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by

J. W. Cleary

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University.

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**Introduction**

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ABSTRACT

The thesis purports to describe the political and administrative system of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic as it was from 1955 to 1964. The first two sections are concerned mainly with central party and governmental institutions - one with the bureaucratic machinery proper, and the second with formally extra-bureaucratic institutions. The relationship between these two parts is discussed.

The third section puts some flesh on the institutional skeleton. The political elite of the republic is identified and career patterns of leading personnel are traced; a case study throws light on the policy making process in agriculture; a chapter on industry shows that republican leadership can get out of step when factional struggle is rife at USSR level; finally an attempt is made to probe the politics of the rapid turnover of top leaders during the decade studied.

Since this is the Kazakh Republic an analysis is made of how power is shared between the main national groups before conclusions on the nature of the system are presented.
In an age when scholarship is fragmented and specialised a thesis purporting to describe the political system of a Soviet republic comparable in size and population to Australia is something of an oddity. No political scientist would claim that the Australian polity has been exhaustively explored, yet Ph.D. theses in this field are now confined to small sectors of it. It is remarkable, then, that no one has attempted even a general study of the Kazakh Republic. Still more remarkable is it that the writer had before him a choice of any of the fifteen Soviet republics, none of them having been breached when the present thesis was begun.

The study of Soviet politics lags behind that of Western democracies in numerous respects, but the gap is not so appalling that it explains the almost complete absence of works on republican level government. Of the many possible explanations perhaps the most obvious is that the Soviet system is generally held to be so centralised that study of its territorial branches is unrewarding.

It is true that the USSR submits to compartmentalised study less easily than any other major power. In so far as it does submit to such treatment, vertical compartmentalisation into institutions (party, government branches, trades unions, etc.) or policy areas (industry, agriculture) possesses considerable advantages over area studies. Nevertheless no more justification for focusing on a single republic is needed than the fact that this has hardly been attempted, whereas studies of vertical slices have been. Having found that most noteworthy
events in the republic are ripples from waves that radiate from the centre, the writer has in fact arrived at a modest estimate of the returns from labour expended at the periphery. Yet if confirmation of the negative value of republican studies were the only return, a pioneering effort would still be worthwhile. The reader may judge for himself whether something more than this has been achieved.

A further reason why studies at republican level have not attracted Western scholars is that institutions there largely duplicate those to be found at USSR level. The republican party and state machinery described in the first section, and the elective institutions described in the second, do indeed closely reproduce the central USSR complex. Nevertheless a comprehensive description is warranted because of certain differences of form and function, as well as some features, which, although common to USSR institutions, have not yet found a place in Western publications. The similarities allow some shorthand, so that more attention can be given to these differences and gaps. For instance a full chapter is devoted to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not because it looms so large among central institutions, but because this part of the system is almost completely neglected in Western textbooks. On the other hand once the party Congress has been described in detail, Central Committee plenums are dismissed summarily because their primary function is similar, and because the character of CPSU Central Committee plenums is sufficiently well-known. This does not mean, of course, that their importance as source material on many aspects of the system is underrated; speeches made at plenums are referred to throughout the thesis.
In drawing together the parts of the thesis and generalizing about the nature of the system, the difficulty that it is a smaller version of a larger whole is encountered even more acutely. The problem is met head-on by acknowledging that most of what has been written of the USSR as a whole will be relevant to conclusions drawn from the present study. It is hoped that enough new and illuminating material emerges from the thesis to justify the eclectic view finally arrived at.

Why Kazakhstan rather than any other republic? It attracted interest because it was the centre of the huge virgin lands project, because it has been given priority in industrial development, because of the turnover of its First and Second Secretaries; in short because something was happening there. There are two larger republics, the RSFSR and the Ukraine. The former was deemed unsuitable because it has no well developed central party organs of its own; they are integrated with those of the CPSU. The latter has at least received attention from one western scholar (J.A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite), and, like Khrushchev, we preferred to plough up virgin soil. Kazakhstan also has oblast divisions (and for a time had krai divisions as well), which are lacking in the small republics. This was not an important consideration, however, because the thesis does not descend to local level except to throw light on the nature and operation of central institutions. A strict word limit imposed this boundary on the thesis.

The time limits to the period covered by the thesis were set at the one end by the availability of source material - files of Kasakhstanskaya Pravda dated from 1955; at the other by the usual problems
of continually revising completed text. Where information was readily
available (e.g. on the central government structure, which may be
ascertained from Supreme Soviet sessions) the text has been brought up
to date as at mid 1966.

The major source was the abovemented newspaper, supplemented
for the ’sixties by the republican party journal, Partiinaya Zhizn’
Kazakhstan. Other material was widely scattered - a small number of
books specifically on Kazakhstan; a number of Moscow publications on the
republican level of government in general; and occasional articles by
Kazakhstan officials in central newspapers and journals. The
difficulties in processing official Soviet publications have been
bemoaned by many a political scientist: ’Systematic secretiveness’ on
everything of vital importance is how D.J.R. Scott summarized them.
’The official picture is black and white; there is also much denunciation
of faults, though these are normally either past or exceptional and
always individual or tactical rather than consequent upon the grand
strategy of the system’. Fortunately there is no infallible test for
Soviet editors to determine what is ’exceptional’ or ’tactical’, and
the present soon becomes the past. Soviet publications are obviously
worth sifting; otherwise we might as well abandon study of the USSR
altogether.

Finally a note on terminology. Because of variations in
western translations of the titles of Soviet administrative divisions
and institutions, a transliterated Russian nomenclature has been preferred.
Where similarly named institutions are to be found at USSR and republican
levels, unspecified references are to republican bodies.
In Australia, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the party or parties in power, and the Cabinet (ministers) constitute the executive branch of government. The Cabinet is responsible for the administration of the country. The Prime Minister, as the leader of the government, has the power to appoint ministers from within his party or a coalition party. The Cabinet is supported by the bureaucracy, which is responsible for implementing policies and administering the laws.

When a government changes, the Cabinet is usually dissolved and a new Cabinet is formed, consisting of new ministers from the new government. The Prime Minister has the power to dissolve Parliament and call for a new election, which can result in a change of government. The Cabinet is accountable to Parliament and the electorate for its actions.

In Australia, the Cabinet is considered to be a powerful institution, with significant influence over the direction of government policy. The Cabinet is also responsible for the appointment of government officials, including judges and other public servants.

The Cabinet is assisted by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which is responsible for providing advice and support to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Department is also responsible for implementing policies and administering the laws.
development was sharply reversed, and the whole administrative structure
now looks much as it did when Stalin died. Republican governments moved
first in one direction, then in the other, in close step with the
all-union government. In the first half of this chapter the changes among
Kazakhistan's central government institutions are traced, and an attempt
is made to assess the significance of the trend towards 'government
through committees' and its recent reversal. In the second half of the
chapter the Council of Ministers itself is investigated.

Among the agencies whose heads were members of the Council of
Ministers up to 1955, the only exceptions to the ministerial form of
organisation were the State Security Committee and Gosplan. At the end
of that year a State Committee on Construction and Architectural Affairs
was formed, and except for a single break of twelve months has existed
over since.¹ A State Scientific and Technical Committee was established
in 1957 to study and promote the introduction of technological advances.
Thereafter the process gathered momentum, until by 1965 there were
twelve specialized state committees. At the same time the number of
ministries declined from 23 in 1955 to 18. It should not be inferred
from this that there was a direct transfer of functions from ministries
to committees. There were only two cases of conversion of ministries
into state committees, and they were balanced by two conversions in the

¹After 1958 it became the State Committee on Construction Affairs -
Gosstroj.
opposite direction. The main cause of the decline in the number of ministries was the reorganisation of industrial administration in 1957, which transferred enterprises to the newly created local sovarkhozy and abolished all industrial ministries. (The reorganisation was thus more thoroughgoing than at USSR level where several industrial ministries were retained). Apart from this reversal, which reduced the number of ministries from 27 to 17, the overall trend was for both ministries and state committees to proliferate, the latter being more favoured. In October 1965 most of the state committees were either abolished or their chairmen excluded from membership of the Council of Ministers, and none new ministries formed. As at mid 1966 this left Kazakhstan with 28 ministries and five committees (with chairmen in the Council of Ministers). To avoid an item by item account of these continual organisational changes since 1955, chart I has been devised.

In order to assess the significance of the drift towards government through committees and the subsequent return to the ministerial form, let us look at the Soviet concepts of these two types of organisation. Ministries are defined as 'central branch organs of state administration'; they oversee a single branch of 'economic or cultural-political construction'. Although conveniently brief and therefore commonly used by Soviet commentators, this definition was never universally

1 In 1958 the Ministry of State Control became a Commission and in 1964 the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Conservation was similarly converted. Conversions in the opposite direction were Higher and Secondary Special Education (1960) and Water Economy (1964).

2 I.N. Ananov, Ministerstva v SSSR, Moscow, 1960, pp. 9, 10; V.A. Vlasov, Osnovy Sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo upravleniya, Moscow, 1960, p. 57.
applicable — not even before the abolition of industrial branch ministries in 1957 — for there had always been a few ministries (e.g. Finance, Central) whose authority in some matters extended over numerous branches of the administration. Nor have the growing complexity and interdependence of branches of the Soviet economy made the definition any more accurate since then. Nevertheless the jurisdictional limitation of ministries to a single sector of "economic or cultural-political construction" still remains their most common and easily distinguishable feature. When this form of organization predominated in the pre-1957 period, the state apparatus was characterised by extremely long vertical lines of subordination, with very few coordinating agencies along these lines. The ministries were something of a law unto themselves, and are said by a Kazakh writer to have become "autonomous economic organisations, aiming at producing everything for themselves and for themselves alone".¹ That this was scarcely an exaggeration will be seen in a later chapter on industry.

State committees and commissions have been defined as general state (obshehosudarstvennoye) central organs of administration, with the role of coordinating (a) particular aspects of the work of ministries, sovnarkhozy, and other agencies, or (b) individual branches of production.² The alternative (b) clearly detracts from the usefulness of this definition as a means of distinguishing the functions of state committees from those of ministries, since the latter must necessarily "coordinate" their own specialised branches. Some Soviet commentators admitted a problem here,

¹S.N. Dosymbekov, Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie prosvetlennosti v Kazakhskoi SSR, Alma-Ata, 1964, p. 139.
²Yu.N. Kozlov, Gruzavo Gosudarstvennego upravlenia, Moscow, 1960, p.83.
and agreed that certain state committees closely resembled ministries; others took evasive action by drawing up a combined list of the functions of all state committees in order to give them all without distinction the appearance of "general organs."

However valid this differentiation may have been in 1957 when operative functions went to the economic councils, some USSR branch committees at least came to fulfil much the same role as had the old ministries. In general, however, this was a problem that presented itself only at USSR level because of the absence there of institutions directly charged with responsibility for the performance of industrial enterprises. In the republics such institutions now existed in greater numbers than before, and the distinction between them and state committees (both those with general and those with branch coordinative functions) remained a useful one. In Kazakhstan such economic branch committees as were established coexisted with ministries or other bodies with operative functions. Thus there were the State Committee of the Council of Ministers on the Use and Conservation of Surface and Subterranean Water Resources, and the Ministry of Water Economy or the Ministry of Irrigation.

1I.N. Ananov, op.cit., p. 29.
3Yu N. Koalev, op.cit., pp. 87, 89.
Farming and Water Economy: the State Committee for Construction Affairs, and the Ministry of Construction. In theory at least the ministry remained the operative agency in each case, the committee being confined to coordination of technical progress and the submission of 'proposals on basic economic problems'. The description of state committees as the 'scientific headquarters' of branches whose 'operative leadership' lay elsewhere seems to have remained generally valid for Kazakhstan - at least in the industrial sphere.

In agriculture the nomenclature of administrative units was more confused. The main operative institution in Kazakhstan, as in other republics, has always been a ministry, whereas at USSR level the Committee of State Purchases took over from the weakened Ministry of Agriculture between 1961 and 1965. Kazakhstan followed suit, with the procurement organisation assuming operative powers, but it remained a ministry (Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products). Legally the Ministry of Agriculture, as a research organisation, should have been converted to a State Committee (both at USSR and republican levels), but this was not done.

As one moves away from the production branches the choice of state committee or ministry as an organisational form becomes more arbitrary. The functions of the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Conservation were predominantly scientific and exploratory for nearly a decade before conversion to a state committee in 1963. In 1965 a Ministry of Geology was again formed. Vocational and technical education comes under a state committee, secondary specialist education under a

\[1\] T.N. Ananov, op.cit., p. 30.
ministry - but was formerly under a committee. There is no obvious rational basis here and practice has varied from republic to republic. From 1960 on Kazakhstan was grouped with the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Belarus in having a Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education, whereas seven other republics established state committees of the same name. (Small republics did not separate higher education from the Ministry of Education). This particular instance of variety was cited by several Soviet writers as evidence of the freedom of the Union Republics to choose the organisational forms most suited to local conditions. If so, the criterion applied seems to have been one of size only, larger republics choosing the ministerial form - without regard for the definitions of the theorists. Likewise there seems to be no logical reason why the civil police should be organised as a ministry (Preservation of Public Order), and security police as a committee (KGB); nor why culture should be a ministry, and some of its parts - radio, cinema, press - separated out as state committees.

Enquiry into whether individual units of the administration conform to official functional categories is not a sterile theoretical exercise. If units are either 'branch' ministries or 'coordinating' committees, then it is a matter of some import that the latter increased


\[2\] The KGB is a committee, not a state committee (at both USSR and republican level), a distinction intended perhaps to symbolise the demarcation of the political police after Beria's fall. At republican level this seems to mean little, for the KGB Chairman is a member of the Council of Ministers on a par with state committee chairman. Whether the KGB is in fact run by a committee, and whether persons other than KGB members are represented on such a committee is not known. It is not classed as a collegial organ (see p. 37).
at the expense of the former at republican level throughout the
Khrushchev era. In contrast to the pre-1957 and post-1965 situations, in
which the dominant pattern is one of long branch lines converging at USSR
level, the increased number of coordinating bodies in the republic should
automatically have betokened enhanced powers for the Kazakh government.
As we have noted, however, the choice of title for administrative agencies
outside the material production sphere bore little relation to their
functions. In fact non-economic state committees generally administered
directly the formations below them so that there was little to distinguish
them from ministries. Now it was precisely the non-economic committees
which were mainly responsible for the lowered ministry/committee ratio
in Kazakhstan. Of the dozen committees established after 1957 only four
(Construction Affairs, Scientific and Technical, Work Safety, Water
Conservation) could be classed as fulfilling a coordinative role.

A further consideration is that each of these four had a
superordinate committee at USSR level, and the question therefore arises
of how far they may be regarded as republican coordinating bodies and not
mere extensions of the USSR government. The same question may be asked
about any republican agency and we shall take this up a little further on
under the heading of 'dual subordination'. Meanwhile there is a third
type of administrative unit to be considered.

The chief directorate (glavnoe upravlenie) may be described
briefly as an inferior kind of ministry. Those appearing on Chart I are
only the more important directorates, whose heads are or were members of
the Council of Ministers. There are usually about an equal number at any
one time which do not rate this distinction: several such lesser chief
directorates were noted over the years, as well as several directorates,
the next and lowest agency of the central government. All are separate
administrative bodies and are not to be confused with the identically
named subdivisions of a ministry. Unlike a ministry or state committee,
which is established and abolished by decree of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, the chief directorate may be brought into existence by a
provision of the Council of Ministers, and dissolved in the same way.

There has been a somewhat puzzling distinction between the
titles of certain chief directorates. All those formed before 1961 were
called chief directorates attached to (мы) the Council of Ministers,
irrespective of whether their heads were members of the Council or not.
When the head of the Chief Directorate on Forestry and Forest Conservation
attached to the Council of Ministers was made a minister in 1961 the words
'attached to' in the full title were changed to 'of'. Also when the Chief
Directorate of State Farms was formed in the same year and its head made
a member of the Council of Ministers, it was given the title Chief
Directorate of the Council of Ministers. Two other chief directorates,
however, with ministers as heads (Highways, Professional and Technical
Education), continued to retain the old formula in their titles. A
text-book on the USSR government published at this time stated that heads
of institutions 'attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR' are not
members of the USSR government and that these institutions are formed and
abolished by the USSR Council of Ministers.¹ Kazakhstan therefore was
apparently following USSR government practice in the case of newly formed

¹I.N. Ananov, op.cit., p. 31. Oddly this did not apply to committees
'attached to' Gosplan and Gosstroy USSR.
bodies, but failing to alter existing nomenclature. Successive
reorganisations had just about taken care of these anomalies by October,
1965, when nine heads of state committees, chief directorates, etc., were
removed from membership of the Council of Ministers. No mention was made
at the time of any change in their titles, though this may have been
affected by an unpublished postscript. If so, the KGB ('attached to'
the Council of Ministers) remains the one agency whose title does not
correspond with its status.

Determination of whether a body will be a ministry or a chief
directorate seems to be based on its size and importance. Kazakhstan was
the only republic to form a Ministry of Geology and Mineral Conservation
in 1956; other republics, including even the RSFSR, formed chief
directorates.1 Presumably this reflected the scale of mineral search and
development in Kazakhstan in the ensuing years. One wonders, however,
whether the title of chief directorate is not sometimes a convenient
subterfuge when ministries in the republics are abolished by central fiat.
The Kazakh Ministry of Water Economy fell under the 1957 axe, only to
reappear the following year as a chief directorate with a minister as its
head. The Ministry of State Farms was similarly dealt with in 1961, when
Kazakhstan was cut of line with other republics in having such a ministry.
Ordered to conform, Kazakhstan leaders may have used the chief directorate
as a means of formal compliance. The assumption that such an order was
given is not a gratuitous one, despite what Soviet sources say about the
choice open to republics in organizing their own administrative structure.

1 A.L. Lepeshkin, op.cit., pp. 496, 497.
The ministry in question was originally formed 'on the personal initiative of N.S. Khrushchev', and would hardly have been abolished by decision at any lower level. The vast majority of organisational changes registered on Chart I can be traced to causative changes at USSR level, and the few instances of variation within the Kazakh administration have been cited because they are exceptional. How dependent the structure of the republican government is on that of the USSR will become even more apparent in the following pages.

We have suggested that the temporary preference for 'government through committee' was little more than a change of nomenclature, but that there were several committees in production branches which may have brought a devolution of coordinative powers to the republic. Much depended on the degree of supervision by similarly named USSR committees. To probe this question we may look at another broad division of administrative agencies. The units of the republican government may be either 'union republican' or 'republican'. The former category exists at both USSR and republic levels, the latter at republic level only. Agencies may be transferred from the all-union to the union-republican, from the union-republican to the republican lists, and vice-versa. Beginning with 1955 when the all-union Ministry of Communications was made a union-republican ministry a trend was initiated towards institutional decentralisation. Early the following year the Kazakh Ministry of Geology and Mineral Conservation was similarly derived, as were

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1 Kzakhestan'skiye Pravda, 11/3/60. Hereafter abbreviated to KP.
2 A third category, the all-union agency does not concern us here because it is not represented in republican governments. Branches of all-union ministries in the republics are administered directly from Moscow.
the Ministries of Higher and Secondary Special Education (1960) and Power and Electrification (1962). Union-republican ministries which became republican numbered five - Justice (1956), Automobile Transport (1956), Trade (1958), Internal Affairs (1960) and Procurements (1962). The changes were given much emphasis in Soviet commentary on decentralisation to the republics - or 'strengthening the rights of the republics' as the official rubric put it.

There were several changes in the other direction towards the end of Khrushchev's era. The republican Ministry of Irrigation and Water Economy was made union-republican in 1963, and Trade reverted to similar status in 1964. Two of the economic branch committees which attracted our attention earlier, Construction Affairs and Coordination of Scientific and Research Work, were likewise converted to union-republican agencies in 1963 and 1964 respectively. In addition to these changes there was also the conversion in May, 1963 of the Kazakh Gosplan and Council of National Economy from 'republican' to union-republican status. It is doubtful however whether these two bodies were any less subject to USSR direction prior to 1963. The writer has failed to find any suggestion that the new status of these two agencies meant any alteration to either planning or industrial administrative procedures; the conversions seem to have entailed nothing more than the removal of a constitutional anomaly. The USSR Gosplan and Council of National Economy had hitherto been designated as all-union agencies, yet their counterparts existed at republican level. The republican Gosplans and Councils had thus been formally subordinate only to their respective Councils of Ministers,
but if the correct channels of communication were observed, then the republican governments must have acted merely as mail boxes on numerous occasions.

The state committees in existence at the end of 1964 had not all been given a formal republican or union-republican designation, but the fact that there was a parallel USSR committee of the same or similar name in each case appears to be sufficient reason for regarding all without exception as union-republican. On balance therefore the proportion between the two types of agency that had existed in 1955, was restored by the end of Khrushchev's reign. If in 1964 there were more 'coordinating' bodies at republican level, there were also more such USSR bodies to supervise them. It would be inaccurate therefore to regard the October, 1965 reorganization simply as a reversal of the 1957 decentralization - institutionally the reversal had occurred well before Khrushchev's handiwork was undone. The 1965 reorganization did in fact leave Kazakhstan with eight republican ministries, as against five in 1955. Whether it was actually a further centralization move depends largely on how one looks at the branch and regional forms of administering industrial enterprises, and these will be examined separately in Chapter VIII. Here it still remains to compare union-republican and republican agencies.

Union-republican ministries are subject to dual subordination; at one and the same time they are organs of the republican government and, in effect, branches of USSR ministries. Non-Soviet works on the USSR political system have generally agreed that vertical subordination has
always proved stronger than lateral subordination.\(^1\) Several ministries of this type have remained common to every republic despite successive reorganizations—Health, Culture, Communications, Agriculture and Finance. The 1965 reorganization added nine new union-republican ministries and left the republican ones almost unchanged. Details are again available in Chart I. At the same time the following union-republican bodies were formed which do not appear on the chart because their heads are not members of the Council of Ministers:

**Directorate of the Coal Industry**

**Directorate of the Chemical Industry**

'Kazakhsteneft' = an oil extraction corporation

'Kaschernet' = the ferrous metallurgical and mining corporation.

Formulation of the position of republican ministries varies somewhat with different Soviet writers. One speaks of complete independence of republican branches of administration,\(^2\) while another states that independence of republican ministries from direction by the all-union government would be a negation of the principles of federation.\(^3\)

All are agreed that while union-republican ministries receive directions from two sources, republican ministries receive them from only one, the republican Council of Ministers. The question is then to what extent are these branches directed by the USSR government via the republican Council of Ministers. Now even the author referred to above as voicing the extreme independence view has this to say: although there are no

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\(^2\) Leshchikin, op.cit., p. 491.

\(^3\) Ananov, op.cit., p. 115.
Specific USSR ministries to issue orders to republican ministries:

the establishment of basic principles...and ensuring unified policy on a USSR wide scale in the basic questions of these branches...comes within the competence of higher organs of power of the USSR. Republican branches of administration should not be regarded as branches in relation to which the higher organs of the USSR have no rights.

Further enquiry as to what areas remain the prerogative of republican ministries after basic questions are decided will be in vain, for neither in constitutional nor in administrative law are republics ever accorded any exclusive spheres of operation.

On the other hand it may be assumed that the difference between union-republican and republican is not merely titular, and that as a general rule the absence of an immediately superior USSR body does mean less tutelage from outside the republic. Conversion of two republican ministries to union-republican can be tied in with heightened USSR concern with these branches. In 1964 when the Ministry of Trade was converted there was much dissatisfaction with the enormous inventories of unsaleable consumer goods accumulated by state trading organisations. Similarly the conversion of the Ministry of Irrigation to union-republican coincided with the swing in 1963 towards a policy of intensive farming, one aspect of which was extension of the irrigated area. In both these cases the USSR government obviously considered that the union-republican system of administration was more effective for tackling a priority problem.

1 Lopshkin, op. cit., p. 495.
In general then, branches under dual subordination are closely supervised from Moscow, but Soviet writers make it clear that the converse may not invariably hold true. Among the republican branches there are indeed some which receive attention from the USSR government only on 'basic' questions - social security, personal services and communal economy can probably be included in this group. Gosplan and the Council of National Economy, which were republican bodies for most of the period studied here, have already been excluded. It is also more than doubtful whether education can be said to be regulated only in 'basic' matters by the USSR government. ¹

Construction is a further field in which the existence of a republican ministry belies the degree of supervision from Moscow. We shall trace developments in this branch in some detail because (a) if tight control by the USSR government can be demonstrated here, then it would seem reasonable to assume the same for union-republican branches; and (b) this was one branch in which Kazakhstan has long had its own 'coordinating' committee (Gosstrakt). If there was decentralisation during the Khrushchev era, then it should be evident in this branch.

At the time of the 1957 reorganization Kazakhstan abolished three specialised union-republican construction ministries and a State Committee on Construction and Architectural Affairs, forming instead one general republican Ministry of Construction. At the same time most USSR construction ministries were abolished, only two (Transport Construction, ¹A recent study concludes that rigidity and central control are the outstanding features of USSR education. Nigel Grant, Soviet Education, Pelican, 1964, p. 22.)
and Construction of Power Stations) surviving into the sixties. Both these USSR ministries were all-union agencies in whose operations the republics had no voice, but outside their areas of jurisdiction lay the bulk of industrial and civil construction, which now fell to the newly created local sownarthoey. The Kazakhstan Ministry of Construction, whose function became the performance of large scale and specialized contract work beyond the capacity of the sownarthoey,\(^1\) thus had fair to develop into an administrative giant, especially in view of the rapid tempo of both rural and industrial construction in Kazakhstan as compared with other republics. In 1953 the Kazakh Gosstroj was set up to coordinate the work of plan-drawing and cost-estimating offices, and to supervise technical standards and planning.

When the USSR construction ministries were abolished coordination of policy in this field fell by default to the USSR Gosstroj (State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Construction Affairs). Its functions as defined at the time were modest, and oriented towards raising technical standards, design improvements, and development of building materials.\(^2\) Structurally the administration of construction changed little between 1953 and 1965. USSR Gosstroj expanded enormously, but did not directly administer the thousands of building organisations throughout the USSR. In Kazakhstan the major

\(^1\)Ananov, op.cit., p. 123. Another source, V.A. Vlasov, op.cit., p. 155, does indeed cast some doubt on this by declaring that the chief functions of republican ministries of construction were mainly concerned with 'planning and securing a high level of technical development', but however true this may have been of smaller republics, the Kazakh ministry was a large affair in direct charge of several territorial chief directorates of construction. The republican Gosstroj was established in 1953 to take over the functions ascribed by Vlasov to the ministry.

\(^2\)Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 154, 155.
building enterprises came under the ministry. Yet practice came to vary radically from what the decentralised structure set up in the mid-'fifties might suggest.

In 1961 USSR Gosplan's hand was strengthened by the transfer to it from republican jurisdiction of major plan-drawing and cost-estimating institutions. The importance of this move lay in the insistence by Gosplan on full documentation as a prerequisite for the inclusion of any project in the annual plan. The most important centralisation measure, however, came with the decision in November, 1962 to remove the administration of all construction work from the sovarkhozy, and form it into a single branch headed by USSR Gosplan.1

The latter was charged, inter alia, with preventing 'dissipation of resources' over a myriad of construction sites throughout the country.2 Complaints about this endemic malady had multiplied before the November, 1962 reorganisation. The head of the Central Committee3 Department of Construction in Kazakhstan blamed the chairman of local sovarkhozy, who, he said

have an irresponsible approach to planning new construction works. Every sovarkhozy considers it a duty to win from Gosplan and the government all the resources possible, and to lay the foundations of as many new projects as possible, even in the absence of requisite documentation and machinery.'

Republican governments in turn passed the pressure on, and apparently USSR Gosplan was not equipped to sift out and pare down the innumerable

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2Ts.N. Kaslov, Sovetskoe administratvnoeumovo, Moscow, 1964, p. 63.
3Henceforth abbreviated to CC.
4KP 18/11/62.
proposals for new works, so that the approval rate far exceeded resources available to ensure completion within reasonable periods. The revised procedure for approving new projects, embodied in a postanovlenie of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers in January 1963, was aimed at tightening up central controls. Gosplan USSR was to be assisted by Gosstroil, which would endorse the 'title list' of all major projects on the basis of submissions put up by the republics. In effect Gosstroil USSR was given the power of veto over major construction ventures. To equip it for the task it was expanded to head no less than six specialised USSR state committees, each with a chairman in the USSR Council of Ministers, and its own apparatus came to include numerous directorates on all kinds of construction.

In Kazakhstan the immediate effect was the concentration of resources on uncompleted projects, the number of which had reached a record level, and the transfer of all construction enterprises from the sovkhoz to the Ministry of Construction. The approval of the USSR Council of Ministers (advised by its Gosstroil) was necessary for any construction project of estimated cost more than 2.5 million roubles. For a republic whose total capital construction expenditure had grown to over 2,625 million roubles this was a significant limitation on what could be undertaken on local initiative. It was not that this provision

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1 Kozlov, loc. cit. The 'title list' is a legal document listing all approved projects by name, and showing their location, times of commencement and completion, and the capital investment and material supplies required.
2 Ibid, p.45.
3 I.L. Kim, speech to Supreme Soviet, KP 28/12/62.
4 KP 20/12/62.
5 Kozlov, Sovetskoe administrativnoe druzhba, pp.48-49.
6 KP 23/12/64. This does not include capital construction on collective farms.
represented any great change on previously existing limits: in 1954 investment of over 2.5 million (new) roubles in certain branches had required the approval of the USSR government. But the latter was now better equipped institutionally to resist pressure from the republics for ‘supra limit’ expenditure. Since 1954, moreover, investment in capital construction had come to be financed largely via the republican budgets, and there was more ‘decentralized’ investment than previously, i.e. investment not covered in detail in the central plan.2

What does appear to have been an innovation in the January, 1963 neo-nationalism was the provision that republican construction works of estimated cost between 1.5 and 2.5 million roubles required the approval of Gosplan USSR. An apparent alternative method of having projects within this range approved, namely by submission to the republican Gosplan and Gosplan, was provided for at the same time, but as both these institutions are dually subordinated this appears to be only a procedural variation of submission to USSR level. If this interpretation is correct then Kazakhstan could not build much more than a large block of flats without the approval of USSR Gosplan. In addition the comments of the republic’s branch of Sberbank had to accompany proposals to build below the 2.5 million limit, which meant that the totals of these ‘below-limit’ investments could not exceed the aggregate sum allocated to any given sector.

3Koslov, Sovetskoe administrativnoe khoziaistvo, p. 50.
Summarising what had occurred in the administration of construction by early 1963, a Soviet commentator referred to a 'tendency towards the strengthening of centralisation' - a rare formulation during the Khrushchev era. He described Gosstroj USSR as the 'sole organ' responsible for technical policy and coordination of the volume of construction with the capacity of building enterprises. 'Within certain limits' it was also responsible for the allocation of capital investment to republics and branches of construction. Decentralisation in this sphere had proved to be unjustified, he continued, and it was a one-sided view to expect that administrative practice should always develop in that direction. It may not be amiss to repeat that throughout this process of centralisation the Kazakh Ministry of Construction remained a republican organ, whose operations were allegedly 'independent' or at least governed only on 'basic' policy. If construction was subject to such centralised direction by 1963, then we may surely assume that the union-republic branches touched upon more briefly were subject to at least the same degree of tutelage from above.

Bearing in mind these limitations on the powers of the republic's central agencies we may now turn to the body which 'unites and directs their work'. The Council of Ministers, as described by the Kazakh Constitution, is the chief executive organ of the Supreme Soviet, by which it is formed and to which it is responsible. Between sessions of the

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The Government Act of 1939 (62/39/19/39) contained the following statement:

"In the event that the proposed activity of the Council of Ministers involves all, or at least six months before the fact was announced, the Council of Ministers will take this step, so that the participatory character of the Council of Ministers is preserved. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to maintain the democratic character of the Council of Ministers, and to add a new section to Article 11 of the Constitution which provides for the protection of the Council of Ministers against hasty or unforeseen decisions. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to add a new section to Article 11 of the Constitution which provides for the protection of the Council of Ministers against hasty or unforeseen decisions. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to add a new section to Article 11 of the Constitution which provides for the protection of the Council of Ministers against hasty or unforeseen decisions."
### Chart II

**First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers**

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*Positions held contemporaneously*

- Secretary, Alma Ata obkom
- Chairman, Gosplan
- Star of Production & Procurement of Agricultural Products
- Minister of PRODUCTION & PROCUREMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
- Minister of Trade
- Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Chairman of the Committee of Party & State Council
The number of First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers has varied from seven to three, and the arithmetic of this post will be best followed with the aid of Chart II. The position was created in January 1947 and in March 1955 the new Supreme Soviet appointed a second First Deputy Chairman. In add 1957, when the industrial ministries were abolished, Gomulkin achieved enhanced status and his chairmanship was made the third First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. No formal reversal of this move was ever made by the Supreme Soviet or its President, but by the beginning of 1958 the Gomulkin chairmanship was being referred to simply as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1 and was confirmed as such in the government listing of 1959.

In add 1958 the original First Deputy had been elected First Secretary of the Akashiite in February of the same year, and although he was not formally released from his government post, the ministry's chairmanship was being referred to simply as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1 and was confirmed as such in the government listing of 1959. Furthermore, the original First Deputy from add 1958 until his new appointment was announced in March 1959, effectively First Deputy from add 1958 until his new appointment was announced in March 1959, in the number of First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, he was referred to simply as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
position. At no subsequent time has more than one First Deputy been a full member of the Bureau. It may be stretching the above evidence somewhat to suggest that Nikolaev and Beisebaev shared responsibility for all branches of the administration, but at least they seem to have been the governmental overlords of industry and agriculture.

The appointee to the single First Deputy Chairmanship in 1959, G.A. Mel'nik, had, as Secretary of the Central Committee, already been a member of the party Bureau for over a year. He exhibited the same wide range of interests as his two predecessors, taking part in public discussions on construction, industry, consumer goods and culture.\(^1\)

From 1961 on, however, agriculture became his dominant concern,\(^2\) and, as already observed, he finally became the Minister of Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products. The second First Deputy who was appointed at the end of 1962 and who became the real deputy of the Chairman, was M. Beisebaev. Since his earlier period in this position he had been first secretary of Alma-Ata obkom and, for a few months, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His sphere of competence now included culture, transport, industry, personal services - and possibly police.\(^3\)

He also addressed a conference of raipolkoms chairman\(^4\) on the work of local soviets, which suggested responsibility for training the local soviet chairmen. Nevertheless the First Deputy Chairmanship no longer carried quite the same weight as it had in the 1956-1958 period, for on

\(^{1}\)KP 18/6/59, 16/7/59, 18/7/59, 23/8/59, 6/7/60.
\(^{3}\)KP 9/1/63, 15/1/63, 10/10/63, 13/11/63, 27/6/64.
\(^{4}\)KP 30/7/64.
Beisebas' appointment both he and Nal'nik were denoted to candidate members of the party Bureau.

At the end of 1964 Beisebas was again appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but the vacancy left by him was not filled until April of the following year. An even longer gap seems to have occurred before the appointment of a new First Deputy for agriculture in 1965. In March, 1966 one of the two First Deputies was restored to full membership of the CC Bureau (the other remaining at candidate member level). Full entry into the highest party body testifies to the enduring importance of this post, but on the other hand the lack of continuity in tenure shows that neither First Deputy is indispensable. On the party side, by way of contrast, delays in appointment of industrial or agricultural Secretaries of the CC seldom occur, and their place in the CC Bureau is always assured. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers can obviously act as government spokesman for these sectors, but more specific representation in the Bureau is essential, it seems, only from the party side.

According to one of the rare statements on the subject by a Soviet writer, each Deputy Chairman is in charge of a defined range of matters, and is empowered to make decisions relating to the ministries and agencies subordinate to him.¹ Both the Chairman and individual Deputy Chairman issue ordinances (rasporядения), fulfilment of which is obligatory for the ministries etc. below them.² Taken in conjunction with what has already been said of the First Deputies, this would tend to show that the Council of Ministers functions on the classical...

¹E.V. Shorina, Kollersialnost' i edinonaschale v sovetskoi gosudarstvennoi upravlyalii, Moscow, 1959, p. 31.
²Ibid., p.32. This applies, of course, a fortiori to First Deputy Chairman.
hierarchical pyramid pattern with the Chairman at the apex, the First Deputy then Deputy Chairman below, and the ministers at the base. Such a description of the Council of Ministers has the merit of brevity, but there has always been some deviation from the model. It is true that certain Deputy Chairmen supervise a group of agencies: others, however, are themselves ministers or chairman of state committees and when their portfolio is an important one, they appear to have no special competence outside of it.

As will be seen from Chart II most Deputy Chairmen have in fact carried a specific portfolio. One of the most consistent combinations has been that of Deputy Chairman as Minister of Foreign Affairs. His primary concerns have regularly been education, health, culture and sport; the foreign affairs portfolio is a sinecure with duties limited to entertainment of the few foreign dignitaries who visit Kazakhstan. The Supreme Soviet seldom even bothers to record appointments or removals of the Minister of Foreign Affairs — the current minister is simply listed every four years when a "new" government is formed. If it is assumed that A.I. Zakarin was released as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the same time as he was removed as Deputy Chairman, then the portfolio was probably vacant throughout 1962 until the appointment of A. Sharipov. In between Zakarin's and Sharipov's tenures of office there was a Deputy Chairman in charge of education and culture, V.D. Atambaev, but there is

2Stalin succeeded in obtaining the admission of only two republics (the Ukraine and Belarusia) into the United Nations as independent nations in 1944, and Kazakhstan has never established diplomatic relations with any foreign nation.
no record of his having been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.\(^1\)

Atashnev's background was different from that of other holders of this deputy chairmanship (education, academic); he had been the Minister of Finance from 1955 on. In keeping with this background he combined some economic responsibilities with his new appointment; in particular he seems to have taken over the consumer goods industry.\(^2\) After his replacement by Sharipov the position reverted to pattern.

At the other extreme are several Deputy Chairmen who held no portfolio throughout the whole or most of their term of office.

I.G. Slashnev was connected with agriculture throughout most of his long term,\(^3\) and during the final year took over the procurements portfolio, probably to the exclusion of his non-agricultural interests. Before that he had been linked with internal trade and the light and food industries.\(^4\)

I.S. Omarova's functions are less easy to define, the problem in her case being not the usual one of paucity of information, but rather the contrary. She shows links with too many branches of the administration - trade, health, communications, railways, construction etc. - for all of them to have been within her purview as Deputy Chairman. The reason for her versatility seems to be that, as the only Kazakh woman at such an exalted level in the republic, she was much in demand on public occasions. These occasions have been relied on to deduce the roles of other Deputy Chairmen (since there is seldom any public statement of their duties).

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\(^1\) The Eshesodnik Bol'sheoi Sovetskoii Entsiklopedii for 1963 omitted its usual reference to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Kazakhstan.


\(^3\) KP 29/1/55, 22/3/59, 23/6/59.

\(^4\) KP 23/9/55, 31/12/58, 26/11/60.
but in Omarov's case it is impossible to determine where administrative responsibility ends and public relations functions begin. It may even be that she was little more than a public relations figure. Her appointment came when she was only thirty-four, and was unusual also in that till then she had been a senior engineer of a branch of a mining enterprise - not an exalted position in comparison with the backgrounds of other Deputy Chairman. She spoke twice at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet when the occasion was rather formal or ceremonial,¹ and once reported to the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet on fulfilment of voters' nakan by the government.² Together with the dissipation of her energies over a wide field these items seem to add up to a less specific administrative role than is normal for a Deputy Chairman. There may well have been a more solid core to her role than demonstration of the possibilities open to enterprising young Kazakh women, but if so it was obscured by her public relations activities.

General supervision of industry can be attributed to a specific Deputy Chairman, and construction to another, over most of the ten year period. Industrial supervision is easily located because of R.B. Beigaliev's two terms as Deputy Chairman: he has been an industrial administrator and planner throughout his party and government career.³ During his second term he was also Chairman of the Kazakh Council of National Economy - the central organ above the local sevmarkhozy. The

¹KP 27/12/58, 29/10/59.
²KP 15/6/66. On voters' nakan see Chapter IV.
³In between these two terms he was First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, and later became Chairman of the Industrial Bureau of the CC.
republic, the planners have more than a coordinating role. Between the 1957
reorganisation and the establishment of the Council of National Economy
in 1960 the Kazakh Gosplan was the only government agency (below the Council
of Ministers itself) to supervise the local sowarkhozy, and during this
period at least it must be regarded as the chief economic executive organ
of the government.

From late 1962 to late 1965 the Chairman of the Committee of
Party and State Control of the CC and the Council of Ministers was the
other functional (as opposed to branch) Deputy Chairman. Like its
predecessors (Ministry of State Control, Commission of Soviet Central and
Commission of State Control) this committee was charged with the
elimination of waste, inefficiency and corruption in state, cooperative
and public organisations. Its powers were also much the same as those of
its forbears – imposition of fines, demotion of culprits and where
appropriate forwarding evidence of criminal culpability to the procuracy.
The promotion of its chairman to the rank of Deputy Chairman of the
government was part of Khrushchev’s attempt to establish tighter inspection
and control procedures following revelations of widespread malpractices
such as ‘padding of figures’ in 1961. The new title did not signify
surveillance of party as well as state organisations, but merely the
dual direction of the committee’s responsibility. Because of this dual
subordination – to both the CC and the Council of Ministers – the control
chairman was unique in holding the two positions of government Deputy
Chairman and Secretary of the CC. At the time of the 1965 reorganisation
he lost both these positions, but remained a member of the CC Bureau.
In summary we may say that the internal structure of the Council of Ministers is a hierarchical one. At most times it would be possible to divide up the administrative agencies of the government and allocate responsibility for them to the various First Deputy and Deputy Chairman, on the basis of observation of the activities of the latter. There are however both branch and functional divisions of responsibility, and even within the branch divisions the structure is not a simple pyramid with increasing lines of subordination at every level. Taking the 1962-1964 period as an example we find something like the following, with one or other of the links (at the left of the diagram) omitted in most branches.

Chairman

1st Deputy Chairman

Deputy Chairman: Gosplan

Minister

Ch Sovnarhosa
If discovery of the formal structure of the Council of Ministers presents difficulty then searching out the decision-making processes is a formidable task indeed. Administration in the USSR is said to be based on the principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism, but the voluminous discussion on these is rarely of assistance.¹ Soviet authors divide institutions into two types, those in which the decision making process is characterized by collegiality, and those where edinopachalie (one-man-management) predominates.

By collegiality is understood that organisational structure of a state organ which secures discussion of questions within its competence, and their resolution, by a simple majority of the votes of specially empowered persons. . . . .

Edinopachalie means that organization of the work of soviet state organs under which the right to decide questions coming within their competence is enjoyed by one person, the leader of a given state organ. ²

These are eminently satisfactory definitions. The problem is that both principles are said to be found at work in individual agencies. Most administrative organs, including all ministries, are headed by edinopachalniki, but democratic centralism requires that they blend both edinopachalie and collegiality. Ministries contain a 'collegium' which, however, is only a consultative body. According to an official of the Kazakh Ministry of Culture, the collegium here is ineffective because of the vagueness of the ministry's polezhente (statute) on the subject. 'As a rule' no more than three or four attend meetings of the collegium, even when the agenda concerns cadres or the work of the theatre of drama. There

¹It is only recently that the case for a separate political science discipline has been argued in the Soviet Union. See L.G. Churchward, 'Towards a Political Science', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. XII No. 1, April, 1966, pp. 65-73. One propensent believed that general policy making should be excluded from the projected range of enquiry! (Abenda 10/1/65.)
²S.V. Shevina, op.cit., pp. 7, 11.
1. The data was collected on the basis of the committee's recommendation and final report.

2. The committee's recommendations were based on the following considerations:

   a. The need for increased research and development in the field of...
committees. Even if we follow the author who is most free in designating committees as collegial, therefore, the degree of collegiality in each case must be held to depend heavily on the chairman's administrative style. The nature of certain committees is such that broad and continuous consultation must be part and parcel of policy formation (e.g. Gosplan), but collegiality places no firm restrictions on chairmen.

When the question of classification of local sovnarkhozy arose, a widely recognised expert on Soviet administrative law, V.A. Vlasov, asserted that they were constructed on the edinonachalniq principle, but his views were quickly challenged. Subsequently the sovnarkhozy were uniformly described as collegial organs. When an authority of Vlasov's stature can be 'mistaken' over the nature of specific institutions, then it can be safely assumed that despite the clear and mutually exclusive definitions of collegiality and edinonachalniq, the two may be difficult to distinguish in practice.

With these prefatory remarks in view the official description of the Council of Ministers as a collegial organ will be seen as a starting point for enquiry into its decision-making processes, rather than as a definitive classification. At the outset it is necessary to attempt to discover which decisions are collegially made and which are not.

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1 op.cit., p.40.
3 Sharina, op.cit., p.31, 52; Koslov, op.cit., p.112; A.S. Lunev 'O Dal'neshem razvitii demokratii v sovetskam gosudarstvennom upravlenii', Sovetskae Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 7, 1962, p.31. Vlasov apparently remained unconvinced that sovnarkhoz chairmen were not edinonachal'nniki: in a publication published a year later he conspicuously avoids mention of the nature of the sovnarkhoz. See Vlasov, Opyt sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravlenia, Moscow, 1960, pp.38, 105-9.
The constitution mentions, but does not distinguish between, two forms in which decisions of the Council of Ministers are promulgated—the postanovlenie and the rasporyashhenie. Until fairly recently law books either ignored the differences between the two, or gave inadequate or misleading accounts of them. Most frequently the postanovlenie was said to be a ruling of general application, whose fulfilment was not limited to one occasion. The rasporyashhenie on the other hand was allegedly designed to meet a specific situation and fulfilment was limited to performance of a single act. In Soviet terminology postanovlenia were normative acts, rasporyashhenia individual acts. This was misleading because there were in fact normative rasporyashhenia, and individual postanovlenia.

In 1958 a distinction between the two was drawn for the first time in legal literature on the basis of their method of adoption. Postanovlenia were said to be collegially adopted acts governing 'the more substantial' matters within the competence of the government, while rasporyashhenia dealt with 'current operative questions', and were issued by the Chairman or a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. By 1964

3 Shorina, op.cit., p. 34.
this differentiation had been recognised widely enough to be used without
explanatory comment. In theory, therefore, it should now be possible to
separate decisions taken as a result of voting in the whole Council of
Ministers (postanovlenia) and unilateral decisions of the Chairman or a
Deputy (raspovrashenie). In the event this gain proves to be illusory.
Firstly there is difficulty in discovering which orders are postanovlenia
and which are raspovrashenie, and secondly collegiality is attributed to
something less than the full Council of Ministers.

Unfortunately collections of the two types of orders of the
Kazakh government are not available to the foreign researcher. Nor is the
republican press helpful in this regard. There has, however, been more
information in recent years on the functioning of the state machinery in
specialised works. One such source for Kazakhstan is a work on industrial
administration by a native of the republic, S. Dosymbekov. A high level of
activity is attributed to the Council of Ministers by this writer: no less
than 504 questions examined collegially in 1961, and 564 in 1962. Of
these 121 and 105 respectively were said to have been dealt with 'by the
protocol procedure'. 'Protocol' is the term used to describe the minutes
of an official body, so that these decisions were apparently recorded in the
minutes without publication of any formal postanovlenia. Two examples of
these are given: unspecified debts of fishing collectives were written off,
and an instruction given to the Kazakh Economic Council to draft a

1 S.N. Dosymbekov, Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie promyslennostyu v Kazakhskoi
SSSR, Alma-Ata, 1964, pp. 123, 125.
2 There are articles headed 'In the Council of Ministers' which contain
instructions to central and local government agencies, but no indication
is given whether these are postanovlenia or raspovrashenie.
3 S.N. Dosymbekov, op.cit., p. 126.
For instance, a point may arise that, in the context of the proposed action, the involvement of the Cabinet Committee on Personnel may be pertinent. As a matter of fact, the Cabinet Committee on Personnel, which is responsible for the management of personnel matters within the government, has been consulted on this issue. The strategic plan is designed to ensure that the government's personnel policies are aligned with its overall objectives. Therefore, any potential changes to the personnel plan will be subject to careful consideration and consultations within the Cabinet Committee on Personnel. This ensures that the proposed changes are consistent with the government's strategic direction and are implemented in a manner that promotes efficiency and effectiveness.

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lists membership as the Chairman, Deputies and 'individually nominated persons' - without adding that the last named must be members of the government. The omission may not be significant, however; in a few instances where Presidium membership has been given, only members of the Council of Ministers were in fact included. The nominated members were the Minister of Finance and the Central Committee Chairman. The Kazakh government Presidium does include some nominated members, because a distinction is drawn between its meetings and those attended only by the Chairman and his Deputies.

There is then an inner body of some nine or ten persons with the same powers as the Council itself, and the possibility arises that this inner body rather than the full Council may have been mainly responsible for the reported level of activity in 1961 and 1962. This would not be surprising in view of the powers of members of the inner body. In theory razgovorshennia issued by the Premier or a Deputy in the name of the government concern 'current questions requiring operative decisions', and must be in conformity with the collegial decisions of the Council of Ministers. In practice they can be stretched to cover major policy. Thus the 'technical-economic bases for the development of the material-technical basis of construction for the Virgin Lands Economic

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1 Lepeshkin, op. cit., p. 490.

2 Robert Tucker, 'Field Observations on Soviet Local Government', American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XVIII, No.4, December, 1959, p. 532. (The chairman of the Control Committee was not at this time a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers). The Bureaus of the Councils of Ministers of Autonomous Republics in the RSFSR are similarly composed - Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Cosplan chairman and one or two ministers - the Minister of Finance sometimes being specified. See Khronologicheskiye sobranie sakony, ukonov, prezidiuma vnesheprovtsa i postanovlenii apparata RSFSR, Vol. V, Moscow, 1959, pp. 50-53.

3 Dosybekov, op. cit., p. 122.

4 Sharina, op. cit., pp.32, 35.
Region for 1965 were fixed by a rasporvazhdenie of one man. Translated, this jargon apparently means that the level of finance and supply of construction machinery and materials for five oblasts were decided by one man – presumably the Premier.

Even where the law specifically assigns competence to the Council of Ministers as a whole, the rasporvazhdenie is sometimes the instrument employed. A law on the 1957 reorganization of industry, for instance, states that the structure of local sovkhozny is approved by the Council. Yet in 1959 a Deputy Chairman fixed the (revised) composition of the Karaganda sovkhozny by rasporvazhdenie. Dosymbekov says that such instances are far from rare. He pleads for a clearer delineation of the functions of the Council but concludes rather despondently that where major policy questions are settled by rasporvazhdenie a report should at least be made to the next regular session of the full Council.

There are then contradictory elements in this writer's treatment of the Council of Ministers. On the one hand there is allegedly a high level of collegial decision-making, while on the other major questions are frequently resolved unilaterally. Before attempting to tie these elements together it is necessary to look at the apparatus of the Council of Ministers, because its departments are said to play an

1 Dosymbekov, op.cit., p. 125.
2 This statement should not be accepted entirely at its face value – the tight Moscow control over the Virgin Lands is described in Chapter II. Nevertheless what planning details were left to Kazakhstan were apparently settled by D.A. Kuznetsov, the Premier at this stage.
3 op.5/6/67. See article 4 of the law.
4 Dosymbekov, op.cit., pp.125, 126.
5 Except where otherwise stated, Dosymbekov op.cit., pp. 127-130 is again the source.
important part in the preparation of the agenda of meetings of the Council, its Presidium, and those confined to the Chairman and his Deputies. A further reason for setting down what can be discovered of these departments is that they have not yet found a place in western textbooks on Soviet government (even at USSR level).

As fixed by a Statute of the Council of Ministers in October, 1961 the rights of the departments were:

(1) to require officials of Gosplan, ministries and other central agencies, local sovarkom and krai, oblast and Alma-Ata city executive committees to participate in preparations of proposals for economic and cultural development;

(2) to require the above organs to produce official files and data on such questions;

(3) to participate in sessions of the Council of Ministers and its Presidium, and of the collegia of ministries etc., when the agenda relates to the work of a department;

(4) to return to the abovementioned organs documents forwarded to the Council of Ministers when they do not conform to established requirements.

These are formidable-looking powers. Not only are the departments clearing houses for all correspondence between administrative agencies and the Council; they are obviously in the thick of things within the Council and its Presidium. We are told in fact that they study all proposals put to the Council by both central and local state organs, and append their recommendations. To be sure one has to be cautious here. It is not uncommon for Soviet commentators to attribute to each of a number
of institutions the powers that are exercised by all of them as a group. At this level, however, the atmosphere is rarefied: the departments somehow link the Presidium with the various administrative agencies, and, apart from the CC apparatus, there are no other institutions here to compete against.

On the other hand there is no evidence that the apparatus of the Council of Ministers has any corporate life of its own; one does not hear of any single head of the apparatus, only heads of individual departments. Furthermore these heads are not public figures — they receive mention only on such occasions as the conferring of an award on a 50th birthday. None of them rates membership of the CC or Auditing Commission of the party. A fairly obvious deduction is that the departments function in practice as secretariats of the First Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, constituting their links with the agencies over which they have charge. No complete list of the departments in existence at any one time has been found, but over the years the following have been mentioned:

Construction, Construction Materials and Town Economy.¹
Health and Culture.²
Heavy Industry.³
Light and Food Industry.⁴
Agriculture and Procurement of Agricultural Products.⁵

¹KP 13/10/62.
²KP 13/1/62.
³KP 23/5/63.
⁴Desyrbekov, op.cit., p. 127.
⁵KP 3/12/64 (Earlier the 'Agricultural Group' of the Council of Ministers — KP 3/1/59).
...when a control committee concerned about the administrative functions of a department, the executive Deputy Chairman, when control of entrusted to the department's, is opened...
report required from a ministry etc., it may be terminated at the
discretion of the departmental head, on all other matters the permission
of a Deputy Chairman is required before the central file may be closed.
Meanwhile the departmental heads make progress reports to the leaders of
the Council of Ministers (sc. the Chairman or Deputy Chairman). These
reports are not confined to fulfilment of appointed tasks by governmental
agencies, but may comment on the general efficiency of the latter and add
recommendations for the future development of the economy. Control
functions place the departments in systematic contact with all agencies
down to oblast level — where necessary officials are sent out to
the oblasts. In the summer of 1963 for instance the Department of Heavy
Industry sent out officials to inquire into the production of wall
excavation machinery by the South Kazakhstan komsomol. The result was
a direction to adhere strictly to the production plan and the adoption of
organizational\(^1\) measures to ensure this.

It will be noted that almost all the information on the
apparatus of the Council of Ministers is of post 1960 vintage. Prior to
that only the Department of Local Soviets and the ‘Administration of
Affairs’ were identified. The functions of the latter were described in
earlier works as the preparation of material for sessions of the Council
of Ministers, checking on fulfilment of tasks assigned to ministries and
other agencies, drawing up of draft postanovlenia, and examination of
complaints from workers.\(^2\) The departments now perform most of these
duties so that Council’s apparatus may have ramified to the extent

\(^1\)Sometimes a euphemism for sacking of officials.
\(^2\)Yu, N. Kozlov. \textit{Organy gosudarstvennoe upravlenie}, p. 76.
described only in recent years. This does not mean that the Deputy Chairman were not previously 'overlords' of the type found in Churchill's cabinets in Britain, but that their departments were more rudimentary than they now are. Alternatively it may be that the departments received no publicity before being legitimated by statute.

Previously we were confronted with the contradiction of an apparently high level of collegial decision making within the Council of Ministers, and concomitant instances of one-man decisions on important issues. The contradiction was partly resolved by the discovery that collegial decisions were, to an unknown degree, the product of an inner body, the Presidium of the Council. Desyabekov's complaint about the stretching of rassporoveshenie to cover major policy questions loses some of its force once it is realised that the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen, who issue these collectively form the Council's inner body. Given that the Presidium is capable of acting on behalf of the full Council of Ministers it becomes much less significant whether one of the Deputy Chairmen publishes his decision as a rassporoveshenie after consultation with his colleagues in charge of other relevant sectors, or whether the Presidium holds a formal session and publishes a joint decision as a poslanovlennia. Certainly there is an important difference between the functioning of a committee of nine or ten and the arbitrary decisions of one man. We are dealing here, however, not with an undeveloped society whose sub-systems are poorly integrated but with one in which planning is a central feature and whose parts are functionally cooperative. The one-man decisions cited by Desyabekov would have necessitated some
The Constitution of the United States, and the compromises that produced it, were intended to provide for the most effective operation of the federal government. However, the Constitution also contains provisions that limit the power of the federal government. These limits are intended to prevent the government from becoming too powerful and to ensure that the rights of the individual are protected.

The Constitution provides for a separation of powers among the three branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This separation of powers is intended to prevent any one branch from becoming too powerful and to ensure that the government remains accountable to the people.

The Constitution also provides for a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government. This system is intended to prevent any one branch from becoming too powerful and to ensure that the government remains accountable to the people. For example, the President can veto legislation passed by Congress, but Congress can override the veto by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Similarly, the Supreme Court can strike down laws passed by Congress or the President, but Congress can override the Court's decision by enacting a new law.

The Constitution also provides for a system of checks and balances on the states. The federal government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and it can also override state laws that are in conflict with federal law.

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breaches of the norm, as well as on the a priori grounds argued above, we take it that the head of government usually consults with Presidium members when elaborating major policies, even if he issues the final order himself.
CHAPTER 2

CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS

Adopting the same direct approach as in the previous chapter, we turn now to the central party organs - the CC Bureau (or Presidium as it was called from 1961 to 1966), the CC secretariat, and the CC apparatus. Institutions nominally superior to these, the party Congress and the CC, can then be examined later in truer perspective.

Composition of the CC Bureau from 1954 to 1966 is shown in Chart III. The number of full members has varied from eight to eleven, and in 1961 two candidate members were listed (for the first time since 1951, when there were three). A third candidate member was again added in 1966. In contrast to practice at all-union level, all Secretaries of the CC, from five to seven in number, have regularly been elected full members of the Bureau. While the Virgin Lands Krai was in existence one CC Secretary was simultaneously first secretary of the kraikom - a departure from normal party practice if the two positions are regarded as separate.

Two further ex-officio members are the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The remaining membership has varied. Until 1962 government First Deputy Chairman were generally included, although L.G. Mellnikov was never formally elected to the Bureau during his brief occupancy of the post. In late 1962 the two

\[A\] departure from this practice occurred in 1965 when one Secretary was elected candidate member (Pravda 6/4/65). It has been the general rule in all republics except the Ukraine to admit all CC Secretaries to full membership of the CC Bureau. See A.C. Berson, Changes in Structure and Personnel in the Soviet State and Communist Party from 1953 to 1959: A Study of Party-State Relations, Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1962, pp. 353, 354.
CHART III
Membership of Bureau/Presidium of CC, CP Kazakhsthan, 1954-1966

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Uzhaulcov, L.A.  
Melnik, G.A.  

Beisebaev, M.  
Matskevich, V.V.  

Dykhnov, N.V.  

Polimbetov, S.P.  
Egizbaev, K.A.  
Slazheev, I.G.  
Dvorettsky, B.N.  
Simakov, K.M.  
Kolebaev, A.S.  
Askarov, A.  

A. Kožlov was released as Secretary CC in January, 1966, but retained his Presidium membership. He is chairman of the People's Control Committee.
government First Deputies were made candidate members of the party Bureau, and their successors remained at this level until March 1965 when one was again elected full member. The Committee of State Security was represented on the Bureau until 1959, but the new chairman of the Committee appointed in that year was excluded. So too were his successors. The first secretary of the Komgosul was a full member for about two years from mid 1956, and a candidate member for over a year from mid 1961. Other officials who joined the Bureau for similar periods were the first secretary of Alma-Ata obkom, the chairman of the Virgin Lands kraispolkom, and (as candidate member) the chairman of the republican Council of Trade Unions.

The Bureau is thus a compact body of a dozen or less top officials, of whom the largest bloc (sometimes more than half the membership) are the CC Secretaries. The distribution of duties among the lesser Secretaries (i.e. other than First and Second) has always been fairly clear from their published speeches and articles. Until he was promoted to Second Secretary, F.R. Karibshanov dealt only with agricultural matters, and he was followed in this secretaryship by G.A. Mel'nik, I. Yusupov, and G.A. Mel'nik again. Industry and construction have been supervised by another Secretary - I.T. Tashiev, then G.A. Koslov. From the end of 1962 the latter became Chairman of the Party and State Control Committee (while remaining CC Secretary), and industry and construction than went to R.B. Baigaliev. There is always a Secretary for ideology - K.U. Usmanov until 1957, N.D. Dshandel'din from then till 1965. From 1960 on, as already noted, there was the CC Secretary cum first secretary of the virgin lands - T.I. Sokolov followed by F.S. Kolomiets. If this distribution of duties is correlated
with Chart III, it will be noted that when the industrial or agricultural
secretaryships fall vacant the new appointee does not always step into the
shoes of the outgoing Secretary; there is sometimes a reshuffle of duties.
In other words, a Secretary's major interest can be safely ascertained only
by studying his occasional pronouncements, not by observing whom he
replaces. Thus Koslov (industry) replaced Mel'nik (agriculture) and six
months later the reverse happened when Yusupov replaced Tashiev. There
was, therefore, a period of duplication or takeover on the industrial side,
but an apparent gap in the supervision of agriculture. Mel'nik remained
in the Bureau as government First Deputy (for agriculture) and presumably
continued to play the same role despite his official transfer from party
to government post. Alternatively Karibhanov, formerly agricultural
Secretary and now Second Secretary, may have devoted special attention to
primary industry for the six months. A similar devious reallocation of
responsibilities is found at the end of 1962, the key to the manoeuvre
this time being F.S. Kolomets, who apparently sat behind the agricultural
desk for a short time before moving out to the Virgin Lands Krai to replace
Sokolov.

The broad division of duties among the lesser Secretaries is
thus clear; however it does not appear to be as watertight as that between
the government Deputy Chairmen. A Secretary with a background in a
particular oblast, for instance, may retain a general interest in his old
bailiwick for a time. R.B. Baigaliev, after promotion from first secretary
of Alma-Ata obkom, attended conferences of both the industrial and
agricultural party organizations in that 

oblast. Again, a CC Secretary faced with an unusually heavy task may be assisted by his colleagues. When the polemic with the Chinese was renewed in April, 1964 at least four CC Secretaries fanned out to address obkom plenums and secure letters of support for N.S. Khrushchev.²

This attendance at local party conferences and plenums is a regular part of the duties of all CC Secretaries. More often than not the agenda at oblast plenums corresponds with the visiting Secretary’s major interest, but one does find the ideology Secretary speaking at a plenum on agriculture,³ or contrariwise the agricultural overseer at a plenum where the agenda is ideological.⁴ Visitation work is also shared at times with other members of the Bureau (Chairman, First Deputy Chairman of the government, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium); which would seem to show that there is considerable ad hoc distribution of functions within the Bureau. Nor is there any pattern in the areas visited by Bureau members; they appear at plenums not only with varying agenda but also in any part of the republic. In short all Bureau members are, in good measure, generalists.

Practically nothing can be learned of how the Bureau functions. This is not surprising when it is considered that little contemporary information is normally available on the workings of parliamentary cabinets. Memoirs often fill this gap, but retired Soviet officials are not given to

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¹KP 20, 23/1/63.
²See oblast plenum reports KP 11-28/4/64.
³KP 4/9/59.
⁴KP 9/6/56.
writing memoirs. The same problem in the case of the Council of Ministers was partly surmountable because this institution occupies a defined constitutional place and parts of the jigsaw are found in legal and other specialized works. Not so with the party Bureau: the writer failed to discover a single account, however formal, of its role, its meetings or agenda.

One does find in the press numerous items headed 'In the CC of the CP of Kazakhstan and the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR'. These are replete with instructions to all levels of party and state organs. The Ministry of Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products, local party committees and soviet executive committees are ordered to set targets for the manufacture of composts in every farm, according to the prescriptions of T.D. Lysenke. Agricultural ministries are instructed to ensure snow is ploughed in over the whole area marked for spring planting.

Similar, though less numerous examples are found on the industrial side. There are also items headed 'In the CC of the CP of Kazakhstan', but these normally concern only approval given by the CC to challenges to 'socialist competition'. Party organs are instructed to have the challenges discussed at worksites and to recommend their acceptance.

The latter type of item is of little interest in seeking out the decision-making role of the Bureau. The former type, embracing as it does orders with the most varied of contents, does at least demonstrate that there is no limit to the involvement of the CC in administrative matters;

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1 KP 4/7/63.
2 KP 23/11/64. See also KP 12/12/56.
and CC here clearly does not mean the full CC, which is not in session, but one or more of its inner bodies - the Bureau, the secretariat, or its apparatus. This is useful, but there is the end to it. Since we know that a Deputy Chairman may on his own issue a rasporvazhenie on behalf of the government, some of these joint orders might theoretically be issued by the party with only one government member participating. At the other extreme even a deputy head of a CC department can speak in the name of the CC,\(^1\) so that the reverse might conceivably be true. All that can be learned from these articles is that even orders on rather trifling matters (e.g. composts) may require some form of collaboration by central party and government officials.\(^2\)

The membership of the Bureau identifies it as the only organ which embraces both party and state officials at the centre, so it is likely that these orders 'of the CC and the Council of Ministers' emanate from it.\(^3\) Even if this guess be accurate, however, it is still impossible to give a breakdown of the Bureau's business because published material appears to represent only arbitrarily selected examples.

It is of some importance to discover the ranking of members of the Bureau for whatever light this may throw on party-government relations.

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\(^1\) KP 27/1/62. The instance in question involved the election to membership of the Academy of Sciences of someone opposed by the Vice President of the Academy. The CC department deputy head insisted on election in the name of the CC.

\(^2\) It might be objected of course that composts were not 'trifling' if N.S. Khrushchev was interested in them. The order was nonetheless extremely detailed, giving organizational details on setting up compost brigades in the farms.

\(^3\) Note the following remark by D.A. Kunaev to a CC plenum. "This question [living conditions of herdsmen] was discussed in detail by the Bureau of the CC, CP of Kazakhstan, and a lengthy resolution of the CC, CP and the Council of Ministers of the republic was adopted\(^7\)." KP 25/6/60.
Furthermore, when more important pronouncements, and have a far-reaching
responsibility of the Government to the Supreme Court. Certainly the
credentials have been matched, there is no way to reconcile the formal constitutional
credibility of the Supreme Court President. The formal relationship between
the President and the President of the Supreme Court as the head of the Court. One doubts that the
formal relationship is the most essential of the Court. The formal relationship and that the
formal relationship of the above is hazardous beyond the obvious
consideration. The formal relationship above the Government need.

on the chairmanship of the Supreme Court President has, with slight compromise
both when united below and then above the second secretary. From 1992
fourth, the President and the head of the state changed place several times.
later then the second secretary was, almost without exception, been placed
the first secretary post. Like, in 1994, their second secretary
The group under consideration the prime minister and the head of the
Chairman of the President and the chair of the Supreme Court, the chairman of the
chairman of the Prime Minister and the Prime Ministerates that
in the pre-1999 state, and the state matterly that
the Prime Secretary often appeared at the head of an administration
senator. However, the real situation of the Prime Secretary is not the same, except that
never until 1999 they were unanimously presented in what looked like
appear in the press on various formal occasions. Over forty of those were
senator. can be determined Appointment from full and part-time

38.
chance of becoming First Secretary than the head of state. The authority of the latter has increased in recent years with the enhanced role of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but, unlike the government head, he has no great institutional power behind him and owes his standing mainly to membership of the CC Bureau.

The place of the Second Secretary is even more debatable. While Brezhnev and Yakovlev held the post their public rating probably did correspond with their power, but the drop of subsequent Second Secretaries to fourth place is rather too sharp to accept at face value. This is especially true from 1960 on when Second Secretary M.K. Rodionov, and later M.S. Solomentsev, was the only Russian in the top four posts. It is common practice in Central Asian republics to have a Russian appointed Second Secretary, and even if he has no formal status or powers as Moscow's envoy, he would surely be looked on in this light by senior indigenous officials and tend to generate an aura of authority beyond what his rating as number four might suggest. The Premier might stand above him in both power and status, but surely not the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium too. But for the constitutional circumstance mentioned above the official order would probably be First Secretary, Premier, Second Secretary, and fourthly the head of state. Whether this would still undermine the Second Secretary is an open question.

The remaining CC Secretaries follow next when seniority is observed, and within this group still less regularity is found. Separate

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1 See chart XIV.
2 See Chapter 4.
lists of Secretaries add more data from which to generalise, however, especially as these were often in seniority order even after 1959. More often than not the Secretaries for agriculture, industry and ideology were listed in that order. This 'rule' was most consistently violated between 1959 and 1962 when Dshandil'din, the Ideology Secretary, took precedence over one, and sometimes the two other Secretaries. To put it another way he changed places several times with Yusupov (agriculture) until the latter consolidated his position just below the Second Secretary. After Yusupov became First Secretary Dshandil'din slipped back to his old place below the Secretaries for industry and agriculture. One may infer that ranking within the secretariat does not attach to function and that these permutations disclose the vicissitudes of the Secretaries as individuals.\(^1\)

The concern with seniority sometimes bordered on obsession. Throughout most of 1958 Mel'nik (agriculture) changed places with Tashiev (industry) in literally every other list. Their fortunes can hardly have waxed and waned so rapidly for so long, and yet it is difficult to dismiss the oddity as mere chance, since the newspaper was normally meticulous in its protocol.\(^2\) Absurd as it may sound the third and most feasible possibility is that the equality of the two was being subtly communicated.

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\(^1\)There are pitfalls, however, in using the lists in this way. For instance when the Secretaries below the Second are listed alphabetically, as sometimes happened, is seniority or seniority plus alphabetical order the key? The partly alphabetical order would seem to be coincidence, but there are some early instances of mixed (seniority plus alphabetical) lists of the Bureau.

\(^2\)For example if an official was released under a cloud the formula of the announcement left out the words 'in connection with transfer to other work'. The importance of this phrase is demonstrated by the following incident. In KP 1/6/57 the release of two ministers was reported. The following day the announcement was repeated for one of them - with the addition of the crucial phrase. Where disgrace was deep the word 'removed' was used in place of 'released'. 
The above pattern, if such it can be called, was overlaid in 1960 by the appointment of a sixth Secretary, and in 1962 of a seventh. Sokolov the Virgin Lands secretary started off above the ideological and industrial Secretaries but slipped to the bottom as his inglorious removal approached. His successor seemed to be faring no better at the end of 1964, but seniority lists were rare at this stage. The seventh Secretary, the Chairman of the Party and State Control Committee, was listed at or near the bottom of the Secretaries.

The remaining group of two or three Bureau members were listed as shown in Chart III, with the exception that the Chairman of the Committee of State Security was never reported present on occasions for which a seniority list was published, and his ranking is therefore unknown. The government First Deputy Chairman follow the CC Secretaries but precede any additional members, such as the first secretary of the Alma-Ata obkom.

To summarize, the Bureau lists fall into groups which symbolize party hegemony, but within the largest grouping, the party Secretaries, kregonology takes over. Secondly the lists sometimes demonstrate an excessive preoccupation with seniority. While there may be no direct incompatibility between differences of power and status of individual members and overall collegiality within the Bureau, the prospects for the latter are not enhanced by this preoccupation. It is not surprising to learn that the First Secretary can, when he wishes, impose his will on the Bureau. According to I. Yusupov, D.A. Kuneev had his way in the appointment of S. Daulenov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 'notwithstanding objections from several members of the CC Bureau'.

\[1\] KP 19/3/63.
functioned according to the principle of simple majority rulings (which is how Khrushchev claimed the CC CPSU Presidium worked\(^1\)), 'several' here must mean a majority: Yusupov would hardly have had legitimate cause for complaint had he been with the minority. On the other hand practice may be to work towards a consensus, without vote, and Kuznetsov may have offended by declaring the matter settled while a substantial minority still had not capitulated.

Rather than speculate further when solid facts are lacking, let us pass on to the apparatus which serves the Bureau. To some extent the latter can be seen through this apparatus. Here we encounter difficulties which are the reverse of those met in studying the Bureau - data on the size\(^2\) and composition of the apparatus are lacking, but there is a good deal of material emanating from many of its departments. Firstly, however, we shall establish the general structure of the CC apparatus. Since this has varied considerably the reader will be assisted if he follows the description with the aid of chart IV.

The last complete, or nearly complete, list of departments of the Central Committee (and the only such list published during the period examined in this thesis) was given at the VIII Kazakh Party Congress in early 1956.\(^3\) There then existed departments for - Party Organs; Propaganda and Agitation; Agriculture; State Farms; Heavy Industry; Construction and Construction Materials; Trade, Finance and Planning

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\(^1\)Pravda 14/5/57. Note that this was before the 'anti-party group' was ousted.

\(^2\)In 1962 the CP of Armenia was stated to have a total paid apparatus of less than 850 (Fainsod, op.cit., p.207). If the ratio to party membership here is projected to Kazakhstan the latter would have had a full time apparatus of about 3560. How this should be divided between the centre and the localities is not known.

\(^3\)KP 28/1/56.
CHART IV

Apparatus of the Central Committee, C.P. Kazakhstan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ivanov, A.T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sagindykov, Sh.S.</td>
<td>Beisembaev, S.</td>
<td>Beisembaev, S.</td>
<td>Beisembaev, S.</td>
<td>Zhangaldin, T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhandagdin, N.D.</td>
<td>Sagindykov, Sh.S.</td>
<td>Beisembaev, S.</td>
<td>Beisembaev, S.</td>
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ent of Administration Organs
ent of State Farms
Cultural Department of CC CP Kaz. for Leadership of Culture
ent of CC CP Kaz. for Northern Oblasts
ent of Work Among Women
ent of Party Organs
- of Agric. Bureau
- Ind. Bureau
ent of Light and Food Industry
- Ind. Bureau
ent of Trade, Finance and Planning
ent of Transport and Communication
ent of Industry and Transport
ent of Heavy Industry
ent of Construction and Construction Materials
ent of Rural Construction
ent of Propaganda and Agitation
Cultural Department of Agric. Bureau
- Ind. Bureau
ent of Schools
ent of Culture and Science
ent of Science, Higher Education Schools
1) In 1956 it was simply called the Administrative Department.
2) Known more briefly as the Agricultural Bureau of CC.
3) Known more briefly as the Industrial Bureau of CC.
4) Also referred to at times as the Industrial Department.
5) Existence known.
6) Existence presumed, but no reference found.
7) In late 1963 or early 1964 renamed Department of Industry for Processing Primary Products, and Trade.
Organs; Science and Culture; Schools; Work among Women; and an
Administrative Department. With the exception of the last mentioned, the
names of these departments convey their general spheres of activity; the
Administrative Department, or Department of Administrative Organs as it
was shortly after renamed, is concerned with the organs of coercion - the
police, procuracy and courts. In addition to the above list, a Department
of Transport and Communications was referred to just a few days before the
Congress, and despite its unexplained omission there, it is presumed to
have enjoyed continuous existence throughout 1956 - otherwise the
industrial department, with which it was amalgamated in some republics,
should have been renamed. A similar doubt exists as to whether there was
a joint Industry and Transport Department in the early part of 1955: such
was the case in several republics. Apart from this the structure
of the CC apparatus as given at the Congress enjoyed stability throughout

During 1957 several amalgamations occurred. Supervision of
agriculture was taken over by a single department, and the Department of
State Farms disappeared. The head of the Department of Work among Women
became deputy head of the Party Organs Department, and since the former
department was heard of no more it was no doubt absorbed by the latter.
The Department of Schools and that for Culture and Science were also
merged into a Department for Science, Higher Education and Schools. In
most republics 1957 also saw the merging of departments for Administrative

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1 See Pravda 20/3/56, report of a conference of heads of central and
republican departments of administrative organs.
2 KP 20/1/56.
3 See Borson, op.cit., pp. 367-368.
Organs and for Trade and Finance Organs, a move which may have been
initiated in Kazakhstan. If so, separation had occurred again by 1960,
when reference is once more made to a Department of Trade, Finance and
Planning Organs.  
Finally, if the supposition that transport remained a
separate department in 1956 is correct, then it too was now absorbed, for
an article by an instructor of the Department of Industry and Transport
appeared in March, 1957. This arrangement had been reversed a month
later,  
and industry and transport have remained apart ever since.

The re-emergence of a Trade, Finance and Planning Department
at the turn of the decade was only one of a series of moves reversing
the 1957 amalgamations. February, 1960 saw the setting up of the Bureau
of the CC for Northern Oblasts, the only example of a territorial unit in
the apparatus.  
A Light and Food Industry Department also appeared shortly
after. This had apparently been part of the Heavy Industry Department -
despite the latter's name. The head of the latter department was in fact
referred to several times simply as the head of the Industrial Department,
and articles by its officials covered all types of industry. The fourth
new unit to appear in the first half of 1960 was the Department of Science
and Culture. Possibly this meant the re-establishment of the former
Schools Department which had earlier coexisted with Culture and Science, or,
alternatively, this sector may have reverted to the Propaganda and

1 EP 12/3/60. It had then been in existence long enough to have drawn
criticism.
3 See Chapter 9.
4 See e.g. T. Gankovitch 'Ryadom c Angarei i Eniseem - Irtysh', PZh X, No. 10,
Agitation Department where it had been housed in the early 'fifties. In either case the separation was short-lived for the Department of Science, Higher Education and Schools had returned by January, 1962 at the latest. Nor did this complete the repetitions cycle: early in 1963 the Department of Culture and Science reappeared, so that the 1959 position was restored.

A major reorganization of the CC apparatus took place at the time of the Union-wide division of intermediate and lower CPSU echelons according to the 'production principle' in November, 1962. Two bureaux headed by CC Secretaries were established, one for leadership of agriculture, the other for industry and construction. These two bureaux now dominated the apparatus, either absorbing or dividing jurisdiction over most of the existing departments. The only two not obviously affected were the departments for Administrative Organs, and Science, Higher Education and Schools. Agricultural and industrial departments were absorbed and their former heads became deputy chairmen of the new bureaux.

The Bureau for Industry and Construction no doubt also absorbed the Department for Construction and Construction Materials, since no reference to the latter is to be found during 1963. The Department for Party Organs was split into two - the Department for Party Organs of the Industry and Construction Bureau, and a parallel body of the Agricultural Bureau. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation, in addition to being split in this fashion, also underwent a title change, becoming the Ideological Department of the Industrial Bureau and its agricultural counterpart. A Department of Transport and Communications of the Industrial Bureau was noted in 1963, but not a similar department of the Agricultural Bureau. Light and Food Industry received similar treatment, and at the same time incorporated at
least some of the functions of the Trade, Finance and Planning admixture. The new unit that resulted was the Department of Light and Food Industries and Trade of the Industrial Bureau.¹ What happened to finance and planning at this stage is not clear: departmental titles became so involved that the parent body, whichever it was, did not spell out its full functions.

The pendulum started back again before a year had elapsed. The first re- amalgamation can be pinpointed early in October, 1963, when there was only one Ideological Department.² Other departments, Party Organs, Transport and Communications, Construction, were noted as having reverted to their old titles at various times in the following year, so that they too had probably separated from the two large bureaux in late 1963.³ At the end of 1964, after Khrushchev's fall the Industrial and Agricultural Bureaux of the CC were abolished and the two former departments for the same re-emerged. The only move against the trend towards a simpler structure at this period was the splitting off of a separate Department for Rural Construction.⁴

Bewildering as this endless series of proliferations and amalgamations may seem, it is possible to distinguish constant elements in

¹ This grouping of almost all departments as integral parts of the bureaux is of interest in that it indicates the coordinating responsibilities of the latter. The separate departments 'for industry' and 'for agriculture' of the CC CPSU were never mentioned as part of the two bureaux at the centre.
² KP 1, 9/10/63.
³ When departments of the CC CPSU were split into 'for the RSFSR' and 'for the Union Republics', those in the latter group were sometimes referred to simply as the Department of Party Organs, Propaganda and Agitation, etc., so caution is needed when abbreviated titles are discovered. There is little doubt that the interpretation given here is correct, however, as heads of former parallel departments were located either as deputy head of the re unified department, or in some other new position.
⁴ KP 29/9/64.
the apparatus structure. No matter what organizational permutations are applied there always remain departments to oversee party organs, agriculture, industry, construction, transport, communications, ideology, culture, education, and law and order. In short the central party apparatus is equipped to give 'guidance' or 'leadership' in every strategic sector of the life of the republic. It is not as highly articulated as the government's central administration, but in fact it covers all the area within the competence of the latter, and more. The government, for instance, has its educational and cultural ministries; the party has sectors for both, as well as a department to preserve ideological orthodoxy in all educational, cultural and mass communications media. The government has its union - republican and republican ministries for branches of the economy; the party has departments to supervise these, and in addition to serve as a liaison channel with all-union ministries in Moscow. When the head of the Karaganda Coal Combine sought additional investment in his mines there was no Kazakh ministry to appeal to, so he requested the CC Department of Heavy Industry to intervene with the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry. Similarly the head of the Department of Schools will take to task the all-union ministries which have failed to build schools in the republic at the rate prescribed by the plan. The Transport Department head criticises the railway chief in Kazakhstan, who comes directly under the USSR Ministry of Railways. The functions of each

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1 At any one time there is a ratio of between 2 and 3 to 1 between agencies of the Council of Ministers and CC departments.
2 KP 25/1/56.
3 KP 9/8/56.
4 KP 30/10/59.
ministry, the direction of its subordination and the list of institutions under it are defined in a statute (poloshenie), but so far as is known no precise definition of the powers of a CC department is attempted.

A good guide to the relative status of heads of departments is their rating as members or candidate members of the CC, or members of the Auditing Commission of the party. At the 1961 Congress nearly all were put on an equal footing, but earlier there was a definite grading.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Full CC Member</th>
<th>Candidate CC Member</th>
<th>AC member</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Agriculture)</td>
<td>1956-1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Industry)</td>
<td>1956-1964</td>
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<td>1963-1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Ideology)</td>
<td>1961-1964</td>
<td>1956-1961</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Administrative Organs)</td>
<td>1961(?)-1964</td>
<td>1956-1961(?)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Transport &amp; Communications)</td>
<td>1961-1964</td>
<td>1956(?)-1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Construction)</td>
<td>1961-1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>1956-1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Trade)</td>
<td>1961-1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>1956-1961</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

If an order of precedence can be presumed on this evidence, departmental heads would rank as at the left of this table. It would seem that there has been some continuity in this order, for confirmation of the upper part of the table comes from the past. In the early 'fifties the heads of the departments of Party Organs, Industry, and Agriculture were

1Or Department of Party, Trade Union and Komsomoł Organs, as it was then known.
the party. However, only a small fraction of the total
and then be passed on to the department of the

continuous political education of the party, the actual

The propaganda and education department is the center of the

To the extent that the department of propaganda

are the two most frequently called upon to introduce the ideas of

Propaganda there are the two political departments. However, there is also a defect in the classification of

If the amount of material published by departments is any
deserves to be noted. However, in the above text,

for ideological matters, so the function of propagandizing orthodoxy

should rank above industry and national defense. Again, there is a secretary

work under supervision of the First or Second Secretary. Then propaganda, etc.
department, and the head. If so, the Jihet, the Party Organ Department

in the first place, there could mean difference between the ranking of a

All departments are processed to come under political secretaries.

reflects the political importance of the department or their function.

order may be for the apparatus heads, there is no guarantee that it

officers in the bureau ceased in 1994). However, within this suggested

members of the CC bureau, the practice of appointments
material is penned directly by the department. Its function is rather to watch over the orthodoxy and to prescribe the general content of the output of the mass media. Six months after the new Party Programme was promulgated, for instance, we find the head of the department's Press Section warning local newspapers against discontinuing discussion of it.

"Certain editorial boards mistakenly believe that it is no longer obligatory to print such material systematically in every edition, and that the subjects for articles and correspondence are exhausted." He went on to assure them that such was not the case.

The department is also responsible for training the republic's army of propaganda and agitation workers. The magnitude of this task is shown by a report by the deputy head of the department that the number of propagandists had doubled from 1956 to 1961 to 34,000. These were all "people trained in theory". Elsewhere the total number of propagandists, agitators and lecturers working on an unpaid basis was given at half a million, which was about one in 24 of the population.

It was formerly customary to distinguish propaganda and agitation according to (a) the scope and depth of content, and (b) the audience reached. Propaganda was aimed at "a comparatively narrow circle of people", which has been interpreted as meaning mainly party members. Agitation was aimed at the masses. The usefulness of this distinction has declined in recent years because of the much expanded annual courses of

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1 PZh K, No. 4, 1962, p. 45.
2 PZh K, No. 7, 1961, pp. 19, 20. Of these 4,000 were party workers, 8,000 were engineers and technicians, over 6,000 agricultural specialists, and some hundreds were scientific workers.
3 PZh K, No. 8, 1964, p. 75.
political studies run by the Propaganda and Agitation Department. In
1959 the courses were attended by only 30,000; three years later by dint
of a republic wide effort the number had risen to over a million, of whom
only 30 per cent were party members. The significance of this 30 per
cent communist membership of classes is that in earlier years the
department boasted only of the number of party members attending political
education courses; non-party attendance was not mentioned. The content
of these courses is clearly well above the agitation level, so that
running them for such large numbers must have required the services of
many of the 34,000 propagandists. In other words the old distinction
between propaganda for the elect and agitation for the benighted is
breaking down; higher educational levels require that direct political
socialization should produce a more intelligent commitment in citizens
than previously. The era has passed when the masses were deemed to be
catered for by a few minutes of agitation before the work-shift began,
and local party organizations are taken to task if the numbers attending
political courses in their areas fall below quota.

Party activities are conventionally discussed under three
headings - ideological, organizational and economic. This usage
corresponds to the structure and functions of the CC departments, but the
three divisions are blurred at the edges. Thus not all of the political

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1 PZh K No. 9, 1962, p. 25. A further quarter of a million were attending
classes organised by the Komzonal.

2 See e.g. KP 25/9/57, 9/9/58.

3 For discussion of the courses see PZh K No. 7, 1964, p. 9; No. 4, 1961, p. 21;
No. 9, 1962, p. 29.

4 See e.g. PZh K, No. 10, 1961, p. 8, where East Kazakhstan is told that an
enrolment of only 600 out of 30,000 building workers in the oblast "cannot
be tolerated".
studies programme devised by the Propaganda and Agitation Department is
directly ideological. It embraces not only philosophy, history of the
CPSU and political economy, but also 'concrete' economy, and culture.
(As will be seen shortly some organizational work would also more aptly
be called economic). Forays into the cultural field by the Propaganda
officials are not unknown. An instructor of the Ideological Department
is found discussing the repertoire of live theatres (too few Russian
dramas produced in the Kazakh language), and whether a theatre is merely
a place of entertainment (certainly not – it is an 'ideological forum of
the party')\(^1\). This particular discussion seems to have been provoked by
non-attendance of theatrical workers at seminars on aesthetics conducted
by the party. Normally such subjects would be discussed by the Culture
and Science Department.

The general impression to be gained from pronouncements of the
latter is that treatment of creative workers is more cavalier than in
Moscow. Writers are likely to be lined up as good or bad by the head of
the Department on the basis of the subjects they choose (do these relate
to 'important' themes like the virgin lands scheme?); and the same
official has no compunction in referring to a poet whose work has been
refused publication on such grounds.\(^2\) Perhaps the lower level of
sophistication of creative workers in Central Asia is a factor here.\(^3\)

\(^1\) KP 29/563.
\(^3\) No doubt even their counterparts in Moscow would be contemptuous of the
fact that of 1806 literary and artistic workers in Kazakhstan in 1963 only
332 had had the benefit of tertiary education, and 600 had not studied
beyond primary school (Ibid). Alma-Ata impressed one Western art critic
as a 'provincial centre...where the propagandistic value of art is deemed
more necessary and the aesthetic value is least questioned'. (Paul
Sjøkløcha, 'Modern Art and the Shackles of Dogma', Problems of Communism,
One more example of this department's supervision of the arts can be accommodated. A cinema producer sought to define the characteristics of the Kazakh; he saw these as hospitality, respect for elders, love of children, musical talent, picturesque speech etc. An innocuous enough profile of his race, one might have thought, but the Science and Culture head attacked it not merely on the grounds that it omitted the devotion of Kazakhs to the ideals of communism, but also because 'the obliteration of the differences between peoples is proceeding as their integration (ublizhenie) progresses on the basis of a common social, economic and spiritual life'. The party does not see the 'national in form' content of socialist realism as extending beyond the use of the local language.

Education falls under the same department. As might be expected the ideological content of school courses and the work of primary party organizations in educational institutions receive close attention. Under the latter heading questions such as school attendance, failure rates and refusal by pupils to go where sent on completion of courses are discussed. Educational ministries come under fire in such articles, but injunctions tend to be so general that they tell us little about the authority of the department over state agencies. How, for instance, is one to interpret a typical instruction such as 'There must be an end to underestimating of school construction by the leaders of

2 KP 18/3/59.
3 KP 25/6/55.
ministries.¹ One clue is the fact that articles reviewing overall educational achievements and shortcomings derive from this department rather than the government; and the head announces a decision to establish new educational institutions.² These are straws in the wind, but they do not tell us what processes led to publication of such articles. The same problem is encountered even more forcibly in the case of the economic departments and is best deferred for the present.

The chief function of the vital Party Organs Department³ is the selection of cadres, not only for party but government and economic posts as well. The lowest known position for which vetting goes as far as the CC apparatus is that of farm director.⁴ Presumably no position above this in the agricultural hierarchy is filled without CC approval. If the same held true on the industrial side factory directors would also be vetted at CC level. No confirmation of this was found however, and since in general the party supervises agriculture more closely than industry the directors of smaller enterprises might be approved by сектора or объека only. This does not mean, of course, that selection of such comparatively lowly cadres as farm and factory directors is made in detail at CC level. Farm directors are apparently on the nomenklatura at all three levels (район, област, CC)⁵; the vetting procedure simply means that appointments proposed by раikons cannot be finalized until cleared by the CC Party Organs Department.

²KP 16/8/57.
³Now renamed the Department of Organizational Party Work.
⁴KP 2/2/61.
⁵The term nomenklatura thus applies both to posts requiring ratification and those for which the body concerned makes the recommendation.
There is in fact considerable evidence that vetting by the CC of
nominations for the raikom personnel is often little more than a
formality. The frequent reproofs of raikoms over the quality of farm
executives would have little point unless this were so. The degree to
which obkom departments interfere is another question. On the one hand we
find a complaint by an obkom party organs department that a raikom
recommends an unsatisfactory collective farm chairman as chairman of a
village soviet, and then as chairman of another farm. He continued to
perform poorly in each position. Here the vetting was obviously
ineffective even at obkom level. On the other hand an obkom is reproved
by the CC journal for blaming a raikom for mistakes in choosing farm
chairman. The obkom should have studied nominations more carefully.2
The Alma-Ata obkom made it a practice to call in every nominee for farm
chairmanship or directorship for interview, first by the obkom agricultural
department, and then by an obkom secretary, before appending a
recommendation (to the CC).3 The final instance for consideration concerns
a state farm director whose appointment was proceeded with by an obkom
despite rejection by the CC (on the grounds of educational qualifications).
The case drew unfavourable comment by Kusnezov three years later because the
director had failed in his assignment.4 Had he been successful, it seems,
no objection would have been raised.

1 PZh K, No. 10, 1961, p.94. These positions are, of course, formally
elective ones.
3 A. Asanov, Partiinye organizatsii Kazakhstana v bor'be za uкреплени
selskogo khozvystva republiki kvalitativno vysshimi kadrami. Alma-Ata.
1962, p.41.
4 KP 2/2/61.
From these cases one is led to infer that effective vetting of even the more important posts on the raion personnel extends only to obkom level. Lexity is not unknown here either, but close scrutiny appears to be the norm. The lesser posts on the raion list, e.g. brigade leader or farm sector head do not appear to go to the CC even formally, discussion of individual cases having been found only as far as obkom level.¹ There is no doubt that the CC Party Organs Department keeps a watch on the placement of party members in general – the Department head comments on the distribution of rank and file members in various branches of the economy² – but this is different matter from vetting individual appointees.

The procedure for appointment of secretaries of primary party organisations is similar to that for farm heads, i.e. they are nominated by the raikom,³ but the obkom is held responsible and is censured by the CC for mistakes by the raikom. Discussion of these appointments at obkom level comes from officials of party organs departments.⁴

Reference thus far has been made only to the party role in the appointment of cadres. In the case of the farm director rejected by the CC, the nomination was said to have come from the obkom and the Ministry of State Farms. Logically it might be expected that the latter would be responsible for the nominee's professional qualifications, and the obkom for his leadership and ideological suitability. Yet the interviews of

¹In PZh K, No. 3, 1962, p.30, these two positions were said to have been placed on the obkom personnel in West Kazakhstan.
²See e.g. PZh K, No. 6, 1961, p.24.
³See e.g. PZh K, No. 10, 1962, p.34.
both collective and state farm executives by the Alma-Ata obkom were specifically stated to have covered agricultural expertise, so that here the party did not rely on the word of the state administration in any respect.

All this is reminiscent of Fainsod's research on the Smolensk archive material. In the 'thirties economic officials such as farm heads and factory directors were proposed by the local office of the relevant commissariat and confirmed by an obkom department.¹ Fainsod found the above positions to be on the obkom nomenklatura, although from correspondence with raikoms it is clear that the latter took the initiative,² just as more recently in Kazakhstan. There are differences, however. Fainsod refers to separate nomenklatura for each obkom department, with only party positions being filled by the party organs department. We have seen that in the early 'sixties both party organs and agricultural departments in the oblaste were involved in the appointment of farm executives in Kazakhstan; it is tentatively suggested therefore that the economic branch departments of obkoms still process nominations as in the 'thirties, but that a consolidated obkom list of all types of positions is maintained by the party organs department, and that the latter may now have an equal voice in making non-party appointments.³

²Ibid., p. 87.
The second main difference is that Fainsod makes no mention of
the obkom referring raikom nomenklatura positions to a higher level. The
lowest appointment that the Smolensk obkom referred to the CC CPSU appears
to have been that of raikom second secretary. In Kazakhstan the
republican CC retained right of veto down to farm head level. Some
centralisation of staffing practice may thus have been effected since the
thirties, but the two situations are not really comparable since no
republican CC intervened between Smolensk and Moscow.

Raikom secretaries and raipolkom chairmen were nominated and
removed on the initiative of obkoms, but at least in the case of the
former scrutiny by the CC was exacting. There is a report by the head
of the Department of Party Organs to the CC Bureau on the quality of 97
raikom secretaries selected in the second half of 1958, the wording being
that the department selected the secretaries 'conjointly with the
obkom'. At the time of the reorganisation of agricultural administration
in March 1962 it was announced that the CC had taken on to its
nomenklatura the heads of the new production directorates (which took
over from raipolkom inspectorates) and the obkom party organisers
attached to these (who replaced raikom secretaries as agricultural

\[\text{References:}\]

1 FZh K, No. 10, 1961, p.23; No. 2, 1962, p.29; No. 10, 1962, p.7; KP
19/3/63 (Yasupov’s comments on raikom secretary Gelishev).
2 Komarty Kazakhstana na vtorom etape tsenod teoliny, Alma-Ata, 1963,
p.371.
Presumably secretaries of party committees of the production directorates were also placed on the CC nomenklatura in November, 1962. Obkom secretaries, it need hardly be added, are also on the CC list, and nominations for first secretary are discussed in the CC Bureau itself. They would also be vetted at CC CPSU level. On the analogy of raionspokom chairmen, one would expect oblishpokom chairmen to be nominated by the CC, but it is clear from the following incident that the obkom first secretary has a strong voice here. First secretary Kh. Bekturganov insistently sought the confirmation of comrade Aldabergenov as chairman of Aktyubinsk oblishpokom, but little more than 18 months had passed before comrade Bekturganov began to seek his removal. Information on the appointment of central government officials is limited to a few cases. When the head of the Chief Directorate for Supply and Sales of the Kazakh National Economic Council was discovered taking bribes he was removed by the Alma-Ata gorkom (which has the status and rights of an obkom). The position would be about the equivalent of a district party secretary, but it is not in the chief directorate a district for which there was formerly.

1KP 6/4/62. It is of interest to note that a centralisation of staffing authority such as this confers some measure of independence on the nominees affected. We read of 'some immature officials' who look down on lower party organs once they are raised to a higher nomenklatura. 'We've negotiated the raion barrier, they say; now we do business only with the obkom or CC' (PZhK, No. 9, 1961, p. 56). In the present instance there would have been less dependence on the favour of obkom officials than formerly.

2See Kunaev on the appointment of S. Tektamysov, KP 26/12/62. Also KP 19/3/63.

3Kunaev, KP 19/3/63.

of a deputy minister in other branches of the government, so perhaps the upper strata of administrative posts to this level are on the cordon list. The CC does not always heed advice from this level, however, as may be illustrated by a case history. This is worth quoting as told by M.P. Karpenko, an okhrana first secretary, in order to show the intrigue that may surround appointments at this level (and the difficulty of sorting out who makes them).

In our govmarkhoz the deputy chairman in charge of construction was comrade Bushev. His work was of a low order; he was a man without initiative, much addicted to alcohol. Suddenly we discovered that comrade Bushev had been summoned to the CC CP of Kazakhstan, where he was appointed to the post of Deputy Minister of State Purchases of the republic. As might have been expected he did nothing to advance construction there either. Someone in Alma-Ata was displaying a touching concern for him without bothering to study his professional qualifications. You see comrade Bushev was sent to us from Alma-Ata. The person who was pushing Bushev acted without consulting the okhrana and then extricated him. And when his position in the Ministry of State Purchases was abolished, the same hand, it seems, was about to push him into responsible work in the CC CP Kazakhstan. Fortunately this was averted by the intervention of comrade Kolesnitsa.¹

Kolesnitsa was a CC Secretary so the case apparently went as far as the CC Bureau, or at least the Secretariat. The import of Karpenko's tale appears to be that he should have been consulted before Bushev's appointment to and transfer from the govmarkhoz. Incidentally he goes on to complain that cadres from the oblasts have little prospect of promotion into government ministries in Alma-Ata.

The next episode indicates that the influence of the CC apparatus is decisive in the case of ministers also. In 1955 there was much

¹KP 20/3/1963.
confusion in the distribution of agricultural machinery; consignments destined for Kustanai ended up in neighbouring oblasts where there was a surplus. Nothing was done by the CC Bureau until field operations were over for the year, although Kustanai obkom made several representations. The Minister of State Farms, who was allegedly responsible for the chaos, retained his position until a belated enquiry was held. According to the Kustanai obkom first secretary, the CC Department of State Farms had defended the minister in the quarrel; and officials of the department came to Kustanai to investigate they would not have made this mistake.¹ This may well be a partisan account of what happened, but it does indicate that it was the CC department that interpreted the oblast versus ministry conflict to the CC Bureau, and that the minister's fate depended on this interpretation. The exact nomenclature position for ministers remains obscure, however - and is complicated by cases of transfer from outside the republic.² Whether Kazakhstan advised Moscow that no suitable local nominees were available, or whether Moscow decided this, is not known.

On the question of appointment of the top officials of the republic, the external origins of many of the First and Second CC Secretaries point to the republic's having little say in the senior

¹KP 27/1/56. This no doubt explains why obkom secretaries complain from time to time that CC departmental heads are infrequent visitors to their areas. (See e.g. speeches by S.M. Novikov KP 13/3/60, and A.Ya. Popad'ko, KP 29/1/65). Personal contact with apparatus heads is the best way to ensure that the 'correct' picture of local events is presented to the CC Bureau.

²See items 8, 10, 12 in key to chart XIV.
party leaders will be.¹ The case of Daulenov's appointment as Chairman of
the Council of Ministers² would seem to indicate on the other hand that
the CC Bureau has considerable freedom in coopting its remaining
membership. Since the government head is the second or third ranking
official in the republic, the Bureau probably has primary responsibility
for its membership from here down.

Discussion of staffing policies has led somewhat beyond the
functions of the CC Party Organs Department, and we now return to these.
In addition to its cadres responsibilities, the Department is what might
be called the party's organisation and methods office. Questions of
regularity of party meetings, party election procedures, recruitment,
discipline, the structure and functions of the apparatus of obkoms and
raions all come within its purview.³ Reports from obkoms party organs
departments to their CC parent body show indeed that there is hardly any
aspect of party activity that does not concern this sector of the
apparatus. The reports relate to such detailed 'organisational' work as
formation of mechanised brigades on farms; artificial insemination of
cattle; the activities of bodies supervised by local party organs, e.g.
trade union and komsomol organisations; training of economic cadres; and

¹Four First Secretaries (Panemarenko, Yakovlev, Brezhnev and Belyaev)
came from outside Kazakhstan. Yakovlev and Brezhnev each served a
preliminary period as Second Secretary. Second Secretary Rodionov came
direct from Leningrad; Selomentsov from Chelyabinsk served as Karaganda
obkoms first secretary for a period before succeeding him.
²See p. 61.
³See matters discussed by a conference of heads of local departments of
party organs, PZhK No. 16, 1964, p.29. The structure and functions of the
local party apparatus was of particular concern from 1959 on when the use
of 'non-staff' personnel, departments and commissions was sharply increased.
The Party Organs head analysed their effectiveness, 'advised' on their
methods of work, whom they should be responsible to, and their functions.
There were about 300 non-staff departments attached to local party
committees down to raion level in 1964.
This would leave the economic department of the OC responsible for all the activities of party former from different levels. The department is taken in isolation and each concludes that the OC would be no hesitation. In fact, the party cannot.

On one hand to continue the work of the economic department of 

1965.

Furthermore, the further representation of control bodies in December, 

and there were regular meetings each month for discussion. The 

representation of party organs and mass participation had been 

represented. In other words, after the Tenth National Congress, the 

1962). It was said that despite measures to eradicate the practice of 

national party-based. When new controls were formed in November, 

administration of production, but it emerged later that they had been 

reduced as anticipated of the growth of control participation in the 

If the state appears to have been almost defunct, at the time they were 

in this respect. The confirmation of state control of the Central of 

years of their existence mark them off as the most important decades 

important references to those control sessions during the three and a half 

administration, attached to party control functions from 1949 on. 

the thousand of control sessions on control of the activities of the 

state agencies. The head and deputy head gave close attention to the
The economic branch departments can be treated together, because all present the same major problems, although there is no lack of articles from officials of this part of the Government. To eliminate the problems, it is necessary to develop the regulations parallel to government agencies in parallel, to eliminate the difficulties, and to conduct a decision atmosphere for profitability in all departments.

In order to alleviate construction from the Government, and to conclude as follows:

-1.5. Last year was held by the Department of Industry for at least ten years, but a search of the remaining government agencies revealed nothing more specific or fruitful. In the way of orders than the following example:

In the following example:

- The estimated branch departments can be treated together, because all present the same major problems, although there is no lack of articles from officials of this part of the government. To eliminate the problems, it is necessary to develop the regulations parallel to government agencies in parallel, to eliminate the difficulties, and to conduct a decision atmosphere for profitability in all departments.
The leaders of the Karaganda Coal Combine, the Irtysh Coal Trust [and several others] must struggle against extravagance in the use of metal, fuel and power.领导者 of sovkhozy and construction organisations should labour hard to ensure timely handing over of projects specified in the economic plan.2 Most of his articles boil down to no more than a summary of achievements and failures over a specific period. Presumably this is because press articles are considered inappropriate media for orders given by a CC department head, but this assumption, even if correct, does not further our enquiry. Gankevich's subordinates do tend to write with clearer purpose; e.g. an instructor of the department accuses the leaders of the Ust Kamaenogorsk lead combine of being reconciled to technological backwardness.3 At the same time his article contains nothing that can be interpreted as an instruction to introduce this or that piece of machinery.

The public pronouncements of CC departments are, then, on the face of it, purely hortative. The virtues and vices of whole economic sectors are reviewed, and sometimes of individual enterprises or farms, but specific instructions on what to do about them are not published. It is possible, of course, that the apparatus is so powerful that nothing more than criticism is necessary. This is the view proposed by Reinhard Bendix - economic officials responding with alacrity to every hint from party chiefs.4 It is true that the complete dependence of careers of state and economic officials on the apparatus makes it dangerous to

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1 KP 27/8/61.
2 KP 16/7/61.
3 KP 14/3/57.
4 See chapter 8.
ignore criticism from this quarter; no doubt there was a flurry of activity whenever Putin'sv was singled out a construction site as performing poorly. On the other hand, we have it on good authority that his department's supervision was sometimes superficial. At the VIII Congress in Kazakhstan an obkom first secretary charged that the Construction Department was ill-informed on how the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction was coping with the building of state farms in the virgin lands. He suspected that material for reports by the department [to the CC Bureau] came from the ministry, and that the republic's leaders were being misled. The ministry was thus winning praise for itself, while in the speaker's oblast its operations were in a muddle.¹

In any case, even supposing that the occasional public assessments of ministerial performance by CC departments do elicit plenty of response, they offer little insight into the day to day relations between the two sets of institutions. One avenue that bears exploring is the primary party organization of each government agency. Nowadays all senior government personnel are party members, and hence bound by the decisions of their party units. Is it possible then that the apparatus works through this channel?

A firmly negative answer can be given here, because party organizations of ministries appear to be the least effective of all. The party statutes specifically deny them the right of central over administrative agencies; if they discover shortcomings they report to

¹KP 27/1/56, Speech by P. Khruschev.
higher party formations. Many of them, we are told, fail to use even this right; apparently they become closely identified with the interests of their ministries.\footnote{PZHK, No. 3, 1962, p.7.} The Ministry of Construction regularly fails to meet its annual targets, but its party organization ‘declines discussion of production questions’. Resolutions vaguely instruct officials of the ministry ‘to adopt effective measures to improve utilization of machinery’ or ‘to devote particular attention to discovering further production reserves’.\footnote{PZHK, No. 5, 1964, p.62.} The secretary of the party bureau is head of the cadres department of the ministry (as is usually the case with part-time secretaries in industrial enterprises). This gives him leverage only over lesser employees, the more senior being on the 

*muscles* or CC *nomenclature*.

The one conference of party secretaries of ministries reported by the press seems to have spent its sessions drubbing them for their impotence. The party organisation of the Ministry of Rural Construction failed to influence the work of the ministry, discussed only questions recommended by higher party organs; the leaders of the Ministry of Agriculture ignored recommendations of their party organization, and so forth.\footnote{KP 16/6/56.} At the time of the discussion of the new Party Programme the head of the Department of Party Organs took the opportunity to advocate amendment of the statutory weakness of party organizations in administrative agencies,\footnote{See N.V. Dykhnov's speech, KP 28/9/61. but his suggestion was never taken up.}
Preparations for elections of the Supreme Court President.

The elections are to be done by the CC to discharge the following:

- Of a letter to the CC of Spain and France.

In addition, the CC received the following:

Sentenced to imprisonment up to the 1996 Congress, a total of 2,492 letters have been sent to the Secretary of the Secretariat and to the CC President.

The CC of the European Parliament to the CC, where 96 were received by the CC in the International Year of the 9,000 Competitors.

A message was made of the CC of the European Parliament, where 1,496 competitors were handed to the Secretary of the CC of the European Parliament, in the year 1996.

For voting criteria, the most important cases were handed to the Secr. 1996 Congress, the CC received 1,496 competitors, in the year of the 996 Congress, the CC was handed the number of competitors.

Another aspect of the report is seen in the report of the CC of the European Parliament, with a long passage of discussion.1

1. Some sources report promotion to Deputy Minister of a non-euphonious commentator.
who also received this kind of mail, may occasionally be heard to complain of the ignorance of workers who do not know where to seek satisfaction of their requests,\footnote{KP 18/7/63.} but no such plaint is voiced by the CC. Indeed statements made at Congress may be regarded as positive encouragement.\footnote{Letters, applications and complaints from communists and workers are regarded in our party as [a sign of] a desire on the part of communists and all workers to assist our party and soviet organs in the \ldots elimination of instances of bureaucracy, red tape, a heartless attitude towards citizens and other abnormal phenomena\footnote{KP 12/3/60.}.} Possibly the letters are welcome as a barometer of public opinion on various issues. The regular affirmation of the interest of CC Secretaries in the more important cases may also be interpreted as a warning to officials that the CC is not dependent solely on regular channels of information. Departments are instructed to analyse the sources of complaints, so that any unusual rise in the volume against an institution or individual would draw scrutiny from party central organs. Awareness of this must be a partial check on the worst forms of arbitrariness.\footnote{The CC receives only a fraction of the total grievance mail, the majority of petitioners electing to send their letters to the institution directly concerned. The Ministry of Health alone received nearly 10,000 letters in 1961 (KP 6/9/62) and the Alma Ata regional clinic over 6000 in 1962 (KP 8/6/63). In any case much of this type of mail received by the CC must simply be referred to lower echelons (despite condensation of this practice) since full investigation of well over 1000 letters a month would consume an inordinate amount of departmental time and resources.}

Mention of postenvelope of the secretariat in the Auditing Commission report quoted above is noteworthy as the only positive hint discovered in the press that the secretariat does function as a unit. Even the type of article headed \"In the CC Bureau\" is missing for the
It is clear that the function of the Secretary to the Party is a vital one, because the Secretary must be present in order to carry out the instructions of the Central Committee and to ensure that the Party is functioning effectively.

The Secretary must also be able to take an active part in the discussions and debates that take place at Party meetings. He must be able to express the views of the Party and to ensure that the decisions taken are implemented.

In order to carry out these functions, the Secretary must have a good understanding of the Party's policies and objectives. He must also be able to work effectively with other members of the Party, both at the local and central levels.

The Secretary must also be able to manage the Party's finances, and to ensure that the Party's resources are used effectively.

In conclusion, the Secretary to the Party is an important role within the Party's structure. He must be able to carry out a wide range of functions, and to ensure that the Party is functioning effectively and efficiently.
Party History, the Party Commission of the CC, and the Central Party School attached to the CC. The last named will be encountered later as the training centre of the future elite of the republic. The Institute of Party History, to judge by reviews of its publications, is mainly devoted to research on the period before the current decade.\(^1\) This by no means removes it from the centre of political storms, however, party history being the most sensitive of disciplines.\(^2\) The director of the institute is an important figure: he reports to ideological conferences, expounds the political theory of the abolition of Machine Tractor Stations, speaks to the Supreme Soviet on legislation against a parasitic way of life.\(^3\) One of the directors was concurrently a Vice Chairman of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. The other was a former deputy head, and subsequently became head of the CC Department of Science and Culture. Both were chairman of standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

The Party Commission of the CC is a disciplinary body concerned with moral standards in the party ranks and the quality of recruits. In recent years responsibility for preliminary checking on would be party members has largely devolved on non-staff commission of

\(^1\) Works by members of the Institute on contemporary history do appear, however, source references then being to records of CC departments, especially the Party Organs Department. Records are thus probably transferred to the Institute after about ten years.

\(^2\) See e.g. the review of I. Shambatov's Bo'birga партійна організація Казахстана а прапопедії технічних спеціалість in KP 18/12/59. The author had underestimated Khrushchev's role and the fraternal help from other republics (especially help in the form of migration) in the virgin lands scheme.

\(^3\) KP 26/1/58, 18/3/58, 22/12/61, 18/12/63.
raikoms, and the Party Commission has supervised their work.\footnote{See KP 7/8/63.} Most of the Commission's energies seem to be devoted to reviewing the sanctions imposed on party members at lower levels. Two examples of these 'personal affairs', as they are called, will best convey its review functions. A party member misused 105,000 roubles from state funds and was expelled from the party by his primary organisation; the raikom reversed the decision (for unspecified reasons); the Commission intervened and the culprit was not only re-expelled but given a five year sentence by a district court.\footnote{PZh K, No. 7, 1960, p. 17.} In a somewhat similar case the temir tem gordon obstructed execution of a jail sentence, and the Commission used the occasion to correct two mistaken impressions of 'some party officials' — that a communist can be charged with a crime only after the question of his party membership has been resolved, and that party sanctions can replace criminal proceedings.\footnote{PZh K, No. 4, 1963, p. 48.} These examples are by no means a tendentious selection; if one wishes to study the seamy side of party life articles on the Commission's activities are the place to look.\footnote{The Chairman of the Commission himself says that most misdemeanours reviewed are committed by communists with 'material responsibilities'. Ibid., p. 40.}

The information gathered into this chapter falls short of a complete picture of central party organs and their relations with state bodies. There is of course plenty of evidence of liaison between CC departments and ministries: indeed they are sometimes instructed by the
CC Bureau to take joint action.  

Furthermore, there is no doubt about who is (formally at least) the senior partner in such ventures; the department is instructed to supervise and correct the behaviour of ministries.  

The difficulty in discovering how detailed and effective this supervision is stems not merely from the nature of source material. The basic fact is that, Party Organs and Ideological Departments excepted, there are pairs of institutions and officials with the same administrative responsibilities. The problem is thus only a part of the whole maze of party-state relations, which has never been fully charted even within the USSR. At local level there is ample documentation of the overlap of functions, and of the perplexity of those involved. Speaking of instances of friction between rural party committees and the parallel agricultural production directorates after the November, 1962 reorganization, the First Secretary admitted that officials were 'racking their brains over the problem of who has the commanding role, who should be subordinate to whom'.  

A verbal solution is found for local level after each reorganization, and although the essence of the problem always remains intractable, post-reorganization discussions afford real insights into local party-state relations at a given time.

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1See e.g. S.M. Novikov, KP 13/3/60, Also Kompartia Kazakhatana na vtoroye obshhestvennoe tseliny. Alma-Ata, 1963, p. 261, where measures on inter-sectoral trade and health are credited to a joint effort by CC departments and government ministries.

2See S.A. Bunakov, KP 12/3/60, on correction of mistakes of the Ministry of Social Security by the Department of Trade and Finance, and Administrative Organs.

3KP 14/6/63. See also A. Bardalin, 'V novykh usloviakh', PZhK, No. 6, 1962, p. 21.
The difference at CC level is that, in Kazakhstan, there has still been no public recognition of the problem. Similar quandaries must have arisen at this level too, since the same conditions were present to generate them. To demonstrate this we may cite a recent statement from Azerbaijan, where CC economic branch departments have been told to rid themselves of their "ingrained habits of deciding everything for everyone, of supplanting .... departments of the Council of Ministers, and the supply organisations".¹ These are strong words, and they have, moreover, been echoed in another Central Asian republic.²

Given the possibility of minor variations from republic to republic because of the different personalities involved, we might expect that the apparatus in Kazakhstan would have been guilty of the same tutelage of government agencies which drew criticism in Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan. One wonders, however, whether the apparatus in those places was as competent as the above quotation suggests. From our study in Kazakhstan we now know that even if CC departments did 'decide everything', they based their decisions at least partly on information supplied by government agencies. This circumstance alone should make us wary of overestimating the powers of the CC apparatus. Certainly the impression gained is that these powers are extensive, but we still lack the kind of evidence that would provide a clear picture of day to day relations with parallel government ministries. This being so, we shall return to the problem later from another direction.

¹Pravda, 17/2/66.
²See Pravda 9/3/66, where branch departments of the CC CP Tadjikistan are criticised for petty tutelage of economic organs.
PART II. THE MACHINERY OF MOBILIZATION

CHAPTER 3

THE SUPREME SOVIET

The subordinate role of the soviets in the USSR political system has inevitably caused some Western observers to ask why they have been retained at all. A.G. Meyer, having found that they do not perform the functions of legislatures in other systems, goes so far as to suggest that their purpose may be to dramatize the political disenfranchisement of the population and symbolize the servile role of citizens. When it is recalled that the soviets are claimed to be instruments of representative and responsible government, a political scientist oriented towards the various Western definitions of these terms might naturally assume a certain cynicism behind their application to the soviets.

Nowadays, however, there is more dispute than ever over what does constitute representative and responsible government, so that assessment of the soviets is not so much a matter of measuring their role against some fixed definition, as of discovering what meaning these terms have in the Soviet context, and with what other principles of rule they coexist and compete. Whatever the contrasts between Western and Soviet legislatures the latter have always occupied a central place in official exegesis of the system, and assurances are given that they will

become more and more central as the system develops. "Many questions that are at present within the competence of the executive bodies of government and administration will be settled directly by the soviets". Despite consistently low Western assessments of the soviets in the past, therefore, a study of the central institutions of a republic must include an up to date description of its Supreme Soviet. In this chapter we shall look at the composition of delegates to the Soviet and how this relates to participation at its sessions; at the procedure for conduct of sessions; at the output of the Soviet; and finally at its standing commissions.

The Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR is constitutionally described as the highest organ of state power, and the only legislative body of the republic. It is a unicameral house, elected for a four year term in the year following elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Representation is on the basis of single member constituencies, each with a population of about 1700. Redefinition of electoral boundaries at each election to maintain representation around this level has meant a steady rise in the number of deputies from 300 in 1947 to a total of 473 elected in 1965.

One fundamental aspect of the Soviet in which there have been no recent developments is the electoral system. As is the practice in elections to other soviets, no choice of candidates is offered to electors, only one name appearing on the ballot papers for each district.

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Extensive comment on this and other features of the electoral system in specialized works makes it unnecessary to recount the procedure here. In Kazakhstan the pattern is familiar—unanimous endorsement of a single candidate at pre-election meetings, participation of 99.97 to 99.99% of voters in elections, and approval of the official party and non-party bloc by 99.53 to 98.65% of votes cast.

The resulting composition of the Supreme Soviet, as described by chairmen of successive mandate commissions, is given in Chart V. One immediately apparent feature of the chart is that deputies are drawn from widely varying social groups—a fact invariably singled out for comment in the commission reports:

In the supreme organ of state power of the republic the widest possible strata of the population are represented, no matter whether [the criterion selected is] social position, nationality, sex or education.

It is a curious twist of political history that Jeremy Bentham’s proposals for an electoral system which would secure that all interests were fairly represented in the House of Commons should have been completely ignored in Britain, and implemented widely in the elective

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1 See Max E. Neta, Soviet Local and Republic Elections, Hoover Institute, Stanford, California, 1965.

2 On the pre-presidential process at the last local soviet elections, see L. C. Churchward, “Soviet Local Government Today,” Soviet Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 4, April, 1966, pp. 446-450. Churchward was assured that there is sometimes competition between collectives nominating alternative candidates for a single electorate, but found no such cases for investigation. If such competition does occur it is settled before the public meetings at which single candidates for each district are nominated.


4 KP 29/3/59.

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<th>1963</th>
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<td>Number Elected</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>473</td>
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<td>Party (nms, &amp; candidates)</td>
<td>316 (70.4%)</td>
<td>309 (68.7%)</td>
<td>313 (66.2%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Party</td>
<td>109 (25.6%)</td>
<td>141 (31.3%)</td>
<td>160 (33.8%)</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>131 (36.8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>188 (44.2%)</td>
<td>199 (44.2%)</td>
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<td>32 (7.5%)</td>
<td>75 (15.8%)</td>
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<td>72 (17.0%)</td>
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<td>185 (39.2%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>208 (46.2%)</td>
<td>215 (45.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>158 (35.1%)</td>
<td>179 (37.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>56 (12.5%)</td>
<td>50 (10.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28 (6.2%)</td>
<td>29 (6.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>43 (10.1%)</td>
<td>42 (9.3%)</td>
<td>82 (14.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>89 (20.9%)</td>
<td>126 (28.0%)</td>
<td>171 (32.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>202 (47.5%)</td>
<td>196 (43.6%)</td>
<td>123 (26.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>75 (17.7%)</td>
<td>79 (17.6%)</td>
<td>107 (22.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+</td>
<td>16 (3.8%)</td>
<td>7 (1.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>114 (26.8%)</td>
<td>396 (88.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>165 (37.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers engaged in party, soviet, economic, military &amp; social work</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants engaged in party, soviet economic, military &amp; social work</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers &amp; peasants directly engaged in production</td>
<td>220 (48.9%)</td>
<td>231 (48.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees in intelligentsia</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arty, social work</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violet, economic work</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(soviet organs 73)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(economic organs 94)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(soviet organs 82)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(economic organs 15)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>priapiculture</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inc., Ch., d/ch., coll., etc.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm managers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idem, brigade idra</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ag. specialists</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor drivers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors of tractor stations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors of state farms</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk maids etc.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (education, health, culture, arts)
institutions of Communist countries. The phenomenon appears to merit investigation, especially as the validity of Soviet claims has been challenged. According to A.C. Berson, who has assembled data from a number of the Union Republics, arbitrariness in the classification of deputies is widespread; mandate commission reports are said to be "completely misleading, if not utterly false".¹

Berson's criticism of the reports is aimed at the figures for 'worker' and 'peasant' deputies, so we shall follow his lead and focus on these two categories. Of 165 'peasants' elected in 1955, 96 were stated to be engaged in 'party, Soviet, economic, military and social work', and there was a similar subdivision of 'workers'. It follows immediately that the basis for inclusion in these two groups is not current occupation. Residual groups of only 69 peasants and 69 workers would seem to have been classified on this basis and to have been directly engaged in production. General, though not exact, confirmation of this supposition is to be found in the breakdown of deputies employed in agriculture.

For the 1959 Soviet, only the aggregate total of 'workers and peasants' was given in the commission report, together with the total number directly engaged in production. The election results published prior to convocation of the Soviet, however, identified deputies according to occupation. An actual head-count of these results is given in Chart VI. If comparison is made with the 1959 commission report as summarised in Chart V, further confirmation will be found that the

**CHART VI**

Kazakh Supreme Soviet - Occupations of Deputies as found by headcount.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR Top Leaders</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh CP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. Central Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec., Kraispolkom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec., Obispolkom</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec., raykoms</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec., partymen</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec., party committee, ag. production directorate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other local party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other central govt.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Kraispolkom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Chairman, Kraispolkom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Obispolkom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Chairman, Obispolkom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, raipolkom</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other local govt.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head, agric. production directorate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, deputy ch.,sovmarkhoz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, factory, mine,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction org.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, director, (section) manager, farm.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, tractor station</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic, research</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
'worker and peasant' category in the latter is not based on current occupation. Still more interesting is the difficulty encountered in explaining the commission's figure of 220 'workers and peasants directly engaged in production'. To arrive at this figure one is forced to include 26 deputies who are more appropriately classified as executives. The commission has thus dubbed about half of the industrial and agricultural executives as 'workers' or 'peasants'.

A similar result is obtained by comparison of commission and actual head-count figures for the 1963 Soviet, the number of executive personnel apparently included in the 'worker' or 'peasant' categories this time being 14. It would thus seem that Berson's comments on the reliability of commission reports is supported by Kazakhstan data in two ways. Firstly 'workers' and 'peasants' are not necessarily engaged in industry or agriculture at all. However the charge of falsification can scarcely be sustained on this score, since it is obvious from the 1955 and 1959 reports that no claim is made that 'peasants' and 'workers' are so employed. Secondly, some of the 'workers' and 'peasants' that are employed in industry and agriculture are in fact executive personnel - factory directors, farm heads, or perhaps even more senior officials. Here the commission reports are, at the very least, misleading. It is odd, however, that the discrepancies should be ascertainable through the simple, if tedious, process of checking reports against published election results. Whatever else may be said of Soviet statistics, they are normally consistent with readily available data. One is prompted, therefore, to look for a simple explanation of the apparent discrepancies.

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1It should be noted also that the classification of workers and peasants in the countryside is somewhat arbitrary. A milkmaid on a collective farm is a 'peasant', but on a state farm a 'worker'.
The obvious question to ask is, if 'worker' and 'peasant' labels do not tell us the current occupation of deputies, what do they stand for? The party's method of classifying its membership appears to be relevant here, since 'peasant' and 'worker' are two of the three categories of 'social position' (sotsial'naia polozhenie) under which new members are enrolled. The third party category is 'employee' (or white-collar worker - alushashchik). Classification of a party member under one of these three headings rests on his 'basic occupation' on entry into the party, and there is some evidence that subsequent changes of occupation are not automatically followed by a reclassification in party records. For instance when the Machine-Tractor Stations were abolished in 1958 and machine operators were transferred to collective farms, an official ruling was needed to reclassify the party members involved from 'workers' to 'peasants'.¹ Now there are conspicuous ideological reasons for even more reluctance to reclassify party 'workers' and 'peasants' after they have become white collar workers. Yet from among workers and peasants it is precisely party members who are most likely to graduate to white collar occupations. The commission reports show that composition of the Supreme Soviet is weighted in favour of party members by a ratio of about 2:1, and the likelihood is, therefore, that they are the primary source of distortion in the commission statistics. The partial decline in this distortion between 1959 and 1963 may be a reflection of a decline in the number of

...
### CHART VII

**Kazak Supreme Soviet - Summary of Composition of deputies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central party officials</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local party officials</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central state officials</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local state officials</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total party &amp; state officials</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural executives</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial executives</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>12.2+</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workers</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>7.3+</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

1) In the calculation of 1955 percentages, 14 USSR leaders elected as deputies have not been included. They were in effect honorary members of the Supreme Soviet and the practice of electing them was terminated in all republics at the 1959 elections.

2) Including police and Trade Union officials, who were shown separately in chart VI.

3) The published list of deputies to the 1955 Supreme Soviet did not include their occupations. In most cases this was found from reports of pre-election meetings, but 17.2% remain unidentified. As it is relatively easy to discover the occupation of party and state officials, at least down to oblast level, almost all of the unidentified deputies would be from below this level, and of these the majority would be workers and peasants.
Within the battle

the next step is to relate the composition of the opponent to what happens
impacted by representation in a particular sociocultural sense; however, and
than any Western legal system, despite several would suggest that
the essence of the problem are representations of the population at large

better detected as summarized in Camp V. By all of these criteria
the battle of the war is international. So far as institutional structures of

There is no evidence in most
representation of constitutional groups at large in concert with these three most
secrecy of the Western democracy. That is to say, in concert with these three agree that proportion

will the United States Constitution considerately moderate the
of the house the outcome of all votes in a Congress consisting of
of the Union. Republic's. Thus the party group constitutes the grades
the direct guidance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
deployment of the members of the CPSU from a party group which acts under

independent stand, the other essential would be impossible because it
did not exclude the election of non-party deputies who might have an
been suppressed the election processes and the general political climate
destruction of the prize fighter Easting. Any doubt the majority.

The interests of various deputies; in another would turn to party
is based on the false notion that conflict could arise between the
### Chart VIII

**Speakers at sessions of Kazakh Supreme Soviet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of Council of Ministers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central govt. officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Soviet Presidium officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Central state Officials</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R., D/Ch., Kraj &amp; oblast is polkov</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>A., City and region is polkov</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R., D/Ch. sovministry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other local state officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total local state officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc., CC</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead dept., CC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. of Kazakhs, obhna</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. of cattlemen, farmers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total local party secs.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academicians, writers, composers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel, secs</td>
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<td>Foremen, workers, (ag. &amp; ind.)</td>
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Of more significance than the numerical strength of the various blocs in a legislature such as this is the quality of their participation in sessions. Speech-makers are normally identified only as representatives of electoral districts, so that to evaluate proceedings from this viewpoint it is first necessary to identify participants. This has been done in Chart VIII, which is a list of speech-makers according to occupation for all sessions from 1955 to 1964. Identification is not based simply on position held at the time of election, but keeps pace with deputies' careers - a necessary precaution since elections are four years apart, and turnover in some leading offices has been high.

In view of the occupational composition of deputies the most noticeable feature of this table is the consistently and remarkably low level of participation by worker and peasant deputies. Given the campaign to revive the soviets from 1956 onward, one might have expected increased participation by deputies other than party and state officials, but there is no evidence of this whatsoever. Since 1958 the chances of a worker or peasant deputy making one speech during the whole of the four year term for which he is elected have been about one in 18. There are sessions when the most junior speaker is a raion secretary (2nd Session 1953) or when all speakers except one are party or state officials (1st Session 1963). This is all the more puzzling if one accepts the generally held view that Supreme Soviets are devoid of any substantial rule-making functions, but are designed to dramatize and popularize the decisions of the leadership. There would seem to be every reason for encouraging selected speakers of common status, both from the point of
view of popularising important measures, and in order to reinforce the
the image of the Soviet itself as a popular assembly. The immediate
obstacle is the brevity of sessions, but this could easily be remedied.
Perhaps part of the explanation lies in the longstanding Leninist
prejudice against all parliamentary 'talking shops', but whatever the
reasons a potentially valuable propaganda avenue is not being exploited.

From this analysis of who speaks at Supreme Soviet sessions
it is clear that rank and file deputies come to the capital not to
contribute to proceedings, but to listen. Their real tasks lie not
within the walls of the legislature, but in their electorates. They are
expected to report back to their voters after each session and publicise
the measures adopted there - the plan, or the campaign against brewing
moonshine, or the latest administrative reorganizations. To assist them
in this the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet distributes newsletters to
then as a basis for public lectures. Until 1956 the printed matter
distributed to deputies consisted of little more than data on the
composition of the Soviet or awards conferred on leading workers; from
then on, in keeping with the campaign to revive the soviets, more
extensive news sheets were compiled and considerable pressure was exerted
on deputies to broadcast them. Local soviets were instructed to assist
Supreme Soviet deputies in arranging meetings with electors several times
a month at different places.

1KP 7/6/56.
2Investia 26/6/56.
3KP 7/3/56; 31/3/56.
The emphasis on propaganda work by deputies is a corollary of the modes of communication in the USSR. The statement that Soviet public opinion trails far behind informed opinion in open societies may be a tautology, but its implications for policy implementation have to be appreciated. When organizational upheavals like that of November, 1962 are sprung on the public it is obvious that acceptance has to be won by a publicity programme on a grand scale. There had been no forewarning of the changes, and suddenly the careers of a large number of party and administration personnel were affected. The same holds true, moreover, of eminently rational decisions such as increasing the output and application of mineral fertilizers. Propaganda and educational media had hitherto advertised extensive methods of raising crop yields; mineral fertilizer had scarcely received any attention. There was therefore no body of public opinion in favour of its use, and despite the shortage of supplies widespread wastage and misuse were common. The prospect of additional deliveries thus meant that enthusiasm for intensive farming had to be manufactured. Where the decision-making process is openly competitive and pressure groups vie with one another in petitioning and lobbying to produce a directive by the state, a measure of education of and acceptance by the public is achieved beforehand. Where public opinion trails behind or is caught completely unawares by a directive, acceptance and cooperation have to be built up from zero or even minus level. This is presumably the context in which one should interpret the Soviet description of the deputy's role:
1960. P. 133

Sentence: One caution needs to be added to the apparent reason.

Paragraph: It seems senseless to imitate the form to secondary readers and thereby give
opportunities to take away readers to make policy alterations. They were held within a week of the conference. No, of course, are other 27-28 November. During the period under study the Supreme Court sessions ended on 17th aプラン and held 27-28 November and the Supreme Court sat.

Paragraph: The phrase used in the conference at the session was announced in 1957. Aプラン was held 27-28 November and the Supreme Court sat.

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VIII thus fails to show for instance that when the Council of Ministers resigns formally to the newly elected Supreme Soviet, it is the party First Secretary who proposes that a deputy named by him be commissioned to form a new government. It is always the outgoing Chairman of the Council of Ministers who is named, and in practice no changes in the Council are made at this juncture. Nevertheless the occasion is a solemn one requiring expression of the party's will. Similarly the composition of the new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet may be proposed by a CC Secretary,¹ and although the secretariat takes no ostensible part in proceedings it is always well represented in the government benches facing the chamber. Whether intervention has even been needed to ensure that conduct of a session returned to a desirable course, or whether, as Fainsod suggests of the USSR Supreme Soviet, proceedings are a "well-rehearsed theatrical spectacle from which all elements of conflict have been eliminated",² cannot easily be determined from newspaper reports. The impression gained from these reports is that Fainsod is correct, but the only way to substantiate this impression is to describe the Soviet in action. Below we recount in detail a typical session of the Soviet so that the reader may judge for himself.

The third session of the fifth convocation of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet opens at 10 a.m., 18 November 1959. The seating arrangement resembles that of a concert hall. On the tiered stage is a

¹KP 21/3/63.
The ‘debate’ is then opened and six speakers come to the rostrum before the sitting is suspended for the day.

Gosplan chairman, L.G. Mal’nikov, tells deputies that industrial output is to rise by 12.1% in 1960 - output of means of production by 12.7% and consumer goods by 10.7%. Elaboration of these targets is patchy, output for specific items being given mostly as a percentage of that for the current year. Exceptions are coal, oil, the total grain harvest, and construction of housing, hospitals and schools, targets for which are given in concrete terms. For many commodities, especially those in the consumer goods group, no targets are given, not even as percentages of the current year’s production. Investment in the various branches is more fully outlined, so that an economist familiar with production costs might gain a meaningful picture, but there are gaps here too.

Now are these filled in by the budget report, which is presented in even less detail than the production plan. Expenditure is given under four headings, two of them extremely broad. The item labelled ‘financing the national economy’ is regarded as having been fully dealt with by Mal’nikov, and is not broken down although two thirds of budget expenditure is involved - investment in heavy and light industry, construction, agriculture, transport, communications, roads and housing. The other main item, ‘social and cultural measures’ is another comprehensive category, but here at least expenditure is broken down under five sub-headings. What precise benefits citizens can expect, is not spelt out. A third item, ‘organs of state administration’,...
constitutes such a small part of disbursements (about 1.8%) that such administrative overhead must surely be included in the first two items. The small balance goes to oblast Soviets - most of their budget receipts will derive from authorization to deduct varying percentages from such union-wide sources of revenue as the turnover tax.

The coreport from the Budget Commission is mostly devoted to current economic performance. Comment on the new budget is purely approbatory except on one point; it is recommended that a petition by local Soviets for an increased allocation of 20 million rubles for school repairs and equipment be granted. The amount originally allocated for these purposes is not stated, but the proposal meant an increase of 1.2% over projected expenditure on primary and secondary education. The Budget Commission chairman suggests that the increase could be met by savings in industry.

At this point general discussion of plan and fiscal policy terminates. All subsequent nineteen speakers confine themselves to the economic sector or area which they represent, its achievements and its needs. Some of the latter may already have been met in the budget - it is often impossible to tell. Others clearly have not, for speakers ask for additional allocations (though not in specific amounts).

A typical speech is that by the chairman of the Akmolinsk obispolkom, D. Dahanogin. He reports meat production successes by the state farms in his oblast, but complains of a shortage of spare parts for agricultural machinery; production of these should be accelerated at the 'Karel'mash' factory. A second request made in the course of his
Budget Commission and Implementation Departures. It was expected that the

instruction to the Council of Ministers to consider proposals put by the

three-page letter, that the proposed budget was passed for and on

an opportunity to reply to the points raised during the debate, but

the speech was not published. Both plan and budget are adopted.

To this end and agreement, the Ministers of France, are now given

come under the

role. In all more than a dozen ministers, of the four ministers of a common council,

on the secretariat - supporting the interpretation of a common council.

commission has been three years under consideration.

committee discussion for non-committal of plans for construction at

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standard and protection accorded. The protection of the party for protection

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In fact by the press - present claim therefore, letter received.

general commission - it is the only speech of the debate to be published.

the agenda of the subcommittee. This address is made to a particular hearing for

day of the session, when the chairman of the Council of Ministers

the pattern of speeches is now set until into the second

been made at committee on the theme.

suppliers' appreciations by those who now are, to presentment having reached

three requests have already been approved. The manner of work

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presentation of the plan, has already outlined in consideration

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28-31 March, 1955(1,2)
20-21 January, 1956(1)
30-31 October, 1956
20-22 March, 1957(1)
3-4 June, 1957
24-25 January, 1958(1)
29-30 December, 1958(1)
27-28 March, 1959(2)
21-22 July, 1959
18-19 November, 1959(1)
20 January, 1960
4-5 July, 1960
3-4 January, 1961(1)
1-2 August, 1961
21-22 December, 1961(1)
15-16 June, 1962
27-28 December, 1962(1)
20-21 March, 1963(2)
27-28 December, 1963(1)
26-27 June, 1964
22-23 December, 1964(1)
5 April, 1965
15 October, 1965
21-22 December, 1965(1)

(1) Budget sessions. It will be noted that two of the earlier budget sessions were not held until the budget had been in force for several months (the Soviet fiscal year corresponds with the calendar year).

(2) First session after elections.

The absence of any definite pattern in the first half of the table parallels the performance of the USSR Supreme Soviet, republican sessions generally being held about a month after those of the central legislature. In recent years a recognisable pattern has emerged with two regular sessions, one at the end of the year to bring down the budget for the coming year, and one in June, or in election year in March. The slightly extended agenda is now always dealt with within two days, the last session to exceed this limit being in 1957. A good indication that the programme is predetermined with no provision for possible extension of sessions is that they are sometimes held just before the New Year holiday.
since the last session. One at least is obviously a controversial measure. It forbids the keeping of cattle by citizens living in urban areas or workers' settlements on the grounds, 1) that breed was being used to feed livestock, 2) maintenance of them distracted workers from productive labour, and 3) they created sanitary problems. The ulasoe nevertheless becomes a law without debate. The agenda is declared exhausted and the Soviet goes into recess.1

The foregoing session is typical in most respects of other sessions in recent years. Earlier, for example in 1955, there were fewer requests in the course of the budget debate for assistance with local projects, and until 1957 a 'debate' on any item other than the budget was a rarity. The agenda was usually completed by the (undebated) approval of Presidium ulasoe. The annual economic plan was examined by the Supreme Soviet for the first time in 1958 - till then it was simply promulgated by the Council of Ministers. After elections, every fourth year, there was the formal selection of a new government, a new Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the standing commissions of the Soviet. Since 1958 the agenda has shown somewhat more variety, but still consists of only three or four items and there has been no essential change either in the length of the sessions or the procedure by which the agenda is handled.

Constitutionally the house is required to convene twice a year, and while this provision has been adhered to since 1956, and 'overfulfilled' on three occasions, the average number of days on which sittings have been held has totalled only 4.4 a year. Sessions have been held as follows:—

1 The account of the session is taken from KP 19-21/11/59.
With its sessions pared down to a minimum it is not surprising that the Soviet's output of laws and resolutions is low by any standard. A collection of all laws and postanovlenia adopted over the ten years would fill no more than a single moderately sized volume, and would constitute an eloquent commentary on the place of the Soviet in the political life of the republic. In perusing the acts passed, furthermore, one cannot fail to note that by far the greater part of them have been complementary to legislation already passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, or as a result of some other form of central direction. Many of the republic's laws amount to little more than a repetition of those parts of central directives which apply locally. An attempt to quantify these observations and determine to what extent the activity of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet is governed by central fiat will be found in Chart IX. As will be appreciated from the notes accompanying the chart the categories used to classify laws and postanovlenia are crude—necessarily so because they involve, in effect, an attempted quantification of the complex relations between the republic and the USSR. If anything, however, this crude measure of the dependence of the republic's legislature on Moscow is a conservative one. Where evidence of USSR level initiation was lacking, laws and postanovlenia were classified as of republican origin. If the 'routine' postanovlenia are excluded the conclusion to be drawn is that only 23% of the Soviet's output originated locally. But if further insights could be gained into the origins of this 23% it is not unlikely that more would be found to be Moscow inspired.
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…окончание текста на предыдущих страницах.

Продолжение текста на этой странице.

В разделе "Содержание"...

В разделе "Материалы"...

В разделе "Методы"...

В разделе "Результаты"...

В разделе "Обсуждение"...

В разделе "Заключение"...

В разделе "Список литературы"...

В разделе "Задачи для самостоятельного решения"...

В разделе "Контрольные вопросы"...

В разделе "Практические задания"...

В разделе "Задачи для самостоятельного выполнения"...

В разделе "Формы отчетности"...

В разделе "Оценка и контроль"...

В разделе "Порядок выполнения"...

В разделе "Задачи для самостоятельного решения"...
(Notes on Chart IX continued)

6) More laws and postanovlenia might have been transferred to the ‘routine’ category. For instance a far-reaching reorganization of local soviets was promulgated by ukase just two days after the second session of the Supreme Soviet in 1962,\(^1\) so that appropriate legislation to amend the constitution at the next session was very much a formality. And apart from this retrospective nature of many laws, there are a few with no significance at all for Kazakhstan (e.g. amendment of the constitutional list of republics in 1956 when the Karelo-Finnish Republic was abolished). The fact is that ‘routine’ involves a different dimension from the other two classifications used in the chart: justification for its use is that it is not normally possible to determine how far ministerial appointments and dismissals are Moscow or Alma-Ata made. Also separation of these numerous personal vicissitudes gives a clearer picture of Supreme Soviet output.

\(^1\)K P 31/12/62.
The probability that considerably less than a fifth of the Supreme Soviet's output can be attributed to the republic itself need occasion no surprise. If one examines the lengthy list of powers ascribed to the republic by the constitution it becomes evident that certain of these are still not exercised (military, diplomatic relations with foreign countries), while others (e.g. revenue collection, production plans, banking, social security, etc.) are basically regulated from USSR level. Indeed the constitution does not, even formally, set aside any exclusive spheres for regulation by the republic; all the republican powers listed are exercised in some measure by Moscow.

If it is agreed that the Supreme Soviet has negligible rule-making functions, a minor problem arises. In the multitude of attempts to describe the changes in the USSR political system under Khrushchev, something like a consensus is to be found on at least one point: there was some deconcentration of power, some accretion of initiative and descretion at lower levels. If this is so, then evidence of the trend should be found at republican level. The problem that arises here is this: granted that the Supreme Soviet is a 'rubber stamp', if other republican rule-making institutions did become more active during the Khrushchev era, should there not have been more directives thrown up to be rubber-stamped?

In the first place it must be said that republican level research does not support the notion of a steady devolution of rule-making

1See Constitution of the Kazakh SSR, Articles 19 & 21.
functions over the whole of the Khrushchev era. In Chapter I where the
administration of capital construction was reviewed it was seen that the
decentralization of 1957 had been completely reversed by late 1962;
separate examination of industry and agriculture in later chapters will
show that something similar occurred in these spheres too. Nonetheless,
even if the Khrushchev administration gradually returned to its original
point of departure, there should have been some increase in the activity
of republican Supreme Soviets in the 'fifties.

There was in fact an increased output by the Kazakh legislature,
although this is not demonstrable from Chart IX. If the latter could be
extended further into the past it would probably be found that the low
figures for 1955 were typical of earlier years when the constitutional
provision for twice yearly sessions was rarely observed.¹ According
to a Soviet source the volume of legislation passed by republican
Supreme Soviets increased four or five-fold after the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU.² This is not a very meaningful comparison, however, since
it fails to show how much of the increase was due to locally originated
laws.

One approach to assessing the activity of the legislature in
recent years is to classify laws passed into a few general categories.
Of the total legislation for the decade 47% related to the various legal
codes, principally the Criminal and Civil Codes. This type of

¹See A.C. Berson, op.cit., p.84.
²V.P. Kotok, Sovetskaya predstavitel'naya sistem., Moscow, 1969, p. 11.
legislation was a continuing preoccupation, and not confined to the period after the adoption of new fundamental codes by the USSR Supreme Soviet. All revisions of the codes, right down to relative minutiae, such as a revised scale of fines for petty speculation, are scrupulously registered by the Soviet - without debate.

The impression of extensive and minute legislation is also conveyed by a second group of laws - those giving formal expression to administrative reorganisations. They formed 36% of the total output, and covered the establishment and abolition of ministries and other governmental organs down to departments of local soviets. For an explanation of the seal of the Supreme Soviet in this area one need look no further than the constitution. One peculiarity of the latter is that it lists fully the composition of the Council of Ministers: ministries, state committees and important directorates; the main territorial administrative units of the republic; and the apparatus of local government organs (departments of krai, oblast, city and raion soviets). All of these were subject to fairly frequent revision and the result has been a steady flow of laws to amend the constitution.

One should not be misled therefore by the detail of the legislation in these two areas. They leave only 27% of the total volume to cover all the remaining areas which can in theory be regulated by the Supreme Soviet. And of this residual miscellaneous output the annual budgets and plans made up more than half. Paradoxically there is less legislation to regulate the economy than in countries where 'free enterprise' predominates. This is certainly not because the annual plan
resolves all the major problems for the ensuing twelve months, thus eliminating the need for further legislation. Nor is it because Soviet executives have fewer rules to contend with than their counterparts abroad. The simple answer to the paradox is that rule-making on matters of 'detail' comes largely in the form of postanovlenia by the Council of Ministers, the party, or both conjointly. The Supreme Soviet is 'called upon to decide only the most important, fundamental questions of state life',\(^1\) In practice this means that the legislature stands in a backwater apart from the main stream of political-economic life. There is, then, no necessary contradiction between the low level of activity of the republic's Supreme Soviet and an alleged deconcentration of power in the USSR. The two are not related to the extent that one may be used as a measure of the other.

The failure of republican Supreme Soviets to exploit their constitutionally wide powers, especially in the economic sphere, has been exercising several Soviet scholars in recent years.\(^2\) The phenomenon is not, of course, described in this manner; discussion

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\(^1\)I.T. Bespaly, Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta Sovetskoi Respubliki, Moscow, 1959, p.6.

\(^2\)See e.g. the following articles in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo: V.F. Eletz, 'Osnovnye tendentsii razvitia sovetskoi predstavitel'noi sistemy v period rasvornyego stroitel'stva Kommunizma', No. 3, 1962, pp.11-30; Yu.A. Tikhomirov, 'Predstavitel'nye organy vlasti i razvitie gosudarstvennogo upravlenia v period rasvornyego stroitel'stva Kommunizma', No. 2, 1962, pp.35-46; F.I. Kalinichev et al., 'Pravitel'stvo Soyusa SSR i soyuznykh respublik na sovremennom etape', No. 12, 1962.
centres on 'extension of the rights' of the soviets in accordance with
the decisions of party congresses. As at mid 1966 there had been no
suggestion that the legislature should concern itself in any way with
long range planning, or even with the compilation of short term plans,
but the possibility of better supervision of the execution of the latter
by the Council of Ministers has been canvassed.

One proponent of these ideas in Kazakhstan is an academic,
S.N. Dosymbekov, who is impressed by the contributions of speakers
debating the annual plan. He observes that 'certain important proposals
and observations of deputies are not considered by the session itself',
and are, as we have already seen, disposed of by a general instruction
to the Council of Ministers to examine them. Dosymbekov agrees that
this is a practical procedure, but advocates that the Council of Ministers
should report at the next session on the action taken on each and every
proposal. The Supreme Soviet should then pass judgement on whether this
action has been adequate.\footnote{S.N. Dosymbekov, op.cit., pp. 22-23. See also article by the same
author in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 10, 1963.} The same writer suggests further that all
'substantive' variations made to the plan by the Council of Ministers
after it has been approved by the Supreme Soviet should be reported to
the latter, or between sessions to its Presidium. The nature of the
Presidium is such\footnote{\ See Chapter 4.} that this arrangement would not be effective in
securing responsibility of the government to the Soviet. The proposal
is of interest mainly because of the accompanying statement by Dosymbekov
that substantive changes to the approved plan are numerous.\textsuperscript{1} This is
puzzling, because the plan as presented to the Soviet is sketched in
broad outline only. Perhaps the full plan is tabled\textsuperscript{2} and the report by
the chairman of Gosplan is only commentary on this. Whatever the
explanation Deysebekov's assertion lends further support to the view
that the Supreme Soviet's role in economic and financial policy making
is marginal.

The only indication thus far that any heed was taken of these
proposals was a reference to a report by the Minister of Finance to the
Budget Commission on fulfillment of deputies' proposals.\textsuperscript{3} No details
were given but the minister admitted that although additional allocations
had been made, several ministries were not using them. This was eight
months after the budget session so that the instruction to the Council
of Ministers to consider deputies' proposals by no means signifies that
all will be acted upon.

So there has been some dissatisfaction with relations between
legislature and executive in the economic sphere, and the discussion of
the problem was no doubt a genuine attempt to adjust these relations in
the direction of somewhat more responsible government. On the other hand
it should be emphasised that underlying the seemingly radical suggestion
that the Council of Ministers should report on action taken on every
proposal by a deputy is the unspoken assumption that the number and scope

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{op.cit.} p.22. Where the abbreviation 'op.cit.' is used in this chapter
reference is to the book, not the article by the same author in \textit{Sovetskoe
Gosudarstvo i Pravo}.
\textsuperscript{2}There was some indication at the budget session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet in December, 1964 that deputies had the basic plan before them
while Kosygin spoke (see \textit{Pravda} 10/12/64, p.2), but no similar evidence
was found in Kazakhstan's budget speeches.
\textsuperscript{3}\textit{KP} 31/8/63.
of such proposals will remain limited. A local party or government official may be presumed to know the limits imposed on him by the practice of unity in the Supreme Soviet; certainly his petitions will not be violently opposed to major provisions of the plan or budget. And in the light of what we have discovered about the number and identity of speakers at sessions, it is not unlikely that proposals from the few workers who come to the rostrum might be welcome as affording an opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of their representation. There is no danger that the Council of Ministers will be inundated with unwelcome requests or that the nature of the Supreme Soviet will be radically and rapidly changed. Dosymbekov himself is clearly not advocating anything like this; in fact he quotes approvingly the view of a colleague who warns that 'extension of the rights of representative organs should not be taken to extremes, to the extent that they absorb the rights of executive organs'.

In the above remark a clear reservation is placed upon the principle of responsibility by the administration to the Supreme Soviet. In the wealth of material published in recent years on the extension of the rights of the soviets one finds many such instances of drawing back from absolute commitment to this principle. A political scientist oriented towards Western parliamentary systems is accustomed to finding that responsible government works imperfectly in practice, but he inevitably finds something anomalous in qualifications placed upon the

1Yu.A. Tikhomirov in article cited above, pp. 37, 46.
principle itself. He may tend to see in them some element of cynicism, as did A.G. Meyer in the view cited at the opening of this chapter. To understand the qualifications placed on the supremacy of the soviets, it is necessary to look briefly at a very different framework of political theory from that which underpins western parliamentary systems.

In potted form, the current official version of the socio-political history of the USSR runs as follows. By 1936 exploiting classes had been eliminated and socialism had 'in the main' been built. From this time on the process of the formation of the 'state of all the people' unfolded (a theoretical innovation introduced by Khrushchev in 1961), but was delayed by the extraordinary conditions of war and Stalin's cult of the individual. The 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 liquidated the baneful effects of the cult, restored 'Leninist norms' in party and state life, and promoted the development of soviet democracy. The period of 'extended building of communism' got under way and, by the 22nd Congress in 1961, had led to the transition from the dictatorship of the proletariat (hitherto believed coextensive in time with socialism) to the state of all the people - the first state in history's long course that was not the dictatorship of any one class. Evolution does not stop here but will continue until the stateless era of 'communist public self-government' is reached.

Analysis of the highly formalised terminology and periodisation of soviet political history is beyond our scope. What is of relevance here is that the present state of political development is only transient and must give way to a 'higher' form of organisation. Representational or 'indirect' democracy is destined to be replaced by 'direct' democracy,
or rather direct administration of the affairs of society by the people themselves. How one may regard this as a utopian view of development in any modern society, but its implications for elective institutions are not to be ignored. The Soviets may be regarded as representing the people, and hence as suitable growth points for the future order; arguments may be adduced for extending their powers at the expense of the state economic administration - which is in any case destined to be transformed into 'organs of public self-government'; but the very fact that the Soviets de nominally supervise the present state apparatus renders their present form unacceptable in the ultimate scheme of things. The problem for Soviet political theorists is thus not how representative and responsible government is to be perfected, but how it is to be dispensed with.

This being so, it is not surprising that even during the current historical stage 'workers do not exercise state power exclusively through the Soviets of workers' deputies', and that there are 'numerous forms of adopting imperative decisions not only through representatives, but also by way of direct expression of the will of the masses'.

Indirect democracy may require constitutionally defined institutional forms, but 'direct democracy' does not. Decision making by extra-soviet bodies is regarded as evidence of the burgeoning even now of future self-government. 'One of the peculiar features of the political organization of socialist society is this combination of the advantages of representative and direct democracy'.
Instances of the workings of 'direct democracy' will be encountered later. As far as the Supreme Soviet is concerned this part of the ideology is of major significance, because it officially precludes development of full responsibility to elective organs, and positively encourages the exercise of power by more 'progressive' institutions. To expand or merely maintain its role in the system the Soviet thus has to contend not only against the party and state bureaucracies, but also against ideological prescriptions for the future. The influence of both factors may be seen in the operation of the standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

Prior to 1957 only three standing commissions existed - Budget, Mandates and Legislative Proposals Commissions. At the March, 1957 session of the Supreme Soviet the deputy chairman of the Presidium proposed that five new commissions be formed - Industry and Transport, Agriculture, Education and Culture, Health and Social Services, and Trade. The last mentioned commission extended its activities in March, 1963 to include public catering, and, in December, 1963, personal services. Its full title thus became the Standing Commission on Trade, Public Catering and Personal Services to the Population. The total membership of the eight commissions in 1965 embraced about half of the Supreme Soviet deputies.1

The Kazakh Supreme Soviet has not adopted any polosheria setting out the rights and duties of its standing commissions,2 but general

2Several republics have done so, including Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhon, Georgia and Moldavia.
descriptions of these are to be found in numerous works. They are said to assist the Supreme Soviet in the preparation and conduct of its sessions, draw up draft laws and postanovlenia, and report on draft laws (including the plan and budget) presented to the Soviet by the administration. In addition they have control functions (in the French or German sense of control, not the English which suggests executive powers) and check on fulfillment of laws and postanovlenia issued by the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers. Their names indicate readily enough the areas in which they operate, with the possible exception of 'personal services' (bytovoe obsluzhivanie); this includes such things as baths, laundries, shoe repairs, repairs to household equipment, hairdressing etc. (There is a ministry responsible for all these services.)

It is worth attempting to penetrate further than the formal role ascribed to the commissions, because they are the one aspect of the Supreme Soviet where substantial change has occurred, and because they are potential growth points for any future expansion of the role of the Soviet. First, however, many claims made for the commissions can clearly be discounted. For instance the Legislative Proposals Commission was credited with having drawn up a bill 'on strengthening the struggle with antisocial, parasitic elements' in 'conformity with numerous proposals and wishes of citizens and public organisations'. Since the same measure


2 They are, however, only one group among many institutions charged with such control functions.

3 KP 5/5/57.
was enacted throughout the USSR one may justifiably question the initiative ascribed to the commission. The same holds true for the law on the reorganization of industry in 1957, which was attributed to this commission. In fact, as will be shown in a later chapter, proposals of both central and local leaders in Kazakhstan were overridden in this reorganization. Such examples obviously raise doubts about the initiating role attributed to the commissions even in cases where there is no clear evidence of the relevant legislation being inspired from outside. Instances like the two quoted above are, of course, ignored in the discussion that follows.

There are differences of emphasis in descriptions of how the commissions do or should carry out their tasks. One commentator will simply list their duties as already described and confine concrete examples to legislation introduced by them.\(^1\) Another speaks of 'systematic control of sovarkhhasy and ministries', and advocates that commission proposals should have binding force on these bodies.\(^2\) Yet another will stress that their recommendations have no obligatory force\(^3\) and several have come out against the proposition that they should have.\(^4\) This now appears to be the official view. At the same time the Party Programme is committed to increasing their control over executive bodies, to ensure which members of commissions are to be periodically released from their regular employment.

\(^1\)M.G. Kirichenko, Vysshie organy vlasti sovyetskikh respublik, Moscow, 1958, pp. 39-41.
\(^2\)Stepanov and Yunevichus, op.cit., p. 111; Dosymbekov, op.cit., p. 25.
\(^3\)Tikhomirov and Stepanov, op.cit., p. 132.
\(^4\)For two such views see Dosymbekov, op.cit., p. 36.
The Budget Commission seems to be the most active of all, yet its influence on policy making is the hardest to assess. Its annual recommendation for a slight increase in expenditure looks like a set piece, but this does not exclude the possibility that some of its views have already been incorporated in the budget as presented to the Supreme Soviet. Since at least 1959 when brief newspaper reports on its activity began to appear,¹ this commission has met regularly before the budget session. The chairman of Gosplan and the Minister for Finance outline the plan and the budget to the commission, which then forms eight or nine subcommissions to examine the drafts in detail before a joint session is held to compile the final report. The subcommissions have varied slightly from year to year and are organized both on an economic sector and a territorial basis, i.e. there are subcommissions for agriculture, construction, etc., and others for groups of sovkhozy and oblasts. Several of the subcommissions thus overlap in function with the other standing commissions, and the chairmen of the latter are invited to speak at subcommission hearings.

Some indication of the diligence of the Budget Commission may be found in the dates on which meetings were held. In 1959 the Commission was in session four days before the Supreme Soviet sat, and this had been extended to 19 days by 1963. Whether this meant that hearings continued for the full 19 days is not clear; it is just possible that

¹KF 17/11/59, 18/11/59, 9/12/61, 26/12/61, 11/12/62, 31/8/63, 12/12/63, 20/12/63, 11/12/64.
they did, since the number of speakers ran to over fifty. This spate of activity is puzzling because USSR budget procedure results in the fixing of limits several months earlier, and the USSR budget, which is always brought down before Union Republic budgets, would appear to leave little room for lengthy debate at republican level. Under the USSR law on budget procedure of 10 October, 1959, the republics are empowered to increase their total revenues and expenditures (as fixed by the USSR government), but not by way of varying the allocated deductions from all-union taxes and revenues. Since these form the lion's share of republican receipts, and the source of the remainder is not given in budget speeches, the degree of latitude available is far from clear. It would seem that published data on such questions has been too meagre for Western economists to give us guidance here. And even if they did the problem of what part of the latitude open to a republic is exercised in the Budget Commission would still have to be faced.

Another method of approach is to examine the list of government personnel attending Budget Commission meetings. In 1959 only the Chairman of Gosplan and the Minister of Finance were reported present; but by 1962 the list of speakers had extended to include the heads of three CC departments, the First Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh Council of National Economy, the Minister of Construction, the Deputy Minister of Education, representatives of other ministries, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and a number of local officials. Of

1Dorzhymbekov, op.cit., p. 47.
3EP 13/10/62.
the speakers at subcommission sessions 10 were from Gosplan and seven from the Ministry of Finance. In fact it becomes a question of whether the Budget Commission is hearing reports from these people, or whether they move into the Commission for the final stages of their task. At this stage Commission membership consisted of three chairs and two general secretaries, seven chairman of oblikpolozya, five production executives and four workers. To be sure this is a more formidable group than the membership of most other standing commissions, but still unimpressive compared with the array of central party and government officials which invade it every year.

There would seem to be at least two possible interpretations of this annual influx. One is that it betokens an annual take-over by the bureaucracy. The Budget Commission is the only one of the eight commissions which is called upon to report regularly to the Supreme Soviet, The CC apparatus, Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance, it might therefore be argued, are faced with the choice of ignoring it (as relevant ministries ignore the industrial and agricultural commissions) and running the risk of hearing unwelcome recommendations, or of invading it once a year to influence its report in the desired direction. Members of the commission are all local men, government officials being excluded by definition from membership of any commission because of the control functions of the latter. The possibility of the Budget Commission becoming infected with 'localism' (so frequently attacked after the 1957 reorganization) would thus seem to be real; hence an annual take-over by the bureaucracy.

1Dosymbekov, op.cit., p. 47.
This is not to say that nothing of consequence is resolved in the commission sittings, and a second interpretation of the evidence might lean towards the view that final details of the budget and plan are fixed in consultation with the Budget Commission. T.H. Rigby suggests 'a law of inverse proportion between the political significance of such bodies [as Budget Commissions] and the degree to which their proceedings are publicised, due to theoretical inhibitions to disagreeing in public'.

If results are proportional to the secrecy of proceedings of the Kazakhstan commission, then they are momentous. The argument cannot be taken this far, however, because there have been recent complaints about the 'episodic' character of the commission's work and the limited achievements that are possible during its still brief period of activity.

The two possible interpretations of the commission's work are not, of course, completely exclusive of each other, but one is inclined to lean towards the 'take-over' view. It is, however, difficult to escape the impression that something is involved which does not easily square with a picture of all decisions being taken within the regular bureaucratic hierarchy.

A footnote needs to be added on the control functions of the Budget Commission. All Soviet sources long agreed that these should be extended, but until 1963 nothing positive happened. Although much of the commission's time was indeed taken up with reviewing the current...

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2 Demyshkov, op.cit., p. 48. The latter remark would seem to cast some doubt on whether the Commission does in fact sit for 19 days.
performance of the economy\(^1\) this had to be fitted in at the annual meetings. In August and December, 1963, however, two extra sessions were reported.\(^2\) At the first the Minister of Finance reported on budget implementation over the first half of the year, and 'measures were decided upon' to eliminate over-expenditure by various bodies. At the second the Minister of Communal Economy and the Deputy Minister for Personal Services reported on the work of their apparatus. Misuse of allocated funds was criticised and directives issued to rectify the abuses. As at the regular annual sessions the Council of Ministers was strongly represented. It appeared that the control functions of the Budget Commission were to receive a boost, but in 1964 no reports of extra sittings were published in the press.

At the other extreme is the Standing Commission on Industry and Transport. A complete agenda of items treated by this commission from 1959 to 1962 is available.\(^3\) It consists of nine matters, of which the following are typical: water reticulation in four towns; personal services in an industrial settlement; extension of furniture manufacture by sovkhozy; services to workers on two branches of the Kazakhstan railway network. In other words the commission is only very marginally concerned with industrial and transport administration.\(^4\) The writer who reported the above agenda added the comment that all the items on it would be more appropriately handled by other standing commissions.

\(^1\)See e.g. KP 13/10/62.
\(^2\)KP 31/8/63, KP 20/12/63.
\(^3\)Dosymbekov, op.cit., pp. 51-52.
\(^4\)For further evidence see report of commission session KP 13/10/62.
Control functions of the Industrial Commission, as reported by the same source, are similarly restricted in nature, but they do extend over several months, so perhaps members are being periodically freed from their regular employment as required by the Party Programme.

Among those serving on this commission over the period covered by the agenda described were the head of the CC Department of Heavy Industry, two chairmen of sovnarkhozy and an okhkom secretary concerned with industry. The weight of its membership was thus out of all proportion to its apparent activity, and one might reasonably suspect a conscious policy of excluding it from interference in major industrial questions. As reconstituted by the 1963 Supreme Soviet, this commission was even more strongly staffed, with two heads of CC departments as members, but no change of policy on its functions followed— a salutary lesson on the pitfalls in determining the importance of Soviet institutions solely on the basis of membership.

The Mandates Commission is dissimilar from other commissions in having no functions outside the Supreme Soviet itself, but may be mentioned here as a further example of the sometimes misleading character of commission membership. Its ostensible duty is simply to check the bona fides of deputies to the new Supreme Soviet every four years and of the few added in by-elections in the interim. The chairman addresses the Supreme Soviet only in his report (already discussed) on the results of elections. Yet this commission as elected in 1963

1 Its programme for 1963 was to check on the quality of products of light industry in two oblasts and transport facilities in two towns — KP 10/4/63. See also KP 30/12/64.
consisted of the head of the CC Department of Party Organs, seven obkom
secretaries, four chairman of obispolkoms and some lesser lights. This
is by far the strongest membership of all the standing commissions, and
represents a continuation of the trend started in 1959, when four obkom
secretaries were elected, as compared with one in 1956. There has always
been a CC official on the commission. No explanation has been found for
the increased weight of the membership.

The opposite probably does hold true, namely that weak
membership indicates an inefficient institution. Two out of three
chairman of the Standing Commission on Agriculture have been research
workers, and the third a deputy chairman of an obispolkom. Apparently
on the general principle that more senior persons should not sit under
such chairman, membership has always been weak. Some of the annual
work programmes for the commission are ambitious; that for 1963, for
instance, ranged over weed control, meat and fodder production,
irrigation construction, and care of farm machinery. The few reports
of what it actually accomplished are far more modest. One example
concerns the checking on grain seed quality, which accords with the
specialist bent of several of its members.²

As regards the level of their reported activity, the other
commissions lie somewhere in between the Budget Commission and the two
economic sector commissions, and it would seem that Soviet commentators
themselves are hard put to support their general description of
commissions' functions by suitable illustrations from practice. The
following episode will demonstrate this.

¹KP 10/4/63.
²KP 29/12/61. See also KP 21/7/60, 5/2/58.
The Standing Commission on Health and Social Security in preparation for a Supreme Soviet session on health and sanitation measures in 1958 sent out members for on-the-spot information gathering. They joined forces with the standing commissions of local soviets, and together with other local deputies formed hundreds of 'inspection brigades'. The material gathered by their widespread inquiries became the basis of recommendations presented at a circuit session of the commission held in Karaganda, in which 600 central and local officials and soviet deputies took part. These 'recommendations' were discussed at local soviet sessions, where appropriate detailed resolutions were adopted. The episode is cited here firstly as demonstrating that when the standing commissions become involved in the decision making process, public meetings rather than the parent elective body are the forums used to give policy orientation. The fact-finding mission began as something after the style of a select committee of the British House of Commons, but acquired much more authority by an influx of officials from the bureaucracy. Secondly, to return to our original point, this example of commission work became something of a cause célèbre. Apart from newspaper coverage at the time it has been described in at least three works dealing with standing commissions of republican Supreme Soviets: wherever Kazakhstan is mentioned in this context so too is the exploit of its Commission on Health and Social Security—which seems to betray a dearth of illustrative material.

This is not to say that there are no instances of a similar nature on a less dramatic scale. From time to time the Standing Commission on Education and Culture holds circuit sessions which pass resolutions recommending action by both local government organs and ministries. They refer to such things as the state of libraries, clubs, cinemas and mobile units catering for the cultural needs of isolated hardmen. The phrasing of newspaper reports of these sessions is meticulous - resolutions are recommendations, not orders, but the chliapedoee or ministry concerned carries them into effect. Always present at the circuit sessions are ministerial and local government officials.¹

The commissions, then, do become involved in the chain of command at certain points, particularly in relation to local soviet. As one writer puts it -

The standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, upon discovering this or that loophole, do not confine themselves to the mere registering of facts, but immediately take steps to eliminate them.²

One would be more inclined to accept this as redounding to the credit of the Supreme Soviet if:

a) membership of the commissions did not frequently include CC department heads or other senior party officials;

b) there was no inflow of government officials whenever important resolutions are adopted; and

¹See e.g., KP 10/11/59.
²Sharipov, KP 29/8/61.
c) the commissions reported back to their parent body, the Supreme Soviet, to secure action, rather than suddenly becoming decision-making centres.

It should be noted that 'direct action' by the commissions is sanctioned under the concept of 'direct democracy', which thus operates against the accumulation of power by the Supreme Soviet. Most of the expansion of the Soviet's role after 1936 was focussed on the commissions, and one is led to speculate that increased activity at this lower level reflects not merely the official transition to 'direct democracy', but also the greater ease of keeping this development under control than higher level 'representative democracy'. Individual commissions are more manipulable than perhaps the Supreme Soviet as a whole would be if admitted further into the political process.

Despite claims to the contrary there is little evidence that the commissions act other than sporadically. They have no continuous life of their own, but are activated from time to time as suits the current campaign. In conclusion, therefore, we shall attempt to locate the coordinating mechanism for these campaigns.

Prior to the formation of five additional standing commissions in 1957 it was the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet which organised deputies into various ad hoc commissions. In 1956, for instance, in preparation for a Supreme Soviet session on trade in consumer goods the Presidium created four regional commissions to check on the work of
trading and catering establishments. The commissions are now more or
less fixed in form, but it is clear that the Presidium continues to
coordinate their work.

Formal statements of relations between the Presidium and the
commissions usually assert that the former
does not have the right to determine the direction of the
work of the commissions, or to exercise control over
their activity. However, by consent of the chairman of
the commissions and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet,
the commissions may fulfill certain tasks set by the
Presidium.

Another source is more forthright, stating that the Presidium 'directs
their activity and places before them definite tasks'. This is a rare
formulation, but indications are that it is the most accurate by a
Soviet writer. In December, 1961, for instance, the Presidium called
a conference of members of all standing commissions. The deputy chairman
of the Presidium analyzed their work and told them of their tasks in the
light of the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress; the conference confirmed the
work plans of each commission for the coming year. Also one finds
authoritative articles on the work of the commissions by the Chairman
of the Presidium.

The most sustained evidence, however, is the regular use of
the commissions as information gatherers for the Presidium's monthly
meetings, at which the work of local soviets is the usual theme. The

\[1\] I.I. Bespaly, op.cit., p. 35.
\[2\] I.I. Bespaly, op.cit., p. 40.
\[3\] Stepanov and Turevichu, op.cit., p. 110.
\[4\] KP 28, 29/12/61.
\[5\] KP 29/3/61, 28/9/61.
main report at these meetings is normally given by a local official whose activities are under scrutiny, and this is often followed by a co-report by a chairman or a member of one of the Supreme Soviet commissions.\(^1\) The most regular contributors are the social services and health, legislative proposals, and trade commissions. A closer look at these Presidium meetings will follow in Chapter IV. For the moment it may be said that decisions arrived at there frequently require the mobilisation of local resources, especially man power resources, and the standing commissions are primarily instruments of mobilisation. Almost every account of their activity stresses their connections with the commissions of local soviets and their ability to draw hundreds of activists into the campaign of the moment.

The above remarks do not apply to three of the commissions, namely those concerned with the budget, industry and agriculture. The Commission on Industry and Transport has given only one co-report to the Supreme Soviet Presidium,\(^2\) the other two none at all. Industry and agriculture normally lie outside the range of matters discussed at Presidium sessions, administration of both being highly centralised and allowing little scope for dilettante interference by deputies.

\(^1\)Mobilisation of the masses\(^1\) is, of course, prominent in industry and agriculture, but here it is more directly the concern of primary party organisations, trade unions and Komsomol - far more than is the case in say, community services. As a result the industrial and agricultural commissions resemble foundlings outside the family of commissions fathered

by the Supreme Soviet Presidium. It might be hypothesised that the Budget Commission, whose sphere of operation also lies outside the interests of the Presidium, might likewise have fallen into the doldrums were it not for the fact that it is required to report to the Supreme Soviet once a year.

To summarise briefly, a review of Supreme Soviet sessions over the decade affords no grounds for varying Fainsod's assessment of them. They still give the impression of being 'well-rehearsed spectacles', designed to lend an air of legitimacy to a small volume of laws and postanovlenia. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Soviet has made negligible progress in asserting its constitutional powers over the bureaucracy, and that its role as an organ of evaluation and criticism remains as dependent as its legislative authority. Some evidence is to be found at its sessions of competition for resources, and this is the only quarter from which a challenge might be made to Fainsod's description of the Soviet as a forum from which all elements of conflict have been eliminated. This competition, however, is not resolved by the Supreme Soviet, and in the one case where it was possible partly to follow what happens after the Council of Ministers is ordered to consider deputies' petitions it was found that ministries are able to ignore them, even when additional expenditure is approved.

What expansion there has been in the activity of the Soviet has centered mainly on its standing commissions. Except in the case of the Budget Commission this increased activity is only rarely allowed to affect the work of the Soviet as a whole. In fact it is a form of
'direct democracy' which, like other examples of this phenomenon, is alien to the development of responsibility of the bureaucracy to elective institutions.

\[1\] Many observers hold that the setting up of certain 'public organisations of workers', far from promoting 'direct administration of the affairs of society', was one of the most retrograde steps of the Khrushchev era. (See e.g. articles by L. Schapiro, L. Idenson and A. Beti in Problems of Communism, No. 2, Vol. XIV, March-April, 1965). They see the comrades' courts, peoples militia and village gatherings (gathering) - all of which were officially lauded as 'shoots of communism' - as modes of extra-legal coercion. (The village gathering was not an innovation of the Khrushchev era, but it did receive a fillip when the other 'public organisations' were established. For some startling examples of its operation in Kazakhstan see Pzh K, No. 9, 1962, p. 59; No. 4, 1964, p. 51; S. Adelev, Doroqua, Alma-Ata, 1963, pp. 42, 43.)
Chapter 4

The Constitution of the High Court, Articles 29, 30, 31, 32,

Both of which are inserted to provide for the Supreme Court,

the Constitution. (Notwithstanding the Act of the budget, the act of the annual plan,

State within the competence of the Supreme Court, and the

may form the subject of discussion. In practice, the latter can be more

appointed or removed from office as has been the case by any Supreme Court,

right to issue orders and to appoint and discharge ministers. The ministers,

of these powers, the two most important are undeniably the

and exercising titles of honour.

persons, as well as other heads of the republic, such function as constituting

which the latter is executed, the President appears as a function of the Supreme Court. In the course of the current year for

may determine and appoint ministers of the Republic subject to subsequent

sessions. It calls the Supreme Court into session, and between sessions

presidential powers of the Council of Ministers and the deputies of the

Supreme Court has been passed and has power to exercise the

departments, and the other of the State, the President of the

respective, but which, along with the Supreme Court Act, makes

The Constitution of the High Court tells us that the Supreme

THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SUPREME COURT
Even Soviet constitutional lawyers no longer argue, as they once did, that ukases are simply administrative directions made in fulfilment of laws\(^1\). Equally with the laws they are enforcible at courts of law\(^2\) — and would in fact be promulgated as laws if the legislature were more active.

Supreme Soviet confirmation of ukases is regarded as automatic, as is indicated by the fact that they become operative before such confirmation is given. Technically there is indeed no constitutional requirement for approval by the Supreme Soviet (except in the case of ministerial appointments and dismissals), but in practice it is sought and obtained for all ukases of consequence.

Constitutionally the Presidium is thus a formidable institution — so much so that its position vis-à-vis the Supreme Soviet presents some nice legal problems for Soviet lawyers now that a more realistic view is being taken of the ukase. If it can no longer be argued that the Presidium is simply an organ or executive committee of the Supreme Soviet, then does it replace the highest organ of state power for 361 days of the year while the latter is in recess? Such would appear to be the logical if unpleasant conclusion that Soviet lawyers are hard pressed to escape. Fortunately the sterile discussion of the Presidium’s constitutional position can be ignored, because theory and practice are at variance: Western political scientists are generally agreed that the Presidia of Supreme Soviets merely provide the signatures under ukases. Some evidence in support of this view is to be found in the composition of the Kazakh Presidium, and in the functions that it actually does perform.

\(^1\)See I.T. Bespal, op.cit., p.115 where sources are cited as holding this view.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 21.
### Chart X

**Composition of Presidium of Kazakh Supreme Soviet, 1951-1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1951 Presidium</th>
<th>1955 Presidium</th>
<th>1959 Presidium</th>
<th>1963 Presidium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members</strong></td>
<td>Debendil'din, A.T.</td>
<td>Oslov, A.S. (1st D/Ch. 11/35-3/56)</td>
<td>Kryukova, K.N.</td>
<td>Kryukova, K.N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iskyanets, I.</td>
<td>Ch., E. Kas. oblishpolkom</td>
<td>Kryukova, K.N.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Secretary, CC</td>
<td>1st Secretary, CC</td>
<td>1st Secretary, CC</td>
<td>1st Secretary, CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Krapilov, S.I.</td>
<td>Brezhnev, L.I.</td>
<td>Karabashov, F.K.</td>
<td>Solomontsev, H.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Secretary, CC</td>
<td>2nd Secretary, CC</td>
<td>2nd Secretary, CC</td>
<td>2nd Secretary, CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Secretary, Karaganda obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Pavlodar obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Pavlodar obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Karaganda obkom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panfilov, Kh.N.</td>
<td>Koniev, A.S.</td>
<td>Beredit, A.N.</td>
<td>Kantsevyrivostov, P.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Secretary, E. Kazakhstan obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, E. Kazakhstan obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, E. Kazakhstan obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, E. Kazakhstan obkom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selyukhin, N.I.</td>
<td>Koniev, A.S.</td>
<td>Koniev, G.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Secretary, Pavlodar obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Pavlodar obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Pavlodar obkom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belyuyev, A.I.</td>
<td>Koniev, G.A.</td>
<td>Nyyshbekov, S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Secretary, Alma-Ata obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Alma-Ata obkom</td>
<td>1st Secretary, Alma-Ata obkom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Government Officials
Kambetov, A.I.
Chairman, Kustanai obispolkom

Kurlybaeva, D.
Chairman, raiispolkom

Trade Union Officials
Beisenov, A.B.
Chairman, Kazakh TUC

Cultural and Scientific
Sadykova, Zh.S.
Doctor

Industrial and Agricultural
a) Executives
Omanova, I.
Chairman, collective farm
Zhakhanov, I.
Chairman, collective farm

Kwaganbetova, Sh.R.
(No other position – the only such member during 10 years)

Sharpev, I.Sh.
Chairman, Kazakhstan TUC

Mustafin, G.
Chairman, Union of Writers

Sadykova, Zh.S.
Doctor

Rakina, T.F.
School Doctor

Nugunov, N.N.
Professor, Medical Institute

Grushkova, V.A.
Teacher

Nakiev, S.
Writer

Roschik, P.Kh.
Factory director

Bankev, I.B.
Chairman, collective farm

Gavrilenko, I.B.
Chairman, collective farm

Koblikov, V.N.
Director, state farm

Katsikin, M.
Chairman, raiispolkom

Kambetov, A.I.
Chairman, Kustanai obispolkom

Beisenov, A.B.
Chairman, Kazakh TUC

Sadykova, Zh.S.
Doctor

Gurkin, T.F.
School Doctor

Nugunov, N.N.
Professor, Medical Institute

Grushkova, V.A.
Teacher

Nakiev, S.
Writer

Roschik, P.Kh.
Factory director

Bankev, I.B.
Chairman, collective farm

Gavrilenko, I.B.
Chairman, collective farm

Koblikov, V.N.
Director, state farm

Seregin, G.A.
Factory director

Ustremenov, Zh.
Head, mine sector

Kosheev, O.A.
Head, agricultural production directorate

Likshakbaev, I.G.
Director, state farm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b) Workers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ryskalova, Zh.</td>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantokhova, D.</td>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurmaganbetov, S.</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakhaev, I.</td>
<td>Brigade leader, collective farm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovalevskaya, T.I.</td>
<td>Train driver</td>
<td>Nurmaganbetov, S.</td>
<td>Miner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shankhaeva, S.</td>
<td>Metal worker</td>
<td>Bosenko, M.S.</td>
<td>Tractor brigade leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grishin, E.V.</td>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>Dauletkaibiev, S.</td>
<td>Herdsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakenov, S.</td>
<td>Tractor driver</td>
<td>Trukhina, E.I.</td>
<td>Slaughterer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td></td>
<td>Akhmetzafin, U.N.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When a new Supreme Court was convened
presidentially in December, 1955, another
Supreme Court, the President and Second
Secretary

H. I. Byars and P. K. Hathorne, also became First and Second
Secretaries. This was the first session of the Supreme Court of
January and July, 1950. D. L. Haneson joined the President the day after
presidency, and D. S. Haneson became the President during one year.

I. D. Hawley became First Secretary in March, 1956, and was elected
Second Secretary at the General Assembly without further debate. He is the
second Secretary, a distinct position from the First Secretary, the new First of
the occupation of the role of the secretary to a different President, and the
which the First of Lower Ketchum is obviously regarded as indispensable.
when elected members of a new Presidency. Participation in the
was of the General Committee to
the First and Second secretaries of the General Committee.

The First and Second Secretaries of the General Committee are
one exception, have always held full-time posts elsewhere.

 ciò a great deal of which more will be said presently. Ordinarily members, with
activities of which more will be said presently. Ordinarily members, with
the President's approval, the part-time deputy chairman (held by an
ex-officio
and need their deputy chairman had died several in the year and had not been
and the Government apparatus. The President was not a great import because the
Chairman was reduced from three to one, as part of a campaign to reduce
least one full-time deputy chairman. In June, 1956 the number of deputy
have always been full-time positions, and that there has always been at
in Proclamation, It was not the case that the Chairman and Secretary
in Proclamation work. It was not the case that the person in question was fully elected
harmful Supreme Court over the period under study.
next to arise the membership of successive Presidents of the

159.
Apart from the two senior party secretaryships, there is no other position in the republic which guarantees membership. A high trade union official is normally included, but he is not invariably the chairman of the Trades Union Council of the republic. There is also a first secretary from Alma-Ata, but he may be either the obkom or krajkom secretary. These persons (seven in all) would appear to exhaust the list of members who could effectively contribute to the functioning of the Presidium as a 'permanently acting body'. The other krajkom and obkom secretaries, although influential figures in their own right, would probably be prevented both by distance and other commitments from being active members. The same holds true of most of the lesser figures who complete the membership list.

Examination of the membership of the Kazakh Presidium thus lends some weight to the usual Western view, which rejects Supreme Soviet Presidia as the real sources of ukases and ministerial appointments. The consistent presence of the First and Second CC Secretaries certainly suggests that further investigation of the role of this body is warranted, but even if they are assumed to be the two most powerful figures in the republic, the Presidium is an unlikely instrument for them to choose as the main rule-making centre. Apart from the two Secretaries the only other member of the CC Bureau here is the Chairman of the Presidium himself. The deputy chairman does not even rate membership of the CC. All members of the Council of Ministers, from its Chairman down, are excluded\(^1\), as are heads of CC departments. Whatever the real source of ukases may be, it can hardly be the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

\(^1\) There is a (pseudo) constitutional point involved here, namely the responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Presidium in between Supreme Soviet sessions.
Removal of this red herring would seem to leave the Presidium as nothing more than an ornamental collective head of state. Perhaps because no Western political scientist has seriously challenged this commonly accepted picture of Supreme Soviet Presidia, no attempt appears to have been made to discover what real functions can be ascribed to these bodies. Evidence from Kazakhstan suggests that their place in the political system amounts to much more than legitimization of ukases and conferring of awards. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to sifting this evidence and to assessing how the Presidium fits into the republic's institutional pattern.

Before 1956 the Presidium was accorded extremely little publicity. The only indication in 1955 that it enjoyed more than nominal existence was a newspaper article by one of its deputy chairmen reminding local soviets of their responsibilities in connection with approaching elections to the Kazakh Supreme Soviet and local soviets; some 68,000 electoral commissions had to be formed, lists of voters compiled, ballot papers and election literature provided, and communications with polling booths established and manned. The article was authoritative in tone, indicating that the Presidium was probably the coordinating centre for the massive electoral campaign and the technical organisation of the elections.

Retrospective reference has also been found to two Presidium postanovlenia of this period. The first, in October, 1955, ordered local soviets to investigate certain complaints made by their employees; the

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1 A notable exception is to be found in H. McClosky and J.E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1960, pp. 350-354, where the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is placed on 'approximately the same level' as the USSR Council of Ministers. This assessment, however, is based on unquestioning acceptance of Soviet assertions concerning the origins of ukases and ministerial appointments.

2 KP 12/1/55.
second, in January, 1956, ordered a district soviet executive committee to provide a block of land for a widow whose house had been demolished in a "heartless, bureaucratic" fashion.\(^1\) The fact that neither of these episodes was reported at the time counsels caution in arriving at firm conclusions about the activity of higher organs on the basis of contemporary reportage, but in comparison with subsequent years this was undoubtedly a period of inactivity for the Presidium. At the same time the few known examples of its work at this period did point in the direction of a coming expansion of operations. It will be noted that the above two postanovleniia, the organisation of elections and conferring awards all have a common denominator: they involve areas of contact between the regime and its citizens. Such contacts are, of course, diverse and numerous; for brevity's sake we shall call this general area that of public relations.

After the twentieth Congress of the CPSU, at which Khrushchev drew attention to breaches of the Soviet constitution by central and local soviets\(^2\), the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium immediately set about resuscitating the moribund public relations functions of the soviets - as distinct from the administrative role of their executive committees and departments. At a meeting in Alma-Ata addressed by the deputy chairman of the Presidium, Supreme Soviet deputies were reminded of their duty to report to electors on their work, to struggle for the fulfilment of nakaney (instructions) from their constituents, and to grant audiences to citizens

\(^1\)I.I. Bespaly, op.cit., pp. 144, 155.
\(^2\)XX S"vjad KPSS. stenograficheskii otchet, Moscow, 1956, p. 92. On contraventions of the rights of local soviets at this period (cooptation to elective positions, failure to hold any sessions other than the post-election session, etc.), see K.I. Suvorov (ed.) Nekotorye voprosy organizatsionnopartiinoj raboty v sovremennykh usloviakh, Moscow, 1961, p. 241.
several times a month. Similar meetings were subsequently held in all oblasts, and from here on there is ample evidence that the Presidium had become responsible for the public activities of all deputies, Supreme Soviet and local. A typical newspaper report of how this supervision is exercised might run, in a much abbreviated form, as follows.  

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR has heard a report by the chairman of the...oblast executive committee on the work of the oblast soviet in extending the ties of deputies with the masses. The Presidium noted that the soviet has improved its work in this sphere: deputies are now reporting to constituents more regularly on the work of the soviet, and have been active in organizing working-bees in fulfilment of nakasy concerning the planting of trees. At the same time the Presidium noted that certain village soviet chairmen (named) do not assist deputies to meet electors by providing office space for this purpose. The Presidium obliged local soviet executive committees to provide facilities for the hearing of reports and the reception of constituents by deputies.

In the preceding chapter emphasis was placed on the propaganda work of deputies. Their relations with the public are not all one way, however. The nakasy referred to above are an important element in these relations, and as a method by which constituents seek satisfaction of their needs, bear close examination. Usually voiced at election time, nakasy range over a wide variety of matters, such as the construction of roads and footpaths, the establishment of cultural and sporting centres, clubs, amenities, kindergartens, medical services, and housing. They are what might be expected from electors, given the range of matters administered by local soviet. Interestingly though, exactly the same range of nakasy are given to Supreme Soviet deputies, who, it might be expected, would receive requests on issues decided at national level, e.g. prices of commodities,

1KP 7/3/56.
2See e.g., KP 31/3/56, 8/3/60, 29/1/64.
Such items are conspicuously absent from lists of nakasy. Since the matters both kinds of deputies are asked to deal with are of local significance, the appropriate place to seek satisfaction is the local soviet executive committee. Local and Supreme Soviet deputies in Kazakhstan therefore form united groups which divide up nakasy according to a joint plan of work, a practice which is encouraged in order to avoid duplication of petitions and complaints forwarded by the two types of deputy.

The absence of nakasy on subjects of more than local interest raises some doubts concerning the degree of spontaneity in drawing up the lists. Furthermore, interspersed among them one finds nakasy which may be said to favour the interests of the state more directly than those of its citizens — a demand for the introduction of advanced technology at an industrial enterprise, or the strengthening of social discipline, or even the application of stern measures to those who decline socially useful work. Nevertheless it remains true that the majority of nakasy represent genuine local needs, and reports that numerous persons seek to add to the lists are no doubt accurate.

A large measure of success in satisfying the demands of electors is often claimed. A village soviet deputy secures the opening of a shop in a new settlement, as well as connection to the electric power grid, and completion of road repairs. At the biennial local elections a village soviet receives 48 nakasy and ten months later has

2AP 29/12/57, 20/1/60, 7/5/63. Such nakasy are not necessarily officially inspired, but their passage may be an easy one in the selection of those that are adopted.
3KP 3/3/57.
4KP 12/12/56.
fulfilled two thirds of them. ¹ Of the 3250 nakazy given to local soviet deputies in Kayl Orda Oblast in March, 1957 2100 were said to have been met by June, 1958. ² Supreme Soviet deputies are credited with similar success: of 2874 nakazy received by them at the 1959 elections, 1070 had been fulfilled a year later. ³

The impression of governmental munificence conveyed by such reports is sharply modified upon examination of the methods by which nakazy are fulfilled. The enterprising deputy mentioned above secured the inclusion of his village in the electric power system by going as far as the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy (which had a plant in the area), but this type of success is rarely quoted. Most of the praise bestowed on successful deputies is for having organized their constituents on a do-it-yourself basis. Oblast, raion and village soviets are directed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium 'to draw society into the task of fulfilling nakazy relating to tree planting, public services and amenities, cleanliness of populated areas, construction of roads and bridges'. All these works, in the view of the Presidium, 'can be carried out by the efforts of the population', whose organizers should be the permanent commissions of local soviets, block and street committees, and other voluntary organizations. ⁴

The scale of work undertaken by this 'people's construction method', as it is officially called, and the numbers of those who contribute their labour is sometimes staggering. In the city of Kayl Orda 30,000, or about half the inhabitants, ⁵ participated in planting 93,000 trees and

¹KP 20/1/60.
²KP 25/6/58.
³KP 15/6/60.
⁴KP 7/5/63.
⁵In 1959 the population of Kayl Orda was 65,902. Itogi vsemovzrnoi perupisi naselenia 1959 goda. Moscow, 1962, p. 33.
mending 46 kilometres of roads during a campaign which extended over

11 eleven Sundays. Of tens of thousands of Alma-Ata dwellers joined in a

month long drive to beautify the city by painting blocks of flats, clearing

rubbish and laying 8 kilometres of gravel road. When this was completed

a canal digging campaign was launched, again by way of 'the people’s

construction method'. As a result of meetings held by permanent

commissions of local soviets, groups of workers promise to contribute 15

and 16 hours a week to these campaigns, i.e., outside their normal

employment hours. For is all this directed towards projects to which

civic-minded persons might naturally turn their energies - one can think

of many alternatives with more appeal to the inhabitants of a raion centre

than the building of sheds for thousands of cattle on a state farm. And

the title of one report to the Supreme Soviet Presidium requires no comment;
it was "On strengthening the struggle against weeds in the virgin lands."

In fact if the monetary value of all these items could be added

together - there are many more including construction of schools,
bathhouses and obstetric centres - the result would be a significant

sum in terms of the budgets of local soviets. The same form of impost is

common elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but may have been more severe in

Kazakhstan where resources were strained to the utmost at this period because

of a more rapid rate of economic expansion than in other republics.

Diversion of funds earmarked for shops, housing and amenities was not

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1 KP 25/6/58.
2 KP 24/4/58. Alma-Ata’s population in 1959 was 456,481. Itogi etc., p. 30.
3 KP 29/12/57, 19/1/61.
4 KP 22/1/63.
5 KP 4/7/63.
6 KP 27/9/63.
7 See N. Mutikhina, Aktiv mestnykh sovietov, Moscow, 1959, pp. 6-14.
unknown, and although the Presidium castigated local soviets for this practice\(^1\), it was in fact condoned from the outset of the campaign to revive the soviets, which were instructed to overcome 'parasitical attitudes' and employ 'local reserves' when attending to the everyday needs of the population.\(^2\)

Considering how nakasy are turned back on those who present them, one wonders not so much at how they are kept within the limited possibilities of local budgets, but at the fact that their fountain-head does not dry up. Assuming that the majority of them are spontaneous - as is likely because of the elementary needs they express - the degree of dissatisfaction with existing conditions must reach a high level before electors will approach their deputy, for it is almost a predictable outcome that they will be organized into remedying matters themselves. One does in fact catch glimpses of something bordering on desperation in reports to the Presidium. Public bathhouses are out of order for months on end; facilities for repair of shoes or household equipment are lacking; 'in many places the most elementary living conveniences are absent'.\(^3\)

'Mobilization of the masses' to cure these ills may be regarded as an equilibrium mechanism: dissatisfaction will not be voiced until needs are urgent, and when it is expectations will be conditioned by the knowledge that self-help is the remedy.

Even so, the mechanism does not always function smoothly, and steps have to be taken to limit the number of nakasy accepted. In mid 1960 the Presidium condemned 'serious infringements of the method of

\(^1\)KP 13/6/63, 6/5/61.
\(^2\)KP 3/1/57.
\(^3\)KP 13/6/63, 13/3/60.
accepting naksy' at meetings of electors. Local soviet executive
committees were told that they
must explain to electors that only those proposals of electors
are regarded as naksy which are accepted by a majority of
votes at a meeting of electors. Every proposal made at such
meetings must be discussed carefully and comprehensively from
the viewpoint of its expediency and possibility of fulfilment,
and then confirmed.1

In other words before a proposal becomes a naksy a majority of local
inhabitants present must display positive agreement not only on the proposal
itself but on how they will implement it. When popular feeling has, in the
sophisticated language of the press, 'matured' to this degree, the formation
of working-bees will present few obstacles.

In its supervision of the public relations side of local soviet
affairs the Presidium performs a dual role. On the one hand, in urging
deputies to action on behalf of constituents and in insisting that soviets
keep registers of naksy,2 it is the champion of the people. This view of
the Presidium is the one most vigorously emphasised in its published
directions to the soviets. On the other hand, in the methods it prescribes
for complying with naksy, it is in effect defending the soviets from
inundation by popular demands, which might disturb the official order of
priorities. Other aspects of the supervision of public relations illustrate
this duality just as well. The Presidium aims at ensuring that soviets
hold sessions as regularly as enjoined by the constitution; that executive
committees do not 'administer by fiat' without any knowledge of deputies'
views; that regular reports are given to the public on the work of the

1KP 15/6/60.
2KP 7/5/63.
soviet. In all this the Presidium is concerned not only with the public image of the soviets as the institutions through which the majority of citizens come into contact with authority, but also with their efficiency from the regime's viewpoint. The more efficiently local soviets perform the freer is the central government to concentrate on industrial, agricultural and other priorities. Statements such as the following are, therefore, not mere cant: "Reports to the population by [deputies] are an effective form of .... helping soviet organs to know better .... the needs of the population". Were the representative functions of the soviet better developed neither executive committees nor deputies would need constant admonitions of this sort. As it is one can almost sense the note of surprise in the words of the local soviet chairman who said that certain defects in the functioning of his town's transport system, which were pointed out by deputies, 'were unknown to the gorispolkom, and were easy to overcome'. Obviously cheating of the soviets by the Presidium fulfils a need both for the regime and the population.

Although nakasy are almost entirely restricted to local matters, the problems they raise cannot always be solved locally. The local health office, for instance, needs allocations from the health ministry to construct a clinic, even if voluntary labour is to be used. Hence allowing local and Supreme Soviet deputies to become channels for receiving grievances and petitions inevitably led the Presidium some distance into the

1 KP 10/5/56. Earlier articles such as this give an illuminating picture of the soviets as they then functioned. Obispolkom chairman decided questions without consultation, repeatedly selected the same speakers for 'debates', ignored those likely to voice criticism etc.

2 KP 20/1/60.

3 KP 18/10/59.
preserves of the central government. Deputies were permitted, perhaps encouraged, to forward a message requiring central government action to the appropriate institution. Supreme Soviet deputies seem to have done this directly, local deputies through their local soviet. At the same time the Presidium obliged ministries to be attentive to requests from deputies, and to adopt measures in fulfilment of request. The Council of Ministers itself was charged by the Presidium with checking on observance of this order by individual ministries.

Perhaps because this general instruction proved ineffective we next find the Presidium requiring the Council of Ministers to examine specific requests made by local soviets, e.g., for extension of local medical services and local industry, and staff to operate these. Obviously these requests had been ignored by the Ministries of Health and Local and Fuel Industry. In other words, as a result of its campaign to inject some life into the soviets, the Presidium found itself championing local interests against ministerial policy—or at least against ministerial inaction.

At the time it would have appeared wildly optimistic to expect that the Presidium could emerge from its ineffectual position and take up a permanent role of badgering the administration. Yet something like this did happen. There must have been considerable confusion over the issue, and, no doubt, opposition from central governmental agencies, which were very much accustomed to placing their own evaluation on petitions from local authorities. Official orientation was required to meet this new situation

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1KP 7/6/56.
2Ibid.
3KP 3/3/57.
and in March, 1957, within a few weeks of the above instruction to the Council of Ministers, the Presidium held a conference of leaders of ministries and other agencies 'to discuss the action to be taken on critical observations and practical suggestions voiced by deputies'. In view of the preceding sequence of events it is probable that the real issue at stake was the right of the Presidium to require governmental agencies to take action on these observations and suggestions. Unfortunately, no details of the conference were published. We are merely told that the leaders of ministries and other agencies heard a speech by the Chairman of the Presidium and exchanged opinions.

There may have been 'kremlinological' overtones to this conference. It will be recalled that this was a period of sharp party-government conflict at USSR level, and the possibility exists that the republican Supreme Soviet Presidium (very much under party direction as may be seen from its membership) was being used to harass or discipline republican governmental agencies. In any case, no matter whether the apparent conflict was generated by the resuscitation of the soviets or engineered from above, or both, a ruling from the party in Moscow at the time would probably have favoured the Presidium rather than the Council of Ministers.

After this conference, and presumably as a result of decisions taken there, the practice of issuing Presidium postanovlenia containing instructions to ministries, chief directorates etc., became firmly established. Thus the Ministry of Communications is instructed to ensure uninterrupted contact with all parts of the republic during elections

1KP 29/3/57.
2KP 2/3/58.
Ministry of Social Security is ordered to eliminate irregularities in the payment of child endowment; the Public Procurator, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Supreme Court are instructed to improve the work of their local organs. In fact it is now exceptional for the Presidium to meet without prodding some central agency. One meeting of the Presidium may produce directives to as many as six government agencies, even though the agenda for the meeting is confined to one aspect of local administration.

In order to show how this comes about it is necessary to explain that local soviets share jurisdiction in some spheres with other local bodies over which they have no control. This is especially true of construction projects. Industrial enterprises, both when administered by sovarkhoz and by industrial ministries, frequently constructed and allocated housing for their own employees. The construction of a sports arena may be jointly undertaken by a raipolkom, an industrial enterprise and nearby state farms. The subject of the Presidium meeting referred to above was school construction in Dshambul oblast. This was shared by state farms, the local branch of the Kazakh railways and a number of industrial concerns. Needless to say the problems of the oblast's standing commissions on education were multiplied by such a division of responsibility. The state farms had used only a third of what had been allocated by the Ministry of Agriculture for school building, and the performance of industry and the railways was little better. The Presidium

3EP 12/10/58.
therefore stepped in to bring pressure on the defaulting bodies through their superiors in Alma-Ata. The other central agencies to which instructions were issued were the Ministry of Health, which had failed to insist on the requisite hygiene standards in school construction, and the Ministry of Trade and Directorate of Consumer’s Cooperatives, whose provisions for school meals were inadequate.¹

Before attempting to generalise about the nature of directives to the ministries from the Presidium, some further examples will be helpful:-

The Ministry of State Farms was ordered to eliminate instances of withholding of pay on state farms.²

The Ministry of Communal Economy was ordered to fulfil its water reticulation and sewerage construction plan in the city of Aralsk.³

The Procurator and the Kasakh Council of National Economy were required to examine observance of the labour code by industrial enterprises in Dakhovskgan city, where miners were being ‘allowed’ to do heavy work, workers were being transferred to new jobs without their consent, etc.⁴

The South Kasakhstan sovnarkhoz was ordered to ensure that training facilities were available for technical school pupils during their prescribed periods in factories - the latter had employed pupils on tasks not related to their training.⁵

¹As a footnote to the Presidium’s concern with school accommodation it may be added that three years later schools in the same area were still conducting classes in two and three shifts. KP 11/1/64.
²KP 29/3/60.
³KP 6/5/61.
⁴KP 4/1/62.
⁵KP 12/5/62.
The Ministry of Personal Services was ordered to improve supplies for service establishments in Suriev oblast. ¹

The State Committee on Cinematography was instructed to provide regular cinema programmes in the outlying districts of Alma-Ata oblast. ²

Numerous and varied though these directives to the state bureaucracy are, their content is not without some recognisable limits: they refer primarily to matters within the orbit of the soviets' public relations and mass-organization work. To put it another way they concern matters which receive most attention from the standing commissions and 'public' organisations³ closely associated with local soviets. The Presidium does not presume to tell the central administration how to run industrial enterprises or state farms, or how to improve planning procedures; these are responsibilities of the Council of Ministers. Tentatively we may say that pure economic administration is beyond the scope of the Presidium.

Secondly the directives usually require the ministries to do something for the local soviets - usually something the ministries should be doing anyway, but are neglecting. At this level, therefore, the duality of the Presidium's role gives way to a more single-minded purpose. If its supervision of mass-organization work at local level involves two main elements - (1) ensuring that the soviets satisfy the basic material needs of the population, and (2) pressuring them to do this as far as possible with local resources - then at republican level it is the first of

¹KP 13/6/63.
²KP 8/9/64.
³See p.188 ff.
these elements which is dominant. Here the Presidium aims at ensuring that
the ministries make it possible for local soviets to fulfil their tasks in
education, social security, retail trade, etc. More often than not this
means that it is bent on furthering local interests, which are, of course,
not infrequently opposed to those of the central government apparatus.
So this extent the Presidium operates as a pressure group on behalf of
local soviets.

At some of the Presidium meetings it is possible to trace the
final postanovlenie back beyond the soviets to more popular origins. This
is especially so of meetings at which ministers, deputy ministers and other
central officials are called upon to give an account of their stewardship.
The practice of hearing reports from these leading administrative personnel
dates from at least 1958 - and may therefore have been one of the issues
decided upon at the 1957 conference between the Presidium and government
leaders. The individual summoned has usually been particularly remiss in
matters reflecting upon the public image of the soviets. The Minister of
Health has twice been called upon because of complaints about 'a heartless
attitude' to letters from the public, red tape in his ministry, failure
to keep records of requests from the public, etc.\(^1\) Similar charges were
levelled at the Minister of Geology and Mineral Conservation.\(^2\) In fact,
with one exception, all ministerial reports to the Presidium up to the end
of 1964 were specifically stated to have had their origins in either nakaev
or popular complaints.\(^3\) The exception was a report by the head of the
Chief Directorate of Highways 'on drawing collective farms, state farms,
industrial, transport, construction and other enterprises into road works,
for which purpose the Minister of Construction\(^4\) was charged with the
task of developing these enterprises into units and bringing them under
control by the Ministry of Construction in the field of housing, agriculture
and roads, etc.\(^5\) The Minister of Construction has also been pressed to

\(^1\) KP 29/3/60, 28/6/62.
\(^2\) KP 23/11/61.
\(^3\) KP 31/8/58, 15/6/60, 23/11/61, 31/12/61, 20/12/63.
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may well have been the action of the President meaning also, but no
the real area of the Presidium's authority. Unless this is so, it would be difficult to explain why one and the same body should make far more restricted use of a minor rule-making instrument than it does of a major one. Examination of the Presidium's partenovlenie thus reinforces the conclusions to be drawn from studying its membership.

After attempting to draw a distinction between the use of the partenovlenie by the Presidium and the Council of Ministers, one is forced to add immediately that the demarcation line is often obscure. Presidium directives have their origins in the public relations role of the local soviets, while those of the government pursue the objectives of the plan - the annual harvest, monthly industrial output quotas, and so forth. But 'administration of the economy' and 'public relations' are not mutually exclusive areas. When the Presidium charges the Ministry of Trade and the Directorate of Consumers' Cooperatives with improving restaurant services it is obviously trespassing on regular administrative channels, even if the order arises from a review of the work of soviet standing commissions.\(^1\) And in relations with non-economic ministries the distinction between administrative and mass-organization matters is hardly valid at all. Almost any instruction on health, education or cultural matters (all the object of regular attention by the Presidium) is bound to cut across the lines of the relevant ministry.

Moreover the Presidium does occasionally act on matters which, on the face of it, should be the sole preserve of the government. A machine operator wrote to the Presidium saying his farm had cut by half the area seen to corn, had failed to fertilize what was sown, and had

\(^1\)KP 12/5/62.
neglected to cultivate the crop. The Presidium checked the accuracy of
the letter and the local kolkhoz was informed. The following year
Khrushchev's 'queen of the fields' was restored to her rightful place. 1
Here the Presidium was clearly displacing the regular agricultural
administration.

Normally its role in production matters is confined to
spurring soviets and deputies to greater efforts in support of targets
formulated by the bureaucracy. Thus it urges the holding of 'socialist
competitions' or the setting up of deputies' control posts to check on the
quality of field work. 2 Subsidiary though these efforts normally are,
they can become a full scale campaign - as did the weed eradication drive
mentioned earlier. The complexity of the Presidium's role is illustrated
here. Far from acting as a pressure group for local interests in such
instances, it is very much an arm of the central government.

Cause was found in Chapter III to remark upon some overlap
in the functions of the Supreme Soviet standing commissions and the
bureaucracy. Since the commissions' activities have been shown to be
largely regulated by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, it is not surprising
that the same phenomenon should distinguish the parent body. Soviet
writers give full recognition to the persistence of this problem, though
they are unable to resolve it. Yu.A. Tikhomirov and I.N. Stepanov, in
their treatment of relations between higher republican organs, state that
the Presidium directs the work of local soviets with a view to securing
observance of socialist democracy and legality, while the Council of

1KP 4/9/63.
2KP 22/1/63.
Constitutional Reform and I'm Stepping Out

Constitutional reform is a pressing issue, governed by Article 7

The proposed amendment is to be drafted and presented to the Germany

Here's why new legislation before the Federal Chamber, and the Senate's

Having new laws that the Federal Chamber does, and who the members

Knowing what the Federal Chamber can be properly assessed to the Federal

Constitutional reform cannot be wholly avoided

Constituency vote of the Federal Chamber is public recognition for the

Constitutional reform is to be conducted in public recognition

and the Grand of Hungary is handed over to the public recognition of the

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demonstrated experience. Here it should be emphasized has not been outlined in any

demonstrated or public attention. That is in all-age-suitable power and in complete

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demonstrates the Federal Chamber, not only the right to reassemble, but also because the Federal

be encouraged bringing the constitutional reform into line with present

strengthenment of the parties of the Federal Chamber and local societies (1.0.9

another editorial comes out in favour of a constitutional

In the new constitutional

experience that the functions of the Federal Chamber will be more clearly defined

of Hungary and that the problem has not been solved legally. They

that not introduced? the Federal Chamber duplicates the work of the Central

that not executed or administrative powers? At the same time they should

implement constitutional guarantees, and regulate the accountability

Institutes, institute them in economic and cultural construction, chances on

179.
There is then a legitimate doubt about attendance at the monthly sessions, and it has to be left unresolved. What may be assumed without any knowledge of how sessions are conducted is that the 'interrogation' of the CC First Secretary proves more decisive than that of a tractor driver, be he at the end of a telephone or on a brief visit to the capital. The first half dozen or so members represent an important enough section of the republic's elite to match the type of order that emanates from the Presidium. What the quality of discussion is at its sessions and what part junior members play remain unknown.

Newspaper articles on the Presidium sessions are somewhat mystifying. The Presidium itself is invariably referred to as a collective whole and there is no hint as to the mechanism of its contact with the soviets or ministries. The main report given by a local soviet chairman or ministerial official is often the only source of information mentioned, and since the rapporteur is usually under fire the impression given is that reports are veritable orgies of self-criticism. A moment's reflection, however, will show this impression to be mistaken. A body with only three full-time members could not hope to assert even superficial authority over hundreds of local soviets without assistance from a permanent staff of sizeable proportions. And the supervision is, to use Soviet terminology, by no means 'general and declarative'. Such details as conscience by soviet executive committees at instances of smoking pregnant women, or lack of washing facilities at a factory site are dealt with by the Presidium. It is sufficiently familiar with the routine of

\[1\] KP 4/1/62.
the office of the Minister of Health to know that he examines personally
only those complaints which arrive via higher party or soviet echelons.¹
These items do not look like the type of detail that would be supplied
by an official under criticism, and one must posit a wide-ranging
apparatus to back the Presidium.²

Reference has been found to several departments of the
Presidium apparatus:

(1) The Department for the Work of Local Soviets (or Information
and Statistics Department as it was called until May, 1959). Some of the
functions of this department will be obvious from what has already been
said, and further amplification follows below.

(2) The Legal Department, which was stated to have heard a report
by the Minister of Justice on the accountability of people’s judges³;
i.e., the department was insisting on popular instruction by judges on
the work of the courts and the laws of the land - the public relations
aspect of court work. The department also organizes the elections of
people’s judges.⁴

(3) The Department of Awards.⁵ No comment is required on this
department except that thousands of awards are conferred every year.⁶

¹KP 29/3/60.
²No indication of the size of the apparatus has been found beyond the fact
that staff members were cut by 25 in May, 1959. See K.I. Suvorov, op.cit.,
p. 238.
³KP 6/7/56.
⁴KP 24/1/61.
⁵KP 27/9/63.
⁶See e.g., Istoria Kazakhskoi SSR Vol. II, Alma-Ata, 1959, p. 611.
An official of any standing in the republic celebrates his fiftieth or sixtieth birthday without recognition, and on occasions like the bumper harvest of 1956 the list of those honoured fills a page of the newspaper. 1

In 1955–56 the head of this department was a member of the Presidium 2 — the only such case. He was the exception among members, referred to earlier as having no full time job outside the Presidium.

(b) The Reception Office of the Presidium. An article by the head of this office indicates that it processes letters, complaints and petitions from workers. 3 The handling of such matters by central ministries and their local departments is discussed, and criticism directed at instances of entrusting enquiry into complaints to the very persons against whom they were made. Bespaly’s work on Supreme Soviet Presidium refers to an Office of the Chairman which maintained to receive protests against the vagaries of the administration, 4 and this would appear to be identical with the above Reception Office in Kazakhstan.

According to Bespaly it has the right to require documents and information from government bodies in the course of investigation of complaints. Use of this right appears to be confirmed by the knowledge of government departments displayed in the above article, and at Presidium meetings in general, but to what extent the office functions as a kind of higher administrative justice tribunal is not clear.

1 Over 40,000 awards were distributed as a result of this harvest.
Ezhegodnik Bol’shoy Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, 1957, p. 133.
2 Izvestia, 9/2/56.
3 KP 18/7/63.
In the department, the importance of continuing to conduct sessions on the adoption of the annual report and the implementation of the department's recommendations, and taking part in important national and international conferences and executive committees, and attending high-quality conferences and executive committees.

The department's recommendation to continue sessions on the adoption of the annual report and the implementation of the department's recommendations, and taking part in important national and international conferences and executive committees, and attending high-quality conferences and executive committees.

The scope of the above departments would seem to leave room for another to deal with similar sectors and standing committees, but no reference to such a department has been found.
To 21/2/69, 15/11/60, 21/6/61, 21/6/62, 21/6/63
II. Report: p. 12

I want to speak of the appointment of women as secretaries to the president, and the appointment of secretaries to the position of the president. The appointment of women to the higher positions of the executive branch is a significant step towards gender equality. However, women in these positions have often faced discrimination and the perception that they lack the necessary experience and qualifications to hold such positions. It is important to consider these factors when evaluating the suitability of women for such roles.

There have been instances where women have been appointed to high-level positions in the government, but their appointments have often been met with resistance and criticism. These appointments have raised questions about the qualifications and experience of these women, and whether they are truly the best candidates for these roles.

It is important to recognize the need for women to be appointed to positions of power and leadership in the government. However, these appointments must be based on merit and qualifications, and not on gender or other factors.

The appointment of women to these positions is a significant step towards gender equality, but it is important to continue to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of these appointments. It is essential to ensure that women are appointed to these positions based on their qualifications and experience, and not on gender or other factors.
she has attended more business-like occasions, such as a conference on internal trade, but not obviously in any very active capacity. In both 1960 and 1961 she was elected chairman of the Auditing Commission of the CP of Kazakhstan. This is largely an honorary post and seems to have been conferred in recognition of her as an individual, and not of her official position, which she had already held for five years. (During this time she had not been even a candidate member of the CC or a member of the Auditing Commission). In 1966 she was elected a candidate CC member and it remains to be seen whether the party honours accorded her will become a precedent for future deputy chairmen of the Presidium. For the present the position must be regarded as the one full-time Presidium position which has not received automatic party recognition.

Information on Kryukova's connections with the real tasks of the Presidium is confined to a few items. She was present at a conference on mass-organization work of the Soviets, has distributed awards, and attended a Virgin Lands Krai soviet session.¹ Consistency is found, however, in her connections with the Supreme Soviet. She proposed the formation of the five new permanent commissions in 1957; has reported on preparations for elections to the Supreme Soviet; given an analysis of the work of the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet at a conference which decided on their year's plan of work; and taken part in a Budget Commission session.² At the very least then she appears to have been responsible for supervision of the work of the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet, and this would include their role as

¹KP 21/6/61, 3/4/62, 10/6/64.
²KP 23/3/57, 27/1/63, 28/12/61, 29/12/61, 20/12/63.
A press conference was held on March 10, 1966, in response to the growing concern among some political observers that the recent election results were not an indication of the true sentiments of the people. The press conference was attended by representatives of various political parties and members of the media.

The participants agreed that the recent election results were not a reflection of the true sentiments of the people. They also discussed the need for greater transparency and accountability in the political process.

The press conference was moderated by a prominent figure in the media. The participants were encouraged to speak freely and express their views.

At the end of the press conference, a formal statement was released to the public, emphasizing the need for greater transparency and accountability in the political process.
In summary, it may be said that健康成长 and other

conditions of the CC Council

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functions of members of the supreme party and the party are elaborated

at the CC Bureau and not as a representative of the Bureau of Affairs.

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secretary degree, or a short term chairman, the P.R. Representative

chairman of the council of ministers, but also, though to a minister

l.a. representatives who hold the position for five years and five

promise 2. This requirement is characteristic not only of a chairman but

delivered a speech on the Khrushchev meeting with a central committee

promise 1. He participated in a conference of cooperative cooperatives, and

163.
of deputies), the work of their standing commissions, and relations between soviets and their executive committees, and between deputies and their electors. Its position vis-à-vis the Supreme Soviet is more ambiguous. The Presidium is said to formulate the agenda of sessions, and though skepticism has been expressed on this point it probably does have some residual functions here. For example in 1956 the Presidium carried out an investigation of the work of trade and public catering enterprises of local soviets, and measures to improve their work were included in the agenda of the November, 1956 Supreme Soviet session. This could be regarded as an example of an item being included by the Presidium, but it would be meaningless to say that the Presidium approves such agenda items as the annual plan or the formation of the government. For the rest, supervision of the Supreme Soviet is exercised in such the same way as in the case of the local soviets. This is spelled out in Soviet texts only in regard to Supreme Soviet elections, but as we have seen here and in the previous chapter supervision extends to permanent commissions and deputies as well. The reason for official reticence in this area is presumably the formal legal subordination of the Presidium to the Supreme Soviet. Apparently it is held that the existence in name as well as in fact of a Presidium Department on the Work of the Supreme Soviet, parallel to the Department on the Work of Local Soviets, would be inimical to the constitutional image of the supreme organ of state power.

The Presidium is endowed with seemingly wide powers over the Council of Ministers, (i.e., apart from the dead letter of the Law on the subject) for it has the right to hear reports from any official and examine documents. In practice the exercise of this right is confined to
investigation of complaints and petitions from outside the administration - from constituents, deputies and soviets. This is no trifling business, however, since thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of complaints and petitions are received by the administration every month.¹ In supervising their handling the Presidium represents individual and local interests against those of ministries, and although it may sometimes require a death caused by bureaucratic bungling to bring action,² this aspect of the public relations work of the Presidium is the one most deserving of continued scrutiny. Here the Presidium approaches nearest to becoming a tribunal of administrative justice or an ombudsman.

The most vitriolic speech ever published in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda was one made in this capacity to the republican X Party Congress by F. Karibshanev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.³ In it the courts and procuracy are blasted for imprisoning petty first offenders; economic officials get a wigging for regular under-fulfilment of housing and hospital construction plans, for breaches of the labour code and general insensitivity to the needs of workers; even party leaders are not immune from attack on these points - though not by name. Karibshanev reviews a wide range of complaints received by the Presidium, and says that investigation showed the greater part of them to be well-founded. All in all his speech is heady stuff, and if he pursued his duties with equal fire along the bureaucratic corridors in Alma-Ata then Kazakhstan's citizens had in him a dauntless champion indeed.

¹One ministry is known to have received 5,719 complaints and petitions in six months. KP 13/11/58.
²KP 28/6/62.
³KP 13/3/60.
The significance of a speech like this from a member of the party's highest organ is not to be underestimated; less than a decade before it would have been almost inconceivable. Yet one cannot but perceive a basic contradiction here. If bureaucratic officials set no great store by the housing programme or committed breaches of the labour code, then it was principally because of the pressure of other priorities. The Supreme Soviet Presidium is very much the creature of central party leaders and as such could scarcely be expected to attack this order of priorities; at best it could remind government officials of lesser priorities, and expose those who tended to ignore them altogether. If the role of the Presidium vis-à-vis the central government is to be likened to that of ombudsman, it must also be emphasised that this role is far from absolute.

On the contrary the Presidium often functions very much as an integral part of the central party and state apparatus, and its furtherance of local and individual interests is sharply circumscribed by its other roles. We have already seen how it seeks to reduce demands on centrally distributed resources by urging self-help methods on local soviets wherever possible. It also directly advances state interests when, for example, it instructs local administrative organs to recover the full value of damage to agricultural machinery by farm workers, and urges the procuracy to institute proceedings in such cases; its postanovlenia are in fact an inseparable mixture of pressure on both citizens and state organisations. It reproaches a gorisanolkom for

\[1^1\text{KP 8/7/64.}\]
excessive reliance on imposition of fines to the neglect of educational measures; then two months later it is found urging sterner action to combat thefts of state property, and upbraiding judges of the People's Courts for imposing light sentences.

If one had to decide whether the Presidium's Javans-like case is more strongly focused in one direction than the other, the argument would be heavily influenced by examination of its posture towards 'public' or 'voluntary' organisations. The presence or absence in society of numerous organisations relatively independent of central state power has been held to be crucial to the nature of any political system. Such organisations inhibit the state....from dominating all political resources; they are a source of new opinions; they can be the means of communicating ideas....to a large section of the citizenry; they train men in political skills and so help to increase the level of interest and participation in politics....men who belong to associations are more likely than others to give the democratic answer to questions concerning tolerance and party systems..

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1 KP 4/10/62.
2 KP 7/12/62.
3 There is some difficulty here with the translation of 'obshchestvenny', usually rendered 'public' or 'social'. The problem is not that 'obshchestvenny' is any less ambiguous politically than the English 'public', which may describe a government owned and operated concern (public utility), or one that is open to the public (public, but privately owned school or baths). Indeed the ambiguity of 'public', even though of different dimensions, renders it a suitably vague translation. The problem is rather that Soviet writers use 'obshchestvenny' interchangeably with 'samodeyatelnuy' (voluntary), so that the former has acquired the sense of the latter. Direct translation is resorted to here simply for purposes of identification: a more accurate description would be 'organisations outside the formal party-state bureaucracy'. (The confusion in Soviet terminology is heightened by the fact that the party itself is described as an 'obshchestvennaya organizatsia').

There were in Kazakhstan in 1963 some 80,000 'public' organizations. They ranged from hobby and amateur artistic groups, through bodies closely associated with the work of local soviets, right up to such structures as the trades unions hierarchy, which is only in a very formal sense distinct from the state bureaucracy. The Soviet view of these organizations does not, of course, correspond with that of Lipsett, as quoted above. A typical description of their place in the scheme of things is the following:

Under the leadership and with the help of party and soviet organs, the voluntary organisations of the population carry on such work in providing amenities; in tree planting; in improving medical, cultural and service establishments, trade and public catering enterprises; in the protection of the social order; in the communist education of workers.1

It is not possible to inquire here how successfully the goals of the regime are imposed on voluntary organisations; more information than is available from the Alma-Ata press would be needed for such a study. As far as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is concerned, however, one can assert that it has used its power over local soviets to prevent extra-bureaucratic groups from becoming genuinely voluntary or independent. There is no recognition whatsoever in its post-sovietic of what is perhaps the primary goal of voluntary social groups in general (taking pluralist systems as a norm) - self-fulfilment for the individual in the manner he chooses.

As already noted, voluntary organisations with an orientation towards community service function as centres of mass mobilisation for

1KP 27/9/63.
public works and the Presidium promotes such usage of them. It does not confine its attentions to service organizations, but takes local soviets to task for not "coordinating" the work of voluntary cultural organizations which are "standing aside from concrete economic and political tasks and doing little to popularise advanced work methods". The soviets are directed to "conduct inspections" of the work of these organizations. 1

In another directive the Presidium criticises a raionkom which "does not examine thoroughly the work of voluntary organizations" and "proposes" that it should "improve its leadership" of them, "define their functions clearly", and regularly discuss questions of voluntary organizations at soviet sessions and raionkom meetings. 2 The instruction to define the functions of voluntary bodies was later followed by a formal order to local soviets to draw up their constitutions or rules for them. 3 Perhaps it should be stressed here that the organizations in question are not the commissions or deputies groups specifically formed to assist local soviets, but ostensibly independent associations of citizens. It should be noted also that the above examples are purposely selected from recent reports of Presidium meetings; they are not remnants of Stalinism from the early fifties.

To discover how successful local soviets are in carrying out such directives would entail empirical investigations at grass roots level, but it seems clear that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet seeks to prevent the development of extra-bureaucratic institutions which might

1 KP 29/1/64.
2 KP 8/12/61.
3 KP 27/9/63.
give adherents a social identity different from that purveyed by the regime. In this the Presidium is very much a tool of the central power structure. In some of its roles we have referred to it variously as a pressure group, an administrative justice tribunal or an ombudsman. These aspects of the Presidium are deserving of continuing scrutiny, but expectations for the future must be tempered by recollection of its integration with central party authority. The interlocking of its membership with that of the CC Presidium is the institutional expression of this integration.
CHAPTER 5

PARTY CONGRESS AND PUBLIC CONFERENCES.

According to party statutes the highest governing body at each level of the party hierarchy above the primary organisation is the conference. At republican level this gathering takes on the more exalted title of Congress. Before 1956 the statutes required convocation of a republican Congress every two years, but an amendment adopted at the CPSU Twentieth Congress reduced this requirement to quadrennial Congresses in republics which are divided into oblasts. (In 1966 this provision was extended also to the smaller republics). The statute on biennial convocation was ignored until 1949 when all republics held their first post-war Congresses. Since then Kazakhstan has, on average, done better than adhere to minimum requirements, Congresses having been held in 1949, 1951, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1966. Four were thus held during the period we are studying.

The supererogatory Congresses of 1952, 1959 and 1961 are explained by the fact that CPSU Congresses were held in these years; one of the functions of the republican Congress is to elect delegates to the all-union gathering. The 1959 Congresses (both CPSU and republican) were called to discuss the inauguration of the seven year plan for economic development, and were regarded as 'extraordinary', i.e. beyond the requirements of party rules. Kazakhstan therefore held its regular Congress in 1960. The regular CPSU Congress was not held until the following year, however, and hence a further republican Congress was convoked in 1961. Synchronisation was restored in 1966 and from now on CPSU and republican Congresses should fall due in the same year.
Election of delegates to Congress is indirect so that all come formally as representatives of oblast party organizations. The scale of representation is fixed by the CC (sc. Bureau, CC), and has been progressively reduced so that attendance might remain around the thousand mark despite rapid growth of party membership. The proportion of delegates to party members declined in this way from about 1:270 in 1956 to 1:400 in 1961. Candidate (probationary) party members have been represented at Congresses on an equal scale, but their delegates are described as having only a 'consultative voice' — a purely formal distinction since voting on resolutions is invariably unanimous.

Information on the backgrounds of delegates to Congress is confined to rather sketchy reports by mandates commissions. These are summarised in Chart XI. Lists of delegates are not published in the press, and we therefore lack the means for checking these reports that were available in the case of the Supreme Soviet. A still more troublesome impediment is the method of grouping delegates. Not only are such dissimilar categories as, say, military and medical often grouped together, but different combinations are also introduced at each Congress, so that comparison is largely frustrated. Thus the total number of party officials attending is given, but the breakdown of this figure, when available, never shows the number of central or local party apparatus officials. In 1959 local party secretaries other than primary organization secretaries were said to make up 219 of the 346 party officials attending. There were 5 CC Secretaries at the time so that if we assume that approximately the same number of primary organization secretaries attended as in 1959 (i.e. 11), then about 111 or 11.6% of delegates were probably apparatus officials.
## Chart XI

### Delegates to Kazakhstan's Party Congresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full delegates (1)</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates without voting rights (1)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party officials (2)</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including: election secretaries,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization secretaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>228</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet officials (2)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of tractor stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of enterprises</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of state farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union officials (2)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union officials (2)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial and transport officials (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural officials (2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific, educational, cultural workers (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>362</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies to Kazakh Supreme Soviet</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies to local sovets</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>677</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Congress mandate commission reports RF 27/1/56, 13/1/59, 12/3/60 29/5/61.

(1) The number of delegates actually attending is slightly less, mainly because of the practice of electing members of the CPSU CC Presidium as delegates.

(2) "Subotnik", literally "worker", has been translated as "official" throughout the table, except in the 1960 category of "scientific, educational and cultural workers". "Subotnik" is a more egalitarian term than "official" and it is safe to assume that party and economic "subotniks" are officials. This does not hold true for scientific, cultural and educational spheres where even the least ambitious description is "subotnik".

|
How this figure was distributed between central and local apparatus officials is not known. We do know that the Alma-Ata delegation was more than twice the size of that from any oblast in 1961, but this delegation would of course contain a large number from the central government apparatus, whose upper echelons include a high concentration of party members.

The proportion of worker and peasant delegates, the next largest group, rose from about 26% in 1956 to about 35% in 1960 and 1961. In 1960 this gain was mainly at the expense of party officials, but in 1961 the latter recovered lost ground, so that the miscellaneous group must have declined, the proportion of soviet officials having remained constant at all four congresses. Some caution is needed in comparing the sizes of occupational categories because of possible overlap. This is unmistakably present in the 1961 figures, additional of which will produce more than the number of elected delegates. Because of the results of our analysis of Supreme Soviet deputies suspicion immediately falls on the worker and peasant group. Since 1959 these have been clearly described as workers and collective farmers directly engaged in production, but in the light of what was learnt in Chapter III it is likely that they overlap somewhat with the new categories introduced in 1961, namely industrial and agricultural officials.

Fortunately this is of no great moment. As in the case of the Supreme Soviet the relative strengths of occupational groups among delegates bears no relationship to their participation at Congress. Chart XII attempts to measure this participation in terms of speeches made. Once again rank and file delegates are found to contribute little to proceedings,
### Chart XII

**Speakers at Party Congresses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC Secretaries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC Department Heads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraikom, okhm secretaries</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorkom, raikom secretaries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary organization secretaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total party officials</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairmen, krai/oblast executive committees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total government officials</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovnarkom chairmen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial executives</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural executives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total economic officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades Union officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konkombol</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Academic, Arts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and Peasants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and this applies not only to frequency, but to content of speeches as well. Typically the worker or peasant delegate recounts a tale of success in some workshop or farm brigade, and his appearance is simply an interlude amidst the more serious business of the Congress, which revolves around the report of the CC, given by the First Secretary.

From Chart XII it will be clear that Congress is largely a forum for local party secretaries, especially obkom secretaries. They dominate the discussion of the First Secretary's report, which means most of the Congress, but it hardly needs to be added that they do not 'debate' (the official term used) the report in the sense of challenging its accuracy or querying the past or future economic policies outlined in it. Rather their addresses are amplifications of the report for particular economic sectors or areas. Each oblast' first secretary in turn renders an account of his stewardship and outlines plans or 'socialist obligations' for the future. Unlike the report by the CC First Secretary, their speeches are, at least in the condensed versions given by the press, confined to economic problems, and local ones at that, references to ideological or national issues being quite rare. This does not necessarily mean a bare recital of facts and figures, though some speeches amount to little more: explanations of an oblast's performance may involve criticism of CC departments, even of the CC Bureau itself if there has been a recent change in the top leadership. Criticism of CC Secretaries responsible for industry, agriculture or ideology is not unknown, but no instance of an attack on the incumbent First or Second Secretary of the CC by an obkom secretary, nor of course by any lesser delegate, has been found. More often, however,
the shafts fired by local secretaries are aimed not at the central party apparatus, but at government ministries and committees, especially the republican Council, their favourite whipping-boy. Furthermore the tone of a local party secretary's speech is very much set by what has been said about his locality in the main report. No criticism in the latter is ever ignored; some acknowledgement, even if confined to a brief sentence or two is an inflexible routine. There have been one or two interesting cases of indirect rejection of strictures made, but the normal pattern is repentance and assurance of improved performance in the future.

Such is the main unvarying content of party Congresses. The 1959 Extraordinary Congress, which was atypical in a number of ways, provides the only exception in that no CC report was delivered. Even then, however, the main agenda item, the control figures for the 1959-65 economic plan, was made the occasion for retrospective analysis, so that the variation was more formal than real. At the 1956 Congress, the other occasion on which a new plan was introduced, it was treated separately from the First Secretary's report, so that discussion was roughly divided between past and future economic plans. In 1961 additional agenda items were the drafts of the new Party Programme and Rules. If Kazakhstan made any contribution to the final form of these it was not visible at the Congress; discussion followed the union-wide pattern of acclamation.

With the exception again of the 1959 Extraordinary Congress, the remainder of the agenda is always filled by two items on which there is no published discussion: the Auditing Commission's report, and election of the Central Committee and Auditing Commission. There is also the report from the mandate or credentials commission of the Congress, which though a
regular feature, finds no formal place on the agenda. Membership of the CC and Auditing Commission will be analysed in the following chapter, where it will be shown that Congress is the occasion for bringing membership of these two bodies into line with the configuration of power in the republic. This does not affect the power structure; it merely confirms and formalizes it. One may assume therefore that Congress's function is not the selection of CC or Auditing Commission members, but approval of predetermined lists - though of course direct evidence of this cannot be adduced.

The mandate commission reports, apart from the data they give on delegates to the Congress, are of interest for their statistics on party membership and recruitment\(^1\). The growth in total party membership over the decade 1954-64 was 84%, which was higher than that in any other republic. Kazakhstan itself was able to furnish only a fraction of the increase; at the 1961 Congress, for instance, 10362 of 46862, or nearly one in four, of new enrolments were said to be transferees from other parts of the USSR. At the same time the intake did little more than maintain the ratio of membership to the rapidly growing population of the republic. In 1956 party members constituted 3.24% of the population, and in 1965 3.75%.

\(^1\) Members and candidate members of CP of Kazakhstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Candidate Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>227,397</td>
<td>KP 26/1/56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>257,055</td>
<td>KP 26/1/56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>312,329</td>
<td>KP 15/1/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>318,502</td>
<td>KP 11/3/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>365,364</td>
<td>KP 29/9/61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The actual Commission report contains two errors -
According to the memorandum, the lower court erred in granting the stay of execution. The
memorandum states that the court was not convinced of the necessity for a stay of execution
and that the evidence presented by the party opposed to the stay was insufficient to warrant
such a decision. The memorandum further notes that the party opposing the stay has
provided no evidence to support their position.

Although the party opposing the stay is entitled to make the party supporting

the stay prove to the contrary, there is much doubt that such an proving can be done in
direct evidence and the party supporting the stay. The memorandum states that the party
supporting the stay has not provided any direct evidence to support their position.

In the memorandum, the party opposing the stay is advised to submit additional
evidence to support their position. The memorandum also notes that the party opposing the
stay has requested a stay of execution, but that the party supporting the stay has not
provided any evidence to support their position.

The memorandum concludes that the lower court erred in granting the stay of execution
and that the party opposing the stay is entitled to appeal the decision.
any rate the collection, without discussion, of arrears of up to eight
months in one primary party organization was described as 'a crude
violation of rules'. Presumably the occasion should have been used to
admonish offenders or ascertain if they really wished to remain in the
party.

The report from the Auditing Commission is its one and only
public act, and it is thus heard from only at the time of its dissolution.
Although described as a central organ of the party, charged with
supervising 'the expeditions and proper handling of affairs by the central
bodies of the party', and with auditing 'the accounts of the treasury and
the enterprises of the CC', it is clearly an ineffectual body.
Membership is a status symbol conferred on those members of the party
hierarchy just below CC level.

On completion of business the Congress issues a lengthy
resolution summarizing its views, or rather those expressed in the report
or reports to it, and obliging party, government and non-government bodies
to implement its decisions. Publication of this resolution may be delayed
by over a fortnight, which would seem to suggest some behind the scenes
discussion on the final wording, or perhaps submission to Moscow for
approval. Yet when the document is made public it is difficult to see
where disagreement could have arisen; the preamble is less specific than
the CC report, names of individuals singled out for criticism having been
replaced by impersonal institutions or oblasts, while the directions in

1KP 29/9/61.
2Rule 37 of the party statutes. Strictly speaking this refers only to the
Auditing Commission of the CPSU; oddly there is no definition of the
functions of republican party commissions in the statutes.
the main body of the resolution are mostly of a general hortatory nature. Indeed the only difficulty for those compiling or revising it would seem to be the fact of including some form of instruction to every important party, economic, soviet and public body in the republic. A few brief examples will serve to illustrate this. The resolution of the 1961 Congress\(^1\) obliged every party level from CC to raiions, the sovarkhozy, ministries and other central agencies, soviets, trade unions and the \[\text{Komsomol}\].

To secure fulfilment of the seven year plan for the development of the economy in every branch of industry, especially ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the fuel, machine-building and construction industries and power.

To be sure this is an extreme example, but even instructions to specific institutions are often equally vague. Several precise instances of malfunctions in the work of Gosplan had been aired by speakers at this Congress, yet the planners are simply directed

- to strengthen methodological leadership of the work of planning organs of the republic, to improve the scientific-technical and economic foundation of plans, to show steadfastness and exactingness in securing fulfilment of economic plans.

The injunction is so ill-defined as to be pure ballast. The clearest directions are no more specific than that addressed to the Ministry of Geology and Preservation of Minerals, namely 'to accelerate the geological survey of the Mangyshlak Peninsula for oil and gas exploration'.

Here at least we have certain priorities stipulated, but what methods or what additional resources are to be applied is left unsaid. Some definite projects are listed in the resolution - power stations and

\(^1\)KP 14/10/61.
railway lines for example - but in general the document is a far cry from anything approaching a blueprint for the coming years. The same is true of the resolutions passed by the Congresses held in 1956 and 1959, when new plans were launched. The 1959 resolution listed the main shortcomings in industry: one-third of all industrial enterprises had failed to meet their targets in 1958, capital construction of steel and cement works was lagging etc. Instead of pointing out where the bottlenecks lay, however, and what to do about them, the resolution merely concluded that "the occurrence of serious defects in the work of many enterprises and construction sites, collective and state farms, is to a significant degree the consequence of unsatisfactory organizational and mass political work". No head of a CC department or minister would ever turn to these fustian documents for guidance - unless we are to assume that they contain gems of esoteric communication, e.g. industrial priorities in the order in which branches are listed, or what to avoid from emphasis on abuses currently regarded as most pernicious by the leadership. It is surely far more reasonable to assume that the resolutions are for public consumption and that executives receive more down-to-earth orders through other channels.

A commonly held view of relations between Soviet elective institutions and their inner bodies is that the former simply perform a ritual endorsement of the decisions of the latter. The published decisions of Kazakh party Congresses, however, raise the question of whether long term plans, for example, can be held to be processed in even this formal

1KP 18/1/59.
way. Certainly Congress's final resolution approves the plan with pomp, but the question is, what plan? The resolution is too sketchy to be regarded as a compendium of the plan, and the main report to Congress leaves many targets unstated. It is difficult to find any evidence that delegates are shown the complete plan, or even an abridged form of it with detail of the kind to make their approval meaningful. In their speeches many officials do display a knowledge of the plan that goes beyond the report and the resolution, but speech-makers are a small fraction of the delegates. It is not meant to suggest that if more details were made available to all there would be any variation in the proceedings, but simply that the full plan does not appear to go before Congress, nor is it published in full in the name of Congress. This means of course that long term plans are not endorsed by any elective body - the Supreme Soviet, as we have seen, confines its deliberations to short term plans.

If the nominal governing body of the party is divorced from policy making functions, even from promulgation of detailed policy, what then is its purpose? First and foremost it is the focal point for a massive mobilisation campaign aimed at stirring up enthusiasm for the new plan, the new Party Programme, or other major event in the life of the republic. Before the 1959 Congress 28,857 meetings attended by nearly 2 million persons were addressed by party agitators on the subject of the seven-year plan. At these meetings 'socialist obligations', (i.e. production targets above those contained in the plan) were adopted at work sites, and 'unanimous approval' of the aims of the party was proclaimed. Other Congresses were similarly utilized. Despite what has been said

1EP 15/1/59.
of the vagueness of the final resolution as a reference for executive personnel, it contains ample material to serve as a source for propaganda work. In the post-Congress period the text of the resolution is paraphrased in editorial after editorial, and becomes the vade-mecum of every party agitator throughout the republic. As one leading article put it, party organizations are obliged to discuss the resolution 'in breadth and depth and mobilize communists, workers, collective farmers and members of the intelligentsia to implement' the goals laid down.¹

The mobilization purpose of Congress is thus indisputable. Apart from this its immediate impact on the wide cross-section of party members attending is probably to give them some sense of participation in the affairs of state. In this regard it is worth noting the small degree of overlap between Congress delegates and Supreme Soviet deputies (see Chart XI). The 120-150 who attend both would be largely top central and local leaders, so that there would be extremely little overlap below, say, oblastkom chairman level. An obvious explanation of this is the aim of giving to as many as possible of humbler status a sense of identification with the regime and its goals.

There are one or two difficulties to be met if Congress is to be regarded mainly as a rally of the faithful. Some features of delegates' speeches do not fit neatly into a simple mobilization theory. In particular a large number of requests are made for developmental and reconstruction works. At least 32 clear requests may be identified in addresses to the 1956 Congress, for instance. The director of a lead and zinc ore

¹KP 10/2/56.
The same problem, it will be recalled, was encountered in the
Department of the Interior. The committee on the

escalation of the budget defense in the previous report, and there are

mandatory reports on the resources and actions of

the Department. If this plan is adopted, it will

as well...
responsibility of the administration to the Soviet threw a little light on the outcome of petitions made there, no comment has been found on the parallel situation on the party side. The reason for this silence seems obvious. It is one thing to call for an accounting by the Council of Ministers to the Supreme Soviet and to pry into what has been done about petitions made, but quite another to raise the question of the accountability of the CC Bureau in a specific context.

In newspaper accounts of the four Kazakh Congresses only one response from the republic’s leadership to the numerous requests by delegates was reported. It showed clearly that the requests are not resolved during the brief period for which Congress assembles. First Secretary Kunaev divided them into two categories, requests connected with ‘current operative work’ and those which bore upon “the long range development of the national economy”.¹ Put simply this division appears to be between projects already approved or under way, and new proposals. The former, said Kunaev, could be resolved by local authorities, ministries and CC departments; the second category would require careful study by Gosplan, the Council of Ministers and the CC Bureau. Only after this would any action be taken. The listing of these three bodies is obviously the order in which proposals for major works are processed, and it completely precludes the possibility of any sudden decisions being made by Congress. Even the fortnight that elapses between the close of Congress and the publication of its resolution would seem too short for the procedure outlined by Kunaev. And to his list of processing organs

¹KP 15/3/60.
one should no doubt add their counterparts at all-union level, since the
same types of requests are also found being put to the USSR Supreme
Soviet and CPSU Congress by delegates from Kazakhstan.¹

The impression gained, therefore, is that these petitions and
proposals are part of the continual jockeying for financial and materi-
al allocations that is mostly submerged from view. Congresses, CC plenums,
Supreme Soviet sessions - it makes no difference to an oblast secretary
or economic executive what the occasion - are simply further
opportunities for pressing claims which, in between times, are advanced
through either bureaucratic or informal channels. There is no lack
of evidence of this competition for allocation of resources: "Certain
party organs exert pressure on planning organs, insisting on supplementary
means for new construction works, even though they know they have large
numbers of incomplete projects². The petitioner does not expect public
resolution of his claims at Congress, but he will not pass up any
opportunity to bring them to notice. Even rather inappropriate occasions
are seized upon. During the discussion of the Party Programme at the
1961 Congress³ the first secretary of South Kazakhstan oblast proposed a
plan for the full electrification of his oblast under the guise of comment
on the programme's section on capital investment. Several other speakers
used the same tactic.

¹See e.g., speeches by V.V. Nylkevich, G.A. Helnik and Z.S. Osmurova,
KP 29/10/59, Pravda 11/12/64.
²KP 10/10/61.
³KP 28/9/61.
Local Leaders:

The plan was to be subject to further negotiation between council and

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plans the pressure is kept up indefinitely. Kuybyshev oblast sought production of a particular type of rice cultivator for nine years\(^1\), and Akademin k the reconstruction of 'Krasnaya mesh' factory for 15 years\(^2\). It is not known whether they were eventually successful.

It should be stressed that such instances of competition for resources are to be found not only at Congresses held when long term plans are being introduced, but also at those held at other times. This is an added reason for believing that the first type of Congress is used to promote local or branch interests simply because it is an important public occasion, and not because the new plan is finally adjusted or revised there. In short then there are insufficient grounds for varying the assessment of Congress as primarily a propaganda and mobilisation vehicle: the competition process is not an integral part of the gathering because proceedings show no evidence that any of it is resolved there.

Having arrived at this assessment, one finds cause to wonder why rank and file are allowed such a small part in the rally. Participation by delegates below the level of oblast official is just as weak as at Supreme Soviet sessions, and Congress could well be extended beyond its present 2-4 day sittings in order to improve its popular image. Perhaps the objection to such a move is that there is a limit to the number of speeches that can serve effectively as a propaganda dosage: as it is a Congress fills the press for over a week. In the ensuing weeks oblast officials and ministers pass on the praise or censure they have received to lower levels, and the cause is possibly better served locally by practical agitation at production sites than by enlarging the focal point of the campaign.

\(^1\) KP 27/1/56.
\(^2\) KP 13/3/60.
Moreover Kazakhstan's leaders can rest assured that whatever Congress lacks in specificity as an instrument of mobilisation is more than compensated for in other ways. It is not that policy decisions on, say, details of the plan are simply promulgated as party or governmental directives. Contrary to what might be expected in a highly bureaucratised system the means by which policy orientation is given to the general public is not usually by way of direct fiat. As was discovered in the first chapter the republican press is markedly reticent about governmental orders. The gap is filled by numerous public conferences catering for every sector of the population. There are conferences of ideologists, of women, of cowgrowers, coal miners, transport workers, herdsmen and so on ad infinitum, and during the Khrushchev era they came to occupy a central place in press reportage.

The simplest method of conveying their variety and scope is to take a fortnight of Kazakhstanskaya Pravda.

EP 24/5/64. A conference 'on the economic problems of industry and construction' has just ended, and participants have issued an appeal to workers. 'In this document...a programme is outlined for a drive to raise production efficiency'.

EP 27/5/64. A conference of sheep breeders and herdsmen begins. It fills the press until

EP 31/5/64 when another appeal is issued, containing advice on how to organise enlarged brigades of herdsmen, and calling for a 'socialist competition' among them. The conference resolves that the number of sheep in the republic be brought to 50 million by 1970. One hundred and eighty five new farms are to be set up at a cost of two million roubles.
The pattern appears to need to be the outcome of a formal conference. But the pattern is the same.

The essence of this summary from gently core in the chance. A point that was not to do the same.2
called on others to do the same.3
today that they have expected to find production targets and
moving paper that they have expected to find production targets and
that some of the rise is included from above: whether to continue to the fact
that production targets are set by the bureaucracy. On any answer
of spontaneous process, and the Patterson of the Geod expansion to
are to be achieved. The patterns are transformed here: the degree
as is their appeal concertation targets and methods by which those

They are the appearance of being detached-middle-class
after standing an appeal — namely to appeal to spontaneous or
how to give them best. They are all the people that have come and detached
what is distinctive about these conference is that they have

Conference of workers in state teaching organizations.

if 5/6/64. Another such appeal is issued by parent-teachers of a

necessary assistance to local conference organization.

challenge, and delays the center directives of Khegres to give the
committee and select executive committee are able to branch of the
associations and select executive committee are able to branch of the
accompanied by reorganization of the Cc, prophecies that first and second party
and call on other organizations in other directions to do the same. In

accompanied by annual plan for 60 Killarney of now forced to accept

if 2/5/64. Hold conference workers in one direction and they
To the party,

these that are will correspond with official policy.

Decision whether the degree of participation at the actual conference
takes on. With the party headquarters devoted to each committee it makes
take at the time. Plan. At some such conferences prepared to make
the decision that it is to or whether the plan for increased participation
start at the time. After the main headquarters plant to fulfill their initial plan
reached such as that at the of the appropriate participation enjoyed by the
parties need to assesses. One finds numerous
that the results are taken up by the party and considered into a committee to
proposes adequate "sufficient" participation at a conference. The party to

As usual, I,

the same voice, and save the materials. This time it sounds like an
the end, that I do propose 4.500 seats. *The chairman interjects. *Repeats
as a voice from the platform.* I am afraid this is too much, answers

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In effect then, these conferences are a mechanism for bureaucratic guidance and channelling of public initiative. Their whole purpose is to avoid the appearance of 'administration by fiat'.

The corollary of this is that the conferences might also be a channel for public pressure on the bureaucracy. Newspaper reports certainly do not convey this impression - they look like rallies of the faithful. Let us assume, however, that newspaper reports are intent on conveying a picture of unity and that some proposals at least are unsolicited. On the grounds that not even party Congress is able to resolve such proposals, although the top leadership is always present, it can be argued that there is little chance of these ad hoc conferences doing better. Later consideration of these proposals by the bureaucracy is not, of course, precluded, but this means that admission of outside initiative is a highly regulated affair, especially as the conferences dissolve without establishing any secretariat to pursue suggestions raised. Public conferences may well be one of the sources of what Soviet jargon calls 'signals' to policy makers, but essentially they appear to fulfil the same role for individual sectors of society as party Congress does for the republic as a whole.

The paradox of a highly centralized administration with an artificial overlay of spontaneity extends beyond the broad sectors catered for by public conferences right into the production units themselves. We shall look at the administration of industry in a later chapter, but it may be recorded here that factory directors complained of being hamstrung by a network of pettyegging regulations and instructions.1

1An all time record was surely set by the director who complained that he had received 12,000 instructions and circulars in one year. EP 9/3/57.
Despite this newspapers gave prominence to the work of various 'voluntary' groups in improving production performance: enterprises had their 'permanently acting production conferences', councils of innovators, constructors' bureaux, bureaux of economic analysis, and so forth. Now minute regulation of the behaviour of an enterprise can neither sustain nor accommodate a continuing fount of new initiatives from employees. Yet startling claims were made concerning the effectiveness of these voluntary groups.\(^1\) The inconsistency between these claims and Kazakhstan's regular failure to fulfil labour productivity plans\(^2\) was partly resolved after Khrushchev's fall, when a more realistic assessment was given of these groups. The numerous forms of worker participation in management were said to have been ineffective, because detailed regulation of enterprise behaviour often made it impossible to act on eminently rational suggestions without infringing some rule or other.\(^3\) It was actually conceded that the production councils had become a brake on worker initiative - management was not obliged to raise 'fundamental questions' at council meetings, and attendance had tapered off.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) \textit{16 million roubles were said to have been saved by application of proposals of young rationalisers in 1961 in Kazakhstan. Belyakisheh Bol'shchro Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, 1962, p. 126. See also similar and progressively larger claims in succeeding volumes.}


\(^3\) Article by V. Andreev, \textit{Pravda} 6/10/65.

\(^4\) \textit{Pravda} editorial, 9/7/65. Such reassessments do not, of course, mean that the last has been heard of voluntary groups in factories, but they do suggest that their raison d'etre has been social and political, rather than economic. Their connections with the phenomenon of alienation in a recently industrialised society like Kazakhstan are of great interest, but beyond the scope of this thesis.
In the second part of the thesis we have found that the Supreme Soviet and party Congress are merely two conspicuous pieces of a whole machinery of mobilisation. Other institutions might also have been treated under this heading - e.g., the Komsomol or the Trades Unions. By concentrating on a limited part of the machinery, however, it has been possible to observe not only how extra-bureaucratic institutions\(^1\) are used to orient and stimulate the populace as a whole, but also the steps taken by the bureaucracy to ensure that these institutions do not give rise to any politically significant pluralism. Whether one looks to stabilised institutions like the Supreme Soviet or to those in continual flux like public conferences, there is ample evidence of manipulation by the bureaucracy.

One writer has described the USSR as an 'administered society'. By this he means a society in which an entrenched and powerful ruling group is impelled by a belief in the moral necessity of planning, directing and coordinating the entire range of social life.\(^2\) We have not covered nearly enough ground in Kazakhstan to establish that the entire range of social life is administered, but there was ample evidence of the interdiction of the autonomy of all the extra-bureaucratic institutions that were examined. It would not be too misleading to describe them as administered by the formal party and state apparatus.

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\(^1\) i.e. institutions outside the formal party-state bureaucracy.

PART III  A UNIFIED ELITE?

CHAPTER 6

DEFINING THE ELITE

The CC, like the Supreme Soviet and party Congress, falls far short of its official dimensions. Formally it is the "highest body of the republican party organisation in the interim between Congresses", and directs the work of lower party formations. Nowadays it is a common place in political texts on the Soviet Union that Central Committees have grown too unwieldy to be effective decision making bodies, and the Kazakh CC is no exception. Plenary meetings, although held regularly as required by party rules, are used (a) to publicise declarations of policy in the same way as are sessions of the Supreme Soviet and Congress, and (b) as a platform for progress reports, for which their greater frequency makes them admirably suited.

The Kazakh CC has in fact shown far less vitality than the CC CPSU, whose authority has been invoked more than once since the Stalin era against dissenters in its Presidium, or Politbureau as it is now again called. It is practically inconceivable that this could occur at republican level: appeal from a divided CC Bureau here would be directed not to its CC but to the Politbureau. Certainly anyone spoiling for the post of First Secretary would need to impress the leadership in Moscow.

1Party Rules, articles 43 and 47.
231 plenums were held over the decade as against 30 required by Rule 46.
rather than his fellow CC members. If anything the Khrushchev era
further diminished whatever potential the republican CC has for a positive
political role: there was no parallel to the brief revival of the CC
CPSU as a 'Soviet parliament', but the practice of diluting attendance at
plenums by inviting along experts in whatever matter might be on the
agenda was imitated on at least seven occasions\(^1\). And as often as not
the agenda was determined by a preceding plenum of the CC CPSU.

The above assertions might be documented and expanded by
analysing CC plenums in the same way as Congress and Supreme Soviet
sessions were analysed in Part 2. Since this would be a repetitions
exercise we shall assume the mobilisation function of this institution and
approach it from another quarter. The aim will be to investigate the CC
as a possible basis for discovering the political elite of the republic.
Usually the political elite of a society is defined in some such terms as
'the governing minority and the circles from which the governing minority
is recruited'.\(^2\) In this study we shall understand the term more narrowly
as applying only to 'the governing minority', and will not be concerned
with the social formations from which this minority derives.

The notion of a political elite has been out of favour for
some time. It has been argued that at least in pluralist societies the
most we can hope to find is an 'establishment', i.e. an unorganized group

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\(^1\) See EF 10/6/58, 11/1/59, 22/1/60, 13/7/63, 18/1/64, 5/4/64, 29/7/64.

\(^2\) J. Gould and W. L. Kelb (eds.) A Dictionary of the Social Sciences,
of Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, p.13, where the political
elite is defined as 'the leadership and social formations from which leaders
typically come, and to which accountability is maintained'.
of people sharing common values who influence but do not rule. It is sometimes asked does anyone rule a pluralist community. Even those who argue the existence of a political elite in any organised society recognise that it can be a sterile concept.

It is one thing to establish that large organised hierarchies of government, industry, finance, and military power tend to throw up small directing groups...It is rather a different undertaking to investigate the setting within which these 'power-holders' or 'decision-makers' operate; but without such further inquiries the concept of the elite has very limited value for the study of society.

This much being said, the notion of a political elite still has a peculiar force when applied to the USSR because of the consistent effort there to integrate under the aegis of the party what elsewhere may be independent centres of power. Even strong critics of the concept concede that here, if anywhere, it is a useful explanatory tool. Because of the claim to monolithic unity still made by the regime itself, one is indeed predisposed to search for a cohesive power elite of the type posited by Wright Mills. For the moment, however, we assume only as a constant characteristic of all organised social life the existence of a minority (minorities), whose judgements, decisions and actions have important and continuing consequences for the remainder of society.

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3 e.g. T.A. Bottomore, for whom elites are an extension of class divisions, and who defends Marxist classes against elites as being more fertile and suggestive concepts, concedes that 'the political system of the Communist countries seems to me to approach the pure type of a "power elite", that is a group which...maintains itself in power chiefly by virtue of being an organised minority confronting the unorganised majority'. Elites and Society, C.A. Watts, London, 1964, p.37.

### Chart XIII

**Membership of Kazakhstan Central Committee and Auditing Commission 1956-1961**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CC Members</th>
<th>CC Candidate Members</th>
<th>AC Members</th>
<th>CC Members</th>
<th>CC Candidate Members</th>
<th>AC Members</th>
<th>CC Members</th>
<th>CC Candidate Members</th>
<th>AC Members</th>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- CC: Central Committee
- AC: Auditing Commission
- %: Percentage
- No.: Number
- Members: Members
- Candidate Members: Candidate Members
- Members: Members
- Department Heads
- Secretaries
- Central Party
- Central Party Officials
- Secretaries
- Secretaries
- Local Party Officials
- Council of Ministers
- Central Government Officials
- Central Government Officials
- Chairman (vice) Chairman
- Chairman (vice) Chairman
- Chairman (vice) Chairman
- Local Government Officials
- Local Government Officials
- Members
- Members
- Members
- Members
- Members
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>% (No)</th>
<th>% (No)</th>
<th>% (No)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Officials (KGB, NVD, Precurry, Courts)</td>
<td>4 3.3</td>
<td>4 3.2</td>
<td>4 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Executives</td>
<td>7 5.7</td>
<td>4 7.0</td>
<td>6 6.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2 3.5</td>
<td>2 1.4</td>
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<td>1 0.8</td>
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<td>5 3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Executives</td>
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<td>4 7.0</td>
<td>4 2.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1 1.6</td>
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<td>2 1.6</td>
<td>8 3.6</td>
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<td>2 1.6</td>
<td>2 3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intellectuals (Academic Research, Writers, Composers, Newspaper Editors)</td>
<td>6 4.9</td>
<td>2 8.0</td>
<td>8 5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Union officials</td>
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<td>2 1.6</td>
<td>2 3.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>10 8.1</td>
<td>9 15.8</td>
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<td>total</td>
<td>123 100</td>
<td>57 100</td>
<td>139 100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
There are good a priori grounds for using CC membership lists as a basis in searching for the elite.\(^1\) Once members have been identified (published lists give names only) it becomes obvious that the composition of the CC is much less 'democratic' than that of either the Supreme Soviet or party Congress - even though the same sectors of society are represented in all three. In the CC the proportions are so heavily weighted in favour of officials (see Chart XIII) that the new membership list published after each Congress reads rather like a select Who's Who for the republic. In this of course the Kazakh CC is a replica of the CC CPSU, and in the absence of comment on republican CCs we may examine how the CC CPSU is regarded by Western writers. Its connections with the elite are referred to frequently.

There is a general consensus that the CC CPSU has, as an institution, followed the course of declining powers and increasing members, but that many individual members are key officials. J.A. Armstrong says that members and candidate or alternate members constitute the "bulk of the most important officials in the USSR". On the basis of a study of the social background of members he proceeds to generalise about the characteristics and attitudes of 'the Soviet elite'.\(^2\) Brezninski too, uses the CC as a sample of the top political leadership.\(^3\)

---

\(^1\)Reference is still to the political elite. There are of course many elites (elites of knowledge, wealth, respect etc.) which are sometimes referred to collectively as 'the elite'. This usage is not followed here.


Bialer claims that the CC is at least a representative sample of the
Soviet elite and at best may contain the entire elite.1 Fainsod says
that the CC represents "an assembly of party notables" and calls
membership "a mark of prestige and status."2 D.J.R. Scott notes the
presence of representatives of all important institutions, but, unlike
most others, adds a caution on the variety of other (less important)
interests that are represented.3 Other writers proceed on the tacit
assumption that membership lists may be regarded as an index of the
distribution of political power.4

All this is directly relevant to the Kazakh CC. Without
any roll call it is abundantly clear that this is an assembly of the
most important officials of the republic, and that membership is a
badge of status and prestige. A closer look might tempt one to go
further than Armstrong and agree with Bialer that all the most important
officials may be here. But this is a formidable proposition to establish,
as will be seen below. On the other hand not all members are important
officials, so that to describe the CC as an "assembly of party notables"
is to tell only part of the story. In what sense, for instance, can such
a title be given to a collective farmer? And in this question we reach

1S. Bialer, "How the Russians Rule Russia", Problems of Communism, No. 5,
2Marie Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Harvard University Press,
3D.J.R. Scott, Russian Political Institutions, Allen and Unwin, London,
1963, p. 142.
4This would seem to be fair enough, for instance, on W. Leonard, The
In all practical purposes, a fifth of the total membership can be abolished with justifications. At this point, however, one finds it very difficult to establish a union of members of the total membership. A further group (second under number 10) the President of the Academy of Sciences and the Chairman of the Council of Attendants, although the elected officers of the two main bodies, the Supreme Council of Attendants (engaged in "agitational work") and the Chairman, are to be regarded as the officers, some preliminary working out must be done.

The Chair, together with the President of the Academy of Sciences and the Chairman, are to be regarded as the officers, some preliminary working out must be done.
The letter addressed to AC.

Level of assistance needed than need to be dedicated upon in order to achieve

enacted to secure the upper ekstra of all three groups. An opportunity
characterization of the Elde. The Elde, moreover. It seems, to better
the political leadership. The Elc Elc to comment on the
residential CC. Here. This seems that some pre in search of a means of the
who are anyway of more common sense than the lower third members in our
the existence of the further groups, each containing a number of ortodons
advertisement, therefore, are the time of the event to get a rather not be
intended of considerable to search for the Elde by a process of

and further ortodons

with the same, or even larger, movement advantage of rank and file
candidate membership of the CC, to act on the Assembly of Parliament.

Agreement Shortly, It can, nevertheless, take both the fact and
ac has been detected elsewhere so inessential body became of the
who without doubt are lesser Elde that any CC department head. The
the CC elected at the same time we are number of timeCC members
1996 were needs of lesser CC department, while none the CC members
amount both the CC candidate members and minorities elected in 1996 and
place for a place in the bonen, By way of illustration we now note that
CC members 1998 by chosen for the CC, we note that
CC members of the HC, have not yet considered, Furthermore, some members of the HC,
the most important candidates or alternate members of the CC, whose we
the possibility of these are eligible that should preferably rank below

determination the membership of the CC in the CC consultation.
the inconvenient admixture present in each group. Needless to say
cross comparison of members of such diverse groups as party apparatus,
military and local government officials would present enormous
methodological problems - which is doubtless why such a course has never
been pursued. On the other hand having spread one's net this far
there is reasonable assurance that the elite encompassed will omit
none of real importance. It would be difficult to name any very
highly placed official in Kazakhstan who does not rate at least AC
membership.

In order to find a way around the problems of comparing
officials of different hierarchies we shall next attempt to reduce the
full CC and AC lists to what might be called their hard core. It can
be shown that the occupants of certain positions are elected to the CC
and AC with such regularity that one is justified in regarding these
offices as entitling their holders to ex-officio membership. Moreover
these ex-officio membership positions appear to be those of greatest
eximance in each of the three groups. Specifically, since we are
dealing with the period 1955-64, it will be assumed, for instance, that
ex-officio full CC membership attaches to any position whose occupant
appears among the full members of all three committees elected during
this decade. Some flexibility must, of course, be allowed in the
application of this criterion - allowance has to be made for the effects
of organisational changes, especially the 1957 reorganisation of
industrial administration, which abolished certain obviously ex-officio
membership positions and established others.
The process of attempting to identify the ex-officio membership of bodies elected by Congress is relatively straightforward but opaque, and has therefore been relegated to Appendix I. Individual positions are discussed in the appendix; here we may summarise the occupational categories of ex-officio full CC members as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC secretaries</td>
<td>5-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of CC Departments</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other central party officials</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shymkent first secretaries and Alma-Ata second secretary</td>
<td>16-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erek-Shymkent first secretaries and Virgin Lands second secretary</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shymkent first secretaries (Alma-Ata and Karaganda)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>13-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other central officials</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblispolkom chairman</td>
<td>13-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somkipkom chairman</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2(-57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the alternative numbers given here, it should be noted, arise from variation in the number of positions over the decade and hence failure to comply with the technical qualification for inclusion (election to three successive CCs), rather than from doubt about the status of officials at any one time. But even if the lower figure is adopted in every case it will be seen that there are always at least eighty positions to which ex-officio full CC membership adheres.

The hard core of candidate CC and AG membership is not difficult to identify, but separation of the two groups is less easy, mainly because of the instability of the lesser posts in the Council of Ministers.
enough are the least important ones.

We take it as well-established that the position of the public in each
subsequent increase in the total number of candidates for honorable.

The initial decrease in the total increase for 1956 is made at the beginning of a number
of AC departmental boards.

The next increase in the total increase after 1955 was the exception of the

I.e. other than those with full AC membership.

which provides the percentage core of the AC stand and were cleared as
important membership of the AC and of the alternative. If the percentage
introduced only a very small group of those in the alternative. Since the
that the AC candidates are the only - so long as the AC candidates to
be compared, it seems that the bench is not accurately in the comparison
If the two are considered groups which we are now led to the

AC members and if members is only 2%-3.5%.

we are interested in the candidates' distribution of candidates
over the three candidates at a level of 9%-6.5% of the total membership
then we call our previous candidates rather than candidates, then
be appreciated from the discussion in Appendix I, as provided, but
half membership of the AC. Exact comparison of percentage is with
full membership of the AC. This is a much smaller group than the AC.

department board, other members of the candidates for independent, and other
department board, other candidates for independent, and three independent candidates - others of
an adjacent second departmental, and three second departmental candidates. The latter candidates do
not matter until we regard as a single group. The latter candidates do

he summary of these points must be included some of the candidates and

superior to those which form the core of candidate CC and AC members.
Members of the CC Bureau and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers
clearly have no peers in the second group: obkom first secretaries are
full CC members, while other obkom secretaries are found among candidate
CC or AC members, and so forth. In other words the problem of cross
comparison between CC and AC members appears to have been at least
partly overcome in the course of determining the permanent membership
of the groups.

In order to confirm that Bialer is right, and that the elite
within the CC is its ex-officio membership it would be logically necessary
to establish the proposition that any permanent CC position is superior
to any permanent candidate CC or AC position. This is a manifestly
impractical task involving comparison of nearly 2,000 pairs of positions.
An alternative, if less watertight, method of testing the proposition
would be to select a few of the more obviously doubtful cases: if the
full CC member overshadows his rival in these combinations, it will be
a fair assumption that this is the general situation. The most difficult
cases for comparison purposes are those selected from different hierarchies.
It is far from immediately apparent, for instance, that obispolkom
chairmen, who are almost always CC members, are more influential than
obkom second secretaries, who are usually candidate CC members.

One approach here is to compare the prestige careers of all
individuals concerned, on the grounds that consistent selection from and
subsequent promotion to higher positions in the case of one group would
indicate its being more influential than the second group. There are,
of course, at any one time an equal number of chairmen of obispolkoms
and second secretaries of *obshum*. It so happens also, that 61 chairman
of *obshum* and 60 *obshum* second secretaries were identified for the
decade so that comparison might be made of two nearly equal groups. For
more complete data, however, we shall extend the comparison of previous
and subsequent positions back beyond 1955, 1 on the assumption that
approximate parity in numbers also extends into the past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>From Chairman</th>
<th>2nd Sec.</th>
<th>To Chairman</th>
<th>2nd Sec.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Council of Ministers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary, CC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head, CC Department</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, TUC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary, Presidium of Supreme Soviet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretary, Armsmoll</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Party Commission</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, <em>komsom</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First secretary, <em>obshum</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second secretary, <em>obshum</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, <em>sokhimon</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For a description of cases covered see explanation to Chart XIV
The table given here is extracted from this chart.
to which Great Secretary's appointment there is no appeal. These are the most common positions for both groups.

As a result, because although the most common positions for both groups are different, the second certificate may also be considered for the first, but the second certificate is not in the same grade. In terms of certification, candidates are generally required to have had higher educational qualifications to be appointed to these positions. We mean that the upper positions of the college could be filled by people with the necessary qualifications.

In addition, the candidate with a greater advantage in the lower part of the position, the second secretary, filled the second secretarial position. From the above, we can see that the second certificate is more necessary than the first certificate.

Promotion

That on balance the second certificate seems to have the advantage in gaining a head of a CC department. But if it is required to have a certificate, the second certificate is the most appropriate position. The need for a certificate is the same for both positions, but only one certificate is required.

Contrary, membership of the CC Bureau, a member of the State Bureau, or any of the leading positions, such as government posts, are not required for government posts. However, some of the positions, such as roles in the upper party, second secretariat, and related positions in selection for higher party positions, are required. Therefore, the second certificate is the most important position for the above roles, which are based on the above table, show the most important position.
a wider variety of positions. If versatility and influence are not
synonymous, there seems to be at least some positive correlation between
the two.

Conversing a further possible line of argument, we may note
that when criticism is leveled at an oblast, the ahkum first secretary
and the oblastkhoz chairman are not infrequently named together,\(^1\)
which suggests that they are the two major figures responsible for the
performance of the oblast. It will be recalled also that the Chairman
of the Council of Ministers is now usually listed after the CC First
Secretary, but ahead of the Second Secretary, so we might expect the
same order of preference to obtain at oblast level.\(^2\) On balance it
would seem that we should accord oblastkhoz chairman seniority over
ahkum second secretaries.

Several other doubtful cases were examined: junior ministers
as compared with oblastkhoz chairmen, heads of lesser CC departments as
compared with the same, and with ahkum first secretaries. The method
of enquiry used above, i.e. comparison of proximate careers,\(^3\) as well as
the criteria of frequency of published speeches and other mention in the
press, all tended to favour the full CC members in everyone of these
combinations. As against this general finding, however, there have been
a dozen or more oblastkhoz chairmen and several ahkum first secretaries
who have been most inconspicuous. Furthermore the amount of publicity

\(^1\)See e.g. KP 24/1/58; PZH K No. 1, 1960, p.5; No. 10, 1961, p.8.
\(^2\)The listing of ahkum bureaux would be useful here, but unfortunately
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda does not publish them.
\(^3\)Data for these comparisons are to be found in Chart XIV.
accorded to heads of CC departments is of little value in determining their position in the republic's hierarchy: the heads of one or two obviously vital departments were seldom even mentioned in the press. It is, then, impossible to demonstrate conclusively that each and every permanent CC position is more influential than each and every position in the two lesser groups. What can be said is that no ex-officio candidate CC or AC position can be shown to be more influential than any ex-officio CC position. This is the minimal conclusion to be drawn; we have been discussing the doubtful cases and it must be remembered that for the most part the superiority of CC members is clear.

Although a negative conclusion, and a dilution of the suggested proposition (which may nevertheless be true), the finding is of vital importance. Assuming once again that the CC and AC between them contain all the top officials in the republic, we may now designate as the political elite the eighty or so ex-officio full CC members. Among the now wholly excluded candidate CC members and AC members there may be a few with claims to inclusion in the elite nearly equal, perhaps even equal to the last few of the eighty, but at least no serious error of omission is committed.

It is clear enough who constitute this elite and that they deserve this title, but what do they represent as a collective entity? They are not a narrowly political elite in the sense of being identical with the membership of any formal political institution—a criticism levelled at the political elites identified in certain studies. Among

\^\textsuperscript{1}See e.g. Ralph G. Ross, 'The Methodology of Politics', Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 1, Spring, 1952, pp. 31, 32.
there are the top political, economic, military, cultural, ideological, and coercion officials of this society. They are an assembly of those who have the greatest influence on decision-making in all of these spheres, and who are responsible for the execution of the decisions made. At first glance therefore it might appear that we have come up with something more than a political elite — perhaps with a group which embraces so many diverse elements that it approximates to a broad sociological concept of the elite, i.e., a minority (minorities) of all individuals "designated to serve the collectivity in a socially useful way".¹

As soon as one begins to search for specific functional groups it becomes clear that this elite will not measure up to the requirements of such a definition. Thus, although the top administrators in the cultural field are present, one will not find here an artistic elite. Incidentally there was a Kazakh writer, Salit Sahanov, who was a full member of all three CCs, and who was therefore technically as qualified for inclusion as any official. With his list of novels dating back to 1919 he might, moreover, be regarded as being as influential a figure as many of the political elite. Furthermore an additional writer or artist will almost always be found in the CC list. They were passed over as not occupying any formal institutional positions, which were the basis of our search for the elite. They could of course be included along with the bureaucrats responsible for cultural supervision. Were this done, however

¹Teller's alternative definition of elites. op.cit. p.4.
consistency would dictate the inclusion of, for instance, raikem
secretaries, who, as is shown in Appendix I, represent their level of the
party hierarchy in general and on a rotational basis, rather than as
holders of specific positions. Extending the elite in this way would
make it difficult to draw any boundary line.

Ex-officio CC members appear at first sight to be more than a
political elite because of the wide range of activities administered by
the state. The political-administrative responsibilities of the
republican leadership are such that the elite must automatically include
officials with functions bearing on many aspects of the life of society.
It may be indeed that all the functions necessary to the continued
existence of any social system find some reflection in this elite -
though this would need to be established analytically. Even if this is
true, however, the elite still does not include 'all minorities
designated to serve the collectivity in a socially useful way'. It may,
in fact should, contain all important officials who administer these
minorities. More simply, it includes cultural officials but not writers
and artists, industrial administrators but not the republic's top engineers
and scientists, and so on.

Given the nature of this elite, any criticism of its
composition should perhaps focus on the representation accorded to the
various bureaucratic hierarchies. In general it is assumed that the
prestige associated with CC membership will ensure regular election of
all the most powerful officials. The inertia of custom and the futility
of personal power struggles no doubt admit some arbitrary elements into
If a not a consistent conclusion.

Propositions Do not properly articulate, which is what could be expected from

The government's important role in the formation and implementation of policies and their

It is one way to articulate that the government's part in the formation of the
core of the proposal, that is, not just a mere change in the drafting or

The direction in the direction of core-enforcement of the party. The


direction of the project.
deriving an elite from a party institution like the CC. How central party and state representation relates to the size of the apparatus of each is not known, there being no published statistics on either. Almost certainly the party is overrepresented by this criterion. Equally certain, however is the fact that the respective sizes of the CC apparatus and central state administration do not correspond with the degrees of power they exercise.

Still on the subject of representation given to various divisions of the bureaucracy, it might perhaps be objected that notwithstanding the decline of police power, it is inadequately represented here. Even if, as suggested in Appendix I, the police are represented not only by the heads of the security and civil police, but also by one or two more officials under the heading of “military”, does this reflect the institutional power behind them? To counter objections such as this we argue that further additions to the elite should have to be justified by naming specific individuals or positions that can lay claim to making an impact as important and sustained as those already selected. Military and police powers are by nature hierarchical, and in a stable society at least, potential rather than actual. It can be held, therefore, that the inclusion of only the very top echelon from these sectors gives adequate representation. In any case no claim is made that the numerical strength of any one sector of our elite is proportional to its power; only that all the most influential positions have been discovered.
The President of the Council of Ministers has never once referred to the National
and Technical Council (or the operation of different laws) in the order
passed which is referred to the President of the Senate or the
Parliament.

Parliament has never moved the order of the President of the
Council of Ministers, because it has no power to override the
President of the Senate or the Parliament.

In the order of the President of the Senate, the instruction is,
"That the Council of Ministers shall immediately refer to the
President of the Senate the order of the President of the
Council of Ministers."
and at the same time hold that attempts at a precise definition of the elite may reduce the gaps in our knowledge. Furthermore, selection of the CC is made by those at the centre of power, and in the absence of a more reliable criterion the outsider has best defer to their judgment.

The second argument advanced is that the CC

while containing part of the ruling group, does not include the entire elite. A fairly broad stratum of officials just below the CC membership shares in the implementation and interpretation of its decisions."

From here the elite is extended to include delegates to party Congresses, and even to the "thousand officials" of a single oblast.

Such a broad concept of the elite may or may not be useful, depending on the aims of the study in hand. The work on the Ukrainian elite was designed, at least in part, to encompass data on the age, length of party membership and education of delegates to party Congresses. Precise data on these characteristics proved inaccessible for the majority of our narrower elite in Kazakhstan - a considerable disadvantage in that they cannot be described with any confidence as a social group.

Having argued against the definition of the elite at CC level, however, the author of the Ukrainian study fails to set any line of demarcation whatsoever, and his concept loses value as an analytical tool. The Kazakhstan elite certainly does not include all involved in "implementation and interpretation" of party and state directives - but few adherents of elite theories would hold that it should. It can lay claim to being "the political elite", is clearly defined, and has relevance to the nature of the political system.

1 Ibid., p. 4.
In the remainder of this chapter a few practical applications (the best criterion of utility) of this concept of the elite will be suggested, but first a general comment on the method of determining its composition. Ex-officio CC membership was defined on the basis of representation in three successive committees, but why not two or four? Insufficient identification of the 1954 and 1966 CCs is as yet available to the writer for firm comment, but it appears that four committees would span too many reorganizations and the resulting elite would contain, for instance, too few members of the Council of Ministers. The same factor would operate even more strongly if Congresses were held, as they possibly will be in future, every four years. Two committees would certainly be too few to ascertain ex-officio membership; specific ranks and general secretarships would be included, for instance, whereas it has been shown in Appendix I that representation from this level does not adhere to specific posts. Since congresses are held with the same frequency at USSR level, similar reasoning is likely to apply to attempts to discover the elite there. Three committees would seem to be a useful basis at both all-union and republican levels.

It is common practice among sovietologists to comment on CC membership turnover as an index of the political turmoil that has occurred between Congresses. The convenience of this index is that it excludes transfers which do not involve donations (e.g. an exchange of personnel in roughly equivalent positions), and avoids double counting (as when a single donation results in several moves within the elite).
It might have been expected that the earlier preparation would have been

and approximately 202 in 1961. 2 It appears that of the three successes

was higher during the second period, amounting to 55% were re-elected in 1960.

It seems that the rate of re-election dropped after the 1960 elections, with

55% were re-elected in 1960, but 76% of the 1960 elections were held
during the 1959-60 period. Of the 90 member seats, the 90 member

throughout the entire period, and the same amounts of money were higher

corresponding to the three major parties, which is why the parties now

- next conference was held only 16 months later and the

as the proportion of the total membership.

my be pointed out that, whereas 6.6% of the total membership of the 1966

- the standard of the standard and the hand of the hand, on the other

An attempt to be made to take into account the number of candidates

- to be made to the number of the at least the number of the at least

however, it is apparent that the overall turnout is due to the fact that the

after the conference to the total in a different form of intervention

separate examination of turnover shows substantial increases in mem-

241.
committees is examined the lower attrition rate among ex-officio members becomes even more apparent. Thirty-four persons retained full membership
of all three committees. Of these 29 were 'entitled' to membership on
all three occasions, and two were not at any time. The other three rose
to ex-officio status after 1956. In part, of course, this is the
circular result of having defined ex-officio members as those who occupy
positions whose occupants are always CC members. Unless turnover among
the elite has been extraordinarily high, they will naturally enjoy a
higher survival rate. The point is, however, that there is a large and
identifiable number of positions responsible for the differential in
turnover rates, and it is on these positions that political analysis
should focus. The statistics adduced above lend support to the contention
that ex-officio membership belongs to the position rather than the
individual.

It is hardly necessary to add that overall turnover of
candidate CC members and AC members, of whom less than a quarter are hard
core, is almost useless as an index of anything, except the fact that
a regular large turnover is a matter of policy. The lack of continuity
here also highlights the importance of continuity (of both positions and
personnel) within the full membership of the CC, and focuses attention on
the latter as the elite.

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1 The industrial executive, Vartanyan, and raikov secretary, Kurlov,
already mentioned.

2 In 1956, 57 candidate members were elected, of whom 14 were candidates
and 2 were members of the 1954 CC. In 1960 the corresponding figures
were 59, 9 and 6. In 1961 they were 71, 17 and 1. Only 6 members of the
1956 AC were elected candidate members of the CC or AC members in 1960.
In 1961, 5 AC members were re-elected to the new AC or promoted to
candidate CC members.
It has been suggested that a study of the positions that entitle their holders to CC membership will provide a basis for predicting who are to be the members of the next CC. ¹ From what has been said in this chapter the validity of this suggestion will be obvious. Such an exercise would be lost labour, however, except as a means of testing the accuracy of one's list of ex-officio positions. If the changes in personnel in these positions are known to the extent of being able to make such a prediction, then one already has at hand all the information for political analysis that a future CC will provide.

Since the election of a new CC merely registers the changes that have occurred among the holders of ex-officio positions (and removes most of the residual membership), each list can be an aid to the identification of key personnel—despite the fact that occupations of members are not published with the list. For example, V.T. Shikov was elected member of the 1960 CC when he was chairman of the Karaganda obkomsynb Razganka obkomsynb, but was not re-elected in 1961. He was last identified as chairman on 5/7/60 and must have been replaced between then and September, 1961. V.A. Ashimov, identified as an obkomsynb second secretary until March, 1961, was elected full member of the new CC and three months later was referred to as chairman of Karaganda obkomsynb. All obkomsynb second secretaries (except the one from Alma-Ata) were elected candidate CC members in 1961, so the obvious conclusion is that Ashimov replaced...

would have been at least a dozen new organizations to cc mainstream in 1966. It is important to note that none of the new organizations that would have formed in response to mainstream organizations were developed during the period of the second intifada. The organizations were formed during the period of mainstream organizations and were not new organizations.

The difference between the two periods and the central question of whether mainstream organizations have been consolidated or polarized is important. The two periods have unique features that make it necessary to understand the difference in the two periods. The two periods were characterized by different political and economic conditions and social norms. However, it is clear that there were similarities between the two periods.

In the first period, the organizations of the second intifada were more numerous and more diverse. This diversity was reflected in the different organizations that emerged in the second intifada period. The second period was characterized by fewer organizations and a greater degree of consolidation. This consolidation was reflected in the different organizations that emerged in the second period.

Once the efforts to consolidate were made, any attempt to reinstate the other group.

In summary, we need to understand that the success of the second intifada period was due to the emergence of new organizations that were developed during the period of mainstream organizations. However, the success of the second period was due to the consolidation of the new organizations and the emergence of fewer organizations.
The CC could have been expanded, and some officials already in the CC gained promotion as a result of the reshuffles. Nonetheless it seems likely that a number of oblast level officials saw a threat to their ex-officio membership.

The effects of the 1962 reorganisation would have been similar in other republics also, even if they were not aggravated there by the formation of new krai. At CPSU CC level the potential effect on membership policy was even greater. A.C. Berson has discovered a high degree of continuity in the ranking of krai and more important oblast secretaries according to CPSU CC and AC membership,¹ Now it was precisely the more important krai (except in Kazakhstan) and oblasts which were selected for division under the 1962 reorganisation,² so that the established ranking of the largest bloc within the CPSU CC was threatened.

The hasty reversal of the reorganisation after Khrushchev's fall has given many commentators reason to think that its unpopularity within the party had a direct bearing on the October 1964 coup. Analysis of the results of the reorganisation in terms of CC status pinpoints one source of local dissatisfaction that may have been a factor in marshalling opposition. One can only speculate on the importance of this factor, but the usefulness of the concept of the elite, as defined, is evident.

¹ op.cit. pp.292-296. (This finding suggests that the method of designating an elite outlined here is also applicable to the CC CPSU).
perhaps the greatest harm from identification of an aide of
CHAPTER 7

ELITE CAREER PATTERNS

Although CC membership remains static (apart from one or two explosions) from Congress to Congress, the composition of the elite does not. Since, by definition, the elite at any one point of time consists of those officials who would automatically qualify for CC membership if a Congress were suddenly to be convened, a study of elite career patterns must include those who join the elite for a period between Congresses but who never have their status formalized by induction into the CC. In all it was found that 220 individuals were members of Kazakhstan's political elite at some time during the period 1955-1964.

The size of the group in itself tells us something of its nature. It establishes that the average time spent in the elite was approximately 3.7 years.\(^1\) The average tenure of individual positions was about 3.2 years,\(^2\) a fact which has power implications of some import.

Power may be limited in terms of tenure as well as scope, and whatever the latter limitation on Kazakhstan officials, that related to time is neither particularly constractive, \textit{nor}, on the other hand, is it conclusive to the formation of semi-autonomous power centres. In

\(^1\) Using the formula $220 \times 3.7 = 826$.

\(^2\) Derived similarly from $826 \div 220 = 3.8$. Where 32 is the sum of the occupants of all positions (i.e., the elite who held more than one position are counted more than once). More accurate calculation is precluded by the fact that transfers to and from many positions (e.g., CC department heads) are not recorded by the press.
comparison with any single Administration in the USA, where a fairly rapid and regular turnover occurs in most offices, the Kazakhstan elite enjoys a considerable advantage: in the early 1950’s, the average tenure of office of 1450 high level USA federal executives was only 23 months.¹ No other stable government regularly experiences such a tremendous upheaval as that of the USA, and although consolidated averages for other countries are hard to come by, piecemeal statistics would seem to show that 3.2 years is by no means an exceptionally long period in high administrative office.²

The overall average does not conceal any wide variations as between groups of positions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Average tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary CC</td>
<td>2.9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Department of CC</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First secretary, ahead</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(First) Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other members of Council of Ministers (elite only)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, oblianlik</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This cannot be taken as evidence of any rigid policy on tenure of these positions, however, for within each group wide variations occur. A dozen oblianlik first secretaries held office for five years and over, while there

²For example, the average length in office of the permanent heads of departments of the Australian Federal Government since World War II has been 3.1 years. (Calculated from Appendix V of C.E. Caiden, Career Service, Melbourne University Press, 1965). Ministers in Kazakhstan, the nearest equivalent to the permanent heads, averaged about three years in office.
are several instances of tenure of less than a year. There is likewise wide variation in turnover from ministry to ministry, as may be seen from Chart I: Construction and agricultural ministries show extremely rapid turnover, social security none at all. The most unstable positions have been the top few - First and Second Secretaries (average only 1.8 years) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers (2.0 years). Continuity and stability can thus be said to have derived from the remaining positions in the CC Bureau, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and the CC apparatus, in all of which tenure of office has been above average.

It proved possible to follow the careers of the whole of the group while they were members of the elite; for 64 no information beyond this was found, i.e. it is not known what positions these 64 held before appointment to an elite position; for the remainder the additional information varied from nothing more than the last post held before promotion into the elite to full career histories (48 in number). In order to discover the points of entry into the group it was necessary to trace the careers of those in office at the beginning of the decade to beyond 1955 - in some cases as far back as the thirties.¹ These cases posed something of a dilemma in the presentation of data. Should this

¹For this purpose arbitrary notions, biographies published in the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, supplements of the latter from 1958-60, and the personnel records accumulated in the Political Science Department of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University were examined. For current occupancy of elite positions, reports of CC and Obshch party conferences and plenums, and the minutes of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan (as published in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda) were generally found to be adequate sources.
be confined to movement during the decade under study, or should the upward movement of all the elite of this period be recorded even when it began well before 1955? The latter course was decided upon as giving a more complete picture of career patterns, even though it obscured whatever change may have occurred in these patterns over time. The careers have been fed into Chart XIV, which is thus a summary of moves into, within, and where applicable, out of the elite as it was constituted from 1955 to 1964. The chart is not confined to moves within this period, however, since many of the group joined the elite earlier than 1955.

Taking the CC secretariat as an obvious point of departure, we may regard the successive appointments of P.K. Ponomarenko, L.I. Brezhnev, and E.I. Balyayev to the republic's top post as atypical, even though their combined tours of duty span six years. All three had held high office in the inner bodies of the CC CPSU before coming to Kazakhstan, and the dispatch of three such high-powered leaders as First Secretaries to any republic is almost without parallel. The explanation is to be found in the ambitious scheme of agricultural development mapped out for Kazakhstan in the early 'fifties.'

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1For purposes of more effectual presentation certain officials have been omitted from the chart, and a few added. See notes to Chart XIV.
2Something similar did happen under Stalin, when Kaganovich, Khrushchev and then Kaganovich again were sent to the Ukraine.
3See Chapter II. Such appointments are not likely to be repeated, not because the cereal supply situation has eased, but because current long-term agricultural plans place more emphasis on established grain-growing areas, and because the exceptional appointments failed in any case to achieve their intended results.
Chart XIV continued

Key to other positions from which elite was derived.

1) USSR Minister for Culture,
   Secretary, CC CPSU.
2) First Deputy Head, Chief Political Directorate, USSR Ministry of
   Defense,
   First Secretary, Leningrad party committee.
3) "Responsible post" in NKVD.
4) Higher Party School, then "responsible party and government posts".
5) Instructor, CC Department.
6) Chairman, Committee on affairs of Cultural and Educational Institutions,
   attached to Council of Ministers.
7) Leading Komsomol work.
8) USSR Minister for Construction of Coal Enterprises, Director, State
   Farm.
9) Chairman Gosplan,
   USSR Deputy Minister for Power Stations, Senior Engineer, Mine
   Planning Institute.
10) Deputy Chairman, USSR KGB,
    Head Administrative Department, CC.
11) Director, State Farm.
12) Twenty years in USSR Ministry of Grain Products.
13) Permanent Kazakhstan Representative at USSR Council of Ministers.
14) Agent for Kazakhstan, USSR Trade Unions Council.
15) Secretary, Kraznais,
    Secretary, Trade Unions Council.
16) Minister of Foodstuffs Industry,
    Head, sector, CC CPSU.
    Secretary, Kraznais.
    Agent, USSR Ministry of Procurement.
    Chairman, Council of Ministers, Belorussian SSR till 1953.
    Party School, Moscow.
17) USSR Minister of Agriculture.
18) Minister of Meat and Dairy Products.
Minister of Food Products Industry.
Deputy Chairman, kraiispolkom.
Deputy Chairman, oblimolkom.
Head, (agricultural) Production Directorate.

Minister of Trade.
Head, obkom propaganda and agitation department.
Deputy Chairman, oblimolkom(2)
Chairmen, Collective farms(2)
Deputy Chairman, local sovmincho.

19) Head, Department, USSR Gosplan.
Deputy Chairman local sovmincha.
Minister of Communal Economy.
Minister of Local and Fuel Industry.
Department Chairman, local sovmincho.

Key to other positions to which elite departed.

20) Secretary, CC CPSU,
Ambassador to Poland.

21) Minister of Trade.

22) Minister of Meat and Dairy Products
Chairman, Committee on Supervision of Work Safety.
Counsellor, USSR Embassy, India.

23) Head, oblast, Directorate of Preservation of Public Order.

24) Deputy Chairman, State Committee of Ferrous and Non-ferrous
Metallurgy attached to USSR Gosplan.

25) Head, kraiispolkom State Farm Directorate.

26) General Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

27) Permanent Kazakhstan Representative at USSR Council of Ministers.

28) Head, Board of Labour Reserves.

Minister of Trade.
Secretary, oblimolkom.
Deputy head, CC Department of Agriculture.

29) Minister of Irrigation and Water Economy,
USSR Minister of Agriculture.

30) Chairman, obkom party commission.
Deputy Chairman, oblimolkom(2)
Head, "Glavtorgmash".
Head, kraiispolkom directorate.
The page contains text in a format that is not clearly legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a series of paragraphs or sections, possibly from a legal or administrative document. The content is not easily transcribed or interpreted without clearer visibility. The document seems to be discussing various topics, but the specifics are not discernible from the image provided.
(6) Persons with names of Slavic origin have been entered separately (in black) from those with indigenous names (in red) with a view to ascertaining differences in career patterns. For the purposes of this chapter the red and black figures in each square may be added.

The final result of the minor manipulations described in (3) and (4) above was the inclusion of 217 careers in the chart.
If these three cases are ignored it is easy to generalise on the origins of the secretariat as a whole. Provincial first secretaries were the primary source of recruitment (12 cases) and senior members of the Council of Ministers ran a poor second (6 cases). Over two-thirds of CC Secretaries derived from these two sources. Of the other appointments listed on the chart two call for some comment. The Secretary who came from a "responsible post" in the NKVD had served there for 10 years prior to his party appointment, which was made in 1933. He was Ch. Shapkinov, the later become Second then First Secretary of the CC. Such a transfer would be virtually impossible today. The other apparently unusual case - that of the appointment of an academic as CC Secretary - is less surprising than it may appear. This was N.D. Dzhendil'din who was very much in his element as propaganda Secretary, having earlier been head of the CC Department of Culture and Science. In 1955 he seems to have suffered an unexplained temporary eclipse, only to be promoted to the secretariat in 1957. In the interim he was described simply as Head of the Philosophy and Law Sector of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. Two other members of the 1933-34 elite were found to have been CC Secretaries in the 1940s, but could not be traced beyond that.

As to the immediate disposal of former secretariat members, the picture is almost identical. By far the greater number (nine) received appointment as provincial secretaries, while three were made Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This pattern of movement in and out of the secretariat, flowing as it does along the same
channels, immediately suggests the generalisation that the group of
officials comprising the CC secretariat, the provincial first secretaries
and the membership of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers all belong
to a common leadership pool.\footnote{This is apparently confirmed by observing
that six \textit{obkom} first secretaries have risen directly to be either Chairman
of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and that there have been
three moves in the opposite direction. The personnel in these three
types of position thus appear to be freely interchangeable.

Pursuing this line of thought, let us look first at \textit{obkom}
secretaries\footnote{As used throughout the chapter, the term \textit{leadership pool} refers to a
group within the elite, not to their earlier origins.} and then at Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. If
first secretaries of \textit{obkom} are part of a common leadership pool, then
chairmen of \textit{obkom} must be declared part of this pool also:
appointment as \textit{obkom} first secretary is the most common avenue of promotion
for the provincial government chairman (13 cases). It is less common for
\textit{obkom} first secretaries to take the reverse step (5 cases), not because
they are not well qualified by training and experience to do so, but
because their position is clearly one that makes or breaks a career.
An \textit{obkom} first secretary may move directly to the top of the party or
state hierarchy, but the chances throughout the \textit{fifties} were almost
equally in favour of his removal in disgrace, no less than 14 and probably
16 having suffered this ignominy (i.e., as many as there were \textit{obkenta}).
The other channels of promotion open to him were comparatively few.}{\textsuperscript{1}}
agricultural portfolios, chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet, or of the Trade Union Council - but more often than not these
posts were filled by other claimants.

The all-or-nothing chances associated with the careers of
local first secretaries are indicative of the store set upon agricultural
performance at this period (a number of the removals were explicitly
connected with harvest failures), and such a high attrition rate may not
prove typical for the post-Khrushchev era. Nor is it intended to convey
the impression that provincial party bosses were continuously rocketing
up or plummeting down from their positions. The pattern of moves away
from this post was certainly one of extremes, but this has little bearing
on the frequency of such moves; earlier remarks showed that average
tenure here was not significantly lower than for other elite positions.

Data cited above tended to show that government Deputy
Chairmen are part of a common pool of leaders. In Chapter I it was shown
that there is a clear allocation of duties among the several Deputy
Chairmen, and we must now ask whether all of them are freely
interchangeable with the leadership pool. If the reader has the patience
to examine the immediate antecedents and subsequent posts of these top
government officials, he will find that the interchange with the CC
secretariat and nhp’s first secretaries is only part of the traffic in
and out of this position. Other sources of recruitment are varied, and
there is naturally a relationship between the functions of the various
Deputy Chairman and their origins.
B.F. Bratysheva was a graduate of the Moscow mining institute and worked his way up in the coal industry until he became USSR Deputy Minister of the Coal Industry. After the 1957 reorganisation he headed two local propaganda in coal mining areas, then returned to Moscow to head a related department of USSR Gosplan. From 1959 to 1961 he headed the Karaganda propaganda in Kazakhstan and then became Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers and Chairman of the republic's Gosplan. Bratysheva is rather exceptional in that he held no party posts during his rise. L.G. Mel'nikov, who was head of Gosplan and Deputy Chairman before Bratysheva, provides an example of the opposite kind, having spent most of his career in party posts. He was secretary then first secretary of Stalin regional in the Ukraine, then successively Secretary, Second Secretary and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. He incurred Khrushchev's disfavour\(^1\) and was sent as ambassador to Romania from 1953-1955, when he returned as Minister of Construction of Coal Industry Enterprises of the USSR. After Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-party group" in 1957 he appeared in Kazakhstan as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Gosplan chairman. These two examples are extreme types, career backgrounds usually being a more even mixture of party and government posts. In general deputy chairman with responsibility for industry, construction and planning tend to have spent most of their time in government posts, while agricultural overseers and the deputy chairman who is also head of the Central Committee (1962-1965) have had more time

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\(^1\)See E.S. Khrushchev, Stroitell'skoe Komsomols v SSR i roditel'skoe sel'skogo khrushcheva, Gospolitizdat, Moscow 1963, Vol. 1, p. 134.
in party posts. Any attempt at more specific generalisation than this is frustrated by exceptions such as Mel'nikov, mentioned above, or E.C.

Dvoretzky, who rose meteorically from director of a state farm to become First Deputy Chairman in charge of agriculture - he had caught Khushchev's eye during the latter's visits to Kazakhstan. The one-deputy chairmanship which does allow more confident generalisation is that which oversees the health, education, and perhaps social service ministries. Career histories here have been fairly uniform (former Ministers of Education or University rectors), and none of the four appointees over the decade had held party posts. No interchange between this post and the CC secretariat or oblast party level has occurred.

Clearly then there is no such thing as a typical career for a government Deputy Chairman. If one had to nominate one or two whose careers embodied many of the features repeated in others, they would be the following

M. Beisebaev (Agricultural type). Born 1909 to peasant parents.

1931-36 In Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture
1932 Joined party
1936-41 In apparatus of CC and Alma-Ata obkom
1941-42 Army
1942-46 Chairman Alma-Ata obispokom
1943- Agent of USSR Ministry of Procurement in Kazakhstan
1946- Second Secretary Almelninsk obkom
1952- First Secretary Kokchetav obkom

1Pravda 15/2/64, p. 3.
1954-56 Deputy, then First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan.
1958-62 First Secretary Alma-Ata obkom
1962-64 Chairman, Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan
1962-64 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan
1964- Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan.


1931 Deputy head of electric power trust, Moscow
Head of power trust in Central Asia
Head of construction of Alma-Ata power station
1937 Deputy Minister, then Minister Communal Economy, Kazakhstan
Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan
1940 Chairman, Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan
Head of construction of Alma-Ata power station
1942 Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan
1942-43 Head of directorate in USSR Ministry of Power Stations
1943 Deputy Minister of Power Stations, USSR
Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, Kazakhstan
1954 Secretary, CC CP Kazakhstan.

The mixed backgrounds of government Deputy Chairman introduce a problem of determining the limits of the leadership pool, and are thus a suitable point at which to begin discussion of the taxonomy of elite positions. The Deputy Chairmen who have had charge of agriculture clearly belong to the occupationally versatile pool of leaders, as do some of the planning and industrial Deputy Chairmen (e.g., Mel'nikov). A few Deputy Chairmen in charge of industry (e.g., Tazhiev) have had a more specialized background before becoming a leading government official. Finally there is one deputy chairmanship which shows no links at all with the leadership pool, the position being filled from the ministries below. Since the immediate object of our enquiry is to discover broad patterns of transfer,
the Deputy Chairman must, as a group, be retained as part of the
leadership pool; but their varied sources of external recruitment will
be excluded, because these are not known to us as giving access to other
parts of the common pool (i.e. to CC or obkom secretaryships or chairmanship
of an obkom).

What all Deputy Chairmen have in common with CC Secretaries,
obkom first secretaries and obkom chairman is that they have moved
up the bureaucratic ladder to posts of broader and broader responsibility.
At the stage at which we meet them they are all generalists in the sense
that they have developed expertise in dealing simultaneously with a
variety of issues and pressures - even if those issues and pressures in
some cases relate to one broad sphere of economic or social life. In
comparison with a Deputy Chairman even a minister is a narrow specialist.
From this viewpoint their backgrounds vary in that some have been
generalists from the time they were oblast first secretaries or soviet
executive committee chairman, while others merit this label only on
becoming Deputy Chairman.

In his work on the Ukrainian elite Armstrong suggests that
there are two general categories of officials in the Soviet hierarchy,
and to describe them he applies the concepts of ‘line’ and ‘staff’, which
have long informed American administrative studies. The transplanation of
these concepts from their original home in military and industrial
organisational theory to a whole polity is a bold taxonomical move, the
more so as they have been in rather bad odour for some years among
theorists.\footnote{See e.g., Peter M. Blau & W.R. Scott, Formal Organisations, Chandler
Publishing Co., San Francisco, 1962, p. 173.} Unfortunately Armstrong’s line of demarcation between the
two types of position within the party hierarchy is not wholly clear, and
in treating the state hierarchy he temporarily abandons these categories
altogether. But despite this writer's de facto rejection of his own
framework of reference, and despite the basic problem associated with the
line and staff dichotomy, namely the refusal of any particular post to
correspond with functionally pure types,¹ the suggestion that the Soviet
political hierarchy might be broken down in this way merits consideration.

As applied to industrial organisations, line units are defined
as those which have authority over production processes, while staff units
provide specialized services, such as personnel and financial administration.
Line organization is said to be characterized by emphasis on differences
in rank and vertical subordination; staff organization by specialization,
and by research and advisory functions.² For adoption in the manner
suggested by Armstrong this typology would need to be lifted to a more
abstract plane. Etzioni has noted that in certain institutions, e.g.,
hospitals and universities, the roles of line and staff units are
reversed,³ so that even at the level of primary social units it becomes
necessary to define line units in terms of the major functions of an
organization, and staff units in terms of auxiliary functions.

¹H.E. & C.D. Dimack, Public Administration, Rinehart & Co., Inc., New
³Amir Etzioni, "Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness",
To expand the past ten issues of the Economic and Political Weekly, an appeal was made to the.

To conduce to the success of the project, we remain the opinion of the editor, D. H. A. B. E. G. R. T. H. A. B. E. G. R. T. H. A. B.

As a matter of fact, the government has been able to do little more than make the.

The project will also help in the study of.

It will be found that career patterns differ in that the.

We are less concerned however with those implications of what is taking.

If functional analysis will then be reduced to a description, the.

How the social democratic tradition would change in taking

connected with providing assistance and means to catch these goals.

The need for some (are to be) addressed. Start will be made, it is clear, and how satisfactorily, and

would also be derived in those capacities the establishment of societies

established to those capacities are incorporated in the planning process, the

It is at least thoughtfully feasible to make a move.
(described in chapter 4) and their careers mark them off clearly as line officials. It so happens that fairly full biographies of all five Chairman of this body are available. They are of interest not only as typical line careers, but also as confirming what was said in chapter 4 about the enhanced role of the Supreme Soviet Presidium in recent years.

D.K. Korobeshov was an oblastokom chairman both before and after his term as Presidium Chairman (1947-54), and held no other posts of importance at any time. Significant also is the fact that at no time in his career did he hold a party post - which speaks volumes on the relatively low status of the Presidium at the time.

N.D. Undasynov had been Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1939 to 1951 but, oddly enough, there is no party post in his background either. He had held several minor government posts and been an oblastokom chairman before 1936. A sign of the changing times was that he was required to complete the Higher Party School course before being elected Chairman of the Presidium.

Zh.A. Tashenov was the well equipped line official with Higher Party School behind him, as well as experience as oblast chairman and obkom first secretary. After his term as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, he went on to become Chairman of the Council of Ministers. By the end of Tashenov's term the new role of the Presidium had crystallised out, and he set the pattern for his successors.

F. Karibshankov had a similar background in local line positions; later he rose through the agricultural administration (head of CC Agricultural Department, Minister of Agriculture) to become Secretary, then Second Secretary of the CC.
I. Sharipov distorted the pattern slightly in that there is no record of his having attended the Higher Party School, and his last party appointment had been a place one book in 1958. His state party appointment had been a place one book in 1958. His state
four trade unions chairmen since 1946 is that only one had ever held a
trade union office. This was A.B. Boissenov, who was agent for the USSR
Trades Unions Council in Kazakhstan (1946-46) before becoming Chairman
of the Kazakh Council. Even this single exception, therefore, refers to a
career made outside the trade union hierarchy, and converging only at the
apex. There appears to be no error of omission here since all four
biographies examined purport to cover complete occupational histories.
No one, it seems, rises to be the trades unions chief through trade unions
work. Labouring the obvious, one may add that although the party supervises
the election of trade union officials at all levels, these officials are
apparently deemed to be somehow contaminated by their experience, and to
be unsuited to the highest position in the trade union hierarchy. This is
reserved for a generalist from the leadership pool.

The illustrative line careers given above show that experience
in the CC apparatus or government ministries is far from being a
prerequisite for appointment to a top line position - either party or state.
This could be further demonstrated by career samples, but these can, of

______________
1 USSR Minister of Procurement 1950-52, and USSR Minister of Culture 1953-54.
Kazakh party central apparatus. On the state side, and here our records extend back to 1938, exceptions are equally rare. Of the six Chairman of the Council of Ministers after that date, none had held office in the central party apparatus. S. Daulenov was a rare exception in having been a minister or deputy minister on several occasions. The current Chairman of the Council, K. Beisheov was deputy agent for the USSR Ministry of Procurement back in 1943. Otherwise the careers of the Chairman are clear of ministerial appointments. Sixteen appointments involving twelve individuals are included here, so it is a reasonable generalisation to assert that the most successful line careers are not built on experience in apparatus or ministerial elite positions, and rarely include such experience.

The First Secretaryship of the CC and the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers are only two out of more than forty individual positions that we have now designated as held by the line elite, and the next step in pursuance of the lead just disclosed is to ascertain whether the CC apparatus and ministerial posts are equally well separated from line positions in general. If, as we now suspect, something of a barrier does exist, there is the question of relationship between the apparatus and ministerial positions. Do these form a second common leadership pool? Or does each generate its own elite?

Taking these problems in order, let us first canvas career links between CC department heads and the line pool. If a now familiar landmark, obshah first secretaryship, is taken as the point of departure, 1

1Eight appointments in all, two having returned to serve a second term.
a firmly negative relationship is discovered from the outset. The wide range of posts to which obkom first secretaries may be transferred has already been commented on, but Chart XIV reveals one notable gap in their prospective postings: only one obkom first secretary has become the head of a CC department. ¹ The previous posts occupied by a third of the departmental heads could not be discovered (they are mainly those in office at the beginning of the period studied), but it is certain that they were not appointed from among obkom first secretaries in Kazakhstan, because the latter were identified in all sixteen oblasts from at least the mid 'forties on. This fact by itself is almost sufficient grounds for excluding apparatus heads from the common leadership pool, for the central core of this pool is the obkom first secretaries, who show clear links with every line post. The previous history of two thirds of the departmental heads is known: they were mostly former obkom secretaries (other than first) and deputy heads of CC departments. There is even a case of promotion from raikom secretary to head of a department.

This recruitment pattern is puzzling if one is accustomed to regarding CC departments at the central instrumentalities serving the party leadership in its control over every aspect of the life of the republic. The obvious field for recruitment has been passed over in favour of an apparently less experienced group. If their subsequent posts are examined it is found that departmental heads have produced one CC

¹Actually there have been no such transfers - that show on the chart was from first secretary of Alma-Ata sorkom to head of the Department of Party Organs. Movement of Alma-Ata sorkom first secretaries has been entered under the first secretaries obkom, heading, because they are equal to the latter in terms of CC membership, and because Alma-Ata city (and party organization) is of republican subordination.
Secretary and two obkom first secretaries. The remainder have received appointment as ministers, second or other obkom secretaries, or to even lesser posts. Collectively these postings are more impressive than their earlier backgrounds, but there is clearly no free exchange between apparatus\textsuperscript{1} heads and the line pool.

The preference shown for filling central apparatus posts with lesser obkom secretaries is all the more perplexing, if it is considered that these latter, especially obkom second secretaries, are also the primary source of recruitment to obkom first secretary and obkom Politburo chairman. In other words at local level the second secretaries seem to be part of the common pool, but once they move to the top obkom party or state positions they apparently forfeit eligibility for transfer to a central party apparatus post. Tentatively, therefore, it is suggested that obkom second secretarieship is a watershed in the career of an upwardly mobile party official. If he is aspiring to a top party or government post, such an official should accept republican level responsibilities only after a period of service as an obkom first secretary or obkom Politburo chairman.

There are four known cases of promotion of obkom second secretaries to CC department heads. All four were Russians, and all had been serving under native obkom first secretaries. The author of a study

\textsuperscript{1} From the context it will be clear that 'apparatus' here refers only to CC departments. No agreement is found among Western writers on the scope of this term: some prefer the usage adopted here, while others include party secretaries under this heading. It seems preferable to distinguish between the secretariat (another term used ambiguously) and the apparatus, and this is done throughout the thesis.
of the careers of communists of different nationalities in Uzbekistan, noting that it was almost invariable practice there to appoint Russian or other European second secretaries under native party leaders (and that the same device was employed at other vital points of the power structure), concluded that European party cadres are charged with supervision of native communist leaders, and with forestalling the development of any nationalist or separatist tendencies.\(^1\) The situation in Kazakhstan is not altogether analogous to that in other Central Asian republics, as will be shown in a later chapter on the nationality question. However it is the usual practice in Kazakhstan also to appoint a European second secretary under a native first secretary, or vice versa; it cannot, therefore, be assumed that a Russian second secretary stands in the same relationship to his first secretary as does his counterpart in the RSFSR. The circumstance is mentioned here as being the basis for a possible objection to the idea that CC department heads are drawn from a secondary level of local party officials.

Rather than be diverted prematurely to the nationality question, let us look for guidance from the other cases of obkom secretaries who were appointed to the CC apparatus. These were of both nationality groups and the above complications cannot be said to have operated to the same degree. There is convincing evidence that these appointments were made on the basis of specialist qualifications. Two of the obkom secretaries had been in charge of propaganda and agitation; each was appointed head of the CC

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Ideological Department. The third ГКГКSecretary, V.Ia. Putintsev, had been a deputy chairman of a local ГКГКконсium in charge of construction; he was appointed head of the CC Construction Department. The fourth case was also a logical one - the appointment of a Kazakh female ГКГКSecretary as head of the CC Department for Work Among Women. The remaining case, that of I. Khalimov, was, at least on the testimony of CC First Secretary I. Yusuov, the exception. He became head of the Department of Transport and Communications and later Minister of Transport. According to Yusuov he had "no special education or experience in transport" and was dismissed for his blunders.

These cases prompt a further look at the local second secretaries who moved to the CC apparatus. L.Ia. Vyatklin had been head of the construction and construction materials department of East Kazakhstan ГКГКкес and then first secretary of the ГКГКконсium of the industrial centre of Ust Kamenogorsk before becoming an ГКГКSecretary; he was appointed head of the CC Construction Department. Two others (V.A. Idvuntsov and A.K. Meresov) held agricultural posts, either state or party, throughout most of their careers, and within the CC apparatus also their place was at the head of agricultural departments. Finally there was the appointment of ГКГКSecretary, N.V. Dykhnov, as head of the Department of Party Organs. As a more highly politicised post than most others in the apparatus we might expect its occupants to show more resemblance to the generalist group of leaders than to the other apparatus men. Dykhnov had

\(^{1}\) КП 19/3/63.
been first secretary of the Kazakh Komsoomol organization earlier in his career and after leaving his CC apparatus position he became first secretary of Alma-Ata obkom. In fact it is this one department, Party Organs, which accounts for half of the links, 'exceptional' in our view of career patterns, between the post of obkom first secretary and the apparatus of the CC. If this one department is excluded it becomes possible to assert that the apparatus heads exhibit a higher degree of specialization than the career linked posts examined earlier. This perhaps goes some way towards explaining the recruitment pattern: a lesser obkom secretary is more likely to possess up to date expertise in a specialized field than an obkom first secretary. The Russian second secretaries looked at above may or may not have been the real party bosses in their oblasts - there is no need to dispute Rywkin's thesis at this point - but they did have specialist qualifications or experience which fitted them to take over CC departments.

At this point there is a strong temptation to resort to sleight-of-hand and declare that if CC Secretaries are generalists, and department heads specialists, then the line and staff framework is complete on the party side. There are indeed grounds for regarding the CC departments as a specialist advisory group of bodies serving the CC Bureau, especially the secretariat, and providing top party leaders with an independent viewpoint (from that of the state administration) on all manner of subjects - economic, social and political. But that is only part of the story. They are, as was seen in Chapter II, not merely advisory bodies, but one of the channels through which decisions are implemented. The CC apparatus was firmly in mind earlier when the generalist-specialist dichotomy was rejected as a means of classifying elite positions. If the line and staff concept is
used in its place the considerable authority that the CC apparatus exercises over ministries and lower party formations presents no greater problem than the same situation in any large-scale organisation, where staff units disrupt the unity-of-command that is part of the line and staff scheme. Specialisation automatically carries with it a degree of authority: there would be no point in having a central personnel office in any industrial enterprise if line units did not heed its directives on personnel matters. CC departments function as do their specialised staff counterparts in smaller bureaucratic systems, by acting in the name of the line units. The staff and line system works, and the concepts are useful, because the myth of unity-of-command is accepted at all levels.¹

¹As to why the myth is accepted, see H.A. Simon, D.N. Smithburg and V.A. Thompson, Public Administration, Knopf, New York, 1950, pp.284-291.
Government to the top level down since position come not from the
position, which has no amount which the position. In short, 
which do appear on the chart we see to the one deputy administrator, department
deputy administrator of the Government. And out of the choice such administrations
be that it doesn’t mean that they’re dependent from administration to
preparation. But, one of the most important reason is that they
influence of a minister ever readiness direct appointment to the administration
dependent on the greater hierarchy to a party. If that choice is otherwise
to select that a chairman of the council of ministers with a minister
back again new to the government also and the reader be asked

asked. A

and the other as well. It means that the whole executive of
secretary appointed in a hierarchy it would be possible to change one aspect.
In hundred, executive on the hierarchy of the types of second
some of the same area on the ground of that hierarchical position
reactivated also, however, the second secretaries can sometime be pushed
of the predicate of the administrative. From the perspective of our far more
government directly chooses some of the areas to be placed
parties. However, as long as such reasoning is possible
cased to be a little speed. And the author of the
another position reaches the level of another position. So, the first a party
and another never has any reason that by the time a party
were chosen to be done. My input opened the existence of either was an
Geared directors and coordinators of staff activities; while others,
The Government of the South Africa has passed the following resolution.

The Government of the South Africa hereby declares that the Union shall not exist as a separate entity.

We, therefore, request that the Union be dissolved immediately.

In accordance with the constitution of the Union, we hereby declare that the Union shall cease to exist as a separate entity.

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We, therefore, request that the Union be dissolved immediately.

In accordance with the constitution of the Union, we hereby declare that the Union shall cease to exist as a separate entity.
There is no doubt on our minds, or on the minds of the people concerned, that this is a matter of national importance. It would take only one or two more cases like this to change the attitude of the government, and it would be in the best interests of the department and the country to make the necessary changes at once.

However, I cannot agree with those who think that the situation can be improved by simply changing personnel. The problem is far more complex than that. It is not just a matter of changing individual members of the department. The entire structure of the department needs to be rethought and reformed.

The Department of Transport and Communications is currently divided into two sections, each with its own minister. This division of responsibility is not effective. It is time to think about how we can improve the situation.

There should be a better balance between party and state interests. The current situation is not sustainable. It is time for a change.

The Department of Transport and Communications is a vital department, and we need to ensure that it is functioning effectively. The current situation is not sustainable. It is time for a change.
Agricultural officials are, then, an extremely mobile group and show little respect for the line and staff construction we have placed on personnel movement. One or two examples will demonstrate their versatility. M.G. Regionets was an obkom secretary in two Ukrainian oblasts from 1945 to 1954, and on transfer to Kazakhstan became first secretary of Kokchetav obkoms. From here he became Minister of State Farms then of Agriculture. When Ministries of Agriculture lost their planning functions to Gosplan throughout the USSR he was made a deputy chairman of the Kazakh Gosplan. An even more mobile executive was A.K. Beredin who was successively Commissioner for Kazakhstan of the USSR Ministry of Procurement, first secretary of Almatinsk obkom, Minister of Agriculture, Gosplan deputy chairman, head of the CC Department of Agriculture and first secretary of Instanai obkon. Beredin has thus lost some ground in recent years, but it is also possible to rise from head of the Agricultural Department to Secretary of the CC, as did F.K. Karibshanev in 1954. Here again the agricultural sphere is unique, no other such transfer from the CC apparatus having occurred.

The 'exceptional' transfers described here are at variance with the movements model erected so far in two ways. Firstly, and more importantly, there is interchange between line and staff elite, and secondly, between party and state staff elite. Whether this means that agricultural officials should be treated as a race apart is debatable: the 1933-64 decade was one of endless organisational, personnel and policy flux for Kazakhstan.1 The game of musical chairs played by

1See Chapter 9.
agricultural officials ranging from elite level to farm managers was so
hazard that its relevance to a general study of career patterns is doubtful.
In view of these special circumstances guidance is needed from similar
studies in other republics on the nature of agricultural careers.
Agricultural officials do, of course, adhere to the pattern of transfer
between line positions. Few are the transfers between party and state
staff elites in any way damaging to the line and staff construct. Indeed,
as already suggested, it is the comparative lack of such transfers elsewhere
that constitutes a matter for curiosity.

One might expect for instance to find fairly free exchange
between apparatus and ministerial elite in the field of culture and
education. Yet only one state to party move was noted, namely the
appointment of the Chairman of the Committee on Affairs of Cultural and
Educational Institutions as head of the CC Department on Literature and
Arts - and this occurred back in 1950. There have been three moves in
the opposite direction: the same official returned to government work as
Minister of Culture in 1953; and a head of the CC Department of Science,
Higher Educational Institutions and Schools has twice become Deputy Minister
of Higher and Secondary Special Education. During the 1955-64 decade,
therefore, there were only two exchanges in this field - and by definition
they were moves out of the elite. Party apparatus officials in this area
have tended to transfer between related departments, or between the latter
and the Institute of Party History: five such moves will be noted on
chart XIV. In other words mobility between party posts was much higher than
between these and corresponding government sectors.

It is not surprising therefore to find that there are enclaves
within both the party apparatus and state bureaucracy whose leading
personnel are highly professionalised and have closed careers. One such enclave is the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. The antecedents of the early heads could not be traced, but the three later heads were all professional ideologues. Two had been chins propaganda secretaries and the third a deputy head of the department.¹

On the state side closed careers seem to have been the rule for Ministers of Education. It will be recalled that this is the one ministry giving access to a deputy chairmanship of the Council of Ministers - the one that has no links with line positions. An enterprising pedagogue thus has a potentially high career ceiling and his progress is not impeded by lateral inward movement of line officials. A.Ş. Sharipov, a pedagogical expert, rose to deputy minister then minister and finally to government Deputy Chairman. A.Ş. Zahirin was rector of the Issik State University and Minister of Education before rising to the same deputy chairmanship.²

¹These transfers prompted a look beyond the elite at the deputy heads and heads of sectors of this department. Some information was unearthed on five out of the twelve identified: four were professional ideologues from chins level, either secretaries or heads of chins propaganda and agitation departments. The one exception to this evidence of closed careers was A. Shalabaev who moved from head of the press and publications sector of the department to become Chairman of the State Committee on Radio-broadcasting in 1963.

²It should be emphasised that no attempt is made to generalise on how closed other positions in the Ministry may be. If one looks below the minister the case of deputy minister of S.K. Zadin will advise caution. From his past in the ministry he became deputy head of the CC Department of Science, Higher Educational Institutions and Schools, and from there went on to Chishent as an chins secretary. This does not necessarily affect what was said of the ministers having closed careers; Zadin may not have been the type of deputy who becomes minister. For one thing he seems to be a Russian, whereas all the Ministers of Education have been natives.
From here the remaining ministries can be covered rapidly, closed careers being the norm. The Ministers of Construction, Geology, and Non-Ferrous Metallurgy have all been highly professional men whose traceable careers were within their own specialized field. There are too many gaps in their early years to allow a blanket statement on their careers being completely closed, but there was certainly no exchange between these staff elites (nine individual ministers are involved) and any of the line positions. A minister holding one of these portfolios is at the peak of his career. It is conceivable no doubt that a Minister of Construction could become the government Deputy Chairman in charge of construction, but in practice this has not happened in more than a dozen years. Government line elites are required to have more of a generalist background than is gained in the ascent to ministerial rank.

It has long been known that security organs have been characterized by closed careers,1 Elite posts in the State Security Committee and Ministry of Preservation of Public Order2 are virtually always filled from lower down in these hierarchies. Moreover with the transfer of V.V. Cubin, the Minister of Internal Affairs from at least 1952, to the post of Chairman of the State Security Committee in 1954, exchange between these two agencies, at least at the top, appears to have ceased. Cubin's replacement as head of security was a Deputy Chairman of the USSR Committee, and the current chairman was formerly a Deputy Chairman of the Kazakhstan Committee.

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2Formerly Internal Affairs.
few candidates for the post of secretary. The selection by the committee was influenced by the need to provide a suitable candidate. After careful consideration, the decision was made to choose a candidate who had experience in government. The process involved a transparent and merit-based approach. The candidate selected was an experienced and capable individual, who had previously served in similar capacities. The appointment was approved by the council, and the new secretary was expected to bring new energy and direction to the department.
almost no exchange with line officials and very little with the CC apparatus. As a point of interest it may be observed that this cannot be said of a number of ministries outside the elite. The service group of ministries - Trade, Communal Economy, Local Industry - all show some links with line appointments. It is, incidentally, indicative of political priorities in the system that only one minister (social security) from among some five or six service ministries has ever rated elite status.

The fact that there was some exchange between line posts and the lesser government agencies meant a variation in career patterns after the 1957 reorganization. As admitted at the outset our study was not designed to bring out such variations but this one is obvious. It was mainly the lesser type of ministry that was abolished in 1957 with the result that whereas before that date an akhun first secretary might try his hand, say, as Minister of Local and Fuel Industry or Dairy Products, these lateral moves were now blocked. In the terms we have applied, there was now a clearer division of line and staff positions, because the new or reconstituted central agencies began recruiting from professional industrial leaders.

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1 Health and Communications, however do not; "closed" careers are the rule in these two.
2The Minister of Local and Fuel Industry from late 1956 to mid 1957 was a full member of the CC, but this was because he had been an akhun first secretary at the time of the 1956 Congress.
3See Chart I.
4All three deputy chairman of the Kazakh Council of National Economy, for example, were recruited from local executivity chairmen (who show no career links with local line positions). A similar trend was noted among the numerous deputy chairman of Kasualan appointed before the Council was set up. Only five of sixteen of these seem to have belonged to the mobile generalist type who moves from party to state positions. The remainder were staff specialists.
choose to be the true type.

Instead, in 1969 it was taken over by an elected body representing the water board was replaced by a single person, the chairman of the water board. This person became the chairman of the council of ministers, who then formed the government. The government then decided to create a new body, the National Industrial Commission, which was to act as an independent body. This body was to be chaired by the Prime Minister, who was to be nominated by the President.

However, the political decisions of the 1997 Constitution...
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a paragraph of text, but the content cannot be accurately transcribed.
Throughout this chapter identification of the line elite has rested on two criteria, their function and the direction of their mobility. In several occupational categories individual officials have been found who cast doubt on the validity of a rigid line and staff division. Nevertheless the latter has served to discern order in what might otherwise seem to be a chaotic interchage of personnel. Moreover the line official emerges as a recognisable type for whom specific qualities can be posited. Without attempting to define these qualities, we may say that they make the line official equally at home in a command position in any type of agency, be it party, government, trade union or the Komsomol.

Now the sovarkhoz chairman patently did not belong among these versatile line officials. As industrial specialists they might be pushed into the staff group, but this too is highly unsatisfactory. The chairman of the Karaganda sovarkhoz was responsible for coal mines, steel mills, non-ferrous metal works, light industry and food processing plants - a far greater range of production processes than was ever supervised by any minister. Anyone with such a range of responsibilities is clearly a line official in every sense of the word except the rather special one we have chosen for it in this study. Confronted with chairman of local sovarkhoz, therefore, our attempt to divide the elite into two neat categories finally breaks down. It is small wonder that this should be so, because conferring such wide ranging responsibilities on a group with no party experience was an unparalleled innovation in Soviet administrative practice.

1 This has been attempted by many writers. See e.g. Kaczynski and Huntington, op.cit., Chapter 3; Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev, Chapter 6.
Had the position continued to exist and to throw up Deputy Chairman like Bratekanko, the whole question of how to fit government leaders into the career movement model would have needed re-examination. As it is the government Deputy Chairman are a rather loose linch-pin in the model. With the ministerial system back again only time will tell whether the post 1957 trend towards professionalism within the state bureaucracy will prove to be stronger than institutional arrangements. Meantime the classification of officials suggested here continues to appear justified.

Rather than summarise the pattern of movement between elite sub-groups that has emerged from our analysis, the main currents of this movement are presented diagrammatically in Chart IV. The volume of interchange is represented approximately by the strength of connecting lines. The diagram thus discloses both the vindi- cation and the weaknesses of separating positions according to the career patterns of their holders. Once again separate treatment of agricultural officials would have simplified the patterns, but certain generalisations are possible even if they are included.

Most studies of the USSR political leadership point up, in one way or another, the horizontal as well as the vertical mobility of officials. Brassinski goes so far as to say that "in bureaucratic structures [he is contrasting the USSR structure with the division of powers in the USA] the hierarchy of positions is clearly defined and almost all positions

Footnote: It will be noted that lesser obkom secretaries have been given a place in the diagram. They are not part of the elite as identified in chapter 6, but constitute such an important source of recruitment to several groups of the elite that their inclusion was advisable.
Exchange of Personnel between major Elite Groups.
are on a single ladder. This is true in the sense that a long enough search for examples will show almost any position to be a stepping-stone to the top. It is certainly valid to make this point in comparing the situation of a Soviet bureaucrat with the 'fourth term crisis' that confronts USA Congressmen, or more generally with the Cincinnatus type careers of many Western politicians. Works devoted specifically to career patterns in the USSR, however, find pockets within the bureaucracy to which this general rule is inapplicable. T.H. Rigby, as a result of a study of 343 biographies concluded that

there is a leadership pool common to the party apparatus and not the state machine as a whole, but only sections of it; those sections concerned with administering industry and agricultural production, and with overall coordination.

Closed careers were frequently found in the ministries, especially Health, Finance, Education, Control, Justice, Security and the Procurety. Armstrong reasons as follows:

Career divisions within both the state bureaucracy and the party bureaucracy are much more significant than the division between these bureaucracies. In fact, there is such a high degree of interchange between the middle levels of the state and Party bureaucracies that it is impossible to look upon these organizations as separate elite segments.

The present study certainly confirms the contention of both these writers that many officials of both party and state hierarchies are so closely associated by career experience as to constitute a single service. As to where to draw the limits of this service among the elite, Chart XIV, while precluding exact definition, suggests that it should be

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held to comprise the holders of line positions. If the administration of agriculture is taken separately then the relevant apparatus and ministerial positions can also be included.

Rigby suggests that the common leadership pool extends to agencies concerned with industrial and agricultural production and with overall coordination. On the score of agriculture, agreement is reached. If overall coordination bodies in the state bureaucracy are defined as the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the local executive committees, agreement is again possible. Over the industrial administration there is disagreement, but the reasons for this are discernable. Firstly Rigby wrote well before the 1957 reorganisation, which, we have suggested, introduced unprecedented changes into recruitment practice. Secondly our study does not extend to USSR level ministries, where the pattern may be somewhat different. Our finding is that industrial administrators below the level of republican Deputy Chairman do not constitute part of the common leadership pool. This is in direct conflict with Armstrong who predicted that

as the proportion of technically trained and experienced state and party line officials increases, their tendency to combine with industrial management in a number of technocratic groups formed on regional or economic bases may well increase.

Indeed the opposite appears to have happened under the nevaxiches system - a further separation of line officials on the one hand and state officials and industrial management on the other.

The discovery of a trend towards more differentiation and specialisation of the industrial leadership will occasion no surprise, functional differentiation being the hallmark of every industrialised society.

\[\text{Iibid., p.145.}\]
According to some authorities this means the ascendancy of those with specialized professional training and experience. Some would argue further that industrialization necessarily entails the growth of separate and autonomous, though interdependent, elites. On such grounds Suzanne Keller rejects attempts to discover an all-encompassing ruling class in any modern society, and speaks of discrete "strategic elites." She contends that as the process of differentiation proceeds in the USSR, party membership, which so far remains "a badge of power," may gradually become "a ceremonial certification" of success already attained in one of the specialist elites. Even now, she claims, it is anachronistic to speak of party functionaries as the governing class. The CPSU can no longer control single-handedly the complex society, centralized monolithic control being inconsistent with a social order in which specialization and expertise are in ever greater demand. Keller is concerned with the impact of industrialization on societies in general and hence does not spell out its full anticipated consequences for the Soviet political system. Nevertheless it is a reasonable inference that she believes the political process is, or soon will be, one of open competition between the several elites.

This is a fascinating line of reasoning. The results we have attributed to the 1957 reorganization - more professionalism, greater opportunity for the specialist, and it might be added, conversely, some decline in party influence within the state bureaucracy - might well be seen as part of a secular adjustment to the imperatives of industrial society.

3 I.e. in the long term. Most students of Soviet affairs contend that the immediate effect of the reorganization was the opposite of that suggested here.
Neither the use of food to the co-op as a replacement for

attended a high school, or the other Group's (the group of the other

somewhere, but in all of them, the use of food as a replacement for

The data in question refer to the training of the above, the

the data to Roulette, for the above as a whole, it may now be interpreted.

explanation of part of the data to Roulette, however, that despite

We have already learned the small proportion of the Kasbahmen

in the social order, but Kasbahmen as yet far from becoming a

on the commandant, and the position of the Kasbahmen in these, that no matter much

the Kasbahmen's, the trades unions and other secreted

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into the Kasbahmen's, rather than into difference.

In the Kasbahmen's, in the Kasbahmen's, it seems highly premature to speak of
and some other tertiary institutes; a further 20 had completed HPS only; 19 had completed tertiary institutes other than a HPS; and four had had secondary education or less.

These figures certainly do not exaggerate the importance of a Higher Party School background in achieving appointment to elite, and especially line elite positions: it was found that the line officials in the sample group who did not have this background were largely those who had risen to prominence before the Moscow school was founded (in 1946).

L.I. Bresheev, L.G. Mel'nikov and Zh. Shayakhmetov, with whom the reader is now acquainted, may be mentioned as typical of this older sub-group. For the more recent recruits to the line elite tertiary party training would appear to have become more and more indispensable.

The significance of this is that only a select few are offered the opportunity of attending a Higher Party School. Only 200 were in attendance at the Moscow school in 19561, and it is not known how many places were reserved for Kazakhstan. The annual average number of graduates from the Alma-Ata Higher Party School over 6 years was only 1692, and these were drawn from all the Central Asian republics. The training offered at these schools is designed to produce the political leaders of the future, about 40% of the curriculum being devoted to purely political subjects.3

In theory this need not necessarily mean that party trained line officials may not have already made their mark as specialists in 'strategic elites', but if this is so it is not apparent in their educational achievements.

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1L. Bresinski and S.P. Huntington, op.cit., p.143.
2KP 12/9/62. See also L.I. Bresheev to 1956 Kazakh Congress, KP 26/1/56.
3For a description of the curriculum see Bresinski and Huntington, loc.cit. It will now be obvious why the Director of the Alma-Ata HPS is always a full member of the CC.
As stated above only four of the sample group had received both party and secular tertiary education. Furthermore selection for leadership training is made up to the age of 40, which scarcely allows time for a high level of success in any specialist elite. Most of those selected to attend a course are probably well below this age since nearly half of the graduates are posted as secretaries of primary party organizations or raikom apparatus officials.\(^1\) The sequence is thus party training and then advancement. One can achieve elite status with either party or secular higher education - the proportions with each type of background are about even - but given the small number of graduates of party schools as compared with other tertiary institutes, the former have infinitely better chances of joining the elite. Kellner’s picture of the structure of a modern industrial society may be valid where selection of elites is not governed by the kind of self-perpetuating process enjoyed by the leadership of the CPSU; for Kazakhstan at least its relevance is confined to speculation about the future.

\(^1\) KP 30/6/63. See also photograph of student group at Alma-Ata school, KP 12/9/62; the average age seems to be well under forty.
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

In one of his characteristically incisive passages Raymond Aron has asserted: 'The fundamental difference of a society of the Soviet type and one of the Western type is that the former has a unified elite and the latter a divided elite'. Aron does not doubt that conflicts of interest arise between sectors of the Soviet bureaucracy, or that there is rivalry between individuals; but he argues that whereas pluralistic societies are full of the noise of public strife between various groups, in the USSR 'this competition and rivalry is not openly declared, and does not take the form of struggle between independent bodies'. The distinction, according to this writer is vital, because freedom depends on a system of checks and balances, which is possible only when the elite is divided. 'A unified elite means the end of freedom'.

Without prejudice to Aron's thesis that democracy and freedom in the West are contingent upon a measure of disunity between competing sectors of the elite, we may take up his selection of what is fundamental to the Soviet system. Industry is a particularly appropriate heading under which to do this because so much has been written of the relationship between industrialization and democratization. Isaac Deutscher, for instance,

2 Ibid, p. 143.
3 For a radical criticism of this view see T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, Watts and Co., London, 1964, Ch. VI.
assured us in the early 'fifties that the USSR would inevitably be
transformed into a democratic regime by the subtle and irresistible influence
of the managerial apparatus. The operational patterns of industry were to be
transferred to the leadership; mass manipulation and the fetish for
unity were to give way to disagreements on matters of expertise, and hence
to genuine arguments over policy. From its traditional role of imposing
self-sacrificing goals on society, the party would come to play a brokerage
role comparable to government or parties in Western democracies. Affluence
would complete the process. 'Economic progress made during the Stalin era
has at last brought within the reach of people a measure of well being which
should make possible an orderly winding up of Stalinism and a gradual
democratic evolution'.

Deutscher has been badly mauled in recent years, but the nature
of industrial society continues to be seen as the dominant factor in the
USSR polity. Reference has already been made to Suzanne Keller's thesis
that industrialization means a high degree of functional differentiation and
hence proliferation of separate and autonomous elites. Centralized
monolithic control is said to be inconsistent with such a social order, in
which specialization and expertise are in ever greater demand. In short
whatever weaknesses there are in Aron's characterization of this polity
should be disclosed by a study of industrial administration.

Kazakhstan is a suitable area in which to attempt investigation
of these conflicting views because of the rapid industrial strides made there
in recent years. Some idea of the achievement is obtained from the list of

1 Isaac Deutscher, Russia : What Next?, Oxford University Press, New York,
1953, p. 227.
2 See p. 288.
new types of production begun during the 1959-65 plan: pig iron, coke, synthetic rubber, magnesium, titanium, agricultural machinery, alumina, asbestos, mineral fertilizers and power transformers.\(^1\) Gross industrial output is claimed to have trebled over ten years.\(^2\) In some spheres development is patchy (e.g. in the machine-building industry); it is also concentrated in the north of the republic. By and large investment has been one sided, with emphasis on extractive rather than processing and manufacturing industries. For our purposes, however, it can be said that Kazakhstan's industrial revolution is well under way.

If one scans the decade for evidence against Aron the most promising event is the 1957 reorganization of industrial administration, which was accompanied by a lively and open, if shortlived, public debate. In outlining this debate it is not intended to convey the impression that the unusual modes of communication at this period were unique to Kazakhstan: it is assumed that the general context of particular events described below is well known.\(^3\) The aim is to add to our knowledge of the reorganization and its interpretation by examining how it was played out in a specific republic.

The original resolution of the February 1957 CC CPSU plenum on the reorganization was far from precise, and Khrushchev's speech to the plenum was not published until about six weeks later. Even in the February resolution, however, it was clear that the central ministries were under attack, and that it was proposed to shift the leadership of industry to

\(^{1}\)Pravda 17/10/65.

\(^{2}\)Kompertia Kazakhstana na vtorom etape osvoenia Tseliny, Alma-Ata, 1963, p.3.

'local economic regions'. As yet there was no hint as to the number or size of these regions, nor of the powers that would devolve upon them. The political import of such a radical proposal has rightly been emphasized; there is no doubt that it was aimed at undermining the Council of Ministers, especially Pervukhin's powerful State Economic Commission. At the same time it was evident in Kazakhstan from the outset that Khrushchev had pinpointed the source of much dissatisfaction in the following extract from his theses:

A major shortcoming...is the presence of departmental barriers...Each ministry frequently attempts to manufacture for itself everything it needs, disregarding costs and ignoring the fact that the production area and equipment are not fully utilized, and that there is considerable cross-shipping...and irrational transportation of goods.\(^2\)

Even well before these words were published glaring examples of cross-shipping, and the uneconomical production of everything down to nuts and bolts by the heavy machine industry had appeared in Kazakhstan's press.\(^3\) Compartmentalization of the administration, it was said, had caused each ministry to construct subsidiary enterprises to ensure that supplies for the main business of the ministry were not interrupted. Factories were forced to produce such a wide range of goods that specialization was impossible.\(^4\)

After the theses were published and public discussion was invited the lid came right off the cauldron; the pages of Kazakhstanskaya Pravda were filled with a variety of views and exposés unparalleled either before

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\(^2\) Pravda 30/3/57.

\(^3\) NP 20/2/57, 8/3/57.

\(^4\) NP 20/3/57.
or after. Of those relevant to the impossibility of rational cooperation between enterprises under different ministries, the following were typical. In North Kazakhstan oblast (which was not highly industrialized) there were 108 construction organisations under fifty different ministries and other agencies.\(^1\) In East Kazakhstan 44 agencies had set up 138 timber procurement bodies, and it was obvious to everyone, said one correspondent, that they should be consolidated and placed under a single authority.\(^2\) There was a Ministry of Construction Materials, but 15 other ministries etc., not relying on supplies from this source, had set up their own production lines.\(^3\) An instance was cited of five ministries setting up five small quarries, all within a kilometre of one another.\(^4\) Industrial ministries had come to do 50% of construction work although there were specialized construction ministries to do it for them.\(^5\)

Cooperation in production and distribution of power supplies was almost non-existent. From 1950 to 1955 the various industrial ministries had built 1400 power stations with an average capacity of 80 kilowatts. Needless to say the cost of power from these dwarf stations was extremely high. Nor was industry the only victim of the inability of ministries to agree to shared projects; localities with no industrial enterprises nearby were fortunate if they could secure connection to any grid.\(^6\)

A Ministry of Geology had been set up in early 1956 to serve the numerous oil extraction and mining enterprises in the republic. Ministries in charge of the enterprises were reluctant to depend on it for

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\(^1\) KP 7/4/57.
\(^3\) KP 27/4/57.
\(^4\) KP 22/3/57.
\(^5\) KP 5/5/57.
\(^6\) KP 6/4/57.
exploration of new deposits and in mid 1957 fourteen ministries and eleven
other agencies still maintained their own geological survey organizations.\(^1\)
The result was not merely duplication of effort, but failure to disseminate
what was learnt by the separate teams. Important mineral discoveries were
said to have been neglected because the ministry whose survey team made
the finds was not interested in that particular type of ore.\(^2\)

Examples could be multiplied. Perhaps the worst example of
cross-hauling was the despatch of partly refined metals to Leningrad and
their return to Ust Kamenogorsk as (rolled) metal.\(^3\) One economist
calculated the cost to the republic of avoidable cross-hauling as at least
50 million roubles per annum.\(^4\) The classical example of 'departmental
barriers' concerned two mines, each with a surplus of machinery wanted by
the other, but unable to effect an exchange because they were under different
ministries.\(^5\) The revelations flowed on briskly, to the delight of everyone
no doubt except central government officials. We must leave the enjoyment
had by local spokesmen, however, and turn to proposals for curing the
chronic situation.

Many saw the irrationality of the numerous subsidiary enterprises
supporting the industrial ministries, and the unanimous prescription was
to amalgamate them. The question was, amalgamate them under what? Regional
supply organizations, transfer of construction to local soviets, and other
like proposals were canvassed, but given the momentum and direction of
ministerial behaviour, it was fairly obvious that more than this kind of

\(^1\) KP 6/4/57.
\(^2\) Ibid. See also KP 6/6/57.
\(^3\) KP 17/4/57. See also similar complaint, KP 9/4/57.
\(^4\) KP 10/4/57.
\(^5\) KP 4/4/57.
tinkering was required. If Gosplan was unable to impose rational regional planning on the ministries, no combination of local bodies would be likely to do better as long as the branch system remained. There were only two real alternatives - that eventually adopted, or the creation of further ministries to handle the functions being mishandled by already existing ministries.

The repetitious pattern of consolidation and splintering of ministries in the past (accompanied by continuous tinkering with the planning structure) did not augur well for the second alternative. Yet there were strong forces in its favour. Local officials, both party and economic, kept referring to those (unnamed) who favoured a single economic council for Kazakhstan. Yet one minister had as yet voiced his opinion, but it was only to be expected that opposition to anything savouring of regional autonomy would be strong in this quarter. At any rate the local men were almost unanimous in advocating a number of regional sovnarkhomy; they differed mainly on how many. Suggestions varied from two to five, and were regularly accompanied by a proposal that the centre of one of them should be in the writer's area : everyone thought his town the centre of a well developed economic district. The sketchy newspaper articles are inadequate to determine whose case was soundest, but it is worth noting that academic economists, who presumably had fewer vested interests in the outcome, advocated from three to five economic areas.

In the midst of this diversity, P.A. Kunaev, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, suddenly declared a decision.

1 See e.g. no 7, 13/4/57.
Having studied the proposals and wishes put forward by workers during the discussion of N.S. Khrushchev's theses, the CC of the CP of Kazakhstan and the Council of Ministers of the republic have come to the conclusion that it is expedient to regard Kazakhstan as a single economic district.1

He proceeded to describe the administrative shape of things to come, which had nothing in common with any proposal published so far. There was to be a Council of national economy with six functional directorates, an equal number of functional departments (planning, finance, labour and wages, etc.), and 10 branch chief directorates, directorates, trusts and corporations. Construction was to be placed under a separate and similarly well articulated structure, with twenty regional and several republican specialized trusts. This bifurcated structure was to be responsible to the Council of Ministers and would replace all existing industrial and construction ministries.

Details of the plan are unimportant for it was aborted a short time later, but even this brief outline will show that it was essentially a further experiment along established lines, the directorates etc. being nothing more than vertically sliced up ministries. A few concessions were made to local aspirations in the form of regional bodies, but the keynote of the plan was centralization of command in Alma-Ata.

It would be naïve to imagine that Kazakhstan's leaders had given a completely independent interpretation to the general resolution of the February CC CPSU plenum. Apart from the a priori improbability of their taking such a major step without central agreement, there were several features of the plan which bore Moscow's imprint. For instance it was proposed to establish a union-republican Ministry of Railways and revamp the

1KP 16/4/57.
existing railway directorates because most lay across Kazakhstan's borders. The Ministry of Railways has always been an all-union agency and there could have been no tampering with its directorates without central approval. One is probably justified, therefore, in regarding the scheme outlined by Kunaev as part of the 'anti-party group's' counterplan to circumvent Khrushchev's reorganization.

At any other time before or since such a clear declaration of policy would have meant the end of free discussion. The very next day, however, an obscure local official said appositely of Kunaev's plan, 'The branch directorates are nothing more than ministries in disguise'.

They were at variance with the February CC resolution. There was to be no Council of the National Economy in Moscow, and none was needed in Kazakhstan. What was needed was several local sovnarkhozy, including one in Kustanai - the writer's hometown of course. We may add here that when the issue was finally resolved the editor of Kazakhstanskaya Pravda was sacked, not, perhaps, because of his liberal editorial policy - a wide variety of views was published in other republics - but because of the manner of presentation.

It is a moot point whether the Kunaev schema was technically at variance with the February resolution. Even the more detailed theses of Khrushchev had called for sovnarkhozy only 'wherever industry is sufficiently developed'. Sverdlovsk was cited as an example, and as a spokesman for the single council plan in Kazakhstan now pointed out, the total industrial output of the republic was less than that of Sverdlovsk.

\[1\text{KP 17/4/57.}\]
oblast.\(^1\) Whatever the value of this argument there remained the provision in the Khrushchev theses for sovnarkhoz in remote oblasts, even where industry was not well developed. Khrushchev himself seems temporarily to have abandoned hope of influencing events in Kazakhstan. He took to the hustings, making speeches in several parts of the USSR, but Alma-Ata was omitted from his itinerary.

There were two further attacks on Kunaev's scheme,\(^2\) but otherwise controversy died in the press. Commentators now saw economic salvation in the amalgamation of power stations, quarries, supply bases and the rest under the central directorates. Just as Kunaev had attempted to sanctify his project in the name of the February resolution, however, there was now an attempt at local level to secure decentralization within Kunaev's framework. This was spearheaded by I. Yusupov, first secretary of South Kazakhstan obkom. Kunaev's plan was basically acceptable, said Yusupov, but it required further elaboration. Smaller and fewer directorates were needed at republican level, and directorates should be established at oblast level in accordance with the economic profile of each oblast. He named at least seven that should be set up in South Kazakhstan.\(^3\) This was about as close as one could go to a local sovnarkhoz while still paying verbal homage to the single economic district plan.

A CC plenum was now held to ram through the reorganization in Kazakhstan.\(^4\) The rapporteur was First Secretary Yakovlev, this being the first time he had been heard from during the discussion. Coverage of the

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1\(^{\text{KP 25/4/57.}}\)
2\(^{\text{KP 24/4/57, 26/4/57.}}\)
3\(^{\text{KP 25/4/57.}}\)
4\(^{\text{KP 27/4/57.}}\)
The plenum was limited to three newspaper columns, into which 17 out of 25 speeches were condensed. Interpretation is therefore hazardous. The few lines summarizing Yusupov’s speech, for example, read like solid backing for the one area idea, but as we already know, he was far from being a pillar of support. Nevertheless a rough division of speakers into those wanting either more or less decentralization within the scope allowed by the dominant proposal is worthwhile, for it correlates closely with the subsequent fortunes of speakers. For reasons of parsimony we must be even more cryptic than Kazakhstanska Pravda. Yakovlev was removed by the end of the year. Yusupov prospered, later becoming Secretary, then First Secretary of the republican CC. An obkom secretary, A.I. Ustenko, who opposed regional administrative bodies within the scheme (Yusupov’s counter-proposal) was later removed. For P.N. Inozemtsev, the head of a large coal combine, who gave solid support and was given more newspaper space than most speakers, this was a swansong: he is heard of no more in Kazakhstan. The head of another combine, N.J. Sandrigailo, who wanted a sovkhoz in Kustanai when economic development has progressed far enough, was still at his post in 1965. Obkom first secretary, N.D. Undasynov, followed the Yusupov line; he remained in office until retirement in 1963. Complan chairman V.A. Bogoslov, warned against localism in carrying through the reorganization; he was removed a month later. The Minister of Construction Materials, G.N. Saklanov, declared that problems in his industry could be solved only by a single central organization; he lasted a further two months.

1 KP 10/7/58.
The complete list of speakers reported continues in this way, with the possible exception of two or three whose attitudes cannot be gauged from the few lines accorded to them. Firm support for the single economic area was a sure step to political oblivion, cautious opposition a passport to success or at least continued occupancy of the position already held. Worthy of note also is the fact that of the eight speakers not reported at all, six still occupied important posts at the end of the Khrushchev era. One, A.P. Sheffer, became chairman of a gomarkhoz. G.A. Neimik, then an obkom first secretary, became a CC Secretary, then First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. There was said to have been a 'lively debate' at the plenum, so perhaps whatever solid opposition there was came from this group of unreported speakers. No resolution was published; the plenum 'basically approved' the main report, but certain proposals were to receive 'further consideration'. In view of the usual professions of unity at CC plenums, this wording must have meant that dissention was wide and deep.

Kazakhstan was still out of line when the USSR Supreme Soviet convened in May, Kunaev again being the spokesman. The about-turn came at a plenum of the Kazakh CC held from 29 May. The only explanation now offered by Kunaev was that further study had revealed shortcomings in the erstwhile plan. It would not have achieved the goal of 'bringing leadership closer to production and liquidating the numerous levels in the administration'. Industrial ministries were to be abolished and Kazakhstan was to have nine economic regions. No one had ever suggested this number.

\[1\text{KP 10, 11/5/57.} \]
\[2\text{KP 2/6/57.} \]
\[3\text{KP 5/6/57.} \]
The people of this nation have been warned. The government has been informed. The media has been briefed. The public has been notified. The situation is grave. The stakes are high. The consequences are dire. This is no time for politics. This is no time for division. This is no time for compromise. This is a time for action. This is a time for unity. This is a time for sacrifice. This is a time for the greater good. This is a time for the survival of this nation.

In the face of this crisis, we must act with urgency and determination. We must mobilize our resources. We must动员 our people. We must protect our borders. We must secure our cities. We must safeguard our citizens. We must ensure our economy. We must maintain our security. We must preserve our democracy. We must uphold our values. We must preserve our way of life.

This is no time for delays. This is no time for excuses. This is no time for blame. This is a time for action. This is a time for leadership. This is a time for unity. This is a time for sacrifice. This is a time for the greater good. This is a time for the survival of this nation.
of watching the ouster of those who had stood with him is evident: he became one of the most sycophant of Khrushchev's followers, his speeches resembling those of the Stalin era. One egregious example contains no less than 22 quotations from and flattering references to Khrushchev.¹

The disunity described here amounted to what Aron had believed impossible in the Soviet Union - open or nearly open rivalry within the elite. His views as quoted at the beginning of this chapter were published in 1950, when stark characterization of the regime was well justified. Should they be discarded in the light of 1957 events?

Aron might still argue that the rivalry we have disclosed was not between 'independent bodies'. Even if party and state hierarchies are so regarded, examination of the debate in Kazakhstan fails to disclose any clear division between party and state leaders at the same level. What can be seen is a conflict of attitudes between local and republican leadership, and between the latter and the victors in the central leadership struggle in Moscow. This may be quibbling on a technicality, however. The split was real, even if it was between different levels of the same bureaucracies and crossed over institutional lines. To decide whether Aron's summation of the system continues to have current application one must first ask whether the open pressing of different viewpoints at this period is unique - public revelation of divergent viewpoints for two or three months out of a decade is certainly insufficient grounds for rejecting his view out of hand.

¹KP 2/2/61. See further on kmaev, Chapter 10.
The basic reason why the 1957 debate ran until the split was visible to everyone was that resolution had to await the outcome of the 'anti-party' struggle. Had a settlement rested with Kazakhstan it would have come quickly - or rather reorganization would not have been mooted in the first place. The obvious place to look for any similar situation is, therefore, the coup of 1964. In Kazakhstan this was followed immediately by Yusupov's removal as First Secretary, so one may again posit a close connection between events at the two levels. In 1964, however, there was no way of anticipating the consequences at republican level, simply because there had been no open split within the elite. The reasons for Yusupov's dismissal still remain obscure.

A year later the reversal of Khrushchev's 1957 reorganization was carried through without any invitation to public discussion, and nothing but condemnation of the sovkhoz system was heard. At most there were isolated requests for retention of a few of the positive features of the system. There were indeed a few 'public discussions' in the intervening years, but these were tame affairs compared with the tale told above; nothing remotely resembling a split in the elite was visible. A cursory glance at recent history thus affords no obvious cause to think that 1957 betokened a political evolution, so that the onus of disproof would appear to be on whoever wishes to dispute Aron's view.

At the same time the 1957 split has its lessons if we are to subscribe to Aron's characterization of the system. Aron, it will be recalled, made allowance for conflict of interests within the bureaucracy

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1Abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations and educational reform were opened to discussion.
even in the Stalin era; the unity he spoke of was relative to the situation prevailing in an open society. Not all writers are so circumspect. Reinhard Bendix in his study of industrial administration in the Russian orbit at this period emphasizes the use of 'loyalty tests' to reinforce unity. Every official, says Bendix, must respond to these tests with repeated avowals of commitment, and implement 'momentary decisions' by the party, however frequently these are reversed.

what matters...is not the personal persuasion of the individual...but the alacrity with which he responds appropriately...to clues emanating from the central organs of the party...Without this test it would be impossible to be absolutely sure of unity and iron discipline...Positions within the production process are subordinated to a new principle of organization which functions not in terms of a pursuit of economic interests, but in terms of political decisions made from on high.1

If by this Bendix simply means that the party continually seeks to assert itself as the single source of ideological unity and to coordinate action in the industrial sphere as well, there could be no objection. One could also agree that the division of Kazakhstan into nine economic regions was a political decision forced on the republic. But if there is anything to be learned from 1957 it is that industrial administrators do not necessarily respond with alacrity to 'clues' emanating from party central organs. There was indeed a loyalty test to which most of the participants in the discussion responded. This was the formula that the reorganization would 'bring leadership closer to enterprises'. Parroting of this phrase from the CC CPSU February 1957 resolution did not, however, exclude simultaneous proposal of differing schemes. The phenomenon Bendix refers to is real enough, but he is deceived into accepting professions of absolute

unity as the reality. The skill of Soviet officials in combining their response to 'loyalty tests' with furtherance of their own schemes is not to be underestimated. It is a gross caricature of industrial administrators to picture them as automata responding to cryptic signals from on high. The gradual purge that followed the 1957 split in Kazakhstan is a perfect illustration of the jealous maintenance of unity in the elite ranks, but at the same time it is a reminder that unity within any elite is always relative. The unity within the industrial administration certainly does not possess the machine-like qualities ascribed to it by Bendix, even if it does preclude open purveying of competing values and goals.

If Aron is right, what of Keller’s contention that 'central monolithic control [Aron’s elite unity], at least in the long run, is inconsistent with a social order in which specialization and expertise are ever in greater demand'? Keller’s approach, with its emphasis on the growing heterogeneity of the elite of an industrial society, points firmly in the direction of an openly competitive system. Inasmuch as she infers that this stage is already at hand one must prefer Aron’s formulation. But a constant watch must be kept for the trends Keller claims to be common to all industrial societies; otherwise Soviet professions of unity might come to mask a reality, less and less like Aron’s description of it. There is no simple formula to test for such a development, but if it is a general process then sampling of almost any part of the administrative process should disclose its presence.

1Op. cit., p. 120. Emphasis added.
Not long after the sovarkhozy were set up they began to be attacked for the vice of 'localism', which manifested itself in diversion of planned investment to projects of local importance; in arranging the product mix to suit one's own region; and in preferential deliveries of funded goods to local factories. Localism showed up in Kazakhstan from the very outset; within a year of the establishment of the Karaganda sovarkhoz, 74.6 million roubles were diverted from investment in coal-mining and metallurgical industries. Numerous other examples have been reported over the years from all parts of the USSR and it is not necessary to recount Kazakhstan's misdeeds in detail. In the preceding chapter we showed that the sovarkhoz chairmen in Kazakhstan were, by background, industrial administrators and experts, so presumably they and their behaviour would be seen by Keller as indicative of 'the proliferation and partial autonomy of strategic elites'.

To analyse this 'partial autonomy' let us turn firstly to the criticisms levelled at the sovarkhoz in 1965. Their existence was said to have hindered specialization in the main branches of industry; coordinating state committees had failed to impose the desired degree of unity of design and interchangeability of machine parts; research and development of new techniques had been duplicated in the economic regions; there had been little exchange of technical data between factories with similar profiles in

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1On funded goods see below, p.312.
different parts of the country. Everything was there except localism, although this had been the vice most attacked in the late 'fifties.

The almost complete absence of criticism of localism in 1965 may have been partly due to tacit recognition of the positive aspects of this vice. In favour of the sovnarkhozy were their successes in amalgamating the numerous small subsidiary enterprises that had served the ministries. They had also consolidated supply bases into units according to materials, each unit supplying (ideally) all customers in one region. In short the sovnarkhozy were interested in rational relations between enterprises within their areas. The ministerial system, as we have seen, was markedly deficient in all these respects and could contribute little in the way of rational regional planning. Possibly, therefore, the nation's leaders had decided that the shortcomings of the ministries were less objectionable than those of the sovnarkhozy, but the less said about localism the better.

A more obvious explanation is that, after the first spate of localism, strong, and apparently effective counter measures were taken in the matter of supply distribution. What happened to the 'partial autonomy' of the sovnarkhozy in this sphere is worth investigation because it complements the well known but incomplete picture of what happened to

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2 Planned material balances between production branches were not disrupted by such ministerial practices as building small power-stations or irrational cross-hauls; they were upset by breakdowns in interdistrict deliveries by the sovnarkhozy. Localism was therefore more reprehensible from the viewpoint of central planners.
administration of the actual production process. In 1958 local sales offices and bases were transferred from USSR subordination. Each sovnarkhoz had its own supply section and republican Gosplans set up glavnabesbyty (Chief Directorates of Supply and Sales) to supervise the local network. USSR Gosplan now had to work through republican bodies to regulate deliveries from the vast majority of enterprises and it was this looser arrangement which allowed the first outbreak of localism.

At USSR level the sequence was as follows. In 1957 the central Gosplan took over the former ministerial glavnabesbyt (Chief Directorates for Sales), together with their local networks. When the latter went to the republics in 1958 the glavnabesbyt became Chief Directorates on Interrepublican Deliveries. As the title suggests they were responsible for deliveries of goods produced in one republic and consumed in another. Their title was retained while the sovnarkhoz system lasted and local supply and sales organs were never transferred back to them. After the first outbreak of localism, however, the Chief Directorates on

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1 In the three years up to April 1957, 144 all-union enterprises were handed over to Kazakhstan (KP 16/4/57). In 1957 865 large enterprises were transferred to the sovnarkhozy (Suvorov, op.cit. p.141). Dosymbekov (op.cit. p.141) gives the number transferred to the sovnarkhozy as over 500. He states that this brought the number of enterprises under republican administration to 30% of the total number in Kazakhstan. At the same time this author makes it clear that the republican Council of Ministers was reluctant to delegate substantial authority to the Council of National Economy (ibid pp.156, 157, 161-166, 172-185) - let alone to the sovnarkhoz.

2 Dubinsky, Organizatsia snabzhenia narodnogo khoziaistva v respublike i ekonomicheskom rajone, Moscow, 1964, p.18. The main advantage to the republic seems to have been that all production and supply plans could now be coordinated on their way up to USSR Gosplan. Previously the supply part of the plan had been submitted directly to USSR Gosplan by the ministries, and discrepancies with the production plan were not satisfactorily resolved. See N. Tasinov in KP 28/4/57.

3 Dubinsky, op.cit., p.15. They also saw to delivery of goods for export or for state reserves.
Interrepublican Deliveries were empowered to issue orders binding upon local supply and sales offices, (and these were not confined to interrepublican distribution orders.)

Parallel with this development went a gradual extension of the range of products centrally distributed. Under the ministerial system there were two categories of such products - 'funded' and 'planned'. The first group were the responsibility of the USSR Council of Ministers, which meant in practice USSR Gosplan. Non-funded or planned materials were allocated by the sales directorates of ministries. As stated above these directorates were transferred to USSR Gosplan in 1957, so that the division between funded and planned materials lost much of its force. The distinction lingered on, however, until 1958 or early 1959, when it was formally abolished. USSR Gosplan then 'began to formulate production and supply plans for a wide range of industrial products'; the list of commodities centrally distributed grew from 6,000 in 1955 to more than 14,000 in 1961, and by 1964 was said to have reached 15-16,000.

There has been some confusion in the West over these centrally fixed allocations. For instance it was reported to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States in 1962 that USSR Gosplan allocated only about 800-1000 products, and that the figure of 12-14,000 still referred to planned products. As we have seen this distinction no

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1. See Levine, op.cit., p.52.
2. Dubinsky, op.cit., p.15, gives 1959 as the date; Yu. Koldomasov, Planovoe khozayistvo, No. 4, 1959, p.54 states that the distinction ceased to exist in 1958.
longer existed. Within Gosplan there may still have been different levels at which the two were processed but this made no difference to the supply plan as it reached the republics.¹

To summarize, the distribution of supplies was not 'regionalized', except perhaps partially for a period in 1958, and a highly centralized supply system was an essential feature of the industrial administration during the existence of the sovarkhozy. The rise in the number of products centrally distributed may not show that an increasing proportion of the total industrial output was allocated by USSR Gosplan, but this proportion seems at least to have kept pace with the growing complexity of the output. Small wonder then that less and less was heard of localism in later years.

If it is objected that Keller has something more fundamental in mind than the ebb and flow of authority between points of the administrative hierarchy, we may descend to the enterprise managers themselves, who would without doubt constitute a 'strategic elite' in her scheme of things. In the absence of any independent publication speaking on behalf of the managers, the best way of discovering where their interests differed from those of the regime is to observe their responses to plan directives.

Perhaps the best known authority on what has been called the pathology of managerial behaviour is J.S. Berliner. He contends that although rewards for plan fulfilment are great, targets are ambitious and frequently inconsistent, so that the manager finds it difficult to fulfil his

¹The thousand items referred to in the Congress report are possibly the products for which USSR Gosplan draws up material balances. In 1963 the number of such products was extended to 1550. For 300 of the most important of these, balances and distribution plans went to the USSR Council of Ministers for confirmation (Dubinsky, op. cit., pp. 44, 45).
assignments without engaging in various unapproved or even illegal practices. Among these are systematic concealment of production capacity; falsification of output figures; overordering of input materials; employment under various guises of unauthorised agents who use influence and gifts to ease procurement problems; and hoarding of machinery and equipment - even such as is not likely to be used by the factory in question. Berliner also produces evidence that managers resist the introduction of new technological advances; are given to 'storming', i.e. producing a major part of their output towards the end of each month; to neglecting quality; and to seeking minimum production plans.¹

Long as this list of sins may seem, most could be readily documented from the Kazakhstan press. Indeed Berliner's list might be extended with variations conceived by resourceful individuals in this part of the USSR. Some of least of this unauthorised kind of behaviour was highlighted frequently enough to deserve the label of habitual. A general impression gained from hundreds of articles is that the most persistent criticism was levelled at storming, neglect of quality, and above all, resistance to technological innovation. It made no difference whether industrial administration was organised along branch or territorial lines; these practices proved to be hydra-headed. We take all this to be well established by Berliner and others.

It does not matter for the purposes of political analysis whether these practices were functional or dysfunctional to the economic system. The point is that all were strongly disapproved and formed the negative

environment with which the elite believed they had to contend. The politics of the situation was a one-sided affair, only the case for the administration being given. Take for instance what was said of managerial resistance to technological progress. An instructor of the CC Industrial Department accuses the heads of the Ust Kamenogorsk zinc plant of being 'reacquainted with technical backwardness' and 'concerned only with fulfilling the plan by any methods' (no matter how inefficient or wasteful). Plant management is soundly berated for this attitude, but there is no discussion of its root causes. Insofar as any explanation is given it centres on the inactivity of the plant's party organisation: the party bureau 'stands aside from decisions involving technical problems'. In short it is taken for granted that management should be enthusiastic about technical innovation, whereas there was no cogent reason why the director should want any change if he was fulfilling his plan by existing methods.

Even where serious analysis might have been expected one simply finds management lampooned as hopelessly conservative or stupid. Thus the CC journal reported that the leaders of the Balkhash cooper smelting works were still digging their heels in four years after a new refining process had been substantially proven by the Academy of Sciences. They allegedly defended their position, and had done so for years, by such arguments as these:

The results of the use of oxygen in the reverberatory furnace will be known in a month's time at the earliest, and in the converter towards the end of the year...Only then will it be possible to say if oxygen is an advantage under the conditions here.

Put you could have established that two or three years ago!

\[^{1}\]KP 14/3/57.
The combine then lacked sufficient ore for the old machinery to process. We had enough to do without innovations... Anyway why take on something new when we still have not fully mastered the old.\(^1\)

Such conversations disclosed the extent to which management failed to articulate its interests. A successful executive did not, by reason of the universal fiction of unity of interests, draw attention to the fact that his ends were better or more clearly served by preservation of the status quo. He subscribed publicly to increased production efficiency but his actions showed that he was perfectly content with the current relationship between techniques and gross output targets. It is not suggested that if the way had been open to collective action the managers would have proclaimed their opposition to technical change; the overwhelming case in its favour was known to no one better than these captains of industry. But they would undoubtedly have made it clear that their rewards for furthering such change were inadequate. As it was the conflicting interests of management and administration were made to appear harmonious at the verbal level, and local party organizations were constantly called upon to overcome the conservatism of industry.\(^2\)

Eventually, we now know, the Soviet leadership was constrained to take steps to vary the incentives offered to managers. Kosygin made it clear that the reforms initiated in 1965 were in part intended as an answer to systematic underfulfilment of plans for technological progress.\(^3\) We argue that the remedy, if such it proves to be, was applied not because of positive and open pressure from the managers, but because of their palpable and costly behavioural responses to earlier incentive schemes. Were the managers an effective force in the process of integrating the various group interests in Soviet society the problem would have been attacked years ago.

\(^1\) FZh K., No.5, 1963, p.24. For similar instances see ibid. No.11, 1964, p.5.
\(^2\) FZh K., No.12, 1964, p.32.
\(^3\) FZh K., No.4, 1963, p.28; No. 11, 1965, p.25.

\(^3\) Pravda 28/9/65.
and far more radically than it has been even now. It makes far more sense, therefore, to see enterprise directors as rather lowly officials somewhere near the base of a single hierarchical structure than as an autonomous interest group, or as Keller would say, a 'strategic elite'. The directors were not without recourse in their conflict with authority (as Berliner has demonstrated), but from their place in the bureaucracy the elite above must have appeared as unified as Aron described it, and not simply as an agglomeration of functionally limited elites of the kind posited by Keller.
CHAPTER 9

AN AGRICULTURAL CASE STUDY

Khrushchev's well-known penchant for organizational experimentation was nowhere more in evidence than in agriculture. The administrative machine in Kazakhstan faithfully reflected the bewildering series of changes engineered by him, more than a score of central institutions and many more local ones having been formed, dissolved and reformed over the decade. A chapter might well be devoted to sorting them out. Since, however, the institutional pattern was much the same as elsewhere in the USSR, and since that pattern has been described by others, 1 enquiry here may be pushed a stage further. Institutions, especially state institutions, have in any case been largely sterile as instruments of agricultural policy formation, as will become clear in the case study presented in this chapter. The study revolves around a small section of the party elite, and tells of the political environment in which they worked, of their relations with soil scientists, and of the policy making process itself. The institutional framework is not wholly neglected, because there were variations on the general USSR pattern, and these are relevant to our story.

As a case study the material presented here concerns a single policy area. In order to isolate such an area a set of problems peculiar to Kazakhstan was sought. One could not, of course, expect to find any issue

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of importance that did not attract Moscow's attention, but if other republics were not closely involved extraneous influence from that direction could be discounted. In short an issue was sought that arose in Kazakhstan and was resolved in conjunction with Moscow. Such an issue presented itself in the shape of the soil tillage methods used in the virgin lands scheme.

The background to this scheme can be put down briefly. Stalin's handling of agriculture had left the country in dire straits in the vital matter of grain supplies, and the CC CPSU Presidium divided over the question of how to grow more grain. Khrushchev opted for an enormous increase in the sown area, even though this meant exploiting semi-arid regions which had turned back land-hungry peasants in Tsarist times. Further attempts to grow grain in some of the areas had failed again in the 'twenties and 'thirties.\(^1\) Opposed to further ventures in these marginal lands were Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich in particular, and the 'anti-party' group in general, all of whom have been accused of obstructing and sabotaging the scheme.\(^2\) Khrushchev's solution to the problem won out, and after a hesitant beginning in 1954, the rate of expansion was stepped up sharply; within three years the plough had sliced into 36 million hectares (almost 90 million acres) of virgin and unused soil in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals, the lower Volga and the north Caucasus. A nation-wide campaign was conducted to find the manpower needed in fields that stretched from

\(^{1}\)KP 4/9/63.

\(^{2}\)The case for the opposition has never been published, but Malenkov is on record in his speech to the Nineteenth Congress as favouring more concentrated use of fertilizers in established areas and extension of irrigation networks - i.e. what Khrushchev himself finally came round to adopting.
horizon to horizon, and by the end of 1956 Kazakhstan alone had absorbed
600,000 'young patriots'. Apart from those who migrated, a million students
and workers participated in harvesting the crops in the three years to 1958.1

Early results were gratifying. In 1956 and 1958 bumper crops
were grown in the new lands, and Kazakhstan, where two-thirds of the scheme
was centered, became briefly the second largest grain producing republic of
the Union, an honour traditionally held by the Ukraine. Success induced in
Khrushchev such confidence that he now risked an ambitious degree of regional
specialization, actually cutting by millions of hectares the area sown to
cereals in European USSR, in favour of fodder crops. How ill-founded this
confidence was is now part of history. Results from here on in Kazakhstan
can be summarized as follows.

| Area sown to grain, cross harvests, state purchases, crop fertility in the Kazakh SSR |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Yield per hectare (quintals) | 9.4             | 8.6             | 6.5             | 6.5             | 4.4             | 9.8             |


1KP 31/10/56: Plema Tsentral'noi Komiteta KPSS, 15-19 Dekabtva, 1958; Stenografichesky Otchet, Moscow, 1958, p.15.
Caution is essential when dealing with dry-land farming statistics, severe fluctuations being their common characteristic the world over. If any trends are to be distinguished in the above table, the two extreme years 1963 and 1964 should probably be excluded, the former as being exceptionally unfavourable, the latter as being the most favourable in living memory. 1965 is not relevant to our case study, for reasons that will be seen later. This leaves a pattern of declining yields from 1958 to 1962 which cannot be attributed to vagaries of weather, even though most of Kazakhstan's grain areas lie between the 5 and 10 inch summer isohyets where variations in rainfall are critical. 1

Now one might name a dozen reasons for Kazakhstan's poor record. One of the greatest difficulties as far as farm directors were concerned was the failure to retain both specialists and workers because of low wages and lack of amenities. 2 Shortages of machinery and personnel led to protracted harvesting with disastrous results. 3 In 1963 the estimated

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1 No detailed weather analyses of the area have been sighted, but general newspaper reports during these five years certainly do not indicate a series of worsening seasons.

2 More than half the operator-mechanics who came to Kustanai oblast between 1955 and 1958 left. (PZh K No. 12, 1963, p. 67). Newly trained specialists, who are obliged to take up appointment wherever they are sent on completion of courses, deserted on the way to the virgin lands. Of 1466 newly trained agronomists etc. assigned there in 1956, 454 failed to arrive (Asanov, op.cit. p. 54). To counter this one obkom secretary requested that their diplomas be withheld and forwarded to the farms to which they were assigned (KP 20/3/63). Recruitment failure and resignations still left the Virgin Lands Krai short of 110,000 operators and mechanics in 1963 (PZh K, No. 12, 1963, p. 40). Insights into the reasons behind all this will be found in discussions on wages in KP 21/11/64, and living conditions in KP 11/6/58; PZh K, No. 10, 1961, p. 17; PZh K, No. 12, 1964, p. 7.

3 At the commencement of harvesting a farm might gather 12.4 tsentners per hectare, and after 3 weeks this would fall to 4 tsentners, most of the overripe grain having fallen. And it was commonplace for harvesting to extend over 35-40 days (KP 9/3/55). Kazakhstan had no agricultural machinery industry and was dependent on 400 enterprises in different parts of the USSR. Spare parts were a continual problem (KP 11/11/59).
requirement of mineral fertilizers was 14 million tons annually; production was 800,000 tons.\(^1\) These and many other problems were of the logistic kind that should have ceased had the scheme been economically sound. Most did, and none of them explains the decline in yields over five years. The basic reason for this was the tillage system used.

As early as 1955 a Soviet agronomist voiced his dismay at the extent of the area subject to wind erosion.\(^2\) Some Western observers at the time forecast that large areas would become dustbowl, but the results achieved in the first few years, the scant references to erosion, and in particular the complete silence on the subject by Khrushchev (so valuable on most agricultural problems) all led to the conclusion that the danger had been overstated. There was, the occasional warning from a troubled scientist, but this long remained the voice of one crying in a potential wilderness. 'If we do not cease mercilessly ploughing up all virgin lands fields', said one agronomist in 1962, 'there will be no escape from erosion. We must stop it immediately'.\(^3\) According to this source 456,000 hectares were subject to erosion in Pavlodar oblast by 1961, and in the Virgin Lands Krai as a whole the danger extended to 42 million hectares. How rapidly it spread after that may be seen from the fact that in mid 1963 three million hectares had been damaged in Pavlodar.\(^4\) The total

\(^1\) KP 3/8/63.
\(^2\) KP 29/11/57.
\(^3\) Pourovsk 29/7/62, p.10.
\(^4\) KP 11/6/63. This oblast is particularly subject to erosion because of its light sandy loam soils.
area affected was now over 9 million hectares, or according to another source as high as 14-15 million.¹

There are, of course, degrees of erosion, and staggering though they are, these figures do not tell us a great deal. When they are combined with accounts by farm directors of resowing thousands of hectares after a 'black storm' because seed grain has disappeared,² it becomes clear that it was erosion of the most virulent kind that bedevilled the scheme. A graphic picture of one of these storms during the summer of 1960 in Tselinograd has been recorded by a journalist, N. Laskovaya.³

A riverbed was filled with topsoil, crops were torn up or smothered in sand drifts, and a village had to be dug out by bulldozers. True, this writer was accused of putting about 'horror stories',⁴ but her account is consistent with the harvest results.

Laskovaya enquired what was being done to avert catastrophe and was referred to the director of the Institute of Grain Farming near Shorandy. He explained to her the general principles of dry-land farming

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¹KP 19/6/62 and KP 3/9/60. Note that the larger figure is a much earlier one. The discrepancy may be due to omission in one case of lands completely abandoned. In a rare statement on this subject in 1958 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers referred to 3 million hectares of ploughland abandoned during the four preceding years (KP 21/2/58). Since these were years of maximum effort to expand the sown area the only explanation possible is that fertility loss had made them unusable. See also Pravda 14/1/65 where 'thousands of hectares' are said to have been written off by two oblasts in 1963 as 'ruined by incorrect tillage practices'.

²KP 16/5/63.

³N. Laskovaya, 'Zemlya i veter', Novy Mir, No. 6, 1960, p. 188.

⁴KP 23/10/63.
based on the retention of the stubble of the previous year's crop, a
minimum of field operations, a high proportion of fallow etc. The stubble
not only helped to retain soil structure but caused the accumulation of a
thick blanket of snow in winter. This in turn prevented the soil from
freezing to a great depth; in the spring both snow and soil then thawed
together so that water was absorbed instead of running off - as was
happening in most farms. Since the area experienced drought in May and
June the technique was vital. To cultivate and sow, while preserving
stubble as far as possible, specialised farming implements were needed,
but as yet these were not being produced. The Institute had only just
received its first two factory made units; all others had been improvised.
Back in Moscow Laskovaya endeavoured to stir up the appropriate officials,
but achieved nothing. She had stumbled upon the remotest point in the whole
scheme, and her advisor was the most controversial agronomist she could
have approached.

For the purposes of our case study we must be sure that dry-land
farming was in fact the correct solution to Kazakhstan's woes, and that the
contest against these inhospitable lands was not a hopeless one. This
is established by the fact that there are areas in Canada (in particular
the province of Saskatchewan) whose natural environment is almost identical
with that of northern Kazakhstan, and which have now been farmed

1 For eventual Soviet recognition of the similarity of the two regions see
KP 3/9/63 and 23/10/63. "Amazingly similar" in natural environment (soils,
rainfall, temperature patterns) is how Saskatchewan and Pavlodar are
described by an official who had earlier opposed the Shortzandy Institute's
recommendations. For a comparison by a Western agricultural economist of
both conditions and farming methods in the two places, see Carl Zorb, "The
Virgin Lands Territory : Plans, Performance, Prospects", Studies on
continuously for over fifty years. Yields there during the decade (when the Soviet areas enjoyed the advantage of their original fertility) have been 79% better than in the Virgin Lands Krai, and erosion has been effectively beaten. The question of mineral fertilizers, it must be added, is largely irrelevant. (Comparisons made for other areas generally show Soviet farms at a disadvantage.) Dry-land farming is not suited to heavy applications of mineral fertilizers and the Canadian achievement can be attributed almost entirely to soil tillage practices which restore depleted organic matter and build up soil structure. Agronomists argue over the details of these practices in Canada as in Kazakhstan, but the principles are the same in both places. They are those outlined to Laskovaya in 1960.

It is possible then to identify a clear issue, a blunder, and a correct solution; for this one must be grateful. The political scientist may well be diffident when neither Soviet nor Western economists can agree about the significance of differing proposals for strengthening the profitability criterion in a command economy. He may despair at the complexity of issues in many policy areas. Here at least the lines are clearly drawn and we may proceed to ask why and how.

In terms of human inertia and rural conservatism there is, of course, nothing very surprising in the fact that fundamentally wrong tillage methods should have prevailed at first. The assumption was

1Carl Zeerb, op.cit., p. 39.
2It took near disaster to convince the Canadians that European farming methods were unsuited to conditions on their prairies; and the 'bad lands' parts of USA are a monument to perverse conservatism there. There is however, room for comment on the fact that the same or worse could occur in a centrally planned economy, especially as the fund of world knowledge on dry-farming had grown rapidly in this century.
carried over from Western USSR that annual deep autumn ploughing was the
universal foundation for high crop yields. The whole scheme was
apparently hastily conceived and no attention paid to the peculiarities
of the region. According to several accounts the idea arose in backroom
consultations at the September 1953 plenum of the CC CPSU. Khrushchev
found the Bureau of the Kazakh CC, as then constituted, either cool or
hostile. He thereupon consulted oblast officials who proved more receptive.
The republican leadership was replaced and the project launched under
the direction of two top party leaders.¹

By early 1955 there was plenty of discussion at a low level
about the techniques best suited to the new lands. Either the new
leaders were still in an experimental mood or perhaps too preoccupied
with organizational problems already referred to. To add to their
difficulties this was the period of Khrushchev's initial maize campaign,
and party officials were having no little trouble imposing the minimum
200 hectares on every farm.² Recommendations from the Ministry of
Agriculture were conventional and took no account of the questions that
were being raised.³

In the absence of any extensive experimental data for northern
Kazakhstan,⁴ discussion began to focus on the work of T.S. Mal'tsev,
a farm agronomist in Kurgan oblast further north in the RSFSR.

Essentially Mal'tsev's system consisted of boardless⁵ deep ploughing of

¹KP 22/11/60, 23/7/63. See further Chapter 10.
²Farms were objecting that 'maize has never grown in our harsh areas and
never will' KP 12/2/55.
³See KP 9/3/55, 26/5/55.
⁴See article by Kh. Syundyukov, KP 20/1/55.
⁵I.e. the plough has no mouldboard and soil is not inverted.
fallow land followed by several years of superficial cultivation before each crop was sown. Kurgan is not a rich arable oblast, but its soils are generally heavier and summer rainfall slightly higher than those of the Kazakh virgin lands. What was 'light' cultivation in Kurgan was still harmful in, say, Pavlodar, because of excessive reliance on discing operations. This was pointed out by A.S. Baraev, a Deputy Minister of Agriculture, in October 1955. While supporting positive elements of the Mal'tsev system, especially boardless ploughing, he called for production of a drill plough and other implements that would reduce the number of spring operations. Some backing for Baraev's stand can be read into a speech by the first secretary of Pavlodar obkom, I.I. Afonov, at the party Congress in January 1956. Wind erosion was already prevalent over large areas of the oblast, said Afonov, and it was time to renounce stereotyped practices and standard implements. There is insufficient detail in the speech report to be sure he supported Baraev in detail, but everything points that way. Afonov was dismissed fifteen months later, one of the charges then laid against him being that under his leadership the oblast had forgotten advanced experience in agriculture and lacked a well thought-out system of field operations. Since he had been the first party official to question the suitability of European farming practices,

1 For details of the system see I.S. Mal'tsev, New Method of Soil and Crop Cultivation, Moscow, 1956.
2 KP 21/10/55.
3 KP 28/1/56.
4 KP 11/4/57.
the charge against him can probably be translated to mean that he had allowed experimentation.¹

Mal’tsev’s methods were endorsed in a postanovlenie of the CC and Council of Ministers in August 1955, L.I. Brezhnev, then First Secretary in Kazakhstan, directing that it should be adhered to in every farm.² Had practice matched this official policy perhaps no great harm would have been done. The system did at least retain more moisture than traditional methods, and made little use of the mouldboard plough – one of the major causes of erosion.³ Mal’tsev himself was no dogmatist and recommended further experimentation for Kazakhstan.⁴ The new policy got off to a good start with approval from the USSR Ministry of State Farms, and a promise of 20,000 Mal’tsev ploughs.⁵ Only six weeks later, however, when an agronomist asked when these might be supplied, he was told by the Minister of Agriculture, G.A. Mel’nik, that this was an inappropriate question to ask.⁶ The August 1955 postanovlenie was never rescinded, but the machinery never arrived.

¹ His successor, S.D. Elagin, never raised the subject again, with the result that by 1963 Pavlodar was a disaster area. The harvest that year averaged 1.8 tsentners/hectare for the oblast, which is about enough to replace seed grain. Elagin tried to cover up by ‘deception of the state and padding figures’ for the 1960 harvest. This won him an award at the time, but finally led to his expulsion from the party. KP 7/2/61, 1/3/61, 29/9/61.
² KP 26/1/56.
³ This implement is almost a museum piece in Saskatchewan.
⁴ KP 24/2/55.
⁵ KP 8/2/56.
⁶ KP 24/3/56. Four years later there were still ‘very few’ Mal’tsev ploughs in the republic – KP 13/3/60.
By the end of 1956 traditional methods were being proclaimed again, and Baraev, whose recommendations would have placed an ever greater load on industry, was under attack. The reason for this de facto abandonment of Mal'tsev and vague accusations about Baraev's 'weak direction of scientific work' is not hard to guess. Without applying dry-land farming methods the republic had produced such a harvest that transport and storage facilities were unable to handle the grain. Baraev either resigned or was removed as deputy minister, and is next heard of as director of the institute near Shortandy in Tselinograd oblast; it was here that Laskovaya later met him. No one wanted the position it seems; the land was infested with weeds and resources were meagre. But despite official indifference Baraev set about testing his theories, and for years to come his institute was the only place in Kazakhstan where a complete anti-erosion system was practised.

There is no evidence that Baraev's disgrace marked any conflict of views among either central or republican leaders. Within the republic Afonov was the only known convert of any standing at this stage, and any doubts Khrushchev may have had were probably assuaged by the 1956 harvest. The 'anti-party' forces, of course, being allegedly opposed to the whole scheme, would not have favoured tooling up for a production run on new machinery. Baraev's ideas were probably regarded merely as a variant on Mal'tsev's, and these were quietly shelved.

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1KP 13/12/56.
2KP 30/10/56, 11/1/57.
3See H.A. Kleshnya's speech, KP 23/3/57.
4KP 22/11/60, 28/7/64.
5Verbal homage continued to be paid to the Mal'tsev system for a further year or more.
Another false start was made at the beginning of 1959 when it was announced that a scientifically based system of farming the virgin lands had been evolved by specialists of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Kazakh Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Teams of experts were shortly to visit each raion to introduce the programme.¹ In later years it was claimed by a member of the Academy that this had been a complete anti-erosion system,² but that it was never put into practice. How true this was is impossible to assess, because all that was said at the time was that clean fallow was to figure largely in the scheme and that grass covers were to be introduced where erosion was prevalent. If there was more to the original scheme it was scotched almost immediately: Belyaev, the First Secretary, quickly declared his satisfaction with the machinery being supplied,³ whereas any scheme resembling Baraev's would have entailed a general re-equipment of the farms. The agronomists who wrote on the new system after Belyaev's pronouncement were, moreover, those who had been outspoken against Baraev in the past. They now achieved the feat of describing the 'new' system without reference to the tillage methods to be used.⁴

Whatever lay behind this incident there was at least enough rethinking at the time to allow Baraev a voice again. He seized upon the crux of the matter, the extreme need for specialized machinery, only to be attacked again. The new system, whatever it was, never saw daylight and republican leaders appeared to lose interest again until the poor 1959 harvest was gathered. Just before his removal as First Secretary N.I. Belyaev belatedly came out in favour of boardless ploughing and stubble

¹KP 16/1/59, 20/2/59.
²KP 4/9/63.
³KP 15/1/59. See also editorial KP 24/2/59.
⁴See e.g. V. Tsoi's article, KP 18/2/59.
retention. At the CC CPSU plenum in December he revealed the extent of eroded ploughland and said he was awaiting the outcome of proposals he had put to party and government leaders in Moscow on production of new types of farm implements in Kazakhstan. Khrushchev was clearly skeptical about Belyaev's conversion to the system. He pointed out that thousands of pieces of machinery had not been used during the sowing and harvesting in Kazakhstan. 'I asked you comrade Belyaev, what you needed in order to ensure timely harvesting of the crop. You replied, nothing is needed, everything has been done'. The implication appears to be that Khrushchev might have given favourable consideration to the proposals had they been put up earlier but not now when they looked like an excuse for failure.

If not distorted the conversation also shows the priority given to Kazakhstan in allocation of resources, for the almost universal plea at the time was lack of machinery and spare parts. In view of subsequent events it would seem that Belyaev's about-face only prejudiced Khrushchev against any revision of tillage policy. One indication of how unwelcome Baraev's radical recommendations had become in Moscow was that T.D. Lysenko, the director of the Institute of Genetics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, eventually joined in the anti-Baraev chorus.

Oddly, Lysenko's speech in Kazakhstan was not published until a month after it was made, a circumstance which might indicate protection for Baraev under the new Khrushchev regime. One suspects that Moscow directed

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2. Pravda 29/12/59.
3. KP 7/8/60. Lysenko challenged Baraev's system only peripherally, advocating an earlier sowing period. Baraev eventually demonstrated the soundness of his views on this point too. For recognition of this see PZh K, No. 5, 1963, p.61; KP 4/2/64.
the publication of the views of Khrushchev's protégé. A similar occurrence towards the end of 1960 was an apology by Kazakhstanskaya Pravda for printing a particularly misleading and confused attack on Barasev by a fellow agronomist. The article in question had relied heavily on the authority of Lysenko. Resistance to the latter's incursions cannot be taken as support for Barasev, however; Lysenko can be presumed to have been unpopular with most specialists irrespective of their views on agrotechnical methods. In any case there is no way of knowing who caused the newspaper to retract.

There was not little hope of any policy change despite the growing inroads of erosion. On taking up office as First Secretary Kunaev was warned by Khrushchev against 'oversimplification' of agrotechniques. Furthermore 1960 brought Khrushchev's energetic anti-fallow drive. Fallow was an essential part of both Kal'tsev's and Barasev's systems, and one more readily appreciated than their other recommendations whose import was largely long-term. Kazakhstan's leaders had been convinced of the merits of fallow even in the midst of the euphoria of 1956. Yakovlev described it as 'the decisive condition for raising fertility', and this remained the view of his successors until the anti-fallow drive. As in the case of the Kal'tsev policy, however, practice fell far short of principle. Sowing plans were so ambitious that farm directors found it

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1KP 3/9/60, 8/12/60.
2KP 22/1/60. 'Oversimplification' was an indirect way of condemning Barasev's system, as will be shown below.
3KP 1/2/57, 4/11/58, 11/1/59.
impossible to avoid planting every hectare for years on end. The result of Khrushchev's intervention in this matter was thus simply to legitimate existing practice: in late 1963 the proportion of fallow in the Virgin lands Krai was 5% - just what it had been in the mid 'fifties.

During his campaign to replace fallow by intertilled crops, Khrushchev explained on several occasions that he did not wish to force his views on the farms. If he was sincere in this, then he greatly underestimated his own power. With yields on the decline the safe course was to follow mistaken recommendations from Khrushchev and attribute the results to climatic conditions. Local party men did not allow even Baraev to continue his research unimpeded. After a visit by Khrushchev to the Shourtandy institute the primary party organization there saw to it that Baraev cut his clean fallow by half and planted intertilled crops in its stead. Presumably the long term value of many of his experiments was lost. Directors of farms and other experimental stations with Baraev's kind of fortitude were rare: they simply abandoned clean fallow altogether - and were praised for doing so.

1 PZh K, No. 4, 1960, p. 69. As one correspondent complained from a raion where all the land marked for fallow had been sown, 'They don't think of the future - their only concern is to get results this year' (KP 13/1/59). While 16-20% fallow continued to be advocated the actual area never exceeded 4-5% of the sown area before 1958. Moreover it was commonly admitted that land was allegedly put to fallow was not in fact cultivated. Figures from here on showed some improvement, but were misleading because they included 'occupied fallow', which simply meant the area sown to corn or other intertilled crops.
2 It is not intended to infer that this measure was mistaken in better favoured areas.
3 See e.g. KP 16/3/64.
4 PZh K No. 5, 1963, p. 60.
5 KP 28/12/61.
By now it should be evident that the issue was never simply one of politicians versus experts. There were in fact several senior agronomists who disagreed with Baraev. It was argued that his system multiplied weeds and pests, and that deep mouldboard ploughing was the best way to combat these.\(^1\) Given that supplies of both herbicides and insecticides were hopelessly inadequate, this was true. It was also true that fertility loss and damage to soil structure resulted. Kazakhstan's leaders were thus faced with a dilemma. If they secured the partial introduction of Baraev's system they faced intensification of an already troublesome insect and weed problem\(^2\); if they ignored it completely they faced erosion on a grand scale. What Baraev was offering was an integrated system that could not properly be adopted in part. Perhaps his opponents were more realistic in the prevailing circumstances, for it was later admitted that two years of plant construction would be required before the needed chemicals could be produced. But there is no question as to who was right.\(^3\)

There are several indications that Kunaev came to favour a change of policy despite Khrushchev's warning about 'oversimplification of agrotechniques'. Kunaev stated in early 1961 that Khrushchev had 'more than once' rejected these techniques,\(^4\) so presumably Kunaev or someone...

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\(^1\) KP 26/8/60.


\(^3\) Nor does the realism of Baraev's opponents temper the dishonesty with which they attacked 'those who think they can live easily by sowing among stubble and carry on the struggle with weeds and insects by chemicals, at the expense of the state'. (N. Spivachenko, director of Akmolinsk Plant Protection Station, KP 22/10/60).

\(^4\) KP 13/1/61.
under him had promoted them to the Soviet leader 'more than once'. There
is little doubt that 'oversimplification' was an esoteric reference to
Barsnev's system. In the context of the semi-public debate among
agronomists it meant superficial cultivation and failure to remove
stubble; to these experts the message would have been unmistakable.1

The first secretary of the Virgin Lands kraikom, T.I. Sokolov,
whom Kunaev regarded as 'one of the leading specialists and organizers
of agricultural production',2 chose not to understand Khrushchev's
strictures on 'oversimplification' and appealed for specialised implements
and extension of fallows3. There is no record of Khrushchev's response -
for some reason he was not prepared to make a forthright policy declaration
as yet. Sokolov continued to show his leanings towards Barsnev, referring
favourably to the latter's institute at a time when its fortunes were
at their nadir.4 By the end of 1962, when Khrushchev was making his
now annual attack on leadership in the virgin lands, Sokolov became
desperate. A careful analysis of his speech to the November CC CPSU
plenum shows that he claims to have done all that Khrushchev had

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1 Kunaev certainly interpreted Khrushchev's remarks in the manner suggested;
a short time later he gave an address in which he turned particular
attention to the impermissability of oversimplification of agricultural
techniques, superficial cultivation of the soil in place of spring
ploughing4 (KP 2/2/61. See also PZh K, No. 4, 1962, p.7). Publicly
Khrushchev continued to assume an attitude of sweet reasonableness,
declaring that he was against any attempts to force a single tillage
system on the virgin lands (KP 22/1/61); since the traditional system
was being applied predominantly this meant he was opposed to change.
2 KP 22/1/60.
3 KP 14/1/61. Sokolov failed to indicate what kind of fallow he wanted,
but since 'occupied fallow' was now the vogue the omission is significant.
4 KP 9/3/62. See also KP 15/6/60, 30/9/61.
recommended, but that this was 'still not enough'. He again asked for specialized implements and compared, without comment, the results of
wheat sown after fallow and after maize; they were an effective answer
to Khrushchev's 'queen of the fields'.

The desperate throw failed and a few months later Sokolov was removed for 'unsatisfactory fulfilment of decisions of the party on the development of agriculture'.

The whole krai komin bureau came under severe attack at the time and its second secretary endeavoured to exculpate himself by asserting that

many of the mistakes of comrade Sokolov took place under the eye of leading workers of the republic. As is now becoming clear, special conversations were held with him in the CC of the CP of Kazakhstan.

This remark is not clarified in any way, and it is odd that conversations between the CC Bureau and the krai first secretary should be adduced as reprehensible. One interpretation is that, since Kunaev was demoted to Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the end of 1962, reference is to conversations between him and Sokolov. Could it be that Sokolov had convinced Kunaev that Khrushchev's veto on 'simplified' methods was erroneous?

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1KP 25/11/62. Baraev's temerity on the subject of maize was notorious. He recommended that it should be confined to an area near the animal husbandry section of farms - thus excluding it from the crop rotation system: (KP 7/1/59).

2KP 20/3/63. He has reappeared since Khrushchev's fall as first secretary of Orlov obkom, Pravda 27/10/63.

3KP 20/3/63.

4If this hypothesis is right, it indicates a shift in Kunaev's position as evidenced by the Kleschev case in early 1966. Kleschev was an obkom first secretary who came out in favour of a systematic anti-erosion policy after crop failures in Kokchetav. At the time Kunaev was unsympathetic and placed an entirely different construction on the failures (KP 9/6/61). Further rapid erosion and Sokolov's advice apparently caused the change. In any case Kleschev is another example of a party official removed after supporting at least part of Baraev's system.
Any doubts that it was Khrushchev himself who vetoed the introduction of dry-farming methods were dispelled at the end of 1961, when the veto passed beyond the cryptic stage. Khrushchev was so voluble on most aspects of agriculture that his esoteric remarks cited above can only mean that he had still entertained some nagging doubts. By November 1961 there was no sign of these. Back in Kazakhstan for the third time in the one year he singled Baraev out for ridicule at a public meeting. With his characteristically earthy humour he suggested that someone at the conference should put a flea or two under the scientist's shirt to cut short his day-dreaming. "If we change over to the system recommended by comrade Baraev", he declared unequivocally, "then we can say in advance that the task set by the 22nd Party Congress would be difficult to fulfil."

Something of a witchhunt ensued. An agronomist publicly recanted his 'mistaken' views on fallow; numerous farm directors were removed for failing to adhere to directions on tillage methods; eventual complete exclusion of clean fallow from the crop rotation system was adopted as long term policy; specialists dutifully lined up in praise of Khrushchev's 'intertilled system'; an author whose work emerged without adjustment to the new line was roughly handled by reviewers, and

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1KP 25/11/61.
2KP 6/1/62.
3KP 18/5/63.
4KP 24/3/62.
5See agricultural conference KP 31/3/62.
6PZh K No. 8, 1962, p.77.
so forth. The atmosphere throughout 1962 was so bleak that comic relief is afforded by a bewildered local chief agronomist in Pavlodar (where some flexibility was still allowed because of the extent of erosion there); he assumed 'a neutral position' on the boardless plough 'for safety's sake'. Such was the climate in which Sokolov and probably Kunaev attempted to influence their leader's soil policy for the republic.

It is hardly surprising that when the denouement came, it came quietly indeed. In August 1963 a member of the republic's Academy of Sciences declared bluntly that 60-90% of the agricultural machinery should be replaced by new units which performed all field operations without greatly disturbing the residue of the previous crop. No comment on the plea followed, and it appears to be no more than another grumble from a conscientious scientist with little political acumen. A month later, however, a full newspaper page was devoted to the experiences of Canadian wheat farmers in the 'thirties and their current anti-erosion techniques. This was a clear change of heart, for one of the charges previously levelled at Baraev was that he had wanted 'mechanical importation' of Canadian dry-farming.

1KP 2/10/62. The crowning irony was Khrushchev's reproof of Kazakhstan's leaders for the crop failure in 1962:

The leaders of the CC CP of Kazakhstan and the Council of Ministers of the republic...do not take into account the peculiarities of the virgin lands, do not listen to the voice of advanced science and practice, and have neglected the land.

(Plenum Iss. KPSS, 19-23 Novabrva, 1962 goda i stenograficheskoy otchet. Moscow, 1963, p.74.)

2KP 3/8/63.

3KP 3/9/63.

4KP 3/9/60 - Baraev had been to Canada to study developments there.
The following day the republic's senior agronomist made known some of the erosion statistics quoted earlier and discussion was invited. This was limited to several articles outlining the experience of the Shortandy institute and soon the only political interest remaining in the issue was the question of who would be the scapegoat. Perhaps to the silent regret of the harried team at Shortandy there was none. The 1963 crop failure, although the worst yet, was also the most peaceful.\(^1\)

At the November 1963 plenum, First Secretary I. Yusupov announced briefly that measures were planned to combat wind erosion, and then devoted the remainder of his speech to the nation-wide campaign to stimulate interest in fertilizer and irrigation. A month later Khrushchev referred shortly to recommendations on new methods of soil cultivation and the use of fallow in dry areas. He allowed that these measures seemed to be correct for the virgin lands.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) A sharp contrast from events twelve months earlier, when, apart from Kunaev's demotion and Sokolov's dismissal, at least three obkom first secretaries were removed for agricultural failures. Kunaev's Second Secretary was moved from the republic at the same time, though no reason was given in his case. Nearly all these officials have been rehabilitated since Khrushchev's fall. Conversely Sokolov's successor in the Virgin Lands Krai, F.S. Kolomlets, who said that 'tried and proven methods of agriculture must become law' (PZh K No. 10, 1962, p.25) has been removed.

\(^2\) Pravda 15/12/63. The volte face passed less smoothly at the local party conferences at the close of the year, in one oblast where an obvious attempt to stifle discussion was made, the conference degenerated into uproar (KP 20/11/63). Elsewhere there was fairly frank recognition that the 1963 conference was not explicable solely in terms of the drought. To illustrate this we may cite one comparison made between Sarayev's results and the rest of the Krai, (KP 20/11/63).

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1963</th>
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<tr>
<td>Average Virgin Land Krai Yield</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutes yield (quintals/hectare)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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fashion he confessed obliquely that he had told only part of the story when he had attributed the 1963 crop failure to drought. His subsequent silence on the subject, the absence of further dismissals in Kazakhstan, and the timing of the policy change to coincide with the fanfare to herald the fertilizer era, all add up to tacit recognition of ten years of costly blunders.

Before attempting to assess the case study presented here one general comment is called for. The magnitude of the issue contrasted sharply with the amount of public discussion that took place. During the years the Shortandy Institute was in disfavour, especially from 1960 to 1963, its work was known principally through sporadic attacks on it. In fact it was only in 1963 that the full system advocated by Barasov was published; only then did it become clear to the writer (admittedly no authority on soil sciences) what much of the controversy had been about. Armed with this retrospective knowledge one could comb the skimpy reports that had been devoted to dry-land farming in earlier years.

The paucity of discussion deserves to be stressed because it bears upon a much canvassed aspect of change in the USSR. It is commonly agreed that the heavy-handed methods of Stalin and the area of politically motivated decision-making has receded before the encroachment of wider consultation with lower formations, a better upward flow of specialist advice, and consequently more rational policies. Much of what has happened since Stalin can undoubtedly be seen in this way. The virgin lands scheme merits attention because so many elements of it ran counter to the alleged overall trend. The muted discussion was only one of these. There was the rejection of professional advice, the following of the arbitrary preferences of one man, and evaluation of the performance of
hundreds of party and state officials on results that were a reflection of misguided direction from above, rather than professional incompetence. If a growing concern for order, for technical and professional standards can be said to be the forces working towards rationalization in a modern society, then they may not be as diffuse and persistent in this political system as is sometimes argued. If they are, then their ineffectiveness for so long in Kazakh agriculture needs to be explained by equal and opposite forces.

As suggested in the narrative there is little cause to wonder at what happened up to 1956 or even 1958. Interpretation must focus on the continued ruthless despoliation of the new lands after that. And since the ultimate responsibility for tillage policy was undoubtedly Khrushchev's it is well to emphasize the extent of his personal involvement in the scheme from 1954 on. He alone, of all the CC CPSU Presidium members, publicly and fully committed himself on the issue before June 1957. Such support as he did receive within the CC CPSU Presidium was at best permissive. In official histories he was fêted as the 'initiator and organizer' of the scheme, so that his political standing rested heavily on its success. How conscious he was himself this is evident from his

1 The turnover at the top has been noted. At the other end of the scale 257 chairmen of collective farms (39% of the total number) and 431 directors of state farms (33%) were changed in two years (KP 14/6/63).


3 At the same time it should be said that opposition cannot have been as strong as he claimed later, since in 1954 he was still dependent on ad hoc alliances within the top leadership to push his agricultural policies through, and a formal vote on a scheme of this size must surely have been inescapable.
sensitivity to any suggestion that performance was not all that he loudly and often said it was.1

No matter how enormous Khrushchev's authority from 1957 on, or how jealously he retained final say on policy details, he was after all dependent on what information, pressures and recommendations came to him from below. From this viewpoint it might be argued that the bureaucracy failed in its functions, and that analysis should begin here. To be sure (the argument might continue) Khrushchev would not have been well disposed to suggestions that he had been even partly wrong, because he had succeeded at first in the virgin lands just when he most needed success,2 and despite the prophets of doom at home and abroad. Nevertheless, because his political prestige was at stake, the bureaucrats below him should have been able to bring about a radical rethinking on his part well before 1963.

Indeed one does not have to look far for bottlenecks. Although, as we have seen, the right kind of advice did begin to come from Kazakhstan from at least 1959 on, it appears to have been neither steady nor forceful. Belyaev and Sokolov failed to take up firm positions until it was improbable that they would be listened to, and a sycophant like Kunaev is unlikely to have presented a strong case. But which are the causes and which the results when the leader takes it upon himself to prescribe

1See e.g. Pravda 10/12/63 where he berates 'enemies of the Soviet Union' for connecting the drive for fertilizer production with failures in the virgin lands.
2i.e. just as the 'anti-party' crisis was looming. To what precise extent the 1956 harvest was instrumental in winning support at the crucial June 1957 plenum is a matter for conjecture. It may not have influenced CC CPSU members already committed to one side or the other for direct patronage reasons, but who knows how many may have been swayed by the best results Soviet agriculture had yet produced? Grain was then, as it is today, the most highly political commodity of all.
agricultural policy in such detail, and to remove his lieutenants as frequently as Khrushchev did? His prejudices and preferences were well known and he pressed them vigorously both where appropriate, and where, as in Kazakhstan, they were not. A vicious circle was produced, for there was always the specialist on hand to pander to him.\(^1\) Whatever Yumurov may have thought of Baraev's proposals he could hardly promote them after what had gone before. As far as is known he remained silent until Khrushchev finally discovered the answer for himself from the work at Shortandy. Even after his inconspicuous capitulation in 1963 the Soviet leader remained only half convinced.\(^2\) Had he remained in power there is little doubt that the remarkable but fortuitous recovery made by the virgin lands in 1964 would have confirmed him in his view that he knew better than the experts. There was a good deal of evidence of backsliding from the Baraev system in the last few months before Khrushchev's fall.\(^3\)

The administrative style in agriculture under Khrushchev bore little resemblance to the weberian ideal-type, where 'the primary source of superiority of bureaucratic administration lies in the role of technical knowledge', and where 'the trained permanent official is more likely to get his way in the long run than his nominal superior...who is not a specialist'.\(^4\) Far more can be learned of the decision-making process in

\(^1\) Even during his last visit to Kazakhstan he was able to find a director of an experimental station who assured him that clean fallow was not needed in the virgin lands (KP 14/8/64). Much of the specialist opposition to Baraev was generated in this way.

\(^2\) During the same visit he again attacked Baraev for insisting on the need for 15-20% clean fallow, and even 20% is low according to Canadian experience (KP 16/8/64).

\(^3\) See KP 3/9/64, 5/9/64, 29/9/64, 16/10/64.

agriculture by following Khrushchev on his tours than by study of the regular administrative organs. In Kazakhstan the history of technical policies, much simplified here for the sake of brevity, was a labyrinth of turns and abandoned paths. Every other year the Ministry of Agriculture or academic scientists were said to be on the verge of producing the complete system for the virgin lands. None of this came to fruition because the Khrushchev campaign of the moment swept all else aside. Any temptation to regard recommendations made by Khrushchev at conferences in various centers as mere friendly advice should be rejected - we have already observed the effects of his 'advice' at Shartandy. At republican level there is a document revealingly headed 'Report of the CC CP of Kazakhstan to the CC CPSU on progress in fulfilment of the instructions [ukazanii] given by N.S. Khrushchev in a speech to the conference of workers of production directorates'.

It lists in some detail the measures adopted in the republic during the preceding two months; they correspond exactly to recommendations made by Khrushchev at a conference in the RSFSR. All are largely irrelevant to the main problems that confronted the Kazakh republic and can have served only to distract officials from their duties. Obkom officials, too, rushed to implement the itinerant leader's prescriptions with the same zeal, even those formulated in areas with different climatic conditions.

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2. Pravda 30/6/62.
3. See Kompartia etc. pp.66-68 for a similar report from the Kurtanai obkom. It tells how buckwheat, fodder beans and several other cultures have just been introduced into the oblast following Khrushchev's advice given in the Ukraine and Tsalinskograd. What was good for the Ukraine was good for the virgin lands too!
The reason for this close watch on regional conferences by republican and local officials was that Khrushchev formulated new policies as he toured the countryside, informing the CC CPSU Presidium of them only on his return to Moscow. 1 Judging by the speed with which local party leaders reported fulfilment of these policies (2-3 months in the cases cited above), they probably did not even wait for directives through normal bureaucratic channels. Khrushchev himself disclosed at times that he was aware of the weight his views carried, despite modest disclaimers to the contrary. 2

Khrushchev was a transitional leader in agriculture, initially progressive in dealing with urgent and obvious problems, but ultimately unwilling or unable to appreciate new and more complex problems generated by his actions. The virgin lands scheme is but one illustration of this; there are many others. 3 Had he been cast in a less troubled and restless mould he might have left the agricultural bureaucracy to extend the work he began, but although his receptiveness to new ideas declined sharply after 1958 he continued to interfere in agriculture to an extent unparalleled by the leader of any great modern nation. He was highly

2 At the Saratov conference a proposal was made to insert in the document adopted a point on the need to introduce Mal'tsev's system. I consider this should not be done. Why? Because if we insert such a point, then with us it is recognised as a kind of law, and people will think no discussion is needed. They will say it is quite clear without this. The First Secretary of the Party CC was there and this decision is law'. (N.3. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo komunizma v SSR 4 razvitie sel'skogo khozyaistva, Moscow, 1963, Vol. II, p.45). See also Khrushchev's discussion of pledges on meat production, Pravda 17/10/59.
mistrustful of the state bureaucracy, shunting the Ministries of Agriculture and State Farms out of Moscow to farm sites, and regularly reorganizing the components below them. As Hove points out the deliberate downgrading of state agencies had the effect by 1962 of making the party the sole organ capable of deciding agricultural policy at the centre.¹

And however justified argument may be about how Khrushchev shared power in other spheres, none of the party leaders was ever able to wrest the initiative from him in agriculture.

All this is fairly well known and it remains only to see how this style of administration affected institutions in Kazakhstan. Khrushchev's reaction to the crop failures was, briefly, to take virgin lands affairs out of the hands of the republic and make the northern administration his own creature. In January 1960 a Ministry of State Farms was set up, its function being to direct agriculture throughout the six northern oblasts.² In keeping with the practice of having party organs parallel state institutions, a Bureau of the CC CP Kazakhstan for Northern Oblasta was established at the same time. Its centre was in Akmolinsk (now Tselinograd) - the only example of a territorial unit of the CC apparatus. The agricultural administration for the republic was thus roughly divided between the virgin lands and established areas. Both the Northern Bureau and the Ministry of State Farms were created 'on the initiative of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev personally'.³

² i.e. agriculture in both state and collective farms, not only the former as the title might suggest. The title derived from the fact that state farms predominate in the area.
³ BR 11/3/60.
These moves turned out to be the forerunner to establishment of the Virgin Lands Krai in December 1960. This was an innovation among the politico-administrative divisions of the USSR. Six other Krai existed, all in the RSFSR, and they differed from oblasts only in size, and in having within their territory one or more autonomous oblasts.¹ The new krai, however, did not replace, but was superimposed on the existing oblasts. Unusual as this structure was, it was a minor novelty compared with the special administrative arrangements that accompanied it.

In a memorandum to the CC CPSU Presidium dated 29 October 1960 Khrushchev describes how he rejected a proposal by Kunaev to reduce the size of administrative divisions in the virgin lands and create an additional oblast. His ground for the rejection was that a new oblast would require an apparatus of not less than 500 officials. His counter proposal, the establishment of a krai, would, on the other hand, be accompanied by a reduction in the staff of the republican Council of Ministers and Gosplan. He revealed that planning of technical supply and financing of the virgin lands oblasts had, by a recent decision, been separated from those of the remainder of the republic, and the purpose of the forthcoming reorganization was to further 'strengthen the responsibility of Union organs'. The new new kraikom and kraispolkom should be placed under dual subordination, i.e. they would be republican organs, 'but leadership should be exercised for 5-7 years by the CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. Planning should also be from the centre'.²

¹The Faritime Krai is an exception - it has no autonomous oblast within its borders.
²N.S. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo etc., Vol. IV, pp.168-170.
Although no reference is to be found to implementation of these measures in the *History of the State and Law of Soviet Kazakhstan*, there are pieces of evidence to show that centralization was effected. The krai was made a self-contained unit, even the Virgin Lands sovnarkhoz being subordinated to the krai spolkom (instead of the Kazakh Council of National economy) — a completely unique arrangement. This too was the result of Khrushchev's 'personal initiative'. We also know that the kraikom addressed memoranda directly to the CC CPSU rather than to the CC CP Kazakhstan. Finally, Khrushchev instructed Kunaev and Beisebaev (Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers) to desist from tutelage of krai organizations, and took Kunaev to task for the failure of planning organs to follow the special procedures set down for the virgin lands. The latter reproof was given some two years after establishment of the krai and suggests Khrushchev did not succeed fully in having the krai run from Moscow, but clearly the influence of republican organs over the area was greatly reduced.

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1 Where, incidentally, the story of the virgin lands is now told without reference to Khrushchev. (Vol. III, Alma-Ata, 1965).
2 KP 26/12/62.
3 KP 5/1/61. (K.K. Kryukova's speech).
4 An example of such a document is to be found in Kompartia Kazakhstana etc., p.c.t. There is also an example of a communication to the CC CP Kazakhstan, but all memoranda from local party organs outside the Virgin Lands krai are to the Kazakh CC.
5 KP 26/12/62.
In the first editorial of the Kazakh party journal after Khrushchev's fall it was said that 'In recent times, as a result of breaches of the norms of party life the role of party organs has been minimized; they were even forbidden to interfere in economic affairs'.

The general tenor of criticism elsewhere at the time (and subsequently in Kazakhstan too) ran in the opposite direction: party organs had become too involved in day to day economic affairs. It is likely therefore that the above lines refer to the exceptional position of the Virgin Lands Krai under Khrushchev, and the restrictions placed on the Kazakh CC Bureau vis-à-vis the Krai.

In a recent work on grain farming in the USSR we are told that a system well suited to the virgin lands was developed a comparatively long time ago by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Grain Farming [at Shortandy] and in a number of experimental stations, but for an unknown reason it was not extended beyond the stage of institute experiments.

Since L.I. Brezhnev was one of the early executors of the virgin lands scheme he cannot be expected to have a vested interest in unpeeling all the layers of propaganda and concealment that have been wrapped around it.

The same applies to Kunaev, now reinstated as First Secretary in Kazakhstan.

So far as is known, Laraev has still received little recognition - tributes to his institute have been, as in the example cited above, impersonal.

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1 PZh K, No. 11, 1964, p.5.
2 T.A. Koval', Zernoye khozyaistvo SSR, Moscow, 1965, p.27. (Emphasis added.)
3 More recently a brief but glowing tribute to Laraev has provided a welcome exception to the treatment accorded him in the post-Khrushchev era. He has at last been praised for not betraying the principles of a man of science. See Yu. Chernichenko 'Na tseline', Pravda 12/10/66. The same article reports that Laraev's system has been adopted over 'millions of hectares', and declares this to have been an important factor in recent good harvests in the virgin lands.
Indeed impersonality might be said to be, by contrast, the most notable feature of agricultural administration since Khrushchev's departure. In the past all important policies derived from Khrushchev, and to understand Soviet agriculture one studied his pronouncements. Henceforth, it seems, study of the interaction between the bureaucracy and the farms will be worthwhile. For the departure from the scene of N.S. Khrushchev - perhaps the last of the political chiefs who saw themselves as supreme judges of scientific truth - by no means clears the way for what many would regard as the next logical step - recognition of the principle that the farms should be autonomous in making production decisions. On the contrary it opens the way to bureaucratization of agriculture in the true sense of the word.
CHAPTER 10

KAZAKH LEADERS AND THE KREMLIN

If, as a number of Western experts have suggested, the Soviet political system can usefully be viewed as a vast network of personal followings in which advancement depends on the favour of dominant leaders, then there still remains a notable gap in the present study. It is, unfortunately, a gap that cannot be adequately filled. Indeed a systematic account of patronage groupings within Kazakhstan during the Khrushchev era is never likely to be written. Not only are there the usual barriers to this kind of study - the political process remains officially one of comradely collaboration in working out objectively correct lines of policy, and conflicts of interest and aspiration are taboo. Kazakhstan was, additionally, exceptional in the degree to which replacement of the top leadership prevented stable followings from building up; with obkom secretaries and other middle level officials generally outlasting CC First and Second Secretaries, patronage groupings were decapitated as fast as they were formed.

In this situation it is the turnover at the top which demands attention rather than the confused picture at lower levels\(^1\) - the more so since changes of Kazakhstan's leaders have been cited from time to time as evidence of the fortunes of Moscow leaders and factions.

\(^1\)Where leadership turnover is rapid and sub-leadership turnover relatively slow, the natural place for patronage groups to acquire some stability would be at oblast level and below. This in fact seems to have happened and to have presented a challenge to the more transient republican leadership; removal of the longer lived obkom first secretaries was not infrequently accompanied by charges that they had surrounded themselves with 'toadies and lickspittles' and made friendship and kinship the criteria for selection of cadres. See e.g. KP7/9/60,9/61,10/1/63; PZh K No.10, 1960, p.20.
The First Secretary in Kazakhstan from June 1946 to January 1954 was Zh. Shayakhetov. His removal was explained to the February 1954 CC CPSU plenum by N.S. Khrushchev as arising out of the need for leadership of greater calibre, now that the republic was about to embark on a grandiose programme of agricultural development. Shayakhetov was 'an honest person, and in this respect no one has any grievances against him, but he was a weak leader for such a large republic'. Without immediate improvement in the party leadership of the republic the task of bring six million hectares of virgin lands into cultivation might not be accomplished.\(^1\) One additional remark by Khrushchev did suggest that there may have been more than this to Shayakhetov's removal. The Kazakh CC plenum of January 1954 had 'arrived at a much more accurate appreciation' of the task of ploughing up new land 'than had members of the [Kazakh CC] bureau when they participated in discussions of the question in the CC CPSU'.\(^2\)

In general, however, the impression left was that Shayakhetov had been willing but unable. Neither Shayakhetov nor his Second Secretary, who was removed at the same time, was in disgrace, each being demoted only as far as oblast first secretary. The unprecedented appointment of two such prominent officials as I.I. Brezhnev and P.K. Ponomarenko in their place appeared to confirm the completeness of Khrushchev's explanation. Shayakhetov, it is true, was moved as far as

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2. Ibid. p.276.
possible from the virgin lands, his new appointment being in the cotton
growing oblast of South Kazakhstan. Furthermore he retained this post for
only 14 months, after which he disappeared from public view. It was later
said that he had been unable to unite the efforts of cadres in South
Kazakhstan, and that under his leadership the cotton growing industry
deteriorated badly. Nevertheless there was still no cause to suspect
that Khrushchev had given less than a full account of his demotion in
1954; his continued decline fitted the picture of him as a well-meaning
but ineffectual and ageing official - perhaps a figurehead for his
Russian Second Secretary.

After Khrushchev had defeated the 'anti-party group' a far
more adverse assessment of Shayakhmetov and his bureau appeared. In the
history of Kazakhstan published in 1959 he is said to have 'underestimated
the significance of measures taken by the party for the sharp advancement
of agriculture, in particular the ploughing up of the virgin lands...and
wheat growing in the new areas'. It thus transpired that Shayakhmetov
had been unwilling as well as unable. More was to follow. In 1960 the
republican party journal attacked a pamphlet which portrayed the virgin
lands history 'as a purely Kazakhstan phenomenon' and ignored K.N.
Khrushchev as the initiator of the scheme. Referring to events in 1953
the article continued: 'It is well known in fact that the former leaders
of the republic not only took no interest in raising new lands, but
actually opposed realization of this great politico-economic measure.'

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1 KP 26/1/56.
2 Istoria Kazakhskoi SSR, Alma-Ata, 1959, Vol. II, pp.666, 667. See also
KP 18/12/59, PZh K, No. 4, 1964, p.37.
3 PZh K, No. 1, 1960, p.9.
Some caution is desirable when handling belated accusations like this; a rather implausible case was gradually built up concerning alleged obstruction to the virgin lands scheme by the whole of the 'anti-party group'. But whereas there are alternative and convincing explanations for the treatment meted out to some of this group after 1957, no other explanation has been forthcoming for the considerable ire which the 1953 Kazakh CC Bureau brought down upon itself. By mid 1955 there had been an almost complete turnover of its former membership.

This was effected in two stages. At the same plenum at which Ponomarenko and Brezhnev were installed the secretariat was increased by two, bringing the number of Secretaries to five. Then in March 1955 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, E.B. Taibekov, was replaced by D.A. Kunayev, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, N.D. Undasynov, by Zh. Tashenev. Both Taibekov and Undasynov were reduced to obispolkom chairmen. For Taibekov this was a step towards political oblivion; Undasynov eventually bettered himself, becoming an obkom first secretary. The other Bureau member demoted at this stage was Third Secretary N.A. Suzhikov, who became an obkom first secretary. These changes left only one survivor of the Bureau which had failed to respond to Khrushchev's agricultural proposals in late 1953. This was V.V. Gubin, a Russian, the Chairman of the State Security Committee who remained on the Bureau until early 1959.

1 This was an exceptional move at the time: the Ukraine and Georgia then had four CC Secretaries, and the remaining republics three each.
Apart from the Second Secretary all those removed from the bureau were non-Russians. It is tempting therefore to speculate whether their resistance to large scale expansion of the wheat area was motivated solely by their assessment of its technical and economic feasibility. Even if their spoken opposition was couched in such terms it is possible to see here vestiges of the historical conflict between the pastoral culture of the Kazakhs and the encroachment by Russian settlers. However, no accusations of 'bourgeois nationalism' have been levelled at Kazakhstan's leaders for their behaviour in 1953, and there is no record of how or why the bureau opposed Khrushchev. It should be added, nevertheless, that the two-stage purge and the temporary cushioning of several dismissals by a staring-out process at oblast level cannot be taken as a measure of the opposition. Kazakhstan was the first republic to feel the weight of Khrushchev's growing power, and in 1954-55 he had good reason not to alarm CPSU Presidium members by injudicious reprisals against everyone with whom he clashed. The coup de grâce administered to Taibekov and Afonov in 1957 seems to show that he had bided his time.

The two additional Secretaries appointed in early 1954 (F. Karibzhanov and I.I. Tazhiyev) had presumably asserted their wholehearted support for the expansion plan. By so doing they accumulated sufficient political capital to last them for the remainder of their

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1 This conflict was the basic cause of the uprisings in the Kazakh steppe in 1916, and although collectivization and a half a century had intervened the prospect of a further influx of settlers must have reminded Kazakhs of their earlier misfortunes. We shall show in the following chapter that such sentiments were not alien to lower party members, so presumably Kazakh leaders could still be affected by them.

2 The Second Secretary replaced by Brezhnev in 1954, and first secretary of Pavlodar obkom from then till 1957. Further possible reasons for Afonov's 1957 demotion were given in Chapter 9.
careers. Despite frequent criticism of performance in their areas of responsibility in the ensuing years, neither ever suffered any serious reverse - no mean feat at this level in Kazakhstan during the 'fifties.¹

There is consensus among sovietologists that First Secretary Ponomarenko was a protégé of G.M. Malenkov, while Second Secretary Brezhnev was a Khrushchev adherent²; allegations made after 1957 of attempted sabotage of the virgin lands scheme by the 'anti-party group' might thus lead one to expect signs of a dramatic conflict at the very apex of the party hierarchy in Kazakhstan. But however intense the rivalry between these two men because of their patronage alignments, there has never been any suggestion that it was carried over into implementation of the policy which brought them both to the republic.

Under Ponomarenko's leadership in 1954 8.4 million hectares of new land were ploughed up, as against the target of 6.3 million.³ The feat was universally praised at the time, and Ponomarenko was never attacked after his departure from Kazakhstan. His connections with Malenkov are sufficient explanation of his appointment as ambassador to Poland in May 1955 (just three months after Malenkov's resignation as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), and there is no need to look for additional causes within the republic.

¹Both these men died in office in 1960.
³In his speeches Ponomarenko promoted the scheme - in his position he could scarcely do otherwise - but he emphasized the assistance given by the Soviet government, not the party. See e.g., KP 16/3/55.
L.I. Brezhnev was not appointed First Secretary until August 1955, three months after Ponomarenko’s departure. The delay has no parallel either before or since, and would appear to indicate that Khrushchev had difficulty in having his nominee accepted by the CPSU Presidium. Brezhnev was of course in de facto command from at least May on, and the only practical effect of the delay was that the secretariat was temporarily reduced, for a new Second Secretary could not be appointed until the post was formally vacated. The new arrival was I.D. Yakovlev who had been first secretary of Novosibirsk obkom since 1946. If it is true that Khrushchev had difficulty in promoting Brezhnev it is likely that the ‘anti-party’ forces would have succeeded at least in having a Second Secretary appointed who was not a Khrushchev adherent. There are several circumstances to support this view. Yakovlev’s successor in Novosibirsk was removed around the time of the defeat of the ‘anti-party group’ in 1957, which leads one to suspect that the party organization in this oblast had not been amenable to Khrushchev’s influence till then. Secondly the proposals put forward by Kazakhstan on the 1957 industrial reorganization (i.e. after Yakovlev had become First Secretary) were strongly at variance with Khrushchev’s theses on the subject. A minimum conclusion is that Yakovlev was no confidante of Khrushchev, and in fact all the signs are that he was dramatically involved in the attempt to thwart the industrial reorganization. His promotion to First Secretary after Brezhnev was raised to the CC CPSU secretariat would thus signify that Khrushchev’s influence declined in the republic where his political prestige was most at stake. This is not at all inconsistent with the
overall accumulation of organizational power by the Khrushchevite camp at this stage: Brezhnev's entrance into the CPSU secretariat was such a clear gain for Khrushchev that he would have been more than willing to trade patronage of the top Kazakh post, and allow it to be filled by an opponent of smaller calibre than Brezhnev. ¹

In the light of subsequent events Brezhnev can be seen as remarkably fortunate to have left Kazakhstan after only seven months as First Secretary. He is the only person to have made the post a stepping stone to higher places, his successors all finding it too slippery even to retain their balance. From here on the fate of First Secretaries in Kazakhstan became closely tied to harvest results, which declined progressively from 1959 to 1963. In addition to the political factors already advanced in explanation of Yakovlev's truncated career - or perhaps because of them - he was blamed for the first major agricultural setback at the end of 1957.²

There are in fact altogether too many grounds for Yakovlev's removal. Although no report of the plenum at which he was replaced was published, an editorial two days later stated that the leadership changes were aimed at furthering the 'bold advancement of capable workers from among indigenous nationalities' and strengthening the ties of friendship between all fraternal peoples. There should not be 'the slightest

¹Yakovlev presented no more threat to the virgin lands scheme than had Ponomarenko; once targets were set he had no option but to work for their fulfilment. This placed him in the odd position (KP 9/2/57) of having to complain of cuts in investment in farmland by the USSR State Economic Commission (headed by N.G. Pervukhin who was later assailed as an 'anti-party' adherent).

²See KP 27, 28/12/57.
manifestation of arrogance or national self-conceit. All this may have been no more than a fanfare for the promotion of a Kazakh, F.K. Karibzhanov, to Second Secretary, but the reference to 'arrogance and national self-conceit' also suggests imputation of these vices to the outgoing First Secretary.

Yakovlev's successor was N.I. Belyaev. He was, of course, a Khrushchev protégé, but this label now loses its interpretative value, since all the republic's top leaders from here on are likely to have met with the Soviet leader's approval. (Henceforth the question is who among them was recommended by, say, Brezhnev or V.L. Kozlov, to whom intermediate allegiance might be owed). Belyaev's assignment to Kazakhstan was especially appropriate because it was he who, on Khrushchev's behalf, had sent up the first public trial balloon on the virgin lands scheme back in 1953. In a Pravda article he had brought to notice the millions of hectares of pasture in Siberia that might be planted to wheat without much capital investment. At the same time his new appointment was eloquent comment on the key significance of the republic from Khrushchev's viewpoint: Belyaev was a Secretary of the CC CPSU and a member of the central party Presidium. Release from the former post came only towards the end of 1958, i.e., after he had been in Kazakhstan for nearly a year. The retention of this post for so long in an honorary capacity (presumably his duties in Kazakhstan precluded any active role as a CC CPSU Secretary) was, it seems, intended to signify that his move

1 Ibid.
2 Pravda, 11/12/53.
to Alma-Ata was not a demotion. Nor was his star on the wane at the end of 1958: (a) he continued to be a member of the CC CPSU Presidium for the remainder of his term in the republic; (b) there was nothing but praise for Kazakhstan's performance in late 1958 when a bumper harvest was gathered; and (c) his belated removal from the CC CPSU secretariat was expressly related to his Kazakhstan responsibilities.¹

A year later no such niceties were observed. The 1959 harvest fell far short of plan targets and Belyaev was promptly removed. Khrushchev made it clear that past association and loyalty could not compensate for this disservice to his agricultural programme. 'Friendship is one thing', he said, 'but work is something else'.²

With the appointment of D.A. Kunaev, a non-Russian, as First Secretary in late 1959 Kazakhstan reverted to the normal pattern of party leadership for the five Asian republics. Kunaev had been chairman of the Council of Ministers since the 1954-55 purge of the CC Bureau. Perhaps Khrushchev believed that his virgin lands scheme was now securely launched, despite Belyaev's failure, and could be entrusted to a local appointee - so long as he was backed by an 'experienced party official' (N.N. Rodionov, the new Russian Second Secretary and former first secretary of Leningrad gorkom was so described). Nature continued to take her revenge in the new lands however; Kunaev and Rodionov rode out successive waves of criticism for three years until both were finally removed at the end of 1962.

¹ Pravda, 14/11/58.
² Pravda, 29/12/59.
Another non-Russian, I.Yu. Yusupov, took over the reins, again with a Russian Second Secretary, N.S. Solomentsev, and again the period of tenure for both was brief. Their removal came at the end of 1964. This time economic causes appear to have played no part: in 1964 nature was bountiful. Yusupov's fall was obviously connected with the coup against Khrushchev, although the details are as yet far from clear. He was replaced by Kunaev, who had reverted to his former post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers during Yusupov's period as First Secretary.

It may at first sight appear over facile to account for three, perhaps four, major leadership changes from 1957 to 1962 by fluctuations in the harvest. We have seen that in Yakovlev's case there were several factors operating, and that the harvest may have been merely a pretext for settling political scores. Might there not have been an equally complex imbroglio in one or more of the succeeding cases? There were intervening years equally or even more disastrous agriculturally (1963) than those in which leadership changes occurred, so other factors may have been at work.

Attributing the turnover primarily to agricultural performance does not, of course, exclude a fuller account as and if more information comes to hand. Meanwhile there is no danger in stressing the agricultural motif because of what we have learned of Khrushchev's extreme sensitivity to what went on in the virgin lands. If it is assumed that he retained the power to sack Kazakhstan's leaders up till 1962 then it is not unreasonable to accept his stated reasons for doing so, and these were all related to the harvest. As for the lean years in which there were no major demotions, one must credit Khrushchev with the patience to allow new appointees at least two years in which to effect a remedy. As it was the turnover just
described was unparalleled in the history of any republic, even during
the purges of the 'thirties.

Plausible explanations are thus possible for appointments and
dismissals from Shayakhmetov to Belyaev - either in terms of the 'anti-
party' struggle, or the harvest, or both. Further consideration must
be given to the rise of the native First Secretaries, Kunaev and Yusupov,
and especially to the fall of the latter.

One version of Kunaev's place in the power struggle is that he
owed his appointment to a 'conservative' opposition to Khrushchev,
headed by CC CPSU Secretaries, M.A. Suslov and F.R. Kozlov. According
to Sidney I. Ploss, Khrushchev and the then heir apparent A.I. Kirichenko,
mismanaged the CC CPSU Plenum of December 1959 so badly that they were
discredited. In particular they window-dressed the situation in
Kazakhstan in order to sustain Belyaev's reputation. Having failed in
this, Khrushchev was forced to sacrifice both Kirichenko and Belyaev.
F.R. Kozlov was then allowed to select Kunaev as Belyaev's successor in
Kazakhstan. Kunaev's demotion in 1962 was therefore a victory for the
Khrushchevite 'progressive' camp \[and I. Yusupov, the new First Secretary,
presumably an adherent of this camp].

Ploss's simple bipolar view of policy making in agriculture
(Khrushchevite reformers versus Kozlovite conservatives) has been
deservedly attacked, 2 but his account of the Kunaev and Yusupov appointments

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1 S.I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study
of Agricultural Policy, 1953-63, Princeton University Press, New Jersey,
1965, Chapter IV, see esp. pp. 155, 180, 181.

2 Jerzy F. Karcz, 'Agriculture and Kremlinology', Problems of Communism,
deserves scrutiny on its own merits. He produces three main arguments in support of the above interpretation:

(a) One of the first actions of the Kunaev regime was to resurrect a former 'henchman' of Malenkov, namely A.I. Kozlov. The latter had been head of the CC CPSU Agricultural Department when Malenkov was in charge of agriculture; was sharply attacked by Khrushchev when Minister of State Farms; and was dismissed in March 1955, just after Malenkov's resignation as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He languished as chairman of a state farm in northern Kazakhstan from then until appointed Minister of State Farms in Kazakhstan.

(b) Kunaev 'later expressed disagreement with Khrushchev's notorious preference for administrative compactness in the localities'. Floss is referring here to the incident, described in chapter 9, where Kunaev proposed the creation of an additional oblast, and Khrushchev counterposed the setting up of the Virgin Lands Krai. To say that Kunaev 'expressed disagreement' is a little misleading. According to Khrushchev's account, Kunaev took the initiative but did not persist in the face of the counterproposal. No doubt Kunaev was piqued by the affair, but there is really nothing here to support the view that he was aligned with a conservative opposition to Khrushchev.

(c) Floss interprets attacks on A.I. Baraev's tillage methods in the 'Kunaev-Kodionov organ', Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, in 1960, as criticism of Khrushchev's 'technical acolyte', I.S. Mol'tsev. This interpretation

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2. TASS 26/1/60.
is based on the incorrect assumption that the systems of these two soil scientists were identical. Khrushchev did praise Kal'tsev in 1956, but rejected Baraev's system. In attacking Baraev, therefore, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* was merely following Khrushchev's lead. In any case, as we have seen in chapter 9, attacks on Baraev went on sporadically from 1957 to 1963 under several First Secretaries.

Although only the first of these three items now appears plausible, Floss's interpretation of the December 1959 plenum can be bolstered by several further arguments. Above all there are the stands taken by Kunaev and Yusupov during the discussion of the 1957 industrial reorganization; at this period at least Kunaev was objectively anti-Khrushchev, while cautious support for the reorganization came from his rival, Yusupov. Furthermore Floss could now argue that his hypothesis had been vindicated by the fall of Yusupov immediately after the coup against Khrushchev, and the restoration of Kunaev to the first secretariatship. To complete the story for him we may also add that A.I. Kozlov, who became first deputy chairman of the Virgin Lands kraiispolkom after the Ministry of State Farms was abolished in Kazakhstan, was roundly criticised by Yusupov in 1963 and removed from office. All this appears to add up to a consistent, if sketchy, explanation of the turnover of Kazakhstan's two recent leaders in terms of their relations with Khrushchev. If enquiry is pressed further, however, the weakness of this case is soon revealed.

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1 See Chapter 8.
Firstly, Ploss's interpretation of the December 1959 plenum is suspect because it forces him into seeing Belyaev's and Kunaev's admissions of failure as a vicarious exercise in self-criticism by Khrushchev. An alternative and more convincing account of events at the plenum sees Belyaev as trying to justify himself to Khrushchev, who rejects all excuses out of hand, confident that 'we have outstanding cadres to replace you'. Certainly Khrushchev roasted both Belyaev and Kunaev in no uncertain terms, and evidence that he made any effort to save Belyaev is lacking. After the plenum Belyaev's removal and Kunaev's installation as First Secretary were supervised by Brezhnev - an unlikely instrument to hammer home a Koslov victory against Khrushchev. And when Kunaev's turn for removal came, the hatchet-man was Koslov himself. Had the reverse been the case there would have been some reason to accept the Ploss version.

Among the members of the CPSU CC Presidium, Brezhnev, by reason of his term of office in Kazakhstan, was the one man who had a personal knowledge of Kunaev's capabilities, and it would be extraordinary if his views were not influential in this particular appointment. Brezhnev's continuing concern with the republic's affairs after his promotion to the CPSU secretariat is indicated by the fact that, apart from Khrushchev, he was the most frequent visitor to the republic from the CPSU Presidium: he was in Alma-Ata on at least four occasions including the visit to

2 Pravda, 29/12/59. For an account of the plenum along these lines see A. Avtokhov, 'Stocktaking in the Kremlin', Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, February, 1960, p.7.
3 KP 21/1/60.
4 KP 27/12/62.
supervise Kunaev’s installation as First Secretary. Kunaev’s failure to improve on Belyaev’s performance reflected on Brezhnev’s judgement, and hence the visit by F.R. Koslov to undo his handiwork and appoint Yusupov. Koslov continued to concern himself with Kazakhstan until a second heart attack suddenly curtailed his activities in spring 1963.

As regards the resurrection of A.I. Koslov, the main prop in Pless’s argument, it should be noted that he had been publicly restored to grace by Khrushchev himself some time before his promotion to Minister of State Farms in Kazakhstan. At the December 1959 plenum he acknowledged the justice of Khrushchev’s attacks on his earlier work as head of the CC CPSU agricultural department and USSR Minister of State Farms. He was, he said, especially grateful to the party for the posting to Kazakhstan as state farm director, because it had enabled him to participate in the expansion there. He went on to pander to Khrushchev’s palpably wrong evaluations of corn and fallow in the virgin lands – and produced statistics to prove Khrushchev right. The Soviet leader responded magnanimously: he had listened to A.I. Koslov ‘with pleasure’ and thought he should receive the Order of Lenin. He did. The prodigal son was thus received back into the fold before Kunaev and Rodionov were appointed First and Second Secretaries, so that his advancement by no means demonstrates any alignment against Khrushchev.

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1 The other visits are referred to in EP 13/8/57, 22/1/60, 5/4/64.
2 He was back in the republic to attend the Virgin Lands plenum which replaced Kunaev’s ally, T.I. Sokolov (EP 22/2/63).
In fact it is far more likely that Khrushchev wanted A.I. Koslov in charge of the virgin lands farms since he had now shown himself such a good disciple. In his later speeches Koslov continued to adhere closely to the formula by which he had ingratiated himself, and one is justified in speculating whether he was not one of the main obstacles in the way of Baraev's proposals. Finally he was no particular favourite of Kunaev who criticised him regularly. If anything A.I. Koslov's recovery in 1960 is a demonstration of Khrushchev's strength at this stage: in his own view at least the Soviet leader could afford to forgive and favour an erstwhile enemy. If this interpretation is correct it becomes more and more unlikely that he could have been constrained to accept Kunaev's promotion against his will.

There may be more substance in Floss's assessment of Kunaev's Second Secretary, B.N. Rodionov, who was a Leningrader and an associate of F.R. Koslov by career and training. He measured up to the Koslovite pattern in his attitude towards the 'anti-party group', a good criterion because purely political. Robert Conquest has plausibly distinguished two different groups of expulsions who wanted the 'anti-party' people out of the CPSU for different reasons, one for conservative and one for Khrushchevite ends. The Leningraders and others not closely associated with Khrushchev focussed on the criminality of the 'anti-party group' rather than on their political errors. Rodionov was in the forefront.

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1 See e.g. KP 29/7/62, 21/3/63.
2 KP 9/6/61, 29/9/61, 26/12/62, 21/3/63.
3 Russia After Khrushchev, p.97.
here; at the Twenty Second Congress he stated that 'the participants of
the anti-party group are called dogmatists. That is correct. But what
they tried to do in June 1957, that is not dogmatism, that is banditry'.
And for this he demanded that the 'full severity of the law' should
apply. ¹

Kumaev on the other hand was silent on the issue at the
Congress (along with the majority of delegates), and made only passing
reference to it in his report to the party aktiv on returning to Alma-Ata.
It may be that Rodionov was speaking for the Kazakhstan delegation as
a whole at the Congress, but more likely Kumaev was consciously remaining
aloof; ever since being caught on the wrong side of the 1957 dispute
he has studiously avoided taking a public position on anything
controversial. At the party aktiv meetings after the Twenty Second
Congress other Central Asian First Secretaries took advantage of the
further de-Stalinization by Khrushchev and rehabilitated local leaders
who had been shot during the period of the 'personality cult'. Kumaev
was having none of this; he merely condemned the cult in formal terms.²
He still abhors public discussion of contentious issues, even after they
have been aired by USSR leaders, his turn of mind being exemplified by
his reaction to the 1965 innovations in factory management. Many experts
both within and without the Soviet Union would see in these at least the
beginnings of a new approach to planning, incentives and delegation of
powers. The one basic conclusion drawn by Kumaev was - the need for

¹ N. Rodionov, S'ezd KPSS. 17-23 Oktyabrya 1961 goda, stenogramfitchesky otchet, Vol. 3, p.130. Some doubt about Rodionov's ties with Kozlov remains justified, however, because the former has been restored to high office since Khrushchev took over from Khrushchev. See p.376n.
discipline. Small wonder then that he maintained complete silence on Yusupov’s removal at the end of 1964.

Yusupov had fewer inhibitions in 1962 when he displaced Kuznetsov. We have already noted in outline his account of Daulanov’s appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers — according to Yusupov this was forced on the CC Bureau by Kuznetsov. Daulanov was released from the premiership in September 1962, but the full reasons were withheld; he was simply said to have ‘lost those most important qualities of a party leader — simplicity and modesty in dealing with people’. Matters rested there till the December plenum at which Kuznetsov himself was demoted to the premiership. Kuznetsov now acknowledged Daulanov’s appointment to have been an obvious error committed by the CC Bureau and ‘himself personally’. This was not good enough for Yusupov who reopened the subject three months later at a CC plenum on ‘measures to improve the selection and placement of cadres’ — the first time such an agenda item had been adopted by the CC since 1951. At this plenum the blame was laid squarely on Kuznetsov’s shoulders, and the CC Bureau, in effect, exculpated.

Placing ‘selection of cadres’ on the agenda was in fact a thinly disguised form of political in-fighting. The first secretary of Semipalatinsk obkom, Karpenko, supported Yusupov by adding that Kuznetsov had acted out of a ‘personal liking for Daulanov’ even though it was well known that as Deputy Minister of Agriculture he used to spend most of his

1 See his article, Pravda 14/12/65.
2 See Chapter 2.
3 Zh K. No. 10. 1962, p.9.
4 KP 26/12/62.
5 KP 19/3/63.
time at work doing, and as first secretary of Semipalatinsk kihva had spent a good half of his time on holidays and trips outside the oblast. Karpenko wanted to know how it came about that Daulanov had now been granted a handsome salary and allowed to retain living quarters (which he had occupied as Premier). ¹

Newspaper readers had not been treated to such a lively public brawl since 1957. Under the tight-lipped Khasov and Belyaev regimes transfers of leading personnel, if explained at all, were generally attributed to respectable, impersonal causes, especially economic performance. A number of these earlier dismissals were now rehashed on a highly personal plane, the pattern of argument being that the dismissal had been well justified — so well justified that they should have occurred earlier than they did. By inference Khasov or someone else in the CC Bureau had protected the officials concerned. Of Zh.A. Tashenev, for instance, who was Daulanov's predecessor as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, it was said that 'nany knew him as a person extremely lacking in self-control, self-conceited and untactful in his relations with others'.²

One appointment made under Khasov, that of S. Tektamysov, the first secretary of Kyl Orda kihva, was apparently quite notorious: several speakers at the plenum contributed details of his misdeeds. These centred around a card playing group of Tektamysov's cronies who were involved in 'casso misappropriation of material goods'. The scandal involved not only party and soviet officials, but also a militia chief, a procurator

¹KP 20/3/63.
²Ibid.
and a judge. Kunev, on his own admission, had taken no action against
Tektamyev until Pravda had published a satirical article on doings in
Kayl Orda.¹

A number of other ‘mistaken’ appointments were reviewed at
the plenum, most of them by Yusupov himself, who was clearly more than
willing when it came to trading political blows. This aggressiveness is
of some interest in view of the contrast between his steady rise, and,
as far as can be ascertained, his rather indifferent administrative
achievements. Yusupov served his apprenticeship for promotion as a
Machine Tractor Station director during the collectivisation of
agriculture in Kazakhstan, and in the army during the war. He was
selected for training at the Higher Part School attached to the CC CPSU
and then rose steadily from raikom secretary to obkom first secretary by
1955. His assignment was South Kazakhstan oblast where the main crop,
cotton, had been the cause of a rapid turnover among his predecessors.
He was in serious trouble from his very first harvest, when Brezhnev, then
First Secretary in Kazakhstan, rejected pleas of bad weather and a labour
shortage. Discipline among the collective farmers was at a low ebb, said
Brezhnev, the number of labour-days performed by members of collectives
being 88 below the individual average for the rest of the republic.²
Yusupov fought back strongly. He acknowledged that the cotton yield in
his oblast was the lowest in Central Asia, but proceeded to outline what
he had done to remedy the situation, his chief boast being to have put

²KP 26/1/56.
the administration approved. If some interesting, interesting, to great
South Earhart. pancreas has been prevailed to the great administration.

However was exchanged but there was no expression the result of
the letters. the letter wanted a deal of expression.

To conclude the performance of the game and respect the administration.

By [legible text] 40,000 hectares that had fallen into disuse.

The same to the problem was a schema for

and some under pressure in the section. never succeeded in the section. inside. under attack from human

centralized to the success in the section. A.R. Malloy.

to the future better besides by the margin.

In order to escape pressure into the section

was expected that the effect would become a leading

minister of administration for administration to the needs of the section.

in the future. 5,000 collection farms none provided been those.
To make full use of the recommendations, the recommendation suggests moving to a new approach. The recommendation is based on the assumption that the current approach, which involves extensive preparation and planning, fails to address the core issues. Therefore, a new approach is proposed, which focuses on a more flexible and dynamic approach. This approach involves regular review and adaptation, as well as the use of technology to facilitate communication. The recommendation also highlights the importance of involving all stakeholders in the decision-making process. Finally, the recommendation suggests that the new approach should be implemented gradually, allowing for adjustments and improvements as necessary.
settled scores immediately after the October 1964 coup. This version of the fluctuation of Kunaev and Yusupov's fortunes in phase with those of the leading contenders in the latter part of the Khrushchev era would seem to have more to recommend it than the opposite version offered by Fless.

As a footnote to this interpretation of leadership changes in Kazakhstan we might consider for a moment the importance of a republican 'tail' for CPSU Politbureau members. Byron Rush, in a review of L.P. Beria's strategy in 1953, asks whether his bid to gain support in the borderland republics signifies that their political potential is greater than is commonly supposed. Beria, it seems, overestimated this potential, but he was operating in Stalinist Russia, and the monolith has shaken itself somewhat looser since then.

In contrast to Fless's analysis, which posits an anti-Khrushchev following in Kazakhstan, the alternative account presented here lends little support to the notion that any of the recent leadership changes presented a direct threat to Khrushchev. The latter had no difficulty in removing Brezhnev's man at the end of 1962 and Koslov probably succeeded in having Yusupov fill the vacancy because Khrushchev was mindful of services rendered by him (Yusupov) in 1957. There is no evidence whatsoever that either Kunaev or Yusupov considered himself more indebted to his immediate benefactor than to the top leader. Numerous

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1 Ibid., p.59.

2 Admittedly none is to be expected. Brezhnev, for instance, would hardly have thanked Kunaev for public expression of support before October 1964.
passages from their speeches might be cited as showing they believed themselves wholly dependent on Khrushchev. In short no indication is to be found in Kazakhstan that the 1957-64 period was other than democratic.

The republic must, of course, have been rife with unspoken anti-Khrushchev sentiment in the early 'sixties. One has only to list those who have been restored to higher office since Khrushchev's fall to appreciate this. In fact former members of Kazakhstan's elite have fared so well since 1964 that it is not unreasonable to ask did the republic's delegation to the CC CPSU October 1964 plenum play some special part. This line of thought would be more attractive, however, if it could be shown that the fallen men had begun to rise before the end of the Khrushchev era. Unless it is eventually discovered that Khrushchev's suitor was affected, and not simply endorsed, at the CPSU plenum, it will remain difficult to imagine what direct influence Brezhnev's following in Kazakhstan could have had on the coup. Still more lenoosing of the power structure would appear to be a precondition for validating Myron Rush's speculation.

1 Apart from Ermakov, there is N.N. Radionov, made first secretary of Chelyabinsk okrug in October 1965; T.I. Serebryakov, made first secretary of Orlov okrug at the same time; L.G. Mal'nikov, appointed Chairman of the RSFSR State Committee on Work Safety in December 1964; and V.V. Maksakovich, restored to his old post of USSR Minister of Agriculture in February, 1965.
CHAPTER II

THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION

It might be said of the Kazakhs that they discovered nationalism only in the form of 'survivals of bourgeois nationalism'. If we understand by nationalism a conscious and general movement among a people towards self-government, then the Kazaks never experienced its heady effects before the revolution, and since then any incipient development in that direction has been effectively curbed. This is not to say they showed no resentment at Russian penetration of the steppe and its final subjugation by the middle of the last century. There were sporadic uprisings but even the most protracted of these (1837-47) failed to secure the adherence of numerous Kazakh tribes. When the steppe was cut off from Bolshevik influence in late 1917 by a cossack seizure of power in the north, an autonomous Kazakh region was proclaimed, but what little organization there was was torn by clan feuds. In short the Kazakhs have at no time during the recorded history of Asia been a united people.

One historian is indeed convinced that the current division of Central Asia into five republics - a division which with only minor adjustments dates from 1924 - was only dimly perceived by the indigenous peoples themselves before 1917. Anti-Soviet leaders of the pan-Russian

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Muslim Movement which developed after the revolution claimed that the
division was an artificial device based on the ancient maxim of divide
and rule. There were, of course, ethnic and linguistic differences,
but there is little evidence that these bore any direct relation to
distinctive national aspirations. This assertion might perhaps be
disputed in the case of the more settled and culturally advanced areas
of Turkestan, but it certainly holds true of the nomadic Kazakhs. Their
pre-revolutionary organisation was basically tribal, and cohesion of
groups was more along kinship and economic than political lines. The
concept of the nation state had barely penetrated the Steppe Region
in 1917.

It cannot be inferred from the above that the political-
administrative divisions imposed by the Soviet government have not since
found acceptance - or even that separate identities were repugnant
from the outset. National identities conferred by colonial powers
elsewhere have often gained lasting acceptance despite the absence of
good historical and ethnic grounds and we cannot assume that Soviet
Central Asia is exceptional in this regard. The divisions were made,
as far as possible in this racially mixed area, with a view to ethnic and
linguistic differences, and the sensitivity of the Soviet Union to any
manifestation of national consciousness which departs from the Stalinist
formula bears witness that the Soviet authorities themselves accept the
reality of the separate identities which they created in 1924.

1Wheeler, op.cit., Chapters I and II. See also the same writer's Racial
Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1960,
Chapters I to III.
A fairly common view of development in Central Asia since 1917 is that now, more than ever in history, the force of nationalism brings Turkic peoples closer to real independence with each passing year.

The Turkish regions of the USSR will undoubtedly continue to develop as problem areas for the Soviets....The Turko-Tartar area including Sinkiang....may eventually become a part of one or more Turkish Muslim states positioned toward, and possibly joined with the Turks of the West.¹

Whereas the independence of the Moslem lands before the Russian conquests, or of the Emirates of Khiva and Bukhara before 1917, was a sham because there was no elite capable of really leading the indigenous people, today there is such an elite, and however distant the prospect, political and cultural autonomy are said to be inevitable. National sentiment and loyalty to national culture are "infinitely stronger and deeper than allegiance to Marxism" among the native leaders trained by the USSR. Moslem intellectuals allegedly regard themselves as natural champions against Soviet colonialism,² and the Moslem population as a whole is said to regard its own party elite as its protectors against Russian chauvinism.³

These confident predictions of future development and diagnoses of the minds of native leaders and masses are, of course, highly pertinent to our study. This is Soviet Kazakhstan and we must endeavour to place a current assessment on the nationality question in the republic.

It hardly needs to be said that this is no easy task. The last occasion on which the West had an insight into the sentiments of a large cross-section of Central Asian nationals was during World War II. The National Turkestan Unity Committee, which was formed with the encouragement of the German Ostministerium, enlisted volunteers for service against the Red Army, and was adamant on combining the nationals of all five Central Asian republics into mixed units. It is reported that despite the different traditions of the more sedentary Uzbeks and Tadzhiks on the one hand and of the Kazakhs, Kirghis and Turkomens on the other, all worked effectively in the close organization of the army. All told about 160,000 prisoners of war volunteered, only 20,000 electing to remain in P.O.W. camps, and the fighting record of such units as the 162nd German Infantry Division has been interpreted as eloquent witness to what these people thought of Russian domination of their lands.\(^1\)

This fragment of history was, of course, close to the ordeal of collectivisation, which was completed only in the late 'thirties in Central Asia. Moreover the clear-cut choice put to the half-starved prisoners of war was to remain where they were or fight. In any case a quarter of a century has since passed and the value of this evidence is fading.

The last time accusations of 'bourgeois nationalism' were levelled against a group\(^2\) of Kazakhstan’s leaders was in 1951, when the Second Secretary (a Russian) and the Ideological Secretary were removed.

\(^2\)As will be seen presently, an individual Kazak leader was more recently charged with making 'nationalistic utterances', and there have been several attacks on deviations by unnamed persons.
The nationalist deviations of this period related to favourable interpretation of 19th century anti-Russian movements, particularly that of the national hero Kenezary Kanysev, who was now branded feudal and reactionary. Similar reassessments and accusations were rife in other republics around the same time, all being connected with the transition of Soviet historiography from the 'lesser evil' to the 'absolute good' theory of Russian colonization. In other words the sins exposed were *ex post facto* sins, not the product of an upsurge of national consciousness. For evidence of any positive opposition on the part of Kazakh communist leaders one has to go back much farther to the early 'thirties.'

An article did appear in 1959 attacking 'serious mistakes of a bourgeois national character' committed 'not long ago' in historical and literary works. 'Under-evaluation of the progressive significance' of unification of Kazakhstan with Russia was again singled out as the main deviation from historical orthodoxy. It seems however that the reference was to the 1951 rectification campaign, for the author continued that 'in later years' much had been done to correct these mistakes. A new history of Kazakhstan had been written and various monographs had demonstrated the benefits stemming from unification.

One looks in vain then for any recent manifestation of nationalism in the sense in which we have defined it. This is hardly conclusive of course; if the regime remains so sensitive about the

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The strongest single cultural influence in the area, as we recall,
the prehistoric guerilla above, we shall take care to tum
examination of these matters should throw light on the validity of the
extravagant on the economic utility of dependence of the population
and power to share between the national groups of the population,
and culture and tended on demographic trends on the manner in which
national identity - which we shall take to mean adherence to national
with international defec to how successful they are in maintaining their
the prehistoric with a given degree of certainty. The future of the past
and tradition and cultural momentum, however recent, brood interest.
Hence the history of degradation in other parts of the world rather than in any
user are applied to degradation, they appear to be based on the general
as confirmatory. These about the nature of the prehistoric are, to the
question to question the present. All that can be said is that interpret...
were in use as against 60 in the far smaller republic of Uzbekistan.\(^1\)

Probably the Kazakhs have displayed less resistance to being de-Islamised than the other Turko peoples because the religion never did acquire quite the same dominance in the Kazakh steppe that it did in Turkestan proper.\(^2\) It still retains some hold nonetheless, for the party journal of Kazakhstan never fails to print at least one anti-religious piece, and the Christian and Moslem religions receive about equal attention in its pages.

Whatever the current state of religious belief as such, it can be confidently stated that the customs and traditions which constitute a specific Moslem way of life are still very much in evidence. There is still recurrent condemnation of the ancestral attitude towards women, child marriage, and bride money. A recent publication from Kazakhstan reports as follows:

Bride money is forbidden by law, but....is still practised in the disguised form of expensive 'presents' to the bride's parents. Abduction cases are still occasionally heard of, as well as the giving in marriage of girls below the legal age.\(^3\)

The writer goes on to condemn 'many men' who prevent their womenfolk from participating actively in community life. Religious leaders still forbid believers to send their children to the atheist schools or join pioneer or Komsomol organizations.\(^4\) Such instances are, of course, summarily

\(^1\) Ibid., p.9. For a description of the organisational strength of Islam in the USSR as a whole see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, 'Islam in the USSR', Central Asian Review, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1961, pp. 325-351.


\(^4\) Ibid., p.192.
dealt with these days if necessary by breaking up the family, or at least by organized social pressure.

One might be inclined to dismiss such reports as exceptional were it not for the fact that party members are sometimes involved. When a young Kazakh woman was abducted in 1964 the party committee of her state farm and the raion procurator's office were deaf to her pleas, while 'influential' clanmen tried to reconcile her to her lot. If party members are guilty of encouraging or at least condoning such customs, albeit in rare instances, then it is safe to assume that they still do hard with the general population. Complaints of obstacles put in the way of advancement of women to party or local soviet positions, must, of course, refer to party officials, and fairly senior ones at that, since the nomenklatura for these positions is compiled by the raikom. There were 'very few' females in party committees, soviets or trade union organizations at raion level in 1963, and only four female okkom secretaries.

Perhaps the 'survival of the past' most difficult for Soviet leaders to combat is clan or tribal loyalty. Overall this phenomenon would seem to work in favour of the Russians since it divides Kazakh against Kazakh. It is certainly viewed with disfavour, however, where it interferes with the selection of suitable cadres. The most frank description of its operation is the following:

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1 This - a thinly veiled reference to this is to be found, pp, 194, 212. In 1958 obstructing a child's formal education was made punishable by six months corrective labour (EP 27/1/58).

2 FRDIA 18/12/64.

can help the learner to:

* Have a better understanding of the concepts.
* Improve retention and recall of information.
* Enhance problem-solving skills.

It is the responsibility of the instructor to ensure that the students are using these strategies effectively. Additionally, the use of these strategies should be tailored to the specific needs of the students, taking into account their learning styles and preferences.
Finally the prize winner was unable even to buy the radio he had intended to get for his family. The anecdote might aptly be captioned, 'To each according to his needs!'  

According to Wheeler, production of pork is cost-effective only with the spread of Slavic migration. This is not difficult to believe when one finds a decision to form a pig farm strongly contested by collective farmers. They accused the farm board of disrespect for national customs and 'flatly refused to work the farm'. A propaganda group had to convince them that their objections had a religious, not a national basis. A Kazakh with a Russian wife was selected to set up the farm and others followed.  

Dozens of similar examples might be cited showing how persistent are the customs and values of this people, despite considerable pressure to abandon them. One finds a rejection of complaints that Kazakh national costumes are not produced in sufficient quantity; a critical review of a painting exhibition where Kazakh villages are all depicted as they were before 1917; an attempt to break down traditional respect for elders because it hinders 'correct' interpretation of social and political events. Evaluation of such reports is a hazardous task, because they come as individual items, but at least it can be said that national identity (as distinct from nationalism) is strong among many Kazakhs. On the other hand it would be wrong to attribute any lasting political significance to

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1 Zh X, No. 7, 1964, p.16.
2 Zh X, No. 4, No. 4, 1964, p.52.
3 A comprehensive study of the retention of traditional social organisation by the Kazaks by Irene Winner will be found in Central Asian Review, Vol. XI, Nos. 2 and 3, 1963. See especially sections on the kinship kolkhoz, marriage customs, women and the division of labour, and patriarchal relations within the family. On the incidence of intermarriage between Slaves and Kazakhs see article by S.M. Abramson in Sovetskaya Etnographia, No. 3, 1962.
many of the behavioural patterns that are criticised in the press. The refusal of Kazakh women to give birth in hospital, for instance, is a rather pitiful heritage of their comparatively recent acquaintance with modern medicine, and one that must disappear in the near future. Even such a distinctive characteristic as clan ties is fading, not only in Soviet Central Asia, but all over the Middle East - even without governmental pressure.

Geoffry Wheeler recognises this trend, but argues that tribal cohesion persists most strongly where colonisation has been most extensive. He believed that at the end of the 'fifties there was still general residential and (at least in agriculture) employment separation of Moslem and non-Moslem races. The pattern in the countryside was held to be farms with predominantly Kazakh personnel (of one tribe) alongside others with a mainly Slavic complement. Ethnically mixed farms were said to be a rarity. ¹

However true this may have been in the past, recent years have seen a positive policy of mixing nationalities in order to bring about a real fusion of peoples. The kinship collective-farm would have been severely hit by the amalgamation of farms into larger units after 1953, but the leadership was not satisfied with this measure alone. No central directive on the subject has been located, but in 1960 an akkem secretary wrote as follows:

¹Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia, pp. 43-47. The authority of Richard Pipes is cited in support of this contentions.
We promote in every way [the aim] that every public organization and state institution should be a multinational collective... In advancing leading cadres we always consider the national composition of the population.¹

There were numerous references at the time to the virtues of racially mixed farms, but the best evidence of an overall policy in this direction comes in the claim, made in 1963, that there was now not one state farm in the republic without representatives of at least ten nationalities.² Such a change could scarcely have come about by chance.

Linguistic habits are a more reliable indicator of national identity inasmuch as they can be studied quantitatively. The basic facts are these. In 1926 99.6% of Kazakhs spoke their native language; in 1959 98.4% still considered their native language to be Kazakh.³ These figures have been interpreted as showing that there has been almost no linguistic assimilation. The eminent historian Richard Pipes goes much further: after showing that the other major languages of the USSR are equally viable (only 4.5% of the total population has been linguistically Russified over the same period), he concludes that we are witnessing the emergence of modern nations within the Soviet Union.

Turkic and other major nationalities are gaining in cohesion despite

²Komparta Kazakhs and ugrs of the USSR, Alma-Ata, 1963, p.15. Although only state farms are mentioned here, it seems clear that the policy extended to collective farms also - see PZh K, No. 11, 1961, p.19.
(ii) Itori vesennoi pereni raselenia 1959 goda, Moscow, 1962, pp. 190, 196.
'thirty years of Russification carried out with all the instruments at the disposal of the totalitarian state.  

Professor Pipes is well aware, of course, that language is only one of a number of criteria of national identity, but he regards it as such an important one that it places the onus of disproof on his opponents. Against him it has been argued that Russians are perfectly willing that Kazakhs or any other nation should use their own language, provided that they express only pro-Soviet ideas with it. The survival of non-Russian languages within the USSR is, therefore, not necessarily such a defeat for Soviet policy, nor such a victory for non-Russian people, as Pipes believes.  

This rejoinder points out, correctly, that Pipes has misrepresented the direction of pressure on minority nations. Indeed the figures cited above could well be used to bolster the Soviet claim that official policy has favoured the development of minority nationalities. An impartial observer might concede that at the very least the healthy state of minority languages is evidence of the liberality of the regime in this one respect. Pipes would undoubtedly counter that language was too tough a problem to meet head-on, and so the argument would continue in circles. What can be salvaged from it all is that, despite some misrepresentation in his case, Pipes's contention that language viability

is a good index of national cohesion is not seriously challenged. Whatever
the force of "thirty years of Russification", on this one index of
language the Kazakhs are still as united as ever. Pipes would thus seem
to have the best of the argument — as far as it goes. To take it further
one would like to know much more than the few facts to which this debate
was confined. How many Kazakhs now use Russian as their second language
as compared with the number in 1926? What are the long term trends in
the education of Kazakh children? No statistical answer was found to
the first question, but what with the move towards work groups of mixed
nationality, and demographic trends to be examined below, it must be
increasingly difficult to get by with a knowledge of only the local native
language. Russian must surely be gaining ground as the lingua franca.
A revealing answer to the second question was found. Russian is, of
course, taught as a second language at national schools. Since the 1938
educational reforms it has been an optional subject, but in practice
all national schools teach it beginning with Grades I or II.¹ Far more
important is the fact that, by 1959, about a quarter of Kazakh children
were attending Russian schools, i.e., schools where all subjects are taught
in Russian. The CC Secretary who reported this emphasised that enrolment
had occurred without a single instance of coercion. School building has

¹EP 27/3/56. Russian was never formally declared a compulsory subject in
national schools, but there is little doubt that it was so regarded. In
the important article by Usandil'din in Kommunist No. 13, 1959, it is
emphasised "that the fact that Russian is now an optional subject will
in no way weaken the yearning of our young people to master Russian".
For a description of the syllabus of the national school and hours spent
on Russian see Central Asian Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1961, pp.27, 28.
lagged behind population growth in Kazakhstan so one doubts whether a choice was in fact always available, but there is no reason to doubt that Kazakh parents realize that a good knowledge of Russian is an essential ingredient of upward mobility for their children. 'Individual people' were said to be disgruntled at the trend towards enrolling at Russian schools and wanted to introduce compulsory attendance at Kazakh schools for all Kazakh children. Their plea was rejected as a display of 'bourgeois nationalism'.\(^1\) If national cohesion is as closely linked with language as Richard Pipes suggests, then its travail may be only just beginning.

In the light of the long term trend revealed here, other instances of friction over the use of language begin to look like attempts to stop the clock. A Kazakh philologist writes of the adulteration (sapronda) of his language with foreign [Russian] scientific, political and artistic words; he is told that there is no need for artificial inventions when Russian terms have already been accepted. 'Individual representatives of the intelligentsia' went so far as to declare that only those who knew the Kazakh language should work in responsible posts in the republic, basing their argument on Lenin's policy of 'korenizatsia' (literally 'indigenisation') of the apparatus in 1920. Needless to say this improbable suggestion was sharply rebuffed; its advocates, whoever they were, were bluntly told that Kazakhstan was now a multiracial republic.\(^2\) One can well imagine such a suggestion coming from other Central Asian republics, but in Kazakhstan the idea was already anachronistic.

\(^1\) Kommunist, No. 13, September, 1959, p.36.
\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 34, 39.
Of all the factors working against the optimistic prediction of future Kazakh independence cited earlier, by far the most important is demographic. Even in 1926 only 57% of the population of the Kazakh ASSR were Kazakhs, while Russians and Ukrainians made up about one third — a far higher proportion than in any other Asian republic. Between them and the 1939 census the number of Kazakhs fell from 3,968,289 to 3,098,764, and they now constituted only 33% of the population of their own republic. Russians and Ukrainians now made up 51%.  

The absolute decrease of about 869,000 Kazakhs between 1926 and 1939 has never been officially explained, despite the contrasting situation in all other Asian republics, where the native population continued to increase. Even allowing for migration to other parts of the Soviet Union and small movement across the closed border into Sinkiang and Iran, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the heavy losses were due to excess deaths in this region. Obviously the Kazakhs were the people most affected by collectivization, their nomad economy being particularly vulnerable to enforced settlement.

The next census was held in 1959 when the number of Kazakhs had recovered to 3,621,610, of whom 2,794,966 were in Kazakhstan.  

Meanwhile, however, migration to Kazakhstan associated with the virgin lands scheme and other developmental work had further muddled the European

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portion of the population. Slave now constituted 52.9% of the total.\footnote{Including Russians 42.7%, Ukrainians 6.2%, Belorussians 1.2%. Ibid, p.206.}

The published results of this census failed to account for 10.9% of the republic's population but the likelihood is that they too were Europeans since native groups were listed down to Dungans (0.1%).\footnote{The Central Asian Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1962, p.373, argues that the majority of the unidentified group are Volga Germans deported to Kazakhstan in 1941.}

The Kazakhs have thus constituted a minority in their own republic for several decades. So far no conclusions have been drawn from this, but according to the administrative conditions specified at the time of the introduction of current constitution\footnote{J.V. Stalin listed three conditions, the second of which was that "the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within the republic". Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1945, p.562.} Kazakhstan no longer qualifies for the status of Union Republic. There is moreover a precedent for the abolition of a republic in the case of the former Karelian SSR, where the indigenous population formed a majority in 1926 and 1939, but had fallen to a mere 13.5% by 1959. Its reduction to Autonomous Republic status in 1956 was explained primarily in demographic terms.\footnote{See A. Tarasov, Pravda, 17/7/56.}

In neither case can the reduction of the indigenous population to a minority be attributed directly to a policy of Russification. In Karelia industrialization and the need for outside labour were the primary factors. Kazakhstan was even less able to develop its mineral and agricultural potential without outside help, its population density in 1926 having been only 2.2 per sq. km. This has now risen to about 4 per
sq. km., which is still low compared with the USSR 1962 average of 9.9.\(^1\) Only Turkmenia stands lower on the density scale, and the need to attract labour in all fields remains an acute problem. The likelihood is, therefore, that the Kazakhs will continue their proportional decline in the foreseeable future.\(^2\) Whether or not the precedent of Karelia is acted upon, the prospects for the formation of an independent Kazakh state, or even of its ever joining any other Turko state formed in the area, are receding. It has been argued that the presence of Europeans (of all political persuasions) in Central Asia was one of the major factors preventing this part of the Russian empire from seceding in 1917. Even if another such cataclysmic upheaval occurred, the same factor would again operate in Kazakhstan, and operate with even greater force.

It would be odd if the prospect of national submersion did not evoke some spark of nationalism in even dedicated Kazakh communists.

Unfortunately there are those comrades who question the progressive nature of the raising of the virgin lands.... and who have a negative attitude to the increasingly mixed national composition of the republic. Certain people even lament the fact that the Virgin Lands Kraj receives so much attention from the party and government.... National-narrow-mindedness and racism prevent these people from seeing the raising of the virgin lands as.... [a step] which will hasten immeasurably the creation of a communist society of the whole community of soviet peoples.\(^3\)


\(^2\) See M. Beisbeyev's speech to 23rd Congress CPSU, Pravda 7/4/66.

\(^3\) Zh K, No. 1, 1963, p.61.
There appears to be no coherent message or information on the page provided. It seems to contain scrambled or illegible text.
the Chairman of the Committee of State Security, the Chairman of
Organisations Department, and the Secretary of the Economic Department
of the Party Central Committee, the Second Secretary of the Political
Department of the Party Central Committee, the Secretary of the Politburo
of the Party Central Committee, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The manner in which power is shared between national bodies.

The power of national bodies can be exercised in national bodies of any sort.

The only function of the national bodies in the power process is to represent the
interests, to represent the national bodies of the duty of the national bodies,
and to exercise the rights of the national bodies. Whatever the matter of the
interests, to represent the national bodies of the duty of the national bodies,
and to exercise the rights of the national bodies, the national bodies of the
national bodies.
Communications and heads of Ministries of special local importance;
(4) deputies to all native party department heads and ministers; and
(5) Commanders of the local Military District and local army garrisons.

Before proceeding further we should ask what will be the
significance of establishing the staffing policy for elite positions in
Kazakhstan. In the Central Asian republics where the indigenous
population still constitutes a majority the policy of reserving specific
posts for Europeans is obviously significant. Since the Kazakhs on the
other hand are now a minority it is only to be expected that they will
be outnumbered in key positions. Not much is gained therefore by showing
that staffing practice is similar to that in other Asian republics. What
can be done for Kazakhstan is to relate preference shown to Europeans
(or natives) in filling any position to the population breakdown. We
shall take the 1959 census figures for this purpose, ignoring the
unidentified 10.9% - even though it is reasonably certain that they are
Europeans. This gives a proportion of almost exactly three Europeans to
two non-Europeans. (If the unknown 10.9% were assumed to be Europeans
the proportion would be 16 Europeans to 9 non-Europeans, so that in
using the 3:2 proportion any bias in favour of Europeans that is
discovered will probably be understated.) The non-European sector of
the population consists of 30% Kazakhs and 5.9% residual indigenous
peoples. They are lumped together because surnames are used below in
determining to which group officials belong, and the writer is unable
to separate Kazakh names from those of Tartars, Uighurs and other small
nationalities.
Either population breakdown may now be used to evaluate appointments to any category of elite position as shown on Chart XIV, where non-Europeans are entered in red. We shall consider here only the more vital posts. But first an important general observation. Of the group of 220 officials who constituted the elite between 1955 and 1964 (see chapters 4 and 5), 116 were Europeans and 104 non-Europeans. In other words, contrary to what might be expected from studies like Rykin's the indigenous population is remarkably well represented in the elite. Even if the 3:2 ratio is used, the elite should have consisted of 132 Europeans and 88 non-Europeans. In the making of a political or administrative career it is clearly an advantage to be a Kazakh in Kazakhstan.

There has been considerable deviation from the general central Asian policy of appointing a native First Secretary and a Russian Second Secretary. During World War II a Russian took over the First Secretaryship - no particular reflection on Kazakhstan since the same move was made in the neighbouring republics. From 1946 to 1954 'normal' practice prevailed, again as in neighbouring republics.1 Ponomarenko and Brezhnev arrived in early 1955 to launch the virgin lands scheme and Russians continued to hold both top party posts until the end of 1957. From then until early 1960 Belyaev, a Russian, was First Secretary, but his deputy F. Karibshinov was a Kazakh. From 1960 to the present the 'normal' pattern of native2 First and Russian Second Secretary has again prevailed.

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1Uzbekistan long remained the exception, a native First Secretary not being elected until 1950.
2I. Yusupov, First Secretary from December 1962 to December 1964, was a Uigur; Uigurs constitute only 0.6% of the republic's population.
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium have always been natives. If the seniority lists discussed in chapter I are a reliable guide, this means that three of the four top positions in the republic have (except in the period 1954-1957) regularly fallen to non-Europeans. In the CC Bureau as a whole Kazakhs have in fact formed a majority throughout the decade. Details of the nationality composition of the Bureau (non-Europeans are again entered in red) are available in chart III, and of the Council of Ministers in charts I and II. For easier reference these charts may be summarised as follows.\textsuperscript{1}

Nationality Composition of CC Presidium and Government

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<tr>
<td>CC Presidium (full members)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Europeans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Deputy and Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>Europeans</td>
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<td>Non-Europeans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministers, Chairman of State Committees etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Europeans</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
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\textsuperscript{1}The figures for each year are those that prevailed for at least six months.
If it is borne in mind that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers is a native it will be seen that there has been a fairly even balance in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Among the heads of ministries and other agencies who make up the remainder of the Council near parity was so consistent until 1960 as to suggest a formal policy to this effect. Fluctuations after that have gradually turned in favour of Europeans.

Because of gaps in our data the position in the CC apparatus does not lend itself to such neat summation, but from Chart IV it will be seen that a very different pattern emerges here. At any one time Russian heads of departments have outnumbered indigenous heads by between two and three to one. The same chart also points clearly to the existence of positions which are always filled by Russians, and attention must next be turned to these. Ryokin in his study of Uzbekistan fixes his gaze solely on these reserved positions, so that comparison with the facts presented above on the CC Bureau and Council of Ministers is, unfortunately, precluded. One suspects that if the Kazakhs are so well represented in central elite positions, there is probably a similar side to the story in Uzbekistan.

Because of the unusual pattern of appointments to the top two party posts there is no position in the CC Bureau that can definitely be called reserved; posts reserved for Russians on the party side begin in the apparatus. The two vital departments of Propaganda and Agitation and Party Organs are always headed by Russians. Industry, construction and agriculture (the main branch departments) have also fallen almost exclusively to Russians. It should be noted, however, that these economic branch heads are not infrequently under a non-European CC Secretary.
On the government side there has usually been a Russian First Deputy Chairman - the counterpart of the Russian Second Secretary. We should note also, however, that the second First Deputy (assuming he is 'second') is a non-European. Other government posts consistently held by Europeans are the chairmanship of Gosplan and the portfolios of Construction, Communal Economy and Procurement. The reader will note the conspicuous absence here of Internal Affairs, Security and Communications: all three have had native heads for considerable periods in Kazakhstan.

Furthermore it should be pointed out that there are a number of posts apparently reserved for non-Europeans. Culture and Education portfolios are the monopoly of Kazakhs, and, more importantly, the same is true of this area of responsibility on the party side. The Propaganda Secretary is always a Kazakh.

Ryskin emphasises that where indigenous CC department heads and ministers are appointed, there are always Russian deputies to assist them.¹ The same pattern was found in Kazakhstan. Probably it is legitimate to infer that this is another manifestation of Russian tutelage, but there is some danger here of assuming what should be proven. Each minister has a number of deputies, often of different nationalities, and it was not usual for the press to identify any one of them as the first deputy. As a correction to some oversimplified Western analysis it should also be stressed that the above arrangement is reciprocal - i.e. Russian heads are assisted by native deputies in both party and state bureaucracies.

At the end of 1964 the native population was thus still strongly over-represented in the central elite, although there were signs of some loss of ground. At the local level the trend against the Kazakhs is clear. In the table below the number of non-European officials is given as a fraction of the total number of officials identified in the three key offices in all oblasts. Identification is complete for the period covered by the thesis; for the preceding five year period there are some gaps in the positions of obkom second secretary and oblastkoms chairman.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of non-European oblast officials</th>
<th>1950-54</th>
<th>1955-59</th>
<th>1960-64</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obkom first secretaries</strong></td>
<td>27/37</td>
<td>25/47</td>
<td>18/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obkom second secretaries</strong></td>
<td>9/30</td>
<td>11/41</td>
<td>20/46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oblastkoms chairman</strong></td>
<td>22/26</td>
<td>26/33</td>
<td>25/42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are now only three oblasts whose first secretaries have always been natives. The number of native second secretaries has risen accordingly, but here too the rules are being broken: in recent years there have been several cases of first and second secretarships being held by Russians in the one oblast. Nevertheless these trends still have a long way to run before breaking down the obvious advantages of being a Kazakh at oblast level.

These advantages extended to lower levels also. In 1960 48.9% of secretaries of obkoms, raikoms and raionkoms were Kazakhs, and this proportion had scarcely changed since 1956. In 1960 59.7% of the

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1. BP 26/1/56, 11/3/60.
chairman of oblast, city and raion executive committees were Kazakhs.¹ In the same year 60% of chairmen of village, aul and settlement soviets were Kazakhs.²

All these figures are well above not only the proportion of Kazakhs in the population, but also the proportion of Kazakh party members. In mid 1961 there were 149,200 Kazakhs in the CPSU.³ It is not known how many of these lived in Kazakhstan, but among the largest Kazakh community outside the republic, that in Uzbekistan, party membership rate was 23 per 1000 in 1959⁴ or just over half the rate for all Kazakhs in the USSR. If we assume that the ratio of party membership among all expatriate Kazakhs was about the same, we find that there were about 22,000 Kazakh party members outside Kazakhstan. This would mean a total of 127,000 Kazakhs out of 360,000 members and candidates of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan at the time, or 36%. Kazakhs are apparently overrepresented in the party, though not to the same degree as they are among local officials.

The nationality distribution among Chairman of sejmarnuk presented the one instance in which natives were underrepresented in an important local position. Only eight out of 25 chairmen had indigenous names. Since these administrators were the pick of industrial executives,

¹LP 11/3/60.
³Partizany Ekhma, No. 1, January, 1962, p.49.
⁴Komsomol'skaya Partia Uzbekistana v tashkakh, p.163.
Vol. 36, No. 7, June 1966
The Journal of American History
561-571

In summary, the results of the study provide an important contribution to our understanding of race and educational attainment. The findings indicate that over the years the gap in educational opportunity and attainment between white and black students has not only persisted but has widened. This suggests that the policies of the past aimed at improving educational outcomes for black students have been insufficient. The study highlights the need for continued efforts to address these disparities and further research is needed to fully understand the underlying causes of the observed trends.

The results of this study also have implications for policy makers and educators. The findings suggest that targeted interventions are necessary to reduce the achievement gap between white and black students. This includes efforts to provide additional resources and support to schools that serve a high proportion of minority students. Additionally, the study highlights the importance of addressing systemic barriers that may contribute to the achievement gap, such as poverty, discrimination, and unequal access to quality education.

In conclusion, the results of this study underscore the importance of addressing the issue of racial disparities in educational attainment. The findings reveal that the gap between white and black students has not only persisted but has widened over time. This highlights the need for continued efforts to improve educational opportunities and outcomes for all students, particularly those from historically marginalized groups. The study provides valuable insights into the factors that contribute to these disparities and suggests potential areas for intervention.
with higher and secondary education were Kazakhs. The corresponding figures for Russians were 54.6% and 62.6%.\(^1\)

Before coming to any conclusions about the nationality question one further factor needs to be mentioned, namely the degree of economic dependence of Kazakhstan on the USSR. Centralised planning has led to extremely close economic integration of the northern part of the republic with the 'new Soviet heartland' complex that stretches from the Volga to Lake Baikal. A description of the economic geography of the area cannot be attempted here, but we may quote the findings of a close student of the area. The British geographer, David Hosson, argues that the natural geographic and economic division between Soviet Central Asia and this heartland lies across the central Kazakh desert, and further that the Kazakh republic is 'an anachronism which will probably be rectified by an administrative change before long'.\(^2\)

Such is the price Kazakhs have had to pay for the considerable material benefits which have accompanied the preferential investment in the republic in recent years.\(^3\) Hosson's prediction about the future of the republic may or may not prove to be accurate, but it is certainly more credible than the contrary prediction cited at the beginning of this

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\(^1\) These proportions are derived from Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1963 godu, Moscow, 1965, p.493. The nationals of other Central Asian republics are similarly underrepresented among specialists: Kirghis are .46% of the population, .23% of specialists; Turtuks .48% and .25% respectively.


\(^3\) In the fifties the republic was not only retaining a high proportion of its turnover taxes (the main source of revenue in the Soviet Union), but was also the only republic to receive large direct grants from the All-Union budget. See Istoria sovetskogo i prava Sovetskogo Kasakhstana, Vol. III, Almaty, 1965, pp. 223, 224.
chapter. If, as has been argued, the Eastern Bloc countries would now find it virtually impossible to leave Comecon, the USSR? how much more is Kazakhstan now an integral part of the USSR?

Kazakh economists are well aware of all this, and from time to time complain rather deviously of the interdependence of the RSFSR and their republic. They criticise the 'non-observance of proportional development of branches of industry', especially the still predominantly extractive nature of Kazakhstan's industry. The blunt response to such complaints is that 'the full and all round development of the economy ...... of any Soviet nation depends primarily on the preferential resolution of tasks of all-union importance'. To what extent planning for Kazakhstan's metallurgical industries is based on considerations of the comparative advantages possessed by adjacent regions of the RSFSR, and to what extent on intentional lop-sided development as a political insurance, is extremely difficult to assess, but the localist pretensions of a few Kazakh economists would no doubt tend to make central Russian planners wary of 'all round local development'. What is clear is that there is no policy of promoting regional autarky, and now that the branch system of industrial administration has been restored there is less prospect than ever of disengagement from economic integration with the RSFSR.

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2 See e.g. S. Sundstov in FZh K, No. 5, 1964, p.26. Note that in 1957 when the reorganisation of industrial administration was first mooted, the directors of large (all-union subordinated) combines were not enthusiastic about exchanging Moscow for Alma-Ata as their coordinating centre; their suppliers and consumers lay to the north in the RSFSR - see KP 7/4/57, 25/4/57.
3 Communist, No. 13, September, 1959, p.34.
Confession that the world has seen

As so often as to be one of the rarest specimens of national scale
compelled to impose upon their perception of their identity that
voter health. Not to demand, one may claim in the present of the
that in every such instance the report came not from a heuristic but a
instance of intervention emerging the health alike one which might meet
attained, the combination of agent and suit, that they see themselves as

beauty, and go to the constraint for @2\$@ that they see themselves as
of intervention still engage in some concern some where, via the
still closer together. This evidence shows that in a confrontation
integrate opposition to the central goal of "disarm the intervention
levels. We have arrived at the empty place of evidence that nothing
that one may aspire to see committed to a position at all.

partial position in the shaping of power (department to other powers)
over the course of health reformation. Not because it does not obey a
the present that the central role Singapore and the notion must prevail
aesthetic ends sought of hope, the only constitution open to the resurrection
In the light of the long term democratic, international and
The Kazakh propaganda Secretary is quoted here not in a moment of temporary aberration; he has consistently advanced this view of his people, and his fellow native leaders have dutifully echoed him.\(^1\)

After reading their declarations of unbounded gratitude and fraternal solidarity, one finds extraordinary the assertion that the Moslem population regards its own party elite as 'its protectors against Russian chauvinism'. Indeed it seems most likely that these leaders will quietly acquiesce in the dissolution of their republic predicted by Kecsk. This conclusion could scarcely be more radically opposed to the usual long term forecasts for the area, but we would add that Kazakhstan appears to be a special case among the five Central Asian republics, and the future may hold quite dissimilar fortunes for the others.

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CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSIONS

Apart from the inevitable problems of selection and emphasis common to any descriptive or analytic study, generalizing about a Soviet republic presents a difficulty sui generis. In drawing together the threads running through the thesis one cannot but be aware that Kazakhstan is a microcosm of the USSR. At both levels there are the same institutions behaving in much the same way, the same ideology, the same political culture. It is best to acknowledge at the outset, therefore, that much of the enormous and often contradictory body of thought on the nature of the USSR will be relevant here.

Recognition of this fact brings both gain and loss. A sound interpretation of the USSR is likely to be also a short path to understanding Kazakhstan’s polity; but the number of interpretations claiming to be the key to Soviet politics is truly bewildering. In order to simplify the task of choosing what models or parts thereof, are helpful in generalizing about Kazakhstan, let us do some violence to the more widely accepted Western descriptions of the USSR, and regard them as falling into one of two broad categories - totalitarian and bureaucratic. Such a broad division produces no unitary theory on either side, of course, but two variegated bodies of thought developed over a long period. Moreover several theories lie partly straddled across the demarcation line.¹

The variants on the totalitarian side are the more easily identified because they constitute well-known landmarks of literature on the Soviet system.\(^1\) The approach which regards the USSR as 'bureaucracy-ruin-large' is as yet still in the process of evolution, but several formulations are already on hand.\(^2\)

A sense of the theoretical inadequacy of the conception of totalitarianism is now widespread and telling criticisms have accumulated.\(^3\) Dissatisfaction has centered more on the close identification of certain methods of rule with totalitarianism than on the way the end result is seen. The latter has been summarized by Arendt as the 'atomization of society' - a dramatic way of saying that autonomous social groups are absent, their place being taken by mass organizations which serve as transmission belts to mobilize society towards goals set by the elite. Few would dispute that mobilization still remains the primary function of Soviet elective institutions and mass organizations, but many now hold that the lesson of how this state of affairs is maintained was over-learned on the basis of two convincing examples. The case with which

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the Brezsinski and Friedrich syndrome of "six interrelated traits" (all
describing methods of rule) was attached in the late "fifties was
perhaps the major factor in the fall of totalitarianism from academic
grace.

Arendt's model of totalitarianism, too, would appear to have
lost its value because of heavy reliance on the terror as an explanatory
feature. Our concern here will be with another aspect of this model
which is still relevant to our studies in Kazakhstan. Arendt was
impressed by the shapelessness and endless flux of the totalitarian state.
What strikes the observer of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, she argued,
was not their monolithic structure, but on the contrary the complete
absence of system; the infinite multiplication of offices; the
continuous competition between offices, whose functions not merely
overlapped, but duplicated one another; the multiplicity of transmission
belts and the confusion of the hierarchy, which assured the leader's
complete independence of all his inferiors. In short the essentially
new feature of totalitarianism distinguishing it from previous forms
of autocracy, was the elimination of all fixed institutions between the
ruler and the ruled.

This model still retains a certain attraction for someone
attempting to bring order to chaotic source material on the politics and
administration of a Soviet republic. His studies of party and state
institutions are frequently interrupted by kaleidoscopic reorganizations;
he has no way of knowing how often the republic's most powerful bodies

\[\text{Arendt, op. cit., pp. 395, 406, 409.}\]
meet, or what their agenda or procedures are; and of course he becomes lost in the twilight area where party and state functions duplicate one another. Arendt’s theory becomes almost irresistible; it offers a ready made garment for clothing the researcher’s confusion with intellectual respectability. Gradually, however, the outlines of a system become visible. It is noted that offices tend to disappear and reappear under another guise rather than to multiply. Despite the numerous reorganizations of the government machine over the decade it is possible to discover a constant hierarchical pattern of authority extending through and above the Council of Ministers, with Deputy Chairman in charge of groups of ministries. On the party side, too, the lesser members of the CC secretariat show a fairly clear allocation of duties, and the organisational permutations of the CC apparatus mask a constant set of functions.

If lines of authoritative communication were varied arbitrarily one might expect to find evidence not only of functional overlap between agencies, but also of conflicting directives at the operational level. Plaints on this score, however, are infrequent. What one does find is a good deal of invective at times against ‘shabilian’, i.e. a stereotyped approach to policy implementation by officials. Usually such criticism is retrospective and associated with policy change, but its recurrence demonstrates a reluctance to apply discretion to directives, and a unitary source of directives despite the party-state division. We have documented the case of an official who consistently, and with

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1Arendt specifically denies the existence of hierarchy anywhere in the system, and paints a state of affairs in which ‘every citizen feels himself directly confronted with the will of the leader’. Op.cit. p.465.
relative impunity, refused to countenance the more egregious blunders committed in soil cultivation from 1955 on, but he is an orchid in a forest. If one had to describe the administrative process in one word it would be rigidity, not confusion; and most definitely one could not speak of 'complete absence of system'.

Arendt's thesis would now seem to have been a straw to a dreaming man. And in truth the idea of a modern society 'organised' along the lines she suggests offends against reason. Would it not be so hopelessly inefficient as to be self-destructive? How one can point to all kinds of mismanagement in Kazakhstan, particularly with reference to the virgin lands scheme, but to balance the picture one has only to point to the coddledness in the midst of the scheme. The contrasts in Soviet efficiency may at times induce in us a schizophrenic bemusement, but the system cannot be dismissed as a cracking failure. Why then bother with the Arendt theory at all if, despite its superficial attraction as a hold-all for untidy pieces of administrative bric-à-brac, and despite the party-state tangle, it will not serve as a useful description of either administrative structures or processes?1

In examining the Supreme Soviet we found that the Budget Commission was, to an unknown degree, involved in the final drafting of the annual budget. It seemed, however, that the commission was overwhelmed by an annual influx of government officials who far outnumbered members.

1The most that can be said for Arendt's formal instability model as it applies to the internal workings of both party and state bureaucracies is that it does point up the frequency and scope of institutional reorganizations in the USSR. The outsider should, however, be wary of branding as 'chaotic' what may in fact be organizational flexibility. Any close and extended study of government organization in a Western democracy will reveal constant flux and dynamic change in structures, distribution of functions, and lines of communication. As one fully documented example see D.N. Chester (ed.), The Organization of British Central Government 1914-1956, Allen and Unwin, London, 1957.
This periodic activation of the commission is reminiscent of what
Arendt had to say about multiplicity of transmission belts and variation
of lines of authoritative communication. The behaviour of other
commissions of the Supreme Soviet, especially as exemplified in the case
where the Health and Social Security Commission was suddenly endowed
with considerable authority by an influx of officials was still more
striking. Remember that commission members have full time jobs
elsewhere, and that the cycle of events that was described is said to be
a recurrent feature of commission activity. In short we may say that
the commissions are activated from time to time as suits the current
needs of the bureaucracy.

If the commissions were the only 'irregular' centres of
decision making or at least preemergence, one might dismiss the
phenomenon as brought about by the anomalous position of the Supreme
Soviet. There are constitutional reasons why the latter must be given
at least a formal role in the life of the republic, and deputies require
something more than twice yearly hand-raising from which to derive a sense
of participation. Commission activity fulfils this need, and is at the
same time more easily manageable than perhaps the Supreme Soviet as a
whole would be if admitted further into the political process. Be this
as it may, there are other extra-bureaucratic bodies which become involved
in the chain of command.

At several points in the thesis occasion was had to remark on
the poor publicity given to orders of central party and state organs. For
instance although the postanovlenia of the Council of Ministers are known
to run to several hundreds every year, only a few trifling examples
of them are found in the press. Obviously they are not considered
suitable vehicles for communicating the regime's priorities to the
general public. If one searches for alternative means by which this is
done they are soon found in the numerous republican and local conferences
which fill so much of the press. Every sector of the population is
catered for in this plethora of public meetings, and we have attempted
to show how the party manipulates them to secure fulfilment of its
aims. The conferences are a major instrument for bureaucratic guidance
and channelling of public initiative.

It would seem that at least in the area of what we have
called public relations Arendt's picture of unstable institutions
between rulers and ruled does have merit. Group gatherings outside the
bureaucratic structure are ephemeral affairs, or, if they have some
permanent organisational basis, are activated at the behest or with
the concurrence of the bureaucracy. After that, as Arendt would say,
individuals are atomised again, and incapable of assuming any permanent
solidarity. Indeed it looks as though one might simply substitute
'bureaucracy' for 'leader' in Arendt's work, and redefine totalitarianism
as a system in which all autonomous secondary institutions between the
bureaucracy and the rest of society have been eliminated.

Before doing this, however, one would need to extend the
present study well beyond central institutions. In the course of
examining these institutions some data was thrown up to suggest that
the same generalisation might be possible at local level. There is the
evidence of regulation of the volume of voters' naky by the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet, and the containment of local pressures by the
mechanism of self-help. Here extra-bureaucratic voluntary groups are,
once again, key instruments. There is also the spectacle of local cultural
organisations having their functions defined for them at the direction of
the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the effort to supply additional
(economic) goals to supplement the primary (cultural) goals of such
organisations. The post-Khrushchev reassessment of voluntary groups in
industry suggests that their real functions were social rather than
economic. They gave process workers an overall picture of the contribution
to society by their production units, thereby serving no doubt to combat
alienation in a newly industrialized society; but the detailed regulation
of plant processes from above was hardly compatible with a sustained
flow of worker initiatives from below. Once again the downward stream
of bureaucratic regulation proved too strong for counter-flow from
'public' or 'voluntary' bodies.

Nonetheless much more empirical data would be needed to
establish that Arendt's insights constitute a complete model of
relationships between the bureaucracy and social groups at local level.
We defend only its usefulness as applied to central institutions. A
somewhat academic question that flows from this is whether the manipulation
of extra-bureaucratic bodies deserves the label of totalitarianism.

A.G. Meyer writes:

In the USSR, bureaucracy has taken over the society and
thus is subject to no checks. No Western bureaucracy has
as much power.....over virtually all areas of life. If
anyone feels the urge to dramatize this difference between
bureaucracy = simple and bureaucracy-writ-large by
labelling the latter totalitarian, so be it.1

p.472.
Meyer himself believes that such a step confuses rather than enlightens because of the divergent meanings given to the word. Perhaps so, but then bureaucracy too means different things to different people, and Professor Meyer needed a sizeable tome to expound his admirable interpretation of the USSR as 'bureaucracy-write-large'.

Meyer sees the USSR as a giant corporation in which party chiefs are the board of directors and state officials the managers. Lesser party members are the stockholders with little control over the major shareholders who sit on the board of directors. There is a fussiness between directors and managers, the two groups overlapping considerably, but there is no doubt that the board of directors shapes the goals and policies of the corporation; reshapes the institutions it has itself created; and hires and fires the managers.¹

The analogy has a clear application to Kazakhstan. Congress bears a resemblance to a stockholders' meeting, delegates unanimously applauding the speeches of leaders and portraying the helplessness and passivity of most constituents of the system. The Council of Ministers is free from effectively enforced responsibility to any representative institution; responsibility is to its board of directors, the CC Bureau. Party leaders are appointed to government posts, just as directors appoint themselves managers. Further, we found no better terms to describe the differences in elite career patterns than 'line' and 'staff', terms once widely used to describe functional divisions within industrial bureaucracies. Party sovereignty in matters of appointments

¹Meyer, op.cit., pp.112-114,
and organization also fits well with the board of directors analogy.
Finally the broad aims of the state can, like those of the corporation, be seen as the accumulation of wealth and power, and self-preservation.

The stranger to the analogy is strikingly to say the least, and it might be pushed a stage further to show Kazakhstan as a branch of its parent USSR corporation. It is in fact more than a flash of descriptive brilliance, and might well be regarded as a ready made theoretical model, allowing inferences to be made about the system of which it is a model. It precludes, for instance, any simplistic notion of the regime as a dictatorship where power is wielded without restraint by party bosses. With this model in view one would not be led to see industrial administration as a monolithic command structure marked by blind obedience below - as did Bendix. The objectives of a large enterprise impose their own rationality and constraints on its leaders just as does the plan in the republic. Conflicts of interest, as between republican leaders and bosses or as manifested by 'localism' or 'departmental barriers' are no less a part of the whole fabric than in any giant concern. At the same time the model will not lead one to see group conflict as evidence of the existence of autonomous interest groups.

Conflict in a bureaucratic milieu has its own specific qualities. C.P. Snow, sees it as a form of 'closed politics', that is any kind of politics in which there is no appeal to a larger assembly - larger assembly in the sense of a group of opinion or an electorate, or on an even bigger scale what we call loosely 'social forces'.

Removed from interference and support from larger assemblies, interest groups within a bureaucracy develop a fairly stable set of mutual expectations, the inherent thrust of which is towards the preservation of some overall harmony. Groups, be they factory directors or ministerial collegia, which push their interests to the extent of being consistently out of step with current policies will be regarded as uncooperative, a threat to harmony. Action will be taken to preserve the atmosphere of potential agreement. In order to effect policy change in a bureaucratic environment one must maintain the appearance of collaboration and not adopt the militant stance open to an independent interest group which appeals to a larger assembly. 1 Under such circumstances it is not difficult to see why the incentives offered to factory managers did not become the subject of fundamental enquiry until their behaviour became a serious threat to the goals of the bureaucracy as a whole. The same atmosphere of potential agreement prevented all but one state official from rocking the agricultural boat in 1956. Party leaders, too, took up the cause of dry-land farming and questioned existing policy only when harvest results threatened to unseat them.

A theoretical model should be a simpler system than the real system of which it is a model - simpler but not otherwise dissimilar. Despite its many virtues the corporation model is, in one vital respect, simple to the extent of being dissimilar. The notion of the party owning the state is apt, and the CC Bureau is indeed comparable to a board of

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...
interpretations comes closest to the facts. There are, of course, numerous instances of party officials supplanting state officials at this level, especially at critical periods (e.g. harvest time), and hence the favour given to the first interpretation by some commentators. Much depends on selection of empirical data.

No such effort is made to define the separate roles of party and state at CC and Council of Ministers level. No Soviet spokesman ever attempts to indicate what the CC Bureau should do and what it should leave to the government - no more than anyone would attempt to do this at USSR level. The CC Bureau is in fact the point where party and state authority finally converges. Its members hold the commanding positions in both hierarchies, and it is almost pointless to ask here whether the party has control of the state or vice versa. Efforts to mould events are launched from this centre and the results flow down the two separate channels. All this is beyond the simple corporation model in which the CC Bureau is in effect just another step in a single hierarchical structure, different only in being named a party organ.

Career patterns of the line elite are relevant here. To cite the best example, the current First Secretary, D.A. Kunaev, is now enjoying his second term of office, and has twice been Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He moves up or down a rung with each transfer, but do his duties vary greatly? C.A. Mel'mik was Minister for Agriculture (1954-57), CC Secretary in charge of agriculture (1957-59), First Deputy

1 The statement by the Azerbaijani CC Secretary quoted in chapter 2 would appear to break new ground.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of agriculture (1959-63), and Chairman of the Agricultural Bureau of the CC from 1969 until its abolition after Khrushchev's fall. In short he was the senior spokesman on agriculture in the CC Bureau for either party or state from 1957 on, and one doubts whether these cross transfers meant much more than a step down or up in the top hierarchy. He was displaced from the CC secretaryship by Yusupov who was on his way up to become First Secretary, and moved back there after Yusupov climbed the final step. Similar examples can be found on the industrial side.\(^1\) The whole pattern of top line careers blurs the party-state division at this level and matches the position of the CC Bureau at the apex of both party and state hierarchies. Thus the third of the three suggested views of party-state relations is the most preferable when the CC Bureau is under consideration.

If the CC Bureau is seen as a joint party and state cabinet, the role of the CC economic branch departments, and indeed of the whole party apparatus down to local level, becomes clearer. The CC Secretaries can sit in conference with government heads precisely because they have their own independent lines of information, their own machinery to control policy implementation. Looked at from the viewpoint of administrative rationality and efficiency the CC branch departments make little sense: the structure within the Council of Ministers provides ample machinery for coordination of the work of the ministries. Looked at from a party power point of view the departments tend to make better sense. Without them party leaders might be hard pressed to prevent the state bureaucracy from achieving de facto usurpation of policy making. Perhaps we have here a

\(^1\)See Tashiev's biography p. 257; R.M. Dalgalin was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of industry, then CC Secretary for the same, and chairman of the CC Industrial Bureau.
due to the limited exchange of personnel between CC branch departments and ministries - the phenomenon which was unexplained in our examination of careers of the staff elite. It might be interpreted as stemming from the need felt by the party to retain the separateness of its branch structure, the source of its independent approach to economic policy.

Let us speculate for a moment on what the role of the party would be without its economic branch departments. The party's dominance over the state bureaucracy would then depend on its functions as (1) custodian of the orthodoxy which legitimates its power, and (2) the source of patronage. These two functions would have to take care of any trend in the state bureaucracy to urge efficient functioning of the system as an end in itself and thereby threaten the long term ideological goals to which the party relates its very existence.

Realization of this danger is probably crucial whenever the role and organization of the party is reviewed. Nevertheless one wonders whether the unending reluctance to reduce the duplication of the state apparatus is not a form of over-insurance by the party. In liberal-democratic states it is rarely suggested that the party-ministry at the top, to which bureaucratic loyalty is taken for granted, fails to have its policies implemented through lack of a party apparatus interfusing the bureaucracy at lower levels. Complaints of bureaucratic sabotage of the governing party's policy are rare, for instance, in Australia; yet the only political influence on the bureaucracy at lower levels is the private Member's representations on behalf of his constituents. Why then the need for party permeation of all levels in the Soviet system? This may have been a necessity in the period 1928-41 when an all-out effort was made to destroy the old order and construct the framework of a
new one. With such a radical programme under way, no part of society, perhaps least of all the state bureaucracy, could be relied upon to possess the needed revolutionary verve. Now if one believes that the party remains deeply committed to still further radical social change then its continued grasp on day to day affairs needs no explanation. But if one discerns much complacency with what has been won, and a growing preference for piecemeal rather than holistic social engineering, then the party’s structure may surely be seen as the result of inertia; success has bred conservatism and a vested interest in the status quo on the part of the apparatus and the elite in general. And the status quo happens to be one in which society is penetrated by political organs that parallel the purely administrative structure.

The very suggestion of a system in which the party did not concern itself with day to day economic affairs brings an awareness of how far it would be from current reality. One may theorise about the chances of the party maintaining its dominance without much of its duplicate machinery - especially if, as Brzezinski suggested a few years ago, the ideology has become the ‘chief buttress for the party’s power’. But a glance at the organisational chart of the CC apparatus shows that the party does not rate ideology so highly as an instrument of power. The Ideological and Party Organs departments, as individual units, do not merit the primacy accorded them in our discussion of central party organs, but at any one time over half the apparatus consists of economic branch departments.

1 Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, p. 80.
The importance that Brzezinski ascribed to the ideology of a simple numerical stocktake of institutions. On the basis of his analysis of the interplay between ideology and action he was able to single out L.I. Brezhnev as 'the man to watch' well before the events of October 1964. The model on which he based his prediction therefore demands close attention. Briefly, Brzezinski argued that the specialists of the system are unable to provide the integration necessary for the continued existence of any large-scale organization. The party with its compulsion towards enforcing social integration around a set of dogmatic beliefs fulfils this need, but to cope with the sometimes recalcitrant experts the party must allow penetration of its own ranks by technical and professional men. This produces an internal reaction in the form of intensified indoctrination, and professionalisation of the agit-prop personnel to maintain commitment to the ideology. The split

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1 He defined the USSR as totalitarian largely in terms of the ideology. Ibid. pp. 17, 68. (More recently he has revised his view of the place of the ideology - see 'The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?', Problems of Communism, Vol. IV, No. 1, January-February, 1966, p. 12).


3 One might be tempted to see here the answer to the question raised above on the duplicate apparatus of the party. Some institution must of course perform this integrative role, but it is debatable whether such an extensive apparatus is required for the task. The degree of integration attempted at the crucial point, and herein lies one of the distinctive characteristics of the Soviet system. The party penetrates other groups so successfully that it has generally been able to deal with them bilaterally, thereby preventing formation of coalitions and unofficial group consensus. Party primacy has thus depended on limiting real participation in the political process. This is over-integration - another aspect of the 'over-insurance' already mentioned.
between these elements in the party causes it in turn to throw up
'ideology-action generalizers' (e.g. Brezhnev) as leaders who preserve
a balance between ideologically governed and pragmatic action\(^1\) - the
much vaunted 'unity of theory and practice'.

This conceptualisation of roles presents difficulties when
applied to particular members of the Kazakh CC Bureau. Kunev's
background, for instance, was in metallurgy; he never held a party post
until appointment as First Secretary; and according to Brazeninaki's
schema he would barely have emerged from the specialist category as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He was, therefore, an unlikely
candidate for appointment as chief 'ideology-action generalizer' of the
Republic. The backgrounds of other First and Second Secretaries do,
with one further exception,\(^2\) qualify them well for such a role, but there
were many other line officials in the running with similar backgrounds,
and prediction on the basis of Brazeninaki's types would have been
hazardous. One suspects that his successful nomination of Brezhnev as
'the man to watch' was based, perhaps unconsciously, on more factors than
the interaction between ideology and action. Brazeninaki's inference that
ideologists do not mount the final few steps to power is, of course,
fully verified in Kazakhstan's history, and his model has at the very
least this negative value. Whatever the relation between ideology and
action the CC Bureau is composed predominantly of men of action - all in
fact may be so described except the Secretary for ideology. If the

\(^1\) Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, pp.72-82.
\(^2\) F.K. Karibshanov - Chairman of an oblastkomm; head of the CC Agricultural
Department; Minister of Agriculture; Secretary CC (for agriculture); Second Secretary.
gestalt of the Bureau is to be seen as working towards the unity of theory and practice, emphasis must be on the latter, on the grounds both of the structure of the supporting apparatus and the careers and functions of Bureau members.

So we have a system in which bureaucratic forms of organisation dominate from top to bottom, and in which relations between the bureaucracy and the rest of society manifest certain totalitarian features as described by Arendt - or, if one prefers, features which protect the bureaucracy from freely organized outside pressure. In the writer's view manipulation of society by the bureaucracy is so successful that any evolution of the system will have to come from within the bureaucracy itself.

Secondly some clear insights into the nature of the bureaucracy are to be gained by seeing it as a giant corporation. One will expect to find interest groups and hence conflict, but these will operate in an environment of 'closed politics'.

Thirdly no simple model can convey the complexity of party-state relations. These have never been successfully described either within or without the USSR by any simple formula. They require constant observation at different levels, times and places.

There is also a fourth dimension from which the system has to be viewed.

Myron Rush argues that the cleavage between the party and state machines 'seems incompatible with the West's conception of a Soviet "ruling class" embracing both the party and the state bureaucracy'. He sees the opposition between the goals of the two as basic - 'in so far as it finds institutional expression'. State officials are bureaucrats and
specialists who prefer orderly procedures, routine and efficiency; who rely on science and technology in problem solving; who disregard problems that are not pressing, and oppose intervention from outside. The party machine displays bureaucratic tendencies too, but traditionally it is committed to fashioning institutions and society in accordance with an ideal, and embodies what remains of the revolutionary spirit in the regime. It is continually setting new tasks, mobilizing opinion, shifting cadres. Its preferred activity is the crash programme.1

As an ideal-typical description of the two halves of the political structure this is acceptable (although the party seems to be undergoing a metamorphosis2), and there is no cause to dispute the fact that the two approaches to government afford ample grounds for conflict. We might ask, however, why this writer was careful to speak of opposition 'in so far as it finds institutional expression'. If opposition is basic one has to explain why its expression is heavily muted. It is precisely here that the concept of a ruling elite is most useful.

We have described the CC Bureau as a combined party and state cabinet, but the means of quashing any expression of institutional conflict extends beyond this arrangement. In searching out the decision-making process within the Council of Ministers it was discovered that the Presidium of the Council, and sometimes even individual Deputy Chairmen,

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2It is now argued that the party is being gradually transformed from an ideologically-oriented organization to a merely instrumental and pragmatic body specializing in adjustment and compromise; and that the party is therefore hard put to justify its leading role. Brzezinski himself has largely come around to this view. See 'The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?', Problems of Communism, Vol. IV, No. 1, January-February, 1966, pp.1-15. In either case there is still room for the 'basic opposition' to interference which Myron Rush sees.
asserted, the concept of a ruling elite starting the top positions on both the CC bureau can operate the state machinery. Contrary to what many president from the ministries meet those, and a contact panel formed which of authority crosses over to the CC bureau, a elite group which the but its not a party state body. Rather it is the point at which these below them. The government president stands above the state president.

differently from that of the ministries or state administrations programs (were they-type June oratories whose form or like was procedurally transitory). The long-term members (e.g., P. Rabaday of I.D).

depended a luminary of expert staff or experts, but they were the more true workers outside the political apparatus enough to have time passed through. Reading party and salon work. The other half, it is a role of President member could be identified as having gained their뼈 of the June elite, if any one there during the decade. but in the midst of the June elite, the President of the council of ministries in the midst of the June elite, the President of the council of ministries a seen useful to regard the state bureaucracy as a decentralized structure. In management at least it would do less commerce the state bureaucracy. In fact those seen to neglect a represented of that President with the state bureaucracy when representing the interests doubt about the correctness of those. By contrast, the government bureaucrat into the president, those big organizations take away

bureaucrats to the state elite. There was little promotion from the state the government president were dominated by the June elite, which ministries the position of career within the elite showed that the membership of the were powerful enough to act on behalf of the full council.
I. 1946.

It is important, however, in the analysis of control societies, to

first look at the particular incidence and contribution of one mode in order to

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and by considering them we interception. It is not the psychological

In the same way, different modes have different consequences.

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A study of Ernesto Laclau and John Zizek

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APPENDIX I

EX-OFFICIO MEMBERSHIP OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND AUDITING COMMISSION.

Central party officials with ex-officio full membership of the CC are its Secretaries, the heads of certain CC departments, the chairman of the Party Commission, the director of the Higher Party School attached to the CC, and the director of the Institute of Party History. The First Secretary of the Komsomol, although not formally a party official, may also be included in this group. The notion of ex-officio membership receives a set-back at the outset, however, because representation of apparatus heads among full CC members has varied considerably.

The heads of the departments of Agriculture and Industry have invariably been elected full members of the CC, and present no difficulty. The head of the Department of Party Organs is also usually a full member, but from 1961 to 1963 was only a candidate member. The action taken to raise him to full membership in between Congresses\(^1\) was unusual, and can probably be interpreted as signifying that failure to grant him full membership in 1961 was an anomaly. Three department heads can thus be regarded as ex-officio full CC members. In 1956 the heads of four departments - Science and Culture, Propaganda and Agitation, Administrative Organs, and possibly Transport and Communication - were candidate members of the CC; another three - Construction, Schools, and

\(^{1}\) WP 20/3/63.
Trade, Finance and Planning Organs were members of the AC. At the 1960 Congress the Science and Culture head was advanced to full CC membership, and in 1961 this status was accorded to the heads of all departments except the Department of Light and Food Industry head, who was an AC member in 1960 and now became a candidate CC member.

Lest it be thought that these variations are too numerous to be compatible with the idea of ex-officio membership we hasten to add that this particular group is rather exceptional; hereafter the concept will be found more variable. This history of honours conferred on departmental heads is consistent in at least one direction—that of continually higher honours. All the other central party officials listed above have been consistently elected full members with one exception; the director of the Institute of Party History was not identified in the 1960 CC. A new director was identified shortly after the 1960 Congress and it is therefore possible that the position was vacant at the time.

Ex-officio membership of the CC among local party officials has been restricted to comparatively few posts. At oblast level all the oblast first secretaries and the second secretary of Alma-Ata oblast have been elected full members without exception at each Congress. Both the first and second secretaries of the Virgin Lands komsomol, which was formed at the end of 1960, were elected full members of the 1961 CC. Two other Krais, South Kazakhstan and West Kazakhstan were established in

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1 It is assumed that the head of the Administrative Organs Department was honoured in this way; he was not identified at the time.
2 This paragraph will be found in tabular form on p.
1962, their first secretaries being already CC members by virtue of their former positions. All three 

eygors had been abolished by the time of the 1966 Congress, so that technically no eygors secretaries meet our requirements for ex-officio membership. If obkoms first secretaries qualify however, eygors first secretaries must be included, and probably second secretaries too if the election of two secretaries from the Virgin Lands in 1961 is any indication.

At this point predictable membership among local party officials tapers off sharply. Although semyaks and sayaks secretaries always form one of the largest groups within the CC, rotation of honours appears to be the general practice and re-election the exception. The only semyaks first secretaries elected full CC members three times in a row were those from Alma-Ata and Karaganda. The former would be more accurately placed at obkoms level, since Alma-Ata is a city of republican, not oblast, subordination; Karaganda is an important supplier of coal for the industrial complex to the north-east in the RSFSR, and the focus of Kazakhstan's new and expanding steel industry.

The first secretariats of only one semyak carried with it membership of all three CCs. The same person was first secretary there throughout the decade,¹ and since his case is apparently unique, it seems preferable to ascribe his continuous membership to personal leadership qualities rather than to the intrinsic importance of his post. There are at least eight semyaks whose first secretaries were members of two out of three CCs; and in half of these there was a change in the identity

¹V.N. Kurlov, Balasov semyak, North Kazakhstan.
of the first secretary between Congresses. If it is conceded that the interpretation placed on the above unique case is correct, then one might say that membership of the CC does not attach automatically to any particular reinsa post. Caution is advised, however, by the small residue of unidentified CC members, among whom are probably a few reinsa secretaries. A negative formulation seems called for: with one possible exception no reinsa secretarships are known to have established a claim to CC membership.

As is to be expected, the Chairman, First Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers are invariably full CC members. In addition the ministers or chairmen of the following agencies were members of all three committees:

- Finance
- Central
- State Security
- Internal Affairs (now Preservation of Public Order)
- Education
- Agriculture
- State Farms (now abolished)
- Social Security.

Geoplen and Procurement portfolios also carry automatic membership; they are already included above since their heads were Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Contrariwise the chairman of the Kazakh Council of National Economy ceased to be a Deputy Chairman of the government in 1962 and from then till the abolition of the post in 1965, he would undoubtedly have been re-elected CC member had a Congress been held. The Ministry of Geology was not in existence in 1956 but the minister was elected CC member of the two subsequent committees. The Ministry of Construction was formed in 1957 as the result of the
amalgamation of three branch construction ministries and hence the minister was a member of only two CCs, but complete confidence is justified in ascribing ex-officio membership to him.

In dealing with this central government bloc we might expect to find less continuity than in the case of the central party officials, for the simple reason that the composition of the Council of Ministers has been frequently changed. There are, however, only two cases of ministers appearing in only one CC because of administrative reorganizations. These were the Ministers of Justice and of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, both members of the 1956 CC, and both of whose ministries were abolished before the next party Congress. It is known that the Minister of Justice had also been a member of the 1954 CC but earlier information was not available. The second ministry was converted from All-Union to Union Republican only in 1954 (too late for the newly appointed minister to be elected to the CC). Nevertheless the prime importance of the non-ferrous metallurgical industry to Kazakhstan is good reason for regarding this portfolio as having been among the more senior throughout its short existence. It is suggested that both these portfolios carried automatic CC membership status.

There are also two portfolios, Culture and Transport, whose status was reduced to candidate CC membership in 1961. Despite the frequent changes in the composition of the Council of Ministers, therefore, there has been a remarkably clear separation of its members according to CC status, only the above two being in a doubtful category. Slightly more than half of the Council was entitled by custom to full CC membership
after the 1961 Congress. To these may be added several government officials who are not members of the Council of Ministers but who are consistently elected to the CC. Two such persons are the chairman of the Kazakh railway system and the Precurator. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, though not formally a government official, may also conveniently be included here. The Secretary of the Presidium was a member of the 1960 and 1961 committees, and the new fairly clearly defined role of the Presidium will no doubt ensure his continued full membership. Oddly perhaps, the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan at the USSR Council of Ministers has only once (in 1950) been identified as a CC member. No reference has been found to this position in recent years and it is not known if it still exists.

Distribution of membership of the CC among local government officials is almost as well defined as in the case of local party officials. Chairman of oblastnorry were elected full members with three exceptions: at the 1960 Congress the chairman of Dzhambul, Gurev and North Kazakhstan oblastnorry became candidate instead of full members. This can perhaps be attributed to their having been crowded out by five (out of nine) chairman of local sovietnory, who now appeared in the CC for the first time. In 1961 the same number of sovietnory chairman were again elected, but all oblastnorry chairman were nevertheless restored to full membership. The eclipse of a few soviet chairman therefore appears to have been temporary (especially as the sovietnory have now been abolished), and the post usually rates the highest party honour.
The representation of the police agencies in the CC under the guise of militancy
the security and court police agencies, there may be one or two
in addition to the society — which keeps the further possibility that, in addition to
not mentioned beyond these. In 1995, the extraordinary arrest, rounded and personnel, states
undertaken Europe in 1995 and 1996. One of those arrested in 1996 and
raze the possibility that there were a few military personnel among the
identified in the counter command. The sudden apparent increase
the military command, was attached to this command, present to the
the military command, was attached to the CC. In 1996
identified, but at least known if he was the Commandant of the
in 1995, the new detachment was attached to the Functional
one before the functional detachment command. The second officer attached
posts in the regular army CC States. Two of these are military officers.
were the party and state therapeutics and twin some schools of the
from both rural and candidates members in 1996. From here we move more
the candidates of the party the Functional was attached
to the lower command.
change in the CC candidates or members of the members that extended
candidates, as needed above these places were allotted to
these conditions, as needed above these places because of the malfunction of economic
somaticity and their exportation in 1995. The detachment of house
only two conferences were held between the formation of the

The document discusses the nature of the occupation and the rights and responsibilities of its members. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the dynamics of the occupation, including the role of the director and the responsibilities of the members. The text also mentions the challenges faced in the field, such as the need for continuous learning and adaptation to new developments.

The document highlights the significance of the occupation in society, indicating its impact on various aspects of life. It underscores the importance of maintaining a balance between the professional and personal aspects of the occupation.

The text is written in a formal style, reflecting the serious nature of the occupation and the importance of the decisions and actions taken by its members.
Turning now to the candidate members of the CC and members of the AC we find the hard core to consist of two progressively smaller and less exalted groups of officials. The majority of obkom second Secretaries (nine out of 16) were elected candidate members in 1956 and again in 1960 (10 out of 15); in 1961 all were given this status except the second Secretary of Almaty obkom, who, it will be recalled, was a full member of all three committees. One second Secretary was a member of the 1956 AC, and another from a different oblast a member of the 1960 AC. Three second Secretaries were passed over altogether in 1956 and 1960 – those from Aktyubinsk, Gurev and Kokchetav, presumably the oblasts least on the scale of economic importance or performance. There were two odd instances of the second Secretary being passed over completely while another obkom Secretary was given AC membership (Pavlodar, Gurev 1960), but otherwise seniority within obkoms seems to have determined the honours conferred. There are several instances of obkom Secretaries (other than first and second) being elected to the AC, but no pattern can be detected here and AC membership cannot be said to belong by custom to a third Secretary of any particular oblast. The practice appears in any case to have almost disappeared, a third Secretary from only one oblast having been elected to the AC in 1961 (and again in 1966). The granting of candidate CC membership to 14 second Secretaries irrespective of oblast importance (also repeated in 1966) has meant the almost complete exclusion of other obkom Secretaries from the lists.

One of these cases might possibly be explained on nationality grounds. In Pavlodar in 1956 both the first and second Secretaries were Russians, which was then exceptional. The Secretary given AC membership was a native.

It should be added also that the identity of two obkom second Secretaries has been assumed on the basis of their election as candidate members of the CC – a circular method of reasoning, but sometimes the only recourse when obkom Secretaries are listed alphabetically.
Descending again to *raikus* secretary level, we find once again the same lack of continuity in representation as was found among the full CC members. Even if *raikus* secretaries from all three groups - full and candidate CC members and AC members - are lumped together only one further case of constant representation from a *raikus* is discovered. Because of the relatively high proportion of unidentified CC candidate members and AC members a firm positive conclusion is once again impossible, but it seems that no *raikus* secretaryship is an open access to even AC membership. A dozen or so *raikus* secretaries will be found regularly as CC candidates or AC members, but it appears that they represent this level of the party bureaucracy in general rather than particular *raikus*. Since we are in search of particular posts *raikus* secretaries may be eliminated from the ex-officio membership of both CC's and AC's.

Because of the pace of industrialisation in Kazakhstan over the decade, it might have been expected that several *raikus* secretaries would have established their claim to some form of recognition, but only the first secretary from Balkhash appeared without fail among the CC candidate members. This city is the centre of Kazakhstan's copper industry, which accounts for 40% of USSR output. Ust Kamenskoursk, a lead and zinc processing centre in East Kazakhstan gained almost equal recognition but seems to have dropped out temporarily in 1960. Perhaps the reason for this and other omissions is that urbanisation and industrialisation has been fairly widely spread in the northern half of the republic (the number of cities grew from 41 to 60 between 1957 and
and the half dozen or so places reserved for pewen secretaries are possibly bestowed according to performance criteria. The same factors have militated against pewen chairman, none of whom, apart from the Alma-ata chairman, have established themselves at even AC level.

Most members of the Council of Ministers who do not rate full CC membership are to be found, along with pewen second secretaries, among the candidate CC members. A residual few are members of the AC. Since, however, it is the more permanent positions in the Council of Ministers to which full CC membership adheres, the remaining positions are an unstable group and difficult to separate according to candidate CC or AC rank. Water Economy, for instance, rated candidate CC membership while organised as a ministry, AC membership as a Chief Directorate; the Minister of Communal Economy was passed over in 1956, but was made CC candidate member twice thereafter; the Minister of Communications is usually a candidate CC member but in 1960 dropped temporarily to AC member; Higher and Secondary Special Education (established 1959) rated candidate membership in 1960 and 1961. In fact only the Ministers of Health and Trade were candidate CC members three times in succession. At the other end of the scale complete omission from both CC and AC has been rare. In 1956 four ministries - all subsequently abolished - were omitted. In 1960 two directorate heads and the Chairman of the State Scientific and Technical Committee were omitted. In 1961 the last named was the only omission. In short then, while it is practice to bestow some form of recognition on almost all members of the Council of Ministers, only two have been consistently placed at candidate CC member level.

## APPENDIX II

### TRANSLITERATION OF RUSSIAN WORDS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Latin</th>
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<td>m m</td>
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<tr>
<td>e v</td>
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<tr>
<td>e z</td>
<td>t t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e i*</td>
<td>y u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e i*</td>
<td>f f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e k</td>
<td>x kh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Combinations ы й and и й at end of word = у.

+ After ы = а.
### APPENDIX III

**GLOSSARY OF SOVIET TERMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Translation/Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinomzhetelie</td>
<td>One-man management, line management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinomzhetel'nik</td>
<td>Official not responsible to a collegium for his decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glavvyt</td>
<td>Chief Sales Directorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glavvytbyt</td>
<td>Chief Supply and Sales Directorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorkom</td>
<td>City (Soviet) Executive Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosbank</td>
<td>City (party) Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosplan</td>
<td>The State Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosstrud</td>
<td>State Planning Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ispolkom</td>
<td>State Construction Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsoenel</td>
<td>Executive Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krai</td>
<td>Leninist Communist League of Youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraispolkom</td>
<td>Territory (sometimes translated as 'area').</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraikom</td>
<td>Territory (Soviet) Executive Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblast</td>
<td>Territory (party) Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblkom</td>
<td>Region, province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblispolkom</td>
<td>Regional (party) Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesheche</td>
<td>Regional (Soviet) Executive Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postanovlenie</td>
<td>Statute, rules (of an institution).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prikas</td>
<td>Resolution, decision (taken by a collegial body).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order (given by a minister or other edinomzhetel'nik).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Term</td>
<td>English Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisen</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisspolkom</td>
<td>District (Soviet) Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raikom</td>
<td>District (party) Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasporyashenie</td>
<td>Order (in recent years, given by a member of a collegial body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovnarishes</td>
<td>Economic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strelbank</td>
<td>Construction Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukase</td>
<td>Order (of Presidium of Supreme Soviet)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Izvestia. Organ of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR. Daily.

Kommunist. Central Organ of the CPSU. 18 issues a year.

Partiinaya Zhizn'. Organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Semi-monthly.


Pravda. Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.


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