AN ANALYSIS OF SELF CONSTRUCTS AND SELF VARIABLES

L.L. Viney

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CHAPTER I

A HISTORY OF THE SELF
The attempt to study the antecedents of the meaning implicit in the various uses of the term 'self' by contemporary psychologists in theory and measurement is a task which has been avoided by historians to date. Examination of a range of the general psychology-psychiatry-philosophy history texts gives merely a sketch of one or two of the main trends. This state of academic under-achievement is, in part, a function of a scarcity of source material and the complexity of the material available; yet it remains remarkable in the light of the increasing amount of research time occupied by psychologists in examination of the self.

This increase in research time is reflected clearly in a survey of publications listed in the complete set of the Psychological Index and in the Psychological Abstracts to date. In no year, in its publication from 1894 to 1935, does the Index list more than five works under the heading of 'Self'. The placement of this heading itself is interesting: 'Self-consciousness' appeared in the early volumes in the category of 'Consciousness' which changed in 1900 to 'Cognition'; in 1910 'Self' was included under 'Attitudes and Intellectual Activities'; while from 1915 'Self' was found in the section labelled 'Social Functions of the Individual'. Just as these changes mirror the opening up of fields in psychology so they mirror the dominant interests of those psychologists evolving concepts of self.
Topics pertaining to the 'Self' listed in the *Psychological Abstracts* (1927- ), on the other hand, show little change over the years. A random sample includes 'self-acceptance', 'self-assessment', 'self-concept', 'self-attitude', 'self-consciousness', 'self-esteem', 'self-image', 'self-perception', and 'self-rating'. Examination of the *Abstracts* indicates the increase in the number of research publications under the above headings. Commencing at the half-century (1950) the incidence of publications listed has doubled three times in ten years. (For visual presentation of the growth of the incidence of publications concerning the 'Self' see Figure I of the Appendix).

It is appropriate, therefore, to explore the history of the construct of self, although the material examined may not always be dignified by the label of psychology. Contributions from the related areas of philosophy and psychiatry are considered for their influence on Western thought and, therefore, on the Western psychologist. A strictly chronological assessment of contributions appears to be the most fruitful method up to the twentieth century, when the increase in the number of publications enforces examination in terms of themes.

It should be noted that there are two associated trends in the development of the concept of self omitted in this
history. Much of the nineteenth century German contemplation of 'das Ich' is ignored because its implications are felt to be mainly philosophical. The only direct psychological offspring of this movement, psychoanalysis, is not examined in detail here but treated in another context of the self in contemporary theories of personality.

The Earliest Constructs of Self

Since man first saw his neighbour he has been conscious of himself. The concept of self, however, was rarely recorded in literature. In fact, the literature of classical Greece provided one of the first records of a similar concept in the 'soul' of Plato. The 'soul', as described in the Phaedo (Trans. Church, 1951), as the initiator of activity, conscious, lifegiving and immaterial, appeared as the prototype of the centre of the self psychology devised by Mary Calkins. She denied the similarity (Calkins, 1917); but the case against her is strong (Case et al., 1918). Aristotle, following his master in the third century B.C., has been described as 'the first to make a systematic enquiry into the nature of the ego' (Altschule, 1957, p.24).

Then followed a gap in the date line broken only by the speculations of Plotinus (c. 200 A.D.), noted by philosophers as the first discussant of the concept of self (Calkins, 1917). It was St Augustine (354-430), however, who provided the
first glimpse of introspection into a personal self:

... in that vast court of memory. For there are present with me, heaven, earth, sea, and whatever I could think on therein, besides what I have forgotten. There also I meet with myself, and recall myself, and when, where, and what I have done, and under what feelings.

(Trans. Pusey, 1939, p.211).

Although not then accessible to the Western world, the literature of classical Indian philosophy, for example the Upanishads, Sāṅkhya - Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, contained extensive discussions of the possibilities of gaining more knowledge of the self or ātmavidyā (Organ, 1964).

Seventeenth Century Revisions

This question of self-knowledge remained a rhetorical one for the few thinkers who raised their heads above the bog of religious and philosophical dogma which stifled creative thought during the Middle Ages. It was the rapidly changing Europe of the seventeenth century which provided the stimulating background for the search for certainty reflected in the thought of Descartes, Hobbes and Locke.

Writers studying the contributions made by Rene Descartes to the construct of self have made much of the equation which he postulated between soul and self (Calkins, 1917; Kehr, 1916). Kehr stressed the constructs he inherited from St Augustine, for example the explanation of will for both men necessitates the self. This construct is common to many
later authors, as is the centrality of the self in systems of cognition and consciousness, implicit in his examinations of the aphorism 'cognito ergo sum' (I think, therefore I am). To let Descartes speak for himself:

... I recognized that I was a substance whose essence or nature is to be conscious ... Thus this self, that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even more easily known.

(Trans. Anscombe & Geach, 1962, p. 50).

Across the Channel Hobbes, in his Leviathan (1951), was propounding an ethical code based on self-interest. G.W. Allport (1954) hailed this doctrine as a herald of social psychology, which 'foreshadows modern doctrines of self-esteem ... and self-regard as pivotal motives' (1954, p.14). Hobbes disagreed with some of Descartes' notions as did Locke. Critics, for example Frondizi (1953) and Altschule (1957), agree that these later writers place more emphasis on the material of sensory experience. John Locke conceived of man as 'a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider self as itself'; then he added, '... it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions; and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self' (Locke, 1960, p.188). An essay concerning human understanding, first published in 1688, expanded this personal identity dependent on sense data to dependency on two concomitants of this data: consciousness and memory.
'The self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness' (Locke, 1960, p.196). 'Continued existence makes identity' (1960, p.200). This description of self foreshadowed that of William James (1890).

The Sceptics

British writers continued this examination of personal identity into the eighteenth century. The sceptic Hume carried the argument of sense-based identity through to a logical conclusion:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (1928, p.252).

This elusiveness of the empirical ego, as expressed in A treatise on human nature in 1740, remains an unsolved problem of measurement. Hume's reduction of the self created some gaps in the logical framework of his philosophy (Wilson, 1926); yet his system is estimated free of the grosser inadequacies of that of Bishop Berkeley (1684-1753), one of which is the difficulty in accounting for the self (Reeves, 1958; Russell, 1945).
To recross the Channel yet remain in the religious orders, Abbe de Condillac appeared as a philosopher working within this trend of sensory empiricism. Ryding (1955) maintained that his notion of self was not only the sum of man's perceptions but included the band which holds them together. This approach is reminiscent of the earlier inclusion of memory. The influence of Locke is noticeable. 'What we understand by this word "I" seems to be only possible in a being who notices that in the present moment he is no longer what he has been'. (1930, p.43). From this reasoning Condillac concluded that his famous statue, without a sense of smell, and with no memory, would have no self-concept.

The Self as Subject and Object

The Critique of pure reason of Kant, first published in 1781, made a welcome contribution to self theory in conceptualization rather than content, thus fulfilling the classical Germanic tradition. He introduced the distinction between the self as subject and object (Alexander, 1911). The aspect of self treated by Locke and Hume Kant saw as a unity attained through synthesis: the empirical self. He also saw, however, the self as an agent: the pure ego.

This distinction, while clarifying the aims and functions of philosophical speculation to this date, also pointed the
way to what may well be an insuperable barrier to any useful contribution by self psychology. Empirical psychologies may extend our knowledge of human behaviour. Within this framework, phenomenology, through response-response designs, may sketch some picture of the empirical self of the individual (to follow the above terminology). The pure ego, however, is defined only in terms of deductive psychologies, the premises of which are too often inadequately validated.

The Kantian tradition carried on into the nineteenth century in Germany in the writings of Hegel (1770-1831) and Schopenhauer (1770-1860). Hegel, following the epistemology of Kant, undertook to show that the universe of knowledge is so constituted that no concept concerning it, being abstract, is adequate to explain its nature (Phenomenology of Mind, first published in 1810). This being so, he found self-consciousness to be the highest form of knowledge. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, followed the Kantian division of selves:

Selfishness contains ... a knower and a known ... the knower himself, as such, cannot be known ... As the known in self-consciousness we find exclusively the will ... all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating. (Schopenhauer, 1948, p.412).

This emphasis on will as the content of the self makes an interesting comparison with the descriptions by St Augustine and Descartes of that phenomenon in which the self is simply a necessary activating constituent.
Psychology, Physiology and Phrenology

Maine de Biran is the first of the writers considered who might properly be described as a psychologist, albeit a mystic rather than a positivist by present day standards and not regarded as a materialist by the standards of his own day. The self was the central pivot of his psychology. This self had not the substance of that of Descartes, nor was it simply the subject or object of Kant. He saw it as the self which causes and is aware that it causes bodily movements, which creates language in order to handle ideas in accordance with its own interests, which endures and recognizes itself in memory, which cultivates itself morally at the same time as intellectually by reflectively liberating itself from dependence on sense objects (Hinrichs, 1953). Maine de Biran was also responsible for the first attempted description of the development of self-awareness in infancy and childhood, the distinction between self and not-self as defined within their own frameworks of the twentieth century by Piaget (1959) and Sullivan (1955).

A treatment of the history of this psychological construct without some mention of the British associationists would be unthinkable; for they too had their comments to make on the self (Sen, 1933). John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) would appear to afford an appropriate example. His account of cognition, emotion and conation in terms of association is indeed credible until his attempt to deal with the subject
of these activities. In *A system of logic ratiocinative* and inductive he wrote:

There is something I call Myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts, etc.; a something which I conceive to be not the thoughts, but the being that has the thoughts, and which I can conceive as existing for ever in a state of quiescence, without any thoughts at all. But what this being is, though it is myself, I have no knowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness. (1904, p.40).

After such psychological speculation a sample of early nineteenth century physiological psychology, however macabre, comes as a breath of fresh air. Cabanis, famous for his study of the after-effects of decapitation by guillotine, endeavoured to give a description of the physiology and anatomy of the self in his *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme* in 1802. The historian, Brett, translated his concept, 'le moi central', as 'an epitome of all the separate centres which the nervous system creates. The apparent signs of life which might be exhibited by the decapitated body are then explained as activities of neural ganglia which are relatively independent of the brain or central ego' (1953, p.459). The essence of self, then, appears to be the physical substrate of consciousness. This concept of Cabanis is one for which the physiologists have not the means as yet to indicate acceptance or rejection.

The physical representation of the self was also the subject of study of those arch-materialists, the phrenologists.
Krech, in his article on the cortical localization of function in Psychology in the making (ed. Postman, 1962), presented a delightful description of the organ of self-esteem by Spurzeim in an English publication of 1815:

Gall first found this organ in a beggar: in examining the head of this person, he observed in the midst of the upper posterior part of the head an elevation which he had not before observed in so high a degree: he asked him the cause of his mendicity; and the beggar accused his pride as the cause of his mental state.... We have a great number of proofs as to this organ, and can establish its existence. Proud persons, and those who, alienated by pride, imagine themselves to be emperors, kings, ministers, generals, etc. possess it in a high degree. (1962, p.39).

The system of sarcognomy of Buchanan, a later extension of this answer to a typologist's prayer, which included the entire body, also localized the organ of self-esteem. The annotated figures reproduced from Roots of modern psychiatry (Altschule, 1957) testify to this: self-esteem apparently resided in the left shoulder, visible in the young lady facing away from the reader. (See Figure 2 of the Appendix).

For all the laughter with which the modern psychologist may greet the phrenologists and their kind, for all the derision which the logic of their method deserves, their work does represent several important developments in the concept of self during the nineteenth century. Firstly, that self-esteem was considered to be a sufficiently important personality trait for analysis by phrenologists, who were
essentially practical people, reflects contemporary thought in a wider scope than some of the more esoteric philosophical meditations. Secondly, some of the phrenological methods of investigation, such as the examination of the beggar, show the hallmarks of later speculations, (for example, McDougall, 1908). Thirdly, the examination of the 'alienated', observation of the malfunction of normal processes to aid in description of these processes, is a technique used in many recent attempts to isolate the self-concept (for example, Rice, 1954; Zucker, 1962).

Problems of Nineteenth Century Self Constructs

Since there was a lull in the mid-nineteenth century in the publication of contributions to the theory of self, with the possible exception of that of G.H. Lewes which might be better classified as a contribution to general personality theory (Cardno, 1962), it is appropriate to pause here to examine some of the questions which the literature reviewed so far poses. May the concept of self be regarded as an antecedant of psychology? Is the self an essential concept in psychology? Is the self, indeed, a tenable concept for psychology? Partial answers, at least, may be given at this stage, before consideration of the great days of the self psychologies (1890-1930).
Several problems, however, present themselves. The soul concept of Plato and Aristotle has been presented as a pseudo self: but what of the semi-mystical aura of this concept, that indefinable something which distinguishes men from machines? Can psychologists accommodate this individuating aspect of the self without regressing to a 'little man in the machine' level of explanation? Perception, memory and consciousness witnessed through introspection have all been cited as necessary concomitants of the self: but psychologists have experienced grave difficulties of criterion selection in attempts to validate the evidence of introspection. Can these difficulties be overcome? The distinction between knower and known does not solve this problem. The temptation to give up and share the thought with David Hume that it is impossible to observe, much less define, the self, is very great. Yet, strange as it may seem, it is the phrenologists who provide a few small rays of hope at this period in history: it is they who pointed to the attitude to self as a significant aspect of man and (note the response of the beggar) a significant determinant of man's behaviour.

In sum, then, here are the answers to those searching questions, given in the light of commentaries relating to the self published prior to 1890. If psychology be defined
as the study of human behaviour, the construct of self may be regarded as one of its antecedants. The answer to the second question depends on that given to the third, concerning the tenability of the construct. This is, indeed, in doubt within a strictly empirical study of behaviour. An emphasis on measurement is a framework which does not easily include the notion of self.

William James

Theories of personal identity have been described as falling into three categories: those concerned with relational phenomena, of which Hobbes' is the earliest example soon to be followed by those of many social psychologists; a search for the pure ego or element of consciousness, of which the sceptical treatise of Hume is the prime example; and the type of theory put forward by William James in which somatic data is shown to provide a basis for the sense of personal identity (Price-Williams, 1957).

William James' great textbook of psychology appeared on this scene of doubt in 1890. His treatment of habit, the stream of thought, the consciousness of self, attention, memory, the emotions and will: each of these in its own right would have formed a useful contribution to psychology. His unique contribution for his time, however, was the scope of The principles of psychology, encompassing almost every
aspect of human behaviour. His refutation of Hume's scruples is an encouraging sign concerning the fate of the concept of self in psychology.

Capek (1953) has pointed out that James was opposed to the dissolving of the self into the immaterial, as, for example, the abstract concept of Hegel. Nor was he prepared to consign it to the neurological rag-bag of some of the materialists. He was prepared, however, to define it. 'In its widest possible sense ... a man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his ...' (1890, p.291). He went on to deal with the constituents of the self, the feelings and emotions they arouse and the actions to which they give rise.

The empirical self, or Me, is made up of three constituents: the material self, or body, clothes and possessions; the social self or the opinions and knowledge a man's fellows have of him; and the spiritual self, or inner being of abilities and traits. These are presided over by the personal unity of the pure ego, the I. 'In each kind of self ... men distinguish between the immediate and actual, and the remote and potential ...' (1890, p.315). Of the emotions these selves arouse James wrote: 'My own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the primitive object, instinctively determined, of my egoistic interests. Other objects may become interesting derivatively through association with any
of these things ...' (1890, p.324). This is his self-regarding emotion. For the parallel actions James distinguished two main goals: self-seeking and self-estimation.

In reference to the topic of personal identity, the Principles provided one of the most concise accounts of the history of the construct available at the time of publication. The original contribution of James to this notion, reflecting his formulations of the stream of consciousness and attention was based on this foundation.

The sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared. (1890, p.334).

The originality of this contribution lies not in the newness of the concepts; dependence of identity on memory was a speculation of the fifth century and the mechanics of this memory were the well-known principles of association, similarity and contiguity of stimuli. It lies rather in James' expression of this unity within the thinking, feeling, willing being of his psychology.

Philosophical Speculations at the Close of the Nineteenth Century

Other publications of this period tended, in the main, to stray to inconclusive speculations based on bizarre hypothetical
experiences of the self (for example, Ladd, 1895; Baker, 1897). One philosopher, however, made an important contribution to the theory of personal identity or self-consciousness. He was Josiah Royce, who published a series of papers in the *Psychological Review* and the *Philosophical Review* (1895a; 1895b). In these papers he emphasized the importance for the development of identity in the individual of the interplay of self-consciousness and social-consciousness, '... each helped and each limited the other, since each exists only in contrast with the other, get organized and developed in the endless giving and taking of social communications...' (Royce, 1895a, p.485). Royce's contribution of the relativity of the self-concept, dependent on communication, was best expressed in this excerpt:

... I am conscious of myself ... as in relation to some real or ideal fellow, and apart from my consciousness of my fellows I have only secondary and derived states and habits of self-consciousness.

(1895a, p.468)

What did the writers of the twentieth century make of the material so far presented? Psychology was established by the year 1900 as a distinct frame of reference for thought on the subject of man, if not as a science. How were these advocates of the new study and its methods to deal with the backlog of speculations surrounding the construct of self? The answers to this problem were almost as varied as were the
personalities of the writers with time and talent to devote to it, although they may be grouped in certain ways. In view of this, the history will no longer be pursued chronologically but in terms of the trends followed by the writers up to 1935. This time limit for the history is arbitrary but convenient, based as it is on the cessation of publication of the Psychological Index in that year and the consideration that the thirty years dating to the present may be appropriately described as the time-span of modern psychology.

Early Twentieth Century Philosophy

The remainder of the history, then, is concerned with the construct of self as developed in differing responses to the pre-twentieth century traditions. The writers are considered in these general categories: those who contributed one or two speculative articles; the authors of comprehensive psychological textbooks; the experimenters and measurers; the social psychologists; and the phenomenologists. The formulations of several individual psychologists, for example, that of Mary Calkins, are examined in detail.

Many of the articles published as referring to the self during the early decades of this century were written within the framework of philosophy, their contents contributing to the areas of epistemology, logic and ethics (e.g. Perry, 1910;
Wright, 1920; Brightman, 1934). Similar articles are included in the Bibliography for the sake of completeness. Others were written in the no man's land between philosophy and psychology, particularly those dealing with self as the agent of will (Stoops, 1901; Lovejoy, 1907; Boodin, 1912). Some writers were content simply to examine the arguments for and against the study of self in psychology, generally deciding in its favour (MacDougall, 1916; Wentscher, 1927; Brotherton, 1935). Others, perhaps some aiming to cash in on the lucrative possibilities of the popular self psychology, produced books to help improve the self and to indicate the means to 'do it yourself' therapy. This development occurred towards the end of the period under consideration, yet most of these books are now out of print. Self direction and adjustment (Fenton, 1926) and The omnipotent self: A study in self-deception and self-cure (Bousfield, 1923) serve as examples of which more may be found in the Bibliography.

Few of these works may be said to have influenced the course of psychological thought. There are many manuscripts, however, which have done so; those of Eduard Claparede, for example. Claparede (1911, 1924) took identity as a fact of observation, and he went on to examine the localization of 'le moi' in individuals. This procedure has been followed successfully, witness the experiment of Horowitz (1935) to
determine the localizations of self in students and children.

The contribution of Claparede was not an extension of the work of others, as was that of Tawney (1902) who endeavoured to clarify the concept of consciousness as related to self. These two constructs had been examined and conjured with until they resembled the proverbial chicken and egg. Tawney distinguished two varieties of consciousness:

Self-consciousness in the first sense includes the empirical qualities of the body itself, together with a sense of externality to everything else within the range of perception and memory. Reflective self-consciousness is based upon the recognition that the self belongs in classes with other selves, that it is in a sense one with them, and that its experiences, therefore, possess a significance for them, and theirs for it.

(1902, p.596).

This paragraph sounds very like a description of the activities of the pure ego and the empirical ego of Emmanuel Kant, or the 'I' and the 'me' of William James. A further distinction along these lines was attempted by Hughes using the terms self and ego, which by 1906 were both in general use and even then the cause of some confusion:

By self I would indicate always an idea present in the self-consciousness of any individual; by ego, the individual who is or can be self-conscious, who has or may have the sense of self and not-self.

(1906b, p.289).

This formulation was amplified by Cunningham who equated consciousness of self with the 'contrast between the self
and its other ... the other ... being the entire content of consciousness.' (1911, p.534).

Definitions of consciousness of self with no definition of self create an unfortunate impression of early twentieth century psychology. For some attempts at definition were made. This one, a product of the prevalent instinct theory of behaviour, is particularly interesting:

The self ... is the psychic correspondent of a complex instinctive system which throbs as a unit, but which is not differentiated by the excessive or emphatic partial activity of any part of the complex system; it is the mass of 'feeling' so called by many; it is that part of the moment's conscious experience which we are warranted in describing as the field of inattention.

(Marshall, 1901, p.112).

This throbbing, pulsating mass of inattention was a much more dynamic self than had hitherto been expressed.

It is interesting to note at this stage that at least one anthropological study of the self-concept had been carried out. Todd (1916) investigated the idea of self in primitive races such as the Kafirs, the Maoris, and the Eskimos, and discovered that for these people it included the name of the individual, his shadow, and his property. He claimed that the concept of self may be subject to consciousness of the group self; and, observing that in the primitive individual the self-concept was not modifiable, he also claimed that it was not modifiable in the Englishman until after the Industrial Revolution.
The Self Theory of Mary Calkins

To present a survey of the speculative articles concerning the self without first presenting something of the theory of the most enthusiastic self psychologist of the earlier decades of this century, may have been somewhat misleading. The publications of Mary Calkins were numerous, indeed it might be said that she never missed a chance to advertise the importance of the self within a study of man (1918). Many of the concepts examined above may have been in part the result of communications with Miss Calkins.

Calkins' earliest contribution, The persistent problems of philosophy, was first published in 1907. This consists of a history of philosophical treatments of the problems of the self, and is merely preparatory to A first book in psychology published in 1909. This textbook covered the topics usual for a general survey of that time but the treatment of each was carefully tailored to fit in the jacket of self psychology. Calkins' description of this jacket was as follows:

Psychology has been defined as science of the self-being-conscious; and we rightly therefore ask for a further description, even if only a preliminary description of the self. The conscious of each one of us is not a reality which is merely inferred to exist: it is immediately experienced as possessed of at least four fundamental characters. The self as immediately experienced is (1) relatively persistent... (2) complex... (3) a unique, an irreplaceable self... and (4) related to objects which are either personal or impersonal. (1911, pp.2-3).
c. A conscious individual in union with an organized body.

d. The individual regarded as a progressively organized system of mental functions and processes.

e. The subject of consciousness (or experiencer) accompanying any complex of mental processes attentively experienced.

f. A specific complex or integration of content in which the body as object of consciousness is fundamental.

(1918, p.93).

These, then, were the definitions of self, six of them, as listed at the end of the second decade of this century. They suggest an examination of the general textbooks available in that period, excluding the rather biased work of Calkins reviewed above. She recognized the Introduction to psychology of Yerkes (1911) as a sample of self psychology (Calkins, 1912): it was only a few years later that he produced his Outline of a study of the self (1914). Yet the better known texts of Stout (1898), Ward (1918), and Woodworth (1921), too, made their contributions to self psychology.

Self Constructs in the Textbooks

In the introductory chapter of the Manual of psychology, Stout asked 'what is this mind (or self) which owns consciousness in distinction from the consciousness which it owns?' (1932, p.14). Stout is not generally known as a self psychologist, but he does appear to have visualized psychology as a science of selves. He stressed the social factor in the
formation of the self-concept. This excerpt describes the individual:

He is continually comparing others with himself, noting the points of agreement and difference. Every advance in his knowledge of them is also an advance in his knowledge of self.

(1932, p.583).

Hughes (1906b) included Stout in his list of writers to be considered before formulating a concept of self.

Neither is James Ward known primarily as a self psychologist; yet in his recent history Hearnshaw wrote: 'the active, unitary self, or subject, was the keystone of Ward's psychology' (1964, p.136). Ward distinguished between the Kantian pure and empirical egos (Laird, 1926); the me, to use the terminology of William James, being made up of the sensitive and apperceptive self, the imagining and desiring self, and the thinking and willing self. '[It is] ... the I - not me - that, as feeling and acting, is essential to any experience, whilst the me is essential only to some' (1933, p.379).

In contrast, Woodworth's Psychology indexed no mention of self (1928) yet Anderson could write in the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy of 1928 '... in textbooks of psychology it is customary to find a chapter devoted to 'The Self' ... By self, we discover is intended the mind, or it may be the soul' (1928, p.93).
Contributions of Social Psychologists

Of the social psychologists to be considered, J.M. Baldwin was the first of this period. He emphasized the social determinants of self (1897) as Stout did in the year following. It was George Herbert Mead, however, who provided the major contribution to the sociological conceptualization of self. Mead saw the self as the result of a social process, an outcome of a long evolutionary process which must be approached empirically. For him, the self comprised both the I, the spontaneous principle of action and impulse, and the me, the attitudes of others organized and taken over by the self. 'The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure and arises in social experience' (1934, p.140). In more detail:

Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there. (1925, p.276)

This object self is part of the reflexive self, and the whole is distinguished by the characteristic of self-consciousness. The predominantly cognitive and social self construct of Mead exercised a strong influence on later work not only of social psychologists and sociologists but also personality theorists.

The approach of William McDougall was, in many ways, similar, though his claim to be known as a social psychologist
is somewhat more in doubt. Certainly his contribution to the development of the construct of self in psychology is of major importance (Martin, 1927). His system was based on the principles of instincts and sentiments in man, the sentiments being non-inherent, organized collections of 'emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object' (1928, p.137). At the pinnacle of the pyramid of these sentiments came the self-regarding sentiment, which developed as 'essentially a social process, one that is dependent throughout upon the complex interactions between the individual and the organized society to which he belongs' (1928, pp.150-51). 'There are two principle varieties of the self-regarding sentiment, which we may distinguish by the names of 'pride' and "self-respect".' (1928, p.165), both involving positive and negative self-feeling. McDougall's diagram of the structure of the character of John Doe (1928, p.440) illustrates the centrality of the self in his theory of personality. Here, too, was the fulfilment of the promise of Hobbes of the prime motive in social psychology.

The Early Phenomenologists

A different trend in psychology which, like social psychology, contributed something to the modern constructs of self was one deriving from themes found in the works of the classical introspectionists, Brentano, Ebbinghaus, and
Külpe; that is, phenomenology. (Boring, 1953). Husserl is known as the writer who founded this approach as it influences psychology today (Farber, 1943; Ames, 1955). In his Ideas (1913) and Cartesian meditations (1929) he portrayed the ego as transcendent, certain and beyond question. In the fourth meditation he stressed the transcendental ego as 'inseparable from the individual's process of life, the centre of identity, and made up of every act and percept' (1960, p.65).

The phenomenological approach had great appeal for the Gestaltists, whom Howie (1945) has credited with one of the most fruitful approaches to the self. Lundholm (1946) claimed that Köhler 'equated the experienced self and the body-percept, scrapping entirely that other acting but non-perceived self' (1946, p.129). The whole of the self plus environment was the world of the individual, according to this summary of the Gestalt point of view:

Self may be regarded as an assimilative system that feeds and grows on its experiences, which in turn are determined by the whole of which it is a part. This makes intelligible the effect of environment on the formation of character and personality. (Josey, 1935, p.54).

This excerpt reflects the view of self which Koffka took in his Principles of Gestalt psychology published in 1935.
Empirical Analysis of the Self up to 1935

The theory of self in psychology by 1935 might be expressed as suggesting the conclusion that there is evidence for an active, functioning, conscious self, distinct from the bodily organism but closely related to it (Allen, 1935). The main problems for psychologists appeared to fall into three main categories: the nature of the self, its relation to the organism, and its relation to the environment (Moore, 1933). Psychology, however, is an empirical science; so what of the activities of the experimenters and measurers up to 1935?

Probably the first empirical attack on the problem of self was that of E.B. Titchener (1911) in an attempt to validate the self theory of Mary Calkins. Titchener found three ways in which the self might become conscious: a class of mental processes may carry self-meaning, the self may be felt in body sensations, or it may be inherent in all conscious experience. He asked his students to introspect for any trace of consciousness of self; and from their answers, which did not fall into the above three categories, he concluded that psychology may not be defined as 'the science of the self as conscious' (Calkins, 1911).

This type of experiment was very different in method from the modern tests of hypotheses concerning the self.
One of the most favoured techniques today is that of self-rating, probably first applied by J. McKeen Cattell in his studies of American men of science (1906-1938). One of the early experiments along these lines is worth reporting in detail: that of Cogan, Conklin and Hollingworth (1915). They took a group of 25 female subjects known to each other and asked them to rank themselves and the other members of the group on each of nine traits at intervals of from two weeks to a month. The trait names are an interesting reflection of the times: neatness, intelligence, humour, conceit, beauty, vulgarity, snobbishness, refinement and sociability. A battery of tests was given and other data collected and compared. Conclusions drawn from the experiment included that errors of self-estimation were greater than of friends' judgements, that with possession of desirable traits judgements of those traits were good but with non-desirable traits results were the reverse, and that scores on intelligence tests and self-estimates tended to agree. Here was the beginning of the collection of evidence rather than speculation on the structure of the concept of self.

Many similar studies followed during this period; in Germany, for example, the self-concept of the delinquent child was examined (Stern, 1922), and the accuracy of self-judgements was evaluated (Meili, 1930). In Japan, Kubo
(1932, 1933a, 1933b) gauged self-concepts through adjective check-lists. In the United States, experiments in self-estimation showed the first signs of becoming as popular as they are today (Hoffman, 1923; Shen, 1925; Jackson, 1929; Simpson, 1933). The work of Baumgartner, measuring self-respect (1935) and of Bernreuter (1933) on self-sufficiency, both add to the impression of the considerable amount of study being put into empirical analysis of the self by the year 1935.

**Historians' Reflections on the Self**

One question concerning the history of the self remains. To what extent do the recognized historians of psychological thought portray this development? The answer to this question is somewhat disappointing.

Of the historian psychologists, Boring in his *History of experimental psychology* (1929) mentions only the soul of Descartes, Peters' edition of *Brett's history of psychology* (1953) only that of St Augustine. Hearnshaw (1964), examining the work of British psychologists, comments on James Ward only; and it remains to Murphy (1950) to describe in some way the notions of self of Hume, Maine de Biran, James, Adler and Piaget. The survey of the historical background of social psychology in the *Handbook of social psychology* (1954) is the most complete examination of the
self within its context. Histories of psychiatry are no more illuminating. Roback (1961) does not mention self. The history by Hall (1944) is chiefly interesting for the survey of the names of psychologists which appeared in the psychiatric textbooks in the United States between 1861 and 1942. Of the psychologists whose contributions to the construct of self are reviewed above a large proportion feature in that list (1944, p.449).

An Analysis of the Parent Self Constructs

A summary of the early self constructs which preceded and influenced current theories of the self would entail selection on such rigorous principles as to be altogether misleading. For this reason, although a diagram representing the interaction of the early self theorists has been drawn up against a chronological background it is relegated to a place in the Appendix (Figure 3). The preferred method of analysis is one through which the essence of each notion is represented and compared. Such a procedure requires the setting up of a set of categories into which the individual ideas may be classified. The seven definitions which English and English (1958) provide for the word 'self' serve well as these categories, since they represent current technical use of the word and embody important distinctions made by psychologists such as that between self as subject and object.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Me &amp; Mine</th>
<th>Whole Being</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Personality</th>
<th>Centre of Psychology</th>
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Table 1. A Content Analysis of Self Theories (400 B.C. to 1935 A.D.)
The self construct posited by a specific theorist is assessed from his writings and the summary of them contained here. The assessment is directed at the establishment of a unitary concept as proposed by each author which is categorised as being predominantly concerned with the phenomena referred to in one of the definitions of English and English. The definitions are described below with the labels of their distinguishing phenomena shown in brackets:

1. That which a person calls his own (Me and Mine)
2. The total living being (Whole Being)
3. The part of the person which carries out the psychological acts (Agent)
4. The characteristics which distinguish the individual (Personality)
5. That which is observed by the person to be the centre of his psychological processes, including both the subject and the object (Centre of Psychology)
6. The ideas, feelings and strivings that are recognised by the individual as his own (Self-Concept)
7. That which is not only the object of appropriate experience but the feelings and strivings organised about that object (Self-Sentiment).

The resulting categorisation is shown in Table I.

In summary it appears that the majority of the early writers on the topic of self were concerned either with what the individual defined as part of and belonging to himself, the self as pure subject or the self as both subject and
object. The object self was described to a lesser extent as were the feeling which the individual might hold towards himself. One little known philosopher-psychologist used the term self to refer to the whole being, while Stout was unique in equating the term with the present day use of the term of personality.
CHAPTER 2

THE SELF IN PERSONALITY THEORY
There is a considerable body of current opinion which agrees that the appreciation of the self, theoretically and empirically, is necessary as a basis for the understanding of human behaviour. Hilgard (1949), Brandt (1957), Hebb (1960) and Holt (1962) have been the most influential protagonists of this view. Lowe (1961) has suggested that the term 'self' refers to an artefact created by psychologists to explain experience. Since this definition would equally well apply to the more recent term 'personality' an examination of the self constructs evolved by theorists of this field is indicated.

Classical Psychoanalytic Constructs of Ego and Self

The first section of this analysis of self in personality theory must contain the picking up of the threads of the history of the construct. The contributions of Freud and his followers and critics, though taking root in the soil of nineteenth century thought, are best examined as the contemporary theories of behaviour they are. The self psychologist Mary Calkins claimed psychoanalysis as a self psychology (Calkins & Gamble, 1930), being the science of the conscious being (or self) and the unconscious (the dissociated self) in relation to the physical and social environment. Psychoanalysis to Calkins, however, comprised the works of Freud, Jung and Adler, almost exclusively.
Psychoanalytic contributions to the construct of self are found to fall within the following schema. At the pinnacle of a metaphorical pyramid lies the prime innovator, Sigmund Freud, giving rise to a series of orthodox followers such as Fenichel and Rado, writing a little closer to the present day. These, in turn, stimulated many minor psychoanalysts grappling recently with problems of ego-strength, self-esteem and identity. On another face of the pyramid are found those psychoanalysts who have developed and emphasized one particular aspect of Freud's system: the ego-psychologists (Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein and Rapaport) concerned with the rational processes in man, thinking, perception and adaptation; the social psychiatrists (Adler, Horney, Fromm and Sullivan) concerned with the relationships between the individual and his inter-personal environment; and the mystics, comprising Jung and his followers analysing the collective and individual unconscious in the process of individuation. Independent psychologists, who nevertheless owed much to Freud, lie on the third face of the pyramid. On this face significant contributions to the construct of self have been made by Hadfield, Anderson and Symonds.

At the outset, it appears impossible to agree with Calkins that Freud was the instigator of a self-psychology. It would seem that she arbitrarily equated the terms ego and
self, ignoring their differing connotations. Munroe (1955) has maintained that this claim is a repudiation of the basic libido theory while allowing that the conceptualizations about the self devised by later psychoanalysts stem from the original concept of ego. This ego grows out of the original primary narcissism of the infant (Freud, 1925).

Under the influence of the real external world which surrounds us, one portion of the id has undergone a special development. From what was originally a cortical layer, provided with organs for receiving stimuli and with an apparatus for protection against excessive stimulation, a special organization has arisen which henceforth acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. This region of our mental life has been given the name of ego. (Freud, 1949, p.15).

Essentially, then, the ego is 'a coherent organization of mental processes' (1927, p.15), rather than the biological unit or the unique object of introspection prominent in later theories. Consciousness of ego actions is customarily taken to be minimal. Ego might, indeed, be regarded as referring to a set of processes rather than an entity.

Franz Alexander (1944) has traced the development of the ego up to 1933 and attempted to treat this problem of the consciousness of ego functions. He concluded that because the ego is so close to the individual, although he is aware of it at all times he is not conscious of its actions (1948). This statement may have intuitive merit, but does little to
clarify the conceptual problem involved. Of more merit is
the contribution of Rado (1928) who postulated a concept
entailing a feeling of self as a whole being, later labelled
self-esteem (Benedek, 1961). Fenichel, another orthodox
Freudian, made use of this concept (1937, 1954), describing
how the anxiety experienced by very young children in
relation to feeding, cuddling and so on is the first determin-
ant of the level of their self-esteem.

Of the minor writers de Groot (1947), also, accepted
the notion of self-esteem which he maintained is observed
when there is a balance between the narcissistic and aggressive
cathexes of the ego. Dorsey (1951) and von Fiesandt (1960)
each stressed the influence of self-consciousness on
behaviour, the latter especially stressing the somatic basis
of the empirical ego or objective self and its dependence
on memory. Here is the shadow of some of the earlier philo-
sophical speculations on the nature of the self in contrast
to the measurements of behaviour related to the self such as
those of Frenkel-Brunswiek (1939; 1941) on self-reports.
The work of Nunberg (1931; 1948) and Gottesman (1959) on ego-
strength follows this line of empirical validation of psycho-
analytic ego-concepts.

In the therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis some
concept of self is usually taken into account. Transference
is regarded as taking place in accordance with the self-concept of the individual (Gut, 1954). The feelings of uniqueness and identity have been examined by the case study method with indications that painful feelings of uniqueness lead to the building up of a strong defensive phantasy system to maintain ego-integrity (Shugart, 1962). A marked resemblance to an aspect of the Rogerian approach to personality and therapy is apparent. Themes familiar from the client-centred approach are also found in the recent psychoanalytic work on self-alienation (Wenkart, 1955; Spiegel, 1959; Rubins, 1961; Schachtel, 1961; Weiss, 1961). Normal early growth of self involves the formation of a self-concept out of experience and identification with self-consciousness to give identity. In seeking personal identity, people often focus on concepts which are alien to the true self. Self-alienation is the result of the neurotic process in which acceptance is withheld, the self rejected, and the ideal-self coveted. Stroh & Buick (1964), also among the orthodox, treated the personality growth of the child in terms of the development of self-consciousness. Such is the emphasis in psychoanalytic psychotherapy on both European and American continents today.

There is some concern over the confusion engendered by the parallel use of the terms self and ego among the
psychoanalysts (for example, Miller, Isaacs & Haggart, 1965). Solutions have ranged from the all-embracing self-system of Kaywin (1957; 1959) which incorporates parts of the id, self-representations and the super-ego (super-self) to the theory that the ego is a structured set of interrelated motives centred about the awareness of the self (Chein, 1944). Jacobson, in her studies of the self and the object world (1954, 1964), provided one of the most useful defining solutions in making this distinction:

The meaning of the concepts self and self-representations in distinction from the ego, become lucid when we remember that the establishment of the system ego sets in with the discovery and growing distinction of the self and the object world. (1954, p. 85).

Further, the concept of self was related to that of super-ego.

Whereas self-perception represents always an ego-function, the self-evaluation of an adult person is not exclusively a super-ego function. Founded on subjective inner experience and on objective perception by the ego of the physical and mental self, it is partly or even predominantly exercised by the super-ego, but it is also partly a critical ego function whose maturation weakens the power of the super-ego over the ego.


The self construct of Jacobson owed much to the notion of self-representation formulated by Hartmann as the psychological meaning of the bodily, social and spiritual identity of the individual within the ego system.
The Psychoanalytic Dissenters

The second face of the psychoanalytic pyramid is now in view. Nearest to the base (the most recent development) stand the ego-psychologists who have been avowedly concerned with self-evaluations within social contexts (Lichtenstein, 1965), Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein have been the most prominent renovators of Freud's construct of ego, maintaining that it must be defined by its functions of organization and control. Papers by Hartmann, especially, emphasized this construct (1950, 1959). For him the self comprised the id, ego and super-ego and exists prior to the differentiation of the ego. An interesting comparison of views can be made with those of another ego psychologist, Paul Federn, who 'reinstated the ego in its rightful place as the actual self-experiencing part of the bodily and mental aspects of personality' (Weiss, 1957, p.210). For Federn the self comprises the ego (subject) and self (object) (1952). He dealt with ego feeling rather than structure, and is considered to have formulated a dynamic phenomenological theory of behaviour combining the best aspects of the Freudian determinism with the phenomenological approach to observation and collection of data (Hinsley, 1962). Examination of a paper written by Federn in 1928 reveals that he anticipated the work of Sheerer (1949) and Stock (1949) by twenty years.
in his belief that the way an individual reacts to himself
determines to some extent his reactions to other persons,
one of the main tenets of client-centered personality theory.

On the same surface of the pyramid lie the social
psychiatrists; interested not in ego concepts based on
Freud's theory but in the importance of interpersonal relation-
ships within the psychoanalytic framework, and owing much of
their approach to the early disagreements of Alfred Adler.
Adler, himself, did not follow through some aspects of his
theory which logically would have led to a central position
for the notion of self-esteem. He emphasized only a creative
self obscurely defined. Closest to him in spirit was Fromm,
who, writing in 1939, put forward the plea that what was
wrong with the world was that there was too much selfishness
and not enough self-love, a similar interpretation to that
of Federn yet in terms of society and culture rather than
the individual.

Karen Horney, also, was interested in cultural and inter-
personal factors determining behaviour. Her psychoanalytic the-
ory emphasized the ego functions rather than libidinal devel-
opment. Another of her quarrels with Freud concerned the self
directly. While Freud maintained that self-esteem has its
roots in narcissism, Horney claimed that self-esteem and
self-aggrandizement are mutually exclusive, the latter arising
out of narcissism (Horney, 1947). Her central concept of basic anxiety was a type of self-awareness. In neurosis the real self becomes lost in an effort to preserve the unrealistic, exaggerated, ideal image of the self (Horney, 1945). Self-acceptance is lacking. Psychologists (Munroe, 1955; Vollmerhausen, 1961) have agreed that the idealized image of the self is one of Horney's most important contributions to psychoanalytic theory. The alienation from the core self which occurs in neurosis and the acceptance which is achieved through therapy has been described by one of her followers (Wenkert, 1955) as taking part on three levels: concerning the self as part of the universe, as a member of the human organization and as the self within oneself.

Harry Stack Sullivan used some construct entitled self as the central pivot of his psychotherapeutic theory. Yet as Thompson (1958) has pointed out, it is not clear whether his self-esteem and his concept of self are identical. Ford and Urban (1963) had no doubts about this: the self-system, groups of anxiety avoidance behaviours, they maintained, is not to be confused with the personification of the self, identity. The development of this self-system was described at length in the papers making up The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. The child gradually differentiates himself from his environment into the categories of the good me (giving
satisfaction), the bad me (anxiety), and the not me (terror). The self is not the entire personality, which is ill-defined in comparison with the various aspects of the self. For Sullivan the self was the dynamism which integrates experience from birth. Green (1962), after tracing the antecedents of the Sullivanian notions of self back to James and Mead, subsumed all such notions under the one definition: '...the self is that aspect of man in his interaction with others which has the task of minimizing anxiety' (p.280).

Sullivan's interest in the development of the individual was shared by E.H. Erikson who saw the self-image as a substructure of the ego (1950), but considered the concept of personal identity to be the most fruitful in this area.

At the time, then, it will appear to refer to a conscious sense of individual identity; at another to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character; at a third as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis; and, finally, as a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity.

(Erickson, 1959, p.102).

Psychologists working within the Jungian framework, too, have recently examined the development of the self in childhood (e.g. Fordham, M., 1947; 1951), giving a picture of the self functioning in the child so as to integrate the child's personality and ensuring development of the ego. Jung has been coupled with Freud as a writer who has only added to the ultimate problem of a psychological concept of self (Boss,
Yet in *Psychological types* (1923) he made quite clear the distinction between self and ego as he saw it. He defined the ego as the subject of consciousness, whereas the self, which includes the ego, is the subject of one's total personality and involves unconscious as well as conscious tendencies. Realization of self is the goal of the individuation process of Jungian therapy (Adler, 1951) in which a new centre of personality emerges. This new centre is called the self. Frieda Fordham has pointed out in her Pelican introduction to Jungian psychology (1961), that Jung used this word in the Eastern manner so that it has overtones of the supreme oneness of being of Hindu thought.

From study of the publications of Jung a case may also be made for a definition of self as the central archetype (Hawkey, 1955) as well as the totality of the psyche as outlined above. Michael Fordham examined the two concepts in detail (1964), placing more emphasis on the latter and concluding that in Jungian psychology 'the self is conceived as not only a dynamic and stable structure but also as an integrating-deintegrating system' (1964, p.101).

**Self Theories related to Psychoanalysis**

The three independent psychologists making up the third face of the psychoanalytic pyramid are selected as representa-
tive for a variety of reasons. The first whose work is examined, Camilla Anderson, is chosen for the precise statement which she has made of her self theory of the dynamics of behaviour in one short paper published in 1952. The theory is best stated in her own terms. 'The pattern of life of every individual is a living out of his self image. (p.236) ... Each person has a physical self-image and a psychological self-image ... The self-image is composed of many parts, and each part is conceived of as having both anatomy and physiology' (p.228). In other words, the self-image has both structure and function. Anderson divided the self structure into id, ego, super-ego and ego-ideal. As to the development of the individual she said: 'The psychological self-image is ... formed early in life as a result of the succession of experiences of the child with significant people in his environment (p.232). Once the psychological self-image has been formed, behaviour loses its free or experimental nature (p.235). As long as the person can maintain his self-image intact and functioning according to anticipation he will be free from anxiety (p.237).'

Finally, she agreed with many personality theorists in this statement: 'The goal of all neurotic behaviour is self-image maintenance, the goal of all therapy is self-acceptance'. (p.244). This conceptual framework around the how and why
of personality which Anderson provided is one of the most succint available to date.

The theory of behaviour which J.A. Hadfield presented in his *Psychology and morals* (1923) might well have a place in the above chapter on the history of the concept of self due to its date of publication and the obvious affinity of the theory with that of McDougall. The debt which Hadfield owed to psychoanalytic thought, however, ensures him a place on the third face of the hypothetical pyramid. That he was at great pains to account for two particular aspects of behaviour especially, the development of the individual and mental illness and therapy, reflects his similar frame of reference. Despite these affinities, it is strange that Mary Calkins never welcomed Hadfield to the brotherhood of self theorists to which he surely belonged.

Certainly a construct of self is central to the conceptual system of personality organization which he built up. The term organization, too, was a central one in his highly cognitive theory. 'The "organized self" may be defined as the organization of all the accepted sentiments and dispositions' (1923, p.78); a sentiment being 'a psychological constellation acceptable to the individual and with which he consciously identifies himself' (p.24), and dispositions differing 'from sentiments in that they are
unconsciously accepted' (p.25). All sentiments and dispositions lead to a common purpose and the function of this organization is will. Will was defined as the self in movement while character is the quality of the self. The development of the individual takes place in stages of organization of self:

(i) self-consciousness (3 to 4 years)
(ii) the development of will (childhood)
(iii) idealism (16 to 18 years)
(iv) character development (adulthood)

Arrest of this development leads to mental breakdown as does identification with the self-phantasy, which, unlike the self-image, is unconscious and not bound by reality. These constructs are reminiscent of the id - super-ego struggle; while the constructs of sentiments and dispositions are common to McDougall and Hadfield, although for the latter the self was not a sentiment but the total personality. He looked forward to the day of the holistic personality theorists (Angyal and Maslow) and to some extent Carl Rogers when he said: 'The craving of the self for completeness is shown in dreams, in neuroses, and in the conscious efforts towards self-realization'. (1923, p.75).

As a concluding representative of modifiers of psychoanalytic thought, Symonds is selected for his survey of contemporary theories of ego and the self (1951).
Although adopting a primarily psychoanalytic point of view, Symonds brought together the sometimes confusing and conflicting theoretical constructs of psychoanalysis and phenomenology against the background of established empirical data. This results in an important treatment of the self and the ego, including comparisons of ego, super-ego and self, and the structure, functions and development of both phenomena. Commencing his survey, Symonds approached the confusion of the differing constructs of self by offering his own definitions:

Ego henceforth will be used to refer to that phase of personality which determines adjustment to the outside world in the interest of satisfying inner needs in those situations where choice and decision are involved.... The self, on the other hand, refers to the body and mind and to bodily and mental processes as they are observed and reacted to by the individual.

(1951, p.4.)

Examination of the treatment of these two constructs clarifies this distinction: the ego is viewed as actor, adaptor, executor, knower, perceiver, thinker and will, while the self is discussed in terms of threat to it, change in it, as a value and as a goal to be realized. In other words, the self is the passive object of the active subject, the ego. This distinction has the merit of clarity but does not reflect current psychological nor, more narrowly, psychoanalytic use. More representative are the aspects of self which
Symonds maintained that different personality theorists emphasize: the self as directly perceived, self as a concept, self as a set of values and self as a system of activities. This claim is borne out in the treatment of the theories below, the last-named aspect, for example, being dominant in the next construct examined.

G.W. Allport: the proprium

Both the notion of ego which Freud evolved, a rational, organizing yet passive agency, and the more active principle of the ego-psychologists appear to bear at least some relationship to the construct labelled Self by various authors. The framework of Bartocci (1945) serves to clarify at least one aspect of this relationship. Following the arguments of G.W. Allport (1943) he formulated this suggestion:

The hypothesis here suggested is that 'I' refers to a complex, unitary activity of sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, wanting, feeling and thinking. These activities are the dynamic unity referred to by the word self. This self is enduring and unique, and unifies diverse descriptions of the ego and clarifies the function of the ego in personality organization.

(1945, pp.91-2).

He emphasized that the self is both knower and known while the ego is never the latter, and defined the ego as the self's evaluation of its activities in the life situation.

G.W. Allport, himself, used the terms ego and self interchangeably. Of the established personality theorists treated
in this chapter he is the only one, to date, who has attempted an honest, detailed response to the question 'Is the concept of self necessary?', be this response still in the realm of theory. He postulated a construct which includes all the unique and personal aspects of the individual, the 'proprium', with its functions of bodily sense, self-identity, ego-enhancement, ego-extension, rational activity, self-image, appropriate striving and knowing (1955, pp.41-54). He has traced the development of these functions in the child (1961, pp.110-138). His answer, then, was as follows:

...all psychological functions commonly ascribed to a self or ego must be admitted as data in the scientific study of personality. These functions are not, however, coextensive with personality as a whole. They are rather the special aspects of personality that have to do with warmth, with unity, with a sense of personal importance.... If the reader prefers, he may call them self-functions, and in this sense self may be said to be a necessary psychological concept. What is unnecessary and inadmissible is a self (or soul) that is said to perform acts, to solve problems, to steer conduct, in a trans-psychological manner, inaccessible to psychological analysis. (1955, p.55).

Allport made an important theoretical point. It is unfortunate that his theoretical acumen did not, apparently, enable him to generate hypotheses amenable to empirical verification.

**Gardner Murphy: a social self**

The bio-social theory of Gardner Murphy may be regarded as a psychology of personality based on the organization of
the self. Predominantly an eclectic theoretist, Murphy, like Freud, was in search of an explanatory concept of motivation. The structure of personality was seen by him as a tension system. Psychological constructs play an important part, yet a psychological construct of self is in evidence:

The self is a thing perceived, and it is also a thing conceived; in both senses it is constantly responded to. A large part of behaviour that constitutes personality is self-oriented behaviour. (1947, p.479).

Murphy made a Piagetian distinction between self and not-self. Self-awareness occurs through canalization on the individual's own body. The origins of the self rest in the psychoanalytically-named processes of identification and projection. Murphy was also concerned with learning and the influences of society on the individual. He stressed the other side of the coin of interaction between self-concept and concept of others to that emphasized by Federn when he said: 'The individual is identified with the group and accepts its structured patterns of values; hence the type of self-portrait is largely defined by the subcultural system of values'. (1947, p.754). Not only, runs the theoretical assumption, does the opinion the individual has of himself influence that which he has of the group, but the way in which he sees the group and its values determines the view he takes of himself.
R.B. Cattell: empirical analysis of the self

Another psychologist whose contributions to the field of personality research must be considered in R.B. Cattell. The range of his interests is wide as is testified in the recent collection of his papers (1964) which include contributions to the areas of personality structure and theory, motivation, clinical psychology, social psychology and genetics. It is with the self in personality theory that we are concerned here however, so that it is the work of Cattell in personality description and motivation measurement which has relevance to this thesis. He has been concerned with the measurement of personality variables and their definition through measurement from the collection of life data, questionnaire data and objective tests. As well as the factors analyzed from this data (e.g. cyclothymia, ego strength, intelligence and surgency), he has examined motivation (attitudes, interests, dynamic structures, conflict and anxiety) by the same methods. He has recognized and attempted to control and measure the effects of personality changes through time-oscillation, fluctuation, learning and maturation.

Cattell defined personality according to several sets of terminology or within the framework of several distinct bodies of knowledge. Within the clinical framework, which
is common to the majority of personality theorists discussed, he wrote of personality as 'a more or less integrated set of originally discrete dynamic trends' (1950, p.221). Factorially, it is 'the dimensions of behavioural space for human beings' (1950, p.222). In sum, 'personality is that which determines behaviour in a defined situation' (1950, p.222). These trends or dimensions or determinants were derived from his experiments in factor analysis of questionnaire data which yielded a number of primary source traits, among which was U.I.(Q) 18 or Q₃: Self Sentiment Control.

Definition and naming of this factor has been, necessarily, the long and laborious process of question and empirically based answer. Cattell gave a progress report of his work (1957) which included these correlates. Of questionnaire items and responses which have high factor loadings (+.60 and above) for Q₃, there are:

Which do you believe in more strongly?

(a) luck
(b) insurance

Do you think that you are less energetic than most people are at getting your work done? No

When a problem proves to be too hard, which do you do?

(a) try another problem
(b) try another approach to the same problem

It appears that environment has an 8-to-1 ratio to heredity
in determining scores. Background variables associated with this source trait include the subject admitting to being a healthy child and not very obedient to father (1 percent level). In occupational analysis Q3 is high in psychiatric technicians, policemen, mechanics, executives and electricians. In group dynamics Q3 persons are outstanding for the total number of remarks made (1 percent level) and correlation with receiving leadership positions is about + 0.4.

U.1. (Q) 18 is thus defined. This does not, however, make clear Cattell's position with regard to the construct of self in personality theory. The self-sentiment remained undefined. He was impressed by the hypothetical system of subsidiary attitudes and goal proposed by Murray (1937) and explored this lattice of needs by factor analysis. A set of factors described as ergs and sentiments resulted, forming a dynamic lattice.

Many of Cattell's early experiments were related to attitudes, which he defined as follows: 'an attitude is a vector, definable by direction as well as magnitude, and further by point of application (object) and stimulus situation' (1947, pp.221-2). This concept is very similar to that of sentiment in which he followed McDougall (1933): 'McDougall defined a sentiment as a compound of dynamic purposes centering on one object' (1947, p.227). R- and P-
techniques enabled Cattell to verify the existence of several ergs and sentiments (1952) among which was the self-sentiment.

Analogous to the self-regarding sentiment of McDougall although not presented as the pinnacle in a theoretical system of motivation components, the self-sentiment is:

... the factor and system of attitudes centered on the conceived, contemplated self and directed to maintaining its physical, social and moral integrity as a basis for other sentiment and ergic satisfactions. (1957, p.900).

In other words, the self-sentiment is a set of attitudes centred around the self for the survival of the self. The pattern of attitudes does not contain high correlates with the factor as reported from experiments to date; those of + 0.4 and above being:

I like to have good control over all of my mental processes - my memory, impulses, and general behaviour.

I want never to do anything that would damage my self-respect.

Clarifying experiments by Horn (1961), Cattell and Horn (in publication) and Gorsuch (in publication) are much needed.

The contribution of Cattell is not made to the construct of self as such but rather to concepts of attitude to self. The task which he set himself is the measurement and empirical definition of such variables, and measuring instruments he
has supplied. The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16 P.F.) provides a score for U.I. (Q) 18, while aspects of the dynamic self-sentiment are measured by the Motivation Analysis Test (M.A.T.).

Other Empirical Analyses

S.M. Jourard may be considered as concurring with Cattell in the importance placed on empirical analysis of the self. He did not, however, derive some theoretical construct related to self from collected data, but searched such data for evidence to support his preconceived theory. This data he collected in a series of experiments designed to examine aspects of body image and cathexes (Secord & Jourard, 1953; Jourard & Remy, 1957), identification (Jourard & Remy, 1955; Jourard, 1957) and self-disclosure (Jourard, 1958; Jourard & Lasakow, 1958; Jourard & Landsman, 1960; Melikan, 1962). The theory of adjustment which appears to lie behind these experiments owes much to the works of A.H. Maslow, Carl Rogers and Martin Buber. What amounts almost to plagiarism is particularly apparent when Jourard was writing for the layman (1964). By way of definition for psychologists he had this to say about the self:

The self-structure is a construction of the ego ... [which is the agent or source of all instrumental behaviour] ... It refers to the beliefs, perceptions, ideals, expectations, and demands which a person has
come to formulate with respect to his own
behaviour and experience.

(Jourard, 1963, p.156).

This self is made up of several components; the self-concept
(the beliefs the individual has concerning what kind of a
person he is), the self-ideal (beliefs about how he should
behave) and various public selves. In reference to the last-
named he quoted William James: '... a man has as many social
selves as there are individuals who recognize him...' (James,
1890, p.179).

Although Jourard has established some picture of the
determinants of self-disclosure he has made little contribu-
tion towards a systematic theory of the self which is both
explanatory and testable. Such was the theory proposed and
tested by Edelson and Jones (1954). Within their elaborate
theory of behaviour they defined the conceptual self-system
as 'that system of conceptions of himself and his relations
to his environment which the individual uses as hypotheses
for interacting with the environment so as to maintain
homeostasis by resolving his affective needs'. (1954, p.119).
This definition leads to a number of operational hypotheses.
The testing of one such hypothesis involved introducing
each subject to several role-playing situations, after each
of which they made Q-sorts of self-evaluative items. Factor
analysis of the resulting data justified acceptance of the
experimental hypothesis.
Organismic Theorists: Goldstein, Angyal, Maslow

The theories of personality examined so far have shown nothing of the influence of Gestalt thought on approaches to the behaviour of the individual. The significance of this influence may be observed in those theories described as organismic by Hall and Lindzey (1957), more specifically those of Goldstein, Maslow and Angyal. Essentially, man is studied as a whole and not part of a whole (the environment), and not in terms of some selected piece of behaviour (for example, perception) which forms a frame of reference for some so-called Gestaltists today. To the organismic personality theorists personality is to be considered as a whole even if it is disorganized as in schizophrenia.

Goldstein (1939) is credited with the publication of the first such holistic theory of personality. He postulated that there is only one chief motive for behaviour under which may be subsumed all the others. This motive he called self-actualization. Maslow, with early emphasis on self-esteem and self-evaluation in abnormal psychology (Maslow & Mittelmann, 1941), took up this concept of motivation as the creative trend in the behaviour of man. He was particularly concerned with the individual who may be described as self-actualizing (Maslow, 1954; 1959; 1962), more truly himself and 'closer to the core of his Being' (1959, p.62). Such
an individual has more efficient perceptions of reality and more comfortable relations with it, is more accepting of self and others, is creative, and has spontaneity and autonomy. Self-actualization, per se, was described by Maslow as being 'intrinsic growth of what is already in the organism, or more accurately of what is the organism itself ... self-actualization is growth motivated rather than deficiency motivated' (1954, p.183). In contrast, Angyal's system placed more emphasis on the interaction between the individual and the environment (the bio-sphere) which was described in terms of self-determination and self-surrender. As part of the bio-sphere exists a set of self-concepts called the symbolic self, which defines the subject - object relationship and which may or may not distort reality. 'The relative segregation of the symbolic self within the organism is perhaps the most vulnerable point of the human personality organization' (1941, p.121).

Phenomenology and the Self Constructs

The influence of Gestalt thought is also apparent in the phenomenological approach to personality which has been rapidly gaining in popularity (Lundin, 1964). The four phenomenologies described by Landsman (1958), the serial theory of awareness of Jones (1949) and the subjective and objective divisions of the extended and striving selves of
Lundholm (1940) all bear witness to this. The most useful collection of comments on these theories is the volume edited by Kuenzli, *The phenomenological problem* (1959), in which the theoretical postulate common to all the writers is that for each individual there is a phenomenal field, life space, reality world, universe of events or behavioural environment which completely determines the behaviour of that individual. Smith (1950), although making use of this frame of reference to distinguish between the terms self and ego as phenomenal and non-phenomenal sides of the same coin, raised critically some important points. These included the accusations that phenomenology ignores psychological facts such as the existence of unconscious determinants of behaviour and that its constructs are merely descriptive rather than explanatory. The defense which Snygg and Combs, perhaps the most ardent supporters of the phenomenological approach, put up (1950) is not impressive.

During the early development of their theory Combs was chiefly concerned with the use of phenomenological concepts in non-directive therapy (1946; 1947; 1948), while Snygg established the respectability of phenomenology as a system. Such a system is superior to the objective approach, he maintained, in that no translation of terms is necessary and the theory can lead to predictions about the individual
rather than about the group only (Snygg, 1941). It is true that it has generated several widely read text-books (Combs & Snygg, 1959; Combs, 1962) and much research (for example, Combs, Soper & Courson, 1963). Such a system does, of course, require some type of self construct forming part of the phenomenal field. 'The phenomenal self includes all those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual experiences as part or characteristic of himself' (Snygg & Combs, 1948, p.58). There is only one real need, actualization of the self, a learning to live effectively with the self-concept. 'In the personal economy of any individual, the concept of self seems to represent the individual's guide to behaviour' (Combs, 1949, p.31). There is concern, too, with the measurement of this self-concept, depending as it does on self-report. Combs and Soper (1957) listed the influences on self-report as follows:

(i) clarity of the subject's awareness
(ii) lack of adequate symbols for expression
(iii) social expectancy
(iv) co-operation from the subject
and (v) freedom from threat and personal adequacy.

These influences are illustrated amply below in the sections on measurement.
Such an emphasis on the empirical basis of theory construction within the phenomenological approach is all too unusual. The interests of Moustakas (1956; 1961), for example, contrast markedly here. Similar in its approach, however, is the hormic theory of personality of Lecky (1951), unfortunately published posthumously. According to Lecky, all behaviour shows an inevitable striving towards self-consistency. He defined personality as 'a unified scheme of experience, an organization of values that are consistent with one another' (1951, p.160). 'According to the theory of self-consistency, we seek those experiences which support our values, and avoid, resist, or if necessary, forcibly reject those which are inconsistent with them' (1951, p.169). Lecky showed himself to be aware of the dangers of an attempt within any one theoretical system to support both the doctrine of the unconscious and such a self-concept as is implied in the doctrine of self-consistency.

The Self Theory of Carl Rogers

The phenomenological basis for a theory of personality organization was used by Carl Rogers who has been much influenced by Snygg and Combs, amongst others, in his theory construction. Primarily, Rogers is a psychotherapist, but
naturally he found that some delineation of a construct of personality and personality functions is necessary to the formulation of general principles of therapy. The chief constructs in the resulting theory are the organism, the phenomenal field and the self which develops out of interaction between the organism and the environment. The most important learning process is the learning of the self. The organism strives perpetually to enhance itself; that is, the chief motive of Rogers' construction may be said to coincide with that of Goldstein, self-actualization. Even as recorded up to 1957 (Cartwright, 1957), the bibliography of research and theory construction related to so-called client-centered therapy which encompasses the work of Rogers and his followers is impressive. A selection of reports of such research collected into just one volume alone, (Rogers & Dymond, eds., 1954; see especially papers by Dymond, Gordon & Cartwright, Grummon & John, Rudikoff, Seeman, and Vargas concerning changes in the self) make up a useful contribution to an empirical basis for the construct of self. Several interesting statements of the personality theory underlying client-centered therapy are available (Shlien, 1961a; Gendlin, 1962), although the original postulates of Rogers concerning the self are examined here.

Rogers' most precise statement of personality organization (1951, pp.483-522) was delivered in a series of
propositions, the first seven of which were primarily phenomenological in character and referred to the behaving organism as outlined above. The remaining propositions introduced the construct of self and elaborated this theme to what is indeed a self psychology:

... VIII. A portion of the total perceptual field gradually becomes differentiated as the self...

... IX. As a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluational interactions with others, the structure of the self is formed - an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the 'I' or the 'me' together with the values attached to these concepts...

... X. The values attached to experiences, and the values which are a part of the self-structure, in some instances, are values experienced directly by the organism, and in some instances are values introjected or taken over from others, but perceived in distorted fashion, as if they had been experienced directly...

... XI. As experiences occur in the life of the individual, they are either:

(a) symbolized, perceived and organized into some relationship to the self, 

(b) ignored because there is perceived relationship to the self-structure, 

(c) denied symbolization or given a distorted symbolization because the experience is inconsistent with the structure of the self...
... XII. Most of the ways of behaving which are adopted by the organism are those which are consistent with the concept of the self...

... XIII. Behaviour may, in some instances, be brought about by organic experiences and needs which have not been symbolized. Such behaviour may be inconsistent with the structure of the self, but in such instances the behaviour is not 'owned' by the self...

... XIV. Psychological maladjustment exists when the organism denies to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the self-structure. When this situation exists, there is basic or potential psychological tension...

... XV. Psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism are or may be assimilated on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with the concept of self...

... XVI. Any experience which is inconsistent with the organization or structure of self may be perceived as a threat, and the more of these perceptions there are, the more rigidly the self-structure is organized to maintain itself...

... XVII. Under certain conditions, involving primarily complete absence of any threat to the self-structure, experiences which are inconsistent with it may be perceived and examined, and the structure of the self revised to assimilate and include such experiences...

... XVIII. When the individual perceives and accepts into one consistent and integrated system all his sensory and visceral experiences, then he is necessarily more understanding of others and is more accepting of others as separate individuals...

... XIX. As the individual perceives and accepts into his self-structure more of his organic
experiences, he finds that he is replacing his present value system - based so largely upon introjections which have been distortedly symbolized - with a continuing valuing process...

This statement of the self theory of Rogers appears to hold through all the adjustments Rogers has made in his therapeutic technique. These adjustments may be traced in Rogers' major publications (1942; 1951; 1961). In the first of these, Counselling and psychotherapy, Rogers emphasized the importance of recognition and acceptance of self; in the second, Client-centered therapy, he described therapy in terms of self-perception, self-evaluation and self-actualization; while in his latest collection of papers, On becoming a person, direct experiencing of the self appeared to be the goal of the therapeutic process. In all this writing, however, Rogers found it necessary to provide a definition of self only once, claiming the term as equivalent to 'the awareness of being, of functioning' (1951, p.498). Similar definitions appear in the chapter Rogers contributed to Koch's volumes (1959).

**Development Psychology and the Growth of the Self**

An examination of the self has been made within a survey of current personality theories, ranging from the self as organizer of the psychoanalysts to the humanistic and experiential self of Carl Rogers. The framework has been
that of the adult personality, the question of the self in the growing child being left begging to some extent. The fate of the construct of self in developmental psychology awaits examination.

The personality theorists whose contributions are outlined above have not, of course, avoided the question of the self in the child entirely. In fact, the psychoanalysts for example, in keeping with their emphasis on the influence of early developmental experiences, have been at pains to postulate the appearance of a sense of self in very young children as observed by Ames (1952). Washburn (1961), in fact used test items oriented to the theories of Erikson, Freud, Fromm, Horney and Theodore Sarbin to ascertain the levels of self-conceptualization in high-school students. In this study he identified six patterns; the somatic - primitive self, the submissive - dependent self, the detached - independent self, the outer controlling self, the inner controlling self and the integrative - actualizing self.

Of the general developmental texts, most contain a section devoted to the growing self (for example, Gesell, Ilg & Ames, 1956) while others purport to examine the whole question of development with the self as the paramount construct (for example, Jersild, 1952; Gordon, 1959). Such discussions centre around the importance of self-estimates
in children's behaviour, how these self-estimates evolve and how adults can estimate and influence childrens' self-concepts.

Adolescence, these texts agree, comprises a period of general change in which change in the self-concept is no exception. This hypothesis has been substantiated by studies such as that of Smith & Lebo (1956). Rube postulated that the child's image of self is related to the growth of his body, and sees the day-dreaming which is prevalent in adolescence as 'the necessary process of re-organisation and re-evaluation of the image of one's self' (Rube, 1955, p.636). Nixon, from observation of some six hundred college students, postulated an organic developmental step in mid-adolescence (15 to 18 years) arising from the two crises of independence and self-discovery. This step he called 'the advent of self-cognition' (Nixon, 1961, p.20). His construct of self refers to a concrete substrate in contrast to the ego which is an abstraction: 'the self is the person's symbol of his own organism' (1961, p.29).

It is within the context of theory and research concerning adolescence that the construct named the ideal self is often examined. It may not be primarily a construct of personality theory but rather
a variable (imagined or otherwise) relatively amenable to measurement. Royce (1895b) suggested that the self-concept was assessed in relation to some ideal. It is true that the ideal self is a significant term for Carl Rogers, but only to the extent that it is helpful in the empirical verification of the hypotheses derived from his theory of the therapeutic process. It is also true that it is difficult to formulate a definition of the term which is purely operational. Studies of the development of the ideal self in children have tended to use identical procedures to gain appropriate measures: Havighust, Robinson & Dorr (1946) and Wheeler (1961) both set the essay topic 'the person I would like to be'. Responses tended to fall into the categories of parents, glamorous adults, attractive and visible young adults and composites, imaginary persons, these being the figures from the environment with whom the adolescent identifies. The publications of Havighust and MacDonald (1955), Glückel (1960), MacDonald and Gynther (1965) have illustrated similar trends within different cultures.

It appears that developmental psychologists have something to add to the construct of self. This is also true of psychologists working in other fields related to that of personality theory and measurement, namely the learning theorists, perceptionists and those concerned with the problems
of motivation. As is to be expected the majority of such theorists have found no place for a self construct; yet there is a minority to whom the self is important.

Theories of Learning, Perception and Motivation

In the field of learning, stimulus-response theories of behaviour have no need of, and do in fact carefully avoid any suggestions for the content of 'the little black box' which a self construct would necessarily be. Such a theory is that presented by Dollard and Miller (1950). Yet this and similar reinforcement learning theories are used to account for the genesis of the concept of self in the individual when the existence of such a concept is accepted. Helper (1955) postulated such a process and tested his hypothesis by comparing the self-concepts of children and their parents. Similarity of such concepts and rewards were associated in male subjects but not females, providing inadequate support for his theory.

Of the perceptionists it is chiefly those interested in person perception who have incorporated a construct of self into a general theory of perception. Macleod, for example, defined perception as '... the process whereby things, events and their qualities and relations become present to a self as here, now and real' (Macleod, 1960, p.233). It was, of course, Macleod who, earlier (1949), suggested that motives
might be defined as the interaction between the self and the object.

A similar view of motivation has been taken more recently by Harvey and Schroder (1963) who examined the cognitive aspects of the self and motivation. It is their definition of self which is of interest here. Self is described as synonymous with 'an individual's totality of modes of ordering of his psychological universe, with one's concatenation of more or less standardized cognitive tendencies or conceptual system(s)' (Harvey & Schroder, 1963, p.97).

**Some Self Constructs of Social Psychologists**

An attempt to divorce personality theorists from social psychologists, as from learning and motivation theorists, is likely to bear the hallmark of hair-splitting. The theory of self which Sarbin advocates, for example, while involving the construct of role (normally the prerogative of the social psychologists) treats the self as one of the many cognitive structures which may be inferred from behaviour. Sarbin's theory, as expressed formally (1952) and as a generator of tested hypotheses (Sarbin & Farberonc, 1952; Sarbin, 1955), is worthy of delineation for its uniqueness in this area as a purely cognitive conceptualization of self.

The statement of the theory proper is preceded by seven postulates, concerning the interbehavioural field of
the human (presumably equivalent to the life space concept or the phenomenal field which includes the self-concept), a definition of the self and the conditions under which change in the self may take place. The self is the result of the responses of the organism to stimuli and is organized around substructures or empirical selves. Sarbin described in detail the development of these substructures, each one being the anlage of the next. In order of appearance they are:

(i) the somatic self, organized around responses to the somesthetic senses (age: up to one month);

(ii) the receptor – effector self, involving global reaction to tension (3 to 4 months);

(iii) the primitive construed self, at which stage the child differentiates between objects and persons (6 months);

(iv) the introjecting – extrojecting self, including a crude use of language and similar to the Piagetian processes of accommodation and assimilation (10 to 14 months);

(v) the social self, which emerges when the child can differentiate not only discrete acts of the people in the environment, but organized patterns of acts or roles (24 months).

In adulthood the social self is the dominant self-structure, although Sarbin postulated that in delinquents the primitive construed self or the introjecting – extrojecting self may be dominant. One point which should be clarified is the nomenclature of the theory. The term empirical as applied
to self does not have the connotations which the Kantian
division between pure and empirical egos implies. Sarbin
avoided this subject - object dichotomy carefully. He was,
however, concerned that the reader be aware that each self
derives from interaction with the interbehavioural field,
and therein the meaning of the term lies.

Sarbin, the social psychologist, saw the self as derived
through learning, rather than as the object learned, so that
it is not innate but determined by the experience of the
environment. Change in the substructures and therefore in
the total self-structure occurs through maturation and
learning, and is a function of the strength of the boundaries
of the self and the ambiguity tolerance of that structure.
Couched in these terms the theory appears to be both hard-
headed and useful; however, the hypotheses which Sarbin put
to the test do not appear to derive directly from the theory,
and it is difficult to devise any which do. It may be more
profitable to turn to the work of Lewin in regard to the self
from whom Sarbin has borrowed several concepts.

The field theory of Kurt Lewin, on closer inspection
however, does not appear to generate testable hypothesis.
Viewing behaviour as a function of the field which exists
at the time at which the behaviour occurs, Lewin postulated
a construct which he named the life-space of the individual
which includes both the organism and the environment. The self is experienced as 'a region within the whole field' (Lewin, 1936). As a Gestaltist, he wished to 'identify the self with the whole of the psychical totality' (1935, p.61), but observations suggest that part of this totality may be denied by an individual while portions of the so-called environment (for example, clothing or the mother) may be included in the self. The boundaries of the self are, Lewin hypothesised, much less firm in the child than they are in the adult. The modifications which Johdai (1955) made in the theory of Lewin lie chiefly in the delineation of the phenomenal self which he sees as having three phases, the bodily, conceptual and social phases, which correspond to those situations of the life-space.

The terms self and ego have frequently been made use of by social psychologists, including not only Sarbin and Lewin who do attempt definition but theorists like Hadley and Cantril (1949) whose interest in ego-involvement appears to survive difficulties of definition of self and ego. The self-concept is often seen as being centrally important, with socio-cultural referents. Dai (1952) saw it as developed in the primary group at the basis of a hierarchy of selves developed in different groups, and maintained that personality integration represents an integration of these primary and secondary selves.
Acceptance of this point of view raises the question of the relationship between self and roles, a question first raised by G.H. Mead. Moreno (1952) claimed that the self emerges from roles, and that even in psychodrama this situation is not reversed. Grace (1953), on the other hand, reviewed the various approaches made by social psychologists to the construct of self and assigned them to three categories: the 'groupist' tradition which defines the self-concept in terms of the individual's acceptance of and by others; the 'individualist' tradition with definition in terms of the acquisition of objects; and the 'situationist' tradition involving conformity with ritual. Grace rejected these approaches, including the role concept which may be incorporated in the last, and described the construct of self somewhat metaphysically as referring to the unique, human individuality.

That self is a necessary construct for social psychology appears obvious. To a psychologist, however, it is surprising that self is regarded as a key construct in sociology in which the behaviour of groups rather than individuals is studied. Such a construct it has been claimed to be, especially as derived from the theories of Mead, James and Baldwin (Gould & Kolb, 1964). Measurement of the self-concept is apparently of as much importance to sociologists
(Nass, 1961) as it was at the time of the study of Todd (1916). Lee (1950) found that for the Wintu Indians much of what is 'other' for us is identified as self. Such investigations are of course extremely dependent on language structure so that any results must be interpreted appropriately. Perhaps because of these difficulties it is a sociologist who has provided one of the clearest and most measurable definitions of self as:

... a person's idea of the conceptions that others have of him, as well as his own disposition towards these judgements. It is the person's awareness of himself as an active being, a subject and initiator of acts in a social context.

An Analysis of Contemporary Self Constructs

Certain aspects of the use of self constructs by psychological theorists deserve special attention. The philosophers and psychologists of past centuries made much of the distinction between the self as subject and object. Certainly the self as subject - the knowing self, the motivator, the experiencing self, the organiser and the subjective voice of society - is prominent in the self constructs of contemporary personality theorists. The self as object, too, is prominent in terms of a self-concept within each individual. As part of this construct of object-self appears the aspect of self-esteem as it was named by the phrenologists
or self-estimation as named by William James. This affective rather than cognitive aspect is described variously by Fenchel, Federn, Horney, Cattell and Rogers as self-esteem, self-attitude, self-evaluation and self-acceptance.

Other aspects of self constructs besides that of the division of subject - object are common to these contemporary constructs and the theories which were their ancestors. An analysis of types of contemporary self constructs, classified according to the definitions provided by English and English (1958) as were the ancestral constructs, is carried out. A summary of the results is shown in Table 2.

From the analysis it appears that the majority of contemporary personality theorists are concerned with the object recognised by the individual as well as with the object with the feelings and strivings pertaining to it. In other words, the self-concept and the self-sentiment are popular notions today. A few theorists make the central point of their psychology the self as distinguished from the environment, the self as total personality or the self which is the centre of the psychological processes. Jung, who as a creator of theories belonged to the earlier period, provided a lone construct of self as agent. Maslow, the Gestaltist holist, naturally referred to a self which is a whole being.
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Table 2. A Content Analysis of Self Theories (1935-1965)
The unique placing of the construct of Jung, whose theories although quite popular were generated much earlier, points up the differences between the historical antecedents and current self constructs. (See Table 1). While six of the earlier writers dealt with a self which was pure subject, only Jungians urge such a construct today. There has been an increase in the number of psychologists who use the term to refer to the personality of the individual and a decrease in its use to indicate 'what is mine'. The general trend of the change over time has been from the self as subject to the self as object. Such a trend appears to be a reflection of the increased emphasis on empirical verification of theories. A parallel analysis of the self variables examined by experimentalists has bearing on this hypothesis.

The results of this third analysis, based on the studies reported as empirical evidence concerning the self, do not require tabular representation. It is apparent that the type of variable, according to the English and English definitions, is determined by the avowed aim of the measure employed. The tests used in these studies, with the exception of those examining self-recognition and self-localisation, claim validity as measures of the ideas, feelings and strivings that are recognised by the individual as his own
(self concept) or the feelings and strivings organised around that object (self-sentiment). Self variables, then, are object - self, by the very necessity of operational definition. The examination of the contemporary self constructs indicates an affinity with the self variables to be examined.
CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING SELF VARIABLES
An extensive variety of concomitants of self variables have been reported in psychological literature. Although it is apparent that it is chiefly the empirical ego with which researchers are dealing, problems of definition are not entirely solved by the operational approach. Statements are made as conclusions drawn from experiments using such names as self-esteem, self-acceptance and the self-concept, yet each of these, operationally defined, is a separate and unique variable. In other words, a collection of research conclusions which purport to pertain to self variables has no theme to justify such a collection. It is also true that no conclusions may be drawn as to the determinants and the determined since most of the examination of the data has been by correlation establishing some form of relationship with no suggestion of causation.

A survey of the current status of the self as a variable may be attempted then, always taking these conditions into account. The literature is collected in such a way as to emphasize the examination of self variables within several frames of reference. Experiments related to self-recognition and self-perception and changes in the structure of the self-concept are examined, as is empirical verification of hypotheses connecting self variables and personality variables. Social interaction in terms of the relationship between
self-feelings and feelings towards others and the effects of attitudes of others on the self-concept receive attention. The development of self variables as established empirically is discussed in more detail, and the validity of self-estimates is questioned. Throughout the survey attention is drawn to the origins of the hypotheses which have been tested.

**Self-Recognition**

For early writers such as Locke and Hume, who were concerned with recognition of self, introspection was the natural means of testing any related hypotheses. More acceptable methods now prevail, but there have been several more recent attempts to isolate the self along the same lines. A Japanese psychologist, Kitamura, in the early stages of his work (1936; 1940) attempted to establish the position of the self in ideation through the introspection of trained subjects, and defined, to his own satisfaction, two forms of imagination. One of these involved an objective approach to the situation, while the other consisted in a subjective consciousness of self. Later Kitamura examined the feelings of satisfaction the individual has about his own appearance and disposition (1951; 1952). Superficially his revised approach using questionnaires appears to be more sophisticated, especially in its similarity to the body-cathexis measures.
of Jourard; however the question is raised as to whether it is justifiable to regard any measure of the self-concept or attitude to the self as more sophisticated than the introspection methods of Locke and Hume. Whatever the merits of his methods, Kitamura claimed to have demonstrated a negative reaction in recognition of self (1951) and, more particularly, in recognition of the physical self, this reaction being psychogenic in nature and not merely a reflection of aesthetic values (1952).

Experiments concerning the early development of this physical self-recognition could just as easily have been designed by Locke or Hume, or Condillac, J.S. Mill or William James in their interest in self-recognition and identity, as by Dixon (1957) who described the process of mirror recognition in the young infant. By six or seven months Dixon observed some attempts to relate the image to the self and by about twelve months true recognition is apparent. This observation lends some credence to the developmental theory of Sarbin who would describe the child of this age as developing the introjecting-extrojecting self through adaptation to the environment. Morowitz (1943), too, gave support to this theory.

Studies of recognition of James' 'bodily me' such as that of Wolff (1945) naturally stimulate interest in the
hypothetical factors governing such recognition which are
difficult to isolate. Huntley (1940a; 1940b) accepted a
view similar to that of Jung with his postulate of an
unconscious self when he examined and compared conscious and
unconscious self-judgements. That it is possible to have
unconscious attitudes or feelings towards any phenomena
appears to be a logical contradiction; but, be that as it
may, Huntley established that when an individual makes
judgements about his own expressions such as writing, voice
or hands without recognition of identity his reactions are
mostly favourable, never neutral and occasionally very
unfavourable. It appears that with partial recognition the
ego or self-esteem is threatened with the result that the
judgements are almost entirely favourable. With recognition
the self-judgements become more moderate: this change the
experimenter interpreted as the effects of modesty.

Changes in the Self Concept

Sarbin would also predict from his theory changes in
the concept of self through the learning process. Several
studies have supported similar hypotheses. Babbitt (1962),
attempting to produce changes in the individual's attitude
to himself by means of verbal conditioning, reinforced one
experimental group of subjects for a negative self-concept
and another for a positive self-concept by appropriate
responses of 'good' while the control group was rewarded randomly. The semantic differential technique was used as a pre- and post-measure of the self-concept which was found to be affected in the intermediate dissatisfaction group reinforced for positive self-referents. In the same way it appears that changes in self-attitudes occur as a function of experimentally induced success and failure, success resulting in an increase in evaluations and failure in a similar decrease (Cohen, 1961). These findings hold for unconscious as well as conscious self-judgments as measured through subjects rating four disguised handwritings including their own and rating themselves and friends on ten traits (Diller, 1954). After success experiences attitudes to self are enhanced at both conscious and unconscious levels and show a positive relationship with attitudes to friends. After failure self-attitudes are not correlated with attitudes to others.

Such experiment results uphold the postulates which Carl Rogers makes concerning the organisation of experience within the self-concept in the fully-functioning individual. As further evidence, direction of changes in I.Q. scores has been successfully predicted on the basis of changes in self-ratings, confirming the notion that the individual seeks to maintain an identity by means of which to
conceptualise himself and his role in a given situation (Benjamins, 1950).

The extent to which experience determines self-attitudes and vice versa is not clear in the above experiments. Techniques for determining such causation are not available. There are, however, some factors which may act as independent rather than dependent variables since variation within these variables is sufficiently defined, perhaps in terms of physical factors. One such factor is sex, which in interaction with the self-concept must be cause rather than effect, except in so far as cultural demands act as intervening variables. On a rating scale for twenty-six traits, rated for self, ideal-self and social self, no sex differences appeared (Martire & Hornberger, 1957); although in checking adjectives women tended to select adjectives which emphasised motivational forces while men preferred those depicting regulatory activity. Differences for the first type of adjectives decreased with age, while for regulatory words the sex difference increased with age (Rongved, 1961). In a recent study relating self-perception to role conflict in woman, Soysa (1962) using a self-report questionnaire of thirty 'I' statements found that women do rate home-making above a career in their self-evaluations.
Relationships between Self Variables and Personality Variables

Of the attempts to establish some connection between the self-concept and well-authenticated personality variables, one of the most interesting is a study which invoked the unconscious self-concept, or, at least, unwitting self-evaluation on the part of the subject. Rogers and Paul (1959) hypothesised that an extreme degree of conscious impunitiveness has a substratum of unconscious aggressiveness. The hypothesis was upheld in that subjects with high E% scores on the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration study differed from the control group in rating unrecognised photographs of themselves as more aggressive when independent judges agreed that there was no difference. Another interesting reference in which colour preferences are related to the self-concept (Kouwer, 1955) is, unfortunately, unavailable, although it is apparent that some relationship was established.

Psychological adjustment is customarily related to the self-ideal discrepancy measures rather than to the self-concept, yet there are two studies which attempt to test that latter hypothesis. Perry (1961) was able to support his statement that well-adjusted individuals would admit to a greater number of self-damaging items as true of themselves than would a group of maladjusted individuals selected by
clinicians. Manis (1956) defined his well-adjusted and maladjusted groups of individuals in terms of M.M.P.I. scores on the D, Pt, Hs, Hy, L and K scales. Subjects described their real selves, ideal selves and each of their parents on twenty-four bipolar rating scales based on a selection of Allport-Odbert adjectives. Manis found from analysis of these scores, that well-adjusted subjects see themselves as more like their parents than do the maladjusted, but not more similar to the same sexed parent. Nor do the poorly adjusted prefer the opposite sex parent, in contra-indication to the psychoanalytic suggestion that the concept of self is formed through identification with similar significant figures in the environment. Sex differences were also revealed: female subjects see themselves as more like parents than male subjects do.

Evidence of Interaction between the Individual and the Environment

Much of the behaviour in which the self-concept is reflected, and which to some extent it may determine, is that involved in learning processes. Using the Gough Adjective List as a vehicle of description for both self and others for each subject, Bieri and Trieschman (1956) tested an hypothesis of mediated generalisation in learning. They showed that ease of learning to associate names of
persons to adjectives highly relevant to the self is a function of the perceived similarity of these persons to the self. Tests of immediate recall as related to the self-concept were also made by Cartwright (1956) in a manner reminiscent of the self-consistency construct of Lecky. Actually Cartwright claimed that his hypotheses arose out of the personality theory of Rogers: that there is no difference in immediate recall for stimuli that are consistent with the self-structure and those which are not, and that if a difference were found it would be the same for adjusted and maladjusted groups. Both null hypotheses were rejected.

The Rogerian series of postulates which stimulated the hypotheses outlined above have also stimulated most of the work aimed at establishing a link between the congruence of self- and ideal-concepts and adjustment. In 1952 Brownfain, using his own inventory, formed a self-ideal discrepancy model by subtracting the 'negative' from the 'positive' self-concept. The resulting measure he defined as one of stability and maintained that subjects with stable self-concepts are better adjusted than those with unstable self-concepts. Hanlon, Hofstaetter and O'Connor (1954) used a Q-sort as a measure of self-ideal congruence and the California Test of Personality for an adjustment score. They found an overall tendency towards congruence between self and ideal,
and a positive correlation between self-ideal congruence and adjustment. Block and Thomas (1955), on the other hand, related self-acceptance measures to defensiveness and rigidity rather than to adjustment. The experimental design of Chodorkoff (1954) involved a similar Q-sort measure but projective tests to give ratings of adjustment for the thirty subjects. Chodorkoff found a curvilinear relationship between the two variables, and not a linear relationship as predicted. He accounted for this result by postulating that there are two types of people who are rated adequate in adjustment: one type feels no need to change the self- or ideal-concept, while the other has the motivation to do so. Chodorkoff's design, however, is suspect, if only for the doubtful validity of the Rorschach Test and the T.A.T. as measures of adjustment and for the small size of his sample.

In contrast is the more recent study of Turner and Vanderlippe (1958) who from a sample of 175 college students extracted one group of twenty-five subjects with the largest self-ideal discrepancy scores and another of twenty-five subjects with the smallest discrepancy scores on the Butler and Haigh Q-sort (1954). These groups were distinguished on various criteria of adjustment, the latter group being described as:

a. participating in more extra-curricular activities,
b. gaining higher scholastic averages,
c. being given higher sociometric ratings,
d. gaining higher adjustment test scores,
e. distinguishable on the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey.

It would appear, then, that there does exist some positive relationship between adjustment and self-acceptance as measured by the self-ideal discrepancy model.

This relationship has been examined in more specific settings, as in the differentiation of successful from non-successful naval officers (Nahinsky, 1958). The self-concept of the successful officer was found to resemble more closely the Q-sort made for the ideal officer made by each subject than did that of the unsuccessful officer. Concomitants of the relationship have also been established. The more poorly adjusted the individual, the more self-depreciative he appears (Calvin & Holzmann, 1953). In describing performance on probability learning tasks subjects with high self-ideal discrepancy tend to depreciate their performance, while those with low discrepancy are more accurate in their estimations (Moses & Duvall, 1960).

Differently derived measures, also labelled self-acceptance, yield similar results in correlation with adjustment. The self-acceptance scale of the California Personality Inventory (Sa), when used in conjunction with a marital
adjustment questionnaire for married students and their spouses showed greater self-acceptance in the students, and a slight negative relationship with marital adjustment (Aller, 1962). Self-acceptance in Negros improved when the Negros were moved into integrated housing (Works, 1962). Pannes (1963) found that the more favourable the self-image, the higher the degree of dogmatism in high school students. These supported hypotheses might well have been generated through the constructs of self-feelings of James, the self-regarding sentiment of McDougall, or the self-esteem of Rado.

This is true also of the attempt to gauge the relationship between the reduction of cognitive dissonance and degree of self-acceptance made by Worchel and McCormick (1963) using the Worchel Self Activity Inventory to measure self-esteem. In their experiment the effect of the contrary opinion resulted in lower derogation of the source in subjects with high self-acceptance, and agreement and disagreement had more effect on the opinions of those with low self-esteem.

A relationship between self-feelings and perception may be suggested. Haigh (1951) presented his subjects with forty-eight descriptive words from counselling interviews tachistoscopically, and recorded recognition times. Subjects then ranked the words for self and ideal, enabling Haigh to
conclude from the analysis of his data that attitudes towards self determine perception. Again the structural framework of the personality theory of Carl Rogers is justifiable. As is more recently reported, Coopersmith (1964), too, dealt with visual perception as influenced by the self-concept. His subjects he divided into various groups according to the individual's own estimate of his self-esteem and a rating of that self-esteem by observers. Sensory constancy of space judgements was measured under stress, and the higher the self-esteem of subjects, by both methods, the better the sensory constancy.

Since motivation has been described in terms of interaction between the self and the object (Macleod, 1949), some empirical linkage of self-attitudes and motivation is to be expected. Nicholas Hobbes imputed to self-esteem the significance of a motive, and of the more recent personality theorists Goldstein, Snygg and Combs, and Rogers all believe the chief motive activating behaviour to be some form of self-actualisation. Certainly a reflection of the self-ideal discrepancy is suggested to lie in the chief projective test for the assessment of motivation, the Thematic Apperception Test (Faith, 1961). The higher the achievement need, as measured by the T.A.T., the greater the self-ideal discrepancy in subjects (Martire, 1956). College students with low
self-esteem were asked to rate their interests in a variety of security-enhancing behaviours while they imagined themselves in situations of varying security. Such interests were more affected by possibilities of success than were identical interests in those with high self-esteem (Stotland, 1961).

Self-perception and goal-setting behaviour represents another facet of the relationship between self and motivation, and one which is not clear (Steiner, 1957). At the time of Steiner's report there had been several attempts to examine the problem but with conflicting results. Using data from administrations of the Rorschach Test, Cohen (1954) found goal-setting not related to feelings of adequacy, although very low goal-settings are related to self-rejection. Lepine and Chodorkoff (1955) likewise found no correlation between levels of aspiration and correspondence between the perceived and ideal self. Solley and Stagner (1956) put forward an experimental design to study the relationship between valuation of self and temporal barriers, insoluble anagrams, and type of goal, whether neutral, negative or positive in affective stimulation. They found that motivational intensity as measured by palmar sweatings increases with increase in barrier magnitude. Barrier behaviour differs with the value the subject attaches to the self.
The Self and Ego Defences

This type of experiment obviously has affinities with those designed to estimate the effects of conflict and stress on self variables. Theoretical roots for such experiments may rise in the psychoanalytically-orientated basic anxiety construct of Horney, the threat and the self-concept postulate of Rogers, or Anderson's belief that if the self-image is intact there will be no anxiety experienced by the individual. Zimmer (1954), however, was not able to establish a relationship between self-acceptance, measured by ratings on seven-point rating scales for twenty-five personality traits, and conflict in a word association task with variables such as reaction time, recognition time, defective reproduction and repetition of stimulus word as samples of the subject's behaviour. No difference was found between groups with low and high negative self-concepts on the Brownfain Self-Rating Inventory in problem solving rigidity or reaction to threat (Cowen, 1954). Goldfarb (1961) failed to link self-acceptance scores and W.A.I.S. Digit Symbol scores as gained under stress. On the other hand, Miller and Worchel (1956) were able to conclude from a variety of results that a curvilinear relationship exists between the individual's evaluation of adequacy in coping with frustration and efficiency in maintaining accuracy of performance.
The question of the conditions under which defensiveness is likely to occur receives a clearer answer. Chodorkoff (1954b) from experimental data supported the notion that the greater the agreement between the individual's self-description and an objective description of him, the less perceptual defence he will show and the more adequate will be his adjustment. Using multiple measures of the self-concept and defensiveness, Wylie (1957) concluded that defensiveness is a function of self-concept discrepancies, rather than being predictable from the observer's knowledge of objective reality or the subject's insight into that reality.

Next comes the question of how this defensiveness makes itself manifest. It appears that in people generally described as defensive, unconscious self-evaluation entails greater dislike of self than that of moderately defensive people (Rogers and Walsh, 1959). Subjects with high self-ideal discrepancies were found to be more hostile under frustration (Rothaus & Worchel, 1960); conversely, by the similar experimental design of Rosenbaum and Stanners (1961) they were not. Perhaps the answer to this paradox lies in the experiment conducted by Veldman and Worchel (1961), the data from which supported the hypothesis that the variables of self-acceptance and defensiveness interact to influence the expression of hostility. Working within a psychoanalytic
framework Washburn (1952) isolated the use of several
defence mechanisms: subjects who see themselves as less
adequate will both become more hostile and use more
retreating defences in the face of anxiety.

A recently developed form of typology characterizes
each individual according to his place on the repression
- sensitization scale, a scale which defines the character-
istic mode of response of the individual to threat from the
most elemental defence mechanism to intellectualization
and its like. Using this typology, then, it is possible to
state that repressors manifest smaller self - ideal discrep-
ancies than do sensitizers (Altrocchi, Parsons & Dickoff,
1960). This statement receives added support from the work
of Byrne, Barry and Nelson (1963).

The effects of stress on the relationship between
acceptance of self and acceptance of others have been examined.
Following administration of tests of acceptance of self and
of others, with and without stress, Levanway (1955) was able
to maintain that after stress subjects tended to express
more liking for pictures of people, rate others more favour-
able and make significant changes in self-ratings. Anxiety,
as measured by the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the
Sarason General Anxiety Questionnaire, is associated with
lowering of both self-acceptance and acceptance of others,
but self-acceptance is lowered at a greater rate than
acceptance of others so that the hypothesis that anxiety increases the self-acceptance – acceptance of others correlation was not supported. Both acceptance measures were derived, in this case, from the Phillips Self-Other Questionnaire (Suinn & Hill, 1964).

Self-Acceptance and Acceptance of Others

Harry Stack Sullivan is one psychological theorist who would emphasize the significance of the self in interaction with other individuals of the environment. This theme has been taken up by many experimentalists attempting to illustrate three well-defined aspects of this interaction. Firstly, there are studies attempting to relate the variable of acceptance of self and those of acceptance of and degree of involvement with individual others. Secondly, there are those studies concerned with the influence of the behaviour of the group on the self-concept of the individual, mainly consisting of examinations of the relationships the individual has with small groups. Thirdly follow the experiments designed to assess the influence of sociological factors on the self-attitudes of the individual.

Subscribers to the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between acceptance of self and acceptance of others would include Sullivan, Adler, Fromm, Horney and Rogers.
One of the first attempts made to substantiate such an hypothesis for normal subjects was made by Phillips (1951). Operationally speaking, he measured simply self-attitudes (25 items) and attitude to others (25 items) in his questionnaire, gaining a remarkably high coefficient of correlation (+.74, S.E. .065) which was not equalled by him with subsequent groups of student subjects, although substantial relationships were demonstrated. Similar results were demonstrated with acceptance measures (Berger, 1952; McIntyre, 1952; Norman, 1953), albeit rough measures. Berger, for example, used a self-rating frequency scale with item weights.

W.E. Fey, however, has conducted the most sustained investigations into the relationship between acceptance of self and others, and, incidentally, acceptance by others. Using a questionnaire of his own devising, Fey established a positive relationship between self-acceptance and acceptance of others scores; and found that, although neither of these scores was related to readiness for therapy, the discrepancy between them was (1954). In a repetition of this study a year later, with the addition of scores for acceptance by others and sociometric scores, Fey found that subjects with high self-acceptance tend to accept others and to feel accepted by others but be neither more or less accepted by
others than those with low self-acceptance scores (1955). Correlates of attitudes towards self and others, primarily from the scales of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, have been established (Fey, 1957). A recent checking repetition of Fey's basic experimental design with different populations from those out of which his samples were selected provided yet more evidence for the acceptance of self-acceptance of others relationship established by Fey (Williams, 1962).

Many similar experiments have been reported. Berger (1955), having established the relationship, correlated both scores with M.M.P.I. scales. Kennedy (1958), was able to support Rogers' dictum that an individual who accepts himself and others will have better interpersonal relations. An approach differing from the prevailing self-acceptance measures is that of Jervis (1959) who made use of the term positive self-concept. Individuals whose self-concepts were positive were defined as those with both low self and low ideal-self scores as well as those with both scores high, although these groups were differentiated by their attitudes to others. Suinn (1961) attempted a learning theory analysis of this relationship, defining the self as the stimulus object and the self-acceptance statements as responses and interesting himself in response generalisations. Postulating that this
phenomena accounts for acceptance of others, he took Q-sorts for the self, the father and the teacher and found significant intercorrelations for acceptance of each. Whatever the merits of this particular theory, Suinn verified again the existence of a relationship between acceptance of self and acceptance of others.

The variables of attitude to 'best friend' and attitude to self have also received some treatment. Positive sociometric choices are similar to acceptable self-descriptions, and similarity between self-description and description of positive sociometric choice friend is related to adjustment (Lundy, Katkovsky, Cromwell & Shoemaker, 1955). When subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire for self, ideal, positive opposite sex sociometric choice and negative opposite sex sociometric choice, the hypothesis confirmed was that maintaining a relationship between self-descriptions and descriptions of positive opposite sex sociometric choices (Lundy, 1956). Subjects who rate best friend less positive than self tend to change that friend and decrease in self-esteem (Kipnis, 1961). Liked persons, more so than disliked, are perceived by an individual as attributing to him traits similar to those he attributes to himself (Backman & Secord, 1962). Empathy forms part of this relationship with a friend, and is operationally defined for experimental purposes as
the congruence between friend's behaviour and prediction of friend's behaviour by the self, perhaps in terms of psychological test scores. Tarwater (1953) used the Bell Adjustment Inventory for this purpose and concluded that understanding of others is a by-product of understanding of the self. Halpern (1955) took a similar measurement of empathy and found it to be correlated with the similarity between the predictor and the predictee, and with the satisfaction of the predictor with his own behaviour in that area.

The Self in the Small Group

It would appear plausible, then, to postulate some relationship between the self-concept and the reactions of others in order to verify an interactionist hypothesis. Certainly such predictions made by Royce, Stout, Mead, Baldwin and McDougall have been borne out by the studies of Miyamoto and Dornbusch (1956), Anderson (1959), Gerard (1961), Evans (1962), and Maehler, Mensing and Nafzger (1962). Change has been shown to occur in response to cognitive dissonance and change in the self-concept should be no exception. Self-evaluations are affected by the individual's knowledge of the opinions of others about him and anticipated or assumed opinions. A Swedish study (Israel, 1956) indicated that acceptance of group evaluations of the self are determined
by strength of attraction to the group, strength of discrepancy between wishful self-evaluation and evaluation by the group and the degree of accuracy which the individual attains in estimating others' opinions of him. The more unfavourable such evaluations from others are and the more informed the source, then the more the individual tends to devaluate the source, distort the evaluations in recall and dissociate the source from the evaluations (Harvey, Kelley & Shapiro, 1956). Flattery from the group, however, may result in improvement in self-evaluations (Hicks, 1962). False personality assessments result in greater change in self-evaluation of low consensus traits (Backman, Secord & Pierce, 1963), and Haas and Maehr (1965) showed these changes to be durable over periods of at least six weeks. Manis (1955) gave the reminder that while the influence of group behaviour on the behaviour of the individual, including the formation of the self-concept, is well validated, there is no evidence to suggest that self-estimates affect the views held by others.

The next question requiring an answer is how is the behaviour of the individual within the group related to his self-concept? Stotland and Cottrell (1961), in answer, measured the self-esteem of subjects by the Q-sort method and placed them in small groups in a problem solving situation in which the amount of information communicated can be
controlled. Unfortunately, the bearing their results have on their interactionist hypothesis is not clear. No more productive was the experiment of Bugental and Lehner (1956), who, although they found several variables related to leadership and popularity in small groups, did not find any relationship with accuracy of self-perception. We must conclude that no relationship between self-attitudes and behaviour within the group has been established.

Some statements can be made, however, about self-attitudes and attitudes to the group as a whole, especially when the group is seen from the outside by an isolate. The stronger the attraction of members to a group, the stronger will be the feelings of inadequacy in those scoring less well on a test and the stronger the feelings of adequacy of the others (Festinger, Torrey & Willerman, 1954). Individuals who perceive themselves as different from the way the group sees them or are unable to predict how other members of the group perceive them, tend to be isolated from the group (Gosline, 1962). Subjects farthest from the controlling clique are most likely to devaluate themselves, while the clique members are the most dependent (Rasmussen & Zander, 1954). Such experimental conclusions bear out the hypothesis of Gardner Murphy in which he maintains that the self-concept is defined by group values.
Sociological Concomitants of Self Variables

Sociological factors interact to some extent with self-concept formation. Social class is the first such variable which presents itself for examination, and as a categorisation process has not been shown to interact (Hill, 1957). The related variable, social mobility, is, however, of interest in this context. Kosa, Rachiele and Schommer (1962) showed that socially mobile male college students have high motivation associated with self-confidence and high achievements. Socially mobile college women, on the other hand, are timid and tend towards self-underevaluation. Harrington's work with Negro resettlements has supplied evidence of this interaction, although it did not help to clarify the sex differences involved (1965).

One of the most successfully measured variables of sociological interest is prejudice in its various forms. Prejudice against Negros is a significant topic of investigation for both American and British psychologists, and so has merited some attention in relation to the self-concept recently. For example, Tabachnick (1962) showed that self-satisfied children are less prejudiced than those with less self-esteem, while Stotland and Patchen (1961) described the performance of their subjects taking part in an experiment designed to clarify the causes of changes in prejudice as
as the result of pressure to achieve cognitive consistency in the self-concept. Broader types of prejudice are also related to self variables. Those individuals who score highly on measures of self-dislike score highly on the California test of authoritarianism and tend to prefer foreign individuals and institutions (Brodbeck & Perlmutter, 1954). The latter conclusion was born out by similar work by Perlmutter (1954) indicating that individuals with low self-esteem show a greater desire to travel and live abroad.

Self-Concepts in Children

Investigations concerning self variables in children have, to some extent, dealt with the same aspects of the self-concept as those using adults as subjects. For example Engel (1959) examined the stability of the self-concept in adolescence by taking two Q-sort measures over a ten-day interval. His findings included those that such concepts are relatively stable, that subjects who saw themselves negatively tend to be less stable than their friends and are less well-adjusted according to the M.M.P.I. scales. This relationship between self-acceptance and adjustment was examined in more detail in children, with the results that self-accepting children were found to be more capable of self-effacement and hence better adjusted (Taylor & Combs, 1952), and to have smaller scores on the Childrens' Manifest
Anxiety Scale (Bruce, 1958). Positive sociometric choice friends were shown to be described as more similar to the self than they actually are (Davitz, 1955). As an interesting reflection on children’s self-conceptualisations Silverstein and Robinson (1961) found that although sixth grade boys and girls estimate their own height and weight well, self-drawn figures give negative correlations with these estimates and their ideal-image.

Some investigations, however, have been concerned solely with problems unique to the child. Educators are beginning to see the importance of the treatment of the self-concept of the child in the learning situation, since consistency with the existing self-structure apparently determines to some extent what is learned (Phillips, 1964). Perkins has explored this problem in relation to teachers’ and peers’ perceptions of the individual’s self-concept (1958a; 1958b). The teaching of adolescents, in particular, must take into account their known negative self-concepts and feelings of inadequacy (Mussen & Jones, 1957). It is also true, of course, that school experiences may affect the self-concept of the child, and that it is possible to provide experiences to that end, such as school camping (Beker, 1960).

The most interesting work concerning the development of the self-structure has been concerned with the child as
part of a family group. The hypotheses of Wilkinson and Worachel (1959) were based on the assumption that the primary relationships of the child are with his parents. They suggested that the self-ideal discrepancy variable is related to that measure in the parents and to the discrepancy between the self-concepts of the parents and between the ideal selves of the parents. Demonstrated curvilinear relationships supported these suggestions. In this connection it is also interesting to note that the empathy of the parents with the children, as estimated again by predicted and actual test scores, is low (Helper, 1958). Specifically, parents underestimate childrens' feelings of inner adjustment, while overestimating those about social adjustment (Langford & Alm, 1954).

As to the structure of the family and self variables in the individual, the findings are much as might be expected from knowledge of the relationships of both these sets of variables to that of adjustment. Simmons and Lamberth (1961) used the Q-technique analysis of self and family structure variables, but their only demonstrable conclusion was that children of divorced parents show lowered self-esteem. Rosenberg (1963) indicated that extreme parental disinterest relates to low self-esteem. Treating the family as a group with the necessity for role specialisation, Couch (1962)
demonstrated that in terms of identification there is a positive correlation between the degree of role specialization and self-identification by sex status for boys and a negative correlation between these two variables for girls.

**Self-Estimates**

Since the early attempt to establish the meaning of self-estimates by Conklin and Hollingsworth (1915) there have been many similar studies as reviewed by Russel (1953). It would seem appropriate to examine their conclusions here since the estimate which the individual forms of his behaviour is necessarily part of his self-concept, and the predictions which he makes about his behaviour provide the psychologist with the rare opportunity to assess the congruence between his subjective self-concept and relatively objective estimates of the phenomena on which this is based. Such studies fall naturally into two groups: those pertaining to the abilities and achievements of the individual, and those involving assessment of personality variables, the unique characteristics of the individual.

In the field of academic achievement being asked for a self-estimate is apparently a threat to some individuals which restricts their field of perception (Torrance, 1954a). Asking for such estimates was claimed by Duell (1958) to raise the standard of learning in class conditions. As to the
accuracy of such self-estimates, this appears to increase with age in children to a certain level. Brandt (1958) derived this conclusion from the self-estimates and actual performances of children in arithmetic, spelling, vocabulary, broad jumping, strength of grip and baseball throwing, in which boys are more accurate in assessing these academic and physical abilities than girls although they tend to overrate themselves more. Such self-estimates attain a certain validity; for example, those who think of themselves as musical receive high scores on the Seashore tests although many contaminating variables such as opportunity for learning must be kept in mind here (Farnsworth, 1941). From a study conducted in the same period, Arsenian (1942) suggested that subjects whose estimates are not so accurate are usually less intelligent and less well-adjusted than those with more accurate perception. There are no reports of confirmation of this prediction for estimates of abilities.

The status of self-estimation of personal variables is, however, a little clearer. In 1951 Stanley published a report of a measure of insight into interests: subjects predicted the ranks of their values on the Allport-Vernon Study of Values and compared them with the actual ranks of the scores. The median Spearman's rho was reported as +.39, the range of coefficients being quite wide. A similar
comparison of self-predictions and actual scores on the Bell Adjustment led to the conclusion, not that insight or accurate self-estimation is related to adjustment, but that there is a relationship between adjustment and the success of rating of self by others (Wittich, 1955). An identical experiment, this time making use of the Heston Personality Inventory and the Gordon Personal Profile showed no difference in insight scores between the groups of subjects scoring highest and lowest on the emotional stability factor of the Heston Personality Inventory (Arbuckle, 1958).

The Value of the Evidence

This exhaustive collection of empirical conclusions pertaining to self variables has been made on the understanding that no conclusions may be drawn about the self, or indeed a self construct, but only about a specific self variable as defined operationally in a certain experiment. Even under these conditions it appears that some hypotheses deriving from self theories are supported and consequently provide validation for these theories. Such validation is satisfactory if the link between the operational definitions of the self variables and the self constructs of the theories is beyond question. The author undertakes to demonstrate, however, that these links are not adequate in that the meaning of the operational definitions is not clear. The lack of descriptive
evidence concerning the measures comprising the operational definitions is demonstrated by reviews of reported studies and by a series of operational checks.