This paper focuses on conflicts in the Province of Papua (former Irian Jaya) that were stimulated by the recent devolution of power of administrative functions in Indonesia. While the national decentralisation policy aims at accommodating anti-Jakarta sentiments in the regions and intends to stimulate development, it augments contentions within the Papuan elite that go hand in hand with ethnic and regional tensions and increasing demands for more sovereignty among communities. This paper investigates the histories of regional identities and Papuan elite politics in order to map the current political landscape in Papua. A brief discussion of the behaviour of certain Papuan political players shows that many of them are enthused by an environment that is no longer defined singly by centralised state control but increasingly by regional opportunities to control state resources and to make profitable deals with national and international commercial ventures. As a result, the aspirations of legislators are all too often detached from the reasons for demands for more sovereignty cherished among the majority of Papuans whose frustrations about ineffective governance are ever increasing. More generally, the conflict in Papua only partly follows prevailing opinion about the tensions between 'Papua' and 'Jakarta' or 'Indonesia'.

For a number of reasons ranging from Dutch nationalism, geopolitical considerations, and self-righteous moral convictions, the Netherlands Government refused to include West New Guinea in the negotiations for the independence of Indonesia in the late 1940s (Lijphart 1966; Huydecoper van Nigtevecht 1990; Penders 2002: Chapter 2; and Vlasblom 2004: Chapter 3). At the same time, the government in Netherlands New Guinea initiated economic and infrastructure development as well as political emancipation of the Papuans under paternalistic guardianship. In the course of the 1950s, when tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia grew over the status of West New Guinea, the Dutch began to guide a limited group of educated Papuans towards independence culminating in the establishment of the New Guinea Council (Nieuw-Guinea Raad) in 1961. In addition, a flag, the Bintang Kejora or Morning Star flag, was designed to be flown beside the Dutch flag and a national anthem was adopted to be played and sung during official occasions after the Netherlands national hymn. After a twelve-year dispute that was reaching its peak with the threat of open military conflict, this policy had to be aborted. In December 1961, President Sukarno issued the Trikora (Tri Komando Rakyat or 'People's Threefold Command') for the
liberation of Irian Barat (West Irian). At the heart of this massive mobilisation was Operasi Mandala, an Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) campaign designed to put pressure on the Netherlands government. The United States and Australia were not willing to support the Dutch military forces.

In an international climate of decolonisation, and after President Sukarno's sustained pressing of Indonesia's claim to the territory, the United States sponsored negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands about the future of West New Guinea under the auspices of the United Nations. The resulting New York Agreement of 15 August 1962 outlined the transfer of Netherlands sovereignty over West New Guinea to an interim United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, to be followed by a second phase during which the intervening administration would hand over full administrative responsibility to Indonesia. The agreement formulated the provision that the people of Irian Barat would exercise free choice over their future relationship with Indonesia before the end of 1969.

The victory over what had now become the Province of Irian Barat was a boost to Indonesian nationalism and became portrayed as the final chapter of decolonisation.1 The Indonesians, ruling the new province under the banner of the Trikora mobilisation, were triumphant while elements of the Papuan elite empowered by the Dutch began to complain about what they saw as a blunt Indonesian takeover. Feelings of being marginalized by Indonesian bureaucrats and immigrants from other Indonesian islands filling jobs and business opportunities arose mainly among urban Papuans. Some of the educated Papuan elite were arrested or sidelined as ‘collaborators with the Dutch’ while others continued to play a role in the administration.

A plebiscite called Pepera (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat or ‘Act of Free Choice’) was held in July-August 1969 during which 1020 cautiously chosen representatives from eight regions voted overwhelmingly for integration with Indonesia.2 Protest was heard, dissonant speeches delivered, desperate cries in the form of written notes were delivered to the United Nations observers, and demonstrations in Sukarnopura (former Hollandia, now Jayapura), Biak and Manokwari were dispersed swiftly by the Indonesian military. Over the following decades, faith in self-determination as linked to the undemocratic implementation of the Pepera became a key ingredient in a variety of Papuan nationalisms.

In response to the 'Indonesian occupation' of their land a liberation organisation called the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Organisation) emerged as a local movement in Manokwari in the 1960s and, from there, spread over the Kepala Burung (Bird's Head region). It soon became a fragmented network of dispersed groups of guerrilla-fighters.3 Its access to weapons was limited and popular support scant. Very few elite Papuans joined the armed struggle and the vast majority of people living outside the urban centres did not feel the sense of belonging to a nation that had been invaded by Indonesia. Nevertheless, disillusion with the Indonesian government began to grow widely among those who had enjoyed the fruits of the accelerated development effort of the Dutch government since the 1950s.

President Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998) put much effort into developing the province and it received more funds than all other regions of Indonesia. But the implementation of largely top-down development programs often failed. At the same time, an ever-growing but relatively poorly funded military (TNI), supporting a network of alliances for both political control and predator business, has lead to the dislocation of Papuans. On top of all, Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese and Javanese immigrants began to fill manual labour and seize small business opportunities. As a result, frustration about limited access to opportunities in modern Indonesia intensified tensions between 'Papuans' and 'Indonesians', in particular those who arrived in Papua through so-called transmigration programs or the larger waves of spontaneous migration.4 Furthermore, in terms of governance, the region is amongst the most poorly developed in Indonesia, while economic and ethnic differences play a significant and sometimes alarming role in land and resource politics (Timmer forthcoming).

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the presidency being handed over to his Deputy President, B.J. Habibie, a spirit of 'democratic reform' (reformasi) swept across the archipelago. In Papua it lead to what has been duly called a 'Papuan Spring' during which Papuan leaders from all over the region carefully sought to balance representations from the coast and the highlands in a wave of national Papuan actions and the establishment of Papuan organisations (see Van den Broek and Szalay 2001). At massive gatherings all over the region during which heated debates over the history of Papua and its possible future (‘autonomy’ or ‘independence’) were held, the Papuan Spring “took the form of the indigenous Papuan people demanding
merdeka, or independence, from Indonesia” (Sumule 2003b: 353; Chauvel 2005: 11-20). Before I discuss the Papuan Spring it is necessary to briefly elaborate on what kinds of meanings merdeka has assumed in the history of Papua.

**MERDEKA AND MEMORIA PASSIONIS**

The Indonesian nationalist revolutionary understanding of ‘merdeka’ dates back to the mid-1920s growth of the nationalist movement followed, after promises during the Japanese occupation, by the Indonesian revolution of 1945-1949. During the late 1940s, ‘merdeka’ became the battle-cry with which the citizenry was summoned to support the cause, the salute with which revolutionaries would greet each other, the cry of solidarity at every mass rally, and the signature at the end of every Republican document’ (Reid 1998: 156). As Reid (1998: 156) points out, merdeka meant national independence to the revolutionaries but the people experienced it as a far more immediate and personal freedom. Later, during Soeharto’s New Order government, merdeka became part of the military ideologies and plainly came to mean ‘the independence’ that was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 and ritually celebrated every year since. In Papua, primarily urban educated Papuans began to absorb the idea of merdeka as national independence since the late 1950s, when President Sukarno became determined to incorporate Netherlands New Guinea to complete the nationalist struggle and resistance amid the Papuan elite against the Dutch government grew (Grootenhuis 1961). Before that period, only a limited number of educated and politically active Papuans cherished ideas about merdeka. For example, in Serui on Yapen Island, Silas Papare established the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia (‘Indonesian Freedom Party’) in 1946, of which members read sections of Republican papers in village churches on the island, while outside the churches people exercised the exclamation of “merdeka”. Papare was a charismatic leader and the pro-Indonesian movement on Yapen was seriously crippled when he left for Indonesia in 1949 (Vlasblom 2004: 162; Chauvel 2005: 71).

Around the same time, also as part of a struggle against the Dutch government, Lukas Rumkorem, a Biak assistant patrol officer, established the Partai Indonesia Merdeka on the island of Biak (Vlasblom 2004: 163). In Hollandia as well, “enthusiasm for ‘red and white’ [the colours of the Indonesian national flag] got hold of a number of schooled Papuans” (Vlasblom 2004: 163, my translation). The merdeka-leader there was Marthen Indey, who was raised in Ambon, Maluku, and had been posted to Banda Neira, where he became inspired by the prominent nationalist, Mohammed Hatta, who was exiled there. In 1946, Indey joined the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KMI, ‘Indonesia Freedom Committee’) led by the Manadonese government medical doctor, Ms Gerungan. KMI advocated the independence of Indonesia, including West New Guinea through all legal means (Vlasblom 2004: 164).

As Chauvel concludes, the nationalism of this period had a narrow base and the nationalists were culturally isolated from the great mass of Papuans’ (2005: 6). The majority of Papuans had very little knowledge of Indonesia and its merdeka struggles. After the incorporation of West New Guinea into Indonesia, people throughout Papua began to learn about merdeka as one of the chief dictums of the New Order government. At the same time, growing resentment due to the failure of development promises to crystallise and unrelenting military operations grew and merdeka began to take on meanings that were part of a struggle to secure freedom against a tyrannical state.

While the OPM and a number of Papuans in exile tried to keep the ideal of merdeka alive for most Papuans it became a principle that is suggested to be in the hearts of all Papuans. When asked bluntly about ‘OPM’, Imyan people of the southwestern Kepala Burung, while having no clear ideas about its organisational structure and strategies, tend to suggest that the OPM will eventually complete the struggle for merdeka. Further scrutiny of their worldviews, however, reveals that many take the view that Jesus Christ will perform the role of bringing merdeka. He will bring wealth and prosperity to their community (not ‘Papua’) and He will re-establish the just, original order in the world. Imyan refer to this order in terms of Toror or Baimla, a mythological world during which the Imyan were at the centre of the world and possessed all the knowledge and power (Timmer 1998, 2000a, and 2000b: 302; cf. Rutherford 2005 and Golden 2003).

Taking into account the immense variety of cultural traditions in Papua, it should be no surprise that peoples’ ideas about merdeka are diverse. Moreover, there are also divisions within Papuan communities. Imyan villagers, for example, tend to divide into two groups: one that is inclined to withdraw into autonomy (related to ideas about a past community of male initiates retreating in the forest to engage with powerful sky beings), and another that seeks...
to benefit from unique opportunities offered by 'Indonesia' by engaging with the government and its promises of development. What the two divisions share is a versatile but persistent concern with effective knowledge that they believe is held among foreigners and considered indispensable for bringing about change that Papuans themselves can control. These beliefs are expressed in terms of a felt need for relative autonomy from state control when the government's administrative grid discords with local realities and people's aspirations (Timmer 2004b: 121-124; cf. Maclean 1994).

This concern is in fact a crucial part of a larger and still more intrusive concern with denied identity and lost certainties. As indicated above, in stories about the millennium, Imyan relate this concern to ancient topographies that characterize the essence of their past lives (Timmer 2004b: 130). The Imyan share this concern with most other Papuan communities and it can be said that a possibly shared merdeka-aspiration in Papua is thus, in general terms, about deferential treatment as human beings, and in principal irrespective of the political or national context. In these ontological ideas about sovereignty and dignity (harga diri), merdeka is thus chiefly a response to decades-long denial of the people's competence in learning and performing in modern colonial and postcolonial contexts. This partly explains the unrelenting search for understanding of the suffering of the Papuans, preferably through a democratic dialogue with 'Jakarta' that was so effectively expressed during the Papuan Spring. But the idea of having one's own state, right now and for all times, is seldom on the minds of most Papuans, as it is a construct far from the more intrusive largely individual and communal concern with sovereignty and harga diri.

During the Papuan Spring (1999-2000), merdeka took on the harga diri-meaning when throughout the territory numerous raisings of the Bintang Kejora flag (which was prohibited until 1998) and concurrent praying sessions were organised. The Papuan Spring was a period during which President Abdurrahman Wahid allowed the Papuans to name their province Papua and to raise their national flag alongside the Indonesian flag. Hundreds of prominent leaders from all over Papua found the space to organise a broadly supported front. They developed political strategies during two large gatherings: MUBES (Musyawarah Besar or 'Grand Gathering for Discussion') in February 2000, and the Papuan Congress (Kongres Papua) in May-June 2000 (see Alua 2002a, 2002b). These gatherings proceeded undisturbed and while the political agenda demanded independence of Papua, the strategies developed favoured a dialogue with Jakarta short of violence. The focus was on the suffering of the Papuans and numerous discussions revolved around human rights. 'HAM' (Hak Asasi Manusia, Human Rights) became a widely used term taking on a variety of meanings in different contexts but generally referred to lack of respect for the Papuans.

Expressions of independence for Papua were articulated by the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Presidium Council) that was established during the MUBES. Under the combined highland-coastal leadership of Thom Beanal and Theys Eluay, the Presidium formulated Papua-wide supported resolutions that were adopted during the Kongres. The resolutions include the claim that Papua had in fact become independent with the establishment of the New Guinea Council in 1961 and rejected the New York Agreement because Papuans did not take part in the negotiations. In addition, the resolution states that the Act of Free Choice was not conducted properly (Alua 2002b: 96). More widely shared was the opinion that 'the land of the Papuans' had become the plaything of international and capitalist forces and that its people had become marginalised in Indonesian society.

Underlying a strong wish for increased sovereignty with predominant millenarian characteristics, the sudden rise of Papuan nationalisms at all levels of society also called into question any extent to which Papuans had become Indonesians. The differences between 'Papuans' and 'Indonesians' were, however, only rarely expressed. Both the symbolic and explicit messages broadcast during gatherings, manifestations, prayer sessions and flag raisings, emphasized the living memory of distress that in human rights activist circles in Papua is typified as memoria passionis (or in Indonesian: ingatan penderitaan).6 Memoria passionis refers to the memory of trauma due to general social and economic marginalisation, frequent denial of dignity, and sometimes, outright terror. Events during the Papuan Spring clearly indicated that the memoria passionis could be ignored only at peril. Since the dawn of this period memoria passionis began to be expressed as a shared Papuan history of suffering and was flung in the face of 'Jakarta' when a team of one-hundred leaders (Tim 100) from all over Papua presented a clear demand for independence to President Habibie on 26 February 1999. Next, a fact-finding team of the Indonesian House of Representatives was sent to Irian Jaya in July 1998, leading to a wave of enthusiasm among virtually all sections of society about a dialogue.
The dialogue was expected to lead to at least formal apologies for human rights violations, end impunity for the armed forces, and increase respect for the harga diri of the Papuans. At the same time, it also unleashed often very political expressions epitomised in such as expressions as OFM (resonating with OPM) meaning: Otonomi – Federasi – Merdeka, indicating people’s hope that discussion about increased autonomy for Irian Jaya would lead to the establishment of a Federal State of Indonesia which would eventually culminate in independence for West Papua. What followed in reality, however, was an overall well-intended Papuan response to President Habibie’s offer to contemplate on independence aspirations and, within the term of reference, establish a dialogue between ‘Jakarta’ and ‘Papua’.

The dialogue was continued during Aburrachman Wahid’s presidency but a ban on flag raisings and a number of bloody military attacks on protesters discouraged most Papuan leaders from continuing to seek understanding of the situation in Papua amid policy makers in Jakarta. The Presidium was labelled illegal and the detention of its leaders on charges of treason and subversion, and the brutal murder of the chair of the Presidium, Theys Hiyo Eluay, in 2000 marked the end of the Papuan Spring. The killing of Eluay was orchestrated by Kopassus (TNI Special Forces). The counterinsurgency practised by the TNI began to form a major threat to most attempts to organise people to defend their rights and to continue pressing Jakarta to seek solutions to past and present injustice and feelings of disenchantment. By the close of 2000, ‘the developing atmosphere of a ‘Papuan Spring’ … had been replaced by widespread fear, silence, and renewed anger’ (Van den Broek and Szalay 2001: 91; see figure 1). At the same time, people began to distrust the remnants of the Presidium and its regional branches because of rumours about the Presidium accepting money from big companies in Papua and frustration about its leaders travelling abroad all the time while neglecting the issues faced by local communities.

SPECIAL AUTONOMY AND NEW BLOSSOMS

Among the most promising developments in this reformasi period was the granting of a so-called Special Autonomy (commonly referred to as Otsus, from Otonomi Khusus) for the province of Papua in early 2001. Otsus matches an earlier law for the province of Aceh but was drafted by people in Papua and establishes provisions that surpass the autonomy conditions for other provinces. Otsus envisions enhanced autonomy for Papuan communities and their institutions, as well as a greater share of revenues from resource extraction projects in Papua, including 70 percent of the oil and gas industry and 80 percent from mining ventures. On top of that, Otsus entails special funds for the improvement of health services, education facilities, and infrastructure.
Otsus was a Papuan political choice that indicated a willingness to cooperate with the central government. It was envisioned as a necessary step towards justice for the neglected people of Papua (Maniagasi 2001; Sumule 2003a, 2003b). A technical assistance team comprising intellectuals from Papua, whom the Governor of Papua, Jaap Solossa, had appointed, drafted the bill in early 2001. After extensive lobbying by the team and a number of influential Papuans, it was accepted as Law No. 21/2001, to be implemented as of 2002. This initially positive answer from Jakarta was one of an insecure central government after the 1999 ballot in East Timor during which a majority voted against autonomy within Indonesia.

Apart from a few hard-line voices demanding merdeka, people in Papua expected positive developments from Otsus. But public interest in Otsus dwindled when people saw that implementation of Otsus was slow due to the lack of capacity of legislators and that the establishment of the Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP) or Papuan People’s Assembly did not receive support from Jakarta. The MRP is an essential element of Otsus as it envisions the protection of the rights of Papuans. It would assemble people from customary groups, religious institutions and women’s groups and grant them extensive political powers. The Ministry of Home Affairs delayed the establishment of the MRP because elements in Jakarta saw that the powers it granted to Papuans could endanger stability in Papua. The Minister of Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno, insisted that the MRP should only represent Papuan cultural values (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004: 38). In the mean time, people in Papua began to question whether Otsus was yet another hollow promise made by ‘Jakarta’. Others remained hopeful that with the assistance of, and pressure from, foreign governments and international NGOs, Jakarta would eventually grant the MRP to Papua.

These hopes basically faced a dead end after President Megawati Sukarnoputri promulgated a decree on 27 January 2003 on the implementation of Law No. 43/1999 regarding the creation of two new provinces (West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya), three new regencies (Paniai, Mimika, and Puncak Jaya), and one municipality (Sorong). The envisioned plan behind the decree is labelled pemekaran (‘blossoming’ or administrative fragmentation). While the division of Papua was also part of the Otsus Law, the procedure it outlined was that it could only be implemented after deliberation of the MRP and upon approval of the provincial parliament (Sullivan 2003).

Then Deputy Governor, John Djopari, stressed that the idea of pemekaran was not new but that it had been proposed in 1999 by the then Governor, Freddy Numberi, and his three Deputy Governors: Djopari, Herman Monim, and Abraham Atururi (ICG 2003: 3). Soon it became clear that Monim and Atururi were frustrated because they were promised governorship for the new provinces but that never materialised. Djopari later became Indonesian ambassador to Papua New Guinea and Monim retired. Atururi, however, was still interested in the establishment of a new province.

In contrast to Otsus, the pemekaran decree was issued without consultation with the provincial government. Local communities or leaders of religious and other civil society organisations in Papua were also not involved in the decision making process. While Otsus had been poorly socialised among the people it met with support because it came from people whose dialogue with Jakarta intended to benefit the development of Papua. Supporters of Otsus saw the presidential decree as a sign that the political climate in Indonesia was reverting to a New Order-style government. Many began to speculate that it was an attempt by Jakarta to ‘divide and rule’ the Papuans. Distress in Papua grew when people learned that the initiative for the policy had come from disgruntled elements in the Papuan elite in cooperation with policy makers in the central government - the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Intelligence Board (BIN, Badan Intelijen Negara) (McGibbon 2004: 55).

The International Crisis Group (2003: 8-9) points out that BIN involvement in the revival of pemekaran may have commenced with the lobbying by Jimmy Ijie, a Papuan from the Sorong region. Ijie heads the so-called Irian Jaya Crisis Centre (IJCC) in Jakarta and, in that capacity, sent a letter to BIN urging that Law No. 45 be implemented immediately. He argues that an administratively undivided Papua would foster Papuan nationalism (ibid: 8). In late 2002, Ijie formed a team called Tim 315 consisting of people from the Sorong and Manokwari regions and a number of Papuan students residing in Yogyakarta and Jakarta to support Atururi to negotiate the plan with BIN and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Apparently, a large amount of money (approximately U$320,000) was involved and a number of financial rewards were promised to officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs and to Ijie’s IJCC.10
Another possible motive for the partitioning of Papua is that the creation of new provinces and districts will increase the number of troops in the territory. Each separate province may get its own Military Resort Command (Korem), with its own network of District Military Commands (Kodim). A potentially stronger military presence aroused suspicion, as it may not only increase repression but also facilitate connections with local businesses with which the army is involved.

As a result, much of the goodwill that was created among Papuans during the dawn of reformasi turned to disappointment. At the same time, the awareness that elements of the Papuan elite were involved in the pemekaran policy nourished already widespread distrust of those Papuans who were making careers in the formal sector or the armed forces, ‘infesting them with the Indonesia virus’, as the popular expression runs. This virus of Indonesia refers to untrustworthy behaviour of Papuan legislators that is also captured under another popular expression, KKN or Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism), which dates back to the New Order period. Swiftly, the previous expression ‘OFM’ developed into ‘OPM’, now referring to a new sequence: autonomy (Otonomi), Pemekaran, and eventually independence (Merdeka).

Ideally, the devolution of power entailed in the pemekaran policy should be a promising move as it can enhance good governance at the local level. This obviously requires an increase in administrative capacities, development planning and program management. Currently, government officials in the region are inclined to acknowledge local demands to become tuan di atas tanahnya (‘the ruler of one’s own country’) but they also tend to be hungry for power after decades of curtailing bonds to the centre. Elite politics and the responses among local people largely revolve around these issues. Decentralisation leads to a diversification of political concerns that are connected with local identities, which in turn tend to become more extreme.

**PAPUANISATION AND ADAPTATION**

Present-day conflicts in Papua include disputes over natural resources and economic and political power struggles, and frictions between peoples of different ethnicities, religions, and between immigrants and locals (ICG 2002; Amnesty International 2002). Studies of ‘the conflict in Papua’, however, commonly focus on Jakarta policies and armed forces operations. Most reports produced by Papua watchers portray developments in Papua mainly in terms of violations of human rights by ‘Jakarta’, which are opposed by ‘Papuan resistance’. This resistance is often depicted as a single actor with a uniform ethnic identity driven by a uniting national consciousness. Papuan identity is then presupposed to exist in a bounded cultural and racial sphere defined as ‘Melanesia’ as opposed to ‘Indonesia’ or ‘Asia’. This is hardly conceivable considering the vast variety of cultural backgrounds and centuries-old histories of connections between Papua and the Moluccas (see below). Only a few recent anthropological and historical studies of Papuan communities relate to these histories and include discussions about the integration of Papuans into Indonesia and its concomitant internal tensions (Oosterhout 2000; Rutherford 2003; Stasch 2001 and 2003; Timmer 2000a, 2000b, and 2003). Rutherford, for instance, points out that the high degree of integration of the Biak-Numfor region into Indonesia illuminates ‘a sociocultural economy that stands cheek by jowl with the discourses of Papuan separatism and Indonesian nationalism, yet radically undercuts them both’ (2003: 4).

The lack of attention to the variety of and changes in Papuan worldviews since decolonisation is astonishing as newly emerging identities and related concerns and strategies lead to tensions in and between local communities and shape to a large extent the politics of the elite. In the virtual absence of a middle-class and very limited private investment in human development and the delivery of services, the powerful elites in Papua are to be found in the administrative sector and in religious institutions. Therefore, Papuan political power is in the hands of these new bureaucratic and religious elites.

Christian and Muslim leaders in Papua recognise that religion is an important source of inspiration for the people and that religious institutions, being the largest and most organised civil society organisations in Papua, should play an important role as mediators between the government and communities (see Giay 2001). In this paper, I focus on certain members of the bureaucratic elite as influential actors in determining the future of the region. In particular I discuss one of the most striking aspects of the present-day politics of this elite in Papua, that is, the ways in which leaders gain popular and central government support and play out regional differences in power politics related to the wave of recently established provinces and districts.

The varied ethnic and political landscape in Papua is accentuated by the timing and nature of contact with outside powers. In pre-colonial times,
contact with regional others and internal and in-migration were perhaps the most significant factors in demographic, social and cultural change in Papua. Papuan communities have always been very mobile and today people are on the move due to urbanisation, village formation, displacement, job migration, resettlement, and so on. More generally, many coastal groups looked for centuries towards the east. In particular the coastal communities of the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih Bay maintained trade and marriage relationships with the Moluccas and Islam spread along certain coastal stretches. In contrast, people in the highland regions lived relatively isolated in mountain valleys with little direct but extensive indirect trade networks extending to the coast (Ploeg 2001).

Cultural differences between the mountains and the north and the west coast changed markedly with the advent of Christian missionisation and Dutch administration during the 20th Century. Mission activity, followed hesitantly by the government, affected the Cenderawasih Bay, the Kepala Burung, the north coast and coastal stretches such as Mimika and Merauke along the southwest coast, while most groups in the highlands and communities in the southern plains remained ‘untouched’ until the 1960s. Encounters between highland people and the state and church intensified after the Indonesian government took over the territory from 1963 (see Ploeg 2001; Hays 1993).

Shortly before and after the Second World War, economic development was limited, while at later stages new political developments took place. The rapid expansion of administration and education had a major impact on the coastal people in Biak, Manokwari, Yapen en Sentani, and to a lesser extent in the Kepala Burung and Fak-fak. Papuans from these regions absorbed Dutch teachings at high schools in Netherlands New Guinea and were exposed to European life styles, while some were given the opportunity to enjoy education in Europe and the Pacific. The figures have remained modest since the early 1960s, with only about ten thousand Papuans (of a total population estimated at around one million) in government service, while a smaller number were employed in the private sector (Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1961; Groenewegen and Van de Kaa 1964; Timmer forthcoming).

Later generations grew up in the context of the Indonesian nation-state, undertook studies at Indonesian institutions and made careers in the Indonesian civil service, equipping themselves with the skills and language of modern Indonesia. Whereas many members of the old Papuan elite created by the Dutch were marginalized, the new generations of educated Papuans (still largely from coastal regions) found their way into the civil service. Participation of Papuans in administration and commercial ventures was however still restricted. The Indonesian government was afraid that Papuans would gain too much of a voice in the administrative sector while banking facilities are few and tend to privilege Javanes, Buginese, Moluccan and foreign investors. Moreover, the commercial infrastructure is poorly developed and bureaucratic approvals for trade are painfully slow, in particular for Papuans.

It was only in the late 1990s that sincere efforts were made to Papuanise the formal sector. Today, around 35 percent of the labour force in the government is Papuan, which is a poor reflection of the demographic reality in which approximately 60 percent of the population is Papuan. Nevertheless, over the last few years more Papuans have become legislators both at the district and provincial levels. Amid many people from elsewhere in Indonesia, the provincial bureaucracy is chiefly dominated by coastal Papuans from the Cenderawasih Bay islands of Biak and Yapen, Sentani, and, more recently from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions of the Kepala Burung. Widjojo (1998:3) signalled in this respect that the biggest problem facing Irian Jaya was social and cultural polarisation and domination of the formal sector by ethnic Biak, Ayamaru, Serui and Sentani. In contrast to the provincial bureaucracy, in the district governments in the highlands and south coastal regions, the local population is more strongly represented, notwithstanding the presence of a significant number of decision makers from Biak and Yapen in the Cenderawasih Bay, the Sorong region of the Kepala Burung, and a few Javanes and Moluccans.

Particularly among the recently ascending Sorong and Ayamaru elites, there is a remarkable acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing politics. The acquired skills and knowledge of the present-day bureaucratic elite enables a number of influential people to establish links with Jakarta, which primarily serves their own benefit. Highlanders and people from the south-coastal regions (Mimika, Merauke) are often consumed with envy about the power enjoyed by people from the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih Bay. Underlying this foremost regional cleavage in Papua is the serious lag in development of most regions of the highlands. Moreover, because of isolation and due to ongoing, often poorly orchestrated, TNI action, the highland
region is currently the chief nursery of Papuan resistance to the Indonesian government. This Papuan resistance also translates into regional tensions as highlanders regularly challenge both the provincial government and coastal Papuans from Biak, Sorong and Sentani, where they are at times accused of collaboration with ‘Indonesia’. This tension highlights one of the main divisions within the Papuan nationalist movement, which is illustrated by Rutherford (2003: xviii), recounting a joke in which a highlander tells another that when Papua gains independence all Biaks will become foreigners (amberi) while highlanders will become Biaks.

As mentioned earlier, during the massive gatherings during the Papuan Spring, Papuan leaders managed to balance representations from the highlands and the coast and Papuans felt united in their memoria passionis. With the advent of pemekaran, the tensions between elites from Biak, Yapien, Ayamaru and Sorong as well as between ‘the coast’ and ‘the highlands’ intensified. A recent Indonesia briefing by the International Crisis Group outlines that the new pemekaran policy, alongside a certain level of support for Otus, ‘has generated intense acrimony within the governing elite in Papua between those who stand to gain from the division … and those who benefit more from the status quo’ (ICG 2003: 1). Chauvel notes that ‘[t]he jockeying for position that this policy unleashed suggests that regional and tribal interests remain politically salient’ (2005: xi).

THE PROTAGONISTS

As indicated above, the pemekaran option was supported if not stimulated by a number of Papuan delegates who met with President Megawati, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and BIN throughout 2002. In particular, malcontent Papuan political elements were mobilized by the above-mentioned Ijie, and Marine Brigadier General (retired) Abraham Atururi, who had lost against the current Governor, Jaap Solossa, during the election campaign for governorship in 1999 (ICG 2003: 8-9). Atururi had enjoyed Dutch boarding school at primary level in Serui, Yapien during the heyday of Dutch efforts to develop Netherlands New Guinea. He is still in touch with most of his schoolmates from that time and is able to mobilise their support for his political aspirations, which indicates the importance of the social networks built during education. After the Dutch left New Guinea, Atururi attended the Navy National Academy after he finished Senior High School in Biak. He made a career in the navy and became a Lieutenant Colonel and member of intelligence agency (BAKIN – Badan Koordinasi Intellen Negara, currently BIN). He also served in the Paspanpres or the ‘Security Guard for the President’. While still a Lieutenant Colonel, he was assigned as head of the Sorong District in 1992. After one five-year term in Sorong, he went to Jayapura to become one of the three Deputy Governors under Freddy Numberi. His term as Deputy Governor allowed him to rise in the military ranks and he earned his first star. During the reformasi period, and marking the end of the military’s New Order dwafingasi (‘dual function’ of the military conflating national defence with nation building), General Wiranto, the then Chief of the Armed Forces, demanded all active military personnel who were occupying civilian positions to choose whether they wanted to continue in the army or pursue a career as legislators. Atururi chose the latter as he aspired to become Governor of Irian Jaya but, as indicated, in 1999 he lost to Jaap Solossa.

Like Atururi, Solossa enjoyed Dutch education at primary and secondary level in Ternabuau and Manokwari respectively, and then Junior High School in Sorong. After the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, he continued his education at Senior High School-level in Manokwari before studying Civil Administration at Universitas Cenderawasih in Jayapura for his undergraduate degree. Later, when he served as a member of the National Parliament, he used his spare time to pursue a Master Degree in Development Economics at Universitas Gajah Mada. He continued this specialisation at postgraduate level at Universitas Padjadjaran in Bandung with research on Special Autonomy for Papua. In May 2005 he received his doctorate. Dr Solossa has a large circle of acquaintances, especially from the Ayamaru and Sorong elites, who became unhappy with Atururi during his term as District Head in Sorong. In a similar vein, Atururi is currently supported by elements of the Kepala Burung elite who are not happy with the current District Head, John Piet Wanane, who is from the Ayamaru region.

Despite growing controversy over the status of the province, the Minister of Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno, inaugurated Atururi as the Governor of West Irian Jaya in November 2003, leading to a barrage of regional criticism. The Speaker of the Papua provincial legislature and supporter of Solossa, John Ibo, said that the inauguration contradicted a recommendation issued by the People’s Consultative Assembly during its latest annual session and urged Jakarta to revise the law on the division of Papua.
Atururi arrived in Manokwari in February 2003 to start work on the establishment of the new provincial headquarters. On his way from Jakarta he stopped in Jayapura to present to Speaker Ibo an official BIN statement signed by its head, Lieutenant General (retired) Hendropriyono, saying that Atururi had the authority to establish West Irian Jaya (Timmer 2004a: 411). Exactly a year later, the Constitutional Court ruled against a lawsuit from a Special Autonomy Defence Team that sought to undo the division of Papua. Supported by Governor Solossa and elements of the Papuan elite in Jayapura, the Defence Team had argued that the establishment of the new province served the interests of the Megawati Sukarnoputri-led Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) which intended to weaken the dominant Golkar Party in the region through the pemekaran plan. The Team suggested that the PDI-P had economic interests in the Bintuni Bay where British Petroleum is establishing the Tangguh liquefied natural gas plant (ICG 2003: 9). The Team added that both the TNI and BIN had also a lot to gain with the province as the two institutions have economic interests in maintaining a high level of TNI presence in the region.

The Constitutional Court concluded that the establishment of West Irian Jaya remained valid although Law No. 45/1999 was no longer effective. Eight of the nine judges argued that the Otsus Law took effect after the new province and regencies were designed and that the law had annulled no state institution. The court ruling was seen as a victory for Atururi and left many in Jayapura, Sorong and elsewhere in Papua confused. While the media reported the decision as a win-win solution for all conflicting parties in Papua and Jakarta, John Ibo noted that it will lead to increasing disorder and growing loss of confidence in Jakarta's commitment to the problems in Papua (Timmer 2005: 454-455).

One of the effects of the above-mentioned differences between the Sorong-Ayamaru elite which is often suspected of conspiring to control Papua as ‘SOS’ (Semua Orang Sorong – ‘all-Sorong’) and ‘disadvantaged’ highland tribes and ‘backward’ south coastal plains peoples, was the significant local support for the establishment of a separate province of Central Irian Jaya in the Timika area. This new province was advocated by the head of the district of Timika, Clemens Tinal, and the head of the Timika legislative council, Andreas Anggaibak. As Anggaibak said himself, he was encouraged by BIN to go ahead with the establishment of the new province (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004: 41). In the region he enjoyed support from a group called ‘Group of Seven Tribes’. When Anggaibak announced the official establishment of the province in late August 2003, riots broke out during which five people were killed and dozens were injured. Anggaibak's alliance met with opposition from a youth group of the Amungme people led by Thomas Uamang, Yopie Kilangin and Yohanes Deikme, with the support of the Amungme and other ethnic groups around Timika. This regional conflict about pemekaran is an extension of older disputes between the communities close to PT Freeport Indonesia copper and gold mining operations that relate to the misuse of company funds and collaboration of community leaders with the TNI in the region (Leith 2003; Ballard 2002; Wijodo 2003). Exposing tensions between highland and north coastal people, and in an attempt to gain a share of the riches of the Freeport mining venture, elements of the elite in Biak argued that Biak would be a better location for the new province’s capital in April and May 2004. They proposed that Admiral Henk Wabier should be appointed as acting Governor (Chauvel 2005: 77).

Tensions at the regional level also played a role in the establishment of West Irian Jaya. New districts in West Irian Jaya like Fak-fak and Raja Ampat (which is rich in forest and nickel resources) felt uncomfortable with what they feared as domination by those from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions and opted to remain within the Province of Papua. Furthermore, during Atururi's lobbying for the establishment of West Irian Jaya, customary leaders in the region had an interest in the division plans, as it would lead to the establishment of twenty-eight new regencies, including Teluk Bintuni, which would offer them an opportunity to occupy new administrative positions. The importance attached to the creation of the Teluk Bintuni regency is related to the above-mentioned operations of the Tangguh plant in the Bintuni Bay. The new regency, and the new province of West Irian Jaya of which it is part, will be abundantly rich in natural resources.

The pemekaran decree amplified cleavages within the Papuan elite, one group of which favours Otsus as a means for the development of Papua as a whole and is lead by Governor Solossa, who is supported by a number of civil society organisations and prominent Papuan intellectuals. Others were keen to establish their own provinces and districts to claim their own power positions and secure access to natural resources. Ethnic tensions along regional fault lines intensified as the pro-pemekaran players in Papua demanded a share of the fiscal transfers from the central government and wanted to increase control over...
the territory's riches. The resulting disunity among influential people in the Papuan bureaucratic elite weakened the support for Otsus and eased the implementation of the pemekaran law (McGibbon 2004: 61).

**AUTONOMY AND ITS OPPORTUNITIES**

Within the plans for the establishment of new districts and new provinces, almost no provision has been made to ensure that new government policies are adjusted to local circumstances and meet the aspirations of the people. The majority of government officials are accustomed to working with top-down programs and accountability procedures that rarely involve the communities who figure as subjects in the plans and reports. The New Order government with its ambition to impose a layer of 'Indonesianness' all over the archipelago propagated the idea that the lives of citizens in such remote and 'underdeveloped' regions as Papua had to be transformed according to fixed formats. The results are often unsettling, in particular when long-standing community-based ways of doing things and local ways of resource management are disrupted. While development plans for Papua were designed to improve the living conditions of so-called 'isolated people' (masyarakat terasing) they often lead to estrangement. This, in turn, stimulated a tendency to reflect nostalgically on one's own unique non-state units such as the kinship group and the 'customary people' (masyarakat adat) – whose rights should be restored.

Currently, decentralised governments at the district levels face the daunting task of finding ways to overcome deep-seated feelings of distrust towards the state, and to develop programs that acknowledge the complex varieties and recent changes in Papuan society. Newly recruited personnel are for the most part educated at schools for public administration with curricula that accord with the New Order and its top-down philosophy. As such, they are ill equipped to adjust themselves to new democratic and open-minded ways of governance.

Reflecting on the colonial context in the Australian-administered Territory of Papua and New Guinea in the 1960s, Lawrence (1969) argues that the difficulty of establishing a Western type of legal system is that the groups concerned, that is, the Australians and the New Guineans, represent quite different, specialized social systems. Both systems had their own idiosyncratic processes of social control that were not expected to function in a single legal framework. Today, the Papua New Guinea government still faces the difficult challenge of binding a variety of distinct communities into an effective political and ideological organisation (LiPuma 1995; Douglas 2000; May 2001 and 2003). The present situation in Papua appears to suffer from a similar incompatibility between models of governance structured upon institutional principles of modern statehood and a variety of everyday political and social realities. Otsus aims to counter this, but the formidable challenge facing decentralising governments is beyond most administrators' imaginations and was not anticipated by the legislative or executive bodies that enacted and implemented the pemekaran law.

Previously, the political and governmental situation in Papua was characterized as based on an 'outside' and 'Indonesian' government ruling a majority of Papuans through models of governance current in Java and not embracing or fully appreciating 'Papuan ways of doing things'. While there were a fair number of Papuans in the bureaucracy at all levels, and a few Governors in the period from 1963 were ethnically Papuan, local communities saw the regional and provincial government as dominated by Javanese. As more Papuans began to occupy seats in the formal sector, ideas about the government changed to a sense of domination of 'Indonesian politics' endorsed by Papuan elites.

Many criticise provincial leaders because they promise local communities development and access to resources while they actually profit from arrangements with elites in Jakarta, TNI and Javanese and foreign investors. This obviously leads to an unstable situation as political support at the local level will soon dwindle and break along regional or ethnic fault lines. Since administrative procedures lack transparency, the widespread feeling among Papuans that their own elite cannot be trusted will no doubt increase.

Significantly, many in Papua believed that national democratic elections would bring the solutions deemed necessary. Presidential elections in September 2004 were a victory for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly know as SBY) who defeated Megawati Sukarnoputri on charisma, a purported no-nonsense approach to reversing the stagnating reform and growing corruption, and the promise to peacefully resolve the tensions in Papua and Aceh. In Papua, the elections proceeded without major disturbances and voter turn-out was high. One of the main reasons for the widespread participation in the elections was disillusionment with President Megawati Sukarnoputri's lack of commitment.
to Papua. Since SBY advocated support for Otsus and promised to foster democracy, many considered a future under him more promising. The elections in Papua clearly demonstrated the general will to support a civilian-led government and the rule of democracy in Indonesia (Timmer 2005: 448-450).

Most Papuans want to become modern Indonesians and find democratic solutions for the problems they are facing. There is, however, a tension between those who seek, find and use opportunities offered in the formal and commercial sectors and those who are denied such prospects. Papuan communities’ responses to a corrupt administration and dishonest behaviour of their own elite are varied. In many of the locations where large-scale resource extraction takes place, such as Freeport mining in the Mimika region and the Tangguh project in the Bintuni Bay, as well as logging and fishery businesses, local communities organise themselves against neighbouring groups and their elites who also claim natural resources and compensation.

One effect of this development is the emergence of eccentric and charged revitalizations of customary structures and the establishment of customary organisations (masyarakat adat). The expectations of monetary flows that resource development projects might bring, and the related competing claims over land and resources, pose problems for local people who no longer know whom to trust and through whom to raise their voices with outside companies and the government. At the same time, the government and the companies find it increasingly difficult to deal effectively with the dispersed forms of Papuan leadership.

On top of the resulting frustrations and tensions between groups and a growing gap between local communities and the formal sector, criminal and predatory business is increasingly entrenching itself in the instruments of the state. The ways in which this also affects local sentiments and discourses on identity, autonomy and independence, and leads to new regional and ethnic alliances, may show parallels to situations in African countries as described by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999), among others. However, as Fraenkel (2004) points out, comparisons between governance in the African and Pacific (and Asian) regions may prove to be very useful but should be done cautiously. A careful comparison between Papua and Africa is beyond the scope of this paper, but let me make the point that the most obvious parallel between Papua and certain regions in Africa is, as said, the criminalization of the state in Papua. In the capacity of provincial legislator, district head, head of a department and so on, individuals not only gain influence over state resources but they also enjoy relative freedom to make profitable deals with resources extraction ventures. These businesses engage in the largely unregulated exploitation of minerals, oil, fish, and forest resources.

A striking example is rampant logging and the illegal trade of merbau (kayu besi) that is threatening the pristine forests of the region. (EIA/Telapak 2005; Down to Earth 2002). Merbau is a luxurious dark hardwood that is the main target of a billion-dollar trade route from Papua to the booming cities of China’s Yangtze River delta. Another unsettling example is the involvement of the TNI and government officials in the gathering and trade of gaharu (eaglewood) that is sold for high prices to the Arab world (SKP Merauke 2004). One of the results is that wealth is taken away from the bottom up while opportunities for advancement are redistributed inside and outside Papua within limited elites by the provision of gifts, commercial opportunities, and so on. Politically and economically, Papua begins to show signs of the privatisation of the state and the criminalization of the behaviour of power-holders.

CONCLUSION

The post-Suharto reformasi period in Papua was marked by revivals of optimism about change and expectations of imminent far-reaching sovereignty. The prospect of justice, the acknowledgement of the ‘true history of Papua’, and increased respect for the Papuans, alternated with strong disappointment and mounting resentment towards ‘Jakarta’ due to renewed harsh and poorly controlled TNI operations. Amid a persistent undercurrent of distrust towards the national government many in Papua showed a remarkable ardour for entering into a bargaining process (albeit often with high opening bids, alarming policy makers in Jakarta). Hopes of justice being done to the Papuans were again visible during the recent national elections in which the people of Papua went to the polls in high numbers. Also, the Otsus and pemekaran supported lobbies indicate that many in Papua want to participate actively in a political economy of dependence on and engagement with Jakarta.

Dependence is constructed and maintained as much by Papuans who support a dialogue with ‘Jakarta’ and are eager to cast votes during democratic elections, as by political actors who try to convince Jakarta of the need to recognise
Underneath the grievances of the people of Papua, or merely seek to profit financially from this relationship. On the other hand, both the ‘indigenous Papuans’ and those generally labelled as ‘immigrants’ – the divisions between the two can never be clear, let alone desirable – have for a number of reasons quite a strong urge to live their lives largely autonomously. This is due to their *memoria passionis* and disappointment about the central government’s policies towards Papua. When the need to distance oneself from unreliable elites and decentralisation goes astray, people begin to revitalise traditions of relative freedom allegedly enjoyed in the past.

At the level of local communities, throughout history, people have been subject to forms of destabilisation as a result of interactions with others and they continuously developed new strategies with locally specific inventiveness. This offers proof that Papua, so often said to be governed by age-old traditions, is in fact a place of inexorable social and cultural change. The historical conditions underlying these processes are centuries-old trade, family and religious links between West New Guinea and the Moluccas and particular exchanges in knowledge and goods between groups in the highlands. Papuan peoples’ potent histories of relative autonomy and their recent experiences with the church, the colonial government and Indonesian institutions are extremely diverse. Generally, local institutions have been internally negotiated in response to the administration and the church. At the same time, from the district level up to the provincial bureaucracy and the national parliament, Papuan leaders and politicians increasingly usurp the powers of the civil service. Less promising is that the district and provincial levels of the administration, in particular, have become intertwined in personal patronage systems.

The voices for more autonomy in Papua are generally not about Papuan nationalism but are cast in opposition to the dominance of the state. The state has not brought what Papuans expected and is thus challenged by social, ethnic, religious and regional identities. Most Papuans treat the state with a high degree of suspicion. Only when the promise of commitment to and respect for their demands and aspirations is in the air, do they want to engage with the state. Currently, there are two points of contention among the vast majority of people in Papua. One is that the unpredictability of ‘Jakarta’ as the model of the state that the central government is propagating to Papua is unclear, and the other is frustration over the wealth and influence of Papuan elites whose agendas are often too detached from the circumstances they claim to address.

To remain critical of what is going on in Papua, policy makers (as well as Papua watchers) should be careful not to fall into the classical mistake of seeing that there is a united Papuan cause that is frustrated by ‘Indonesia’. In fact, there has never been an en masse Papuan effort to struggle for secession from Indonesia or a ‘compact, self-conscious, and organized community’ as Chauvel (2005: 3), among others, observes. There have always been strong divisions within Papua even when people organise in civil society organisations, government bodies, or alongside activist circles abroad. What most Papuans have in common though is a *memoria passionis* and the experiences of development programs and democratisation efforts dogged by unfulfilled promises and failures. During the Papuan Spring this shared history was expressed Papua-wide in terms of a demand for the straightening of Papuan history and enhanced respect for the Papuans. But the attempts of organising people into a united front were undermined by military operations and the *pemekaran* decree that was supported by elements of the Papuan elite. What remained was Otsus; but this promising reform policy was frustrated by Papuan and Jakarta politics surrounding the *pemekaran* decree which brought to the surface a state of old and enduring regional, political and personal tensions in the region. The *pemekaran* plan provided opportunities for disenfranchised Papuan leaders and subsequently unleashed regional and ethnic sentiments as well as mutual distrust among Papuan leaders.

Finally, with respect to the increasing prominence of the informal economy in Papua, it is important to realise that since the New Order period, major parts of domestic Papua operated more as an unofficial or ‘unconventional’ economy than an economy of wage earners, formal institutions, and legal contracts. While it is true that a formidable number of people earn government wages, most rural people trade and exchange goods in and between communities in order to survive. Erring decentralisation and the limited presence of meaningful development programs trigger fractionalisation when people begin to compete for political and economic resources. Self-interest in this context is the result of a realistic view that relates to current and past development promises. People know that outsiders come and make promises about financial rewards, roads, bridges, sago factories, logging activities, fish factories and so on, which are unlikely to be sustainable. In these circumstances, elites and local people have a realistic view to get what they
can while they can. Hence what is often seen as greediness is a response to the ongoing deferral of development alongside failing policies that aim to enhance services to the people of Papua. In a region that is abundantly rich in natural resources, whose people do not share equally in the profits of resource development projects, and where many people's dignities have been denied in violent ways for a long period of time, this kind of response is understandable. In other words, 'disorder' in Papua is not merely a condition created by 'Jakarta' or as a state of dereliction; it is a condition that offers opportunities for people in Papua who know how to play the system.

ENDNOTES

1 See Soekarno (2000).
2 See Pepera (1972: 82-83) and Vlasblom (2004: 479). For an account of the Pepera based on archival materials and concluding that it was a sham, see Saltford (2000).
3 A reconstruction of the origin and development of the OPM can be found in Vlasblom (2004: 469, chapters 9, 10 and 11). Less thoroughly researched is the Indonesian-language account by Djopari (1993).
4 Since the Indonesian government began to stimulate economic development in the region, an older Dutch colonial programme of population distribution from highly populated regions such as Java and Bali to Papua and other less populated regions was continued. Among policy makers, this so-called transmigrasi (‘transmigration’) was seen as a way to boost the development of Papua, but the programme proved to be largely unsuccessful (see Pouwer 1999: 173-174).
5 See van den Broek and Szalay (2001) for an overview of the turbulent events in Papua from 1999 to 2000.
6 See Hernawan and Van den Broek (1999). The concept of ‘memoria passionis’ was introduced into Papua by the Office for Justice & Peace (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian) of the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura and is also the title of a series of annual reports on the social and political situation in Papua (see www.hampapua.org).
7 See Sumule (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) for overviews of the establishment of the team, the production of the bill, the amendments, and its passing through the People’s Consultative Assembly in Jakarta.
8 In fact, the pemekaran model was devised in the early 1980s by then Irian Jaya Governor Busiri Suryowinoto and Minister of Home Affairs Supardjo Rustam. The idea was to Papuanise the bureaucracy, beginning at the district level, and create six provincial levels based on the administrative areas demarcated by the colonial Dutch government (ICG 2003: 2). The plan was shelved largely because there were not enough qualified locals to fill the required positions. In 1999, the division of the province was proposed again by the transitional government of President Habibie as a way to speed up the pemekaran of the province. However, the law was suspended after sweeping resistance in Papua, where the provincial government and a majority of the people feared that it would spread discord among the people of Papua.
9 To illustrate his position in the Papua conflict, Jimmy Ijie wrote a preface to an IJCC publication of the Indonesian translation of an essay written by the Russian Gavriil Kesselbrenner in 1961 about the international politics surrounding the status of West New Guinea. In his preface, Ijie stresses that Kesselbrenner’s analysis highlights that Irian Jaya is a rightful part of Indonesia. He also stresses that
there is a danger of the internationalisation of the conflict in Papua, then and now, because it so easily provokes people to make a stand against Indonesia (Ijie 2003).

10 Muridan Widjojo, personal communication, 7 May 2005.

11 See for example, Budiardjo and Sioe Long (1983), Osborne (1985), Sharp with Kaisiéro (1994), Walsh and Rouch (1999), Barr (2002), Martinus (2002), King (2004), and contributions to a special edition on Papua of the New Internationalist (Volume 344, April 2002). By and large, these works follow one basic line of argument which suggests that Papua will or should become a second East Timor and that Papuans are the victims of genocide or deliberate, well-organised terror, obscuring the fact that Papuans are (and have always been) divided. Some of these analyses also exaggerate the number of victims of military operations in the region. The growing amount of writings by people from the region include Kholifan (1999) on the histories of the OPM and the TNI, Giay (2000) on the need for emancipation of Papuans, Yoman (2000) on the international and Indonesian verdicts on West New Guinea, and Pugay (2000) presenting an overview of the dynamics of Papuan nationalism.

12 One of the reasons for this lack of attention to the cultural and social realities of Papuans is that since its incorporation in Indonesia access to the region for researchers has been severely restricted.


14 Don Flassy, personal communication, 23 April 2005.

15 In the statistics for social welfare produced by the Provincial Statistical Agency in 2002, the districts of Jayawijaya, Paniai and Puncak Jaya show the highest number of poor families and the greatest amount of so-called ‘isolated communities’ (masyarakat terasing) (BPS Papua 2002: 207). The 2004 National Human Development Report shows that the average human development index (HDI) for Indonesia in 2002 is 66, ranging from 76 in the highly urbanised and industrialised region of East Jakarta to 47 in the district of Jayawijaya in Papua (NHDR 2004: 1). See Timmer (forthcoming) for an evaluation of these statistics.

16 Anggabak, who is a former policeman, tried to control the so-called One Percent Fund that was set up in 1996 by the Freeport mining company to support social development programs, which met with opposition from other political players in the region.

17 The rampant spread of the HIV/AIDS-virus is partly connected to the prostitution centres established and run by the TNI to service local and migrant workers. These prostitution centres are a principal source of the infection. Estimates suggest that the number of HIV-infected people in Papua stands at approximately 15,000 at present.

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