapter examines whether identity frames contained in public discourses function as identity-signalling processes and therefore influence public opinion by affecting the way individual citizens interpret the meanings of their identities. For example, if foreign aid is framed as promoting corruption through a news media story about an African dictator living in a palace while his people starve, the issue of aid-giving may

102 There is ambiguity in the content of social identities because they are measured as the degree to which a person identifies with various social groups. These groups are assumed to contain pro-aid norms because they are stereotypically associated with aid advocacy. By comparison, the content of personal identities is measured directly as individual value priorities. Therefore we can be confident that cross-national variation in personal identity-attitude linkages is due to differences in meaning rather than content.
become meaningful to personal and social identities that are defined by honour, truthfulness and honesty. Accordingly, people who define themselves by such categories are likely to display strong disapproval of foreign aid because doing so confirms (to themselves and to others) who they are.

The concept of identity framing proposes that a variety of players within a political system—including the media, politicians, interest groups, and the civil service—invoke identity symbols, metaphors and rhetorical devices in policy discourses. Although identity frames genuinely assist public interpretation of policy issues, they also structure identity stereotypes. Therefore, those with the power to control policy discourses have the power to control public opinion. I argue that aid policy discourses at the national level are constructed differently by different actors. In particular, I posit that news media, governments, and aid agencies are the originators of unique identity frames. Therefore, their level of influence at the national level should partly explain cross-national variation in identity-attitude linkages.

If aid policy discourses at the national level incorporate identity frames, then the identities that support or disapprove of aid-giving will vary across countries even when the content of those identities is the same. This is exactly what was found in Chapter 6. Despite the fact that the content of personal identities is exactly the same across countries—according to the WVS items that were analysed—support and disapproval of aid was not uniformly stereotypical of prosocial and proself identities respectively. For example, in Australia and Germany the tradition personal identity increased support for aid, whereas in Norway and Sweden it decreased support, and in the remaining nine countries it did not have a statistically significant influence. To understand why the same identities in different countries had different attitudinal consequences, this chapter tests three identity framing hypotheses:

H7. Identity frames in news media discourse will reinforce the negative aid-giving orientations of proself personal identities.

H8. The absence of identity frames in development education discourse will have a neutral impact on the positive aid-giving orientations of prosocial personal identities.

H9. Identity frames in independent (versus non-independent) aid agency discourse will reinforce the positive aid-giving orientations of prosocial personal identities.

The identity-based approach posits that news media, official development education and the government’s foreign aid agency represent different discourses on foreign aid and, therefore, promote different identity frames. Although each contributes to the broader public discourse on
foreign aid, each has a different agenda in communicating the formulation of aid policy. News media’s aim is to sell stories so it is likely to present aid policy in a sensationalised way. The role of official development education is to present the public with the facts about foreign aid so it is likely to present aid policy in a neutral rationalist way. Finally, government aid agencies want to justify what they do so they are likely to present aid policy differently depending on whether their policies aim to reduce poverty or facilitate foreign affairs and trade. Thus, each of these three sources of aid policy information is posited to moderate the aid-giving orientation of a different personal identity.

Using aggregate data for all 13 DAC members, I run three multi-level logistic regression analyses with cross-level interactions to separately examine the three identity framing hypotheses in relation to willingness to sacrifice (see Table 8.1). Each interaction is between a personal identity variable from the WVS and a country-level policy discourse proxy. As per the previous chapter, I only allow random intercepts, not random coefficients. This is to account for cases where the assumption that within-group effects are equal to between-group effects is violated, or where the Likelihood-Ratio Test favoured the random intercepts model over the random coefficients model. As before, I include the standard demographic controls and values controls in each model.

Where aid policy discourses contain prosocial identity frames, in addition to strengthening the relationships between prosocial identities and support for aid, support for aid might also be higher overall (main effect). This is because simply referencing prosocial identities reminds people who categorise themselves as such to focus on this aspect of who they are. Eliciting identity salience increases the probability that people will perform pro-identity behaviours. Therefore, policy discourses are theorised to change the meaning, and possibly also the salience, of personal identities. To be clear, policy discourses are not theorised to change the content of personal identities because this is a function of contrastive differences with others. Instead, identity frames contained in policy discourses influence identities by constructing stereotypes for categories that have already arisen from people’s contrastive contexts. In addition, because policy discourses are a source of identity signals, it is theoretically possible that they increase support for aid by pushing people into higher ranges of the prosocial identity measures.
### Table 8.1 Odds Ratios for Willingness to Sacrifice with Identity Framing Interactions

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>News Media</th>
<th>Development Education p/c</th>
<th>Agency US dropped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>1.250***</td>
<td>1.263***</td>
<td>1.231***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0308)</td>
<td>(0.0367)</td>
<td>(0.0380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>1.189***</td>
<td>1.189***</td>
<td>1.186***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0307)</td>
<td>(0.0307)</td>
<td>(0.0318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0204)</td>
<td>(0.0204)</td>
<td>(0.0211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.823***</td>
<td>0.903***</td>
<td>0.902***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0361)</td>
<td>(0.0185)</td>
<td>(0.0185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.912***</td>
<td>0.913***</td>
<td>0.912***</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.261)</td>
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<th>12062</th>
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<td>337.8 (0.000)</td>
<td>347.0 (0.000)</td>
<td>297.9 (0.000)</td>
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Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008; World Development Indicators 2008; McDonnell, Solignac-Lecomte et al 2003a; Author collected from individual aid agency websites.

Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001

Demographic controls=Age Group, Gender, Income, Education Level

Values controls=Achievement, Hedonism, Self-Direction

### 8.2 The Effect of Identity Frames in News Media Discourse

News media are likely to be an important factor in how identity-based attitudes to foreign aid are constructed because news is a form of public discourse (van Dijk, 1988) that has been shown to directly shape public opinion (Soroka, 2003), as well as produce and reproduce ideologies (Fowler, 1991). Moreover, on average 80 percent of citizens in OECD countries rely on television (TV)

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103 Cohen’s (1963) frequently cited quote that the press ‘may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think’
followed by print media for information about poverty in developing countries (Mc Donnell et al., 2003b). Although the question of whether and to what extent identity frames are present in news media can only be definitively answered with content analysis, existing research into how the developing world is covered in news media can shed some light.

A number of studies have investigated the portrayal of global poverty, development and foreign aid issues in newspaper and TV news reporting. In a 24 hour news cycle, media outlets must grab the attention of audiences. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the current context of the ‘War Against Terrorism’ and political debate around globalisation, most studies find over-simplified and sensationalised coverage of development issues, including an emphasis on conflict (terrorism and war), social instability (domestic corruption and migration), and economic insecurity (financial costs of providing aid and cancelling debts).

A report into news reporting of humanitarian, aid and development issues in Australian news media (Bacon & Nash, 2002) found three narrative themes:

[1.] Nearly two-thirds of all stories were told within broader ongoing narratives of internal political crises and international conflict. Violence was mentioned more than any other topic.

[2.] Disasters were covered as short term emergencies. There was almost no coverage of rehabilitation of areas affected by disasters or about famine or floods more generally.

[3.] Less than 7% of stories were about long term development issues and most of these were about large scale infrastructure issues rather than grassroots development (1.6% of all stories). There was very little coverage of other issues of importance to aid agencies, e.g. environmental sustainability, landmines or third world debt (p. 13).

Philo (2002) summarised a range of studies that focused on TV news content and public understanding of the developing world in the UK. Even prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, research showed that over a third of the news coverage about developing countries on the main TV channels (BBC and ITN) was devoted to war, conflict, terrorism and disasters. This coincided with a 50 percent decrease in the total output of factual programs on developing

about’ (p. 13) highlights that the media has long been accused of ‘agenda-setting’ (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In addition to increasing the perceived importance of issues (agenda-setting), scholars argue that news media shapes public opinion by changing the evaluative dimensions of their decisions (priming), and using language that (re)produces certain ideas, beliefs or perceptions of reality (framing) (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).
countries by the four terrestrial channels (BBC, ITN, Channel 4, and Sky and Discovery Television) in the ten years after 1989. Furthermore, stories of war, conflict and terrorism with dramatic, violent and tragic images presented in the absence of history, politics, economics and everyday life conditions were associated with negative responses in TV audiences towards the developing world.

An analysis of how the War Against Terrorism was framed in 104 editorials published in the top ten largest US newspapers in the month following the 9/11 attacks found that statements claiming that humanitarian aid is a component of war appeared a total of 19 times. In other words, aid was often framed as a means to fight terrorism (Ryan, 2004).

My literature search found only one published study, by van Heerde and Hudson (2010), that did not conclude that conflict and terrorism is a major theme in news reporting on global poverty. Their content analysis of 112 articles in eight UK national newspapers, from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2005, showed that social instability and economic insecurity were dominant:

By a sizeable margin (82 per cent), self-interest frames [as opposed to moral frames] are used to engage the public on poverty and development aid, and despite observing indicators of multiple frames most articles employed a single, dominant frame. Of the self-interest frames, 39 per cent were political in orientation, focusing predominantly on issues of corruption in the domestic setting and migration. Economic self-interest accounted for 36 per cent of frames used with the emphasis here clearly on the financial costs of cancelling debts, providing aid and promoting good governance. Only 7 per cent of articles used security issues to frame the discussion of global poverty. Moral framing, observed as calls for justice and human rights, accounted for less than 18 per cent of the total (van Heerde & Hudson, 2010, p. 7).

In terms of how conflict, social instability and economic insecurity narratives about global poverty might influence identity-based attitudes to foreign aid, all three narratives feed into the security personal identity. Recall that the security identity prioritises the safety, harmony and welfare of society and of one self. As previous chapters have shown that the security personal identity is normatively anti-aid, security frames in news media about foreign aid are likely to reinforce this stereotype. It is therefore hypothesised that the security personal identity will be more anti-aid the greater the national level of news media consumption (H7). News media is operationalised as
I created an interaction term between the security personal identity and newspapers per capita which I included in the basis personal identity model from Chapter 6. Using multi-level logistic regression to predict willingness to sacrifice, the first column of Table 8.1 reports the odds ratios. The odds ratio for the NewsXSecurity interaction is 1.343 (p<.05), suggesting news media have a mild pro-aid effect on the security identity. To provide further insight, Figure 8.1 plots the predicted probabilities of willingness to sacrifice at different strengths of the security personal identity after grouping countries into three levels of newspaper circulation (low, medium and high). Consistent with the odds ratio, but contrary to expectations, news media circulation actually weakens the anti-aid orientation of the security identity. That is, as the security identity strengthens, the sharpest decrease in support for aid occurs in those countries with the lowest level of daily newspapers per capita (<0.20). In addition, regardless of the strength of the security personal identity, support for aid is lowest in countries with a medium level of daily newspapers per capita (0.20–0.40) and highest in countries with a high level of daily newspapers per capita (>0.40). This suggests that far from presenting aid recipients as a threat, news media may in fact present them as hopeless, dependent and pathetic – so weak that they are the opposite of a threat.\footnote{I found that at the individual level, using a daily newspaper in the last week to learn what is going on in one’s country and the world increased the odds of willingness to sacrifice which is consistent with the country level effect.}
As the anti-aid orientation of the security identity weakened with news media consumption, the dominant frame in news reporting on foreign aid issues might be self-direction (independent thinker) as this is the opposite value to security in Schwartz’s (2007b) values construct. Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, and Rees (2009) demonstrated that opposing values have reciprocal behavioural effects. Figure 8.2 confirms that news media consumption slightly weakens the pro-aid orientation of the self-direction identity, although news media makes no significant difference to willingness to sacrifice when self-direction values are highly identified. This implies that the frequently used images of malnourished, despondent children with bloated stomachs and flies in their eyes turns off citizens who moderately identify with self-direction but softens the perspective of those who are concerned with security.

Some commentators have started to condemn anti-poverty organisations for using ‘poverty porn’ (images of victimhood in advertising) to generate public empathy for a given cause or to increase charitable donations. These reciprocal effects of news media on the security and self-direction identities highlights that identity framing may be a zero sum game. That is, employing self-

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105 [http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/39940.html](http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/39940.html)
determination frames may boost the pro-aid convictions of people who stand for self-direction values but also boost the anti-aid convictions of people who stand for security values. Likewise, employing victimhood frames may weaken the anti-aid convictions of people who stand for security values (by reducing the perceived threat posed by aid recipients) but also weaken the pro-aid convictions of people who stand for self-direction values.

Figure 8.2 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Self-Direction Personal Identity and National News Media Consumption

There is another possible explanation for why per capita newspaper circulation weakened the negative effect of the security personal identity on willingness to sacrifice. That is, given the proximate nature of the variable, it may be that a single identity frame does not dominate news media about foreign aid in all DAC member states. Indeed, most of the studies that were reviewed to formulate the hypothesis that newspaper circulation strengthens the negative effect of the security personal identity on support for foreign aid, covered news media content in only three countries: the US, UK and Australia. In these English-speaking countries, reporting on foreign aid does seem to be dominated by a security identity frame. However, this may reflect the political
conditions in these countries, raising the possibility that the hypothesis was not borne out because countries with higher newspaper circulation also happen to frame foreign aid prosocially.

Consider the correlation coefficients presented in Table 8.2 which suggest that there may be substantive contextual reasons for why newspaper circulation appears to weaken the negative effect of the security identity on support for aid (Refer to Table 5.A in Appendix 5 for the sources of data). Newspaper circulation is negatively correlated with: the percentage of the total population born overseas (% Pop Foreign Born); the percentage of bilateral aid allocated to former colonies (Colonial Aid); and the level of income inequality in society (Gini). Table 8.2 also shows that newspaper circulation is positively correlated with the degree to which a country’s political parties occupy divergent ideological positions (Polarization Index).106

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<tr>
<td>% Pop Foreign Born</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Aid</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization Index</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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</table>

These correlations highlight that in countries with higher newspaper circulation, there is also less basis for promoting a security identity frame around foreign aid. Indeed, with less reason to be anxious about immigration, or geopolitical posturing, or domestic poverty, in combination with a more wide-ranging political debate about aid-giving, it is likely that news stories about foreign aid are dominated by prosocial identity frames.107 With regard to the US, UK and Australia, these countries have fairly low levels of polarization and they are all former colonial powers with large immigrant populations and moderate to high levels of inequality. Therefore, it stands to reason

106 Dalton and Anderson’s (2011) Polarization Index, measures diversity of ideological choice in party systems. ‘It has a value of 0 when all parties occupy the same position on the Left/Right scale, and 10 when all the parties are split between the two extremes of the scale [according to survey respondents’ positioning of parties on a Left/Right scale]. The index is comparable to the standard deviation of parties distributed along the dimension’ (p. 29).

107 It may also be the case that some of these contextual factors increase newspaper circulation. For example, a more polarized politics is likely to generate more news, and in rich countries a more equal society implies higher average education which will give rise to more consumers of news.
that variations in the quality of news coverage may be more important than variations in the quantity, when it comes to influencing the meaning of the security personal identity.

### 8.3 The Effect of Identity Frames in Development Education Discourse

Development education refers here to activities, events and structured educational programs in schools or communities that are funded by the government to raise awareness of development issues, policies, programs and results, and to enhance understanding and facilitate personal action on the causes and effects of global poverty. All donor governments fund development education and are in fact required to as signatories to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which calls for ‘...enhancing donor’s and partner countries’ respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies, strategies and performance’.

For a number of years the UN and the OECD have recommended that DAC donors spend two percent of total ODA on official development education. It is their belief that development education is critical to ensuring public support for increased volumes of aid, improved aid effectiveness and greater policy coherence – all necessary conditions for achieving the MDGs. However, few donors have ever reached this spending target (Fransman & Solignac-Lecomte, 2004). In addition, whether development education actually increases public support for development goals remains an open question because survey analyses suffer self-selection problems. That is, those already supportive of aid are more likely to be interested in learning about global poverty.

Most donors fund development education activities with small grant schemes to NGOs. For example, after joining the ‘MDG Call to Action’ (a global initiative calling on community groups, governments and the private sector to work together to reach the MDGs), Australia’s aid agency, AusAID, established a 12-month pilot ‘Community Call to Action’ grant funding program (AU$1.5 million). The aim was to engage community groups that did not already have AusAID accreditation to raise public awareness about global poverty. The funding guidelines stated that funding was not to be used for specific lobbying or partisan activities. Thirteen groups were provided with grant payments of between $25,000 and $150,000. A review of the program estimated that 50,000 Australians were directly reached by participating in seminars, forums, workshops, organised tours or participatory exhibitions. In addition, over 250,000 Australians were indirectly reached through

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viewing exhibitions, receiving resources, viewing websites etc (Morrow & Thomson, 2010). While the level of outreach achieved by AusAID’s Community Call to Action sounds small for a national population of 25 million, AusAID also provides curriculum material for use in Australian schools on aid related issues such as globalisation, human rights, developing economies, HIV/AIDS, natural disasters, landmines, refugees, and the environment (Hart & Shipley, 2005).

School is considered an important arena for development education. A UK survey found that ‘Only a third (35%) of people who did not learn about global issues in school support the [0.7% of GNI for ODA] spending commitment, but this rises to over half amongst those who learnt about poverty or world politics and trade in school (52% and 53% respectively)’ (DEA, 2010b, p. 6). Given that those who remember learning about global issues at school were probably more interested, it is important to identify the mechanism that potentially links development education to support for aid. Indeed, from their typically rationalist perspective, all of the major international development organisations, as well a majority of aid advocates, place tremendous faith in development education for promoting bottom-up policy reform (Kouvaras & Sarli, 2012). However, from an identity-based approach, the impact of development education is highly questionable.

The notion of identity framing suggests that identity symbols and metaphors contained in development education could influence the level of public support for foreign aid. That is, if development education makes aid issues seem meaningful to the maintenance of certain prosocial identities, then those identities can reasonably be expected to motivate individual support for foreign aid. Conversely, if development education makes aid issues seem meaningful to the maintenance of certain proself identities, then those identities can reasonably be expected to motivate individual opposition to foreign aid. However, by definition, development education is politically neutral. Therefore, it is hypothesised to have limited effectiveness in terms of identity framing (this is effectively a null hypothesis). But what does politically neutral mean?

We know from a large cross-national study that teachers in different countries conceptualise civic and citizenship education differently (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). For example, when teachers were asked to identify the three most important aims of civic and citizenship education, 61 percent of teachers in Finland versus 22 percent of teachers in Indonesia and Denmark said ‘Promoting respect for and safeguard of the environment’. Similarly, 63 percent of

teachers in Chinese Taipei nominated ‘Developing students’ skills and competencies in conflict resolution’ while only 15 percent and 21 percent of teachers in Hong Kong SAR and Italy respectively agreed. Given such wide disparities in how civic and citizenship education is conceptualised, it is likely that the way development education is conceptualised also varies significantly from country-to-country.

Many European NGOs that are involved in development education (such as DEEEP) explicitly promote a progressive agenda in the way they define development education.

 Development education is an active learning process, founded on values of solidarity, equality, inclusion and co-operation. It enables people to move from basic awareness of international development priorities and sustainable human development, through understanding of the causes and effects of global issues, to personal involvement and informed action. Development education fosters the full participation of all citizens in worldwide poverty eradication, and the fight against exclusion. It seeks to influence more just and sustainable economic, social, environmental, human rights based national and international policies.\(^{110}\)

As most NGOs rely on state (or EU) funding, the ‘requirement’ to operate as dispassionate purveyors of factual information could be interpreted to mean that NGO communications should not challenge the dominant cultural narrative about foreign aid and global poverty (Harper, 2003). In other words, development education is likely to be an extension of broader cultural norms. However, to achieve its stated aim of increasing public support for aid (as opposed to maintaining the status quo), development education needs to promote prosocial identity frames. Under an identity framing hypothesis, when development education emphasises values such as solidarity, equality, inclusion and co-operation, it strengthens the pro-aid orientation of citizens with a universalism personal identity. This is because promoting a link between aid-giving and values that define the universalism personal identity helps to manufacture that identity’s practical meaning. However, if development education simply reproduces existing stereotypes, or if it is truly unbiased and therefore cognitively neutral, it will not expand the size of the aid constituency. It is hypothesised that official government spending on development education per capita will have no influence on the relationship between the universalism personal identity and support for aid (H8).

\(^{110}\) [http://www.deeep.org/](http://www.deeep.org/)
The second column in Table 8.1 reports an odds ratio of 0.984 for the interaction term between development education spending per capita and the universalism personal identity. As this result is not statistically significant, the analysis confirms the hypothesis that development education does not moderate the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity. Figure 8.3 confirms the regression finding but also reveals that, amongst people with a universalism personal identity, overall support for aid is lowest in countries with the lowest level of per capita expenditure on development education. This is not surprising from the perspective of identity alignment as the countries that spend the most on development education also tend to be the largest aid donors (Mc Donnell & Solignac-Lecomte, 2005).

Figure 8.3 Probability of Willingness to Sacrifice by Universalism Personal Identity and Development Education Spending Per Capita

To unpack the main effect for development education, I explored the idea that development education increases the salience of the universalism personal identity, which in turn increases the level of identity-driven action. I tested this possibility with a mediation model. A mediation model can determine whether the universalism personal identity partly mediates the relationship between development education and willingness to sacrifice.
Using aggregate data for 13 DAC member states, the four steps laid out by Baron and Kenny (1986) were followed to establish whether the universalism personal identity intervenes in the relationship between development education and willingness to sacrifice.

First, I condensed the non-ipsatized universalism measure into a binary variable to make the estimates comparable to the willingness to sacrifice estimates. I then ran the following logistic regression analyses controlling for age, gender, income and education:

Step 1 (X on Y): Effect of development education on willingness to sacrifice = 0.19, p<.001.
Step 2 (X on M): Effect of development education on binary universalism measure = 0.17, p<.001.
Step 3 (M on Y): Effect of binary universalism measure on willingness to sacrifice = 0.71, p<.001.
Step 4 (M and X on Y): Effect of development education on willingness to sacrifice after controlling for binary universalism measure (0.17, p<.001). Effect of binary universalism measure on willingness to sacrifice after controlling for development education = 0.70, p<.001.

Complete mediation is ruled out as the coefficient for the effect of development education on willingness to sacrifice after controlling for universalism is greater than zero. However, controlling for universalism weakened the coefficient from 0.19 to 0.17. Therefore, partial mediation was examined with the Sobel Test (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Using an online tool created by Kristopher J. Preacher and Geoffrey J. Leonardelli (2001), the Sobel Test statistic was 5.2527 (Std. Err. 0.0227), p value = <.001. Therefore, the indirect effect of development education on willingness to sacrifice via universalism is statistically different from zero. This suggests that development education increases support for aid, not for rational reasons, but in part because it primes the universalism personal identity. In other words, development education increases the salience of the universalism personal identity, which in turn increases pro-identity behaviour. As the universalism personal identity is normatively pro-aid, development education has a direct positive effect on support for aid.

8.4 The Effect of Identity Frames in Aid Agency Discourse

The term ‘aid agency’ is commonly used to describe two types of organisations that define, deliver, coordinate, and manage development policy, finance and programs. These are multilateral agencies such as the UN and World Bank, and bilateral agencies such as AusAID (Australia), SIDA (Sweden) and DFID (UK). Here the term is singularly used to describe bilateral agencies as the analysis is focused on comparing identity framing effects across countries.
Across the DAC member states, aid agencies have varying responsibilities and supervisory structures (see OECD, 2009, chapter 3). Some agencies are responsible for policy-making and implementation whereas others are responsible for implementation only. A majority of aid agencies are accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whereas DFID in the UK is an independent ministry. It is also common for DAC member states to have several aid agencies, such as in Japan and Germany.

Unlike private companies where profit is the single goal, bilateral agencies come under strong political pressure to pursue multiple goals. Where political oversight of the agency is spread between various ministerial portfolios, with multiple and possibly divergent objectives, the agency cannot please everyone. Indeed, according to Seabright (2002), the agency will be forced to vaguely define its objectives and reduce the quality of evaluation because achieving one objective is likely to come at a cost of achieving other objectives. By comparison, where accountability is structured according to a single set of agreed parliamentary standards, the aid agency is likely to perform coherently and effectively. The Public Service Agreement (PSA) in the UK, for example, holds ministries responsible for reporting to the Treasury, the Prime Minister’s Office and Parliament on the achievement of a set of national goals. DFID is the lead ministry for PSA 29: ‘Reduce poverty in poorer countries through quicker progress towards the Millennium Development Goals’ (Vielajus, Hudson, Jonsson, & Neu, 2009). Although this goal is difficult to measure, it is nevertheless focused. Accordingly, DFID is not subject to competing political pressures, and can legitimately justify and advocate giving aid to reduce poverty overseas.

Taking this argument forward, the poverty-reduction focus of a country’s aid program should be directly related to the autonomy of the main aid agency (Howes, 2011). This question has never been adequately examined, and numerous analyses of aid effectiveness rank donors differently (for example, Birdsall et al., 2010; Knack, Rogers, & Eubank, 2010). However, if an aid agency’s sole reason for existing is to reduce poverty in developing countries because other agencies and ministries are responsible for diplomacy, trade, defence, and migration, then the agency’s objectives and evaluation criteria are more likely to be centred on poverty-reduction.

As tax-payers in DAC member states are not the beneficiaries of their country’s foreign aid, and therefore have no direct way of knowing the results of government spending, ministers in charge of aid must explain to the public the aid program’s objectives and evaluation criteria. Accordingly, where an agency operates independently of ministries such as foreign affairs, finance and trade, the government’s discourse around aid policy is likely to emphasise universalism values such as
human rights and fairness. Conversely, where an aid agency’s decision-making is subordinate to other agendas, the political discourse around aid policy is likely to play down universalism values or emphasise different values at different times depending on the attention of specific domestic interest groups. Formally, the hypothesis tested here is that the identity framing effect from an independent aid agency strengthens the relationship between the universalism personal identity and support for aid (H9). Refer to Appendix 2 to see how I applied a binary coding system (independent versus non-independent aid agency) to the 13 DAC donors.

Table 8.1 (column 3) presents the odds ratio for the interaction term between aid agency independence and the universalism personal identity. Having an independent aid agency does not appear to have a statistically significant moderating effect on the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity (odds ratio 1.038, ns). In other words, whether or not a country has a politically independent aid agency does not influence the extent to which aid-giving is normatively perceived as a matter of ethics (universalism) versus other objectives such as charity (benevolence), national security (security), hegemony (power), and custom (tradition).

It is possible that the AgencyXUniversalism interaction effect is distorted by the way the US aid agency (USAID) was coded. USAID was coded 0 as it ‘receives general direction and overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary [of State]’. However, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created by the US Congress in 2004, was responsible for $1.1 billion of US aid in 2010 (MCC, 2009). The MCC is an independent development corporation with four board members from outside government. To overcome this coding challenge, the US data were dropped and the analysis was repeated. As can be seen in column 4 of Table 8.1, without the US, aid agency independence had a strengthening effect on the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity at the ten percent level (odds ratio 1.084, p<.10). Figure 8.4 also supports this finding diagrammatically.

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111 The frames used by political leaders also condition the organisational structure of aid agencies (van der Veen, 2011). Thus, the link between aid agency independence and government discourse on foreign aid may be mediated by political leaders in both directions.

8.5 Implications for Expanding the Aid Constituency

A crucial question for campaigners seeking to promote bottom-up policy reform is what makes supporting aid feel identity-congruent? By knowing how to make aid issues relevant to more people, campaigners can expand the number of aid supporters. If few people perceive foreign aid as relevant to the type of person they are, energising a small segment of the population may not be sufficient to force policy change. Therefore, campaigners also need to consider expanding the size of the aid constituency from an understanding of how attitudes to foreign aid become an outcome of identity-based motivation.

This chapter examined the concept of identity framing which argues that certain behaviours become stereotypical of an identity due to discursively constructed linkages between the content of the identity and specific issues. The behavioural orientation of an identity is therefore a matter of how issues are framed. The chapter tested the effects of exposure to three potential sources of identity frames: news media, development education and aid agencies. Overall, Figures 8.1 to 8.4 suggest that at very high levels of identification (‘very much like me’), people are impervious to identity frames (confidence intervals overlap). This is perhaps because of alignment with higher order identities. That is, if a personal identity is strongly held, it will regularly guide a person’s
behaviour so it will be more important for the person to align it with higher order identities in order to maintain self-consistency. By comparison, changing the meaning of a weakly identified personal identity will not cause obvious contradiction with higher order identities because it will rarely be operational, making it more susceptible to framing effects. With this condition in mind, news media and aid agency exposure were found to moderate the aid-giving orientation of the security and universalism personal identities respectively. However, development education exposure, which is usually prioritised by anti-poverty campaigners as a way to rationally shift public attitudes to aid, did not have an identity framing effect. It did, however, boost support for aid by increasing the salience of the universalism personal identity for whole countries.\footnote{The analyses lend credibility to the hypothesis that discourse matters because exposure to a specific source of policy information is a crude marker of discourse. Indeed it is highly unlikely that newspapers made a difference to how people define their identity based on the number of pieces of paper they were exposed to. Rather, it is more likely that the content of newspapers made a difference. The analyses are therefore encouraging for future research to examine exactly how identity communication is constructed by various actors to further their interests.}

The results for the development education variable challenge the prevailing rationalist perspective which in turn justifies moving to an identity-based approach. The basic premise of the identity-based approach is that rather than using information to form rational preferences, people look for ways to confirm who they are through pro-identity behaviours. The so-called ‘European consensus’ on development education maintains that development education is not an exercise in public relations aimed ‘at predefined outcomes in terms of public support for development co-operation efforts’ (European Multi-Stakeholder Steering Group on Development Education, 2010, p. 7). Rather, development education is recognised as raising public awareness of global interdependency and encouraging democratic participation. Yet, the hope of those involved in development education is to ‘bring about a world of greater justice, equity and human rights for all’ (p. 6). To achieve this goal efficiently, development education needs to be re-thought as more than facts and figures. Indeed, according to the identity-based approach, it is not enough for the OECD and the UN to simply set a target for donor spending on development education at two percent of ODA. The aim of development education should be to actively rebrand aid issues so that positive relevant behaviours become identity-reinforcing.

Marketing companies have long been interested in rebranding products to mean something else. That is, the product is still differentiated from its competitors by the same characteristics (ingredients, name, logo) but the types of people who associate with the product changes. For
example, in the 2000s and 1960s respectively, the basic characteristics of Dunlop Volley shoes and Levi blue jeans had not changed since their creation many decades earlier (1939 for Dunlop Volleys and the 1920s for modern denim jeans). However, successful rebranding changed their target market from workmen to young fashionable types. The same may be possible for public attitudes to foreign aid. Just as people wear certain clothes to convey and reinforce their identity, they also express certain attitudes for the same reason. Which attitudes serve this function depends on how issues are branded or framed.

Development education must explicitly link aid issues to various personal and social categories of self-definition so that supporting aid becomes an affirmation or outward expression of identity. Which categories should campaigners focus on? Schultz and Zelezny (2003) suggest that, because the US is characterised at the national level as having a relatively high degree of proself values, environmental messages should be based on self-interest rather than altruism. However, this approach would be self-defeating. Identities prescribe behaviours that are consistent with the content of the category in question. To this end, it is appropriate that some identities are self-interested and some are other-interested. Sometimes in life we need to prioritise our own needs, and sometimes we need to prioritise the needs of others. This dualism reflects the balance between individualism and collectivism as means of survival. However, to frame inherently self-interested identities as pro-aid would be counter-productive in the long term because the dynamism of an issue like global poverty requires inherently other-interested responses.

If aid issues are connected to an identity that is defined by helping others (i.e., the content of the category is prosocial) then supporting foreign aid will become a meaningful expression of that identity. Likewise, if aid issues are connected to an identity that is defined by concern for one’s own wellbeing (i.e., the content of the category is proself) then disapproving of foreign aid will become a meaningful expression of that identity. Campaigners should thus exercise caution in developing identity frames. Even establishing a normative connection between aid-giving and identities defined by novelty and innovation (for example, tech geeks), could restrict public support to technological initiatives such as vaccines, to the detriment of meeting basic needs such as sanitation. Accordingly, campaigners should try to link aid-giving to personal and social identities with a social focus (such as pro-welfare, animal rights and trade union identities) in order to generate a sustainable and comprehensive public response to the issue of global poverty.

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114 Dunlop Volleys are a canvas shoe originally designed for playing tennis but they quickly became popular amongst Australian tradesmen such as roof tillers due to their excellent grip.
Arguably the universalism personal identity is the most suitable for constructing a pro-aid meaning given its emphasis on equality and solidarity. Therefore, the key objective for campaigners, especially in those countries where universalism is not a significant predictor of willingness to sacrifice, should be to actively employ universalism identity symbols and metaphors in development education. Beyond improving development education, campaigners should also engage with news media to try to strengthen prosocial identity frames in reporting about foreign aid. Likewise, direct lobbying for aid agency independence could assist in ensuring aid agency discourse does not promote proself identity frames in relation to aid policy. The politics of manipulating the identity frames that are embedded in official sources of policy communication will no doubt be challenging but the pay-off may be enormous.

To highlight the significance of identity framing variation in aid agency discourse, I have used an online tool called ‘Wordle’ to produce two ‘word clouds’. Word clouds reflect the prominence of words that appear in a designated text – the larger the word the more it is repeated in the text. The first word cloud, presented in Figure 8.5, was constructed from the webpage of the Director of US Foreign Assistance at the US Department of State. The webpage covers the vision statement, mission statement, and operating principles of the Office of the Director of US Foreign Assistance. As can be seen, the words ‘foreign’, ‘assistance’, ‘state’ and ‘resources’ feature heavily. There is also a secondary emphasis on ‘strategic’, ‘stakeholders’, ‘performance’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘needs’. Overall, the word cloud points to the dominance of a power identity frame in the policy discourse of the US aid agency.

[^115]: [http://www.wordle.net/]
[^116]: [http://www.state.gov/f/]
By comparison, the Netherlands’ priorities for development cooperation, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, are presented in Figure 8.6. The word cloud strongly features the terms ‘development’, ‘many’, ‘countries’, ‘girls’, ‘millennium’ and ‘women’. Slightly less prominent are the terms ‘sustainability’, ‘make’, ‘rights’, ‘growth’ and ‘goals’. Overall, the word cloud indicates that a universalism identity frame is dominant in the Dutch aid agency’s policy discourse.

http://www.minbuza.nl/en/Key_Topics/Development_Cooperation/Dutch_development_policy/The_Netherlands'_priorities

117
What these word clouds attempt to show, in a rather rudimentary way, is that even seemingly neutral policy statements can in fact powerfully influence which identities the public have in mind when they form policy preferences. Although these word clouds cannot be directly associated with the empirical results presented above, in a comparative sense they at least underscore the point that not all communications are equal. This is a key insight that framing theory brings to the identity-based approach: ‘an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations’ (D. Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Accordingly, the frame in which an individual understands aid issues is likely to shape their attitude preferences.

For campaigners to practically apply framing theory to identity-based support for aid, it is helpful to keep in mind that identity framing is a tool for potentially overcoming some of the constraints of identity alignment. The aim of identity framing is to manipulate normative associations between identities and action tendencies, so that supporting aid becomes stereotypical of a wider array of identities and, therefore, expands the size of the aid constituency. Identity alignment contends that identity-based behaviours such as supporting foreign aid become either inevitable or unimaginable depending on the pro- or anti-aid orientations of more legitimate higher order identities. Therefore, campaigners can utilise identity framing techniques to encourage individuals and groups to re-imagine their lower identities as having a different or contradictory meaning.

Another consideration is that efforts to reframe social identities (as opposed to personal identities) may be hampered (or facilitated) by leadership factors. That is, group leaders who are perceived to exemplify the identity of a social group have referent and position power to criticise and change the behavioural expectations of the group (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Reid, 2006). Therefore, campaigns think aid-giving to particular group identities (such as medical professionals for example) should be complemented by persuading group leaders (such as the heads of key medical associations and unions) to adopt a pro-aid orientation. Bono (knowingly or unknowingly) used this technique with religious leaders in the US to mobilise public support for foreign aid (Busby, 2007). Reframing the meaning of the Evangelical identity as pro-aid convinced President George W. Bush to establish a $15 billion aid program to fight HIV/AIDS in order to meet the expectations of his electoral base.

A final caveat for mobilising support for aid is to avoid more than one identity frame at a time as this may dampen the effect (P. R. Brewer, 2002). In other words, instead of trying to be all things to all people, campaign communications should uniquely target discrete audiences. US President
Bill Clinton lost public support for his health care plan by simultaneously framing it in terms of both ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ in order to appeal to Republicans and Democrats respectively (Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). Similarly, during the 2010 general election in the UK, the Conservative Party simultaneously framed aid-giving in terms of ‘value for money’ and ‘cutbacks must not cost lives’ in an attempt to appeal to Conservative and Labour voters respectively (Conservative Party, 2009). At this stage it is unclear what effect this contradictory frame will have on public support for reaching the 0.7 percent aid target which the elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government pledged to enshrine in law (Townsend, 2010). However, by moving away from the singular ‘ethical state’ frame used by the previous Labour government (Dunne, 2008), public support for aid may wane as the post-financial crisis austerity measures cut through.

8.6 Conclusion

The OECD Development Centre regularly publishes reports which assert that the main obstacle to policy reform is the public’s shallow understanding of global development and poverty issues (Mc Donnell et al., 2003b). Thus, donor governments are encouraged to better inform and educate citizens (Mc Donnell, 2004; Mc Donnell et al., 2003a). However, across a range of disciplines there is empirical evidence to support the notion that the frame in which an issue is presented – in the media, the education system or political discourse – influences public attitudes towards the issue.

Traditional framing studies often start from the position that an individual’s attitudes are motivated by ideological or normative considerations. Therefore, discursively constructing associations between these considerations and policy issues guarantees a particular response. This chapter started from the position that an individual’s attitudes are a function of self-identification as a person who stands for certain values or as a member of a particular social group. Therefore, it was proposed that unlike identity content (values and norms), which is defined by comparisons with others, identity meaning (the usefulness of an identity for interpreting the world) is discursively constructed by identity frames. This explains why personal identities defined by the same values were associated with different attitudes to foreign aid in different countries (Chapter 6).

Specifically, it was argued that when policy discourses articulate a link between an identity and foreign aid, the issue of foreign aid becomes part of that identity’s interpretive framework. Depending on the nature of the identity in question (prosocial or proself), supporting or
disapproving of foreign aid then constitutes identity-reinforcing behaviour. To this end, when foreign aid is linked to protecting one’s self-interest, disapproving of aid becomes meaningful to proself identities. Accordingly, the number of people who support aid-giving is likely to decrease. By comparison, when foreign aid is linked to helping others, approving of aid becomes meaningful to prosocial identities. The likely consequence is broader support for aid-giving. The chapter therefore contributes to the overarching argument presented throughout this dissertation: that providing the public with facts and figures about global poverty in the hope that it will build an aid constituency is misguided.

The sources of policy discourses that were found to shape identity-attitude linkages, particularly at low levels of identification, were news media and government aid agencies. The national consumption of news media was hypothesised to strengthen the negative relationship between the security personal identity and willingness to sacrifice whereas it actually had the opposite effect. Therefore, images of victimhood may be prominent in news media reporting on foreign aid. Having an independent aid agency was hypothesised to strengthen the positive relationship between the universalism personal identity and willingness to sacrifice. This hypothesis was supported, suggesting that poverty reduction is emphasised in aid agency discourse when the agency has political independence.

A third source of identity framing that was examined was official development education. It was hypothesised that greater government spending on raising awareness of global poverty would not have a significant impact on the relationship between the universalism personal identity and willingness to sacrifice. This is because development education is positioned as politically-unbiased or dispassionate which suggests it may be too cognitively neutral to have any influence on public opinion or it may simply promote whatever identity frame is culturally dominant. Although the null hypothesis was sustained, a main effect for development education was found. Exploratory analysis showed that development education directly increases support for aid, in part by priming the universalism personal identity which is stereotypically pro-aid.

By examining three diverse sources of identity frames, this chapter not only accounted for some of the cross-national variation in the security and universalism personal identity estimates reported in Chapter 6, but also identified some of the powerful actors and entities that (re)produce identity stereotypes. The findings therefore highlight the possibility that campaigners can actively manipulate identity-based opinion by engaging in identity framing techniques. In other words, the way to expand (not just activate) the aid-giving constituency is by developing and promoting
identity frames that link aid-giving to prosocial identities. However, campaigns that construct pro-
aid identity meanings must be balanced with efforts to undermine culturally- and historically-
important anti-aid identity frames. This involves challenging the powerful actors that dominate or
direct national policy discourses. Accordingly, expectations for expanding the aid constituency
should be tempered by the likely success of taking on those with an interest in making aid issues
seem logically connected to proself identities.

Finally, Chapter 4 mentioned some of the assumptions that underpin the analyses undertaken in
this chapter. Namely, that each source of identity communication actually represents a coherent
discourse about global poverty and aid policy; and that these discourses permeate all aspects of
social life to affect citizens equally, regardless of their individual exposure to the original source of
communication. To this end, further analysis could be undertaken to determine the degree to
which identity frames compete within national policy discourses. Equally, although laboratory
conditions compromise external validity, framing experiments would help to overcome the
concern that one can never be certain that presenting aid issues in different ways produces
different reactions when country-level variables are used to proxy identity frames. A potential
avenue for future experimental research could be in testing possible campaign narratives, such as
does the term ‘war on poverty’ frame aid as relevant to the power personal identity? Such
knowledge would provide campaigners with the evidence to build extensive systems of meaning
production to transform the politics of foreign aid.
Chapter 9. Contribution to Knowledge and Theory

We know what we are, but not what we may be. William Shakespeare

The main motivation for the current research was to bring fresh thinking and analysis to the long-standing problem of the word-deeds gap in global governance. According to the UN Environment Programme, we now have ‘treaty congestion’. World leaders have signed up to 500 international agreements in the past 50 years to commit to sustainable development, protect the Earth and use resources more wisely, yet the health of the planet is deteriorating. Why? Because after the negotiations have concluded, these agreements are wilfully ignored (Vidal, 2012). When world leaders make policy promises to the international community which they do not implement, they threaten global peace, prosperity and sustainability. Finding a solution to this problem is therefore a priority for global governance organisations such as the UN, as well as NGOs and some politicians around the world.

It is widely recognised that governments make decisions that affect the global population yet they are only ever accountable to their domestic constituencies. This is particularly evident when it comes to global poverty and many anti-poverty advocates have expressed frustration at the long history of failed pledges to increase foreign aid. However, the extant international relations literature on the determinants of foreign policy and the extant political science literature on the determinants of public opinion offer little practical evidence-based guidance for mobilising public pressure on democratically-elected leaders to fulfil their international commitments.

I integrated the constructivist perspective in international relations with SCT in social psychology to propose an identity-based approach to promoting bottom-up policy reform. The approach comprised four key components which I examined with quantitative analyses, using policy and survey data from 13 major aid donor states, and covering the opinions of over 16,000 citizens. The evidence supported all four components, suggesting that the identity-based approach is a valid framework for promoting bottom-up policy reform.

My research findings have a number of theoretical and practical implications. To a large extent, the theoretical implications of the identity-based approach for constructivism and SCT in particular have already been discussed throughout the preceding chapters, as have many of the practical
implications for campaigners. As such, this concluding chapter is concerned with: (1) summarising the research findings (Section 9.1); (2) placing the main findings in the context of existing knowledge and theory. This includes applying the findings to existing anti-poverty campaigns, and extending the application of the identity-based approach to enhancing supranational identities in order to promote solidarity between developed and developing countries (Section 9.2); and (3) outlining potential avenues for future research to address the limitations of the current work (Section 9.3).

9.1 Summary of the Research Findings

Identity-based support for aid was initially examined at the state level. Chapter 5 found support for component 1 of the model: A state’s identity is defined by the normative foreign policies and practices that differentiate the state from other states in the international system. The categorical measure of state identities that was established in Chapter 5 is the first quantitative characterisation of pro-aid and anti-aid state identities based on a range of policy actions for reducing global poverty (not just foreign aid). The analysis discerned distinct patterns in each state’s aid, debt, FDI and migration policies and practices. Each pattern was shown to reflect a different type of justice which also differentiated states’ domestic welfare policies. It was concluded that to successfully reduce global poverty the current conceptualisation of international cooperation should be rethought. That is, developed countries legitimately resist meeting uniform policy targets because maintaining their unique identities assists with navigating reality. However, they may be motivated to achieve customised policy targets that are in line with who they are. Accordingly, the goal of international agreements should be either to enhance the minimum effort of all states across all policy domains (i.e., between country difference remain stable but the bar is raised for all), or to encourage states to specialise in the policies that enhance their distinctiveness in a positive way (i.e., between country differences are exaggerated but complementary).

Next, identity-based support for aid was examined in relation to individuals and members of social groups within states. Chapter 6 found support for component 2 of the model: Prosocial personal and social identities drive citizen policy preferences. By conceptualising public opinion about foreign aid as an identity-based behaviour rather than as a rational or moral attitude, the findings presented in Chapter 6 are a novel contribution to the political science literature. In addition, the operationalisation of personal identities with Schwartz’s (2007b) personal values construct is a novel contribution to the SCT literature which has thus far only analysed the behavioural effects of
social identities – even though personal identities are considered equally important to a person’s self-concept. I operationalised social identities with survey items measuring the degree to which a person belongs to, or participates in, various social groups that are recognised internationally for their aid advocacy. The results from a series of regression analyses showed that, although the size and statistical significance of the estimates varied from country-to-country, people with personal identities that are prosocial (versus proself), and social identities that are pro-aid, were more likely to believe that their country’s current level of aid is too low, and they were more likely to express willingness to pay higher taxes to increase their country’s aid. It was argued that campaigners may be able to mobilise dormant aid supporters by priming prosocial personal identities and pro-aid social identities, and by taking actions to minimise social cues that call attention to proself and anti-aid identities.

After establishing the aid-giving orientations of states, social groups and individual voters, I examined the impact of interactions between identities at different levels on citizen support for aid. I theorised the concept of ‘identity alignment’ to specify where identity stereotypes come from and to explain why the strength of identity-attitude linkages varied cross-nationally. Chapter 7 affirmed component 3 of the model: The alignment of identities at different levels modifies the meaning of identities. In particular, the analyses showed that the behaviours that express personal identities are moderated by the behaviours that express social identities, and the behaviours that express social identities are moderated by the policies that express state identities. The notion that people cognitively align lower order identity stereotypes with higher order identity stereotypes contributes to the constructivist literature by reconciling the fact that states function as coherent entities despite identity variation within states. The findings also contribute to the SCT literature which has not empirically accounted for consistent political attitudes within a person or systematic differences in political attitudes across countries. For campaigners, identity alignment processes present both constraints and opportunities for promoting bottom-up policy reform. In particular, top-down policy reforms may be necessary to give legitimacy to bottom-up momentum. However, once the reforms are in place, they will be sustained by the realignment of lower order identity stereotypes.

The final piece of analytical work was to examine whether aid policy discourses shape the normative connections people make between expressing an identity and supporting or disapproving of foreign aid. I posited that those with the power to control the types of identity symbols and metaphors (identity frames) contained within policy discourses have the power to
control public opinion by structuring identity stereotypes. Chapter 8 found support for component 4 of the model: Identity frames modify the meaning of identities. In particular, the news media’s apparent portrayal of aid recipients as victims weakened the anti-aid orientation of the security identity, and the apparent poverty-reduction emphasis of independent aid agencies (versus the geopolitical posturing of non-independent aid agencies) strengthened the pro-aid orientation of the universalism personal identity. Unexpectedly, development education increased support for aid by increasing the salience of the universalism personal identity, but not through identity framing. The findings suggest that to expand the aid-giving constituency (and overcome identity alignment constraints) campaigners should shift away from communicating neutral messages about foreign aid. Instead, as identities prescribe behaviours that are consistent with the content of the identity, they should strategically deploy prosocial identity frames and mitigate proself identity frames. For example, campaigners might advise political elites to avoid language that implies aid is given in the national interest because this will diminish public support by linking aid to proself identities which are inherently anathema to policies that benefit others.

9.2 Recommendations for Campaigning and Policy

The French writer Victor-Marie Hugo once said ‘there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come’. Anti-poverty campaigners are slowly realising that the dominant rationalist approach is broken but to date they have not had a solid empirical base from which to develop alternative campaign strategies. Some savvy campaigners have taken ideas directly from prosocial behaviour experiments. However, what motivates research subjects to share a small sum of money in a laboratory-setting game is not necessarily comparable to what motivates citizens to support higher taxes to increase foreign aid. In this section I make several practical recommendations for campaigning based on my own ‘real world’ research into how public support for foreign aid is motivated within the context of existing aid policies. I then go on to illustrate the relevance of in-group solidarity models in social psychology to international relations, thereby situating my findings in the broader prosocial behaviour literature.\(^\text{118}\)

\(^{118}\) It should be remembered that identity-based mobilisation strategies will be most effective when executed in tandem with systemic support for pro-aid behaviour. Indeed, identity is an important organising principle for campaigning but other non-identity factors also affect citizen behaviour such as increasing perceived efficacy and reducing barriers for action.
9.2.1 Application of the Identity-Based Approach to Existing Campaigns

In terms of what identity-based campaigning might look like in the real world, let us consider several existing anti-poverty campaigns. Oxfam’s current strapline ‘Be Humankind’ is a good example of how aid advocates should implement some of the proposed recommendations. The clever play on grammar (using a noun as an adjective) is an example of identity framing. It implies that taking any form of anti-poverty action is both a way of expressing kindness to other humans, and a way of sharing a collective human identity. In other words, the term creates a normative connection between anti-poverty action and people who identify with benevolence values (kindness), as well as those who identify with universalism values (humanity). Oxfam’s previous strapline ‘Working for a fairer world’ branded Oxfam the entity rather than the ideal. It implied that people who identify with Oxfam’s work should support the organisation. The slogan ‘Be Humankind’ on the other hand, encourages non-specific support for global poverty as a cause. It therefore motivates a broader audience to take some kind of action on global poverty irrespective of whether they identify with Oxfam itself.

Another reason why the slogan ‘Be Humankind’ is likely to motivate political action is because, in April 2008, it was launched in combination with a series of animated television advertisements depicting regular people working together to fight injustice. The ads associate the human identity with a sense of empowerment and feelings of outrage at an unfair system. In one of the ads, after initially ignoring media reports about global poverty issues, a woman expresses her moral outrage at the situation by breathing white light onto the word ‘injustice’ which is represented as a giant monster. She soon finds that other people join in and the monster turns into a rainbow. By working together they are successful in achieving their goal of defeating injustice.119

According to Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor (2009), for identity-based political action to be sustainable, it must be normatively empowered by efficacy beliefs and normatively directed to a third party by feelings of moral outrage (as opposed to the self-focused emotions of guilt or sympathy). In other words, Thomas et al. (2009) argue that a group’s commitment to take action on global poverty is strengthened by a shared emotional understanding and beliefs about the probability of achieving change. Given that the collective human identity is rarely perceived as successful in dealing with international challenges (think of climate change), and given that most anti-poverty charities use poverty porn to elicit donations based on guilt and sympathy, Oxfam’s ad helps to positively redefine the emotions and beliefs that are stereotypical of the collective

119 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQK6ODxDFDY&feature=relmfu
human identity. Thus, the ad promotes an identity frame that benefits the anti-poverty movement as a whole, in addition to the organisation’s own aims.

Now consider the ONE campaign which was cofounded by Bono. It has a mixed record on incorporating identity into its advertisements. This may explain why some ads appear more popular than others when measured as the number of YouTube viewings as of 18 September 2011, although the age of an ad is also likely to be a factor. Compare an ad from one year ago entitled ‘Coming Together as One’ (411,155 views) to an ad released three months ago entitled ‘ONE App That Could Change the World’ (15,240 views).

‘Coming Together as One’ explicitly primes universalism values (rather than benevolence values), it frames anti-poverty action as relevant to young people (specifically college students) as a single shared group membership, and it invokes feelings of collective-efficacy.\textsuperscript{120} The video depicts various male and female celebrities in their twenties pointing out that much has already been achieved in the fight against global poverty but more needs to be done. Their spoken words are reinforced with written messages such as ‘Malaria deaths cut in half’. A clear distinction is made that ‘This is not about charity, it’s about justice, it’s about equality’ (images of the words ‘not charity, ‘justice’ and ‘equality’ flash on the screen). The speakers frame the meaning of youth identity by emphasising that throughout history it has been young people who have led political change. ‘Over the course of history, young people like us have made a difference’ (this is reinforced with images of political action). They urge ‘awareness, advocacy and action’ with the following appeal: ‘as college students you have the power’. This ad meets all of the requirements for a successful identity-based campaign: it primes prosocial identities, it frames pro-identity behaviour as activism, and it reinforces efficacy beliefs. The only criticism is that using celebrity speakers might encourage some in the audience to support the cause simply because they identify with the celebrities. This is likely to weaken their responsiveness to global poverty issues compared to those who identify as student activists.

In contrast, the ONE campaign’s newer advertisement for the ONE smart phone application – ‘ONE App That Could Change the World’ – is an example of what campaigners should not do.\textsuperscript{121} The ad showcases a mobile phone technology that helps users to learn about global poverty issues (such as childhood vaccinations in Africa) and take political action (such as sign an e-petition or call the White House on speed dial). Aside from the fact that people are unlikely to become politically

\textsuperscript{120} http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTzfQLRP4kk&feature=relmfu
\textsuperscript{121} http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXSHJ45lpTI&feature=player_profilepage
engaged in an issue simply because their phone makes it convenient (a rationalist assumption),
the ad does nothing to inspire the audience to download the application in the first place. The
video depicts various images of a phone with the application in operation. The ad never shows a
person actually using the application. Between scenes that demonstrate what the application
looks like, messages flash on the screen such as ‘Get involved’, ‘Learn the proof’ and ‘Sign a
petition’. However, without any identity signals (such as references to group memberships) to help
the audience know who this ad is speaking to and why the application is relevant to them, this
campaign fails to make meaningful the political actions it is trying to motivate.¹²²

The rational perspective of public opinion guides a majority of organisations that campaign on
global poverty issues, especially the UN and OECD. However, there are signs that some
organisations are waking up to the value of using empirical evidence. For example, DEEEP’s annual
Development Education Summer School, which convenes a number of working groups on
development education, included a working group on advocacy and campaigning for the first time
in 2011.¹²³ The group discussed the role of emotions, narratives, values and frames in campaign
and communication practices, and critically reflected upon the dominance of rational approaches
(DEEEP, 2011). Also, the international conservation organisation, WWF, has collaborated with
academics and various other NGOs such as Oxfam, to produce a series of reports summarising the
social psychological literature on political behaviour. These reports strongly emphasise the role of
cultural values, frames and identity as the main mechanisms for promoting social change
(Crompton, 2010; Crompton & Kasser, 2009). It is my hope that the current research, which uses
real-world data to establish an evidence-based framework for bottom-up reform of aid policies,
will add to and strengthen this knowledge base.

¹²² At the bottom of the ad is the following message: ‘The ONE App
(http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/one-campaign/id439424134?mt=8) provides a new,
contemporary way for people to connect and use their voices to persuade political leaders to
support poverty-fighting projects that are saving lives and building sustainable futures -- for less
than 1% of the U.S. budget’.
¹²³ ‘DEEEP is a programme initiated by the Development Awareness Raising and Education Forum
of CONCORD that aims at strengthening capacities of NGDOs [non-governmental development
organisations] to raise awareness, educate and mobilise the European public for world-wide
poverty eradication and social inclusion. DEEEP is co-funded by the European Union.’
http://www.deeep.org/
9.2.2 Enhancing International Solidarity with Supranational Identities

In order to increase public support for foreign aid, this dissertation focused on strategies for enhancing the pro-aid orientations of sub-national identities. However another way to achieve this aim is to construct a supranational identity that encompasses both aid donors and aid recipients. The SCT literature maintains that categorisation is associated with in-group favouritism. This typically translates into hostility towards out-group members and prosocial behaviour towards in-group members. It therefore follows that expanding the scope of a rich country’s in-group to include poor countries, might help to strengthen public support for policies that reduce suffering in those countries, including giving more foreign aid.

Efforts to build international solidarity through supranational structures are not new. Indeed, this is precisely the EU model – top-down policy initiatives, such as a common currency, are supplemented with bottom-up cultural initiatives, such as European public radio, student exchange programs and language training. The construction of a common EU identity has legitimised financial transfers and migration between countries that were once at war. With modern technological interconnectedness, it might be possible to similarly legitimise the implementation of international commitments to reduce global poverty by enhancing a common identity between developed and developing countries.

The social psychology literature offers three basic models for bringing groups together under a collective identity: (1) the ‘common in-group identity model’ emphasises recategorisation from a lower order category to a superordinate category; (2) the ‘mutual intergroup differentiation model’ emphasises mutually-beneficial differentiation of sub-groups within a superordinate category; and (3) the ‘dual identities model’ emphasises sub-group distinctiveness within a superordinate category (Dovidio, Gaertner, Esses, & Brewer, 2003). In this section I compare the potential of each of these models for promoting solidarity between developed and developing countries.

The common in-group identity model has been shown to build solidarity amongst different racial groups by shifting the level of category inclusiveness from race to a collective superordinate category such as neighbourhood, nation, or humankind. As in-group versus out-group distinctions

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124 Perceiving that in-group members hold similar beliefs to the self increases interpersonal attraction; and in-group membership coordinates a person’s motivational system with the needs of another so prosocial behaviour is offered more readily to in-group than to out-group members (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 2001).
on the basis of race become less relevant, in-group favouritism is redirected to the collective group, including former out-group members. Thus, racial tensions decrease and prosocial behaviours increase. The logic behind the common in-group identity model is attributed to Gordon Allport’s work in the 1950s and a number of studies lend empirical support. For example, Nier et al (2001) found that white students were more likely to act prosocially toward black students with the same university affiliation as themselves, compared to black students affiliated with a different university. Recategorisation from race to university was based on wearing university branded clothing.\textsuperscript{125}

In international society, the common in-group identity model is reflected in the global citizen movement. As this is not a coherent program or organisation, different actors have different visions, from the extremely radical pursuit of free migration by issuing world passports\textsuperscript{126} to the less radical ‘Think Global School’\textsuperscript{127} where students selected from around the world travel to a different world city every term to complete their secondary education. The problem with creating a global citizen identity for building solidarity between developed and developing countries is that it is not very salient. This is largely because, aside from a handful of wealthy intellectuals who spend time contemplating global citizenship, there are no institutional structures to redefine the average citizen’s everyday logic. By comparison, EU institutions affect all aspects of citizens’ lives, whether it is interest rates to borrow money, criminal law, employment, media, or energy. Another problem with this model is that humanity does not have a readily identifiable out-group, except for other species. Thus, distinctiveness needs are not met.

Another way to structure a collective superordinate identity is with mutual differentiation. The mutual intergroup differentiation model (Brown & Wade, 1987) proposes that members of respective groups should have distinct but complementary roles to contribute towards a common goal. This model helps to satisfy distinctiveness needs when a superordinate category is highly inclusive. Indeed, mutual differentiation was recommended in Chapter 5 as a way of encouraging developed countries who share a common DAC identity to contribute their fair share to addressing global poverty. However, if mutual differentiation reinforces negative beliefs about sub-group

\textsuperscript{125} Other factors that have been shown to enhance a common group identity include: cooperation incentives, interaction, integrated seating, emphasising a common group name, and identifying an out-group (for a summary of this research see Nier et al., 2001).
\textsuperscript{126} \url{http://www.worldservice.org/}
\textsuperscript{127} \url{http://www.thinkglobalschool.org/}
members, it can be counterproductive for strengthening the superordinate identity in the longer term.

The failure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to make progress on cutting global carbons emissions highlights why mutual differentiation is unlikely to reduce global poverty. Within the UN system, many laws are universal but cooperation on climate change and international development is based on each country’s contribution to the problem and capacity to solve it. This is not the same as countries playing different but complementary roles as specified by the mutual differentiation model. Hence, mutual distrust between developed and developing countries has increased since the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2012). For example, after the Copenhagen meeting, developed countries portrayed developing countries as spoilers, and developing countries accused developed countries of shirking their responsibilities (Murray, 2009). As the only reason developing countries need foreign aid in the first place is because they are poor, they cannot be expected to make the same level of contribution as rich countries to the goal of poverty reduction. Therefore, this model is best suited to building solidarity amongst countries of equal power and wealth.

A third approach is to integrate majority and minority perspectives as dual identities. Some scholars argue that sub-group identities are not easily abandoned so they must be accepted within the context of a common group identity. For example, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) maintain that dual identities (rather than superordinate recategorisation alone) allow groups to coexist in a multicultural society because it is only when one’s original identity is secure that one can also come to identify with a binding superordinate identity. However, the dual identities model can lead to negative effects (such as discrimination) where there is disagreement over which sub-group is more prototypical of the superordinate category and where sub-groups are not equal in power/status. Therefore, the superordinate identity must be flexible enough to allow for diversity in how it is represented (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003).

The closest thing to dual identities in the international system is seen in the three main ‘post-colonial families of nations’. Britain, France and Spain refer to their former colonies in the

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128 Article 3.1 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change states: ‘The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’ (United Nations, 1992, p. 4). Also see CISDL (2002) for a history of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle.
language of ‘family’ and ‘sustain special economic, political and institutional relationships with otherwise ordinary (even unappealing) partners’ because they share a collective identity (Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholtz, 2002, p. 268). Despite taking pride in their independence, developing countries actively maintain post-colonial identities through the legacy languages, legal and parliamentary systems, and cultural practices such as sport that they share with their former rulers. Indeed, a survey of member countries of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ which arose out of the British empire found that ‘on average, people in developing countries are twice as likely to think the Commonwealth is important compared to developed countries’ (Bennett, Sriskandarajah, & Ware, 2010, p. 9). If post-colonial family identities were strengthened in the image of all family members, not just the ‘parents’, they could potentially promote greater solidarity between many of the world’s developing countries and at least six DAC donors as Australia, New Zealand and Canada are also former British colonies.

My suggestions for positively strengthening post-colonial family identities while allowing the coexistence of national identities include: (1) teaching students in civic education classes that being a citizen of a particular country helps a person to locate themselves within a cultural context, but being a citizen of a post-colonial family helps them to connect to the institutional structures that define their rights and responsibilities; (2) lifting travel restrictions between members of post-colonial families; and (3) finding similarities and consistencies among the different national identities within families that campaigners can highlight, such as similar values of democracy and the rule of law in the case of the Commonwealth (Amiot, de la Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007).

9.3 Future Research

With any research project, various factors will constrain the researcher’s ability to draw firm conclusions about the real world from the results of their analyses. In particular, every researcher must define the scope of their project according to the practicalities of collecting and analysing data. Therefore, there is always potential to enhance the interpretation of the findings by extending and validating the research.

In order to understand identity-based support for aid, I chose to analyse existing survey and country data, and to employ quantitative research methods. This choice was necessary to test the

129 I have deliberately not discussed other former colonial powers which have less influence (such as Portugal and the Netherlands) or which have retained an imperialist image (such as America).
hypotheses across the widest range of DAC countries. However, the downside was that I had to accept variables that were less than optimal in terms of representing the constructs they were supposed to measure, and some of the analyses lacked the richness that comes from single-country or qualitative analyses. To take the identity-based approach forward, this section sets out a robust and vigorous future research agenda that addresses the following key limitations of the current work: the quality and availability of comparable survey data, the assumptions underlying the selection of country-level data, and the cross-sectional methodological approach.

9.3.1 Survey Data

Concerns about the quality of the WVS data were first acknowledged in Chapter 4. These concerns include errors in the quoted aid figures for DV1, inconsistencies in the survey format across countries (for example, Britain, France and the Netherlands only asked respondents DV2), and the construct validity of the single-item Schwartz (2007b) values measures. While these concerns are best addressed by the World Values Survey Group exercising greater vigilance over the design and implementation of the original survey, a number of additional concerns could be addressed by repeating the analyses with a new custom-built survey.

First, repeating the analyses with measures of religious, political and humanitarian social identities that are more consistent with SCT would help to establish the robustness of the results and the credibility of the identity-based approach as a theoretical rival to SCT. A key difference between SCT and the identity-based approach is that the former argues that identities arise instantaneously through contrasts with others, whereas the latter argues that identities are deep-rooted and fairly stable social categories that may be internalised over time as a result of social structures. Accordingly, SCT maintains that identities can only be measured with questions about the affective and cognitive aspects of identification, such as ‘being a member of Group X is important to me’. The identity-based approach, on the other hand, maintains that the depth of an identity (in relation to other identities within the self-concept) will be accurately reflected in behavioural measures.

From the perspective of both SCT and the identity-based approach, the WVS does not include questions that capture affective and cognitive identification with pro-aid social groups. Therefore, the current research examined behavioural and ideological indicators of group membership only. For example, religious identity was measured as the frequency of church attendance which, according to SCT, may be a reflection of obligation rather than identification with other church
members per se. It therefore follows that in order to confirm the robustness of the results and the credibility of the theoretical approach, it is necessary to demonstrate that the estimates for the three pro-aid social identities hold regardless of whether they are measured behaviourally, affectively, or cognitively.

Second, the current research relied on single items to measure both personal and social identities. However, with additional questions a more reliable multi-item index could be developed for each identity under investigation. To this end, Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears’ (1995) four-item in-group identification scale is commonly used to measure social identities:

1. I see myself as a [member of Group X]
2. I am pleased to be a [member of Group X]
3. I feel strong ties with [members of Group X]
4. I identify with other [members of Group X]

*Do not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 agree completely*

Related to this, where holding multiple identities pulls a person in different directions, centring the scores for each identity on the individual’s own mean over all identities (i.e., ipsatization), is likely to increase the accuracy of predicting public opinion. In the current research, the number of response categories for the three social identity variables ranged from 3 (humanitarian) to 7 (religious) to 10 (political). Therefore, if the same response scale had been used for each type of identity, it would have been easier to determine which identity was most central to a person’s self-concept.

Third, it is empirically and practically important to replicate the analyses in countries that have not yet been examined. Although the name of the WVS suggests it aspires to measure public opinion around the world, only 13 out of 22 DAC member states fully participated in the 2005-2008 wave. The next wave of the WVS, which is being conducted in 2011-2012, may provide a wider dataset. However, at this stage it is not known which countries will participate and to what extent. All other existing cross-national surveys that cover the entire DAC membership either do not ask questions about foreign aid, or they do not ask questions about identity. Therefore, it may be necessary to commission a custom-built survey that either incorporates the suggestions made above and covers all DAC member states (perhaps with fewer respondents than the WVS for cost reasons), or
that covers the missing DAC countries with the current methodology. The former option would help to validate the findings of the current research, whereas the latter would help to establish the generalisability of the findings.

Finally, the two dependent variables that are drawn from the WVS do not distinguish between different types of aid (military aid, long-term development aid, and humanitarian relief) and only cover attitudes toward aid levels, not aid policy goals, nor national budget priorities. Comparing the identity estimates for each type of aid could enhance the specificity of the model. Likewise, rather than simply asking respondents whether the current level of aid is appropriate, they could be asked to rank aid against other national budget priorities such as domestic health care, policing, and education. This would improve the trustworthiness of the estimates by filtering the truly committed supporters of aid-giving from the superficial supporters. National surveys on foreign aid typically ask such nuanced questions. Therefore, even if only a few countries can be convinced to include the identity measures in future surveys, it might be possible to elaborate the hypotheses, and in turn improve the rigour of the analyses.

9.3.2 Country Data

In order to understand how identity meaning is constructed and how it might be manipulated, several country-level variables were used to represent two highly complex phenomena: (1) the cultural norms that constitute state identities; and (2) public discourses that contain identity frames. Although the state identity variable that I constructed was heavily simplified because the underlying cultural norms were treated as objective categories rather than as subjective experiences, it was nevertheless empirically derived and validated. In contrast, the country-level variables that I used to represent public discourses (such as government expenditure on development education) were pre-existing measures selected out of convenience.

Arguably, the extent to which public discourses contain identity frames deserves to be analysed in its own right. However, I assumed that each of the three public discourses represented by the three identity framing variables contained a single dominant identity frame. Most analyses of public discourses where political outcomes are at stake find competing frames running in parallel (S. J. Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, & Waring, 1990). Therefore, it may not be valid to assume that when a single condition is present across more than one DAC member state (such as an independent aid agency) the same identity frame dominates regardless of other factors that are specific to each particular country. Nevertheless, this limitation was accepted as necessary due to
difficulties in obtaining more robust identity framing variables ‘off the shelf’. Furthermore, the emphasis in the current study was not on politically-charged frames that compete for influence and vary over the course of an election cycle, but rather on culturally- and historically-stable frames.

As the only hypothesis (out of nine) that defied expectations related to identity framing in news media discourse, a possible avenue for future research would be to conduct a comparative content analysis of newspaper articles on foreign aid. Content analysis is a well established technique for aggregating concepts from a large number of texts and also identifying interrelationships between words that are considered important in the interpretation of discourse. A content analysis, similar to that undertaken by Bardi, Calogero, and Mullen (2008), could help to determine whether aid is framed differently in different countries’ news media, and whether the dominant frame corresponds to the identity-attitude linkages that have been reported.130

9.3.3 Methodological approach

There is a strong tradition of experimental research in social psychology and a strong tradition of public opinion analysis in political science. Both disciplines offer a valid method for testing the identity-based approach. The latter was chosen for this dissertation as it provides a real-world understanding of identity-based attitudes which is critical to the practical task of campaigning. In addition, studying attitudes to foreign aid in the context of existing aid policies could only be done with a representative sample of citizens from a range of DAC member states. Nevertheless, the methodology suffers limitations that could be addressed with a panel survey and a complementary experimental study.

An important avenue for future research is to design a panel survey that can establish causal direction by factoring in real-world phenomenology that is time-bound. The main limitation of the current methodology is that a cross-sectional design can only ever establish associations, rather than causal connections, between identities and policy attitudes. Therefore, it is not possible to ask questions such as ‘what impact did the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have on identity-based attitudes’?

130 Bardi et al (2008) examined value representations (words) in US newspapers over 101 years by measuring co-occurrences of certain words. For example, ‘unity’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’ represented universalism values.
Another advantage of testing the identity-based approach with panel data is that it could shed light on how the realignment of identities over time influences behaviour. For example, by tracking subjects who move from one country to another (such as international students), it becomes possible to investigate whether the meanings of lower order identities realign when a different state identity is externally imposed. There are several intergenerational studies which point to the possible impact of international migration on identity alignment. A study by Uslaner (2008) found that the children of migrants exhibited similar levels of social capital to the countrymen and women their parents left behind. On the other hand, a study by Jackson and Sasikumar (2011) found that the first or second generational status of American immigrants was a weaker predictor of foreign policy attitudes than American social identification. These conflicting findings highlight that in order to be confident that direct lobbying to change the state identity will facilitate bottom-up mobilisation, it is necessary to analyse how exposure to an alternative state’s institutions may change the meaning of social identities, and whether people’s interpretations of identity stereotypes are fixed early in life.

Before a campaign is launched, its effectiveness to prime and frame identities should be tested experimentally. Experiments that test the impact of campaigns on public attitudes are considered critical to winning political contests (Westen, 2007). Therefore, they are also likely to be critical to mobilising political activism. Identity campaigning experiments might be conducted in one of two ways. The first is in a lab where the mean attitudes of two or three randomly assigned groups are compared after they have been exposed to different campaign advertisements or a control advertisement. The second is in a natural setting, similar to the television experiment conducted by Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, and Grube (1984), where two local districts are matched by socio-economic status but only one is exposed to a campaign message via media broadcasts. The mean attitudes of residents from the two districts are then compared. Given that these types of experiments are costly and country-specific factors may influence the meanings of personal and social identities, they are best performed in each specific country where campaigners seek to mobilise public opinion.

A final suggestion for future research is to embed randomised experiments within the design of a survey in order to discern the rational and identity-based components of respondents’ attitudes. Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius (2008) showed that people generally do not know the reasons for their behaviour, so when asked, they tend to provide socially-plausible responses. This has contributed to the misperception that people’s attitudes are rationally
informed. With regard to increasing aid spending, people may justify their approval or disapproval on the basis of aid effectiveness or budget constraints when in fact the real reason is their identity. One way of establishing this empirically, is to create three differently-worded surveys that ask respondents to indicate the reasons for their aid-giving preferences. The first survey might be a control. The second survey might be premised with rational information about the effectiveness or affordability of the government’s aid program. The third survey might be designed to reinforce the behavioural expectations of the left-wing identity by informing respondents that the purpose of the study is to verify the results of an earlier survey which found that, compared to right-wing voters, left-wing voters are significantly more favourable to foreign aid. It can be expected a priori that left-wing respondents exposed to the identity condition will be more supportive of aid than left-wing respondents exposed to either the control condition or the rational condition. However, when provided with a list of factors that might have influenced their decision, responses for the three groups are not expected to differ. That is, respondents in the identity condition are equally likely to assert that their decision was based on the effectiveness or affordability of the government’s aid program rather than the information they received about the stereotypical attitudes of left-wing voters.

9.4 Conclusion

The political scientist, Harold Dwight Lasswell, famously said in 1936 that ‘Politics is who gets what, when, and how’, highlighting that policies to reduce global poverty and politics are inextricably linked. However, for those interested in changing politics, so as to promote policy reform and close the word-deeds gap, it is necessary to understand the missing ‘why’ component in Lasswell’s equation. To this end, the current research explored the question of why citizens do or do not support aid-giving within the context of existing aid policies.

This dissertation has laid the foundations for a new identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform. Activating and expanding aid constituencies in DAC member states may help to strengthen international cooperation on reducing global poverty as leaders will feel pressured to meet their international obligations. With the 2015 deadline for the world to achieve the MDGs looming, and insufficient progress by DAC member states towards meeting their obligations under Goal 8 (MDG Gap Task Force, 2011), this chapter has demonstrated how the research findings presented in the preceding chapters can be practically applied, validated, and built upon to fully realise the identity-based approach as new paradigm in global governance.
I developed a framework to promote aid policy reform not only because it is important for its own sake, but also because it was a way of narrowing the research focus on the broader issue of strengthening global governance. I believe that when we look back at what the world achieved in the 21st century in terms of addressing global challenges, the picture will largely depend on whether we were able to link who we are as citizens of states with the role we play in shaping global stability, prosperity and sustainability. Greater understanding of the domestic politics of foreign policies is therefore deemed necessary but the academic discipline of political science is unlikely to provide all of the answers on its own for two reasons. First, aggregate public opinion is not necessarily predictive of policy outputs. In 2003, millions of people around the world protested against the planned invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies yet the ‘coalition of the willing’ proceeded anyway. We need to look to the constructivist perspective in international relations to understand that legitimate policy choices are constitutive of cultural norms and the state’s international image. Therefore, the location of these anti-war protests was not reflective of the states that would eventually join the invasion (see O'Connor & Vucetic, 2010). Second, in most countries, policies on international cooperation are bipartisan so they typically fly under the public radar. Therefore, the policy reform convictions of citizens must be fairly strong, or the scope of the policy reform constituency must be fairly broad, to effectively bring about change. We need to look to the social psychology literature to understand that people hold strong policy convictions because doing so affirms their self-understanding.

In order to overcome the theoretical and practical limitations of liberal democracy, I asked whether the decision to support or disapprove of policies that impact on global poverty is a way of reinforcing identity. In other words, does identity drives politics? The proposed relationship between identity and public attitudes to foreign aid was empiricised by first developing, and then testing, a new conceptual model. The model places individual understanding of how to think or act within a cognitive system of interacting social categories or identities that constitute an individual’s self-concept. I argued that these categories – which are defined at various levels of inclusiveness including personal, social and state – help to structure human lives so that we can meet our material, emotional and spiritual needs. In other words, the model shifts thinking away from the conventional rationalist-moralist division in political science, to argue that in fact it is rational to base one’s political attitudes on identity because identity is a social anchor. Identity delineates friend from foe, giver from recipient, teacher from student, and so on. It is by knowing who one is and who others are that the world makes sense and is therefore manageable.
The key finding from testing my identity-based approach to bottom-up policy reform is that public opinion is a virtuous/vicious circle. I showed, with more than 16,000 survey responses from 13 diverse developed economies, that identity-based preferences are more likely to promote policy stability than policy change. This is because institutions systematically bias peoples’ perceptions of incoming information, reinforcing support for the existing system. Therefore, unless states’ anti-aid policy norms are re-imagined, internationally-agreed policy goals such as the 0.7 percent aid target will not be perceived as legitimate. My research used the latest policy and survey data possible so as to optimise the usefulness of the findings for campaigners looking to the 2015 deadline to halve global poverty. However, as DAC countries continue their current austerity drives, future research should update the data in order to understand the intersection between public opinion and international relations going forward.

Looking ahead, anti-poverty campaigners will face various constraints and opportunities when they try to build and sustain identity-based support for aid in the current age of austerity. Indeed, a 2011 Special Eurobarometer report entitled ‘Making a Difference in the World: Europeans and the Future of Development Aid’ validates my constructivist political economy model. It shows that economic decline has eroded support for aid in some states more than others. Most significantly, only in the top aid donor states of Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland and Denmark do a strong majority of respondents believe that aid promises should be upheld (EUROPA, 2011). However, my research findings highlight that public opinion is not devoid of agency. Every person’s interpretation of what it means to have a particular identity is subtly different depending on the particular combination of identities that comprise their self-concept. Therefore, the strategies for campaigning that I have recommended have the potential to activate the dormant aid constituency and enable new aid supporters to see meaning in their convictions. Furthermore, campaigners should remain optimistic in the face of specific policy reform defeats because the ultimate prize is to shift the boundaries of deep-seated cultural norms so that new norms are slowly realised. This means that small wins in reforming policies in the domestic realm can have a tipping effect, facilitating a shift in the state’s policy orientation in international realm, and eventually leading to positive feedback loops so that we may become what we cannot yet imagine.
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261


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271


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286


Appendix 1

1.A Review of the Rationalist Literature

The rationalist perspective of public opinion is the dominant normative view of politics. It also offers campaigners a workable solution to mobilising public support for policy reform, namely by raising awareness of utility gains. However, empirical support for the rationalist approach is mixed, as the below summary of the literature indicates.

Researchers who pursue the rationalist approach have typically looked at the following predictor variables of public support for foreign aid:

1. Personal income (Diven & Constantelos, 2009; Newspoll, 2005)
2. General level of education (D. Adamson, Belden, DaVanzo, & Patterson, 2000; Gilens, 2001)
3. Beliefs about aid effectiveness (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009; Kelley, 1989; Noël, Thérien, & Dallaire, 2003) and the causes of poverty (Paxton & Knack, 2008)
4. Trust in either recipient governments or the donor government (P. R. Brewer, Gross, Aday, & Willnat, 2004; A. Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Hetherington, 2005)
5. Trust in multilateral organisations (Diven & Constantelos, 2009; Hero, 1966; Paxton & Knack, 2008)
6. Benefits flowing to the donor country, including perceptions about the role of aid in reducing international terrorism, enhancing the trading position of the donor, and reducing immigration (TNS Opinion & Social, 2009; van Heerde & Hudson, 2010)
7. Knowledge of the proportion of total government expenditure allocated to aid (Brady et al., 2003; Gilens, 2001; Kull, 2005b)
8. Interest in politics (Diven & Constantelos, 2009; Paxton & Knack, 2008; UMR Research Limited, 2007)
9. Awareness of international development issues such as the MDGs and agricultural subsidies (DEA, 2010a; Kull, 2005a; TNS Opinion & Social, 2007)

In line with rationalist expectations, there is some evidence that public support for aid is motivated by material and physical self-interest. However, when the results of various studies are
combined, the picture is fairly incoherent. As a basic indicator of self-interest, most studies find personal income has a positive influence on support for aid. However, in some cases personal income has been found to decrease support for aid (Noël et al., 2003; UMR Research Limited, 2007), and a negative effect was found for country-level income (measured as GDP) on individual-level support for aid (Paxton & Knack, 2008). No further insight is gleaned from more specific indicators of self-interest. A survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation (2009) found that support for aid was higher amongst American respondents who agreed that ‘U.S. global health spending protects the health of Americans’ (p. 6). In contrast, van Heerde and Hudson (2010) found a negative relationship between self-interest and concern about poverty in developing countries using survey data from the UK. With further analysis, they distinguished a positive relationship between self-interest and concern about poverty when self-interest was defined as personal consequences, but a negative relationship when self-interest was defined as consequences for the UK. Contradictory findings within surveys also make it difficult to draw straightforward conclusions about the self-interest motive. Consistent with the rationalist view, when Canadian respondents were asked what the government’s policy priorities should be, foreign aid ranked well below health care, Canadian poverty, and other domestic concerns. Despite this, support for domestic redistribution was positively correlated with support for increasing foreign aid (Noël et al., 2003).

Another aspect of rationality that is weakly supported by the research literature is the notion that citizens will always strive to achieve the best possible outcome according to the expected utility. Indeed, it is not clear from the literature that believing aid is effective increases public support for aid. On the one hand, individuals who trust their own government and the UN show greater support for aid (A. Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Diven & Constantelos, 2009). Thus, it is often inferred that support for aid is motivated by the perceived efficiency of aid delivery. Relatedly, the finding that humanitarian relief receives greater public support than long-term development assistance (D. Adamson et al., 2000; TNS Opinion & Social, 2007) could mean that citizens recognise that it easier to alleviate short-term suffering following a natural disaster than control the various social, economic and political factors that contribute to poverty. On the other hand, Kelley’s (1989) analysis demonstrated that support for aid may drive beliefs about aid effectiveness, not the other way around. He found that Australians who supported aid were more likely to believe that aid helps ordinary people and that the government is doing a good job on foreign aid.

The rationalist view that human decisions are consciously formulated by weighing up alternatives and making trade-offs is undermined by unconvincing evidence that knowledge of development
issues influences support for aid. For example, Gilens’ (2001) discovered that policy specific information – such as knowing the true level of aid spending – did not influence people’s policy judgements without a high level of general knowledge. To this end, most studies find a positive effect for general level of education and political interest (indicating political knowledge). However, it does not necessarily follow that support for aid is rationally determined by logical reasoning rather than normatively determined by socialisation processes (such as liberal arts education). Indeed, the Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that support for aid is correlated with awareness of the MDGs even though few respondents can say anything about them (TNS Opinion & Social, 2005, 2007). Using more robust methodology, a study by Brady et al (2003) found that American support for increasing aid rose from 20 percent to 53 percent after participants had a chance to deliberate about the true level of government spending on aid. This finding is encouraging from a rationalist perspective as many surveys reveal that the public significantly over-estimate how much aid their government actually gives (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; INRA, 1997, 1999). However, the way information was presented and discussed in Brady et al’s study may be a factor in the results. Indeed, van Heerde and Hudson (2010) reported that awareness of events in developing countries from TV news or newspaper readership actually decreased public concern about poverty. They concluded that ‘the largely negative, sensationalistic and truncated nature of media coverage of global poverty works to reduce individuals’ feelings of efficacy in solving the issue’ (p. 12).

1.B Review of the Moral Judgement Literature

The moral judgement approach does a better job of explaining public support for aid than the rationalist approach but it is less desirable to campaigners. This is because, without a clear theoretical foundation, it cannot be practically implemented as a strategy for mobilising public opinion. Indeed, a wide range of theoretically unrelated variables have been studied as determinants of support for aid within the moral judgement approach, including:

1. Gender and age (A. Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Fite et al., 1990; Lader, 2007)
2. Religiosity (Kelley, 1989; Lumsdaine, 1993; Wuthnow & Lewis, 2008)
4. Internationalist, accommodationist and prosocial foreign policy outlooks (Fite et al., 1990; Lumsdaine, 1993; Wittkopf, 1990; Worchel, 1967)
5. Moral sentiment (Kelley, 1989; Lumsdaine, 1993; van Heerde & Hudson, 2010)

6. Fellow-feeling toward aid recipients, immigrants and racial minorities (Cook, 2005; Lumsdaine, 1993; O'Leary, 1967)

7. Personal charitable behaviour (Lumsdaine, 1993)


9. Structural factors, i.e., socialisation (Noël & Thérien, 2002; Paxton & Knack, 2008; M. Stern, 1998)

Although gender and age are standard ascriptive characteristics that are measured in most surveys, they are included in the moral judgement approach because of the theory that explains their effects. Females are sometimes found to be more favourable toward foreign aid than males and this is explained by their more nurturing disposition. However, some studies (such as A. Chong & Gradstein, 2008) have found no effect for gender which might be explained by Fite et al’s (1990) finding that women are more likely than men to believe that aid leads to military involvement. Younger people are thought to be more supportive of foreign aid and other measures to address global poverty because they are less conservative and more optimistic about humankind’s capacity for dealing with large-scale problems. However, van Heerde and Hudson (2010) found that respondents of all ages with positive assessments of progress in achieving the MDGs were more likely to be concerned about poverty in developing countries.

Belief systems appear to have the most powerful influence on support for aid, particularly left-wing ideology and religiosity (D. Adamson et al., 2000; Lumsdaine, 1993). Wuthnow and Lewis (2008) clarified that religious congregations shape attitudes to international development not via attendance alone, but through social norms such as volunteering, discussing foreign policy, encouraging thinking about social and political issues, and emphasising social service programs. Their study helps to explain why Kelley (1989) found that the positive effect of Christian belief on support for aid became insignificant when moral duty was added to the model. Interestingly, Lumsdaine (1993) observed that in addition to those with strong religious commitment, atheists were also more likely to favour aid. He underscored that it is people without moral conviction of any kind that are least supportive of aid. Along similar lines, those who were more internationalistic and democratic, less ethnocentric, gave to charity, and supported domestic
welfare, also tended to support foreign aid (Cook, 2005; Fite et al., 1990; Hero, 1966; Lumsdaine, 1993; Wittkopf, 1990; Worochel, 1967).

In fact, preferring that aid is given for moral rather than self-interest reasons was demonstrated to be an important predictor of support for aid in a number of studies (for example, Kelley, 1989). Lumsdaine (1993) remarked that across ten European countries, ‘the strongest predictor by far of support for aid was agreement with the statement “we have a moral duty to help” Third World countries; this item alone accounted for an astonishing 37% of the variance in support for aid’ (p. 43). Paxton and Knack’s (2008) finding of a positive effect for world citizen orientation further suggests that peoples’ moral universe is expanding beyond national borders, although they claimed to be capturing ‘attention to international affairs’. These same authors also found evidence that citizens of former colonial powers expressed higher levels of support for aid which they posited may be due to feeling greater responsibility for the welfare of people in the developing world.

While Paxton and Knack (2008) are the only scholars to have tested the direct impact of country-level variables on individual-level support for aid, two important studies considered potential structural influences on aggregate support for aid. Noël and Thérien (2002) looked at aggregate support for helping poor countries and found a negative and statistically significant relationship with conservative domestic welfare regimes and a positive relationship with socialist domestic welfare regimes.131 Stern (1998) meanwhile found a negative correlation between aggregate support for aid and remittance outflows. A possible interpretation of his and Noël and Thérien’s findings is that support for aid is higher where principles of distributive justice have been domestically institutionalised. Conversely, where market principles have been domestically institutionalised, support for aid is lower, but immigration substitutes foreign aid.

131 Conservative welfare regimes such as Germany are based on the guild-model or familialism system of social insurance which promotes social stratification. Socialist welfare regimes such as Sweden are based on intra-class solidarity or collective identity so social insurance promotes social equality. Liberal welfare regimes such as the US are based on market principles so social assistance is targeted at the very poor.
## Appendix 2

### Table 2.A The Potential for Bias in the WVS Data Due to Variation in the Mode of Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mode of Administration</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Mail back</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Face-to-face in-home computer-assisted personal interview&lt;sup&gt;132&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Quota sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Personal interview</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Personal interview</td>
<td>Quota sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Face-to-face in-home computer-assisted personal interview</td>
<td>Quota sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Face-to-face interview</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Mail back</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Face-to-face in-home computer-assisted personal interview</td>
<td>Quota sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>86.7% Face-to-face 13.3% Phone interview</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Face-to-face interview</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Face-to-face interview</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Face-to-face interview</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Self-administered via the internet (random recruitment) and phone interview&lt;sup&gt;133&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>132</sup> CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing) is a face-to-face technique for administering a survey in which the interviewer reads questions from the screen of a laptop (which the respondent cannot usually see) and responses are typed into designated fields. The computer loads the questionnaire script, which automates coherence, the answers' redirection and the quota management.

<sup>133</sup> "There were two U.S. surveys, one an internet survey done by Knowledge Networks, the other a telephone survey by GfK. The former survey has been distributed because the latter did not ask the full questionnaire. The dates for this are Sept 19 to 29th, 2006’ (Personal correspondence from Ronald Inglehart, 6 December 2009).
2.B Differences and Commonalities Between the Values Literature and the SCT Literature

There are several major conceptual differences between the values literature and SCT. In SCT, group members who share an identity act in concert because they see themselves as interchangeable with other group members. Thus, their perceptions become uniform, even without interacting. Conversely, according to the values literature, members of a social group are said to behave similarly because they have similar values, not because they attribute group characteristics to their self-definition. Unlike SCT, values are also not defined by differentiation because they are inherently given by survival needs. Thus, values are typically seen as cross-situational priorities (rather than context-dependent constructions) that can only change slowly over time, such as during different life stages. Relatedly, SCT has not specified how identities relate to each other whereas values operate within a system. This is because life would be impossible if a person were to prioritise two competing values at the same time (for example, self-direction and conformity) (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009). In fact, some research suggests that people feel ambivalent about issues when competing values pull them in opposing directions. For example, the abortion debate pits ‘freedom of choice’ against ‘sanctity of human life’ (Maio, 2010).

The values literature and SCT nevertheless also have some important commonalities. In particular, values must be salient to motivate relevant (value-congruent) attitudes and behaviours. Everyday experiences affect people’s awareness of values, but values can also be invoked through priming techniques (Maio et al., 2009). Value priming makes a value more cognitively accessible, and therefore increases its weighting in subsequent judgements about the isomorphism of values and

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134: Indeed, Schwartz (2010) argues that values motivate action according to the importance of the value to the individual, and the perceived impact (size and probability) actions have for value-expression. On the flip side, ‘cognitive dissonance’ (psychological discomfort from holding inconsistent cognitions) results when a person acts against their prized values (V. Braithwaite, 2009; Grube, Maytom II, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Maio, 2010).

135: According to Schwartz (1992), values represent three requirements for human existence: ‘needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups’ (p. 4).

136: For example, within Schwartz’s values structure, desiring self-direction (independent thought) is congruent with desiring stimulation (excitement) and conflicting with desiring security. Thus, an increase in self-direction values can comfortably coincide with an increase in stimulation values, but comes at the expense of prioritising security values. By detailing how values relate to each, Schwartz’s value structure enables one to make predictions about how behaviours associated with those values relate to each other. Indeed, research has demonstrated that priming a particular value type both increases behaviours that express that value type and decreases behaviours that express the conflicting value type (Maio et al., 2009).
behaviour. Examples of value priming include: indirectly enhancing the person’s attention to the value; encouraging self-focus; or forcing the person to violate the value and then giving them an opportunity to compensate for the violation (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Another commonality between the values and SCT literatures is that cultural norms determine the meanings ascribed to values. However, because values are frequently measured in cross-national surveys (but identities are not), it has only been possible for scholars to compare normative linkages between values and behaviour across cultures. For example, Schwartz (2007a) found that the breadth of the community to which a culture normatively applied moral values and rules of fairness, influenced relations between individual universalism values and perceptions of immigration, opposition to immigrants from different racial or ethnic groups, and participation in activities that benefit the wider society.

With more and more cross-situational research, the notion that the meanings of values are susceptible to manipulation by powerful interests has gained ground amongst values scholars (for example, V. Braithwaite, 2009; Maio, 2010; Seligman & Katz, 1996). Scholars increasingly find that the motivational link between values on the one hand and attitudes and behaviours on the other can be reconfigured through persuasive arguments that certain attitudes and behaviours express a particular value or reflect a certain value choice. This process, known as value framing, helps to explain why people apply contradictory values to different issues. For example, pro-life advocates who value ‘sanctity of human life’ see no contradiction in supporting capital punishment because capital punishment is framed as ‘retribution’. On the other hand, those against capital punishment also claim to value ‘sanctity of human life’ but nevertheless support abortion because it is framed as women’s ‘freedom of choice’. Value framing at the national level may also explain why Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet and Schmidt (2008) found country differences in the effect sizes of values for predicting public support for immigration. The authors speculated that this may have something to do with the political discourse around immigration in wealthier countries versus poorer countries.
2.C Construct Validity of Schwartz’s Values Items in the WVS

The original Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) measured personal values by asking respondents to rate ‘as a guiding principle in MY life’ a list of abstract items such as social justice, humility, creativity, social order, pleasure and ambition. Each item was ‘followed in parenthesis by a phrase that further specifies their meaning’ (Schwartz, 2006b, p. 144). The original SVS (Schwartz, 1992, 1994) comprised 56/57 items (3 to 8 items per value type). Later, a different instrument known as the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz et al., 2001) also discriminated the ten individual-level value orientations with 40 items (3 to 6 items per value type), thus demonstrating the robustness of Schwartz’s structure. Schwartz et al (2001) concluded: ‘The PVQ is more concrete and contextualized, provides descriptions of people rather than abstract value terms, and uses a response format that does not require expressing judgements in numerical ratings’ (p. 538). More recently the PVQ was shortened to only 21 items – 2 items per value type, except for universalism which has 3 items (Schwartz, 2007b). Verification of the basic values structure with these diverse instruments supports Schwartz’s (1992) early confidence that his structure ‘may be taken as tentatively exhausting the distinctive, near universal, motivational types of values’ (p. 37).

The WVS items are phrased along the lines of the PVQ. However, instead of measuring each value orientation with 2 or 3 items, the WVS used single item measures. Single item measures of values are not necessarily problematic because they can be as accurate as multi-item scales (V. A. Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). The problem with the WVS items is that they only capture one component of each value type. For example, the WVS only asked respondents the extent to which the description of a person for whom it was important ‘to be rich;

137 Other versions of Schwartz’s values structure include the ‘Brief Inventory’ which comprises 12 items (P. C. Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1998); and a slightly different instrument is the ‘Schwartz Values Best-Worst Survey’ (J. A. Lee, Soutar, & Louviere, 2008).
138 According to Bardi and Schwartz (2003) numerous studies have established the internal reliability, temporal stability, and external validity of the values indices, and it has been demonstrated that scores are not contaminated by social desirability. In addition, Spini (2003) demonstrated metric and configural equivalence, as well as factor variance invariance, for most of Schwartz’s value types across 21 countries. Spini thus confirmed the legitimacy of using the SVS in cross-cultural research.
139 Moreover, a ten item survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005) known as the Short Schwartz’s Value Survey (SSVS) was found to be a suitable substitute for the much longer SVS and PVQ. Critically, however, the SSVS was worded in such a way as to capture the full character of each value orientation with only one question per orientation. For example, the three abstract items which comprise the power values type in the SVS are ‘social power, authority, and wealth’. As such, the SSVS asked respondents to rate, ‘as a life-guiding principle’, the importance of ‘Power, that is, social power, authority, wealth’.

297
to have a lot of money and expensive things’ was like them. Therefore, the WVS items do not fully capture the range of goals underlying the power values construct. These are: social status, prestige, and control or dominance over people and resource (Schwartz, 2007b). Refer to Box 2.A to see how Schwartz characterises each value type.

According to personal correspondence with Schwartz in 2009, he was not consulted by the WVS when the questions were designed. Therefore, the construct validity of the WVS items had to be tested. This appendix explains the procedure that I followed and demonstrates that in fact the construct validity of the WVS items was affirmed. Also refer to Welzel (2010) for evidence that the WVS measures group to form the two higher-order dimensions of self-transcendence versus self-enhancement and openness-to-change versus conservation.

Construct validity was tested by correlating specific value types from the WVS items with demographic variables to confirm the predicted direction and strength of the associations. For example, Schwartz et al (2001) reported that age correlated positively with self-transcendence

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Box 2.A The Schwartz values structure identifies ten motivationally distinct values which serve as guiding principles in people’s lives. The ten basic values can be characterized by describing its central motivational goal:

1. **Self-Direction.** Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring.
2. **Stimulation.** Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
3. **Hedonism.** Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.
4. **Achievement.** Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
5. **Power.** Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.
7. **Conformity.** Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
8. **Tradition.** Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self.
9. **Benevolence.** Preserving and enhancing the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the ‘in-group’).
10. **Universalism.** Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.

(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, p. 1208; Schwartz, 2006a)
values and negatively with self-enhancement values. Likewise, education correlated positively with self-direction and stimulation values and negatively with conformity and tradition values.

Correlations between each value type and age, gender, and education are presented in Table 2.8 for both the SVS and the WVS (ipsatized and non-ipsatized values). Overall, the WVS associations appear consistent with the correlations Schwartz (2006a) reported with his own measures.

Another test of construct validity involved regressing ‘life satisfaction’ on the eight key value types that I use to predict support for aid. Power and security values are known to have a strong negative relationship with life satisfaction, while hedonism, benevolence, and self-direction values are known to have a strong positive relationship (Schwartz, 2010). The results converged with these expectations. Refer to Table 2.C for the regression estimates.

Finally, Schwartz’s circular arrangement portrays the motivational continuum of each of the ten individual-level values – adjacent values are congruent and opposing values are antagonistic. Thus, associations of core values with outside variables such as support for aid, should ‘decrease monotonically as one goes around the circular structure of value types in both directions from the most positively associated value type to the least positively associated value type’ (Schwartz, 1992, p. 54). Any deviations can then be investigated. This third test of construct validity also supported the WVS single items as shown in Figure 2.A.

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Table 2.B Pairwise Correlations Between Value Types and Demographic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age (18+)</th>
<th>Gender (female)</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-ipsatized WVS</td>
<td>Ipsatized WVS</td>
<td>Schwartz (20 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WVS correlations use Bonferroni corrected p values; Schwartz correlations presumably use non-ipsatized values
† Correlation does not differ significantly from zero
Table 2.C Regression Estimates for ‘Life Satisfaction’ (Ipsatized Values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
<td>Coef./</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
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<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=F)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>5.92**</td>
<td>6.37***</td>
<td>6.92**</td>
<td>5.44***</td>
<td>5.83**</td>
<td>5.78***</td>
<td>7.09***</td>
<td>7.24***</td>
<td>6.95**</td>
<td>6.82***</td>
<td>6.52***</td>
<td>5.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. of cases</td>
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<td>792</td>
<td>1735</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>1126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**H** = hypothesised direction of effect; **c** = control variable

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

AU=Australia; GB=Great Britain; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; FR=France; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America
Figure 2.A The Motivational Continuum of Values with Support for Aid

The Pattern of Value Relations with Support for Aid: An Integrated System


Note. Correlations between ‘willingness to sacrifice’ and tradition, achievement, and hedonism do not differ significantly from zero.
Table 2.D Correlation Matrix for all Dependent and Independent Variables at the Individual-Level (Non-ipsatized Values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid Endorsement</th>
<th>Willingness to Sacrifice</th>
<th>Universalism</th>
<th>Benevolence</th>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to Sacrifice</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (1=Left; 10=Right)</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>-0.07***</td>
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Bonferroni corrected p values
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001

N=16560
Table 2.E Mean Scores for Individual-Level Variables by Country (Non-Ipsatized Values)

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<th>CA</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>NL</th>
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<th>ES</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aid Endorsement</td>
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<td>2.346</td>
<td>2.240</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>2.454</td>
<td>2.431</td>
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<td>Willingness to Sacrifice</td>
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<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.419</td>
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<td>Age Group</td>
<td>(1=15-29; 2=30-49; 3=50-98)</td>
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<td>2.365</td>
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<td>1025</td>
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<td>2019</td>
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<td>Power</td>
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<td>1021</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>1233</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=not like me; 6=like me</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>3.274 (1.368) 3.359 (1.452) 3.633 (1.449) 3.076 (1.297) 3.646 (1.541) 3.825 (1.272) 2.926 (1.202) 2.926 (1.349) 3.084 (1.298) 3.717 (1.105) 3.196 (1.343) 3.534 (1.375) 3.305 (1.378)</td>
<td>1394 1038 2151 1010 900 2006 1030 1048 1018 1180 998 1234 1217</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>3.061 (1.300) 3.489 (1.414) 3.514 (1.425) 3.676 (1.312) 4.347 (1.362) 4.026 (1.156) 2.705 (1.105) 4.092 (1.268) 3.356 (1.344) 3.904 (1.136) 3.717 (1.268) 4.189 (1.343)</td>
<td>1388 1035 2142 1010 999 2029 1048 1045 1019 1183 998 1238 1214</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>4.139 (1.251) 4.275 (1.271) 4.575 (1.181) 4.357 (1.196) 4.358 (1.357) 4.115 (1.232) 3.989 (1.246) 4.272 (1.263) 4.061 (1.210) 4.615 (1.071) 4.453 (1.087) 4.167 (1.092)</td>
<td>1391 1036 2122 1005 996 2025 1038 1042 1018 1177 1001 1239 1219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>5.519 (1.949) 5.287 (1.854) 5.426 (1.877) 5.602 (1.968) 5.478 (2.120) 4.768 (1.831) 4.596 (1.787) 5.241 (1.974) 5.604 (1.892) 5.436 (1.966) 5.588 (2.202) 5.161 (2.011)</td>
<td>1348 880 1624 903 931 1824 863 913 997 1045 975 1111 1203</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2.611 (1.972) 2.738 (2.067) 3.449 (2.101) 2.898 (1.576) 2.201 (1.710) 2.649 (1.756) 3.302 (1.262) 2.486 (1.923) 2.416 (1.535) 2.711 (1.969) 2.119 (1.401) 3.091 (1.878)</td>
<td>1405 1034 2144 1009 997 2015 1090 988 1018 1179 1002 1226 1198</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>0.475 (0.762) 0.526 (0.823) 0.524 (0.819) 0.303 (0.621) 0.299 (0.626) 0.140 (0.449) 0.0653 (0.309) 0.271 (0.574) 0.0439 (0.702) 0.425 (0.475) 0.481 (0.664) 0.466 (0.711)</td>
<td>1339 1030 2149 1008 1000 2045 1042 1018 1024 1199 999 1234 1215</td>
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</table>


Standard deviation in parentheses

AU=Australia; GB=Great Britain; CA=Canada; FN=Finland; FR=France; DE=Germany; JP=Japan; NL=Netherlands NO=Norway; ES=Spain; SE=Sweden; CH=Switzerland; US=United States of America

Note. In Canada, only respondents who endorsed aid, i.e., 'aid too low', were asked whether they would be willing to sacrifice for aid
### Table 2.F Raw Data on Policy Discourse Proxies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Development Education Per Capita</th>
<th>Daily Newspapers Per capita</th>
<th>Aid Agency Independence</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>0.551</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>0.429</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.194</td>
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### Table 2.G Sources of Country-Level Data on Policy Discourses

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source of Data</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Education Per Capita</td>
<td>Donor expenditure on information and development education per capita $, 2001-2002</td>
<td>McDonnell, Solignac-Lecomte et al, 2003a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Newspapers Per Capita</td>
<td>Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a week and calculated as average circulation (or copies printed) per person, 2004</td>
<td>World Development Indicators, 2008, The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Agency Independence</td>
<td>Minister for international development, 2010</td>
<td>Author collected from individual aid agency websites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3

### Table 3.A Sources of Country-Level Data on State Identities

<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIC ODA</td>
<td>Aid to LIC as percentage of GNI (average 2006-2007) LICs comprise ‘least developed countries’ and all other countries with per capita income (World Bank Atlas basis) of USD 825 or less in 2004. Includes imputed multilateral ODA.</td>
<td>2009 Development Co-operation Report, OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>Share of aid recorded in recipient budgets (2007) ‘Data from recipient country governments on how much aid passes through their budgets are compared with donor estimates of total aid to the government sector to estimate how much aid is on-budget and how much is off-budget’ (Birdsall et al., 2010)</td>
<td>2010 Quality of ODA (QuODA), Center for Global Development, Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI/GNI</td>
<td>Direct investment flows to developing countries as percentage of GNI (2007) [Austrian data=2006]*</td>
<td>2009 Development Co-operation Report, OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Employment equality ratio (2006) Calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the unemployment rate of foreign-born men to native-born men (as percentage of total labour force)</td>
<td>OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Number of students from non-DAC countries as fraction of all foreign students (2003-2005)</td>
<td>2008 Commitment to Development Index, Center for Global Development, Washington</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Austria’s 2007 export credits and FDI were replaced with 2006 figures due to concerns that the 2007 data were unusually high.*
Appendix 4

4.A Cross-national Variation in the Predicted Probabilities of Personal Identities on Aid Endorsement

Figures 4.A to 4.K graphically depict the predicted probabilities of respondents’ saying aid is ‘too low’ as each of the eight value orientations increase in strength. Value strength is considered low for respondents who said the portrait of a person for whom the value (e.g., security) is important is ‘not at all like me’ and high if they said the portrait is ‘very much like me’. Note that confidence intervals have not been included in these graphs to assist the reader decipher the direction and strength of the effects. Therefore, it must be remembered that not every line is statistically significant. However, the point of these graphs is to show that the impact of values on support for aid differs across the DAC member states as the theory predicted. In other words, the relationship between personal identities and aid endorsement is not constant cross-nationally.

Figure 4.A The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Australia
Figure 4.B The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Canada

Figure 4.C The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Finland
Figure 4.D The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Germany

![Graph showing the effects of values on aid endorsement in Germany.](image)

Figure 4.E The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Japan

![Graph showing the effects of values on aid endorsement in Japan.](image)
Figure 4.F The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Norway

Norway: Predicted Probabilities
Aid Too Low

Probability

Not At All Like Me

Personal Values

Very Much Like Me

Universalism Benevolence Tradition Security

Power Achievement Hedonism Self-Direction

Figure 4.G The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Spain

Spain: Predicted Probabilities
Aid Too Low

Probability

Not At All Like Me

Personal Values

Very Much Like Me

Universalism Benevolence Tradition Security

Power Achievement Hedonism Self-Direction
Figure 4.H The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Sweden

Figure 4.I The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in Switzerland
Figure 4.J The Effects of Values on Aid Endorsement in the US
**Appendix 5**

Table 5.A Variable Definitions and Sources of Data for Additional Analyses

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<thead>
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<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>% Pop Foreign Born</td>
<td>Foreign-born population as % total population, 2006</td>
<td>OECD (2008a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Aid</td>
<td>% Bilateral aid to former colonies, 1970 to 1994</td>
<td>Alesina and Dollar (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization Index</td>
<td>Diversity of ideological choice in political party systems, 2001-2006</td>
<td>Dalton and Anderson (2011)</td>
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