

POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

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overnment capacity and
citizen expectations in
Bougainville: The impact
of political autonomy

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Abstract

After ten years of civil war (1989-97), four years of protracted political negotiations (1998-2001), and another four years of legislative amendments (2002-05), Bougainvillians now have a government which the majority believe will finally address the issues that underpinned two previous unilateral declarations of independence (1975 and 1990). However while expectations are understandably high, the ABG's ability to meet citizen expectations is being hampered by the government's administrative, institutional and financial capacities, the security situation on the island and a very weak economy. The success or failure of political autonomy, and indeed this post-conflict governance structure will depend to a large extent on the type of policies that the government designs and implements as well as its interactions with citizens.

Government Capacity and Citizen Expectations in Bougainville: The Impact of Political Autonomy

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* The author is a planning officer in the Bougainville Administration's planning unit. This paper was submitted in part fulfillment for the requirement of Master of Public Policy, Australian National University, in 2006.

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Maps

Map 1 - Location of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea



Source: <http://www.riverbendnelligen.com/bougainvillemap.html> (06/06/06)

Map 2 – Bougainville, Buka, Adjacent Islands & Atolls



Source: <http://www.riverbendnelligen.com/bougainvillemap.html> (06/06/06)

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List of Acronyms

ABG	Autonomous Bougainville Government
ARB	Autonomous Region of Bougainville
BCC	Bougainville Constitutional Commission
BEC	Bougainville Executive Council
BGT	Bougainville Group Tax
BHR	Bougainville House of Representative
BPC	Bougainville People's Congress
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BRF	Bougainville Resistance Forces
BRI	Bougainville Research Institute
CCEA	Cocoa and Coconut Extension Agency
CVS	Civil Society
DSG	District Support Grant
GoPNG	Government of Papua New Guinea
GST	Goods and Services Tax
MHR	Member of the House of Representative
NGZ	No Go Zone
NSPG	North Solomons Provincial Government
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLPG	Organic Law on Provincial Government 1977
OLPB-ABG & BR	Organic Law on Peace Building in Bougainville-Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum
OLPG & LLG	Organic Law on Provincial & Local Level Governments 1995
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Force
PRVS	Private Sector
PUBS	Public Sector
SAP	Strategic Action Plan
SUBD	Subsistence Dweller
UNOMB	United Nations Observer Missions on Bougainville

1

Introduction

The policy of devolving power and authority to sub-national governments (generally referred to as decentralization) has been adopted and applied in many countries as a tenet of ‘good governance’ to promote people’s participation in decision-making and development. This is based on the premise that the structural arrangement under decentralized governance provides a level playing field for stakeholders and players to promote peace, democracy, and development (Kauzya 2005). Decentralization is a generic term which covers a number of modes; deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and delocalization.¹ However no country has undertaken only one of the above different modes of decentralization; instead countries have tried to find the right mix of all the above modes in an attempt to determine what, and how much power should be transferred to lower level governments.

More recently many countries have been promoting decentralization as a measure of democratization, people empowerment and poverty reduction (Edminston 2002). However among these countries the efforts to decentralize are not moving at the same pace, with the same political conviction, using equally competent capacities, or with the same success (Mohan and Stokke 2000). While some countries have decentralized by establishing federal systems, others have done so with strong doses of devolution. The general observation is that the decentralization process is still ongoing and needs strong support not only because people prefer decentralization as a politico-administrative and structural arrangement for their empowerment but also because it promises much in terms of democratization, people empowerment and poverty reduction, which are very much in line with the Millennium Development Goals (UN cited in Kauzya 2005: 3). When thus understood, decentralization has the potential to become the vehicle for promoting democratic participation.

¹ For a detailed description of the four modes, see Kauzya, J., 2005 ‘Decentralization: Prospects for Peace, Democracy and Development: 1-18

Caution however needs to be exercised in assuming that decentralization will always result in democratic participation. Although the process of decentralization provides structural arrangements through which participation can be engineered, actual participation depends on political will, bureaucratic commitment and the extent to which the local people and other stakeholders are empowered with knowledge, skills, attitudes, networks and resources (Kauzya 2005: 8). Nevertheless, decentralized governance is increasingly being favoured as the most suitable mode of governance through which poverty reduction interventions can be conceived, planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated. Decentralized governance is assumed to facilitate greater participation of communities in project identification, planning, and implementation, which in turn increases ownership and sustainability.

Moreover decentralized governance is viewed as an instrument of people empowerment, a platform for sustainable democratization, a structure for the mobilization of resources for economic development, a veritable instrument of reconciliation, social integration and wellbeing in post-conflict environments, and a vehicle for the promotion of a culture of political, economic, civic, and managerial/administrative good governance (Kauzya 2005: 4; Mohan and Stokke 2000: 250).

In every country and indeed every society (including those that are seemingly homogenous) there are always centripetal forces tending towards centralization and centrifugal forces tending towards the periphery (Baldwin 1979). This is the fulcrum of decentralization which is undertaken as a deliberate process to provide a stable and predictable structural arrangement where the two forces can interact and maintain a win-win position for forces of unity and indivisibility and those of local autonomy and diversity (Kauzya 2005: 5; Reilly 2001: 15). The interplay between centripetal and centrifugal forces can lead to either total unity (strong centralized, unitary state) or total disintegration. However it can also lead to an arrangement where powers are shared equally between levels of governance. In governance and public administration, decentralization is commonly regarded as a process through which powers, functions,

responsibilities and resources are transferred from central to local governments, howsoever defined. Practically however policy makers are always engaged in the process of striking a balance between the claims of the periphery and the demands of the centre, which includes political decentralization.

Political decentralization is the process of transferring political power from the central government to give citizens and their elected representatives more say in public decision-making in domains (previously exclusive to central governments) that extend beyond political governance to include general socio-economic development. It should not however be understood only from the aspect of local electoral practices whereby local people elect their leaders as well as their representatives in the central government legislature because it goes beyond this narrow view. The choice of political leadership at elections is just a small component of political decentralization.

However to achieve the aims of decentralization requires a highly participatory process and consultation devoid of suspicion (neither of which is possible at the height of war or immediately after hostilities). In such situations Kauzya (2005: 11) argues that decentralization is not appropriate, instead, political devolution, the transfer of political power and authority from the central government to a sub-national government is more appropriate. Political devolution stands a greater chance of promoting sustainable development and peace if it is sustained as a structural arrangement to support and facilitate the involvement of the local people in the process of their own development (Hadden 2004: 34). In other words, it depends on the underlying purpose for which political autonomy is conceived, planned, implemented and sustained. If the underlying reason for Bougainville's political autonomy is the fulfillment of the long-held desire for self-determination (Havini and Havini 1995), there is a real danger that the development aspirations and expectations of the majority will only be given lip service (similar to the previous provincial government system) (see also Appendix A for an overview of Bougainville's history from early contact to the present). Political autonomy should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means to more effectively address citizen expectations.

Being accountable, receptive and responsive to the needs and wants of citizens is not only one of the hallmarks of good government but is also critical to government success (Segal and Summers 2002: 1). Adequate time and resources should therefore be invested in engaging citizens in determining the kind of development that they desire. Active participation by citizens contributes to good governance because it fosters greater transparency, creates ownership of development initiatives, enhancing accountability through direct public scrutiny and oversight (OECD 2001). Besides, it also produces better quality policy decisions and hence planning. The limited resources in developing countries however does not allow for this type of engagement to take place more frequently and on a wider scale. Whenever such engagements do take place, the most vulnerable sections of the population such as the poor, women, and the elderly are mostly left out of the process.

This study sought to address the above contexts by exploring citizens' perceptions and expectations of the government after the installation of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). The aim of the study was:

- (i) to determine whether the installation of the ABG has affected citizen perceptions and expectations, with regard to the government's ability to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, and if not, the factors which influenced their expectations,
- (ii) to identify the developmental issues which, according to citizens would change their perceptions and expectations if addressed, and
- (iii) to establish whether the ABG has the capacity to meet these expectations.

The study found that the installation of the ABG (in June 2005) had increased citizen expectations, not only on what the government can, but perhaps more so, on what it should do, to improve their wellbeing. This is because the ABG is now seen to have the powers to deal with the long standing issues that had resulted in two unilateral declarations of independence. Moreover Bougainvillians now expect social and economic

advancement from the autonomous administration (Gwyer 2003), because of the euphoria surrounding its establishment. Indeed as one prominent community leader remarked, ABG is equated with “a new beginning, a new spirit, and a new Bougainville”.²

However while perceptions and expectations on the ABG’s ability to address these issues are obviously high, citizens also acknowledged that the government’s limited financial, administrative and institutional capacities and the security situation on the island will continue to impede its ability to more effectively address citizen expectations. Although participants had their own ‘wish list’ of the sectors or activities that needs to be implemented to improve government capacity (see section 3.6), the focus for the next five to ten years should be on revitalizing the economy to improve and diversify the government’s internal revenue base, consolidate peace and stability, and more effectively engage citizens as genuine partners in the development process. By setting out a road map for the immediate post-conflict restoration as well as the long-term development in the region,³ the ABG’s inaugural development strategy (*Strategic Action Plan 2006-2010*), is an additional prospectus for sustainable peace and development. However it is of utmost importance that the SAP actually guides policy makers in allocating scarce development resources because more than anything else, the success or failure of the ongoing peace process (and indeed political autonomy) will depend to a large extent on the ABG’s ability to bring tangible development in the short-to-medium terms.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical discussion of the concepts discussed in the paper; citizen perception and expectation, government capacity, and political autonomy. Section 3 describes the research methodologies employed in the study including data collection, analysis and interpretation and presents initial findings regarding citizen perceptions and expectations. Section 4 discusses the installation of the ABG as the primary catalyst in increasing citizen expectations. The next 3 sections are devoted to discussing and analyzing in a thematic fashion the three

² Cyril Tivai was a former Chairman of the pre-conflict Nasioi-Pirung Community Government in Central Bougainville and is still a respected community leader among the ‘Torau’ speaking peoples of the area.

³ Under Section 1 (2) (a) – (b) of the Bougainville Constitution, Bougainville shall be called the Autonomous Region of Bougainville or Bougainville and unless specified, a reference to region in this paper is a reference to Bougainville.

main variables that influence citizen expectations. Section 5, 6, and 7 discuss financial constraints, security and safety, and (lack of) development as factors which influenced citizen expectations, as well as impediments to government capacity. Section 8 analyzes the ABG's inaugural development strategy (SAP 2006–2010) in relation to citizen priorities. The last section (Section 9) begins by highlighting the challenges of political autonomy. Then it speculates on the prospects for sustainable peace and development given existing challenges, concluding by proposing the strategies to improve government capacity; strengthening governance & administration, improving service delivery, increasing government finances, consolidating peace and stability, and reviving the economy.

As with any research there are several shortcomings to this study. Firstly, by confining the study to only one location (Buka), the most vulnerable sections of the population (the poor, women, and the elderly) may have been left out. Although 24 per cent of interviewees described themselves as subsistence dwellers (SUBD), the fact that they could afford to travel to the capital, differentiates them from the rural poor. Secondly, confining the study to the capital (due to the high cost of travel outside of Buka) meant accepting participant's response as *prima facie* description of the real situation. Interviewing participants in their local settings would have enabled the researcher to complement interviews with physical observation. Finally, the study was conducted only a short time after the installation of the ABG and this might have resulted in the reluctance of MHRs to participate. However due to the circumstances surrounding the installation of the ABG, it was considered essential to establish (at the very outset) the impact of political autonomy on citizen expectations. Moreover it was equally important to emphasize the need for increased interactions between the government and citizens not as mere recipients of development but as effective partners in the development process. Not only would this improve the relationship between the governed and the governing, but it would also enable the ABG to focus on better performance, more efficient government in partnership with an informed citizenry (Segal and Summers 2002).

Theoretical Discussion

This section discusses the existing literature relating to the concepts integral to this study; namely, citizen's expectations and perceptions, government capacity and political autonomy. The reasons for establishing governments are briefly highlighted because they are the basis of the complex relationship between the government and citizens. Citizens' expectations and perceptions of government are also discussed because of the way they influence the manner in which governments organize their operations. Political autonomy is discussed because it is the primary catalyst for citizens' perceptions and expectations in Bougainville. McAllister and Wanna (2001) argue that the willingness of citizens to engage in voluntary compliance with the law is positively correlated with the level of popular support for political institutions. For governments to successfully govern there is a need for broad agreement on their roles and responsibilities. Such broad agreement creates public trust and consent, without which governments would not be able to sustain their policies (Schwarzmantel 1994). It is this public trust and consent that governments periodically seek to justify or legitimize by appealing to the electorate.

2.1 Rationale for Government

Most liberal philosophers (including libertarianism) view governments in relation to natural rights. Human beings they argue are born with certain 'natural rights' which governments are established to protect, although what these rights actually are differs between different branches of liberalism (Schwarzmantel 1994: 42). The task of the government or state is to defend the basic rights of individuals. Whether these rights should also be extended to other forms of life (such as animals) is still contentious.

Perhaps one of the most influential theories of government in the past two hundred years has been that of 'social contract', on which modern democracy and most forms of socialism are founded. This theory holds that governments are created by the people in

order to provide for collective needs (through public goods) that cannot be properly provided through individual or private means. In this sense governments exist to serve the needs and wishes of the people whose relationships with the former are clearly stipulated in a 'social contract' or constitution and by which both the government and the people must abide. Such governance is achieved by creating interactive, social-political structures and processes that stimulate communication between different actors, and the creation of common responsibilities. Kooiman (2003: 5) describes governments as:

The totality of interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities.

However instead of looking only at the market as the obvious partners, governments also need to engage civil society actors as serious governing partners. This, according to Kooiman (2003: 6) is essential if governments are to continue responding effectively to the different, changing and complex issues affecting citizens. Indeed there is now awareness that governments are not the only actors addressing the major developmental issues affecting the people. For example in PNG, international and local NGOs are now playing an important role in delivering basic services although this is more to do with international donor's distrust of the government over the use of funds than an inclination by the GoPNG to involve NGOs as partners in the development process.

2.2 Citizen Perceptions and Expectations

There are two approaches in exploring the relations between the government and citizens' expectations (McAllister and Wanna 2001). The first approach views citizens' expectations as a primary set of attitudes formed on the basis of life experiences and/or knowledge of the political system, and from which citizens' derive measurable levels of satisfaction and trust. The second approach postulates a far more iterative set of relations between key phenomena such as the state action, media representations, policy choices, expectations of government and public opinion. According to the second approach governments may be far more instrumental in shaping both the major topics of 'public

awareness' and the types and levels of support shown in public opinion. The first approach suggests the intensity of citizens' expectations about politics, and the degree to which those expectations are met, informs the level of satisfaction/support displayed towards the community, the regime and the actors (McAllister and Wanna 2001: 13). High expectations that are largely unfulfilled would result in dissatisfaction and a loss of support. Low expectations would have less serious repercussions for politicians as unfulfilled low expectations might merely reinforce pre-existing views about politics, while any expectations that are met might result in more support. The outcomes of the relations between expectations and support are usually reflected in two concepts; the trust that citizens show in politics, and the sense of responsiveness or 'efficacy' they hold (McAllister and Wanna 2001: 13-4). Thus it is important for governments to continuously attempt to seek the views of the people with regard to their perceptions and what they expect from the government. In developed countries the people's views are collected by either government or private organizations established to carry out research on issues affecting the community. These are then articulated to the population as public information and upon which governments may or may not act. Due to lack of resources developing countries do not normally have the luxury of public opinions and surveys and most of the time the views of the people with regard to their expectations and perceptions are assumed.

McAllister and Wanna (2001: 15), further argue that citizen expectations about the role of governments have generally increased in the postwar years as government responsibility has spread into new areas. Nevertheless these expectations still remain heavily focused on economic management, economic projects and living standards, including social protection. Citizens' expectations of what government *should* do are generally contingent with what governments *actually* do. A very practical example of this scenario is the recent increase in interest rates in Australia. The incumbent government's hold on power is partly the result of citizen expectations of its past performance in managing the economy and keeping interest rate low. The recent rise in interest rates may cause citizens to change their expectations with regard to the government's claim on sound economic management. In Bougainville, citizen expectations of the ABG can also be

traced back to the performance of its predecessor (NSPG), which despite its limited powers was able to achieve much prior to 1989. Furthermore governments are also under pressure from citizens to do even more, and to extend their range of responsibilities in response to changing citizens' expectations (McAllister and Wanna 2001: 16).

Norpoth (1996 cited in McAllister and Wanna 2001: 12) cites the positive correlation between longitudinal voting patterns of incumbent parties with changes in gross domestic product (GDP) as clear evidence that effective management of the economy is seen as the major day-to-day responsibility of the government. Not only do citizens expect their living standards to rise, but they also believe that their government ought to satisfy most of their expectations. Governments are also expected to manage the economy in a way that will support and guarantee rising living standards not only in the immediate term but also and more importantly for the next generation. This is of course the foundation of most economic theory that economic growth (measured in real GDP and real GDP per capita) will result in improved living standards.

Governments are also charged with ensuring safety and security in order to pursue these economic goals. People want to feel safe from crime and to be sure that their jobs are safe and will seek retribution from the government whenever crime or unemployment are seen to be rising. However the notion about the citizen's rights to expect the government to meet the expectations of the former is challenged by the 20th century philosopher Friedrich von Hayek (1978 cited in Schwarzmantel 1994) stating that the decline of the liberal doctrine is closely connected to the re-interpretation of freedom as a claim that the state should also supply particular goods as opposed to general economic growth. The state's primary responsibility for the latter is based on the theory that the wealth created through economic growth will eventually 'trickle down' to the masses, resulting in social and economic advancement for all. The fact that poverty and inequality between and within nations is now more widespread despite increase in world affluence in the last 50 years (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2000/01), would seem to disprove the trickle down effect and thus the expectations by citizens for the government to supply particular goods.

However this disparity between theory and what is happening on the ground is partly the result of the manner in which the two causality-related concepts of development and poverty have been treated both by academics and development practitioners. Firstly, from the traditional material deprivation of income and consumption, poverty has been redefined to include low achievements in health and education, vulnerability to risks, powerlessness and voicelessness, and more recently, human rights and justice (UK Department for International Development 2000). Development Economists like Amartya Sen, for example, define poverty in terms of the deprivations that restricts a person's capabilities, the substantial freedoms necessary to live the kind of life that the person values (UN 2005: 15). Secondly, the definition of development has also been changing. From its initial association with industrialization, westernization, modernization, growth, and progress (Arndt 1987), new meanings have been added to emphasize the social aspects of development.

In developing countries the majority of the population is neither aware nor too concerned about the macroeconomic policies that determine government capacity to deliver goods and services. They are more interested in what Hayek discussed as particular goods; that is they are interested in what the government can and should do to build roads, schools, and hospitals, which affect their lives at household level. However whereas developed countries usually have the resources to meet people's expectations, developing countries often do not have the resources to bring the expected development to their people. Thus when developing country governments fail to deliver due to lack of capacity, citizens withdraw their support. The high turnover of members of parliaments in some countries such as PNG where 60 percent of incumbent members lose their seats (Reilly 2002a; Reilly 2002b) can in some way be attributed to the failure of governments to meet people's expectations.

2.3 Government Capacity

Government capacity refers not only to the financial, physical and intellectual resources, but also to the administrative, management and legal processes and systems that enable a

government to effectively conduct its business. Keating and Weller (2001) argue that there has been reconfiguration – part forced, part driven – with regard to the roles and responsibilities of governments, the preferred processes and tools, their organization, and the nature of accountability. All of these factors impact on the kind of policies that different levels of government develop and implement in order to solve problems.

This is seen as the result of the changes in the expectations, living styles and ideas that have developed over the last 30 years, which have forced governments to change the way they organize their activities (Keating and Weller 2001: 73). The dynamic nature of the constituency is such that governments cannot afford to sit on their laurels. As people become more informed of their rights and the government's responsibility to address these rights, they become more skeptical, less trusting and still more demanding (Keating and Weller 2001). Despite the comparative prosperity, especially in the developed world, expectations have generally run ahead of capacity. Even when the government is seen to be doing more now than at any other time in the past the dynamic nature of society's perceptions on the role of government is such that it is unlikely to meet all these expectations and demands (Keating and Weller 2001).

The widening of the gap between expectations and capacity has forced governments to realize their limitations in terms of resources. Attitudes to public spending have also changed partly for ideological reasons (public spending is bad) and partly for pragmatic reasons (people resist paying taxes to finance public spending) (Keating and Weller 2001: 74). In Australia, as in other highly developed countries of Europe and North America, these different attitudes are essentially an expression of a constituency that is not only divided but which is also struggling over distributional issues. Furthermore government capacity is also challenged by the competing material claims for higher incomes, greater security, lower taxation, greater variety of lifestyles and new social and political divides that create new pressures on governments (Keating and Weller 2001: 75). Governments are being asked to strike a balance between different sets of values and conflicting ideas about the role of the state which in turn reflect the differences in education and access to technology, divergent attitudes to quality of life issues versus material possessions, and

the security of individuals and their families. These new political divides overlap or complement the traditional division between labour and capital.

The shift towards a more individualistic society has also affected the compatibility between citizens' expectations and government capacity (Maine 1996 cited in Keating and Weller 2001). For example greater material wealth has reduced the dependency between individuals in a society. Obligations to the extended family have largely disappeared while the mutual support offered within the nuclear family is also declining. Individuals are now finding it easier to get out of marital commitment while responsibility for the young and the old is being shared between the family and the state (Keating and Weller 2001: 75). All these contribute to increasing the expectations of citizens' on the government's responsibility to meeting these needs and the changing role of governments.

Again this contrasts greatly with the values or set of values that influence societies in developing countries. Extended families are very much part of the values or set of values that have cushioned the government's inability to provide effectively for its citizens. These well entrenched kinship systems such as the PNG *wantok* system have often acted as an informal social safety net for those whom the government is unable to adequately provide (Gibson *et al* 1999; de Renzio 2000). At the same time however this had also limited the capacity of the government to meet the people's expectations because such informal networks also enhance corruption at all levels (Renzio 2000: 22).

2.4 Political Autonomy

To be autonomous is to be one's own person, to be directed by conscience, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not imposed externally, but are part of what can be considered one's authentic self (Christman 2001). However because the term is often used in a wide variety of contexts and in numerous philosophical and practical settings, a number of distinctions must be made on the kind of autonomy that is of interest to moral and political theory (Berlin 1969). Philosophers allude to four types of autonomy; basic,

moral, personal and political autonomy (Christman 2001: Ch 2). Under political liberalism, autonomy is associated with the core liberal idea that justice – that is, the principles that free and equal persons would want to be governed by, must be secured prior to the pursuit of collective goals in a society. The commitment to popular sovereignty implies that justice must be an extension of people’s rule of themselves, the free and rational pursuit of people’s own conception of morality and good, assuming pluralism among such conceptions (Kymlicka 1990; Christman 2001).

Political autonomy is the outcome of the ‘shift of political power and authority to lower levels of government’ (Rondinelli et al 1983). Examples of autonomous arrangements include Hong Kong, under the ‘one state, two systems’ arrangement with China (USINFO 2005), and The Basque Region of Spain (Castells and Jauregui 2006; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2001). The argument for political autonomy is that it provides a structural arrangement to reconcile issues of national unity and indivisibility and the safeguarding of national interest to ensure local autonomy (Kauzya 2003: 4). The test of political autonomy is the recognition that the autonomous peoples can make the rules governing their internal affairs.

However there is a need to distinguish between the peaceful transfer of powers, responsibilities, functions and resources from the centre to lower level governments (in the case of provincial or state governments) and post-conflict negotiated settlement where powers, responsibilities, functions and resources are taken away from the central government and given/ offered to a group that has been fighting for them (O’Flynn 2005; O’Flynn and Russell 2005; Russel and Shehadi 2005; Oberschall and Palmer 2005; Bieber 2005; Zahar 2005). In situations where political control over territory is the contested issue the best post-conflict solution is to give specific territorial parts of a country under governance of one warring faction (Kauzya 2003: 12). When such provisions are enshrined in legal documents such as a constitution, political devolution can become a strong vehicle for championing local diversity, autonomy and peace-building. There is the risk of ‘recentralization’ that should be borne in mind as a possible cause for disenchantment at local level. That is, vertical devolution must be supported by

appropriate horizontal structures that enable citizens to experience the impact of political autonomy at community and household levels.

The difference between decentralization and political autonomy is that while decentralization (in its various modes) is centered on three reform questions of expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, and the resolution of fiscal imbalances, political autonomy goes beyond administrative reform. Furthermore decentralization very seldom results in the disintegration of the state, on the contrary it is aimed at strengthening the centre. Political autonomy on the other hand involves considerable concessions on the part of the state in response to the demands for political control from the periphery. Moreover, it is almost always the result of protracted negotiated settlements sometimes involving international neutral mediators.

Although existing literature is scanty on the level of citizen perceptions and expectations in regions that have been granted political autonomy, this study has found that political autonomy generally increases citizen perception and expectations. For example 57 per cent of participants believed that the ABG has the ability to address the problems affecting Bougainvillians because of the additional powers available to the region under the autonomous arrangement. However the level of capacity in regions that have been granted political autonomy will depend on the extent to which that particular region is developed, underdeveloped or undeveloped at the attainment of political autonomy. For example the capacity of autonomous regions such as Hong Kong and the Basque Region of Spain (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2001: 2) would be totally different from Bougainville. In the latter, coming out of a decade of civil war (which destroyed all of its social and economic infrastructures) government capacity is so low to the extent that the initial period of political autonomy will be spent rebuilding the region's infrastructures and hence capacities. Whether citizens are prepared to wait is, however, another question.

3

Research Methodologies

The field work was conducted in, and around the town of Buka, the present capital of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB). Buka was chosen because it is currently the ‘melting pot’ of all Bougainvillian (and to a lesser extent Papua New Guinean and other) cultures and hence the relative ease with which interviewees from other regions of Bougainville could be reached. The financial cost of conducting a Bougainville-wide study, and to a lesser extent time, also assisted in the selection of Buka as the location of the study. This research used a type of probability sampling called multistage cluster sampling (Babbie 2004; O’Leary 2004: 108; Shively 2005: 100). Firstly, the population was divided into three geographical clusters based on the three main regions of north, central and south. From these clusters four sampling units were identified; members of the public, members of the Bougainville House of Representative, the business community and civil society (Churches, NGOs, and Trade Unions etc). Using the Equal Probability Sampling Method (EPSM) 49 ‘knowledgeable informants’ were interviewed comprising 37 members of the public, five members of the business community, four members of the Bougainville House of Representative, and three members of the civil society.

3.1 Data Collection

The main data collection technique was semi-structured interviews and informal discussions with ‘knowledgeable participants’. Three sets of opened ended questions (public, MHRs, and civil society) were used to explore whether the installation of the ABG had changed people’s perceptions of the role of government, and their expectations with regard to its ability to address the problems facing Bougainvillians (See Appendix C). With members of the House of Representatives, the semi-structured interviews and informal discussions became formal surveys using the list of questions which had now become survey questionnaires. This is because MHRs appeared reluctant to be

interviewed on the spot saying that they needed more time to go through the list of questions. When given the list of questions (on the understanding that the interviews would be conducted the next day), only three out of the 10 members who asked for more time had either completed the questionnaires or were willing to be interviewed. Only one member of the House agreed to an on the spot interview bringing the total participants in this category to four.

This was in stark contrast to the level of interest by members of the public especially from North Bougainville, which was overwhelming. It is highly probable that interest in participating in the study would have been just as overwhelming in the other two regions (central and south) had the researcher also traveled to these region's main urban centres of Arawa and Buin. However due to the high cost of travel outside of the capital, interviews with people from these regions depended on their availability in Buka during the period of the study. Beside the transcripts of interviews conducted with the 49 participants and informal discussions held with other members of the public, the government's 2006-2010 Strategic Action Plan (SAP), 2006 Budget and Explanatory Notes including Ministerial Statements, and newspaper cuttings about issues concerning Bougainville during the period of the study were also used as sources of data.

3.2 Data Analysis

The research questions which asked participants about their perceptions (Q1a and Q1b) and expectations of the ABG (Q2a and Q2b) contained three possible answers; *low, medium, or high*. Analyzing the responses to these questions involved assigning participants according to how they answered, tabulating the responses, and creating a matrix or table (containing the two variables and the three categories of responses) to summarize the results (See Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, pp. 18 & 20).


Similarly, the research question which asked participants to rate ABG's level of capacity (Q4) contained five possible answers; *a lot, sufficient, some, not a lot, and none*. For this question the five categories of responses were firstly converted to a five-point numerical

scale of '0' to '4' where: 0 = none, 1 = not a lot, 2 = some, 3 = sufficient, and 4 = a lot. It was decided that a numerically weighted scale would more accurately depict citizen rating of ABG's capacity. The 49 participants were then assigned according to where they rated ABG's capacity on the given scale (0 – 4) and the responses tabulated in accordance with the set parameters. A matrix or table (containing the variable and the five – point scale) was created to summarize the results (See Figure 3.3, p. 28).

3.3 Citizen Perceptions

Of the 49 participants interviewed, 18 (37 %) stated that their perceptions in terms of the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians were high (See Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 – Analysis of Perception Levels



Within this group, 16 of the 18 attributed their belief in the ABG's capacity to the installation of an autonomous government, that is, political autonomy. The other two participants attributed the change in perception to the relative peace that now exists in the region. Another 19 (39%) said that their perceptions in terms of the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians were only moderate. For those with

moderate level perception, eight attributed their answer to the lack of development since the installation of the ABG. Three attributed their perceptions of the ABG to the security situation on the island while another three thought that the installation of the ABG was too early. The general improvement in the delivery of goods and services was also cited by two of the participants in this category as influencing their perceptions. Of the rest of the participants with moderate perceptions, another two stated financial constraints while one believed that politicians were not honest. While no specific instance of political dishonesty by individual politician was mentioned this is probably a generalization of what is happening at national level with regard to the number of politicians that are being referred for prosecution. For example in the first six months of 2006, the Ombudsman Commission referred five politicians to the Public Prosecutor for alleged improper conduct, most relating to the use of District Support Grant (DSG).⁴ Although no politician from the region has yet been referred for prosecution, the perception is that politicians are generally either corrupt or dishonest.

The rest of the participants (12) stated that their perceptions were low. Five of those with low perception (42%) attributed their perceptions to the lack of development since the installation of the ABG. Three cited the current security situation on the island as influencing their current low perception. Of the rest of the participant in this category two each cited financial constraints and inexperienced politicians respectively as influencing their perceptions. Nevertheless these analyses show that the perceptions of Bougainvillians of the ABG are high. However, as with citizens' expectations the level of perception also varied between regions and within different population units of the regions as discussed below.


3.4 Citizen Expectations

Expectations emanate from the complex relationship that exists between the state as the provider of public goods and services, and citizens in their status as consumers (Vigoda

⁴ This information is based on the author's daily online access of PNG's two major newspapers (Post Courier & The National)

2000). These expectations are in turn influenced by the citizens' perception of the role of government and its capacity to appropriately and effectively respond to these expectations (McAllister and Wanna 2001). In terms of the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, 23 of those interviewed stated that their expectations of the ABG were high (See Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 – Analysis of Expectation Levels



Of this group, 20 (87%) attributed changes in their expectations to the installation of the ABG or political autonomy. One of the participants however wanted services to be more equitably distributed between the three main regions (north, central and south) while another acknowledged the financial constraints being experienced by the government. The fact that there are too many inexperienced members of parliament was also cited by one participant as a problem despite high expectations.

Fifteen interviewees (31%) stated that their expectations of government performance were at moderate level. Of this group four (27%) attributed their expectations to the fact that ABG is still new and, (with very little resources), people should not expect too much too soon. Another three (20%) attributed their moderate expectations to the security situation in the region. The rest of the participants in this group attributed their

expectation levels to the installation of the ABG (two), the general improvement in the delivery of services since ABG’s installation (two), lack of resources (two), and financial constraints (two).

Eleven (22%) of those interviewed said that their expectations of the ABG were low. Four (36%) of those with low expectations attributed their expectation levels to the present financial constraints faced by the ABG. Two interviewees each cited the security situation, lack of understanding by politicians of their roles, and the wrong priorities being pursued by the government. Nevertheless an analysis of government priorities in the SAP would seem to indicate a high degree of alignment with citizen priorities (See Section 8). Those interviewees who stated that their expectations from the government were moderate or low cited the ABG’s current financial constraints as their reason.

3.4.1 Expectations by Regions

Analysis by regions shows that expectation levels vary between and within different population units of the regions. Expectations are higher in the northern region compared to the central and southern regions (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 – Summary of Expectation Levels by Regions

Regions	Expectation Levels		
	High	Medium	Low
North	17	9	3
Central	3	2	4
South	4	4	3

The first reason for this difference relates to the slow progress in the government’s efforts to restore services to other parts of the island. Except for North Bougainville, in particular Buka, the restoration program is very slow and proceeding at an almost identical pace everywhere else, reflecting the security situation outside of the capital. Government presence in Central and South Bougainville mainly consists of the district administration, police detachments, rural health staff and teachers. Although government officials have

been in place since 1997, their areas of service would be viewed differently from those of a postmaster, banker and agricultural extension officer, which are still non-existent in these regions. These services had existed prior to the conflict and their presence would indicate a return to some degree of normalcy in districts outside of the capital. In the former capital of Arawa, business by local entrepreneurs is said to be thriving, however the private sector is generally still reluctant to invest due to the uncertainty over safety and security. This partly explains the moderate-to-low expectations especially in the central and southern regions.

The second possible reason has a political dimension to it. For South Bougainvillians, their moderate-to-low expectations reflect the low perceptions they have of the ABG; only three of the eleven participants from this region stated that their perceptions of the government were high. South Bougainville was the political stronghold of former Governor John Momis, the Regional Member for Bougainville in the National Parliament from 1972-2005. In 2005 Momis (of South Bougainvillian and New Ireland parentage) resigned from the National Parliament to contest the inaugural ABG elections for the president's seat which he lost to the incumbent Joseph Kabui, who hails from the Ioro-Eivo Constituency in the Panguna area of Central Bougainville. The fact that the loss by Momis was still fresh in the minds of his supporters may well explain their low perceptions of, and hence expectations of the ABG.

However it could also be that residents of Central and South Bougainville are probably among those who believe that it is too early to expect the ABG to meet the people's expectations. This explanation seems plausible for Central Bougainvillians seeing that one of their sons and a former leader of the secessionist movement is currently the president of the ABG. As Reilly (2002: 156) points out, voting in fragmented societies (such as PNG) tends to be in 'blocks' for a clan's candidate irrespective of party affiliation. Because most Central Bougainvillians would have given their votes to Kabui, they would also feel bound to support him in these early days of political autonomy.

3.4.2 Expectations by Gender

In terms of gender, women not only have a higher perception of the government, but their expectations are also higher than their male counterparts (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 – Summary of Expectation Levels by Gender

Gender	Expectation		
	High	Medium	Low
Female	13	3	3
Male	12	12	7

Women seem to expect more from the ABG for several reasons. Firstly, women were among the principal victims of the Bougainville conflict whether at home or in the camps (or care centres) (UNIFEM 2005: 2). They were raped, tortured, and abused by both the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Women and children also suffered the most through lack of medicine with many women dying during child birth. Secondly, while the men were away fighting, it was the women who organized and maintained civil society. Thus women were also the first to organize by taking an active role in the process to find a lasting solution to end the conflict (Hakena 2001: 3). Naturally they would want to avoid a repetition of the conflict and thus want the ABG to succeed.

3.4.3 Expectations by Age-group

In analyzing expectation levels of the different age-groups, the trend shows that there is a positive correlation between expectation levels and participant's age-groups. While expectation levels are lower in the younger age-groups (15-24 and 25-34), these increases with each of the older age-groups (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 – Summary of Expectation Levels by Age-group

Expectation			
Age-group	High	Medium	Low
15-24	1	3	2
25-34	1	3	3
35-44	8	6	2
45-54	6	2	2
55+	8	0	1

It is interesting to note that the 15-24 years age-groups (which encompasses the youth of the region), does not believe that the installation of the ABG had changed its expectations. It is this same age-group that was responsible for the destruction that took place during the conflict either as foot soldiers of the BRA or members of the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF).

Although critics will quickly point to the small number of participants interviewed in this group as statistically insignificant to represent the majority of Bougainville's youth, it should be understood that participants in this age group were born between 1982 and 1991 and have no other experience of Bougainville. This is the age group that is often referred to as Bougainville's 'lost generation' in terms of education and other life's opportunities. Their only experience of Bougainville is chaos, anarchy, and the power of the gun. On the other hand older interviewees (35+) envy the higher living standards of the pre-conflict period (Griffin and Togolo 1997: 350) and are hoping that ABG can become the catalyst in bringing Bougainville back to where it used to be or even better (in terms of improving the people's wellbeing), especially with the additional powers available to it.

While it is too early to conclude that the youth of Bougainville may be disgruntled with the government, it is important for the government to engage this age group in a meaningful and productive manner including an awareness that a period of relative peace and prosperity had preceded the conflict and that the region could once again experience

such prosperity if the ABG is given the chance to address some of their expectations. While ‘sport’ is rightly recognized by the government as an important component of rehabilitating the youth of the region (as evident in the financial support to sportsmen and women),⁵ this should not be seen as a substitute for, but rather a supplement to, economic oriented programs that would improve living standards and thus alleviate poverty.

3.4.4 Expectations by Occupational Status

With regard to the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, politicians’ expectations are naturally high with all of the four interviewees in this occupational category (100%) stating that their expectations from the government were high (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 – Summary of Expectation Levels by Occupational Status

Expectation			
Occupational Status	High	Medium	Low
Civil Society	1	2	0
MHR	4	0	0
Private Sector	2	2	1
Public Sector	5	4	4
Subsistence Dweller	12	7	5

This occupational group is followed by the subsistence dweller category where 12 (50%) of the interviewees also had high expectations of the government. Another seven (28%) of interviewees in this category described their expectations as moderate while another five (37%) had a low expectation. In the private sector category two (40%) of interviewees had high expectations. An equal number (two) and proportion (40%) described their expectations as moderate while another interviewee (20%) had a low expectation. In the public sector category five (37%) of the interviewees stated that their

⁵ See 2006 ABG Budget for appropriation on Sports Development.

expectations were high; four (30%) described their expectations as moderate with the remaining four (30%) stating that expectation was low. Only one interviewee (33%) in the civil society category had a high expectation level while two interviewees (66%) described their expectations as moderate.

3.5 Citizens' Development Priorities

The purpose of question 3 (which asked participants to describe the issues that they believed the government should prioritize to address the problems facing Bougainvillians) was to determine the congruence between citizen priorities and the government's development strategy. A total of 22 issues were identified by citizens, upon which the ABG should focus to enhance development. These have been condensed into 14 main categories in line with the ABG's priority sectors (see SAP 2006-10). These are discussed under Section 8 to determine the extent of congruence between the two sets of priorities. Condensing involved grouping issues with less than 2 frequencies with those of similar contexts. For example the response 'build more schools' was grouped under priority 5 (infrastructure).

Table 3.5 summarizes the main categories; the numbers in column 3 denotes the frequency with which a particular issue was mentioned by interviewees, not the number of participants. According to the table, economic development was cited as the number one priority. This is followed closely by education services, security (law & order), health services, infrastructure (i.e. economic and social) and the transport network (land, sea, and air).

Table 3.5– Summary of Citizens’ Priority Development Issues

Priority No	Description	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Economic Development	21	16
2	Education Services	19	14
3	Security (Law and Order)	18	13
4	Health Services	15	11
5	Infrastructure (Economic & Social)	14	10
6	Transport Network (Land, Sea & Air)	14	10
7	Establish Markets (Overseas & Local)	6	5
8	Improve quality of Human Capital	6	5
9	Peace & Reconciliation	5	4
10	Encourage Partnership	4	3
11	Community Development	4	3
12	Agriculture/Fisheries	3	2
13	Resettlement	3	2
14	Improve Service Delivery	2	1.5
	Total	134	99.5

Except for the post-conflict issue of peace and reconciliation (issue 9), the above issues are very similar to those identified by participants of the 1996 Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) which was conducted to determine the extent of poverty in PNG (Feeny 2003). Thus by identifying those issues, participants have to some degree also indirectly described the post-conflict situation in which a majority of Bougainvillians find themselves.

3.6 Capacity Rating

While Bougainvillians’ perceptions and expectations of the government were generally high, their rating of the ABG’s capacity to address their problems was more conservative.

In the ascending order on the five-point scale, six out of the 49 participants (12%) rated ABG’s capacity at ‘0’ (See Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 – Analysis of Capacity Levels

No of Participants	Capacity Scale									
	0		1		2		3			4
49	6	14%	6	14%	19	39%	11	22%	7	14%

This group did not believe that the ABG has any capacity to address the problems facing Bougainvillians. Three of the six attributed their rating to the current financial constraints facing the government. The remaining three participant each attributed ABG’s low capacity to either wrong priorities by the ABG, unequal distribution of development resources, and brain drain. Another six participants gave the ABG a capacity rating of one out of four. In this group three attributed their rating to the limited resources currently available to the government. The rest gave no change in development (one), too many politicians (one) and the handout mentality (one).

The majority of participants 19 (39%) rated ABG’s capacity at two out of a possible 4. Of these, 11 (58%) attributed their rating of ABG’s capacity to the limited funding available to finance the level of development demanded by the population. Two of those who gave the ABG a rating of 2 attributed their answers to the lack of good policies while another two mentioned the lack of properly qualified people to implement government policies as the reasons for their rating. The rest of the participants in this group attributed their rating of ABG’s capacity to the security situation on the island (one), the lack of change in development since the installation of ABG (one), lack of transparency (one) and the fact that ABG should be given more time to build up its capacities (one).

This was followed by 11 participants (22%) who gave the ABG a capacity rating of three out of four. Five participants in this group (45%) also acknowledged the current financial constraints facing the government. According to this group, there are inadequate funds to finance the kind of development that would meet the people’s expectations so soon after the ABG’s installation. Two (18%) however believed that ABG should be given time to

establish the capacity required to address the problems facing Bougainvillians. The rest of the participants in this group gave too many politicians (one), too much handout (one), security (one) and inefficient public service (one) as their reasons. Apart from the 4 MHRs, only three (6%) of the 49 interviewees gave ABG a rating of four out four. All seven interviewees attributed their rating to the fact that Bougainville now has a government with the powers to make decisions independently from the GoPNG on the kind of development that it desires for its people.

The analyses of citizen expectations provide evidence to support the original hypothesis; that political autonomy, especially the installation of the ABG has impacted on the people's perceptions of the government with regard to its ability to address the problems facing Bougainvillians. These findings are important because they provide the first empirical evidence of what (to date) has been general assertion on the impact of political autonomy in Bougainville. On a wider scale the findings also establish 'higher expectations' as a necessary characteristic of post-conflict sub-national governance structures, of which governments, sub-national governments, and their policy makers ought to be aware.

The Autonomous Bougainville Government

As the primary catalyst for increasing citizen expectations of government, the ABG is discussed in terms of its role in implementing political autonomy (in preparation for the referendum in 2020), the existing administrative and institutional capacities available to absorb the responsibilities associated with the additional powers, and, the timing and determinants for the ‘draw down’ of powers.

4.1 Implementing Political Autonomy

The installation of the ABG was the principle catalyst in increasing citizen expectations in Bougainville. Fifty seven per cent (57%) of the population now see the ABG as the panacea for most of their problems because of the additional powers that are available for draw down from the GoPNG. Nevertheless the history of devolving political power and authority in PNG paints a different picture especially in terms of the delivery of services to the rural majority (Koyama 2001: 130; Demas 2004a). Joseph Demas (2004a: 50) in his investigation of the consequences of decentralization on agricultural extension services in PNG found that the competition between the national government and provincial governments over the responsibility for agricultural extension services had virtually ‘killed off’ the delivery of this important service to the rural farmers. At the same time the decline in health outcomes from the 1980s onwards has been attributed to the transfer of the responsibility over primary health functions to the 19 provincial governments, which has resulted ‘in lack of coordination, collaboration and wastage of resources’ (PNG National Health Plan 2001-2010: 2).

However under the Bougainville Peace Agreement (Sec. 52), the Organic Law on Peace Building (Sec. 290), and the Bougainville Constitution (Sec. 42 and Schedule 4) there is very little room for competition over which level of government is responsible for what service. The ABG can formulate and implement policies on all matters (except foreign

affairs, national security and currency) independently from the GoPNG.⁶ The powers related to all other policy areas are available for ‘draw down’ by the Bougainville Government whenever it is ready to do so, thus providing a golden opportunity to address the longstanding issues which had triggered two unilateral declarations of independence (financial autonomy, land, and mining). However under the Organic Law (Sec. 295 *Process of Transfer of Functions and Powers*), the transfer of functions and powers shall take into account the need by the ABG for a particular function or power as well as the government’s capacity in relation to such a function or power. The government’s preparedness to draw down these additional powers will thus be determined by a number of factors, such as the capacity of the Bougainville Administration to absorb the responsibilities that would accompany these additional powers.

4.2 Existing Administrative & Institutional Capacities

Capacity refers not only to the human and other physical resources that are essential to facilitate the delivery of goods and services to the people, but also to the administrative, institutional and organizational structures, management and planning systems, and procedures that are in place to ensure that these resources are utilized in a transparent and accountable manner for the benefit of the people. The ability of the ABG to effectively implement political autonomy (and thus begin addressing the problems facing Bougainvillians) will largely be determined by the government’s administrative and institutional capacities including the administrative and institutional framework that enables public servants to effectively function in their role as implementers of government policies. For example, placing a medical doctor in a health facility which lacks the basic diagnostic equipment; X-ray machine and Biochemistry analyzer is not much better than having a doctor because this person is not able to effectively function without this basic equipment. In such a scenario, one would have solved the human resource issue without actually improving the quality of health and medical services

⁶ See Bougainville Constitution Section 42-Functions and Powers of the Autonomous Bougainville Government

available to the people. Thus human resources (or the lack of it) cannot be discussed without reference to low administrative and institutional capacities.

At present the Bougainville Administration (ABG's main administrative machinery) is unable to effectively assume and exercise the responsibilities associated with supporting an autonomous executive government. Since the resumption of government services initially in Rabaul (East New Britain Province 1991) and later on in Buka (1992), the public service machinery has been operating at less than one third of its ability and potential. Three factors have contributed to the present state of affairs. The first is the mass exodus of public servants from Bougainville (Bougainvillians and non-Bougainvillians) at the height of the conflict in 1990. At the time when anyone and everything connected with the GoPNG was considered unpalatable, many senior Bougainvillian public servants also left Bougainville to escape the conflict, creating a vacuum in the government's human resource stocks which had to be filled by recruiting inexperienced and unqualified personnel into the Administration.

The second factor is the legacy of the dual administrative structure that existed in Bougainville prior to 1990. Apart from the (provincial) Department of North Solomon (DNS) which was the provincial government's main implementing agency under the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government, the then North Solomons Provincial Government was probably the only province in the country to also directly employ its own staff (besides the six secretariat personnel allowed under the OLPG). At the outset the former NSPG wanted to employ staff whose performance it could effectively control and monitor with regard the implementation of its broad objectives. Thus at the cessation of government activities and services in March 1990, it had amassed between 50 and 100 well-qualified, experienced, and dedicated staff (both national and expatriate) outside of the mainstream DNS. Although this arrangement may have contributed to NSPG's reputation as one of the best-managed provinces (Griffin and Togolo 1997), the parallel administrative structures and disparities in salaries and conditions (at executive management levels) were, and still are, a source of constant tension that continued throughout the initial period of the restoration program. The establishment of the

Program Management Unit (PMU) in 1992 and subsequent appointment of six program managers by the then Provincial Secretary to facilitate the delivery of service into areas that were opening up to government control, resulted in the duplication of efforts by the Administrator to oversee the resumption of health, education and other services on the island. Unlike their colleagues within the DNS, most of the program managers had very little project management experience. The fact that these program managers had been appointed under the Provincial Administration Act 1988 also meant that they were not bound by the bureaucratic 'red tape' of the public service recruitment procedures and were recruiting 'left, right and centre' mainly to induce former rebels to abandon the armed struggle, irrespective of qualifications, experience and position specification. Thus when the PMU was finally abolished in 1995, the number of provincial government employees had outstripped nationally-paid public servants by more than 300 percent.

The third is the outdated administrative, organizational and management structure which has outlasted the dynamic political changes that had occurred in Bougainville since the *1997 Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development*. In spite of the changes that had taken place in the political arena, the administration had persevered with the outdated DNS 1988 administrative structure. Attempts made to restructure the Bougainville Administration in response to the changes that were taking place in the province had been to no avail. Nevertheless it meant that the province had persevered with two separate public services up to the present. Furthermore a major proportion of available funds were absorbed in personnel emoluments, not only leaving very little to finance other operational costs, but also greatly demoralizing public servants. Although the proposed restructuring of the Bougainville Administration is aimed at addressing some of the inherent weaknesses in the government's administrative machinery, the new structure is unlikely to effectively support the operations of a sub-national government because such a restructuring is still being pursued within the framework of the OLPG & LLG 1995, in spite of the fact that the effect of these laws in Bougainville should probably have ceased with the coming into force of the Bougainville Constitution.

The current administration needs to be immediately restructured as a ‘state’ or sub-national public service machinery capable of supporting a sub-national government in accordance with the Bougainville Constitution (Section 138 *Establishment of Bougainville Government Service* and 146 *Bougainville Public Service*). This is because the ABG could wait ‘forever’ if it plans to subject such ‘draw down’ of powers to its financial or institutional capacities. Moreover the psychological preoccupation with lack of funding (as a condition for the drawing down of powers) can also hinder the government from implementing initiatives which do not require large financial outlays such as creating the Bougainville Public Service. Not only should the Bougainville Constitution be the basis of any restructuring, but such restructuring must be aimed at enhancing the ability of the ABG to implement the ‘draw down’ of the additional powers from the GoPNG, which Bougainvillians demand. The drawing down of relevant powers from the GoPNG should be undertaken now because:

- These additional powers are essential in facilitating political autonomy which according to some sectors of the population is too slow, and
- The government’s administrative and institutional capacities to absorb the additional responsibilities can only be determined after, not before the ABG has had the opportunity to implement them.

In other words, as the *Mekamui* slogan of ‘*Save na Mekim*’⁷ rightly alludes, one learns by actually doing, not by watching. Thus the process of establishing the Bougainville Public Service should commence sooner rather than later. In fact it should now provide the framework for any institutional strengthening, capacity-building or performance-enhancing activities that are envisaged, planned or work-in-progress to improve service delivery in the region.

⁷ ‘*Save na mekim*’ translates to learning by doing, and describes the self-reliant initiatives that helped to cushion the impact of the economic blockade of Bougainville by the GOPNG, especially in and around the Panguna Copper Mine.

Financial Constraints

In spite of the installation of the ABG, not all participants were convinced that the ABG is the panacea for their social and economic advancement with 43% of the participants stating that their expectations under political autonomy were either moderate or still low. The main factors that influenced this group were financial constraints, security and safety, and lack of development. Security and safety, and lack of development are discussed in the latter sections of the paper. This section highlights the current financial constraints facing the ABG in its efforts to meet citizen expectations for development. The underlying causes are discussed. Then the ABG's financial status is discussed by analyzing the 2006 Budget to highlight the difference between citizen expectations and the government's meager financial resources.

5.1 Underlying Causes

The chronic shortage of funds is not unique to Bougainville. It is the legacy of decades of inappropriate fiscal management policies by successive PNG governments, either unable or unwilling to restrain spending at national level. The closure of the Panguna Copper Mine in Bougainville (which was then contributing almost one third of PNG's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) also contributed to the decline in national government revenues. Despite the commissioning of at least two new mines since, the country has never quite recovered from the closure of the Panguna Mine. Increased internal and external borrowings to finance policies like free education, slush funds for members of parliament and other non-economic projects resulted in a mountain of debt, a financial meltdown of the country to the point of bankruptcy, and the intervention (rightly or wrongly) of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in PNG's affairs. While the present government's (GoPNG) five year (2003-07) Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) seems to have succeeded in addressing its predecessor's macroeconomic mismanagement (by bringing the country back on the part of growth (Treasury Economic Monitor 2004:


4), it will take more than the current MTFS for the country to fully recover and for the national government's grants to provinces including Bougainville to improve.

Bougainville's financial problems are compounded by the fact that its internal revenue base is still very weak. In 2005 the internal revenue component of the ABG budget of K1.2 Million accounted for a mere 1.7 per cent of the total revenue available to the ABG in that financial year. Thus while other provincial governments have been able to cushion the impact of the shortfall in national government development grants by raising their own revenues, ABG is unable to do this because its economy is still in ruins.

5.2 The ABG's 2006 Budget

The ABG's 'Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the FY 2004-06 indicates that finance (or lack of finance) would continue to impede the government's efforts to provide the type and level of socioeconomic development that the population expect in the foreseeable future (see Appendix A). In addition, despite the political rhetoric about increases in the 2006 budget to K98.397 Million, the trends in the increases are mostly sporadic in nature. Of the four major revenue sources, only the recurrent unconditional grant and the restoration & development grant (both PNG Government grants) show consistent increases over FY 2004-06 (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 – Trends in ABG’s Revenue by Sources 2004-06



The RUG is probably the only revenue source from which consistent increases would be expected. This is because apart from the 16.6 per cent that is disbursed to the ABG as village courts, establishment, police, rural local government, and town services grants, the rest is controlled by the National Treasury under Expenditure Item 110 (Personal Emoluments) to pay the Salaries and Allowances, Wages, Overtime, and Leave Fares for ABG staff, national public servants and teachers serving in Bougainville. In other words increases in this revenue source basically reflect the cost of salaries (the only variable that is immune from gravitational forces). Furthermore K2 Million of the RUG has been earmarked for the operations of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) while the K1.6 Million to implement the ABG’s retrenchment exercise in 2006 appears to be a ‘one off’ appropriation.

The restoration and development grant has also yielded consistent increases for the FY 2004-06. However this component is unlikely to experience any significant increases beyond 2006 because the two revenue heads under the RDG are governed by separate administrative and legal arrangements. The district support grant is fixed under the OLPG & LLG while Bougainville is entitled to K10 Million per annum from the GoPNG under the Peace Agreement and the ensuing Organic Law (PB-ABG & BR) to assist with post-

conflict restoration and development of the region. Unless the administrative and legal arrangements governing these revenue heads are reviewed (which is very unlikely), the RDG to the region had probably plateaued.

In contrast with the above, is the ABG internal revenue component which (after plummeting to K1.2 Million in 2005 from K5.465 Million in 2004), increased to K19.732 Million in 2006. The most significant increases is in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the Bougainville Group Tax⁸ (BGT), both of which are expected to net a total of K12 Million (or 63% of all internal revenues in 2006). Apart from the Motor Vehicle Registration (of K100,000) and Liquor Licensing Fees (of K140,000) the other increase in the internal revenue component is made up of K4 Million of 'draw down funds' from 2005 RDG and K2.932 Million being 2005 Balance Carried Forward to 2006. The rest of the increase is expected in the donor component of the budget which will increase from K21.690 Million in 2005 to K25.276 Million in 2006. Like a major part of the RUG (which is controlled by the GoPNG), this component is not controlled by the ABG, with regard to how, and where it is used.

Therefore, while trends in the ABG's revenue show a consistent increase for the FY 2004-06, a large proportion of this increase has occurred in the areas over which the government has no control. Even the RDG is expected to plateau off after 2006 once the maximum amount allowed under the various administrative and legal arrangements is attained. Two of the revenue heads; GST and BGT have the potential to contribute significantly in consolidating the region's revenue base and hence improving its financial capacity. However they can also fluctuate considerably depending on the state of the national economy. Only persistent and sustained economic growth over the next five to ten years can significantly increase revenue from these two sources. With a weak private sector, it is the ABG that will have to bear the cost of actually kick starting the process of economic growth in the region (see section 9.1.5 p.64).

⁸ Payroll Tax for people working in Bougainville and paid to the GoPNG

However it will require more than PNG's K10 Million annual restoration and development grant to finance the kind of development that is required to kick-start the economy. Nevertheless until the region's economy is rebuilt to increase the amount of revenue collected internally, the ABG (like its predecessor) could fall short of effectively addressing citizen expectations thereby causing people to again lose faith in the new system.

6

Security and Safety

In every post-conflict situation, security is always a major factor because of the concept of property rights. Not only are citizens unable to engage in meaningful development when they feel threatened, but outsiders are also reluctant to invest in an unstable economic and political environment (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2001: 1). Investors (irrespective of origin) want to be assured that their investments, including profits will be protected by the government. Although the security situation on the island is relatively safe, law and order was identified as one of the factors which influenced citizen expectations. This reflects the people's concerns regarding the incomplete weapons disposal program (WDP), the continued isolation of the *Mekamui* faction from the ongoing peace process, and the emergence of the *UV-Stract* phenomena, a fast-money scheme whose operator (Noah Musingku) has engaged former Fijian soldiers who are said to be providing military training to young Bougainvillians in the southern part of the island.

6.1 Weapons Disposal Program

The weapons disposal program (one of the main pillars of the peace agreement) is still very much a 'work in progress'. Although the third stage of the WDP has been completed to the satisfaction of the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB), the period between UN certification and their final disposal is a cause for concern to the majority of Bougainvillians. Under the WDP agreement, the guns are being held in three containers (in three separate locations) until after (and most probably subject to the result of) the referendum on independence. The question is, can the safety of these weapons be guaranteed while their locations are known only to a few outside of the ex-combatants? Furthermore, what about the rest of the weapons that (according to the UNOMB) were not handed in? Finally, what guarantees are there that these weapons will not be used to intimidate voters during the proposed referendum in 10 or 15 years time?

6.2 The *Mekamui* and *UV-Stract* Phenomena

According to those interviewed the continued isolation of the *Mekamui* faction under the late Francis Ona also reflects negatively on the ABG's ability to meet the people's expectations. Not only does *Mekamui* purports to be an alternative government, claiming to have popular support for its existence, but members of the Mekamui Defence Force (MDF) are still holding on to their weapons. With these weapons MDF soldiers man the illegal roadblocks that prevent people, goods and services from reaching those in the 'No Go Zone' (NGZ) areas of central and south Bougainville. The *Mekamui* faction has been around since 1989, and many believe has only itself to blame for being marginalized as a result of maintaining such a hard-line policy at different stages of the peace process.

For example in 1990 a *Mekamui* government (then known as the Bougainville Interim Government) was set up to fill the political vacuum created by the withdrawal of the GoPNG. Having succeeded in removing the PNGDF from the island, the next step for *Mekamui* should have been to consolidate its support and to let the GoPNG know that it would not be allowed back into Bougainville unless they were prepared to negotiate self-determination and independence. Had it done that and had it controlled the post-withdrawal activities of the BRA, it is most likely that the destruction of the physical infrastructures that took place would have been avoided thus leaving most of the social and economic infrastructures intact, not to mention the loss of innocent lives that would have also been avoided. Instead the failure by the *Mekamui* government to control the BRA and to deliver on their promises of a 'better Bougainville' eventually gave rise to the counter-revolution by the BRF, the ensuing civil war and the decision by prominent Central Bougainvillians such as the late Theodore Miriung and later Joseph Kabui and Sam Kauona to abandon the armed struggle and negotiate a political settlement

The second lost opportunity concerns the refusal by the *Mekamui* faction to participate in the peace process, especially the ABG elections. Although it had supported the elections (the Late Francis Ona is known to have openly told *Mekamui* supporters to vote for his former right-hand man, Joseph Kabui), *Mekamui* did not field candidates. With the

political future of Bougainville on the line,⁹ one would have thought that this was the opportunity for the *Mekamui* faction to articulate its political philosophies to the people of Bougainville and to gauge the extent of its support among the population. It could have done this by forming a political party, fielding candidates and participating in the elections.

The security situation on the island is being exacerbated by the emergence of Noah Musingku and his *UV-Stract* fast money scheme. A fugitive from the law with a warrant of arrest on his head from the PNG government, Musingku is now operating from his village of Tonu in Siwai, Southwest Bougainville, where he has declared himself King David Pei II of the (imaginary) Kingdom of Papala. The existence of *UV-Stract* has also become a security issue following the recruitment of ex-Fijian soldiers who are said to be carrying out military training, not only to Musingku's personal body guards but also of *Mekamui* soldiers and other young Bougainvillians who have been lured to join this organization. Recent events¹⁰ seem to indicate that *Mekamui* (or a splinter group within it) and *UV-Stract* have effectively amalgamated and are working together to overthrow the democratically elected government.

After 'having gone through the lowest level of human experience in the conflict' (Kabui 2005) Bougainvillians shudder to imagine a repetition of such a situation. Not only do people want to feel safe from the threats of another conflict, but they also want to be sure that their efforts at rebuilding their lives (in terms of businesses and properties) will not be in vain in the event of another conflict. A safe and secure environment is also a pre-requisite for social and economic development. This is especially true for countries, states, or regions wishing to attract foreign direct investment (Chen 2000; Nunnenkamp 2002). In his thesis on '*The Location Advantage of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries*', Chen (2000: 27) argues that the overall attractiveness of a host country is determined by (among others) local factors such as political stability and law and order. If Bougainville wishes to enhance its location advantage for external

⁹ Of the two main political parties, the Bougainville United Party (John Momis) was pro-PNG while the Bougainville Peoples Congress (Joseph Kabui) was pro-independence.

¹⁰ For latest development see 'UV-Stract in shoot out with police' Post Courier Thursday 11 May 2006

assistance in whatever form (aid, grant or FDI), the law and order situation on the island needs to be addressed as a matter of priority. As one primary school teacher in Bougainville recently commented on the National Education Plan 2005-2014 perceived failure to address the goal of 'education for all', by leaving out many young people, 'where there is lawlessness, there is no real growth and development' (*Post Courier*, 26 April 2006: 1).

7

Development

Development is an abstract phenomenon that can sometimes be more effectively described in terms of its tangible benefits on people's wellbeing; high living standards, low infant and maternal mortality, high life expectancy, high literacy and freedom from crime and violence. At the same time development can also be described in terms of the absence of, or low achievements in the above; that is, high infant and maternal mortality, low life expectancy, low literacy, and high crime rates, which incidentally are some of the characteristics of poverty. In addition development can also be described, as participants have in the study (See section 3.5), in terms of the strategies, policies, programs, projects and activities which, if implemented will result in the achievement of social and economic advancement.

The fact that forty-three per cent (43%) of participants attributed their moderate or low expectations to the lack of or slow progress in development, demonstrates two things; their understanding of the concept of development, and their perceptions of the ABG as the government that will bring development to the people. According to participants development can be achieved if the ABG focuses on the issues that participants identified as priorities (see section 3.5). Incidentally many of these issues are similar to those that were raised by participants of the 1996 PPA to determine the extent of poverty in PNG. The 1996 PPA concluded that because the *wantok* system helps to protect almost everyone from outright destitution in rural areas, poverty in PNG is not about a lack of food, rather it relates more to a lack of infrastructure, opportunities, and access to services (Feeny 2002: 53), which are discussed under the headings of economic development, social development and infrastructure development.

7.1 Economic Development

While not attempting to define development, the Bougainville Constitution attributes 13 sections to its outcomes (Sections 22 – 35). For example section 22 *General Social and Economic Objectives* states that:

the Autonomous Bougainville Government shall endeavour to fulfill the fundamental rights of all people in Bougainville to social justice and economic development and shall, in particular, ensure that:- (a) all governmental efforts are directed at ensuring the maximum social, cultural and spiritual well-being of all people in Bougainville; and (b) all people in Bougainville enjoy rights and opportunities and access to education, health services, clean and safe water, work, decent shelter, adequate clothing and food and security.

Economic development can be described as the process through which a country or region creates economic wealth for the wellbeing of citizens (McTaggart *et al* 2003). According to participants economic development include reviving rural industries, creating employment, finding (overseas) markets for the region's agricultural produce, and establishing trade relations with countries in Southeast Asia. The preference by citizens for the above activities reflects the fact that Bougainville's economy is still predominantly agriculturally based, and more than 90 per cent of the population currently depends on the agricultural sector for its livelihood. Because there is very little economic activity in the other sectors of the economy and because of the sensitivity surrounding the resumption of mining in the region, the ABG has also identified the agricultural sector as the mainstay of its economic development strategies.

However an economy that is based predominantly on the production of primary products such as cocoa and copra cannot support or sustain the development challenges of autonomy. Such an economy is too dependent on exogenous factors and hence subject to economic and financial shocks beyond the control of the producer. Nevertheless the agricultural sector has the potential to increase rural household income levels. For this reason activities in this sector (funded by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies) have so far focused on smallholder production. At the same time the ABG is targeting the fisheries and forestry sectors as potential revenue earners for the region. One sector that has the potential to increase rural household income as well as contribute to government

revenue is the plantation sector; nevertheless Bougainvillians cannot shy away from the subject of mining. Despite the sensitivity of this sector, only a mine can finance the massive rebuilding program to bring the region's social and economic infrastructures to a level where they can 'crowd in' private investments.

7.2 Social Development

Social development is the process through which access to services such as education and health can 'transform subjects and beneficiaries into citizens by fostering an enabling, accessible, responsive, and accountable state or region' (World Bank 2006). Indeed the autonomous region of Bougainville cannot survive, nor prosper without a literate, industrious and healthy population. Moreover the provision of such services must also comply with internationally sanctioned standards of the Millennium Development Goals in terms of poverty alleviation, human rights, justice and empowerment. Sustainable living can only be achieved when the majority of the population has an acceptable quality of life (Salas 2005: 12).

Participants' views of social development revolved around access to education and health services, community development, gender equality, and creating effective partnerships to improve service delivery. The challenges to provide high quality education and health services are still enormous. Lack of basic school and curriculum materials still hamper the provision of education services while the chronic shortage of the most commonly-used drugs and other medical supplies continue to impede the delivery of an acceptable level of health service to the people, especially the rural majority. With education, participants were concerned with the increasing cost of educating their children. Except for 2006 the cost of education has been increasing every year. Although the national government contributes by paying for teacher's salaries, parents have to struggle to meet the fees required from elementary right up to University levels. Thus the ABG's 2006 school fees assistance scheme from Year 11 upwards was a welcome relief to most parents.

In contrast, participants' concerns with health were more to do with the shortage of medicines particularly at health centres, sub-centres and community health post levels, performance of health staff, rundown conditions of health infrastructure, and hence quality of service. The chronic shortage of drugs and the rundown conditions of health facilities generally depict the state of the country's health system. While increased supervision by program managers can assist in addressing staff performances, it goes back to the attitudes of staff at these health facilities; if staff do not change their attitudes, supervision can only go so far.

Nevertheless the problem for many developing countries is not just that they lack resources; resources allocated and expenditures incurred do not yield the desired outcomes at ground level. According to the World Bank (World Development Report 2004), there are four possible reasons for this ineffectiveness of the public expenditure in the social sector; misallocation of resources by the government, resources not reaching frontline service providers, a weak incentive to provide service, and the demand side-failure (the people may not avail themselves of the services provided to them). To a large extent this is a problem of awareness and participation. Although the four problems affect different parts of the service delivery chain, they can be divided into three kinds of accountability relationships; the contracts between the policy-maker and the service provider, client-power between the citizen-client and service provider, and voice relationships between the citizen-client and the policy-maker (WDR 2004: 3).

Social development will depend on the way services are delivered to the people, which the ABG aims to improve through a proposed 'lean and mean' administration, management, and organizational structure that focuses on strengthening district administration. This entails placing key technical staff in the districts to enhance district capacity as the main mechanisms for delivering goods and service to the rural majority. There is nothing too innovative about this proposal. In the pre-conflict period, district administrations were the only government institutions (besides community governments) that linked the rural population with the NSPG. Furthermore (except for the very small and isolated districts) key technical (health, education, agricultural and other) extension

staff were also domiciled in most of the districts to facilitate extension services to the people, without achieving much. Sometimes it is not the system that needs to be reviewed, rather it is the attitude of those with whom the responsibility for delivering government services and the mode of delivery that needs to be changed. Delivering service through partnership with civil society should be explored as an alternative *modus operandi* in delivering services to the rural majority.

Effective partnership (as stipulated in section 35 of the Bougainville Constitution) is important to avoid the likelihood of ‘recentralization’ at regional level. This, according to a EU conflict-prevention mission that visited Bougainville, Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2002, could be achieved by facilitating links between the village level governance structures and the autonomous government to improve the delivery of service (Gwyer 2003: 46). In other words vertical devolution of power and authority needs to be complemented by horizontal decentralization; the establishment of community – based civil society organizations that not only integrate community socioeconomic actors into the process of project development (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 255), but also the structural arrangements of local governance such as Community Development Committees (CDC) (Kayzua 2003: 6). Such structural arrangements enable citizens to make decisions on the problems that concern them most and how these might be addressed as well as involving them in all aspects of social and economic development pertinent to their wellbeing through engagement in a full range of economic, commercial and non-profit activities. Therefore improving service delivery to the rural majority will not only require a complete change of attitude by public servants, but also a ‘risk taker’ innovative approach by policy makers. One such innovative approach is to strengthen government partnership with civil society (see section 9.1.2).

7.3 Infrastructure Development

Economic and social development will also depend on the state of the region’s economic and social infrastructures, most of which were either destroyed during the conflict or left to deteriorate due to lack of maintenance resources. For participants, infrastructure

development encompassed the transport network (land, sea and air), classrooms, health facilities, and housing.

Due to the appalling conditions of the feeder roads, farmers in some parts of the region still have to carry their produce on their shoulders in order to reach the main roads. However considerable progress is being made with the generous assistance of bilateral and multilateral donors (AusAID and EU) in revitalizing the region's social and economic infrastructures. The regional trunk road network is being upgraded under the AusAID funded '*Bougainville Trunk Roads Rehabilitation Program*' while the EU, having already financed a K12 Million refurbishment of Hutjena Secondary High School on Buka Island, is also set to finance the rehabilitation of the region's feeder roads network (Gwyer 2003: 48). However much remains to be done to rehabilitate the region's social and economic infrastructure to a stage where they can facilitate economic and social development. Furthermore such bilateral and multilateral assistance are usually 'one off' and are unsustainable in the long-term unless additional resources can be secured internally to continue rehabilitating the region's social and economic infrastructure, which despite its 14th ranking in the ABG's SAP, has rightly received the largest proportion of the 2006 development budget.

The dilemma confronting the ABG in its efforts to meet the expectations of the people is that on the one hand it is required to fast-track development programs to satisfy the immediate needs of a population that had been denied basic services during the decade of civil war, while on the other it is also required to develop long-range policies that would deal with the pressing social, political, economic, and security issues that could impede development. The relatively short period in which the ABG has to satisfy the expectations of its citizens (before a referendum is held to determine Bougainville's political future between 2015 and 2020) could force the government to produce short cut measures that could in the long run be detrimental to the regions longer-term development needs. For this reason it is necessary that the government is guided as much as possible by its development strategy.

8

The Strategic Action Plan 2006-2010

In my 10 years at senior management level in the public sector, I have always maintained the simple philosophy that ‘if you fail to plan, you plan to fail’. Not only does planning allow effective allocation of scarce resources, but it also sets predetermined targets against which public sector performance can be monitored, evaluated and measured. In fact in an era characterized by dwindling government resources, planning is all the more necessary to make optimal use of the limited resources available. This point has not been lost to the ABG, which, within only five months of its installation had produced its inaugural five – year development strategy; the ABG’s Strategic Action Plan 2006-2010. This section is devoted to discussing the SAP 2006-10 in relation to its alignment with citizen priorities (see section 3.5) and whether implementing the SAP will address citizen expectations. The Strategic Action Plan:

Attempts to address priority goals identified by our leaders,.....to reduce poverty levels and help people improve their living standards,.....strive for economic prosperity and self-reliance, and encourage peace and reconciliation amongst our people’. The plan essentially sets out in priority order, policies that the ABG intends to develop and the actions that will be taken to achieve a peaceful, prosperous and autonomous Bougainville (Watawi 2005: 1).

8.1 Structure and Process

The SAP is the result of an extensive planning process that began in 2003, well before ABG’s installation. A series of planning workshops were conducted by the Planning Office involving senior officers of the Administration. Although the issues used in the production of the SAP were also the result of ‘extensive Bougainville-wide consultation’ in 2004 (SAP 2005: 13), the methods of consultation and who was involved in these consultations is not clear. However some of the issues would have been raised during the Bougainville Constitutional Commission’s (BCC) travel throughout the island to gather people’s views on the proposed Bougainville Constitution. In addition two half-day

workshops were also conducted with the newly appointed members of the BEC to brainstorm and set the goals of the SAP. The SAP has a single Mission Statement; *Together help village people improve their wellbeing through a sustainable local level approach*. It is supported by 11 goals, six strategic policies and 283 actions. The priorities in the SAP are translated into 14 major sectors in the ABG 2006 Budget (ABG 2005: 27).

8.2 Aligning Citizens Priorities with the SAP

The ABG's Strategic Action Plan 2006-2010 contains a matrix in appendix 4 (page 55) which cross-checks the links between the government's priority sectors and key sections of the Bougainville Constitution. A modified version of the matrix is reproduced below to cross-check the linkages between participants' priorities discussed on page 27 and the ABG's priority sectors. The priorities of the SAP have been used as the basis for establishing the linkages because the 14 main sectors comprise actions which were systematically assessed on the basis of five predetermined criteria approved by the BEC. That is:

- the importance of the actions in achieving the goal or goals of the SAP,
- the timeframe within which a project or policy could be implemented and the benefits realized (from 100 days to three years),
- the number of capacity or resource factors that an activity or project addresses (from a maximum of five to a minimum of two cost factors),
- the cost factors (should meet a maximum of four to a minimum of not less than two cost factors, and
- the impact of an action on economic development.¹¹

Table 8.1 summarizes the links between the two sets of priorities. Columns 1 and 2 list the priority status and description of the government's priority sectors while columns 3 and 4 list the corresponding citizen development priorities.

¹¹ See PART D 'Appendices' of the Strategic Action Plan for details of capacity and cost factors.

Table 8.1 – Linking ABG’s Priorities to Citizens’ Issues

SAP Priority		Links to Citizens	
No	Description	Issue No	Description
1	Governance *	8, 9	Improve HR, Reconciliation
2	Agriculture	1, 12	ED, Agriculture
3	Fisheries	1, 12	E.D, Agriculture
4	Forestry	1, 12	ED, Agriculture
5	Tourism	1	Economic Development
6	Manufacturing	1	Economic Development
7	Business & Commerce	1	Economic Development
8	Mining	1	Economic Development
9	Land & Environment	1, 12, 13	ED, Agriculture,
10	Health	4, 14	Health, Service Delivery
11	Education	2, 14	Education, Service Delivery
12	Community Dev.	10	Women, Partnership
13	Law & Justice	3, 9	Security, Reconciliation
14	Infrastructure	1, 5, 6	ED, Transport network

* includes administration & autonomy

According to the above table, the two sets of priorities are not incompatible. In fact in terms of coverage (that is, the identified sectors), the ABG’s Strategic Action Plan adequately reflects citizen aspirations. However some divergence is evident in the order of priority. For example, the closest alignment of the ABG’s priority sector 1 (governance/administration/autonomy) is with improving HR and continuing with peace and reconciliation ceremonies which citizens prioritized as 8 and 9 respectively.

Nevertheless the implementation of sectors relating to economic development (citizen's priority 1); agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism, business and commerce, mining, land and environment (priority 2-9), would require the 'draw down' of relevant powers from the GoPNG, thus the importance of governance/administration/autonomy as a priority. Furthermore the government's priority sectors 2 – 9 are not only aligned with, but are also essential in achieving the citizens' most important priority issue of economic development. In the SAP, health, education, community development, and law & justice are listed as priority 10, 11, 12, and 13 respectively, which contrasts with citizens' prioritization of 4, 2, 11 and 3.

Another divergence area is between the SAP listing of infrastructure as priority 14 as opposed to citizens' opinion of this sector as priority 5 (infrastructure) and 6 (transport network). Because of the importance of infrastructure and transport in the achievement of the ABG's broad goals, one would be more inclined to agree with the citizens' listing of these sectors. For example the region's transport network (land, sea and air) would require major improvement while economic and social infrastructures which were destroyed during the conflict must be rehabilitated to achieve the necessary 'crowding in' of investment in the ABG's economic sectors of fisheries, forestry, tourism, mining, manufacturing and business and commerce.

However the greatest divergence is perhaps in the law and justice sector, not only in its prioritization, but also in the meanings attached to law and justice both by the government and citizens. In fact the difference in prioritization basically reflects the different interpretation attached to the sector by both parties. While the law and justice sector is described in the SAP in terms of the activities (community policing, Bougainville police services and border surveillance), participants were more concerned with its outcomes (the instability created by the presence of the *Mekamui* and *UV-Stract*) as threats to the peace process and ultimately the ABG's existence. Surprisingly the security concerns of citizens are not seen in the same light because specific threats to the peace process posed by groups such as *Mekamui* is not mentioned at all in the programs under governance and autonomy. Either this was an inadvertent oversight or intentional

omission to avoid inflaming the situation while dialogue is being established. Nevertheless it could be said that there is sufficient alignment (between the two sets of priorities) to suggest that implementing the ABG's Strategic Action Plan 2006-10 would (to some extent) meet citizen development aspirations.

9

Conclusion

This paper maintains that political autonomy increases citizen expectations with regard to the government's ability to address the problems facing the people. Although this may not be universally applicable in peace and post-conflict situations, a study of the impact of the installation of the ABG as a post-conflict governance structure corroborates the theory. For example the majority of Bougainvillians (57%) now see the ABG as the government that will eventually address the social, economic, and political issues that resulted in two UDIs, not only in terms of the people's social and economic advancement, but also in moving Bougainville towards self-determination. This is especially true after the additional powers available to the ABG were well publicized.

However, between regions and within different population units of the regions, not all Bougainvillians regard the ABG as the answer to all their problems. In the north (in particular Buka) where most governmental activities seem to be taking place, expectations are higher compared to the central and southern regions. With regard to gender, women's expectations were also higher than their male colleagues. However political autonomy seem to have had very little or no impact on the region's youth (15-29 age-groups) both in terms of their perceptions and expectations compared to the older age-groups (35+), which were high. This in turn reflects the different pre-conflict experiences of these age-groups (see section 3.4.3).

For the 43 per cent of participants with moderate or low expectations, the administrative, institutional and financial constraints faced by the ABG, the security and safety situation on the island, and lack of development were the main mitigating factors. In fact these issues were prominent not only as factors which influenced citizen expectations and as impediments to government capacity (see sections 4, 5, & 6), but also as priority issues that ought to be addressed to bring about development. The development issues prioritized by participants also represent citizens' increasing awareness not only of the

concept of development (as a process that involves progression from one plane to another, higher plane through economic development, improved infrastructure and access to services), but also of their rights as citizens, to progress to a higher plane, and the government's responsibility to address these rights. However the ABG's ability to meet citizen expectations would ultimately be determined by its administrative and institutional capacities, financial resources and the security situation on the island.

Thus while the euphoria of inaugurating Bougainville's first autonomous government is well and truly over, the difficult task of governing the affairs of the region and providing public goods and services to its citizens have only begun. As alluded to by the President during his inauguration (in which he compared ABG to a newly born baby that would need to be nursed and nurtured to ensure that it grows up to be a healthy human being),¹² the task will not be easy. This baby will need to be properly housed, given the right kind of food, taken to a clinic and hospital when illness strikes, educated in a reasonably well-equipped school and institution of higher learning, trained and finally injected back into a workforce that would hopefully be able to absorb a young and energetic human being who is ready to contribute to his/her own social and economic advancement. Unfortunately none of these basic needs are free. Nonetheless these are not only considered essential to the future progress of any nation but are also an accurate list of 'goods and services' that citizens would generally expect of their government.

Although political autonomy offers a golden opportunity to make a fresh start in addressing citizen expectations, it also brings with it new challenges that will need to be overcome if the government is to effectively meet citizen expectations for social and economic advancement. Not only are the problems and challenges facing the ABG much greater than those faced by the then NSPG, but they are also more complex. For a government coming out of a post-conflict situation and virtually starting from scratch, it will take 20 years just to rebuild its capacities and probably longer for its development policies to make an impact on the people's quality of life.

¹² PNG Post Courier, Wednesday 15 June 2005.

In the meantime there is a need to address the pressing challenges of political autonomy, such as consolidating peace and stability and reviving the economy. This is because on the one hand, peace and stability is an essential ingredient for economic growth while on the other, only persistent economic growth will sustain peace and stability in the region. Without peace and stability, no meaningful development can take place. As the President rightly acknowledges:

The ABG has enormous task not only to revitalize its infrastructure and basic services, but also to respond to other demands and challenges that have emerged out of the 15 years of civil war. This in itself has placed the ABG in a most difficult and complex situation which has the potential to make ABG redundant if we are not collectively united and determined to take on these responsibilities. (Kabui 2005: 6).

However in spite of the obvious challenges, there are prospects for peace and sustainable development because there is a high level of political will to acknowledge these challenges and to face them head on. Furthermore, there is an equally high level of optimism among the majority of Bougainvillians that, (having experienced the worse during the conflict), the situation can only improve. Moreover the level of sympathy shown (by those who believe that it is too early to expect too much, too soon from the government) further suggest that Bougainvillians also appreciate the enormity of the task ahead and are prepared to give the government as much time as possible to build up its capacity.

Nevertheless the greatest prospect for sustainable peace and development is probably in the knowledge that political autonomy is only a prelude to resolving the question of Bougainville's political future. Bougainvillians only have between now and the planned referendum to make political autonomy work. Having contributed in shaping PNG's political landscape since the 1960s, Bougainvillians would need to invoke what Robson (1994) described as an inherent Bougainvillian characteristic to lead to prove to political skeptics that Bougainville can rise above its latest challenges, and presumably having learnt from its past mistakes can again become a role model for the rest of the country. Thus, having hitherto discussed the constraints on the capacity of the ABG in sections 4,

5, and 6, it is only prudent that this paper also offers some strategies to meet these challenges, namely; strengthening governance and administration, improving service delivery, increasing ABG's finances, consolidating peace and stability, and reviving the economy. The following strategies are not presented in any pre-determined order. Nevertheless strengthening governance and administration through the establishment of the Bougainville Public Service is considered paramount not only to the draw down of additional powers from the GoPNG, but also in implementing the rest of the strategies.

9.1 Strengthening Governance & Administration

The strategies discussed to enhance governance and administration represents a departure from the commonly held view that the creation of the Bougainville Public Service (and the draw down of powers) should be contingent upon the ABG's financial capacity. While finance is an important factor in deciding when to undertake such an exercise, it should not be the sole determinant. The amount of information available to citizens regarding the additional powers, and their demand for the impact of political autonomy in their every day lives should also be factored into any timeframe for such draw downs. Only when a sub-national government is being supported by a sub-national public service can the process of drawing down of powers relating to income-generating sectors such as mining, fisheries, forestry and tourism be undertaken to diversify the ABG's internal revenue base, increase financial capacities, and more effectively address the problems facing Bougainvillians. To facilitate this objective, sections 138, 140, 142 and 146 of the constitution should be invoked in relation to the Bougainville Public Service. The first step is to fast-track the establishment of the Bougainville Public Service Commission whose immediate task would be to help facilitate the enactment of a Bougainville Public Service Act and the production of the Bougainville General Orders. This should not be too difficult because the PNG Public Service Act and General Orders are already available as a guide.

This should be followed by the establishment of the various departments of the Bougainville Public Service. This can be done either by re-designating current

administrative divisions into fully-pledged departments or by creating super departments through amalgamation and mergers. Ideally re-designating current divisions would be more appropriate because it not only retains the same operational structure, but recognizes incumbent officers by giving them the opportunity to prove their worth at this level. However this is also the most costly procedure. A more cost-effective alternative would be to create super departments by amalgamating existing cost centres.

The third step in the process is to appoint the head of the Bougainville Public Service in accordance with the Bougainville Constitution (Section 147), either by re-designating the title of the current *Administrator* to Chief Secretary or another more appropriate title, or making a completely new appointment. As mentioned earlier the position of administrator is a legacy of the OLPG & LLG 1995 which technically became redundant at the inauguration of the ABG. Departments or super departmental heads should then be appointed through the appropriate selection process based on position specifications. The creation of super departments will only be a cost-containment measure; as funding improves, they would be dismantled allowing smaller, more manageable departments to be revived along the lines of existing divisions to improve service delivery.

9.2 Improving Service Delivery

Service delivery can also be improved by strengthening existing partnerships as well as by encouraging new ones. Bougainville has a unique system of local level governments, the Council of Elders (COE), which basically tries to blend both formal and informal decision-making. If properly structured and resourced COEs have the potential to become an effective mechanism for bringing services to the people, as they are much closer to the rural majority than district administration. Creating effective partnerships between the ABG and the COE has the potential to improve accessibility of services by the rural majority.

Secondly, existing partnerships between the Churches and the government could be strengthened. The three mainline Christian Churches (Catholic, United and the Seventh

Day Adventist) have been providing essential basic education and health services in the region since the early 1900s (Griffin 1990: 6). This partnership could be taken to the next level especially in the delivery of basic health services. Under such partnerships, the coordination and delivery of primary and secondary health service (up to health centre levels) could be given to the churches. Such an arrangement would limit the role of the ABG in this sector to the overall responsibility for regional health policies, management of secondary and tertiary health services from district hospital level upwards and the regulation of health standards. Contracting (or outsourcing) transfers the management and provision of a public service from the public provider (in this case the ABG) to a private provider (the churches). In this arrangement the churches would assume the responsibility under a contract or agreement to provide a specific level and quantity of service for a fee. Despite differing levels of success, contracting is supported by proponents of the new public management as one of the alternative ways of delivering services (Minogue 1997: 27; Kettl 1997: 446). Because church health facilities are usually part of bigger church establishments under the management of the parish or circuits, outsourcing will address the problems relating to poor staff performance by improving onsite supervision.

Thirdly, effective partnerships should also be established between Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in terms of advocacy and awareness on HIV/AIDS and gender related issues. At the same time partnership with consultants could be useful in the area of development research that can be used to formulate policies on matters concerning the wellbeing of the people. While proper cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses would need to be conducted to determine the feasibility of delivering services through partnerships, such an approach could complement the ABG administration's proposed lean and mean administration, management and organizational structure. As 'consultancy services' is already an appropriated activity under the normal budgetary process, utilizing private consultants to provide objective feedback on specific development issues would improve the quality of planning and hence government decision-making.

9.3 Increasing ABG's Finances

With regard to improving ABG's finances, there is no 'quick fix' solution to the financial constraints that the government currently experiences. Nevertheless there are two strategies immediately available to the government. The first is an ongoing need to exercise tight fiscal control by monitoring expenditure. The second strategy is to improve the government's revenue collection efforts by diversifying the region's revenue base so that more of the ABG's budget can be financed from revenues collected within Bougainville. With regard to the first strategy one also needs to be cautious about using expenditure control to address what is really a chronic funds shortage. Efforts to maintain tight fiscal control can also result in either the withholding or late disbursement of funds for essential services such as health and education thereby further disadvantaging the most vulnerable in the community. Improving the government's internal revenue base will also depend on the extent to which Bougainville's economy is revitalized and developed in the next ten years. Immediately however, the government could consider imposing an annual 'restoration' levy on every adult Bougainvillian to assist finance infrastructure development at COE level. Although the proceeds would be recorded as consolidated revenue, this money would be used by COEs to rebuild or improve infrastructure in their areas. That is, the annual 'restoration' levy would be collected by the COEs, remitted to the ABG consolidated revenue account, and reimbursed as part of quarterly grants to COEs. Not only must Bougainvillians be made to contribute to the cost of development right from the outset, but they must also contribute in rebuilding what they destroyed during the conflict.

9.4 Consolidating Peace & Stability

The difficulty in addressing security and safety is that it is not a normal law and order problem. The issues of law and order are to a large extent, related to the claims by the *Mekamui* and *UV-Stract* factions not only as alternative, but also as co-governments with the ABG, and the number of (both legal and illegal) weapons that are still in Bougainville.

Despite claims by the *Mekamui* and *UV-Stract* factions of popular support as alternative governments, the people of Bougainville have made their choice through the democratic process in the 2005 elections, preferring peace and development to conflict. Furthermore any attempt by these organizations to overthrow a democratically elected government would probably fail and (even if successful) will only be short-lived because ‘you cannot fool all of the people, all of the time’. With regard to the number of weapons in Bougainville, the Bougainville Police Service is the sole ABG instrumentality that can acquire and possess weapons under the PNG and ARB Constitutions. However the ABG also has access to the former BRA and BRF weapons currently being held in designated locations throughout the island (since both organizations are now part of the ABG). The fact that illegal organizations such as *Mekamui* and *UV-Stract* also possess weapons is a likely recipe for a three-pronged conflict which would be more catastrophic than the previous one. This is especially true when ex-combatants have been pressurizing the ABG for approval to ‘flush out’ Musingku and his followers.

Nevertheless the ABG is the only legally constituted government in Bougainville and those outside of this framework must be considered as mere splinter groups that must somehow eventually be brought into the mainstream. This necessitates the return to tried and tested strategies and the social capital investments of the initial period of the peace process to break the current impasse and avoid confrontation. Dialogue with these organizations must be established from the bottom-up with families, clans, traditional chiefs, COEs, community-based civil society organizations (churches and women) and finally the ABG.

Firstly, the family is the basic unit of existence in every society, which sometimes determines what becomes of siblings. Every ‘soldier’ of the MDF has parents or guardians who are aware of the activities of these young men. It is time for the parents, guardians and elder siblings in the family to talk to their younger brothers manning the illegal road blocks. The time for fighting is over, not only is there no enemy to fight (unless you regard your own people who just happen to have a different opinion as ‘the

enemy'), but there is nothing to fight for when the primary objective of the struggle (independence), can be achieved under the ABG.

Secondly, at the height of the conflict and in the anarchy that followed the withdrawal of government authority, the traditional authority which had always existed (but which up until then had been subsumed by Western systems) was the only authority that could fill the vacuum left by the crumbling formal system and bring some order out of chaos. The authority of the chiefs was recognized even by hardened combatants (BRA and BRF). Although controversial at times, the chiefs nevertheless played an important role in the peace process. With their recognition by the ABG, the COEs should be playing a more active role in bringing an end to the present impasse. Thirdly, women both as individuals and as a body corporate were instrumental in bringing peace to Bougainville with basically nothing by way of resources. Now that they are better-organized and resourced, they should be doing even more to establish dialogue with these organizations. With *UV-Stract* many women are also investors who have lost savings in this failed scheme. Revealing Musingku for what he is, and telling him to stop misleading the people is better than supporting him by remaining silent.

Fourthly, Bougainvillians are predominantly Christians, and thus the Churches also played a key role in the peace process (not to mention their earlier support for secession and independence). When Bougainville was on the brink of total destruction the people turned to the churches for guidance and prayers. Now that relative peace has been achieved, the churches have preferred an arms-length approach to the current impasse when they should be more active in talking to the *Mekamui* faction and denouncing *UV-Stract* for deliberately misinterpreting the Bible to support an illegal money scheme. Finally, unlike the NSPG whose 23 members represented large constituencies both in terms of geographical area and number of voters, current MHRs represent relatively small constituencies and fewer voters. They are therefore much closer to their voters (some of whom are members of the opposing factions) and should take a more active role in talking to the people on the other side of the political divide because the success of the ABG in bringing development to its citizens depends to an extent on how it resolves the

impasse. The resolution of the current impasse is important in achieving sustainable peace, a pre-requisite for economic and social development.

9.5 Reviving the Economy

Although development economists have not been able to agree on any institutional theory of economic development that is tailor-made for developing countries or regions (Amin 1999; Moore 2000) the Lewis-Ranis-Fei (LRF) or surplus labour economic growth model (Fei and Ranis 1997) is said to be applicable to developing countries where surplus low-skilled labour (a key ingredient) is already in abundance. This model is also compatible with the ABG's emphasis on the agriculture sector as the mainstay of its economic development strategy. Bilateral and multilateral donors are already investing in revitalizing smallholder production in the agriculture sector within the framework of post-conflict rehabilitation because of the fact that economic progress will be necessary to secure the revenue needed for the redevelopment of social services and the island's infrastructure (Gwyer 2003: 47). However despite the importance of the plantation sector in the ABG's emphasis on an agriculturally-based economic development strategy, there has been very little discussion on the region's plantations to date.

Not only was Bougainville the largest producer of cocoa and coconut products prior to the conflict, but it is also home to some of the largest plantations in the southern hemisphere, which the government can focus on, to kick start the economic 'take-off' for further economic and social development in Bougainville. A policy on this sector should be formulated setting forth guidelines pertinent to the redevelopment of the plantation industry including the issue of ownership. The return of these plantations to the traditional landowners is arguably the majority view at present. Whether the traditional landowners are capable of managing these important economic assets in a way that ensures maximum economic benefits (both to themselves and the government) should also be considered. Another issue is that of capital; most if not all of these plantations are completely run down and would require considerable capital investments to bring them to the stage where they can produce and export quality primary products. Returning these

plantations to the traditional landowners will however require a drastic improvement in the level of agricultural extension services currently available to farmers under the Cocoa and Coconut Extension Agency (CCEA). Thus it may be necessary to allow the legal owners to return and finance the redevelopment while a policy on the industry is being formulated. Thereafter further involvement of the legal owners could be negotiated as part of the new policy on this sector. Simultaneously, however discussions should also begin on the possibility of either re-opening the Panguna Mine or starting a new one elsewhere in the region because only a mine can help finance the massive redevelopment required to bring Bougainville to its pre-conflict development status.

However achieving sustainable peace and economic development will require a paradigm shift, not only with regard to the government's approach to development, but also its interaction with citizens. If anything, the decade-long conflict should have taught us that maintaining the status quo can no longer be trusted to achieve the broad goal of improving the people's wellbeing. The fact that a localized grievance by Panguna Landowners for increased land and environmental compensation was able to gain widespread support for secession and independence in 1989, although attributed to a host of ethno-cultural, social, economic and political factors (Oliver 1991; Claxton 1998; Filer 1992; Lawson 1992; Regan 1998; Regan 2002), can in a way be blamed on the failure of past policies to meet citizen expectations. Despite the former NSPG's reputation as one of the best managed provinces in the country, the development benefits of this prudent management were not equitably distributed among the people. This, in turn reflected the processes, procedures and systems under which such policies were implemented, which may require reconfiguration.

Finally, this study has also highlighted the need to more regularly engage citizens as effective partners in the development process by getting them to decide on the issues that affect them most, and the manner in which the government ought to address these issues. Government interaction with citizens will need to be more frequent and systematic rather than ad-hoc. This can be achieved by either strengthening the research function of the ABG's planning department or by establishing a 'think tank' or Bougainville Research

Institute (BRI) to periodically gauge citizens' opinion on issues pertinent to their wellbeing, after all, it is the citizens as consumers of public goods and services who would ultimately either benefit or suffer from the positive or negative impacts of development policies, programs, projects or actions. Although such research would be ongoing, one of the main tasks of either body will be to conduct a more wide ranging follow-up study in 2010 to determine the changes in citizen expectation levels as well as the issues that citizen consider important in improving their wellbeing. Such a study would coincide not only with the end of the region's first autonomous government, but also its inaugural five year development strategy (SAP 2006-10).

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Appendix A: Bougainville – An Overview

Bougainville's recorded history dates back to August 25, 1767 when the British ship *Swallow* under the command of Captain Philip Carteret passed within sight of Buka Island. Less than a year later on July 4, 1768 the French explorer Louise de Bougainville sailed along the eastern coast of the island that now bears his name, anchoring briefly at Buka (see Map 1 & 2). Over the next 100 years Europeans made infrequent and sporadic visits to the islands as explorers, traders and whalers, sometimes meeting with stiff and ferocious opposition. In the 1800s, Bougainvillians were recruited as plantation workers in Queensland, Fiji, Samoa, and New Britain in what is known as 'black birding'. However Bougainville remained outside of formal colonization until 1899 when it was added to the German controlled north east New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago through an exchange of diplomatic notes between Great Britain and Germany, severing the prehistoric, cultural and ethnic links between Bougainville and the Shortlands, Choiseul, and Isabel islands of the Solomon Islands.

The seed of Bougainville's antipathy towards central authority was first sown in 1962 when members of the Hahalis Welfare Society on Buka Island clashed with the colonial government over the payment of council taxes. In the same year a UN visiting mission to Bougainville was asked during a meeting in Kieta to transfer Bougainville from Australia to the USA. Six years later in 1968, Australia rejected a demand for a referendum to decide Bougainville's future within an independent Papua New Guinea. In 1975 a disagreement with the pre-independence PNG Government over the sharing of financial resources from the Panguna Copper Mine resulted in the first unilateral declaration of independence on 1 September 1975 (resulting in the inclusion of the OLPG in the PNG Constitution).

In 1989 a demand for increased land and environmental compensation by landowners of the giant Bougainville Copper Mine in Panguna acted as the catalyst in re-igniting secessionist sentiments, turning a localized landowner grievance into a province-wide struggle for independence. The deployment of the PNGDF to flush out the rebels only exacerbated the situation into a full scale civil war between pro-PNG BRG and the BRA that lasted a decade. After 26 agreements (between Bougainvillians and between Bougainville and PNG), the Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed on 30 August 2001 in Arawa paving the way for the establishment of an autonomous Bougainville government. On June 15 2005, after an internationally observed election, Bougainville's first autonomous government (ABG) was inaugurated on Buka Island. Because of the additional powers available to the ABG under the autonomous arrangements, and the fact that the present arrangement is a prelude to possible independence, expectations are high for the ABG to implement the peace agreement, improve the economy, rehabilitate the island's infrastructures and restore vital services in preparation for the referendum to decide Bougainville's political future between 2015 and 2020.

Appendix B: ABG's Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure FY 2004 - 2006

National Government (GOPNG) Grants	2004	2005	(+/-)		2006	(+/-)	
	Appro K'000	Appro K'000	Amount	%	Est. K'000	Amount	%
Recurrent Unconditional Grant (RUCG)					38789		
Block Grant	4332.1	6935.4	-2603.3	-60.09			
Staffing Grant (ABG)	4000	4120	-120	-3			
Staffing Grant (GOPNG)	3000	3090	-90	-3			
Teaching Services Commission	16531	16651	-120.6	-0.73			
Public Servants Leave Fares	210.3	210.3	0	0			
Teacher's Leave Fares	718.6	718.6	0	0			
Village Courts Grants	0	176.5	-176.5	0			
Establishment Grants	5000	5000	0	0			
Police Grants	0	0	0	0	2000	-2000	0
Conditional Grant (Retrenchment)		1600	-1600	0	1600	0	0
Derivation Grant	443.4	610.3	-166.9	-37.64			
Rural Local Government Grant	434.4	484.4	-50	-11.51			
Town Services Grant	330.1	367.5	-37.4	-11.33			
Total Recurrent Grant	34999	39964	-4964.7	-14.19	42389	-2425	-6.068
Restoration & Development Grant							
Public Investment Program	500	5000	-4500	-900	10000	-5000	-100
District Support Grant	1000	1000	0	0	1000	0	0
Total Restoration & Development Grant	1500	6000	-4500	-300	11000	-5000	-83.33
Total National (GOPNG) Grants	36499	45964	-9464.7	-314.2	53389	-7425	-89.4
ABG Internal Revenue							
Share of GST	720	900	-180	-25	2500	-1600	-177.8
Motor Vehicle Registration	80	100	-20	-25	100	0	0
Liquor Licensing Fees		140	10	6.667	140	0	0
Draw Down Funds	4365	0	4365	100	4000	-4000	0
Balance of 2005 C/FWD	0	0	0	0	2932	-2932	0
Bougainville Group Tax	0		0	0	10000	-10000	0
Sundry Revenue	150	60	90	60	60	0	0
Total ABG Internal Revenue	5465	1200	4265	116.7	19732	-18532	-1544
Estimated Donor Funding	40479	21690	18789	46.42	25276	-3586.3	-16.53
Total Revenue (All Sources)	82443	68854	13589	-151.1	98397	-29543	-1650

Source: Autonomous Bougainville Government Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the Year ending

Appendix C: Research Questions

Part 1 – Personal Details

1. Gender: Male Female
2. What region of Bougainville do you come from?
 North Central South
3. Which age group best describes you?
 15 – 24 years
 25 – 34
 35 – 44
 45 – 54
 55 +
4. Are you
 Employed in the public sector?
 Employed in the private sector?
 A Business person?
 Member of parliament?
 Subsistence dweller?

Part 2 – Questions on citizen perceptions & expectations (members of the public)

The questions in this section is to find out whether the installation of the Autonomous Bougainville Government has changed your perceptions on the role of government and what (if any) you think that the ABG should do to improve your life in your status as citizen.

Question 1

- A. Is your perception in terms of the role of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, high, medium, or low?

High	Medium	Low

- B. What specific events prompted your change in perception? *(Please comment)*

Question 2

- A. Is your expectation in terms of the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, high, medium, or low?

High	Medium	Low

- B. What specific events prompted your change of expectations? *(Please comment)*

- Question 3 What would you consider as the government’s priority in terms of addressing the immediate and long term expectations of the people? *(Please comment)*

Question 4

A. In your opinion, to what extent does the ABG has the ability to meet the people's expectations?

A lot	Sufficient	Some	Not a lot	None

B. If your answer to the above question is other than 'a lot', why do you think ABG does not have a high level of capacity to meet the people's expectations? (*Please comment*)

Question 5 If you would like to make any additional comments, please do so.

Part 3 – Questions to assess government capacity (members of parliament)

The questions in this section is to find out whether the installation of Autonomous Bougainville Government has changed your perceptions on your role as MPs and the capacity (if any) of the government as the provider of public goods and services to improve the welfare of the majority of Bougainvillians.

Question 1

- A. Is your perception in terms of the ability of ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, high, medium, or low?

High	Medium	Low

- B. What specific events prompted your change in perception? *(Please comment)*

Question 2

- A. Is your expectation in terms of the ability of ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, high, medium, or low?

High	Medium	Low

- B. What specific events prompted your change in expectation? *(Please comment)*

- Question 3 What would you consider as the government’s priority in terms of addressing the immediate and long term expectations of the people? *(Please comment)*

Question 4

A. In your opinion, to what extent does the ABG has the ability to meet the peoples expectations?

A lot	Sufficient	Some	Not a lot	None

B. If your answer to the above question is other than 'a lot', why do you think ABG does not have a high level of capacity to meet the people's expectations? (*Please comment*)

Question 5 If you would like to make any additional comments, please do so.

Part 4 – Questions for members of civil society)

The questions in this section is to establish whether the installation of the Autonomous Bougainville Government has changed your perceptions on the role of government and what (if any) you think that the ABG should do to improve your life in your status as citizen and your role(if any) as a member of civil society.

Question 1

A. Is your perception in terms of the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, high, medium, or low?

High	Medium	Low

B. What specific events prompted your change of perception? *(Please comment)*

Question 2

A. Is your expectation in terms of the ability of the ABG to address the problems facing Bougainvillians, high, medium, or low?

High	Medium	Low

B. What specific events prompted your change of expectations? *(Please comment)*

Question 3 What would you consider as the government’s priority in terms of addressing the immediate and long term expectations of the people? *(Please comment)*

Question 4

A. In your opinion, to what extent does the ABG has the ability to meet the people's expectations?

A lot	Sufficient	Some	Not a lot	None

B. If your answer to the above question is other than 'a lot', why do you think ABG does not have a high level of capacity to meet the people's expectations? *(Please comment)*

Question 5 What (if any) do you think your role is, in this development process? *(Please comment)*

Question 6 If you would like to make any additional comments, please do so.
