IMAGINATION AND PERCEPTION

by

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CHAPTER 4

PERCEPTION AND EXISTENCE

I

Having established that Sartre's account of imagining as a seeing-as is unsatisfactory, we can now move on to a consideration of Ryle's analysis of imagination. However, since he does not argue that all imaginings are seeings-as, the analysis Ryle puts forward in opposition to image-theories of imagination raises a new problem. What can be made of imaginings in which there is no perceptually present analogue?

II

Hinton's analysis of perception and illusion could be offered as a solution to this problem. 1 Hinton argues that:

One of the things we can say and think is:

(A) I see a flash of light: actual light, a photic flash.

Another is:

(B) I have an illusion of a flash of light: I do not see a flash of light, but something is happening that to me is like seeing one.

A third thing we can say and think is:

(AvB) Either I see a flash of light, or I have an illusion of a flash of light.¹

(AvB) does not, he contends, "say what is happening as distinct from saying non-committally that one of a number of things is happening . . . . It does not give a definite answer to the question 'What is happening?'"² But this is not true of (A) and (B) even though each is "implicitly disjunctive."³ (B) is implicitly disjunctive because the illusion of seeing a flash of light is the disjunction of cases that are not, but to the subject are like, seeing a flash of light . . . . Similarly, (A) is implicitly disjunctive: some flashes of light are lightning-flashes, others are flashlight signals, and so on. The reality of seeing a flash of light is the disjunction of cases of seeing a flash of light.⁴

But even though (A) and (B) are in this way implicitly disjunctive, they are, he argues, more definite answers to the question "What is happening?" than (AvB). The reason for this is that each comes down, without ambiguity, on the side of either reality or illusion.⁵

1. Ibid, p. 217
2. loc.cit.
3. Ibid, p. 218-9
4. loc.cit.
5. Ibid, p. 219
We may, therefore, expect that nothing other than (A) or (B) can answer the question "What is happening?". But, continues Hinton, in answer to the question "Flash or false flash?" we could receive the guarded answer "I'm not saying, but something certainly happened which happens when either of these things happens, namely I psi-ed". However, it is, he contends, a moot point whether there is to be found among the things we can say and think such a thing as

(Q) I psi - possible wordings: I see a flash, I have a visual experience of a flash - which does give a definite answer to the question 'What is happening?' but which is like (A\lor B) in at least two of the other respects that I have mentioned: necessarily being true if either (A) or (B) are true, and being hard to understand if prefixed by 'I am inclined to believe that ...'.

That there should be such a thing as (Q) is, Hinton claims, vital to a number of philosophical positions. He contends that:

1. If there is no such thing as (Q) then there is - of course - no such thing as my psi-ing for the following statements to be about.
2. My psi-ing is one and the same event as some happening that is describable in the language of physics and/or physiology including neurophysiology.

1. loc.cit.
2. Ibid, pp. 219-20
(ii) That is not so, but no doubt there is some such happening from which my psi-ing could have been inferred.

(iii) When I see a photic flash, a part of what happens is that I psi. This is also a part of what happens when I have an illusion of a flash of light.

(iv) Seeing a photic flash may be defined as psi-ing due to a photic flash.¹

Hinton's main contention is that he does not see how it could be established that there is such a thing as (Q), and, consequently, how it could be established that there is such a thing as his psi-ing for these statements to be about. But that there is, he argues, no such thing as my psi-ing, does not of itself prevent us from making statements that are just like (i) and (ii) above, except that either 'my seeing a photic flash' or 'my having an illusion of a flash of light' are substituted for 'my psi-ing'. ... Nor does it prevent us from asserting that there is something that happens both when I see a photic flash and when I have an illusion of one; only neither that happening nor any other happening would be my psi-ing. It would be absurd not to posit that happening, but this is no reason to identify it with, or marry it to, a chimaera.²

This, concedes Hinton, raises a possible objection. Someone could ask "But what predicates are

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1. Ibid., p. 220
2. loc.cit.
true both of my seeing a flash of light and of my having that illusion?¹ There must, he admits, be "some physiological describable event phi such that the predicate 'when x happens phi happens' is true of both".² This is not, however, the sort of predicate hinted at by the objection. What is wanted is "a predicate whose applicability to what is happening in or to me is made clear to me by the very fact of that thing's happening".³ But what reason, he now asks, "is there to think that my A-ing and my B-ing must have a common property which each wears as it were on its sleeve to me?"⁴ A possible answer is that my A-ing and my B-ing must have a common property because I can, and often do, mistake the one for the other. But why, Hinton retorts, should events have to have properties in common in order to be mistaken for one another? Why should it not just seem as if they had properties in common? Seeing a flash of light and having that illusion seem, but only seem, to have in common the property 'when x occurs a flash of light occurs'.⁵

Hinton's chief conclusion is that we cannot ask in what way the having of an illusion is like perceiving. Nor can we ask what it is in the experience itself which makes us take the illusion of seeing something for seeing something. If we do argue that having an illusion of

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1. Ibid, p. 224
2. loc.cit.
3. loc.cit.
4. loc.cit.
5. Ibid, p. 225
seeing, for example, a cat must be like seeing a cat in the sense of having some experience in common with seeing a cat, then we could be making one of two distinct claims. We could be making either the unexceptional claim that there are some physiological or neurological processes common to seeing a cat and to having an illusion of seeing a cat, or the dubious claim that there is some experience — e.g. psi-ing — common to both seeing a cat and to having an illusion of seeing a cat. If our argument is that there is something in the experience itself which leads to a true belief in the case of seeing a cat and to a false belief in the case of having an illusion of seeing a cat, we will again be implying that there is a psi-ing common to both. Thus, the fact that we do sometimes mistake the illusion of seeing a cat for seeing a cat does not imply that the illusion of seeing a cat is made up of psi-ing plus the false belief that the psi-ing is due to a cat. When we do have such mistaken beliefs, the illusion experience itself is the ground of this false belief. What we call the illusion of seeing a cat is belief-free. It can be the ground of true or false beliefs without itself altering in any way. It follows from this that perceiving-statements and having-an-illusion-statements must be reports of two "primitive" experiences, which have nothing in common except, perhaps, some physiological and/or neurological processes.

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Hinton's conclusions about perceiving and having illusions have an important bearing on the analysis he would offer of imagining. If he were asked the question "What can be made of acts of imagining in which there is no perceptually present analogue?", Hinton's answer would have to run along the following lines:

Suppose that I imagine, or conjure up an image of my absent friend Peter, and say "I see Peter". Since the object which I claim to be perceiving (Peter) is not physically present, my statement cannot be a true report of a perceiving. My statement must be of the form "It is as if I were seeing Peter". I am, that is, B-ing and not A-ing. Consequently, the experience to which this statement refers must be different from, and can have no constituent experience in common with, the seeing of Peter. My imagining, or conjuring up an image of, Peter can only be an instance of an illusion-experience.

Since this conclusion must, on Hinton's analysis, be true of all imagining, important consequences follow. We cannot say that we perceive our images, or that we perceive anything in hypnagogic or hallucinatory states, or that we perceive anything when we visualise things. These experiences cannot be perceiving, for what the subject claims to be aware of does not, in such circumstances, exist - i.e. is not a publicly perceptible thing, at that time, in the subject's perceptual range. Thus, it can never be true that we see a red after-image or hear a hallucinatory cat. If I happen to believe mistakenly
that I am perceiving something when I have an after-image or an hallucination, then the grounds of my false beliefs will be the experiences called "after-imaging" and "hallucinating". No true or false beliefs are built-into these experiences.

III

Objections have been raised to this Hinton-type analysis of imagining. For example, Price¹ and Smythies² argue that images are entities, that they can be taken to be pictures or representations, and that they are perceived in the same way as we perceive actual pictures. Thus, they reject Hinton-type claims that we simply "after-image" and "hallucinate". They insist that we see our visual after-images and hear things in an hallucinatory state.

Lycos also argues that images are spatial entities, which stand in spatial relations to other images, and which have boundaries and limits.³ He says, however,

that we must make a distinction between sensory images and mental images, even though all images are in some way spatial. Sensory images, he contends, are typically described by "phenomenal descriptions" which have the form "x appears F". For example, when I say "This visual image looks flat", I am contrasting the way three-dimensional or solid objects look with the way the image looks. I am, in effect, saying that while a visual image looks flat it is not actually flat. But visual images are still seen even though they possess only phenomenal flatness. We can see, and determine, their flatness in the same way as we can see, and determine, the flat look, for example, of a photograph. Furthermore, we can, and often do, mistake sensory images for perceptions, and perceptions for sensory images.

Lycos argues that when we speak about the flatness of a mental image we are no longer speaking about phenomenal flatness. For we cannot, he says, determine the flatness of mental images by projecting them against the background of physical objects. This, he argues further, when taken together with the fact that we cannot make perceptual mistakes about mental images, shows that we cannot say truly that we perceive our mental images. Since, however, they are spatial entities, we must be aware of our mental images.

1. Ibid, p. 323
2. Ibid, pp. 323-5
3. Ibid, pp. 331-2
4. Ibid, pp. 323-5
5. Ibid, pp. 331-2
in some sort of "visual mental space". Thus, we can distinguish between "visual image space" and "visual mental space". This, concludes Lycos, we can only do by attending closely to the image in question.

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This dispute between a Hinton-type analysis of the having of images and the analyses of Price, Smythies and Lycos, raises problems of a kind fundamentally different from those discussed in the last chapter. The basis of the Hinton-type analysis is a claim that statements such as "A imagines x" and "A has an image of x" cannot be about A's experience of an entity which is present to him at the time of the imagining. On this analysis, such statements can only have the form "A is imagining (or imaging) x-ly". In other words, the basic claim in the Hinton-type analyses is that statements about imaginings or the having of images are about non-perceptual experiences, which take no (present) object, and which can, as a result, be qualified only in an adverbial way. On the other hand, Lycos asserts that statements such as "I am imagining Peter" do, at least with respect to the having of sensory images, imply that I am perceiving something other than the real Peter - viz. an image which is not a physical event or thing. If the image is not a sensory one - i.e. if it is a mental image - it could still be true that I am aware of a spatial entity. I will now, however, be aware of this spatial entity only in an introspective way.
It is evident from the wide divergence between these analyses that we can make no further progress with the analysis of imaginings which have no perceptually present analogue until we reconsider the problem of what is involved in perceiving. We must, in particular, re-examine the notion of non-propositional perceiving.

In Chapter 2, I showed that on the Soltis-Chisholm analysis of perceiving, a propositional-perceiving-statement such as "I see that it is Peter" implies that I am non-propositionally-perceiving something (a public perceptual object). This means that if my statement is to be true, then (i) there must be a public perceptual object in my line of vision – for what I perceive must, in Chisholm's terms, be functionally dependent on the stimulus energy produced in me by some public perceptual object, and (ii) by taking it to have some characteristic, I must discriminate this public perceptual object from other public perceptual objects in my line of vision. My earlier argument has shown that the Hinton-type analysis of imagining depends on a claim that (i) must be true of all perceiving, and has shown that this claim is the basis for the argument that no imagining can be a perceiving. Thus, before a solution can be offered to the problem of what is to be made of imaginings having no perceptually present analogue, we must determine whether this claim is correct. The determination of this will form the burden of the rest of this chapter.
If I say "I see Peter", after conjuring up an image of the absent Peter, and if I intend my statement to be a report of a perceiving, it must, on the argument in Chapter 2, be false. According to Soltis, my statement will report a failure to perceive; according to Chisholm, an instance of neither propositional nor non-propositional perceiving; and according to Ryle, an application of a perception recipe without the appropriate perceptual sensations having been had. The argument which all three use to substantiate their claim is basically the same.

If imagining is to be a form of perceiving, the statements reporting imaginings must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form "A perceives x" must be, or must entail, a non-propositional-perceiving statement, and hence must entail that x exists. For example, my statement "I see Peter" will be a perceiving-statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or if I take (knowingly or mistakenly) some public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our imagining things cannot satisfy this condition. The object imagined - e.g. Peter - is not always present in the subject's perceptual range at the time of the imagining, and the subject does not take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object (to be Peter). Hence, any statement reporting our imagining,
or that an image of, something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving.

The main prop of this argument is clearly the claim that statements of the form "A perceives x" entail that x is present as a public perceptual object in A's perceptual range. On this argument, it is true that a statement reports a perceiving only if what the subject claims to be perceiving is a public perceptual object - or at least part of one - in his perceptual range. If, for example, John says "I hear a cat", and if no vibrating object is in fact in his range of hearing, then we must say that John is not, and cannot be, perceiving anything. An important consequence follows. Since it must be false that John hears anything if there is no vibrating object in his range of hearing, the relation between the presence of a vibrating object in his range of hearing and John's hearing something is a logical one. If there is no vibrating object in his range of hearing, it can only be true that John is having the illusion of hearing a cat. In such circumstances, John should have said "It is to me as if I were hearing a cat", and not "I hear a cat".

This argument displays the extent to which the Soltis-Chisholm assertion, as well as the Hintor-type assertion, that no imagining is a perceiving depends on the claim that statements of the form "A perceives x" entail that x exists. Since any account of imagining must hinge on an acceptance or rejection of this claim - or at least on a particular way of interpreting it, this
claim must be examined further. The conclusion reached will determine whether the Hinton-type assertion about perceiving is correct.

My argument in this chapter will, as I stated in Chapter 1, be essentially negative in character. I will maintain, contra the Hinton-type claim about perceiving, that there is a wide range of contexts in which a concept such as "see" can properly occur, and that there are no good, philosophical, grounds for calling any one sense primary and others deviant. In this way, I hope to establish that Chisholm, Soltis, Ryle and Hinton are mistaken in arguing that the concept "perceive" has precise limits and boundaries. It is not true, I will conclude, that a statement of the form "A perceives x" must be false if there is no x (or no other public perceptual object) where A claims to be perceiving something.

V

The Soltis-Chisholm use of the claim that statements of the form "A perceives x" entail that x exists is tied up with their account of simple or non-propositional perceiving. Let us, therefore, reconsider the main points of this analysis. On the Soltis-Chisholm analysis of perceiving, it will be true that my statement "I see a snake" reports a perceiving only if:
(i) there is some public perceptual object in my line of vision which is a proper stimulus for me — i.e. I must perceive in a way functionally dependent on the stimulus energy produced in me by some public perceptual object;

and (ii) I discriminate this public perceptual object from other public perceptual objects in my line of vision by taking it to have some characteristic.

If (i) and (ii) are true of my statement "I see a snake", then I can at least say that I am non-propositionally perceiving something. It will still be true that I am perceiving something even if the public perceptual object in my line of vision is a piece of wire and not a snake. Because of this, the Soltis-Chisholm analysis rules out strict Naive Realist theories of perception. These are theories which claim that we can say truly that we are perceiving something only if all the qualities we claim to perceive are actual, physical, characteristics of that public perceptual object. An important point follows from this. On the Soltis-Chisholm analysis, I can, in principle, say truly "I see something which looks F, G, H" without knowing what any of this thing's actual, physical, characteristics are. But I cannot say truly that I am perceiving something if there is nothing to be perceived; nothing which is a proper stimulus for me and which looks F, G, H. Thus, to them, the most basic visual perceptual statement must be "A sees a public perceptual object looking F".
Since this analysis is supposed to apply to perceiving in general, whatever has been said about statements such as "I see a snake" must apply to statements such as "I hear a cat". We can say immediately that the statement "I hear a cat" implies that I hear something which sounds like a cat. We can add, furthermore, that while it implies that there is a public perceptual object in my range of hearing, the statement "I hear a cat" can be a report of a perceiving even if what I hear is not a cat. Thus, on this analysis, the most basic auditory perceptual statement must be of the form "A hears a public perceptual object which sounds F."

From this it follows that when I say "I hear a cat", I imply that there is within my range of hearing a public perceptual object transmitting sound waves. I imply, furthermore, that these sound waves have stimulated my auditory receptors, and that, as a result of this stimulation, and by utilising knowledge of the sounds of things, I have discriminated a public perceptual object from others which are also in my range of hearing. It could, however, still be true that I am perceiving something even if there is nothing in my range of hearing which is a cat. All that is required is that there be some public perceptual object which is a proper stimulus for me, and that by utilising certain knowledge of the sounds of things, I discriminate this public perceptual object from others which are in my perceptual range.

We can sum up the Soltis-Chisholm analysis of the claim that statements of the form "A perceives x" entail that x exists in the following way:
The statement "A perceives x" can be a report of a perceiving only if it implies truly that there is, in his perceptual range, some public perceptual object which appears F to A. This public perceptual object need not actually be F. It can be true that A perceives x even if x is not F. Nevertheless, the use of "public perceptual object" is essential in the implied statement. For it shows that the statement "A perceives x" implies that there is something to be perceived - i.e. something which is a proper stimulus for A. If there is nothing to be perceived - no stimulus object present to A, this statement "A perceives x" cannot be a report of a perceiving.

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Suppose now that when there is a vibrating object in my range of hearing I say "I hear a cat", and that when the vibrating object is later removed, I still say "I hear a cat". On the Soltis-Chisholm analysis, my last statement cannot be a report of a perceiving. For there is in these circumstances no longer anything to be heard. Since there is no longer a vibrating object in my range of hearing, there is no public perceptual object which is a proper auditory stimulus for me.

Suppose, however, that I lodge the following objection to this argument:
"My auditory receptors could well be stimulated without there being a vibrating object in my range of hearing - e.g. as in after-imagings or in artificial stimulations of the auditory receptors. This stimulation may be such that I utilise certain knowledge of the sounds of things in discriminating it from other auditory stimulations I may be having at the same time. I may well react to this stimulation in the way in which I do to that which does in fact result from a vibrating object. Why, then, can't this be an instance of perceiving?"

"Because this stimulation", the Soltis-Chisholm reply must be, "is not proper or appropriate. It did not result from the causal activity of a vibrating object in your range of hearing." "But what", my retort must be, "does 'proper or appropriate stimulation' mean? Since you have rejected the Naive Realist claim that statements of the form 'A perceives x' can be true perceiving-statements only if the public perceptual object in A's perceptual range is an x, won't this claim that a proper or appropriate stimulus distinguishes perceiving from non-perceivings become strained?"

If Soltis and Chisholm were strict Naive Realists, then they might have been able to argue that there is something "special" or "unique" about the stimulation involved in an auditory perception, which distinguishes it from, for example, an after-imaging's stimulation.
They could, then, have claimed that the stimulation resulting from a cat is of such a kind that I could say truly only that I hear a cat, and that the stimulation resulting from a swinging door is of such a kind that I could say truly only that I hear a swinging door. In other words, if a strict Naive Realist analysis were true, it might make sense to argue that there is something special or unique about the stimulation of my auditory receptors resulting from a cat, and something special or unique about that resulting from a swinging door, and that this uniqueness makes these stimulations distinguishable by the mere having. This unique or special factor could, then, be that which makes the stimulation "proper" or "appropriate".

Since, however, Soltis and Chisholm argue that it can still be true that I perceive something even when the public perceptual object in my perceptual range is not what I believe it to be, it is difficult to grasp what this special or unique factor could be on their analysis. Because they claim that I can say truly "Something sounds like a cat" when the proper stimulus for me is a swinging door, and "Something sounds like a swinging door" when the proper stimulus for me is a cat, they must be committed to arguing that the stimulation of my visual receptors resulting from a cat, and that resulting from a swinging door, cannot be identified or distinguished by the mere having.
But my auditory receptors can be stimulated artificially, and this artificial stimulation could be similar to that produced by the causal activity of a vibrating public perceptual object in my range of hearing. It follows that Soltis and Chisholm must concede that when my auditory receptors are artificially stimulated, this stimulation cannot be distinguished, by the mere having, from that resulting from the causal activity of a vibrating object. Furthermore, since this must be true of any stimulation of the perceptual receptors, they must concede (a) that the stimulation of our perceptual receptors resulting from the causal activity of any public perceptual object cannot be distinguished, by the mere having, from that resulting from the causal activity of any other public perceptual object, and (b) that the stimulation of our perceptual receptors resulting from the causal activity of a public perceptual object cannot be distinguished, by the mere having, from that not resulting from the causal activity of a public perceptual object in our perceptual range.

Consequently, if Soltis and Chisholm were asked to explain in what way a stimulation is "proper" or "appropriate", all they could say is this:

When I perceive a public perceptual object, the stimulation on which my perceiving is functionally dependent must be a direct causal effect of that public perceptual object. When I have, for example, an after-image,
the stimulation of my sense-organs cannot be a direct causal effect of any public perceptual object in my perceptual range. ¹

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This conclusion has a vital effect on the Soltis-Chisholm analysis of perception. The basis of this analysis is an assertion that if it is false that x or some other public perceptual object is in A's perceptual range, then it must be false that A perceives x, and must be false that A perceives anything at all. So it appears that at the root of this analysis is the assertion that there is a logical relation between A's perceiving something and the presence of a public perceptual object in A's perceptual range. But we found that when the Soltis-Chisholm analysis is pressed, it appears in fact to rest, not on this claim, but on another one. ¹ This is the claim that since the stimulation of, for example,

¹. Since there is a sense in which after-images are the result of the causal activity of public perceptual objects, the notion of a "direct causal effect" must be used here. This must be taken to imply that if an experience is to be a perceiving, then there must be a public perceptual object in the perceiver's perceptual range which is (in Chisholm's sense) a proper stimulus for him, and which is, therefore, at that time stimulating the subject's perceptual receptors. This is in effect what Hinton claims when he says that there must be physiological and/or neurological processes common to seeing x and to the illusion of seeing x.
my auditory receptors in an after-imaging does not, as a matter of fact, result from the direct causal activity of some vibrating object, it must be false that I hear anything when I have an after-image. We found, furthermore, that proponents of this analysis must concede that a stimulation which is a direct causal effect cannot be distinguished, by the mere having, from a stimulation which is not. These points raise a number of problems for the Soltis-Chisholm analysis.

The vital aspects of perceiving are, to them, a stimulation of the perceptual receptors plus a utilisation of knowledge of the appearances of things. For example, if I see a cat, then my visual receptors will have been stimulated by the causal activity of some public perceptual object which is in my line of vision, and I will have utilised knowledge of the looks of cats in discriminating this public perceptual object. Now in other circumstances, my visual receptors could well be stimulated artificially, and, as a result, I could still utilise knowledge of the looks of cats in claiming to see a cat (where there is no cat and no other public perceptual object to be seen). So on the Soltis-Chisholm analysis, the subjective aspects of seeing a cat (viz. the stimulation of the visual receptors and the utilisation of knowledge of the looks of things) could well be the same as the subjective aspects of having an illusion of seeing a cat. Furthermore, on this analysis, only one factor could distinguish these two experiences. In the seeing of a cat, the stimulation of the subject's visual receptors happens to result from
the direct causal activity of a public perceptual object. On the other hand, in the having of an illusion of seeing a cat, it so happens that the stimulation of the visual receptors is not the result of the direct causal activity of some public perceptual object. But if this is all that can distinguish a perceiving from a non-perceiving, what justification can be offered for the Soltis-Chisholm claim that there is a logical relation between the presence of a public perceptual object in a subject's perceptual range and his perceiving something? Can proponents of the Soltis-Chisholm analysis still justify their argument that a statement such as "I hear a cat" must be false if there is no public perceptual object which is a proper stimulus for me?

Soltis and Chisholm cannot hope to avoid these difficulties simply by referring again to their analysis of what is involved in perceiving. Their contention that seeing involves the stimulation of the visual receptors, plus a utilisation of knowledge of the looks of things, is not sufficient in itself to show that statements of the form "A sees x" must be false when there is no x in A's line of vision, or when there is no public perceptual object in A's line of vision which A takes to be x. For it is precisely this analysis which raises the above problems. If supporters of this analysis of perception are still to maintain that a positive answer must be given to the question "Are statements of the form 'A sees x' necessarily false when there is no public perceptual object in A's line
of vision which A takes to be x?", they must adopt a fresh line of argument.

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Since the argument that a unique factor in the stimulation of a perceiving distinguishes perceiving from non-perceiving cannot be employed, there seems to be only one course left open to them. Proponents of the Soltis-Chisholm analysis must now argue that the meaning of statements of the form "A sees x" determines that a positive answer must be given to the above question. They must contend that the concept "see" is such that the question of whether the stimulation of the visual receptors is direct or indirect is, strictly speaking, irrelevant. Our ordinary use of "see", they must argue, determines that statements of the form "A sees x" are always false when there is no x in A's line of vision, or no object in A's line of vision which A takes to be x.

Consider the following examples:

(1) "When I look at a bright light and then close my eyes slightly, I see shafts of light radiating out from the light".

(2) "By focusing my eyes on that spot eighteen inches in front of me, I see two spots and not just the one".

(3) "When a small part of the brain is stimulated a human patient reports a
flask of light. Upon a single change of position of the stimulating electrode, a flash is seen in another part of the visual field. ... Stimulation of surrounding regions of the striate area also gives visual sensations, but instead of flashes of light the sensations are more elaborate. Brilliant coloured balloons may be seen floating up in an infinite sky". 1

(4) "The apparatus is a single lighted cigarette placed on an ashtray at the far end of a completely dark room. If the glowing end is observed for more than a few seconds, it will be found to wander around in a curious erratic manner, sometimes swooping in one direction, sometimes oscillating gently to and fro". 2

(5) "... pressure on the eye makes us see light in darkness ..." 3

According to this new argument, (1)-(5) do not constitute legitimate uses of "see". If, as in (1), I say "I see shafts of light radiating out from that bright light", then part of what my statement means is "There are publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from that publicly observable bright light". Since the shafts of light in (1) are not publicly observable, my statement must be false if I intend it to be a report of a perceiving.

2. Ibid, p. 99
3. Ibid, p. 101
A similar line of argument can be applied to the other examples if they are also construed as reports of perceivings. Since part of what my statement "I see two spots before me" means is "There are two publicly observable spots in my line of vision", this statement, uttered in a context such as (2), must be false. Similarly, the statement "I see flashes of light", uttered in contexts such as (3) and (5), and the statement "I see the cigarette end moving around", uttered in a context such as (4), must be false.

VI

The Soltis-Chisholm claim that statements of the form "A sees x" entail that x exists becomes a conceptual one. The argument that "A sees x" must be false if there is no public perceptual object in A's perceptual range which A takes to be x becomes, as a result, dependent on an account of the meaning of "see". Thus, if we are to determine whether a Hinton-type claim about perceivings (the claim that the physical presence of a public perceptual object is essential for perceiving) is correct, we must determine whether this new Soltis-Chisholm argument does offer an adequate account of the meaning of "see".

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There is in ordinary usage, it may be conceded, some justification for this new argument. We can, in this regard, point to two aspects of the ordinary use of statements of the form "A sees x":

(1) I often imply, when I say "I see a snake", not only that I am having a visual perception, but also that if I brought my other senses to bear, they would be stimulated by the same public perceptual object. In other words, I often imply that there is in my line of vision something which is (in Chisholm's sense) a proper visual stimulus for me, and which could, therefore, be a proper auditory, tactual, etc, stimulus for me. Thus, ordinary usage is such that a statement reporting a perceiving in one sense mode will normally imply the possibility of perceivings in other sense modes, as well as the possibility of changes in the original mode of perception if either the object's or the subject's position or characteristics should change. This offers some support for the claim that part of the meaning of statements of the form "A perceives x" is "x exists".

(2) In a sense related to the one above, my statement "I see a snake" often refers to the evidence which I have for claiming that a snake is present. Statements such as this are often used as replies to the question "How do you know that there is a (publicly observable) snake there?"

I will, however, ignore these examples, and
approach this new argument on a different tack. What

effect, I will now ask, does this argument have on the

logic of "Can....see....?"-questions?

VII

Suppose now that the question "Can you see ..."
is asked in contexts such as those described by examples
(1)-(5). This question could be interpreted in a number
of different ways.

(i) The speaker could be asking if the subject,
at the time of asking, is looking at,
has noticed, or can point to, a public
perceptual object which is in his field
of vision. For example, the question
"Can you (he) see the dog?" could simply
be a request for information whether the
subject has seen, noticed, or can point
to, a publicly perceptible dog.

(ii) The speaker could be asking if the subject
has succeeded in seeing a public perceptual
object which is in his field of vision.
For example, the question "Can you (he)
see the dog (now, yet)?" could be a
request for information whether the speaker
has now seen or noticed the publicly
observable dog (perhaps after looking
around for it for some time).

(iii) The speaker could be querying the subject's
claim that he is looking at, or has
noticed, or can point to, a public
perceptual object which is in his field
of vision. For example, the question
"Can you (he) (really) see the dog?"
could amount to a suggestion that I am
in fact mistaking a bush for the dog, or am just pretending that I can see the dog.

(iv) The speaker could be querying the subject's claim that he is seeing something. For example, the question "Can you (he) (really) see a dog (any dog)?" could be expressing doubts that the speaker is seeing anything since there is no public perceptual object where he claims to be seeing one.

(v) The speaker could be asking if the subject has now, through following the prescribed technique, succeeded in seeing something which is not a public perceptual object in his line of vision. For example, the question "Can you (he) see the shafts of light (now)?" could be asking if the subject, when looking at the bright light, has closed his eyelids to the right degree.

On the Soltis-Chisholm analysis, interpretation (v) of this question must be illegitimate. For this question presupposes that we can say truly that the subject sees something which is not a public perceptual object in his line of vision. Such a presupposition is, on their analysis, always false. If, they must argue, I am asked in a context such as (1) "Can you see shafts of light radiating out from that bright light?", my questioner could only be querying:

(a) if, at the moment of asking, I am looking at, have noticed, or can point to, the publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from a publicly observable bright light;
OR (b) if I have (now, at last) succeeded in seeing these publicly observable shafts of light;

OR (c) if I have really succeeded in seeing the publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from the publicly observable bright light;

OR (d) if I have in fact succeeded in seeing any publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from the publicly observable bright light.

In the same way, if I am asked in a context such as (2) "Can you see two spots in front of you?", my questioner could only be querying whether I have in fact seen, or have succeeded now in seeing, or can really see the two publicly observable spots, or can really see any two publicly observable spots. Similarly, in contexts such as (3)-(5) anyone asking "Can you (he) see ...?" can only be querying if the subject has in fact seen the publicly observable flashes of light and the publicly observable moving cigarette end, or if the subject really is seeing any publicly observable flashes of light or any publicly observable moving cigarette end.

If the restriction which this analysis places on the interpretation of can-see questions is a justified one, it must be applicable in ones other than those described above. For example, these questions must be restricted in the same way in the context of statements about the seeing of things in, or by means of, public perceptual objects.
Suppose that while I am looking at a coloured canvas and at a heap of stones, I am asked "Can you see Peter?" and "Can you see a lion?" According to this new argument, my questioner:

(1) could be requesting the information whether, at the moment of asking, I am looking at, have noticed, or can point to, two public perceptual objects - viz. the real Peter and a real lion;

OR (2) could be requesting the information whether, at the moment of asking, I have (now, at last) succeeded in seeing these public perceptual objects;

OR (3) could be requesting the information whether, at the moment of asking, I have really succeeded in seeing the real Peter, and have really succeeded in seeing a real lion (when Peter and a lion are in fact present as public perceptual objects);

OR (4) could be querying whether I have really succeeded in seeing the real Peter and any real lion (since neither Peter nor any lions are in fact present).

If the questions "Can you see Peter?" and "Can you see a lion?" are given interpretations (1) and (2), any correct reply would have to tender the information (1) that, at the moment of asking, I am or am not looking at, have or have not noticed, or can or cannot point to, the real Peter and a real lion; and (2) that I have or have not succeeded (now, at last) in seeing the real Peter and a real lion. If these questions are given
interpretations (3) and (4), any correct reply either would have to acknowledge or would have to rebut the questioner's implication (3) that I have not succeeded in seeing the real Peter and a real lion (assuming that Peter and at least one lion happen, at the time of asking, to be physically present); and (4) that I have not succeeded in seeing the real Peter or any real lion (assuming that, at the time of asking, neither Peter nor a lion happen to be physically present).

Suppose now that I say "I can see Peter" and "I can see a lion" in answer to the above questions. According to this account of the logic of can-see-questions, these statements must be false. No matter what interpretation is given to the questions "Can you see Peter?" and "Can you see a lion?", these statements can only imply (a) that I am now looking at, have noticed, or can point to, the real Peter and a real lion; or (b) that I have now succeeded (perhaps, after looking for them) in seeing the real Peter and a real lion. In other words, my statements can only be tendering information to the effect that the real Peter and a real lion are in my line of vision, or be asserting, despite the questioner's implications to the contrary, that I am seeing these public perceptual objects. Since I am in fact, at the moment of asking, looking at a coloured canvas and at a heap of stones, my statements "I can see Peter" and "I can see a lion" are false.

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This line of argument runs counter to the conclusions reached in Chapter 3. I argued, in Chapter 3, that statements of the form "A can see x" generally imply that the subject has scored some success. I argued further that the success claimed varies according to the range of contexts in which statements of this form can occur. In one range of contexts, statements of the form "A can see x" imply that the subject's seeing x is a special success; one gained only as a result of his having engaged in certain special activities (looking carefully around him, or looking in a direction in which no one else happens to be looking). In another range of contexts, statements of this form imply that the subject's seeing x is related to his being aware of some ambiguity in the looks of a public perceptual object, and as a result to his taking the public perceptual object to be something which he knows it is not.

The account which this new argument gives of the logic of can-see-x-questions limits the success implied by statements of the form "A can see x". On this new Boltis-Chisholm argument, my statements "I can see Peter" and "I can see a lion" imply that the real Peter and a real lion are in my line of vision; that the public perceptual objects in my line of vision are what they look like. So if I say "I can see Peter" and "I can see a lion", when looking at a coloured canvas and at a heap of stones, these statements will have to be false. In other words, the success implied by "A can see x" can only be that
implied by statements from the first range of contexts referred to above.

This new Soltis-Chisholm argument has, therefore, two important consequences. Firstly, statements reporting the seeing of things in, or by means of, public perceptual objects must always be false. Secondly, if, for example, I say "I can see Peter" (when looking at a coloured canvas), I can only be implying that I have seen Peter as a result of my having engaged in activities such as carefully looking around me or happening to look in a direction in which no one else is looking.

My argument in Chapter 3 shows that if I say "I can see Peter" (when looking at a coloured canvas), my statement need not be false. I can say truly "I can see Peter" without implying that the real Peter is present as a public perceptual object in my line of vision. Consider again the main points of that argument.

A statement such as "I can see Peter" (uttered when the subject is looking at a painting) implies, I argued, that the subject sees something (the configuration of colours on canvas) whose shape looks like the shape of Peter's face. This statement implies, therefore, that the subject sees a public perceptual object which looks like (and is) a configuration of colours on canvas, and which also looks like (and is not) a view of Peter's face. The use of "can see" in such a statement also implies that the subject has scored some success. But the success
the subject has scored is not connected with his simply engaging in activities such as looking carefully around him. This success is that of recognising some ambiguity in the looks of the paint-on-canvas, and of seeing both the paint-on-canvas look and the Peter's-face-look of this public perceptual object. In Gombrich's terms, the statement "I can see Peter" implies that the subject has succeeded in applying more than one perceptual classification to the public perceptual object in his line of vision. Since the subject does not take the Peter's-face-look of the paint-on-canvas to indicate that this is the real Peter, he is not deceived by this look of the paint-on-canvas. Furthermore, the statement "I can see Peter" does not, for the same reason, imply that anyone is likely to be deceived by this Peter's-face-look of the paint-on-canvas.

So if I say "I can see Peter" and "I can see a lion", when looking at the coloured canvas and at the heap of stones, my statements need not be false. Consequently, the limitation which the new Soltis-Chisholm argument places on the statements of the form "A can see x" is mistaken. From this it follows that the restriction which this argument places on the logic of can-see-questions must be rejected.

According to the new Soltis-Chisholm argument, the questions "Can you see Peter?" (asked when the subject is looking at a coloured canvas) and "Can you see a lion?" (asked when the subject is looking at a heap of stones)
must, roughly speaking, be directed at determining whether the subject sees, has seen, or has succeeded in seeing, the real Peter and a real lion. But since the reply "Yes, I can see Peter" could correctly imply that the subject is seeing Peter and a lion in, or by means of, some public perceptual objects (that he is taking these public perceptual objects to be something which he knows they are not), these questions cannot be given this restricted interpretation. A correct reply to the questions could well take the form of an assertion that the subject has scored a special success — a success not connected with the performance of acts such as carefully looking around him. The questioner could, for example, be asking whether I have noticed the Peter's-face-look of parts of the paint-on-canvas; whether I have, or can, utilise knowledge of the looks of Peter's face in discriminating parts of the surface of the paint-on-canvas from other parts. I could reply by asserting that I have noticed the ambiguity of the paint-on-canvas, and that I can utilise my knowledge of the looks of Peter's face in discriminating parts of the surface of the paint-on-canvas from others. The problem of whether the real Peter is, or was, physically present could, therefore, be irrelevant for some correct replies to the question "Can you see Peter?".

Since the problem of whether the real Peter is, or was, physically present must, according to the new Soltis-Chisholm argument, always be relevant to a question
such as "Can you see Peter?", this argument's account of the logic of can-see-questions is unsatisfactory. My argument shows that another interpretation can be added to the list. In asking "Can you see x?", the questioner could be asking

(vi) whether the subject has noticed some ambiguity in a public perceptual object he is looking at, and whether he can, through utilising some additional knowledge of the looks of things, take this public perceptual object to be something which he knows it is not.

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The restriction which this new Soltis-Chisholm analysis places on the logic of can-see-questions cannot, then, be applied in every context in which "see" is legitimately used. Since the claim that it must be applicable in every context is an important part of this restriction, let us now reconsider its application to the earlier examples.

According to this new analysis, the examples (1) "When I look at a bright light and then close my eyes slightly, I see shafts of light radiating out from the bright light", and (2) "By focusing my eyes on that spot eighteen inches in front of me, I see two spots and not just one", do not constitute legitimate uses of "see". For part of what "I see shafts of light" and "I see two
spots" mean is "There are publicly observable shafts of light in my line of vision" and "There are two publicly observable spots in my line of vision". Because of this, the questions "Can you see the shafts of light radiating out from that bright light?" and "Can you see the two spots?" can only be interpreted in a limited number of ways.

Suppose now that, in reply to the question "Can you see ...?", I say "I can see shafts of light radiating out from the bright light". This statement, on the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis, can only imply (i) that I am looking at, have noticed, or can point to, publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from a publicly observable bright light, or (ii) that I have now (perhaps, after looking around for them) succeeded in seeing these publicly observable shafts of light. So if I say, in a context such as (1) above, "I can see shafts of light radiating out from that bright light", my statement will be false. There are, in such circumstances, no publicly observable shafts of light to be seen.

This restriction on can-see-questions has, once again, a vital effect on statements of the form "A can see x". In contexts such as (1) above, the success implied by the use of "can see" can only be the subject's seeing of a public perceptual object as the result of, for example, his carefully looking around him. However, since my argument shows that some statements of the form "A can see x" imply the scoring of successes other than this, we
can now ask if the new Soltis-Chisholm argument has offered an adequate account of can-see-statements and of can-see-questions in contexts such as (1) and (2) above.

Let us consider more fully what is normally presupposed by can-see-questions, asked in contexts such as (1) and (2). Suppose that an experimenter asks me (i) to look at a bright light and then to close my eyes slightly, and (ii) to focus my eyes on a spot eighteen inches in front of me. Suppose, too, that he asks me "What can you see?", and I reply "A bright light" and "A spot on the wall".

The experimenter will probably not be satisfied with these replies. "Of course you can see a bright light and a spot on the wall", he might retort. "They are, after all, what I asked you to look at. What I want to know is if you see anything other than the bright light and the spot when you look at them in the way I prescribed." If I were a supporter of the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis, I would now probably ask "What public perceptual objects other than the spot on the wall and the bright light are there to be seen? Are there public perceptual objects in, or near, the spot and the light, which I will see only by looking at the light and the spot in the way you prescribe?" "I am not interested in public perceptual objects which you might well see if you look carefully at, and around, the light and the spot",
the experimenter could reply. "I am not asking you to locate additional public perceptual objects. All I want you to do is to look at the light and the spot in a certain way, and then to tell me what you see as a result of looking at them in this way." If I still insist that I can see just the bright light and the spot on the wall, the experimenter would most likely give up in despair. "You either have abnormal vision", he might say, "or you just cannot grasp the point of my question."

In this dispute, I have clearly been following the Soltis-Chisholm account of can-see-questions. I have, at all times, taken the experimenter to be asking for information about public perceptual objects - whether I have succeeded in seeing some public perceptual objects as a result of my looking at a bright light and the spot on the wall. But my adherence to this interpretation leads to a breakdown in communication between the experimenter and me. I either simply do not understand what he wants (what his question presupposes), or refuse to acknowledge that he is asking a legitimate question.

Suppose that John, in the same circumstances, says to the experimenter "I can see shafts of light radiating out from that bright light" and "I can see two spots". Suppose, too, that I ask him to point to the shafts of light and to the two spots. "I cannot do that", John might reply. "I can see the shafts of light and the two spots only when I look at the bright light and the spot in a certain way. There are no publicly
observable shafts of light and there are not two publicly observable spots to be seen." John, in other words, is arguing that I have misunderstood his statements — that I have mistakenly taken him to be claiming that he has scored the sort of success implied by straightforward propositional—and non-propositional—perceiving statements.

John's use of "can see" in his replies to the experimenter does indicate that he is claiming that he has scored some success; that his seeing the shafts of light and his seeing the two spots involve more than just looking at the bright light and at the spot on the wall. The success he claims results from his looking at the bright light and the spot in a certain way. He looks at the bright light with half-closed eyes, and focuses both his eyes on the spot when it is only eighteen inches in front of him. He follows, in other words, the technique prescribed by the experimenter. "When I do what the experimenter tells me", John might say, "there appear to be shafts of light radiating out from the bright light, and appear to be two spots in front of me. But I do not just suppose, or think, or pretend, that there are shafts of light and two spots in my line of vision. I know that there are no publicly observable shafts of light in my line of vision, and I know that there are not two spots in my line of vision. However, because I am looking at them in the way prescribed by the experimenter, the bright light takes on the look of a bright light with shafts of light radiating out from it, and the spot takes
on the look of two spots side by side. I see shafts of light radiating out from the bright light, and I see two spots, even though I know that there are in fact no publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from that bright light, and even though I know that there is only one publicly observable spot in my line of vision."

The success which John claims is, therefore, closer to that implied by statements about seeing things in, or by means of public perceptual objects than to that implied by straightforward propositional- and non-propositional-perceiving-statements. When he says "I can see ...", John is claiming that he sees, by looking at a public perceptual object in a prescribed way, something which is not itself a public perceptual object in his line of vision.

This analysis of John’s statements would be unacceptable to supporters of the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis. John, they would have to argue, is misusing "see"; his use of "see" in the statements "I can see shafts of light" and "I can see two spots" is illegitimate. For part of what these statements mean is "There are publicly observable shafts of light in my line of vision" and "There are two publicly observable spots in my line of vision". Is this still a defensible line of argument?

The restriction which the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis places on can-see-questions stems from the assertion that part of what statements of the form "A sees x" mean is "x is present as a public perceptual object".
But this restriction cannot, I argued, be applied in seeing-as-contexts. In such contexts, the statement "I can see Peter", given in reply to the question "Can you see Peter?", does not imply that Peter is present as a public perceptual object. So the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis has not given an adequate account of the meaning of "A sees x" in seeing-as-contexts. This has important consequences. Since it is not universally true that statements of the form "A sees x" mean "x is present as a public perceptual object", any attempted rebuttal of my analysis of John's statements cannot rely on such a general claim about the meaning of "see". Supporters of the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis will have to show that, in contexts such as the one set out by the experimenter, they have given a correct account of the normal meaning of "A sees x".

This demand creates a serious problem for the Soltis-Chisholm analysis of perception. Its argument that any statement of the form "A sees x" will be true only if x is present as a public perceptual object has become, in this new line of argument, dependent on a claim about the normal use of "see". My argument has shown that the claim that "A sees x" normally means "x is present as a public perceptual object" is not universally true; that it is not true of every context in which "see" is legitimately used. So my analysis of John's replies to the experimenter cannot, without a detailed preliminary analysis, be rejected by an appeal to a "general meaning of 'see'".
My analysis of John's statements offers what I take to be the normal response when questions of the form "Can you see x?" are asked in this context. It also offers what I take to be the normal implications of statements of the form "A can see x". I have, in other words, put forward an account of the normal meaning of "see" in this context. My conclusion is that, in such a context, statements of the form "A can see x" do not normally mean "x is present as a public perceptual object". John can, I concluded, legitimately say "I see shafts of light" even though there are no publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from the publicly observable bright light.

Thus, the new Soltis-Chisholm analysis has not offered an adequate account of the normal meaning of "see". Its account of the meaning of statements of the form "A sees x" does not apply in at least two contexts in which "see" may be legitimately used.

VIII

The collapse of this new Soltis-Chisholm argument shows that the Hinton-type claim about perceiving must be mistaken. There are contexts, I have concluded, in which statements of the form "A sees x" do not imply that x is present as a public perceptual object, and yet still are legitimate uses of "see". It is not universally
true that "A sees x" must be false if there is no public perceptual object in A's line of vision, which is x, or which he takes to be x. In other words, it can be true that A sees something even if there is no public perceptual object where A claims to be seeing something.
CHAPTER 5

IMAGING

I

The argument and conclusions of Chapter 4 permit us now to examine Ryle's version of the claim that no imagining (or imaging) can be a perceiving. In this chapter, I will argue that Ryle's account is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of what is to be made of acts of imagining in which there is no perceptually present analogue. However, my argument will not be directed solely at Ryle. I hope, in the course of it, to establish not only that Ryle's analysis is mistaken, but also that no similar version can offer a satisfactory account of imagination in general, and of the having of images in particular.

II

Consider first an example of an after-imaging. Suppose that I look at a bright light, turn my head away, and say "I see a brightly coloured patch of light".

To Ryle, this can only be a report of my imaging, and not seeing, something. I should, he would
argue, say "I 'see' (and not see) a brightly coloured patch of light". My use of "'see'" in the statement "I 'see' a brightly coloured patch of light" implies that I am making a factual disclaimer; that I am claiming that I am not in fact perceiving a brightly coloured patch of light. My 'seeing' a brightly coloured patch of light, maintains Ryle, is a form of make-believing. As such, it is of a higher order than my actually seeing a brightly coloured patch of light. My 'seeing', and my seeing, a brightly coloured patch of light both involve knowing (and not having forgotten) how such patches of light look in normal circumstances. My 'seeing' a patch of brightly coloured light, unlike my seeing one, does not involve the having of visual sensations. 'Seeing' a patch of light, argues Ryle, involves missing just the visual sensations I would have had, if I were in fact seeing a patch of light. Thus, an after-imaging, like any other imaging, is in no sense a perceiving.

Ryle's argument that imagerings (e.g. the having of after-images) cannot be perceiving depends, I argued in Chapter 4, on the validity of the assertion that statements of the form "A sees x" must be false if there is no public perceptual object in A's line of vision which he takes to be x. But this is, I concluded, a mistaken claim. It can be true that A sees (and not 'sees') x even if there is no public perceptual object in A's line of vision which he takes to be x.
Thus, the fact that there is no public perceptual object in my line of vision which I take to be a brightly coloured patch of light, does not in itself establish that my having such an after-image is not a perceiving. It may well be true that I see a brightly coloured patch of light, even though there is no publicly perceptible patch of light to be seen.

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Ryle could enter an objection to this suggestion that the having of after-images could be a form of perceiving. The nature of the statement "I see a brightly coloured patch of light" is such, Ryle might argue, that anyone hearing it could take the subject to be claiming that there is a publicly perceptible patch of light in his line of vision. The validity of this point could be established in a number of different ways:

(1) As was argued in Chapter 4, statements of the form "A sees x" (a) often imply that A would hear, taste, smell, or touch, x if he brought his other senses to bear; and (b) often refer to the evidence A has for claiming that x is physically present. In such contexts, anyone hearing the statement "A sees x" could assume that x is present as a public perceptual object in A's line of vision, or assume that there is some public perceptual object in A's line of vision which he takes to be x.
(2) The retort "But there is nothing there" is often used to rebut a statement of the form "A sees x". Suppose, for example, that while out hunting I say "I see a rabbit". If someone else says "There is no rabbit where you say that you are seeing one", that person will be claiming that I am not in fact seeing a rabbit. "You are", he might say, "only imagining that you see a rabbit (or, mistaking that rock for a rabbit). So in such a context, as in (1), anyone hearing a statement of the form "A sees x" could assume that A takes some public perceptual object in his line of vision to be x. If I said "I am not claiming that I am seeing a real (a publicly perceptible) rabbit. - I am in fact only visualising one", my listener could claim that I misled him. "You should", he might retort, "have qualified your statement in some way. You should have inserted a warning that you were not to be taken to be claiming that there is a publicly perceptible rabbit in your line of vision."

A similar argument, Ryle might maintain, could apply to my statement "I see a brightly coloured patch of light". If someone discovers that I uttered this statement when my eyes were closed, or when there was no publicly perceptible patch of light to be seen, that person could claim that my statement is misleading. "You should not", he might say, "have said 'I see a brightly coloured patch of light' without qualifying your statement in some way." "Since you are not claiming that there is a public perceptual object to be seen", the objection might
continue, "you should have qualified your statement in such a way that no one could take you to be claiming this." But how, Ryle might ask, could such a statement be qualified?

An obvious way in which I could qualify my statement is by using guarded formulae such as "It is as if ...". Instead of saying of my having a visual after-image "I see a brightly coloured patch of light", I could have said something such as "It is as if I were seeing a brightly coloured patch of light". Such a qualification of my original statement will serve as a warning that I am not claiming that there is a publicly perceptible patch of light in my line of vision. Once they are qualified in this way, it will be clear that statements reporting our after-images are not to be taken to be claims about our seeing public perceptual objects. Hence, they will not be misleading in the way Ryle suggests.

But this method of qualification, Ryle might object further, is no different from that which he himself advocates. If I have to use guarded formulae such as "It is as if ..." and "It seems ..." to avoid misleading anyone, will I not in effect be admitting that (in his sense) I only 'see', and not see, the brightly coloured patch of light? Having qualified my statement, will it not follow, the Rylean objection might continue, that it cannot be true that I am seeing something?

This Rylean objection will have some point only if the force of the qualification of a perceiving-statement
is interpreted in a particular way. The point of the use of the guarded expression in statements of the form "It is as if A perceives x" is, we may concede, to withdraw something claimed by the statement "A perceives x." The statement "A perceives x" is qualified as a whole, we may concede further, and one purpose of this qualification would be to ensure that no one takes the statement to be a claim that there is, in A's perceptual range, a publicly perceptible x to be perceived. But these concessions do not establish the validity of Ryle's argument. For Ryle's objection will be a telling one only if we must always take the effect of the qualification to be a withdrawing of the claim that A perceives x.¹ In other words, the assumption, which is basic to Ryle's objection and to his analysis as a whole, is that the as-if-qualification of perceiving-statements can only govern the supposed perceiving and not what the subject claims to be perceiving.

Let us suppose that my statement "I am seeing a brightly coloured patch of light" is equivalent to the complex statement "I am seeing something, and what I am seeing is a brightly coloured patch of light". According to Ryle, the effect of the qualification "It is as if I were seeing a brightly coloured patch of light" can only be a withdrawing of the first part of the complex statement;

¹ Hinton has admitted that he takes this mode of qualification to be the obvious one. This assumption is particularly evident in his discussion of seeing and having illusions (op. cit.)
of the claim that I am seeing something. Since he argues that the use of "It is as if ..." indicates that I am not perceiving at all, the effect of the qualification cannot be a withdrawing of just the second part of the complex statement. I cannot be withdrawing only the claim that what I am seeing is a brightly coloured patch of light, since this will leave open the possibility that I could be asserting truly that I am seeing something. So if I qualify my statement by the use of scare-quotes, it must, to Ryle, be read as "I 'see' a brightly coloured patch of light" and not as "I see 'a brightly coloured patch of light'".

This shows that the validity of the argument that at least some imaginings (imagings) can be perceiving becomes dependent on the issue of what the import is of the qualification of statements reporting such imaginings (imagings). Is Ryle correct in maintaining that the qualification of an imagining-statement has the effect of withdrawing the claim that the subject is perceiving something? If it does not have this effect, does it follow that an imagining-statement can be qualified, and yet can still be a perceiving-statement? To establish that it is true that I see something when I have, for example, an after-image, I must be able to show, contra Ryle, that the qualification of an after-imaging-statement need not have only the effect of withdrawing the claim that I am perceiving something; that scare-quotes can be placed around the accusative of the statement reporting
this imaging.1

III

My argument in Chapter 3 could point to a way in which a solution to this problem may be reached. Since seeing-as is, to Ryle, a species of imagining, my argument in that chapter must be relevant to the present discussion. Ryle would maintain that since a statement such as "I can see Peter" (uttered when the subject is looking at a painting) is like any other imagining-statement, it cannot be a report of the subject's seeing what a painting represents. Since this statement, he would argue, must be read as "I 'see' Peter", it implies that the subject is not seeing anything at all. So Ryle's objections to the suggestion that visual-after-imaging-statements are perceiving-statements, would also apply to any argument that seeing-as-statements are perceiving-statements.

There is, I concluded in Chapter 3, a sense in which seeing-as-statements are perceiving-statements. It is true that I, for example, see Peter when I see him in, or by means of, a paint-on-canvas. Thus, Ryle's argument is mistaken. However, his objection is relevant in an important respect. My statement "I see Peter" will be


Locke argues that if we do use scare-quotes in statements reporting our having images, it would be more appropriate to write them as, for example, "I see 'a dagger'" than the Rylean "I 'see' a dagger."
misleading if it is not qualified in some way. For I could be taken to be claiming, when I say "I see Peter", that the real Peter is present as a public perceptual object in my line of vision.

The method of qualification is a straightforward one. I could qualify my statement by using the guarded expression "It is as if ...". If I said "It is as if I were seeing Peter" (when I see him in, or by means of, a public perceptual object), a listener would realise that I am not claiming that the real Peter is present as a public perceptual object in my line of vision. It does not, however, follow that Ryle's objection is correct. Since this seeing of Peter is still a perceiving, the qualification of my statement cannot, as Ryle claims it must, have the effect of withdrawing the claim that I am seeing something. It can only have the effect of withdrawing the claim that what I am seeing is the real Peter. Thus, if I were to qualify my statement by the use of scare-quotes, I could write it as "I see 'Peter'" rather than the Rylean "I 'see' Peter". I qualify, by the use of scare-quotes, the accusative of this statement to show that I am claiming that I am seeing (and not 'seeing') something which I say is Peter, even though it is not, and I know it is not, the real Peter.

This argument counts heavily against the Rylean assertion that the qualification of an imagining-statement can only have the effect of withdrawing the claim that the
subject is perceiving something. The conclusions of Chapter 3 show that this mode of qualification is not true of all imagining-statements. If we do, like Ryle, wish to distinguish between statements reporting our seeing Peter when looking at a painting or photograph, and statements reporting our seeing Peter when he is present as a public perceptual object, then we can say "I see Peter" (when he is present as a public perceptual object) and "I see 'Peter'" (when looking at a photograph or painting). Consequently, since our seeing Peter in a painting is, to Sartre, an instance of an imaginative consciousness, and, to Ryle, an imagining to see (a 'seeing'), we have at least one context in which we can say "A sees 'x'", rather than "A 'sees' x", when reporting such an imagining. We have shown, contra the Rylean objection, that it is true that a statement reporting an imagining (imaging) can be qualified in such a way that it will not be misleading, and true that it can still be a perceiving-statement.

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The argument so far relates only to the qualification of imagining-statements which are reports

1. We can, therefore, introduce something very much like Bedford's iconographical notation (op. cit.) to distinguish between these two cases, and to show, contra Ryle, that the seeing of what a painting represents can still be a form of perceiving.
of the seeing of some perceptually present object as an absent or non-existent object. If we are to deal further with the Rylean objection, a further problem must be considered. How can we qualify statements reporting visual imaginings (or visual imagings) in which no publicly perceptible x is taken to be some absent or non-existent y?

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When I have a visual after-image, I can say, for example, "It is as if I were seeing a brightly coloured patch of light" or "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light". My use of "it is as if" and "can" indicates that I have, in a sense, built their qualification into these statements. Thus, the problem to be faced in dealing further with the Rylean objection is that of determining what is implied by these statements with their built-in qualifications. Does this qualification withdraw the implied claim that I am perceiving something or the implied claim about what I am perceiving? Are my qualified statements of the form "I 'see' a brightly coloured patch of light" or of the form "I see 'a brightly coloured patch of light'"?

A Ryle-type qualification will be justified only if it cannot be true that we are perceiving something when we have after-images. But it could be true, I argued
earlier, that after-imagings are perceivings. That there is no public perceptual object in my line of vision, which I take to be a brightly coloured patch of light, is not sufficient in itself to show that my having such an after-image cannot be a perceiving. Ryle's argument that the visual-after-imaging-statement "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light" must be false if it is construed as a perceiving-statement depends, I contended, on a number of assumptions. One of these is that the subject's use of "can see" in this statement implies that he has scored only one kind of success. This success is that of having noticed, or of being able to point to or locate, a public perceptual object as the result of having engaged in certain special activities (e.g. carefully looking around him). This assumption, I argued, is false. Perceiving-statements of the form "A can see x" also could imply:

(1) that the subject has noticed some ambiguity in a public perceptual object he is looking at, and that, through utilising some additional knowledge of the looks of things, he is able to take this public perceptual object to be something which he knows it is not;

or (2) that by looking at a public perceptual object in a prescribed way, the subject sees something which is not itself a public perceptual object in his line of vision.

Ryle's claim that after-imagings are not perceivings will be true only if the success claimed by my statement
"I can see a brightly coloured patch of light" cannot be either of the sort claimed by ordinary propositional-and non-propositional-perceiving-statements, or of types (1) and (2) above.

The success I claim when I say "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light" cannot be that of having located one public perceptual object among others in my line of vision. I am not implying that there is a publicly perceptible patch of light, for example, on a publicly perceptible wall. Nor can the success be like that claimed by statements about our seeing what paintings represent. Since my having a visual after-image does not depend on there being a public perceptual object in my line of vision which is $F$ or even looks $F$, I cannot, when having such an after-image, be taking a public perceptual object to be something which it is not, and which I know it is not. For example, I cannot argue that my statement "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light" implies that I am seeing a public perceptual object (the wall), and that I take this public perceptual object, because of its looks, to have a characteristic (that of having a brightly coloured patch of light on its surface) which it does not, and which I know it does not, in fact possess.

Public perceptual objects do, nevertheless, "play some part" in many of our visual after-imagings, even though this role is different from that which they play
in our seeing what paintings represent. To have a visual after-image, I could first look at a public perceptual object (e.g. an electric lamp), and then at some other public perceptual object (e.g. the wall). What I claim to see when I have such a visual after-image is something which appears against a background of public perceptual objects – e.g. on tables, walls, chairs, and (if my eyes are closed) on the backs of my eyelids. In other words, what I claim to see is often locateable (by me) with reference to public perceptual objects which are in my line of vision. Although this feature of such visual after-images can be explained in a number of different ways, for the purposes of the present argument, only one

1. I am, in this discussion, limiting my analysis of visual after-imagings to those which clearly satisfy what is commonly called the "projection criterion" – viz. those after-images which are seen against some background of public perceptual objects. Thus, I will not consider as examples the visual after-images we have when our eyes are closed, even though it may be possible to make out a case that such after-imagings satisfy the projection criterion. The demonstration that at least some (even if not all) after-imaging-statements can be qualified, and yet can still be perceiving-statements, is sufficient for the purposes of my argument against the Rylean objection.

2. Cf. M. Furberg and N. Nordenstam, "If I carefully examine a Visual After-image, What am I looking at and where is it?", Problem 14, Analysis, Vol. 19, 1958-8, pp. 99-100. Lycos (op.cit.) and Smythies (op.cit.) argue that this implies that visual after-images are spatial entities which are seen in an ordinary sense of "see".
conclusion need be drawn. We often cannot speak about our having visual after-images without presupposing some reference to public perceptual objects which are in our line of vision.

Let us consider this further. Suppose that I say "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light on the wall", and someone else asks "Where is it?". Because my statement makes reference to a public perceptual object, this person has taken me to be claiming that there is, in my line of vision, some public perceptual object (the wall), which possesses the publicly observable characteristic of having a brightly coloured patch of light on its surface. A problem with which I will be faced in trying to frame a reply is that I cannot simply side-step this question. I cannot drop my reference to a public perceptual object by saying simply "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light". Since the brightly coloured patch of light appears now on the wall, now on the paper, now on my hand, when I have such a visual after-image, I cannot rule out the question "Where is it?". This is a legitimate question even though I could, in reply to it, say something such as "It is on whatever I happen at the time to be looking at". Thus, when fully articulated, my report of this visual after-image must be a statement such as "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light on the wall".

It need not follow, however, that my statement "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light on the wall"
is false if there is no publicly observable patch of light to be seen. If my questioner persisted in asking "Where is it?" (after I have said that my visual after-image is on whatever I happen at the time to be looking at), my only recourse would be to maintain that he has misunderstood my statement. "I am not claiming", my retort must be, "that there is a publicly observable patch of light which moves from my hand, to the paper, and then to the wall. What I am saying is that because I have looked at an electric lamp for several seconds, my eyes have been affected in such a way that it looks as if there is a patch of brightly coloured light on any other public perceptual object I look at afterwards. In other words, the effect of the electric lamp on my eyes is such that I see something which is not, and which I know is not, a public perceptual object or a characteristic of a public perceptual object, in my line of vision." "If you still do not understand my statement", I could continue, "then try it yourself. Look at the electric lamp for several seconds, and then look at the wall or at your hand. If you have normal vision, the effect of the lamp on your eyes will also be such that you will see a patch, or patches, of light on whatever you happen at the time to be looking at."

This argument makes my having visual after-images similar to my seeing shafts of light radiating out from a bright light when I look at it with half-closed eyes. I argued, in Chapter 4, that the statement "I can
see shafts of light radiating out from that bright light" does not necessarily imply that there are publicly observable shafts of light radiating out from a bright light in the subject's line of vision. The use of "can see" in this statement could indicate that the subject is claiming that, as a result of looking at a public perceptual object (the bright light) in a prescribed way, he is able to see something (the shafts of light) which are not public perceptual objects in his line of vision. In the same way, my use of "can see" in the statement "I can see a patch of brightly coloured light on the wall" could indicate that I am claiming that, as a result of looking at one public perceptual object (the electric lamp) in a prescribed way and then looking at another (the wall), I see something (the patch of bright light) which is not a public perceptual object, or a characteristic of a public perceptual object in my line of vision. Since I concluded that it can be true that I see the shafts of light, it can also be true that I see the brightly coloured patch of light when I have a visual after-image.

My visual after-imagings can, therefore, be seen. But the success which I claim when I say "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light" is not like that which I claim when I see one public perceptual object among others, or when I see what a painting represents. This success is that of being able to see, as a result of my looking at one public perceptual object and then at another, something which is not, and which I know is not,
a public perceptual object, or a characteristic of a
public perceptual object in my line of vision. Ryle's
analysis of after-imagings is, therefore, mistaken in an
important respect.

However, the Rylean argument that my after-imaging
statements must be qualified in some way does still apply.
For anyone hearing me say "I can see a brightly coloured
patch of light on the wall" could take me to be claiming
that there is a publicly perceptible brightly coloured
patch of light on the publicly perceptible wall. Thus,
if it is not qualified in some way, my statement will be
misleading.

My earlier argument shows what the force of this
qualification must be. The statement reporting my having
this visual after-image must, when fully articulated, be
a statement such as "I see a brightly coloured patch of
light on the wall". In other words, any statement
reporting my having such a visual after-image must be
articulated in such a way that it could be taken to be a
statement predicated something or other of one or more
public perceptual objects which are in my line of vision.
Thus, we qualify these after-imaging-statements in order
to prevent this construction being placed on them. Since
visual after-imagings can be perceivings, this qualification
has the effect of withdrawing the implied claim about what
the subject is perceiving. For example, if it is to be
qualified by the use of scare-quotes, my statement "I can
see a brightly coloured patch of light on the wall" must
be read, not as "I 'see' a brightly coloured patch of light on the wall", but as "I see a 'brightly coloured patch of light on the wall."

My statement can, that is, be qualified in the same way as we qualify statements reporting our seeing what paintings represent.

There is, however, a wide divergence between the logic of statements reporting our having visual after-images, and the logic of statements reporting our seeing what paintings represent. Statements of both sorts can, I have argued, be true reports of perceiving, even though they imply that the subject could believe that what he is perceiving is not, at that time, a public perceptual object in his line of vision. Because of this implication, statements of both sorts must be qualified if they are not to be misleading. When they are qualified, seeing-as-statements imply that the subject is seeing some public perceptual object which looks F, and which can, therefore, be called F even though it is not, and he knows it is not, F. At least some qualified after-imaging-statements, on the other hand, only imply that there is a public perceptual object in the subject's line of vision. Such statements do not imply that this public perceptual object has a certain look, which makes it ambiguous, and which allows the subject to say that he sees something which it is not, and which he knows it is not. Some visual-after-imaging-statements have, nevertheless, the form of statements which predicate something of a public perceptual object in the subject's line of vision.
According to this argument, therefore, my statement "I can see a brightly coloured patch of light" implies this: "I see a public perceptual object - I see something which looks like, and is, a wall. I also see something (the brightly coloured patch of light) which is not, and which I know is not, a publicly observable characteristic of the wall." Thus, at least some statements reporting the having of a visual after-image can be qualified, and yet can still be true reports of a perceiving.

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This conclusion that the having of a visual after-image can be a perceiving has important consequences. Since eidetic-images are similar to, and merge into, after-images, the having of eidetic-images could also be a form of perceiving. Suppose that, after working for some time over a microscope, I say "I can (still) see the microscopic field" (I am asserting that I am having an eidetic image). Since I could be taken to be claiming that the publicly perceptible microscopic field is now in my line of vision, I must, to avoid misleading anyone, qualify my statement in some way. The problem associated with an imaging of this sort is again that of determining the import of this

2. This example is taken from McKellar *(op.cit)* pp. 25-7
qualification. Will my qualified statement take the form "A 'sees' x" or the form "A sees 'x'? Does the qualification have the effect of withdrawing my claim to be perceiving something, or the effect of withdrawing the implied claim about what I am perceiving?

My use of 'can see' in the statement reporting my having a visual eidetic-image again indicates that I am claiming some success. This success cannot be that claimed by seeing-as-statements, nor that claimed by statements to the effect that I am able to see one public perceptual object among others in my line of vision. When I say "I can see the microscopic field", I am not claiming that I am seeing something in, or by means of, a public perceptual object which is in my line of vision. Nor am I claiming that I have located, am looking at, or can point to, a public perceptual object as a result of having engaged in certain special activities - e.g. looking carefully around me. Nevertheless, public perceptual objects do play some part in our having visual eidetic images.

Suppose that having said "I can (still) see the microscopic field", I am asked "Where is it?" I must reply, as with queries about the having of at least some after-images, that my eidetic-image is on whatever I happen, at the time, to be looking at. What is seen in such imagings is always projected against, and located with respect to, some background of public perceptual
object which are in our line of vision. When they are fully articulated, statements reporting the having of visual eidetic images must take the form "I can see the microscopic field on the wall". Consequently, statements reporting the having of visual eidetic-images must, like statements reporting the having of some visual after-images, be such that they could be taken to be predicating something of public perceptual objects which are in the subject's line of vision.

The success claimed by a visual-eidetic-imaging statement could, therefore, be similar to that claimed by the sort of visual-after-imaging-statement discussed earlier. If I can say "I can see ...", when reporting the having of a visual eidetic-image, I am claiming that, as a result of my looking at a public perceptual object (the microscopic field) for some time, and as a result of my later looking at another public perceptual object (the wall), I see something which is not itself a public perceptual object in my line of vision, or a characteristic of such a public perceptual object. Thus, the success I claim is that of seeing something (which is not a public perceptual object or a characteristic of a public perceptual object) as a result of my looking, in a prescribed way, first at one public perceptual object and then at another.

1. I am drawing here a fairly sharp distinction between eidetic images and hypnagogic and hypnopompic images (the images we have just before falling asleep and just before waking). If, for example, I still experience the microscopic field just before going to sleep, this will be a hypnagogic and not an eidetic image.
Since this is similar to the success claimed by at least some statements reporting the having of visual after-images, and since I argued that visual after-images can be perceivings, it can be true that the having of visual eidetic-images is a form of perceiving. Furthermore, since visual eidetic-imaging-statements could also, if not qualified, be taken to be predicating something of a public perceptual object in the subject's line of vision, they must be qualified in the same way as statements reporting the having of visual after-images. The qualification does not withdraw the implied claim that I am perceiving something. My statement "I can see the microscopic field on the wall" must be read as "I see 'the microscopic field on the wall!'" and not as "I 'see' the microscopic field on the wall".

We have, therefore, a further example of a statement about the having of images, which can be qualified, and yet can still be a perceiving-statement.

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Thus, the Rylean objection to the suggestion that some imagings can be perceivings has collapsed. This objection was that since statements reporting imagings will be misleading if not qualified in some way, they cannot be perceiving-statements. According to Ryle, once a
perceiving-statement is qualified, it will have the form "A 'sees' x", and will, as a result, imply that the subject is not perceiving at all. My argument shows that Ryle's claim is mistaken. I have concluded that at least some statements which Ryle would regard as imagining-statements (e.g. statements about the having of visual after-images and visual eidetic-images) can be qualified, and yet can still be true reports of perceiving.

IV

What might be regarded as the important part of Ryle's analysis could be salvaged in a different way. Someone could argue that even though Ryle's account of imagination is unsatisfactory, the reason for this is not his refusal to admit that some imaginings (or imagings) could be perceiving. Even though it may be true, the argument might continue, that the having of sensory images is a form of perceiving, this is not true of the having of mental images. Ryle is at least correct in claiming that when we, for example, visualise something, it is never true that we see that thing, or see anything at all.

Shorter's account of imagining can be used as an example of this new argument.¹ Shorter argues that the main difficulty in Ryle's analysis is his failure to distinguish between the various senses of "'see'".²

2. Ibid, p. 529
"It is this failure", he maintains, "which makes his account of visualising seem plausible. Indeed he does not just blur or ignore such distinctions, but positively denies their existence." An example of this is Ryle's claim that the use of "'see'" in statements reporting our visualising things is the same as the use of "'see'" in statements reporting cases of delirium tremens. We do in fact, contends Shorter, use "'see'" in a number of different ways.

(i) We may say, as Ryle does, that in a cinematic picture we 'see' a car driving along the road. However, Ryle is mistaken in claiming that this use of "'see'" refers to a form of imagining. We can say that even though we only "'see'" a car, we really see a picture of a car.

(ii) 'Seeing' an oasis is a case which has something to do with imagining. Nevertheless, there is still a difference between 'seeing' an oasis and imagining that we see one. In some contexts, we say of someone that he is 'seeing' an oasis when he is taken in by a mirage. In such circumstances, the statement "He is seeing an oasis" is close to "He thinks he is seeing an oasis". But in other contexts, we may say that an old desert hand 'sees' an oasis without implying that he imagines that he sees one.

1. Ibid, p. 529
2. loc. cit.
3. Ibid, p. 532
4. loc. cit.
(iii) This same point can be brought out by a different use of "'see'". When I have an hallucination, I do not visualise anything - I make a mistake about whether or not I see something. I think that I see something, when I in fact see nothing at all. When, however, I visualise a mountain, I do not make such a mistake. For while I cannot deliberately 'see' snakes (as in an hallucination), I can deliberately visualise the mountain. In other words, I can imagine that I am seeing something and I can visualise that thing, but these are in fact two different activities.  

Shorter argues further that another major error in Ryle's analysis is his claim that visualising is a form of sham-seeing, and thus a form of pretending to see.

Visualising is not sham Anything. It does not involve any sort of pretence, or the going through of any motions. It may, however, be involved in pretence and make-believe, and often in fact is.  

"This brings out", maintains Shorter, "how wrong it is to describe visualising as a sort of abstaining. Rather visualising is a substitute for doing something else."  

But Ryle is, Shorter says, correct on at least one vital point. This is his claim that visualising is

1. Ibid, pp. 532-3  
2. Ibid, p. 533  
3. loc.cit.  
4. Ibid, p. 534
in no way related to perceiving, and cannot, therefore, be a form of sentence. However, Ryle makes this claim for the wrong reasons. The reason why visualising is not a form of sentence is

not because visualising belongs to that aspect of perceiving that might be described 'in a strained sense' as thinking. It is because visualising does not correspond to perceiving at all. Visualising is not mock-seeing. Visualising is doing something in a way that seeing is not doing something, and more in a way that depicting is doing something. One can be ordered to depict or to visualise something, one cannot be ordered to see it.

This shows, Shorter argues, that visualising "must be distinguished from other sorts of 'seeing', and not confounded with them. Roughly to visualise is to do something, whereas to 'see' snakes is not to do something."

This argument that doing something is an important part of visualising does, admits Shorter, raise problems. Someone could well ask "What, positively, is visualising?" or "Granted that visualising is doing something, what exactly is it that we do when we visualise?" The problem is that "if these questions are taken in one way, they are unanswerable".

But the desire to ask them may be allayed by seeing why they cannot be answered.

1. Ibid, p. 530
2. loc. cit.
3. Ibid, p. 536
4. Ibid, p. 537
It may be that what is wanted is a description of visualising that would enable someone who could not visualise to know what visualising is.

But ultimately the only answer to the question about 'what visualising is' is something like, 'It is what you do when you solve a geometrical problem in your head; remember someone's face and so on'. Similarly if a man has never had a pain, you cannot make him understand just what it is like to have a pain. You can perhaps give him some idea by saying it is a very unpleasant bodily sensation. You can give a man who cannot visualise some idea of what it is like, by saying things like, 'It is the visual analogue of having a tune running in your head'. If this is not the sort of thing that is wanted, then there is nothing that is wanted.

But we can, Shorter argues further, explicate the concept "visualising" in terms of its parallel to certain other concepts. We can say that because we use adjectives such as "vivid", "faithful", "life-like" in connection with both depicting and visualising and picturing, the "analogue of 'seeing' and picturing is not seeing, but depicting". But even though depicting and visualising are in some ways parallel, visualising something is not the same as depicting it. Visualising is depicting only in a metaphorical sense – perhaps,

1. loc.cit.
2. Ibid, pp. 529-30
3. Ibid, p. 530
only sham-detecting. The concept "describe", he continues, also throws some light on the concept "visualise".

The ways we use these words run parallel to a considerable extent. Visual images are always images of something, and so are descriptions. We may visualise men as bald and we may describe them as bald. We may visualise or describe something correctly or incorrectly, and if we want to check on our accuracy, we must do the same thing in either case, go and have a look at the object in question. Visualising and describing can be done in greater or less detail.

This analysis does, Shorter concedes, raise further problems. If visualising can be explicated in terms of depicting and describing, someone might ask, what then is the justification for our use of an expression such as "visual image"? We can, Shorter argues, always ask a question in turn if asked this one. Why is a word such as "picture" necessary when nothing corresponds to it in the case of describing. The answer to be given to this question will point to the one that must be given to the first question.

In some respects we can liken depicting to describing. The police can circulate both pictures and descriptions of criminals for roughly the same purpose. Reading a

1. Ibid, p. 533
2. Ibid, pp. 536-9
3. Ibid, p. 540
4. loc. cit.
description of a murderer and looking at his picture both enable one to say 'So that's what he's like'. ... Portraits and descriptions can be accurate or inaccurate representations, detailed or not detailed, lifelike or not lifelike. Portraits and descriptions have to be of something. However, there is one big difference about the ways we can talk about the two. For pictures are things, just as much as the things they are pictures of. For this reason one can ascribe to pictures the properties one can ascribe to other material objects. ... We cannot do this in the case of a description.†

It is for all these reasons, Shorter concludes, that we need a term such as "picture".

We have a similar excuse for introducing the term "visual image". "Now quite clearly", maintains Shorter, "a mental image is not an object, but it may be in some way analogous to one in that it is useful to have a way of talking about visualising that does not refer to the representational aspect of visualising." ¹ Consider, he says, this example:

It is a fairly well known fact that it is often difficult to visualise the faces of people we know very well. We can get so far, we can perhaps put in the outline of the head, but the features elude us. Now when people describe this they tend to say things like this. 'I tried to visualise

1. loc.cit.
2. loc.cit.
the face but all I got was a blur', or 'His face was a blur' or 'It was a blur'.
Now we may ask 'What was a blur?' What does 'his face' refer to? It does not
refer to the face we are trying to visualise, nor do we mean that we visualise
his face as blurred. What we are referring to is something analogous to the 'face in
the picture', the picture-face. The blur does not represent anything in the face
visualised. It is, so to speak, a feature of the image in its own right."

But there is, concedes Shorter,
danger here. One may press the analogy
too far, and talk of seeing mental images
as though having produced them one could
afterwards do something analogous to examining them. This is one of the ways
in which mental images are not like pictures.2

Thus, Shorter concludes that even though we can
say that there are mental images, the questions to be
asked about them are not the same as those to be asked
about pictures. Mental images are, he argues, a sort of
half-way house between pictures and descriptions.3 To
answer the question "Are there mental images?", we must
discuss depicting and pictures, and in this way determine
whether, and how far, such a way of talking is possible
and useful.4

1. Ibid, p. 541
2. loc.cit.
3. Ibid, p. 542
4. loc.cit.
Squires' analysis of visualising can be used as a further example of this new defence of Ryle's analysis of imagination. He supports Ryle's main contention that the relation between a person and his mental imagery is not that of perceiving, but rejects, like Shorter, the arguments which Ryle uses to support this claim.

Squires maintains that:

Mental images are no more a kind of image than unreal ducks are a kind of duck or imaginary castles a kind of castle. Therefore we do not have privileged access to them nor do we need an inner eye to view them. Nor should we wonder where they are.

We have, argues Squires, a number of good reasons for maintaining this.

The relation between a person and his mental pictures is not that of sight. We look for and detect things that are 'there' with our eyes, but this sort of language does not apply to internal representations. Our eyes are not involved in the normal way. Inability to visualise is not treated by oculists. Mental images can be called up or evoked, unlike objects of sight, which are not under our control in the same fashion. There is no room for being fooled by the appearance of a mental image in the way that we can be fooled by the appearance of a stick in water or taken in by the conjuror's sleight of hand. Nor can we get better views of

2. Ibid, p. 60
our mental images, though we can sometimes get better images. Mental images are not seen in space or at any distance and no location is attributed to them. But if we do not see mental images it is immediately questionable whether they are images or pictures, which are emphatically the sort of things which are visible.¹

Squires claims that to have a mental image of something is "simply to visualise it".² He, therefore, construes the problem of what mental images are as that of giving some account of visualising.

He argues that visualising is (as Ryle suggests) more like imitating than like describing or portraying (as Shorter suggests).³ Visualising, Squires maintains, is not as close to describing and portraying as Shorter would have it be.

You cannot visualise what you are now looking at, though you could portray or describe what you are now looking at. Similarly, you cannot pretend to be what you are, impersonate yourself doing what you are now doing. ... One cannot visualise what one is now seeing because it is one of the conditions for visualising a scene that one should not be looking at it, just as one of the conditions for pretending to be rich is that one should not actually be rich.⁴

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1. Ibid, pp. 60-1
3. Ibid, p. 61
4. Ibid, pp. 61-2
But this does not imply, Squires argues further, that Ryle's positive suggestions about visualising are correct.¹ For a serious objection can be raised against Ryle's analysis of visualising as sham-seeing.

Suppose that we have certain expectations as to the appearance of Helvellyn, say, that it has snow on top and birch-scrub lower down. We could pretend that we have witnessed it by saying, 'Hm, birch-scrub and snow higher up' or by drawing or describing it. But this is nothing like visualising it.² It is this fact that we can pretend to see Helvellyn without visualising it, which permits an objection to be raised against Ryle's analysis. Squires contends that:

If visualising is sham-seeing, there is something which counts as the shamming. But if this is recognisable behavior such as we might instigate if someone were to challenge us to pretend to be seeing Helvellyn or something of that sort then it seems to be consistent with visualising or not visualising no matter how successful the pretence.³

In other words, Ryle will be committed to arguing that the pretence-behaviour which constitutes visualising is consistent with both visualising and not visualising.

Shorter's argument against Ryle is, Squires continues, unsatisfactory.⁴ It is misleading to maintain,

1. Ibid, p. 62
2. Ibid, p. 63
3. loc.cit.
4. Ibid, p. 64
as Shorter does, that visualisations (or mental images) are like pictures or descriptions. Descriptions are like pictures in the important respect that they can be written down or tape-recorded, and, like pictures, they can be characterised independently of that to which they refer.¹ This, Squires argues, can never be true of mental images. Mental images, he contends, "can have only oblique adjectives. We never refer to their constitution or location; any characterisation of them can only be understood by reference to what they are mental portraits or images of".² Thus, we may be inclined to say "Mental images do not exist", even though people do visualise things.³

We can say, he argues further, that visualising is a form of seeming to see something when it is not there to be seen. For example, when we visualise Helvellyn, it is as if we were seeing a mountain even though we have our eyes closed. Visualising is, therefore, unlike those instances of seeming to see when we see a thing which resembles what we seem to see.⁴ Visualising, Squires concludes,

is seeming to see something when it is not there and when there is nothing like it there either which would account for our seeming to see it in the way that

1. loc.cit.
2. Ibid, p. 65
3. Ibid, p. 66
4. Ibid, p. 67
a decoy duck would explain our seeming to see a duck. A final condition is that we should believe that we are not actually seeing the thing, otherwise we should not have distinguished visualising from hallucinating or dreaming.

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Flew, like Squires, rejects Shorter's analysis. But the arguments he uses could count equally well as objections to Squires' analysis. Shorter is mistaken, claims Flew, in arguing that there is no analogy between seeing something and seeing something in the mind's eye. Flew argues that:

There is an analogy between seeing overhangs and seeing overhangs in the mind's eye, at least where this latter involves having mental images or mental pictures of overhangs. For a start - and surely it is a flying start - the 'experience' of having visual imagery is like the 'experience' of seeing physical objects in being visual, i.e. in involving shapes and colours, etc., rather than, say, tone, pitch, etc. But of course there are also many vital differences between seeing and seeing in the mind's eye: perhaps the most important being the difference that the home you can see must be there now, whereas the ideal home you see in your mind's eye may never be built at all.

1. loc.cit.
It is precisely and only because the analogy both holds in some respects and breaks down in others that the latter is, what Shorter insists that it is not, 'metaphorical seeing'.

Shorter's argument that visualising is doing something in the way that seeing is not depends, Flew argues further, on an assumption about the nature of mental imagery. This is the assumption that mental imagery occurs only in intentional visualising. This may be so in his case, objects Flew, but it is certainly not so generally much less universally. Most people have imagery which is not the result of any doing on their part, which comes spontaneously, and may even be positively unwelcome: and with some some of this cannot be got rid of at will. In such spontaneous cases the word 'see' would be appropriate and 'visualise', 'picture', or 'depict' would be inappropriate: precisely inasmuch and insofar as it does not, whereas the others do, suggest doing. ... Furthermore there are certain aspects of the visual experience of some, perhaps most, people to which the metaphorical use of 'see' is peculiarly apt. Just as sometimes after carefully scanning the side of the ben, you may at last manage to see the deer; and then continue with an effort to keep them distinct from the background of rock and heather. So some of us sometimes after trying with some difficulty to picture something in our mind's eyes succeed in

1. Ibid, pp. 393-4
doing so; and then continue with an
effort to keep the picture before us:
'I've got it now, I can see in my mind's
eye how it would look.'

Another important part of Shorter's argument
is, Flew argues, simply false. Shorter claims that
describing is an analogue of visualising because images,
like descriptions, must always be of something. But it
is, argues Flew,
simply untrue to say that even all the
visual imagery which is produced
deliberately by visualising is pictorial.
Some people can form abstract as well as
representational mental images: the present
writer is one of them. Furthermore, as we
have said above, many if not most people
experience imagery other than that
deliberately produced in visualising, some
of which in some people is again not
pictorial but abstract.2

A further problem in Shorter's analysis, Flew
contends, is that he overlooks the fact that imagery occurs
and has characteristics.3 There is no reason, he argues,
to attempt, as Shorter does, to excuse "the desire to say
that images are vague".4

The reason for saying that most images
are vague, indeterminate, etc. is simple
and sufficient. It lies in the curiously
neglected fact that most images are vague,

1. Ibid, pp. 394-5
2. Ibid, pp. 395-6
3. Ibid, p. 397
4. loc. cit.
indeterminate, etc. both considered in themselves; and considered, where this is relevant, as pictures of something else.

There are, Flew concedes, parts of Shorter's analysis which are unexceptional. For example, Shorter is correct in saying that there is something odd about speaking of images as existing. Images, argues Flew, "do not exist, they occur or are had". But even though it may be misleading to ask "Where is the mental image?", questions such as "Can you localise it?" and "Does it seem to be in relation to the things in front of you?" are natural ones when the questioner is interested in the characteristics of imaging as such. Images can, contends Flew, sometimes be localised - e.g., we can say "It seems to be suspended this side of the table but moves when I move my head". Such talk is, he admits, metaphorical. "But", he asks, "how else could image experience be described but by metaphors drawn from the physical world?"  

The dispute between Flew and Shorter raises a narrower version of the problems discussed at the beginning

1. loc.cit.
2. Ibid, p. 398
3. Ibid, p. 399
4. loc.cit.
of Chapter 4. These problems centre around the conflict between the account of imagination (specifically, of the having of images) put forward by Lycos, Price, and Smythies, and the account implied by Hinton's analysis of perception and illusion.

On Hinton's analysis, the experience of having an image must be completely different from, and opposed to, the experience of perceiving something. Statements reporting imagings must have the form "It is as if ... were perceiving ...". As a result, such statements cannot be true if they are construed to be reports of perceivings. When we have an image of something it is not true that we are perceiving that thing, nor true that we are perceiving at all. In opposition to this, Lycos, Price, and Smythies argue that we can say truly that we perceive something when we have sensory images. Sensory images are, they claim, spatial entities which we perceive in the same way as we perceive actual pictures.

These conflicting points of view arise, I argued, because of opposing views on what conditions must be satisfied before anything can count as an instance of perceiving. Hinton contends that we can say truly that a person perceives something only if there is a public perceptual object in that person's perceptual range which he takes to have some characteristic. On the other hand, Lycos contends that we can say truly that a person perceives something even if there is no public perceptual object where he claims to be perceiving something. My
argument in Chapter 4 established that Hinton's assertion is mistaken. There are contexts in which statements of the form "A perceives x" can be true even if there is no public perceptual object in A's perceptual range, which is (in Chisholm's sense) a proper stimulus for him.

The basis of the dispute between Flew's account and those of Shorter and Squires is the same. Squires argues that an experience can be a visual perception only if it involves looking for and detecting, with the eyes, things that are there. To him, any statement of the form "A perceives x" entails the existence of a public perceptual object in the subject's perceptual range. Squires, therefore, reaches a conclusion much the same as Hinton's. Since there are, in visualising, no public perceptual objects which the subject takes to be something, visualising must be a seeming to see something when that thing is not present, and when nothing is there to be taken to be that thing. Shorter's conclusion is also similar to Hinton's. To him, visualising must be some doing different from seeing. He argues that all we can say about visualising is that it is what we do when we, for example, solve a geometrical problem in our heads. Flew, like Shorter and Squires, maintains that seeing proper entails the existence of a public perceptual object in the seer's line of vision. He argues, however, that since the having of mental images satisfies at least some of the conditions for perceiving, it cannot be an experience completely different from, and opposed to, perceiving.
The having of a mental image, he contends, is closer to perceiving than Shorter (and, therefore, Squires and Ryle) is prepared to admit. Thus, Flew's argument amounts to a claim that there is at least one sense of "see" in which it is true to say that the having of visual mental images is a seeing of something.

The settling of this dispute about the nature of the having of mental images cannot be dependent on another analysis of perceiving. The problem to be resolved is this: given the earlier analysis of perceiving, can the having of mental images be construed as a form of perceiving?

Ishiguro asserts confidently that the having of a mental image is a form of perceiving. She argues that when we picture an object to ourselves, we see that object in the same sense as we see the subject of a painting.

When we picture an object to ourselves, we see the object in the same sense in which we see Olga in Picasso's painting. And so long as we can understand and allow the use of the expression 'I see Olga' or 'I see a duck' said in front of a canvas or a drawing, we cannot disallow claims to see an object when people picture them in their minds.

2. Ibid, p. 50
It should be remembered both that 'see' is here used differently from the normal sense of 'see' and that it is parasitic on the normal sense.¹

These two senses of "see" are not, she argues further,

different from each other in the way in which, say, the verb 'draw' could mean either 'pull' or 'depict'. I would like to suggest that we understand the two senses of 'see' because under normal conditions when I claim 'I see X', 'X' gives both kinds of object of sight. I am using 'X' both extensionally and intentionally. I am as it were claiming to 'see X as X' where the first X is used purely referentially, and the second 'X' to describe how I see the object. In other words, in normal conditions when I say 'I see X' I am making a claim both about the presence of X (which I believe has causal links with the visual experiences I am having), and also about my mental state or visual experience which makes me describe or identify the object I see as 'X'. It is precisely because it is, as it were, a logical truth that see X means 'see X as X' in normal conditions, that 'see ... as X' gets the meaning it does have and can get detached and be used to make claims of the form 'see Y as X'.²

This conclusion that "seeing X" means, in normal conditions, "seeing X as X" has important consequences in Ishiguro's analysis. Since it explains

1. Ibid, pp. 50-1
2. Ibid, p. 54
how "seeing ... as X" gets its meaning, it follows that not only "can I claim to see Y as X when I am unsure whether Y is X, and even when I know perfectly well that Y is not X, but I can, as in mental imagery, claim to see X when there is no X that I see as X". When used in the first two contexts, these statements have the form "I am seeing Y as X". When used in the last context, they have the form "I am seeing as X" in which the Y has, as it were, disappeared. Ishiguro maintains that:

It might be that our ability to do this, i.e., our ability to see images - or to 'see' things that are not present or which only correspond to our thoughts, is what makes the richness of our life as Sartre suggests. But it is certainly not, as Sartre suggests, an ability which can be seen as totally different from, or conflicting with, perceiving.3

Let us consider this point further. Ishiguro argues that when I see a picture in my mind's eye, I do not see a picture of an object, but only the object in my mind's eye. This, she contends, is what I mean when I say that I have a mental image of the object.4

I can describe the shapes and colours of after images but when I describe my mental image, that which I picture in my mind, I can only describe the object as I see it - that it is tall, that it is sitting down, that it has a sneering mouth.5

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1. loc. cit.
2. Ibid, p. 50
3. Ibid, p. 54
4. Ibid, p. 51
5. loc. cit.
This must be true, she insists, even though the features which I picture a person as having need not all correspond to features which the person actually has. The pictured features cannot be features of the image itself.

Since it makes sense, she argues further, to order a person to imagine how something looks, picturing an object in the mind's eye must be purposive. It is purposive in the same sense as that in which drawing an object on paper is purposive. Nevertheless, just as I cannot see an object at will, even when I am told what to look for, so I may find myself unable to picture an object no matter how hard I try. Furthermore, I can also find myself picturing an object in ways which I do not expect, and which go against some verbal description which I may be prepared to offer. Thus, in the case of seeing images there is an added element of something being beyond our control, of being an experience probably governed by causal forces we do not understand. That is why it seems appropriate to say on certain occasions that an aspect dawns on one, or that a picture came to one's mind.

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In her analysis, Ishiguro argues that we can say truly that we are perceiving something even if there

1. loc. cit.
2. Ibid, pp. 52-3
3. Ibid, p. 53
is nothing to be perceived. Her analysis, therefore, offers some support to Flew's, and amounts to a rejection of Ryle's, Shorter's, and Squires', analyses. Ishiguro contends that when we say that we are perceiving something, we make a claim about the presence of a public perceptual object, as well as a claim about the experience we are having. If we have the experience we would have if there were in fact a public perceptual object in our perceptual range, we could say truly that this experience is a perceiving. Her argument is, therefore, at least compatible with the account of perceiving presented in Chapter 4.

Does it follow, we must now ask, that Ishiguro is correct in claiming that it can be true that the having of visual mental images is a seeing of something?

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Consider the following example:

Sitting in my room in Canberra, I visualise the Statue of Liberty and say (1) "I can see the Statue of Liberty"; (2) "It is as if I were seeing the Statue of Liberty".

My use of "can see" and "it is as if" in these statements shows that I have, in a sense, built their
qualification into them. "You must not", I am, as it were, warning a listener, "take me to be claiming that the Statue of Liberty is present as a public perceptual object in my line of vision." The problem of whether Ishiguro is correct in claiming that this example of the having of a visual mental image is a seeing becomes that of determining what effect this built-in qualification has. Am I, as Kyle, Shorter and Squires insist I must be, withdrawing the claim that I am perceiving something? Are my qualified statements (1) and (2) of the form "I 'see' the Statue of Liberty", or of the form "I see 'the Statue of Liberty'"?

My use of "can see" in these statements indicates not only that I have qualified them, but also that I am claiming that I have scored some success. But the success I claim when I say, as in (1) above, "I can see the Statue of Liberty" cannot be the same as that which I claim when I say (3) "I can see Peter" (when looking at a painting), or (4) "I can see a patch of brightly coloured light" (when having a visual after-image), or (5) "I can see a rabbit (after looking carefully around me). The success claimed in (5) is that of locating one public perceptual object from among others in my line of vision; in (4) is that of seeing something which is not a public perceptual object or a characteristic of a public perceptual object in my line of vision; in (3) is that of taking, because of some ambiguity in its looks, a public perceptual object to be something which it is not, and which I know it is not.
There is an important reason why the success claimed in statements reporting our having visual mental images cannot be the same as that claimed in (3)-(5). A statement such as (5) implies that there is a public perceptual object in the subject's line of vision which is a rabbit. Statements such as (3) and (4) also imply that there is some public perceptual object in the subject's line of vision. Seeing-as-statements imply that there is now in the subject's line of vision a public perceptual object which looks F, and which he takes to be F even though it is not F. Some statements reporting visual after-imagings imply that there is some public perceptual object in the subject's line of vision, which appears, because of the effect of some other public perceptual object on his eyes, to be F. However, when we visualise something, we do not see any public perceptual object in our line of vision. Nor do we see any public perceptual object whose looks are ambiguous; nor anything projected against a public perceptual object in our line of vision. It is this feature of visualising - that at the time of the visualising it is not necessarily true that the subject at least sees a public perceptual object - which shows that the success claimed in visual-mental-imaging-statements cannot be the same as that claimed in statements (3)-(5).

Let us consider in more detail what is involved in our visualising something. If I am to successfully visualise the Statue of Liberty, I must no longer concentrate on my surroundings. I must, as it were, attempt to ignore
the perceptual characteristics of the public perceptual objects in my line of vision and try to see the Statue of Liberty. If I succeed in visualising the Statue of Liberty, what I claim to see will not be like what I claim to see in imaginings or imagings of other sorts. When I succeed in visualising the Statue of Liberty, the Statue of Liberty will not be localisable with respect to the public perceptual objects which are in my line of vision.

In my visualising the Statue of Liberty, it will be to me as if I were seeing a public perceptual object which is, at that time, in another place.

But even though what I am visualising is not localisable with respect to the public perceptual objects in my line of vision, the visualised object appears to me (as Flew argues) with visual characteristics. What I claim to see when I succeed in visualising the Statue of Liberty has a shape, size, and colours. Thus, when I say "I can see the Statue of Liberty", I am claiming that, even though I know that I am in Canberra and know that the Statue of Liberty is not present as a public perceptual object, the end result of (say) my trying to see the Statue of Liberty is such that the Statue of Liberty has appeared to me as a visual object. The success which I claim when I say "I can see the Statue of Liberty" is, therefore, that of seeing some public perceptual object (the Statue of Liberty) which is, at that time, in another place (i.e. which is not present as a public perceptual object).
But it is true, someone might object, that this visualising the Statue of Liberty is a seeing? Won't this analysis imply that I am aware of a private mental image of the Statue of Liberty? Ishiguro would counter this objection by arguing that since the status of the visualised object (e.g. of the visualised Statue of Liberty) is similar to that of the object represented in a painting, what we are aware of, when we visualise something, cannot be a private mental object such as an image. Let us consider this argument in more detail.

To see what is represented in a painting, I must utilise certain knowledge of the looks of public perceptual objects. For example, to see Peter in, or by means of, a paint-on-canvas, I must know what Peter looks like in normal circumstances. But just knowing what Peter looks like is not sufficient. I must be able to identify specific parts of the surface of the paint-on-canvas as specific parts of (say) Peter's face. Thus, if I say "I can see Peter" (when looking at a paint-on-canvas), I will be claiming, not that an image or copy of Peter has appeared to me, but that it is the real Peter who has appeared to me. When I succeed in seeing what a painting represents, I say, for example, "I see Peter", implying that I have taken a public perceptual object, because of its looks, to be something (i.e. Peter) which it is not, and which I know it is not. Thus, in our seeing what paintings represent, what we claim to see is not a public perceptual object in our line of vision, but neither is it
a private mental object. It is the absent or nonexistent represented object that we see.

This is clearly similar to what I claim when I say "I can see the Statue of Liberty" (after visualising it). I claim that, through some efforts on my behalf (concentrating on what the Statue of Liberty looks like, ignoring my surroundings), I have succeeded in making the real Statue of Liberty appear to me. What appears to me when I succeed in visualising the Statue of Liberty is not some private mental object, but simply the Statue of Liberty. In other words, the visualised object has the same status as the object represented in a painting.

Since it is true that I see Peter (when looking at a painting), it must be true that I see the Statue of Liberty (when I am visualising it). Thus, I say that I can see the Statue of Liberty to show that I am seeing, as a result of following a prescribed technique (concentrating on the Statue of Liberty, ignoring my surroundings), something which is not, and which I know is not, a public perceptual object in my line of vision; something which is in fact located in another place beyond my line of vision. My visualising the Statue of Liberty is, therefore, similar in certain respects to my succeeding in seeing shafts of bright light radiating out from a bright light when I look at it with half-closed eyes. In both cases, I claim to see something as a result of following a prescribed technique, and what I claim to see is not a public perceptual object at that time in my line of vision. Thus, when I qualify
My statement "I see the Statue of Liberty" I am not withdrawing the implied claim that I am perceiving something. If qualified by scare-quotes, my statement must be read as "I see 'the Statue of Liberty'" and not as "I 'see' the Statue of Liberty". In other words, Ishiguro is correct in arguing, contra Ryle (and Sartre), that it is true that we see something when we are successful in our visualising.

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Thus, a Shorter-Squires-type defence of Ryle's analysis of imagination has failed. The conclusion reached is that Ryle (and Shorter and Squires) are mistaken in claiming that the having of images is completely unlike seeing; that there is no sense in which it is true that we see something when we have a visual sensory image or a visual mental image.

VI

The basic error in Ryle's analysis (and in any analysis similar to his) is, I have argued, that of placing limits on the concept "see" which are too narrow. According to Ryle, it is true that A sees x only if x is a public perceptual object, at the time of the seeing, in A's line of vision. If there is no x physically present,
or if A mistakenly takes some public perceptual object to be x, then it is false that A sees x.

My argument has been that the conditions for the truth of statements of the form "A sees x" cannot be defined in terms of a theory of vision, and so are not applicable in any context, to statements of the form "A sees x." I argued that it is true that A sees x:

(i) if there is a public perceptual object in A's line of vision which A correctly identifies as x;

(ii) even if there is a public perceptual object in A's line of vision which A mistakenly identifies as x;

(iii) even if there is no public perceptual object in A's line of vision which A claims to be seeing something.

There is, I argued, even a distinction within context, such contexts (i.e., in contexts where there is no public perceptual x to be seen), it can be true that A sees x:

(a) if A looks at a public perceptual object in a prescribed way (e.g., if A looks at a bright light with half-closed eyes);

(b) if A looks at one public perceptual object in a prescribed way (having an after-image or elicited image).
(c) If A ignores the background of public perceptual objects in his line of vision, and attempts to see an absent or non-existent object (visualising something).

What my analysis shows is that when Ryle, or his supporters, argue (and also when Sartre argues in this way) that having a visual image is not a seeing something, all they are in fact claiming is that visual imagings are not like seeings in Ryle's strong sense, or in sense (i) above. My argument in this chapter has established that it does not follow from such a claim that there is no sense in which visual imagings are seeings; that Sartre and Ryle have not succeeded in showing that visual imagings are completely unlike seeings. These imagings are not seeings in one sense of this term, but it is still true that we see something when we have visual images.

A central part of both Ryle's and Sartre's analyses of imagination is, therefore, mistaken.
CHAPTER 6

IMAGINING AND BELIEVING

I

My argument so far in this thesis has been directed at establishing that the main claim made by the doctrine of imagination typified by Sartre's and Ryle's analyses is mistaken. There is a sense, I have concluded, in which an imagining, or the having of an image, can be a perceiving. However, my conclusion that at least some imaginings (seeings-as and the having of visual images) can be perceiving seems to support, rather than to undermine, the second important claim made by this doctrine of imagination. My conclusion appears to lend weight to its contention that image-theories are at least correct in maintaining that there are close logical links between imagining and perceiving.

An examination of the assertion that there are close logical links between imagining and perceiving will be the subject of the remainder of my thesis.

II

The way in which the relations between imagining and believing are construed is the crucial part of Sartre's
and Ryle's contention that there are close logical links
between imagining and perceiving. Acts of imagining,
Sartre and Ryle both argue, are constituted by, or involve,
suspended or negated or false forms of the beliefs typically
involved in perceiving. When I imagine something, either
I have no beliefs as to whether or not I am perceiving this
thing, or I do not believe that I am perceiving it, or I
believe falsely that I am perceiving it. Any imagining-
statement implies, in Ryle's sense, the operation of a
factual disclaimer.

Thus, the plausibility of this contention that
imagining has close logical links with perceiving seems to
depend on the viability of a particular account of the
relations between imagining and believing. Have Sartre
and Ryle, we must now ask, given a correct analysis of
the relations between imagining and believing?

III

In examining Sartre's and Ryle's accounts of the
relations between imagining and believing, we are faced
with an immediate problem. Although their general claims
about the nature of imagination are similar in many ways,
Sartre and Ryle diverge on the question of precisely what
relations hold between imagining and believing. Both
agree that at least some imagining-statements imply a
suspension or negation of belief. But Ryle takes some
false supposals - in particular, mistaken-perceptions -
to be a form of imagining, whereas Sartre does not. Why are there these differences between their theories?

Consider again the different ways in which they would analyse the example of my taking, on a dark night, a boot for a cat. On Ryle's analysis, my statement "I see a cat" is, in such a context, false, since there is no cat to be seen. If, therefore, I am later shown that there is not, or could not be, a cat where I say that I see one, I must retract my original statement. I must admit that I am mistaken; that I am only imagining that I am seeing a cat (that I only 'see' a cat).

Ryle bases his claim that I am imagining, and not perceiving, a cat on the following argument:

When I say "I see a cat", I imply (a) that there is now a public perceptual object in my line of vision which is (in Chisholm's sense) a proper stimulus for me, and (b) that this public perceptual object is of the class of cats. Since perceiving is the scoring of successes in our exploration of the physical world (i.e. since perceiving involves the acquiring of true beliefs about public perceptual objects which are in the subject's perceptual range), it follows that it is true that I see a cat only if (a) and (b) are true. Since the public perceptual object in my line of vision is in fact a member of the class of boots (since I believe falsely that it is a cat), it is false that I am seeing a cat, and, indeed, false that I am seeing anything at all. I can only be imagining that I am seeing a cat.
Sartre argues that mistaken perceivings cannot be imaginings. If I mistake a boot for a cat, I perceive poorly. Nevertheless, I still perceive something. My act of consciousness is, in such circumstances, still a perceptual one, because I have attempted to grasp "the meaning or import" of an object via one of its aspects. This, contends Sartre, is the essence of a perceiving. Furthermore, since there is a public perceptual object where I claim to be perceiving one, I have also to a point perceived correctly.

Sartre bases his analysis on the following argument about perceiving and imagining:

My statement "I see a cat" implies, in this context, that I believe that there is now a public perceptual object in my line of vision, and implies that I believe that this public perceptual object is a member of the class of cats. If I had imagined a cat (or conjured up an image of one), I would not have believed that there is a public perceptual object in my line of vision. I would have believed that the imagined cat is absent or non-existent. Since I believe (and believe truly) that there is a public perceptual object (the boot) in my line of vision (which I mistakenly take to be a cat), my act of consciousness must be a perceptual, and not an imaginative, one.

Even though Sartre and Kyle agree that my statement "I see a cat" implies that I believe that there is a public perceptual object in my line of vision and that
I believe that this public perceptual object is a cat, this is as far as their agreement goes. Ryle argues that both beliefs must be true if it is to be true that I am perceiving something. Sartre, argues that the truth of the first belief and the falsity of the second are sufficient to establish that I am perceiving something. He argues further that the statement that I am imagining something is not dependent on the truth or falsity of either of these two beliefs.

Thus, the crucial difference between Sartre's and Ryle's analyses of the relations between imagining and believing stems from a disagreement over whether mistaken-perceivings are imaginings or perceivings. According to Ryle, mistaken perceivings must be imaginings, since I can say truly that I am perceiving something only if the perceived thing is actually what I claim to perceive. According to Sartre, mistaken perceivings must be imaginings since I can say truly that I am imagining something only if I either do not believe that what I am imagining is perceptually present, or have no beliefs as to whether or not what I am imagining is perceptually present. In other words, Ryle permits a looser account of imagining-statements than that permitted by Sartre, and Sartre permits a looser account of perceiving-statements than that proposed by Ryle.

Which of these approaches is the correct one?

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The analysis of perceiving in Chapter 2 shows that the strict Rylean account of perception is mistaken. I argued, following Chisholm and Soltis, that there is a sense of "perceive" in which the necessary and sufficient conditions for the statement "A perceives x" to be true are:

(1) x must be a public perceptual object in A's perceptual range;

AND

(2) A must discriminate x from other public perceptual objects in his perceptual range by taking x to have some characteristic.

My statement "I see a cat" (uttered in the context of my mistaking a boot for a cat) satisfies both these conditions. There is a public perceptual object in my line of vision (which is, in Chisholm's sense, a proper stimulus for me); and by calling it a cat, I indicate that I have discriminated this public perceptual object (the boot) from others in my line of vision. Thus, when I mistakenly take a boot to be a cat, it is true that I am perceiving something, even though I believe falsely that this public perceptual object is a member of the class of cats. This shows that Sartre is correct in maintaining that such mistaken perceiving are perceiving. Ryle's claim that my statement "I see a cat" can only be an imagining-statement is, on the other hand, mistaken.

It does not, however, follow that Sartre is correct in maintaining that mistaken-perceiving cannot be
called imaginings. Suppose, again, that I say "I see a cat", and someone else says "You're mistaken. That's only an old boot". There are two courses I could follow in framing a reply to this objection. I may insist that my listener is mistaken, and say "I am seeing a cat". Or I may apologize by saying "I must have imagined things. I only imagined that I saw a cat".

Now when I reply to my listener's objection by saying "I only imagined that I saw a cat", I am, in a sense, reclassifying what I claimed was a perceiving as really being an imagining. I am retracting a perceptual claim by admitting that I only imagined that I was seeing something, and am, therefore, calling a mistaken perceiving an imagining. This is precisely what Sartre says I cannot legitimately do.

The implausibility of Sartre's claim becomes evident when we reiterate the distinction made in Chapter 2 between the two senses of "perceive". The most basic sense of "perceive" (Chisholm's non-propositional sense) is the one outlined above. The second sense is Chisholm's propositional sense of "perceive". In the propositional sense, a statement of the form "A sees x" implies not only that there is a public perceptual object in A's line of vision (which he discriminates by taking it to have some characteristic), but also that A sees that this public perceptual object is an x. That is, a propositional-perceiving-statement, unlike a non-propositional-perceiving-statement, also implies that A believes truly that what he
sees is a member of the class of x-es. For example, since my propositional-perceiving-statement, "I see a cat" implies that I see that the public perceptual object in my line of vision is a cat, this statement will be true only if there is a cat in my line of vision; only if I believe truly that the public perceptual object in my line of vision is a cat.

With these distinctions in mind, let us consider again the earlier example. I say "I see a cat", and someone else says "You are wrong. There is only a boot where you say that you are seeing a cat". If I retort that I am seeing a cat, I will be claiming that there is a public perceptual object in such-and-such a place in my line of vision, and will be claiming that this public perceptual object is a cat. My insistence that I am seeing a cat shows that I am, in a sense, evaluating as true all the beliefs I have acquired about what I am perceiving. However, if my reply to this objection had been an admission that I must have imagined things, I will be conceding that I am not, in fact, seeing a cat. In making this admission, I will still be operating on the level of the propositional sense of "perceive". For I will have evaluated only one of my perceptual beliefs as false — viz. the belief that a cat is in my line of vision. Thus, even though I am not seeing a cat, it is still true, in these circumstances, that I am perceiving something. (i.e. still true that I am seeing the boot). There is a public perceptual object in my line of vision (the boot), and by taking it to have some characteristic (that of being
a cat), I have succeeded in discriminating the boot from other public perceptual objects in my line of vision.

On this analysis, therefore, when I say (after mistaking a public perceptual object \( x \) for a public perceptual object \( y \)) "I only imagined that I saw \( y \)", I imply this:

I am perceiving, or did perceive, something - i.e. there is or was a public perceptual object \( x \) in my line of vision which I discriminated from others by taking it to have some characteristic (that of being \( y \)). But since I believed falsely that \( x \) is \( y \), I misperceived. It is not true that I saw that the public perceptual object in my line of vision is \( x \), or true that I saw that it was \( y \).

From this it follows that Sartre's analysis, like Kyle's is unsatisfactory. Sartre is correct in arguing that mistaken perceivings are perceivings, but wrong in maintaining that there is no sense in which they are imaginings. His analysis commits him to the mistaken view that "imagine" cannot be used to indicate the falsity of perceptual beliefs on the propositional level.

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This conclusion has important consequences. Sartre asserts that it can never be true that mistaken
perceivings are imaginings. On the other hand, Ryle asserts that it can never be true that such imaginings are perceivings. Both claims are crucial for their respective accounts of relations between imagining and believing, and both are mistaken. This permits us to ask a further important question. Given that they are wrong on the score of false suppositions, have Sartre and Ryle put forward an adequate account of the role played by belief in directed imagining?

IV

Let us, first, consider again what is involved in Sartre's and Ryle's claims that directed imaginings are a form of make-believing. According to Sartre, all acts of imagination are either playful activities or fascinated consciousnesses. As a playful activity, imagining is the sort of thing we do when we, for example, see a face in a spot on a wall. As a fascinated consciousness, imagining is the sort of activity we engage in when a world-as-image appears to us via, for example, entoptic lights (in a hypnagogic state) or the lines on a page (when reading a novel). Since Sartre claims that only the analogue varies in different acts of imaginative consciousness, his argument can be reformulated in this way: all acts of imaginative consciousness are, what Furlong calls "directed imaginings performed in imagination"† (given

1. *Imagination*, London, 1961, Chapter IV
that such imaginings always require a perceptually present analogue).

Ryle, on the other hand, argues that directed imaginings can take another form. There are, he contends, two distinct ways in which we can respond to the request "Imagine that x". (1) We may picture ourselves x-ing - we may, in Furlong's sense, x in imagination.1 (2) We may perform some overt bodily activity in acting as if we were x-ing - i.e. we may, in Furlong's sense, x with imagination.2

Although Ryle's analysis does, in this way, differ from Sartre's, they make a common claim about the nature and importance of the relations between believing and directed imagining. Sartre argues that any act of imagining can be characterised either by a belief that what is imagined is not perceptually present, or by an absence of belief that what is imagined is perceptually present. Ryle argues that both the above types of directed imagining can be characterised in this way. They both argue, furthermore, that it is this characterisation of directed imagining which shows that such imaginings cannot be a form of perceiving.

Suppose that I am asked to imagine that there is a man on the moon. On Sartre's analysis, as well as on

1. loc.cit.
2. Ibid, Chapter VIII
Ryle's, a number of conditions must be satisfied before I can comply with such a request. What I am asked to imagine must be something which could be perceived if it were present or if it existed - i.e. must be something of which it is true to say "It can be perceived". I must, furthermore, know what the moon and a man look like, and, perhaps, what it would be like to be on the moon. According to Sartre, if I am to be successful in my imagining John on the moon, there must be, in my line of vision, some analogue (some perceptually present object) which stands for, or represents, a man-as-imagined-on-the-moon.

Suppose now that I am asked if I have succeeded in imagining that there is a man on the moon, and I reply "I am seeing John on the moon". According to Ryle, my statement must be construed as one to the effect that I am 'seeing', and not seeing John on the moon. My 'seeing' John on the moon, to Sartre, is an imaginative act of consciousness directed at the real John, at the real moon and at the non-existent spatial relation between them. According to Ryle, my 'seeing' John on the moon is an incipient or inhibited performance. It is an activity which involves knowing how John would look if he were on the moon, but which is not in fact a seeing of John on the moon. Because of this, Sartre and Ryle argue that such an imaginative activity (if it is to be of the directed sort) must be "belief free" in an important sense. My imagining that John is on the moon must be characterised either by a negation of the belief that what I am imagining is actually
the case (that John is actually to be seen on the moon), or by an absence of belief that what I am imagining is actually the case.

The important part of Sartre's account, and of Ryle's account, of directed imaginings is the contention that the characterisation of these imaginings as "belief free" (in the sense outlined above) shows that such imaginings cannot be a form of perceiving. According to the arguments they put forward, when I say that I see John on the moon, I imply that it is the case that John and the moon are in a specific spatial relation, and I imply that they are present as such in my line of vision. But when I say that I am imagining that John is on the moon (that I 'see' John on the moon), I imply that John cannot now be seen on the moon - i.e. I imply that John and the moon are not in a specific spatial relation and that they are not present as such in my line of vision. Thus, my imagining that John is on the moon differs from my seeing John on the moon by being a suspension or negation of the beliefs which characterise my seeing John on the moon. This, Sartre and Ryle both argue, is the distinguishing feature of directed imaginings, and shows that it is not true that such imaginings are perceiving.

Can this claim be substantiated?
In rejecting Sartre's version of the argument that no imagining can be a perceiving, I concluded that it is true that seeings-as are perceiving. If I see the paint-on-canvas as John on the moon, it is true that I see John on the moon. But a statement such as "I see John on the moon" (uttered when I am looking at a painting) must, I argued further, be qualified if it is not to be misleading. If qualified by the use of scare-quotes my statement must be read as "I see 'John on the moon". This mode of qualification serves as a warning that I am not to be taken to be claiming that the real John and the real moon are in a specific spatial relation and that they are present as such in my line of vision. But it is still true, despite this qualification of my statement, that I am seeing John on the moon.

It follows from this argument that my seeing John on the moon in, or by means of, a painting is "belief free" in Sartre's and Ryle's special sense. My argument has shown that when I succeed, in such circumstances, in seeing John on the moon, I either do not believe that I am seeing the real John on the real moon, or have no beliefs as to whether or not I am seeing the real John on the real moon. Since the main conclusion of my argument is that this seeing John on the moon is a perceiving, what I have established is that seeings-as (or what Sartre calls acts of imaginative consciousness) can be "belief-free" in Sartre's and Ryle's special sense, while still being perceiving.

A similar conclusion can be reached with respect to Ryle's analysis. Suppose that my seeing John on the
moon is an instance of visualising rather than of seeing-as. I argued, in Chapter 5, that visualisings can be perceiving. I also argued that since I am not claiming that John can be seen on the moon when I visualise him as being there, the statement "I see John" must, like a seeing-as-statement, be qualified in order not to mislead anyone. This qualification of my statement has the specific purpose of withdrawing the implied claim about what I am perceiving; the implied claim that what I am perceiving is the real John on the real moon. In other words, part of what I imply when I say, in this context, "I see John on the moon" is that I do not believe that I am in fact seeing the real John on the real moon. Consequently, even though visualisings are perceiving, they are "belief free" in Sartre's and Ryle's special sense.

An important part of Sartre's and Ryle's analyses is, therefore, wrong. They are mistaken in asserting that the characterisation of directed imaginings as "belief free" shows that such imaginings cannot be perceiving. Thus, their analysis of the relations between imagining and believing is inadequate in the sense that it cannot fulfill the prime function they demand of it - viz. that of distinguishing between directed imaginings and perceiving.

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My argument so far in this chapter has been directed at the inadequacy of Sartre's and Ryle's accounts
of the relations between imagining and believing, and has been circumscribed by the limits they set. The problems I have considered so far have been concerned primarily with whether Sartre and KYLE treat correctly the relations between imagining and believing (a) in those cases where imagining is a form of mistaken perceiving, and (b) in those cases where imagining is a form of directed supposal. I concluded that their analyses are unsatisfactory in both cases.

An important problem does still remain. In arguing that certain important consequences do not follow from Sartre's and KYLE's characterisation of directed imaginings as "belief free", I assumed that all directed imaginings are "belief free" in their sense. Is this a correct assumption?

V

Oosthuizen argues that there must be directed imaginings which are more than make-believing or pretending.\(^1\) The relations between imagining and believing can, he maintains, be illustrated by a consideration of the logic of can-questions.\(^2\) We may begin this analysis by examining some of the ways in which can-questions are

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2. Ibid, p. 8
the cat to there. Can you see the one that tells that you know where the car is on the map? I'll know, and the car. It is the same one that tells that you can see the cat on the map. Say, I can see the cat on the map. Can you see the questions to be answered? The answer to be observed or because he seems to be discomforted or because he...

the walls of some industrial person's quarters. Can you see the car on the map? Does the question, "Can you see the car on the map?" suggest that a certain kind of knowledge to be acquired or developed, that is known or believed to be required or developed in a certain way. Do you know, and you believe that."
Can questions with verbs of imagining seem, Costhuizen maintains, to function in both these ways.

The question 'Can you imagine that the Führer is not mad?' may express surprise at the excessive imaginative abilities of some people; it may also express surprise that such a thing could be imagined in spite of all the obvious evidence to the contrary.¹

If, he contends,

I am faced with the question 'Can you imagine that the Führer is not mad?', I may take it to read 'Can you imagine a non-mad Führer?'. In an attempt to answer this question all I need do is to picture a Hitler as flying sedately to London, waving an umbrella at excited crowds, smiling under his bowler hat, saying 'Peace in our time ...'. The imagining here is like fancying that one is seeing, pretending that one is reading, playing at possible sketches, planning a Walt Disney Cartoon. The only rules operative in this test of my imaginative ability is I should think of, picture, etc., someone in some sense resembling Hitler acting in more or less sane ways. For the purposes of the test other factual knowledge about Hitler is suspended.²

"Imagine", as used in this context, is, argues Costhuizen, a proper sense of "make-believe".³

And it is in these cases, where 'can you imagine ...' questions resemble

1. loc. cit.
2. loc. cit.
3. Ibid, p.10
'can you perceive ...' questions in querying abilities, that answers to these questions furnish no evidence for believing what is imagined to be possibly the case. My playful consideration of a Hitler doing this or that in no way decides the question whether the Hitler, despite outward appearances, could really have been like that. It might not be plausible at all.¹

I can, continues Gosthuizen, respond to the question "Can you imagine that the Führer is not mad?" in a different way. I can also interpret it as asking whether it is possible, without doing violence to the facts, to make out a plausible case that Hitler was sane.² If it is interpreted in this way, this question does not, he contends,

query individual imaginative abilities; and answers to this question do provide important evidence for believing, disbelieving or doubting statements about the sanity of Hitler. The imaginative enquiry establishes the plausibility of certain beliefs, and in this way parallels the function of statements like 'I can see the cat ...' with regard to 'believing that ...'. The character of this sort of 'imagining' may be made clearer by considering what is involved in 'imagining that the Führer is not mad in this sense. The task set is obviously not that of pretending to see or playfully to describe a different Hitler, but to interpret differently the same Hitler. We are asked

1. loc.cit.
2. loc.cit.
to consider not 'a Hitler' but 'the Hitler'; and this involves the discipline of 'seeing him as ...' 'thinking of him as ...' 'interpreting him as ...' he really was.'

Cottingham concludes that:

A successful outcome to the exercise in 'imagining' in the second sense, then, does provide evidence for saying 'I can believe, I do believe, that Hitler was not insane. It is not a preposterous suggestion'. But the sense of possibility suggested by 'not preposterous' must be sharply distinguished from the sense of possibility tied to the first kind of 'imagining'. 'Possible' in the first sense means to be able playfully to give a description of a mock-Hitler, a preposterous description, possibly. In the latter sense it means seriously to give a non-preposterous description or interpretation of the real Hitler. 2

Bernadete argues in a similar way that we must distinguish between a make-believe and a serious sense of "imagine". 3 Recognition of these two senses is forced on us because of problems with the Humean principle "Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible". 4 The chief difficulty with this principle, asserts Bernadete, is that it is far from being self-evident.

1. loc. cit.
2. Ibid., pp. 10-11
4. Ibid., p. 342
In fact, it seems to be quite false. I can readily 'imagine' myself, in Hume's sense of 'imagine', lifting the Great Pyramid off the ground and high into the air, with my bare hands, unaided by any resource of modern technology. But no one in his right mind ... supposes that my little fantasy in any way establishes the possibility of the exploit. We know ... that the exploit is utterly and absolutely impossible. We call the exploit Impossible. It is a standard case, a paradigm case, of sheer impossibly, and in calling the thing impossible we do not deny that it can be 'imagined', i.e. pictured in the mind or drawn on paper.7

"What we do deny", Bernadete argues, "is simply the inference that because it can be 'imagined', therefore it must be 'possible'. With what right is that inference negotiated?"2 But there is, he admits, "a sense in which if something is acknowledged to be 'imaginable' or 'conceivable' it is also acknowledged to be 'possible'."3 Bernadete argues further that this sense of "imagine" and "conceive" is very different from that intended by Hume.

Let me but ask, 'Is it possible in the years ahead that war might break out over Berlin?', you will answer, 'Yes, it
is quite possible'; or 'I can very well imagine such a thing'; or 'It is certainly conceivable'. These three alternative answers all mean the same thing. In the same way we should all insist that it is quite inconceivable that Paraguay will knock out the Soviet Union tomorrow in a great war — nothing of the sort can be imagined — it is absolutely impossible. Here, again, there is an equivalence of meaning in the three locations. There is certainly no inference. If it is quite conceivable that war might break out over Berlin, then it is certainly possible. But there is no inference from the one to the other — from conceivability to possibility. So, too, if it is inconceivable and unimaginable that Paraguay should knock out the Soviet Union, it is also impossible. No evidence is here required to validate a leap from 'inconceivability' to 'impossibility'. The very same grounds that entitle us to say that the thing is inconceivable (they are not psychological grounds) also entitle us to say that it is impossible.¹

The sense of "imagining" as used above, contends Bernadete, must be sharply distinguished from a second sense of "imagine".² He maintains that:

This second sense is the make-believe or storytelling sense, and it is identical with, or at least rather close to, the sense intended by Hume. I can certainly

1. loc.cit.
2. loc.cit.
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This text appears to be a partial transcription, possibly from a historical or legal document, considering the structure and language. The text is not entirely clear due to the quality of the image. However, it seems to discuss a concept or principle that includes terms like "decreased," "increased," and possibly "contention." The text might be about a comparison or change in some context, but the specific content is not fully legible.

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Sartre and Deleuze would argue that a question such as "Can you (really) imagine that Hitler was not mad?" can be interpreted in only two ways:

1. The questioner could be asking if I really am able to picture a sane Hitler, or if I really am able to pretend that I am a sane Hitler. The questioner could be querying my ability to make-believe on the grounds, for example, that I am physically incapable of visualising anything, or that I do not know what Hitler looked like or behaved like.

2. The questioner could also be querying my claim that a sane Hitler is something which could be imagined. Given the sense of the word "imagine", I cannot, in fact, imagine Hitler as he was. If I insist that a sane Hitler is something which could be imagined, my evidence for believing that Hitler was sane or "the real world is such that this is possible". If I insist that a sane Hitler cannot be imagined, I can only say that a sane Hitler cannot be imagined. A counter to this is that a sane Hitler cannot be perceived. And if we can say that Hitler was sane, but of an assertion to the effect that a sane Hitler is something which could be represented (say) in a picture or a stage...
The grounds which Sartre and Ryle have for rejecting Oosthuizen's and Bernadette's additional sense of "imagine" are indistinguishable from the general claims they make about directed imagining. They would argue that if I maintain that my imagining (in the directed sense) a sane Hitler is compatible with my believing that he was in fact sane, I will encounter the following problem:

When I say truly that I am imagining something, what I am imagining must be something which could be perceived if it were present or if it existed. The point of imagining a thing is to determine what the imagined thing would be like if it were present or if it existed. But since no act of imagining can be a form of perceiving, when I successfully (in the directed sense) imagine anything, I cannot believe that what I am imagining is the case — e.g., that it is perceptually present. Thus, I cannot, as Oosthuizen and Bernadette argue I can, say truly, at one and the same time, "I am imagining x" and "I believe that x is the case". The statement "I believe that x is the case" contradicts what the statement "I am imagining x" implies — viz. that I do not believe that x is the case. If I say truly that I am imagining that Paraguay could knock out the Soviet Union in a war and that I am imagining that Hitler was sane, I must be make-believing that these situations are true. The statements "I believe that Hitler was sane" and "I believe that Paraguay could knock
out the Soviet Union in a war" are, therefore, incompatible with my original statements that I am imagining these states of affairs.

Two important claims lie at the heart of this argument. They are (a) that imagining cannot be a form of perceiving, and (b) that the point of imagining anything is that of determining what the imagined thing would be like if it were perceptually present. Although I have not shown that (b) is false, I have established that (a) is false. This has serious consequences for the argument Sartre and Ryle would employ to reject Gosthuizen's and Bernadete's additional sense of "imagine".

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the purpose of imagining something is, as Sartre and Ryle maintain, that of determining what an absent or non-existent object would be like if it were perceptually present. Suppose, too, that I am asked to imagine a flying pig, and I do this (i) by looking at a spot on a wall, and (ii) by visualising a flying pig.

Sartre and Ryle both argue that if a flying pig were perceptually present, then there would have to be some public perceptual object in my line of vision which I take to have some characteristic - e.g. the characteristic of looking like a flying pig. On Ryle's analysis, my visualising a flying pig cannot be a perceiving since there is, in these circumstances, no
public perceptual object which I take to be a flying pig. If, therefore, I know that I am visualising a flying pig, I cannot believe that a flying pig is perceptually present to me. According to Sartre, since I do not take the public perceptual object in my line of vision (the wall) to have any characteristic when I see a flying pig by means of it, this act of consciousness cannot be a perceiving. Thus, if I know that I am seeing a flying pig by means of the spot on the wall, I cannot believe that a flying pig is perceptually present. I must suspend or negate any belief that what I am imagining is the case (is perceptually present).

The crux of the argument that Sartre and Ryle would employ as a counter-objection to Costhuizen's and Bernadette's analyses lies in their claim that when I (in the directed sense) imagine anything, I cannot believe truly that what I am imagining is perceptually present. According to Sartre and to Ryle, the notion of something "being perceptually present" is univocal. It can only mean "present as a public perceptual object in the subject's perceptual range". However, since I have concluded that visualising and seeings-as can be perceiving, the notion of something being perceptually present is not as unambiguous as is supposed by Sartre and Ryle. Since it is true that my visualising a flying pig is a perceiving, there must be a sense in which a flying pig is perceptually present to me when I visualise one. In the same way, since it is true that my seeing a flying pig in a spot on a wall is a perceiving, a
flying pig must be, in an important sense, perceptually present to me when I succeed in seeing one by means of the spot on the wall. In other words, when I succeed in imagining a flying pig in either of these two ways, a flying pig will be perceptually present to me, and I can believe truly that a flying pig is perceptually present.

This argument has important consequences. Since visualisings and seeings-as are instances of directed imagining, Sartre's and Ryle's arguments fail. We can now conclude, contra Sartre and Ryle, that it is not the case, when I directly imagine a flying pig, that I cannot believe truly that a flying pig is perceptually present. Thus, their counter to Coethuizen's and Bernadete's analyses falls away.

Sartre and Ryle could, however, enter a new counter-objection. They might concede that there is a sense in which a flying pig is perceptually present when I visualise one and when I see one in a spot on a wall. But they might argue that since a flying pig is not, and I know one is not, present as a public perceptual object, the chief point of their counter-objection remains. When I (in the directed sense) imagine anything, I do not, and cannot, believe that this thing is present as a public perceptual object. I can only make-believe that it is present as a public perceptual object.
This new argument cannot prevent the collapse of Sartre's and Ryle's analyses of the relations between imagining and believing. If Sartre and Ryle concede that the sense in which something can be perceptually present is ambiguous, then they let in a conclusion reached earlier in this chapter. This is the conclusion that their analyses cannot fulfill the function they demand of it.

Sartre and Ryle maintain that their analyses of directed imaginings as "belief-free" (in their special sense) demarcates directed imaginings from perceiving as well as from other forms of imagining. When we directly imagine anything, they insist, we do not, and cannot, believe that the imagined object is perceptually present. If Sartre and Ryle now concede that there is a sense in which we can believe truly that, for example, a flying pig is perceptually present when we imagine one (in the directed sense of "imagine") they will have to drop this strong claim in favour of a weaker one. Sartre and Ryle will now have to say that their contention that directed imaginings are "belief free" implies, not that such imaginings are not perceiving, but only that such imaginings are not mistakenly-believing (false suppositions). The key claim in their counter to Costhuzen's and Bernadete's argument amounts now to this: while we do, in some false suppositions, believe falsely that we are perceiving public perceptual objects in directed imaginings we do not, and cannot, believe that
we are perceiving public perceptual objects. As my argument has shown, this weaker version of Sartre's and Ryle's contention that directed imaginings are "belief free" does not establish either that such imaginings cannot be perceiving; or precisely what is involved in directed imaginings. In other words, their analysis of the relations between imagining and believing cannot fulfill the functions they demand of it.

Thus, once it has been established that Sartre and Ryle are wrong in claiming that no form of imagining can be a perceiving, no viable defence of their rejection of Oosthuizen's and Bernardete's additional (i.e. non-make-believing and non-mistakenly-believing) sense of "imagine" is possible.

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Since all Sartre's and Ryle's counter-objections have failed, we can conclude that Oosthuizen's and Bernardete's additional sense of "imagine" is a legitimate one. We can now consider in more detail what is involved in uses of this additional sense of "imagine". In this way, we can show that Sartre's and Ryle's analyses of the relations between imagining and believing have collapsed entirely.
A vital part of Sartre's and Ryle's analyses is the claim that whatever we do, or can, imagine is possibly the case. The sense in which an imagined object is possibly the case is, they maintain, a limited one. Whatever is or can be imagined must be something of which it is true to say "It can be perceived". An important part of the argument which Oosthuizen and Bernadete employ to establish their additional sense of "imagines" is the assertion that analyses such as those of Sartre and Ryle have not stated the only sense in which whatever is or can be imagined is possibly the case.

Oosthuizen uses the example of a judge reaching a verdict to illustrate this further sense in which whatever is or can be imagined is possibly the case.¹ A judge, says Oosthuizen, must, in his attempt to reach a verdict, try to fit together bits and pieces of evidence.² He must do this "by making allowance for wrong interpretations, and he must try to fill in gaps in the evidence presented to him".³ The judge, Oosthuizen argues,

must try to decide what had in fact happened. He has to reconstruct the

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¹ "The Role of Imagination in Judgements of Fact", paper read at the Eighth Conference of The Society for the Advancement of Philosophy in South Africa, Durban, July, 1965 (To be published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
² Ibid, p. 25
³ Ibid, pp. 25-6
crime. But the mere fact that the judge has to reconstruct a past event in this way implies that he has not observed or is at any rate not observing what he is reconstructing. At the most a judge can picture what he would most likely have observed, had he been a spectator of the event, what he would have felt, had he been the criminal or the victim; and he has to do so by taking cognizance of the rules of logic, the rules of behaviour and the facts before the court.¹

This shows that the judge is using his imagination in the sense of imaginatively reconstructing a past event.

Let us consider now, Costhuizen continues, some important features of the judge's use of imagination. We can do this by examining in some detail what is involved in the judge treating an eye-witness report, not as a factual report, but as a piece of evidence.²

When a judge treats something as a piece of evidence, he treats it, contends Costhuizen, neither with belief nor with disbelief. We cannot, however, say that the judge's suspension of belief implies that he transforms an eye-witness report into a "belief-free piece of imagining".

That it is regarded with neither belief nor disbelief means rather, that the statement is not fixed in a context of true or false descriptive, categorical statements. What is stated as a fact by an eye-witness is "translated" by

¹. *Ibid*, p. 26
². *loc.cit*. 
a judge into a modal form, into 'what possibly may have been the case'. Any belief attached to this statement by the judge will similarly be translated into a modal form; or more precisely, will be a modal form of belief in a statement merely entertained, presumed, supposed etc. to have possibly been the case. The task of the judge, now, is to move back to a descriptive categorical form of statement, but only in so far as the evidence allows, by the general rules of inference, common-sense and the facts. These latter facts are those which are not disputed and therefore not translated into a modal form.1

The fact that we qualify our descriptions of the judge's use of imagination by means of phrases such as "by general rules", "in so far as the evidence allows", "according to the facts" is, Oosthuizen argues further, of vital importance in distinguishing this sense of "imagine" from the make-believing sense.

Something may be thought or imagined to have been the case, regardless of the facts. We can imagine many things which because they are imaginable, are logically possible, but which would not accord with known facts. In this sense it is conceivable, imaginable that pigs could fly given different laws of gravitation.2

But in a more rigorous sense, contends Oosthuizen, "'what may have possibly been the case' is qualified as what can

1. Ibid, p. 27
2. loc.cit.
be thought or imagined to be the case with due regard to the facts, the rules of evidence and our accepted knowledge of human behaviour".¹ In this sort of imagining, he continues, we have to reconstruct an alleged fact.

What is imagined as possibly the case represents the states of affairs to be reconstructed and may do so with more or less or with no success. In imagining what possibly may have been the case, one must be led by accepted facts and general empirical and formal rules. One tries to picture, draw or depict, in terms of what one knows. One tries to fill in the gaps between bits and pieces of evidence. Here in short imagining does fulfill many of the functions traditionally ascribed to it — those of gap-filling, ergatzseeing, constructions and so on.²

Oosthuizen's conclusion must be that if the judge succeeds in imagining the disputed event, he can believe truly that what he is imagining is the case. In this sense of "imagine", a true imagining-statement does not necessarily imply the operation of a factual disclaimer.

It is apparent from this outline that once we accept that Sartre and Ryle cannot rebut Oosthuizen's and Bernadete's analyses, we must admit a class of imagining-statements which are such that anyone can say truly at

1. loc. cit.
2. Ibid, pp. 27-8
one and the same time "I am imagining x" and "I believe that x is the case". We may conclude, unless further arguments to the contrary are raised, that Sartre and Ryle are mistaken in claiming that any imagining-statement implies the operation of a factual disclaimer.

VI

The discussion in this chapter shows that Sartre and Ryle cannot give an adequate analysis of the relations between imagining and believing. Any imagining-statement implies, according to them, a factual disclaimer - i.e. implies either (1) a suspension or negation of belief that what is imagined is the case (Sartre and Ryle) or (2) a false belief that what is imagined is the case (Ryle). I have argued that both give a mistaken account of (2). Ryle's error lies in his claim that mistaken perceivingings are not perceivingings, and Sartre's in his claim that mistaken perceivingings are not imaginings. I argued further that both are wrong with respect to (1). Point (1) cannot, as they claim it does, indicate precisely what is involved in directed imaginings. Nor can it show that directed imaginings must be distinguished from perceivingings. A further difficulty in their account is that point (1) does not appear to give a complete account of directed imaginings. For there is a sense in which we can, at one and the same time, say truly that we are imagining something and that we believe truly that it is the case.
The collapse of their account of the relations between imagining and believing has serious consequences for Sartre's and Ryle's analyses of imagination. Their way of construing these relations constitutes, I argued, a major part of their contention that imagining has close logical links with perceiving. Thus, we may conclude that because their account of the relations between imagining and believing is not correct, this contention of Sartre's and Ryle's cannot be substantiated.