USE OF THESES

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DEMONSTRATION AND BELIEF:

THE INVESTIGATION OF A DIFFERENCE

IN CLASSICAL THOUGHT

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This thesis is my own work,
except where specifically acknowledged.

(Andrew Benjamin)
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ABBREVIATIONS AND FOOTNOTING

I have, within this text, attempted to keep footnotes to a minimum level of disruption. Ideas which are related, though not central, to my major concerns have been included, in brackets, in the body of the text. With regard to footnoting books, I have adopted the following procedure: if a section is devoted entirely or for the major part to a single book, then I have included only the relevant page number after a quote or reference. In those sections in which there are a number of references to various books I have either given the title and page number after the reference, or used one of the following abbreviations:

AK  M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge.*

BPW  *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings,* ed. D. M. Armstrong.

DCB  *Descartes' Conversations with Burman,* introduced, with a commentary, by J. Cottingham.

DPL  *Descartes' Philosophical Letters,* ed. A. Kenny.


HEW  *Hobbes' English Works.* Number refers to Volume.

HR  *Descartes' Philosophical Works,* ed. Haldane and Ross. Number refers to Volume.


OT  M. Foucault, *The Order of Things.*
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As for individuals, I wish to thank Ian Jordan, Tim Nicholson, and especially Peter Whitney for their constant though critical interest in my work. Apart from the above individuals, it would be impossible to fully thank the two people with whom I live for providing the sort of environment in which this work could have been both conceived and completed. It is for this reason that I dedicate this thesis to Diane and Jennifer.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis exists on two levels. It is an examination of certain topics in seventeenth century and eighteenth century philosophy, and at the same time an attempt to utilise the insights afforded by Heidegger and Foucault in the writing of the history of systems of thought. I have gone about the thesis in this way because I think there are theoretical inadequacies in most writings in the history of ideas. While I have not concerned myself to any great degree with an examination and critique of these inadequacies, I have used them as a starting point. In other words, my concern is not with these inadequacies as such. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to examine the writing of the history of philosophy by attempting to write a tiny portion of its history. This thesis is therefore a process, a means by which the act of writing becomes an examination of the possibility of writing the 'history of philosophy' itself.

In the introduction to the first chapter and in the first section of that chapter, I have attempted to establish certain problems and conditions which provide a way into the writing of the history of philosophy. The way in is not pure acceptance of certain approaches. Rather, it is an examination of what constitutes an 'approach'. The criterion used to substantiate what accounts for an 'approach' is the relationship between the approach and metaphysics. What has been argued is that central to any approach, central to the act of writing, is that the approach to metaphysics cannot be trapped within metaphysics. Rather, writing must exist in a state of diff-
ference from metaphysics. There can be no 'outside' of metaphysics, as the opposition outside/inside is part of metaphysics itself. The consequence of this is that a non-metaphysical conception of difference must be established. Hence one of the main concerns of the first chapter is this activity.

The first chapter is therefore an establishing of the means by which two paradigms of the knowing process will be examined. However, as is made clear in the first chapter, it is not the 'pure' part of a pure and applied study. Rather, what has been attempted are the pre-conditions of such a study, concentrating on an explanation of the way in which these paradigms can differ and the conception of 'text' which is at play in the establishing of a paradigm. I argue that a text is inseparable from its epistemic conditions of existence, i.e., the conditions which constitute knowledge in a given discursive practice, in terms of the rules governing the knowing process. The second section of the first chapter is an attempt to establish the epistemic conditions of existence which were at play in these centuries. However, if the text is inseparable from its conditions of existence, then the discussion of philosophical texts must take place in terms of their conditions of existence. It is for this reason too that the thesis does not divide into a pure section and an applied section. The establishing of the paradigms must take place in relation to these conditions of existence. This point is at play in chapters two and three, which are concerned with establishing the paradigms of demonstrable knowledge and the
Humean paradigm. What I attempt to show is that it is only in terms of a certain conception of identity and difference that the difference between these can be explained, and that it is only in terms of a certain conception of text that the paradigms can in fact be constructed.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an investigation of the period beginning with Descartes' writing of the 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind' in 1628 and ending with the publication of Hume's 'Enquiries' in 1777. The chronological domain which will be traversed comprises one hundred and fifty one years. However, the chronological schema, though forever lurking in the background, is not the concern of this thesis. Rather, my concern is to establish what it is about the texts located in the schema that allows for a difference between them, and what it is that allows for an identity.

Within this period there seem to exist two semi-discrete paradigms; where paradigm is to be loosely understood as incorporating the knowing subject, the object of knowledge and the relationship existing between them. The first paradigm is characterised by the texts of Descartes, Locke, and the Port Royal Logicians, and could be described as the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge and the attack upon the primacy of reason. The texts which mark the existence of this particular paradigm are those of David Hume; it could be called the Humean paradigm. As my concern is with an explanation of the nature and possibility of the difference between these paradigms, the first chapter is an elaboration of a conception of identity and difference which is pertinent to the writing of the history of systems of thought.
The question of the possibility of the text is symptomatic of a more fundamental question: one posed on the level of identity. It is then a question concerning that which governs the text's possibility, in the almost Kantian sense which asks for the grounds of its formulation. In looking at this dual sense of possibility, my concern moves from locating identity and difference on the level of empirical content to locating identity and difference in relationship to their possibility. This level is the epistemic level, conditioning the possibility of what counts as knowledge. The difference between the content level and the epistemic level is that the former takes the utterances of the text as given, while the latter is concerned with what it is that governs and makes possible the utterances of the text.

The texts of this period exist in and owe their existence to the same domain of possibility. In stating this, the limits of comparison have been set as: what has been excluded is the activity of isolating like and unlike statements, and what has been included is the same epistemic possibility accounting for the existence of like and unlike statements. This is, of course, the consequence of the shift in emphasis from the content to the epistemic level. However, though this shift undermines analysis which concentrates exclusively on the content level of the text, the text remains, analysed on the interface between the epistemic and the content levels. The interface between these two levels should not be seen as two faces, one containing the cause and the other the effect. For
possibility is not causality, and the conditions of existence of a text are not discovered by viewing such conditions as one step of an overall teleological development. Consequently, the relationship between these two levels is to be understood as involving a structured set of ideational relations and concrete practices which, combined, account for the existence of texts.

Posing questions in terms of possibility opens up a series of problems. This introduction is a discussion of those problems, in order to clarify and explain what is at play in the term 'possibility'.

I will pose three related questions which strike at the problematic nature of this procedure:

1. Is the question of possibility one which generates an infinite regress? In other words, does the approach necessitate reference to the possibility of a possibility, one resting in turn on a further possibility, and so on, ad infinitum?

2. If the above is not the case, then what status can be given to the final position? Is there a plane which is not open to the question of possibility? And if so,
3. How is it that possibility is no longer a question, but rather, the plane is viewed as a point of departure?

The basis of the above questions is that the term 'possibility' is given the character of a surrogate origin. Consequently, what needs to be established in order to answer the implicit criticism in the above questions is why the concept of possibility is not a thinly-disguised concept of origin.

By the term 'possibility', what is intended is a specific conception of text which views the text as inseparable from its epistemic conditions of existence. Consequently, the text is viewed as part of the process which accounts for its existence as text. In stating this, my concern has been re-located, as it moves from a consideration of the text in terms of its being a static entity to a concern which necessitates a more organic approach to the text. By 'static entity', what is intended is a conception of the text as given. It is either a given historical event which can be assessed in terms of its historical location, or it is a given textual event which is assessed in terms of the coherence (or incoherence) of its utterances. The organic approach re-poses the question, 'What is a text?', for it asks the question, 'What epistemic conditions have to hold for there to be a given text?'. The term 'organic' refers to the inseparability of this new question and the
text itself. It is this organic approach which dispels the conflation of origin and possibility. In order to indicate why this is the case, I will return to the three questions.

The first question is concerned with the relation between text, the possibility of the text, and the possibility of the text's possibility, where the relationship is envisaged as involving an unspecified form of teleological development. Due to the incorporation of this conception of development an infinite regress must occur, as the only way it could be circumvented is if there existed an uncaused cause; the uncaused cause being a moment in historical time which, though accounting for the existence of various textual utterances, does not have a 'moment' which accounts for its existence. Now, implicit in this question is a conception of origin as cause, the consequence being that it cannot escape the contradictory nature of an existence which, if the infinite regress is to be avoided, must be conceived of as an uncaused cause.

The second and third questions are concerned with the potential status of an uncaused cause, since they are concerned with something's being a cause, though not itself subject to a causal relationship in terms of which its existence could be explained.
However, this concept of origin is self-contradictory and collapses in upon itself. Origin is the seed, it is that which has causal primacy and a discoverable generative power. And yet though it is these things, it can only exist in this way in the denial of what it is. For if an origin is the start of a path that can always be traced back (to its origin), then it has only two alternative forms of existence: either it is the contradictory uncaused cause, or it is an assumed origin which is not an origin at all. The latter form of existence is the only alternative to the uncaused cause, though this form of existence is equally contradictory. An effect, even though it may have certain generative powers, is hardly an origin.

Consequently, trapped in this impossibility is a conception of origin that incorporates teleological development and continuous development. This impossibility gives rise to the attempt to forge a continuous development and the related existence of an atemporal and ahistorical approach to the history of ideas. The former is the teleological development: one event being caused by another. This conception of the history of thought is marked by an emphasis on a linear development. The primacy of the causal event is of necessity located prior to its effect. The consequence of this is that implicit in the conception of teleological development is a notion of chronological time. This conception of time is also found in the ahistorical approach. This is due to the fixity of the cause taking as its only criterion a particular point
in a linear conception of chronological time, which also serves as a marker for the relationship between cause and effect.

Having identified in what sense these questions are problematic, it is now possible to identify the unproblematic ways in which they can be posed. To express this in the negative, it is possible to say that the unproblematic sense necessitates a conception of origin that incorporates neither a teleological development nor a conception of continuous development. Therefore the unproblematic conception is marked by the denial of teleology and the related existence of an emphasis on the discontinuous. The consequence of this, given two conditions, is that at this stage, and only at this stage can in fact exist as identity. This is conditional firstly upon the space between a text and its possibility not being filled by a causal connection, and secondly upon the relationship between a possibility and a possibility being expressed in terms of discontinuities rather than continuous development. The existence of possibility as identity is due to its being located outside a teleological schema and not posited as a contradictory uncaused cause. Furthermore, it is only at this stage that the organic relationship between text and possibility can exist.

The subject under discussion in the first section of Chapter I is the nature of this identity and the way in which this identity accounts for the existence of differences. Part
of this discussion will take place in terms of a more extended critique of the concept of chronological time as applied in the writing of the history of ideas.

Throughout this thesis there is evident use of the work of Michel Foucault. One of the major aims of the first section of Chapter I has been to locate the Foucaultian enterprise in terms of its possibility. Situating the work of Foucault is an enormously difficult task, as it is more than simply 'doing a Foucault on Foucault'. Instead of attempting to situate Foucault's work by an analysis of it in its own terms, I have tried to locate the possibility of his discourse in the 'subversion' of metaphysics. In the case of Foucault, this is the recognition of the historical possibility of a separation between 'thought' and 'being' which allows for an approach to the writing of the history of metaphysics such that the writing itself is not metaphysical.

The way in which the situation will occur is by means of a Heideggerian reflection. I intend to commence by detailing Heidegger's critique of essentialism as it is presented in his critique of the essentialist conception of identity and difference. The relevance of this is that Foucault's work uses a particular conception of identity, the 'episteme', and a particular conception of difference, the as yet unspecified contents of the episteme. However, it is vital to grasp these concepts not in terms of their metaphysical beginnings but in their relationship of difference to metaphysics. The reason
why this is vital is that 'archaeology' exists in such a relationship.

The movement of the first section of Chapter I commences with a discussion of Heidegger's text, 'The principle of identity', in order to locate the way in which Heidegger expresses a non-metaphysical conception of identity and difference. For this reason, the language used to state Heidegger's expression is difficult.

Language has two poles: one is the language of propositions, of argument, of reason, which is the language of metaphysics; the other is rhetoric and metaphoric, language in a relation of difference to propositional language. The consequence of this is that a discussion of non-metaphysical conceptions must be expressed in terms of a flight from one view of language to another. This results in language itself becoming problematic. My moving from one domain to another has two consequences: on the one hand the language used signifies the flight, while on the other hand the language of flight cannot be reduced to the language of propositions. While this may amount to the complexity of expression, complexity is an unavoidable consequence of the nature of the activity.
CHAPTER ONE

SECTION ONE

THE HEIDEGGERIAN REFLECTION
Heidegger begins his text, 'The Principle of Identity', with what he assumes to be the usual formulation of the principle of identity, $A = A$. What is at play in such an expression is the question of whether or not this formulation is in fact the principle of identity. For Heidegger the answer is in the negative, as the formulation expresses equality not identity. Equality necessitates two terms. While identity traced etymologically through *idem* to *auto* does not reveal equality, it reveals sameness and in so doing reveals oneness, since 'for something to be the same, one is always enough. Two are not needed, as they are in the case of equality' (23-24). Consequently, the most fitting formulation of the principle of identity is that 'A is itself the same with itself' (25). However, even if posed in this 'improved' way, the question still arises whether or not such an expression of identity allows us to penetrate it and determine the actual nature of identity. Once again Heidegger answers in the negative, as the 'improved' principle 'already presupposes what identity means and where it belongs' (26). For Heidegger the principle of identity is revealed in its presuppositions; in the very copula which joins the one A with the other. The copula states the nature of the being of the A, namely, 'it itself is the same with itself' (25). Consequently the principle of identity speaks of the 'Being of being'. This formulation utters what two thousand years of Western European thought had always known, that the 'unity of identity forms a basic characteristic in the Being of beings' (26). However, traced back to one of its early

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[1] The English translation of 'Der Satz Der Identität' which I have used is by Joan Stambaugh. It forms the first part of her translation of *Identität und Differenz*. All page numbers refer to this edition.
formulations, the principle of the Being of beings speaks of a different formulation. In the Parmenidean fragment, to gar auto noein estin to kai einai, what should be different, namely 'thinking' and 'Being', are the same, to auto. The fragment of Parmenides is paraphrased by Heidegger as follows: 'thinking and Being belong together in the Same by virtue of the Same' (27). It is not the case, as was stated above, that identity is seen as belonging to Being; rather, what emerges in the fragment is the opposite, namely that Being should be seen as belonging to identity. The force of this interpretation resides in Heidegger's translation of to auto as 'the Same', where Same is interpreted as a belonging together.

If the Parmenidean fragment is to be interpreted in terms of Western metaphysics, then the 'belonging together' has to be represented in terms of identity. And as such, the fragment would then read (utilising Heidegger's paraphrase): 'Thought and Being are identical by virtue of their being identical', or: 'Thought and Being form an identity by virtue of their being an identity'. If this was what the fragment actually said, then in its saying this it would accord with what Heidegger sees as one of the dominant aspects of Western metaphysics, namely, identity belonging to Being. However, what the fragment actually says is not that Thought and Being are identical, nor that Thought and Being form an identity, but rather that Thought and Being belong to the Same (to auto) and exist by virtue of their belonging to the Same (to auto). And furthermore, that Being receives its determination from
an existent identity insofar as it is a characteristic of that existent identity. Identity is no longer represented as a characteristic of Being; rather, Being belongs to identity. What emerges as the opaque point is the interpretation of Sameness as 'belonging together'. Consequently Heidegger's next move is a clarification of the 'belonging together'.

What needs to be established is in what sense 'belonging together' can be read as entailing a unity, and in what sense it can be read as denying such a unity. For Heidegger there are two possible ways of interpreting the 'belonging together' (Zusammengehören). The first is with the together emphasised, and the second is with the belonging emphasised. What is involved in the first interpretation is a determination of belonging by together, which is a determination of belonging by unity. The term 'to belong' means 'to be assigned and placed in the order of a together, established in the unity of a manifold, combined into the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying centre of an authoritative synthesis' (29). Consequently unity is located as paramount, and unity sliding into identity opens itself up to its dependence on Being. However, if we interpret it in the second sense, where belonging is dominant, then the together (identity/unity) is determined by the belonging. Consequently belonging is no longer represented by unity/identity and thus entails that the together will be expressed in terms of the belonging or absence of unity. The problem with this shift, as Heidegger mentions,
is that it can appear to be no more than a mere play on words: and as the possibility of upsetting metaphysics rests on its not being mere play, he pursues the nuances of the fragment into the fundamental domain of metaphysics, the 'belonging together' of man and Being.

Heidegger's concern is not to establish a unity between man and Being such that the unity is explained in terms of man or in terms of Being. Such an explanation of unity in terms of the representation of unity is abandoned. Rather, following the fragment and the two interpretations of 'belonging together', he attempts to grasp the relation in terms of these two interpretations. Consequently his first question concerning man and Being 'is how a belonging to one another ... is at stake in this "together"' (30-31). Operating on this level, what will emerge is a relationship between man and Being defined in terms of their essences. His argument for this is as follows: man is a being, understood in the sense that he is a being qua object in the world. Now such a status entails that he is part of the set of things which are the totality of Being. While man is part of the totality of Being, he occupies a unique place within such a totality. His uniqueness, his 'distinctive feature', is that he is a being who thinks, and as such faces the totality of Being in his thinking. Man's constant state of being referred to Being is contingent on Heidegger's conception of Being as presence. There seems to be an almost Cartesian element in Heidegger's thought, as Being is presence only in its relationship to man, and man is
only in a constant state of responding to or referring to Being because of his distinctive nature. 'Being is presence and abides only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on his. For it is man open towards Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence' (31). This does not mean, however, that Being came into existence by its being posited by man. Rather, my allusion to an implicit Cartesian element was intended to refer to a relation of mutual dependence, in the case of Descartes between thinking and being, and in this case between man and being; as Heidegger expresses it, 'Man and Being are appropriated to each other' (31).

However, if this appropriation is understood in terms of the together, then an explanation of appropriation must take place in terms of the unity residing in either man or Being, in other words, an explanation in terms of essences. In breaking with representational thinking and explanations in terms of essences, Heidegger moves from the domination of the together to the domination of the belonging. This break also entails a break with the essentialist understanding of Being as 'interpreted as the ground in which every being is grounded' (32). The break exists as metaphor in the text in that it fulfils the function of metaphor, the expression of that which is both same and different, like and unlike. The break is then the leap into a pure abyss and a leap into a charted abyss. It is the former as only the spring appears in the break with the ground of being, and it is the latter because the abyss is a familiar domain, a domain suggested by the fragment, the
belonging to Being. The belonging to Being has an already ascribed nature insofar as being belongs to man. Being understood as presence is only possible because being is being qua presence in that it is being for us. Consequently the spring, the existence of the break as metaphor is, as Heidegger states, 'needed in order to experience authentically the belonging together of man and Being' (33).

Why does authenticity depend on a leap, on a break? The answer to this question lies at the very heart of Heidegger's enterprise, namely, the subversion of metaphysics; and in so doing, it must depart from its actual terrain. Metaphysics, the point and cause of the rupture, is concerned with argument, reasoning, the establishment and use of presuppositions. In other words, metaphysics exists as propositional language. In breaking with metaphysics, in moving outside of the domain of propositional language, the armoury of metaphysics cannot be used, consequently all that remains are metaphor and rhetoric, being those things which capture the spring, the leap out of metaphysics. 'The spring is the abrupt entry into the realm from which man and Being have already revealed each other in their active nature (Wesen), since both mutually appropriated, extended as a gift one to the other' (33). Before discussing the nature of this appropriation, it is important to notice the actual language which Heidegger is using. The importance lies in the fact that an understanding of the principle of identity is in part contingent on understanding the language used to establish it.
The title of the lecture is 'Der Satz Der Identität'. The title can be translated in two ways. The first of these is the most obvious and standard of translations, namely, 'The Principle of Identity'. However, the German lends itself to another possible translation, namely, 'The Spring of Identity'. Heidegger, when he uses the word 'spring' (as, for example, in some of the quotations cited above), does not use the term Satz; rather, he uses Sprung. However, the niceties of terminology should not be allowed to hide the fact that the Identity in the actual title of the text is bound to the word Satz. The implication of this is that contained in the title of the work is the oscillation between the language of propositions and the language of metaphor and rhetoric. This has the effect that identity has a mutually exclusive dual natured existence, as it is embodied in a principle (Satz) and contained in the break with metaphysics, the spring (Satz) into the domain of the belonging to Being.

Therefore the break with metaphysics, the leap into the belonging to Being, established the relationship between identity and appropriation. However, we are still a certain distance from grasping why this is the case. To return to the question of appropriation. The mutual appropriation between man and Being is the belonging together of man and Being. Heidegger expresses this and the implications of it in the following compressed sentence: 'Only the entry into the realm of this mutual appropriation determines and defines the experience of thinking' (33). Heidegger has a very specific conception of
'thinking'. For Heidegger thinking is what man is. This conception of man and thinking quite clearly refers to our previous discussion of man and Being, since man is in his relation to Being, and his relation to Being is only possible because of what has already been described as his 'distinctive feature', that thing which differentiates him from other beings. In this particular text of Heidegger's, he is concerned to show what form this relation of man to Being has in what he calls the 'atomic age', or the here and now. The reason for this concern rather than the problem of man and Being posed in the abstract functioning as the concern is that it is only in metaphysics that such abstractions can be posed, as it is only within that realm that such questions can be posed 'in vacuo'. Posing the questions of man's relation to his age is not a Heideggerian question, as for Heidegger man is the atomic age. This particular age presents an essential challenge to the relationship of mutual appropriation between man and Being. It is with the consequences of this challenge that our concern lies.

The consequences of this age are: firstly, because of the leap into the belonging of Being there is a re-formulation of Being as presence, as 'Being itself ... belongs to us, for only with us can Being be present as Being, that is, become present' (33). Being as presence understood in terms of representation is de-centred, and Being belonging to man becomes central. In other words, Being conceived as the ground of being gives way to a conception of Being which takes as
central man's relation to Being. Secondly, because of this and because of the nature of the age, man and Being exist in a state of confrontation, they exist facing each other. The reasons for this existing as a consequence are not immediately obvious. The reasons are related to the following: in an age of technology it is possible to see the technology as a product of man, and within that product resides Being. However, such an observation would, as far as Heidegger is concerned, misunderstand the nature of the age and the nature of man, since man is technology in the sense that for Heidegger technology is concrete thought. Consequently as man is, in that he is his thinking, it is impossible to separate man and technology. Being, because it is no longer merely Being as presence, is only in its relation to man. Consequently, as the defining characteristic of the age is technology, and since technology is not a product of man in the sense that it exists apart from man but in the sense that man is technology, then technology is not Being; rather, 'Being speaks in the essence of technology' (34). In this particular age, this particular manner of the existence of relation between man and Being, man, and consequently Being, are challenged by the nature of beings. In order to both develop and clarify this challenge, Heidegger describes it as engendering a further challenge, one between man and Being. In other words, the challenge presented by beings in terms of the tenuous control man has over his 'thoughts', this challenge which confronts man and Being, 'places man and Being face to face in such a way that they challenge each other'. The name Heidegger gives to this
domain in which is situated the internal challenge existing between man and Being is the 'framework'. What is intended by this particular term is suggested by the original German word, 'Ge-stell'. The prefix 'Ge' refers to unity, but not to an essentialist conception of unity; rather, to a very specific sense of the term, a unity that while encompassing all that there is to encompass, allows the components of the all to retain their individual specificity. The 'stell' refers to the various permutations and usages of the verb 'stellen', i.e. vor-stellen, stellen, ent-stellen, nach-stellen, darstellen. The concept of 'framework', even understood as the unity of putting, placing, setting, representing, etc., is still an elusive notion. Even though it is elusive, it has for Heidegger a greater reality than the various manifestations of technology. The concept reality resides in the fact that in the 'atomic age' man and Being confront each other in terms of a 'set up' that is of their own making.

The term 'framework' refers therefore to the particular nature (existence) of the relationship between man and Being existing in the 'atomic age'. The existence of man and Being is such that the thought of man (which is man in the sense mentioned above) is of a nature that both challenges and jeopardises the existence of man. The various beings, which are concrete thought and in which Being resides, challenge man. Consequently man is in the peculiar situation of challenging his own existence because of the nature of his existence.

1. For a further discussion of Heidegger's German, see the translator's Introduction to the English edition of 'Identity and Difference'.
'In the mutual confrontation of man and Being we discern the claim that determines the constellation of our age' (35). The implication of the relationship between man and Being is found in Heidegger's expression of the relationship as being the 'belonging together' of man and Being. The emphasis on belonging signifies the nature of the mutual dependence and mutual appropriation of man and Being. 'Within the framework there prevails a strange ownership and a strange appropriation. We must experience simply this owning in which man and Being are delivered over to each other, that is, we must enter into what is called the event of appropriation' (36). Once again Heidegger's terminology is difficult. The 'Ereignis' is translated into English as the 'event of appropriation'. However, the German word contains important connotations that are not immediately evident in the English translation. The Heideggerian meaning of the German term is that of an abstract entity removed from the domain of everyday life, though so close that it cannot be seen; and that of a concrete entity involved in a coming to be seen. Consequently the term Ereignis contains the quality of something being at hand and seen due to the recognition of its being at hand.¹ The event of appropriation is therefore the realm in which man and Being obtain their true nature by their being seen to lose the determinations given to them by metaphysics. We have now reached the point where, as Heidegger states, we 'must ask

1. This conception of something being close at hand and yet not seen for that reason is also evident in Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, 127, 129.
the crude but inevitable question; What does appropriation have to do with identity?' (38). He answers this question as follows: 'Nothing. Identity, on the other hand, has much, perhaps everything, to do with appropriation' (38).

In the framework appropriation is seen as the belonging together of man and Being where the belonging (disunity) dominates the together (unity). This structure, this signification, calls into question what was identified as the metaphysical conception of Identity: Identity envisaged as central characteristic of Being. The consequence of this particular mode of existence is that it now becomes clear that 'Being belongs with thinking to an identity whose active essence stems from that letting belong together which we call appropriation. The essence of identity is a property of the event of appropriation' (39). The exact meaning of this is as follows: the event of appropriation is dependent on a view of Being which does not accord with the dominant metaphysical view (namely, Being as the Being of beings), but rather on a conception that both entails and marks a break with metaphysics. This conception, as has been previously mentioned, is Being understood not in terms of unity but in terms of a 'belonging to Being'. This 'belonging to Being' was part of the break with a representational view of Being, i.e. a break with a conception of Being which designates it as the grounds of beings such that Being both represents and provides the existentiality of being. The consequence of the break with this conception of Being is that it implies
a break with metaphysics. However, while this is the case, the fundamental aspect of the break was the nature of the break. In other words, the possibility of the break. The break was a 'spring'.

In fact this is the only way to depart from the domain of metaphysics, as using the procedure engendered by metaphysics (argument, reasoning, etc.) would in the act of using them designate the procedure as metaphysical. This conception of an outside of metaphysics is also suggested in the Parmenidean fragment, in that the fragment suggests a principle of identity that entails a conception of sameness (to auto) and not the subordination of identity to Being. If the principle of identity is not the expression of equality and not the expression of the dominance of together, then in what sense is it a principle (Satz)? The Satz of identity is a Satz in its otherness, in that hinted-at suggestion contained in the dual sense of the Satz. The principle of identity is 'a spring demanded by the essence of identity because it needs the spring if the belonging together of man and Being is to attain the essential light of the appropriation' (39). In other words, the principle of identity is related to a non-metaphysical conception of the belonging together of man and Being and as such is the prelude to the break with metaphysics. (The ultimate break with metaphysics occurs in the recognition of the 'framework' existing as the prelude to the event of appropriation and that both of 'them' contain and are dependent on a non-metaphysical view of Being. Hence the value of the term 'Ereignis'.)
The principle of identity when postulated on the edge of metaphysics has an undecidable status. In a sense this must be the case: to attempt an expression of the principle and still posit the principle at the edge of metaphysics flirts with self-contradiction. What then is the principle of identity? The answer to this question is that the principle of identity is similar to the nature of man and the nature of Being. In other words, it is a conception or principle that no longer is specific in the sense that its meaning can be gathered under a simple definition; rather, identity is the belonging together of man and Being, given that this belonging together is not an expression of equality, nor is it the expression of mere sameness. It is a relationship of identity posited outside a conception of equality, identity (understood as identity qua representation), and mere sameness. It is as was alluded to before the elusive 'belonging together'.

After having travelled this far in our discussion of Heidegger's text, we have reached the point where the fruits of the Heideggerian reflection can be utilised.

Part of the value of the Heideggerian reflection lies not in an absence in the text considered, nor does it lie in an actual presence, but rather in a specific mute utterance which is for ever unspoken in his text, an utterance which of necessity is silent, and which, if it were explicitly spoken by the text, would in the act of its own speaking deny its own force. The utterance concerns language and metaphysics and
the possibility that language and metaphysics are so interrelated that the actual act of writing, the construction of philosophical discourse, is itself just one more metaphysical act.

The recognition that language speaks metaphysics and that metaphysics speaks language brings the Heideggerian discourse to the edge of classical metaphysics. The positing of an outside gives this particular domain or abyss some form of ontology. And yet if Heidegger is read carefully, is not the act of using the word ontology to describe an attribute of the abyss an attempt to subdue its disruptive nature and consequently drive it back into the domain (not abyss) of metaphysics. The relationship between language and metaphysics and the possibility of constructing a discourse about the history of metaphysics where that discourse is in a constant state of difference with metaphysics is the legacy of the Heideggerian reflection.

How then can this legacy be utilised in attempting to write the history of systems of thought? The answer to the question resides in the nature of Heidegger's break with a metaphysical conception of identity. When Heidegger posited the 'fundamental' question of metaphysics, the relation between man and Being, he advanced one possible approach, which was an investigation that involved determining the essential nature of man and then the essential nature of Being. Once these essences had been located, then the nature of relation
was seen to reside in the nature of the essential characteristics. Consequently the identity existing between man and Being and the identity existing between A and A, or even a partial identity existing between A and B is located in the essential characteristics of either man or Being, A or B. Therefore the attribute of identity functions as representing these essential characteristics. It is clear that in the break with metaphysics such a conception of identity is abandoned. In fact the break with metaphysics is occasioned by the critique of essentialism. Consequently in the break and as a result of the break the identity between a given A and either A or B is not found in the components A and B but in their 'belonging together'. The same approach is also the case in regard to 'difference'. The difference between A and B is not found in their having different characteristics, as such a conception of difference resides within the domain of metaphysics and is dominated by an overt essentialism. Rather, the difference is located in their belonging together. In other words, they belong together in a mode of difference.

The value of the Heideggerian reflection is twofold. However, before identifying this twofold value, it is important to reiterate part of what has already been discussed, namely our relation to Heidegger. Heidegger's text was used not to expand the existing literature on Heidegger, nor was it used to introduce an explicit Heideggerian element into this work. The reason for saying this is that if the last few pages were
seen as an essay in Heideggerian philosophy, then they would appear in need of theoretical refurbishment, since I have explicitly left out a discussion of 'thinking', a discussion of the 'essence', a discussion of 'Das Ding', and a discussion of his text, 'The End of Philosophy', all of which would have been essential were I explicitly discussing Heidegger and the end of metaphysics. However, as has already been mentioned, the Heideggerian reflection was just that, a reflection; the conceptions of identity and difference were appropriated in the vibrating realm of Heidegger's discourse.

The twofold value refers primarily to a conception of identity and difference existing on the edge of metaphysics in a constant process of breaking with it, and secondly to the problem of the relationship between language and thought and the relationship between the history of thought and language. The primary value provides a means by which it is possible to understand the difference that exists between different paradigms concerned with the 'knowing process'. And furthermore, it allows us to understand in what sense there is a prevailing identity. The secondary value allows for an understanding, not simply of the problems of terminology, but rather of the enormous problems posed by the relationship between metaphysics and language. To express the problem in a Heideggerian way, how is it that the belonging together of language and metaphysics can be overcome? The Heideggerian reflection contains an answer to this problem, and that is, that the relationship between the writing of the history of
systems of thought and the systems of thought necessitates a relationship of difference between the act of writing and the systems of thought. It can be seen therefore that the break with metaphysics, expressed as the recognition of the framework existing as the prelude to the event of appropriation, is the constitutive moment of writing. (It is at this point that the Derridian concept of 'l'écriture' comes into play, as it is at this moment that there is the possibility of writing dominating the spoken or verbal.)

Having identified the value of the Heideggerian legacy, it is now possible to approach the Foucaultian discourse. However, the difficulty with Foucault's work, and the related difficulty of interpolating the Heideggerian legacy within it, is to locate a starting point. The point that has been chosen is, to commence with what will be called the 'standard objection' to Foucault. Unfortunately there are many different objections; such a discussion of the internal specificity of each would be time-consuming, and in the end it would detract from the actual activity of carefully discussing Foucault's position.

The reason why I have chosen this as the starting point is that in my opinion the standard objection to Foucault is not based on mere factual objection (even though it appears in this form); rather, the basis is a profound 'misunderstanding' of what Foucault is actually doing. In saying this I am not saying anything as trite as that the objectors have not read
the text closely, but that the objectors fail to grasp the nature of the activity. Now, one of the reasons for this is that Foucault demands a lot of his readers, and in his being demanding one of the things he expects them to grasp is the relationship between 'archaeological analysis' and conventional history of ideas. Consequently in demanding this, he expects the readers to notice the disruptive, the radical nature of his text. He expects them to see that his analysis reveals answers to questions like: 'What are the modes of existence of the discourse?'; 'What is the possibility of this discourse?', and not answers to questions concerning the gradual evolution of ideas; nor questions concerning the intention of the author; nor questions concerning biographical determinants. His questioning resides in the domain of possibility and not in the domain of empirical actuality. The other important reason why Foucault is in general 'misunderstood' is related to the first reason, but is, however, specific to Foucault's actual text. This reason is the difficulty involved in understanding his conception of discontinuity. In other words, his readers invariably fail to see where the discontinuities actually lie. It must be said, however, that the actual text is not as revealing as it might be; but nevertheless its failure to be revealing relates in many ways to the amount that Foucault demands of his reader. Therefore our task becomes a discussion of the 'standard objection', and in doing this to indicate what it is about the text that the objectors fail to understand and how, in regard to the conception of discontinuity, this misunderstanding can be circumvented.
In outline the standard objection to Foucault usually takes the following form: thinkers X, Y and Z all fit into one of the three epistemic domains which Foucault has described; however, thinker Q does not, and given that his 'dates' are similar to those of X, Y and Z, then it should be the case that he does fit into the particular domain. The consequence of this particular thinker's not fitting in is that the particular epistemic domain is an arbitrary construct and that its efficiency in providing a scheme by which texts can be grouped is negated by the existence of exceptions where there should be no exceptions. A particular instance of this objection is the following: in one of Sanctius' texts, namely the 'Minerva seu de causis linguae latinae', there is a doctrine of the linguistic sign which bears a greater affinity to the conception of the sign in the Port Royal Logic than it does to the doctrine of signatures. Now, given that the 'Minerva' was written in 1585 and that the Port Royal Logic was written in 1662, it follows that if Foucault is read as conceiving of the points that end and begin epistemes in terms of dates, i.e. if they are viewed within the ambit of chronological time; and as the date which is usually given in the standard objection for the beginning of the classical episteme is 1600; then the existence of a text which on the one hand preempts the theory of the sign in the classical episteme, and on the other forecloses the Renaissance concep-

1. This example is taken from an article by G. S. Rousseau published in Eighteenth Century Studies (Winter 1972-73).
tions of the sign fulfils the function of the above-mentioned exception, i.e., it deems the episteme to be an arbitrary construct.

Within the standard objection there exists a series of fundamental misunderstandings which function as unstated premises. The most important 'premise' is the implicit use of a chronological conception of time. It is this 'premise' which will be discussed, as this premise bears on our previous discussion of identity and difference.

There is an inherent difficulty in discussing the distinction between a chronological as opposed to a non-chronological view of time. This difficulty (existing as a surface phenomenon) is language, or rather the language specific to time. For example, if the following questions are asked: When did Descartes write, and when did he compose the cogito argument? Did Descartes and Arnauld live at the same time, did they write at the same time? then the answer to all of these questions necessitates a chronological conception of time. Once again, if one asks, when was mathematics conceived of as the model to be used to determine certainty, then the usual answer would be 'in 1628, when Descartes wrote the Rules for the Direction of the Mind'. Even in the move from a concentration on empirical events to a concentration on the concept of possibility, it is still difficult to rid the discourse with which one writes of an implicit use of chronological time. The reason why this is the case can be seen by
utilising the example mentioned above. If the question concerning the use of mathematical models is posed in terms of possibility such that it reads, 'when was it possible that mathematics could function as the model used to determine certainty?', quite clearly even the question is problematic, as it is not immediately clear to what the interrogative 'when' refers. Consequently the answers fluctuate between '1628' and a discussion of the way in which a theory of representation gives rise to a general mathesis. Even then, siding with an explanation in terms of a theory of representation opens up the possibility of discussing the existence of that theory in terms of either its chronological existence or at least in terms of citing the evidence for it in terms of the evidences of chronological existence. There is therefore a real danger of invoking chronology. The reason why this danger needs to be avoided is primarily related to the assumption that there is a notion of temporality which is specific or germane to the object under consideration.

The point at issue then is the relationship between chronology and possibility. In the 'standard objections' reading of Foucault, chronological events determine the matrix of the episteme; and the chronological location of the episteme determines the unity that resides within the episteme. If Foucault were arguing or advancing such a position, then it is clear that his text would depend on a chronological view of time. What would be important about Descartes' text would be the fact that it was written in 1628. However, if one is
questioning not the mere actuality of the text but rather investigating the possibility of the text, then the text's possibility cannot be determined by calmly announcing that the text was written in 1628; for while this fact may be true, it does not begin to answer questions posed on the level of possibility, as what is the possibility of the text other than its epistemic conditions of existence; and it is certainly not the case that the conditions of existence of a text are grounded in the fact that it was written at a certain date.

I am not going so far as to suggest that Foucault does not use dates or that his texts are totally devoid of allusions to chronological time. Rather, my point is that the standard objection reads Foucault as though he were using a conception of chronological time. In fact this must be the base, as their criticisms could only function as criticism, and furthermore their criticisms would only be valid, if Foucault were using such a conception of time. In other words, the criticism concerning the dates of Sanctius' text could only be a criticism if the locating of a text outside the classical episteme is done on the basis of the dates of the episteme and the date of the text. Furthermore, not only does the criticism depend on the use of dates; it also depends on the following: that the unity of a given period is determined by the dates of that period, and that the relationship between a given textual event and the period under consideration is described in terms of the dates of the period and the date of the event as being predominant. In order to indicate the notion of
identity that is implicit in Foucault's work and is necessitated by Foucault's work, I will briefly discuss a conception of identity and difference that is based on a chronological view of time.

The defining characteristics of chronological time with regard to the study of the history of systems of thought are: firstly that the existence of any given system and the location of any given text within that system are determined by the dates of that system and the date or dates of the textual event; secondly, this view of time necessitates and is necessitated by a reading of texts that takes the text as given and therefore operates on what has been called the 'content level' of texts. In other words, chronological time and a content level reading of texts cannot be separated in that they are interdependent. Furthermore, what I hope to show in briefly detailing the relationship between these two conceptions is how in their coming together they systematically exclude questions posed on the level of possibility; and that they are premised on and engender an essentialist conception of identity and difference.

Now, to an example: the origin of eighteenth century thought is often located in the concerns presented in the texts of Rousseau, and the end of eighteenth century thought is often located in the development of neo-Kantian idealism. Within this scenario, eighteenth century thought becomes firstly a domain exhibiting the sorts of concerns evident in Rousseau;
and secondly a domain excluding the concerns evident in thinkers who are pre-Rousseau and post-Kantian. Consequently the question must arise as to what sort of unity resides in the term 'eighteenth century thought'. In order to answer this question let us postulate the existence of a text or series of texts which, while 'written' in the eighteenth century, exhibit concerns which are pre-Rousseau, and furthermore a text or series of texts that have a closer affinity to the neo-Kantian idealists than they do to eighteenth century texts proper. What can be said about these texts? In the case of the later group of texts, the usual approach is to see them as either precursors of 'things to come' or to describe them as being before their time. In the case of the former, terms like a 'Cartesian hangover' are used to describe the particular texts in question.

In what has been stated above there is an implicit notion of identity and difference. The notion of identity is based on the conception of time and the conception of reading that have already been mentioned. If the eighteenth century is described as the 'enlightenment', then the term 'enlightenment' has its origins in the texts of the eighteenth century. In other words, the origin of the term 'enlightenment' has the same origin as all abstractions. However, the term 'enlightenment' exists as a secondary abstraction insofar as it refers almost exclusively to a particular period of time. This period of time is often discussed in terms of a primary abstraction. The distinction between these two levels of
abstraction is as follows: the distinction is in fact embodied in the question 'what is the enlightenment?'. Cassirer's answer to this question would be that the 'enlightenment is contained in Kant's dictum, "Have courage to use your own reason". For Cassirer, the enlightenment was the primacy of Reason. The question immediately arises as to what is the primacy of Reason, or, to put it another way, how is the enlightenment seen in terms of the primacy of Reason discovered? Clearly the designation of the period as 'the enlightenment' is assumed and after that a unifying force is sought. This unifying force is, in the case of Cassirer, Reason; in the hypothetical example mentioned above, it is Rousseau (or the concerns evident in Rousseau's texts). Given that this is the case, the next question must concern the nature of the unifying force. Obviously it is an abstraction in that it is skimmed from the surface of certain texts. However, in this case the skimming has specific boundaries, and it is the nature of those boundaries that will provide an understanding of the conception of identity and difference that is related to this overall position. The boundaries are textual events, i.e. a conflation of the text and the event of the text. Now, because the textual event has two components, it is possible to see how the two components function. In regard to the text, there occurs a process of abstraction in that the concerns of the text are reified beyond the pages of the text until the concerns take on a transcendental role and are therefore irreducible to the actual pages of a book. In regard to the event of the text,
it becomes the mark of the abstraction. The event becomes the temporal location of the now transcendent contents. In this role the event sits at the boundary, it marks out the domain. And in conjunction with the abstraction (e.g. Reason) it forms a unity.

Therefore the unity that is engendered is a unity of the interplay between the text qua abstraction and the event of the text. This unity is in sum an essentialist conception of unity, insofar as it is seen as residing in a dominant abstract, the inflexibility and rigidity of which is evidenced in temporal markers.

The conception of difference which is engendered by this conception of time and reading is an essentialist conception of difference, in that the difference lies in the essential characteristics of a text or group of texts (as discovered by a content reading) and the essential characteristics of an age or Zeitgeist. In fact, difference is not a simple matter in the way that the identity between a text and the essential characteristic of the 'age' is established. Rather, in the case of difference, there is a web of difference, since difference presupposes at least two prevailing identities, and consequently it is only in its relationship with one age that the difference is established between the text and another age. In other words, difference presupposes the following: firstly, that an identity (understood as abstraction) has been established concerning, for
example, the seventeenth century and that an identity concerning the eighteenth century has been established. Secondly, given the description of identity as the interplay between the text qua abstraction and the event of the text, the difference becomes the non-interplay between the text qua abstraction and a given textual event, in that there is identity on another level, namely, on the level of the same textual event but a different text qua abstraction. In other words, a text or series of texts written in the eighteenth century which exhibit (on the level of content) the concerns of the seventeenth century are in a relationship of difference with the eighteenth century in that they are in a relationship of identity with the concerns of the seventeenth century. Thirdly, an explanation in these terms is only possible if the conceptions of identity and difference are understood in terms of either the essential characteristics of an age or the essential characteristics of a given text or series of texts. Fourthly, such a conception of text presupposes that the texts are read not in terms of the text's possibility but rather in terms of the text's content. In other words, the contents of the text are taken as given. It can be seen therefore that an essentialist concept of difference has the same conditions of existence as the essentialist conception of identity. It is at this stage that the practical value of the Heideggerian reflection comes into play, as it is at this stage that we are confronted by a conception of identity and difference that is within the purview of metaphysics, and
it is precisely this conception of identity and difference which is the subject of Heidegger's critique.

Furthermore, it is this conception of identity and difference which is rejected in Foucault's work; and in its rejection it becomes possible to recast the concepts of identity and difference. It is my contention that this recasting can be best understood if it is seen in terms of a Heideggerian recasting. Therefore the question that arises is the nature of the conceptions of identity and difference which are implicit in, and utilised in, Foucault's work. In answering this question I am going to assume certain things about Foucault which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. The reason for doing this is that I think it essential to discuss one of the things that makes Foucault's discourse possible prior to the actual discussion of his discourse. The only danger in doing this is, as I mentioned above, that certain things will have to be assumed; nevertheless, the clarity it will give to my discussion of Foucault makes such a move viable.

Our concern becomes therefore a detailing of how the rejection of the essentialist conceptions of identity and difference allows for an understanding of Foucault's enterprise. In its most simple form, The Order of Things is an investigation of the distinct epistemic domains existing in the history of systems of thought. The name given to these domains is 'epistememes'. Within each of these domains there
exist a number of varying discourses. In regard to the Classical episteme, the discourses that Foucault chooses to examine are those of Natural History, the Analysis of Wealth, and Grammar. The fact that he chose these three should not be seen, as some commentators have done, as limiting the Classical episteme to these three discourses; rather, of the discourses which exist in and comprise the Classical episteme, these are the three which were chosen to be examined. The question of identity comes into play on several levels. The first of these levels is the relationship between the Renaissance episteme, the Classical episteme and the Modern episteme. The second level is the relationship between varying discourses within a particular episteme. And the third level is the relationship between discourses in one episteme and those in another.

Identity and difference on the first level

This level concerns the nature of the episteme and the relationship between epistemes. Foucault describes the episteme and the nature of his project as follows:

What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account what should appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. (CT, p.xxii)
Now in the 'Western episteme' there are three distinct epistemological fields. The conditions of existence of the three fields are two distinct breaks or ruptures in the 'Western episteme'. These ruptures are related to the ordering of what can be known and the way in which ordering is essential if things are to be known. Foucault's procedure is to isolate the conditions of existence of a vast number of empirical sciences. In doing this, the ruptures are discovered, in that the conditions of existence that hold in the Renaissance episteme are not the same conditions of existence that hold in the Classical episteme. In a sense, there is a pervading blend of realism in Foucault's text, as he assumes that within the Western episteme there have been varying conceptions of order. Order can take place according to resemblance or representation, etc. However, where his analysis departs from that of conventional history of ideas is that he does not evaluate or investigate one conception of order from within the boundaries of another conception of order. Rather, what he is attempting to investigate is the middle ground, 'the pure experience of order and of its modes of being' (OT, p.xxi). The only way around the already existing conceptions of order is this middle ground, the ground of the possibility of order. Consequently, what I mean by Foucault's 'realism' is that he takes these conceptions of order as given and then looks for a way of investigating them from outside.

The conception of unity or identity that is the episteme is a conception that is concerned with order. However, the
real question is, how is the unity a unity? The answer to this question is that the unity of the Classical episteme is established because of the discontinuity existing between it and the conception of order in the Renaissance episteme, on the one hand, and the modern episteme, on the other. There is no pure unity of pure identity; rather, identity is established by the prevailing conceptions of order being discontinuous. Consequently, the concept of unity cannot be separated from the concept of discontinuity. In fact this must be the case, given the results of the critique of essentialism. Since essentialism located unity in the thing itself, in regard to the episteme an essentialist rendering of it would locate the unity or prevailing identity in the nature of the episteme, and therefore the episteme would be no more than a 'Weltanschauung', as the critique of essentialism denied the possibility of unity residing in the thing itself and defined it in the nature of the belonging together. It can be seen, therefore, that the identity of B is established by its discontinuous belonging together with A and C. In other words, the identity of the Classical episteme is defined as an identity in its being discontinuous with the other epistemes.

It is essential that at this stage an important aspect of the couple 'discontinuity/continuity' be mentioned. This aspect is the relationship between the concept of continuity and the Subject. I say 'mention', as it is an aspect that I do not wish to discuss in detail; for my concern is to
establish the conceptions of identity and difference which are pertinent to Foucault and not to discuss all of those things which detract from his enterprise and furthermore those things which his enterprise intends to undermine. As well as this, there is a strong relationship between the results of using a chronological view of time and writing history in terms of an anthropologism. Foucault alludes to this in the following passage:

Making historical analysis the discourse of the contiguous, and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are two sides of the same system of thought. In this system time is conceived in terms of totalisation and revolutions are never more than moments of consciousness. (Foucault, 1972, p.12)

Consequently, in breaking with the notion of chronological time and conceiving of time in relation to possibility, there is a break with conceiving thought as a human artefact, and with the related analysis of thought in terms of a human consciousness - namely, as a product of the writing subject.

In concluding this level, we can say that identity is not the product of a thinking subject, nor is identity to be understood as the essential characteristic of an age; rather, identity is the product of a discontinuous belonging together. In regard to difference, the actual question of difference does not arise, given that the relationship between epistemes is a belonging together on the level of discontinuity, rather than a belonging together on the level of difference.
Identity and Difference on the Second Level

This level concerns the relationship between discourses within an episteme. At this level we also need to distinguish between a discourse (for example, the discourse of 'general grammar') and the various theories of grammar of of logics. My concern is not with the relationship between discourses such as the relationship between 'general grammar' and the 'analysis of wealth'; rather, my concern is with the existence of various theories of grammar, logic, etc. On this level we have both identity and difference. The identity is established by the means mentioned in our discussion of the first level; we can therefore take the existence of the identity as given. Therefore our concern becomes an explanation of the possibility of the varying existent theories. Discussion of the difference is a discussion of the possibility of difference rather than a discussion of actual differences, as the possibility needs to be established prior to an investigation of actual differences. The possibility of difference is, like the possibility of identity, related to the critique of the essentialist conception of difference. The basis of the critique was that difference should not be seen as the difference between the essential characteristics of two theories. In other words, the difference between A and B is not found in the nature of A and the nature of B; rather, the difference was their mode of belonging together. Consequently, the difference between two varying conceptions of logic or grammar is found in their belonging together in
a mode of difference. However, the connection of difference that is pertinent to Foucault's work is substantially more complex than this, as there is an already existent identity to be taken into consideration in formulating the concept of difference.

The complicating factor is that if there is to be a difference between a given A and a given B, and even if the difference is a Heideggerian conception of difference, there still has to be the possibility of difference. By 'possibility of difference', I mean that a given A and a given B have to be in a context such that they belong together in a mode of difference. In other words, there has to be a prevailing identity to generate the possibility of difference. Consequently, one of the results of the critique of essentialism is that difference depends on identity in that the overcoming of the conception of difference that located the difference in the characteristics of the thing under consideration means that the ground of difference is moved from the thing itself to the possibility of the thing itself being in a relation of difference. The move from the thing itself to the possibility of difference entails that identity, understood in the above-mentioned sense, is the ground of difference.

In conclusion, therefore, we can say that difference is not discontinuity in that discontinuity is established because the conditions of possibility A are discontinuous with the conditions of possibility B. Difference, because it takes
as its condition the possibility of a prevailing identity (a prevailing condition of possibility), has a completely different status. Difference depends on identity; consequently, as will be argued in greater detail later, the difference between the 'paradigm of demonstrable knowledge' and the 'Humean paradigm' is that while they belong together in a mode of difference, they do so (and can only do so) because of a prevailing identity, namely, the identity which is order based on 'representation'.

Identity and Difference on the Third Level

This level concerns the relationship between the discourses and existent theories in one episteme with those in another. At this level there exist discontinuities rather than differences. The reason why this is the case is as follows: firstly, difference is dependent on there existing the same conditions of possibility; secondly, the identity that is the episteme is grounded in the concept of discontinuity; thirdly, it must be the case therefore that between epistemes there do not exist differences rather than discontinuities. An example will indicate that this is the case. The conception of the cogito in the modern episteme has as the conditions of its existence a radical separation between thought and being. This separation results in there existing a space for a discourse of consciousness, and related to this it creates a domain where the mode of being and the conscious-
ness of the subject can exist as transcendental objects, i.e. their status as objects does not refer to an 'I' whose existence is as an empirical thinking subject. It is this fact and this fact alone which accounts for the possibility of the Husserlian 'transcendental ego' or the Sartrean 'pre-reflective consciousness'. Now, in the Classical episteme the conception of the Cogito had as the conditions of its existence the inseparability of thought and being. The 'I' of the Cogito was the same 'I' as the 'I' of the sum. This inseparability does not preclude Descartes from talking about a notion of self; what it does preclude, insofar as it does not allocate a space to it, is consciousness as an object of knowledge. Consciousness is absolutely wed to the thinking subject. Therefore the discourse of consciousness which exists in the Modern episteme does not exist, or, put more correctly, could not exist, in the Classical episteme. Therefore there is a discontinuity between the Classical and Modern conceptions of the Cogito. This discontinuity is based on the fact that there is a related discontinuity existing between the conditions of existence which are the Modern episteme and the conditions of existence which are the Classical episteme.

In concluding, we can state that on this level there exist only discontinuities and not differences.

Before discussing Foucault's conception of the Classical episteme, a few concluding points need to be made. It has
been seen that the rejection of the essentialist conception of identity and difference has allowed for an understanding of the conception of identity and difference which is both presupposed in and engendered by Foucault's enterprise. It is also clear in what way the Heideggerian reflection allowed this to take place.

Finally, it should be noted that our discussion of the three levels of identity and difference was not intended as the 'pure' section of a 'pure' and 'applied' study. Rather, what was intended was a discussion of the possibility of identity and difference.
CHAPTER ONE

SECTION TWO

THE CLASSICAL EPSTEME
In this section I intend to establish what Foucault means by the Classical episteme, and in so doing extend and utilise the previous discussion of identity and difference, in order that the ensuing analysis of the 'paradigms' will be theoretically reinforced. In presenting a critical exposition of complex thought, the writer constantly confronts the perennial problem of a starting point. Our approach to Foucault's discourse, in terms of presenting a discussion of the possibility of his discourse, was undertaken in relation to what was called the 'standard objection' to Foucault. Our task in presenting an exposition is not as simple, if only for the reason that instead of operating from outside the discourse, we have to operate from within. Consequently the point that has been chosen is a point that coincides with the actual title of the book, namely, the relationship between words (mots) and things (choses).

In The Order of Things Foucault identifies the discontinuity which established the Classical as opposed to the Renaissance episteme in Descartes' critique of resemblance. The importance of this critique lies not in its mere existence as a critique, as there is critique of resemblance in Bacon. The importance lies in the nature of the critique. For Bacon the problem resulting from a conception of knowledge based on

1. The Order of Things is the English translation of Foucault's Les Mots et les Choses. All page references which appear in brackets after quotations from Foucault (1970) are from the English translation.
resemblance was that of deception. The 'idols of the den' and the 'idols of the market place' could encourage us to believe that there was a resemblance between things where in fact there existed no resemblance at all. The thrust of Bacon's critique is located within a resemblance theory of knowledge, as his concern is with the limitations of resemblance couched in the language of resemblance. In Bacon there is 'sixteenth century thought becoming troubled as it contemplates itself' (52). However, in Descartes there is a different approach to the question of resemblance. Resemblance is no longer the centre of knowledge and is therefore no longer asking questions of itself; rather, it is resemblance itself which is called into question. This de-centring of resemblance indicates that there is a new set of questions at play, the possibility of which resides in there being a new set of epistemic conditions of existence. What emerges in the Cartesian texts is the mark of their possibility, i.e. a new relation between words and things. No longer, as was the case in the Renaissance episteme, is the sign known through its resemblance with the thing; no longer is the sign existent in nature waiting to be seen; rather 'the sign can be constituted only by the act of knowing' (59). The effect that this re-working of the relationship between signs and things has on the conception of language is that language moves from bearing the truth about things to being the medium of truth. Language has 'entered a period of transparency and neutrality' (56). This transparency entails that language exists outside the domain of pure knowledge; what is left to language is the role
of representing the truth, representing what is known. Language as the medium of truth, language as the neutral representation of knowledge has, as the conditions of its possibility, not a conception of knowing which consisted in uncovering the true meaning of the sign which was forever lurking behind the sign, but a conception of knowing that was at once outside the language and yet conditioned the expression. The disappearance of language from the 'midst of beings themselves' opens up a series of divisions and possibilities for the Classical age. The most important of these is the 'relation that all Classical knowledge, in its most general form, maintains with the mathesis understood as a universal science of measurement and order' (56).

The positing of the importance of a mathesis should not be seen as suggesting that the dominant concern of Classical thought was to mathematise the knowing process. The existence of mathesis signified two ambivalent characteristics of Classical thought which were defined in relation to mathesis. The first of these was that the relation between things was to be understood not in terms of the resemblance between them, but rather in terms of 'order or measurement'. The relation to mathesis in this regard is that it established a criterion of relationship between things which does not establish the relation in terms of the thing qua thing, but rather in terms of an ordering process that is always outside the thing yet is always representing the thing. The second characteristic is that the desire for a mathesis gives rise to, in the sense of both accompanying and engendering, a 'certain number of
empirical fields'. These fields do not contain the marks of any mathematization; rather, their possibility, like that of mathesis, is defined in terms of a need for order. 'They rely for their foundation on a possible science of order' (57). It is this science of order that accounts for the possibility of the three empirical studies that Foucault analyses (grammar, natural history, and wealth), as none of these sciences of order could have been founded 'without the relation that the entire episteme of Western culture maintained at that time with a universal science of order' (57). This science of order always exists outside the thing under consideration; it is for this reason that Foucault can conclude his discussion of the Classical episteme by stating that 'representation governs the mode of being of language, individuals, nature and need itself. The analysis of representation has a determining value for all empirical domains' (208-209). Since what is representation but the separation of thing and the thing as ordered? Order is representation and the science of order is a science undertaken in the name of representation. Consequently in the Classical age knowledge was based on the ordering of things and the representing of them by means of signs. The age of resemblance gave way to an age where knowledge 'was based on identity and difference' (57). In other words, ordering is the grouping, classifying and measuring of things in terms of the difference between them and the similarity between them. The episteme of resemblance is split in two. On the one hand there is the general theory of order (general theory of signs, classifications, divisions, etc.) and on the other hand there is
resemblance, no longer dominant but both the basis of knowledge and of error (Descartes). The second aspect of the split gives rise to the theory of the imagination, and thus the problem of resemblance.

In pursuing our discussion of the Classical episteme we will centre on the concepts of representation and order as they determine the relationship between words and things. There is another reason for defining our discussion of the Classical episteme in terms of the representation of the sign, and that is that it is this aspect of the episteme which is of central concern to the difference which will be explored in the following sections.

In the Classical episteme the sign was defined in accordance with certain variables. These variables establish the varying roles and functions of the sign within the 'domains of empirical knowledge'. These three variables are: firstly, the sign may be both certain and probable (A is either a certain sign of B or a probable sign of B); secondly, the sign may be either part of the thing it signifies or be other than the thing it signifies (A may be part of the sign of A or A may be other than B yet still be the sign of B); thirdly, the sign may be either conventional or natural (A may be the sign of A, or A may be the sign of B because certain conventions have deemed that it be the sign of B). It is these three variables which are manifested in Classical thought, and it is in terms of these three variables that the differences contained in Classical thought are expressed.
In other words, 'these three variables replace resemblance in defining the sign's efficacity in the domains of empirical knowledge' (59). It is now possible to see in what way this 'efficacity' is realised. The variable certainty/probability is realised in the following way: the sign can only function in these two ways if it is defined in relation to knowledge. That is, its function as sign is defined in terms of knowledge. For what is knowledge but the relation between signs and things? And what is the nature of the relation other than that it is certain or less certain or probable? If, as was mentioned previously, the sign no longer contains the truth but rather represents it, then this entails that the efficacy of the sign resides in the fact that it is 'from knowledge that it will borrow its certainty or probability' (59). The transparency of language, its neutrality, entails that its power as a signifier comes from outside, and this outside is its constitution as a sign by knowledge. Now that the sign resides in the domain of knowledge, the relation of the sign to the signified accounts for the relation between one impression and another, in other words, 'a relation which, like succession, will progress from the weakest probability to the greatest certainty' (60).

The second variable referred to is the relation between the sign and the thing it signifies. Within this domain the sign can occupy two positions. The first of these is that the sign can be an aspect or a part of the thing it signifies, while the second is that the sign can be completely distinct
from the thing it signifies. But Foucault points out that these alternatives are not mutually exclusive, 'since the sign, in order to function, must be simultaneously an insertion in that which it signifies and also distinct from it. For the sign to be in effect what it is, it must be presented as an object of knowledge at the same time as that which it signifies' (60). It is this conception of the sign that is clearly evident in Hobbes' discussion of the use of speech:

The general use of Speech is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registration of the Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of rememberance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called Signes. (HEW. Vol.3, pp.19-20)

For Hobbes, the sign is both the basis of knowing insofar as it represents it, and the medium with which what is known is expressed. The sign is at once neutral, constituted in the act of knowing, and separate from, yet the expression of, knowledge (the thing it signifies). Consequently the sign in Classical thought enables things to be known in that it enables things to become distinct, to have an identity. Furthermore, because of this the sign can be grouped with other signs and then broken down and regrouped. It is for this reason that Foucault describes Western thought as 'entering the age of judgement' (61). The final variable concerns the sign's designation as either natural
or conventional. The sign being thus is not a new prospect for Western thought. In fact, as Foucault points out, this particular possibility has existed at least since the time of the Cratylus. However, what is new in Classical thought is the nature of the relationship, namely, that it is an inverted form of the expression of this distinction, the possibility of which existed during the sixteenth century. The natural sign is no more than a mere part of things selected at random, and existing as a sign because of our knowledge of it. The conventional sign has a more complex origin, in that choosing this particular sign must be done in such a way 'that it will be simple, easy to remember, applicable to an indefinite number of elements, susceptible of sub-division within itself and of combination with other signs' (62). Consequently both the origin and the nature of the conventional sign as opposed to the natural sign engenders a distinction between them in terms of fixedness on the part of the natural sign and arbitrariness on the part of the conventional sign. The arbitrariness of the conventional sign refers to the actual function of the sign in that the sign must be capable of expressing things in their most simple nature and reciprocally, must be able to represent things in their most complex state of being. Foucault suggests that the conventional sign appearing in both a search for the origin of things (things as primary or simple parts) and also existing in a 'calculus of combination' may appear to us as an ambiguity or an incompatibility. However, this is not the case, as the use of the sign in the
Classical age related to an attempt to construct the sign for the thing, to give the thing its one true representation, and doing this necessitated locating the thing as it existed in its most simple form and then being able to generate the number of possible combinations. In other words, to construct by artificial means (conventional signs) a universal language with which the primary and the complex can be represented. This particular variable is evident in a letter written by Descartes to Mersenne, in which Descartes sets out the conditions of there existing a universal language, and the conditions under which such a language could be learned. For Descartes, the possibility of such a language resides in order:

Order is what is needed: all the thoughts which can come into the human mind in an order like the natural order of the numbers. In a single day one can learn to name every one of the infinite series of numbers, and thus to write infinitely many different words in an unknown language. (DPL, p. 5)

What better example do we have of Foucault's point that the use of signs in the Classical age was an attempt to discover the arbitrary language that will authorise the 'deployment of nature within its space'? In other words, residing in Descartes' statement about the nature of the universal language there exist some of the basic attributes of the sign in the Classical episteme, namely, the artificial creation of signs oscillates between the simple and the most complex, between origin and calculus. The artificiality of a universal language captures the other aspect of the sign in that it is
both part of the thing it represents but is only this because it is apart from it in its representing it. This description of a grammar or conception of language that is both universal and arbitrary is evident in the discussion of grammar contained in the Encyclopedia Britannica (1773):

grammars considered as a Science, views language in itself: neglecting particular modification, or analogy which words may bear to each other, it examines the analogy or relation between words and things: distinguishes between those particulars which are essential to language, and those which are accidental; and thus furnishes a certain standard by which certain languages may be compared, and then several excellencies or defects pointed out. This is what is called PHILOSOPHICAL or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. (Vol. II, p. 728)

The sign engenders those aspects which are the instruments of knowledge in Classical thought; certainty, probability, origin, combination, and the inevitable separation and hence arbitrariness of signs and things. In other words, what emerges in Classical thought is 'probability, analysis, combination and universal language system ... not as successive themes engendering one another or driving one another out, but as a single network of necessities' (63).

This being the case, the most important aspect of this conception of the sign that awaits clarification is the relation of sign to content. It is clear that the nature of the above-mentioned variables means that the relation of the sign to the signified does not occur spontaneously in nature, nor is it part of the nature of things; rather, the relation, or bond, 'is established inside knowledge, between
the idea of one thing and the idea of another' (63). This can be seen in the passage from Hobbes that has already been cited. In our previous discussion of this distinction, I indicated that it is an example of Foucault's more general point that the sign in order to be a sign must be an object of knowledge at that same time as the object it signifies is an object of knowledge. This general statement is exemplified in Hobbes' description of the nature of the 'Signe'. However, our use of Hobbes becomes not a concern with the nature of the sign per se, but rather with the distinction between 'Signes' on the one hand and 'Markes' or 'Notes' on the other. The basis of the distinction between them is as follows: 'Markes' and 'Notes' are words that 'mark' the transference of 'Mentall Discourse' into 'Verbal Discourse'. The function of these marks is that they aid in the remembrance of the initial thoughts. 'Signes', on the other hand, are the conventional expression of these 'marks' in everyday discourse. To use the language of the Port Royal Logic, the distinction is between the thing representing and the thing represented. This binary structure of the sign is what Foucault calls 'duplicated representation' and it is this structure which is discontinuous with the ternary structure of the sign which was evident in the Renaissance episteme, the ternary structure consisting of the thing which was signified, the sign, and the possibility of seeing the sign as the sign of the initial thing. The possibility of seeing the signifying aspect of the sign was, of course, resemblance. The sign in the Classical episteme had a binary structure,
which is not to say that one of the components of the sign disappeared; rather, the sign had a new set of conditions of existence and it was this that the sign reflected. It should be remembered that the relationship between the sign in the Renaissance episteme and the sign in the Classical episteme is a relationship which exists on the third level and is therefore a relationship that is marked by discontinuity and not mere difference. This binary structure consisted of the thing which is represented by the sign and the sign as representing, and implicit in this structure is the conception of the sign as that which represents. Consequently, the sign both in and from the Classical age is 'the representativity of the representation insofar as it is representable' (65). This structure of the sign as a 'duplicated representation' giving the sign no function other than that of representation has three important consequences.

The first of these consequences is that signs are coextensive with thought. In the Renaissance episteme the sign was a way into knowing the thing; the discontinuity establishes the sign as the thing. The sign is not the mark of the thing; rather, the sign is such that its coextensivity with thought establishes it as a thing. Is not this coextensivity between ideas and signs the actual basis of Philonous' question: 'Can a real thing, in itself indivisible, be like a colour, or a real thing which is not audible be like a sound? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or an idea, but another sensation or idea?' Classical thought must, like Hylas, reply 'I must own, I think not' (BPW, p. 169).
The second consequence of the structure of the sign is that because of the sign being coextensive with thought and the sign being no more than the representation of the thing in its representing, then this must almost by definition preclude the possibility of a theory of signification. The reason why this is the case is as follows: 'If phenomena are posited only in representation that, in itself and because of its own representability, is wholly a sign, then signification cannot constitute a problem' (65). In other words, the possibility of a theory of signification resides in the separability of signs and representation. This, however, was not the case in the Classical episteme, since there could be no things outside of the sign and there could be no sign except for sign qua duplicated representation. It is this aspect of the structure of the sign that is the basis of the third consequence, namely, the linkage between the sign and a 'general theory of representation'. 'The signifying element and the signified element are linked only insofar as they are (or have been or can be) represented, and insofar as the one represents the other' (67). It is this aspect of the sign which accounts for the existence in the Classical age of the analysis of representation always proceeding from the complex to the simple and then from the simple to the complex. The linkage between the sign and representation provides for a domain of never-ending ordering and simplifying and re-ordering.
This structure of the sign de-centres resemblance from its previous position as the possibility of knowledge itself. However, the demise of resemblance does not mean that it disappears; it still plays a pivotal role in that 'no equality or relation of order can be established between two things unless their resemblance has at least occasioned their comparison' (67). It is to the position of resemblance in the Classical episteme that we now turn.

In the Classical episteme, resemblance is situated on the other side of the split. The episteme of resemblance was split by the coming into being of a science of order. This other side is, as has already been mentioned, the domain of the theory of the imagination. The reason why this is the case is that without a theory of imagination, there could be no resemblance, as it is the imagination which initially detects the resemblance existing between things. How else is a past impression able to become present at a later time, except by the power of resemblance? The curious position of resemblance is evident in Hume's first discussion of this particular philosophical relation:

'Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. (HT, 11)

Now, if this passage which locates resemblance in the domain of the 'fancy' (imagination) is compared to Hume's discussion of resemblance as a philosophical relation proper, not only
does its curious position emerge; what emerges as well is the tension that characterises the existence of resemblance in Classical thought:

... this is a relation, without which no philosophical relation can exist; since no objects will admit of comparison, but what have some degree of resemblance. But though resemblance be necessary to a philosophical relation, it does not follow that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas. When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a great many individuals, it leads not the mind directly to any one of them; but by presenting at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any single object. (HT, 14)

What is found in Hume is a conception of resemblance which is on the one hand essential and ever-present in the possibility of representation, and on the other, present in the functioning of the imagination, given that the function, or at least one of the main functions, of the imagination is the possibility of 'imaginative recall'. In Hume, this tension exists in that he claims that resemblance is essential for the existence of any philosophical relations, yet resemblance does not produce a connexion or association of ideas. In other words, it is the basis of knowing, yet cannot of itself produce knowledge, i.e. produce a connexion or association of ideas. Furthermore, it is resemblance which is the basis of the workings of the fancy (imagination). Foucault describes this double requisite of resemblance as follows: 'There must be in things represented, the insistent murmur of resemblance; there must be, in the representation, the perpetual possibility of imaginative recall. And neither of these requisites can dispense with the other, which completes and confronts it' (69).
This double requisite is the mark of two paths that exist in Classical thought. The one is concerned with the analysis of mechanisms that provide a comparison of things prior to the introduction of an ordering system. In other words, the analysis of 'impressions, reminiscences, impressions, memory'. The other path of analysis is the analysis involving the unordered similitudes. In other words, analysis on the level of resemblances themselves. The two paths are then the mechanisms of resemblance and the actual resemblances between things. These two paths, although they intersect and overlap, give rise to a series of problems, the answers to which are part of the concern of the Classical age. The first path Foucault calls the 'analytic of imagination', while the second is described as the 'analysis of nature'. The concern of the 'analytic of imagination' is the disorder in nature and the disorder of 'our' impressions. The 'analysis of nature' is the possibility of order. These paths, or 'stages', are for Foucault united in the 'idea of a genesis'. This unity exists in two forms, the first form being the negative. In the negative stage, the unity consists of disorder and vague resemblance, and it is at once attributable to the imagination. And the imagination is able to establish order only in its being at once the basis of order and that which hinders the perception of order. (Spinoza, in his Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding, advances just such a position in his discussion of memory.) It is this hindering aspect of the imagination that is the basis of the conception of human fallibility. This aspect of the Classical episteme
will be discussed in detail further on. Nevertheless, we can state that this is the reason why the writers of the seventeenth century at least were concerned to such a great degree with the problem of error. Furthermore, the positive path, the positive stages of the unity, allow for the Humean reconstruction of the problem posed by the imagination. The positive stage is the domain where Hume sought a link between 'resemblance and imagination'. It is the disorder of nature where disorder fails to provide representations of itself and all that there are are the vague amorphous resemblances: 'so that representation, perpetually bound to contents so very close to one another, repeats itself, recalls itself, duplicates itself quite naturally, causes almost identical impressions to arise, again and again, and engenders imagination' (70).

The conception of 'genesis' implicit in both of these paths is a conception leading from the Same to order, in other words, from undifferentiated, unordered and vague resemblances, an amorphous Sameness, to 'the great table of knowledge developed according to the form of identity, of difference, and of order' (71). Therefore essential to the construction of order is an analysis that operates on what Foucault calls the genesis of consciousness. It is now possible to situate the nature of this order, this conception of knowledge and of signification that was intimately tied to a 'mathesis' and a 'taxinomia'. We can see that the relationship between resemblance and the imagination, in that
it is both the possibility of knowledge yet the hindrance to knowledge, generates the sciences of order; those conceptions based on representation which inevitably overlap the confused and the disordered; and which are forever present in the meeting of nature and human nature. It is now possible to move to a discussion of the mathesis and taxinomia proper; a discussion of a conception of knowledge that was discontinuous with that found in resemblance theorists and discontinuous with the one located in the epistemic conditions that gave rise to what we call Nietzsche.

It is these two conceptions which define the Classical episteme and consequently mark its discontinuous existence. In discussing the way in which mathesis and taxinomia function in the 'general science of order', I will utilise Foucault's diagrammatic presentation of the same.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{General science of order} \\
\text{Simple natures} & \quad \text{Complex representations} \\
\text{Mathesis} & \quad \text{Taxinomia} \\
\text{Algebra} & \quad \text{Signs}
\end{align*}
\]

The function of the diagram is twofold: firstly, it will allow a discussion of the 'nature' of the relationship between the simple and the complex, and of ordering in general. Secondly, it will allow a discussion of the presuppositions of ordering and the openings and closures of representation.
In regard to the first function, it is clear that the ordering of simple natures and the ordering of complex representations (i.e., representations themselves) takes place in accordance with a pre-established conception of order. In regard to the ordering of simple natures, there is a 'recourse' to a mathesis which has as its most general method algebra. In regard to the ordering of representations, this involves the constitution of a mathesis, and this is done by the establishing of a system of signs. Consequently, on this level of ordering, signs and algebra have equivalent status, insofar as 'signs are to the order of composite natures what algebra is to the order of simple natures' (72). However, this construction of order excludes certain relationships of interdependence. These are, firstly, the relationship between mathesis and taxinomia. This relationship is important because simple natures must be able to be analysed into complex, and representations must be analysed into their simple natures. Consequently, taxinomia relates to mathesis in the analysis of actual representations into their simple natures, and mathesis relates to taxinomia in that mathesis is a particular instance of taxinomia, since the analysis of simple natures is an instance of a general analysis of representation. The second relationship is between signs and algebra. The relationship between signs and algebra is established on the level of the nature of the sign, that is, signs, because they are 'established by thought ... constitute an algebra of complex representations' (72). The relationship between algebra and signs is established due to the function of
algebra. That is, the relationship is established because algebra is a method by which simple natures are provided with signs and because this provision provides a related operational component to simple natures.

It is these relationships and interrelationships which are captured in the diagram. Therefore, having discussed the diagram proper, we will move to the second function of the diagram, and this is a discussion of the presuppositions of ordering and the openings and closures of representation itself.

The possibility of taxinomia, the possibility of a continuous move from the complex to the simple and the related move of constructing the complex from the simple, resides in the possibility of constructing unity and continuity from the random and discontinuous. In other words, the possibility of a science of order resides in the power of taxonomy to construct this continuity, and the power of the imagination to make visible (e.g. memory) what is not immediately visible in order to facilitate the construction of order. Consequently, taxinomia must be understood in relation to the continual search which manifested itself throughout Classical thought for the origin of knowledge. This search, understood not in terms of a search based purely on sameness but rather understood in terms of the establishing of order, is one of the major components of the Classical episteme, namely, 'Genesis'. In fact, Genesis resides at one of the borders of Classical thought;
residing at the other is mathesis: 'at the two extremities of the Classical episteme, we have a mathesis as the science of calculable order and a genesis as the analysis of a constitution of orders on the basis of empirical series' (73). Existing between these extremities is the domain of the table, the analysis of identity and difference in terms of representation, the allocation of signs. This domain is the 'area of the table', which involves 'the allotting of a sign to all that our representation can present us with' (73). This allocating of signs is done in terms that emerge as a table of signs constructed in terms of identity and difference.

What emerges therefore as the 'solid grid of kinships that define the general configuration of knowledge in the Classical age' (74) is the 'calculation of equalities', the 'genesis of representation', and existing as a domain between these other two is the 'ordered table'. Consequently, taxinomia, mathesis, and genesis define in the general sense of the term the Classical episteme. It is at this stage that we can pause, insofar as the three elements that define the Classical episteme have been isolated. Furthermore, these three elements, understood in terms of what they are and what they establish, account for the differences in Classical thought. For example, taxinomia, as will be shown in greater detail further on, because it defines in its relation to mathesis and genesis both the nature of things and the way in which things are known, accounts for a theory of signs.
that includes the prescriptivism of Descartes, the oscillations of Locke and the nominalism of Hume.

Mathesis, taxinomia and genesis establish the workings of the general theory of representation, and in conjunction with representation establish the identity, the Classical episteme. As I have indicated throughout our discussion of the Classical episteme, and as I tried to show in a more general fashion in our discussion of a non-essentialist conception of identity and difference, the identity of the episteme is not established because of the essential characteristics it possesses, but rather in its being discontinuous with a theory of knowledge which is based on resemblance. Furthermore, the three elements provide a basis in terms of which certain differences that occur within the episteme can be fully understood, i.e., we are now in a position to grasp the non-essentialist conception of difference.

What will be undertaken next is not a discussion on the level of doxology, but a discussion of difference on the level of possibility. The rest of this thesis will consist of five sections; what I intend to show in these sections is as follows: in the first section I intend to discuss the concepts of error, certainty and truth as they occur in the texts of Descartes. In the second section I intend to discuss the relationship between method and mathematics in certain of the 'rules' found in Descartes' text Rules for the Direction of the Mind. In the third section I intend to present an expo-
sition in terms of possibility of Part IV of the Port Royal Logic. In these three sections I hope to establish one possible conception of knowledge which has as its possibility the Classical episteme. This conception will be called the 'paradigm of demonstratable knowledge'.

In section four, I intend to establish the difference between a characteristic of the paradigm of demonstratable knowledge and a characteristic of the Humean paradigm. These characteristics are the prescriptive as opposed to the descriptive. After establishing this, I will then attempt to ground it in its possibility - in other words, establish the belonging together between the differences and the general identity (the episteme). In the fifth section, I intend to establish this difference by investigating the concepts of probability, belief, and causality as they appear in the writings of Hume.

At this stage, even though I am dissatisfied with it, the term 'paradigm' is essential for the rest of this thesis, as it is a term that invokes the concept of boundary or foreclosure. And it is precisely the nature of the boundary and the nature of the foreclosure existing between the works of Descartes and Arnauld on the one hand and the works of Hume on the other that I wish to investigate.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PARADIGM OF DEMONSTRABLE KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

The whole of anything is never told; you can only take what groups together.

—Henry James.
Notebook Entry, 1881
In this chapter the different sections, if considered as a whole, comprise what has been called the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. While reference will be made to several writers, those whose texts will dominate our discussion are Descartes, Locke and Arnauld. However, before a start is made in establishing the paradigm, it is vital that the nature and claims of the activity of 'establishing' be discussed. What is of fundamental importance is that the activity be explained in such a way that the status of the texts discussed is clarified.

Now, what is involved in establishing a paradigm is, firstly, establishing the foreclosure that exists between one philosophical discourse and another. In this case the foreclosure is the point at which the difference between the Humean paradigm and the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge emerges. The second aspect of establishing a paradigm involves the contents of the paradigm existing in a relation of exclusion to representation. It is the textual utterance captured in its presentation, but understood not in terms of the presentation being governed by the 're' of (re)presentation. Consequently the utterance is no longer viewed in terms of its being represented, but merely in terms of its presentation in the text. Expressed in the negative, the intention of the relation of exclusion is aimed at a view of the text which precludes the view being either the text as a given or constructed totality or the text existing in relation to its inner logic. Rather, my concern in insisting that the
text exists in a relation of exclusion to totalisation (i.e. taking the text as given and representing it in terms of criticism) or deconstruction (i.e. reducing the text to its constitutive elements and representing its effectuation in terms of a commentary) reverts back to a theme developed in the preceding chapter. This theme is that the text is viewed in terms of a relationship existing between the text's presentation of concepts like 'error', 'truth', 'certainty', etc. and the text's possibility.

In excluding deconstruction and totalisation, my concern moves from establishing the truth of the text - i.e. a representation of the truth of the text or a presentation of the text's constitutive elements out of which the true text can be constructed and hence represented in its truth - to what will be called the 'play' of the text. The play of the text is the text viewed as differing from either a representation of its being (criticism) or a representation of its becoming (commentary). Therefore in order to establish the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge, the possibility of the paradigm can only be seen in terms of the utterances of those texts which are the expression of the paradigm; while the texts which 'are' the paradigm can only be seen in terms of their possibility. It is this view which I have termed the 'play' of the text.

The reason why the language used to express this point is dense is the difficulty of discussing texts where the
discussion precludes involvement in either an implicit or explicit representation of the texts concerned. The difficulty is symptomatic in part of a general dilemma confronting modern thought. Foucault indicates the limiting factor implicit in modern thought as follows:

until the connection between language and representation is broken, or at least transcended in our culture, all secondary languages will be imprisoned within the alternative of criticism and commentary. And in the indecision they will proliferate ad infinitum. (CT, p.81)

In response to the challenge engendered by the above, this chapter and the next chapter attempt neither criticism or commentary; rather, they intend to operate in the as yet unspecified domain of the relationship between and the inseparability of the text and the text's possibility; the domain which is not the prison of commentary and criticism but the play which is the difference from representation.

. . . . . . .

Throughout this chapter and the next, a great deal of the discussion is oriented around the presentation of the question of miracles. In locating my discussion in this area, I am not intending to suggest that the question of miracles played a dominant part in either the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge or the Humean paradigm. In fact this is far from being the case. In the former paradigm, the existence of miracles was assumed, while in the latter miracles were used in order to develop a critique of religious systems which
were premissed on revealed truths. What is of interest therefore in regard to miracles is not the question of miracles per se, but rather their place and function within the two paradigms. What will be shown in using the instance of miracles is that the philosophical questions which they generate are such that it is possible to see in their differing treatments the emergence of the difference between the paradigms.
CHAPTER TWO

SECTION ONE

THE CARTESIAN PLAY
For Descartes there are only two roads to knowledge: they are intuition and necessary deduction. This conception of the paths to knowledge seems to engender, if not a blurred distinction between truth and certainty, at least a distinction which entails that what is true is certain and what is certain is true. This lack of a clear differentiation between truth and certainty reflects the concerns of the Cartesian texts. Descartes was far more concerned with the means for establishing certainty and the ways of avoiding error than he was with truth. The reason why this might be the case is evident from an early letter to Mersenne. In this particular letter, one of the objects of his discussion was Lord Herbert of Cherbury's text, 'De Veritate'. In his discussion he says the following about the text:

he examines what truth is; I have never thought of doing so, because it seems a notion so transcendently clear that nobody could be ignorant of it (DPL, p. 65)

Descartes goes on in this particular letter to state that while truth can be defined as 'the conformity of thought with its object', there seems little point in doing so, as the mere definition of truth is not going to convince anyone of what truth is for the simple reason that the only criterion of truth is the 'light of nature' itself.

The reason for explicating this particular expression of Descartes' conception of truth is twofold. Firstly, it indicates his attitude to questions concerning 'mere' truth. Secondly, however, it indicates that knowing and certainty
amount to the same thing, in the sense that to know $X$ entails the certainty of the knowledge of $A$. Furthermore, and related to this, necessary deductions must commence with established self-evident truths, and consequently the results of the deduction must be both true and certain. In other words, because of the inseparability of knowing and certainty these two paths to knowledge entail a conception of truth and certainty at the beginning of the road and a conception of truth and certainty at the end. Consequently there seems little point in demanding of the Cartesian texts a rigorous distinction between truth and certainty. Rather, my approach will be to commence with a discussion of truth, and in the course of this, to let the Cartesian conception of certainty emerge.

The Cartesian conception of truth is related to a particular mode of perception. This is expressed in the Third Meditation as follows:

it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and distinctly are true. (HR. Vol.I, p.158)

In Part I of the Principles of Philosophy, he articulates in greater detail, in Principle XLV, the nature of these modes of perception:

I term that clear which is present and apparent to the attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate on it with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear. (HR. Vol.I, p.237)
What is of interest in the elucidation of these modes of perception is the characterisation of distinct perceptions as yielding a perception of the object such that the object is precise and different from all other objects. This particular expression marks the existence of a method for determining truth, in other words, a methodological guarantee of certainty. Truth is then the end result of a process of delineation which results in a simple nature being isolated from other aspects of the object. Within the Cartesian system, as simple natures do not exist in themselves, this mode of perception also allows for the combination of natures which comprise the object to be extrapolated.

This theme of separation and combination exists in varying forms and with varying force throughout the writings of Descartes. It was discussed in my exposition of the Classical Episteme. There the theme took the form of a consequence of the binary structure of the sign. It was this binary structure of the sign, because it encompassed the coextensivity between the sign and the idea, that tied the sign to a 'theory of representation'. This linkage entailed that the analysis of the sign must range between a process of simplifying and the reciprocal process of constructing the complex from the simple. In Descartes the consequence of the structure of the sign appears in both his directly philosophical writings and in his writings on geometry.
In fact this theme is as a matter of course evident in a number of texts whose conditions of existence are the Classical Episteme. For example, it appears in the entry on Logic in the *Encyclopedia Brittanica* (1773) as follows:

> Logic, or the art of thinking and reasoning, or it may be defined as the science of the human mind, in as much as it traces the progress of our knowledge from our first and most simple ideas through all their different combinations, conceptions, and all those numerous deductions that result from variously comparing them one with another. (Vol.II, p.984)

The movement, in the *Encyclopedia Brittanica* as in Descartes, in fact the entire oscillation between what Foucault calls the 'origin of things' and a 'calculus of combination', is related to the structure of the sign in the Classical Episteme. This in turn has as the conditions of its possibility the discontinuous relationship between it and the ternary structure of the sign in the Renaissance Episteme.

To return to Descartes: this theme of the move from the simple to the complex is articulated in another letter to Mersenne written shortly after Descartes wrote the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. In the letter he describes the great secret of acquiring true scientific knowledge as the numbering and ordering of thoughts and the separating of them into 'clear and simple thought' (*DPL*, p.6). This methodological approach to truth is evident in Principles XLIX and L, where common truths are called axioms, and as
such 'there is not doubt that they may be clearly and distinctly perceived'. A further re-statement of this approach to truth is crucial to his reply concerning his 'wax' analogy used in the *Meditations*. In his reply to the second set of objections, he argues that knowledge about the wax can be 'drawn from no other source than the fact that one thing can be perceived apart from the other'. The problems of 'identity' and 'continuity through time' which were posed by the wax's changing shape, colour and smell were solved due to the application of this method, since the solution that wax is in essence reducible to extension was a solution which could only have been arrived at if the method involved was concerned with the movement from the complex to the simple and from the simple to the complex.

The sense of perception that is at work in this particular method is not one that refers to 'sense data'. Rather, the perception of extension is an act of the intellect, an act of cognition. This conception of perception is epistemically similar to the concept involved in the Lockeian conception of certainty. For Locke, certainty involves perceiving whether or not signs are joined incorrectly or correctly. The act of perceiving in both senses is an act of the intellect, and in both cases, though there may be some differences in the actual object of perception, the important point is that certainty can be derived from the mind 'seeing' that it is the case. (See *LEHU*, Bk IV, Ch.5.)
Now once this perception has taken place, once the object is clearly and distinctly perceived, then the delineated object can be represented by a sign. This sign could not signify what was false or be open to an interpretation not intended by the sign, for two interrelated reasons. The first of these is, as was indicated in my discussion of the Classical Episteme, that in this period language was both transparent and neutral. It had no function outside of representation. Consequently in this case, as the object as the delineated object is identified as such because of the guarantee of method, the sign representing the object can have no other role than that of representing. The second reason is related to the first, as it refers to the impossibility of a theory of signification existing in the Classical Episteme. The reason for this impossibility resides in the fact that a theory of signification necessitates a distinction between the sign and the theory of representation in order that the theory condition and regulate the signification. In the Classical Episteme, as has already been shown, there is no such distinction, and as a consequence the sign existed as 'duplicate representation'. The preclusion of this distinction entailed that as the sign was inseparable from its function, which was representation, it was not the sign qua sign which could be true or false, but only the thing represented. In this case, as the thing represented derived its representability from method, it had to be the case that the sign could not, in this instance, signify what was false. The act of signification, the one-to-one correspondence between
the word for a thing and the thing itself, is in this case the result of a process, a method; the correct following of a series of instructions, which by their very nature ensure that the object is known with certainty.

The certainty of representation due to the neutrality of language in the Classical Age is also evident in Locke. In his discussion of the representation of complex ideas he states the following:

That which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never be capable of wrong representation, nor mislead us from true apprehension of anything, by its dislikeness to it; and such ... are our complex Ideas. (LEHU, p.564)

In Locke, complex ideas are combinations of simple ideas, and because ideas are considered as archetypes, this establishes a relation of certainty between the archetype and the thing signified, i.e. the idea and the thing signified are conformable due to the conception of idea, as for Locke 'we intend Things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas'.

Locke's conception of ideas is, of course, not the same as the Cartesian conception. In referring to Locke here, I merely intend to show how the theme of the certainty of representation appears in Locke and to indicate that it has the same epistemic conditions, namely the neutrality of language and the inseparability of the sign and representation. It is quite clearly the case that there is a fundamental
difference between Locke and Descartes in regard to the question of 'innate ideas', but this does not detract from or alter the fact that certain similarities can be located in the play of the two texts.

Within the Cartesian texts themselves, certainty is part of a structured set of relations. Central to this set, and in some sense forming the first part, is the Cogito argument. Consequently, I now turn to a discussion of the Cartesian concept of the Cogito.

The Cogito argument is intended to overcome the sceptical position in regard to the existence of the self and the existence of objects in the world. Even though certainty in the Cartesian system is methodological and therefore trans-individual, the application of the methodology necessitates the existence of the self. In other words, there has to be something to play the active role in signification. In fact this has to be the case, as the sign in the Classical Episteme is 'constituted through an act of knowing', in contrast to the Renaissance Episteme where the sign was the mark of the thing. As the sign is coextensive with thought, this explains why the Cogito argument played such a pivotal role in the Classical Episteme; the process of signification and the attribution of signs were contingent on there being a thinking subject. (I will have more to say about the relationship between knowledge and the thinking subject further on in this section and in the next chapter. However, at this stage
it is worth mentioning that the structure of the relationship between knowledge and the thinking subject as it appears in Descartes and the Port Royal Logic forms one of the basic differences between the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge and the Humean paradigm.)

Now, it is usually asserted that the role of the Cogito argument within the Meditations is to establish the existence of the self whose mode of existence can be contrasted to that of the body, in order to define the self as a being whose essence is thinking. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that the Cogito move is essential for attributing to objects in the world the quality of being objects of knowledge. It is worth remembering that for Descartes the objects of knowledge are ideas:

\[\text{there is no difference between my perceiving one thing apart from the other and having an idea of one thing and understanding that the idea is not the same as the idea of something else.} \]  
\[(HR. \ Vol.I, p.155)\]

What is at play in the Cogito argument is the relationship between self and the object of knowledge, where the object exists as a discrete entity, an individual idea. When the Cartesian self invokes the Cogito, there is in the act of invoking a guaranteed certitude of self. Therefore the object at which the Cogito is directed has the unique function of gaining existence by granting it. In other words, because the 'I think' has to be object-directed, the existence of the object \textit{qua} object of knowledge is established by its role
in securing the existence of the 'I think'. The consequence of this is that there is both a mutual interdependence and an inseparability between the self and the object of knowledge. We have, as Hegel described the relation, thought and being, inseparably bound. The Cogito argument, in establishing the status of the object as an object of knowledge, opens up the possibility of representation in regard to that particular object. In other words, the thing or idea of the thing is, with Classical thought, coextensive with the sign; however, while this is the case, the existence of the thing or idea of thing appears in the mind because of the Cogito move. The Cogito move, in establishing the existence of a being who thinks, because of the inseparability of being and thinking, also establishes the existence of the object at which the object-directed 'I think' is directed. Therefore within the Cartesian texts there emerges a distinct structured set of relations involved with certainty and representation. It is the Cogito move that introduces the concept of the representation of the thing by a sign. That is to say, within Cartesian thought the coextensivity between sign and thought is dependent upon the Cogito move.

What shall be discussed next is the relationship between the Cogito and the methodological guarantee of certainty. This relationship is in fact the relationship between the nature of thinking, subject and knowledge. In regard to clear and distinct perception, I have adopted the approach suggested by Frankfurt that clear and distinct perception is methodolo-
gical. It is a way of seeing things and establishing the certainty of things that involves the application of a method that exists independently of its use and that can be taught. In fact Descartes' Discourse on Method is just such a didactic or prescriptive text. Consequently on this level there is a distinction between the method used for attaining certainty and the thinking subject, i.e. the method exists prior to its use by any one thinking subject. However there is clearly another level on which this separation does not exist. If we understand the separation as entailing that certainty is the product of a method being brought to bear on ideas, then it follows that the non-separation is found in the instance where certainty exists, even though the usual method for obtaining certainty is absent. In other words, the non-separation must involve clear and distinct perception independent of method. (An example of this distinction would be the distinction found in Descartes between Idea and Adequate Idea, i.e. a distinction between an idea which is immediately perceived as clear and distinct and an idea which via the operation of a certain process comes to be seen as such.) This distinction is of fundamental importance in the Port Royal Logic, as on the basis of it the concept of demonstrable truths can be introduced. There is, as I have already mentioned, a similarity between the Lockean and the Cartesian conceptions of certainty, as both involve a conception of perception, a seeing that it is the case. However in Locke this mode of perception seems to incorporate an additional aspect which appears to be missing in Descartes,
namely, self-evident knowledge. This conception of knowledge is defined by Locke as follows:

Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the disagreement or agreement of Ideas. Now where the agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. (LEHU, p.591. My emphasis)

The defining characteristic of this conception of knowledge is that the agreement or disagreement is immediately perceived, i.e. a spontaneous and immediate act of the intellect. I have distinguished between, on the one hand a separation of knowledge and the thinking subject (the transindividual method, clearly evident in Descartes), and on the other hand the joining of knowledge and the thinking subject (understood not as the individual application of method, but rather the immediate and spontaneous perception of certainty, which is evident in Locke and Spinoza). The question is then, does this later conception appear in Descartes, or is it a point that marks the existence of a difference between Descartes and, for example, Locke, Spinoza and Arnauld?

There are two reasons for suggesting that it does not. The importance of this absence in Descartes is that while it indicates something particular about the Cartesian discourse itself, it allows us to see in what way the primacy of method occurs in the Cartesian texts. The first reason refers to the actual method used in the Meditations and repeated throughout Descartes' writings, namely, Cartesian doubt. It is clear that the method of doubt is an explanatory device used to sub-
stantiate the existence of self and of God; however, it is not the function of the method of doubt which is of interest but the fact that things could be doubted. The Lockean conception of immediate perception precluded the possibility that something could be self-evident without it being obvious that it is so. The whole point of such a conception is that the mind immediately perceives the self-evidence of a truth. Consequently the fact that the existence of God has to be demonstrated, and the fact that the mind's being better known than the body has to be shown by a procedure that necessitates doubting the existence of the entire self, both indicate that this concept of perception is lacking from the Cartesian system. For if they were self-evident, then the method of doubt, apart from being unnecessary, would be highly misleading; misleading in the sense that if they were self-evident yet could be doubted, the whole concept of self-evidence would be rendered self-contradictory. The second reason for asserting that the conception of self-evidence that is in Locke is absent from Descartes refers to the fact that within the Cartesian system, 'simple natures' do not exist in themselves. In consequence, they are always subject to the application of a method. Descartes describes the procedure in terms of which knowledge is possible as follows:

Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth. We shall comply with it exactly if we reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to those that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive apprehension of all things that are absolutely simple, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others, by precisely similar steps. (HR. I, p.14)
Consequently, the recognition of simple natures is not an act of immediate perception. Rather, the knowledge that they are simple is derived from the existence of a method which locates them in their simplicity and allows for a subsequent extrapolation from the simple to the complex. For Locke self-evidence is granted by attending to the relation between ideas - whereas for Descartes, as we saw, ideas are not separated out from things. Clear and distinct perception is not a matter of granting relations between ideas which are given to the mind already formed. It is tied to method. The thinking subject gains clear and distinct ideas by the service of the Cartesian method. The fact that it is tied to method makes self-evidence itself different.

There are two reasons for arguing that Descartes is in fact giving primacy to method. The first reason is implicit in the following statement:

if we are without knowledge of any of the things we are capable of understanding, that is because we have never perceived any way to bring us to this knowledge. (HR. I, p.9)

In this statement, being without knowledge does not preclude the possibility of knowing. However, the way in which knowledge would be arrived at is not through its being revealed but rather through the application of method. Since simple natures are not revealed as such, they are only located as such through the application of method. The second reason for arguing for the primacy of method in Descartes is related to the following statement of Pascal about Descartes:
I cannot forgive Descartes: in his whole philosophy he would like to do without God; but he could not help allowing him a flick of the fingers to set the world in motion; after that he had no more use for God. (Pascal. Pensées, p.355)

The basis of Pascal's objection to Descartes, as is evidenced in the above, is that the Cartesian system does not take as its lynchpin the 'author of our being'. Rather, even though the importance of God within the Cartesian system cannot be ignored, the particular concepts of certainty and truth rely more on the efficacy of method than they do on God.

The final point which needs to be explained is the relation between this aspect of Descartes' position and his claim that intuition is one of the paths to knowledge. While this may appear, given our previous discussion, as a contradiction, this is in fact not the case. What does emerge is a peculiar tension in Descartes' texts. I use the term peculiar, as the tension is unique to Descartes. In other texts which have been cited there is no tension between intuitive knowledge and knowledge which is arrived at on the basis of method.

Now, intuition is a road to knowledge. However, intuition has to be recognised as such; consequently it is at this point that the primacy of method can be recognised. The tension emerges as this claim of mine about Descartes has to be reconciled with the following statement of Descartes, which occurs in Rule XII during his discussion of the knowledge the knowing subject has of simple things:
Here we shall treat of things only in relation to our understanding awareness of them, and shall call those only simple, the cognition of which, is so clear and distinct that they cannot be analysed by the mind into others more distinctly known. Such are figure, extension, motion, etc.; all others we conceive to be in some way compounded out of these. (HR. I, p.41)

In this particular instance Descartes is discussing those things which exist in themselves and from which other things are constructed or composed. Furthermore, he is also stating that these primary elements are known through simple awareness of them existing as such. However, this needs to be seen in conjunction with the wax example, where the problem posed by the wax was 'solved' by seeing that it was in fact reducible to extension. This reduction was itself only possible because of the application of method. Furthermore, because simple natures do not exist in themselves, as has already been mentioned, identification of simple natures is dependent on that particular aspect of method which locates simple natures.

At this stage it is only possible to offer a tentative conclusion concerning the Cartesian conception of certainty; and that is that it is methodological. Furthermore, our discussion of this aspect of certainty has involved locating the role of method within the Cartesian texts. The reason why only a tentative conclusion can be advanced is that we have not as yet discussed the concept of error which is evident in Descartes' text. I now turn to this discussion.
Error in the Cartesian system is located in the other domain of consciousness, i.e. in volition. Willing, desiring, judging, are all activities which can result in error, as all of them are premised on a certain subjectivity of attitude. They can take place either prior to clear and distinct perception, or in the false belief that the method which results in the delineation of the object has been correctly applied. Error is related to fallibility; the subjective dimension. Certainty, as has already been mentioned, is subjective only in the sense that objects have, within the Cartesian system, a mental nature. More importantly, however, certainty is not subjective as it is the consequence of the application of method. It is this aspect of the method which necessitates its objectivity, as it is held independently of any one application of it.

This interplay between subjectivity and objectivity is also evident in Leibniz. In the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, the distinction takes the form of a contrast between those things which are of us and those things which are of God, the former being the subjective domain and the latter the objective domain. The guarantee of certainty lies in the security provided by the 'of God' (the objective domain). In both cases certainty exists in the objective domain and is therefore not self-referring. The domain of certainty is a domain existing outside of the thinking subject. It is for this reason that it could be argued that God for Leibniz and method for Descartes have structurally similar roles. In
both cases, because of the fallibility of human action, certainty or the possibility of attaining certainty is introduced on another level.

There is an epistemically similar position concerning the relationship between error and certainty to be found in Locke. For Locke, 'error is not a fault of our knowledge but a mistake of our judgement giving assent to that which is not true' (LEHU, p.706). Consequently, for Locke knowledge is impersonal in the sense that while it refers to the 'perception of agreement or disagreement of two ideas', this perception is regulated by means of pre-established ways in which ideas may agree or disagree. There is therefore the same distinction between the subjective and objective domains, encompassing error on the one hand and certainty on the other.

Now, within the Cartesian texts the actual structure which encompasses the question of error consists of the interplay between the freedom of the will and the rigidity of method. The untrained will does not have prescribed rules by which to operate and consequently operates on ideas in an unsystematic way. That is why, for Descartes, the way in which error can be avoided is by withholding judgement of ideas prior to the operation of the method which results in clear and distinct perception.

It can be seen that 'error' in Descartes, Locke and Leibniz, even though their particular systems differ, has the
same epistemic role. Consequently, in concluding this section, what shall be done is to draw these epistemic similarities together and as such, indicate the first move in the establishing of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.

In our discussion of the Classical Episteme I indicated that one of the consequences of the discontinuity between it and the Renaissance Episteme, and one of the things that marks the discontinuity, was the splitting of resemblance. This split generated two distinct domains, one being the domain of order, and the other being resemblance. The second domain comprises the dependence of the possibility of knowledge and error in the Classical Episteme on 'imaginative recall' and resemblance. It is in this second domain that we find the possibility of, and the necessity for, a theory of the imagination. The existence of, and the relationship between, these two domains is expressed by Hobbes, as follows:

The first beginnings ... of knowledge, are the phantasms of sense and imagination; and there being such phantasms we know well enough by nature; but to know why they be or from what causes they proceed, is the work of ratiocination; which consists in composition, and division or resolution. (Hew, Vol.I, p.66)

For Hobbes, the distinction between the locus of the imagination and the locus of knowledge is a rigid distinction. And this distinction exists in different forms, and at times with different consequences echoes through the Classical Episteme. It is for this reason that the distinction between certainty, error and truth can be explained in terms of these two domains.
One of the major differences which emerged in our discussion of Descartes was the absence within his system of a thorough-going distinction between self-evident truths and truths established methodologically. It was found that this distinction is evident in Locke and Spinoza and, as will be shown in greater detail in section 3 of this chapter, in the Port Royal Logic. However, while this absence establishes a difference between the above-mentioned texts, in this regard what is of importance is the similarity which locates itself in a domain outside of the knowing subject.

The possibility of this location is found in the conception of the sign in the Classical Age. I have already described this as the 'attempt to construct by artificial means (conventional signs) a universal language with which the primary and complex can be represented'. Now, this attempt had to have a form of justification that existed outside of the attempt itself. It is at this particular point that the function and purpose served by both God and method can be located. (It should be remembered that I have already posited a structural similarity between God and method in my allusion to Leibniz.) Consequently, the domain of order encapsulated and ordained the conditions of existence of the role of God and the role of the primacy of method within Classical thought.

In regard to error, it is clear that if the Hobbesian distinction is extrapolated so that it can be seen to permeate
the entirety of Classical thought, then all error can be seen as having as its basis the attempt to ground or establish certainty on resemblance. This is at the same time the attempt to establish certainty via the operation of the will and the operation of judgement. This conception of error is, of course, established by the discontinuity existing between the Renaissance Episteme and the Classical Episteme, where a conception of knowledge based on resemblance gave way to a conception based on representation. Consequently the possibility of the primacy of method and the structural similarity between its role and that of God is grounded in the above-mentioned discontinuous relationship, since it is on the basis of this discontinuity that what emerges as the fundamental task of Classical discourse is 'to ascribe a name to a thing, and in that name to name their being' (OT, p.120). And, because the sign is no longer inherent in nature, the name or conventional sign comes to be ascribed in accordance with a set of rules or an operational procedure that exist independently of the thinking subject.

The next stage in establishing the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge will comprise an investigation of the relationship between certainty and the use of mathematical knowledge. The reason for doing this is that one of the dominant components of Classical thought is a mathesis. However, as I have already mentioned in my discussion of the Classical Episteme (chapter 1, section 2), this mathesis should not be seen as an attempt by Classical thought to mathematicise philosophical discourse; rather, it should be seen as a metaphor for order.
CHAPTER TWO

SECTION TWO

THE RULE OF MATHEISIS
In this section I intend to examine Rule IV of Descartes' text, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. This 'rule' is concerned with the fact that there is 'need of a method for finding out the truth'. The reason why this search for a method involves mathematics is explained by Descartes in an earlier rule. In Rule II, he states that arithmetic and geometry are not the sole sciences but rather

that in our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry. (HR. I, p.5)

The immediate question that arises concerns the nature of this certitude; and the obvious related question, why it is that demonstration furnishes this certainty. It is in Rule IV that answers to these questions may be found.

The rule commences with a critical discussion of the way in which most chemists, geometers and philosophers undertake their studies. Expressed simply, the basis of Descartes' criticism is that they are unsystematic in their approach to problems, resulting in the fact that if problems are solved then this suggests luck rather than the application of a systematic method. There is therefore the need for a systematic method which in all cases will result in its application establishing the truth of things. In his discussion of the method Descartes claims that one of the functions of the method should be to explain 'how our mental vision should be used'. In stating this, he is articulating the theme mentioned
in the previous section; namely, that the guarantee of truth lies outside the thinking subject. However, as well as this, he is establishing one of the dominant themes of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge, i.e. its prescriptivism. I will have more to say about the opposition between a prescriptive and a descriptive approach to the knowing process later on; for the moment it is sufficient to indicate that a dominant characteristic of the paradigm under consideration is its prescriptivism.

Descartes' next move is to locate the unsystematic approach outside of the domain of reason. The haphazard approach of previous thinkers lay in their denial of the efficacy of reason and their related attempt to found science on the operations of judgement. As was indicated in the previous section, such an attempt within the Classical Episteme is not possible, as it is in the area of judgement that error is to be found. From this position it is a simple step to then go on and argue that while previous mathematicians had insights into the best methods for determining truth, what is essential is to show how 'the clearness and simplicity which we imagine ought to exist in a genuine mathematics' can be brought to light. What is of particular interest in this regard is the method which Descartes pursues. The first move which is made is to explain what it is that is intended by the term 'mathematics'; and the related question, what is it about mathematics which results in its being used in various other sciences, e.g. Astronomy, Music, Optics, Mechanics, etc.
The answer to these questions does not lie, as Descartes indicates, in a semantic analysis of the word 'mathematics' as such an analysis would only reveal that it was through, or by means of, mathematics that the scientificity of the various sciences was established. Such an answer begged the question, since even in admitting that this is the case such an admission fails the answer the initial question and re-poses it in terms of why this is the case. Clearly the answer involved locating in all allusions and references to mathematics the basis of the reference or allusion. In posing the question in this way, it refers to what has already been identified as one of the dominant characteristics of the Classical Episteme, namely, order and measurement. Consequently, 'all those matters only were referred to Mathematics in which order and measurement were investigated, and it makes no difference whether it be in numbers, figures, stars, sounds, or any other object that the question of measurement arises' (HR. I, p.13).

Therefore the efficacy of mathematics is due to the nature of the actual activity and to its universality. The nature of the activity refers to its dealing with things in terms of the combination of the simple and its reciprocal possibility of reducing the complex to the simple and then generating further complex entities. Its universality refers, once again, to what was isolated as one of the dominant characteristics of the Classical Episteme, namely, the use of an artificial though universal system for representing the
primary and the complex. The existence of universal systems has already been indicated in the references to Logic and Grammar in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica. The importance and necessity of utilising a 'universal Mathematics' is that it is only by means of it that an investigation into truth is possible, given that the investigation is defined by Descartes as follows:

> in my investigation into truth I shall obstinately follow such an order as will require me first to start with what is simplest and easiest, and never permit me to proceed farther until in the first sphere there seems to be nothing further to be done. (HR. I, p.14)

What emerges from this statement concerning method is the location of method and certainty within the domain of the understanding. The reason why this occurs is that as the raw materials of representation are ideas, and as the sign and thought are coextensive, it must be the case that the representation afforded by mathematics is a representation on the level of the understanding. The importance of this particular series of relationships can be seen by comparing it to Descartes' initial treatment of the activities of other practitioners of the 'higher arts'. His treatment was in terms of a criticism of the activity of attempting to ground certainty, or establish the truth about things, while not operating within the domain of the understanding. Consequently the critique and subsequent re-working of the relationship between certainty and mathematics afford the following insight into the Cartesian system: namely, that there is an insep-
rability between the understanding, universality and method. While it is the case that method refers to the training of the will, the efficacy of the method is recognised as such by the understanding.

It can be seen that truth and certainty necessitate texts which refer to the correct use of the understanding. The inseparability of method, universality and the understanding demand that this be the case, as error is not located in the understanding, or in the method, or in the universal nature of systems of order; error always comes from outside. In other words, expressed simply, one of the defining characteristics of the Classical Episteme is that error results from an operation of the will or judgement on the understanding. It is therefore located outside the domain of the understanding.

What has been seen in the brief discussion of Rule IV is as follows: firstly, the way in which mathesis relates to a general science of order, incorporating both the universality of representation and the relationship between order and measurement. Secondly, the distinction between the domain of the understanding and the domain of the will resulted in a similarity between the understanding, method and universality located in the first domain, and error located in the operation of the latter domain on the former.

While certain of the themes which comprise the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge have been discussed, there are two
concepts which have not. They are probability, and the actual workings of demonstration. The way in which they will be discussed is in terms of their function in the Port Royal Logic. This may appear a somewhat tenuous activity, given the famed difference of opinion between Descartes and Arnauld. However, as I have already indicated, I am not writing the history of doxology. My interest is in the presentation of these concepts within this particular text in accordance with the overall task of constructing the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.
CHAPTER TWO

SECTION THREE

ORDERING
I shall now discuss the fourth part of the Port Royal Logic. This particular part of the Logic is concerned with method, i.e. the way ordering takes place such that demonstration is possible. The relationship between demonstration and ordering is essential, as 'the demonstration of a truth consists more often in a series of arguments than in a single argument and convincing demonstration requires an arrangement of thoughts about what is clearly and distinctly known to discover the less obvious' (p.293). This distinction between what is known clearly and distinctly and things that can be known on the basis of this prior knowledge indicates that the distinction between on the one hand a separation between knowledge and the thinking subject, and on the other a non-separation between knowledge and the thinking subject is rigorously at work in the Logic. (From now on I shall call knowledge based solely on clear and distinct perception 'first order knowledge', and knowledge arising from demonstration 'second order knowledge'.) In the Logic, this distinction is presupposed and is the basis of the description of the three possible objects of knowledge. Reciprocally the distinction is evidenced in the description of the three possible objects of knowledge.

1. What I have attempted to show in this section is the entire procedure of demonstration. While I have not referred to all the aspects of demonstration presented here, in my discussion of Hume it is important that the entirety of the procedure be understood in order that the radical nature of the re-working of the knowing process in the Humean paradigm be fully seen.

2. All page numbers refer to the Dickoff & James translation of the Port Royal Logic.
The first object consists of those things which are known clearly and distinctly. The second object consists of those things which are not known clearly and distinctly but can be known on the basis of clear and distinct perceptions. Finally, there are those things which cannot be known. What is intended by the description that there are things which cannot be known is illustrated as follows: the power of God is an object which cannot be known. Now, the reason why this is the case is that as God's power is infinite and as the human mind has (by definition) finite capacities, then as what is finite cannot apprehend the infinite (by definition), then it must be the case that the power of God cannot be a possible object of knowledge. This is not to claim that the infinite nature of things cannot be demonstrated; rather, the point is that infinity or the infinite cannot be known. What can be known is that the infinite is what cannot be known is the infinite \textit{qua} infinite.

The possibility of the infinite not being a possible object of knowledge is grounded in what was discovered previously concerning the inseparability of the understanding and the coextensivity between ideas and signs. The understanding is by definition finite. This has the consequence that while it is the basis of knowledge, knowledge itself is limited by the understanding. In regard to this particular example, it is not simply the fact that there are not signs by which the power of God can be represented; it is rather that the power of God, or the infinite \textit{qua} infinite, can never
be a clear and distinct idea. Once again, this is not to say that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated; what cannot be demonstrated is the manner of this existence. In the words of the Logic, 'there are some things which are certain in their existence yet incomprehensible in the manner of their existence' (p. 298). This confirms what I said above, namely, that the existence of God can be a clear and distinct idea or it can be demonstrated: what cannot be either of these things is the manner of this existence.

The first group of possible objects of knowledge comprises those things the certainty of which has been established by clear and distinct perception and those things which are known clearly and distinctly due to the fact that they have been demonstrated as such. It would seem therefore that the second group, i.e. those things which have not as yet been established as certain but can and will be established as such by demonstration, will eventually occupy a space within the first group, given that the other component of the first group consists of the components of the second group, post demonstration. But what is of greater interest for our purpose is the concept of demonstration proper.

Demonstration is composed of many parts and involves an explicit use of method which renders the demonstration itself 'clear and conclusive'. This method 'may be called the art of arranging well a sequence of thoughts either to discover a truth of which we are ignorant or to prove to others a truth
we already know' (p.302). This division between the instruc-
tion and discovery indicates that there are in fact two kinds
of method: synthesis and analysis. Analysis is used to
discover truths, while synthesis is used to instruct others
of these truths. While there are two methods, both are applied
to the same domain, i.e. the domain of possible questions, and
within this domain the most important questions are those
concerning 'things'. Of this type of question there are
four parts. The first mode of questioning refers to the
seeking of answers by examining given effects in order to
locate causes. The second mode of questioning is the inverse
of the first form, in that this mode seeks answers by exam-
ing given causes in order to determine the effects. The
third mode refers to the examination of given parts in order
to determine the whole. The final mode of questioning refers
to the examination of a given whole in order to discover the
parts.

Once a question has been posed, the first step is to
determine clearly and distinctly what in fact is being asked
by the question. If this step is not taken, then within the
terms of the Logic, error is possible. Error is a result of
either neglecting an aspect of the question, or of adding a
part to the question where this part should not have been
added. This conception of error is structurally similar to
the conception of error that was found in Locke and Descartes,
in that it is premised on the failure to determine a given
thing clearly and distinctly and in doing this it is an easy
matter for the domain of will to intrude into the procedure of questioning.

Analysis consists in 'attending to what is known in the questions we are asked; the skill in analysis lies in isolating from the conditions of the question those assumptions sufficient to lead us to the unknown we seek' (p.306). In order to answer questions posed for analysis, what must be presupposed is that there are a number of self-evident truths, i.e. those things which are not true because they have been initially demonstrated to be true, but because they are clearly and distinctly perceived to be true.

This can be seen in the example used in the Logic in order to explain the procedure of analysis. The question used is: Is the soul of man immortal? In order to answer this question, the first move made in the Logic is to consider the nature of the soul. This is done by 'noting' that the essential characteristic of the soul is that it thinks. Therefore, even if it doubts its own existence, since doubting is a type of thinking it must by the act of doubting not only establish its existence but also the nature of its existence, i.e. as a being which thinks. The next step is an examination of thinking itself. When this examination takes place, it is 'found' that nothing which is contained in the idea of thought is also contained in the idea of body. It is then possible, with the aid of an already established truth, to conclude that 'thought is not a mode of extended substance' (p.306). From
this, it is possible to 'infer' that there is a distinction between thinking substance and extended substance; following from this, it must also be the case that the destruction of one does not entail the destruction of the other. Furthermore, because extended substance cannot be destroyed per se, but only its parts can be rearranged, it is the case that thinking substance, having no parts, cannot be destroyed. It is therefore possible to conclude that as the soul is a thinking substance and has by definition no parts, then, as it does not fulfil the prerequisites for being able to be destroyed, it is immortal.

The intriguing aspect of this argument is not its internal validity but the use of the terms 'noting', 'found', and 'infer'. In passing, it is possible to add that the use of 'noting' seems to indicate that thinking being the essence of the soul is an assumed truth, a clear and distinct perception; a first order truth. As for 'found', since part of the critique of Aristotle which is developed in the opening pages of the Logic relates to the arbitrariness of the categories, it would seem that 'found' is intended to mean something other than an arbitrary finding. What it does in fact mean is that the term 'found' signifies the existence of a clear and distinct perception, i.e. of the understanding clearly seeing that this is the case. The importance of the term 'infer' is, firstly, on a somewhat trivial level, it indicates that inference, when used in certain contexts, is not a problematic concept. And secondly, it indicates, as does the use of the
term 'causality' in the structure of the domain of possible questions mentioned above, that inference and causality are part of an explanatory device and part of a method of discovery and not concepts that can of themselves be questioned or examined. They exist purely in terms of their efficacy as tools of explanation and discovery.

It can be seen in the above argument that the basis of analysis is to break down the question into the parts that are known; then, on the basis of this activity, to generate a series of internal arguments in order to answer the question under consideration. However, what is presupposed in analysis, as in composition, is the existence of first order knowledge. In fact, were it not for the existence of first order knowledge, second order knowledge (the result of the demonstration) would not be possible, as regardless of whether or not the demonstration is taking place from general principles leading to an understanding of more obscure ones (composition) or moving from the largely known components of a single question in order to answer an as yet unanswered question (analysis), what has to be assumed is the existence of first order knowledge.

I will leave comment on this section until I have discussed two components of this part of the Logic; namely, the 'Rules Pertaining to Demonstration' and the sections on 'belief'. The reasons for not commenting are that these two areas fill in many of the obvious gaps in the exposition so
far, and once they are fully discussed, the nature of the difference established by Hume's critique of demonstration and his subsequent psychology of belief will emerge in a clear light.

In chapter eight of this section of the Logic there are advanced the two basic prerequisites for a demonstration. The first of these is that the content of the demonstration be certain, and the second is that the form of the argument is sound. The content of a demonstration will be certain if the propositions used in proofs are characterised by the following four attributes. The first of these is that the proposition be a 'nominal definition'. Nominal definitions (definatio nominis) are, in the Logic, contrasted with real definitions (definatio rei). Real definitions are of the type 'a man is an animal'. What characterises this form of definition is that the connection between the thing and the definition of the thing is a non-arbitrary connection. However, what is of importance is the sense in which the relation is non-arbitrary. It is not as though the non-arbitraryness is established by proof, but that it is a relation established by everyday usage. For example, if one were to say that 'time is the measure of motion', then it would be a real definition, for the simple reason that that is what time is understood to be. The problem with real definitions is that they are ambiguous; for example, the word 'life' has two different applications: it can on the one hand describe the 'cause of activity in animals', and it can on the other hand be the basis
of 'what causes men to think'. There are numerous other real definitions which are equally ambiguous, and it is for this reason that they cannot be used in demonstrations. The point about nominal definitions is that though they are arbitrary there is a certain finality about them:

words may be arbitrarily defined. The idea to be joined to a given word must be indicated so clearly and so precisely that subsequent to the definition the defined word cannot be equivocated upon: we must be able everywhere to substitute the definition for the defined word without producing an absurdity. (p.315)

Consequently, the term 'arbitrary' indicates that a conception of signification where signs were said to exist as part of nature is no longer at play. In other words, the resemblance theory of the sign has given way to a conception of the sign which, as Foucault indicates, can 'be constituted only by an act of knowing' (OF, 7). This conception of signification also refers to what has been isolated as one of the dominant aspects of the Classical Episteme: the distinction between the natural and the conventional sign. Quite clearly the distinction appears in the Logic in terms of the distinction between real and nominal definitions. Consequently, through the use of nominal definitions it is possible to construct an artificial and universal system of order. There is therefore an epistemic similarity between the Cartesian conception of a 'Universal mathematics' and the use of nominal definitions, as both relate to the construction of an 'arbitrary' and universal ordering system.
The second thing which has to characterise a demonstration in order to secure the certainty of the demonstration is the use of certain axioms. It is assumed that through a borrowing from the method of the geometers, axioms are to be accepted as clearly evident. (This is a direct echoing of the Cartesian conception of axiom.) From this it is possible to develop rules pertaining to the correct use and construction of axioms. The first rule is:

If moderate attention to the subject-idea and the attribute suffices to show that the attribute is truly contained in the subject-idea, then we have a right to take as an axiom the proposition joining the attribute with the subject-idea. (p.321)

The second rule is:

When simply consideration of the subject-idea and the attribute is insufficient for our seeing clearly that the attribute belongs to the subject-idea, the proposition joining the two ideas must not be taken as an axiom. (p.322)

What is intended by these two rules is as follows: the 'subject-idea' is the idea of the subject that is contained in the subject of a sentence. (In order for this to be made clear, it is worthwhile pointing out that as far as the Logic is concerned, 'all that is contained in the clear and distinct idea of a thing can be truly affirmed of the idea of that thing' (p.320).) The attribute, or rather the expression of the attribute, is the predicate of the sentence. Consequently the first rule refers to the relation between the idea expressed in the subject and the idea expressed in the attribute. This should not be read as a reference to the thing to which the attribute refers or to the thing to which the subject refers.
Similarly, the proposition should not be understood as being, for example, the copula which may join the two; rather, the proposition is the thought which joins them. Therefore, to translate the first rule, what is being claimed is that if the thought which joins the idea expressed in the subject to the idea expressed in the attribute can be clearly seen as joining them, then the thought or proposition can function as an axiom. In regard to the second rule, what is being claimed is that if the thought which joins the idea expressed in the subject-idea to the idea expressed in the attribute cannot be clearly seen as in fact joining them, then that thought or proposition cannot function as an axiom. There is no need for a method to determine whether or not the proposition actually joins the two ideas. By method I mean that which would demonstrate the necessity of the connection, be the connection either positive or negative. I say this as, while it is the case that the necessity can be demonstrated, there is in this regard no need to do so, since recognising the nature of the connection would be an act of immediate perception by the understanding, a spontaneous act of the intellect. This is indicated in the Logic as follows:

Everyone agrees that some propositions are clear and evident in themselves and need no demonstration. (p.318)

The third characteristic of a demonstration which, if involved in the demonstration will ensure its certainty, is the use of propositions which have already been demonstrated. This characteristic relates back to the discussion of the first
and second objects of knowledge, i.e. first order and second order knowledge. The second objects of knowledge were those things which, while not being held as certain, could be shown to be certain. We saw that once this had been done, those objects could be located in the domain of the primary objects of knowledge, as that domain was marked by the fact that those things which were in it were already assumed to be certain to be known.

The fourth characteristic is concerned with the formation of questions. In this particular instance, the proposition has to be:

the construction of the very thing which is in question when there is some operation to perform (this construction would be as indubitable as any definition, axiom or demonstrated proposition since, were there any doubt of its possibility, that possibility would have been previously demonstrated. (p.325)

This requirement refers to the nature of the proposition actually involved in a demonstration. The point is that the proposition has to be in all cases applicable to the demonstration. If the proposition is in fact applicable, then the result of the demonstration is assured of being certain insofar as the proposition is clearly applicable. This is not to say that the demonstration conditions the actual result. Rather, the nature of the proposition conditions the manner of the result, as the proposition exists as a clear and distinct idea.
The defining characteristic of the type of knowledge and signification discussed so far is that it pertains to knowledge understood in terms of its acceptance as knowledge by reason. In order to discuss the concept of belief which is evident in the Logic, it is essential to move from this domain to the domain of knowledge based on authority. In saying this it should be clear that the idea of belief does not involve the idea of demonstrated knowledge. It would be a misnomer to argue that one believes demonstrated knowledge; the point is that one knows demonstrated knowledge. Therefore (and while this point will be expanded later, it is worthwhile pointing it out at this stage) that belief is located outside the domain of demonstrable knowledge. This is not to say that certainty cannot be achieved; on the contrary, it is probable that via the means of knowledge based on authority certainty can in fact be reached. The point is that the certainty cannot be demonstrated as such. As St Augustine expressed it:

What we know we owe to reason; what we believe to authority. There are two types of authority, the authority of God and the authority of man.

What is of interest for my purpose is this second form of authority. Two things are interesting about this type of authority. On the one hand, human faith is subject to error, and, on the other, through it some things can be known with certainty, even though the certainty is not, in the strict sense of the term, demonstrable. An instance of this is that if the uniform testimony of a great many people attests to the occurrence of an event, then we can accept the occurrence
of the event as being certain. The reason for this is that 'it would be morally impossible for such a number to conspire together to maintain a story were it false' (p.338). The type of truth that is involved here is of a different status to the type of truth that refers to the nature of things, as the type of truth involved here is not related to immutable essences but rather to existing things, 'especially to human and contingent events'. The reason why there exist two different notions of truth is that the first notion of truth should be understood as necessary truth. It follows therefore that if something is necessarily true, it is true universally. As human activity and events are contingent, it would be 'ludicrous' to demand of such things the idea of necessity. It is for this reason that the following maxim is advanced, on the basis of which these contingent events can be judged:

In order to judge of the truth of some event and to decide whether or not to believe in its occurrence, the event need not be considered in isolation—such as a proposition of geometry would be; but rather all the circumstances of the event, both internal and external, should be considered. (pp.341-2)

The way in which this maxim would work in practice would be as follows: in the example 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', the internal circumstances would be of the nature of whether it was possible to cross the Rubicon; and if it was, whether it was possible for Caesar to have crossed the Rubicon. Other consideration on this level would be whether or not there was any evidence after the event that would affirm the event. In regard to the external circumstances, as they refer to the testimony of those who wrote about the event, the questions
that would be asked would concern the reliability of the commentators. If it is the case that the questions posed on the level of the internal circumstances indicate the actual occurrence of the event, and if the same is true on the level of the external circumstances, then it could be concluded with certainty that Caesar did in fact cross the Rubicon.

Given that Hume's critique of the whole paradigm of demonstrable knowledge will be discussed in the next chapter, it is worth briefly discussing the way in which this maxim applies to belief in miracles, and furthermore, how it is possible to have belief in historical events. Belief in the latter necessitates a distinction between what is called in the Logic 'moral', as opposed to 'metaphysical', certainty.

It should be pointed out that the distinction between reason and belief is, on the level of the Logic's method, a tight distinction. As has previously been pointed out, the distinction rests on the fact that things which are believed cannot be demonstrated as being certain by the means provided by the understanding. This is not to say, however, that their certainty is not recognised by reason.

The argument concerning miracles takes as its first premise that miracles exist. Consequently, this assumed existence gives rise to a specific series of questions. If miracles exist, how can it be determined that any one reported miracle is in fact a miracle? How is it possible to determine that the report of a miracle refers to an actual miracle and
is not in fact a devious device invented to convince pagans
of the power of God. (In chapter 3 it will be shown that
such questions cannot be posed within the Humean discourse,
and it is within the terms of this impossibility that the
difference between the paradigms can be examined.)

The principle mentioned above guides the assessment of
miracles, as it necessitates that questions be asked of the
purported miracle itself and of the 'faithfulness' and reli-
gious nature of the reporter of the miracle. It is because
of this approach to miracles that the position which argues
for the existence of any one miracle on the basis of its
resemblance to previous miracles fails to secure the certainty
of the miracle under consideration. The reason for this is
that if the reporter of the event is not subject to scrutiny,
then it may be the case that the reported miracle is a con-
struction, which even though constructed to resemble other
miracles is not in fact a miracle at all. The epistemic
possibility of this being the case does, of course, reside
in the de-centring of resemblance and its replacement by
representation as the basis of knowledge and order, since if
the resemblance theory of signification and the resemblance
theory of order were dominant, then it would be the case that
the resemblance between a 'genuine' miracle and a purported
miracle would establish the purported miracle as genuine.
However, because of the de-centring of resemblance mentioned
previously, the purported miracle has to be represented in its
genuineness, and this entails the judging of the event and the
consequent existence of rules in terms of which this judging can take place. Furthermore, the position of resemblance in regard to the belief in miracles is consistent with the role of resemblance within the Classical Episteme, in that it is the basis of knowledge; a miracle could not even be recognised as a miracle unless it in some way resembled previous miracles; and the basis of error lies in assuming a miracle to be a miracle simply because of the resemblance between it and previous miracles.

Now, given that miracles occur, it is at least probable that the miracles reported by St Augustine are in fact miracles. (The examples of miracles used in the Logic are predominantly those reported by St Augustine.) The miracles resemble other miracles, but we know that while this establishes something about the miracle, it does not establish the certainty of a given individual occurrence. It is also known that large numbers of people observed the miracles; while it could be the case that large numbers of people could be tricked, it is, as was mentioned above, impossible that large numbers of people would conspire together in order to deceive. However, the ultimate reason why the miracles reported by St Augustine are in fact deemed to be miracles is because of the nature of St Augustine himself. The fact that his piety would not lead him to bring disrepute to the Church by fabricating miracles, and that in fact he was a 'great enemy of falsehood', are enough in themselves to satisfy the maxim.
The same type of judgement is involved with respect to belief in 'historical events' as in 'future contingent events'. In regard to belief in historical events, their credibility resides in their 'being accompanied by common circumstances' (p.350). These circumstances are the circumstances that are similar in the occurrence of like events. Consequently, if an event is purported to have occurred, and if it is usually the case that when this event occurs certain other things also occur, then if the usual accompanying events have occurred it is probable that the major event has also occurred. In regard to this type of belief, it is clear that the type of certainty which is involved is not 'metaphysical certainty', that is, the type of certainty which follows demonstration or is generated by what has been called 'first order knowledge'. The type of certainty that is involved in this regard is called in the Logic 'moral certainty', i.e. the sort of certainty which is based solely on the probability of the event under consideration having occurred. Furthermore, if the common circumstances are such that it is highly probable that the event actually occurred, then to argue that there is still the possibility of its not having occurred, in other words to lapse into scepticism, is, in the words of the Logic, a 'betrayal of reason'. What is intended by this description of the denial of probability based on scepticism as a betrayal of reason is an attempt to defy the sceptic, not on strictly logical grounds but by an appeal to the supreme intellectual arbitrator, reason. Consequently, when the words 'betrayal of reason' are written, what is signified is nothing
less than an epistemological 'fait accompli' - nothing more to be said. (Of course, other things can be said, but such utterances would, by their very nature, be located outside a domain which took as one of its fundamental building blocks the epistemological efficacy of reason.) Consequently, if reason is dominant, and if reason deems that the probability of an event having occurred is sufficient, then the event occurred. To deny this is to deny reason.

The way in which this related to the probability of events occurring in the future is, once again, in terms of the circumstances accompanying the event. If, for example, one bought a lottery ticket of which one thousand were sold and two of these were to be winning tickets, then, as the chance of winning is one in five hundred, the probability indicates that the buyer of the ticket will not in fact win. If, on the other hand, the eating of roast beef is always accompanied by indigestion, then it is highly probable that the same person's eating of roast beef, on a different occasion, will also be accompanied by indigestion. However, while belief in future events can be assessed in terms of their probability, there is in the Logic a strong didactic element concerning the relationship between probabilistic reasoning and behaviour. An example used in the Logic indicates the basis of this relationship; this particular example concerns the fear of being struck by lightning.

Now this fear could be such that the intensity with which it was felt altered one's behaviour, and if this were the case,
then it would reveal a systematic failure to utilise one's intellectual capabilities. The reason why this is the case is evidenced by what probabilistic reasoning would reveal in its application to this particular example. It would reveal the following: if in a large town one thousand people die each year; and of the total number of deaths, two are caused by the victim being struck by lightning; then this would entail that there is as much right to fear being struck by lightning as there is the right to expect to win the lottery. In conclusion, therefore, belief in the past is based on the likelihood of the event having occurred, assessed in terms of the circumstances which have assured the existence of the event in the past; it follows from this that if the circumstances were to occur in the future, then it is 'morally' certain that the event will occur in the future.

Consequently, having discussed the nature of belief and the structure of demonstration, it is now possible to draw out the central tenets of demonstrable knowledge, and in so doing to establish the presuppositions that make possible this form of knowing. The fundamental distinction that emerged toward the end of the discussion, that between moral and metaphysical certainty, provides a way into the project of establishing tenets and presuppositions. Metaphysical certainty was either that form of certainty that was established by clear and distinct perception independently of demonstration (what has been called first order knowledge), or that form of certainty that arose out of demonstration (what has been called second
order knowledge). Moral certainty is that type of certainty which is not subject to demonstration. As was indicated, probabilistic reasoning, which will guarantee either the certitude of events having occurred or the certitude of events that will occur, is a mode of knowing that precludes considerations of proof. The recognition of moral certitude is an act of reason, that is, an act of the level of the intellect, but only insofar as the certitude is recognised as such by the intellect. The way of establishing the certainty by the use of probability is a method that is antithetical to the establishing of certainty either by demonstration or by clear and distinct perception. Furthermore, moral certainty exists in degrees, that is, it is possible to be more morally certain about something having occurred or being about to occur than it is about other things having occurred or being about to occur. This conception of certainty which is explicable in terms of degree is related to the term 'moral'. 'Moral' in this instance does not refer to notions of good or bad; rather, it refers exclusively to human action and those events which are contingent in the same sense that human action is contingent, that is, actions which can be discussed in terms of their likelihood. In other words, the nature of the event is such that its necessity could never be demonstrated, especially given the simple fact that the type of questioning that pertains to demonstration and the categories involved in demonstration are not applicable in this particular domain. The most important aspect of moral certainty as far as the concerns of this chapter are involved
is the location within it of probability. It is the probabilistic nature of moral certainty which defines its existence as certainty. Furthermore, because this particular form of certainty is unlike metaphysical certainty, it admits of degrees.

The concept of degrees of probabilistic certainty refers to what Foucault defined as one of the consequences of the structure of the sign, namely, that because and only because the sign is constituted by knowledge, and because knowledge admits of degrees, then this provides the possibility of degrees of knowledge. The form this takes in the Logic is conditioned by the existence of a distinction between reason and belief. Within the terms of this distinction, the possibility of degrees of knowledge manifests itself within the domain of belief and is excluded by definition from the domain of reason. If, as in the case of Hume, this distinction is collapsed, then it follows as a consequence that all knowledge admits of degrees of certainty. However, this aspect of the Classical Episteme will be discussed in the next chapter.

Metaphysical certainty, while distinct from moral certainty, encompasses two interrelated notions of certainty; clear and distinct perception, and demonstration. In the discussion of the concepts of certainty that were existent in Descartes and Locke, it was suggested that clear and distinct perception could have a twofold nature. On the one hand it was methodological in the sense that it indicated
the existence of a *reductio* method, i.e. a method that resulted in 'seeing' one thing in terms of the other. On the other hand it was a spontaneous act of perception, i.e. the seeing of things clearly and distinctly occurs prior to the application of method. It should be clear that this dual nature also exists in the Port Royal Logic. In both cases the end result of a demonstration is seen as such by this mode of perception.

In the Logic, as was mentioned, the relationship between the subject-idea and the attribute was such that if they are joined by a proposition that is *clearly* seen as joining them then that proposition can serve as part of the basis of a demonstration. Therefore the 'clearly seeing' is the spontaneous expression of clear and distinct perception. The *reductio*, or methodological, sense of clear and distinct perception is evidenced in the Logic in the actual practice of demonstration. Demonstration is 'the arranging of ideas' in order to solve a given problem or to instruct by indicating the necessity of what is being claimed. In both cases the intention of the demonstration is achieved by the content of the demonstration being certain and the form of the demonstration not containing an internal defect. Consequently, if the demonstration establishes the certainty of the thing which is the subject of the demonstration, then this only occurs because the method involved is such that it isolates that part of the problem which is already known from parts which are not, and then by a further process of delineation is able to
express the unknown aspects in such a way that, as isolated and delineated aspects of a general problem, they can in fact be solved as part of the overall demonstration.

In concluding this section, there is one other aspect of demonstration that is of great interest, and that is the role of causation in demonstrations. I have already mentioned that reasoning from effect to cause and reasoning from cause to effect is an assumed part of analysis. In saying this, what is being claimed is that causality is not of itself the subject of analysis; there exists no possibility of calling the causal principle into question, insofar as it forms the basis of two aspects of demonstration. The fact that something is caused is an assumed fact, as is the fact that for every cause there must be effects and for every effect there must be a cause. In other words, the relationship between the cause and the effect is a necessary connection that can be clearly and distinctly perceived.

While I shall not be dealing with Hume's critique of the causal connection per se, I shall show that Hume's arguments conceiving necessary connection and his critique of the role of reason carries the implication of denying to causality any privileged status in the knowing process.

It is now possible to sketch the structure of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.
Firstly: moral certainty establishes the certainty of contingent events by means of probabilistic reasoning. Because moral certainty is located in the domain of belief rather than the domain of reason proper, moral certainty admits of degrees. Secondly: metaphysical certainty involves clear and distinct perception understood as first order knowledge. Once again, the actuality of this type of perception is not in question. Its existence is both presupposed and forms the basis of the other form of metaphysical certainty, namely, demonstration. Demonstration establishes the certainty of those things which are not of themselves evidently certain. In doing this it employs, in the sense that it is presupposed, the causal principle. Both of these domains of certainty are bound by representation, in the sense that the certain event, or the knowledge which is the product of demonstration, and the first order knowledge are epistemically similar insofar as they are characterised by a certain concept of signification and have as their possibility a certain structure of the sign. On this conception, once a sign has been attributed to an object, then the sign is inseparable from the object. There is, as has already been mentioned, a one-to-one correspondence between the established sign of a thing and the thing itself. Thirdly: error is the intrusion of the domain of volition into the domain of the intellect or the domain of reason. Furthermore, error does not reflect on the method that is used to establish certainty; rather, error indicates human fallibility. The last point is evidenced in the fact that of the two uses of demonstration, one is to instruct. Fourthly:
the domain of things which cannot be known consists of those things of which it is impossible to form a clear and distinct idea. The implications of this can only be fully understood if it is remembered that there is an inseparability between the coextensive nature of signs and ideas and the understanding. This inseparability has the implication that as there can be no clear and distinct idea of, for example, the power of God, then by definition there can be no sign or series of signs which could represent the power of God. Fifthly: this tenet of the structure is the inseparability between sign, idea and the understanding mentioned above. In many respects, this is one of the defining characteristics of the structure. However, its existence, while it has been amply shown throughout this chapter, will emerge in greater detail after our discussion of Hume's critique. Sixthly: the most significant aspect of the paradigm is its prescriptive nature. The location of certainty or the means for attaining certainty is a method which exists independently of its use by the thinking subject.

Consequently, what has been attempted in this and the previous sections is a construction of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. What has emerged is that these six tenets provide an internally coherent structure of the knowing process, the possibility of which resides in the Classical Episteme. What I hope to show in the next chapter is that while the Humean paradigm exists in a relation of difference to the one constructed in this chapter, it too has the same domain of possibility.
In the first chapter I argued that the concept of identity and difference which were at play in Foucault's work allowed for the same identity to account for the existence of differences. In this chapter I have tried to tie its utterances to my previous discussion of the Classical Episteme. In doing this, I was attempting to show the relationship between the identity and the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. In the next chapter, the relationship between the identity and the Humean paradigm will be shown in the same way, that is, by referring certain of Hume's utterances back to what has already been established in my discussion of the prevailing identity.
CHAPTER THREE

SECTION ONE

DESCRIBING AND PRESCRIBING
When Descartes states 'that our method rightly explains how our mental vision should be used', he is exemplifying one of the defining characteristics of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. The method which determines how the 'vision' of the thinking subject could be used is a method which, as method, transcends the thinking subject. The thinking subject's involvement only occurs in the application of the method. With Hume it is no longer the case that a method is prescribed; rather, what is found is a description of the mental processes which accompany the thinking subject's claims to certainty. In Hume, therefore, there exists a descriptive rather than a prescriptive approach to the knowing process.

The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive philosophical discourse is a distinction which holds between different paradigms of the knowing process. Consequently the move from the prescriptive to the descriptive indicates a profound re-structuring of that process. This discourse generated by the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge is, as has been mentioned previously, marked by its being prescriptive. What is intended by this particular characterisation is that the philosophical texts belonging to the paradigm were concerned with carefully detailing the correct method of knowing and with defining those things which could not be known. The actual demonstrations were not demonstrations or examples of how the knowing process takes place; rather, they were instances of the thinking subject's application of the
prescribed method. Expressed epistemically, they indicate the nature of representation, and furthermore they indicate the type of relationship which existed between signs and things. The prescriptive nature of this paradigm entailed the existence of an arbitrary relationship between the signifier and the signified, since the intent of demonstration is to secure the thing with its one true sign. Quite clearly this relationship between the signifier and the signified is also evidenced in what has been called 'first order knowledge', that is, where reason perceives the connection clearly and distinctly without the need of demonstration.

The prescriptive nature of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge is further evidenced in the role that the problem of error plays within it. What is of interest in regard to error is its relationship to certainty. Error was something that, although it existed, could be avoided by 'observing' the rules. The existence of human fallibility and the related existence of error did not impinge upon certainty. The reason why this is the case is due to the nature of, and the ways in which, certainty can be established. It is because certainty can be established by means of demonstration or probabilistic reasoning or by means of clear and distinct perception (understood in this instance as 'first order knowledge'). This entails that certainty does not refer to, nor is it contingent upon, the actions of the thinking subject. These methods are transindividual as they all refer to a prescribed method which both postdates and predates the thinking subject's use
of them. The importance of this particular point is that with Hume, the fact that individuals err does cast doubt upon the possibility of attaining certainty. In the case of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge, in contrast, the fact that method is badly applied such that error results does not cast doubt on the method itself. This is why it is important to recognise that the method's efficacy is not tied to its successful use in any particular instance. Consequently, while it is the case that the subjectivity of 'willing', 'desiring', 'judging' can in any instance dash the claims of certainty, this does not call the method itself into question. The separation of the subjective and the objective such that the subjective dimension does not call into question the objective nature of the objective dimension is possible only if the approach to the knowing process is a prescriptive approach. If there is a prescribed method or way of proceeding, then the fact that certain individuals err is only of consequence to those individuals who err. Error does not relate to the prescribed method, and, more importantly, can be explained in terms of it, so that the explanation of error locates it in the relationship between the subjective domain and the objective domain (the pre-existing method).

The explanation of error and its relationship to certainty is premised on an assumed relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. What was assumed in this relationship was that knowledge itself is not problematic.
The only way in which knowledge was a problem was that the most efficacious method for knowing needed to be established. There was no problem of knowledge expressed in terms of the possibility of knowledge and certainty. Rather, knowledge was inevitable. In fact it could be argued that, due to the power of reason and the related existence of first order knowledge, it was inevitable. Consequently, the challenge of the sceptic, the possibility of being deceived by a deceitful demon, etc., were all heuristic devices. The questions that emerged with Hume were questions that could not be posed within the preceding paradigm. Consequently, Hume's questioning of the nature of the knowing subject, of why things are believed, was an activity which marked the difference between the two paradigms.

A further example of the prescriptive nature of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge can be seen in the discussion of miracles in the Port Royal Logic. What is of interest in this regard is the fact that within the Logic miracles are assumed to exist. The consequence of this assumed status is that the philosophical problems generated are concerned with determining whether or not a purported miracle is in fact a miracle. It is the assumption that miracles exist, and the related questions generated by such an assumption, that indicate and are symptomatic of a prescriptive rather than a descriptive approach to the knowing process. If the question was as to why it is that miracles are believed, then it would refer to a psychology of belief,
and as such would necessitate a description of the process of believing in general and a description of the particular belief, namely, the belief in miracles. As the questions posed by the Logic assume the existence of miracles, it follows that the questions generated by such an assumption concern only the prescribed method for determining in any particular instance whether or not a reported miracle is in fact a miracle. The assumption that miracles exist highlights the primacy of reason within this paradigm, as the assumption that miracles exist is not an assumption that can be argued for; rather, the existence of miracles is taken to be evident to reason. Without intending to preempt what will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, it is at this stage possible to state that Hume's questioning of the nature of belief, his approach to the question of causality, and the way in which in his writings he posits and structures the distinctions between knowledge and probability, indicate that he is not writing from within the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.

This aspect of Hume's discourse is of great importance, as an understanding of Hume must be premised on the recognition that his enterprise was not simply a critique of demonstrable knowledge and an attack upon the primacy and scope of reason; rather, his enterprise marks a shift in the gaze of philosophical discourse away from questions concerning how things can be known with certainty to a questioning of the possibility of knowledge itself. This shift had the
consequence that his arguments attempted to establish that certainty was in fact an unobtainable state of affairs and that all that could be known was why in a particular instance certainty is claimed. This does not entail that this was the only way in which the question could be resolved, since it was still possible for Hume's contemporaries to come down on the side of truth and certainty (e.g. Reid and Beattie) and to assert the methodological guarantee of clear and distinct perception (e.g. Bentham). The point is, however, that with Hume there is a difference constructed between the paradigm within which his discourse is located and the paradigm containing the Cartesian discourse. Consequently, in constructing the Humean discourse what will be constructed is the difference between it and the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.

I have already argued in the first chapter that the relationship between the paradigms is a relation of difference rather than a discontinuous relationship. The reason why this is the case is that in regard to the paradigms, the difference exists because both have the same epistemic conditions of existence - a conception of order based on representation. It is for this reason that the discussion of Hume will take place in relation to this prevailing identity.

Before moving to a discussion of Hume, the possibility and nature of the difference needs to be established. As prescriptivism has been dealt with in considerable detail,
I will commence with a discussion of the descriptive nature of the Humean discourse. However, before undertaking this task it is vital that the nature of difference be reiterated. The contrast between difference and discontinuity was that the concept of difference depended on there being a prevailing identity. I have already argued that if there is a relationship of difference between a given A and a given B, there has to be prevailing identity to generate and provide the possibility of difference. The differences do not exist in themselves, i.e., they do not exist in terms of the essential characteristics of A and B; rather, the difference is established because of the difference found in their relationship to the identity. And it is this conception of difference which will be established in this chapter by focusing on the relationship between the Humean paradigm and the prevailing identity.

The difference between description and prescription as two approaches to the knowing process is intimately connected to the distinction between internal and external evidence. (In saying this I am not precluding its being connected to other components of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge or, for that matter, components of the Humean paradigm. I am merely using this connection as a starting point for my discussion.)

In the Logic, the distinction takes the following form: 'internal circumstances (are) those which belong to the event
itself; external circumstances, those which pertain to the persons by whose testimony we are led to believe in the events' occurrence' (Arnauld, p. 342). It should be remembered that this particular conception of evidence does not pertain to what has been described as first or second order knowledge, as the truth or the certainty which is established by evidence is qualitatively different from the conception of certainty that pertains to the domain of ideas. This conception of evidence relates to the existence and likelihood of past, present and future events. These two conceptions of evidence are therefore only concerned with establishing the moral certainty of the event. (The distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty has been discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3.) It will be seen, as Hacking has indicated,¹ that the distinction between external and internal evidence provides the basis for Hume to write his essay 'On Miracles'.

In terms of their appearance in the Logic, the distinction between external and internal evidence is that the former is concerned with those aspects of the event which are extrinsic to the event itself, while the latter is concerned with those aspects of the event which are intrinsic to the event itself.

These two conceptions of evidence for an event were, in terms of their appearance in the Logic, intended to be combined. Internal evidence would account for the possibility of the event considered in itself. To use the example men-

¹. See Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, Chapters 4 and 5.
tioned in the previous chapter, internal evidence would be concerned with the possibility of crossing the Rubicon, while external evidence referred to the confirmation by others of the likelihood of the event. In our previous discussion of miracles, one of the aspects of the miracles was the fact that they were reported by St Augustine. As St Augustine was not the type of man who would intentionally deceive others, it was thought that his testimony provided sufficient external evidence to justify the judgement that the miracles he reported were in fact miracles. However, as the testimony of others was not as unchallengeable as the evidence presented by St Augustine, then it followed that the evidence of others was not accorded the same degree of certainty, and as such was less probable. The consequence of this is that external evidence established degrees of certainty depending on the reliability of the testimony.

The same situation also occurs with internal evidence. However, internal evidence is slightly more complex than mere testimony, as internal evidence was concerned with the possibility of the event itself. The evidence for the possibility of an event was not the evidence derived from the authority of testimony; rather, it was the event functioning as evidence. This conception of the sign was not established on the basis of verisimilitude, as it does not refer to the event under consideration appearing as anything; rather, the sign pointed beyond itself. The sign as evidence was not therefore the conventional sign, nor the nominal
definition; rather, it was the natural sign and the real definition. It was this particular conception of signification which, because it was ambiguous, could not function as the basis of demonstration. Yet the chance of its significations resulting in a degree of certainty opened up its use in the domain of probabilistic reasoning.

The distinction between internal and external evidence is combined in the idea of calculation. As Hacking describes the goal of the section on probability in the Port Royal Logic, 'the goal is a calculus for combining evidence to discover which proposition has an acceptable level of probability' (Hacking, 1975b, p.79). (This theme of a calculus of combination has already been mentioned in our discussion of the Classical Episteme, where it was identified as one of the consequences of the binary structure of the sign found in the Classical Episteme.)

It can be seen therefore that the distinction between nominal definitions and real definitions, conventional signs and natural signs, accounts for the emergence of probabilistic reasoning. In many ways there does not exist a point of comparison between the Port Royal Logic and Hume in their respective treatments of the relationship between knowledge and probability. This aspect of their respective writings is illustrated in Reid's comment:

But it may be understood that Hume ... uses the word probability in a sense for which I know no authority
but his own. Philosophers understood probability as opposed to demonstration; the vulgar as opposed to certainty; but this author understands it as opposed to infallibility which no man does. (Reid, *Of Reasoning*, Ch.IV)

Now, it is clear from Reid's comments that there is something quite remarkable in Hume's opposition between infallibility and probability. The opposition between demonstration and probability is an opposition which was evident in the Logic. It was an opposition which generated two incommensurate views of certainty; and furthermore, it was an opposition that accepted as an essential premise the primacy of method and the transindividual nature of the method. Error, as has been mentioned before, belonged to a completely different domain - a domain which did not refer to certainty. In this lengthy quote from Hume it can be seen that for him this separation was not strict and that demonstration was not transindividual:

In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error. We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgement, as a check or control on our first judgement or belief; and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances where in our understanding has deceived us, compar'd with those, where in its testimony was just and true. Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity and intricacy of the question. (*HT*, p.180)

In many respects, Hume's philosophical corpus (even his theory of the passions) can be extrapolated from this particular
passage. However, while this is the case, my concern is far narrower than this, as all I am concerned with is the relationships between: certainty and error, reason and judgement, and finally, knowledge and probability.

Hume's first move is to describe demonstration as certain and infallible. With this point the Port Royal logicians would not quibble. Once again, his next move, which is to state that in the application of method we sometimes err, would not cause too much consternation. After all, the Logic was written to instruct others in how to reason so they did not fall into error. However, even in this move there are glimmerings of the horrors to come. Hume has excluded clear and distinct perception (first order knowledge) and spontaneous acts of reason. Hume's next move is to advocate a system whereby judgements can be checked by forming new judgements. It is at this point that there is a complete break with the procedure of the Logic, as the system of clear and distinct perception circumvents the need for undertaking this activity. The establishing of a procedure for checking judgements has the consequence, as Hume indicates, that all 'knowledge degenerates into probability'.

Clearly these are many points at which it is possible to establish the incommensurate nature of the relationship between the two paradigms. One of the most important is the relationship between knowledge and the thinking subject. In
stating the relationship in this way, I am not referring to Hume's conception of the self *per se*, but rather to the way in which Hume envisages the role of the thinking subject in the knowing process. What is intended by this can be made clear by briefly recapitulating my discussion of the role of the thinking subject in the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.

In this paradigm, as has already been mentioned, there existed a primacy of method. This primacy of method entailed that knowledge was not dependent on the thinking subject, in that the means for determining certainty pre-existed the individual. The question as to how representations which have their origin in the mind can give us knowledge of independently existing substances was simply answered in what I have called the primacy of method. In every instance there was the real possibility of a methodological guarantee of certainty. However, once the distinction between method and the thinking subject is destroyed; once the question is posed in terms of the fact that error destroys the credibility usually granted to the thinking subject, all that can be left is the thinking subject's claims concerning knowledge about the world. It is as though with Hume, instead of the primacy of method, there is the primacy of the thinking subject. The reason why this is the case is that it is a direct consequence of denial of a transindividual method. This denial can be seen in Hume's claim that error on behalf of the thinking subject calls the possibility of certainty
into question. This 'calling into question' could only be operational if there was a denial of what I have called a distinction between the subjective and the objective domains.

The primacy of the thinking subject entails that there can only be probability rather than certainty given that there is not an outside domain in which the guarantee of certainty can be located; and the thinking subject is no guarantee in itself.

It is now possible to see in what way the move from prescriptive to descriptive philosophical discourse has taken place. In order to develop this theme, and consequently the difference between the paradigms, I now move to a discussion of the Humean paradigm.
CHAPTER THREE

SECTION TWO

MIRACLES AND NATURE
In this section it is intended that the Humean paradigm be established. The way in which this task will be undertaken is by commencing with a discussion of Hume's critique of miracles. The reason for taking this approach is based, in part, on the revealing nature of the treatment of miracles in the Port Royal Logic. The discussion of miracles in the Logic both highlighted and exemplified the concerns of the Logic. In orientating my discussion around the question of miracles I am not, as has already been mentioned, intending to over-emphasise their importance in Classical thought. Rather, what is of interest is that their presentation in the Logic marks the emergence of difference, since with Hume what was unproblematic becomes problematic. As my concern lies with the nature of the difference rather than merely the history of miracles, my use of Hume's critique of miracles is as a marker in terms of which the nature of the difference can be both explained and developed.

In Section X of the Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, Hume advances what is usually described as a rigorous and successful critique of the démonstrable existence of miracles, which has the implication of being a critique of the belief in religion in general; a critique of the concept of revealed truths on which so much religious thought and dogma were based. What is of interest in this regard is not the critique qua critique; rather, it is the possibility of
the critique. Hume's discussion of miracles encapsulates and is premised upon the tenets of the paradigm which mark the limit and establish the difference between it and the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge.

In the opening paragraphs of Section X, Hume quotes with approval Dr Tillitson's argument against the Catholic doctrine of 'real presence'. Tillitson's argument as presented by Hume begins with the claim that the evidence for the truth of the Christian religion is premised on the testimony of the apostles and therefore on their sense perceptions. It follows therefore that the evidence presented by the apostles is not as strong as our evidence for believing things. Now, as the reports of the apostles were transcribed over time, then it must be the case that their veracity (as evidence) must decrease over time. Therefore, we must have less faith in the works of the apostles than we have in our own senses. Now, as 'weaker evidence can never destroy strong evidence', we have no justified reason for believing this instance of weaker evidence. Consequently, as the justification for 'real presence' resides in the scriptures and not as an object of our senses, it can be concluded that the evidence against believing it is greater than the evidence for believing it. After presenting this argument, Hume concludes by stating that 'I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument of a like nature' (HE, p.110). Before moving to a discussion of Hume's argument, it is important
to note that the conception of evidence presented by Tillitson differs quite markedly from the conception of evidence introduced in the Logic. It was certainly the case that in the Logic there was a conception of evidence which allowed for greater and lesser degrees of certainty. However, in the Logic, degrees of certainty were not calculated in terms of a temporal schema. The testimony of St Augustine derives its reliability from the character of Augustine. The fact that he lived in the fifth century A.D. is irrelevant. Tillitson points out that evidence decreases in its power as evidence over time, which is a conception of evidence that is in marked contrast to the atemporal conception of evidence in the Logic. Consequently, it is possible even at this stage to glimpse the difference that emerges in the treatment of evidence in Hume.

In discussing Hume's arguments concerning miracles, instead of discussing them in relation to his overall philosophical position I will proceed by discussing them in terms of their presentation in the text. The section on miracles consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with showing that the existence of miracles could be accounted for on the basis of testimony, such that the testimony comprised 'an entire proof' (HE, p.116). The second part is an undermining of this position such that Hume can conclude that the testimony which accompanies miracles provides neither a proof nor a probability.
Hume begins by claiming that the only guide which exists for the reasoning that is concerned with matters of fact is experience, and that such reasoning is not infallible. Hume in this instance is clearly dealing with matters of fact rather than the relationship that exists between ideas, and as such is operating within the domain which in the Logic was characterised by moral rather than metaphysical certainty. However, Hume is in fact doing more than this. As will be indicated later, he is undermining the distinction between a domain of pure ideas and a domain based on experience. The point of saying that he is operating in the domain of moral certainty is that within the Logic the concept of evidence was only pertinent to this domain. Consequently, in his critique of the power of evidence, Hume is in fact collapsing the opposition between a domain of understanding and a domain of the will.

After discussing the fallibility of reason, Hume indicates that instead of using experience to corroborate such reasonings, evidence fulfils the role of experience. Hume's next move is to claim that while reasoning on the basis of human experience is extremely common, this aspect should not be accepted as an essential characteristic of reasoning, but rather its commonality should be understood in relation to its origin. Its origin is that because human testimony is usually true, and because the 'facts' usually conform to testimony, our experience of these connections establishes their necessity, rather than being either something inherent
in the experience, or objects themselves, or the fact that they are commonly conjoined. This being the case, the origin or proof of probability in regard to matters of fact is subject to Hume's general maxim concerning the connection between objects:

that no objects have any discoverable connexion together and that all inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction. (HE, p.111)

Consequently, while this is the case with human testimony, it is still the case that we discover by experience that men seldom lie, that the memory is for the most part reliable, that falsehood is discoverable; and as such we do grant a certain authority to human testimony. Since we do grant this authority, we do deem some testimony as providing proof and other testimonies as providing a probability, if the relationship between the report and the object under consideration has also been found to be either 'constant or variable' (HE, p.112).

It seems that for Hume matters of fact always lend themselves to a 'contrariety of evidence', and it is for this reason that we always have to balance the evidence, assessing the positive against the negative. It is at this stage that Hume introduces a reference to the nature of the object under consideration being either ordinary or 'extraordinary'. He states that the reason why we tend to believe historians or witnesses is not because we have an a priori understanding of
the relationship between testimony and reality, but rather because 'we are accustomed to find a conformity between them' (HE, p.113). However, it is a slightly different case if the reality of the object under consideration is less. Hume describes this phenomenon in terms of the object having 'seldom fallen under observation' (HE, p.113). When this is the case, the evidence for the object having existence is assessed against the contrary evidence, and the conclusion should always be in terms of the stronger evidence.

Now, in order to extend his discussion, Hume states that instead of looking at ordinary, or for that matter marvellous or extraordinary facts, 'let us suppose, that the fact, ... is really miraculous' (HE, p.114). If this is the case, and if there is testimony functioning as proof affirming the miracle, then this results, as Hume indicates, in a 'proof against proof'.

Hume has two definitions of miracle. The first is that a miracle is

a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of them, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. (HE, p.114)

The second definition of miracles is:

a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. (HE, p.115)
There is no real difference between the two definitions, except that with the second, instead of tying miracles solely to nature, he is tying them to the action of the Deity in regard to nature. Consequently, his second definition will allow for the polemical conclusion of Section X.

After defining miracles in this way, Hume then moves to a discussion of the implications of such a definition. His basic point is that in taking nature as constant and as the basis of experience, it must follow that miracles are not found in nature, and as such not the objects of experience. Furthermore, if a miracle is a violation of nature, then the natural occurrence which is violated must function as the object of experience. If, for example, the miraculous event is that a man rises from the dead, then this is miraculous because our experience is that men do not rise from the dead. Hume expresses this as follows:

> There must (therefore) be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit the appellation. (HE, p.115)

The consequence of their existing such a 'uniform experience' is that the evidence for a miracle existing must be greater than the evidence that would indicate the contrary. In regard to the above example, a report that a man rose from the dead would establish itself as a belief in the minds of others if, and only if, the statement's being false would be a more miraculous state of affairs than the statement's being true. In posing the point in this way, Hume is allowing for the
possibility of miracles, though restricting the possibility to a seemingly improbable, though not impossible, state of affairs. In fact this in the conclusion of the first part of Section X. While I wish to wait until the whole of Section X has been discussed before commenting on the nature of Hume's activity, it is clear that even at this stage the treatment of miracles indicates a profound re-working (by Hume) of the concepts of evidence and probability.

The second part of Section X begins with the admission that the conclusion of the first part is a 'great deal too liberal' (HE, p.116) in its concession in allowing for the possibility that there might be a proof for the existence of miracles. Consequently, Hume uses four arguments to undermine the conclusions of Part 1.

The first takes as a premise a fact that Hume deems indisputable, namely, that through the course of history the testimony which accompanies miracles has not been derived from a sufficient number of reliable witnesses. For example, it is not the case that any reports of miracles have had as their source a witness whose reputation would suffer if the miracles were in fact shown to be fraudulent. Hume lists other such 'circumstances' which would be necessary if we were to trust the testimony of others. He concludes that it is for this reason that testimony cannot be fully trusted.

The second argument which Hume advances concerns the role of resemblance in the activity of reasoning. He claims
that the maxim by which we commonly reason is

that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. (HE, p.117)

However, though the thinking subject does tend to reason according to this maxim in matters of fact, 'the mind observes not always the same rule' when it is dealing with events that are marvellous or events that are miraculous. In fact such occurrences are granted credibility and consequent reality on the basis of that which, if examined, would destroy their credibility or authority. That is, such events are granted existence because of the passions which accompany consideration of them. In the case of miracles, the passions which accompany them are 'surprise' and 'wonder'. (Hume's 'theory of the passions' assumes that the qualities that engender the passion do not inhere in the object itself; rather, as in this case, the 'surprise is nothing but a pleasure arising from novelty' (HT, p.301), and as such, it is the pleasure, or it is on the basis of the pleasure, that the existence of the miraculous is affirmed.) The consequence of this is that because the passion does not affirm the nature of the occurrence, the fact that a purported occurrence can generate a certain passion is not in itself sufficient reason for affirming the existence of the actual occurrence. In other words, the fact that people enjoy hearing stories concerning fabulous events does not of itself provide sufficient
evidence to claim that the events actually occurred. The further consequence of this is that the belief in miracles can be explained by the theory of the passions, such that all authority that was thought to reside in the testimony of others which would confirm the existence of miracles is actually stripped of all authority.

The third argument concerning the existence of miracles is advanced in terms of the nature of the peoples who originally reported miracles and the fact that miracles no longer occur. Hume begins by stating that

It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relation, that they are observed to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; (HE, p.119)

Hume also states that if civilised peoples claim the existence of miracles, they usually do so on the basis that such occurrences occur among 'ignorant and barbarous' peopled. For Hume, the origin or initial histories of all nations are obscured and mystified by the fact that the 'whole frame of nature is disjointed' (HE, p.119), and consequently things appear differently. For example, reports of marvellous or miraculous occurrences during war are in fact to be understood as being no more, or reflecting no more, than man's 'propensity' towards the marvellous. Hume's point is that it seems to be part of human nature to describe certain events in terms of their being miraculous occurrences. However, though this may be the case, this does not entail that the events are miraculous. In fact, to use Hume's word, the fact that
human nature has such tendencies should make us 'suspicious' of all reports of miraculous events. Hume's point concerning the non-occurrence of miracles in the present day is couched in antagonistic polemic: 'It is strange, ... that such prodigious events never happen in our day. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages' (HE, pp. 119-120). Though this statement of Hume's is polemical, the point it is making is not new; in fact St Augustine answered such objections in The City of God as follows:

Cur, inquiunt, nunc illa miracula quae praedicatis facta esse non fiunt? Possem quidem dicere necessaria prius fuisse quam credit mindus, ad hoc ut credet mundus.

(Why, they inquire, are the miracles that used to be done, as you boast, not done now? I could reply that they were necessary before the world believed, in order that the world should believe.)

Hume's point is not simply pedantic; rather, it reflects a broader epistemological point concerning the nature of evidence, and the relationship between evidence and authority. He is claiming that the testimony of others, even if the testimony derives from a source that should be reliable and in which it should be possible to grant authority, this need not be the case. We should be 'suspicious', as reliable witnesses have misled in the past, and because of this there is not a sufficient reason to suggest that this will not occur in the present or in the future.

The fourth reason which 'diminishes the authority of prodigies' (HE, p. 121) once again concerns testimony. Only in this case, the argument is far more subtle. Here Hume
argues the following: that for every prodigy, even though it be accompanied by testimony in its favour, it is always opposed by an 'infinite number of witnesses'. This being the case, it follows that the existence of miracles must destroy the authority of testimony, and furthermore the testimony qua evidence is self-defeating. In other words, the fact that a number of people affirm the miracle's existence must be weighed against the number who deny it; therefore, for Hume, as the number of negative instances is greater (as a matter of course) than the number of positive instances, then it is the case that, firstly, the miracle destroys the evidence for its own existence, and, secondly, the greater number of negative instances destroys the smaller number of positive, and consequently, 'the testimony destroys itself' (HE, p.121).

This brings Hume to the most important point he makes against the belief in miracles. Throughout the four arguments, Hume has slowly undermined the possibility of there being evidence to substantiate the existence of miracles. He starts by attacking the authority of human testimony by claiming that the testimony which accompanies miracles is not always reliable and as such should not necessarily be trusted. He then takes a new tack on the undermining of testimony by showing that in the case of the miraculous, such testimony can be explained in terms of his theory of the passions. This move has the consequence that the miraculous quality is to be explained with reference to the thinking subject, rather than being located in the event itself.
His next move is to undermine the credibility and authority of those who report the occurrence of miracles. And finally, in his most subtle argument, he undermines the idea of testimony altogether. These moves, if taken together, comprise a systematic attack not on miracles per se, but on the testimony which would establish the veracity of miracles. From this point, Hume is able to make two separate, though related, conclusions. In fact his first conclusion refers to the first definition of miracles, and his second conclusion to the second definition. To begin with, he concludes:

Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability much less to a proof; and that even supposing that it amounted to a proof; it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. (HE, p.127)

This conclusion refers to the first definition of miracles, as it was this particular definition which described miracles as a simple violation of the laws of nature. Such a description necessitated as a proof an argument from experience that would prove the existence of the miracle as miracle; and it is this being a possibility which is denied in the conclusion.

The second conclusion is concerned with the function of miracles:

that no human testimony can have such a force as to prove a miracle, and to make it a just foundation for any system of religion. (HE, p.127).
It is clear that this distinction refers to the second definition, as it describes miracles as not simply being a divergence from the laws of nature, but rather a divergence undertaken by a Deity. The consequence of this is that, if miracles depend upon the existence of a Deity, and if it can be shown that it is impossible to provide sufficient testimony to establish either the proof or probability of miracles, then it must also follow that it is impossible to substantiate, either on the level of proof or probability, the existence of the actions of a Deity. Now, the second conclusion states that if a religious system is founded on the existence of miracles, and if their existence cannot be affirmed, then it must be the case that the religious system is without a base. Consequently, the second conclusion is both an implicit attack on religion in that it reaffirms the impossibility of establishing the veracity of miracles, and an explicit attack as it leaves the way open to argue that, as religious systems are based on miracles, and as miracles cannot be affirmed, then there is no reason to believe in the dogmas of any particular religious system. In fact, this is Hume's conclusion:

we may conclude, that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. ([E, p.131]).

In his conclusion, Hume reaffirms certain themes which played a central role in his attack on the veracity of miracles.
He argues that the belief in miracles is an impossible state of affairs unless one's entire being is accompanied by a miracle such that the basis of knowing, experience, is constantly being denied. The reason why this is the case is that things are known due to the operations of custom and experience. Furthermore, what is known in this way is 'nature'. Consequently, since the definition of miracles is a 'transgression of the laws of nature', this necessitates a particular conception of nature. Prior to my discussion of Hume's theory of belief, this conception of nature will be examined. This comes through, of course, throughout much of the Treatise. I will try to bring it to light by focusing on his discussion of love and hate.

Hume in his discussion of the passions of love and hate argues that while it should be the case that these passions are of necessity related to 'desire' and 'aversion', this may not in fact be the case at all. As it is, it is assumed that a relationship exists between on the one hand, love and desire and on the other, hatred and aversion, because the relationship can be explained in terms of the fact that the passions of love and hatred are thought to have a cause, an object and an end. In the case of love, the cause would be pleasure; the object a person; and the end, the happiness for the person. If this were the case, the distinction between love and desire would collapse, as implicit in the 'necessity' of the connection between cause, object and end is the equality between love and desire; i.e., love and the
desire for another's happiness amount to the same thing. The same state of affairs can be shown to exist in the relationship between hatred and aversion.

Hume quickly points out that this scenario is 'contrary to experience' (HT, p.137). The reason why it is contrary is that happiness and misery are not essential characteristics of love and hatred; rather, they are presented by the imagination as such. While this finding has important consequences for Hume's theory of the passions, it has, as well as this, important consequences for his theory of nature.

The fact that love and hatred are joined to desire and aversion by the imagination indicates that the actual joining and the actual configuration are arbitrary. The consequence of this is similar to the consequence inherent in the distinction between the natural and the conventional sign. The conventional sign consisted of the application of the sign to the thing, which entailed that signs were not inherent in nature, but were applied by means of conventional though arbitrary rules. Both the arbitrary relationship between sign and thing and the arbitrary connection between various passions indicate that order is not inherent in the nature of things; rather, things are ordered. To express this in terms of necessity, the argument follows the same lines. In the same way as the relationship between sign and thing is not a necessary connection, the nature of the sign is that it is conventional, the necessity of the relationship between
passions is not due to the nature of the passion; rather, it is also established by convention. The consequence of this is that necessity is not inherent in the nature of things; rather, necessity comes from outside of the domain of things and nature. In fact, order arises due to the operation of the imagination, given that one of the functions of the imagination is the separating and ordering of ideas. Consequently, if the idea of necessity does not reside in nature, then this leaves open the question of the origin of necessity and its relation to nature. Hume in his previous discussion of the idea of necessity argues the following:

The idea of necessity arises, from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv'd from some internal impression, or impression of reflexion. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity. (HT, p.165).

Implicit in this discussion is the dominance of resemblance. When Hume states that the idea of necessity is to be explained in terms of a propensity which allows for the passing from an object to its usual attendant, he is in fact highlighting the role of resemblance, since if it were not for the fact that there was a resemblance, this 'passing' would not be possible. Though there are other philosophical relations, it is the concept of resemblance which underpins them all.

In his discussion of resemblance in Book I, Section VI, Hume states that the concept of memory is inextricably related
to resemblance, since for memory to function, the images that it recalls must resemble the objects under consideration. Consequently, though memory is in some sense a secondary occurrence in comparison to the account of the origin of the idea of necessity, in both instances it can be seen that what is at work is a type of process, a process which in the case of necessity moves from the unordered Sameness via resemblance to the establishing of order and necessity. In the case of memory, as its 'chief exercise is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position' (HT, p.9), it can be seen that the same type of process is at work: from the random impressions that enter the mind, order is constructed. Once again the movement is similar; from unordered Sameness to a conception of order as a differentiated order which is dependent for its workings on resemblance.

It is clear then that in the case of the idea of necessity and in the Humean conception of memory there is always the movement from an unordered, undifferentiated and random domain to a domain of order and necessity. It is in the first domain that nature can be located. It is now possible to relate the existence of these two domains, and the location of nature in the first - and therefore outside the domain of order and necessity - to our discussion of the 'analytic of the imagination' and the 'analysis of nature' which formed an integral part of the discussion of the role of the imagination in the 'Classical episteme'.
It has already been mentioned that the 'analytic of imagination' was concerned with the disorder in nature and, related to this, the disorder of the impressions of the thinking subject. The 'analysis of nature' was concerned with the resemblances between things prior to their reduction to order. In other words, the concern exhibited by the 'analysis of nature' was with both the possibility and basis of order. That is why in the interplay between the 'analysis of nature' and the 'analytic of imagination' we find Hume's concern with establishing the relationship between the imagination and resemblance. However, before discussing this relationship, it is vital that the conception of nature in the Classical episteme be mentioned, since what will be shown later is that Hume's definition of miracles as a transgression of the laws of nature depends not only on a certain conception of nature but also on a distinction between nature and the laws of nature.

In the section of The Order of Things which is devoted to establishing the internal specificity of the Classical episteme, Foucault describes the concept of nature inherent in the episteme as follows:

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\text{nature is nothing but the impalpable confusion within representation which makes the resemblance there before the order of identities is yet visible. (OT, p.71)}
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It is this conception of nature that enables the linkage between impressions and nature, and furthermore, this description necessitates a further linkage (in the case of Hume)
between memory and the imagination. It can be seen that on the one hand there are brute impressions, those things which, due to a certain degree of passivity on behalf of the thinking subject, enter the mind in a random and disparate manner—the entry of the unordered and undifferentiated Same. And yet on the other hand, if there is to be both a connection between impressions and the consequent comparison of ideas in order that custom and experience can play a decisive epistemological role, it is essential that these impressions can be represented. Furthermore, it is also essential that they can be represented again and again; and it is at this point that it is possible to see the emergence of memory playing the dual role of ordering impressions and, due to the power of resemblance, enabling their imaginative recall. It is also at this stage that it is possible to see the operation of the imagination in joining together different ideas such that from the disorder of nature a conception of natural order can emerge. In the example of the relationship between love, happiness and desire, a relationship which for all intents and purposes looked 'natural', we found that though it appears as such, it is only a certain conformity of experience, aided by the role of resemblance, which establishes any order of the relationship such that it can appear natural. Consequently, it can be seen that the Humean relationship between imagination and resemblance is a relationship where the dominance of disordered Sameness is being constantly traversed by resemblance such that from its undifferentiated domain emerges a conception of linear order.
The problem posed by Hume's description of the miracle as being a transgression of the laws of nature was that it necessitated a certain conception, yet a difference, between nature and the laws of nature. Now, nature, as has already been indicated, is the domain of Sameness; of undifferentiated impressions. Given that this is the case, it opens up the question of the laws of nature. The difference between the laws of nature and nature lies not in the term 'law' being located before the term 'nature'; but rather because it stands in marked contrast to the conception of nature in the Classical episteme. Nature is disorder, while the term 'law' can only refer to order; and as the order invoked in such a term cannot be found in the disorder itself, the origin of the law provides a way into Hume's theory of belief, since the origin of the belief is the same as that of the law.

It has already been suggested that it is resemblance which, in providing the means for the operation of the imagination, establishes order from the disorder of random impressions. Consequently, it is within the terms of this distinction that the distinction between nature and the laws of nature can be located. If law is to be located in the domain of order, then it must be the case that the conception of necessity which is pertinent to the Humean conception of necessary connection is also evident in the concept of law. There are two characteristics of necessity which seem to validate the relationship between law and necessity. The first of these is the fact that necessity does not inhere in
the object itself, or in the relationship between objects. The same is true of the laws of nature, as it has already been shown that nature itself does not contain any law-like qualities. The second characteristic is that necessity cannot be explained in terms of necessary relations between ideas or impressions; but rather, can only be explained in terms of the propensity produced by custom to pass from ideas to impressions. The fact that they are usually joined entails that via resemblance and custom, any future occurrence will join those ideas. Once again, it is possible to see a structurally similar position in regard to the laws of nature. If, for example, it can be assumed that 'men once dead do not rise from the grave' is a law of nature, then the reason it exists as such is not that there is a particular essence, 'deadness', that precludes their rising from the grave, but rather than men rising from the grave is contrary to experience. In other words, death and the idea of rising from the grave are not joined by resemblance.

It is now possible to grasp what is at stake in the description of the belief in miracles being a belief which, if held 'by a reasonable man', must necessitate a constant miraculous state in the believer, given that the belief is a belief in the transgression of the laws of nature. It is not because the belief in miracles is contrary to the nature of things, as for Hume things do not have a nature or essence; rather, it is because the belief is contrary to the necessity established by custom and resemblance. This, of course, must
be understood in relation to the fact that for Hume the only way things can be known is on the basis of the orderings and arrangement of ideas and impressions.

Throughout this section I have been concerned with Hume's undermining of the concept of evidence which is at play in the Logic. However, the way in which Hume undertakes this activity is not merely by attacking evidence per se; rather, it is by attacking the conditions of this particular concept of evidence. The way this is achieved is by attacking the distinction between a domain of reason and a domain of judgement. The consequence of this attack is that, among other possibilities, it allows for an explanation of the belief in miracles to be advanced in relation to the passion 'novelty'. To show that there can never be sufficient evidence to substantiate the existence of miracles necessitates, given that miracles are believed, an explanation of this particular belief. Furthermore, throughout this section I have attempted to give greater content to the difference between a prescriptive and a descriptive approach to the knowing process. In Hume, the fact that miracles come to be treated in terms of an explanation of the belief in miracles indicates that there is no transindividual method for determining the relationship between subject and object. Rather, what is of interest for Hume is the subject's claims or beliefs concerning the object. In the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge, the subject knowing the object with certainty was established by means of this transindividual method. This distinction has important impli-
cations for the differing conceptions of the knowing subject in the two paradigms. In the case of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge, there is a tangible cogito, and hence it is possible to determine the nature of the thinking subject. This activity is clearly at work in Descartes' Meditations. However, in the Humean paradigm it is clear that the shift from prescribing to describing has different implications for the conception of the knowing subject. If I am right in asserting that what is important for Hume is the thinking subject's claims or beliefs, and that the origin of this is the epistemological primacy of custom and resemblance, then it is not the case that Hume could state, 'I believe therefore I exist'. The consequence of the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum', namely that the existence of the 'I' of the 'cogito' is established by an act of the thinking subject, is absent from Hume. There are two reasons why this is the case. The first relates to the impossibility of there being a separate idea of existence which could be annexed to the idea of 'I' and the related impossibility of there being an impression which corresponds to the idea of an 'I'. This reason itself undermines the possibility of the statement's being a proof of the identity of the cogito. However, there is a more significant reason, namely, that the statement runs contrary to Hume's theory of belief. Belief for Hume is not an act of the thinking subject; rather, belief is a passive process that occurs within the thinking subject. In order to indicate why this is the case and to further develop the descriptive nature
of the Humean paradigm, I now turn to a discussion of Hume's general theory of belief.
CHAPTER THREE

SECTION THREE

BELIEF
Throughout the Treatise, Hume discusses belief in terms of its origin and hence can account for why the thinking subject believes matters of fact, namely, where the cause and effect are presented to the subject. However, in the Appendix Hume returns to what he sees as the problematic nature of the theory of belief. This aspect of the theory is the nature of belief itself. It is in the Appendix that he realises that while he has dealt with the question 'why is a belief a belief?', he has not as yet dealt satisfactorily with the related question, 'what is it about a belief which makes it a belief?'. My concern in this section is with the later question, since it is this question and the answer to this question which will allow greater amplification of the descriptive nature of this paradigm. It is for this reason that this section will centre around Hume's discussion of belief in the Appendix.

Having posed the question 'what makes a belief a belief?', Hume suggests that there are two possible answers. The first is that a belief is an idea which is joined to the simple conception of an object. The consequence of this is that belief assumes the status of a Berkeleyan abstract general idea; the particular structure of belief that it engenders is a ternary structure comprising the idea 'belief', the thinking subject, and the object of belief. The second answer to the question is that belief is a 'feeling or sentiment' which arises when the cause and effect which give rise to the belief occur in the thinking subject. The consequences of this particular
answer are that belief is no longer an idea which entails that it does not exist in itself, and that the structure of belief engendered, instead of being a ternary structure, is a binary structure. In this instance, while there is a distinction between the believer and the object of belief, there is a coalescence between the belief and the object of belief. Furthermore, the binary structure indicates a degree of passivity on behalf of the thinking subject, while the ternary structure indicates a degree of activity in that the idea 'belief' is joined to the object of belief by an act of the thinking subject, namely, the act of believing. In the ternary structure, because the belief and the object of belief are inseparable, the thinking subject's believing is a passive act, which has the broader implication that it is an act which cannot be regimented (that is, the thinking subject can believe anything presented to it by custom) but can only be described. In other words, the process of belief is a passive process in the thinking subject and, as such, a theory of belief must be a description of the operation of this passivity.

As is well known, for Hume belief is the latter of these two alternatives. However, what is of interest here is the argument presented to establish the binary structure of belief and the arguments used against the ternary structure.

Hume advances two arguments which are intended to show that belief 'is not a new idea annexed to a simple conception'
The first of his arguments concerns the possibility of there being ideas like existence and reality. The reason for taking this approach is that if there is an idea of belief, then it would have a status similar to that of the ideas of existence or reality, in that they exist independently of the objects to which they are annexed. In the Appendix, Hume takes as his premise that there are no ideas of existence which are independent of the existence of objects.

In the first argument, Hume takes as his premise the non-existence of abstract general ideas. The argument runs as follows:

We have no abstract idea of existence distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects. 'Tis impossible therefore, that this idea of existence can be annex'd to the idea of any object, or form the difference between a simple conception and belief. (HT, p.623)

What is being said here is that, given the initial premise that there can be no abstract idea of existence, then this idea cannot be annexed to objects in order to give them existence. Furthermore, if this is the case, then the idea of existence cannot be used to establish the difference between ideas and beliefs. The consequence of this is that ideas and beliefs are reduced to the same level, which has the broader implication that all knowledge slides into belief. Consequently, the conclusion of the argument is that on the one hand, there is no abstract idea such as existence or belief separable from objects; and on the other hand, the difference between ideas and beliefs does not lie in the 'existence' of
the former. However, while this argument establishes the fact that existence cannot be used to explain the difference, it opens up the question of what will explain the difference. Hume turns to this question in his second argument.

Hume's second argument against a belief's being a new idea is as follows: firstly, as the mind has control over all its ideas, it can do with them as it pleases. Secondly, it follows from this that if a belief is a new idea, then the thinking subject could believe anything it wanted to believe, as all that would be involved would be the annexing of the idea of belief to the object under consideration. Consequently, as there is the regulatory power of custom, it can be shown that this is not the case, and that the thinking subject only believes certain things, that is, those things which are presented by cause and effect. Relating this back to what I have called the ternary structure of belief, it is possible to get a better idea of what Hume is actually doing.

Quite clearly, one of the things which is being done is denoting the possibility of a separation between the belief and the object of belief. If belief consists merely in a new idea, then this allows for the possibility of the knowing process being the annexing of the idea to objects or the ideas of objects. And if this were the case, the result would be (as Hume indicates) that the knowing subject could believe whatsoever it pleased.
In many ways, the denial of the ternary structure complicates Hume's theory of belief, as it introduces a further coalescence to the one already mentioned. There is the primary coalescence between the belief and the object of belief such that it becomes difficult to grant each component a separate status; furthermore, there is a secondary coalescence between the believer and the primary coalescence. The consequence is that it is difficult to extract the believer without dragging out with him the belief and the object of belief. That this is the case is amply demonstrated by Hume's conclusion to this particular argument:

We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinant causes and principles of which we are not master. (HT, p. 624)

Having arrived at the conclusion that belief differs from a simple conception in that a belief is a particular feeling or sentiment that occurs in the thinking subject when it believes, his next concern is with the nature of the sentiment or feeling, and whether it is analogous to other sentiments which occur in the human mind.

Once again, Hume offers two alternative answers to this question. If the feeling is not analogous, the implication is that the sentiment has no cause; that it is therefore one of the 'original principles' of the mind. On the other hand, if there is an analogy between this feeling and other feelings, it then becomes possible to explain 'its causes from analogy,
and trace it up to more general principles' (HT, p.624).

Hume begins the discussion by claiming that those things which are believed (the objects of conviction and assurance) strike the mind with great force, and thus are similar to impressions, as they share with impressions the immediacy of their presentation to the thinking subject. This being the case, it is but a short step to conclude that the sentiment or feeling which is the belief is to all intents and purposes analogous to impressions. After showing in what way the feeling or sentiment is analogous to impressions, Hume states that there does not exist an argument against this conclusion except the statement that:

There is not, in my opinion, any possibility of evading this conclusion except by asserting, that belief, beside the simple conception, consists in some impression or feeling, distinguishable from the conception. It does not modify the conception, and render it more present and intense; it is only annexed to it ... (HT, p.625)

After stating the above, he then advances four arguments to show that such an hypothesis can be 'removed', and therefore it can be concluded that belief does in fact modify the conception and 'render it different to the feeling, without producing a distinct impression' (HT, p.627)

The first argument begins with the claim that belief, being analogous to other states of mind, is in fact contrary to experience. What is meant by this is stated further on, when it is claimed that 'no distinct impression attends every distinct idea or conception of matters of fact' (HT, p.625). It
is the nature of the relationship between ideas and impressions which is known by experience. The following example is used to indicate how belief can modify a conception. Suppose that I see the legs and thighs of a particular individual, but the rest of him is obscured from my vision. Then if this is the case, the imagination 'supplies' the rest of the body. The implication of this is that the customary connection between parts of a body and the whole body leads the imagination to spontaneously supply the present impression with those parts that are absent. Consequently it can be seen that the conception is in fact modified; but due to the spontaneity of the modification, there is no act of mind which occurs apart from the modification. This relates back to our description of the distinction between an active theory of belief and a passive theory of belief. It is clear from this example that the Humean conception is characterised by a degree of passivity on the part of the thinking subject.

The second argument is a re-statement of a theme that appears throughout the Treatise: that the mind has greater control over matters of fact than it does over those objects of mind which are fictitious. The implication of this is that belief, because it is regulated by custom, is primarily concerned with matters of fact, i.e. those things which are the objects of experience. This being the case, it is evident that in regard to matters of fact, modifications occurring due to the origin and nature of the impression make it both unnecessary and in the end misleading to advance explanations
for the operation of the imagination where such suppositions are located beyond the parameters of the thinking subject's experience.

In the third argument, Hume states that the cause of a firm conception can readily be identified, but what cannot be identified or explained are the causes of separate impressions. However, the point that is being made is stronger even than this, since the reason it is possible to explain the causes of a firm conception is that it can be done because of, in relation to, and in terms of, impressions. Consequently, the explanatory movement is an oscillation between impression and idea. This does not preclude the conceptions of causality or custom being at play in the explanation. All it does do is to locate their explanatory power in no domain existing outside of the oscillation between impression and idea. As Hume puts it, 'This is the whole of it' (HT, p.626). There is nothing within this domain that can produce a new impression. In other words, the functioning of the imagination or memory can be used to explain the relationship between ideas and impressions; however, the relationship between the impression and the object which causes the impression cannot be given a causal explanation. All that can be said is that the impressions are due to the experiences of the thinking subject.

The fourth argument concerns the effects of belief in their influencing the passions and the imagination. Hume's point is that the influence can be explained in terms of a
firm conception. The implication of this is that if this were not the case, then this absence would logically necessitate the existence of a separate impression which would influence the passions. The fact that the influence can be attributed to a firm conception means that there is no separate impression.

These four arguments lead Hume to conclude that belief only modifies the idea or conception, and renders it different to the feeling without producing any distinct impression. (HT, p.627)

In this dense conclusion it should be remembered that Hume is answering the following questions: firstly, what is the nature of belief? and secondly, is the nature of pure belief analogous to other mental events? Now, Hume's answer to these questions is that the belief modifies the object of belief, rendering it different without producing a different impression. What Hume is doing here is conflating believing X with the belief about X, though the results of this conflation are separate from what has been called 'pure belief', which is the sentiment or feeling. This could be called the mental registration of the belief.

The distinctions at play in Hume's conception of belief can be explained by using an example. In regard to the often-used example of the billiard ball metaphor: believing that a billiard ball will move if hit by another billiard ball
signifies a process of belief, as the process incorporates
the belief that the billiard ball will move and believing
that the billiard ball will move. The conflation of these
two aspects of belief amounts to the process of belief. Now
the process of belief differs from what I have called the
pure belief, which is the registration of the process, which
in this instance refers to the belief that if a billard ball
is hit by another billard ball, then the stationary billiard
ball will move.

Consequently, the final structure of belief is as follows:
the registration of the belief (the belief qua feeling)
differs from the process of belief (the conflation between
the belief and believing). The relationship between the
believer and the object of belief is the same as the relation­
ship between the simple concept and the belief about the
simple conception, i.e., it is possible to account for the
relationship in terms of habit and custom, given the funda­
mental pre-requisite that the operation is immediate, and as
such requires not an act of the thinking subject but rather
the passivity of the thinking subject. This structure of
belief precludes a distinction between justified and unjus­
tified beliefs. All that is at play in Hume's theory of
belief is a description of the process and nature of belief.

After having sketched the structure of the Humean con­
ception of belief, it is possible both to relate it back to
the previous discussion of miracles, and to utilise it in
further establishing the difference that exists between the Humean paradigm and the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. The reason why it is possible to do the latter of these is that it is via the structure of belief that the Humean conception of the knowing subject is established; and, related to this (as has already been seen), it is possible to see in what way the knowing process is structured such that knowledge is always reduced to belief. Consequently, this section and this chapter will conclude with a discussion of the above.

One of the interesting conclusions to emerge from the discussion of miracles was the description of the belief in miracles as being itself miraculous. While this point has already been discussed, it is worth briefly mentioning again, as the miraculous nature of such a belief should be even more apparent now that Hume's theory of belief has been discussed. What is of interest at this stage is the question of how it is that the thinking subject could believe in miracles.

The process of belief is, as I have already mentioned, a passive process, the only regulatory powers being custom and experience. If this is the case, what sort of custom or experience would be necessary for the thinking subject to believe in miracles? It is certainly the case that the thinking subject's attraction to the novel plays a decisive role in the belief in miracles. Yet there is more to Hume's attack on miracles than merely pointing out some of the
foibles of human nature. I have already suggested that the miraculous nature of this particular belief resides in the fact that the belief is contrary to the necessity established by resemblance and custom. If this is the case, why is it that there exist such beliefs? There are two answers to this particular question, one of which indicates how thorough-going Hume's critique of religion actually was. The second refers to the role of reason in general and the conception of reason that Hume was attempting to undermine.

The first answer concerns those experiences which would give rise to the belief in miracles. Clearly such experiences are not, as far as Hume is concerned, the experience of miracles themselves; rather, they would be the experience of, for example, going to church and hearing reports of miracles, or reading particular holy works and reading the discussion of miracles. Consequently, the belief itself can be accounted for on the basis of the fact that those in authority are trusted, or that the printed word does not deceive. It is a simple matter to develop this point to indicate that resemblance plays a powerful role in explaining the belief in miracles, given the above characterisation of the origin of such a belief. This point also clarifies our conception of Hume's theory of belief as not admitting the distinction between a justified and an unjustified belief. The distinction between 'justified' and 'unjustified' entails that there is a procedure in terms of which the justification for holding a particular belief can be assessed. If this is the case, it
would seem that holding a belief in miracles is unjustified because it can be demonstrated that such a belief is contrary to experience. However, the point is that the above would be true if belief were a separate idea which was annexed to other ideas or conceptions, since what would be unjustified would be the act of annexing the idea of belief to the idea of miracles. Hume has already demonstrated that such a configuration of belief is not at play. Now, given that this is the case, it immediately poses the question of what it is that Hume in his critique of the belief in miracles is actually criticising. On the one hand, there is no denial that people hold such beliefs; yet on the other, there is a description of the belief as being as miraculous as the object of belief. To express Hume's point simply, it is impossible for there to be sufficient evidence to support a belief in the existence of miracles. While this clearly relates to a critique of the role of reason, this point must wait, as there is implicit in Hume's critique a critique of authority and a critique of the particular manifestations of authority. In other words, the critique is on one level aimed at those who propagate beliefs for which there is insufficient evidence. Consequently, while Hume does not allow for a distinction between unjustified and justified beliefs, as belief is a spontaneous act of mind, there is implicit in his writings a critique of those who play upon the 'weakness' of human nature and the fallibility of reason in order to inculcate into others beliefs that are unsubstantiated.
This aspect of Hume's critique is related to the other answer to the question of why it is that miracles are believed to exist. This particular answer refers to Hume's conception of the power of reason. It should be remembered that the treatment of belief in miracles is just one instance of the overall critique of the primacy and scope of reason.

In the Port Royal Logic it is stated that the existence of miracles is evident to reason. There is no argument for their existence beyond the fact that their existence is assumed due to its being evident to reason. This being the case, it is clear that reason plays a powerful role in the Logic, and for that matter throughout the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. In the Enquiries, Hume states the following about reason:

... reason, which is slow in its operations, appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. (HE, p.55)

In the Treatise, Hume argues against reason, as it is this faculty which attempts to convince the thinking subject that there is a connection between cause and effect, which is inherent in the cause and given effect. The difference between the Humean conception of reason and the conception in the Logic is simply that reason in the latter is the guarantee of truth, i.e., something's being evident to reason is enough to establish its veracity, while in the latter case, Hume's conception of reason provides no such guarantee. It is clear
therefore that Hume's attack on the belief in miracles is part of his general attack on the efficacy of reason.

Prior to explaining the possibility of this difference, it is essential that the Humean conception of the thinking subject be related to the conception of the thinking subject which is found in the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge. I have specifically used the term 'thinking subject', rather than 'self', because the Humean 'self' is a problematic concept in that within the Humean discourse there is no impression which corresponds with an idea of self. The consequence of this is that Hume is forced to conclude that there is no conception of self per se; rather, all that there is is a bundle of sense impressions. However, the absence of a conception of self does not entail that there is no implicit conception of the thinking subject in the Humean discourse; nor does it entail that the role of the thinking subject in the knowing process cannot be examined.

I have already alluded to the role of the thinking subject in the Humean paradigm in stating that with Hume, because there exists a descriptive approach to the knowing process, and the absence of a transindividual method, the knowing process becomes the thinking subject's claim to knowledge. Everything is reduced to the thinking subject. Consequently, the absence of method, coupled with the existence of 'human fallibility', entails that the knowing process in the Humean paradigm becomes an investigation of the process
qua process. It is for this reason that Hume's text is a 'Treatise on Human Nature' and not a 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind'. The fact that the relationship between ideas is not based on the idea qua idea, but rather on custom and habit, facilitates the work of the imagination via resemblance, entailing that there are no rules to direct the operation of the mind and hence there is no act of mind to be regulated. Belief is a passive process that occurs and can be accounted for on the basis of the thinking subject's experience of the world.

The two contrasting titles embody the difference between the two paradigms. For Descartes, the separation between the subject and the object of knowledge is filled by rules, by the transindividual method, while for Hume, the separation between the subject and the object of knowledge is absolute. The entry of random and disparate impressions is a process that cannot be regulated, and the separation and ordering of impressions and ideas is a spontaneous mental act which also cannot be regulated. At this stage, having established certain aspects of the difference between paradigms, it is vital that these differences be examined in relation to the prevailing identity.

What I intend to show is that even though representation plays a structurally similar role in both the texts of the paradigm of demonstrable knowledge and in the Humean paradigm, it is possible that this identity can account for the differ-
rences that mark the existence of the two distinct paradigms. This relationship between the identity and the differences can be seen in the following two quotations, the first from Descartes, and the second from Hume:

Our ideas do depend upon things, in so far as they represent them. *(DCB, p.25)*

Our ideas are copy'd from our impressions and represent them in all their parts. *(HT, p.96)*

The quotation from Descartes comes from his conversation with Burman, where he is explaining the following passage from the Second Replies:

*For all contradictions and impossibility reside simply in our thought, when we make the mistake of joining together mutually inconsistent ideas; it cannot occur in anything which is outside the mind.* *(HR, II, p.46; my emphasis)*

Descartes is arguing against Burman's claim that if there is a contradiction among ideas, there must be a contradiction in things themselves. The important aspect of both the reply to Burman and the passage from the Second Replies is that they both refer to an active state of mind. In the latter, the joining of the two ideas is an activity undertaken by the thinking subject, i.e., it is an occurrence that we generate. This is why, as was mentioned previously, the division between error and certainty is not merely the opposition of two concepts, but rather a division which involves two distinct domains: the domain of judgement and the domain of the
understanding. Therefore, even though ideas represent things, the joining of ideas can be an active act of the thinking subject.

In Hume, however, there exists the same conception of representation; but because of the collapsing of the Cartesian distinction between the domain of judgement and the domain of the understanding, the same consequences do not follow. In other words, the structure and function of representation is similar to the conception found in Descartes (the opposition between ideas and things) and in Hobbes (the opposition between Markes and Signes), namely, it is representation existing as 'duplicated representation'; but this does not in Hume give rise to the same consequences as in Descartes. In Descartes, the conception of the sign, and hence the distinction between ideas and things, are regulated by a pre-existing method. It is the methodological guarantee provided by clear and distinct perception that regulates the relationship between sign and thing. In Hume this is not the case. Even though resemblance produces order from the random and unordered domain of impressions, the relationship between sign and thing and the relationship between ideas are both established by custom. Consequently, while custom in the case of Hume and method in the case of Descartes play structurally similar roles, they also give rise to, and mark the difference between, the two paradigms. It is at this stage that the relationship between identity and difference can be re-introduced. The differences have been established not
only in terms of textual presentation but also in terms of what I have previously terms an 'organic' approach to the text. The organic approach to the text was described as existing at the interface between the text and the possibility of the text. In constructing the paradigms, then, I have tried to follow this organic approach. Thus, throughout Chapters 2 and 3 I have attempted to ground certain textual utterances in terms of their possibility by references to the Classical episteme. For example, in the case of probabilistic reasoning I attempted to show that the possibility of this type of reasoning is to be found in the fact that in the Classical age the sign was defined in terms of knowledge; and as knowledge admitted of degrees, as it oscillated between the certain and the probable, then the sign also admitted of such degrees.

Attempting to establish the paradigms in terms of this interface refers to the statement in the Introduction to the thesis which described it as 'existing on two levels'. It is both an examination of certain topics in seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy and an attempted examination of what is at play in writing the history of philosophy. The examination was the establishing of the paradigms while concentrating on certain topics: the thinking subject, certainty, knowledge, and error. The possibility was the relationship between the paradigms and the prevailing identity, the Classical episteme.
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